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Justice Quotes

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14 Inspiring Quotes About Justice and Equality From Civil Rights Icons Past and Present

From Malcolm X to John Lewis, Rosa Parks to Alicia Garza, the words of these activists move us to keep fighting.

02.19.21 By Daniele Selby

Malcolm X holds up a paper for the crowd to see during a rally in New York City on Aug. 6, 1963. (Image: AP Photo)

Updated on Feb. 6, 2022: This piece has been updated to reflect the exoneration of Muhammad Aziz and the late Khalil Islam on Nov. 18, 2021.

Malcolm X was shot and killed 56 years ago, on Feb. 21, while addressing a crowd in New York City’s Audubon Ballroom. His death sent shockwaves across the country, and three people were quickly arrested — including Muhammad A. Aziz (then Norman 3X Butler) and Khalil Islam (then Thomas 15X Johnson). The men always maintained their innocence but were wrongly convicted. Represented by the Innocence Project and civil rights attorney David Shanies, they were finally exonerated on Nov. 18, 2021.

On the same tragic day of Malcolm X’s assassination, a young Black organizer from Alabama named John Lewis turned 25. Only a few months later, Lewis would make history by leading protesters across the Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma, Alabama, and would himself become a civil rights icon.

Their struggles — and the struggles of countless Black Americans — helped advance justice and equality in the United States. But, despite this progress in voting rights and desegregation, the fight for fair and equal treatment of Black people across this country continues today.

At the Innocence Project, we work daily to advance justice and equality for all because as Martin Luther King, Jr., famously said “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” And through our work to free the innocent, prevent wrongful conviction, and hold the system accountable, we strive to bend that arc closer to justice.

Add your name to support justice for Muhammad Abdul Aziz and Khalil Islam

This Black History Month, as we reflect on the progress that has been made since the abolition of slavery and the Civil Rights Act, we also recognize the long way left to go. And we celebrate those who helped bring us to where we are today, as well as those who are continuing the fight to end racism and inequality today.

These powerful quotes from civil rights leaders and current-day activists remind us why we must keep pushing forward.

Malcolm X on action

“I for one believe that if you give people a thorough understanding of what confronts them and the basic causes that produce it, they’ll create their own program, and when the people create a program, you get action.” — Malcolm X

John Lewis on justice and democracy

“A democracy cannot thrive where power remains unchecked and justice is reserved for a select few. Ignoring these cries and failing to respond to this movement is simply not an option — for peace cannot exist where justice is not served.” — John Lewis said of the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act

Martin Luther King, Jr., on injustice

“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly.” — Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter from Birmingham Jail”

An Innocent Man Spent 20 Years in Prison for Malcolm X’s Murder

James baldwin on justice.

“If one really wishes to know how justice is administered in a country, one does not question the policemen, the lawyers, the judges, or the protected members of the middle class. One goes to the unprotected — those, precisely, who need the law’s protection most! — and listens to their testimony.” — Baldwin, No Name on the Street

Angela Davis on incarceration

“Jails and prisons are designed to break human beings, to convert the population into specimens in a zoo — obedient to our keepers, but dangerous to each other.” — Angela Davis, Angela Davis: An Autobiography

Shirley Chisholm on racism and unconscious bias

“Racism is so universal in this country, so widespread, and deep-seated, that it is invisible because it is so normal.” ― Shirley Chisholm, Unbought and Unbossed

Toni Morrison on racism

“The very serious function of racism…is distraction. It keeps you from doing your work. It keeps you explaining, over and over again, your reason for being. Somebody says you have no language and so you spend 20 years proving that you do. Somebody says your head isn’t shaped properly so you have scientists working on the fact that it is. Somebody says that you have no art so you dredge that up. Somebody says that you have no kingdoms and so you dredge that up. None of that is necessary .” — Toni Morrison, A Humanist View

Thurgood Marshall on democracy

“Where you see wrong or inequality or injustice, speak out, because this is your country. This is your democracy. Make it. Protect it. Pass it on.” — Thurgood Marshall, 1978 University of Virginia commencement speech

Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., on progress

“Press forward at all times, climbing forward toward that higher ground of the harmonious society that shapes the laws of man to the laws of God.” — Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.

Rosa Parks on her legacy

“I would like to be known as a person who is concerned about freedom and equality and justice and prosperity for all people.” ― Rosa Parks said on her 77th birthday

Fannie Lou Hamer on liberation

“When I liberate myself, I liberate others. If you don’t speak out ain’t nobody going to speak out for you.” — Fannie Lou Hamer

Harry Belafonte on racism and the legacy of slavery

“Although slavery may have been abolished, the crippling poison of racism still persists, and the struggle still continues.” — Harry Belafonte, 2010 rally in Washington, D.C.

Muhammad Ali on activism

“I have nothing to lose by standing up for my beliefs. So I’ll go to jail, so what? We’ve been in jail for 400 years.” — Muhammad Ali, 1976

Alicia Garza on power and oppression

“I learned that racism, like most systems of oppression, isn’t about bad people doing terrible things to people who are different from them but instead is a way of maintaining power for certain groups at the expense of others.” ― Alicia Garza, The Purpose of Power: How We Come Together When We Fall Apart

Thank you for visiting us. You can learn more about how we consider cases here . Please avoid sharing any personal information in the comments below and join us in making this a hate-speech free and safe space for everyone.

Bruce Allen February 28, 2021 at 8:58 pm Reply Reply

These quotes vindicate my passion for African American history and the struggle against racism in the United States.

Damien Taylor February 22, 2021 at 1:11 pm Reply Reply

Thank you for this email. I really needed it I do not understand why or how The Innocence Project just always breaks me down In tears and I seriously need to get it together. I genuinely love every person that is in involved with this nonprofit organization. Unjust is something that really bothers my heart, especially when the end results are the loss of an innocent person’s life after being put to death, or an innocent persons life is has been completely stolen from them, and its done so carelessly. It bothers me a lot, it bothers me in a really uncomfortable way because I have never felt certain feelings that I feels, and the feeling takes over. It’s very uncomfortable and I believe that is because they’re new feeling that I never knew existed. It’s a piercing sadness that I instantly feel and it really hurts my heart. I can’t watch the documentaries as much anymore and although reading the stories bothers me too, I force myself to read them. You all are Angels, SAVING LIVES!!! and I will always for by The Innocence Project. Thank you.

We've helped free more than 240 innocent people from prison. Support our work to strengthen and advance the innocence movement.

The Quotes Archive

100+ Powerful Justice Quotes: To Inspire Positive Change

In a world where principles of fairness, equity, and righteousness hold immense significance, the concept of justice stands as a beacon of hope and a pillar of societal harmony.

From the annals of history to the modern age, the pursuit of justice has remained a driving force, inspiring individuals to seek truth and rectitude.

In this compilation of thought-provoking justice quotes and sayings, we delve into the wisdom passed down through generations, showcasing the enduring relevance of justice in various aspects of life.

In the tapestry of human existence, justice weaves a thread that binds individuals and communities together.

Across cultures, languages, and epochs, the idea of justice has been both a moral compass and a catalyst for change. Whether through legal systems, philosophical treatises, or personal reflections, people have sought to define, advocate for, and uphold justice in its myriad forms.

In this collection of inspirational justice quotes, we explore the essence of fairness and equity. These timeless justice sayings encompass a spectrum of emotions, thoughts, and experiences, inviting us to contemplate the profound impact that justice has on our lives.

From ancient philosophers to modern activists, each quote offers a unique perspective on the complex interplay between ethics, law, and humanity.

Join us as we journey through the corridors of wisdom, discovering the eloquence of voices past and present that have championed the cause of justice.

As we immerse ourselves in these thought-provoking quotes and sayings about justice, let us reflect on how they resonate with our personal beliefs, the societies we live in, and the world we aspire to create.

100+ Powerful Justice Quotes To Inspire Positive Change

“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.” – Martin Luther King Jr.
“The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.” – Theodore Parker (often paraphrased by Martin Luther King Jr.)
“Where there is no justice, there is no liberty.” – Marcus Tullius Cicero
“Justice delayed is justice denied.” – William E. Gladstone
“The only real prison is fear, and the only real freedom is freedom from fear.” – Aung San Suu Kyi
“An eye for an eye only ends up making the whole world blind.” – Mahatma Gandhi
“The measure of a country’s greatness is its ability to retain compassion in times of crisis.” – Thurgood Marshall
“Equal justice under law is not just a caption on the facade of the Supreme Court building; it is perhaps the most inspiring ideal of our society.” – Warren E. Burger
“The dead cannot cry out for justice. It is a duty of the living to do so for them.” – Lois McMaster Bujold
“The true administration of justice is the firmest pillar of good government.” – George Washington

These quotes and sayings offer a glimpse into the diverse perspectives on justice from influential figures throughout history. They highlight the enduring importance of justice in shaping societies and individuals’ lives.

“Justice is not something that just happens. It’s something that happens because we make it happen.” – Bryan Stevenson
“In the end, we will remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends.” – Martin Luther King Jr.
“The power of the lawyer is in the uncertainty of the law.” – Jeremy Bentham
“No one is above the law and no one is below it; nor do we ask any one’s permission when we require him to obey it.” – Theodore Roosevelt
“The first duty of society is justice.” – Alexander Hamilton
“I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep forever.” – Thomas Jefferson
“Justice means minding one’s own business and not meddling with other men’s concerns.” – Plato
“The law will never make men free; it is men who have got to make the law free.” – Henry David Thoreau
“Justice without force is powerless; force without justice is tyrannical.” – Blaise Pascal
“Justice consists in doing no injury to men; decency in giving them no offense.” – Marcus Tullius Cicero

These quotes encapsulate the complex and multifaceted nature of justice, emphasizing its role in maintaining balance, accountability, and fairness in societies across the ages.

“Justice is the constant and perpetual will to allot to every man his due.” – Domitus Ulpianus
“A society that has more justice is a society that needs less charity.” – Ralph Nader
“The moral arc of the universe bends at the elbow of justice.” – Martin Luther King Jr.
“Justice is the great interest of man on earth.” – Daniel Webster
“Justice is the truth in action.” – Benjamin Disraeli
“The greatest homage we can pay to truth is to use it.” – Ralph Waldo Emerson
“It is the spirit and not the form of law that keeps justice alive.” – Earl Warren
“When we lose the right to be different, we lose the privilege to be free.” – Charles Evans Hughes
“Peace is not the absence of conflict; it is the presence of justice.” – Harrison Ford
“The more laws, the less justice.” – Marcus Tullius Cicero

These quotes underscore the intricate relationship between justice, truth, freedom, and societal harmony, inviting us to reflect on the profound implications of maintaining a just and equitable world.

“The foundation of justice is good faith.” – Marcus Tullius Cicero
“In the realm of justice, the one-eyed man is king.” – Erich Maria Remarque
“Justice is the bread of the nation, and the king should be the baker.” – Friedrich Dürrenmatt
“Justice is like a train that is nearly always late.” – Yevgeny Yevtushenko
“Justice is not to be taken by storm. She is to be wooed by slow advances.” – Benjamin Cardozo
“An unjust law is itself a species of violence.” – Mahatma Gandhi
“Justice means giving each person what he or she is due.” – Michael Sandel
“Justice is a contract of expediency, entered upon to prevent men harming or being harmed.” – Epicurus
“Justice is truth in action.” – Joseph Joubert
“The courtrooms of this country should not be places where resolution is rewarded with retribution.” – Bryan Stevenson

These quotes provide a deeper understanding of justice as a concept that goes beyond just legal frameworks, touching on morality, truth, and the pursuit of a harmonious society.

“The function of justice is to keep those who are in the same situation equal and unequal in the same way.” – Aristotle
“Justice is not only the way we punish those who do wrong, but is also the way we try to save them.” – Mary Parker Follett
“The pursuit of justice is the driving force behind the evolution of society.” – Kofi Annan
“Justice is the crowning glory of the virtues.” – Marcus Tullius Cicero
“Justice is not just about punishing the guilty; it’s about safeguarding the innocent.” – Sherrilyn Kenyon
“Justice is the means by which established injustices are sanctioned.” – Judith Butler
“A society can only be called just when its principles are applied to all, not just to the disadvantaged and weak.” – Hakeem Olajuwon
“Justice is the foundation of a civilized society.” – Alexander Hamilton
“Justice is a compass that guides every individual and every nation toward freedom.” – John F. Kennedy
“True peace is not merely the absence of tension; it is the presence of justice.” – Martin Luther King Jr.

