peace building essay

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What is peacebuilding?

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Peacebuilding means supporting people in or at risk of conflict to prevent or end direct violence. It also means creating the conditions for sustainable peaceful coexistence and peaceful social change by addressing ‘structural violence’ – the underlying inequalities, injustice or conflict between groups of people by established institutions or processes.

Preventing or ending direct violence requires people to talk to one another, build relationships and come to agreements about how to resolve conflicts without fighting. It often also requires a shifting of power and greater social equity.

In addition, creating the conditions for ongoing positive social change and addressing structural violence requires communication and relationships between those who seek change and those who maintain the status quo, whether that is in formal institutions or through the established attitudes and behaviours in society. Societal structures, attitudes and behaviours are well established, and influencing those who have the power to change them is a long-term endeavour.

In many contexts there are groups or actors who may seek or foster violent conflict and benefit from it – for example, to weaken a neighbouring region, generate or sustain business opportunities, or reinforce political narratives and authority. Peacebuilding involves calling out and challenging such groups and actors and trying to limit their capacity to foment violent conflict or gain from it.

We do not undertake peacekeeping (providing a physical presence to prevent the resumption of violence) and tend not to get directly involved in national or international peacemaking (high-level, elite negotiations aimed at stopping immediate violence).

Our peacebuilding focusses at the community and societal levels, on strengthening relationships before, during or after violent conflict, and in creating the ongoing conditions for peaceful coexistence and positive social change.

International Alert’s approach to peacebuilding

This practice brief outlines what International Alert as an organisation means by peace and peacebuilding, the reasons why peacebuilding is so important and how we work to build peace.

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We believe in a world where people resolve their differences without violence. From the grassroots to policy level, we bring people together to build sustainable peace.

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What is peacebuilding?

Peacebuilding seeks to address the underlying causes of conflict, helping people to resolve their differences peacefully and lay the foundations to prevent future violence.

Why do we need peacebuilding?

The number of violent conflicts has increased dramatically since 2010. The world urgently needs to respond differently. 

Violence affects everyone. Wars prevent communities from developing, stop children going to school and make it harder for people to access healthcare. Poverty then drives more conflict, and the cycle continues.

• Around a quarter of all people live in countries affected by conflict and violence. 
• Over 68 million people alive today have been forced to flee their homes. This is the highest it’s been since the end of the second world war.
• Conflicts drive 80% of all humanitarian needs. 
• By 2030, it is predicted that half of the world’s poorest people will be living in conflict-affected places. 

We need to think differently – it’s time we stopped picking up the pieces and started putting an end to the cycles of violence. It’s time we invested more in peacebuilding.

What does peacebuilding involve? 

Peacebuilding is a long-term process of encouraging people to talk, repairing relationships, and reforming institutions. For positive change to last, everyone affected by a destructive conflict has to be involved in the process of building peace.

Transforming relationships is key to putting an end to violence. That means understanding  and dealing with why people are fighting in the first place, and finding ways of moving things forward. This is true whether the conflict is within communities, between societies, or between the state and ordinary people. 

In practical terms, peacebuilding can look like any one of hundreds of different actions. It can be bringing different groups together to discuss the issues, or using film and media to help people understand the viewpoints of others. It might be providing support to formal processes of negotiation between governments and armed groups, or ensuring marginalised groups can have a say. Peace is built when we break down stereotypes and when different groups work together.

How we address conflict

Simply stopping fighting is not the same as transforming conflict and putting a permanent end to violence. Patient, persistent work to find creative solutions to conflict is needed to build sustainable peace.

Conciliation Resources works to truly understand conflicts, and then we share what we learn with others. We create connections between the different groups involved, and most importantly, ensure the people directly impacted by conflict are leading initiatives to respond to the violence.

EQUIP through local ownership

Helping people affected by conflict make a change.

We work side-by-side with the people affected by conflict – providing connections, developing skills and equipping them to take part in peace processes. We bring people from regions of conflict to meetings with policymakers, so policies can be informed by those experiencing the impact of violence. All this means that their voices are heard, they lead initiatives and their insight drives action.

BUILD sustainable solutions

Working together to find different responses.

Working in partnership, we find creative ways to initiate dialogue, solve problems and kick-start change when conflicts seem stuck. We accompany our partners, involve the community and influence governments to do things differently. The result – we help build peaceful and inclusive societies. 

CONNECT everyone involved

Building relationships with communities and governments.

Developing trusted relationships and networks is vital. We connect groups in conflict who rarely speak or meet, across dangerous and often impassable divides. We work with all sections of society – from politicians to communities – reaching out to people who are bypassed by mainstream peace processes.

LEARN from experience

Analysing conflicts and sharing learning. 

Analysis is the foundation of our work. Collaborating with others, we learn from diverse perspectives and real experiences, to understand the many factors that cause and sustain conflicts. We share lessons from peace processes across the globe and use past experience to shape solutions for the future – it’s central to everything we do.

Making peace possible

Get involved

We rely on substantial support from our funding partners; institutional donors, trusts and foundations, corporate support and very importantly, individuals who share our commitment.

Our work in action

Peacebuilding comes in many forms. Explore what our work looks like in practice.

How we make a difference

With our courageous partners, and the vital support of our donors, we are helping people living with conflict to reduce and prevent violence in their communities. And we are guiding countries that have suffered decades of war, on to the path to peace. 

Beyond Intractability

The Hyper-Polarization Challenge to the Conflict Resolution Field: A Joint BI/CRQ Discussion BI and the Conflict Resolution Quarterly invite you to participate in an online exploration of what those with conflict and peacebuilding expertise can do to help defend liberal democracies and encourage them live up to their ideals.

Follow BI and the Hyper-Polarization Discussion on BI's New Substack Newsletter .

Hyper-Polarization, COVID, Racism, and the Constructive Conflict Initiative Read about (and contribute to) the  Constructive Conflict Initiative  and its associated Blog —our effort to assemble what we collectively know about how to move beyond our hyperpolarized politics and start solving society's problems. 

By Michelle Maiese

September 2003  

What it Means to Build a Lasting Peace

It should be noted at the outset that there are two distinct ways to understand peacebuilding. According the United Nations (UN) document An Agenda for Peace [1], peacebuilding consists of a wide range of activities associated with capacity building, reconciliation , and societal transformation . Peacebuilding is a long-term process that occurs after violent conflict has slowed down or come to a halt. Thus, it is the phase of the peace process that takes place after peacemaking and peacekeeping.

Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs), on the other hand, understand peacebuilding as an umbrella concept that encompasses not only long-term transformative efforts, but also peacemaking and peacekeeping . In this view, peacebuilding includes early warning and response efforts, violence prevention , advocacy work, civilian and military peacekeeping , military intervention , humanitarian assistance , ceasefire agreements , and the establishment of peace zones.

In the interests of keeping these essays a reasonable length, this essay primarily focuses on the narrower use of the term "peacebuilding."  For more information about other phases of the peace process, readers should refer to the knowledge base essays about violence prevention , peacemaking and peacekeeping , as well as the essay on peace processes  which is what we use as our "umbrella" term.

In this narrower sense, peacebuilding is a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through reconciliation , institution building, and political as well as economic transformation.[1] This consists of a set of physical, social, and structural initiatives that are often an integral part of post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.

It is generally agreed that the central task of peacebuilding is to create positive peace, a "stable social equilibrium in which the surfacing of new disputes does not escalate into violence and war."[2] Sustainable peace is characterized by the absence of physical and structural violence , the elimination of discrimination, and self-sustainability.[3] Moving towards this sort of environment goes beyond problem solving or conflict management. Peacebuilding initiatives try to fix the core problems that underlie the conflict and change the patterns of interaction of the involved parties.[4] They aim to move a given population from a condition of extreme vulnerability and dependency to one of self-sufficiency and well-being.[5]

To further understand the notion of peacebuilding, many contrast it with the more traditional strategies of peacemaking and peacekeeping. Peacemaking is the diplomatic effort to end the violence between the conflicting parties, move them towards nonviolent dialogue, and eventually reach a peace agreement. Peacekeeping , on the other hand, is a third-party intervention (often, but not always done by military forces) to assist parties in transitioning from violent conflict to peace by separating the fighting parties and keeping them apart. These peacekeeping operations not only provide security, but also facilitate other non-military initiatives.[6]

Some draw a distinction between post-conflict peacebuilding and long-term peacebuilding. Post-conflict peacebuilding is connected to peacekeeping, and often involves demobilization and reintegration programs, as well as immediate reconstruction needs.[7] Meeting immediate needs and handling crises is no doubt crucial. But while peacemaking and peacekeeping processes are an important part of peace transitions, they are not enough in and of themselves to meet longer-term needs and build a lasting peace.

Long-term peacebuilding techniques are designed to fill this gap, and to address the underlying substantive issues that brought about conflict. Various transformation techniques aim to move parties away from confrontation and violence, and towards political and economic participation, peaceful relationships, and social harmony.[8]

This longer-term perspective is crucial to future violence prevention and the promotion of a more peaceful future. Thinking about the future involves articulating desirable structural, systemic, and relationship goals. These might include sustainable economic development, self-sufficiency, equitable social structures that meet human needs, and building positive relationships.[9]

Peacebuilding measures also aim to prevent conflict from reemerging. Through the creation of mechanisms that enhance cooperation and dialogue among different identity groups , these measures can help parties manage their conflict of interests through peaceful means. This might include building institutions that provide procedures and mechanisms for effectively handling and resolving conflict.[10] For example, societies can build fair courts, capacities for labor negotiation, systems of civil society reconciliation, and a stable electoral process.[11] Such designing of new dispute resolution systems is an important part of creating a lasting peace.

In short, parties must replace the spiral of violence and destruction with a spiral of peace and development, and create an environment conducive to self-sustaining and durable peace.[12] The creation of such an environment has three central dimensions: addressing the underlying causes of conflict, repairing damaged relationships and dealing with psychological trauma at the individual level. Each of these dimensions relies on different strategies and techniques.

The Structural Dimension: Addressing Root Causes

The structural dimension of peacebuilding focuses on the social conditions that foster violent conflict. Many note that stable peace must be built on social, economic, and political foundations that serve the needs of the populace.[13] In many cases, crises arise out of systemic roots. These root causes are typically complex, but include skewed land distribution, environmental degradation, and unequal political representation.[14] If these social problems are not addressed, there can be no lasting peace.

Thus, in order to establish durable peace, parties must analyze the structural causes of the conflict and initiate social structural change. The promotion of substantive and procedural justice through structural means typically involves institution building and the strengthening of civil society .

Avenues of political and economic transformation include social structural change to remedy political or economic injustice, reconstruction programs designed to help communities ravaged by conflict revitalize their economies, and the institution of effective and legitimate restorative justice systems.[15] Peacebuilding initiatives aim to promote nonviolent mechanisms that eliminate violence, foster structures that meet basic human needs , and maximize public participation .[16]

To provide fundamental services to its citizens, a state needs strong executive, legislative, and judicial institutions.[17] Many point to democratization as a key way to create these sorts of peace-enhancing structures. Democratization seeks to establish legitimate and stable political institutions and civil liberties that allow for meaningful competition for political power and broad participation in the selection of leaders and policies.[18] It is important for governments to adhere to principles of transparency and predictability, and for laws to be adopted through an open and public process.[19] For the purpose of post-conflict peacebuilding, the democratization process should be part of a comprehensive project to rebuild society's institutions.

Political structural changes focus on political development, state building , and the establishment of effective government institutions. This often involves election reform, judicial reform, power-sharing initiatives, and constitutional reform. It also includes building political parties, creating institutions that provide procedures and mechanisms for effectively handling and resolving conflict, and establishing mechanisms to monitor and protect human rights . Such institution building and infrastructure development typically requires the dismantling, strengthening, or reformation of old institutions in order to make them more effective.

It is crucial to establish and maintain rule of law, and to implement rules and procedures that constrain the powers of all parties and hold them accountable for their actions.[20] This can help to ease tension, create stability, and lessen the likelihood of further conflict. For example, an independent judiciary can serve as a forum for the peaceful resolution of disputes and post-war grievances.[21]

In addition, societies need a system of criminal justice that deters and punishes banditry and acts of violence.[22] Fair police mechanisms must be established and government officials and members of the police force must be trained to observe basic rights in the execution of their duties.[23] In addition, legislation protecting minorities and laws securing gender equality should be advanced. Courts and police forces must be free of corruption and discrimination.

But structural change can also be economic. Many note that economic development is integral to preventing future conflict and avoiding a relapse into violence.[24] Economic factors that put societies at risk include lack of employment opportunities, food scarcity, and lack of access to natural resources or land. A variety of social structural changes aim to eliminate the structural violence that arises out of a society's economic system. These economic and social reforms include economic development programs, health care assistance, land reform, social safety nets, and programs to promote agricultural productivity.[25]

Economic peacebuilding targets both the micro- and macro-level and aims to create economic opportunities and ensure that the basic needs of the population are met. On the microeconomic level, societies should establish micro-credit institutions to increase economic activity and investment at the local level, promote inter-communal trade and an equitable distribution of land, and expand school enrollment and job training.[26] On the macroeconomic level, the post-conflict government should be assisted in its efforts to secure the economic foundations and infrastructure necessary for a transition to peace.[27]

The Relational Dimension

A second integral part of building peace is reducing the effects of war-related hostility through the repair and transformation of damaged relationships. The relational dimension of peacebuilding centers on reconciliation , forgiveness , trust building , and future imagining . It seeks to minimize poorly functioning communication and maximize mutual understanding.[28]

Many believe that reconciliation is one of the most effective and durable ways to transform relationships and prevent destructive conflicts.[29] The essence of reconciliation is the voluntary initiative of the conflicting parties to acknowledge their responsibility and guilt. Parties reflect upon their own role and behavior in the conflict, and acknowledge and accept responsibility for the part they have played. As parties share their experiences, they learn new perspectives and change their perception of their "enemies." There is recognition of the difficulties faced by the opposing side and of their legitimate grievances, and a sense of empathy begins to develop. Each side expresses sincere regret and remorse, and is prepared to apologize for what has transpired. The parties make a commitment to let go of anger , and to refrain from repeating the injury. Finally, there is a sincere effort to redress past grievances and compensate for the damage done. This process often relies on interactive negotiation and allows the parties to enter into a new mutually enriching relationship.[30]

One of the essential requirements for the transformation of conflicts is effective communication and negotiation at both the elite and grassroots levels . Through both high- and community-level dialogues , parties can increase their awareness of their own role in the conflict and develop a more accurate perception of both their own and the other group's identity .[31] As each group shares its unique history, traditions, and culture, the parties may come to understand each other better. International exchange programs and problem-solving workshops are two techniques that can help to change perceptions, build trust , open communication , and increase empathy .[32] For example, over the course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the main antagonists have sometimes been able to build trust through meeting outside their areas , not for formal negotiations, but simply to better understand each other.[33]

If these sorts of bridge-building communication systems are in place, relations between the parties can improve and any peace agreements they reach will more likely be self-sustaining.[34] (The Israeli-Palestinian situation illustrates that there are no guarantees, however.) Various mass communication and education measures, such as peace radio and TV , peace-education projects , and conflict-resolution training , can help parties to reach such agreements.[35] And dialogue between people of various ethnicities or opposing groups can lead to deepened understanding and help to change the demonic image of the enemy group.[36] It can also help parties to overcome grief, fear, and mistrust and enhance their sense of security.

A crucial component of such dialogue is future imaging , whereby parties form a vision of the commonly shared future they are trying to build. Conflicting parties often have more in common in terms of their visions of the future than they do in terms of their shared and violent past.[37] The thought is that if they know where they are trying to go, it will be easier to get there.

Another way for the parties to build a future together is to pursue joint projects that are unrelated to the conflict's core issues and center on shared interests. This can benefit the parties' relationship. Leaders who project a clear and hopeful vision of the future and the ways and means to get there can play a crucial role here.

But in addition to looking towards the future, parties must deal with their painful past. Reconciliation not only envisions a common, connected future, but also recognizes the need to redress past wrongdoing.[38] If the parties are to renew their relationship and build an interdependent future, what has happened must be exposed and then forgiven .

Indeed, a crucial part of peacebuilding is addressing past wrongdoing while at the same time promoting healing and rule of law.[39] Part of repairing damaged relationships is responding to past human rights violations and genocide through the establishment of truth commissions , fact-finding missions, and war crimes tribunals .[40] These processes attempt to deal with the complex legal and emotional issues associated with human rights abuses and ensure that justice is served. It is commonly thought that past injustice must be recognized, and the perpetrators punished if parties wish to achieve reconciliation.

However, many note that the retributive justice advanced by Western legal systems often ignores the needs of victims and exacerbates wounds.[41] Many note that to advance healing between the conflicting parties, justice must be more reparative in focus. Central to restorative justice is its future-orientation and its emphasis on the relationship between victims and offenders. It seeks to engage both victims and offenders in dialogue and make things right by identifying their needs and obligations.[42] Having community-based restorative justice processes in place can help to build a sustainable peace.

The Personal Dimension

The personal dimension of peacebuilding centers on desired changes at the individual level. If individuals are not able to undergo a process of healing, there will be broader social, political, and economic repercussions.[43] The destructive effects of social conflict must be minimized, and its potential for personal growth must be maximized.[44] Reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts must prioritize treating mental health problems and integrate these efforts into peace plans and rehabilitation efforts.

In traumatic situations, a person is rendered powerless and faces the threat of death and injury. Traumatic events might include a serious threat or harm to one's family or friends, sudden destruction of one's home or community, and a threat to one's own physical being.[45] Such events overwhelm an individual's coping resources, making it difficult for the individual to function effectively in society.[46] Typical emotional effects include depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. After prolonged and extensive trauma, a person is often left with intense feelings that negatively influence his/her psychological well-being. After an experience of violence, an individual is likely to feel vulnerable, helpless, and out of control in a world that is unpredictable.[47]

Building peace requires attention to these psychological and emotional layers of the conflict. The social fabric that has been destroyed by war must be repaired, and trauma must be dealt with on the national, community, and individual levels.[48] At the national level, parties can accomplish widespread personal healing through truth and reconciliation commissions that seek to uncover the truth and deal with perpetrators. At the community level, parties can pay tribute to the suffering of the past through various rituals or ceremonies, or build memorials to commemorate the pain and suffering that has been endured.[49] Strong family units that can rebuild community structures and moral environments are also crucial.

At the individual level, one-on-one counseling has obvious limitations when large numbers of people have been traumatized and there are insufficient resources to address their needs. Peacebuilding initiatives must therefore provide support for mental health infrastructure and ensure that mental health professionals receive adequate training. Mental health programs should be adapted to suit the local context, and draw from traditional and communal practice and customs wherever possible.[50] Participating in counseling and dialogue can help individuals to develop coping mechanisms and to rebuild their trust in others.[51]

If it is taken that psychology drives individuals' attitudes and behaviors, then new emphasis must be placed on understanding the social psychology of conflict and its consequences. If ignored, certain victims of past violence are at risk for becoming perpetrators of future violence.[52] Victim empowerment and support can help to break this cycle.

Peacebuilding Agents

Peacebuilding measures should integrate civil society in all efforts and include all levels of society in the post-conflict strategy. All society members, from those in elite leadership positions, to religious leaders, to those at the grassroots level, have a role to play in building a lasting peace. Many apply John Paul Lederach's model of hierarchical intervention levels to make sense of the various levels at which peacebuilding efforts occur.[53]

Because peace-building measures involve all levels of society and target all aspects of the state structure, they require a wide variety of agents for their implementation. These agents advance peace-building efforts by addressing functional and emotional dimensions in specified target areas, including civil society and legal institutions.[54] While external agents can facilitate and support peacebuilding, ultimately it must be driven by internal forces. It cannot be imposed from the outside.

Various internal actors play an integral role in peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts. The government of the affected country is not only the object of peacebuilding, but also the subject. While peacebuilding aims to transform various government structures, the government typically oversees and engages in this reconstruction process. A variety of the community specialists, including lawyers, economists, scholars, educators, and teachers, contribute their expertise to help carry out peacebuilding projects. Finally, a society's religious networks can play an important role in establishing social and moral norms.[55]

Nevertheless, outside parties typically play a crucial role in advancing such peacebuilding efforts. Few peacebuilding plans work unless regional neighbors and other significant international actors support peace through economic development aid and humanitarian relief .[56] At the request of the affected country, international organizations can intervene at the government level to transform established structures.[57] They not only provide monetary support to post-conflict governments, but also assist in the restoration of financial and political institutions. Because their efforts carry the legitimacy of the international community, they can be quite effective.

Various institutions provide the necessary funding for peacebuilding projects. While international institutions are the largest donors, private foundations contribute a great deal through project-based financing.[58] In addition, regional organizations often help to both fund and implement peacebuilding strategies. Finally, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often carry out small-scale projects to strengthen countries at the grassroots level. Not only traditional NGOs but also the business and academic community and various grassroots organizations work to further these peace-building efforts. All of the groups help to address "the limits imposed on governmental action by limited resources, lack of consensus, or insufficient political will."[59]

Some suggest that governments, NGOs, and intergovernmental agencies need to create categories of funding related to conflict transformation and peacebuilding.[60] Funds are often difficult to secure when they are intended to finance preventive action. And middle-range initiatives, infrastructure building, and grassroots projects do not typically attract significant funding, even though these sorts of projects may have the greatest potential to sustain long-term conflict transformation.[61] Those providing resources for peacebuilding initiatives must look to fill these gaps. In addition, external actors must think through the broader ramifications of their programs.[62] They must ensure that funds are used to advance genuine peacebuilding initiatives rather than be swallowed up by corrupt leaders or channeled into armed conflict.

