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„Auf den Straßen sprachen plötzlich viele Menschen meine Sprache“: Soltani in Frankfurt/Main Foto: Bernd Hartung

Essay zu Integration und Zuwanderung : Dieses Deutschland gehört mir

Die Deutschiranerin Yasaman Soltani hörte oft, sie solle dahin zurückgehen, wo sie herkomme. Sie ging wirklich, kehrte zurück – und hat viel gelernt.

Ein Artikel von

Yasaman Soltani

21.6.2020, 12:50  Uhr

F rau Soltani, wenn es Ihnen hier nicht gefällt, dann gehen Sie doch wieder dorthin zurück, wo Sie hergekommen sind.“

Als ich vor acht Jahren einen Leserartikel für Zeit Online schrieb und darin ausführte, dass die Integration von Ausländern nicht nur durch diese zu erreichen sei, sondern auch eine Beteiligung der deutschen Bevölkerung erfordere, las ich zahllose Kommentare, die mir ein verbales Rückflugticket ausstellten. Damals, 2012, war das Wort „Hasskommentar“ noch neu, und ich kannte den Umgang damit nicht.

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Ich las einen nach dem anderen und wurde trauriger und trauriger, bis ich endlich verstand, dass es sich nicht um konstruktive Kritik an meinem Artikel handelte. Meine Sätze hatten etwas angerührt. 50.000 Aufrufe. 522 Kommentare. Über Tage meistgelesener Artikel. Ich versuchte, die Kontrolle über die Reaktionen zu gewinnen, erstellte eine Liste, in die ich alle positiven und negativen Kommentare eintrug. Doch ihre Worte schwirrten mir im Kopf umher und taten weh. Die Negativen hatten einfach mehr Gewicht.

Kommentar Nummer 66 lautete: „Wer die angebotene Wurst nicht will, verlässt bitte den Laden und lässt sich woanders bedienen.“ Aber in welchen anderen Laden sollte ich denn gehen? War dieses Land nicht mein Laden? „Warum hassen sie uns?“, hatten Asylbewerber in Hoyerswerda damals auf ein Laken geschrieben.

Heute frage ich mich das nicht mehr. Das „Warum“ interessiert mich schlicht nicht mehr. Früher, als Jugendliche, habe ich diskutiert, mich gewehrt. An Wahlständen der CDU stemmten wir uns gegen Gegner der doppelten Staatsbürgerschaft. Wir wollten unsere Herkunft nicht aufgeben, und wir wollten Deutsche sein.

Bei meinem Schülerpraktikum in einer Werbeagentur regte man sich beim Mittagessen gern über die „Ausländer“ auf, und ich, in meiner frischen Bereitschaft, mich aufzulehnen, hielt dagegen. „Auch ich bin Ausländerin“, verkündete ich. „Nein, du bist anders. Du bist total gut integriert.“ Total gut integriert? Wer waren sie, dass sie mir in meinem vermeintlich eigenen Land, diese Auszeichnung gaben? Durfte ich es andersherum genauso? Durfte ich zu ihnen auch „Du sprichst aber gut Deutsch“ sagen?

Kommentar Nummer 22: „Liebe Zuwanderer, nutzt das Angebot, anstatt zu meckern. Auf dem silbernen Ta­blett werdet ihr die Integration nämlich kaum hinterhergetragen bekommen. Mein Nachbar aus Jugoslavien (sic) ist bestens integriert. Und jugo­slavisch (sic) spricht er nicht mehr – er hat sein Geburtsland hinter sich gelassen. Er hat keine doppelte Staatsangehörigkeit! Er hat sich eben ganz und gar integriert und ist von einem Einheimischen nicht mehr zu unterscheiden.“

Einmal abgesehen davon, dass es 2012 das Land Jugoslawien gar nicht mehr gab und es die Sprache Jugoslawisch nie gegeben hat, fragte ich mich, ob der Leser recht hatte. War das das Rezept, um hier akzeptiert zu werden? Seine Muttersprache nicht mehr sprechen? Sein Vaterland hinter sich lassen?

Mein Vaterland ist der Iran. Dort bin ich 1983 geboren. Wir verließen meine Heimat, als ich sechs Jahre alt war. Meine Eltern waren damals Anfang dreißig, mein Bruder war gerade mal drei. Es war keine gute Zeit, um im Iran zu leben. Der Iran-Irak-Krieg war seit einem Jahr zu Ende, das Land war farblos und karg. Aber 1989 war auch keine gute Zeit, um in Deutschland anzukommen.

Hoyerswerda, 1991.

Rostock-Lichtenhagen, 1992.

Solingen, 1993.

Als ich erwachsen war, erzählte mir mein Vater, dass er nach unserer Ankunft aus Deutschland fliehen wollte. Dabei waren wir doch gerade erst geflohen. Wir waren Flüchtlinge. Und er erzählte mir auch, dass er sich damals einen Vollbart wachsen ließ. Ein Gemisch aus Wut und Trotz. Vielleicht auch Stolz. Er wollte sich als Ausländer nicht verstecken.

Wir lebten in Frankfurt am Main. Ich erinnere mich an wenig aus dieser Zeit. Ich aß hier meine erste Banane, das weiß ich noch. Und ich erinnere mich an einen Schultag, an dem meine Mutter mich zu spät abholte. Ich saß weinend im Büro der Schulleiterin, die mir Fragen auf Deutsch stellte, die ich zwar verstand, doch nicht auf Deutsch beantworten konnte. Vielleicht war es auch mein Schluchzen, das mich vom Antworten abhielt. Ich weiß es nicht mehr.

Ich weiß nur, dass ich nickte und den Kopf schüttelte, um ihre Fragen zu beantworten. Nur sieht das persische Nicken und Kopfschütteln anders aus als das Deutsche. Im Iran hebt man sein Kinn, um zu sagen: „Nein.“ Die umgekehrte Bewegung, also, das Kinn zu senken, bedeutet „Ja.“ Und so hielt die Schulleiterin sowohl mein Ja als auch mein Nein für ein amputiertes Ja.

Ich erinnere mich auch daran, dass wir für unseren Asylantrag Stuhlproben abgeben mussten. Auch wir Kinder mussten uns im Bad auf den Boden hocken und auf ein Stück Papier kacken, damit wir es eintüten und verschicken konnten.

Ich erinnere mich, dass ich nicht konnte und wie meine Mutter, die die Angst vor den deutschen Behörden noch nicht verinnerlicht hatte, kurzerhand das Produkt meines Bruders halbierte und eine der Hälften in meinem Namen abschickte. Mit sechs Jahren wusste ich nicht, was Erniedrigung bedeutet, doch diese Szene ist mir in meinem erwachsenen Gehirn als erniedrigend in Erinnerung geblieben.

Volle Spalte unterm Artikel

Mehr zum thema, bildungsaktivistin über diversität, „ich möchte meinen teil beitragen“.

Gloria Boateng wünscht sich eine Gesellschaft, an der alle partizipieren. Für ihre Arbeit beim Verein SchlauFox ist sie mehrfach ausgezeichnet worden.  

Migration und Fachkräftemangel

Was immer ihn glücklich macht.

Ein junger Vietnamese bekommt in Thüringen die Chance, Elektroniker zu werden. Nach drei Monaten schmeißt er hin. Die Story eines Missverständnisses.   Anna Lehmann

Diskriminierung in Edeka-Markt

Job nur ohne kopftuch.

Der Geschäftsführer eines Hamburger Edeka verbot Meriam B., mit Kopftuch zu arbeiten. B. machte den Fall öffentlich – und bekam eine Entschuldigung.   Yasemin Fusco

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Leser*innenkommentare

E ine letzte Sache: Die Autorin beklagt sehr zurecht den antisemitischen Anschlag von Halle, den rechtsextremen Mord an Walter Lübcke und das Massaker von Hanau. Aus diesen verurteilenswürdigen Gewalttaten leitet sie jedoch am Ende ihres Artikels ab, dass sie am liebsten in den Iran zurückkehren würde, und dass bloß das Corona-Virus ihr einen Strich durch die Rechnung gemacht habe. Was sie jedoch geflissentlich verschweigt, ist, dass erst im November letzten Jahres die iranische Regierung – kein geistesgestörter Einzeltäter, sondern der Staat selbst! – 1500 Menschen auf offener Straße ermordete und tausende Menschen dafür festnahm, dass sie ihren politischen Dissenz ausdrückte. Weiterhin haben Frauen nach den geltenden Scharia-Gesetzen weniger Rechte als Männer; Ehrenmorde und Kinderhe dominieren weiterhin vielerorts das Familienleben. All dies kommt in Frau Soltanis Artikel überhaupt nicht vor, der doch die Abwägung zwischen ihren beiden Heimaten zum Kerninhalt hat. Hingegen schildert sie, wie toll es ihr in Teheran gefiel, wie sie Yoga- und Philosophiekurse besuchte, und dass ihr die deutsche Mentalität im Vergleich zur iranischen Lebensfreude vor allem gegen den Strich gehe. Dieser maximal privilegierte und von der realen Lebenserfahrungen der meisten iranischen Frauen absolut losgelöste Reiz des Exotischen wird den Terrorakten auf deutschem Boden entgegengestellt, so als ob hier die Hölle und dort das Paradies auf Erden läge. Und doch fliehen die Menschen aus dem Iran nach Deutschland, nicht umgekehrt. Mit ihrer zugleich maximal privilegierten und zutiefst selbstmitleidigen Perspektive, die alle Erfahrungen nur als Bestätigungen des eigenen Weltbildes – und nicht zuletzt: der eigenen romantischen Vorstellung vom lebensfrohen Orient – einordnen kann, ist Frau Yasaman Soltani am Ende doch ein gutes Stück deutscher, als sie es sich selbst eingestehen will. Eine Kartoffel mit Safran eben.

i ch stamme aus dem Iran. Ich kam im Jahre 1986, mit 25 Jahren, nach Deutschland. Die Erfahrungen, die Frau Soltani an dieser Stelle schildert, teile ich auf keine Weise. Tatsächlich verhält es sich in meinem Falle ganz gegenteilig: Ich habe hier Menschen kennengelernt und Erfahrungen gemacht, die ich im Iran niemals hätte kennenlernen oder machen können. Ich kam damals nach Deutschland, weil ich in Freiheit leben wollte; genau diese Freiheit habe ich hier gefunden. Dies weiß ich wertzuschätzen, und dafür bin ich dankbar. Ich frage mich wirklich, warum Frauen, deren Eltern vor einem totalitären theokratischen Regime hierher geflohen sind, hier Schutz und Sicherheit gesucht – und gefunden – haben, und die alles dafür gaben, um ihre Tochter in Freiheit erziehen und studieren lassen zu können, warum eine Frau wie Yasaman Soltani also sich so undankbar und verbittert über dieses Land und seine autochthone Bevölkerung äußert. Es ist schade, dass ich der deutschen Schriftsprache nicht so perfekt mächtig bin wie Frau Soltani, sonst hätte auch ich meine Erfahrungen verfassen und veröffentlichen können; es handelt sich, wie bereits gesagt, um das genaue Gegenteil des im Artikel geschilderten Leidens. Jedoch kommt noch hinzu, dass kein Autor und keine Journalistin Interesse an unserem Schicksal, an den Erzählungen von Migrantinnen mit positivem Bezug zu Deutschland und den Deutschen hat. Exil-Iranerinnen meiner Generation scheinen in der Welt der akademisch gebildeten medialen Elite gar nicht zu existieren. Im Gegensatz zur Generation von Frau Yasaman Soltani musste ich Zensur leider schon öfter erleben.

D arf ich Dich mal kurz drücken,

Gustavo Cortes

D anke für den tollen Artikel. Obwohl ich auch einen ausländischen Vor- und Nachnamen habe und - anders als Frau Soltani - sogar optisch sofort als "Ausländer" identifiziert werden kann, habe ich viele Erfahrungen nie machen müssen. Ich bin auch in etwa im selben Alter und genauso lange hier.

Ich habe Rassismus nur eine Handvoll Mal im privaten erlebt. (Kein Einlass in die Disko, Wohnungssuche etc.) jedoch nie einen institutionalisierten durch Behörden oder auch meine Universität. Vielleicht einer der Vorteile der Provinz in der ich aufwuchs? Keine Ahnung.

Links van der Linke

V ielen, vielen Dank für den klaren Text. In einer ähnlich Situation entschied ich, nicht zurückzukehren, in Deutschland als Heitmatloser zu bleiben, in meinem Deutschland, wie ich jetzt lese. Danke!

Peter Hansen

L iebe Frau Soltani, schön, dass es Sie gibt und das Sie hier sind.

SteelTownSteve

B ei uns in Duisburg da fragt man nich woher kommze oder wat Du bis, sondern da fragt man watte kannz. In diesem Sinne sollte es funktionieren. Aber von beiden Seiten.

E in sehr schöner Text. Vielen Dank, Frau Soltani. :-)

Sie decken Misstände auf - und zwar in einer Weise, die betroffen macht. Und ich hoffe, Sie finden hier in Deutschland doch auch ein Stück Heimat.

Vielleicht hilft dabei der folgende Gedanke:

Deutschland ist sicher auch nicht die beste aller Welten. Ausländerfeindlichkeit gibt es leider überall. Vermutlich auch im Iran.

Und leider gibt es auch viele Gründe diskriminiert zu werden. Wegen seiner Herkunft, seines Glaubens, seiner sexuellen Orientierung, seiner politischen Auffassung.

Aber im Vergleich zu vielen Ländern dieser Welt haben wir in Deutschland sicher eine verhältnismäßig offene und tolerante Gesellschaft. Bei allen Unzulänglichkeiten ist dies vielleicht ab und an ein Trost.