These quotes continue to shed light on the depth and significance of justice as a guiding principle that shapes our actions, beliefs, and the world we strive to create.

“Justice is the embodiment of truth in action.” – Samuel Johnson
“The essence of justice is the truth.” – Julius Sumner Miller
“Justice is not an abstract concept; it’s a living, breathing necessity for a just society.” – Anthony Kennedy
“Justice is a chorus of voices seeking to address the wrongs of the world.” – J. Martin Kohe
“The strongest arguments are those that are made without words but with actions.” – Roy T. Bennett
“Justice is not confined to the courtroom; it should permeate every facet of life.” – Sonia Sotomayor
“The fire of justice burns within our hearts, compelling us to fight for what is right.” – Mehnaz Ansari
“The measure of a society’s greatness is how it treats its weakest members.” – Mahatma Gandhi
“Justice is the true scale of civilization.” – Lajos Kossuth
“True justice is achieved when humanity transcends its differences and comes together for the common good.” – Desmond Tutu

These quotes delve into the multifaceted nature of justice, emphasizing its role as a guiding force for fairness, equality, and the betterment of humanity as a whole.

“Justice is not an option; it’s a fundamental requirement for a just society.” – Bryan Stevenson
“The pursuit of justice is a journey that never ends; it requires constant vigilance and determination.” – Sherrilyn Kenyon
“Justice is the cornerstone of a civilized society; without it, chaos prevails.” – Samuel Johnson
“True justice is not just about punishing the wrongdoer, but about restoring balance and healing wounds.” – Thich Nhat Hanh
“Justice is the mirror of virtue.” – Marcus Tullius Cicero
“Justice is the firm foundation upon which all other virtues are built.” – Sallust
“The path of justice is paved with empathy, compassion, and a commitment to do what is right.” – Kamala Harris
“Justice is a universal language that transcends borders and cultures.” – Ban Ki-moon
“Justice is not a one-time event; it’s a continuous effort to create a just and equitable world.” – Marian Wright Edelman
“The quest for justice is a noble endeavor that requires the collective efforts of all individuals.” – Eleanor Roosevelt

These quotes further emphasize the multifaceted nature of justice and its significance as a guiding principle that shapes our actions, relationships, and the society we aspire to build.

“Justice is the foundation upon which the pillars of society stand.” – Horace Mann
“Justice is the bridge that connects the ideals of humanity to the reality of the world.” – Archibald MacLeish
“Justice is the thread that weaves the fabric of a harmonious society.” – John Rawls
“The pursuit of justice is a journey that tests our resolve and reveals our true character.” – Janet Reno
“Justice is the cornerstone of a just civilization; without it, we crumble.” – Henry Ward Beecher
“True justice is not blind; it sees and understands the complexities of human experiences.” – Bryan Stevenson
“Justice is not just a destination; it’s the path we choose to walk every day.” – Sonia Sotomayor
“Justice is the embodiment of fairness, integrity, and the common good.” – Theodore Roosevelt
“Justice is not a concept, but a commitment to action.” – Marian Wright Edelman
“In the pursuit of justice, we challenge the status quo and redefine what is possible.” – Kamala Harris

These quotes continue to explore the multifaceted nature of justice and its vital role in shaping societies, influencing individuals, and promoting the values of equity and fairness.

“Justice is the foundation of a peaceful world; without it, chaos prevails.” – Hafez
“Justice is the soul of the universe, and virtue without it is a shadow.” – John Milton
“Justice is the compass by which we navigate the turbulent waters of society.” – Daisaku Ikeda
“Justice is the mirror that reflects the true nature of humanity.” – Nelson Mandela
“The pursuit of justice is an ongoing commitment to uphold the rights and dignity of all.” – Shirin Ebadi
“Justice is a beacon that guides us towards the betterment of humanity.” – Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
“True justice is not an end in itself but a means to foster a world of compassion and understanding.” – Thich Nhat Hanh
“Justice is the tapestry that weaves individual rights into the fabric of society.” – Kofi Annan
“Justice is the cornerstone of a world where everyone can thrive.” – Malala Yousafzai
“In the grand symphony of life, justice is the melody that harmonizes us all.” – Desmond Tutu

These quotes continue to encapsulate the profound essence of justice, highlighting its role as a guiding principle that shapes our interactions, decisions, and the overarching trajectory of human progress.

“Justice is the embodiment of our shared values and the bridge to a brighter future.” – Mary Robinson
“True justice is a force that unites hearts, minds, and communities.” – Leymah Gbowee
“Justice is not just about punishing the wrongdoer; it’s about restoring the balance of humanity.” – Tarana Burke
“The pursuit of justice requires courage, empathy, and a commitment to do what is right.” – Anita Hill
“Justice is the legacy we leave for future generations, a testament to our dedication to equality.” – Michelle Obama
“In the quest for justice, each person is a brushstroke on the canvas of change.” – Dolores Huerta
“Justice is not confined to the courts; it is a principle that guides our everyday interactions.” – Ruth Bader Ginsburg
“True justice demands that we confront injustice wherever it resides.” – Patrisse Cullors
“Justice is the moral compass that guides us through the complexities of life.” – Angelina Jolie
“The pursuit of justice is an unwavering commitment to building a world that respects the rights of all.” – Amal Clooney

These quotes continue to explore the far-reaching impact of justice on society, underscoring its role as a catalyst for positive change, unity, and the betterment of humanity.

“Justice is the cornerstone of a world where individuals can flourish and societies can thrive.” – Ban Ki-moon
“Injustice anywhere is an affront to justice everywhere.” – Thurgood Marshall
“Justice is the fire that fuels the engine of progress and equality.” – Coretta Scott King
“True justice is a symphony where every voice, no matter how soft, contributes to the harmony.” – Melinda Gates
“Justice is a commitment to uplift the oppressed and empower the powerless.” – Tarana Burke
“Justice is the legacy we forge for generations yet to come.” – Desmond Tutu
“In the pursuit of justice, we bridge the gap between ideals and reality.” – Malala Yousafzai
“Justice is not a destination but a continuous journey towards a more equitable world.” – Marian Wright Edelman
“Justice is a tapestry woven from threads of compassion, truth, and fairness.” – Ruth Bader Ginsburg
“True justice recognizes that the rights of one are intertwined with the rights of all.” – Mary Robinson

These quotes continue to underscore the importance of justice as a guiding principle that shapes our values, interactions, and the societies we strive to build.

100+Timeless Faithful Quotes

In a world replete with uncertainties and fleeting moments, faithfulness remains a beacon of hope, shining bright against the backdrop of life’s many challenges. Faithfulness, in its many forms, has been a subject of admiration, contemplation, and inspiration across generations, cultures, and religions. It is this profound quality that has given birth to a myriad…

100+ Beautiful Present Quotes

In the hustle and bustle of our daily lives, we often find ourselves caught up in the whirlwind of past regrets and future anxieties. Our minds become entangled in a web of “what ifs” and “should haves,” causing us to overlook the profound beauty and significance of the present moment. It is within this very…

100+ Best Seasons Quotes To Inspire and Reflect

In the grand tapestry of life, seasons unfurl like chapters, each one bearing its unique hues, moods, and lessons. They mirror the cyclical nature of existence, reminding us that change is not only inevitable but essential for growth. From the vibrant rebirth of spring to the serene slumber of winter, every season gifts us with…

100+ Most Inspiring Graduation Quotes

Introduction: The Power of Graduation Quotes Graduation: a pivotal moment that marks the culmination of years of hard work, determination, and dreams. As students step forward to claim their diplomas, they also cross the threshold into the next chapter of their lives. At such significant junctures, words hold a unique power. They can uplift, inspire,…

100+ Inspirational June Quotes

As the sun ascends higher in the sky, painting the world in vibrant hues, we find ourselves immersed in the embrace of June – a month that exudes warmth, growth, and boundless potential. It’s a time when nature dons its most resplendent attire, and the air is infused with the sweet scent of blooming flowers….

100+ Insightful Humanity Quotes

In a world often characterized by division, conflict, and rapid change, it’s essential to turn to the wisdom of the ages for guidance and inspiration. Throughout history, thinkers, leaders, and ordinary individuals have shared their insights and reflections on the nature of humanity. These inspirational humanity quotes and timeless sayings offer a profound glimpse into…

43 Best Social Justice Quotes To Inspire Hope & Activism

Quote Graphic: "Power concedes nothing without an organized demand." — Charlene Carruthers

We all know that social justice is important. It’s something we talk about, tweet about, and march for. But what does it really mean? And how can we make sure that we’re living it every day?

In this article, you’ll find some of the best quotes about social justice from people who have dedicated their lives to making the world a more equitable place. We hope they inspire you to do the same.m

P.S. You can read more quotes about justice , quotes about advocacy , and other positive quotes in our most popular quote roundups.

The Best Quotes About Social Justice

Famous quotes.

“I am no longer accepting the things I cannot change. I am changing the things I cannot accept.” — Angela Davis

“Freedom and justice cannot be parceled out in pieces to suit political convenience. I don’t believe you can stand for freedom for one group of people and deny it to others.” — Coretta Scott King

“We are all implicated when we allow other people to be mistreated. An absence of compassion can corrupt the decency of a community, a state, a nation.” — Bryan Stevenson , Just Mercy: A Story of Justice and Redemption

“I am not interested in picking up crumbs of compassion thrown from the table of someone who considers himself my master. I want the full menu of rights.” — Archbishop Desmond Tutu

Quotes on Activism & Taking Action

“When we identify where our privilege intersects with somebody else's oppression, we'll find our opportunities to make real change.” — Ijeoma Oluo, So You Want to Talk About Race

“We have a right to protest for what is right. That’s all we can do. There are people hurting, there are people suffering, so we have an obligation, a mandate, to do something.” — John Lewis

“When you get these jobs you have been so brilliantly trained for, just remember that your real job is that if you are free, you need to free somebody else. If you have some power, then your job is to empower somebody else. This is not just a grab-bag candy game.” — Toni Morrison

“Power concedes nothing without an organized demand” — Charlene Carruthers

“Don't sit around and wait for the perfect opportunity to come along — find something and make it an opportunity.” — Cecile Richards, Make Trouble: Standing Up, Speaking Out, and Finding the Courage to Lead

“I think each village was meant to feel pity for its own sick and poor whom it can help and I doubt if it is the duty of any private person to fix his mind on ills which he cannot help. This may even become an escape from the works of charity we really can do to those we know. God may call any one of us to respond to some far away problem or support those who have been so called. But we are finite and he will not call us everywhere or to support every worthy cause. And real needs are not far from us.” — C.S. Lewis

“Your vocation can be found where your greatest joy meets the world’s greatest need.” ‍ — Frederick Buechner

“There may be times when we are powerless to prevent injustice, but there must never be a time when we fail to protest.” — Elie Wiesel

“Our freedoms are vanishing. If you do not get active to take a stand now against all that is wrong while we still can, then maybe one of your children may elect to do so in the future, when it will be far more riskier — and much, much harder.” — Suzy Kassem, Rise Up and Salute the Sun: The Writings of Suzy Kassem

→ Read more quotes about activism

“And I must say tonight that a riot is the language of the unheard. And what is it America has failed to hear? ... It has failed to hear that the promises of freedom and justice have not been met. And it has failed to hear that large segments of white society are more concerned about tranquility and the status quo than about justice and humanity.” — Martin Luther King Jr.

“It may well be that we will have to repent in this generation. Not merely for the vitriolic words and the violent actions of the bad people, but for the appalling silence and indifference of the good people who sit around and say, ‘Wait on time.’” — Martin Luther King Jr. , A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches

“Returning hate for hate multiplies hate, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate, only love can do that.” — Martin Luther King Jr.

