essay about telling truth

• Why Truthtelling Is Important

Besides emulating the character of God, truthtelling is critical for a flourishing society. Therefore, except in rare circumstances, God mandates it. Though God’s command would be a sufficient motivation, theologians and philosophers have identified other reasons as well.

• Authentic Communication Requires Truthtelling

Truthtelling is essential for authentic communication to occur, and makes genuine interaction between people possible. That is, if truth were not expected, it would not be long before communication would entirely break down. Imagine what it would be like living in a society in which no one expected the truth. How could a person discern what is accurate and what is a falsehood? On what basis could a person make important decisions if there was no expectation of the truth? Life would be chaotic without the norm of honesty.

This is essentially the view of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, and the principle of universalizability of truthtelling (though he would not support the notion given here that there are exceptions to the universal norm). Kant argued that this principle was the test of a valid moral principle, and used truthtelling as one of his primary illustrations. He insisted that for a norm to be legitimate, it must be universalizable—applicable to everyone. One of his illustrations envisioned what might happen if no one accepted the norm in question. He correctly argued that without a universal norm of truthtelling, the basis for communication would be in jeopardy, and a society in which this was not a norm would not be functional. [1] This is recognized by the fact that virtually every civilization has some kind of norm that promotes truthtelling and prohibits deception. [2]

• Trust and Cooperation Require Truthtelling

Truthtelling builds trust and civil cooperation among human beings. Trust is critical for a prosperous society, and being a person of one’s word establishes trust and trustworthiness. [1] The Mosaic Law underscored this in Deuteronomy 25:15, connecting honest dealings with Israel’s prosperity in the land. “You shall have only a full and honest weight; you shall have only a full and honest measure, so that your days may be long in the land that the Lord your God is giving you” (also see Leviticus 19:36). Similarly Proverbs brings out the connection between trustworthiness and social harmony. Proverbs 3:29 emphasizes that trust among neighbors is what enables them to live in peace, not fearing harm from one’s neighbor. Further, Proverbs emphasize that trustworthiness brings healing to both relationships and communities (Prov. 13:17, 25:13). Adam Smith was very clear that honest dealings and trustworthiness were critical for a properly functioning market system. Cultures that are given to corruption are often in the most impoverished parts of the world, since it is more difficult and risky to do business in cultures in which the level of trust is low. Similarly, companies in which there is a culture of distrust typically have higher costs of doing business, since they require costly regimens of oversight. They also have intangible costs, as employees tend to be more reluctant to “go the extra mile” for their employer and tend to be less eager to embrace change and less committed to their work.

• Human Dignity Requires Truthtelling

Truthtelling treats people with dignity. To tell someone the truth is a measure of respect that is missing when someone is lied to.

The Scriptures illustrate this with the Genesis account of Jacob and his service to Laban (Genesis 29-30). Jacob works seven years for the right to marry Rachel and after the years of service are complete, Laban deceives Jacob and substitutes his less desirable daughter Leah as Jacob’s bride. Jacob is justifiably outraged at being deceived and treated with such disrespect (Gen. 29:25). Jacob returns the disrespect to Laban in Genesis 30 when he deceives Laban with respect to the flocks that Jacob is tending for Laban, separating out the stronger flocks for himself and leaving the weaker ones for Laban (Gen. 30:42).

Similarly in 2 Kings 12, when it came to the money for the repair of the temple, there were certain workmen who were so trustworthy that the overseers of the repairs did not need an accounting of the money they spent for the repairs. Because they were honest, they were treated with dignity and trust by the king and by the priests in charge of temple repair (also 2 Kings 22:7). This is also borne out by the proverb that warns a person, “Well meant are the wounds a friend inflicts, but profuse are the kisses of an enemy” (Proverbs 27:6). The enemy who multiplies kisses is the one who showers a person with false flattery, deceiving the person into the illusion of friendship and trust, when in reality, he is the enemy. Here, deception treats the person being deceived as a pawn to be manipulated for the deceiver’s own selfish purposes, not as someone with dignity who is deserving of respect. Disrespect also comes through in, “A lying tongue hates its victims; and a flattering mouth works ruin” (Prov. 26:28; also Prov. 26:18-19, 24, 26).

The right of a person to make his or her own autonomous decisions is based on having accurate information, so much so that people often and understandably feel violated and disrespected when they are deceived. A person’s autonomy is weakened when they are deceived. This is evident in the example of Jacob and Laban. Jacob’s autonomy to marry the woman of his choice was completely undermined by Laban’s deception, since Jacob would never have married Leah if left entirely to his own choice (Genesis 29:17-20). It is further evident in Jacob’s reciprocal deception of Laban, since Laban would not have managed the flocks to his obvious financial disadvantage had he not been deceived so effectively by Jacob (Gen. 30:42-43).

Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals , tr. James W. Ellington, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1993, original, 1785), 30-36. See also, Kant’s essay, “On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Altruistic Motives,” ibid.

See C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: Macmillan, 1943). See especially the appendix for a listing of the virtues in common to most of the world’s major civilizations. There are rare exceptions to this—a few cultures hold treachery and deceit as virtues. See for example, Don Richardson, Peace Child: An Unforgettable Story of Primitive Jungle Treachery , 4th edition (Ventura, California: Regal, 2005).

For more on this, see Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1995).

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Table of Contents

• Truthtelling in the Bible
• Truthtelling is the Norm in the Bible
• Exceptions to Truthtelling in the Bible
• Truthtelling in the Workplace
• Financial Statements Must Tell the Truth
• There May Be Exceptions to Truthtelling in the Workplace
• Puffery/Exaggeration
• When Someone Has No Right to the Truth
• Deception to Obtain Information You Have a Right to Know
• Information You Have No Right to Know
• Social Implications of Protecting Information Others Have No Right to Know
• Conclusions About Truth & Deception
• Key Biblical Texts on Truth & Deception

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Why is truth-telling so important? Our research shows meaningful reconciliation cannot occur without it

Research Associate, Deakin University

Professor of Race Relations, Deakin University

Disclosure statement

Vanessa Barolsky received funding to conduct research on community truth-telling from Reconciliation Australia, Deakin University and the Centre for Inclusive and Resilient Societies.

Yin Paradies receives funding to conduct research on community truth-telling from Reconciliation Australia, Deakin University and the Centre for Inclusive and Resilient Societies.

Deakin University provides funding as a member of The Conversation AU.

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This article mentions ongoing colonial violence towards Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, and contains references that feature antiquated language.

Truth-telling is a key demand in the Uluru Statement and is seen as a vital step for both the Voice to Parliament and a Treaty. However, there has been ongoing debate as to whether historical injustices against First Nations peoples need to be addressed today.

Wiradjuri and Wailwan lawyer Teela Reid posed a question in a 2020 essay, is Australia ready to Gari Yala (speak truth) and reckon with its past?

We recently conducted a study to investigate this question by looking at First Nations community truth-telling practices. Our study found these communities have shown significant leadership in truth-telling, often without resources or support. Importantly, they have invited non-Indigenous people to also take part in truth-telling.

Truth-telling can take the form of memorial and commemorative events, repatriation of remains and cultural artefacts, the renaming of places, and the creation of public artworks and healing sites. A recent example is the Yoorrook Justice Commission’s truth-telling commission. Yoorrook released the truth-telling report this week, providing 46 recommendations for reforms into Victoria’s justice and child protection systems.

We found when non-Indigenous people participated in truth-telling with First Nations communities, it helped build a deeper shared understanding of the past and the achievements of First Nations peoples. This is why truth-telling is a collective social responsibility and non-Indigenous Australians are crucial participants.

But there is still much work to do. Many important historical events and First Nations achievements remain largely unrecognised. Sustained funding and support and the recognition of Australia’s difficult historical truths are crucial.

Read more: First Nations people have made a plea for 'truth-telling'. By reckoning with its past, Australia can finally help improve our future

Our research findings

Our research focused on documenting community truth-telling that reclaimed First Nations sovereignty and self-determination, as well as recognising colonial violence. We did in-depth investigations through 25 case studies, including ten in which we held yarning interviews with community organisers. These interviews helped shed new light on rich and diverse ways to engage with the truths of colonial history.

In the MacArthur region of New South Wales, reconciliation group Winga Myamly worked to make sure the 1816 Appin massacre on Dharawal Country is recognised and commemorated annually .

In the massacre, at least 14 (likely more) Aboriginal men, women and children were killed by members of a British Army regiment. The regiment chased the group to nearby cliffs at Cataract Gorge where many jumped to their deaths.

The 2019 commemoration brought together Dharawal Elder Aunty Glenda Chalker, a descendent of Giribunger, one of the survivors of the massacre, and Sandy Hamilton, descended from Stephen Partridge, who served with the regiment that carried out the attack.

In Portland, Victoria, a towering gum leaf sculpture, Mayapa Weeyn (meaning “make fire”) was erected near the site of the Convincing Ground massacre . This is where between 20 and 200 members of the Kilcarer Gunditj clan were killed by British whalers.

The sculpture recognises all 59 Gunditjmara clans, many of whom were killed during the Eumeralla Wars that followed the Convincing Ground massacre. Gunditjmara Elder Walter Saunders, who designed the sculpture, spent two years building it and talking with local residents in an informal process of truth-telling.

In Tasmania, the Mannalargenna Day Festival commemorates Pairrebeenne/Trawlwoolway leader Mannalargenna. Mannalargenna tried to negotiate to save the lives of Aboriginal people in Tasmania who had been devastated by the Black War during the 1830s.

Our study found truth-telling is more effective when it occurs through immersive experiences. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultural practices, such as smoking ceremonies, walking on Country, storytelling and personal engagements with survivors, contributed to healing, dialogue and a deeper shared understanding of history.

Through these events Indigenous people deepened their connections to community, history and Country and non-Indigenous people learned about these connections from them. The increasing attendance at events such as the Appin massacre memorial, the Mannalargenna Day Festival and similar commemorations is evidence of the impact of this type of truth-telling.

Read more: 'Why didn't we know?' is no excuse. Non-Indigenous Australians must listen to the difficult historical truths told by First Nations people

Why is truth-telling important?

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have long called for Australia’s history to be told truthfully. The local truth-telling activities we have documented are examples of how communities have responded to this desire. They emphasise the importance of supporting communities to tell their stories, rather than government directing how truth-telling occurs.

While truth-telling does not guarantee reconciliation, the participants in our study stressed that meaningful reconciliation cannot occur without it. They emphasised the importance of reconciliation between First Nations and non-Indigenous communities because for some people these relationships have never existed, or are in need of repair.

Truth-telling is also crucial for political and social transformation. For example, the Queensland government is using truth-telling to help inform the path to Treaty. In Victoria, the Yoorrook Justice Commission is investigating historic and ongoing injustices experienced by First Nations peoples, alongside ongoing Treaty negotiations.

Read more: What is NAIDOC week? How did it start and what does it celebrate?

Community truth-telling can demonstrate the power of Indigenous identity and self-determination. It can also counter past attempts to erase Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples from Australian history.

Truth-telling highlights the crucial roles and contributions of First Nations peoples. Their acts of bravery and sacrifice, resistance against colonialism and contributions to communities.

Although some local governments have played a key role in supporting truth-telling, more support for local initiatives is required. National proposals, such as a national recognition of Mabo Day and a formal remembrance for frontier conflicts, have the potential to create a better environment for truth-telling.

• Stolen Generations
• Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples
• truth-telling
• Voice to parliament
• First Nations people

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Is Telling the Truth Always Good? Research Paper

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Truth is a virtue that is upheld by individuals and most societies around the globe. Telling the truth has been for ages held as a virtue and as a sign of honesty in human beings. It is a sign of respect for other people by showing them that you value their trust in you. It is important to note that telling the truth does not always bind a person to respond to every situation one is faced with. It can therefore be argued how one is supposed to respond to such situations. In this case we would ask ourselves whether it is always the best option to be honest and tell the truth or it is sometimes easier to tell lies and safe the situation of the day. This paper will generally focus on the importance of always telling the truth no matter the kind of situations we are faced with. Telling the truth can be held as always the better option.

The Virtue of always telling the truth helps to build ones character as an honest person. It does not really matter whether the act of telling the truth especially in difficult situations will put you into more problems. This is because one’s mind is cleared of guilt conscience. The mind is also cleared of any contradictions and one does not have to really always remember what you said to every one (Michael, p10). This is because you will not be afraid that a certain situation will come and the answer you might give might contradict the first one. Truth does not change and if one always tells the truth you don’t have to think and twist answers to save yourself. On the other hand telling the truth is good since this might prevent more problems to be created in future either in your life or other people’s lives. Once the truth about a situation is known, it can be handled with every possible solution to either solve problems of the day or be lessons to you and other people (Jean, p13).

It is always true that if one is used to telling the truth the people that you deal with will be more likely to tell the truth to you. This makes life very easy since you will also not have problems with the persons around you trying to think what is true and what is not true. You will be always a good example to the others. A person who learns to always tell the truth will also build a lot of self confidence. Being always true means no one can put you down for what you said as a form of deceit. This also makes one to be always proud of who they are. Since telling the truth clears one’s mind of guilt conscience, it follows that telling the truth reduces chances of a person being stressed. One is therefore able to always present themselves in a good manner, eat well and also improve on their physical appearance (Jean, p22). Truth also helps other individuals have confidence in you and also believe in you. This virtue assures other people that when things don’t work out as they should you will always present it as it is and this is what every one values as a bold person.

Telling the truth sometimes will hurt other people (Michael, p24). In such cases one should always try to use words and ways of expressions that will be taken in a very understanding manner. This is especially when we are dealing with very close friends, families and work colleagues. For example a friend asks you if a dress or a hair style is looking good on them. If you are sure it is not attractive one can respond with answers such as, “Am not certain this is your color or style.” In this way one can be able to automatically know they are not looking good and they will be willing to ask for opinions from you. It is also argued that sometimes we lie by telling the truth. The necessity of telling the truth also matters with the outcome of the situation. A false statement also has a degree of falsity and these measures whether one is really telling the truth or not. Not telling the truth does not really make some body a liar since the sole intention and the reactions by the speaker is what matters. What others believe about an individual also matters and some times telling the truth will only deceive the loyalty they hold on you. IT is therefore possible to not tell the truth and still get the satisfaction of others. He argues that telling the truth is always not part of the solution to everything (lumpur, p6).