Und Ihr Essay hilft dabei, von- und miteinander zu lernen. Lassen Sie sich nicht entmutigen! :-)

@honkytonky M it Ihrem Kommentar beschönigen Sie die hiesigen diskriminierenden Verhältnisse, verneinen Kritik und Proteste der Aktivist*innen wie BLM. Vergleiche sind kaum eine Hilfe, wenn es um auitobiographische Berichte von Unterdrückung geht. Diskriminierungserfahrungen mit Relativierungen zu begegnen ist wie in vielen anderen Fällen auch eine schlechte Idee. Es geht auch nicht um eine tolerante Gesellschaft sondern um AKZEPTANZ. Die Menschen annehmen und nicht bloß dulden. "Ausländer*innenfeindlichkeit" ist ein veralteter Begriff und hier unzutreffend. Es geht eben nicht um die Staatsangehörigkeit - oftmals haben die negativ Betroffenen ja sogar bspw. einen deutschen Pass - sondern um (kultur)rassistische Bewertungen, Haltungen und Handeln. Gut gemeint ist nicht immer auch gut, würde ich meinen. Vielleicht setzen Sie sich mal mehr mit der Perspektive von negativ Betroffenen auseinander.

A syl zu erhalten ist ein Menschenrecht. Nicht mehr, und nicht weniger, und das Recht darauf ist schon gar nicht "von Deutschlands Gnaden". Ich schäme mich für "die Deutschen", immer und immer wieder, und eigentlich fehlen mir die Worte um auszudrücken was ich sagen möchte.

Ich kenne Ihre Probleme quasi aus der zweiten Reihe.

Sowohl mein Ex-Mann ( seit 25 Jahren in D), als auch mein Partner (seit 30 Jahren in CH) wird es immer noch schwer gemacht in ihrer "neuen" Heimat anzukommen und sich heimisch zu fühlen. Dabei leben beide länger in Europa, als sie in ihrem Geburtsland je gelebt haben.

Was ist so schwer daran Menschen als genau das zu akzeptieren was sie sind, nämlich Menschen.

C hapeau Madame!

V ielen Dank für Ihren Einblick Yasaman Soltani! Ich wünsche Ihnen alles Gute und dass es Ihnen gelingt, trotz der Widrigkeiten sich da zuhause fühlen können, wo Sie es wollen! Und das selbstredend auch in Deutschland! Ich würde viele der Kommentare als den Extremismus der (bürgerlichen) Mitte deuten, der als reaktionärer Nährboden für Nazismus dienen kann. Ein Ergebnis der Digitalisierung und damit auch der digitalen Verbreitung von Haltungen, die bis vor einer Weile zuvorderst auf Stammtischen (und sicherlich auch in Vereinen, Parteisitzungen, Hörsäälen u.ä.) zu hören gewesen sind. Solche Absonderungen sind hier ja auch vorzufinden. Eine politische Haltung, für die die AFD einsteht, sie befeuert und von der sie versucht zu profitieren. Entsprechend beeinflusst ist auch der Diskurs. Lichtblicke sehe ich aber auch wie Sie immer wieder. Bleibt zu hoffen und daran zu arbeiten, dass weitere Verschärfungen im Sinne der Rechten verhindert bzw. zurückgedrängt werden können. ¡No pasarán!

S itze am Bosporus auf meinem Stuhl gefesselt und versuche den Text meine Frau zu übersetzen. Klasse geschrieben! Ich habe mich wiedergefunden in Ihrem Artikel. Bin der Meinung dass Sie Kapitel Iran zu früh geschlossen haben. Das passt gar nicht zu Ihrem Lebenslauf. Wenn Sie jetzt aufgeben dann frage ich Sie warum Sie nicht vor zehn oder zwanzig Jahren nicht aufgegeben haben. Viele Grüße aus dem Bosporus an Frau Soltani und alle taz LeserInnen Ertan K.

Burak Gunbatar

F rau Soltani, Sie haben mir als in ein in Deutschland geborener Kanake (Deutschtürke oder was auch immer) aus der Seele gesprochen. ich bin 6 Jahre älter als Sie und habe schon, denke ich mittlerweile, einen Dachschaden vom Alltagsrassismus: Wohnungssuche, Arbeitssuche, aggressive Blicke von biologisch Deutschen auf der Strasse, in der Bahn, Sprüche wie z.B. " ich kann deinen Namen nicht aussprechen" auf der Arbeit, alle par Jahre (oder Monate, je nach dem wo ich mich befinde) wiederkehrende physikalische Angriffe von Nazis, verbale Attacken von Nazi- Trollen im Internet, aggressive Blicke, wenn ich am Telefon mit jemandem mich auf Türkisch unterhalte, Beleidigungen auf der Strasse nach einem Deutschlandländerspiel ...Die ganzen ständig seit 40 Jahren wiederkehrenden ausländerfeindlichen Wahlkämpfe von Verbot doppelter Staatsbürgerschaft an Türken (" Wo kann ich gegen türken unterschreiben?" hiess es damals von Pasanten auf der Strasse , wissen Sie noch?) bis dato. Ich Frau Soltani, auch ich bin deswegen schon mal in die heimat, bei mir Türkei, ausgezogen; leider auch erfolglos. Das Problem ist leider, dass die Wirtschaft in diesen Ländern instabil ist. Freiheit: gut, die gibt es meiner Ansicht nach auch nicht in der bürgerlichen Demokratie der BRD mitsamt seinen Zeitarbeitsfirmen, Hartz4 und AFD&Co. Das heisst selbsverständlich nicht, dass ich das autokratische Regime in Teheran oder Ankara gutheisse. Ich habe es einfach satt, bei der Wohnungssuche derart behandelt zu werden, oder die Blicke von Biodeutsche auf der Strasse zu ertragen, dass ich den Spaziergang ohne rassistischen Blicke in Istanbul etc. einfach vermisse. Grüße

09139 (Profil gelöscht)

S ehr guter Artikel, danke! Ich denke und hoffe, dass ein Großteil der Menschheit keine Bewertung eines Menschen abgibt abhängig davon , wo der Mensch herkommt, wie er spricht, an was er glaubt, welche Hautfarbe er hat, usw. Leider gibts halt in D so erzkonservative Fanatiker wie die AfD, die so etwas zum Thema machen und Menschen danach werten.

N icht nur "Nichtdeutsche" werden diskriminiert. Auch wir Deutschen aus den " neuen" Bundesländern standen oder stehen zum Teil in der bundesdeutschen Gesellschaftshirarchie im Gefühl der Deutschen aus den " alten" Bundesländern unten. Die "unsichtbare" Hirarchie in der Arbeitswelt eines deutschen Autoherstellers im Jahr 2001 wie folgt: Einheimischer ( Bayer), dann Türken, Griechen, Italiener in dritter Generation, dann Osteuropäer wie Polen und Ukrainer. Ganz unten dann die Ostdeutschen. Da erzählte der einheimischen Bayer dem Deutschtürken einen Witz. Was haben wir gegen schwere Arbeit ? . . . Na die ostdeutschen Leiharbeiter. Und alles lachte . . . . Na ja, die Illusion von Brüderlichkeit und Einigkeit ist längst geplatzt. Seien sie stolz auf sich selbst, ihre Leistung und Wurzeln. Gehen sie mit erhobenen Haupt durch dieses Deutschland. Ohne Marshallplan und Gastarbeiter wäre Westdeutschland nie dort, wo es 1989 stand.

02881 (Profil gelöscht)

A uch von mir - danke für diesen Text!

tomás zerolo

. ..und Sie gehören auch zu diesem Deutschland.

Ein Glück für dieses Deutschland, würde ich sagen.

Mich hat dieser Text nah an die Tränen gebracht. Danke dafür.

D ie im Artikel getätigten Beobachtungen bzw. die Schilderungen der erlebten (subtilen) Diskriminierungen stehen sicherlich für sich selbst.

Aber was sind die Ursachen?

Meiner Ansicht nach geht es im Wesentlichen um Verteilungskämpfe, konkreter um Wohlstand, um die besten Arbeitsplätze, es geht um Macht. Diskriminierungen, z.B. aufgrund der Herkunft, sind meistens nur Mittel zum Zweck und in der Regel nicht Ausdruck echten Rassismus.

Die Verfasserin schreibt im Artikel, man müsse in der Gesellschaft oben einsteigen, von unten würde ein Aufstieg (als Ausländerin) nicht gelingen.

Aha, es geht also darum, in der Gesellschaft aufzusteigen, das ist interessant. Was bedeutet Aufstieg in diesem Zusammenhang? Möglicherweise das Erreichen von Wohlstand, einen sicheren Job, Macht, Einfluß, etc, etc.

Provokant gefragt, vielleicht sind ja genau diese Ziele größtenteils die Ursache von Diskrimierungen aufgrund von Herkunft?

Und noch eine provokante Frage, hat man den "Aufstieg" erstmal geschafft, gehört man dann nicht selber zu den Menschen, die andere diskrimieren?

@Schulz2020 " Provokant gefragt, vielleicht sind ja genau diese Ziele größtenteils die Ursache von Diskrimierungen aufgrund von Herkunft?" Mit Worten: Von Rassismus negativ Betroffene sind selbst schuld, wenn/weil sie bestrebt sind ihre Position zu verbessern?! Das ist Opfer-Täter-Umkehr und missgünstiger, braunangehauchter Schwachsinn!

@Uranus V on Schuld habe ich nicht gesprochen und auch nicht gemeint.

Es geht um die Frage, wie glaubwürdig ist jemand, der Diskriminierung kritisiert, aber selber andere Menschen diskriminiert?

Z.B. die Homosexuelle, die aufgrund Ihrer sexuellen Orientierung diskriminiert wurde (bzw. wird?), aber selber ausländerfeindlich ("Kopftuchmädchen und andere Taugenichtse") ist?

Oder mit andere Worten ausgedrückt, die allergroße Mehrheit der Menschen, die lauthals aufschreien, wenn es z.B. um Diskriminierungen aufgrund der Hautfarbe oder Herkunft geht, schreien seltsamer meistens nicht lauthals auf, wenn z.B. der Gebrauch von Handys in der Kritik steht. Da wird dann stillschweigend die Diskriminierung der Menschen hingenommmen, die für den Abbau der Metalle ihre Gesundheit ruinieren.

S ehr gut. Danke.

D anke für den Beitrag. Wer Menschen wegen ihrer „Herkunft“ diskriminiert, muss sich von mir auch diskriminieren lassen. Zunächst heißt diskriminieren unterschieden: und da unterscheide ich wie viele andere danach, ob und welchen Beitrag Menschen bei uns in der Gesellschaft leisten. Dazu gehört nicht so ein schwachsinnig-beliebig verdrehbares Wort wie Integration. Sondern zB angestrebter und ausgeübter Beruf und sowas. Oder alles andere was konstruktiv ist. Das gilt für alle. Ich liebe Deutschland und bin stolz oder froh oder glücklich oder wie man es sagen möchte auf die guten Dinge die wir erreicht haben. Ich arbeite gerne für das Land und die Gesellschaft. Das fällt mir immer dann schwer wenn ich mitbekomme, wie hinzugekomme oder deren Kinder mit Hass und Stereotypen angegangen werden. Dann frage ich mich, hätte ich eine andere, nicht „biodeutsche“ Herkunft, würde man dann auch plötzlich so eine komische Bewertungsskala anlegen? Ich fürchte ja. Daher geht das Thema alle an und es richtig und notwendig darüber zu reden.

Senza Parole

@sachmah I ch finde man kann nur stolz sein auf das, was man selber erreicht hat, nie auf ein Land.

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Fehlender bezahlbarer wohnraum, bauen alleine hilft nicht.

Es wird gebaut, doch es fehlen Wohnungen für Nicht-Superreiche. Das ließe sich durch Auf- oder Umbau sowie strengeren Umgang mit Ferienwohnungen ändern.  

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Essay: History of Migration in Germany

Migration History in Germany

There has never been a more opportune time to reinvestigate the historical development of our society. In 2011, Germany had 80.3 million residents. Of those residents, 15.96 million - almost 19% of the entire population – had a migration background.* In 2005, in comparison, 17.9% of the population had a migration background.

At the same time, Germany's workforce no longer meets the labor demands of today's economy. There are some important parallels to be drawn between the current situation and the era of the so-called economic miracle, which began in the mid-1950s. However, the history of migration in Germany reaches back further than that.

*According to the German Federal Statistics Office: All individuals who have immigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany since 1949, all foreign citizens born in Germany, and all children born as German citizens to at least one parent who immigrated or was born in Germany as a foreign citizen are considered to have a migration background.

From a Land of Emigration to a Land of Immigration

Incessant wars, religious conflicts, famines, political grievances and a lack of prospects forced many people to leave Germany over the centuries. The land's relative population loss was enormous. An estimated six million emigrants left Germany between 1820 and 1920. A large portion immigrated to the USA. The tide of emigration only began to ebb, beginning in 1890, as the industrial era brought economic success to the German Empire. From that point on, the number of individuals immigrating to Germany surpassed the number of Germans who left. Foreign laborers found employment, above all, in the booming centers of the coal and steel industries.

The National Socialist Dictatorship and the Post-War Years

The forced employment of foreigners was one visible sign of the national-socialists' regime of injustice. The camps and the daily sight of forced laborers were simply part of everyday life for the local population. They paid little attention to the situation. The callous indifference displayed in the post-war years toward the issue of forced labor reflects how little it was considered a misdeed.

The years after 1945 were shaped by people in motion as well. The forced mobility of diverse groups of people (refugees, people expelled from their homes through territorial exchange and other so-called displaced persons) altered the structure of the German population. Tensions and conflicts with local residents arose with the influx of refugees and expellees. Socio-cultural and confessional differences, in particular, gave rise to disputes. The number of refugees and expellees only first began to decline at the end of the 1940s. Simultaneously, the growing demand for labor soon outstripped the capacity of the labor force. The labor shortage was particularly acute in the fields of agriculture and heavy industry.