But as already noted, higher-order peace, connected to improving local capacities, is not possible simply through third-party intervention.[63] And while top-down approaches are important, peace must also be built from the bottom up. Many top-down agreements collapse because the ground below has not been prepared. Top-down approaches must therefore be buttressed, and relationships built.

Thus, an important task in sustaining peace is to build a peace constituency within the conflict setting. Middle-range actors form the core of a peace constituency. They are more flexible than top-level leaders, and less vulnerable in terms of daily survival than those at the grassroots level.[64] Middle-range actors who strive to build bridges to their counterparts across the lines of conflict are the ones best positioned to sustain conflict transformation. This is because they have an understanding of the nuances of the conflict setting, as well as access to the elite leadership .

Many believe that the greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long term is always rooted in the local people and their culture.[65] Parties should strive to understand the cultural dimension of conflict, and identify the mechanisms for handling conflict that exist within that cultural setting. Building on cultural resources and utilizing local mechanisms for handling disputes can be quite effective in resolving conflicts and transforming relationships. Initiatives that incorporate citizen-based peacebuilding include community peace projects in schools and villages, local peace commissions and problem-solving workshops , and a variety of other grassroots initiatives .

Effective peacebuilding also requires public-private partnerships in addressing conflict and greater coordination among the various actors.[66] International governmental organizations, national governments, bilateral donors, and international and local NGOs need to coordinate to ensure that every dollar invested in peacebuilding is spent wisely.[67] To accomplish this, advanced planning and intervention coordination is needed.

There are various ways to attempt to coordinate peace-building efforts. One way is to develop a peace inventory to keep track of which agents are doing various peace-building activities. A second is to develop clearer channels of communication and more points of contact between the elite and middle ranges. In addition, a coordination committee should be instituted so that agreements reached at the top level are actually capable of being implemented.[68] A third way to better coordinate peace-building efforts is to create peace-donor conferences that bring together representatives from humanitarian organizations, NGOs, and the concerned governments. It is often noted that "peacebuilding would greatly benefit from cross-fertilization of ideas and expertise and the bringing together of people working in relief, development, conflict resolution, arms control, diplomacy, and peacekeeping."[69] Lastly, there should be efforts to link internal and external actors. Any external initiatives must also enhance the capacity of internal resources to build peace-enhancing structures that support reconciliation efforts throughout a society.[70] In other words, the international role must be designed to fit each case.

[1] Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. An Agenda for Peace. New York: United Nations 1995 .

[1a] SAIS, "The Conflict Management Toolkit: Approaches," The Conflict Management Program, Johns Hopkins University [available at: http://www.sais-jhu.edu/resources/middle-east-studies/conflict-management-toolkit

[2] Henning Haugerudbraaten, "Peacebuilding: Six Dimensions and Two Concepts," Institute For Security Studies. [available at: http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/7No6/Peacebuilding.html ]

[3] Luc Reychler, "From Conflict to Sustainable Peacebuilding: Concepts and Analytical Tools," in Peacebuilding: A Field Guide , Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 12.

[4] Reychler, 12.

[5] John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies . (Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 75.

[6] SAIS, [available at: http://www.sais-jhu.edu/resources/middle-east-studies/conflict-management-toolkit ]

[7] Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. "Building Peace: Challenges and Strategies After Civil War," The World Bank Group. [available at: http://www.chs.ubc.ca/srilanka/PDFs/Building%20peace--challenges%20and%20strategies.pdf ] 3.

[8] Doyle and Sambanis, 2

[9] Lederach, 77.

[11] Doyle and Sambanis, 5.

[13] Haugerudbraaten

[14] Haugerudbraaten

[16] Lederach, 83.

[19] Neil J. Kritz, "The Rule of Law in the Post-Conflict Phase: Building a Stable Peace," in Managing Global Chaos: Sources or and Responses to International Conflict , eds. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 593.

[20] Kritz, 588.

[21] Kritz, 591.

[22] Kritz, 591.

[25] Michael Lund, "A Toolbox for Responding to Conflicts and Building Peace," In Peacebuilding: A Field Guide , Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 18.

[27] These issues are discussed in detail in the set of essays on development in this knowledge base.

[28] Lederach, 82.

[29] Hizkias Assefa, "Reconciliation," in Peacebuilding: A Field Guide , Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 342.

[30] Assefa, 340.

[33] Kathleen Stephens, "Building Peace in Deeply Rooted Conflicts: Exploring New Ideas to Shape the Future" INCORE, 1997.

[34] Reychler, 13.

[35] Lund, 18.

[37] Lederach, 77.

[38] Lederach, 31.

[39] Howard Zehr, "Restorative Justice," In Peacebuilding: A Field Guide , Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 330.

[41] Zehr, 330.

[42] Zehr, 331.

[44] Lederach, 82.

[45] Hugo van der Merwe and Tracy Vienings, "Coping with Trauma," in Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 343.

[46] van der Merwe, 343.

[47] van der Merwe, 345.

[48] van der Merwe, 343.

[49] van der Merwe, 344.

[51] van der Merwe, 347.

[52] van der Merwe, 344.

[53] John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Chapter 4.

[56] Doyle and Sambanis, 18.

[59] Stephens.

[60] Lederach, 89.

[61] Lederach, 92.

[62] Lederach, 91.

[63] Doyle and Sambanis, 25.

[64] Lederach, 94.

[65] Lederach, 94.

[66] Stephens.

[67] Doyle and Sambanis, 23.

[68] Lederach, 100.

[69] Lederach, 101.

[70] Lederach, 103.

Use the following to cite this article: Maiese, Michelle. "Peacebuilding." Beyond Intractability . Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: September 2003 < http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/peacebuilding >.

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• Crisis, Contradiction, Certainty, and Contempt -- Columbia Professor Peter Coleman, an expert on intractable conflict, reflects on the intractable conflict occurring on his own campus, suggesting "ways out" that would be better for everyone.
• Massively Parallel Peace and Democracy Building Links for the Week of April 28, 2024 -- New suggested readings from colleagues and the Burgesses.

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Rotary History

Promoting peace: rotary’s peacebuilding history around the world.

From a pre-World War I resolution calling for “the maintenance of peace” to our continuing support for Rotary Peace Centers, Rotary and its members have a long history of promoting peace and working to address the underlying causes of conflict in communities around the world.

Lending our influence

Rotarians from Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, proposed before the 1914 Rotary Convention that the International Association of Rotary Clubs (now Rotary International) “lend its influence to the maintenance of peace among the nations of the world.” Delegates at the convention, which took place just weeks before Europe became engulfed in war, agreed.

It was a bold statement for a relatively young organization that had become international only two years earlier and had a presence in just a handful of countries.

Chester Williams, a British expert on Anglo-American relations, answers questions from high school students during an Institute of International Understanding event in Michigan, USA, circa 1943.

The Objects of Rotary

With memories of the Great War fresh in their minds, delegates to the 1921 convention in Edinburgh, Scotland, amended the association’s constitution to include the goal “to aid in the advancement of international peace and goodwill through a fellowship of business and professional men of all nations united in the Rotary ideal of service.”

Delegates to the 1922 convention made sweeping changes to the Rotary International and club constitutions. Separate objectives for each were replaced with the Objects of Rotary (now called the Object of Rotary). The new approach, however, retained the vision for peace.

Institutes of International Understanding

An early effort to achieve this objective involved Rotarians in Nashville, Tennessee, USA, who organized a program in 1934 to encourage and foster international understanding. It included 11 days of public community meetings, bringing in prominent authors, economists, scientists, politicians, and commentators to discuss issues such as the economy, world peace, and scientific advances.

The idea, which came to be known as Institutes of International Understanding, was well-received, and in 1936, Rotary International suggested that other Rotary clubs emulate it. While clubs were responsible for arranging local institutes, The Rotary Foundation helped pay for speakers’ expenses beyond what clubs could afford. Over the next decade, 965 clubs in the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand sponsored hundreds of institutes that drew thousands of people eager to learn more about the world beyond their own borders.

World War II

During World War II, Rotary members looked for ways to create a stable and peaceful world. In 1940, convention delegates adopted a statement, Rotary Amid World Conflict, which emphasized that “where freedom, justice, truth, sanctity of the pledged word, and respect for human rights do not exist, Rotary cannot live nor its ideal prevail.” Walter D. Head, then Rotary International’s president, remarked that there must be a better way to settle international differences than violence and called on Rotarians to find it.

“Peace Is a Process,” a 1944 compilation of articles from The Rotarian magazine, focused on the new opportunities for international cooperation that would appear when the war ended. In “Setting the Pattern for Peace,” historian and diplomat James Shotwell explained the differences between the failed League of Nations and the approach taken to form the United Nations.

The Rotarian magazine ran essays by authors, politicians, and other well-known figures that encouraged discussion on the topic of peace. Rotary published collections of these essays as “A World to Live In” (1942) and “Peace Is a Process” (1944). Recognizing that the end of the war didn’t eliminate the need to discuss these topics, Rotary continued the series with “Peace Demands Action” in 1947.

The United Nations

Rotary was present at the start of the United Nations in 1945. Rotary International was one of 42 organizations invited to serve as consultants to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, California, USA (commonly called the UN charter conference). Additionally, many Rotary members and honorary members from around the world attended the conference as members of and consultants to their nations’ delegations.

Rotary and the United Nations remain committed to creating lasting change that enhances international relationships, improves lives and communities, and creates a more peaceful world.

Today, Rotary International holds the highest consultative status offered to a nongovernmental organization by the UN’s Economic and Social Council (UNESCO). The Rotary Representative Network, established in 1991, maintains and furthers this relationship with several UN bodies, programs, commissions, and agencies.

Scholarships

Rotary founder Paul Harris recognized the connection between international understanding and peace. In a message to the 1921 convention, Harris had written, “Rotary believes that the better the people of one nation understand the people of other nations, the less the likelihood of friction, and Rotary will therefore encourage acquaintance and friendships between individuals of different nations.”

Scholarships for graduate study in other countries became the first program of The Rotary Foundation in 1947. The idea of sending a student abroad for at least a year of university study was part of an effort to encourage higher education and promote greater understanding between people of different cultures and nationalities.

After Harris’ death that year, donations to The Rotary Foundation (Harris had requested them in lieu of flowers) began flooding in to Rotary headquarters. The Paul Harris Memorial Fund was designated for the newly created scholarship program.

Called the Paul Harris Foundation Fellowships For Advanced Study, it supported 18 scholars in its first year. Later it became known as the Ambassadorial Scholarships and lasted until 2013, when graduate-level scholarships were incorporated into district and global grants.

Peace Forums

To raise awareness about issues that cause conflict and activities that promote peace, Rotary created Peace Forums as a three-year pilot program. Rotary leaders and invited guests explored topics such as “Nongovernmental Organizations and the Search for Peace” at the first Peace Forum held in 1988 in Evanston, Illinois, USA.

In 1990, the Trustees of The Rotary Foundation broadened the program and changed the name to Rotary Peace Programs.

Rotary Peace Centers

At various times, Rotary members had proposed creating a university to promote peace, but the concept never seemed feasible. In the 1990s, Rotary leaders were inspired by the 50th anniversary of Harris’ death to consider an alternate approach.

The idea was simple, but the impact would be tremendous: Rotary would encourage people already engaged in peacebuilding as a career to apply for graduate-level study in the field, and The Rotary Foundation would provide scholarships to peace fellows that would allow them to enroll in established peace programs at existing universities.

Rotary approved the creation of Rotary Peace Centers program in 1999, and the inaugural class of Rotary Peace Fellows began their studies in 2002.

Rotary Peace Centers, located at universities around the world, develop leaders who become catalysts for peace in local communities and on the global stage. They study the causes of conflict and build practical skills exploring innovative solutions to real-world problems in areas such as human rights, international relations, and global health and development.

Rotary is not a university and yet it has an educational task to perform, and that task is to divert the world mind to thoughts of friendly cooperation. — Arch Klumph, father of The Rotary Foundation, in a speech to the 1921 convention

Peace for all time

Rotary’s goal today is to create environments where peace can be built and maintained through sustainable and measurable activities in communities worldwide. Peacebuilding remains a cornerstone of our mission as a humanitarian service organization.

Read more stories of Rotary peacemaking and find out how you can make an impact.

Protestant and Catholic women embrace in Derry/Londonderry, Northern Ireland, in 1976. The Peace People began in 1976 as a protest movement against the ongoing violence in Northern Ireland. Its founders Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize that year. Photo by Peter Marlow/Magnum

Hail the peacebuilders

Conflicts only fully end when the delicate threads of peace have been steadily and quietly woven by ordinary, dedicated folk.

by Tobias Jones   + BIO

We live in an age in which – for obvious reasons – it’s vital to understand how to build peace. Nuclear proliferation, inter-state and civil wars, terrorism and insurgencies, rising extremisms and hate crimes, social polarisation and increasingly vituperate online diction mean that learning how to reconcile enemies has never been more important.

This importance is widely recognised. Around $22 billion is spent annually by international donors on peacebuilding efforts. Since 2000, $10 billion has been spent in Colombia alone. The world’s second largest force deployed abroad – after the United States military – is the United Nation’s cohort of 100,000 peacekeepers, while internationalist organisations such as the World Bank and the Africa Union work alongside thousands of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), diplomats, aid workers and research institutes to contain and reduce conflict.

It seems common sense that this epic, cooperative peacekeeping effort must have benevolent effects, and that it will be lauded across the political and ideological spectrums. In reality, however, there’s mounting evidence that it’s not the case: 40 per cent of all post-conflict arenas have reverted to violence within a decade, according to the economist Paul Collier at the University of Oxford. Half of ongoing wars have already lasted more than 20 years. Battle deaths have rocketed 277 per cent in the past 15 years. ‘Our templates and techniques for building lasting peace just don’t work,’ writes Séverine Autesserre, a political scientist at Columbia University in New York, in her book The Frontlines of Peace (2021).

The problem, according to Autesserre, is ‘the automatic, thoughtless use of templated, technocratic, top-down measures’. She cites a study in which leading experts analysed 21 peace accords: ‘There is not a single clear-cut example where deals among elites have actually ended violence. Trickle-down peace, it turns out, is just as fraught an ideology as trickle-down economics.’

One of her principal criticisms is the way in which ‘imposed’ peace resembles old-fashioned imperialism. She describes residents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Palestine and Timor-Leste all complaining to her that ‘the interveners’ behaviours reminded them of what their parents or grandparents said colonialism felt like: demeaning, dehumanising, and infuriating.’

This is the result of what Roger Mac Ginty, professor in defence, development and diplomacy at Durham University, calls the ‘technocratic turn’ in peace-making: ‘the professionalisation of personnel, the standardisation of operating procedures, and the adoption and honing of “best practice”.’ It’s the business-management, box-ticking approach to peace in which expertise is exogenous: know-it-all first-worlders – who rarely speak the language and stay, briefly, in safe, secluded compounds – order how to fix things.

One of the obsessions of this model is democratic elections. But according to Autesserre, ‘democratisation is not an antidote to violence, but rather the opposite: it doubles the risk of civil war resumption’. Democratic elections produce, in the words of Collier, ‘a winner and a loser. And the loser is unreconciled.’ Even in peace processes that have been generally admired, as in Northern Ireland, democracy creates, according to Mac Ginty ‘increasingly polarised voting patterns’ and ‘ethnic outbidding’.

This ‘liberal peace’ has also been tarnished by its occasional imposition through violence, bringing to mind Mark Twain’s wistful quip about the US intervention in the Philippines at the end of the 19th century: ‘We have pacified some thousands of the islanders and buried them.’ The scorn for the foreign ‘peace-keepers’ extends to the UN since many of its peacekeepers have been accused of sexual violence. The UN’s Conduct and Discipline Unit has confirmed 700 rapes over the past 10 years, although some media reports suggest the real figure could be as high as 60,000.

It has also proved very difficult for cookie-cutter peacekeepers to comprehend the complexity of many conflicts. According to a 2018 report by the International Committee of the Red Cross, 44 per cent of conflicts involve between three and nine forces, and 22 per cent have more than 10. Some, such as the DRC and Libya, have hundreds. These multifaceted warzones are often simplified to oppositional binaries and, because negotiation is reduced to a few representatives around a table, it’s rarely inclusive. One UN study in 2012 found that, in 31 major peace processes, only 2.4 per cent of chief mediators, 4 per cent of signatories and 3.7 per cent of witnesses were women.

These superficial peace accords create what Jane Addams – one of the great theorists of peace in the early 20th century – called ‘negative peace’. It’s little more than a volatile truce. Traumas are often suppressed: because war had been based on the weaponisation of memory, this thin peace can survive only through the eradication of it. It’s coercive because often the very same militants who were forcing people to fight are now forcing them to make peace.

John Paul Lederach, professor emeritus of international peacebuilding at the University of Notre-Dame in Indiana and a senior fellow at Humanity United, is both an academic and an experienced peacebuilder at the coalface of dozens of conflicts. He says that this top-down peace creates an ‘authenticity gap’, leading to ‘suspicion, indifference, and distance’. In these circumstances, writes Duncan Morrow, a director of community engagement at Ulster University in Northern Ireland, ‘peace is presented as loss: a prison chosen as a least worst option not the miraculous opportunity of escape.’

‘P eaceniks’ are used to societal scorn. They have always stood accused of naivety because, cynics say, violence is intrinsic to human nature: we’re nothing more than aggressive primates fighting for resources and power. That position was challenged in the immediate postwar years not only by Mohandas Gandhi’s pacific campaign against the British empire, but also by the realisation that, if the primates now had nuclear arsenals, there could no longer be a meaningful winner in warfare.

So, having studied war for centuries, people began to study peace. The first undergraduate programme was initiated in the US, in Indiana, in 1948. Often the impetus came from Scandinavia: in 1959, Johan Galtung (one of the leading lights of peace studies) co-founded the Peace Research Institute in Norway and, in 1963, the Peace Research (later ‘Science’) Society was founded in Sweden. By the mid-1970s, the word ‘irenology’ (the study of peace) had entered dictionaries.

As a formal, academic pursuit, it had many disadvantages. Peace studies was suspect to rigorous scientists because it often seemed speculative: not an analysis of what is, but what might be. It seemed to be about studying a project, or a process, not an object. It was often associated with progressive politics (decolonisation and the civil rights movement) and radical Christians (Quakers and Anabaptists) on whom traditionalists looked with alarm.

Latent attitudes – requiring reconciliation and healing (peacebuilding) – have often been ignored

But for many, this nascent discipline was extraordinarily creative and exciting. It seemed to draw on a rich variety of academic disciplines, including anthropology, psychology, sociology, history, religious studies, criminology, security studies and so on. Peace studies had – in an age of nuclear proliferation and postcolonial wars – an urgent and practical application.

But the end of the Cold War radically changed the discipline. New countries and civil conflicts emerged from the disintegration of the old order and encouraged many northern hemisphere leaders to become messianic, liberal interventionists. ‘Peace studies became not only a bona fide academic discipline, but also a field of practice,’ says Mac Ginty. There were huge investments, and peace scholars were drawn into the overlapping fields of conflict-resolution, state-building, development and security. Although it seemed like the apotheosis of the profession, many felt it was akin to the Roman emperor Constantine’s co-option of Christianity.

Investments and personnel were concentrated on only two of the three corners of the ‘conflict triangle’. Conceived by Galtung in 1969, and frequently emulated and altered, the triangle offers an ABC to understand conflict: attitudes, behaviour and context. While the ‘context’ requires diplomatic intervention (peace-making), and ‘behaviour’ needs monitors and enforcement (peacekeeping), the latent, diffused ‘attitudes’ corner – requiring reconciliation and healing (peacebuilding) – has often been ignored.

P eacebuilding is the much more inclusive, fuzzy, even mysterious side of peace studies. There were many examples of it in Northern Ireland. Ray Davey – a chaplain and prisoner-of-war in Germany who witnessed, first-hand, the bombing of Dresden in 1945 – set up the Corrymeela Community in 1965. Joe Parker, a fellow cleric who lost a son in the ‘Bloody Friday’ bombings of July 1972, created the movement Witness for Peace. Most famously, Women for Peace (subsequently, the Community of Peace People) came into being in 1976 after a getaway driver for the paramilitary Irish Republican Army (IRA) was shot by the British Army and his swerving car killed three children passing by.

But very often peacebuilding initiatives were anonymous and unseen. In 1983, John Lampen, an English Quaker, moved to Derry in Northern Ireland. A year later, he was joined by his wife, Diana, and their children. The Lampens were inspired by the work of another Quaker, Will Warren, who had lived in Derry for many years and had quietly befriended both sides in the conflict, including various members of the rival paramilitaries.

Warren once said that his role as peacebuilder had been ‘to listen to people on both sides … and maybe, one day, to help them to listen to one another’. Listening was the central element of Quaker peacebuilding. Adam Curle, who was the inaugural professor at the hugely influential Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, wrote in True Justice (1981):

The importance of listening, then, is that we not only ‘hear’ the other in a profound sense but communicate with him or her through our true nature. This in turn evokes a response from the true part of her or his nature … That is why peacemakers should learn to listen as attentively and as constantly as possible. They not only discover what may be vital to know, but they reach the part of the other person that is really able to make peace, both inwardly and outwardly .

So the Lampens listened a lot and planned little. Through slowly meeting people, they realised how much the violence was provoked by grief that was caused, in turn, by violence. Choosing to be with all sides, rather than denounce them, was a way to break that cycle. ‘Hurt only heals when it’s heard,’ says John Lampen. They became close friends with Martin McGuinness (the former IRA member who was later a deputy first minister of Northern Ireland): ‘We had to hear some of his hurt – the bayonet into the stomach of his friend and so on. We just had to be there to understand.’