A large number of individuals would consider not telling the truth with the sole intention of making other people believe in false facts. One may therefore argue it is good to not tell the truth in certain situations. The act of not telling the truth is considered a vice in the society and generally not accepted. The motive of not telling the truth is mostly directed towards preventing people from acting in a certain manner that may cause pain or hurt the informant. This then motivates the persons to make decisions or act in favor of the other person (Ben). Normally, People will not tell the truth because they are afraid of facing the consequences that might follow the truth. People also tell lies to save the situation of the day. One may not tell the truth because they consider it a short term solution of their problems. This is then followed by a series of lies as one tries to save the previous lies which might have been discovered and to avoid contradiction (Michael, p27).

In some situations one may weigh the cost of lying and that of telling the truth and decide the former is easier to handle. Individuals also find it easier to keep lying about different matters especially if one is used to not telling the truth to find favor. A perfect lie is said to be one that will result to some kind of benefit and which no one will find about. It can also be a lie that is used to divert people who will never affect once life either to add or reduce value (Ben). Life is very complicated and one may not be able differentiate who will be of benefit to you later in life and who will not. It is also very difficult to tell whether a certain lie will actually be discovered or not. It is very important to note that once a person learns to use lies as scapegoats to situations, the lies will finally be a habit and form patterns that are often repeated. Such repeated patterns will eventually give rise to a mistake and this might attract heavy consequences.

Mazur clearly brings out the vice of lying as corrupting the rational thinking of human beings. It denies one the freedom to make rational choices to reflect reality and also robs others their rationality and moral ethics (p15). It causes a lot of pain to the human dignity upon discovery of the truth. It diminishes the way we value ourselves and also the value we give to other individuals. The act of lying or not telling the truth clearly depicts the social uncertainty prevailing in the society and the lack of understanding the rules and authorities of personal behavior. Lying only acts as a solution to the dissatisfaction that we may have to go through by telling the truth (Bailey, p29).

In conclusion, it is always good to tell the truth since this increases one’s credibility. It helps in molding the relations-ships between individuals since they will be based on trust and believing in each other. The vice of not telling the truth no matter the consequences will always lead to short term solutions which may turn out to be bigger problems between individuals in future. The vice will eventually lead to a lot of enmity between individuals which might even cause psychological stress. The actual cost of not telling the truth is therefore higher than telling the truth. People should always weigh the cost of lying as a risk of creating enemies and losing their credibility as individuals who can be believed in.

Works Cited

Bailey. The Prevalence of Deceit. Cornell University Press, 1991, p 23-34.

Ben Best. Some Philosophizing About Lying. Web.

Greenberg, Michael A. The Consequences of Truth Telling. The Journal of the American Medical Association, 1991, p8-28.

Kuala Lumpur. Don’t Always Tell the Truth.Today’s Woman magazine, 2003.

Revell Jean. The Flight from Truth: The Reign of Deceit in the Age of Information. New York, Random House Books, 1992, p12-41.

Tim C. Mazur. Issues in Ethics -lying. California, Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, 2003, p3-18.

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IvyPanda. (2021, December 3). Is Telling the Truth Always Good? https://ivypanda.com/essays/is-telling-the-truth-always-good/

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1. IvyPanda . "Is Telling the Truth Always Good?" December 3, 2021. https://ivypanda.com/essays/is-telling-the-truth-always-good/.

Bibliography

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Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also one of the largest. Truth has been a topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in philosophy relate to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth.

It would be impossible to survey all there is to say about truth in any coherent way. Instead, this essay will concentrate on the main themes in the study of truth in the contemporary philosophical literature. It will attempt to survey the key problems and theories of current interest, and show how they relate to one-another. A number of other entries investigate many of these topics in greater depth. Generally, discussion of the principal arguments is left to them. The goal of this essay is only to provide an overview of the current Theories. Many of the papers mentioned in this essay can be found in the anthologies edited by Blackburn and Simmons (1999) and Lynch (2001b). There are a number of book-length surveys of the topics discussed here, including Burgess and Burgess (2011), Kirkham (1992), and Künne (2003). Also, a number of the topics discussed here, and many further ones, are surveyed at more length in papers in Glanzberg (2018).

The problem of truth is in a way easy to state: what truths are, and what (if anything) makes them true. But this simple statement masks a great deal of controversy. Whether there is a metaphysical problem of truth at all, and if there is, what kind of theory might address it, are all standing issues in the theory of truth. We will see a number of distinct ways of answering these questions.

1.1 The correspondence theory

1.1.1 the origins of the correspondence theory, 1.1.2 the neo-classical correspondence theory, 1.2 the coherence theory, 1.3 pragmatist theories, 2.1 sentences as truth-bearers, 2.2 convention t, 2.3 recursive definition of truth, 2.4 reference and satisfaction, 3.1 correspondence without facts, 3.2 representation and correspondence, 3.3 facts again, 3.4 truthmakers, 4.1 realism and truth, 4.2 anti-realism and truth, 4.3 anti-realism and pragmatism, 4.4 truth pluralism, 5.1 the redundancy theory, 5.2 minimalist theories, 5.3 other aspects of deflationism, 6.1 truth-bearers, 6.2 truth and truth conditions, 6.3 truth conditions and deflationism, 6.4 truth and the theory of meaning, 6.5 the coherence theory and meaning, 6.6 truth and assertion, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the neo-classical theories of truth.

Much of the contemporary literature on truth takes as its starting point some ideas which were prominent in the early part of the 20th century. There were a number of views of truth under discussion at that time, the most significant for the contemporary literature being the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatist theories of truth.

These theories all attempt to directly answer the nature question : what is the nature of truth? They take this question at face value: there are truths, and the question to be answered concerns their nature. In answering this question, each theory makes the notion of truth part of a more thoroughgoing metaphysics or epistemology. Explaining the nature of truth becomes an application of some metaphysical system, and truth inherits significant metaphysical presuppositions along the way.

The goal of this section is to characterize the ideas of the correspondence, coherence and pragmatist theories which animate the contemporary debate. In some cases, the received forms of these theories depart from the views that were actually defended in the early 20th century. We thus dub them the ‘neo-classical theories’. Where appropriate, we pause to indicate how the neo-classical theories emerge from their ‘classical’ roots in the early 20th century.

Perhaps the most important of the neo-classical theories for the contemporary literature is the correspondence theory. Ideas that sound strikingly like a correspondence theory are no doubt very old. They might well be found in Aristotle or Aquinas. When we turn to the late 19th and early 20th centuries where we pick up the story of the neo-classical theories of truth, it is clear that ideas about correspondence were central to the discussions of the time. In spite of their importance, however, it is strikingly difficult to find an accurate citation in the early 20th century for the received neo-classical view. Furthermore, the way the correspondence theory actually emerged will provide some valuable reference points for the contemporary debate. For these reasons, we dwell on the origins of the correspondence theory in the late 19th and early 20th centuries at greater length than those of the other neo-classical views, before turning to its contemporary neo-classical form. For an overview of the correspondence theory, see David (2018).

The basic idea of the correspondence theory is that what we believe or say is true if it corresponds to the way things actually are – to the facts. This idea can be seen in various forms throughout the history of philosophy. Its modern history starts with the beginnings of analytic philosophy at the turn of the 20th century, particularly in the work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell.

Let us pick up the thread of this story in the years between 1898 and about 1910. These years are marked by Moore and Russell’s rejection of idealism. Yet at this point, they do not hold a correspondence theory of truth. Indeed Moore (1899) sees the correspondence theory as a source of idealism, and rejects it. Russell follows Moore in this regard. (For discussion of Moore’s early critique of idealism, where he rejects the correspondence theory of truth, see Baldwin (1991). Hylton (1990) provides an extensive discussion of Russell in the context of British idealism. An overview of these issues is given by Baldwin (2018).)

In this period, Moore and Russell hold a version of the identity theory of truth . They say comparatively little about it, but it is stated briefly in Moore (1899; 1902) and Russell (1904). According to the identity theory, a true proposition is identical to a fact. Specifically, in Moore and Russell’s hands, the theory begins with propositions, understood as the objects of beliefs and other propositional attitudes. Propositions are what are believed, and give the contents of beliefs. They are also, according to this theory, the primary bearers of truth. When a proposition is true, it is identical to a fact, and a belief in that proposition is correct. (Related ideas about the identity theory and idealism are discussed by McDowell (1994) and further developed by Hornsby (2001).)

The identity theory Moore and Russell espoused takes truth to be a property of propositions. Furthermore, taking up an idea familiar to readers of Moore, the property of truth is a simple unanalyzable property. Facts are understood as simply those propositions which are true. There are true propositions and false ones, and facts just are true propositions. There is thus no “difference between truth and the reality to which it is supposed to correspond” (Moore, 1902, p. 21). (For further discussion of the identity theory of truth, see Baldwin (1991), Candlish (1999), Candlish and Damnjanovic (2018), Cartwright (1987), Dodd (2000), and the entry on the identity theory of truth .)

Moore and Russell came to reject the identity theory of truth in favor of a correspondence theory, sometime around 1910 (as we see in Moore, 1953, which reports lectures he gave in 1910–1911, and Russell, 1910b). They do so because they came to reject the existence of propositions. Why? Among reasons, they came to doubt that there could be any such things as false propositions, and then concluded that there are no such things as propositions at all.

Why did Moore and Russell find false propositions problematic? A full answer to this question is a point of scholarship that would take us too far afield. (Moore himself lamented that he could not “put the objection in a clear and convincing way” (1953, p. 263), but see Cartwright (1987) and David (2001) for careful and clear exploration of the arguments.) But very roughly, the identification of facts with true propositions left them unable to see what a false proposition could be other than something which is just like a fact, though false. If such things existed, we would have fact-like things in the world, which Moore and Russell now see as enough to make false propositions count as true. Hence, they cannot exist, and so there are no false propositions. As Russell (1956, p. 223) later says, propositions seem to be at best “curious shadowy things” in addition to facts.

As Cartwright (1987) reminds us, it is useful to think of this argument in the context of Russell’s slightly earlier views about propositions. As we see clearly in Russell (1903), for instance, he takes propositions to have constituents. But they are not mere collections of constituents, but a ‘unity’ which brings the constituents together. (We thus confront the ‘problem of the unity of the proposition’.) But what, we might ask, would be the ‘unity’ of a proposition that Samuel Ramey sings – with constituents Ramey and singing – except Ramey bearing the property of singing? If that is what the unity consists in, then we seem to have nothing other than the fact that Ramey sings. But then we could not have genuine false propositions without having false facts.

As Cartwright also reminds us, there is some reason to doubt the cogency of this sort of argument. But let us put the assessment of the arguments aside, and continue the story. From the rejection of propositions a correspondence theory emerges. The primary bearers of truth are no longer propositions, but beliefs themselves. In a slogan:

A belief is true if and only if it corresponds to a fact .

Views like this are held by Moore (1953) and Russell (1910b; 1912). Of course, to understand such a theory, we need to understand the crucial relation of correspondence, as well as the notion of a fact to which a belief corresponds. We now turn to these questions. In doing so, we will leave the history, and present a somewhat more modern reconstruction of a correspondence theory. (For more on facts and proposition in this period, see Sullivan and Johnston (2018).)

The correspondence theory of truth is at its core an ontological thesis: a belief is true if there exists an appropriate entity – a fact – to which it corresponds. If there is no such entity, the belief is false.

Facts, for the neo-classical correspondence theory, are entities in their own right. Facts are generally taken to be composed of particulars and properties and relations or universals, at least. The neo-classical correspondence theory thus only makes sense within the setting of a metaphysics that includes such facts. Hence, it is no accident that as Moore and Russell turn away from the identity theory of truth, the metaphysics of facts takes on a much more significant role in their views. This perhaps becomes most vivid in the later Russell (1956, p. 182), where the existence of facts is the “first truism.” (The influence of Wittgenstein’s ideas to appear in the Tractatus (1922) on Russell in this period was strong, and indeed, the Tractatus remains one of the important sources for the neo-classical correspondence theory. For more recent extensive discussions of facts, see Armstrong (1997) and Neale (2001).)

Consider, for example, the belief that Ramey sings. Let us grant that this belief is true. In what does its truth consist, according to the correspondence theory? It consists in there being a fact in the world, built from the individual Ramey, and the property of singing. Let us denote this \(\langle\) Ramey , Singing \(\rangle\). This fact exists. In contrast, the world (we presume) contains no fact \(\langle\) Ramey , Dancing \(\rangle\). The belief that Ramey sings stands in the relation of correspondence to the fact \(\langle\) Ramey , Singing \(\rangle\), and so the belief is true.

What is the relation of correspondence? One of the standing objections to the classical correspondence theory is that a fully adequate explanation of correspondence proves elusive. But for a simple belief, like that Ramey sings, we can observe that the structure of the fact \(\langle\) Ramey , Singing \(\rangle\) matches the subject-predicate form of the that -clause which reports the belief, and may well match the structure of the belief itself.

So far, we have very much the kind of view that Moore and Russell would have found congenial. But the modern form of the correspondence theory seeks to round out the explanation of correspondence by appeal to propositions . Indeed, it is common to base a correspondence theory of truth upon the notion of a structured proposition . Propositions are again cast as the contents of beliefs and assertions, and propositions have structure which at least roughly corresponds to the structure of sentences. At least, for simple beliefs like that Ramey sings, the proposition has the same subject predicate structure as the sentence. (Proponents of structured propositions, such as Kaplan (1989), often look to Russell (1903) for inspiration, and find unconvincing Russell’s reasons for rejecting them.)

With facts and structured propositions in hand, an attempt may be made to explain the relation of correspondence. Correspondence holds between a proposition and a fact when the proposition and fact have the same structure, and the same constituents at each structural position. When they correspond, the proposition and fact thus mirror each-other. In our simple example, we might have:

Propositions, though structured like facts, can be true or false. In a false case, like the proposition that Ramey dances, we would find no fact at the bottom of the corresponding diagram. Beliefs are true or false depending on whether the propositions which are believed are.

We have sketched this view for simple propositions like the proposition that Ramey sings. How to extend it to more complex cases, like general propositions or negative propositions, is an issue we will not delve into here. It requires deciding whether there are complex facts, such as general facts or negative facts, or whether there is a more complex relation of correspondence between complex propositions and simple facts. (The issue of whether there are such complex facts marks a break between Russell (1956) and Wittgenstein (1922) and the earlier views which Moore (1953) and Russell (1912) sketch.)

According to the correspondence theory as sketched here, what is key to truth is a relation between propositions and the world, which obtains when the world contains a fact that is structurally similar to the proposition. Though this is not the theory Moore and Russell held, it weaves together ideas of theirs with a more modern take on (structured) propositions. We will thus dub it the neo-classical correspondence theory. This theory offers us a paradigm example of a correspondence theory of truth.