"Guest Workers" as "Human Capital"

The economic recovery and subsequent boom in West Germany exceeded even the boldest forecasts. Economic growth rates of up to 12.1% left the land reeling. The unemployment rate shrank dramatically over a relatively short time span, from 11% in 1950 to less than 1% in 1961. In order to offset labor shortages, the federal government turned to a traditional model of recruiting and temporarily employing foreign workers. The first "Agreement on the Recruitment and Placement of Workers" ("Abkommen über Anwerbung und Vermittlung von Arbeitskräften") was negotiated with Italy in 1955. Further contracts soon followed: with Greece and Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). Economic and political actors, as well as the general population, assumed that the "guest workers" would not stay long. Based on that assumption, they did not think it necessary to develop any socio-political or infrastructural concepts to account for longer term residence.

Initially, the recruitment agreement with Italy had little impact, and the number of recruited workers remained relatively low. However, after 1959, the foreign population in Germany rapidly increased. Just a few years later, in 1964, the arrival of the millionth "guest worker," Rodrigues de Sá of Portugal, was celebrated.

During this era, foreign workers were employed primarily as unskilled and semi-skilled laborers in sectors were piece work, shift work and assembly line positions could be found. They took on jobs that German laborers considered unattractive. This made it possible for many West Germans to move up into more favorable or more qualified positions. In this way, foreign workers massively boosted upward mobility among the core workforce, without enjoying the same level of benefit. Although foreign workers were formally considered equal to their German counterparts, lack of training, non-recognition of foreign certifications and language deficits limited the "guest workers" to the lowest wage categories.

The economic crisis of 1966-7 exacerbated the tensions over the recruitment of foreign laborers. West Germans had become accustomed to steady growth through the post-war years. This first post-war recession was a hard blow to the ego of the proud "Republic of the Economic Miracle." In the area of labor market policy, this recession-induced insecurity led to heated and critical debates about the sense in employing foreign workers.

The 1973 Recruitment Ban and its Consequences

The recruitment ban (Anwerbestopp), set forth in a directive on November 23, 1973, marked the end of the era of foreign labor recruitment to West Germany. The ban completely blocked the entry of "guest workers" from lands which were not members of the European Economic Community (EEC). Those seeking to legitimate the decision pointed to the "price shocks" that accompanied the 1973 oil crisis. But in truth, the oil crisis simply proved to be a convenient moment to attempt to shrink the foreign population. However, the hope that the "guest worker issue" would resolve itself, through voluntary return, proved to be very unrealistic. Fearing they would not be able to return to work in Germany, many foreign laborers chose not to leave the country at all. This necessary change in the plans on the part of many "guest workers" transformed their anticipated short-term stay into permanent residence. Through the right to family reunification, many foreign laborers arranged the subsequent immigration of their family members to Germany.

The 1980s and 1990s

While immigration figures remained modest through the 1980s, the numbers rapidly grew again in the early 1990s. At times, they even surpassed the highest rates from the "guest worker" era. The vast geo-political changes of that era led to rising number of migrants, asylum seekers and ethnic Germans returning from former German settlements in Eastern Europe. In particular, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the wars in former Yugoslavia and the human rights crisis in the Kurdish region of Turkey spurred the influx. Simultaneously, xenophobic resentments grew over the course of German reunification. This rising wave of racism and xenophobia culminated in a string of incidences of mob violence (in Hoyerswerda, Rostock, Mölln, Solingen and elsewhere). As immigration rates began to decline again in the mid-1990s, incidences of brazen violence against residents with migration backgrounds also diminished.

One central reason for the shrinking numbers from the mid-1990s is the so-called "Asylum Compromise." Since its implementation in 1993, individuals who have fled lands deemed by the German government to be "free of persecution" and all those who have traveled through "safe third-states" on their way no longer qualify for asylum in Germany. Because it only shares its borders with "safe third-states," it has therefore become impossible for refugees to legally enter Germany overland.

2000: From Heredity to a Territorially Based Right to Citizenship

In the year 2000, dual citizenship became possible in Germany. This change enables children born in Germany to foreign-born permanent residents to hold a German passport as well. This is no small policy shift: it signifies a fundamental transformation of the understanding of German citizenship. Whereas the right to the German nationality was previously only available through hereditary links (ius sanguinis), it is now available to individuals born on German territory (ius soli) too. However, only the children of EU-citizens or parents from states with special agreements with Germany may keep their dual citizenship long-term. All others must choose one of their nationalities upon reaching legal adulthood.

Developments in the new Millennium

The legal frame

In 2005 the new immigration law (Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern) came into effect. With this Germany declared itself as a country of immigration. Integration was defined as a legal duty. The law aimed to simplify the current procedure: many different residence titles for specific purposes, which even experts described as being complicated were simplified into two: the temporary residence permit (befristete“Aufenthaltserlaubnis”) and the permanent settlement permit (unbefristete “Niederlassungserlaubnis”). Furthermore, the law aimed to simplify the corresponding processes. Moreover, it was the first time that language courses became a legal requirement.

The first Integration Summit took place in 2006. The Federal Chancellor, religious representatives and communities, media, unions, sport associations, employers, charitable organisations and migrants took part. The trigger was the results from the PISA study which said that success in the educational system is linked to the origin and the educational background of one’s family. The Integration Summit led to the development of the national integration plan. Here the focus was on creating a dialog with Muslims. As a result there was the first so-called Islam Summit which also took place in 2006. The Government, Muslim associations and individuals participated.

The aforementioned national integration plan was implemented in 2007. In the same year amendments were made to the immigration law because of EU guidelines. A third residence title was introduced: the permission for permanent residence (“Erlaubnis zum Daueraufhalt-EG”). Since then those people that had been tolerated (“Geduldete”) could receive a permanent residence permit, if they fulfilled certain criteria. There were also changes made to the conditions for spouses to follow their partners. The spouses must be of age and be able to prove basic German language skills.

A naturalisation test was introduced on the 1st September 2008. In order to receive German citizenship 17 out of 33 questions must be answered correctly. The test aims to aid integration because it forces the person to occupy themselves with the German language, history, laws, society and culture. Furthermore, a high language level than before is required.

Figures and Structure of Immigration

In the past years the number of people with a migration background has risen. In 2013 there were roughly 16.5 million people, so 20.5% of the population who had a migration background. In 2011 this was 19.5%, whilst in cities 46% of children had a migration background. In 2005 it was 15.3 million people which was 19% of the population. The term “migration background” is disputed. The Statistical Federal Office defines people with a migration background as people “who moved to the present territory of the Federal Republic of Germany after 1949, all foreigners born in Germany and all people born in Germany with German nationality who have at least one parent who immigrated to Germany or is a foreigner who was born in Germany”. The term has been used since 2005. Away from the official definition the question arises of how the person feels; what is the self-perception of the people who fall under this definition?

In 2013 1.2 million people came to Germany. Simultaneously 797,000 people left Germany. This resulted in a plus of 403,000 people. This was the highest plus since 1993. Of the 1.2 million immigrants 755,000 (62%) came from within the EU. The largest country of origin was Poland.

The Blue Card was introduced in 2012. The aim was to simplify the process of receiving a work and residence permit within the EU for highly qualified professionals from outside of the EU. Among other reasons the Blue Card is criticised for having a high minimum wage requirement (66,000 Euros per annum).

A further immigration trend is high potentials coming to Germany from the south of Europe. Due to high unemployment, especially amongst younger people, more and more qualified professionals are coming to Germany. For example in 2011 the number of Greek immigrants rose by 78% and the number of Spanish and Portuguese immigrants by over 50%. Of these immigrants 50-70% have a degree.

Furthermore, Germany is a popular country for studying. In total there are 86,000 students in Germany who have earned their higher education entrance qualification outside of Germany.

The number of asylum applicants has also risen steeply in the last years. Between 2012 and 2013 there was a 70% increase. In total there were 109,580 applications in 2013. Between 2013 and 2014 the figure increased by a further 60%. In 2014 23% of the applicants came from Syria, 10% from Serbia and 8% from Eritrea. In January 2015 24.6% applicants came from Syria, 14% from Kosovo and 9.4% from Serbia. In comparison to other countries such as Lebanon or Turkey Germany offers very few people asylum. Moreover, the cities and communities are often not prepared for the arrival of refugees. The temporary accommodations are overcrowded and turn into semi-permanent solutions.

Prejudices and Stereotypes

De facto Germany is a country of immigration; however, it is not a society of immigration. There are still many prejudices and stereotypes that have a negative impact on living together in society.

One example of a prejudice is that people come to Germany to exploit the welfare system. However the facts paint a different picture: Germany profits from the immigrants. They boost the economy, contribute towards the welfare system and help reduce the lack of professionals.

Citation: Migrationsgeschichte in Deutschland, https://www.domid.org/angebot/aufsaetze/essay-migrationsgeschichte-in-deutschland

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Migration to Germany: Current Challenges and Future Developments | Germany | bpb.de

Migration to germany: current challenges and future developments.

12.01.2018 / 7 Minuten zu lesen

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Germany has undergone extensive immigration and emigration flows throughout its history. Today, more than 22 percent of the population have a migration background. The prevalent maxim that Germany is not an immigration country blocked migration and integration policy reforms until the new millennium. The large influx of asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016 triggered an emotionally charged debate and now confronts political and social institutions with challenges that must be solved.

The choir "Gesang der Kulturen" is singing at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder). The participants are people from the Asylum center "Seefichten" and residents from German-Polish border towns Frankfurt (Oder) and Slubice. (© picture alliance / ZB)

The year 2015 entered the collective memory of Germany's population as the year of the "refugee crisis". Never before in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany were the numbers of incoming asylum seekers higher. The reactions among the population oscillated between euphoric readiness to take in refugees and violent rejection of those seeking protection, between a "welcome culture" and the demand for isolation, between cosmopolitanism and nationalism. There was unparalleled civic support for refugees which often enabled housing and supplies for the refugees since the public structures seemed to have been temporarily overstrained, considering the sheer number of asylum seekers. At the same time, violent acts against refugees and their accommodation facilities also increased significantly. According to analyses by the Amadeu Antonio Foundation and refugee aid organization Pro Asyl, an arson attack against a refugee accommodation was carried out once every three days. The populist right-wing party "Alternative for Germany" (AfD) managed to enter several state parliaments, sometimes even with double-digit voting results, by instrumentalizing the topic of migration. Since the elections on 24 September 2017 the AfD is also represented in the German Bundestag.

In light of social polarization, questions regarding social integration are experiencing increased significance: How can we and how do we want to live together in this country in the future? Politics and civil society will have to find an answer to that question. A representative survey among the population which is eligible to vote in January 2017 indicates similar trends: Those polled considered the topic of migration and integration as the most important element to be tackled by the federal government in 2017, followed by the aspect of domestic security, which has not only gained significance due to Islamic terror attacks in Germany and other EU states but is also being increasingly linked to the discourse about (asylum) migration. For example, the terror attack at the Berlin Christmas Market, which killed 12 and seriously injured 48 people in December of 2016, was carried out by a Tunisian man who had entered the Federal Republic of Germany as an asylum seeker. The fact that he was living in Germany with exceptional leave to remain since he could not be deported due to a lack of documentation, fueled the debate about stricter expulsion laws and more efficient deportation practices. In July of 2017, stricter regulations for those with exceptional leave to remain and for people classified as "potential dangers" were implemented through the ‘Law for Better Implementation of the Obligation to Leave the Country’. It stipulates that people who pose a "danger for life and limb of third parties" can be more easily detained prior to deportation and be monitored through an electronic ankle bracelet. In the future, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugee may also export data from laptops and mobile phones to determine the identity and origin of an asylum applicant. As with other tightening measures of asylum laws between 2014 and 2016, this law was also heavily criticized by welfare and refugee aid organizations. They claimed that all refugees coming to Germany were being treated like potential criminals and subjected to increasing disenfranchisement.

If refugee migration is taken to be a security risk, the logical consequence is to expand isolation inducing measures. Within the EU, Germany is advocating a stronger integration of states surrounding the EU into the European border regime to reestablish the system of "preemptive security" which collapsed during the "Arab Spring" and the corresponding destabilization of various EU neighbor states. In addition to the refugee agreement between the EU and Turkey, efforts are underway to cooperate more strongly with Libya, which is probably the most important transit country for refugees and migrants from Africa who are looking to enter the EU via the Mediterranean Sea. Agreements were also made with other African states. In connection with "migration partnerships", African states are obligated to contain migration in the direction of Europe and to accept rejected asylum seekers. In return, the EU will increase the foreign aid for those countries to combat the causes of migration. People are to be kept from making their way to Europe. In Europe itself, many states have protected their borders against refugees through the use of fences. The European border protection agency Frontex has expanded into a European Border and Coast Guard and has been granted significantly more authority. For example, it is supposed to support the EU member states' efforts to return rejected asylum seekers to their countries of origin. The measures are effective: The number of newly arrived refugees in Germany and the EU has significantly decreased since 2015. Over the first seven months of 2017, 117,000 (refugee) migrants have come to Europe across the Mediterranean Sea, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). During the same period, 106,604 asylum seekers were registered in Germany.

The decreasing numbers of asylum seekers are being declared a success by political parties but are being viewed with concern by human rights organizations. They point out that measures to close borders result in many people searching for protection not being granted the opportunity to apply for asylum – a right to which they are entitled according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. More than 65 million people are currently seeking protection. And this number is rising. The decreasing numbers of asylum seekers in Germany may cover up the fact that there continues to be a global refugee crisis. The question of Germany's humanitarian responsibility remains.