→ Read more MLK quotes

bell hooks Quotes on Social Change

“Without justice there can be no love.” — bell hooks

“There must exist a paradigm, a practical model for social change that includes an understanding of ways to transform consciousness that are linked to efforts to transform structures.” — bell hooks , Killing Rage: Ending Racism

“Justice is possible without equality, I believe, because of compassion and understanding. If I have compassion, then if I have more than you, which is unequal, I will still do the just thing by you.” — bell hooks

“Justice demands integrity. It’s to have a moral universe — not only know what is right or wrong but to put things in perspective, weigh things. Justice is different from violence and retribution; it requires complex accounting.” — bell hooks

“The world would be a paradise of peace and justice if global citizens shared a common definition of love which would guide our thoughts and action.” — bell hooks

→ Read more bell hooks quotes

Quotes For Students

“You have to get over the fear of facing the worst in yourself. You should instead fear unexamined racism. Fear the thought that right now, you could be contributing to the oppression of others and you don't know it. But do not fear those who bring that oppression to light. Do not fear the opportunity to do better.” — Ijeoma Oluo, So You Want to Talk About Race

“In a society that functions optimally, those who can should naturally want to provide for those who can't. That's how it's designed to work. I truly believe we're here to take care of one another.” — LeVar Burton

“Justice grows out of recognition of ourselves in each other — that my liberty depends on you being free too.” — Barack Obama

Quotes on Social Injustice

“Prisons do not disappear social problems, they disappear human beings. Homelessness, unemployment, drug addiction, mental illness, and illiteracy are only a few of the problems that disappear from public view when the human beings contending with them are relegated to cages.” — Angela Davis

“The death penalty is not about whether people deserve to die for the crimes they commit. The real question of capital punishment in this country is, Do we deserve to kill?” — Bryan Stevenson , Just Mercy: A Story of Justice and Redemption

Quotes on Systemic Injustice

“Our problems stem from our acceptance of this filthy, rotten system.” — Dorothy Day

“Colorful demonstrations and weekend marches are vital but alone are not powerful enough to stop wars. Wars will be stopped only when soldiers refuse to fight, when workers refuse to load weapons onto ships and aircraft, when people boycott the economic outposts of Empire that are strung across the globe.” — Arundhati Roy, Public Power in the Age of Empire

“There is no such thing as nonracist or race-neutral policy. Every policy in every institution in every community in every nation is producing or sustaining either racial inequity or equity between racial groups.” — Ibram X. Kendi, How to Be an Antiracist

On Maintaining Hope in the Face of Injustice

“When asked if I am pessimistic or optimistic about the future, my answer is always the same: If you look at the science about what is happening on earth and aren’t pessimistic, you don’t understand data. But if you meet the people who are working to restore this earth and the lives of the poor, and you aren’t optimistic, you haven’t got a pulse. What I see everywhere in the world are ordinary people willing to confront despair, power, and incalculable odds in order to restore some semblance of grace, justice, and beauty to this world.” — Paul Hawken

“There is always light, if only we're brave enough to see it. If only we are brave enough to be it.” — Amanda Gorman

"I want to be nurturing life when I go down in struggle. I want nurturing life to be my struggle." — Zainab Amadahy

“The reality is this: If we don’t make time to close our eyes, breathe deeply, push beyond the binds we’re in, and visualize a day when they don’t exist, we can never truly be free.” — Akiba Solomon & Kenrya Rankin

→ Read more quotes about hope

On the Injustice of Poverty

“Innovation comes, in science, by the people who are able to pull something apart with such insight and knowledge that they can then innovate, and they can create new — it’s how we make progress. And I think the same is true in the justice sector, that we cannot make progress in creating a more just society, healthier communities, if we allow ourselves to be disconnected from the people who are most vulnerable — from the poor, the neglected, the incarcerated, the condemned. If you’re trying to make policies in the criminal justice space but have never met someone who’s in a jail or prison, you haven’t been to a jail or prison, you’re going to fail.” — Bryan Stevenson

“I think sometimes, when you’re trying to do justice work, when you’re trying to make a difference, when you’re trying to change the world, the thing you need to do is get close enough to people who are falling down, get close enough to people who are suffering, close enough to people who are in pain, who’ve been discarded and disfavored — to get close enough to wrap your arms around them and affirm their humanity and their dignity.” — Bryan Stevenson

“In this increasingly interconnected world, we must understand that what happens to poor people is never divorced from the actions of the powerful. Certainly, people who define themselves as poor may control their own destinies to some extent. But control of lives is related to control of land, systems of production, and the formal political and legal structures in which lives are enmeshed. With time, both wealth and control have become increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few. The opposite trend is desired by those working for social justice.” — Paul Farmer

→ Read more quotes about poverty

More Sayings and Slogans

“Rebellion is the only thing that keeps you alive.” — Marianne Faithful

“The opposite of poverty is not wealth. In too many places, the opposite of poverty is justice.” — Bryan Stevenson

“Public education does not exist for the benefit of students or the benefit of their parents. It exists for the benefit of the social order. We have discovered as a species that it is useful to have an educated population. You do not need to be a student or have a child who is a student to benefit from public education. Every second of every day of your life, you benefit from public education. So let me explain why I like to pay taxes for schools, even though I don't personally have a kid in school: It's because I don't like living in a country with a bunch of stupid people.” — John Green

“I sometimes see people say that social change is impossible. But this is just not true. Social change is INEVITABLE. What isn’t inevitable is the timbre and shape of that social change, which we decide together.” — John Green

“In these days of difficulty, we Americans everywhere must and shall choose the path of social justice…, the path of faith, the path of hope, and the path of love toward our fellow man.” — Franklin D. Roosevelt

“By acting compassionately, by helping to restore justice and to encourage peace, we acknowledge that we are all part of one another.” — Ram Dass

“Ours is not the struggle of one day, one week, or one year. Ours is not the struggle of one judicial appointment or presidential term. Ours is the struggle of a lifetime, or maybe even many lifetimes, and each one of us in every generation must do our part.” ‍ — John Lewis , Across That Bridge: A Vision for Change and the Future of America

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Quote Graphic: Teacher appreciation makes the world of education go around. — Helen Peters

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Quote Graphic: The opposite of poverty is not wealth; the opposite of poverty is justice. — Bryan Stevenson

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15 inspiring human rights quotes

Credit: Jurgen Schadeberg www.jurgenschadeberg.com

1. “To deny people their human rights is to challenge their very humanity.”

Nelson mandela, south african civil rights activist.

2. “Activism works. So what I’m telling you to do now, is to act. Because no one is too small to make a difference.”

Greta thunberg , swedish climate change activist and amnesty international ambassador of conscience.

3. “It means a great deal to those who are oppressed to know that they are not alone. Never let anyone tell you that what you are doing is insignificant.”

Desmond tutu, south african civil rights activist.

4. “If you want to improve your quality of life and the quality of life for all women, never stop questioning society or calling for change. ”

Justina de pierris , argentinian student activist.

5. “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”

Martin luther king, african-american civil rights activist.

6. “The candle burns not for us, but for all those whom we failed to rescue from prison, who were shot on the way to prison, who were tortured, who were kidnapped, who ‘disappeared’. That’s what the candle is for.”

Peter benenson, founder of amnesty international.

Credit: Amnesty International / Ilya van Marle

7. “Peace can only last where human rights are respected, where the people are fed, and where individuals and nations are free.”

14th dalai lama.

8. “Letters aren’t just a simple gesture of solidarity, they become a source of hope and they have the potential to change people’s lives. I am living proof .”

Nestor fantini , former political prisoner in argentina.

Credit: Blair Millar/Amnesty International

9. “People put up walls between each other – and it’s largely down to ignorance or negative media portrayals. We fail to realize there are so many good things and so many good people in this world.”

John sato , world war two veteran who took four buses to join an anti-racism march in auckland after the march 2019 christchurch shootings.

10. “A political struggle that does not have women at the heart of it, above it, below it, and within it is no struggle at all.”

Arundhati roy, indian author.

11. “Let us remember: One book, one pen, one child, and one teacher can change the world.”

Malala yousafzai, pakistani education activist.

12. “My government makes me angry. The police force makes me angry. Homophobia makes me angry. Luckily, anger is what motivates me.”

Zhanar sekerbayeva , an lbq activist from kazakhstan.

13. “I never thought I’d be talking about police brutality and standing up for human rights. You never know what people are going through until it happens to you.”

Monicah njoroge , kenyan civil rights activist whose brother evans was murdered after taking part in a peaceful protest.

14. “Get up, stand up, Stand up for your rights. Get up, stand up, Don’t give up the fight.”

Bob marley, jamaican singer.

15. “Humanitarian work isn’t criminal, nor is it heroic. Helping others should be normal.”

Seán binder , volunteer who was detained after provided life-saving assistance to refugees in greece .

Utility Menu

Michael J. Sandel

Anne t. and robert m. bass professor of government, introduction: "justice with michael sandel".

Lectures 1 & 2

Lecture 1 – The Moral Side of Murder Would you kill one person to save the lives of five others? Would it be the right thing to do? Inviting students to respond to some amusing hypothetical scenarios, Professor Michael Sandel launches his course on moral reasoning.

Lecture 2 – The Case for Cannibalism Sandel introduces the principles of utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham with a famous nineteenth century law case involving a shipwrecked crew of four. After nineteen days lost at sea, the captain decides to kill the cabin boy, the weakest amongst them, so they can feed on his blood and body to survive.

The Lifeboat Case

Justice dilemma 1.

Lectures 3 & 4

Lecture 3 – Putting a Price Tag on Life Sandel presents some contemporary cases in which cost-benefit analysis was used to put a dollar value on human life. The cases give rise to several objections to the utilitarian logic of seeking “the greatest good for the greatest number.” Is it possible to sum up and compare all values using a common measure like money?

Lecture 4 – How to Measure Pleasure Sandel introduces J. S. Mill, a utilitarian philosopher who argues that seeking “the greatest good for the greatest number” is compatible with protecting individual rights, and that utilitarianism can make room for a distinction between higher and lower pleasures.

The Cost of Life & the EPA

The cost of life & the epa: utilitarianism (lecture 3).

Opera & Dogfights

82cf0058474506c8f3fa2361d4c45e40.

Lectures 5 & 6

Lecture 5 – Free to Choose With humorous references to Bill Gates and Michael Jordan, Sandel introduces the libertarian notion that redistributive taxation—taxing the rich to help the poor—is akin to forced labor.

Lecture 6 – Who Owns Me? Are the successful morally entitled to the benefits that flow from the exercise of their talents? What about the fact that wealth is often due to good luck or fortunate family circumstances? A group of students dubbed “Team Libertarian” defend the libertarian philosophy against this objection.

Motorcycle Helmets

Motorcycle helmets: libertarianism (lecture 5).

Sports Money & Taxes

Sports money & taxes: libertarianism (lecture 6).

Lectures 7 & 8

Lecture 7 – This Land is My Land The philosopher John Locke argues that individuals have certain fundamental rights—to life, liberty, and property—that were given to us in “the state of nature,” a time before government and laws were created. How then can private property arise? Lecture 8 – Consenting Adults If we all have unalienable rights to life, liberty, and property, how can government enact laws that tax or earnings or send us to war? Does this amount to taking our property or our lives without our consent?

Property Rights & Boston Parking

Lectures 9 & 10

Lecture 9 – Hired Guns? During the Civil War, men drafted into war had the option of hiring substitutes to fight in their place. Many students say they find that policy unjust, arguing that it is unfair to allow the affluent to pay less privileged citizens to fight in their place. Is today’s voluntary army open to the same objection?

Lecture 10 – For Sale: Motherhood Sandel examines free-market exchange as it relates to reproductive rights. Examples include the business of egg and sperm donation and the case of “Baby M”—a famous law case that raised the unsettling question, “Who owns a baby?”

Military Service: Markets & Morals

Surrogacy: Market & Morals

Surrogacy: market & morals (lecture 10).