They were able to convey messages from one side to the other in ‘the Derry experiment’

They were part of the Peace and Reconciliation Group (PRG) in Derry. Often what they were doing was a gentle dismantling of barriers. There was a Quaker Youth Theatre that deliberately went into both Catholic and Protestant housing estates and, even, the British Army barracks. They organised a neighbourhood festival on derelict ground and invited musicians and sportsmen and women from all sides. Their peace group minibus deliberately used to pick up and drop off Catholics and Protestants so that they both saw the other’s community, their estates, shops, churches and schools. ‘Often,’ remembers Diana Lampen, ‘they would look out of the window and say: “Oh, it’s just like our place.”’

It was a practical application of what the US psychologist Gordon Allport in the 1950s called the ‘contact hypothesis’, his notion that border crossings could reduce prejudice. Diana Lampen took women to retreats at Corrymeela and recalls that they, from either side, stayed up until dawn drinking tea and finding common ground.

But as well as making low-key connections, the Lampens also became vital conduits between the British Army and the IRA. Before becoming a Quaker, John Lampen had been a soldier engaged in ‘internal security’ operations during the insurgency in Cyprus, so he understood the military and was accepted by them. As well as being close with McGuinness (a Catholic), the Lampens were also friends with Gusty Spence, a Protestant and a former leader of the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force, who’d also been in Cyprus. They were able to convey messages and complaints from one side to the other in what became known as ‘the Derry experiment’.

The Lampens and the PRG were using a technique pioneered by the US psychologist Charles E Osgood. His so-called GRIT method was a de-escalation strategy in which reciprocal concessions were made. Over time, as specific requests were met, trust was built even if the two sides were never directly talking to each other. The Lampens took the community’s concerns to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (the police force in Northern Ireland) and to the British Army: that the use of helmets instead of berets made the streets appear ever more militarised; that the use of telescopic sights to scan the streets added to citizens’ sense of being in the crosshairs; that civilians were being mistreated by police and Army. The Lampens set up seminars for soldiers to understand the issues.

Messages also went the other way: the Army was alarmed at the new use of coffee-jar bombs filled with Semtex explosives that were indistinguishable from the other (empty) jars and bottles that were frequently thrown. Their retaliation could cost innocent lives, and thus intensify hostilities, if they mistook one for the other. The message was taken to the IRA and, in Derry at least, the coffee-jar bombs weren’t used again. Later, larger issues were addressed and ‘the Derry experiment’ became the precursor to the formal peace talks.

Those fragile beginnings of peace were sometimes harder for combatants than warfare, because they were no longer lamenting what others had done to them, but what they had done to others. The Lampens began to realise that an important part of their work ‘was to be alongside them [former militants] as they faced alcoholism and depression, remorse for deeds done … ’ Morrow, a longtime observer of the Northern Ireland peace process, wrote in 2016 that ‘far from being romantic, reconciliation is always a shocking apocalypse of both mercy and truth. Generosity shines a more penetrating and unbearable light on our complicity with violence than conflict.’ A forgotten component of the peacebuilder’s role is to help militants make peace not just with each other but also with themselves.

None of which detracts from the obvious need for what are usually called ‘track one’ activities – the elite-level negotiations and accords. They can, clearly, encourage or enforce formal disarmament and public disavowals of violence; they create or repair civil institutions and provide a context of ‘consociationalism’ (power-sharing) all of which allow ‘track two’ citizen peacebuilding to flourish. The criticism arises because top-down peacebuilding soaks up almost all the available diplomatic, political and economic capital, as well as drawing the lion’s share of media attention on account of producing a standardised narrative of a peace out of a complex, multifaceted reality.

But those two tracks are, ideally, complementary: theorists of peacebuilding often refer to Lederach’s top-down, bottom-up pyramid described in his book Building Peace (1997), which can create the desired ‘middle-out’, or what Addams poetically called ‘lateral progress’. And it’s noticeable that the emissaries of elitist peacebuilding often learn precisely the same lessons as those on the ground: in his book Great Hatred, Little Room (1999), on the endless calls and meetings that led to the Good Friday agreement that ended the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the former UK government adviser Jonathan Powell wrote that ‘the most important aspect … by a long way … was the personal relationship between the leaders.’

B eing in turbulent settings, many peacebuilders mention the need for an inner stillness, what Hindus would call ‘shanti’. Jonathan Herbert is a lifelong peacebuilder and has worked in conflicts in the Solomon Islands, Israel-Palestine and Uganda. ‘For me, in Palestine,’ he says, ‘the biggest thing was having to come to terms with so much conflict within myself. I had taken on the pain of Palestinian friends and had seen so many horrible rights abuses – kids handcuffed and traumatised, old men beaten up. I felt polluted by the place, by the hatred. I had to look at myself, and go and reflect and find compassion for Israel. That’s what reconciliation is about: making peace with ourselves first, then with others…’

It’s a question, he says, of quietly observing what the conflict is doing to you before you can ponder the opposite, what you might do to it. Rather than be active, you have to slow down and see what moves in and around you. ‘A lot of it is about listening,’ says Herbert, ‘listening to people, but also listening to yourself to find your balance.’

It requires the sort of humility that isn’t often found among problem-solving peacekeepers. ‘It’s about presence,’ says Herbert, ‘about just living in an area of conflict and learning the language. You have to dare to be fairly useless to begin with, dare not to get anything out of it…’ As one’s perspective on the violence becomes much more local, both conflict and peace start to be framed very differently. In Israel, it becomes about not only the twin tragedies of the Shoah and the Nakba, but about far smaller, sometimes even remediable issues: access to olive groves, to running water, to relatives and to education.

In order to understand peace on locals’ terms, Mac Ginty and his colleague Pamina Firchow devised what they call ‘everyday peace indicators’. Rather than the slightly absurd parameters often used to evaluate pacification, they found that the real indices of peace were, for locals, often far more mundane: a lack of barking dogs, a child using the future tense, the ability to sleep in pyjamas, put up an antenna on the roof, or urinate outside at night. Bruno Hussar, the founder of Wahat al-Salam /Neve Shalom, a peace community in Israel, once said that there were, for him, two clear indicators that his community was finally creating peace: ‘the children and the trees… That’s life; life coming up.’

The path to peace isn’t a question of eradicating the trauma but using it differently

Very often ‘peace communities’ like Hussar’s are experimental incubators of what might work in society at large. Rondine – a ‘peace citadel’ in the Tuscan countryside – brings together young Israelis and Palestinians (as well as many other warring nationalities) for two-year residencies. The community’s founder, Franco Vaccari, is a psychotherapist and teacher, and, although he says that Rondine is an ‘experiment or hypothesis’, he mentions one vital point of departure: the removal of ‘fantasised presences’, those notions we have about the enemy that dehumanise them. ‘The concept of the enemy,’ Vaccari tells me, ‘poisons the relationships of anyone who has lived through war, but it’s dormant within all our relationships.’

Peacebuilding is also hampered if conflict is erased rather than observed. According to Paul Hutchinson, a mediator and former centre director of Corrymeela in Northern Ireland, ‘you make a faulty peace if you think conflict is bad.’ The classic playground intervention – ‘Say sorry, shake hands’ – is counterproductive, he says: ‘Culturally, the West doesn’t know where to put conflict other than in the bin or under the carpet. So conflict is avoided as opposed to being seen as revealing about the relationship. It has the potential for learning.’

Part of that learning often involves the recognition of a community’s or an individual’s ‘chosen trauma’. Prevalent in therapeutic circles, this concept has been applied to conflict situations by, among others, Vamik Volkan, a Cypriot peacebuilder and psychiatrist. It suggests that a group’s identity relies upon a collective memory of a profound violation that often serves as the justification for their own violence and revenge. The path to peace isn’t a question of eradicating the trauma but using it differently. As Hussar once said in an interview: ‘What do we do with the memory of the Holocaust?’

‘Communicating one’s own pain is the turning point,’ writes Vaccari in his book Metodo Rondine (2018), or ‘The Rondine Method’. At Rondine, they use a weaver’s shuttle, and ‘enemies’ take it in turns to pass it to each other across the loom and express their grief. The transformation is, writes Vaccari, sometimes very slow, sometimes sudden: ‘The person once considered the most distant is now the closest … : “No one else can understand my pain better!” … The suffering is simply symmetrical … now, in the presence of the new protective relationship, pain becomes a shared sensation.’

It’s an inversion of Sigmund Freud’s notion of the ‘narcissism of small differences’, the idea that very similar peoples exaggerate their separateness. It happens in many warzones but at Rondine, instead of magnifying the differences, they discover similarities: it’s what one Azeri participant at Rondine called ‘discovering oneself within the other’. Another participant, an Israeli, said: ‘My enemy’s heart is the Promised Land.’ These aren’t trite lines, but epiphanies that emerge only after a year or two of intense and painful accompaniment at Rondine. Participants then return to their own countries as ambassadors of peace, trying to rehumanise their enemies for their own communities and holding on to the paradox – expressed by Vaccari – that ‘the more I’m bound, the more I’m free.’

P eacebuilders are often searching for metaphors to understand the mysterious process they’re engaged in. Addams spoke of ‘peaceweaving’, and in their admiring essay about her, the political scientists Patricia M Shields and Joseph Soeters in 2015 wrote of why it’s an apt metaphor: ‘individual, often fragile, strings are connected through the process of weaving, which does not homogenise the combined, often colourful, strings but lets them work together despite their differences.’ Diana Lampen calls peacebuilding a spider’s web: there are delicate links in all directions with, at the centre, not a spider but peace itself.

It’s noticeable how often the natural world – its adaptability and fragility – is invoked as a metaphor. In attempting to imagine a more inclusive metaphor than the cliché of the negotiating table (with its very limited participants), Lederach talks of ‘stigmergy’. It’s the technical term for the scent left by insects as they travel, enabling itinerance and interaction to create order without centralised commands. He eulogises: ‘The trace of a thousand conversations … spider-like travelling, moving across communities and locations to spend time in collective, repeated, sustained and … open conversations.’

Many express a sort of powerlessness. Stephen Ruttle is a QC who is one of the UK’s foremost legal mediators. In his previous incarnation as an adversarial lawyer, his work was, he says, ‘very linear, very logical. Words were bullets. But mediation is a control freak’s nightmare,’ he says, laughing. ‘You just don’t know what’s going to happen next. Words are building blocks, and mediation has no goal in mind other than the next conversation.’

Nothing can be forced. Autesserre writes that ‘the process is just as important as the outcome’, and many bottom-up peacebuilders are suspicious of the directional commands of the ‘roadmap’ cliché. They talk instead of platforms, of spaces that are more about experiences than results, where there is space for intuition, chance, observation and encounter. Morrow, in writing about Corrymeela, said: ‘There was no grand plan, only steps. There was no political blueprint …’ That lack of control occurs because of the innate fragility and vulnerability of the vital filaments on the spider’s web: relationships that can’t be legislated, quantified or enforced.

Lederach says that ‘the ability to sense the humanness of another begins with attending.’ For him, ‘to attend’ encapsulates the role of the peacebuilder because it implies not only waiting on someone, being attentive and attuned to them, but also, etymologically, being stretched and made sensitive (‘to attend’ is linked to ‘tenderness’). It’s similar diction used by R S Thomas in ‘Tell Us’, his poem about bridging polarities, where he writes of a stretching so extreme that it raises ‘the possibility of dislocation’. This need for sensitivity means that the peacebuilder is, according to Lederach, far more artist than technician: ‘unveiling, releasing and unleashing potential to bring into existence what does not now exist’, offering what the poet Seamus Heaney called ‘a glimpsed alternative’.

You’re more like a window through which the opposing sides can see each other

If it’s true that peacebuilding requires not esoteric learning but sacrifice, sensitivity and artistry, it might be that we’re closer than expected to what Mac Ginty in 2014 called ‘the elixir’ of peacebuilding: ‘local ownership’. Not in the sense that locals accept what’s cooked up for them, but that they actually create their own recipes for peace. Many scholars, such as Oliver Kaplan at the University of Denver, have begun studying pockets of spontaneous peace initiatives in places that had been discounted as conflict zones: the San José de Apartadó village in Colombia, founded in 1997, with its simple rules (‘Don’t carry arms’); the Association of Peasant Workers of Carare (ATCC), founded in 1987, also in Colombia, whose philosophy is encapsulated in the line ‘We shall die before we kill’; the village in South Kivu, in the DRC, where microloans have created cottage industries drying bricks, refining cassava flour and brewing beer; the autonomous peace initiatives in the Republic of Somaliland and on the island of Idjwi in the DRC.

What’s interesting is that those local peace projects have discovered almost identical rules around peacebuilding to their learned counterparts. One of the clauses of the ATCC manifesto says: ‘Talk and negotiate with everyone.’ They, like the Quakers, put a premium on veracity and transparency, what Gandhi called satyagraha , or ‘holding on to truth’. Like him, many have paid with their lives for their idealism: the founder of ATCC, Josué Vargas, was murdered in 1990, and eight people were killed in San José de Apartadó in 2005.

Peacebuilding is inherently risky. Roy Calvocoressi, the late founder of the Christian International Peace Service (CHIPS), used to talk about ‘bearing the enmity’, when you’re stuck in the middle, untrusted and scapegoated. ‘It can feel like an attack,’ says Hutchinson. It requires almost a self-emptying (what Christians would call ‘kenosis’) so that you’re more like a window through which the opposing sides can see each other. You’re present, but also, somehow, absent.

Accepting the risks is part of the role: ‘If the police, soldiers and paramilitaries were risking their lives in the cause of war,’ says Diana Lampen, ‘full-time peacemakers had to be prepared to risk theirs in the cause of peace.’ She was, briefly, taken hostage by paramilitaries but found them metaphorically disarmed because she was neither fearful nor aggressive. ‘That’s the power of the powerless,’ she says.

Despite such vulnerabilities, very often the professional peacebuilders learn from these vernacular projects: Lederach, considered by many a global guru of peacebuilding, often writes in his books how he learns from those on the ground, not vice versa, particularly around the notions of collective narratives and the meaning of memory and of the land. ‘This work,’ says Herbert, ‘gives you a more indigenous way of looking at things: not that resources are scarce and we have to fight for them, but that the world is full of abundance if we respect it and share the fruits.’

Clearly, troubled conflict zones still, often, require outside mediators. But the most admired of them – such as the Life and Peace Institute based in Sweden or the global RESOLVE Network, don’t hubristically impose their own roadmap, what Hutchinson jokingly calls ‘mediation jujitsu’, but listen, curate and facilitate conversations. It raises the uplifting notion that peace is far more egalitarian than war, requiring not expensive arms, but simply the freely available, sometimes suppressed human spirit.

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Peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement in the 21st century

When we discuss peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding as a means to attain the UN Charter's goal “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” we must make a distinction between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. They reflect the express and implied boundaries and potential interpretations of chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter.

Chapter VI of the UN Charter talks about peacemaking as a non-restrictive list of peaceful, diplomatic, and judicial means of resolving disputes. Peacekeeping is situated before peace enforcement and before the sanctions regime as seen in chapter VII of the UN Charter. Peacebuilding is more than a process that has a broad post-conflict agenda and more than an instrumentalist method to secure peace. The Brahimi Report noted that effective peacebuilding includes “support for the fight against corruption, the implementation of humanitarian demining programmes and an emphasis on HIV/AIDS, education and control, and action against infectious diseases.”

An important part of peacebuilding includes reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, and strengthening the rule of law through training, restructuring local police, and through judicial and penal reform. Secondly, it includes improving respect for human rights through monitoring, education, and investigation of past and existing abuses, and providing technical assistance for democratic development like electoral assistance and support for free media, for example. Peacebuilding must include promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.

Peacebuilding is a quasi solidarity right that empowers popular action. The recent events in Ukraine is an example of popular action which comes as an applicability of this quasi-solidarity right. It supports the civil and political rights of the Ukrainian citizens by reassembling the foundation of peace through activities undertaken from the far side of the conflict in which democratic nations play an important role.

On the other side peacemaking is represented through activities such as mediation, conciliation, and judicial settlement. These elements of peacemaking are part of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's conceptual platform in his “ Agenda for Peace ”.  M. Sarigiannidis (2007) argued that this agenda has been misapplied and not used as an essential foundation of UN principles and practices.

Peacebuilding and democratisation

Peacebuilding and democratisation is based on a proposed strategic framework which “ addresses the link between social and economic development, reconciliation and postconflict retributive justice, the development of political stability, and democratic governance. ”.

There must be a shift towards local capacity building, away from patronage and towards partnership. So far, the US model has failed to address these issues and continues the business as usual - neglecting the postconflict realities by continuing to enforce institutionalisation and competitive elections. These are the main causes of continuing violence in post-conflict societies, which have a very fragile democracy built into their governance system. Peacebuilding and democratisation must retain its original purpose by focusing in areas which consolidate peace in the short-term by managing the future through conflict prevention and reconciliation strategies rather than resorting to violence.

A strong peacebuilding strategy first of all involves reconstructing and/or strengthening legitimate and authoritative governance mechanisms. The next step is building local democratic capacities by using knowledge from appropriate segments of society to enhance the legitimacy of peacebuilding by adding post-conflict political reconstruction activities rather than institution building alone. There must be a shift towards local capacity building, away from patronage and towards partnership. All multilateral or bilateral strategies for democratisation need reformulation and retooling.

Let's talk about deductive versus inductive approaches to peacebuilding. The deductive approaches to peacebuilding are driven by donor tools and capacities which tend to favour institutions over processes and ultimately will result in failed or mixed outcomes. The inductive approach is focused on conflict parameters and strategies that are being employed. Local capacity building means that local priorities are identified at all levels of society. It is centred on peacebuilding processes rather than building institutions. Inductive strategies include managing conflict without violence, local participation, and the use of appropriate forms of knowledge.

The only way to achieve a lasting peace is by “ shifting the strategic enterprise from a deductive, structural perspective to an inductive, process-driven one brings local priorities to the fore, rather than subordinating them to donor priorities. ” The “chronic gap between pledges and delivery of aid jeopardize the consolidation of national peace and postconflict transitions.” (Shapard Forman and Stewart Patrick, 'Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery' 2000) The need for stable, effective, and legitimate forms of governance is imperative. We can note the latest developments in Ukraine, for example, to realize the need for conflict prevention and especially the need for inductive strategies of partnership with local agencies. “ Peacebuilding operations should be concerned about creating the conditions for the outcome that will lay the foundations for continued democratization. ”

Peacebuilders must be facilitators rather than be perceived as dominant occupiers. It is imperative to end the culture of dependency which was created by some international organisations. Instead we must resolve conflicts by using grassroots solutions and integration of local groups and organisations.

Peacebuilders must be facilitators rather than be perceived as dominant occupiers. It is imperative to end the culture of dependency which was created by some international organisations. A creative and effective initiative is to foster a legitimate traditional and culturally specific model of inter-group decision-making employing norms of democracy. Including local representatives at the highest level in planning and coordination of peacebuilding would increase the opportunities for participation in shaping the design of these missions and increase accountability.

Any peacebuilding activity that does not involve local traditional values and culture will not last. Any form of peace intervention, technical or financial aid and diplomatic work will fail if the local people are not consulted and involved in the process. Through recognition and shared authority given to the local organisations, their civil and political rights are enforced. It will lessen the power gap between government and citizens. A balance of power is necessary to maintain peace while a new and effective structure of governance is built in post-conflict societies.

A “ durable peace is not possible without stabilisation and structural reform.” International organisations should support a reform program that is consistent with the proposed agenda for peace. Such reform should have the following objectives :

• A greater transparency between actions of the different institutions and agencies through periodic and systematic exchange of information at the appropriate levels.
• An enhanced coordination between those bodies and agencies as well as integration of goals and activities so as to assist in a peace-related effort under the auspices of the UN.
• Flexibility in the application of rules of financial institutions or adjustment of such rules when UN preventive diplomacy, peacemaking or post-conflict peacebuilding so requires.

Concluding remarks

In conclusion, “ peacebuilding is designed to build confidence among the parties, facilitate institutional reform, demobilize armies, and assist the reform and integration of police forces and judiciaries. ” Statistically, it is known that more than 86% of negotiated peace treaties last. These cases reflect the peace processes that are participatory and where the defeated join in the governance. They can compete for elected office and allow the opposition in power-sharing. The UN Secretary General's report, No Exit Without Strategy describes the three means of reconstructive peacebuilding. They are:

• Consolidating internal and external security;
• Strengthening political institutions by increasing effectiveness and participation;
• Promoting economic and social reconstruction.

Peace negotiations test the sincerity and the willingness of the parties to live with each other and indicates how well they can design a comprehensive blueprint for peace. They can mobilize the support of local interest groups in peacemaking. The foreign aid coming from the international community in support of implementing the peace-related activities is essential in establishing a commitment to promote human rights, economic, and social development.

So far, the United Nations has employed with success the four linked strategies of peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement. Such strategies promote the multinational and multilateral impartiality based on the principle of equality of states and universal human rights which are embedded in the UN Charter. The United Nations' multinational character is based on cross ethnic and cross-ideological cooperation between member states. The linked strategies for peace aim at achieving a lasting democratic change through reform and justice.

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Understanding Peacebuilding: An Issue of Approach Rather than Definition

Peacebuilding studies typically begin with a sentence along the lines of: ‘peacebuilding defies a single definition’ (Tschirgi 2013, 197), or ‘it is difficult to define the concept’ (Ryan 2013, 31). However, there is rarely a reflection on exactly why peacebuilding evades definition. Therefore, my aim in this article is to shed some light on what we mean by this concept, by tracing its ontology and application, in the hope of understanding why scholars struggle to define it. In doing so, I argue that there is, somewhat surprisingly, widespread agreement as to what peacebuilding boils down to – an attempt to address and tackle the underlying structures and root causes of conflict. The complexity or difficulty in understanding peacebuilding instead derives from the multiple approaches articulated for addressing a conflict’s root causes. In addition to explaining this overall argument, the article offers a brief introduction to peacebuilding, which should particularly be of interest to scholars trying to make sense of what has become a diverse field of study.