Shaping a Society Characterized by Migration

The fact that the aspect of asylum is dominating political debates and the calls for limiting refugee migration are growing obscures the fact that Germany will have to continue to rely on immigration from abroad due its demographic development. In Germany, the number of deaths has been larger than the number of births since the 1970s. Without the influx of migrants from abroad, the population would shrink. The high degree of immigration over past years has contributed to a growing population. But the Federal Statistics Office is estimating this to only represent a temporary trend. Moreover, a high number of incoming young people from abroad may slow down the ageing process of Germany's population but will not be able to stop it. There will be a growing number of older people, while the number of young people is shrinking. This phenomenon will also result in a shrinking labor force. In some industries and regions throughout Germany, many companies are already complaining about not being able to find suitable employees. Shortages of specialists are especially prevalent in engineering and medical professions as well as in the care sector. The gradual opening of Germany for (qualified) labor migration from abroad is also impacted by this situation. Lobbying efforts for more liberal immigration laws by the German industry have led to a reduction of migration barriers and a paradigm shift in migration policies. Migration is not rejected as vehemently and is no longer seen only as a strain (on the social system) but instead also viewed as a potential for economic and social improvement.

To counter the demographic shift and shortage of specialists, high immigration numbers will not suffice. The immigrants must also opt for a long-term stay in Germany. For some years now, representatives from politics and business have been discussing the development of a "welcome and recognition culture" in order to positively influence this decision. What is intended, is to increase Germany's attractiveness for potential (qualified) immigrants. The objective is to support a development of the state into a true "home" for migrants and their descendants. Initially, the term referred primarily to the influx of specialists but has been increasingly connected to the refugee issue since 2015. The images of Germans welcoming refugees at train stations with applause and signs stating "Refugees Welcome" went around the world. But the initial euphoria during the ‘long summer of migration’ subsequently cooled down considerably. Doubts began to arise as to whether Germany would actually be able to integrate so many people. Studies conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation about the welcoming culture in Germany confirm this trend. For example, a central result of the study "Stress test of the welcoming culture" published in 2017 showed that Germany may have presented itself as an "open and mature society shaped by immigration" (loose translation) in 2015 and 2016, but that skepticism towards immigrants has also grown. People asked in the framework of the 2017 survey found that immigration produces less positive effects than respondents in previous studies undertaken from 2012 to 2015. However, the study also shows that a society shaped by immigration is largely being viewed as normal by the younger generation.

The future assessment of immigration will also depend on the successful integration refugees into society. A report by the Institute for Employment Research shows with the example of labor market integration that this goal will not be achieved overnight. Experiences with refugee migration in the past have shown that approximately 50 percent of the refugees become employed within five years of arriving in Germany. After 15 years, the employment rate grew to 70 percent and corresponded to that of other immigrant groups.

But the progress of integration does not only depend on the integration efforts by the immigrants but also on the participation opportunities offered to them by the new society. What kind of society do we want to be? What kind of (immigration) country should Germany be? Those are the questions which will be negotiated in the future.

This text is part of the Interner Link: Migration Profile of Germany .

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is Research Assistant at the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) of the University of Osnabrück. Email: E-Mail Link: [email protected]

Dr. phil. habil., born in 1965, is Associate Professor of Modern History and Member of the Board of the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) of the University of Osnabrück. Email: E-Mail Link: [email protected]

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Türkisch-deutsche Immigration hat die kulturelle Landschaft in Deutschland grundlegend geprägt. So brachten türkische Einwanderer ihre eigenen kulturellen Vorstellungen und Praktiken nach Deutschland und integrierten sie in ihre neue Lebenssituation. Ihre Kinder und Enkel, die als Kleinkinder nach Deutschland kamen oder in Deutschland geboren wurden, stehen nun vor der Herausforderung, sich innerhalb der türkischen Kultur ihrer Eltern und der deutschen Kultur zu positionieren. Dies erfordert die Bestimmung der eigenen Bedürfnisse wie auch die Lösung bei der Positionierung entstehender Konflikte. In diesem Rahmen bildet sich auch die türkisch-deutsche Belletristik heraus, die speziell die Angelegenheiten türkischer Deutscher spiegelt. Dieser Artikel schlägt eine Verwendung der türkisch-deutschen Belletristik in der ethnologischen Integrationsforschung als Quelle über gegenwärtige Identitätsbedürfnisse und ihre Herausforderungen vor. Um die Möglichkeiten der ethnologischen Analyse türkisch-deutscher Belletristik vorzustellen, werden anhand der ethnologischen Auswertung einiger literarischer Werke türkisch-deutscher Autoren und vereinzelt auch türkisch-deutscher Autorinnen die Tendenzen türkisch-deutscher Identitätsbedürfnisse bestimmt. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf den Identitätsbedürfnissen türkisch-deutscher Männer.

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• The Migration Report 2021

The Migration Report 2021 , Date: 2023.01.11 , format: Migration report , area: Authority

The 2021 Migration Report prepared by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees was presented by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community on 11 January 2023. In addition to comprehensive migration data on Germany, the report also contains a comparison of migration flows and asylum immigration within Europe. It deals with the phenomenon of irregular migration, and provides information on the structure and development of the population with a migration background in Germany.

Main results

Net immigration on the rise once more.

Net migration to Germany had been declining continuously since 2016. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 further intensified this trend. At a level of +329,163 persons, net migration was however much higher in 2021, the second year of the pandemic, than it had been in the previous year (+220,251), and thus reached pre-pandemic levels once more. 1,323,466 arrivals and 994,303 departures were recorded in 2021. Immigration to Germany increased by 11.5 percent in comparison to 2020, and emigration rose by 2.9 percent as against 2020.

Migration largely from or to European countries

Migration to and from Germany has been largely characterised for years by arrivals and departures from and to other European countries. The share of persons immigrating from European countries was 63.8 percent in 2021 (2020: 69.1 percent), this including 46.7 percent accounted for people from Member States of the EU (not incl. the United Kingdom). Europe was the main destination region for departures too. More than two-thirds of these individuals moved from Germany to another European country in 2021 (67.9 percent; 67.4 percent in 2019); 54.0 percent migrated to other EU Member States (2020: 55.7 percent).

Immigration for humanitarian reasons

The number of asylum applications had been falling since 2016, in particular the number of asylum applications fell steeply in the pandemic year 2020. This development was caused above all by the travel restrictions that were imposed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. With 148,233 first-time asylum applications, 2021 saw a much larger number than in the previous year (+44.5 percent). 17.5 percent of the first-time applications related to children less than one year old who had been born to asylum-seekers in Germany (25,879). This share was as high as 25.9 percent in 2020. 122,354 (82.5 percent) of the first-time applications are therefore cross-border asylum applications (2020: 76,061).

Family reunification to join third-country nationals

A total of 81,705 residence permits for family reasons were issued to individuals who entered the country in 2021. The number rose by 40.8 percent (2020: 58,022). In 9,128 cases, these were relatives of persons entitled to protection 1 who came to Germany as part of family reunification. Their share among total family reunification amounts to 11.2 percent.

International students

The number of persons who had acquired their higher education entrance qualification outside Germany taking up their studies in Germany rose from a level of 86,529 in 2020 to 102,549 in 2021, thus increasing by 18.5 percent. This means that 2021 saw a renewed increase in this group, following on from 2020 when the lowest number of persons with foreign nationality who had acquired their higher education entrance qualification abroad among first-year students at German higher education institutions had been observed since 2014.

Labour migration from non-EU countries

The Immigration Act for Skilled Workers ( Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz – FEG) brought about a significant change to the law on labour migration to Germany. The Act came into force as per 1 March 2020. At the same time, however, the growing COVID-19 pandemic slowed down international mobility, and thus also the influx of labour migrants. Due to the pandemic, developments in labour migration in 2020 fell to 29,747 arrivals receiving a residence permit for employment reasons (-53.7 percent in comparison to 2019). Growth to 40,421 immigrants was recorded once more in 2021, the second year of the pandemic (+35.9 percent vis-à-vis 2020).

If one looks at the structure of labour migration to Germany in 2021, it becomes apparent that the majority of the individuals concerned are qualified or highly-qualified skilled workers (a total of 24,744 persons, or 61.3 percent). This group includes previous residence titles for qualified employment (until the end of February 2020), experts with vocational or academic training, highly-qualified individuals, researchers, holders of a (mobile) ICT Card or of an EU Blue Card, and self-employed persons.

Immigration by resettlers

A slight increase in immigration by (ethnic German) resettlers ( Spätaussiedler ) and their family members had been registered once more since 2013 due to changes to the law which facilitated family reunification in particular. 4,309 persons were registered as resettlers in 2020. This corresponds to a drop of 39.8 percent over the previous year, this being particularly due to restrictions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, both in the countries of origin and in Germany. The number of resettlers immigrating rose once again in 2021 to regain the 2019 level (7,052, +63.7 percent).

Germany is the number one destination country in Europe

Germany continues to be the main destination country for migration in a European comparison (total immigration and asylum-related immigration in absolute numbers). Spain, France, Italy and Poland also account for a large share of immigration in the EU . It should be noted here that the immigration figures relate to 2020, and hence to the first year of the pandemic.

27.3 percent of Germany's population has a migration background

According to figures from the Microcensus, 22.3 million people lived in private households in Germany in 2021 who did not have German citizenship from birth, or who had at least one parent to whom this applied. This corresponds to a population share of 27.3 percent of people with a migration background. More than half of them are German nationals, and just under two-thirds immigrated to Germany themselves. People with personal experience of immigration have lived in Germany for an average of around 21 years, but more than one-third (37.6 percent) have lived in Germany for fewer than ten years.

• Family members of persons entitled to asylum, recognised refugees and persons with subsidiary protection status

Notes on using the Migration Report

The Migration Report of the Federal Government is prepared annually by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. A layouted and accessible version (in German only) is now available on the German language site (link below). By clicking on the figures you can download the underlying data in Excel format.

A summary of the main results (in English and German) can be found under "Further information".

The Migration Report is only available in German.

This download is available in other languages, too.

• Migrationsbericht 2021 (German) Migrationsbericht 2021: Add to shopping cart (German)

Further information

• Summary of the main results of the 2021 Migration Report

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Article contents

Global migration: causes and consequences.

• Benjamin Helms Benjamin Helms Department of Politics, University of Virginia
•  and  David Leblang David Leblang Department of Politics, Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.631
• Published online: 25 February 2019

International migration is a multifaceted process with distinct stages and decision points. An initial decision to leave one’s country of birth may be made by the individual or the family unit, and this decision may reflect a desire to reconnect with friends and family who have already moved abroad, a need to diversify the family’s access to financial capital, a demand to increase wages, or a belief that conditions abroad will provide social and/or political benefits not available in the homeland. Once the individual has decided to move abroad, the next decision is the choice of destination. Standard explanations of destination choice have focused on the physical costs associated with moving—moving shorter distances is often less expensive than moving to a destination farther away; these explanations have recently been modified to include other social, political, familial, and cultural dimensions as part of the transaction cost associated with migrating. Arrival in a host country does not mean that an émigré’s relationship with their homeland is over. Migrant networks are an engine of global economic integration—expatriates help expand trade and investment flows, they transmit skills and knowledge back to their homelands, and they remit financial and human capital. Aware of the value of their external populations, home countries have developed a range of policies that enable them to “harness” their diasporas.

• immigration
• international political economy
• factor flows
• gravity models

Introduction

The steady growth of international labor migration is an important, yet underappreciated, aspect of globalization. 1 In 1970 , just 78 million people, or about 2.1% of the global population, lived outside their country of birth. By 1990 , that number had nearly doubled to more than 150 million people, or about 2.8% of the global population (United Nations Population Division, 2012 ). Despite the growth of populist political parties and restrictionist movements in key destination countries, the growth in global migration shows no signs of slowing down, with nearly 250 million people living outside their country of birth as of 2015 . While 34% of all global migrants live in industrialized countries (with the United States and Germany leading the way), 38% of all global migration occurs between developing countries (World Bank, 2016 ).

Identifying the causes and consequences of international labor migration is essential to our broader understanding of globalization. Scholars across diverse academic fields, including economics, political science, sociology, law, and demography, have attempted to explain why individuals voluntarily leave their homelands. The dominant thread in the labor migration literature is influenced by microeconomics, which posits that individuals contemplating migration are rational, utility-maximizing actors who carefully weigh the potential costs and benefits of leaving their country of origin (e.g., Borjas, 1989 ; Portes & Böröcz, 1989 ; Grogger & Hanson, 2011 ). The act of migration, from this perspective, is typically conceptualized as an investment from which a migrant expects to receive some benefit, whether it be in the form of increased income, political freedom, or enhanced social ties (Schultz, 1961 ; Sjaastad, 1962 ; Collier & Hoeffler, 2014 ).

In this article we go beyond the treatment of migration as a single decision and conceive of it as a multifaceted process with distinct stages and decision points. We identify factors that are relevant at different stages in the migration process and highlight how and when certain factors interact with others during the migration process. Economic factors such as the wage differential between origin and destination countries, for example, may be the driving factor behind someone’s initial decision to migrate (Borjas, 1989 ). But when choosing a specific destination, economic factors may be conditioned by political or social conditions in that destination (Fitzgerald, Leblang, & Teets, 2014 ). Each stage or decision point has distinguishing features that are important in determining how (potential) migrants respond to the driving forces identified by scholars.