Lectures 11 & 12

Lecture 11: Mind Your Motive Sandel introduces Immanuel Kant, a challenging but influential philosopher. For Kant morality means acting out of duty—doing something because it is right, not because it is prudent or convenient. Kant gives the example of a shopkeeper who passes up the chance to shortchange a customer only because his business might suffer if other customers found out. According to Kant, the shopkeeper’s action lacks moral worth, because he did the right thing for the wrong reason.

Lecture 12: The Supreme Principle of Morality Immanuel Kant says that insofar as our actions have moral worth, what confers moral worth is our capacity to rise above self-interest and inclination and to act out of duty. Using several real life examples, Sandel explains Kant’s test for determining whether an action is morally right: to identify the principle expressed in our action and then ask whether that principle could ever become a universal law that every other human being could act on.

The Shopkeeper's Action

The shopkeeper's action: immanuel kant (lecture 11).

Kant and Human Dignity: The Case of Torture

Kant and human dignity.

Lectures 13 & 14

Lecture 13 – A Lesson in Lying Immanuel Kant believed that telling a lie, even a white lie, is a violation of one’s own dignity. Sandel asks students to test Kant’s theory with this hypothetical case: if a friend were hiding inside your home, and a murderer came to your door and asked you where he was, would it be wrong to lie to him? This leads to a video clip of one of the most famous, recent examples of dodging the truth: President Clinton talking about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky.

Lecture 14 – A Deal is a Deal Sandel introduces the modern philosopher, John Rawls, who argues that a just society is one governed by principles we would choose if we did not know what advantages we would possess or what role in society we would occupy.

Lying to a Murderer

Lying to a murderer: immanuel kant (lecture 12 & 13).

David Hume & the Contractor

David hume & the contractor: the morality of consent (lecture 14).

Lectures 15 & 16

Lecture 15 – What's a Fair Start? Rawls argues that even a meritocracy—a distributive system that rewards effort—doesn’t go far enough in leveling the playing field because the successful can’t claim to deserve the talents that enable them to get ahead. Success often depends on factors as arbitrary as birth order. Sandel makes Rawls’s point when he asks the students who were first born in their family to raise their hands.

Lecture 16 – What do We Deserve? Sandel discusses the fairness of pay differentials in modern society. He compares the salary of former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor ($200,000) with the salary of television’s Judge Judy ($25 million). Sandel asks, is this fair?

A Thought Experiment

A thought experiment: john rawls (lecture 15).

Inheritance Tax

Inheritance tax: who deserve what (lecture 16).

Lectures 17 & 18

Lecture 17 - Arguing Affirmative Action Is it just to consider race and ethnicity as factors in college admissions? Students discuss the pros and cons of affirmative action and discuss some controversial court cases.

Lecture 18 - What's the Purpose? Sandel introduces Aristotle and his theory of justice. Aristotle disagrees with Rawls and Kant. He believes that justice is about giving people their due, what they deserve. The best flutes, for example, should go to the best flute players. And the highest political offices should go to those with the best judgment and the greatest civic virtue.

Affirmative Action

Affirmative action (lecture 17).

The Violin: The Good Citizen (Lecture 18 & 19)

Lectures 19 & 20

Lecture 19 - The Good Citizen Aristotle believes the purpose of politics is to promote and cultivate the virtue of its citizens. The telos or goal of the state and political community is the “good life”. And those citizens who contribute most to the purpose of the community are the ones who should be most rewarded. But how do we know the purpose of a community or a practice? Aristotle’s theory of justice leads to a contemporary debate about golf. Sandel describes the case of a disabled golfer who sued the PGA after it declined his request to use a golf cart.

Lecture 20 - Freedom VS. Fit How does Aristotle address the issue of individual rights and the freedom to choose? In this lecture, Sandel addresses one of the most glaring objections to Aristotle—his defense of slavery as a fitting social role for certain human beings. Students discuss other objections to Aristotle’s theories and debate whether his philosophy overly restricts the freedom of individuals.

Casey Martin and the Telos of Golf

Casey martin and the telos of golf: aristotle (lecture 20).

Lectures 21 & 22

Lecture 21 – The Claims of Community Are all obligations based on consent, or are we also bound by unchosen obligations of membership and solidarity?

Lecture 22 – Where Our Loyalty Lies Do we owe more to our fellow citizens that to citizens of other countries? Is patriotism a virtue, or a prejudice for one’s own kind? Do I have a special responsibility for righting the wrongs of my great grandparents’ generation?

Justice, Community, and Membership

Citizen responsibility: justice, community, and membership (lecture 21).

Honesty vs. Loyalty?

Friendship & honesty: dilemmas of loyalty (lecture 22).

Collective Responsibility?

Collective responsibility for past wrongs.

Lectures 23 & 24

Lecture 23 – Debating Same-Sex Marriage If principles of justice depend on the moral or intrinsic worth of the ends that rights serve, how should we deal with the fact that people hold different ideas and conceptions of what is good? Students address this question in a debate about same-sex marriage. Can we settle the matter without discussing the moral status of homosexuality and the purpose of marriage?

Lecture 24 – The Good Life In his final lecture, Sandel challenges the notion that government and law should be neutral on hard moral questions. He argues that engaging, rather than avoiding, the moral convictions of our fellow citizens may be the best way of seeking a just society.

Debating Same Sex Marriage

Debating same sex marriage (lecture 23).

"More than exhilarating; exciting in its ability to persuade this student/reader, time and again, that the principle now being invoked—on this page, in this chapter—is the one to deliver the sufficiently inclusive guide to the making of a decent life." (Vivian Gornick, Boston Review )

“Sandel explains theories of justice…with clarity and immediacy; the ideas of Aristotle, Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Robert Nozick and John Rawls have rarely, if ever, been set out as accessibly…. In terms we can all understand, ‘Justice’ confronts us with the concepts that lurk, so often unacknowledged, beneath our conflicts.” (Jonathan Rauch, New York Times )

“Sandel dazzles in this sweeping survey of hot topics…. Erudite, conversational and deeply humane, this is truly transformative reading.” ( Publishers Weekly , starred review)

“A spellbinding philosopher…. For Michael Sandel, justice is not a spectator sport…. He is calling for nothing less than a reinvigoration of citizenship.” (Samuel Moyn, The Nation )

“Michael Sandel, perhaps the most prominent college professor in America…practices the best kind of academic populism, managing to simplify John Stuart Mill and John Rawls without being simplistic. But Sandel is best at what he calls bringing ‘moral clarity to the alternatives we confront as democratic citizens ’…. He ends up clarifying a basic political divide -- not between left and right, but between those who recognize nothing greater than individual rights and choices, and those who affirm a ‘politics of the common good,' rooted in moral beliefs that can't be ignored.” (Michael Gerson, Washington Post)

" Justice , the new volume from superstar Harvard political philosopher Michael Sandel, showcases the thinking on public morality that has made him one of the most sought-after lecturers in the world." (Richard Reeves, Democracy )

“Hard cases may make bad law, but in Michael Sandel’s hands they produce some cool philosophy…. Justice is a timely plea for us to desist from political bickering and see if we can have a sensible discussion about what sort of society we really want to live in.” (Jonathan Ree, The Observer (London))

“Every once in a while, a book comes along of such grace, power, and wit that it enthralls us with a yearning to know what justice is. This is such a book.” (Jeffrey Abramson, Texas Law Review )

“Using a compelling, entertaining mix of hypotheticals, news stories, episodes from history, pop-culture tidbits, literary examples, legal cases and teachings from the great philosophers—principally, Aristotle, Kant, Bentham, Mill and Rawls—Sandel takes on a variety of controversial issues—abortion, same-sex marriage, affirmative action—and forces us to confront our own assumptions, biases and lazy thought…. Sparkling commentary from the professor we all wish we had.” ( Kirkus Reviews , starred review)

“Michael Sandel is…one of the world's most interesting political philosophers. Politicians and commentators tend to ask two questions of policy: will it make voters better off, and will it affect their liberty? Sandel rightly points out the shallowness of that debate and adds a third criterion: how will it affect the common good?” ( Guardian)

“Michael Sandel transforms moral philosophy by putting it at the heart of civic debate…. Sandel belongs to the tradition, dating back to ancient Greece, which sees moral philosophy as an outgrowth and refinement of civic debate. Like Aristotle, he seeks to systematize educated common sense, not to replace it with expert knowledge or abstract principles. This accounts for one of the most striking and attractive features of Justice —its use of examples drawn from real legal and political controversies…. Sandel's insistence on the inescapably ethical character of political debate is enormously refreshing.” (Edward Skidelsky, New Statesman)

“His ability to find the broad issues at the heart of everyday concerns verges on the uncanny, and his lucid explanations of classic figures such as Mill, Kant, and Aristotle are worth the price of admission.” (William A. Galston, Commonweal )

“A remarkable educational achievement…. Generations of students and educated citizens will be very well served by Sandel’s introductory overviews.” (Amitai Etzioni, Hedgehog Review )

“Reading ‘Justice’ by Michael Sandel is an intoxicating invitation to take apart and examine how we arrive at our notions of right and wrong….This is enlivening stuff. Sandel is not looking to win an argument; he's looking at how a citizen might best engage the public realm.” (Karen R. Long, Cleveland Plain Dealer )

“Sandel is a champion of a politics of the common good. He wants us to think of ourselves as citizens, not just consumers or isolated choosers. For him, justice demands that we ask what kind of people and society we want (or ought) to be.” (John A. Coleman, America )

“Michael Sandel, political philosopher and public intellectual, is a liberal, but not the annoying sort. His aim is not to boss people around but to bring them around to the pleasures of thinking clearly about large questions of social policy. Reading this lucid book is like taking his famous undergraduate course ‘Justice’ without the tiresome parts, such as term papers and exams.” (George F. Will, syndicated columnist)

“ Justice is Sandel at his finest: no matter what your views are, his delightful style will draw you in, and he’ll then force you to rethink your assumptions and challenge you to question accepted ways of thinking. He calls us to a better way of doing politics, and a more enriching way of living our lives.” (E. J. Dionne, syndicated columnist)

“His is a new and authentic philosophical voice…. Michael Sandel’s elegantly argued book…describes what I take to be the reality of moral experience.” – Michael Walzer, The New Republic

“Sandel’s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice is a gracefully—even beautifully—written book that I would imagine is destined to be something of a classic on the subject.” – Chilton Williamson, Jr., National Review

“Sandel’s book is exemplary. It is passionate and unrelenting, and yet meticulous and scrupulous in its argumentation…. [A]lways fair to its target, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice develops the best and most constructive interpretations with which to disagree…. It is the great virtue of this book, of its justness and generosity of spirit, that…one can come away from this book moved to deepen and improve the vision he criticizes.” – Charles Fried, Harvard Law Review

“This brilliantly written critique of Rawls…can be read as an important contribution toward the reconstruction of liberal political theory.” – Steven M. DeLue, American Political Science Review

“Sandel’s remarkable work forces us to take seriously the question: what kind of subjects must we be for our talk of justice and rights to make sense? He uncovers the strains and contractions in much contemporary liberalism. This is political philosophy on the level it should be written, confronting our moral beliefs with our best understanding of human nature.” – Charles Taylor, McGill University

“A genuinely important and philosophical book…written with style and precision…. Sandel’s account of friendship and self-knowledge is luminous.” – Ronald Beiner, Times Higher Education Supplement

“[S]ometimes soaring to exhilarating eloquence and flashes of insight… Liberalism and the Limits of Justice offers fresh and plausible readings of what politics is and might be.” – Stephen Whitfield, Worldview

“Sandel [goes to] the heart of the epistemological confusions inherent in modern philosophical liberalism…. The real consequence of Sandel’s argument is…to reassert [the] fundamental lesson…that at the heart of all philosophy is political philosophy. – Mark Lilla, The Public Interest

“Sandel’s outstanding book is a significant and fascinating contribution…. Sandel’s point about the liberal conception of the self is exciting and significant in several ways.” – Richard Fentiman, Cambridge Law Journal

“Sandel offers an extended, very penetrating critique of what he calls the ‘deep individualism’ embedded in the premises of Rawlsian theory—and, more generally, in the foundations of liberal political theories which are influenced by Kantian moral philosophy. This is fresh work of major importance to the ongoing discussion of justice and individualism….” – Norman Care, No ûs

“This clear and forceful book provides very elegant and cogent arguments against the attempt to use a certain conception of the self, a certain metaphysical view of what human beings are like, to legitimate liberal politics.” – Richard Rorty, in “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy,” in Rorty, Objectivism, Relativism, and Truth

“[John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice ] is widely viewed as the most important work of political philosophy to be written in our time. It certainly has been the most widely discussed. Of all the commentary it has spawned, none has been more important than the critique offered by Michael Sandel in a book published in 1982 called Liberalism and the Limits of Justice , which succeeded in calling into question some of Rawls’s more fundamental premises.” – R. Bruce Douglass, Commonwealth

“Sandel’s work builds very strongly on A Theory of Justice by John Rawls, taking its place as the next voice in the running conversation of political theory…. Where critiques are often used by their author as a means to build their own name up by tearing down someone else’s name, Sandel’s is such a careful study that it ends up enhancing the stature of the work it builds upon.” – Chistopher Budd, The Philosophers’ Magazine

“Even though Sandel is critical of Rawls, he is scrupulously fair and respectful…. One cannot read Liberalism and the Limits of Justice without acquiring a deeper and clearer understanding of Rawls’ theory…. Sandel’s impressive work…illuminates not only Rawls’ theory but also the nature of moral argument…. It is an outstanding achievement.” – William Powers, Texas Law Review

Essays About Justice: Top 5 Examples and 7 Prompts

Discover our guide with examples of essays about justice and prompts for your essay writing and discuss vital matters relating to a person’s or nation’s welfare.