Origins of peacebuilding

Modern ideas around ‘peace’, in juxtaposition of war and conflict, can be traced back to the Enlightenment period. However, it is Johan Galtung who is credited with first introducing the concept of peacebuilding. In a 1975 essay, he proposed that peace is about the abolition of structural violence and the root causes of war, such as oppression and domination, rather than being solely focused on eliminating direct violence or warfare (Galtung 1975; Cockell 2000; Ryan 2013). He argues that tackling structural violence requires an associative approach towards peace, where the ‘antihuman conditions of exploitation, elitism and isolation’ are replaced by conditions of ‘equity, entropy and symbiosis’ (Galtung 1975, 299). In other words, rather than peace being conceived in dissociative terms, where antagonists are isolated or separated from each other, it requires increased interaction channels between all levels of society, including a ’high level of interdependence’ and exchange between nations (Galtung 1975, 298-9). Galtung’s conception of peacebuilding received some academic attention (Harbottle 1980; Fischer 1993), with a few studies similarly claiming that associative practices, such as ‘bridges of communication at all levels’, are necessary for long-lasting peace (Harbottle 1980, 131). Nevertheless, peacebuilding remained a largely niche idea until the early 1990s, when several connecting factors made it more pertinent.

Agenda for Peace

The publication of the United Nation’s (UN) 1992 ‘Agenda for Peace’ report catalysed peacebuilding into mainstream discourse in both theory and practice. Although rarely commented upon explicitly, the report shares Galtung’s attention to the underlying structures and root causes of conflict, for it defines peacebuilding as the ability ‘to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ (Boutros-Ghali 1992, para.21). There is a commitment to addressing the ‘deepest causes of conflict’, such as economic despair and social injustice (Pugh 2000, 6-7). Some commentators claim that the report presents a somewhat narrow definition of peacebuilding, for it positions the term as specifically ‘post-conflict’, rather than encompassing all phases of conflict, including the ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘conflict management’ stages (Ryan 2013; Tschirgi 2013; Paffenholz 2013). The report is certainly explicit in articulating that the avoidance of conflict rests on ‘preventative diplomacy’, whereas ‘post-conflict peace-building’ is designed to ’prevent a recurrence’ of conflict (Boutros-Ghali 1992, para.57). Peacebuilding is therefore equated with the final phase of conflict.

However, the reason why the report sparked widespread interest is its formulation for how the international community – namely international organisations (IOs), including the UN, and Western states – can address root causes of conflict within societies and consequently prevent its recurrence. The document claims the ‘socioeconomic and political context of conflict’ can only be transformed from one of insecurity to one of stability by democratising and developing states in the aftermath of conflict (Pugh 2000, 20). It is argued that ‘democracy at all levels is essential to attain peace for a new era of prosperity and justice’ (Boutros-Ghali 1992, para.82). This causality between democracy and peace is of course philosophically rooted in Immanuel Kant’s belief that the democratic constitution of states correlates with their interest in maintaining peace with other states (Chan 1997; Ray 1998). Kant’s argument is that if governments are democratically accountable to their citizens, then they are a powerful force against conflict, for ‘if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared…nothing is more natural than they would be cautious in commencing such a poor game’ (Kant 1795, 123).

Liberal internationalism

Following the publication of the Agenda for Peace, this ideology of democratic peace became synonymous with peacebuilding operations. In subsequent reports, the UN became more specific on the measures it felt essential for democratising conflict-affected countries as diverse as Cambodia, Bosnia and El Salvador, given the assumption that this was ’the surest foundation for peace’ (Knight 2003, 253). These measures included ‘improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development’ (Boutros-Ghali 1995, para.47). They were designed to support a ‘culture of democracy’ within conflict zones around the world (Boutros-Ghali 1996, para.46). Simultaneously, a vast amount of academic research was dedicated to theorising and understanding how exactly IOs and Western states were trying to establish democratic elections, marketisation programs, and constitutional reforms codifying civil and individual rights, in areas of conflict (Diamond 1995; Maynard 1999). These international peacebuilding practices became defined as the ‘liberal internationalism paradigm’ (Zaum 2013, 108). This term was first coined by Roland Paris in 1997, given that market economies, democratic elections and human rights were deemed ‘three core institutions’ of liberalism (John 2013, 32).

Of course, coming in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War, there are several reasons why liberal internationalism and Western liberal democracy were believed capable of solving all ‘fundamental contradictions’ within society, including issues contributing towards conflict (Fukuyama 1989, 8). It was an assumption ‘widely shared by academics, politicians and publics’ (John 2013, 31). The way the Cold War ended, whereby non-violent revolutions overthrew repressive regimes, crystallised the idea that worldwide society was experiencing ‘an unstoppable wave of democratisation’ (Ryan 2013, 27), producing a mood of ‘democratic optimism’ (Mayall 2000, 61). It led to a resurgence of studies into the so-called ‘democratic peace proposition’ (Russett and Antholis 1992; Chan 1997), which centres on the Kantian belief that ‘democratic states do not fight interstate wars against each other’ (Ray 1998, 27), contrasting with the Hobbesian and realist view of international politics. There is no denying that this proposition became an influential doctrine in the post-Cold War era. It led Bill Clinton to claim that ‘democracies rarely wage war on one another’ (quoted in Chan 1997, 59). George W. Bush subsequently justified American international intervention by referring to the ‘transformative power of liberty’ (quoted in Ryan 2013, 27).

A further crucial reason why liberal internationalism was so germane in the 1990s is the changing nature of conflict after the Cold War. Stereotypical wars between sovereign states were largely replaced by complex intra-state, ethnic conflicts, some of which had essentially become free and ‘unfrozen’ from superpower rivalries (Ryan 2013, 26). The nature of these ethnic conflicts, such as in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, created ‘new opportunities for innovation in peace process design’ (Sisk 2001, 1). They specifically led to growth in the idea that human rights protection and multilateral humanitarian intervention were now more pertinent than respect for state sovereignty (Hoffman 1996; Chandler 2002). Consequently, liberal internationalism was regarded as necessary and suitably equipped for dealing with these different forms of conflict.

Critique of liberal internationalism and alternatives

However, liberal internationalism subsequently faced a barrage of criticism from different directions, particularly when scholars began to perceive this paradigm as being unsuccessful and ineffective in establishing peace. Many commentators, usually underlining their analysis with specific case studies, even began to claim that liberal internationalism destabilises war-torn countries, by contributing to a resurgence of violence and preventing the consolidation of peace (Paris 1997; Knight 2003).

One oft-cited example is Cambodia, where the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) came into operation in 1992. UNTAC conducted elections in the country in 1993, which led to two rival political parties – the ‘National United Front for an Independent Neutral and Cooperative Cambodia’ (FUNCINPEC), and the ‘Cambodian People’s Party’ (CPP) – forming a coalition government following a hung parliament. However, distrust between both parties prevented reconciliation and led to them competing for authority, with the CPP leader ultimately forcing his FUNCINPEC counterpart out of government (Paris 1997, 65). The UN tried to coordinate elections again in 1998, but these were widely characterised by intimidation, coercion and violence by CPP officials. A further case is Angola, where international mediators secured a ceasefire in 1991 between warring parties, culminating in UN-led elections in 1992 (Paris 1997, 70). However, the elections led to the country ‘slipping back into war’, as neither side secured a majority, and no provision was made for a power sharing agreement (Ottaway quoted in Knight 2003, 258). Such failures became a familiar story in the 1990s, with the international community presiding over similar outcomes in Bosnia, Rwanda and Nicaragua. In more recent times, academic studies focused on Iraq and Afghanistan have concluded that liberal internationalism did not end insurgency, ‘failed to establish a sustainable market democracy and steadily increased the influence of the Taliban’ (John 2013, 35).

There are many practical and contextual reasons why liberal internationalism proved to be so unsuccessful. Most war-torn societies simply do not possess the required infrastructure, socio-economic stability or political will to embark on elections (Paris 1997, 57). Furthermore, holding premature elections can stifle rather than facilitate democracy (Knight 2003, 258). One of the main reasons for this is that democracy naturally encourages competition and conflict, for it requires opposing interests and ideas to be presented and debated in the public domain. In some cases, such as Angola and Bosnia, this leads to society becoming further polarised into hostile groups, resulting in exacerbated divisions which only sharpen conflict (Paris 1997, 75-6). Marketisation, or capitalism, similarly invites conflict, as it encourages greater competition for the national wealth, besides creating economic inequalities that deepen societal divides and fuel resentment (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 782). Ultimately, the many failed cases of liberal internationalism led scholars to conclude that its ’one size fits all’ approach to peacebuilding (John 2021, 35), consisting of imposing Western ideals of market democracy onto radically different countries decimated by conflict, is naïve and unrealistic. There was a general sense that alternative approaches to peacebuilding were required.

One such alternative approach rests on the social constructivist interpretation of peace. This ideology asserts that peace cannot simply be imposed onto a particular setting, given that it does not have a universally accepted definition. In other words, peace means ‘different things to different actors in different contexts’ (Wallis 2021, 77). Peace is therefore said to be socially constructed, based on the ideas and practices of human agents within intersubjective social contexts. Whereas liberal internationalism is centred on the normative universality of liberal peace, social constructivists perceive peace as being reflexive, contextual and dynamic, rather than scientific and rational (Richmond and Visoka 2021, 4; Wallis 2021, 87). Consequently, advocates of this approach believe peacebuilding can only ever be operationalised if practitioners ‘dismantle this knowledge hierarchy’ – whereby liberal peace is presented a blueprint for peace in all contexts – and instead approach peace from the ’subaltern positionality’, thereby allowing local knowledge and dynamics within particular contexts to drive ideas and attitudes towards peace (Wallis 2021, 81).

This more contextual approach towards peacebuilding is reflected in a body of literature termed the ‘local turn’, which emphasises that addressing underlying structures of conflict requires ‘local ownership’ and ‘local agency’. This equates to people on the ground, who are aware of a conflict’s dynamics, being actively involved in the creation and implementation of peace agreements (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, 769; Leonardsson and Rudd 2015, 825; Odendaal 2021, 627). Most of these studies begin by citing John Paul Lederach. In his 1997 ‘integrated framework for peacebuilding’, Lederach taught that sustainable peace is rooted in local people, who must replace external actors as the ‘primary authors of peacebuilding’ if peace is to be ordained (Paffenholz 2015, 859). This is said to only be possible through ‘clearer channels of communication’ and integration between all levels of society, including the ‘grassroots’ and the external IOs and states involved in a particular conflict (Lederach 1997, 100). One school of thought has consequently advocated a ‘hybrid’ approach to peacebuilding, involving a combined ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approach, centred on the idealised belief that local actors can bring knowledge and ideas for peace, whilst the international community can ‘provide technical support’ (Paffenholz 2015, 863). Following the failures of liberal internationalism, the international community now generally advocates the inclusion of local actors, to some extent at least, in peace processes.

A further alternative approach to peacebuilding regards liberal internationalism as an unhelpful distraction from the real reasons why the international community wishes to address the root causes of a particular conflict. Some researchers claim that, since 9/11 at least, peacebuilding has become securitised and essentially represents a ‘sub-set of the international security agenda’ (Tschirgi 2013, 198). These studies accept that securing liberal peace was the main driver for international intervention in the 1990s, but that 9/11 radically changed the focus to one where tackling underlying structures of conflict means eliminating the international threat of terrorism and organised crime (Zaum 2012, 126). The US-led operation in Afghanistan is the most notable example where securitisation became conflated with peacebuilding. The operation was attuned to deep-rooted humanitarian and human rights issues within the country, but largely used them as evidence of the need to stabilise the country, and the wider world, from the threat of al Qaeda and terrorism (Tschirgi 2013, 203). However, Afghanistan also highlights how international actors do not necessarily share the same motivation or reason for intervening in a conflict, despite the liberal internationalist assumption that the international community collectively regards building liberal peace as an imperative. For instance, whereas the US operation was very much dedicated towards removing al Qaeda, the UN’s ‘nation-building project’ was more aligned to liberal internationalism (Tschirgi 2013, 203), given its emphasis on the respect for human rights, accountable institutions based on the rule of law, and economic integration (Rubin 2008, 39).

At first glance, this overview of peacebuilding may indicate that the concept invites a variety of definitions, given that it is associated with different ideologies, including liberal internationalism and securitisation. However, I contend that the same definition holds throughout, as the discussion always centres around addressing and tackling the underlying structures and root causes of conflict. These will clearly differ by context and ideology, but can include, for example, organised crime and insecurity, human rights violations, religious and ethnic tensions, and a country’s instability and political authority. Relevant domestic and international actors will conceivably have varied opinions as to what they regard the main root causes of a conflict to be, as I alluded to with regards to Afghanistan. However, the point which dominates the peacebuilding literature, and leads to complexity and difficulty in defining the concept, is that of the approach advocated for addressing these root causes. As shown in this article, approaches include imposing liberal internationalist ideals of market democracy and constitutional rights, commitment to local agency and grassroots-driven ideas, and the elimination of international threats. Liberal internationalism certainly remains the approach most discussed within academic circles. Alternative approaches which I discussed are, to an extent, driven by countering this approach. In differentiating peacebuilding approach from definition, I hope this article has achieved its simultaneous aim of providing an informative introduction to the study of peacebuilding.

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Ray, James Lee. 1998. ‘’Does Democracy cause Peace?’’. Annual Review of Political Science 1, No. 1: 27-46. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.27

Richmond, Oliver P and Gezim Visoka. 2021. ‘’Introduction: International, State, and Local Dynamics of Peace in the Twenty-First Century’’. In The Oxford Handbook of Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, and Peace Formation , edited by Oliver P. Richmond and Gëzim Visoka, 1-30. Oxford University Press.

Russett, Bruce and William Antholis. 1992. ‘’Do Democracies Fight each other? Evidence from the Peloponnesian War’’. Journal of Peace Research 29, No. 4: 415-434. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343392029004005

Ryan, Stephen. 2013. ‘’The Evolution of Peacebuilding’’. In Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, edited by Roger Mac Ginty, 25-35. London: Routledge.

Sisk, Timothy D. 2001. ‘’Peacemaking in Civil Wars: Obstacles, Options and Opportunities’’, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper 20. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/wps/sit02/index.html

Tschirgi, Necla. 2013. ‘’Securitisation and Peacebuilding’’. In Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, edited by Roger Mac Ginty, 197-210. London: Routledge.

Wallis, Joanne. 2021. ‘’The Social Construction of Peace’’. In The Oxford Handbook of Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, and Peace Formation , edited by Oliver P. Richmond and Gëzim Visoka, 77-90. Oxford University Press.

Zaum, Dominik. 2013. ‘’International Relations theory and peacebuilding’’. In Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding , edited by Roger Mac Ginty, 105-116. London: Routledge.

Further Reading on E-International Relations

• Interpreting Indigenous Peacebuilding Civil Society Organisations
• Brexit and the Consequences for International Peacebuilding
• Developing Countries and UN Peacebuilding: Opportunities and Challenges
• Educating Conflict Management and Practicing Peacebuilding: The Case of Lebanon
• Pluriversal Peacebuilding: Peace Beyond Epistemic and Ontological Violence
• Sustaining Peace and Internal Self-Determination in the UN Perspective

Mark Barrow is a PhD candidate in Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge. He is researching the role played by indigenous civil society organisations in peacebuilding efforts.

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Peacebuilding and the Arts

• © 2020
• Jolyon Mitchell 0 ,
• Giselle Vincett 1 ,
• Theodora Hawksley 2 ,
• Hal Culbertson 3

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• Explores the roles of film, theatre, literature, music, dance and visual arts in peacebuilding
• Considers the interactions between Peacebuilding and the Arts
• Analyses how the arts can contribute to building peace

Part of the book series: Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies (RCS)

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Aesthetics of Peace: The Role of Art in Conflict Transformation

• peacebuilding
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Table of contents (22 chapters)

Front matter, introduction.

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Visual Arts

Peacebuilding through the visual arts.

Jolyon Mitchell

Peacebuilding in Korea Through Minjung Art: Struggle for Justice and Peace

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Art, Protest and Peace: The Murals of the Bogside Artists

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Drawings for Projection: Proposing Peacebuilding Through the Arts

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Music Writ Large: The Potential of Music in Peacebuilding

• John Paul Lederach

Engaging the “Other”: Contemporary Music as Perspective-Shifting in Post-conflict Northern Uganda

• Lindsay McClain Opiyo

Music’s Limits: The Early Years of the Barenboim–Said Foundation (2003–2009)

• Rachel Beckles Willson

The Role of Music-Making in Peacebuilding: A Levinasian Perspective

• Kathryn Jourdan

Literature and Peace Studies

• Sandra M. Gustafson

Storytelling and Peacebuilding: Lessons from Northern Uganda

• Ketty Anyeko, Tamara Shaya Hoffmann

What Choice Between Nightmares?: Intersecting Local, Global and Intimate Stories of Pain in Peacebuilding

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Literary Strains: The Challenges of Making Meaning and Promoting Peace Through Written Works

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Catalyzing Peace: Re-humanizing Through Embodied Experience of Cinema

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Editors and Affiliations

Giselle Vincett

Hal Culbertson

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Book Title : Peacebuilding and the Arts

Editors : Jolyon Mitchell, Giselle Vincett, Theodora Hawksley, Hal Culbertson

Series Title : Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17875-8

Publisher : Palgrave Macmillan Cham

eBook Packages : Political Science and International Studies , Political Science and International Studies (R0)

Copyright Information : The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Hardcover ISBN : 978-3-030-17874-1 Published: 28 November 2019

Softcover ISBN : 978-3-030-17877-2 Published: 28 November 2020

eBook ISBN : 978-3-030-17875-8 Published: 19 November 2019

Series ISSN : 1759-3735

Series E-ISSN : 2752-857X

Edition Number : 1

Number of Pages : XXII, 483

Number of Illustrations : 7 b/w illustrations, 21 illustrations in colour

Topics : Performing Arts , Peace Studies , Conflict Studies , International Security Studies , Citizenship , Cultural Policy and Politics

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Lessons from Ukraine

Editor’s Note: This piece is part of a series of policy analyses entitled “ The Talbott Papers on Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine ,” named in honor of American statesman and former Brookings Institution President Strobe Talbott. Brookings is grateful to Trustee Phil Knight for his generous support of the Brookings Foreign Policy program .

Introduction

Constanze stelzenmüller.

At the one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, much Western commentary features a mixture of relief and self-congratulation. Both are deserved in considerable measure. Ukrainians have proved astonishingly brave and resilient in the face of an assault of a scale and brutality not seen in Europe since 1945. The war galvanized the trans-Atlantic alliance into unity and action, with forceful and generous American leadership, and an unexpectedly muscular role played by the European Union. Indeed, the United States and Europe have been highly effective in leveraging each other’s diplomatic, economic, and military assets to support Ukraine, and constrain Russia. Public opinion, too, has remained remarkably supportive of aiding Ukraine.

At the same time, the alliance has been careful to draw red lines. Western leaders have said throughout that they are giving Ukraine the means to defend itself, but will not become parties to the conflict, for instance by establishing a no-fly zone or deploying NATO troops. Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, has also — despite his repeated assertions that Russia is being attacked by the West, and bald-faced threats of escalation — observed red lines himself by avoiding overt military action against Ukraine’s supporters. And despite ambivalence in the rest of the world in view of calls to take sides on behalf of Ukraine, it is notable how many non-Western countries have spoken out in condemnation of Russia’s actions, or (like Japan and South Korea) sent money and materiel to Kyiv.

Nonetheless, for what may already be the defining crisis of our era, crucial questions remain unresolved: how to avoid an escalation of the war; how and when to bring this war to an end; how to stop sanctions evasion; how to avoid impunity for the perpetrators and bring them to justice; how to assure the effectiveness of NATO deterrence and defense; how to prevent key non-Western powers — above all China — from throwing their full weight in with Russia; how to mitigate the immense costs of supporting Ukraine and the global consequences of the war; how to reconstruct Ukraine and bring back refugees; how to redefine the European security order against an imperialist Russia; and how to do better at protecting the world from the depredations of autocratic great powers.

This much is clear: 2023 could be a decisive year for the future of Ukraine, the West, and global order and security — for better, but also for worse. Below, 16 Brookings scholars examine the lessons of the first year of Russia’s war against Ukraine and look ahead to coming challenges.

Fiona Hill observes that Russia’s attack on Ukraine is a full-scale assault on the post-World War II global order and demands nothing less than a U.S.-led revamping of the international security system. Restoring European security and deterrence will require the United States and its allies to persuade skeptical middle powers that a world order that is safe for all nations can only be based on international law and the United Nations Charter. Steven Pifer addresses the thorny question of how Ukraine can best protect itself against future Russian aggression; he argues that the West’s red lines — NATO boots on the ground and membership for Ukraine — mean that Kyiv must be given all the arms it needs to defend itself.

James Goldgeier explains that the Biden administration, after a remarkably adept and forceful response, must nonetheless now contemplate a long and demanding war; and he cautions America’s allies that the bipartisan consensus around supporting Ukraine may not last. Tara Varma writes that the invasion of Ukraine provoked a strategic awakening in Europe. But the coming months may well see intra-European division — and Europe’s security dependency on the United States — resurface. Aslı Aydıntaşbaş charts Turkey’s complex balancing act between Russia and the West under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and predicts that — despite a potential post-earthquake warming of relations between Ankara and its NATO allies — Turkey will remain ambivalent as long as there is no clear victor in Ukraine.