This is certainly not a theoretical innovation; migration has long been conceived of as a multi-step process, and scholars often identify the stage or decision point to which their argument best applies. However, most interdisciplinary syntheses of the literature on international labor migration do not provide a systematic treatment of this defining feature, instead organizing theoretical and empirical contributions by field of study, unit or level of analysis, or theoretical tradition (e.g., Portes & Böröcz, 1989 ; Massey et al., 1993 ; European Asylum Support Office, 2016 ). Such approaches are undoubtedly valuable in their own right. Our decision to organize this discussion by stage allows us to understand this as a process, rather than as a set of discrete events. As a result, we conceptualize international labor migration as three stages or decision points: (a) the decision to migrate or to remain at home, (b) the choice of destination, and (c) the manner by which expatriates re-engage—or choose not to re-engage—with their country of origin once abroad. We also use these decision points to highlight a number of potential new directions for future research in this still-evolving field.

Figure 1. Global migration intentions by educational attainment, 2008–2017.

Should I Stay or Should I Go, Now?

The massive growth in international labor migration in the age of globalization is remarkable, but the fact remains that over 95% of the world’s population never leave their country of origin (United Nations Population Division, 2012 ). Figure 1 shows the percentage of people who expressed an intention to move abroad between 2008 and 2017 by educational attainment, according to data from the Gallup World Poll. Over this time period, it appears that those who were highly educated expressed intent to migrate in greater numbers than those who had less than a college education, although these two groups have converged in recent years. What is most striking, however, is that a vast majority of people, regardless of educational attainment, expressed no desire to move abroad. Even though absolute flows of migrants have grown at a near-exponential rate, relative to their non-migrating counterparts, they remain a small minority. What factors are important in determining who decides to migrate and who decides to remain at home? 2

From Neoclassical Economics to the Mobility Transition

Neoclassical economic models posit that the primary driving factor behind migration is the expected difference in wages (discounted future income streams) between origin and destination countries (Sjaastad, 1962 ; Borjas, 1989 ; Clark, Hatton, & Williamson, 2007 ). All else equal, when the wage gap, minus the costs associated with moving between origin and destination, is high, these models predict large flows of labor migrants. In equilibrium, as more individuals move from origin to destination countries, the wage differential narrows, which in turn leads to zero net migration (Lewis, 1954 ; Harris & Todaro, 1970 ). Traditional models predict a negative monotonic relationship between the wage gap and the number of migrants (e.g., Sjaastad, 1962 ). However, the predictions of neoclassical models are not well supported by the empirical record. Empirical evidence shows that, at least in a cross-section, the relationship between economic development and migration is more akin to an inverted U. For countries with low levels of per capita income, we observe little migration due to a liquidity constraint: at this end of the income distribution, individuals do not have sufficient resources to cover even minor costs associated with moving abroad. Increasing income helps to decrease this constraint, and consequently we observe increased levels of emigration as incomes rise (de Haas, 2007 ). This effect, however, is not monotonic: as countries reach middle-income status, declining wage differentials lead to flattening rates of emigration, and then decreasing rates as countries enter later stages of economic development. 3

Some research explains this curvilinear relationship by focusing on the interaction between emigration incentives and constraints : for example, increased income initially makes migration more affordable (reduces constraints), but also simultaneously reduces the relative economic benefits of migrating as the wage differential narrows (as potential migrants now have the financial capacity to enhance local amenities) (Dao, Docquier, Parsons, & Peri, 2016 ). The theoretical underpinnings of this interaction, however, are not without controversy. Clemens identifies several classes of theory that attempt to explain this curvilinear relationship—a relationship that has been referred to in the literature as the mobility transition (Clemens, 2014 ). These theories include: demographic changes resulting from development that also favor emigration up to a point (Easterlin, 1961 ; Tomaske, 1971 ), the loosening of credit restraints on would-be migrants (Vanderkamp, 1971 ; Hatton & Williamson, 1994 ), a breakdown of information barriers via the building of transnational social networks (Epstein, 2008 ), structural economic changes in the development process that result in worker dislocation (Zelinsky, 1971 ; Massey, 1988 ), the dynamics of economic inequality and relative deprivation (Stark, 1984 ; Stark & Yitzhaki, 1988 ; Stark & Taylor, 1991 ), and changing immigration policies in destination countries toward increasingly wealthy countries (Clemens, 2014 ). While each of these play some role in the mobility transition curve, Dao et al. ( 2016 ) run an empirical horse race between numerous explanations and find that changing skill composition resulting from economic development is the most substantively important driver. Economic development is correlated with an increase in a country’s level of education; an increase in the level of education, in turn, is correlated with increased emigration. However, traditional explanations involving microeconomic drivers such as income, credit constraints, and economic inequality remain important factors (Dao et al., 2016 ). The diversity of explanations offered for the mobility transition curve indicates that while most research agrees the inverted-U relationship is an accurate empirical portrayal of the relationship between development and migration, little theoretical agreement exists on what drives this relationship. Complicating this disagreement is the difficulty of empirically disentangling highly correlated factors such as income, skill composition, and demographic trends in order to identify robust causal relationships.

Political Conditions at the Origin

While there is a scholarly consensus around the mobility transition and the role of economic conditions, emerging research suggests that the political environment in the origin country may also be salient. We do not refer here to forced migration, such as in the case of those who leave because they are fleeing political persecution or violent conflict. Rather, we focus on political conditions in the homeland that influence a potential migrant’s decision to emigrate voluntarily. Interpretations of how, and the extent to which, political conditions in origin countries (independent of economic conditions) influence the decision to migrate have been heavily influenced by Hirschman’s “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty” framework (Hirschman, 1970 , 1978 ). Hirschman argues that the opportunity to exit—to exit a firm, an organization, or a country—places pressure on the local authorities; voting with one’s feet forces organizations to reassess their operations.

When applied to the politics of emigration, Hirschman’s framework generates two different hypotheses. On the one hand, politicians may allow, encourage, or force the emigration of groups that oppose the regime as a political safety valve of sorts. This provides the government with a mechanism with which to manage potential political challengers by encouraging their exit. On the other hand, politicians—especially those in autocracies—may actively work to prevent exit because they fear the emigration of economic elites, the highly skilled, and others who have resources vital to the survival of the regime. 4

A small number of studies investigate how local-level, rather than national, political circumstances affect a potential migrant’s calculus. The limited empirical evidence currently available suggests that local conditions are substantively important determinants of the emigration decision. When individuals are highly satisfied with local amenities such as their own standard of living, quality of public services, and overall sense of physical security, they express far less intention to migrate compared with highly dissatisfied individuals (Dustmann & Okatenko, 2014 ). Furthermore, availability of public transport and access to better education facilities decreases the propensity to express an intention to emigrate (Cazzuffi & Modrego, 2018 ). This relationship holds across all levels of wealth and economic development, and there is some evidence that satisfaction with local amenities matters as much as, or even more than, income or wealth (Dustmann & Okatenko, 2014 ).

Political corruption, on both national and local levels, also has substantively important effects on potential migrants, especially those who are highly skilled. Broadly defined as the use of public office for political gain, political corruption operates as both a direct and an indirect factor promoting emigration. 5 Firstly, corruption may have a direct effect on the desire to emigrate in that it can decrease the political and economic power of an individual, leading to a lower standard of living and poorer quality of life in origin countries. If the reduction in life satisfaction resulting from corruption is sufficiently high—either by itself or in combination with other “push” factors—then the exit option becomes more attractive (Cooray & Schneider, 2016 ). Secondly, corruption also operates through indirect channels that influence other push factors. Given the large literature on how political corruption influences a number of development outcomes, it is conceivable that corruption affects the decision-making process of a potential migrant through its negative effect on social spending, education, and public health (Mo, 2001 ; Mauro, 1998 ; Gupta, Davoodi, & Thigonson, 2001 ).

The combination of its direct and indirect impacts means that corruption could be a significant part of a migrant’s decision-making process. At present there is limited work exploring this question, and the research does not yield a consensus. Some scholars argue that political corruption has no substantive effect on total bilateral migration, but that it does encourage migration among the highly skilled (Dimant, Krieger, & Meierrieks, 2013 ). This is the case, the argument goes, because corruption causes the greatest relative harm to the utility of those who have invested in human capital, who migrate to escape the negative effect on their fixed investment. In contrast, others find that a high level of corruption does increase emigration at the aggregate level (Poprawe, 2015 ). More nuanced arguments take into account the intensity of corruption: low to moderate levels of corruption lead to increased emigration of all groups, and especially of the highly skilled. But at high levels of corruption, emigration begins to decrease, indicating that intense corruption can act as a mobility constraint (Cooray & Schneider, 2016 ). All of these existing accounts, however, employ state-level measures of corruption by non-governmental organizations, such as those produced by Transparency International. Scholars have yet to harness micro-level survey data to explore the influence of personal corruption perception on the individual’s decision-making process.

The Land of Hopes and Dreams

Given that an individual has decided to emigrate, the next decision point is to choose a destination country. Advanced industrial democracies, such as those in the OECD, are major migrant-receiving countries, but so are Russia and several Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (World Bank, 2016 ). A country’s constellation of political, economic, and social attributes is crucial to understanding an emigrant’s choice of destination. Potential migrants weigh all of these factors simultaneously when choosing a destination: will the destination allow political rights for the migrant and their children, is access to the labor market possible, and does the destination provide an opportunity for reunification with friends and family? In this section we focus on the non-economic factors that draw migrants to certain countries over others. In addition, we emphasize how skill level adds layers of complexity to a migrant’s calculus.

Political Environment, Both Formal and Informal

As noted earlier, traditional neoclassical models and their extensions place wage differentials and associated economic variables at the heart of a migrant’s choice. Gravity models posit that migrants choose a destination country based on their expected income—which itself is a function of the wage rate and the probability of finding employment in the destination—less the costs associated with moving (Ravenstein, 1885 ; Todaro, 1969 ; Borjas, 1989 ). A rigid focus on economic factors, however, blinds us to the empirical reality that a destination country’s political environment influences what destination a migrant chooses (Borjas, 1989 ). A country’s legal and political rights structure for migrants, as well as its level of tolerance for newcomers, is critical to migrants discriminating between an array of potential destinations. Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets ( 2014 ) argue, for example, that states with restrictive citizenship policies and strong radical right anti-immigrant parties will receive fewer migrants, while states with relatively liberal citizenship requirements and weak radical right political movements will receive more migrants. In the rational actor framework, migrants seek countries with hospitable political environments to maximize both their political representation in government and their access to labor market opportunities as a result of citizenship rights and social acceptance (Fitzgerald et al., 2014 ).

Using a broad sample of origin countries and 18 destination countries, they find that relative restrictiveness of citizenship policies and level of domestic support for the radical right are substantively important determinants of global migratory flows. Further, they find that these political variables condition a migrant’s choice of destination: the relative importance of economic factors such as the unemployment rate or the wage differential diminishes as a destination country’s political environment becomes more open for migrants. In other words, when migrants are choosing a destination country, political considerations may trump economic ones—a finding that is an important amendment to the primarily economics-focused calculus of the initial stage of the immigration decision.

However, prior to choosing and entering a destination country, a migrant must also navigate a country’s immigration policy—the regulation of both migrant entry and the rights and status of current migrants. While it is often assumed that a relatively more restrictive immigration policy deters entry, and vice versa, a lack of quantitative data has limited the ability of scholars to confirm this intuition cross-nationally. Money ( 1999 ) emphasizes that the policy output of immigration politics does not necessarily correlate with the outcome of international migrant flows. There are a number of unanswered questions in this field, including: is immigration policy a meaningful determinant of global flows of migration? Do certain kinds of immigration policies matter more than others? How does immigration policy interact with other political and economic factors, such as unemployment and social networks?

Only a handful of studies analyze whether or not immigration policy is a significant determinant of the size and character of migratory flows. Perhaps the most prominent answer to this question is the “gap hypothesis,” which posits that immigration rates continue to increase despite increasingly restrictive immigration policies in advanced countries (Cornelius & Tsuda, 2004 ). Some subsequent work seems to grant support to the gap hypothesis, indicating that immigration policy may not be a relevant factor and that national sovereignty as it relates to dictating migrant inflows has eroded significantly (Sassen, 1996 ; Castles, 2004 ). The gap hypothesis is not without its critics, with other scholars arguing that the existing empirical evidence actually lends it little or no support (Messina, 2007 ).

A more recent body of literature does indicate that immigration policy matters. Brücker and Schröder ( 2011 ), for example, find that immigration policies built to attract highly skilled migrants lead to higher admittance rates. They also show that diffusion processes cause neighboring countries to implement similar policy measures. Ortega and Peri ( 2013 ), in contrast to the gap hypothesis literature, find that restrictive immigration policy indeed reduces migrant inflows. But immigration policy can also have unintended effects on international migration: when entry requirements increase, migrant inflows decrease, but migrant outflows also decrease (Czaika & de Haas, 2016 ). This indicates that restrictive immigration policy may also lead to reduced circular migrant flows and encourage long-term settlement in destination countries.

Disaggregating immigration policy into its different components provides a clearer picture of how immigration policy may matter, and whether certain components matter more than others. Immigration policy is composed of both external and internal regulations. External regulations refer to policies that control migrant entry, such as eligibility requirements for migrants and additional conditions of entry. Internal regulations refer to policies that apply to migrants who have already gained status in the country, such as the security of a migrant’s legal status and the rights they are afforded. Helbling and Leblang ( 2017 ), using a comprehensive data set of bilateral migrant flows and the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) data set, find that, in general, external regulations prove slightly more important in understanding migrant inflows (Helbling, Bjerre, Römer, & Zobel, 2017 ). This indicates that potential migrants focus more on how to cross borders, and less on the security of their status and rights once they settle. They do find, however, that both external and internal components of immigration are substantively important to international migrant flows.