The leading idea of the correspondence theory is familiar. It is a form of the older idea that true beliefs show the right kind of resemblance to what is believed. In contrast to earlier empiricist theories, the thesis is not that one’s ideas per se resemble what they are about. Rather, the propositions which give the contents of one’s true beliefs mirror reality, in virtue of entering into correspondence relations to the right pieces of it.

In this theory, it is the way the world provides us with appropriately structured entities that explains truth. Our metaphysics thus explains the nature of truth, by providing the entities needed to enter into correspondence relations.

For more on the correspondence theory, see David (1994, 2018) and the entry on the correspondance theory of truth .

Though initially the correspondence theory was seen by its developers as a competitor to the identity theory of truth, it was also understood as opposed to the coherence theory of truth.

We will be much briefer with the historical origins of the coherence theory than we were with the correspondence theory. Like the correspondence theory, versions of the coherence theory can be seen throughout the history of philosophy. (See, for instance, Walker (1989) for a discussion of its early modern lineage.) Like the correspondence theory, it was important in the early 20th century British origins of analytic philosophy. Particularly, the coherence theory of truth is associated with the British idealists to whom Moore and Russell were reacting.

Many idealists at that time did indeed hold coherence theories. Let us take as an example Joachim (1906). (This is the theory that Russell (1910a) attacks.) Joachim says that:

Truth in its essential nature is that systematic coherence which is the character of a significant whole (p. 76).

We will not attempt a full exposition of Joachim’s view, which would take us well beyond the discussion of truth into the details of British idealism. But a few remarks about his theory will help to give substance to the quoted passage.

Perhaps most importantly, Joachim talks of ‘truth’ in the singular. This is not merely a turn of phrase, but a reflection of his monistic idealism. Joachim insists that what is true is the “whole complete truth” (p. 90). Individual judgments or beliefs are certainly not the whole complete truth. Such judgments are, according to Joachim, only true to a degree. One aspect of this doctrine is a kind of holism about content, which holds that any individual belief or judgment gets its content only in virtue of being part of a system of judgments. But even these systems are only true to a degree, measuring the extent to which they express the content of the single ‘whole complete truth’. Any real judgment we might make will only be partially true.

To flesh out Joachim’s theory, we would have to explain what a significant whole is. We will not attempt that, as it leads us to some of the more formidable aspects of his view, e.g., that it is a “process of self-fulfillment” (p. 77). But it is clear that Joachim takes ‘systematic coherence’ to be stronger than consistency. In keeping with his holism about content, he rejects the idea that coherence is a relation between independently identified contents, and so finds it necessary to appeal to ‘significant wholes’.

As with the correspondence theory, it will be useful to recast the coherence theory in a more modern form, which will abstract away from some of the difficult features of British idealism. As with the correspondence theory, it can be put in a slogan:

A belief is true if and only if it is part of a coherent system of beliefs.

To further the contrast with the neo-classical correspondence theory, we may add that a proposition is true if it is the content of a belief in the system, or entailed by a belief in the system. We may assume, with Joachim, that the condition of coherence will be stronger than consistency. With the idealists generally, we might suppose that features of the believing subject will come into play.

This theory is offered as an analysis of the nature of truth, and not simply a test or criterion for truth. Put as such, it is clearly not Joachim’s theory (it lacks his monism, and he rejects propositions), but it is a standard take on coherence in the contemporary literature. (It is the way the coherence theory is given in Walker (1989), for instance. See also Young (2001) for a recent defense of a coherence theory.) Let us take this as our neo-classical version of the coherence theory. The contrast with the correspondence theory of truth is clear. Far from being a matter of whether the world provides a suitable object to mirror a proposition, truth is a matter of how beliefs are related to each-other.

The coherence theory of truth enjoys two sorts of motivations. One is primarily epistemological. Most coherence theorists also hold a coherence theory of knowledge; more specifically, a coherence theory of justification. According to this theory, to be justified is to be part of a coherent system of beliefs. An argument for this is often based on the claim that only another belief could stand in a justification relation to a belief, allowing nothing but properties of systems of belief, including coherence, to be conditions for justification. Combining this with the thesis that a fully justified belief is true forms an argument for the coherence theory of truth. (An argument along these lines is found in Blanshard (1939), who holds a form of the coherence theory closely related to Joachim’s.)

The steps in this argument may be questioned by a number of contemporary epistemological views. But the coherence theory also goes hand-in-hand with its own metaphysics as well. The coherence theory is typically associated with idealism. As we have already discussed, forms of it were held by British idealists such as Joachim, and later by Blanshard (in America). An idealist should see the last step in the justification argument as quite natural. More generally, an idealist will see little (if any) room between a system of beliefs and the world it is about, leaving the coherence theory of truth as an extremely natural option.

It is possible to be an idealist without adopting a coherence theory. (For instance, many scholars read Bradley as holding a version of the identity theory of truth. See Baldwin (1991) for some discussion.) However, it is hard to see much of a way to hold the coherence theory of truth without maintaining some form of idealism. If there is nothing to truth beyond what is to be found in an appropriate system of beliefs, then it would seem one’s beliefs constitute the world in a way that amounts to idealism. (Walker (1989) argues that every coherence theorist must be an idealist, but not vice-versa.)

The neo-classical correspondence theory seeks to capture the intuition that truth is a content-to-world relation. It captures this in the most straightforward way, by asking for an object in the world to pair up with a true proposition. The neo-classical coherence theory, in contrast, insists that truth is not a content-to-world relation at all; rather, it is a content-to-content, or belief-to-belief, relation. The coherence theory requires some metaphysics which can make the world somehow reflect this, and idealism appears to be it. (A distant descendant of the neo-classical coherence theory that does not require idealism will be discussed in section 6.5 below.)

For more on the coherence theory, see Walker (2018) and the entry on the coherence theory of truth .

A different perspective on truth was offered by the American pragmatists. As with the neo-classical correspondence and coherence theories, the pragmatist theories go with some typical slogans. For example, Peirce is usually understood as holding the view that:

Truth is the end of inquiry.

(See, for instance Hartshorne et al., 1931–58, §3.432.) Both Peirce and James are associated with the slogan that:

Truth is satisfactory to believe.

James (e.g., 1907) understands this principle as telling us what practical value truth has. True beliefs are guaranteed not to conflict with subsequent experience. Likewise, Peirce’s slogan tells us that true beliefs will remain settled at the end of prolonged inquiry. Peirce’s slogan is perhaps most typically associated with pragmatist views of truth, so we might take it to be our canonical neo-classical theory. However, the contemporary literature does not seem to have firmly settled upon a received ‘neo-classical’ pragmatist theory.

In her reconstruction (upon which we have relied heavily), Haack (1976) notes that the pragmatists’ views on truth also make room for the idea that truth involves a kind of correspondence, insofar as the scientific method of inquiry is answerable to some independent world. Peirce, for instance, does not reject a correspondence theory outright; rather, he complains that it provides merely a ‘nominal’ or ‘transcendental’ definition of truth (e.g Hartshorne et al., 1931–58, §5.553, §5.572), which is cut off from practical matters of experience, belief, and doubt (§5.416). (See Misak (2004) for an extended discussion.)

This marks an important difference between the pragmatist theories and the coherence theory we just considered. Even so, pragmatist theories also have an affinity with coherence theories, insofar as we expect the end of inquiry to be a coherent system of beliefs. As Haack also notes, James maintains an important verificationist idea: truth is what is verifiable. We will see this idea re-appear in section 4.

For more on pragmatist theories of truth, see Misak (2018). James’ views are discussed further in the entry on William James . Peirce’s views are discussed further in the entry on Charles Sanders Peirce .

2. Tarski’s theory of truth

Modern forms of the classical theories survive. Many of these modern theories, notably correspondence theories, draw on ideas developed by Tarski.

In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that his seminal work on truth (1935) is very much of a piece with other works in mathematical logic, such as his (1931), and as much as anything this work lays the ground-work for the modern subject of model theory – a branch of mathematical logic, not the metaphysics of truth. In this respect, Tarski’s work provides a set of highly useful tools that may be employed in a wide range of philosophical projects. (See Patterson (2012) for more on Tarski’s work in its historical context.)

Tarski’s work has a number of components, which we will consider in turn.

In the classical debate on truth at the beginning of the 20th century we considered in section 1, the issue of truth-bearers was of great significance. For instance, Moore and Russell’s turn to the correspondence theory was driven by their views on whether there are propositions to be the bearers of truth. Many theories we reviewed took beliefs to be the bearers of truth.

In contrast, Tarski and much of the subsequent work on truth takes sentences to be the primary bearers of truth. This is not an entirely novel development: Russell (1956) also takes truth to apply to sentence (which he calls ‘propositions’ in that text). But whereas much of the classical debate takes the issue of the primary bearers of truth to be a substantial and important metaphysical one, Tarski is quite casual about it. His primary reason for taking sentences as truth-bearers is convenience, and he explicitly distances himself from any commitment about the philosophically contentious issues surrounding other candidate truth-bearers (e.g., Tarski, 1944). (Russell (1956) makes a similar suggestion that sentences are the appropriate truth-bearers “for the purposes of logic” (p. 184), though he still takes the classical metaphysical issues to be important.)

We will return to the issue of the primary bearers of truth in section 6.1. For the moment, it will be useful to simply follow Tarski’s lead. But it should be stressed that for this discussion, sentences are fully interpreted sentences, having meanings. We will also assume that the sentences in question do not change their content across occasions of use, i.e., that they display no context-dependence. We are taking sentences to be what Quine (1960) calls ‘eternal sentences’.

In some places (e.g., Tarski, 1944), Tarski refers to his view as the ‘semantic conception of truth’. It is not entirely clear just what Tarski had in mind by this, but it is clear enough that Tarski’s theory defines truth for sentences in terms of concepts like reference and satisfaction, which are intimately related to the basic semantic functions of names and predicates (according to many approaches to semantics). For more discussion, see Woleński (2001).

Let us suppose we have a fixed language \(\mathbf{L}\) whose sentences are fully interpreted. The basic question Tarski poses is what an adequate theory of truth for \(\mathbf{L}\) would be. Tarski’s answer is embodied in what he calls Convention T :

An adequate theory of truth for \(\mathbf{L}\) must imply, for each sentence \(\phi\) of \(\mathbf{L}\)

\(\ulcorner \phi \urcorner\) is true if and only if \(\phi\).

(We have simplified Tarski’s presentation somewhat.) This is an adequacy condition for theories, not a theory itself. Given the assumption that \(\mathbf{L}\) is fully interpreted, we may assume that each sentence \(\phi\) in fact has a truth value. In light of this, Convention T guarantees that the truth predicate given by the theory will be extensionally correct , i.e., have as its extension all and only the true sentences of \(\mathbf{L}\).

Convention T draws our attention to the biconditionals of the form

\(\ulcorner \ulcorner \phi \urcorner\) is true if and only if \(\phi \urcorner\),

which are usually called the Tarski biconditionals for a language \(\mathbf{L}\).

Tarski does not merely propose a condition of adequacy for theories of truth, he also shows how to meet it. One of his insights is that if the language \(\mathbf{L}\) displays the right structure, then truth for \(\mathbf{L}\) can be defined recursively. For instance, let us suppose that \(\mathbf{L}\) is a simple formal language, containing two atomic sentences ‘snow is white’ and ‘grass is green’, and the sentential connectives \(\vee\) and \(\neg\).

In spite of its simplicity, \(\mathbf{L}\) contains infinitely many distinct sentences. But truth can be defined for all of them by recursion.

• ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white.
• ‘Grass is green’ is true if and only if grass is green.
• \(\ulcorner \phi \vee \psi \urcorner\) is true if and only if \(\ulcorner \phi \urcorner\) is true or \(\ulcorner \psi \urcorner\) is true.
• \(\ulcorner \neg \phi \urcorner\) is true if and only if it is not the case that \(\ulcorner \phi \urcorner\) is true.

This theory satisfies Convention T.

This may look trivial, but in defining an extensionally correct truth predicate for an infinite language with four clauses, we have made a modest application of a very powerful technique.

Tarski’s techniques go further, however. They do not stop with atomic sentences. Tarski notes that truth for each atomic sentence can be defined in terms of two closely related notions: reference and satisfaction . Let us consider a language \(\mathbf{L}'\), just like \(\mathbf{L}\) except that instead of simply having two atomic sentences, \(\mathbf{L}'\) breaks atomic sentences into terms and predicates. \(\mathbf{L}'\) contains terms ‘snow’ and ‘grass’ (let us engage in the idealization that these are simply singular terms), and predicates ‘is white’ and ‘is green’. So \(\mathbf{L}'\) is like \(\mathbf{L}\), but also contains the sentences ‘Snow is green’ and ‘Grass is white’.)

We can define truth for atomic sentences of \(\mathbf{L}'\) in the following way.

• ‘Snow’ refers to snow.
• ‘Grass’ refers to grass.
• \(a\) satisfies ‘is white’ if and only if \(a\) is white.
• \(a\) satisfies ‘is green’ if and only if \(a\) is green.
• For any atomic sentence \(\ulcorner t\) is \(P \urcorner\): \(\ulcorner t\) is \(P \urcorner\) is true if and only if the referent of \(\ulcorner t \urcorner\) satisfies \(\ulcorner P\urcorner\).

One of Tarski’s key insights is that the apparatus of satisfaction allows for a recursive definition of truth for sentences with quantifiers , though we will not examine that here. We could repeat the recursion clauses for \(\mathbf{L}\) to produce a full theory of truth for \(\mathbf{L}'\).

Let us say that a Tarskian theory of truth is a recursive theory, built up in ways similar to the theory of truth for \(\mathbf{L}'\). Tarski goes on to demonstrate some key applications of such a theory of truth. A Tarskian theory of truth for a language \(\mathbf{L}\) can be used to show that theories in \(\mathbf{L}\) are consistent. This was especially important to Tarski, who was concerned the Liar paradox would make theories in languages containing a truth predicate inconsistent.

For more, see Ray (2018) and the entries on axiomatic theories of truth , the Liar paradox , and Tarski’s truth definitions .