Patricia M. Kim maintains that China’s “no limits” partnership with Russia will endure because both powers share an interest in challenging what they perceive as a Western-dominated global order. But China also stands to lose much more than Russia from global insecurity. Western powers should use this leverage to get Chinese leaders to constructively influence Moscow to prevent escalation in Europe. Suzanne Maloney points out that Iran’s emergence as the only state to provide offensive weaponry to Moscow reflects a decisive shift in Tehran’s risk tolerance and its geopolitical orientation toward Russia and China. It puts paid to efforts by the Biden administration and its European allies to resuscitate the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, as Tehran nears nuclear breakout.

Tanvi Madan argues that the Western-led coalition supporting Ukraine should not be surprised by the reservations and ambivalence of non-Western powers like India. Instead, the West should highlight how Russian imperialism is a threat to the global order and offer real alleviation to these countries’ concerns. Bruce Jones says the West needs to face up to a future of unstable great power relations and the risk of manifold disruptions from deepening global interdependence; building security will be hard and costly for democracies.

Caitlin Talmadge notes that the danger of nuclear escalation has constrained both Russia and the West in this war, but other states are likely to reconsider the importance of having nuclear weapons of their own. Melanie W. Sisson interrogates the Western alliance’s many failures to predict the course of this war and warns that a focus on incremental, tactical successes could mask a real problem: the absence of a compelling vision of how to end it. Michael E. O’Hanlon is struck by the echoes of World War I: not just in the battlefield dynamics, but also in the prospect of a long war of attrition — and especially in the challenge of finding a peace settlement that does not merely create a pretext for the next horrific war.

David Wessel remarks that some of the war’s economic lessons challenge conventional wisdom: the resilience of Ukraine’s economy — as well as Russia’s, despite unprecedented Western sanctions — and the ability of Europeans to wean themselves off Russian fossil fuel imports. Samantha Gross describes the global tensions between climate change mitigation policies and the energy market disruptions unleashed by the war — as well as the extraordinary efforts made by governments, businesses, and consumers to soften their impact. But she cautions that 2023 might witness significant new disturbances.

Finally, Sophie Roehse and Kemal Kirişci remind us of the horrific human cost paid by Ukrainians: a displacement crisis on a scale and speed not seen in Europe since World War II. Nearly 40% of the country’s citizens have been driven from their homes in the past year; more than 8 million are refugees in Europe or North America, and more than 5 million are internally displaced. Their ability to return safely to their homes will determine Ukraine’s ability to reestablish itself as a functioning and prosperous state in Europe.

Russia and European security

Assault on global order.

This commentary is based on Dr. Hill’s opening statement to a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on global security challenges and strategy on February 15, 2023. Video of the hearing can be found here .

The war in Ukraine has necessitated the third intervention by the United States in a European conflict in a little over a century; and what will likely be its third attempt at revamping the international security system. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was an assault on the post-World War II global order. This wasn’t just an American-imposed order but a set of rules that all nations, including Russia and its predecessor, the Soviet Union, had agreed to. Russia violated the United Nations Charter and fundamental principles of international law by attacking an independent state that had been recognized by all members of the international community — including Russia itself — for more than 30 years.

The current challenge in Europe is how to craft more durable regional security arrangements that roll back Russia’s land grab in Ukraine, are embraced by all Europeans, and set a precedent for reinvigorating the larger set of international agreements. We need to find a formula that is not entirely dependent on U.S. military and economic power and political leadership to ensure its long-term success.

The European security environment was ruptured in 2014 when Russia annexed Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and sparked off a brutal proxy war in the Donbas region. None of the United States and Europe’s mechanisms and practices for keeping the peace after World War II and during the Cold War had much, if any, effect on deterring Russia from seizing Crimea or attempting to take Kyiv and the rest of Ukraine in 2022. Western deterrence failed in part because American and European policymakers never meaningfully emphasized the West’s redlines. Indeed, one might even ask, “what were the redlines?” The West certainly did not appear to uphold the postwar principle of ensuring independent states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Instead, after 2014, European leaders, led by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, rushed to push Russia’s annexation of Crimea to one side and broker a quick peace settlement in Donbas — the Minsk Accords, which would have limited Ukraine’s sovereignty if fully implemented.

We have spent more time contemplating the perils of provoking Russia’s mercurial president, Vladimir Putin, than the merits of bolstering Europe’s resilience and capacity to limit Putin’s coercive power.

The tepid Western political response to Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s territory and the limited application of international sanctions after this first invasion convinced Moscow that attacking Ukraine was not, in fact, a serious breach of post-World War II norms. Indeed, Western commentary since 2014 has frequently focused on the risks of stepping over Russia’s redlines, rather than enforcing the West’s. We have spent more time contemplating the perils of provoking Russia’s mercurial president, Vladimir Putin, than the merits of bolstering Europe’s resilience and capacity to limit Putin’s coercive power.

In charting a path forward, we need to recognize that the war in Ukraine has been brewing for decades because of a key distinction in the way the international community approached the collapse of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In the case of Yugoslavia, the country was dissolved without the recognition of a single successor state. Serbia’s territorial claims against its neighbors were rejected. In the case of the USSR, the United States and every other country recognized Russia as the sole successor state. Moscow inherited the Soviet Union’s U.N. Security Council seat and its other privileges and obligations, as well as, it seemed, the Soviet Union’s Cold War sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Ukraine and other former Soviet republics fell into a gray zone where Russia’s interests trumped theirs’. They were deemed Russia’s “near abroad.”

Putin has repeatedly stated that Moscow has the right to dominate this neighborhood and reclaim “lost” territory. For Putin, the war in Ukraine is a continuation of the Soviet struggle with the United States to carve up Europe after 1945. Russia still sees NATO as a U.S. Cold War bloc — a cover for American imperialism, not an alliance of equals to ensure common defense and security. In this context, NATO’s post-Cold War expansion and Ukraine’s reluctance to implement the Minsk Accords in Donbas became the current war’s casus belli.

Redefining European security and restoring deterrence will involve explicitly countering this narrative. Building an international coalition against Russia’s aggression to facilitate an eventual settlement of the war will require the same. The United States and its allies must clarify and emphasize that they are supporting Ukraine on the battlefield to uphold the United Nations Charter and international law. Building on President Joe Biden’s historic February 20 visit to Kyiv to underline enduring U.S. support for Ukraine, Washington needs to step up diplomatic efforts, including in the U.N., to convince friends and ambivalent middle powers in the so-called Global South that the West’s goal is not to retain supremacy in Europe but to keep the world safer for every nation. If Russia succeeds in carving up Ukraine, then the future sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states could be imperiled. Upholding international norms must once again be a central part of U.S. global security strategy.

Arm Kyiv for self-defense

Steven pifer.

Ukraine has surprised many, not least the Kremlin, with its resistance against the aggression that Russian President Vladimir Putin unleashed in February 2022. The tenacity, skill, and courage of Ukraine’s soldiers, and many of its civilians as well, have frustrated an all-out invasion launched by what was regarded as the world’s second or, at least, third most powerful military.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that modern force-on-force warfare consumes much in terms of ammunition, materiel, and soldiers’ lives. That provides an important lesson for Western militaries, now in the process of restoring their focus on traditional territorial defense in the face of a very evident Russian security threat to Europe.

By dint of tactical agility and innovation , a lesser-armed but more motivated Ukrainian military has withstood the attacks of a larger and far more powerful adversary. The West can learn from that, and, as it integrates more sophisticated Western arms into its operations, the Ukrainian military will want to maintain that agility and innovation.

As for the Ukrainian civilian population, it has shown remarkable resilience , particularly as the Russian military launched attacks on electric power, municipal central heating, and other infrastructure to make up for its lack of progress in battle. The lesson here is that a people who see themselves in an existential fight for their national identity, democracy, and land will endure great hardship.

The West has helped Ukraine by  providing weapons ,  financial assistance , and intelligence support . Ukraine needs to maintain and expand that flow.

At the same time, Kyiv has to recognize that the West has drawn a firm red line: no troops. NATO members have armed and trained Ukrainians, but no member has offered to join the fight. President Joe Biden, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, and other Western leaders ruled out a no-fly zone over Ukraine, as it raised the prospect of U.S. and NATO pilots shooting down Russian planes and conducting strikes against Russian air defenses — perhaps in Russia itself.

Looking to the longer term, Kyiv should bear the West’s red line in mind, including as it considers postwar security arrangements.

To be sure, Ukraine has not asked for troops. Still, looking to the longer term, Kyiv should bear the West’s red line in mind, including as it considers postwar security arrangements. It is difficult to see Moscow winning — at least in the sense implied by the Russian army’s multiple attack vectors in February 2022, which suggested Kremlin goals of occupying Kyiv and perhaps the eastern one-half to two-thirds of Ukraine. However, a Ukrainian victory or a stalemated end to the current fighting would still leave Ukraine facing the risk of future Russian aggression.

To deal with that, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy understandably seeks NATO membership . Ukraine meets the democratic standards that NATO expects of aspiring members and, prior to the war, had built a functioning if flawed market economy. Ukraine’s military has proven a force to be reckoned with; just ask General Valery Gerasimov.

Nine European members of NATO have expressed support, as has Canada . However, membership would require the consent of all 30 alliance members (32 once Finland and Sweden enter). Each would have to be prepared to go to war against Russia for Ukraine. True, with Ukraine in the alliance, NATO’s military would be added to the equation of helping Ukraine deter a new Russian attack. That seems less risky than what might happen if NATO forces were to enter the ongoing war.

Still, a majority of NATO members currently deem that risk too great. This suggests a serious membership bid would have little prospect in the near term.

In the future, Ukraine will need a modernized military to deter a new Russian assault. Kyiv should look to the West for the weapons to arm that military. That means Abrams and Leopard tanks, Bradley and other fighting vehicles, ATACMS surface-to-surface missiles, and fighter aircraft, among other things.

Many Western leaders seem readier to agree to arm Ukraine than to support its NATO membership. Now, and in a post-conflict situation, Kyiv should ask for — and the West should pay — a significant price in weapons in return for the delay of Ukraine’s NATO quest.

That does not mean NATO membership comes off the table forever. Ukraine should continue its preparations so that, when the political window opens, it can pass through. In the meantime, a strongly armed Ukraine would put Ukraine’s defense where it best belongs: in the hands of Ukrainians.

United States

Leadership, but for how long, james goldgeier.

Considering how the United States responded to the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine, namely with economic sanctions and supplying only non-lethal military aid to Kyiv, one could be forgiven for being repeatedly surprised over the past year. Perhaps if Russia had succeeded in taking over much of Ukraine right away, toppled the government, and installed a puppet regime, the U.S. response in 2022 would not have been dramatically different than it was eight years earlier. But despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s longstanding obsession with controlling Ukraine and his apparent belief he could get away with it, the Russians failed in their drive to occupy Kyiv, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy did not flee to form a government in exile. And the rest of Europe finally realized what the Balts and Poles had been trying to tell them for years: Putin was a threat to the peaceful continental order the Europeans thought they had achieved after the end of the Balkans wars more than two decades ago.

With Ukrainians fighting valiantly against a brutal invasion, the United States and its allies stepped into the breach to assist them. After four years of his predecessor denigrating and dismissing allies, all the while expressing admiration for Putin, President Joe Biden was eager to rally American allies and partners to support Ukraine. If there was anything his long political career as senator, vice president, and president prepared him for, it was leading the trans-Atlantic alliance in a vigorous response to the horrific Russian attack. While explicitly refusing to send American troops into the fight to prevent a direct NATO-Russia conflagration, Biden committed nearly $47 billion dollars in U.S. military assistance after February 2022, with increasing levels of lethality, and he rallied NATO allies and partners to send significant military assistance of their own. Over time, the United States enhanced its intelligence and military support by sending a variety of systems not contemplated at the war’s outset, including the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, Patriot air defense missile systems, Bradley fighting vehicles, and finally M1 Abrams tanks (to be delivered later).

As the war continues with little sign of slowing down, and the prospects for a peace settlement remain quite dim, the United States and its allies will have to continue to stand fast in the face of Putin’s imperial designs.

With strong bipartisan support on Capitol Hill and among the general public, the United States was engaged in a European conflict in ways that few would have predicted on February 23, 2022, particularly after the administration entered office determined to focus attention on the China challenge and had only recently completed a chaotic military withdrawal from Afghanistan. While Putin may have been emboldened by the administration’s desire to pivot to Asia and its mishandling of the Afghanistan withdrawal, he completely miscalculated what the United States and its allies were willing to do for Ukraine.

As the war continues with little sign of slowing down, and the prospects for a peace settlement remain quite dim , the United States and its allies will have to continue to stand fast in the face of Putin’s imperial designs. They must prepare for a long war that will require continued investments in Ukraine’s defense and reconstruction for years to come. The U.S. policy to help Ukraine liberate more territory without provoking a NATO-Russia war remains the right approach. However, given the divided government that emerged after the U.S. 2022 midterm elections, it is increasingly uncertain whether or not that kind of sustained involvement is politically possible .

Strategic wake-up call

A year into Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine, Europeans are taking stock — literally and figuratively — of where they stand and where they need to be in a few months’ time.

They have undergone several shocks: First, war, in the form of a massive attack by one state upon another, was back on the continent. Second, Europe had created dependencies, especially on Russian gas and oil, that were endangering its very existence. It needed to become a more sovereign actor.

The first shock was hard to recover from. Despite U.S . and U.K. warnings as early as the fall of 2022 that Russian President Vladimir Putin was intent on invading not only part of Ukraine but the whole country, Western Europeans were mostly skeptical. They did prepare an economic response and threatened Putin with heavy sanctions if he went ahead with his plans. But they were still in shock when his troops entered the country. Past the initial state of paralysis, the European Union acted steadfastly in coordinating with NATO and implementing the first of several sanctions packages meant to seriously damage the Russian economy. Europeans also realized the extent of their dependency on Russian gas and oil and worked to effectively be free of it by the end of 2022. Putin’s aggression provoked a strategic awakening on one of the most sensitive topics in European foreign policy, relations with Russia.

For a long time, Europeans were divided on their approach to Russia: some privileged the economic dimension, some warned of the existential threat Russia posed, and others wanted to integrate Russia into a new European security architecture. When Putin decided to invade Ukraine, he thought he could exploit those divisions once again, as he had in the past. He wasn’t expecting — few were — such a wave of Ukrainian resistance, which in turn won European and U.S. support for Kyiv. Soon, materiel, humanitarian aid, and lethal weapons were flowing to Ukraine, including, unprecedently, through the EU .

The strategic awakening mentioned above took several forms. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed a “Zeitenwende” or turning point for Berlin’s foreign policy, but that remains incomplete . France also fought the belief of its Central and Eastern European partners that Paris had been complacent when it came to Russia. These eastern partners took on a much greater role in shaping the debate in European foreign policy. The war proved how the Europeanization of climate, energy, and defense has become critical. On sanctions, the sense of unity was strong. But now that weaponry for Ukraine is the central discussion, and since military spending remains a national member-state prerogative, the risk of comparison and division is emerging again.

The European and trans-Atlantic unity we witnessed is still fragile. There are divisions in the EU about supporting more sanctions packages, with ramifications in national debates. This has been evident in both Bulgaria and Hungary , for example, and debate on the war and its economic consequences was very present in the Italian and French elections in 2022.

European reliance on the United States was also made clear. We need only to see how anxiously Europeans were following the American midterm elections in the fall, as several Republican leaders indicated that if they won control of Congress, they might end U.S. support to Ukraine. European security still very much depends on the United States. The reciprocal is far less true amidst deteriorating U.S. relations with and concern about China.

The future of the European project will be determined by what comes next and by the Europeans’ capacity to respond to major challenges ahead: political, economic, social, and geopolitical.

For Europeans, the outcome of the war carries special weight, as they have now granted EU membership perspectives to both Ukraine and Moldova, which is also the target of Russian destabilization. Hence, the future of the European project will be determined by what comes next and by the Europeans’ capacity to respond to major challenges ahead: political, economic, social, and geopolitical. Responding to these risks will require them to develop European sovereignty when it comes to information, decision, and action: fostering their agency to address the economic and security challenges posed by the interdependence mentioned above, all the while defending the trans-Atlantic partnership and the rules-based order.

The war has shifted the nature of the debate everywhere in Europe: after a 30-year opt-out, Denmark will now be participating in EU defense initiatives ; Sweden and Finland have formally sought to join NATO; and many European member states are increasing their defense spending in line with NATO requirements. Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas has suggested that the EU proceed to common procurement of weapons for Ukraine, as it did for vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic. The EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept , published in March and July 2022, paved the way for a common vision of Europe’s role as a global actor and security provider. This vision now needs implementation, for the sake of Ukraine, Moldova, and Europe.

(L): Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Turkey’s President Tayyip Erdoğan meet on the sidelines of the sixth summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA), in Astana, Kazakhstan, October 13, 2022. Sputnik/Vyacheslav Prokofyev/Pool via Reuters. (R): Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hold talks before signing an agreement on rebuilding Ukraine’s damaged infrastructure, in Lviv, Ukraine, August 18, 2022. EYEPRESS News via Reuters.

East-West balancer

Aslı aydıntaşbaş.

As the war in Ukraine enters its second year, with waves of soldiers on both sides fighting and dying on the battlefield, Turkey is turning inward. The massive earthquake that hit southern Turkey in early February will have significant political and economic consequences for the country.

For starters, the earthquake disrupts Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s re-election plans and his carefully calibrated balancing act between the West and Russia. Self-confident and eager for a greater role on the world stage, Erdoğan’s Turkey had seen Russia as an economic partner and useful leverage in its relations with the West. While Turkey has been selling drones to Ukraine and has restricted Russian access in the Bosporus and Dardanelles, Ankara has also deepened its economic ties with Moscow and kept a line of communication open with the Kremlin. Erdoğan has been proud of his “balanced” policy and has criticized the robust Western response to Russia’s invasion as “ provocative .”

There are both geopolitical and domestic imperatives for Ankara’s desire to protect its relations with Moscow. Over the past few years, Russia has made investments in Turkey’s energy industry and, facing an economic downturn, Erdoğan’s government has been relying on financial flows from Russia — as well as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia — to muddle through until the Turkish elections. Russian energy giant Rosatom reportedly announced plans last summer to transfer $15 billion to Turkey’s central bank for the construction of the country’s first nuclear reactor; Gazprom also pledged to delay Ankara’s natural gas payments. These steps, coupled with the inflow of Russian tourists and investors, led Russia to emerge as an indispensable partner for the Turkish government ahead of a highly competitive election season.

But that doesn’t mean Ankara’s contribution to Ukraine’s war effort is unimportant. Turkey truly plays both ends of the equation. Early in the war, Turkish drones made a difference on the battlefield and in the defense of Kyiv. Erdoğan has been essential in securing the grain deal that allowed for Ukrainian food supplies to reach world markets. Turkey has also facilitated prisoner swaps and organized two rounds of negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow. If the current stalemate on the battlefield pushes either side toward negotiations later this year, Turkey will once again emerge as an enabler, providing a possible meeting point and important channel to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Russia continues to be indispensable for Erdoğan, the Turkish economy, and Turkey’s strategic leverage in Syria — and the earthquake will not change that.

But will the earthquake that hit Turkey this month alter that equation? While this might create a desire in Turkey for closer cooperation with Europe and the United States, it is unlikely to change the symbiotic nature of the Turkish government’s relationship with Russia — sealed at the top by the chemistry between Putin and Erdoğan. Russia continues to be indispensable for Erdoğan, the Turkish economy, and Turkey’s strategic leverage in Syria — and the earthquake will not change that.

However, earthquake diplomacy can create a better atmosphere in Ankara’s relations with Washington. Turkey’s estranged neighbors like Greece and Armenia, as well as its NATO allies, were quick to come to its aid in the early phase of search and rescue operations — invalidating the government’s consistent domestic narrative that the West is not Turkey’s friend and even has ambitions to destabilize it. Days before the devastating earthquake, Turkey’s interior minister had accused Washington of organizing terrorist acts in Turkey and called on the U.S. ambassador to “take [his] dirty hands off of Turkey.” Today, European nations and the United States are already making plans to provide reconstruction aid to Turkey’s devastated southern region.

This catastrophic natural disaster could usher in a new honeymoon between Turkey and the West. Ankara will need reconstruction funds for years to come and support from NATO allies and multinational organizations will be essential. Rekindling ties with the trans-Atlantic community may lead Erdoğan’s government to moderate its tone toward NATO allies and even greenlight Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession.

But even if Turkey tilts a little toward the West, it will not become another Poland overnight. The Turkish public and its leadership are united in an intuitive desire for neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine War. Whether under Erdoğan or a future leader, Turkey will be cautious about antagonizing Russia.

As long as the war in Ukraine continues, with no clear winner, Ankara will, for good or bad, stick to its balancing act between the West and Russia.

A strategic alliance with risks

Patricia m. kim.

The last 12 months since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have revealed three striking aspects of China and Russia’s strategic alignment, including the depth of their ties, the limits of their partnership, and the prospects for China to serve as a moderating force to Russia’s violent revisionism.

Since declaring a “no limits” partnership with Moscow in February of last year, Beijing has doubled down on its alignment with Moscow, despite the steep costs to its global reputation and strategic interests, particularly around Taiwan. While claiming to be a neutral party to the conflict and to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states, Beijing has refused to explicitly condemn Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brutal aggression in Ukraine and expressed sympathy for Moscow’s “legitimate security concerns.”