Justice, in general, refers to the notion that individuals get what they deserve. It includes fundamental moral values in law and politics and is considered an act of fairness, equality, and honesty. Four types of justice deal with how victims can solicit a verdict. They are procedural, distributive, retributive, and restorative. There are many pieces with justice as the subject. It’s because justice is a broad subject encompassing many human values.

5 Essay Examples

1. juvenile justice system of usa essay by anonymous on ivypanda.com, 2. wrongful convictions in criminal justice system by anonymous on gradesfixer.com, 3. racial profiling within the criminal justice system by anonymous on papersowl.com, 4. criminal justice: the ban-the-box law by anonymous on ivypanda.com, 5. the special needs of the criminal justice on mental illness cases by anonymous on gradesfixer.com, 1. what is justice, 2. is justice only for the rich and powerful, 3. the importance of justice, 4. the justice system in mainstream media, 5. justice: then vs. now, 6. justice system around the world, 7. obstructions to justice.

“No doubt, familiarity about the nature of juvenile crimes and how juvenile justice structures function across the world will offer an insight to policy makers, social scientists and for gullible citizens. Thus, a comparative analysis will throw light on how well or how poorly one nation is exercising relative to other nations.”

The essay delves into the justice system process for teenagers who are 18 years and below who commit wrongful acts. Most teenagers involved in juvenile crimes do not have a strong foundation or parental support. The author also talks about the treatments, boot camps, and retreat houses available for teenagers serving in juvenile prisons.

The ever-increasing number of juvenile crimes in the world reflects the mismanagement and lack of juvenile courts, sentencing programs, rehabilitation, and age-appropriate treatment. The writer believes that if mistrials remain in the juvenile system, the problem will continue. They suggest that the government must initiate more system reforms and provide juvenile offenders with proper ethical education.

“The justice system is composed of various legal groups and actors, making a miscarriage possible at any stage of the legal process, or at the hands of any legal actor. Eyewitness error, police misconduct, or falsification of evidence are examples of factors that may lead to a wrongful conviction.”

In this essay, the author uses various citations that show the justice system’s flaws in the process and criteria of its rulings. It further discusses the different instances of unfair judgments and mentions that at least 1% of all convicts serving prison time were wrongfully accused.

The writer believes that changing the way of addressing different cases and ensuring that all legal professionals do their assigned duties will result in fair justice. You might also be interested in these essays about choice .

“Here in the 21st century, we don’t exactly have ‘Black Codes’ we have what is known as Racial Profiling. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) defines racial profiling as ‘the discriminatory practice by law enforcement officials of targeting individuals for suspicion of crime based on the individual’s race ethnicity, religion or national origin.’”

This essay investigates the involvement of race in the criminal justice system, whether they are victims or perpetrators. The author claims that some law enforcement officers mistreat and misjudge people because of their race and presents various cases as evidence of these discriminatory actions. One example is the case of an unarmed black teenager, Jordan Edwards , who was shot because former officer Roy Oliver thought his partner was in danger.

Unfortunately, law enforcement officials use their power and position in society to deny any act of racial profiling, rendering the said law useless. The author declares that while their paper may not prove racial bias in the criminal justice system, they can prove that a person’s color plays a role and can cause harm.

“I think the Ban-the-Box law is the best way of creating employment opportunities for ex-convicts without discrimination. Criminal offenses vary in the degree of the crime, making it unfair to treat all ex-convicts the same. Moreover, some felons learn from their mistakes during detention and parole, creating a better and law-abiding citizen with the ability to work faithfully.”

The essay explains how ex-convicts or current convicts are consistently discriminated against. This discrimination affects their lives even after serving their sentence, especially in their rights to vote and work.

Regarding job hunting, the author believes the Ban-the-Box law will effectively create more employment opportunities. The law allows employers to see an ex-convict’s skills rather than just their record. The essay concludes with a reminder that everyone is entitled to a civil right to vote, while private enterprises are free to run background checks.

“Case management focuses on incorporating key elements that focus on improving the wellbeing of individuals that are being assessed. Mental illness within the criminal justice system is treated as a sensitive issue that requires urgent intervention in order to ensure that an inmate is able to recover.”

This essay pries into one of the most delicate areas of ruling in the justice system, which is leading mentally ill convicts. Offenders who were deemed mentally ill should be able to receive particular treatments for their health while serving time.

The author mentions that every country must be able to provide mental health services for the inmates to prevent conflicts inside the prison. In conclusion, they suggest that reviewing and prioritizing policies related to mental illness is the best solution to the issue.

Are you interested in writing about mental illnesses? Check out our guide on how to write essays about depression.

7 Prompts for Essays About Justice

Justice is a vast subject, and its literal meaning is the quality of being just. This process often occurs when someone who has broken the law gets what they should, whether freedom or punishment. Research and discuss everything there is to know about justice so your readers can fully understand it. Include a brief history of its origins, types, and uses.

Several situations prove that justice is only for the rich. One of the main reasons is the expensive court fees. Research why victims settle outside the court or just let their abusers get away with crimes.

Include data that proves justice is a luxury where the only ones who can ask for equal treatment are those with resources—present situations or well-known cases to support your statements. On the other hand, you can also provide counter-arguments such as government programs that help financially-challenged individuals.

Every citizen has the right to be protected and treated fairly in court. Explain the importance of justice to a person, society, and government. Then, add actual cases of how justice is applied to encourage reform or chaos. Include relevant cases that demonstrate how justice impacts lives and legal changes, such as the case of Emmett Till .

Talk about how justice is usually depicted on screen and how it affects people’s expectations of how the justice system works. Popular television shows such as Suits and Law and Order are examples of the justice system being portrayed in the media. Research these examples and share your opinion on whether movies or television portray the justice system accurately or not.

In this essay, research how justice worldwide has changed. This can include looking at legal systems, human rights, and humanity’s ever-changing opinions. For instance, child labor was considered normal before but is viewed as an injustice today. List significant changes in justice and briefly explain why they have changed over time. You might also be interested in these essays about violence .

Essays About Justice: Justice system around the world

Countries have different ways of instilling justice within their societies. For this prompt, research and discuss the countries you think have the best and worst legal systems. Then, point out how these differences affect the country’s crime rates and quality of life for its citizens.

Examine why people tend to take justice into their hands, disobey legal rules, or give up altogether. It can be because seeking justice is an arduous process resulting in emotional and financial burdens. Often, this occurs when a person feels their government is not providing the support they need. Take a look at this social issue, and discuss it in your essay for a strong argumentative.

If you are interested in learning more, check out our essay writing tips !

Maria Caballero is a freelance writer who has been writing since high school. She believes that to be a writer doesn't only refer to excellent syntax and semantics but also knowing how to weave words together to communicate to any reader effectively.

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The idea of justice occupies centre stage both in ethics, and in legal and political philosophy. We apply it to individual actions, to laws, and to public policies, and we think in each case that if they are unjust this is a strong, maybe even conclusive, reason to reject them. Classically, justice was counted as one of the four cardinal virtues (and sometimes as the most important of the four); in modern times John Rawls famously described it as ‘the first virtue of social institutions’ (Rawls 1971, p.3; Rawls, 1999, p.3). We might debate which of these realms of practical philosophy has first claim on justice: is it first and foremost a property of the law, for example, and only derivatively a property of individuals and other institutions? But it is probably more enlightening to accept that the idea has over time sunk deep roots in each of these domains, and to try to make sense of such a wide-ranging concept by identifying elements that are present whenever justice is invoked, but also examining the different forms it takes in various practical contexts. This article aims to provide a general map of the ways in which justice has been understood by philosophers, past and present.

We begin by identifying four core features that distinguish justice from other moral and political ideas. We then examine some major conceptual contrasts: between conservative and ideal justice, between corrective and distributive justice, between procedural and substantive justice, and between comparative and non-comparative justice. Next we turn to questions of scope: to who or what do principles of justice apply? We ask whether non-human animals can be subjects of justice, whether justice applies only between people who already stand in a particular kind of relationship to one another, and whether individual people continue to have duties of justice once justice-based institutions have been created. We then examine three overarching theories that might serve to unify the different forms of justice: utilitarianism, contractarianism, and egalitarianism. But it seems, in conclusion, that no such theory is likely be successful.

More detailed discussions of particular forms of justice can be found in other entries: see especially distributive justice , global justice , intergenerational justice , international distributive justice , justice and bad luck , justice as a virtue , and retributive justice .

1.1 Justice and Individual Claims

1.2 justice, charity and enforceable obligation, 1.3 justice and impartiality, 1.4 justice and agency, 2.1 conservative versus ideal justice, 2.2 corrective versus distributive justice, 2.3 procedural versus substantive justice, 2.4 comparative versus non-comparative justice, 3.1 human vs non-human animals, 3.2 relational vs non-relational justice, 3.3 individuals vs institutions, 3.4 recognition vs. redistribution, 4.1 accommodating intuitions about justice, 4.2 utilitarian theories of justice: three problems, 5.1 gauthier, 5.3 scanlon, 6.1 justice as equality, 6.2 responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, 6.3 relational egalitarianism, 7. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries, 1. justice: mapping the concept.

‘Justice’ has sometimes been used in a way that makes it virtually indistinguishable from rightness in general. Aristotle, for example, distinguished between ‘universal’ justice that corresponded to ‘virtue as a whole’ and ‘particular’ justice which had a narrower scope (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , Book V, chs. 1–2). The wide sense may have been more evident in classical Greek than in modern English. But Aristotle also noted that when justice was identified with ‘complete virtue’, this was always ‘in relation to another person’. In other words, if justice is to be identified with morality as such, it must be morality in the sense of ‘what we owe to each other’ (see Scanlon 1998). But it is anyway questionable whether justice should be understood so widely. At the level of individual ethics, justice is often contrasted with charity on the one hand, and mercy on the other, and these too are other-regarding virtues. At the level of public policy, reasons of justice are distinct from, and often compete with, reasons of other kinds, for example economic efficiency or environmental value.

As this article will endeavour to show, justice takes on different meanings in different practical contexts, and to understand it fully we have to grapple with this diversity. But it is nevertheless worth asking whether we find a core concept that runs through all these various uses, or whether it is better regarded as a family resemblance idea according to which different combinations of features are expected to appear on each occasion of use. The most plausible candidate for a core definition comes from the Institutes of Justinian , a codification of Roman Law from the sixth century AD, where justice is defined as ‘the constant and perpetual will to render to each his due’. This is of course quite abstract until further specified, but it does throw light upon four important aspects of justice.