3. Correspondence revisited

The correspondence theory of truth expresses the very natural idea that truth is a content-to-world or word-to-world relation: what we say or think is true or false in virtue of the way the world turns out to be. We suggested that, against a background like the metaphysics of facts, it does so in a straightforward way. But the idea of correspondence is certainly not specific to this framework. Indeed, it is controversial whether a correspondence theory should rely on any particular metaphysics at all. The basic idea of correspondence, as Tarski (1944) and others have suggested, is captured in the slogan from Aristotle’s Metaphysics Γ 7.27, “to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true” (Ross, 1928). ‘What is’, it is natural enough to say, is a fact, but this natural turn of phrase may well not require a full-blown metaphysics of facts. (For a discussion of Aristotle’s views in a historical context, see Szaif (2018).)

Yet without the metaphysics of facts, the notion of correspondence as discussed in section 1.1 loses substance. This has led to two distinct strands in contemporary thinking about the correspondence theory. One strand seeks to recast the correspondence theory in a way that does not rely on any particular ontology. Another seeks to find an appropriate ontology for correspondence, either in terms of facts or other entities. We will consider each in turn.

Tarski himself sometimes suggested that his theory was a kind of correspondence theory of truth. Whether his own theory is a correspondence theory, and even whether it provides any substantial philosophical account of truth at all, is a matter of controversy. (One rather drastic negative assessment from Putnam (1985–86, p. 333) is that “As a philosophical account of truth, Tarski’s theory fails as badly as it is possible for an account to fail.”) But a number of philosophers (e.g., Davidson, 1969; Field, 1972) have seen Tarski’s theory as providing at least the core of a correspondence theory of truth which dispenses with the metaphysics of facts.

Tarski’s theory shows how truth for a sentence is determined by certain properties of its constituents; in particular, by properties of reference and satisfaction (as well as by the logical constants). As it is normally understood, reference is the preeminent word-to-world relation. Satisfaction is naturally understood as a word-to-world relation as well, which relates a predicate to the things in the world that bear it. The Tarskian recursive definition shows how truth is determined by reference and satisfaction, and so is in effect determined by the things in the world we refer to and the properties they bear. This, one might propose, is all the correspondence we need. It is not correspondence of sentences or propositions to facts; rather, it is correspondence of our expressions to objects and the properties they bear, and then ways of working out the truth of claims in terms of this.

This is certainly not the neo-classical idea of correspondence. In not positing facts, it does not posit any single object to which a true proposition or sentence might correspond. Rather, it shows how truth might be worked out from basic word-to-world relations. However, a number of authors have noted that Tarski’s theory cannot by itself provide us with such an account of truth. As we will discuss more fully in section 4.2, Tarski’s apparatus is in fact compatible with theories of truth that are certainly not correspondence theories.

Field (1972), in an influential discussion and diagnosis of what is lacking in Tarski’s account, in effect points out that whether we really have something worthy of the name ‘correspondence’ depends on our having notions of reference and satisfaction which genuinely establish word-to-world relations. (Field does not use the term ‘correspondence’, but does talk about e.g., the “connection between words and things” (p. 373).) By itself, Field notes, Tarski’s theory does not offer an account of reference and satisfaction at all. Rather, it offers a number of disquotation clauses , such as:

These clauses have an air of triviality (though whether they are to be understood as trivial principles or statements of non-trivial semantic facts has been a matter of some debate). With Field, we might propose to supplement clauses like these with an account of reference and satisfaction. Such a theory should tell us what makes it the case that the word ‘snow’ refer to snow. (In 1972, Field was envisaging a physicalist account, along the lines of the causal theory of reference.) This should inter alia guarantee that truth is really determined by word-to-world relations, so in conjunction with the Tarskian recursive definition, it could provide a correspondence theory of truth.

Such a theory clearly does not rely on a metaphysics of facts. Indeed, it is in many ways metaphysically neutral, as it does not take a stand on the nature of particulars, or of the properties or universals that underwrite facts about satisfaction. However, it may not be entirely devoid of metaphysical implications, as we will discuss further in section 4.1.

Much of the subsequent discussion of Field-style approaches to correspondence has focused on the role of representation in these views. Field’s own (1972) discussion relies on a causal relation between terms and their referents, and a similar relation for satisfaction. These are instances of representation relations. According to representational views, meaningful items, like perhaps thoughts or sentences or their constituents, have their contents in virtue of standing in the right relation to the things they represent. On many views, including Field’s, a name stands in such a relation to its bearer, and the relation is a causal one.

The project of developing a naturalist account of the representation relation has been an important one in the philosophy of mind and language. (See the entry on mental representation .) But, it has implications for the theory of truth. Representational views of content lead naturally to correspondence theories of truth. To make this vivid, suppose you hold that sentences or beliefs stand in a representation relation to some objects. It is natural to suppose that for true beliefs or sentences, those objects would be facts. We then have a correspondence theory, with the correspondence relation explicated as a representation relation: a truth bearer is true if it represents a fact.

As we have discussed, many contemporary views reject facts, but one can hold a representational view of content without them. One interpretation of Field’s theory is just that. The relations of reference and satisfaction are representation relations, and truth for sentences is determined compositionally in terms of those representation relations, and the nature of the objects they represent. If we have such relations, we have the building blocks for a correspondence theory without facts. Field (1972) anticipated a naturalist reduction of the representation via a causal theory, but any view that accepts representation relations for truth bearers or their constituents can provide a similar theory of truth. (See Jackson (2006) and Lynch (2009) for further discussion.)

Representational views of content provide a natural way to approach the correspondence theory of truth, and likewise, anti-representational views provide a natural way to avoid the correspondence theory of truth. This is most clear in the work of Davidson, as we will discuss more in section 6.5.

There have been a number of correspondence theories that do make use of facts. Some are notably different from the neo-classical theory sketched in section 1.1. For instance, Austin (1950) proposes a view in which each statement (understood roughly as an utterance event) corresponds to both a fact or situation, and a type of situation. It is true if the former is of the latter type. This theory, which has been developed by situation theory (e.g., Barwise and Perry, 1986), rejects the idea that correspondence is a kind of mirroring between a fact and a proposition. Rather, correspondence relations to Austin are entirely conventional. (See Vision (2004) for an extended defense of an Austinian correspondence theory.) As an ordinary language philosopher, Austin grounds his notion of fact more in linguistic usage than in an articulated metaphysics, but he defends his use of fact-talk in Austin (1961b).

In a somewhat more Tarskian spirit, formal theories of facts or states of affairs have also been developed. For instance, Taylor (1976) provides a recursive definition of a collection of ‘states of affairs’ for a given language. Taylor’s states of affairs seem to reflect the notion of fact at work in the neo-classical theory, though as an exercise in logic, they are officially \(n\)-tuples of objects and intensions .

There are more metaphysically robust notions of fact in the current literature. For instance, Armstrong (1997) defends a metaphysics in which facts (under the name ‘states of affairs’) are metaphysically fundamental. The view has much in common with the neo-classical one. Like the neo-classical view, Armstrong endorses a version of the correspondence theory. States of affairs are truthmakers for propositions, though Armstrong argues that there may be many such truthmakers for a given proposition, and vice versa. (Armstrong also envisages a naturalistic account of propositions as classes of equivalent belief-tokens.)

Armstrong’s primary argument is what he calls the ‘truthmaker argument’. It begins by advancing a truthmaker principle , which holds that for any given truth, there must be a truthmaker – a “something in the world which makes it the case, that serves as an ontological ground, for this truth” (p. 115). It is then argued that facts are the appropriate truthmakers.

In contrast to the approach to correspondence discussed in section 3.1, which offered correspondence with minimal ontological implications, this view returns to the ontological basis of correspondence that was characteristic of the neo-classical theory.

For more on facts, see the entry on facts .

The truthmaker principle is often put as the schema:

If \(\phi\), then there is an \(x\) such that necessarily, if \(x\) exists, then \(\phi\).

(Fox (1987) proposed putting the principle this way, rather than explicitly in terms of truth.)

The truthmaker principle expresses the ontological aspect of the neo-classical correspondence theory. Not merely must truth obtain in virtue of word-to-world relations, but there must be a thing that makes each truth true. (For one view on this, see Merricks (2007).)

The neo-classical correspondence theory, and Armstrong, cast facts as the appropriate truthmakers. However, it is a non-trivial step from the truthmaker principle to the existence of facts. There are a number of proposals in the literature for how other sorts of objects could be truthmakers; for instance, tropes (called ‘moments’, in Mulligan et al., 1984). Parsons (1999) argues that the truthmaker principle (presented in a somewhat different form) is compatible with there being only concrete particulars.

As we saw in discussing the neo-classical correspondence theory, truthmaker theories, and fact theories in particular, raise a number of issues. One which has been discussed at length, for instance, is whether there are negative facts . Negative facts would be the truthmakers for negated sentences. Russell (1956) notoriously expresses ambivalence about whether there are negative facts. Armstrong (1997) rejects them, while Beall (2000) defends them. (For more discussion of truthmakers, see Cameron (2018) and the papers in Beebee and Dodd (2005).)

4. Realism and anti-realism

The neo-classical theories we surveyed in section 1 made the theory of truth an application of their background metaphysics (and in some cases epistemology). In section 2 and especially in section 3, we returned to the issue of what sorts of ontological commitments might go with the theory of truth. There we saw a range of options, from relatively ontologically non-committal theories, to theories requiring highly specific ontologies.

There is another way in which truth relates to metaphysics. Many ideas about realism and anti-realism are closely related to ideas about truth. Indeed, many approaches to questions about realism and anti-realism simply make them questions about truth.

In discussing the approach to correspondence of section 3.1, we noted that it has few ontological requirements. It relies on there being objects of reference, and something about the world which makes for determinate satisfaction relations; but beyond that, it is ontologically neutral. But as we mentioned there, this is not to say that it has no metaphysical implications. A correspondence theory of truth, of any kind, is often taken to embody a form of realism .

The key features of realism, as we will take it, are that:

• The world exists objectively, independently of the ways we think about it or describe it.
• Our thoughts and claims are about that world.

(Wright (1992) offers a nice statement of this way of thinking about realism.) These theses imply that our claims are objectively true or false, depending on how the world they are about is. The world that we represent in our thoughts or language is an objective world. (Realism may be restricted to some subject-matter, or range of discourse, but for simplicity, we will talk about only its global form.)

It is often argued that these theses require some form of the correspondence theory of truth. (Putnam (1978, p. 18) notes, “Whatever else realists say, they typically say that they believe in a ‘correspondence theory of truth’.”) At least, they are supported by the kind of correspondence theory without facts discussed in section 3.1, such as Field’s proposal. Such a theory will provide an account of objective relations of reference and satisfaction, and show how these determine the truth or falsehood of what we say about the world. Field’s own approach (1972) to this problem seeks a physicalist explanation of reference. But realism is a more general idea than physicalism. Any theory that provides objective relations of reference and satisfaction, and builds up a theory of truth from them, would give a form of realism. (Making the objectivity of reference the key to realism is characteristic of work of Putnam, e.g., 1978.)

Another important mark of realism expressed in terms of truth is the property of bivalence . As Dummett has stressed (e.g., 1959; 1976; 1983; 1991), a realist should see there being a fact of the matter one way or the other about whether any given claim is correct. Hence, one important mark of realism is that it goes together with the principle of bivalence : every truth-bearer (sentence or proposition) is true or false. In much of his work, Dummett has made this the characteristic mark of realism, and often identifies realism about some subject-matter with accepting bivalence for discourse about that subject-matter. At the very least, it captures a great deal of what is more loosely put in the statement of realism above.

Both the approaches to realism, through reference and through bivalence, make truth the primary vehicle for an account of realism. A theory of truth which substantiates bivalence, or builds truth from a determinate reference relation, does most of the work of giving a realistic metaphysics. It might even simply be a realistic metaphysics.

We have thus turned on its head the relation of truth to metaphysics we saw in our discussion of the neo-classical correspondence theory in section 1.1. There, a correspondence theory of truth was built upon a substantial metaphysics. Here, we have seen how articulating a theory that captures the idea of correspondence can be crucial to providing a realist metaphysics. (For another perspective on realism and truth, see Alston (1996). Devitt (1984) offers an opposing view to the kind we have sketched here, which rejects any characterization of realism in terms of truth or other semantic concepts.)

In light of our discussion in section 1.1.1, we should pause to note that the connection between realism and the correspondence theory of truth is not absolute. When Moore and Russell held the identity theory of truth, they were most certainly realists. The right kind of metaphysics of propositions can support a realist view, as can a metaphysics of facts. The modern form of realism we have been discussing here seeks to avoid basing itself on such particular ontological commitments, and so prefers to rely on the kind of correspondence-without-facts approach discussed in section 3.1. This is not to say that realism will be devoid of ontological commitments, but the commitments will flow from whichever specific claims about some subject-matter are taken to be true.

For more on realism and truth, see Fumerton (2002) and the entry on realism .

It should come as no surprise that the relation between truth and metaphysics seen by modern realists can also be exploited by anti-realists. Many modern anti-realists see the theory of truth as the key to formulating and defending their views. With Dummett (e.g., 1959; 1976; 1991), we might expect the characteristic mark of anti-realism to be the rejection of bivalence.

Indeed, many contemporary forms of anti-realism may be formulated as theories of truth, and they do typically deny bivalence. Anti-realism comes in many forms, but let us take as an example a (somewhat crude) form of verificationism. Such a theory holds that a claim is correct just insofar as it is in principle verifiable , i.e., there is a verification procedure we could in principle carry out which would yield the answer that the claim in question was verified.

So understood, verificationism is a theory of truth. The claim is not that verification is the most important epistemic notion, but that truth just is verifiability. As with the kind of realism we considered in section 4.1, this view expresses its metaphysical commitments in its explanation of the nature of truth. Truth is not, to this view, a fully objective matter, independent of us or our thoughts. Instead, truth is constrained by our abilities to verify, and is thus constrained by our epistemic situation. Truth is to a significant degree an epistemic matter, which is typical of many anti-realist positions.

As Dummett says, the verificationist notion of truth does not appear to support bivalence. Any statement that reaches beyond what we can in principle verify or refute (verify its negation) will be a counter-example to bivalence. Take, for instance, the claim that there is some substance, say uranium, present in some region of the universe too distant to be inspected by us within the expected lifespan of the universe. Insofar as this really would be in principle unverifiable, we have no reason to maintain it is true or false according to the verificationist theory of truth.

Verificationism of this sort is one of a family of anti-realist views. Another example is the view that identifies truth with warranted assertibility. Assertibility, as well as verifiability, has been important in Dummett’s work. (See also works of McDowell, e.g., 1976 and Wright, e.g., 1976; 1982; 1992.)