China-Russia ties have been maintained, if not strengthened, across the diplomatic, economic, and military domains in recent months. High-ranking Chinese officials and their Russian counterparts, including Chinese President Xi Jinping and Putin, have met consistently both in person and virtually. China-Russia trade has boomed, breaking previous records to reach more than $190 billion last year. Quite strikingly, Beijing has also continued its joint military exercises with Moscow. These include bilateral naval exercises in Northeast Asia last spring as U.S. President Joe Biden visited the region and again this past December . This year, China and Russia held their first military exercise together with South Africa off the latter’s coast, which coincided with the anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine.

The last year has made clear that China and Russia’s strategic alignment is not simply a marriage of convenience, but a deep partnership that is likely to endure for the foreseeable future.

The last year has made clear that China and Russia’s strategic alignment is not simply a marriage of convenience, but a deep partnership that is likely to endure for the foreseeable future. To be sure, Beijing’s embrace of Moscow is motivated in part by a hardheaded calculation of the need to stabilize relations with its former rival and militarily formidable neighbor as China braces for long-term competition with the United States. But beyond realpolitik concerns, at the core of Beijing and Moscow’s 21st-century partnership is a shared aim of challenging what these two states perceive to be a Western-dominated global order that enables the United States and its allies to impose their standards, values, and interests on others thanks to international institutions that were created by and continue to favor Western powers.

Although China and Russia seek to jointly challenge the existing global order, the two do not always see eye to eye on the means to achieving these shared objectives given their different material circumstances. China, as the world’s second-largest economy, stands to lose much more than Russia from global instability and economic isolation. Chinese leaders have therefore called for a cease-fire in Ukraine and expressed opposition to the threat or use of nuclear weapons in the conflict. While there are recent reports of Chinese companies selling dual-use items such as commercial drones to Russian entities, Beijing has refrained thus far from providing Putin with direct military assistance. The Biden administration has recently revealed that China may be on the cusp of supplying Russia with lethal weapons, however, and has strongly warned Beijing not to take such steps. According to a breaking report , the Russian military is in negotiations with a Chinese drone manufacturer to mass produce so-called “kamikaze” drones. Whether Beijing allows this or other weapons transactions to move forward with increased global scrutiny remains to be seen. At present, it seems unlikely that China will lean into the conflict to militarily support Moscow to the degree that the United States and its partners have assisted Kyiv.

Barring an extreme situation, such as the use of weapons of mass destruction by Russian forces, Beijing is also unlikely to join in on Western sanctions against Russia or to embrace other measures that may endanger its ties with Moscow. China has a strong self-interest in a stable global environment as it seeks sustained economic growth and prosperity for its people. Consequently, Washington and its allies should continue to lean on Chinese leaders to, at a minimum, refrain from assisting Moscow’s war efforts, and to constructively use their influence to reduce escalatory risks as the war rages on in Europe. Recent diplomatic efforts by Biden, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and others to press Xi to oppose Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling were critical for sending the right signal to Russia. Similar efforts should be made to ensure China cooperates in advocating for a peace agreement that does right by Ukraine, once such a roadmap emerges.

Turn toward Moscow

Suzanne maloney.

In the first year of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Iran has emerged as an unlikely wild card — the only state in the world that is providing offensive weaponry to Moscow to bolster its brutal military campaign. Tehran’s unusual gambit to insert itself into a war in the heart of Europe reflects a decisive shift in its geopolitical orientation and risk tolerance. The conflict in Ukraine has supercharged a strategic partnership between Iran and Russia that began nearly eight years ago in Syria, accelerating Iran’s embrace of authoritarian alternatives to the West and dooming any prospects for the Biden administration’s dogged efforts to resuscitate the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Some observers have described the Tehran-Moscow relationship as an “ alliance of convenience ,” a case of short-term opportunism by a beleaguered regime. After all, Iranians know something about wars of aggression, having endured their own catastrophic conflict with a neighbor, the eight-year “ imposed war ” precipitated by Saddam Hussein’s 1980 invasion. And the legacy of Russian territorial acquisitiveness still looms large in Iran, which ceded the southern Caucasus to imperial Russia in the 19th century and outmaneuvered Soviet attempts to install proxies in northwest Iran after World War II. While their more recent engagement in Syria has been mutually beneficial, Tehran has always been clear-eyed about the divergence in Russian and Iranian interests there.

And yet this inauspicious legacy has not inhibited Iran’s support for the Russian war effort. As the conflict approached its six-month mark, Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles began striking  Ukraine’s critical infrastructure . Reports suggest that Tehran is helping to train Russian soldiers and transfer drone production systems to Russia, and ballistic missile exports to Moscow may be next. In return, Moscow has promised fighter jets, helicopters, and newer air defense systems. Even so-called pragmatic political figures in Iran  endorse the Russian narrative  that its war is purely defensive. As a result, the cagey cooperation established between their militaries in Syria has now blossomed into “ a full-fledged defense partnership ” according to the Biden administration — one that provides  significant military value to both regimes. Iran’s intervention can’t turn the tide of the war in Moscow’s favor, but Iranian drones can impose significant financial costs on Ukraine and terrorize its citizens.

The reciprocal military cooperation reflects only one dimension of the deepening strategic partnership between the two countries. Beyond the battlefield, Tehran and Moscow have exchanged a series of high-level visits and significantly upgraded military, economic, and energy cooperation. The fruits of this new partnership include a mostly speculative commitment of a $40 billion Russian investment in Iran’s oil and gas development and sanctions-proof trade corridors and financial mechanisms .

Today, Iranian leaders are persuaded that their country’s fortunes lie in China and Russia.

The multifaceted relationship between Tehran and Moscow belies any sanguine assertion of opportunism. Rather, Iranian leaders are pursuing longstanding pledges to  pivot east . Iran’s leaders have long anticipated — and exulted in — the decline of U.S. influence on the world stage. That forecast has increasingly been supplemented by a recognition of the shift in the locus of economic, diplomatic, and military power to Asia. While Beijing has not delivered on its epic 2021 $400 billion economic pact  with Tehran, its imports of Iranian crude oil in defiance of U.S. sanctions have proven an essential lifeline for sustaining Iran’s economy and its ruling system. With  Tehran’s accession  to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization last year, the influential Iranian newspaper Kayhan celebrated this newfound convergence among “ the three great powers ” — Russia, China, and Iran.

Tehran’s embrace of Russia and China also reflects its assessment that the West is no longer a desirable or reliable conduit for economic or diplomatic opportunities. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine coincided with hard-fought progress toward resuscitating the nuclear deal with Iran. A decade ago, access to Western finance was a central imperative in persuading Tehran to negotiate over its nuclear program, but today, Iranian leaders are persuaded that their country’s fortunes lie in China and Russia. That calculation suits Russian interests neatly; whatever benefits Moscow might once have perceived in constraining Iran’s nuclear advances have been displaced by the exigencies of the war in Ukraine. As a result, Washington now must be prepared to balance a brewing crisis over Iran’s proximity to nuclear breakout even as it contends with the monumental Russia and China challenges.

Global South

It’s complicated, tanvi madan.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the “Global South” — encompassing a diverse range of countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Pacific — has been seen as “sitting on the fence.” Yet in vote after vote in the UN General Assembly, most of the developing world has criticized Moscow’s actions. The abstentions — particularly India’s in the U.N. Security Council — received greater attention, but even the abstainers list is striking since it includes several traditional Russian partners who declined to support Moscow’s actions despite Russian lobbying. Bhutan’s permanent representative identified the reason , “for small states [the UN principles] serve as the guarantor of our existence … We cannot condone the unilateral redrawing of international borders.” The Kenyan representative asserted that security concerns did not justify “breach[ing]” Ukraine’s territorial integrity or legitimizing “irredentism and expansionism.”

Yet the Kenyan representative also exposed a North-South fault line. He suggested that the powerful — and not just Russian President Vladimir Putin — operated on the basis of one rule for me, but not for thee. Other officials have noted that the West expects the Global South to care about European security but doesn’t reciprocate. More broadly, there is worry that the war — which unleashed intensified inflationary pressures, debt sustainability doubts, and food and energy insecurity as a result of higher grain, fuel, and fertilizer prices — has worsened developing countries’ economic challenges, which COVID had already exacerbated. And they question whether the West will now meet its commitments to help address their development, health security, and climate change-related challenges. In addition, defense trade partners of Russia and Ukraine are facing military supply disruptions.

The response and impact in the Global South have varied. India, for instance, has been more reluctant to criticize Russia by name, but it shares several of these concerns — one reason it seeks to play a bridging role between North and South and East and West. Moreover, the war is making India’s largest military supplier (Russia) more dependent on India’s primary adversary (China). New Delhi is also concerned about China filling the vacuum left in the developing world by a distracted Russia, and how the war has complicated its ties with crucial partners in North America, Europe, and Asia — and might reduce their attention on the Indo-Pacific.

Given these concerns, it should not be surprising that the developing world wants to see the Russia-Ukraine War end.

Developing countries have see the West condemning them for what the United States and Europe often do — protecting their own interests.

Yet many Western observers seem taken aback by the Global South’s reaction. That perhaps reflects that developing countries are overlooked when Washington or Brussels do not perceive them as relevant to their dominant strategic frameworks. Now that developing countries’ views are coming into focus, they find themselves being criticized for not isolating Moscow. Instead of acknowledging their comments in support of the international order, they see the West condemning them for what the United States and Europe often do — protecting their own interests.

This is counterproductive for the West. Rather, it could heed the lessons from President Dwight Eisenhower’s second-term engagement with non-aligned countries: (1) learn to tolerate differences, and (2) honey works better than vinegar. Moreover, instead of taking a with-us-or-against-us attitude or talking about weakening Russia, a more effective approach would keep the focus on Moscow’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the need for it to end the war (and thus alleviate the developing world’s pain). Outreach from Russia’s neighbors — e.g., Central and Eastern European countries that don’t have imperial baggage or had pre-1991 ties with the Global South — might resonate more than from major powers who are seen as selectively citing the rules-based order. They can also highlight the imperial nature of Putin’s project, using his own words — not least to counter Moscow’s attempt to portray itself as anti-imperialist and Russia and China’s messaging that NATO, not Russia, is responsible for this war. The United States and its European allies should also more proactively highlight that it is primarily Putin’s war of choice rather than Western sanctions that is causing developing countries’ pain — most countries don’t realize that food, fuel, and fertilizer are largely not sanctioned.

The West has made some efforts along these lines. This has been evident in the Biden administration’s outreach to Africa, and Berlin’s acknowledgment of the need to demonstrate concern about developments beyond the West.

Most significantly, however, the West needs to be visibly responsive in alleviating the pain being felt beyond its borders and addressing these countries’ development concerns — especially vis-à-vis food, energy, health, and climate security. This cannot be a one-time effort. It needs to involve consistent outreach that recognizes the variation in the Global South and these countries’ agency, and tailors engagement accordingly. This will not be easy given bandwidth and other constraints, but it is a necessary task on which Western countries should collaborate with each other and with like-minded partners in the “Global South” as well.

International order

This will be hard (and could get worse), bruce jones.

Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine does not yet rank among the deadliest wars of the post-Cold War period, but it is surely the most dangerous — with nuclear-armed Russia invading a sovereign country that borders NATO members, signaling wider ambitions, and threatening nuclear escalation. The West has reacted accordingly, pouring weaponry and money into the fight, as well as imposing sanctions on Russia — while staying open to (credible) diplomacy.

A year in, we can take stock of the wider consequences. Politically speaking, Ukraine’s courage and the West’s response have helped stem the leaching of influence away from the democratic powers. China was stunned by the sophistication of America’s operational intelligence in advance of Russia’s invasion, giving Beijing pause for thought in its own regional ambitions. Russia itself is weakened (though not hobbled), and its partnership with China is revealed to have sharp limits. The diplomacy surrounding the war, though, also revealed that the non-Western middle powers (including democracies) have limited stakes in an order whose “rules” do little to help them through crises, and much to frustrate their growth. As guardians at the gate, the United States and the European powers are the objects of much resentment for keeping the southern powers from a seat at the table at the key institutions that shape the economic order — to say nothing about the deep anger at the West’s nationalist and recalcitrant responses in the first phase of the COVID-19 crisis and vaccine distribution. An order that fails to attract rising adherents is at risk.

We must retool our security concepts around the fact of sustained tension and the economic architecture around the need for less dependence on distrusted partners.

The war is also chipping away at the remaining delusions about operating a global system built, over 40 years, on the premise of stable great power relations. We are beginning to understand that we must retool our security concepts around the fact of sustained tension and the economic architecture around the need for less dependence on distrusted partners. The reality we still shy away from is: this is going to be extremely costly and dangerous.

But the alternatives are likely worse. Among them: a naval crisis in the western Pacific that badly disrupts global trade. Despite “teaching moments” in the Suez Canal and Long Beach, we are still sea-blind: our imaginations do not encompass how dependent every major economy (including America’s) is on the flow of goods — industrial, agricultural, energy — by sea. Despite the sophistication of U.S. intelligence on Ukraine, we were caught flat-footed when naval conflict in the Black Sea roiled global food markets, risking famine for tens of millions. A similar, sustained interruption of trade flows through the East and South China Seas would cause a global economic crisis and kneecap the American economy — as well as China’s. Yet scenario exercises around a Taiwan crisis often underestimate the effect of interrupting shipping. Integrating the reality of sea-borne globalization into our strategic planning is vital.

There’s another cost: to our bandwidth for other crises. In Haiti, Yemen, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa, violence, lawlessness, or famine rises while the West’s attention, deployments, and resources dwindle — to say nothing of the disaster left behind in Afghanistan. The United States and Europe may rise to the occasion in response to the devastating earthquake in Turkey and Syria, but their central role in managing global crises is diminishing.

And then there are the hazards. The conflict in Ukraine is not yet a direct war between the nuclear powers, but it is the most important of several recent instances that have seen the armed personnel of one nuclear power killed by partners of another. In the absence of robust deterrence beyond allied territory and determined to resist new “spheres of influence,” the West is drawn into these indirect but substantial fights over non-allied territory. Escalation dynamics are running ahead of either real deterrent capacity or diplomatic guardrails. A sense of being in the wars before the war is mounting.

This leaves us in urgent need of invigorating our defenses for a geopolitical contest that no longer seems likely to remain “ short of war .” And with the long, hard graft of re-globalizing to decrease the role of China in vulnerable supply chains. Except in niche technologies, the wrong approach to that is expensive friend-shoring; the right approach is adapting our investments and trade rules to better support productive growth in emerging economies.

All of this lies ahead of us even if Russia fails to win — which, in parallel, we must work with Ukraine to guarantee.

Nuclear deterrence

We will all go together when we go, caitlin talmadge.

As Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 2022 speech announcing the invasion of Ukraine reminded the world, “Russia remains one of the most powerful nuclear states,” and fears of Russian nuclear use have persisted with varying intensity throughout the conflict. Neither the conventional war nor the prolonged nuclear crisis it has sparked appears likely to end any time soon, so modesty is warranted in drawing any grand conclusions. Yet given that data on nuclear crises are (thankfully) rare, the past year offers an unusual opportunity to reflect on the emerging contours of strategic deterrence in an era of resurgent competition. Three lessons stand out.

The Russia-Ukraine War has reinforced how important nuclear weapons are because, by their very existence, they dramatically raise the potential costs of escalation.

First, nuclear weapons still cast a long shadow on world politics. They have not been fired in anger since 1945, but that doesn’t mean that they’ve gone away. The Russia-Ukraine War has reinforced how important they are because, by their very existence, they dramatically raise the potential costs of escalation. Putin has leveraged this fact, repeatedly reminding the world of his country’s arsenal in an effort to dissuade other countries from intervening on Ukraine’s behalf. His nuclear threats have not succeeded in stopping outside aid, but they have induced significant restraint in the extent, nature, and pace of that support. Western military assistance, while vigorous, has been piecemeal , careful , and cautious due to fears of escalation . Absent Russian nuclear weapons, the escalation discussion would sound very different, and the West would worry much less about the dangers of a decisive Russian defeat. Instead, it faces a situation in which it has to balance a desire to support Ukraine against the need to avoid World War III if Putin’s conventional campaign implodes. Of course, Putin has to worry about U.S. nuclear weapons too, which is a major reason that he has avoided attacking NATO supply lines.

Second, nuclear weapons deter invasion — and states without the protection of such weapons are more vulnerable to attack. Even though nuclear weapons have not been employed in this war, the fact that the war occurred at all surely reminds states of the inescapable value of nuclear deterrence in protecting the homeland. No one wants to be the next Ukraine. Ukraine had neither its own nuclear weapons nor an extended deterrence guarantee from a nuclear patron. Facing a nuclear-armed Ukraine, or a Ukraine under NATO’s nuclear umbrella, Russia would have had to worry that a large-scale invasion might prompt a nuclear response. Instead, Russia gambled on invasion, knowing that doing so would never put its own cities at risk. Watching this unfold, Japan , South Korea , Taiwan , and others (perhaps Iran and Saudi Arabia) have all undoubtedly been taking notes. They are likely to infer the renewed importance of acquiring their own nuclear weapons, pursuing nuclear sharing , or obtaining stronger security guarantees from a nuclear power. This is not good news for the global non-proliferation regime.

Third, arms control is a vital tool in a world of nuclear danger. As scary as the nuclear dimensions of the war have been, some of the guardrails in the U.S.-Russian relationship held during the first year of the war, most notably the New START Treaty. Though on  life support , this strategic arms control framework still managed to provide some assurances to each side about the other’s nuclear arsenal at a time of intense distrust. It also enabled the two sides to continue communicating about routine peacetime nuclear activities such as missile  tests , reducing the chance that a test might be mistaken for a launch against the backdrop of hostilities. Just as important have been the less formal methods of risk reduction between the two sides, such as maintaining  military-to-military communications  to avoid miscalculations. The war thus reinforces the role of dialogue as a tool for managing escalation — a mutual interest shared by even the most bitter enemies. Of course, Putin’s recent  announcement  that Russia is suspending its participation in the treaty raises deep concerns about the future; it will be important to discern whether Putin intends to evade the treaty’s force limits or simply to halt inspections permanently. Either way, the episode also reminds us that the United States and China lack an arms control  framework  for managing their interactions akin to what the United States and Russia have had over the past year. Were conflict to break out over Taiwan, for example, even the minimal guardrails that have been present in the current war would be absent.

Future of warfare

Plan for the end of the war, or be sorry, melanie w. sisson.

There has been intense interest over the past year in extracting lessons from the allied West’s attempt to forestall Russian President Vladimir Putin’s appalling aggression in Ukraine, and from the war that has followed. There is examination of whether and how the West could have done more and better to deter Putin from acting on his ego and id, on whether and how modern technologies — drones, precision munitions, and cyber operations — are affecting the course of this war and what they mean for the future of warfare , and on whether and how this conflict will affect the likelihood of others after it, most especially in the contested Taiwan Strait .

All of these very pragmatic areas of inquiry deserve the attention they are getting. So too, however, should the war in Ukraine reinforce the fact — not the idea, but the fact — that war is inherently unpredictable. It should be sobering not just that Putin’s predictions were so very wrong , but that so too were those of the West — despite the most modern and sophisticated intelligence organizations in the world, despite the collective expertise of scholars and analysts who have devoted their careers to studying Putin and warfare, and despite the observable, ongoing consequences of the West’s own poor predictions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

NATO similarly has surprised itself with the extent of its willingness to arm Ukrainian fighters. Hard lines drawn in February 2022 for fear of escalation have softened over the course of the conflict. Now, one year in, the unthinkable has become the doable with the promised delivery to Ukraine of German Leopard and U.S. M1 Abrams tanks. Policymakers explain this evolution as a responsiveness to conditions on the ground , to the wisdom of pressing advantages as they arise. When viewed through the unsentimental lens of history, however, this progression usually is called mission creep, the pejorative term used to describe an incrementalism that either makes wars longer and bloodier or that puts the conflict on a path toward expansion and escalation.

It should be sobering not just that Putin’s predictions were so very wrong, but that so too were those of the West.

The likelihood of mission creep correlates with the extent to which policymakers enter their nation into war — as a direct combatant or as a material supporter thereof — without a clear concept of the peace they are seeking to achieve, or with only idealized visions of how that peace will come about. The latter characterizes the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which succeeded in the breaking but failed in the building, and there is reason to be concerned that the former characterizes the alliance’s engagement in Ukraine today.

Economically, it is unclear for how long or until what point the alliance intends to use sanctions, export controls, financial restrictions, and other measures to punish Russia. Militarily, the White House is taking great care not to assert that the goal is either Ukrainian victory or Russian defeat, much less to describe what either of those terms would mean in practice. Instead, it is declaring an intent to ensure that Ukraine is in the “ strongest possible position ” to defend itself on the battlefield so that it can be “ in the best possible position at the negotiating table ” when that time comes. This framing makes it difficult not to worry that policymakers will be tempted to use Ukrainian battle victories as predictors of future success, as indicators of irreversible progress toward having that strong hand at the negotiating table, and therefore as justification for continuing to redraw the lines of what military armaments are, and are not, out of bounds.

Allowing events to alleviate the pressure on policymakers to make hard decisions about goals and objectives and to reduce NATO vigilance about escalation can have dangerous effects in a war with a cynical, sadistic, nuclear-armed adversary. Perhaps the most unpleasant of all lessons to be learned from the first year of this terrible war, then, is that strategies led by predictions about how the fighting will go rather than by a vision of how it should end run the risk of failing either very slowly, or in very dangerous ways.

Parallels with WWI

Nothing quiet on the eastern front, michael e. o’hanlon.

As I reflect on the Ukraine war one year in, the many parallels with World War I haunt me.