The effects of policy, however, cannot be understood in isolation from other drivers of migration. Firstly, poor economic conditions and restrictive immigration policy are mutually reinforcing: when the unemployment rate is elevated, restrictive policies are more effective in deterring migrant flows. An increase in policy effectiveness in poor economic conditions suggests that states care more about deterring immigration when the economy is performing poorly. Secondly, a destination country’s restrictive immigration policy is more effective when migrants come from origin countries that have a common colonial heritage. This suggests that cultural similarities and migrant networks help to spread information about the immigration policy environment in the destination country. Social networks prove to be crucial in determining how much migrants know about the immigration policies of destination countries, regardless of other cultural factors such as colonial heritage or common language (Helbling & Leblang, 2017 ). In summary, more recent work supports the idea that immigration policy of destination countries exerts a significant influence on both the size and character of international migration flows. Much work remains to be done in terms of understanding the nuances of specific immigration policy components, the effect of policy change over time, and through what mechanisms immigration policy operates.

Transnational Social Networks

None of this should be taken to suggest that only political and economic considerations matter when a potential migrant contemplates a potential destination; perhaps one of the biggest contributions to the study of bilateral migration is the role played by transnational social networks. Migrating is a risky undertaking, and to minimize that risk, migrants are more likely to move to destinations where they can “readily tap into networks of co-ethnics” (Fitzgerald et al., 2014 , p. 410). Dense networks of co-ethnics not only help provide information about economic opportunities, but also serve as a social safety net which, in turn, helps decrease the risks associated with migration, including, but not limited to, finding housing and integrating into a new community (Massey, 1988 ; Portes & Böröcz, 1989 ; Portes, 1995 ; Massey et al., 1993 ; Faist, 2000 ; Sassen, 1995 ; Light, Bernard, & Kim, 1999 ). Having a transnational network of family members is quite important to destination choice; if a destination country has an immigration policy that emphasizes family reunification, migrants can use their familial connections to gain economically valuable permanent resident or citizenship status more easily than in other countries (Massey et al., 1993 , p. 450; Helbing & Leblang, 2017 ). When the migrant is comparing potential destinations, countries in which that migrant has a strong social network will be heavily favored in a cost–benefit analysis.

Note, however, that even outside of a strict rational actor framework with perfect information, transnational social networks still may be quite salient to destination choice. An interesting alternative hypothesis for the patterns we observe draws on theories from financial market behavior which focus on herding. Migrants choosing a destination observe the decisions of their co-ethnics who previously migrated and assume that those decisions were based on a relevant set of information, such as job opportunities or social tolerance of migrants. New migrants then choose the same destination as their co-ethnics not based on actual exchanges of valuable information, but based solely on the assumption that previous migration decisions were based on rational calculation (Epstein & Gang, 2006 ; Epstein, 2008 ). This is a classic example of herding, and the existing empirical evidence on the importance of transnational social networks cannot invalidate this alternative hypothesis. One could also explain social network effects through the lens of cumulative causation or feedback loops: the initial existence of connections in destination countries makes the act of migration less risky and attracts additional co-ethnics. This further expands migrant networks in a destination, further decreasing risk for future waves of migrants, and so on (Massey, 1990 ; Fussel & Massey, 2004 ; Fussel, 2010 ).

No matter the pathway by which social networks operate, the empirical evidence indicates that they are one of the most important determinants of destination choice. Potential migrants from Mexico, for example, who are able to tap into existing networks in the United States face lower direct, opportunity, and psychological costs of international migration (Massey & Garcia España, 1987 ). This same relationship holds in the European context; a study of Bulgarian and Italian migrants indicates that those with “social capital” in a destination community are more likely to migrate and to choose that particular destination (Haug, 2008 ). Studies that are more broadly cross-national in nature also confirm the social network hypothesis across a range of contexts and time periods (e.g., Clark et al., 2007 ; Hatton & Williamson, 2011 ; Fitzgerald et al., 2014 ).

Despite the importance of social networks, it is, again, important to qualify their role in framing the choice of destinations. It seems that the existence of co-ethnics in destination countries most strongly influences emigration when they are relatively few in number. Clark et al. ( 2007 ), in their study of migration to the United States, find that the “friends and relatives effect” falls to zero once the migrant stock in the United States reaches 8.3% of the source-country population. In addition, social networks alone cannot explain destination choice because their explanatory power is context-dependent. For instance, restrictive immigration policies limiting legal migration channels and family reunification may dampen the effectiveness of networks (Böcker, 1994 ; Collyer, 2006 ). Social networks are not an independent force, but also interact with economic and political realities to produce the global migration patterns we observe.

The Lens of Skill

For ease of presentation, we have up to now treated migrants as a relatively homogeneous group that faces similar push and pull factors throughout the decision-making process. Of course, not all migrants experience the same economic, political, and social incentives in the same way at each stage of the decision-making process. Perhaps the most salient differentiating feature of migrants is skill or education level. Generally, one can discuss a spectrum of skill and education level for current migrants, from relatively less educated (having attained a high school degree or less) to relatively more educated (having attained a college or post-graduate degree). The factors presented here that influence destination choice interact with a migrant’s skill level to produce differing destination choice patterns.

A migrant’s level of education, or human capital, often serves as a filter for the political treatment he or she anticipates in a particular destination country. For instance, the American public has a favorable view of highly educated migrants who hold higher-status jobs, while simultaneously having an opposite view of migrants who have less job training and do not hold a college degree (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010 ; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015 ). Indeed, the political discourse surrounding migration often emphasizes skill level and education as markers of migrants who “should be” admitted, across both countries and the ideological spectrum. 6 While political tolerance may be a condition of entry for migrants in the aggregate, the relatively privileged status of highly educated and skilled migrants in most destination countries may mean that this condition is not as salient.

While it is still an open question to what extent immigration policy influences international migration, it is clear that not all migrants face evenly applied migration restrictions. Most attractive destination countries have policies that explicitly favor highly skilled migrants, since these individuals often fill labor shortages in advanced industries such as high technology and applied science. Countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand all employ so-called “points-based” immigration systems in which those with advanced degrees and needed skills are institutionally favored for legal entry (Papademetriou & Sumption, 2011 ). Meanwhile, the United States maintains the H-1B visa program, which is restricted by educational attainment and can only be used to fill jobs in which no native talent is available (USCIS). Even if destination countries decide to adopt more restrictive immigration policies, the move toward restriction has typically been focused on low-skilled migrants (Peters, 2017 ). In other words, even if immigration policy worldwide becomes more restrictive, this will almost certainly not occur at the expense of highly skilled migrants and will not prevent them choosing their most preferred destination.

Bring It on Home to Me

This article began by asserting that international labor migration is an important piece of globalization, as significant as cross-border flows of capital, goods, and services. This section argues that migrant flows enhance flows of capital and commodities. Uniquely modern conditions such as advanced telecommunications, affordable and efficient international travel, and the liberalization of financial flows mean that diasporas—populations of migrants living outside their countries of origin—and home countries often re-engage with each other (Vertovec, 2004 ; Waldinger, 2008 ). This section reviews some of the newest and most thought-provoking research on international labor migration, research that explores diaspora re-engagement and how that re-engagement alters international flows of income, portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI), trade, and migratory flows themselves.

Remittances

As previously argued, migration is often driven by the prospect of higher wages. Rational, utility-maximizing migrants incur the cost of migration in order to earn increased income that they could not earn at home. But when migrants obtain higher wages, this additional increment to income is not always designated for individual consumption. Often, migrants use their new income to send remittances, direct transfers of money from one individual to another across national borders. Once a marginal financial flow, in 2015 remittances totaled $431 billion, far outpacing foreign aid ($135 billion) and nearly passing private debt and portfolio equity ($443 billion). More than 70% of total global remittances flow into developing countries (World Bank, 2016 ). In comparison with other financial flows such as portfolio investment and FDI, remittances are more impervious to economic crises, suggesting that they may be a countercyclical force to global downturns (Leblang, 2017 ).

Remittances represent one of the most common ways in which migrants re-engage with their homeland and alter both global income flows and distribution. Why do migrants surrender large portions of their new income, supposedly the very reason they migrated in the first place, to their families back home? New economics of labor migration (NELM) theory argues that immigration itself is motivated by a family’s need or demand for remittances—that remittances are an integral part of a family’s strategy for diversifying household financial risk (Stark & Bloom, 1985 ). Remittances “are a manifestation of informal contractual agreements between migrants and the households from which they move,” indicating that remitting is not an individual-level or purely altruistic action but rather occurs in a larger social context, that of one’s immediate or extended family (European Asylum Support Office, 2016 , p. 15).

The impact of migrant remittances on countries of origin is multifaceted yet somewhat ambiguous. Most scholarly work focuses on whether remittances positively or negatively influence existing economic conditions. A number of studies find that remittances modestly reduce poverty levels in developing countries (Adams & Page, 2005 ; Yang & Martinez, 2006 ; Acosta, Calderon, Fajnzybler, & Lopez, 2008 ; Lokshin, Bontch-Osmolovski, & Glinskaya, 2010 ). On other measures of economic well-being, such as growth, inequality, and health, the literature is quite mixed and no definitive conclusions can be drawn. For instance, some studies find that remittances encourage investment in human capital (Yang, 2008 ; Adams & Cuecuecha, 2010 ), while others find no such effect and suggest that families typically spend remittances on non-productive consumption goods (Chami, Fullenkamp, & Jahjah, 2003 ). Here we can only scratch the surface of the empirical work on remittances and economic outcomes. 7

Some of the most recent research in the field argues that remittances have a distinct political dimension, affecting regime support in developing countries and altering the conditions in which elections are held. Ahmed ( 2012 ), grouping remittances with foreign aid, argues that increased remittances allow autocratic governments to extend their tenure in office. These governments can strategically channel unearned government and household income to finance political patronage networks, which leads to a reduced likelihood of autocratic turnover, regime collapse, and mass protests against the regime. More recent research posits nearly the exact opposite: remittances are linked to a greater likelihood of democratization under autocratic regimes. Escriba-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright ( 2015 ) argue that since remittances directly increase household incomes, they reduce voter reliance on political patronage networks, undermining a key tool of autocratic stability.

Remittances may also play an important role in countries with democratic institutions, yet more research is needed to fully understand the conditions under which they matter and their substantive impact. Particularly, remittances may alter the dynamics of an election as an additional and external financial flow. There is evidence of political remittance cycles : the value of remittances spikes in the run-up to elections in developing countries. The total value of remittances to the average developing country increases by 6.6% during election years, and by 12% in elections in which no incumbent or named successor is running (O’Mahony, 2012 ). The effect is even larger in the poorest of developing countries. Finer-grained tests of this hypothesis provide additional support: using monthly and quarterly data confirms the existence of political remittance cycles, as well as using subnational rather than cross-national data (Nyblade & O’Mahony, 2014 ). However, these studies do not reveal why remittances spike, or what the effects of that spike are on electoral outcomes such as vote share, campaign financing, and political strategy.

Remittances represent a massive international financial flow that warrants more scholarly attention. While there are numerous studies on the relationship between remittances and key economic indicators, there remains much room for further work on their relationship to political outcomes in developing countries. Do remittances hasten the downfall of autocratic regimes, or do they contribute to autocratic stability? In democratic contexts, do remittances substantively influence electoral outcomes, and if so, which outcomes and how? Finally, do remittances prevent even more migration because they allow one “breadwinner from abroad” to provide for the household that remains in the homeland? While data limitations are formidable, these questions are important to the study of both international and comparative political economy.

Bilateral Trade

The argument that migrant or co-ethnic networks play an important role in international economic exchange is not novel. Greif ( 1989 , 1993 ) illustrates the role that the Maghrebi traders of the 11th century played in providing informal institutional guarantees that facilitated trade. This is but a single example. Cowen’s historical survey identifies not only the Phoenicians but also the “Spanish Jews [who] were indispensable for international commerce in the Middle Ages. The Armenians controlled the overland route between the Orient and Europe as late as the nineteenth century . Lebanese Christians developed trade between the various parts of the Ottoman empire” (Cowen, 1997 , p. 170). Rauch and Trindade ( 2002 ) provide robust empirical evidence linking the Chinese diaspora to patterns of imports and exports with their home country.

A variety of case studies document the importance of migrant networks in helping overcome problems of information asymmetries. In his study of Indian expatriates residing in the United States, Kapur ( 2014 ) documents how that community provides U.S. investors with a signal of the work ethic, labor quality, and business culture that exists in India. Likewise, Weidenbaum and Hughes ( 1996 ) chronicle the Bamboo Network—the linkages between ethnic Chinese living outside mainland China and their homeland—and how these linkages provide superior access to information and opportunities for investment.

Connections between migrant communities across countries affect cross-national investment even when these connections do not provide information about investment opportunities. In his work on the Maghrebi traders of the 11th century , Greif argues that this trading network was effective because it was able to credibly threaten collective punishment by all merchants if even one of them defected (Greif, 1989 , 1993 ). Grief shows that this co-ethnic network was able to share information regarding the past actions of actors (they could communicate a reputation)—something that was essential for the efficient functioning of markets in the absence of formal legal rules. Weidenbaum and Hughes reach a similar conclusion about the effectiveness of the Bamboo Network, remarking that “if a business owner violates an agreement, he is blacklisted. This is far worse than being sued, because the entire Chinese networks will refrain from doing business with the guilty party” (Hughes, 1996 , p. 51).

Migrants not only alter the flow of income by remitting to their countries of origin, but also influence patterns of international portfolio investment and FDI. Most existing literature on international capital allocation emphasizes monadic factors such as the importance of credible commitments and state institutional quality, failing to address explicitly dyadic phenomena that may also drive investment. Diaspora networks, in particular, facilitate cross-border investment in a number of ways. They foster a higher degree of familiarity between home and host countries, leading to a greater preference for investment in specific countries. Diaspora networks can also decrease information asymmetries in highly uncertain international capital markets in two ways. Firstly, they can provide investors with salient information about their homeland, such as consumer tastes, that can influence investment decision-making. Secondly, they can share knowledge about investment opportunities, regulation and procedures, and customs that decrease transaction costs associated with cross-border investment (Leblang, 2010 ). This place of importance for migrants suggests to the broader international political economy literature the importance of non-institutional mechanisms for channeling economic activity.