Anti-realism of the Dummettian sort is not a descendant of the coherence theory of truth per se . But in some ways, as Dummett himself has noted, it might be construed as a descendant – perhaps very distant – of idealism. If idealism is the most drastic form of rejection of the independence of mind and world, Dummettian anti-realism is a more modest form, which sees epistemology imprinted in the world, rather than the wholesale embedding of world into mind. At the same time, the idea of truth as warranted assertibility or verifiability reiterates a theme from the pragmatist views of truth we surveyed in section 1.3.

Anti-realist theories of truth, like the realist ones we discussed in section 4.1, can generally make use of the Tarskian apparatus. Convention T, in particular, does not discriminate between realist and anti-realist notions of truth. Likewise, the base clauses of a Tarskian recursive theory are given as disquotation principles, which are neutral between realist and anti-realist understandings of notions like reference. As we saw with the correspondence theory, giving a full account of the nature of truth will generally require more than the Tarskian apparatus itself. How an anti-realist is to explain the basic concepts that go into a Tarskian theory is a delicate matter. As Dummett and Wright have investigated in great detail, it appears that the background logic in which the theory is developed will have to be non-classical.

For more on anti-realism and truth, see Shieh (2018) and the papers in Greenough and Lynch (2006) and the entry on realism .

Many commentators see a close connection between Dummett’s anti-realism and the pragmatists’ views of truth, in that both put great weight on ideas of verifiability or assertibility. Dummett himself stressed parallels between anti-realism and intuitionism in the philosophy of mathematics.

Another view on truth which returns to pragmatist themes is the ‘internal realism’ of Putnam (1981). There Putnam glosses truth as what would be justified under ideal epistemic conditions. With the pragmatists, Putnam sees the ideal conditions as something which can be approximated, echoing the idea of truth as the end of inquiry.

Putnam is cautious about calling his view anti-realism, preferring the label ‘internal realism’. But he is clear that he sees his view as opposed to realism (‘metaphysical realism’, as he calls it).

Davidson’s views on truth have also been associated with pragmatism, notably by Rorty (1986). Davidson has distanced himself from this interpretation (e.g., 1990), but he does highlight connections between truth and belief and meaning. Insofar as these are human attitudes or relate to human actions, Davidson grants there is some affinity between his views and those of some pragmatists (especially, he says, Dewey).

Another view that has grown out of the literature on realism and anti-realism, and has become increasingly important in the current literature, is that of pluralism about truth. This view, developed in work of Lynch (e.g. 2001b; 2009) and Wright (e.g. 1992; 1999), proposes that there are multiple ways for truth bearers to be true. Wright, in particular, suggests that in certain domains of discourse what we say is true in virtue of a correspondence-like relation, while in others it is its true in virtue of a kind of assertibility relation that is closer in spirit to the anti-realist views we have just discussed.

Such a proposal might suggest there are multiple concepts of truth, or that the term ‘true’ is itself ambiguous. However, whether or not a pluralist view is committed to such claims has been disputed. In particular, Lynch (2001b; 2009) develops a version of pluralism which takes truth to be a functional role concept. The functional role of truth is characterized by a range of principles that articulate such features of truth as its objectivity, its role in inquiry, and related ideas we have encountered in considering various theories of truth. (A related point about platitudes governing the concept of truth is made by Wright (1992).) But according to Lynch, these display the functional role of truth. Furthermore, Lynch claims that on analogy with analytic functionalism, these principles can be seen as deriving from our pre-theoretic or ‘folk’ ideas about truth.

Like all functional role concepts, truth must be realized, and according to Lynch it may be realized in different ways in different settings. Such multiple realizability has been one of the hallmarks of functional role concepts discussed in the philosophy of mind. For instance, Lynch suggests that for ordinary claims about material objects, truth might be realized by a correspondence property (which he links to representational views), while for moral claims truth might be manifest by an assertibility property along more anti-realist lines.

For more on pluralism about truth, see Pedersen and Lynch (2018) and the entry on pluralist theories of truth .

5. Deflationism

We began in section 1 with the neo-classical theories, which explained the nature of truth within wider metaphysical systems. We then considered some alternatives in sections 2 and 3, some of which had more modest ontological implications. But we still saw in section 4 that substantial theories of truth tend to imply metaphysical theses, or even embody metaphysical positions.

One long-standing trend in the discussion of truth is to insist that truth really does not carry metaphysical significance at all. It does not, as it has no significance on its own. A number of different ideas have been advanced along these lines, under the general heading of deflationism .

Deflationist ideas appear quite early on, including a well-known argument against correspondence in Frege (1918–19). However, many deflationists take their cue from an idea of Ramsey (1927), often called the equivalence thesis :

\(\ulcorner \ulcorner \phi \urcorner\) is true \(\urcorner\) has the same meaning as \(\phi\).

(Ramsey himself takes truth-bearers to be propositions rather than sentences. Glanzberg (2003b) questions whether Ramsey’s account of propositions really makes him a deflationist.)

This can be taken as the core of a theory of truth, often called the redundancy theory . The redundancy theory holds that there is no property of truth at all, and appearances of the expression ‘true’ in our sentences are redundant, having no effect on what we express.

The equivalence thesis can also be understood in terms of speech acts rather than meaning:

To assert that \(\ulcorner \phi \urcorner\) is true is just to assert that \(\phi\).

This view was advanced by Strawson (1949; 1950), though Strawson also argues that there are other important aspects of speech acts involving ‘true’ beyond what is asserted. For instance, they may be acts of confirming or granting what someone else said. (Strawson would also object to my making sentences the bearers of truth.)

In either its speech act or meaning form, the redundancy theory argues there is no property of truth. It is commonly noted that the equivalence thesis itself is not enough to sustain the redundancy theory. It merely holds that when truth occurs in the outermost position in a sentence, and the full sentence to which truth is predicated is quoted, then truth is eliminable. What happens in other environments is left to be seen. Modern developments of the redundancy theory include Grover et al. (1975).

The equivalence principle looks familiar: it has something like the form of the Tarski biconditionals discussed in section 2.2. However, it is a stronger principle, which identifies the two sides of the biconditional – either their meanings or the speech acts performed with them. The Tarski biconditionals themselves are simply material biconditionals.

A number of deflationary theories look to the Tarski biconditionals rather than the full equivalence principle. Their key idea is that even if we do not insist on redundancy, we may still hold the following theses:

• For a given language \(\mathbf{L}\) and every \(\phi\) in \(\mathbf{L}\), the biconditionals \(\ulcorner \ulcorner \phi \urcorner\) is true if and only if \(\phi \urcorner\) hold by definition (or analytically, or trivially, or by stipulation …).
• This is all there is to say about the concept of truth.

We will refer to views which adopt these as minimalist . Officially, this is the name of the view of Horwich (1990), but we will apply it somewhat more widely. (Horwich’s view differs in some specific respects from what is presented here, such as predicating truth of propositions, but we believe it is close enough to what is sketched here to justify the name.)

The second thesis, that the Tarski biconditionals are all there is to say about truth, captures something similar to the redundancy theory’s view. It comes near to saying that truth is not a property at all; to the extent that truth is a property, there is no more to it than the disquotational pattern of the Tarski biconditionals. As Horwich puts it, there is no substantial underlying metaphysics to truth. And as Soames (1984) stresses, certainly nothing that could ground as far-reaching a view as realism or anti-realism.

If there is no property of truth, or no substantial property of truth, what role does our term ‘true’ play? Deflationists typically note that the truth predicate provides us with a convenient device of disquotation . Such a device allows us to make some useful claims which we could not formulate otherwise, such as the blind ascription ‘The next thing that Bill says will be true’. (For more on blind ascriptions and their relation to deflationism, see Azzouni, 2001.) A predicate obeying the Tarski biconditionals can also be used to express what would otherwise be (potentially) infinite conjunctions or disjunctions, such as the notorious statement of Papal infallibility put ‘Everything the Pope says is true’. (Suggestions like this are found in Leeds, 1978 and Quine, 1970.)

Recognizing these uses for a truth predicate, we might simply think of it as introduced into a language by stipulation . The Tarski biconditionals themselves might be stipulated, as the minimalists envisage. One could also construe the clauses of a recursive Tarskian theory as stipulated. (There are some significant logical differences between these two options. See Halbach (1999) and Ketland (1999) for discussion.) Other deflationists, such as Beall (2005) or Field (1994), might prefer to focus here on rules of inference or rules of use, rather than the Tarski biconditionals themselves.

There are also important connections between deflationist ideas about truth and certain ideas about meaning. These are fundamental to the deflationism of Field (1986; 1994), which will be discussed in section 6.3. For an insightful critique of deflationism, see Gupta (1993).

For more on deflationism, see Azzouni (2018) and the entry on the deflationary theory of truth .

6. Truth and language

One of the important themes in the literature on truth is its connection to meaning, or more generally, to language. This has proved an important application of ideas about truth, and an important issue in the study of truth itself. This section will consider a number of issues relating truth and language.

There have been many debates in the literature over what the primary bearers of truth are. Candidates typically include beliefs, propositions, sentences, and utterances. We have already seen in section 1 that the classical debates on truth took this issue very seriously, and what sort of theory of truth was viable was often seen to depend on what the bearers of truth are.

In spite of the number of options under discussion, and the significance that has sometimes been placed on the choice, there is an important similarity between candidate truth-bearers. Consider the role of truth-bearers in the correspondence theory, for instance. We have seen versions of it which take beliefs, propositions, or interpreted sentences to be the primary bearers of truth. But all of them rely upon the idea that their truth-bearers are meaningful , and are thereby able to say something about what the world is like. (We might say that they are able to represent the world, but that is to use ‘represent’ in a wider sense than we saw in section 3.2. No assumptions about just what stands in relations to what objects are required to see truth-bearers as meaningful.) It is in virtue of being meaningful that truth-bearers are able to enter into correspondence relations. Truth-bearers are things which meaningfully make claims about what the world is like, and are true or false depending on whether the facts in the world are as described.

Exactly the same point can be made for the anti-realist theories of truth we saw in section 4.2, though with different accounts of how truth-bearers are meaningful, and what the world contributes. Though it is somewhat more delicate, something similar can be said for coherence theories, which usually take beliefs, or whole systems of beliefs, as the primary truth-bearers. Though a coherence theory will hardly talk of beliefs representing the facts, it is crucial to the coherence theory that beliefs are contentful beliefs of agents, and that they can enter into coherence relations. Noting the complications in interpreting the genuine classical coherence theories, it appears fair to note that this requires truth-bearers to be meaningful, however the background metaphysics (presumably idealism) understands meaning.

Though Tarski works with sentences, the same can be said of his theory. The sentences to which Tarski’s theory applies are fully interpreted, and so also are meaningful. They characterize the world as being some way or another, and this in turn determines whether they are true or false. Indeed, Tarski needs there to be a fact of the matter about whether each sentence is true or false (abstracting away from context dependence), to ensure that the Tarski biconditionals do their job of fixing the extension of ‘is true’. (But note that just what this fact of the matter consists in is left open by the Tarskian apparatus.)

We thus find the usual candidate truth-bearers linked in a tight circle: interpreted sentences, the propositions they express, the belief speakers might hold towards them, and the acts of assertion they might perform with them are all connected by providing something meaningful. This makes them reasonable bearers of truth. For this reason, it seems, contemporary debates on truth have been much less concerned with the issue of truth-bearers than were the classical ones. Some issues remain, of course. Different metaphysical assumptions may place primary weight on some particular node in the circle, and some metaphysical views still challenge the existence of some of the nodes. Perhaps more importantly, different views on the nature of meaning itself might cast doubt on the coherence of some of the nodes. Notoriously for instance, Quineans (e.g., Quine, 1960) deny the existence of intensional entities, including propositions. Even so, it increasingly appears doubtful that attention to truth per se will bias us towards one particular primary bearer of truth.

For more on these issues, see King (2018).

There is a related, but somewhat different point, which is important to understanding the theories we have canvassed.

The neo-classical theories of truth start with truth-bearers which are already understood to be meaningful, and explain how they get their truth values. But along the way, they often do something more. Take the neo-classical correspondence theory, for instance. This theory, in effect, starts with a view of how propositions are meaningful. They are so in virtue of having constituents in the world, which are brought together in the right way. There are many complications about the nature of meaning, but at a minimum, this tells us what the truth conditions associated with a proposition are. The theory then explains how such truth conditions can lead to the truth value true , by the right fact existing .

Many theories of truth are like the neo-classical correspondence theory in being as much theories of how truth-bearers are meaningful as of how their truth values are fixed. Again, abstracting from some complications about meaning, this makes them theories both of truth conditions and truth values . The Tarskian theory of truth can be construed this way too. This can be seen both in the way the Tarski biconditionals are understood, and how a recursive theory of truth is understood. As we explained Convention T in section 2.2, the primary role of a Tarski biconditional of the form \(\ulcorner \ulcorner \phi \urcorner\) is true if and only if \(\phi \urcorner\) is to fix whether \(\phi\) is in the extension of ‘is true’ or not. But it can also be seen as stating the truth conditions of \(\phi\). Both rely on the fact that the unquoted occurrence of \(\phi\) is an occurrence of an interpreted sentence, which has a truth value, but also provides its truth conditions upon occasions of use.

Likewise, the base clauses of the recursive definition of truth, those for reference and satisfaction, are taken to state the relevant semantic properties of constituents of an interpreted sentence. In discussing Tarski’s theory of truth in section 2, we focused on how these determine the truth value of a sentence. But they also show us the truth conditions of a sentence are determined by these semantic properties. For instance, for a simple sentence like ‘Snow is white’, the theory tells us that the sentence is true if the referent of ‘Snow’ satisfies ‘white’. This can be understood as telling us that the truth conditions of ‘Snow is white’ are those conditions in which the referent of ‘Snow’ satisfies the predicate ‘is white’.

As we saw in sections 3 and 4, the Tarskian apparatus is often seen as needing some kind of supplementation to provide a full theory of truth. A full theory of truth conditions will likewise rest on how the Tarskian apparatus is put to use. In particular, just what kinds of conditions those in which the referent of ‘snow’ satisfies the predicate ‘is white’ are will depend on whether we opt for realist or anti-realist theories. The realist option will simply look for the conditions under which the stuff snow bears the property of whiteness; the anti-realist option will look to the conditions under which it can be verified, or asserted with warrant, that snow is white.

There is a broad family of theories of truth which are theories of truth conditions as well as truth values. This family includes the correspondence theory in all its forms – classical and modern. Yet this family is much wider than the correspondence theory, and wider than realist theories of truth more generally. Indeed, virtually all the theories of truth that make contributions to the realism/anti-realism debate are theories of truth conditions. In a slogan, for many approaches to truth, a theory of truth is a theory of truth conditions.