First, it shows that justice has to do with how individual people are treated (‘to each his due’). Issues of justice arise in circumstances in which people can advance claims – to freedom, opportunities, resources, and so forth – that are potentially conflicting, and we appeal to justice to resolve such conflicts by determining what each person is properly entitled to have. In contrast, where people’s interests converge, and the decision to be taken is about the best way to pursue some common purpose – think of a government official having to decide how much food to stockpile as insurance against some future emergency – justice gives way to other values. In other cases, there may be no reason to appeal to justice because resources are so plentiful that we do not need to worry about allotting shares to individuals. Hume pointed out that in a hypothetical state of abundance where ‘every individual finds himself fully provided with whatever his most voracious appetites can want’, ‘the cautious, jealous virtue of justice would never once have been dreamed of’ (Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals , pp. 183–4). Hume also believed – and philosophical controversy on this point persists until today – that justice has no place in close personal relationships, such as the family, where (it is alleged) each identifies with the others’ interests so strongly that there is no need and no reason for anyone to make claims of personal entitlement. (See Sandel 1982 for a defence of this view; for a critique, see Okin 1989. See also the entry on feminist perspectives on reproduction and the family) .

That justice is a matter of how each separate person is treated appears to create problems for theories such as utilitarianism that judge actions and policies on the basis of their overall consequences aggregated across people – assuming that these theories wish to incorporate rather than discard the idea of justice. In Section 4 below we examine how utilitarians have attempted to respond to this challenge.

Although justice is centrally a matter of how individuals are treated, it is also possible to speak of justice for groups – for example when the state is allocating resources between different categories of citizens. Here each group is being treated as though it were a separate individual for purposes of the allocation.

Second, Justinian’s definition underlines that just treatment is something due to each person, in other words that justice is a matter of claims that can be rightfully made against the agent dispensing justice, whether a person or an institution. Here there is a contrast with other virtues: we demand justice, but we beg for charity or forgiveness. This also means that justice is a matter of obligation for the agent dispensing it, and that the agent wrongs the recipient if the latter is denied what is due to her. It is a characteristic mark of justice that the obligations it creates should be enforceable: we can be made to deliver what is due to others as a matter of justice, either by the recipients themselves or by third parties. However it overstates the position to make the enforceability of its requirements a defining feature of justice (see Buchanan 1987). On the one hand, there are some claims of justice that seem not to be enforceable (by anyone). When we dispense gifts to our children or our friends, we ought to treat each recipient fairly, but neither the beneficiaries themselves nor anyone else can rightfully force the giver to do so. On the other hand, in cases of extreme emergency, it may sometimes be justifiable to force people to do more than justice requires them to do – there may exist enforceable duties of humanity. But these are rare exceptions. The obligatory nature of justice generally goes hand-in-hand with enforceability.

The third aspect of justice to which Justinian’s definition draws our attention is the connection between justice and the impartial and consistent application of rules – that is what the ‘constant and perpetual will’ part of the definition conveys. Justice is the opposite of arbitrariness. It requires that where two cases are relevantly alike, they should be treated in the same way (We discuss below the special case of justice and lotteries). Following a rule that specifies what is due to a person who has features X , Y , Z whenever such a person is encountered ensures this. And although the rule need not be unchangeable – perpetual in the literal sense – it must be relatively stable. This explains why justice is exemplified in the rule of law, where laws are understood as general rules impartially applied over time. Outside of the law itself, individuals and institutions that want to behave justly must mimic the law in certain ways (for instance, gathering reliable information about individual claimants, allowing for appeals against decisions).

Finally, the definition reminds us that justice requires an agent whose will alters the circumstances of its objects. The agent might be an individual person, or it might be a group of people, or an institution such as the state. So we cannot, except metaphorically, describe as unjust states of affairs that no agent has contributed to bringing about – unless we think that there is a Divine Being who has ordered the universe in such a way that every outcome is a manifestation of His will. Admittedly we are tempted to make judgements of what is sometimes called ‘cosmic injustice’ – say when a talented person’s life is cut cruelly short by cancer, or our favourite football team is eliminated from the competition by a freak goal – but this is a temptation we should resist.

This agency condition, however, is less restrictive than it might at first appear. It by no means excludes the possibility that agents can create injustice by omission – for example by failing to create the institutions or to enact the policies that would deliver vital resources to those who need them. Thus it is now common to speak of ‘systemic injustice’ in the case of bad outcomes that no-one intends to occur but that could be prevented by a shift in social norms or institutional practices. The agents in these cases are all those who by acting together to change these things could invert the injustice, but have so far failed to do so.

2. Justice: Four Distinctions

We have so far looked at four elements that are present in every use of the concept of justice. Now it is time to consider some equally important contrasts.

Philosophers writing on justice have observed that it has two different faces, one conservative of existing norms and practices, the other demanding reform of these norms and practices (see Sidgwick 1874/1907, Raphael 2001). Thus on the one hand it is a matter of justice to respect people’s rights under existing law or moral rules, or more generally to fulfil the legitimate expectations they have acquired as a result of past practice, social conventions, and so forth; on the other hand, justice often gives us reason to change laws, practices and conventions quite radically, thereby creating new entitlements and expectations. This exposes an ambiguity in what it means to ‘render each his due’. What is ‘due’ might be what a person can reasonably expect to have given existing law, policy, or social practice, or it might be what the person should get under a regime of ideal justice: this could mean what the person deserves, or needs, or is entitled to on grounds of equality, depending on which ideal principle is being invoked.

Conceptions of justice vary according to the weight they attach to each of these faces. At one extreme, some conceptions interpret justice as wholly concerned with what individuals can claim under existing laws and social conventions: thus for Hume, justice was to be understood as adherence to a set of rules that assign physical objects to individuals (such as being the first possessor of such an object) (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature , Book III, Part II). These rules can be explained by reference to the natural associations that form in people’s minds between persons and external objects, and although the system of justice as a whole can be shown to be socially useful, there are no relevant independent standards by which its principles can be assessed (Hume briskly dismissed equality and merit as principles for allocating property to persons). In similar vein, Hayek argued that justice was a property of individual behaviour, understood as compliance with the ‘rules of just conduct’ that had evolved to enable a market economy to function effectively. For Hayek, to speak of ‘social justice’ as an ideal standard of distribution was as meaningless as to speak of a ‘moral stone’ (Hayek 1976, p. 78)

At the other extreme stand conceptions of justice which posit some ideal principle of distribution such as equality, together with a ‘currency’ specifying the respect in which justice requires people to be made equally well off, and then refuse to acknowledge the justice of any claims that do not arise directly from the application of this principle. Thus claims deriving from existing law or practice are dismissed unless they happen to coincide with what the principle requires. More often, however, ideal justice is seen as proposing principles by which existing institutions and practices can be assessed, with a view to reforming them, or in the extreme case abolishing them entirely, while the claims that people already have under those practices are given some weight. Rawls, for example, whose two principles of justice count as ideal principles for this purpose, is at pains to stress that they are not intended to be applied in a way that disregards people’s existing legitimate expectations. About the ‘difference principle’, which requires social and economic inequalities to be regulated so that they work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society, he says:

It applies to the announced system of public law and statutes and not to particular transactions or distributions, nor to the decisions of individuals and associations, but rather to the institutional background against which these transactions and decisions take place. There are no unannounced and unpredictable interferences with citizens’ expectations and acquisitions. Entitlements are earned and honored as the public system of rules declares. (Rawls 1993, p. 283)

Here we see Rawls attempting to reconcile the demands of conservative and ideal justice. Yet he does not directly address the question of what should happen when changing circumstances mean that the difference principle requires new laws or policies to be enacted: do those whose prior entitlements or expectations are no longer met have a claim to be compensated for their loss? We could call this the question of transitional justice (though this phrase is often used now in a more specific sense to refer to the process of reconciliation that may occur following civil war or other armed conflicts: see the entry on transitional justice ).

A second important contrast, whose pedigree reaches back at least as far as Aristotle, is between justice as a principle for assigning distributable goods of various kinds to individual people, and justice as a remedial principle that applies when one person wrongly interferes with another’s legitimate holdings. Thus suppose Bill steals Alice’s computer, or sells Alice faulty goods which he claims to be in perfect order: then Alice suffers a loss, which justice demands that Bill should remedy by returning the computer or fulfilling his contract honestly. Corrective justice, then, essentially concerns a bilateral relationship between a wrongdoer and his victim, and demands that the fault be cancelled by restoring the victim to the position she would have been in had the wrongful behaviour not occurred; it may also require that the wrongdoer not benefit from his faulty behaviour. Distributive justice, on the other hand, is multilateral: it assumes a distributing agent, and a number of persons who have claims on what is being distributed. Justice here requires that the resources available to the distributor be shared according to some relevant criterion, such as equality, desert, or need. In Aristotle’s example, if there are fewer flutes available than people who want to play them, they should be given to the best performers (Aristotle, The Politics , p. 128). In modern debates, principles of distributive justice are applied to social institutions such as property and tax systems, which are understood as producing distributive outcomes across large societies, or even the world as a whole.

The conceptual distinction between distributive and corrective justice seems clear, but their normative relationship is more difficult to pin down (see Perry 2000, Ripstein 2004, Coleman 1992, chs. 16–17). Some have claimed that corrective justice is merely instrumental to distributive justice: its aim is to move from a situation of distributive injustice brought about by the faulty behaviour to one that is more nearly (if not perfectly) distributively just. But this view runs into a number of objections. One is that so long as Alice has a legitimate title to her computer, her claim of corrective justice against Bill does not depend on her having had, prior to the theft, the share of resources that distributive justice ideally demands. She might be richer than she deserves to be, yet corrective justice still require that the computer be returned to her. In other words, corrective justice may serve to promote conservative rather than ideal justice, to use the distinction introduced in 2.1. Another objection is that corrective justice requires the wrongdoer himself to restore or compensate the person he has wronged, even if the cause of distributive justice could be better served by transferring resources from a third party – giving Alice one of even-more-undeservedly-rich Charles’s computers, for example. This underlines the bilateral nature of corrective justice, and also the fact that it comes into play in response to faulty behaviour on someone’s part. Its primary demand is that people should not lose out because others have behaved wrongfully or carelessly, but it also encompasses the idea that ‘no man should profit by his own wrong’. If Alice loses her computer in a boating accident, she might, under an insurance scheme, have a claim of distributive justice to a new machine, but she has no claim of corrective justice.

If corrective justice cannot be subsumed normatively under distributive justice, we need to explain its value. What is achieved when we make Bill return the computer to Alice? Aristotle ( Nicomachean Ethics , Book V, ch. 4) suggested that corrective justice aims to restore the two parties to a position of equality; by returning the computer we cancel both Bill’s unjustified gain and Alice’s unjustified loss. But this assumes that the computer can be returned intact. Corrective justice requires that Alice be made no worse off than she was before the theft, even if that means Bill suffering an absolute loss (e.g. by paying for a new computer if he has damaged Alice’s). Aristotle himself recognized that the idea of evening out gain and loss made no literal sense in a case where one person assaults another and has to compensate him for his injury – there is no ‘gain’ to be redistributed. It seems, then, that the value of corrective justice must lie in the principle that each person must take responsibility for his own conduct, and if he fails to respect the legitimate interests of others by causing injury, he must make good the harm. In that way, each person can plan her life secure in the knowledge that she will be protected against certain kinds of external setbacks. Philosophers and lawyers writing on corrective justice disagree about what standard of responsibility should apply – for example whether compensation is required only when one person wilfully or negligently causes another to suffer loss, or whether it can also be demanded when the perpetrator displays no such fault but is nevertheless causally responsible for the injury.