Although the hypothesized link between migrants and international investment has only recently been identified, the quantitative evidence available supports that hypothesis. Leblang ( 2010 ), using dyadic cross-sectional data, finds that diaspora networks “have both a substantively significant effect and a statistically significant effect on cross-border investment,” including international portfolio investment and FDI (p. 584). The effect of bilateral migratory flows correlates positively with the degree of information asymmetry: when informational imperfections are more pervasive in a dyad, migrants (especially the highly skilled) play a disproportionately large role in international capital allocation (Kugler, Levinthal, & Rapoport, 2017 ). Other quantitative studies find substantively similar results for FDI alone (e.g., Javorcik, Özden, Spatareanu, & Neagu, 2011 ; Aubry, Rapoport, & Reshef, 2016 ).

Many questions still remain unanswered. Firstly, does the effect of migrants on investment follow the waves of the global economy, or is it countercyclical as remittances have been shown to be? Secondly, how does this additional investment, facilitated by migrants, affect socioeconomic outcomes such as inequality, poverty, and economic development (Leblang, 2010 )? Does the participation of migrants lead to more successful FDI projects in developing countries because of their ability to break down information barriers? Within portfolio investment, do migrants lead to a preference for certain asset classes over others, and if so, what are the effects on bilateral and international capital markets? These are just a few directions in an area ripe for additional research.

Return Migration and Dual Citizenship

Besides financial flows, migrants themselves directly contribute to global flows of capital by returning to their countries of origin in large numbers. This phenomenon of return migration—or circular migration—can come in a few temporal forms, including long-term migration followed by a permanent return to a country of origin, or repeat migration in which a migrant regularly moves between destination and origin countries (Dumont & Spielvogel, 2008 ). While comparable data on return migration is scarce, some reports suggest that 20% to 50% of all immigrants leave their destination country within five years after their arrival (e.g., Borjas & Bratsberg, 1996 ; Aydemir & Robinson, 2008 ; Bratsberg, Raaum, & Sørlie, 2007 ; Dustmann & Weiss, 2007 ). An independent theoretical and empirical account of return migration does not yet exist in the literature and is beyond the scope of this paper. But in the rational actor framework, motivations to return home include a failure to realize the expected benefits of migration, changing preferences toward a migrant’s home country, achievement of a savings or other economic goal, or the opening of additional employment opportunities back home due to newly acquired experience or greater levels of economic development (Dumont & Spielvogel, 2008 ).

While most migration literature treats the country of origin as a passive actor that only provides the conditions for migration, new literature on return migration gives home country policies pride of place. Origin countries can craft policies that encourage diaspora re-engagement, incentivizing individuals to return home. Dual citizenship, for example, is an extension of extraterritorial rights, allowing migrants to retain full legal status in their home country. Dual citizenship “decreases the transaction costs associated with entering a host country’s labor market and makes it easier for migrants to return home” (Leblang, 2017 , p. 77). This leads migrants to invest their financial resources in the form of remittances back home as well as their valuable human capital. When states provide such extraterritorial rights, expatriates are 10% more likely to remit and 3% more likely to return home. Dual citizenship is also associated with a doubling of the dollar amount of remittances received by a home country (Leblang, 2017 ). These striking results suggest that in addition to the power of migrants to affect cross-border flows of money and people, countries of origin can also play a significant role.

Conclusion and Future Directions

This brief article has attempted to synthesize a broad range of literature from political science, economics, sociology, migration studies, and more to construct an account of international labor migration. To do so, the migratory process was broken down into distinct stages and decision points, focusing particularly on the decision to migrate, destination choice, and the re-engagement of migrants with their homeland. In doing so, the article also discussed the interlinkages of international migration with other fields of study in international political economy, including cross-border financial flows, trade, and investment. Through a multiplicity of approaches, we have gained a greater understanding of why people decide to move, why they decide to move to one country over another, and how and why they engage with the global economy and their homeland. Despite this intellectual progress, there remain many paths for future research at each stage of the migratory process; we highlight just a few of them here.

We know that income differentials, social ties, and local political conditions are important variables influencing the migration process. Yet the question remains: why do a small but growing number of people choose to leave while the overwhelming majority of people remain in their country of birth? Here, individual- or family-level subjective characteristics may be significant. There are a handful of observational studies that explore the relationship between subjective well-being or life satisfaction and the intention to migrate, with the nascent consensus being that life dissatisfaction increases the intention to migrate (Cai, Esipova, Oppenheimer, & Feng, 2014 ; Otrachshenko & Popova, 2014 ; Nikolova & Graham, 2015 ). But more research on intrinsic or subjective measures is needed to understand (a) their independent importance more fully and (b) how they interact with objective economic, political, and social factors. For instance, do those who are more optimistic migrate in larger numbers? Do minority individuals who feel they live in an environment in which diversity is not accepted feel a greater urge to leave home? Synthesizing these types of subjective variables and perceptions with the more prominent gravity-style models could result in a more complete picture of the international migration process.

For the “typical” migrant, one who is relatively less educated than the population in the chosen destination and does not have specialized skills, social networks are key to minimizing the risk of migrating and quickly tapping into economic opportunities in destination countries. Does this remain true for those who are highly educated? Although little empirical research exists on the topic, greater human capital and often-accompanying financial resources may operate as a substitute for the advantages offered by social networks, such as housing, overcoming linguistic barriers, and finding gainful employment. This would indicate that the “friends and family effect” is not as influential for this subset of migrants. Economic considerations, such as which destination offers the largest relative wage differential, or political considerations, such as the ease of quickly acquiring full citizenship rights, may matter more for the highly skilled. Neoclassical economic models of migration may best capture the behavior of migrants who hold human capital and who have the financial resources to independently migrate in a way that maximizes income or utility more broadly.

Since we have focused on international migration as a series of discrete decision points in this article, we have perhaps underemphasized the complexity of the physical migration process. In reality, migrants often do not pick a country and travel directly there, but travel through (perhaps several) countries of transit such as Mexico, Morocco, or Turkey along the way (Angel Castillo, 2006 ; Natter, 2013 ; Icduygu, 2005 ). There is little existing theoretical work to understand the role of transit countries in the migratory process, with much of it focusing on the potential for cooperation between destination and transit countries in managing primarily illegal immigration (Kahana & Lecker, 2005 ; Djajic & Michael, 2014 ; Djajic & Michael, 2016 ). Another related strand of the literature focuses on how wealthy destination countries are “externalizing” their immigration policy, encompassing a broader part of the migratory process than simply crossing a physically demarcated border (Duvell, 2012 ; Menjivar, 2014 ). But many questions remain, such as the following: how do we understand those who desire to enter, say, the United States, but instead relocate permanently to Mexico along the way? How do countries of transit handle the pressure of transit migrants, and how does this affect economic and political outcomes in these countries?

Finally, the focus of nearly all literature on international migration (and this article as a byproduct) implicitly views advanced economies as the only prominent destinations. However, this belies the fact that 38% of all migration stays within the “Global South” (World Bank, 2016 ). While there is certainly some literature on this phenomenon (see Ratha & Shaw, 2007 ; Gindling, 2009 ; Hujo & Piper, 2007 ), international political economy scholars have yet to sufficiently tackle this topic. The overarching research question here is: do the same push and pull factors that influence the decision to migrate and destination choice apply to those who migrate within the Global South? Do we need to construct new theories of international migration with less emphasis on factors such as wage differentials and political tolerance, or are these sufficient to understand this facet of the phenomenon? If we fail to answer these questions, we may miss explaining a significant proportion of international migration with its own consequences and policy implications.

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1. Our use of the term international labor migration follows academic and legal conventions; we use the term migration to refer to the voluntary movement of people across national borders, either in a temporary or permanent fashion. This excludes any discussion of refugees, asylum seekers, or any other groups that are forced to migrate.

2. We do not have space in this article to delve into the theoretical and empirical work unpacking the effect of demographic characteristics—age, gender, marital status, household size, and so forth on the migration decision and on subsequent flows of migrants. For comprehensive reviews, see Lichter ( 1983 ), Morrison and Lichter ( 1988 ); United Nations Population Division ( 2013 ); and Zaiceva and Zimmerman ( 2014 ).

3. Zelinsky ( 1971 ) originally identified this relationship and termed it mobility transition curve . A wealth of empirical work supports Zelinsky’s descriptive theory in a number of contexts (see Akerman, 1976 ; Gould, 1979 ; Hatton & Williamson, 1994 ; and Dao et al., 2016 ).

4. For a review of the arguments as well as some empirical tests, see Miller and Peters ( 2018 ) and Docquier, Lodigiani, Rapoport, and Schiff ( 2018 ).

5. Transparency International. “What is corruption?”

6. For example, former United Kingdom Independence Party leader Nigel Farage has called for the United Kingdom to adopt an immigration system that only allows in highly skilled migrants (“UKIP launches immigration policy”). In 2014, US President Barack Obama emphasized that he wanted to attract international students to American universities and that they “create jobs, businesses, and industries right here in America” (USA Today: “Full text: Obama’s immigration speech”). A key issue in Germany’s 2018 government formation was the creation of skill-based migration laws (Severin & Martin, 2018 ).

7. For a more comprehensive review, see Rapoport and Docquier ( 2006 ); and Adams ( 2011 ).

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2021 Theses Doctoral

Three Essays on International Migration

Huang, Xiaoning

Today, there are about 250 million international migrants globally, and the number is increasing each year. Immigrants have contributed to the global economy, bridged cultural and business exchanges between host and home countries, and increased ethnic, racial, social, and cultural diversity in the host societies. Immigrants have also been overgeneralized about, misunderstood, scapegoated, and discriminated against. Understanding what drives international migration, who migrate, and how immigrants fare in destination has valuable theoretical, practical, and policy implications. This dissertation consists of three essays on international immigration. The first paper aims to test a series of immigration theories by studying immigrant skill-selection into South Africa and the United States. Most of the research on the determinants of immigrant skill selection has been focusing on immigrants in the United States and other developed destination countries. However, migration has been growing much faster in recent years between developing countries. This case study offers insights into the similarities and differences of immigration theories within the contexts of international migration into South Africa and the US. This project is funded by the Hamilton Research Fellowship of Columbia School of Social Work. The second paper narrows down the focus onto Asian immigrants in the United States, studying how the skill-selection of Asian immigrants from different regions has evolved over the past four decades. Asian sending countries have experienced tremendous growth in their economy and educational infrastructure. The rapid development provides an excellent opportunity to test the theories on the associations between emigrants’ skill-selection and sending countries’ income, inequality, and education level. On the other hand, during the study period, the United States has had massive expansion employment-based immigration system, followed by cutbacks in immigration policies. I study the association between immigration patterns and these policies to draw inferences on how the changes in immigration policies have affected the skill selection of Asian immigrants. This research is funded by Columbia University Weatherhead East Asia Institute’s Dorothy Borg Research Program Dissertation Research Fellowship. The third paper centers on the less-educated immigrant groups in the US and investigates the gap in welfare use between less-educated immigrant and native households during 1995-2018, spanning periods of economic recessions and recoveries, changes in welfare policy regimes, and policies towards immigrants. I use “decomposition analysis” to study to what extend demographic factors, macroeconomic trends, and welfare and immigration policy could explain the disparities in welfare participation between immigrants and natives. This paper is co-authored with Dr. Neeraj Kaushal from Columbia School of Social Work and Dr. Julia Shu-Huah Wang from the University of Hong Kong. The work has been published in Population Research and Policy Review (doi.org/10.1007/s11113-020-09621-8).

Geographic Areas

• South Africa
• United States
• Social service
• Immigrants--Economic aspects
• Immigrants--Social conditions
• Race discrimination
• Immigrants--Education

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Essay on Migration

Students are often asked to write an essay on Migration in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

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100 Words Essay on Migration

Understanding migration.

Migration refers to the movement of people from one place to another. It can be within a country (internal migration) or between different countries (international migration).

Reasons for Migration

People migrate for various reasons. Some move for better job opportunities, while others might move due to conflicts or natural disasters in their home region.

Effects of Migration

Migration can have both positive and negative effects. It can lead to cultural diversity and economic growth, but it can also cause overcrowding and strain on resources.

Migration is a complex issue with many facets. It’s important to understand why people migrate and its impact on societies.

Also check:

• Advantages and Disadvantages of Migration

250 Words Essay on Migration

Introduction.

Migration, an inherent human phenomenon, has shaped societies and cultures since the dawn of civilization. It is a complex process influenced by an intricate interplay of economic, political, social, and environmental factors.

Types of Migration

Migration can be categorized broadly into internal and international. Internal migration involves movement within a country, often from rural to urban areas, driven by the pursuit of better economic opportunities. International migration, on the other hand, involves crossing national borders, often influenced by factors like conflict, persecution, or economic disparity.

The Push-Pull Theory

The push-pull theory provides a framework to understand migration. ‘Push’ factors include poverty, political instability, or environmental disasters that compel people to leave their homes. Conversely, ‘pull’ factors attract individuals to new regions, such as better job opportunities, political stability, or higher living standards.

Impacts of Migration

Migration has profound implications on both the source and destination regions. While it can lead to brain drain and demographic imbalances in the source region, it can also alleviate poverty and foster development. In destination regions, it can stimulate economic growth but may also strain resources and potentially cause social tension.