Any theory that provides a substantial account of truth conditions can offer a simple account of truth values: a truth-bearer provides truth conditions, and it is true if and only if the actual way things are is among them. Because of this, any such theory will imply a strong, but very particular, biconditional, close in form to the Tarski biconditionals. It can be made most vivid if we think of propositions as sets of truth conditions. Let \(p\) be a proposition, i.e., a set of truth conditions, and let \(a\) be the ‘actual world’, the condition that actually obtains. Then we can almost trivially see:

\(p\) is true if and only if \(a \in p\).

This is presumably necessary. But it is important to observe that it is in one respect crucially different from the genuine Tarski biconditionals. It makes no use of a non-quoted sentence, or in fact any sentence at all. It does not have the disquotational character of the Tarski biconditionals.

Though this may look like a principle that deflationists should applaud, it is not. Rather, it shows that deflationists cannot really hold a truth-conditional view of content at all. If they do, then they inter alia have a non-deflationary theory of truth, simply by linking truth value to truth conditions through the above biconditional. It is typical of thoroughgoing deflationist theories to present a non-truth-conditional theory of the contents of sentences: a non-truth-conditional account of what makes truth-bearers meaningful. We take it this is what is offered, for instance, by the use theory of propositions in Horwich (1990). It is certainly one of the leading ideas of Field (1986; 1994), which explore how a conceptual role account of content would ground a deflationist view of truth. Once one has a non-truth-conditional account of content, it is then possible to add a deflationist truth predicate, and use this to give purely deflationist statements of truth conditions. But the starting point must be a non-truth-conditional view of what makes truth-bearers meaningful.

Both deflationists and anti-realists start with something other than correspondence truth conditions. But whereas an anti-realist will propose a different theory of truth conditions, a deflationists will start with an account of content which is not a theory of truth conditions at all. The deflationist will then propose that the truth predicate, given by the Tarski biconditionals, is an additional device, not for understanding content, but for disquotation. It is a useful device, as we discussed in section 5.3, but it has nothing to do with content. To a deflationist, the meaningfulness of truth-bearers has nothing to do with truth.

It has been an influential idea, since the seminal work of Davidson (e.g., 1967), to see a Tarskian theory of truth as a theory of meaning. At least, as we have seen, a Tarskian theory can be seen as showing how the truth conditions of a sentence are determined by the semantic properties of its parts. More generally, as we see in much of the work of Davidson and of Dummett (e.g., 1959; 1976; 1983; 1991), giving a theory of truth conditions can be understood as a crucial part of giving a theory of meaning. Thus, any theory of truth that falls into the broad category of those which are theories of truth conditions can be seen as part of a theory of meaning. (For more discussion of these issues, see Higginbotham (1986; 1989) and the exchange between Higginbotham (1992) and Soames (1992).)

A number of commentators on Tarski (e.g., Etchemendy, 1988; Soames, 1984) have observed that the Tarskian apparatus needs to be understood in a particular way to make it suitable for giving a theory of meaning. Tarski’s work is often taken to show how to define a truth predicate. If it is so used, then whether or not a sentence is true becomes, in essence, a truth of mathematics. Presumably what truth conditions sentences of a natural language have is a contingent matter, so a truth predicate defined in this way cannot be used to give a theory of meaning for them. But the Tarskian apparatus need not be used just to explicitly define truth. The recursive characterization of truth can be used to state the semantic properties of sentences and their constituents, as a theory of meaning should. In such an application, truth is not taken to be explicitly defined, but rather the truth conditions of sentences are taken to be described. (See Heck, 1997 for more discussion.)

Inspired by Quine (e.g., 1960), Davidson himself is well known for taking a different approach to using a theory of truth as a theory of meaning than is implicit in Field (1972). Whereas a Field-inspired representational approach is based on a causal account of reference, Davidson (e.g., 1973) proposes a process of radical interpretation in which an interpreter builds a Tarskian theory to interpret a speaker as holding beliefs which are consistent, coherent, and largely true.

This led Davidson (e.g. 1986) to argue that most of our beliefs are true – a conclusion that squares well with the coherence theory of truth. This is a weaker claim than the neo-classical coherence theory would make. It does not insist that all the members of any coherent set of beliefs are true, or that truth simply consists in being a member of such a coherent set. But all the same, the conclusion that most of our beliefs are true, because their contents are to be understood through a process of radical interpretation which will make them a coherent and rational system, has a clear affinity with the neo-classical coherence theory.

In Davidson (1986), he thought his view of truth had enough affinity with the neo-classical coherence theory to warrant being called a coherence theory of truth, while at the same time he saw the role of Tarskian apparatus as warranting the claim that his view was also compatible with a kind of correspondence theory of truth.

In later work, however, Davidson reconsidered this position. In fact, already in Davidson (1977) he had expressed doubt about any understanding of the role of Tarski’s theory in radical interpretation that involves the kind of representational apparatus relied on by Field (1972), as we discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2. In the “Afterthoughts” to Davidson (1986), he also concluded that his view departs too far from the neo-classical coherence theory to be named one. What is important is rather the role of radical interpretation in the theory of content, and its leading to the idea that belief is veridical. These are indeed points connected to coherence, but not to the coherence theory of truth per se. They also comprise a strong form of anti-representationalism. Thus, though he does not advance a coherence theory of truth, he does advance a theory that stands in opposition to the representational variants of the correspondence theory we discussed in section 3.2.

For more on Davidson, see Glanzberg (2013) and the entry on Donald Davidson .

The relation between truth and meaning is not the only place where truth and language relate closely. Another is the idea, also much-stressed in the writings of Dummett (e.g., 1959), of the relation between truth and assertion. Again, it fits into a platitude:

Truth is the aim of assertion.

A person making an assertion, the platitude holds, aims to say something true.

It is easy to cast this platitude in a way that appears false. Surely, many speakers do not aim to say something true. Any speaker who lies does not. Any speaker whose aim is to flatter, or to deceive, aims at something other than truth.

The motivation for the truth-assertion platitude is rather different. It looks at assertion as a practice, in which certain rules are constitutive . As is often noted, the natural parallel here is with games, like chess or baseball, which are defined by certain rules. The platitude holds that it is constitutive of the practice of making assertions that assertions aim at truth. An assertion by its nature presents what it is saying as true, and any assertion which fails to be true is ipso facto liable to criticism, whether or not the person making the assertion themself wished to have said something true or to have lied.

Dummett’s original discussion of this idea was partially a criticism of deflationism (in particular, of views of Strawson, 1950). The idea that we fully explain the concept of truth by way of the Tarski biconditionals is challenged by the claim that the truth-assertion platitude is fundamental to truth. As Dummett there put it, what is left out by the Tarski biconditionals, and captured by the truth-assertion platitude, is the point of the concept of truth, or what the concept is used for. (For further discussion, see Glanzberg, 2003a and Wright, 1992.)

Whether or not assertion has such constitutive rules is, of course, controversial. But among those who accept that it does, the place of truth in the constitutive rules is itself controversial. The leading alternative, defended by Williamson (1996), is that knowledge, not truth, is fundamental to the constitutive rules of assertion. Williamson defends an account of assertion based on the rule that one must assert only what one knows.

For more on truth and assertion, see the papers in Brown and Cappelen (2011) and the entry on assertion .

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Davidson, Donald | facts | James, William | liar paradox | Peirce, Charles Sanders | realism | Tarski, Alfred: truth definitions | truth: axiomatic theories of | truth: coherence theory of | truth: correspondence theory of | truth: deflationism about | truth: identity theory of | truth: pluralist theories of

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Josh Parsons for advice on metaphysics, and to Jc Beall, Justin Khoo, Jason Stanley, Paul Teller, and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments on earlier drafts.

Copyright © 2018 by Michael Glanzberg < michael . glanzberg @ philosophy . rutgers . edu >

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Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Lying to Tell the Truth

Barbezieux, France, 1984. Two young men rendezvous at a “nearly empty café, just at the edge of town,” where they negotiate the terms of their love. “Thomas Andrieu,” a farmer’s son, “says that no one can know, everything must stay hidden. That is the condition: take it or leave it.” Philippe, the son of their high school’s principal, agrees to the secrecy, and to the lies. Before the boys abandon the café to consummate their desire in their locker room, Philippe asks why, out of all of the young men at their school, Thomas chose him. Their love affair will be brief and incandescent as “a firework exploding on a dark night in July,” yet Thomas’s answer, like that relationship, will remain with Philippe for the rest of his life: “ Because you will leave and we will stay. ”

Did this clandestine meeting ever take place? Did the real Thomas Andrieu actually utter such conspicuously literary, uncannily prescient words? Likely we will never know, for Philippe Besson’s Lie With Me (translated from the original French by Molly Ringwald) is no fact-checked work of nonfiction. Instead, this elegant and deceptively simple piece is subtitled “A Novel,” and is written in the mode or genre of “autofiction,” or fictionalized autobiography. Philippe, the narrator and protagonist, certainly shares enough in common with his author to tempt us to read through the lens of memoir. The basic plot points of Philippe’s character arc, from closeted young student in rural Charente to openly gay, internationally successful Parisian writer, correspond exactly with Besson’s own journey. And yet, at the same time, Besson clearly wants to discourage his readers from mistaking his novelistic creation for straightforward autobiography. “[My] books are fiction,” Philippe insists at one point. “Memoir doesn’t interest me.” Yes, it’s possible Philippe protests too much. Equally, though, it’s through the use of tongue-in-cheek statements like these that Besson prompts us to question our assumptions, to pay attention not only to the fictiveness of his novel, but also to the narrative quality of our own life stories.

Besson signals this metafictional skepticism from the novel’s opening page, in which an adult Philippe sits in a hotel lobby in 2007, watching people come and go: “I’ve always loved to do that, to invent the lives of strangers in passing,” he says. “It could almost be considered an obsession. I believe it started when I was a child. I remember its worrying my mother. ‘Stop with your lies!’ she would say. She used the word ‘lies’ instead of ‘stories,’ but nevertheless, it continued, and all these years later, I still find myself doing it.” It would be easy to dismiss Philippe’s mother’s stance as unsophisticated provincialism, mere parochial discomfort with an effete son’s far-flung fancies. Yet Besson is obviously also using the mother (who may or may not echo his own) to play devil’s advocate, to alert the reader to the artificiality of storytelling and, by extension, to the fictiveness inherent in the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves.

After this brief prologue, Philippe’s narrative rewinds to the year 1984, when he and Thomas are seventeen, just before their relationship begins. “I’m a student in terminal C at the Lycée Elie Vinet de Barbezieux,” Philippe tells us, and then, puzzlingly, immediately contradicts himself: “Barbezieux doesn’t exist.” Perhaps by this contradiction, Philippe means to suggest that the Barbezieux of his youth has disappeared—“who remembers the C terminals? They say ‘S’ today, I think”—or perhaps he is intimating that the Barbizeaux of Lie With Me only recreates the town as imperfectly as photographs capture sunsets or maps capture mountains. Or, indeed, perhaps Philippe is an unreliable narrator, misremembering, and the terminals were always labeled “S.” At any rate, the first-person narrative voice, always the adult Philippe’s, continues to skip back and forth through time, often editorializing around moments focalized through his seventeen-year-old self’s point of view, as when Philippe observes, “I am this young man there, in the winter of Barbezieux.” Lines like these, which on a purely semantic level test logic, function to draw attention to the separate yet somehow twinned consciousnesses of the author and his narrator-protagonist.

The triple entendre of the title unifies these metafictional games into a single thematic conceit, that of lying as lovemaking as storytelling. Most obviously, the title refers to the physical act of lying with another to make love, as Philippe and Thomas do, repeatedly, in unflinchingly painted scenes (Philippe tells us, “I let myself grow in his mouth . . . I’m struck by his voracity. He’s like a ravenous child who has just been given food and prefers to choke on it”). Secondly, the title refers to the deceptions that protect Thomas and Philippe’s secret affair, as when the boys are almost caught lying naked together in bed by Philippe’s mother. To avoid catastrophe, Philippe pretends they are working on a school project (“She doesn’t dare to push open the door. In the end we are saved by my ability to invent plausible lies”). And finally, most sophisticatedly, the title implicates the novel’s audience by referring to fictionalization itself, to the narrative acts of remembering and misremembering, fantasizing and imagining, which somehow tell us the truth of who we are even when they lie. After all, to illustrate the paradox of the truthful lie, what finer metaphor could there be than that of two young people, compelled by circumstance as if by fate to deceive their friends and family, precisely in order to safeguard the truths they can entrust only to each other?

For Philippe, and presumably also for Besson, storytelling—the crafting of the honest lie, the placement of the “art” in “artifice”—is as much an erotic pursuit as sex itself. Long after their affair has ended and Thomas and Philippe have gone their separate ways, Philippe reflects upon the possibility that the whole thing could have been “a complete invention”: “As you already know, I invented stories all the time, with so much authenticity that people usually ended up believing me (sometimes even I was no longer able to disentangle the true from the false). Could I have made this story up from scratch? Could I have turned an erotic passion into an obsession? Yes, it’s possible.” For Philippe and for the novel in a broader metaphysical sense, desire is the experience of need that necessitates sexuality and storytelling both. “You can’t fight necessity,” he tells us. “If you do, necessity will win.” Everyone knows that love renders to eros what is the god’s, but in the absence of love, in “the pain of missing someone,” Philippe finds another, sublimated way of ameliorating his yearnings. “Later I will write about this longing,” he says, “the intolerable deprivation of the other . . . I wonder sometimes if I have ever written of anything else.”

“ Because you will leave and we will stay. ” Thomas’s prediction, if not quite Greek in its stakes, has a prophetic quality nonetheless, and in the end it does come true. Like Besson before him, Philippe outgrows Barbezieux. He goes to university and becomes a novelist, making good on the promise of his middle-class upbringing. Thomas, by contrast, is left to inherit the family farm, to marry a Spanish girl, to sire a son, to live a lie in no clever, paradoxical sense, and finally, after abandoning his family in a too-late attempt to live freely and openly, to take his own life. This tragic news is relayed to Philippe by Thomas’s son, Lucas.

He is the one who speaks again: What about you? You will write about this story, won’t you? You won’t be able to stop yourself. I repeat that I never write about my life, that I’m a novelist. He smiles: Another one of your lies, right? I smile back at him. Will you allow me to write about it? He shrugs: I have nothing to forbid.