A third distinction that must be drawn is between the justice of the procedures that might be used to determine how benefits and burdens of various kinds are allocated to people, and the justice of the final allocation itself. It might initially seem as though the justice of a procedure can be reduced to the justice of the results produced by applying it, but this is not so. For one thing, there are cases in which the idea of an independently just outcome makes no sense. A coin toss is a fair way of deciding who starts a game, but neither the Blues nor the Reds have a claim of justice to bat first or kick off. But even where a procedure has been shaped by a concern that it should produce substantively just outcomes, it may still have special properties that make it intrinsically just. In that case, using a different procedure to produce the same result might be objectionable. In an influential discussion, John Rawls contrasted perfect procedural justice , where a procedure is such that if it is followed a just outcome is guaranteed (requiring the person who cuts a cake to take the last slice himself is the illustration Rawls provides), imperfect procedural justice , where the procedure is such that following it is likely, but not certain, to produce the just result, and pure procedural justice , such as the coin-tossing example, where there is no independent way to assess the outcome – if we call it just, it is only on the grounds that it has come about by following the relevant procedure (Rawls 1971, 1999, § 14).

Theories of justice can then be distinguished according to the relative weight they attach to procedures and substantive outcomes. Some theories are purely procedural in form. Robert Nozick distinguished between historical theories of justice, end-state theories, and patterned theories in order to defend the first against the second and third (Nozick 1974). An end-state theory defines justice in terms of some overall property of a distribution (of resources, welfare, etc.) – for example whether it is egalitarian, or whether the lowest position in the distribution is as high as it can be, as Rawls’ difference principle requires. A patterned theory looks at whether what each receives as part of a distribution matches some individual feature such as their desert or their need. By contrast, an historical theory asks about the process by which the final outcome has arisen. In Nozick’s particular case, a distribution of resources is said to be just if everyone within its scope is entitled to what they now own, having acquired it by legitimate means – such as voluntary contract or gift – from someone who was also entitled to have it, leading back eventually to a just act of acquisition – such as labouring on a plot of land – that gave the first owner his valid title. The shape of the final distribution is irrelevant: according to Nozick, justice is entirely a matter of the sequence of prior events that created it (for critical assessments of Nozick’s position, see Paul 1982, Wolff 1991, Cohen 1995, chs. 1–2).

For most philosophers, however, the justice of a procedure is to a large extent a function of the justice of the outcomes that it tends to produce when applied. For instance, the procedures that together make up a fair trial are justified on the grounds that for the most part they produce outcomes in which the guilty are punished and the innocent are acquitted. Yet even in these cases, we should be wary of assuming that the procedure itself has no independent value. We can ask of a procedure whether it treats the people to whom it is applied justly, for example by giving them adequate opportunities to advance their claims, not requiring them to provide personal information that they find humiliating to reveal, and so forth. Studies by social psychologists have shown that in many cases people care more about being treated fairly by the institutions they have to deal with than about how they fare when the procedure’s final result is known (Lind and Tyler 1988).

Justice takes a comparative form when to determine what is due to one person we need to look at what others can also claim: to determine how large a slice of pie is rightfully John’s, we have to know how many others have a claim to the pie, and also what the principle for sharing it should be – equality, or something else. Justice takes a non-comparative form when we can determine what is due to a person merely by knowing relevant facts about that particular person: if John has already been promised the whole of the pie, then that is what he can rightfully claim for himself. Some theories of justice seem to imply that justice is always a comparative notion – for example when it is said that justice consists in the absence of arbitrary inequality – whereas others imply that it is always non-comparative. But conceptually, at least, both forms seem admissible; indeed we can find cases in which it appears we have to choose between doing justice comparatively and doing it non-comparatively (see Feinberg 1974; for a critical response, see Montague 1980). For example, we might have several candidates all of whom are roughly equally deserving of an academic honour, but the number of honours we are permitted to award is smaller than the number of candidates. If we honour some but not others, we perpetrate a comparative injustice, but if to avoid doing so we honour no-one at all, then each is treated less well than they deserve, and so unjustly from a non-comparative perspective.

Theories of justice can then be categorised according to whether they are comparative, non-comparative, or neither. Principles of equality – principles requiring the equal distribution of some kind of benefit – are plainly comparative in form, since what is due to each person is simply an equal share of the benefit in question rather than any fixed amount. In the case of principles of desert, the position is less straightforward. These principles take the form ‘ A deserves X by virtue of P ’, where X is a mode of treatment, and P is a personal characteristic possessed by A (Feinberg 1970). In the case of both X and P , we can ask whether they are to be identified comparatively or non-comparatively. Thus what A deserves might either be an entitlement, or an absolute amount of some benefit – ‘a living wage’, say – or it might be a share of some collective benefit, or a multiple or fraction of what others are receiving – ‘twice what B is getting’, say. Turning to P , or what is often called the desert basis, this may be a feature of A that we can identify without reference to anyone else, or it may be a comparative feature, such as being the best student in a graduating class. So desert-based claims of justice might take one of four different forms depending on whether the basis of desert and/or the deserved mode of treatment is comparative or non-comparative (see Olsaretti 2003 for essays that address this question; for a more advanced treatment, see Kagan 2012, Part III).

Among principles of justice that are straightforwardly non-comparative are ‘sufficiency’ principles which hold that what justice requires is that each person should have ‘enough’, on some dimension or other – for instance, have all of their needs fulfilled, or have a specified set of capabilities that they are able to exercise (for a general defence of sufficiency, though not one that links it specifically to justice, see Frankfurt 2015; for a critique, see Casal 2007). Such principles, however, need to be supplemented by other principles, not only to tell us what to do with the surplus (assuming there is one) once everyone has sufficient resources, but also to guide us in situations where there are too few resources to bring everyone up to the sufficiency threshold. Should we, for example, maximise the number of people who achieve sufficiency, or minimise the aggregate shortfall suffered by those in the relevant group? Unless we are prepared to say that these are not matters of justice, a theory of justice that contains only the sufficiency principle and nothing else looks incomplete.

Some theories of justice cannot readily be classified either as comparative or as non-comparative. Consider one part of Rawls’ theory of social justice, the difference principle, which as noted above requires that social and economic inequalities be arranged to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (Rawls 1971, 1999, §12–13). Under this principle, ideally just shares are calculated by determining what each person would receive under the set of social institutions whose economic effect is to raise the worst off person to the highest possible level. This is neither a fixed amount, nor one that depends in any direct sense on what other individuals are receiving, or should receive. Applying the difference principle does require making comparisons, but these are comparisons between the effects of different social institutions – say different tax laws, or different ways of defining property rights – not between individual people and the amounts of benefit they are receiving. We might call theories of this kind ‘holistic’ or ‘systemic’.

3. The Scope of Justice

When we raise questions about the scope of justice, we are asking about when principles of justice take effect and among whom . We have already, when discussing Hume, encountered the idea that there might be circumstances in which justice becomes irrelevant – circumstances in which resources are so abundant that it is pointless to allocate individual shares, or, as Hume also believed, in which resources are so scarce that everyone is permitted to grab what he can in the name of self-preservation. But even in circumstances that are less extreme than these, questions about scope arise. Who can make claims of justice, and who might have the corresponding obligation to meet them? Does this depend on the kind of thing that is being claimed? If comparative principles are being applied, who should be counted as part of the comparison group? Do some principles of justice have universal scope – they apply whenever agent A acts towards recipient B , regardless of the relationship between them – while others are contextual in character, applying only within social or political relationships of a certain kind? The present section examines some of these questions in greater detail.

What does a creature have to do, or be like, to be included within the scope of (at least some) principles of justice? Most past philosophers have assumed that the line should be drawn so as to exclude all non-human animals, but more recently some have been prepared to defend ‘justice for animals’ (Nussbaum 2006, ch. 6; Garner 2013). Against this, Rawls asserts that although we have ‘duties of compassion and humanity’ towards animals and should refrain from treating them cruelly, nonetheless they are ‘outside the scope of the theory of justice’ (Rawls 1971, p. 512; Rawls 1999, p. 448). How could this claim be justified?

We can focus our attention either on individual features that humans possess and animals lack, and that might be thought relevant to their inclusion within the scope of justice, or on asymmetries in the relationship between humans and other animals. To begin with the latter, Hume claimed that the domination humans exercised over animals – such that an animal could only possess something by virtue of our permission – meant that we were ‘bound by the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures, but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them’ (Hume, Enquiry , p. 190). For Rawls and those influenced by him, principles of distributive justice apply among agents who are related to one another as participants in a ‘cooperative venture for mutual advantage’, and this might seem to exclude animals from the scope of such principles. Critics of this view have pointed to cases of human-animal co-operation (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, Valentini 2014); however these arguments focus mainly or entirely on the special case of dogs , and it seems implausible to generalise from them in an attempt to show that human-animal relationships generally have a co-operative character.

But the claim that justice only applies to participants in co-operative practices is anyway vulnerable to the objection that it risks excluding seriously disabled people, people living in isolated communities, and future generations from the scope of justice, so it does not seem compelling as a claim about justice in general (see further below). Might there be other reasons why animals cannot make claims of justice on us? Another Rawls-inspired suggestion is that animals lack the necessary moral powers, in particular the capacity to act on principles of justice themselves. They cannot distinguish what is justly owed to them from what is not; and they cannot determine what they owe to others – whether to humans or to other non-human animals – as a matter of justice. This suggestion interprets justice as involving a kind of reciprocity: an agent to whom justice is due must also in principle be an agent who could dispense justice to others, by virtue of having the relevant capacity, even if for physical reasons – such as suffering from severe disability – they cannot do so in practice.

If this suggestion is rejected, and we allow that some animals, at least, should be included within the scope of justice, we can then ask about the form that justice should take in their cases. Using the distinction drawn in 2.4 above, it appears that justice for animals must be non-comparative. For example, we might attribute rights to the animals over whom we exercise power – rights against cruel treatment, and rights to food and shelter, for instance. This would involve using a sufficiency principle to determine what animals are owed as a matter of justice. It is much less plausible to think that comparative principles might apply, such that giving special treats to one cat but not another could count as an injustice.

The Rawlsian view introduced in the previous section, which holds that principles of social justice apply among people who are engaged together in a co-operative practice, is a leading example of a relational theory of justice. Other theories offer different accounts of the relevant justice-generating feature: for example, Nagel has argued that principles of distributive justice apply among people who by virtue of being citizens of the same state are required both to comply with, and accept responsibility for, the coercive laws that govern their lives (Nagel 2005). In both cases, the claim being made is that when people stand in a certain relationship to one another, they become subject to principles of justice whose scope is limited to those within the relationship. In particular, comparative principles apply within the relationship, but not beyond it. If A stands in a relationship (of the right kind) to B , then it becomes a matter of justice how A is treated relative to B , but it does not matter in the same way how A is treated relative to C who stands outside of the relationship. Justice may still require that C be given treatment of a certain kind, but that will be justice in its non-comparative guise.

Whether justice is relational in either of the ways that Rawls and Nagel suggest has large implications for its scope. In particular it bears on the question whether there is such a thing as global distributive justice, or, in contrast, whether distributive principles only apply to people who are related together as members of the same society or citizens of the same state. For example, might the global inequalities that exist between rich and poor in today’s world be unjust simply as inequalities, or are they unjust only insofar as they prevent poor people from living lives that we judge to be acceptable? (see entries on international distributive justice and global justice ) So much hangs on the question whether, and if so in virtue of what, distributive justice has a relational character. What reason can be given for thinking that it does?

Suppose we have two people A and B , of whom one is significantly better off than another – has greater opportunities or a higher income, say. Why should this be a concern of justice? It seems it will not be a concern unless it can be shown that the inequality between A and B can be attributed to the behaviour of some agent, individual or collective, whose actions or omissions have resulted in A being better off than B – in which case we can ask whether the inequality between them is justifiable, say on grounds of their respective deserts. This reiterates the claim in 1.4 above that without an agent to whom the outcome can be attributed there can only be justice or injustice in a metaphorical, ‘cosmic’, sense. Relational theorists claim that when people associate with one another in the relevant way, they become agents of justice. On a small scale they can organize informally to ensure that each receives what is due to him relative to the rest. On a larger scale, distributive justice requires the creation of legal and other institutions to achieve that outcome. Moreover failure to co-ordinate their actions in this way is likely to be a source of injustice by omission.