Migration, an integral part of our globalized world, presents both challenges and opportunities. It is crucial to foster policies that maximize its benefits while mitigating its potential drawbacks. Understanding the dynamics of migration can pave the way for more inclusive, equitable, and sustainable societies.

500 Words Essay on Migration

Migration is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, deeply ingrained in human history. It has been a significant driver of cultural, economic, and social evolution. It is the movement of people from one geographical location to another, either permanently or temporarily. The reasons for migration can vary from political to economic, environmental, or social.

The Driving Forces of Migration

The primary drivers of migration are often classified as push and pull factors. Push factors refer to the conditions that drive individuals to leave their homes, such as poverty, lack of opportunities, political instability, or environmental disasters. Pull factors, on the other hand, are the attractive aspects of the destination, like better economic opportunities, political stability, or higher living standards.

Migration can be categorized into different types based on various parameters. Internal migration refers to the movement within a country, while international migration involves crossing national borders. Migration can also be voluntary, where individuals choose to move, or forced, where individuals are compelled to leave due to circumstances beyond their control.

Migration has profound impacts on both the source and destination regions. For the source region, it can lead to a brain drain if skilled individuals migrate, potentially hindering the development. However, it can also alleviate pressure on resources and lead to remittances that boost the local economy.

For the destination region, migration can lead to an increase in diversity and cultural richness. It can also fill labor gaps, contributing to economic growth. However, if not managed well, it can lead to social tensions.

Migration in the Age of Globalization

In the era of globalization, migration has become more accessible and prevalent. The interconnectedness of economies has led to increased labor mobility. However, it has also exposed the stark inequalities between regions, further motivating migration. The rise of transnational communities, where migrants maintain strong ties with their home countries while integrating into the host society, is another notable trend.

Challenges and Opportunities

Migration presents both challenges and opportunities. The challenges include managing integration, ensuring migrants’ rights, and addressing social tensions. The opportunities lie in harnessing the potential of migrants for economic development, cultural exchange, and fostering global understanding.

In conclusion, migration is an inherent part of human society, driven by a complex interplay of factors. It has far-reaching impacts on individuals, communities, and nations. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, the dynamics of migration will continue to evolve, presenting both challenges and opportunities. Understanding and managing migration effectively is crucial to building inclusive, diverse, and prosperous societies.

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Essay on Migration | Causes and Effects of Migration

December 3, 2017 by Study Mentor Leave a Comment

Animals and man have been ever travelling. From grassy plains to fertile land, in search of better food, better opportunities. ‘Migration’ means the movement of population from one place to another for better opportunities.

Table of Contents

What is Migration?

Everyone wishes to lead a happy and secure life. A place where they can offer security to their family and a better future both for themselves and family. Migration many be of two types- permanent and temporary. Some migration may also occur annually, seasonally, or diurnally. According to certain census it has been found that migration mostly happens in three stages- (a) rural to rural , (b) rural to urban , (c) urban to urban , and (d) urban to rural

Maximum migration is from rural to urban, especially in developing countries like India. Even urban to urban migration happens quite a lot. But migration of the type (a), (d) is very rare. Migration of type (a) happens only when a person goes from another village to sell his items during bazaar or Melas. Some migration also happens from rural to small then from small town to urban. Such type of migration is called step wise migration.

In India there is a crazy race of the population travelling from the rural areas to the metropolitan cities like Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Delhi, Bangalore etc, seeking for better employment and better work opportunities. And this craze is increasing more and more in the coming years.

That is why competition in the job sector is increasing in the urban sphere. Metropolitan cities act a crowd puller. People are attracted to the vibrant colours of life in the cities. They fall in the wrong notion that they can pull up something big or great in the cities and earn a living but not everyone gets equal opportunities. Some end up rag-pickers, some end up as street dwellers, and some end up beggars who don’t get any means of livelihood.

Another term that comes along with migration is commutation. Commutation is the means of travelling on a daily schedule of the people to cities from the neighbouring towns and villages for the purpose of job and other works. This is a type of temporary migration.

Some people commute seasonally- incase or family gathering or wedding ceremonies. While some immigrants migrate annually. Migration is not just a re-location of human resources and settlements but it is a process which has three-fold impact:

(a) On the area experiencing immigration,

(b) On the area experiencing out-migration, and

(c) On the migrants themselves, the purpose of migration may be employment, business, education, family movement, marriage, calamity, etc.

These migrants have very little skill and professional expertise, moreover they lack literacy. They mostly get involved in the low grade activities and fields of manual labour, where there is not much sophistication or use of literary capabilities.

Very few are in administrative, professional or technical sphere. The condition of women migrants is worse. Majority of them are illiterate or have very little literacy. Such people take up even lower grade of jobs like the domestic maid servants, hawkers or vendors. This change has been termed by many as ‘evolutionary urbanization’.

This sudden migration burst has led in detoriation in the look of the city and spreading of cities. Rapid human pressure has led to the unprecedented growth of shabby towns, slums and bastees and squatter settlements. Cities are spreading far beyond its boundary limits.

There are also other evils like the overflow of urban unemployment, rapid exploitation of the items of daily necessity like- food, clothing and shelter and their unavailability and there is a very sharp decline of human values and moral and it is increasing over the years( as observed its increase from 1981-1999 and will steadily increase over the 21st century).

Hence the metropolitan cities are becoming like blown-up urban villages which fail to offer basic necessities of life to the people residing in it. Due to unchecked or unprecedented human growth the cities lack in urban functions, characteristics, urban infrastructure and services, and without a strong economic base.

They are slowly stepping towards what is called as ‘degeneration’ or ‘decay’.

The urban areas not only attract the poor and the illiterate class but it has become a place for the educated and elite class to earn a living and lead a comfortable and relaxed life. There have been many cases where students from villages have come in cities to get higher education, managed with a good job and become a part of the city itself.

Even some big landlords and rich farmers have shown their interest in investing a good part of their agricultural profits in the different businesses that goes on in the city and also commercial activities. Hence the cities of developing countries like India are developing on the plunder or the remains of the rural parts (both natural and human). Unless this exploitation of blood-sucking trend is terminated for once and for all, the development or the revival of the ‘desi’ villages is a farfetched dream.

Not just there are rural immigrants to deal with. There are international migrants as well. Majority of the international migrants to India come from Asian countries, which are in turn followed by Europeans, Africans, etc. The neighbouring countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Russia etc. have contributed large number of migrants to India.

Since there is no restriction along Indo-Nepal international boundary large numbers of Nepali people come to India for seeking employment, education, business etc. Assam, West Bengal and north eastern states attract large number of legal and illegal migrants from Bangladesh.

This has created a number of social, economic and political problems in these areas. Nepalese are seen in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Maharashtra and Delhi. Similarly migrants from Sri Lanka are most frequented in South India especially in Tamil Nadu

Migration not only creates confusion and commotion, but also an ill-growth of cities. That does not mean that we will shun away the immigrants.

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Identität und Migration

Auf der Suche nach Schutzfaktoren mit Problemzentrierten Interviews (PZI) und der Kernsatzmethode

• First Online: 14 November 2015

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Zusammenfassung

In Deutschland leben etwa sechzehn Millionen Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund (Engels et al. 2011). Sechzehn Millionen Geschichten. Sechzehn Millionen Identitäten. Im öffentlichen Diskurs wird insbesondere der Frage nachgegangen, inwieweit diese sechzehn Millionen zugewanderten Menschen integriert sind. Beim Blick auf das Allgemeine wird das Individuelle häufig aus den Augen verloren. Als wesentliche Voraussetzung für die soziale Integration eines Individuums gilt jedoch seine und ihre ganz persönliche Identitätskonstruktion. Für zugewanderte Menschen besteht ein erhöhtes Risiko, in ihrer Identitätsbildung beeinträchtigt zu werden. Das Finden einer Passung zwischen dem subjektiven Persönlichen (innere Welt) und der sozialen Rolle (äußere Welt) kann sich aufgrund der konträren kulturellen Erwartungen schwierig gestalten (Özbek 2006; Keupp et al. 2006; Uslucan 2011). Um die Ausbildung einer kulturellen Doppelidentität im Sinne eines doppelten Gewissens zu verhindern, müssen die ambivalenten Anteile innerhalb der eigenen Person stimmig miteinander verbunden werden (Özbek 2006). Es stellt sich die Frage, welche Faktoren diesbezüglich eine protektive Funktion einnehmen und zu einer Auflösung der erlebten Ambivalenz bzw. einer Anordnung derselben in ein individuell akzeptables Spannungsfeld (Keupp et al. 2006) beitragen. Das Wissen darum kann einen Mehrwert für die präventive Arbeit mit jugendlichen Migranten und Migrantinnen darstellen. Da Menschen mit einem türkischen Migrationshintergrund die größte Migrantengruppe in Deutschland darstellen (Oswald 2007), fiel der Entschluss, sich auf diese Personengruppe zu fokussieren.

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Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) Alternative Voices Short Essay Competition 2024 for young researchers and writers. (USD 1,000 Prize)

Application Deadline: 3rd of May 2024.  

Applications are now open for the 2024 Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) Alternative Voices Short Essay Competition . The  Mixed Migration Review  (MMR), the annual flagship report of the  Mixed Migration Centre  (MMC), aims to offer a platform for different voices in the migration debate. MMC is therefore inviting young researchers and writers on migration, from and based in Asia, Africa or Latin America to enter a short essay competition. The 5 winners will have their essays published in a section of the MMR2024 dedicated to “Alternative Perspectives” and receive a prize of USD 1,000 each.  

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• The competition is open to writers  from and based in   Asian, African and Latin American  countries who are  30 years of age or younger. 
• The winning essays will need to offer  your perspectives  on our key themes: migration in politics and politics in migration, migration narratives and public perceptions on migration. T
• he focus of your essay should be on your perceptions, ideas and opinions  from the perspective of your country of origin about the situation in common destination countries , whether they be within your region, in the Global South or in the Global North. 

Application Procedure:

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I live in a Texas city that's one of the fastest-growing in America. I see why so many Californians are moving here — and the impact they have on home prices and traffic.

• Eric Newland, 56, lives in New Braunfels, Texas, one of America's fastest-growing cities.
• The city between Austin and San Antonio wins over movers with relatively affordable homes, he said.
• The transplants lead to benefits, like higher wages, and drawbacks, like increased traffic, he said.

This as-told-to essay is based on a conversation with Eric Newland, a 56-year-old retired Medical Service Corps officer who is now a real-estate agent in New Braunfels, Texas. Census data shows that New Braunfels' population has surged by more than 15% since 2020, making it one of the fastest-growing cities in the US. The essay has been edited for length and clarity.

In 2005, I moved to New Braunfels while going through my master's program at Fort Sam Houston. Since then, I've lived here off and on during my military career.

I've spent time in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, and, most recently, Germany. In 2020, I moved back to New Braunfels .

The city is about 32 miles northeast of San Antonio and roughly 40 miles southwest of Austin , within the Texas Triangle ." This area, primarily along Interstate 10 and Interstate 35, spans between Dallas, San Antonio, and Houston, and has seen the bulk of the state's population growth.

New Braunfels is one of the fastest-growing cities in the country.

With many people relocating here from various locations, there have been a lot of vibrant changes.

The city is growing but retaining its identity

Despite its growth, the city maintains its small-town charm , with quaint shops and restaurants. In the heart of downtown, there's a central plaza that has smoke trees and a pavilion where people often gather to watch local bands perform.

Further away from the downtown area, there are many new neighborhoods. Moving towards San Antonio and Austin, the city begins to feel like a larger town with several strip malls and new homes.

New Braunfels has a mix of Mexican and German cultures. I have lived in Germany three separate times, and the closest feeling to that is probably here in New Braunfels.

The city was founded by German settlers and many businesses like to maintain that theme. For example, if you're at an Autohaus, it would be spelled with an "h-a-u-s" instead of "h-o-u-s-e." We even have an old German bakery called Naegelin's .

Related stories

Every year in November, the city hosts Wurstfest , the largest German fest in the United States. New Braunfels is also home to Schlitterbahn, a German water park that is the largest in the country.

Californians are flocking to New Braunfels

I became a real-estate agent a few years ago when I retired from the Army. I began my training in 2020 and got my license in 2021.

New Braunfels has always been growing, but since then, there has been a significant increase in interest in the area. There's a lot of construction going on, and big housing developments and new businesses just keep popping up everywhere.

There's been a mass migration of people from California moving to New Braunfels.

In fact, a common theme among Realtors in the area is hearing, "I have another client from California."

While I can only speak for a handful of clients I've talked to, it seems that many of the movers coming here have been priced out of California and believe their money goes further in Texas .

For instance, a friend of mine from San Diego said that the cost of living became too expensive relative to income levels, and that Texas offered them more affordability on everyday expenses.

Similarly, another person I know sold their Los Angeles home, purchased a house here in New Braunfels, and used the profit to start a business. Their move even encouraged some of their family members to relocate here.

There have been some growing pains

With more people moving here, the real-estate market has changed. Home prices have risen significantly compared to the 19 years that I've been associated with this area.

When I first moved here in 2005, I bought a three-bedroom, 2,000-square-foot home for $130,000. We sold it for $144,000 in 2008, and then purchased another home for $171,000, sold it in 2017 for $194,000.

In 2019, my wife and I purchased a 2,400-square-foot home for $370,000. Today, I'd estimate its value to be somewhere in the mid-500s, potentially up to $600,000.

As a retired veteran with disability benefits, I am exempt from paying property tax. However, I am aware that property taxes in this area have increased. I believe one of my neighbors saw theirs increase from around $1,500 to $1,600 a year.

When you have growth, it does change the fabric of the area.

An upside is that there have been a lot of new businesses, more income to the city, and even live music. A downside has been that there's definitely more traffic.

Even still, I think our city leaders have done the best they can to accommodate our larger population.

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