The similarities, or at least strong echoes, begin with the causes of conflict. Old-fashioned imperial ambitions and rivalries were key then, and in the case of Moscow, they have been important here too.

But it is in the war’s actual combat dynamics where the World War I analogy may apply best, even if of course they are not exact. At the tactical level, the heavy use of artillery constitutes an obvious parallel, as does the widespread use of trenches to protect against it. In this conflict, as in World War I, aircraft have been important but not too important; the same is true of tanks so far. Offensives have been possible in both wars; for example, on the Western Front, the front lines moved considerably in both 1914 and 1918. But such offensives tend to be difficult, costly in casualties, and inconclusive in strategic effect. Where weapons have improved, countermeasures often partially cancel out their advanced characteristics. For example, much Russian artillery today is still unguided, as in World War I, but even those weapons that are more precise can often be partly countered through jamming, defensive measures like deeper trenches, dispersal of combat forces, and other responses.

I fear there could be another echo of World War I in today’s conflict — the distinct possibility that we could be in for a long war. Few expected as much, of course, in the summer of 1914, when leaders widely expected that “the boys will be home before the leaves fall” or at least before Christmas. But after September 1914’s so-called “Miracle on the Marne,” in which the Entente Powers stymied Germany’s attempt at Paris, and subsequently, the inconclusive “race to the sea” around Ypres, Belgium, stalemate settled in. By year’s end, there was a trench line nearly 500 miles long from the English Channel to the Swiss Alps, and the parties settled in for a protracted struggle. Each winter, industry would churn out prodigious amounts of weaponry as generals would plot new offensives for the coming spring and summer. But until 1918 at least, these efforts proved generally futile. Front lines barely moved for about three years.

If proposed terms of peace are too lenient, Russia may be able to attack again after months or a few years of preparation. Alternatively, if they are too tough, Russia may wind up destitute, angry, and vengeful.

Admittedly, that was the Western Front in World War I. The Eastern Front, including today’s Ukraine, was usually more fluid. Also, today’s fight features precision weaponry, drones, and exquisite intelligence that the parties to World War I did not possess. The parallels, therefore, are far from absolute. Still, many aspects of the current fight have an uncanny precedent in World War I. It seems distinctly possible that the durations of the two wars could wind up similar as well — we will have to see — though this war could be shorter or, heaven forbid, even longer. That will call for continued Western resolve in helping Ukraine over the long haul.

Avoiding a forever war in Ukraine may also hinge on a smart strategy for eventual negotiations — even if now is not yet the time. This is where the echoes of World War I are particularly poignant. The Versailles peace wound up establishing the predicate for World War II more than producing stability; it is for that reason that historian Margaret MacMillan entitled her history of the conflict The War that Ended Peace.

The lessons for today are twofold. If proposed terms of peace are too lenient, or if there is simply a cease-fire but no durable agreement on ending the conflict, Russia may be able to attack again after months or a few years of preparation. Alternatively, if they are too tough, Russia may wind up destitute, angry, and vengeful. Right now, the latter concerns seem beside the point, given Russian President Vladimir Putin’s horrendous behavior and his disinterest in talks. But that could change. We need to be ready if it does — so that we can wind up this war better than nations a century ago were willing and able to stop World War I.

All m easures short of war

David wessel.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has taught us a lot — about Russia’s revanchism, the strength of the NATO alliance, and the nature of warfare in the early 21st century. It has reminded us of the horrors of war, especially since this time we are seeing it in almost real time on our smartphones. This is not primarily an economic event, but we have learned a few economic lessons, some of which challenge what was conventional wisdom just a year ago.

The war has been devastating for Ukraine, its people, and its economy, but the economy has done better than many predicted.

First, the Ukrainian economy is impressively resilient. Russia’s cruel assault on Ukrainian infrastructure, industry, and neighborhoods has taken an enormous human toll and devastated the Ukrainian economy. Ukraine’s GDP shrank by 30% in 2022 . (That’s Great Depression territory.) The Kyiv School of Economics estimates that as of November 2022 $136 billion worth of buildings and infrastructure had been destroyed, a sum equal to about two-thirds of pre-invasion GDP. Photos and videos remind me of the pictures of Berlin, Dresden, Kassel, and other German cities at the end of World War II. But beyond that horror, Ukrainians have proved remarkably resilient amid the largest military aggression in Europe since World War II. The government is functioning, even from bunkers . Pensions are being paid. The banking system, strengthened before the invasion, is working. The central bank is setting up stations with backup electricity for Ukrainians to charge phones and tap ATMs when there are blackouts — and I’m told even in Russian-occupied territory, Ukrainians can tap their hryvnia bank accounts for transactions on their phones. Of course, the war has been devastating for Ukraine, its people, and its economy, but the economy has done better than many predicted.

Second, unprecedented Western sanctions have not debilitated Russia’s economy. We have learned that the United States and its allies can and will impose stiff economic sanctions, such as freezing what Russia says is about half of its more than $600 billion in foreign-currency reserves. Restricting Russia’s imports of high-tech (and not-so-high-tech) goods is harming its economy. Russian automakers, for example, were forced to produce cars without airbags and anti-lock braking-system sensors, an industry standard. Because of U.S. and European sanctions, Russia is forced to sell its oil at a deep discount to India and China. But Russia’s economy did not melt down. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) says Russia’s 2022 economic contraction was smaller than IMF economists anticipated , and the economy will grow a bit this year, not shrink as the IMF predicted in its October forecast. Since Russia continues to run a significant current-account surplus — it is importing less and the price of its primary export, oil, is up — it has weathered the freezing of reserves and other financial sanctions. The worst may be yet to come, though: Russia’s government budget deficit is growing as military spending soars and sanctions bite. There has been a significant loss of human capital (due to both death and emigration), and the inability to import key parts and technology points to slower productivity growth in the future. Still, economic sanctions do not seem to have influenced Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggressiveness on the battlefield.

Third, Russia is an unreliable energy supplier. A year ago, the notion that Europe could wean itself off Russian energy imports seemed far-fetched. No longer. When this war ends — and it will someday — Russia will find that Europe is no longer a lucrative market for its natural gas. Germany is acquiring floating terminals so it can import liquified natural gas from the United States and Qatar — and will add capacity over the next few years. It will be a long time — if ever — before Europe looks to Russia to satisfy its appetite for petroleum and natural gas. Russia probably will find other markets eventually, though that is easier for petroleum (much of which travels by ships) than for natural gas (which, for Russia, requires pipelines). However, for Russia, transporting to these markets will be costlier than selling to Europe and the other buyers (e.g., China and India) probably will have more bargaining power.

Fourth, all this slowed the move to wean the world off fossil fuels. Despite the rising angst about climate change and the popularity of renewable energy, the spike in energy prices and the urgent need to replace Russian gas in Europe has led to calls to increase the production of fossil fuels outside of Russia. One energy expert quipped the other day that the major legacy of the Greens in the German coalition government may be to extend the life of coal in the country’s energy mix. And in the United States, one sign of the changing attitude toward oil and natural gas production came at S&P Global’s annual CERAWeek conference. At the March 2021 conference, newly confirmed Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm’s rhetoric was all about investing in clean energy and weaning the nation off of fossil fuels to combat climate change. At CERAWeek 2022, her message was different: “We need more supply. Right now, we need oil and gas production to rise to meet current demand.”

Unpleasant trade-offs

Samantha gross.

In the energy policy world, we refer to the challenge of providing sustainable, secure, and affordable energy as the “energy trilemma.” Policy focus in recent years has been on the sustainable part of the equation, given the imperative of preventing the worst impacts of climate change. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reminded us that the secure and affordable parts of the equation are also critical.

The war in Ukraine is disrupting energy markets all over the world, as both Russia and the West attempt to use energy markets and energy interdependence to further their goals. The European Union, G-7 countries, and Australia have sanctioned Russian crude oil and oil products , an unprecedented action against one of the world’s largest oil exporters, in an attempt to reduce an important source of funding for Russia’s war machine. Russian oil and oil products can avoid the sanctions if they are sold below specified prices. The effectiveness of “price caps,” as the mechanism is called, is uncertain so far.

But unquestionably, the European natural gas market has been hardest hit by the energy impacts of the war. Russia is weaponizing its gas supply to try to soften European support for Ukraine. In 2021, Russia supplied nearly 40% of Europe’s total natural gas consumption, imported mostly through pipelines. Slowdowns in gas deliveries started before the war, in the fall of 2021, when the state-owned Russian gas provider Gazprom did not fill gas storage facilities it owned or controlled in Europe in advance of the winter. Since that time, gas flows have slowed to a trickle. Little gas was flowing through the Nord Stream pipeline from Russia to Germany in September 2022, when an act of sabotage damaged both that pipeline and its completed, but not operational, twin, Nord Stream 2. The culprit is not yet known.

Europe has not wavered in its support for Ukraine, but greatly reduced natural gas supply has brought hardship to European governments and citizens. European gas prices reached their highest level ever in August 2022 . Heading into the winter, Europeans were concerned not just about high prices, but about actual shortages, potentially requiring shutdowns of gas-reliant industries. In response, the European Union established a plan for member states to reduce their gas demand 15% by March 2023 and prioritized sectors to receive gas in case of shortage. Subsidies are also blunting the impact on gas consumers of tight supply and high prices, but at great expense to EU governments. Subsidies and other policies to cope with the natural gas crisis cost 1.7% of GDP in Germany, 2.3% in Spain, 2.8% in Italy, and 3.7% in Greece.

In addition to financial impacts, reduced natural gas supply required some difficult decisions by the EU and member governments. For example, Germany extended the lives of its last three nuclear power plants by several months, until April 2023. The EU is supporting the development of natural gas supply in the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa and liquified natural gas (LNG) receiving facilities on the continent. Coal consumption in Europe increased in each of the last two years as a substitute for natural gas in power generation (and to make up for shortfalls in French nuclear power generation). Each of these decisions would have been nearly unthinkable before the crisis.

Although Europe has managed to dodge an energy crisis, more challenges lie ahead, and not just because next winter might be colder.

Despite fears of idled factories and cold homes, Europe is surviving the winter quite well, and natural gas prices are now below their prewar level . LNG has been a savior for Europe, although there is not enough LNG in the world to make up for the loss of Russian pipeline gas. Europe’s LNG imports increased by 65% in 2022 over their 2021 volume, with the United States as the largest supplier . Europe managed to enter the winter heating season, when natural gas demand is highest, with more than 90% of its reserve storage capacity filled . Reduced gas demand has been the other key factor, due to warm weather and conservation efforts and fuel switching by gas consumers. If trends continue, European gas storage could exit the winter approximately half full .

Although Europe has managed — with a lot of money, some gas conservation efforts, and more than a little good luck — to dodge an energy crisis, more challenges lie ahead, and not just because next winter might be colder. China’s economy is recovering quickly from its COVID-19 woes and is likely to increase its demand for energy, including LNG. No new LNG facilities are coming online in 2023 , meaning that the global market is expected to be tight, and expensive. Europe is likely to face very high prices yet again, having already spent significant resources to get through the first round. The transition to a low-carbon energy system is the long-term answer to fossil fuel crises but cannot occur overnight. In the meantime, Europe must continue its efforts to conserve natural gas, find new sources of supply, and accelerate its energy transition.

The human cost

Sophie Roehse and Kemal Kirişci

One year of Russia’s war in Ukraine has triggered a displacement crisis of staggering speed and scale. Almost 40% of Ukraine’s prewar population has been driven out of its homes since the invasion. With no end to the conflict in sight, the future of displaced Ukrainians remains highly uncertain. For Ukraine, the return of refugees from abroad and effective support of internally displaced persons (IDPs) will determine the country’s ability to reestablish itself as an independent state, prosper, and deter future attacks on its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Putin’s strategy of terror and displacement. Russia has waged a ruthless campaign of destruction in Ukraine. The victims are Ukrainian civilians, who have been terrorized by widespread bombing campaigns, targeted airstrikes on energy and social infrastructure, and regional massacres in Russian-controlled territories. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s tactics have prompted millions to leave the war-torn country, with over 8 million Ukrainian refugees having fled to Europe and hundreds of thousands crossing the Atlantic Ocean to seek refuge in the United States and Canada . An additional estimated 5.4 million Ukrainians are currently displaced within Ukraine, among whom almost 60% have lived outside their habitual residences for six months or longer.

Forced relocations. An ominous aspect of the displacement crisis is the fate of the almost 3 million Ukrainian refugees reported to have fled to Russia . Though some Ukrainians — especially residents of eastern Ukraine — may reasonably have gone voluntarily to escape active fighting , forced deportations of Ukrainian civilians to Russia and Russian-occupied territories have raised serious international concern. At crossing points bordering Russian-controlled areas, investigations have uncovered a “ filtration process ” suspected to ensure obedience with Kremlin-doctrine and deny entry of individuals deemed ideologically threatening . Those who fail screening are reportedly detained in “ filtration camps ,” which have been discovered across occupied and illegally annexed territories and described as a new form of Russian mass incarceration . Hundreds of thousands of children have been among these involuntary removals, including orphans relocated with adoptive Russian families and children separated from their parents.

Refugees’ decisions about whether to return or not will have tremendous demographic consequences for Ukraine, shaping its ability to recover economically, repair its social fabric, and defend its national security.

Domestic resilience and international political will are central to Ukraine’s survival. Using terror and the displacement of civilians as a war tactic is not new. One needs to look no further than Syria , where the Assad regime and Russia used forced mass migration as a way of applying international political pressure. In Ukraine, however, Putin’s plan to coerce Ukraine’s government and civil society into negotiations and create a fait accompli with annexed territories has not succeeded. The Zelenskyy government and the Ukrainian people have proven outstandingly courageous and resilient in defending Ukrainian independence. Beyond the country’s borders, societies across the European Union and in the United States have risen to the challenge of arriving Ukrainian refugees — contrary to expectations — with solidarity and temporary protection. When safe conditions are met, however, most Ukrainians abroad hope to return home. Yet the longer the conflict endures, the deeper their roots in host communities will grow. Refugees’ decisions about whether to return or not will have tremendous demographic consequences for Ukraine, shaping its ability to recover economically, repair its social fabric, and defend its national security. Similarly, ensuring the return of those internally displaced through safe transit routes as well as supporting them with housing and economic assistance will be crucial in rebuilding communities from the local level up. In reconstruction planning, Ukraine’s supporters should start to think now about strategies for incorporating refugees and IDPs.

As for Russia, its forced relocation of Ukrainian civilians constitutes an outright violation of international humanitarian laws . The laws of war articulated in the four Geneva Conventions aim to protect civilian life and minimize harm to innocent civilians in conflict situations, which Putin’s troops have violated repeatedly. Forcibly deporting people as a means of erasing Ukrainian national identity is increasingly resembling the ethnic cleansing experienced during the war in Yugoslavia, when displacement was last weaponized in Europe. Some have even argued that Russia’s actions may constitute genocide . Necessarily, the Kremlin regime and its perpetrators on the battlefield and in the state bureaucracy will have to face international legal accountability for their offenses. It is the right thing to do; but more fundamentally, it is crucial to ensure compliance with the international laws of war, to confirm respect for the inviolability of territorial integrity and national sovereignty, and to protect human life beyond Ukraine.

About the Authors

Director – center on the united states and europe, senior fellow – foreign policy, center on the united states and europe, nonresident senior fellow – foreign policy, center on the united states and europe, strobe talbott center for security, strategy, and technology, arms control and non-proliferation initiative, visiting fellow – foreign policy, center on the united states and europe, visiting fellow – foreign policy, center on the united states and europe, the turkey project, david m. rubenstein fellow – foreign policy, center for east asia policy studies, john l. thornton china center, vice president and director – foreign policy, director – the india project, director – project on international order and strategy, nonresident senior fellow – foreign policy, strobe talbott center for security, strategy, and technology, fellow – foreign policy, strobe talbott center for security, strategy, and technology, director of research – foreign policy, director – the hutchins center on fiscal and monetary policy, director – energy security and climate initiative, sophie roehse, research assistant – foreign policy, center on the united states and europe, kemal kirişci, nonresident senior fellow – foreign policy, center on the united states and europe, the turkey project, for more….

The Russia-Ukraine War: Year two and strategic consequences

Ukraine Index

The Kremlin’s grand delusions

Meeting the Russia challenge: Lessons from the foreign policy transition from Bush to Obama

Acknowledgments.

Editorial: Adam Lammon, Ted Reinert, Constanze Stelzenmüller

Web design: Rachel Slattery

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Essay on Peace

500 words essay peace.

Peace is the path we take for bringing growth and prosperity to society. If we do not have peace and harmony, achieving political strength, economic stability and cultural growth will be impossible. Moreover, before we transmit the notion of peace to others, it is vital for us to possess peace within. It is not a certain individual’s responsibility to maintain peace but everyone’s duty. Thus, an essay on peace will throw some light on the same topic.

Importance of Peace

History has been proof of the thousands of war which have taken place in all periods at different levels between nations. Thus, we learned that peace played an important role in ending these wars or even preventing some of them.

In fact, if you take a look at all religious scriptures and ceremonies, you will realize that all of them teach peace. They mostly advocate eliminating war and maintaining harmony. In other words, all of them hold out a sacred commitment to peace.

It is after the thousands of destructive wars that humans realized the importance of peace. Earth needs peace in order to survive. This applies to every angle including wars, pollution , natural disasters and more.

When peace and harmony are maintained, things will continue to run smoothly without any delay. Moreover, it can be a saviour for many who do not wish to engage in any disrupting activities or more.

In other words, while war destroys and disrupts, peace builds and strengthens as well as restores. Moreover, peace is personal which helps us achieve security and tranquillity and avoid anxiety and chaos to make our lives better.

How to Maintain Peace

There are many ways in which we can maintain peace at different levels. To begin with humankind, it is essential to maintain equality, security and justice to maintain the political order of any nation.

Further, we must promote the advancement of technology and science which will ultimately benefit all of humankind and maintain the welfare of people. In addition, introducing a global economic system will help eliminate divergence, mistrust and regional imbalance.

It is also essential to encourage ethics that promote ecological prosperity and incorporate solutions to resolve the environmental crisis. This will in turn share success and fulfil the responsibility of individuals to end historical prejudices.

Similarly, we must also adopt a mental and spiritual ideology that embodies a helpful attitude to spread harmony. We must also recognize diversity and integration for expressing emotion to enhance our friendship with everyone from different cultures.

Finally, it must be everyone’s noble mission to promote peace by expressing its contribution to the long-lasting well-being factor of everyone’s lives. Thus, we must all try our level best to maintain peace and harmony.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Conclusion of the Essay on Peace

To sum it up, peace is essential to control the evils which damage our society. It is obvious that we will keep facing crises on many levels but we can manage them better with the help of peace. Moreover, peace is vital for humankind to survive and strive for a better future.

FAQ of Essay on Peace

Question 1: What is the importance of peace?

Answer 1: Peace is the way that helps us prevent inequity and violence. It is no less than a golden ticket to enter a new and bright future for mankind. Moreover, everyone plays an essential role in this so that everybody can get a more equal and peaceful world.

Question 2: What exactly is peace?

Answer 2: Peace is a concept of societal friendship and harmony in which there is no hostility and violence. In social terms, we use it commonly to refer to a lack of conflict, such as war. Thus, it is freedom from fear of violence between individuals or groups.

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China and Russia reaffirm their close ties as Moscow presses its offensive in Ukraine

China’s leader Xi Jinping has welcomed Russia’s President Vladimir Putin at an official ceremony Thursday on his state visit to China. Putin’s visit comes as Russia has become more economically dependent on China following Moscow’s military operation in Ukraine more than two years ago.

Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed gratitude to Xi Jinping for China’s initiatives to resolve the Ukraine conflict at their Beijing summit Thursday where the Chinese leader said China hopes Europe will return to peace and stability soon and that China will play a constructive role.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has landed in Beijing as part of a two-day state visit to China. Putin’s visit comes as Russia has become more economically dependent on China following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine more than two years ago. (AP Production Tracy Brown)

Russian President Vladimir Putin held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Thursday, in which he stressed the two countries’ strong relations.

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin landed on Thursday in Beijing for a two-day state visit to China. The Kremlin said this will be Putin’s first foreign trip since he was sworn in as president and began his fifth term in office.

Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin look toward each other as they shake hands prior to their talks in Beijing, China, on Thursday, May 16, 2024. (Sergei Bobylev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

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Chinese President Xi Jinping, left, and Russian President Vladimir Putin review the honor guard during an official welcome ceremony in Beijing, China, Thursday, May 16, 2024. (Sergei Bobylev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend a concert marking the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and China and opening of China-Russia Years of Culture at the National Centre for the Performing Arts in Beijing, China, on Thursday, May 16, 2024. (Sergei Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

Chinese President Xi Jinping, left, and Russian President Vladimir Putin shake hands during their meeting in Beijing, China, on Thursday, May 16, 2024. (Sergei Bobylev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a wreath laying ceremony at the Monument to the People’s Heroes in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China, on Thursday, May 16, 2024. (Sergei Bobylev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

Chinese President Xi Jinping, center right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin walk during an official welcome ceremony in Beijing, China, on Thursday, May 16, 2024. (Sergei Bobylev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin walk during an official welcome ceremony in Beijing, China, on Thursday, May 16, 2024. (Sergei Bobylev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin pose for a photo prior to their talks in Beijing, China, on Thursday, May 16, 2024. (Sergei Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin attend an official welcome ceremony in Beijing, China, on Thursday, May 16, 2024. (Sergei Bobylev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

Chinese President Xi Jinping, left, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, walk during an official welcome ceremony in Beijing, China, on Thursday, May 16, 2024. (Sergei Bobylev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

Chinese President Xi Jinping, foreground right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, foreground left, walk past members of Russian cabinet during an official welcome ceremony in Beijing, China, on Thursday, May 16, 2024. (Sergei Bobylev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin review the honor guard during an official welcome ceremony in Beijing, China, Thursday, May 16, 2024. (Sergei Bobylev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, attends a wreath laying ceremony at the Monument to the People’s Heroes in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China, on Thursday, May 16, 2024. (Sergei Bobylev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

BEIJING (AP) — Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping on Thursday reaffirmed their “no-limits” partnership that has deepened as both countries face rising tensions with the West, and they criticized U.S. military alliances in Asia and the Pacific region.