Lucas’s parting gift to Philippe is an old letter, never sent, discovered in Thomas’s wardrobe after his death, and addressed, of course, to Philippe. “ It was love ,” Thomas writes, and offers a blue sort of blessing: “ tomorrow, there will be a great emptiness. But we could not continue—you have your life waiting for you, and I will never change. ” Lie With Me , dedicated “In Memory of Thomas Andrieu, 1966-2016,” is surely Philippe’s answer to this letter, Besson’s way of sustaining desire and keeping love alive. “Perhaps writing is a good means of survival,” Philippe muses. “A way of not forgetting the ones who have disappeared.” A way of using lies not to hide, but finally, to tell the truth.

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Sample toefl essay – should we always tell the truth, the question.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Sometimes it is better to be dishonest with people than to always tell them the truth. Use specific reasons and details to support your answer.

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         Maintaining healthy relationships can be very difficult in today’s world, and there are many aspects of our interactions with others that we need to worry about.  In my opinion, there are times when it is better to not tell the truth to others. I feel this way for two reasons, which I will explore in the following essay.

          First of all, telling small lies can sometimes motivate the people we care about to excel. Humans are very competitive and want to be the best at whatever task they have been assigned. Whether they are involved in an athletic event or taking a test at school, they feel more motivated if they think it is possible that they will achieve an impressive result.  In cases like these, sometimes lying about their potential can encourage them to perform well. My own experience is a compelling example of this. Last year, my husband signed up for a marathon in our city. I knew that he would struggle to even finish the event, but I wanted him to feel confident about his ability. Accordingly, when he asked me for my opinion, I lied and said that he had a chance of finishing in the top ten. This gave him a lot of confidence and he dedicated himself to training for the marathon.  Even though he did not win the race, my small lie was enough to maintain his motivation both before and during the race. Had I told him what I really thought, he might have given up altogether.

         Secondly, being honest all of the time can lead to high levels of anxiety. If we tell unpleasant truths, we may spend days or hours worrying about the possible consequences of what we have revealed.  For instance, last week a colleague asked me what I thought of her new hairstyle. I was honest, and said that I thought it looked terrible. Though she did not express any anger at my remarks, I could see that she was really hurt by what I said. As a result of this, I spent the rest of the day worrying that I had jeopardized our friendship. My emotional state greatly reduced my productivity that day, and I am still a bit nervous that my colleague will hold a grudge against me. Had I simply said that her hair looked wonderful, I could have avoided all of these feelings.

        In conclusion, I believe that there are times when it is best to not tell the truth to others. This is because lies can motivate people to perform well, and because always being honest can sometimes cause personal turmoil. (438 words)

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Home — Essay Samples — Philosophy — Truth — Is It Better to Tell the Truth or Lie

Is It Better to Tell The Truth Or Lie

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Published: Sep 1, 2023

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Truth Essay Guide - Importance of a Truth Today

Any topic expressing a particular view of truth is a good idea as it's an all-time relevant issue. While working on a truth essay, you should combine examples from real-life, widely-accepted definitions, and personal experience to identify this phenomenon as accurately as possible.

If this writing guide, we will explain how to write an essay about truth, explore the matter in terms of prompts and topics, and provide you with some simple examples and tips.

What to Write in Your Truth Essay?

An essay on such a specific topic isn't a separate type of academic paper - it's just writing with a different subject matter. Defining it is not that easy. Our beliefs and perception of truth may vary depending on subjective experience and even life values. That is why one of the simplest strategies would be to come up with a definition of truth. There, you don't have to argue that lying is evil, and we should be honest with each other. You can just provide a trustworthy definition to the phenomena and analyze the way the world translates its importance. The main sources one can use for this paper are reliable websites and dictionaries.

And what if you're writing a philosophy essay? This is what is preferred the most amongst the college students because Philosophy offers more self-expression. Here, every opinion may be considered relevant if you provide the reader with reliable evidence and reasonable statements. But don't forget about the coherence. While being immersed in your thoughts, you may forget about the essay structure and start beating around the bush. To avoid that, pay attention to the structure of your truth essay and don't neglect to outline your assignment. Here is an example of how you can start this writing:

"I think that truth is one's perception of beliefs and decisions. The contrasting points of view predetermine the way each of us understands this phenomenon and answer the question, 'What is true or false?'. There is only one thing that unites all possible definitions of truth and makes people agree on it. That is something believed to be accurate while the opposite is wrong."

So, a philosophy essay on this topic is based more on the author's opinion than an official definition from the dictionary.

Master Absolute Truth Essay Writing

We've gone through two most popular assignment types that the students of different schools frequently deal with. But there are truth essays with other purposes that we must consider. Look through the following list with short explanations.

• Descriptive. Involving touch, smell, hear, sight, taste, try to describe what a true is by these means.
• Narrative. Create a narration in which the frankness will be a core idea.
• Compare-contrast. Analyze why people express the same or completely different opinions on truth.
• Cause-effect (problem-solution). Consider the consequences the world actually is facing because of the lie.
• Argumentative. Formulate an idea related to the topic and provide arguments showing your statement is true and valid.
• Persuasive. Convince the reader that a certain statement is/is not the truth.
• Reflective. The way you reflect on being honest or telling lies.

So, when you are assigned to write an essay on truth, you may focus on the purpose that interests you the most (unless the type is assigned)

10 Great Truth Essay Topics

There are many students thinking that truth essays are all about "grass is green" and "the moon has craters" issues. The joke is it's not true - there are many great ideas to write about. It depends on which aspect you wish to focus as well as the type of academic paper you have to turn in. Here are some questions to consider:

• The issue of true words through the history of mankind.
• Locke's theories of truth correspondence.
• The link between truth and honesty.
• The challenges of being sincere.
• The consequences of pretending to be someone else.
• The idea of honesty in "Dear Evan Hansen."
• Lies VS Truth: A never-never-ending battle.
• Importance of being honest as a postmodern thought.
• Situations in which lies could be justified.
• Lying to dear people. How do they know about you being dishonest?
• The correspondence theory of truth in everyday life.
• How lying can distort our sense of reality.

The range of possible topic options is far wider - just decide a knowledge of what life aspect, science, or course you can successfully apply in your assignment.

Essay Thesis Statement

Each paper of this type should have a frankness-related thesis statement. That is the main idea of the entire writing that should appear in the opening paragraph (introduction). In your conclusion, you may paraphrase the thesis from the first paragraph to remind people of what you plan to talk about. However, we advise you to make conclusions more valuable than that and come up with thought-provoking ideas.

Essay about Honesty

Now, we're going to provide several examples, and the first one is an essay about truth and honesty. These two terms are interrelated, and one can barely exist without another. You may start with something like this:

"How is telling accurate things related to honesty? Honesty is one of the best human traits as it refers to always being open, no matter how bitter or sweet it is. Honesty is what makes human beings brave and robust, and that is why it is one of the most significant traits of candidates to become a president and other ruling authorities. It can lead to certain problems, but people tend to sympathize with those who are honest. It's an integral part of morality, which is the best policy in relationships; it's a significant building block."

Essay about Lies

Is life worth lying? In an essay about lies, you may compare and contrast two opposites. It is okay if you think that telling lies is more beneficial than being frank in specific cases. Share some examples and try to prove your position by providing relevant evidence. Here's an example that can inspire you:

"Is there a single person in the world who has never told a lie throughout life? Excluding Jesus Christ and some other saints from the Bible, everyone has experienced lies from both sides - telling and being told. A completely honest person is a myth. It's not because all people are bad and insincere. In my essay, I'm going to prove that telling lies in some situations may save one's life."

Importance of Being Frank in Our Life

Here, you should provide enough arguments against lying. You may recall some episodes from your favorite movies or just depict real-life examples when telling lies ended up dramatically for both sides. One of the good examples could be Evan Hansen from the "Dear Evan Hansen" musical. There, the socially anxious boy pretended to be the friend of his classmate who committed suicide to make friends with his family. Then, he becomes a hero in the eyes of other people. It all resulted in a big confusion, and the boy was left with nothing.

Truth Essays for Kids

Such an essay for kids should explain what the matter of truth is from a childish perspective. Avoid using difficult, complex terms from philosophy or other science as your target audience won't understand the text. Try to explain what each complex term means.

"In human frankness, there is essential and biggest virtue. Sincerity refers to speaking exactly what you think and feel, and an honest man never tells a lie. We should start telling only the true things since our early days, and here, a lot depends on our parents. You might have had these conversations with them already. Lying to parents is the biggest sin, so practice being honest with them and people around. You may tell lies only in sporadic cases, ensuring that no one will suffer from it, but benefit."

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Home Essay Samples Philosophy

Essay Samples on Truth

Universal truth: the importance of good explanations.

Introduction As a young child, I remember believing in the fictitious story of Santa Claus based purely on imagination. Every Christmas, my friends, and family would celebrate “Santa” coming from the North Pole to bring presents to all children who behaved well. Eighty-four percent of...

Implementing the Four Noble Truths in Everyday Life

Introduction One of the fundamental doctrines of Buddhism set forth by Buddha himself are the Four Noble Truths. These contain the very essence of the Buddha's pragmatic teachings. The Buddha is known to attain enlightenment only after the realization of these four truths during his...

Maintaining Trust: Importance of Telling the Truth

Have you ever wondered if lying is right or wrong? Have you ever lied and been tricked into telling the truth? Most people have been tricked by pretty much everyone. Lying according to research is always wrong. Most people feel guilty about lying and almost...

• Communication

Evaluation of Truth in Life with Doubt and Skepticism

Skepticism brings us to doubt everything in our lives that we once perceived as true. David Hume, Rene Descartes, and Sextus Empiricus have all made a contribution with their stance on skepticism through their writings Discourse on the method of rightly conducting the reason, and...

Uncovering The True Fiction Behind Ishmael Beah’s Recount of His Life Story

What settles the difference between nonfiction and fiction? The specifics. In a nonfiction novel, the author is recounting on purely true events. However, in a fictional text, the author has a wide range of possibilities and can be very subjective. The specifics can be used...

• A Long Way Gone

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The Effects of Sincerity on Our Lives

Whoever Sows Truth does not always Reap Confidence Whoever usually sows truth, as amazing as it may seem, does not always receive confidence. When we talk about sincerity, we are undoubtedly facing a double-edged sword before which many feel uncomfortable and even threatened, because sometimes...

• Human Behavior

Why Facts Are the Enemy of Truth: Facts and Misrepresented Context

The definition of truth is the quality or state of being true. The word truth is used in everyone’s life, whether it is a mom teaching their kid to always tell the truth, or a kid learning that telling the truth can hurt someone’s feelings....

The Perception of Reality and Truth by People

Truth, the property of sentences, assertions, beliefs, thoughts, or propositions in metaphysics and philosophy are said to agree with the facts or state what is the case in normal discourse. Truth is the object of the belief; logical error is a mistake. Individuals need to...

Understanding the Power of Truth from the Perspective of Philosophy

The word 'truth' originates from the Anglo-Saxon word 'tree' meaning 'believed'. 'Belief' itself is from the word 'glycan', which means 'to esteem dear'. Etymologically, ‘truth' would be something accepted to be of some value, instead of essentially being right. 'Believe' is used in the more...

• Personal Philosophy

Understanding the Power of Truth and why it is so Important for Us

For as long as human beings have been able to think, they’ve had the desire to understand the truths of life. In ‘The Allegory of the Cave’, when referring to these desires Plato states, “God knows whether it is true”. When trying to answer many...

Development of Science in Postmodernistic Era

This “post-truth” phenomenon is essentially an extension of postmodernism. Postmodernism attacks the ideal of truth and embraces indeterminacy. The prevalence of postmodernism is a reaction to the flaws of the modern world since the 18-th century Enlightenment. In the Age of Enlightenment, one of what...

• Postmodernism

A Lie: Social and Philosophical Definiton of Lying

Someone could argue that from an early age, the parents, the school teachers and everyone who is being involved with children, advise them that lying is evil and they should not use it as a practice. However, is it always bad to lie? What if...

• Immanuel Kant

Edmund's Quest for Recognition in Shakespeare's "King Lear"

King Lear, one of William Shakespeare's most celebrated works, is a tragedy that explores the theme of revenge against society. The play follows the story of Edmund, the illegitimate son of the Earl of Gloucester, who seeks vengeance against those who have wronged him due...

Lying or Withholding the Truth in the Medical Setting

Withholding the truth about a patient’s health, health outcomes, or treatment can be taxing for families and medical providers. Doing so could also be in direct violation of a patient’s autonomy, their right to make rational decisions and choices regarding one’s overall well-being (Vaughn, 2013,...

Best topics on Truth

1. Universal Truth: the Importance of Good Explanations

2. Implementing the Four Noble Truths in Everyday Life

3. Maintaining Trust: Importance of Telling the Truth

4. Evaluation of Truth in Life with Doubt and Skepticism

5. Uncovering The True Fiction Behind Ishmael Beah’s Recount of His Life Story

6. The Effects of Sincerity on Our Lives

7. Why Facts Are the Enemy of Truth: Facts and Misrepresented Context

8. The Perception of Reality and Truth by People

9. Understanding the Power of Truth from the Perspective of Philosophy

10. Understanding the Power of Truth and why it is so Important for Us

11. Development of Science in Postmodernistic Era

12. A Lie: Social and Philosophical Definiton of Lying

13. Edmund’s Quest for Recognition in Shakespeare’s “King Lear”

14. Lying or Withholding the Truth in the Medical Setting

• Euthyphro Dilemma
• Ethics in Everyday Life
• John Stuart Mill
• Michel Foucault
• Allegory of The Cave

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7 Reasons Why You Should Always Tell the Truth

Every moment of our lives, we have the option to either tell the complete truth or make up a bold-faced lie. Lies can cover true feelings, make it easier to get out of things we don’t want to do and make us look better. They can also hurt not just the person that we tell the lie to, but ourselves as well. A big reason to not lie is to avoid the downfall of getting caught. However, many will still wonder what the most important aspects of telling the truth are.

What are the reasons why you should always tell the truth? You should always tell the truth because :

• The Truth Will Always Come Out
• It Will Make Things Worse for You
• You Don’t Want to Lose Respect
• It Will Help Everyone Grow
• There’s a Bigger Issue That Needs Attention
• You’re Usually Lying to Yourself the Most
• Lying Holds You Back

Honesty is important because it can help get to the deeper meaning of any issues that are at hand. It can ensure you are confronting yourself so that you can continue on a path toward a growth mindset. When you’re honest with everyone, it might be hard at the time, but eventually, things will get better, rather than a lie where things could actually end up getting worse.