At their summit in Beijing, Putin thanked Xi for China’s proposals for ending the war in Ukraine , which have been rejected by Ukraine and its Western supporters as largely following the Kremlin’s line.

Putin’s two-day state visit to one of his strongest allies and trading partners comes as Russian forces are pressing an offensive in northeastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv region in the most significant border incursion since the full-scale invasion began on Feb. 24, 2022.

China claims to take a neutral position in the conflict, but it has backed the Kremlin’s contentions that Russia was provoked into attacking Ukraine by the West, and it continues to supply key components needed by Moscow for weapons production.

China, which hasn’t criticized the invasion, proposed a broadly worded peace plan in 2023, calling for a cease-fire and for direct talks between Moscow and Kyiv. The plan was rejected by both Ukraine and the West for failing to call for Russia to leave occupied parts of Ukraine.

AP AUDIO: China and Russia reaffirm their close ties as Moscow presses its offensive in Ukraine

AP correspondent Karen Chammas reports on a summit between the leaders of China and Russia.

China also gave a rhetorical nod to Russia’s narrative about Nazism in Ukraine, with a joint statement Thursday that said Moscow and Beijing should defend the post-World War II order and “severely condemn the glorification of or even attempts to revive Nazism and militarism.”

Putin has cited the “denazification” of Ukraine as a main goal of the military action, falsely describing the government of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who is Jewish and lost relatives in the Holocaust, as neo-Nazis.

The largely symbolic and ceremonial visit stressed partnership between two countries who both face challenges in their relationship with the U.S. and Europe.

“Both sides want to show that despite what is happening globally, despite the pressure that both sides are facing from the U.S., both sides are not about to turn their backs on each other anytime soon,” said Hoo Tiang Boon, who researches Chinese foreign policy at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University.

While Putin and Xi said they were seeking an end to the war, they offered no new proposals in their public remarks.

“China hopes for the early return of Europe to peace and stability and will continue to play a constructive role toward this,” Xi said in prepared remarks to media in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People. His words echoed what China said when it offered a broad plan for peace .

Earlier, Putin was welcomed in Tiananmen Square with military pomp. After a day in Beijing, the Russian leader arrived in Harbin, where he was expected to attend a number of events on Friday.

On the eve of his visit, Putin said China’s proposal could “lay the groundwork for a political and diplomatic process that would take into account Russia’s security concerns and contribute to achieving a long-term and sustainable peace.”

Zelenskyy has said any negotiations must include a restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the withdrawal of Russian troops, the release of all prisoners, a tribunal for those responsible for the aggression and security guarantees for Ukraine.

After Russia’s latest offensive in Ukraine last week, the war is in a critical stage as Ukraine’s depleted military waits for new supplies of anti-aircraft missiles and artillery shells from the United States after months of delay.

The joint statement from China and Russia also criticized U.S. foreign policy at length, hitting out at U.S.-formed alliances, which the statement called having a “Cold War mentality.”

China and Russia also accused the U.S. of deploying land-based intermediate range missile systems in the Asia-Pacific under the pretext of joint exercises with allies. They said that the U.S. actions in Asia were “changing the balance of power” and “endangering the security of all countries in the region.”

The joint statement demonstrated China’s support to Russia.

China is “falling over themselves to give Russia face and respect without saying anything specific, and without committing themselves to anything,” said Susan Thornton, a former diplomat and a senior fellow at the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School.

The meeting was yet another affirmation of the friendly “no-limits” relationship China and Russia signed in 2022, just before Moscow invaded Ukraine.

Since then, Russia has become increasingly dependent economically on China as Western sanctions cut its access to much of the international trading system. China’s increased trade with Russia, totaling $240 billion last year, has helped the country mitigate some of the worst blowback from sanctions.

Moscow has diverted the bulk of its energy exports to China and relied on Chinese companies for importing high-tech components for Russian military industries to circumvent Western sanctions.

“I and President Putin agree we should actively look for convergence points of the interests of both countries, to develop each’s advantages, and deepen integration of interests, realizing each others’ achievements,” Xi said.

U.S. State Department deputy spokesperson Vedant Patel said that China can’t “have its cake and eat it too.

“You cannot want to have deepened relations with Europe … while simultaneously continuing to fuel the biggest threat to European security in a long time,” Patel said.

Xi congratulated Putin on starting his fifth term in office and celebrated the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the former Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, which was established following a civil war in 1949. Putin has eliminated all major political opponents and faced no real challenge in the March election.

“In a famous song of that time, 75 years ago — it is still performed today — there is a phrase that has become a catchphrase: ‘Russians and Chinese are brothers forever,’” Putin said.

Russia-China military ties have strengthened during the war. They have held a series of joint war games in recent years.

China remains a major market for Russian military, while also massively expanding its domestic defensive industries, including building aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines.

Putin has previously said that Russia has been sharing highly sensitive military technologies with China that helped significantly bolster its defense capability.

Huizhong Wu reported from Bangkok. Yu Bing and Wanqing Chen in Beijing, Christopher Bodeen in Taipei, Jim Heintz and Dasha Litvinova in Tallinn, Estonia, and Ellen Knickmeyer in Washington contributed to this report.

Ukraine-Russia war: Latest updates

Scroll down to catch up on all the main developments and analysis of the war in Ukraine.

Saturday 25 May 2024 15:07, UK

• Big picture: What you need to know this week

Our live coverage remains paused today, so we've rounded up the key developments you should be aware of.

• A Russian strike on the city of Kharkiv killed at least one person and injured four others, regional governor Oleh Syniehubov said;
• Russia's defence ministry claimed to have taken over the village of Arkhanhelske in the eastern Donetsk region, as well as to be advancing in the northeastern Kharkiv region;
• But Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukrainian forces had secured "combat control" of areas where Russian troops staged their incursion into the Kharkiv region;
• The US announced a new $275m package of weapons and equipment for Ukraine to help it repel Russia's assault near Kharkiv;
• American treasury secretary Janet Yellen said a loan for Ukraine backed by the income from frozen Russian sovereign assets is the "main option" for G7 leaders to consider when they meet next month.

While we are not running our usual updates, here is a rundown of the main events:

Vladimir Putin is ready to halt the war in Ukraine with a ceasefire that recognises current battlefield lines, four Russian sources have told the Reuters news agency.

Three of those sources claimed the Russian leader had expressed frustration about what he views as Western-backed attempts to hinder ceasefire negotiations.

"Putin can fight for as long as it takes, but Putin is also ready for a ceasefire - to freeze the war," a senior Russian source who has reportedly worked with Mr Putin and has knowledge of top-level conversations in the Kremlin, told Reuters.

Read more here...

Zelenskyy visits Kharkiv

Volodymyr Zelenskyy has travelled to the northeastern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, which has been facing intensive Russian air attacks. 

The Ukrainian president met senior military leaders and travelled to the site of a major printing house - a day after it was destroyed in a Russian missile attack that killed at least seven people. 

Further developments :

• Russian forces have had partial success near the village of Ivanivka in the east of Kharkiv region, the Ukrainian military said. Ukraine's general staff said 10 battles took place, with one successfully repelled and more ongoing near the villages of Petropavlivka, Ivanivka, Stelmakhivka, Nevske and Druzhelyubivka;
• Volodymyr Zelenskyy will travel to Spain on Sunday, Spanish radio station Cadena SER reported. The Ukrainian president postponed visits to Madrid and Lisbon earlier this month because of intense fighting in Kharkiv;
• Vladimir Putin is planning to visit North Korea, Russian state news agency RIA said.

Our live coverage will remain paused today, but let's catch you up on where things stand and on any updates overnight.

• Russia said 35 rockets and three drones were fired into Belgorod and overnight, claiming to have destroyed all of them;
• Blasts were heard in Kherson as Russia shelled the city, said its regional governor Roman Mrochko;
• The leader of Russia's Chechnya region, Ramzan Kadyrov, met  Vladimir Putin and offered to send more fighters to the frontline;
• Volodymyr Zelenskyy issued a fresh plea for upgraded defence systems to protect Ukraine's cities against guided bombs, which he described as the "the main instrument" now used by Moscow';
• A Russian airstrike on Ukraine's northeastern city of Kharkiv yesterday destroyed a cafe, damaged a nearby residential building and set a petrol station ablaze, with local officials saying ten people were wounded.

As we've not been providing rolling coverage of the war in Ukraine today, here is a quick update on what's been happening since this morning. 

One of the most significant new stories is the UK accusing China of providing or preparing to provide lethal aid to Russia for use in the war against Ukraine. 

Defence Secretary Grant Shapps told a news conference this morning that US and British defence intelligence had evidence "lethal aid is now, or will be, flowing from China to Russia and into Ukraine".

He called this a "significant development".

We also heard from the Kremlin this morning, which said "in-depth dialogue" was needed to reduce rising tensions between Russia and the West - particularly with regards to nuclear issues. 

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused the "collective West" of refusing to engage with Russia despite the potential dangers. 

Here are more of the top stories: 

• Russian forces have taken over the village of Klishchiivka in Ukraine's eastern Donetsk region, close to the city of Bakhmut, according to Russian news agencies 
• At least nine people have been injured in a Russian air attack on the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv
• Russia accused Ukraine of using a drone to attack a non-nuclear facility at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, causing no critical damage
• Moscow said it is bolstering its efforts to protect its energy infrastructure from drone attacks
• Six children were handed over to Ukraine by Russia and reunited with their families, after a deal was brokered by Qatar. 

We're pausing our coverage of the Ukraine war for the moment.

Scroll through the blog below to catch up on today's developments.

Vladimir Putin has praised the late president of Iran, Ebrahim Raisi, and said he was a "reliable partner".

Raisi was killed in a helicopter crash near the Azerbaijan border over the weekend along with his foreign minister and seven others.

Speaking on the leader, Mr Putin said he was "a man of his word" who carried out any agreements the pair made.

"He was truly a reliable partner, a man sure of himself, who acted in the national interest," Russian news agencies quoted Mr Putin as telling Vyacheslav Volodin, chairman of Russia's lower house of parliament.

"He was, of course, a man of his word and it was always good to work with him. What I mean is if we came to an agreement on something, you could be sure the agreement was carried out."

The Kremlin leader asked Mr Volodin, who will be attending memorial events in Iran, to pass on "words of our sincere condolences in connection with this tragedy".

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia has strengthened political, trade and military ties with Iran in a deepening relationship that the US and Israel view with concern.

Heavy fighting in the Pokrovsk area in eastern Ukraine has forced Ukrainian troops to engage in "manoeuvres," the Ukrainian military's general staff have said.

Their report said Pokrovsk, northwest of the Russian-held city of Donetsk, remains the front's "hottest" sector.

"In some areas, the situation requires our troops to engage in manoeuvres," the general staff report reads.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy has referred to the region and adjacent areas as "extraordinarily difficult" in his nightly video address.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said allies are taking too long when it comes to decisions on military support for Ukraine.

In an interview with Reuters, the Ukrainian leader said every decision which everyone came to was "late by around one year".

"But it is what it is: one big step forward, but before that two steps back. So we need to change the paradigm a little bit," he said.

"When we're quick, they fall behind. And then there's a gap - six, eight months of unpassed (aid) packages, and then two-three months of supplies - and a year goes by. We would like not to lose the advantage."

Mr Zelenskyy also said Ukraine had never used Western weapons on Russian territory.

A senior Russian diplomat has said that the EU plan to channel profits from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine would have "unpredictable" consequences, according to the TASS news agency.

According to TASS, Kirill Logvinov, Russia's acting permanent representative to the EU in Brussels, told Russia journalists: "The only predictable thing is that those in the EU will be obliged sooner or later to return to our country what has been stolen."

For context : In March the European Commission proposed transferring to Ukraine profits generated by Russian central bank assets frozen in Europe.

The plan would see 90% channeled through the European Peace Facility fund to buy weapons for Ukraine. 

The rest would be used for recovery and reconstruction.

Russia's defence ministry has said it has begun a round of drills involving tactical nuclear weapons. 

The exercises were announced by Russian authorities this month in response to remarks by senior Western officials about the possibility of deeper involvement in the war in Ukraine.

It was the first time Russia has publicly announced drills involving tactical nuclear weapons, although its strategic nuclear forces regularly hold exercises.

According to the ministry's statement, the first stage of the new drills include nuclear-capable Kinzhal and Iskander missiles.

The maneuvers are taking place in the southern military district, which consists of Russian regions in the south.

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Ukraine’s Peace Project Is Dented by Rival Plan, Hollywood Cash

(Bloomberg) -- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s main diplomatic push to secure broader global support against Russia’s invasion has suffered a double blow less than a month before leaders gather for a once-ambitious summit.

Brazil and China announced a rival initiative early Friday aiming to bring both Ukraine and Russia to the table. And it emerged that President Joe Biden would likely be a no-show at the Ukraine conference in Switzerland because it clashes with an election fundraiser in California alongside stars including George Clooney and Julia Roberts.

The shifting diplomatic terrain amounts to a downgrade for the June 15-16 meeting near Lucerne that Zelenskiy had hoped would be the initial culmination of his nearly two-year effort to rally world powers — above all in the Global South — behind demands that Russia withdraw its forces from Ukraine as a precondition for a peace deal. 

Those goals look increasingly remote with steady Russian gains on the battlefield this year — and as support from potential allies outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Group of Seven risks fading with each month the war that’s grinding into its third year goes on. 

Brazil and China invited other nations to support their call for an international conference involving Russia and Ukraine to discuss an end to the war. It’s the first time they’ve made a joint appeal on the war since Russia began the February 2022 invasion.

That threatens to cast a shadow over Ukraine’s gathering, to which the Swiss government has invited more than 160 countries. Russia isn’t among them, as Ukraine and its allies don’t want to engage with Moscow until a set of principles that would define any future peace settlement are broadly agreed. 

Biden’s likely absence as he pivots to campaign mode ahead of November’s presidential election to try to erase Donald Trump’s poll lead in key states also risks undercutting Kyiv. The two men have disparate views of NATO, with Biden publicly maintaining full-throated support and Trump saying that US backing should be conditioned upon whether member countries have fulfilled their defense spending allocations. Trump, without offering detail, has also said that he could forge a deal between Russia and Ukraine.

China and Brazil, both members of the BRICS group alongside Russia, have insisted that a diplomatic forum that excludes Moscow won’t bring peace — a prospect that won’t go down well with Ukraine.  

Russia has long said it’s open to talks — a position viewed by critics as a tactic to undermine support for Kyiv, as Moscow presses forward with its war aims. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown no intention of taking peace talks seriously based on acceptable terms, Ukraine’s allies have said. Putin himself insists any talks must take account of “realities on the ground,” a reference to areas of eastern and southern Ukraine occupied by his army. 

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said the joint document with Brazil is aimed at garnering international support. “We welcome more countries, whether developing or developed, to support and join the consensus,” he said Friday in Beijing. 

An inability to build bridges to nations such as Brazil, India and South Africa would be a blow to Kyiv’s diplomatic campaign since Zelenskiy unveiled the blueprint at a Group of 20 summit in November 2022. It would also represent a broader failure of the West to win over opinion in the Global South, which has been reticent to criticize the Kremlin’s war.  

Several G-7 allies had cautioned Zelenskiy’s government against pushing for a summit before they had buy-in from key parties, above all China. While the Swiss hosts are holding out for at least a Chinese special envoy, Beijing has yet to say whom it will send. 

Zelenskiy is expected to join G-7 leaders at their June meeting in Italy just before the Swiss gathering. While several plan to travel on to the Swiss Alpine resort, neither Biden nor Vice President Kamala Harris are scheduled to attend, according to people familiar with the deliberations.

Though Ukraine’s peace blueprint ultimately aims to forge a set of broadly embraced principles — such as respecting territorial integrity before engaging in talks — the objectives of the Swiss meeting have been whittled down to a narrower set of goals as a way to ensure China and other BRICS nations were on board. 

While it’s not yet clear who’ll represent the Biden administration at the talks, the US presence is expected to be robust. Organizers forecast a big turnout of leaders.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who will attend the meeting, made clear that the focus will be on nuclear safety, grain exports and prisoner exchanges. Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau plans to attend, while Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s presence is likely. 

“The peace conference in Switzerland is a building block,” Scholz told reporters in Berlin on Friday, adding that he expects a high attendance. “There will be this and certainly other such peace conferences.” 

Whatever the outcome, Ukrainian allies will aim to sell it as a success, according to an official involved with the planning. So far, however, the meeting is on course to miss a benchmark privately set by organizers, for the participation of 100 leaders, including from key nations. 

Putin has been working to stymie the effort, using the Kremlin’s diplomatic channels to Asia, Africa and South America to try to convince leaders to stay away. 

The Russian president and officials including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have been in talks with dozens of nations — from India to tiny Comoros — with the apparent aim of deterring participation, according to a diplomatic memo seen by Bloomberg.

Lavrov has also reached out to ambassadors in Moscow with the same goal, according to the memo, and a June 10-11 meeting of foreign ministers from BRICS countries and their allies may seal that effort. 

Zelenskiy on Thursday described Moscow’s attempts to scupper the summit as “the key goal for Russian diplomacy and foreign intelligence for the nearest future.”

--With assistance from Alberto Nardelli, Jennifer Jacobs, Michael Nienaber, Colum Murphy and Alessandro Speciale.

More stories like this are available on bloomberg.com

©2024 Bloomberg L.P.

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Hundreds Feared Dead in Papua New Guinea Landslide

Nearly 4,000 people live in villages that were engulfed, a local official said. Unstable debris was complicating search and rescue efforts in a rural part of the Pacific nation.

By Victoria Kim and Christopher Cottrell

Unstable rubble and debris were complicating search and rescue efforts in rural Papua New Guinea on Saturday, a day after a massive landslide buried villages and killed at least three people. Local officials said the death toll was likely to be at least in the hundreds.

Nearly 4,000 people live in the three villages engulfed by the landslide early Friday, said Sandis Tsaka, the provincial administrator for Enga, which includes the affected area. He said the death toll was likely to be high because the landslide hit a densely populated area that is also a highly trafficked corridor.

“Our people will consider it of biblical proportions,” he said. “We are looking for all the help and support we can get to address the humanitarian disaster of proportions we’ve never seen in this part of the world.”

Prime Minister James Marape said in a voice message that while the toll had yet to be determined, the disaster could be the country’s biggest landslide.

“This year we’ve experienced prolonged and extraordinary rain in most parts of our country that has caused flood and also landslips,” he said. “It is a heavily populated village that experienced the entire village being submerged.”

Three bodies were pulled out of the rubble on Friday, and five people, including a child, were treated for their injuries, according to Mr. Tsaka.

The disaster struck around 3 a.m., catching most residents off guard and sending huge boulders, some larger than shipping containers, tumbling down. At least 60 homes were buried under as much as 20 feet of debris, Mr. Tsaka said. At least a 500-foot section of the Porgera Highway, the main thoroughfare connecting the area, was inundated, he said.

The landslide buried an area equivalent to about three or four soccer fields, said Serhan Aktoprak, the chief of mission for the International Organization for Migration’s office in Papua New Guinea. A humanitarian aid convoy, after some delays, reached the affected villages Saturday afternoon to deliver tarps and water, he said, though no food would arrive on Saturday.

The villages are populated mostly by subsistence farmers and are in the highlands region of Papua New Guinea, an island nation in the Pacific Ocean north of Australia. The province has been afflicted in recent months by escalating deadly clashes between tribal groups.

The aid convoy was delayed by a blockade set up by one of the groups involved in the conflict, and was allowed through only after the military got involved, Mr. Aktoprak said, slowing relief efforts when time was critical. Daylight hours are getting shorter in the Southern Hemisphere, with the sun setting just before 6 p.m., he noted.

“Every minute that passes is basically shrinking our chances of reaching them alive,” he said.

Mr. Tsaka, the provincial official, said that the area was prone to smaller landslides, and in recent months, the weather had been continuously wet.

Heavy rain was forecast to continue pummeling the area in the coming days, further hampering rescue efforts. International organizations and the country’s defense forces were arriving to help, according to Mr. Tsaka.

Michael Main, an anthropologist who researches tribal violence in Papua New Guinea, said the country had been seeing a rapid increase in population, especially in resource-rich places like the landslide-affected area, which is near the Porgera gold mine. The country’s tropical highlands, with heavy rainfall, frequent tectonic activity and unstable geology, are prone to landslides, he said.

“Its villages are expanding, and there are simply more people and more houses spread across the landscape,” said Dr. Main, a researcher at the University of Melbourne’s Initiative for Peacebuilding. “So more people are going to be impacted by these events.”

President Biden said in a statement Friday that the United States was ready to aid in rescue and recovery efforts. Australia’s foreign minister, Penny Wong, also said in a statement that her country was ready to respond to requests for assistance.

Vincent Pyati, president of the local Community Development Association, said the area was a transport node where many came from remote areas overnight to catch public motor vehicles, a popular method of transit, probably adding to the toll. He said there was also a drinking club popular with people from all over the district.

Mr. Pyati said at least 300 people were estimated to have been killed.

Victoria Kim is a reporter based in Seoul and focuses on breaking news coverage across the world. More about Victoria Kim