The truth is always going to be there, and a lie is a choice made to avoid this. We’re going to help you better understand why you should always tell the truth, starting with the most important reason of all.

#1: The Truth Will Always Come Out

We’ve been taught since we were kids that the truth was always the right choice, even when it might have been hard. As adults, we might not always reflect on the real reasons why lying is the worst choice. Lying is bad because (Carey, 2008):

• It hurts other people
• It is deceptive
• It creates more issues
• It is bad for your health

“The truth will always come out in the end” is a common saying, but it isn’t always, well, the truth.

Imagine a girl who tells her parents she’s going to a friend’s house when really, she’s going to meet up with a boy that she was forbidden to date. They ask her the next day if she had fun at her friend’s house, and she replies, “Yeah, we watched a movie together.” Fifty years later, both of her parents have passed away, and not once did she ever reveal the truth. They lived a long and happy life, and not once did the daughter’s falsehood cause any conflict in the family.

On one hand, it’s safe to say her lie was never revealed. On the other hand, maybe her father had noticed but didn’t mind, keeping it hidden from his wife who would have caused a huge fight. The daughter never knew about this truth either.

We can’t say for certain whether the truth will always come out or not, but we can know that there will always be a possibility of the truth coming out. It is the person who holds this truth who has the most power over what will or will not be revealed.

It can sometimes be easier to keep a secret yourself rather than trusting others to do the same. Think of how easily secrets can spread. How many of those secrets have been lies?

Then what are you to do? Share the truth and be branded a liar, or change reality to suit the false information? Create more lies to cover up any loopholes in the first?

The possibility of a lie coming out can be the most challenging part. The fear over the exposure finally coming to the surface can engulf a happy mind and cause immense stress.

Consider those who confess to crimes after not being able to live with the secrecy. Sometimes the lie can become the reality to the point that people don’t even realize their dishonesty anymore.

It’s best to avoid the lies because not doing so means you never know what’s going to happen in the end. You might dig yourself into a deep hole by not sharing the reality and getting lost in the cover-ups.

#2: It Will Make Things Worse for You

Lying is something that is thought to be the most hurtful to the person who receives the lie. In reality, the liar is the one who will end up hurting the longer they keep up their facade.

Sometimes we lie because we think we’re protecting ourselves. We envision a terrible outcome from what could happen if we were to share the truth. In order to avoid that, it can be easy for many people to want to turn to the lie as a form of protection.

Unfortunately, this will only hurt the one who spills the deceit from their mouths.

It can start first by affecting your mental health. When you tell a lie, you are instantly putting yourself in a stressful situation. Sometimes it feels like you’re going to be fine in the end, and that’s why you lie. But really, you are causing more worry in your mind. You’re creating a focal point for anxiety to fester and blossom.

Anxiety can take a huge toll on not just your mental health but also your physical health. You might grind your teeth. Perhaps you pick at your fingers or at scabs on your face.

Some people even pull out their hair when they are under an intense amount of stress. It can affect you internally. You might feel sick to your stomach or have constant headaches from the anxiety.

It’s not necessarily the lie that will automatically begin manifesting itself through physical ailments; it’s the stressful life that can be created once a lie is told.

To see more ways that stress, fear, and anxiety can negatively affect your overall health, check out the video below:

Lying can also affect your sleep. You might have trouble getting to bed and falling asleep at a certain time because worried thoughts over the lie are consuming your brain.

If your sleep is messed up, then this will also negatively affect your overall health. You might struggle to pay attention and focus at work. Maybe the stress from everything is causing you to overeat or skip the gym. Whatever might be going on in your life, if we are not properly managing our mental health, it will reflect on our physical health much more than you would ever be able to imagine.

You will lower your self-esteem and lack confidence if you are constantly worried about a lie coming to the surface. It can make you very defensive. It can create this sort of blockage to any kind of criticism or comment that can be taken as something used against you.

When you are holding on to a lie, then that means that you are protecting something. There is a morsel of truth that you are desperately trying to cover up.

When you are acting in defense against that, this will show in other people. Somebody might make a completely unrelated comment to you, but your brain connects it back to the lie that you’re covering up, and this leads to a stressful thought. Then you believe that the other person might be out to get you.

It makes it hard for us to be ourselves because our true self is the person that knows the lie. The person that everybody else knows is the one who is living that lie.

It can be really hard to be comfortable with yourself and have high self-esteem when you’re so terrified about the truth coming to the surface.

#3: You Don’t Want to Lose Respect

Some lies are going to be bigger than others. When a friend asks, “Do I look fat in this dress?” you might lie a bit because you don’t want to hurt her feelings. When someone asks, “Can you help me move this weekend?” you might say that you’re busy with something else to avoid the extra labor.

When considering bigger lies that might end up hurting someone else in the process, you’ll want to consider filling out this chart below to determine if the lie is really going to be worth it in the end. It might seem like the lie is better, but really, it might just be easier at that moment.

Trust is one of the most important things you can have in a relationship. If there is no trust, then there is no dependency that others will want to rely on. There is no agreement between the two people that they can depend on the other person. Trust isn’t something that always is discussed upfront with others. Most of the time, we just have this underlying understanding with another person where we know that we can count on them to support us or keep a secret.

As soon as you show the other person that you have lied just one time, it can destroy that trust. They will start to wonder, “If they lied about that, what else might they have lied about?”

Lies are like things buried under the sand. You usually don’t know that you are walking on top of something when you’re strolling along the beach. As soon as one tiny little protrusion sticks up from the surface, you can pull it up to see that something giant has been hidden under there all along.

While you might have only lied just one time, that still doesn’t assure the other person of anything. You might beg and plead with them letting them know that truly, deeply, you only lied once. They might even forgive you for that lie, but they will still struggle to believe if that really was the only lie that you’ve told. They can forever wonder if you are still hiding something bigger. Other people will also question if you even told the entire truth about the lie, or if you just gave them a glimpse at something deeper that you tried to cover up.

A lie isn’t just a lie. It’s not just a sentence, a hidden object, a secret passed between others. It is an action. It is a lifestyle choice. It’s not just the lie that is hard to accept. Others will struggle after you’ve lied to them because they won’t know if there are other parts of yourself that you have hidden.

If you’re good at lying about where you were the night before, maybe you’re also good at lying about whether or not you truly love them.

Lying can really mess with a person’s head. It can make them doubt you and everything that they know to be true.

More people will be able to tell if you are lying than you’d think. You might have thought you got away with a lie, but maybe the other person is just not as great at confrontation. They could seemingly accept the false information that you fed to them, but perhaps they already know the truth anyway.

This video shows how easy it is to see if someone is lying:

It’s a reminder that even though someone won’t blatantly call you out when you’re lying, they can still likely pick up on the half-truth you’re sharing. Don’t risk someone losing respect for you because of a lie. Take an honest way to ensure your relationships will continue in the right direction.

#4: It Will Help Everyone Grow

A lie is something that is told usually to cover up an issue. Nobody lies just for fun. Perhaps there is that individual who lies about having more money, nicer things, and greater experiences than other people. But still, there is an underlying issue there.

When we begin to choose the truth over a lie, that is when people will actually be able to grow rather than focusing on trying to bury the actual issue.

Lying can just make things worse. It can destroy trust in a relationship and ruin the bond that two people have managed to create. Telling the truth is important because it will help everybody to grow. When you learn how to properly express your feelings and share those with other people, it creates a closer connection.

Perhaps you decide to lie to your significant other and tell them that you’re not upset after you’ve had a fight. Maybe you are still harboring some resentment, but you don’t feel like talking about it or getting into an argument, so you just tell them that it’s all good now.

Unfortunately, this just causes that to fester inside of you. Your significant other isn’t going to be reflecting on this issue anymore. They’ve moved on now because they think that you’re fine. The issue might come up again and you have to go through this experience all over. If you had told the truth from the start, it could have helped show the significant other your perspective, giving them the opportunity to grow from it.

In reality, we need to confront that issue so that you can share it with the other person and come to a healthier conclusion in the end rather than just saying, “I’m fine,” when you’re actually suffering.

You can talk things out and get to a place where both of you can grow. The issue that many people have is that they don’t know how to effectively communicate with others. In order to properly share your feelings and discuss the truth in a way that won’t cause an explosive issue, you have to check in with how you are sharing your words.

Let them know why you decided to lie. Don’t just reveal the lie and have them suddenly blame you for that. You want to approach the topic to get to the root of the issue. These are a few phrases that you can say in order to help smooth over a conversation and keep it civil so that the both of you end up growing closer together in the end, rather than letting a lie tear you apart (Smith, 2017).

It’s better to approach the topic by sharing the “why” and also stating that you didn’t tell the truth rather than blatantly saying, “I lied.” It’s never going to be easy, but open and honest communication is essential for a healthy relationship and a happy life.

#5: There’s a Bigger Issue That Needs Attention

Truth is like a seed. When you lie, you bury that seed deep into the ground, but that truth is going to continue to grow and grow. It might take it a while to get to the surface, but eventually, it will. Once it is at the surface, it has likely collected to become even bigger than it would have been if you just would have planted the seed of truth at the surface from the start.

Lying only continues to cover up something that needs to be confronted. Imagine that you have an infected cut on your arm. You can put a Band-Aid on it, but if you are not properly caring for that infection, it’s going to spread to every part of your body.

A lie is like a Band-Aid on top of an infected wound. It might make everything seem like it is okay, but there is a deeper issue going on. A common lie we have is that we tell our friends, our family, or whoever we are closest to that we are fine and that we are happy when we actually are not.

It’s important that we begin to confront the truth to address these underlying issues and help everyone grow along the way.

To further explore this topic, this video is a great one that gets into the details of the psychology of lying:

#6: You’re Usually Lying to Yourself the Most

We lie to other people because we don’t want the truth to come out. In reality, we are lying to ourselves the most. We are talking to our own brains and convincing them of a truth that is not real. You can lie to your coworkers, to your friends, and to the person that you share a bed with every night, but the person that we end up lying to more than anyone else will always be ourselves.

Oftentimes, this issue is something that deals directly with yourself. Perhaps you lie to other people about how much you enjoy your job. Maybe you continue to go on about how great it is, always talking about the fun work parties, the many benefits, and your huge paycheck. Other people might not really care whether or not you like your job. They have their own lives going on, and while they are happy for you, it really doesn’t concern them one way or another.

You might continue to talk about this as a way to validate your own perspective.

After a while, it’s not even about convincing other people that you’re happy; instead, it’s about convincing yourself.

The more that somebody talks about something and has to validate it to others, usually, the more that they have to validate it to themselves.

When you want to lie, you have to look deep inside yourself and ask if there is a truth you are trying to keep from your own mind (Kornet, 1997).

#7: Lying Holds You Back

For all of the other reasons that we discussed above, lying is only going to hold you back. It’s going to make you sick because you’ll think about how the truth is going to come out. It’s going to make things worse for you because it could lead to stress and anxiety. People might lose respect, and you can destroy relationships.

You might cover up the actual issue that needs to be addressed.

The truth is hard. It can be scary, and it can be messy. However, the truth can also help release us from the restrictions we’ve placed with the lie.

Life is all about growing and becoming a better person tomorrow than the one that you were yesterday.

Lying is going to keep you stuck in that mindset that you had when you began the actual lie. Lying is like a weighted chain that keeps you trapped to the ground. You will be stationary, whereas truth can help you actually grow. You can continue to pretend like everything is fine and nothing is wrong by creating lie after lie after lie.

Or you can tell the truth, the first time, deal with all those messy consequences, and then put that behind you as you move on. A lie is like taking the hard emotion or that challenging issue and putting it in your back pocket.

It might not be right in front of you, but it will always be right behind you. It will always be there with you. Only the truth can be left behind. Yes, the truth could negatively impact you for a month or even a year at a time. However, it will eventually help to release you.

For example, imagine a husband and wife who have been together for five years. They had a great relationship at the start but unfortunately, things have gotten messy.

They’re constantly fighting and neither one really wants to be with the other person. However, they continue to lie to themselves and pretend as though everything is good because they have a young child, and they are too afraid to be alone. They continue to live unhappy for the next 15 years. Eventually, one of them cheats on the other. Everything gets messy, and they divorce.

They could have revealed the truth 15 years ago and released themselves from that situation.

They might have gotten a divorce, and it would have been ugly for a year or so. It was messy, they fought, and their families were upset. It did put a little pressure on the child. However, after two years, everything settled down, and they are all completely happy. They’ve each remarried and started a brand-new life with people that they truly love.

The child is thriving because they have two different homes filled with people who love them. It was messy, and it was awful for those two years, but now it is better than it ever could have been in the other situation where they were miserable for those 15 years.

The truth can be bad, but lying will always be worse.

Related Questions

To lie or not to lie is a dilemma we might often find ourselves in. It’s a good topic to explore more of, so check out these further questions to get the most out of your perspective on lying.

Is it lying if I don’t say anything at all?

You might wonder if you avoid responding to a question rather than telling a lie, is that being dishonest? That can be dependent on the situation. If the truth is unnecessary, like an employer asking why you left your last job, you can gloss over the truth and say you were let go, but you don’t have to go into the dirty details of how you were fired for showing up late three times in one week. Question who you are hurting by hiding the truth. Anytime the truth is intentionally hidden, it is dishonesty. It’s ok to not get too deep into the details of a situation, but when someone is intentionally seeking out the truth and it is intentionally hidden, that can be just as bad as lying.

Will, there ever be a time when telling a lie is good? You might find yourself in a situation where lying is going to help others. Perhaps you’re working in a bank and a robber comes in, so you lie and say you’re the only one there to protect coworkers in the back. Maybe bullies in school are asking something personal and you lie to make sure they don’t attack you or a friend. If the lie will protect someone’s life or health, you might consider lying. Eventually, you will want to share the truth, but safety is important, so it’s ok to make sure you are protecting others. There are a few serious situations where a lie could help act as a defense, but for the most part, it’s best, to be honest.

S.Y.H Staff is a collection of writers whose purpose is to provide the best value and information on the article's content.

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Home / Essay Samples / Literature / Lying / Ethical Implications of Truth-Telling and Lying in Every Day Life

Ethical Implications of Truth-Telling and Lying in Every Day Life

• Category: Literature , Philosophy
• Topic: Lying , Truth

Pages: 4 (1717 words)

Views: 1799

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• Translated by H. Browne. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 3. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co. , 1887. ) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight.
• Bok, Sissela. Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
• Greenberg, Michael A. 'The Consequences of Truth-Telling. ' JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association 266 (1991): 66.

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