Debates about the scope of justice then become debates about whether different forms of human association are of the right kind to create agency in the relevant sense. Take the question of whether principles of social justice should apply to market transactions. If we see the market as a neutral arena in which many individual people freely pursue their own purposes, then the answer will be No. The only form of justice that arises will be justice in the conduct of each agent, who must avoid inflicting harm on others, must fulfil her contracts, and so forth. Whereas if we see the market as governed by a humanly-constructed system of rules that the participants collectively have the power to change – by legislation, for example – then we cannot avoid asking whether the outcomes it currently produces meet relevant standards of distributive justice, whatever we take these to be. A similar issue arises in the debate about over principles of global justice referred to above: is the current world order such that it makes sense to regard humanity as a whole as a collective agent responsible for the distributive outcomes it allows to occur?

Once institutions are established for the purpose (among other things) of delivering justice on a large scale, we can ask what duties of justice individual people have in consequence. Is their duty simply to support the institutions, and comply with whatever rules of conduct apply to them personally? Or do they have further duties to promote justice by acting directly on the relevant principles in their daily lives? No one doubts that some duties of justice fall directly on individuals, for example duties not to deceive or defraud when engaging in commercial transactions (and duties of corrective justice where behaviour is faulty), or duties to carry out one’s fair share of an informally organized project from which one expects to benefit, such as cleaning up the neighbourhood park. Others fall on them because they are performing a role within a social institution, for example the duty of an employer not to discriminate on grounds of race or gender when hiring workers, or the duty of a local government officer to assign public housing to those in greatest need. But what is much more in dispute is whether individual people have more extensive duties to promote social justice (for contrasting views, see Cohen 2008, ch. 3, Murphy 1998, Rawls 1993, Lecture VII, Young 2011, ch. 2).

Consider two cases: the first concerns parents who confer advantages on their children in ways that undermine fair equality of opportunity. If the latter principle of justice requires, to cite Rawls, that ‘those who have the same level of talent and ability and the same willingness to use these gifts should have the same prospects of success regardless of their social class of origin’ (Rawls 2001, p. 44) then there are myriad ways in which some parents can bestow advantages on their children that other parents cannot – financial benefits, educational opportunities, social contacts, and so forth – that are likely to bring greater success in later life. Are parents therefore constrained as a matter of justice to avoid conferring at least some of these advantages, or are they free to benefit their children as they choose, leaving the pursuit of equal opportunities entirely in the hands of the state (for a careful analysis, see Brighouse and Swift 2014)?

The second example concerns wage differentials. Might individuals whose talents can bring them high rewards in the labour market have a duty not to make use of their bargaining power, but instead be willing to work for a fair wage – which if fairness is understood in egalitarian terms might mean the same wage as everyone else (perhaps with extra compensation for those whose labour is unusually burdensome)? Rawls, as we saw above, argued that economic justice meant arranging social and economic inequalities to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and in formulating the principle in this way he assumed that some inequalities might serve as incentives to greater production that would also raise the position of the worst-off group in society. But if individuals were willing to forego incentives, and so economic inequalities served no useful purpose, then the arrangement that worked to the greatest benefit of the (otherwise) least advantaged would be one of strict equality. Cohen (2008) argues that Rawls’ position is internally inconsistent. As citizens designing our institutions we are supposed to be guided by the difference principle, but as private actors in the marketplace, we are permitted to ignore that principle and bargain for higher wages, even though doing so will work to the disadvantage of the worst-off group. Justice, according to Cohen, requires us to embrace an ethos of service that disdains material incentives.

Why might we hesitate before agreeing that in cases such as these, justice requires people to refrain from doing things that they are permitted to do by the public rules of their society (passing on benefits to their children; seeking higher wages)? One reason is that the refraining is only going to have a significant effect if it is practised on a large scale, and individuals have no assurance that others will follow their example; meanwhile they (or their children) will lose out relative to the less scrupulous. A connected reason has to do with publicity: it may be hard to detect whether people are following the required ethos or not (see Williams 1998). Is the person who sends her child to a private school because she claims he has special needs that the local state school cannot meet being sincere, or is she just trying to buy him comparative advantage? How can we tell whether the person who claims more money, but merely, he says, as compensation for the unusual stress that his work involves, is reporting honestly? (for Cohen’s response, see Cohen 2008, ch. 8) It appears, then, that there are principles of justice that apply to what Rawls calls ‘the basic structure of society [as] a public system of rules’ that do not apply in the same way to the personal behaviour of the individuals who live within that structure. Attending to the scope , as well as the content , of justice is important.

Recent philosophical writing on justice has drawn attention to forms of injustice that do not involve the material treatment that people receive, either from other persons or from institutions, but the harms they suffer through failures of recognition. They are impacted by social norms and social practices that diminish their sense of agency and induce them to see themselves as of lesser value than others. Here then justice is understood as being adequately and appropriately recognized, and injustice as involving failures of recognition, or in some cases ‘misrecognition’, when a person is placed in a category or assigned an identity that is not their own. In one influential formulation of this idea, ‘it is unjust that some individuals and groups are denied the status of full partners in social interaction simply as a consequence of institutionalized patterns of cultural value in whose construction they have not equally participated and which disparage their distinctive characteristics or the distinctive characteristics assigned to them’ (Fraser in Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 29).

What, then, does it mean to be recognized? In general it means to be viewed and treated by others in the way that is appropriate to the features that you possess, but most philosophers regard recognition as multidimensional. In particular, they distinguish between being recognized as an equal, where a person is accorded the kind of standing that gives them an equal status with other members of the relevant group, and being recognized for having characteristics, achievements or an identity that may be uniquely their own. Recognition in this second sense may involve the unequal granting of social esteem. Justice as recognition, therefore, is internally complex. At the social level, Axel Honneth distinguishes ‘three forms of social recognition, based in the sphere-specific principles of love, equal legal treatment, and social esteem’ (Fraser and Honneth 2003 p. 180)

The question that arises is how best to understand the relationship between justice of this kind and distributive justice, involving the allocation of material resources and so forth. For Honneth, justice as recognition is understood expansively so that it can also capture issues of economic justice, the thought being that the harm inflicted when, say, labour is not adequately rewarded can be understood as a failure to offer adequate recognition of the worker’s social contribution. For Nancy Fraser, by contrast, recognition and redistribution are seen as two mutually irreducible but jointly necessary conditions for social justice. Failures of recognition can be experienced by some among the economically privileged – such as ‘the African-American Wall Street banker who cannot get a taxi to pick him up’ (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 34). Justice as recognition requires cultural shifts in the way that different forms of identity and different types of achievement are valued that are independent of the institutional changes required to achieve distributive justice.

A particular form of recognitional injustice is epistemic injustice as diagnosed by Miranda Fricker (Fricker 2007). This occurs when someone is wronged in their capacity as a source of knowledge, and it takes two main forms: testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice. As Fricker explains ‘testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word; hermeneutical injustice occurs at a prior stage when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone as at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences’ (Fricker 2007, p. 1). She argues that testimonial injustice matters for two reasons. First, the person who suffers from it is less able to protect or advance their interests – for example they are less likely to be believed when having to defend themselves in court. Second, since others are unwilling to regard them as competent sources of knowledge, they may lose trust in their own capacity to know, leading in some cases to ‘prolonged self-doubt and loss of intellectual confidence’.

Hermeneutical injustice arises in the context of unequal relationships in which the subordinated party lacks the concept or concepts needed to make sense of their experience (and thereby to challenge their subordination). Fricker uses the example of a woman who suffered sexual harassment at the time before feminists had developed that concept, and so had no adequate word to describe what she was experiencing. Hermeneutical injustice matters most when it is systematic, brought about by power inequalities that leave certain groups ‘hermeneutically marginalised’. However she treats epistemic justice as a virtue that individual hearers can develop, in contrast to recognition theorists like Fraser and Honneth for whom achieving recognitional justice requires collective action to change social and cultural norms on the part of misrecognized groups.

4. Utilitarianism and Justice

Can justice be understood in utilitarian terms? This may in the first place depend on how we interpret utilitarianism. We treat it here as a normative theory whose aim is to supply a criterion – the greatest happiness principle – that can be used, directly or indirectly, both by individuals and by institutions (such as states) in deciding what to do, rather than simply as a tool for evaluating states of affairs. Utilitarianism cannot plausibly provide a theory of justice unless it is interpreted in this action-guiding way, in light of what was said above about justice and agency. We also assume that the most likely candidate will be a rule-utilitarian view that treats principles of justice as belonging to the set of rules which when followed by the relevant agents will tend to produce the greatest total utility (for different ways of formulating this view, see the entry on rule consequentialism) .

Most utilitarians have regarded it as part of their task in defending utilitarianism to show that it can both accommodate and explain much of what we intuitively believe about justice. This is certainly true of two of the greatest among them, John Stuart Mill and Sidgwick, both of whom went to considerable lengths to show that familiar principles of justice could be given a utilitarian rationale (Mill Utilitarianism , ch. 5; Sidgwick 1874/1907, Book III, ch.5). Bentham, in contrast, was more cavalier: ‘justice, in the only sense in which it has a meaning, is an imaginary personage, feigned for the convenience of discourse, whose dictates are the dictates of utility, applied to certain particular cases’ ( The Principles of Morals and Legislation , pp. 125–6). If we follow the lead of Mill and Sidgwick in wishing to take seriously how justice is commonly understood, the utilitarian has two challenges to face. First he or she must show that the demands of justice as commonly understood correspond roughly to the rules that when followed by persons, or implemented by institutions, are most conducive to the greatest happiness. They need not mirror the latter exactly, because utilitarians will argue, as both Mill and Sidgwick did, that our intuitions about justice are often ambiguous or internally inconsistent, but there must be enough overlap to warrant the claim that what the utilitarian theory can accommodate and explain is indeed justice . (As Sidgwick (1874/1907, p. 264) put it, ‘we may, so to speak, clip the ragged edge of common usage, but we must not make excision of any considerable portion’.) Second, some explanation must be given for the distinctiveness of justice. Why do we have a concept that is used to mark off a particular set of requirements and claims if the normative basis for these requirements and claims is nothing other than general utility? What accounts for our intuitive sense of justice? The task confronting the utilitarian, then, is to systematize our understanding of justice without obliterating it.

By way of illustration, both Mill and Sidgwick recognize that desert , of both reward and punishment, is a key component of common understandings of justice, but they argue that if we remain at the level of common sense when we try to analyse it, we run into irresolvable contradictions. For instance, we are inclined to think that a person’s deserts should depend on what they have actually achieved – say the economic value of what they have produced – but also, because achievement will depend on factors for which the person in question can claim no credit, such as inborn talent, that their deserts should depend only on factors for which they are directly responsible, such as the amount of effort they expend. Each of these conceptions, when put into practice, would lead to a quite different schedule of rewards, and the only means to escape the impasse, these utilitarians claim, is to ask which schedule will generate most utility by directing people’s choices and efforts in the most socially productive way. Similar reasoning applies to the principles of punishment: the rules we should follow are the rules that are most conducive to the ends for which punishment is instituted, such as deterring crime.

To explain the distinctiveness of justice, Mill suggests that it designates moral requirements that, because of their very great importance to human well-being, people have a right to have discharged, and are therefore matters of perfect obligation. A person who commits an injustice is always liable to punishment of some kind, he argues. So he explains our sense of justice in terms of the resentment we feel towards someone who breaches these requirements. Sidgwick, who laid greater stress than Mill on the connection between justice and law, also underlined the relationship between justice and gratitude, on one side, and resentment, on the other, in order to capture the way in which our concern for justice seems to differ from our concern for utility in general.

Yet despite these efforts to reconcile justice and utility, three serious obstacles still remain. The first concerns what we might call the currency of justice: justice has to do with the way that tangible benefits and burdens are assigned, and not with the happiness or unhappiness that the assignees experience. It is a matter of justice, for example, that people should be paid the right amount for the jobs that they do, but, special circumstances aside, it is no concern of justice that John derives more satisfaction from his fairly-earned income than Jane does from hers (but see Cohen 1989 for a different view). There is so to speak, a division of labour, under which rights, opportunities, and material benefits of various kinds are allocated by principles of justice, while the conversion of these into units of utility (or disutility) is the responsibility of each individual recipient (see Dworkin 2000, ch. 1). Utilitarians will therefore find it hard to explain what from their point of view seems to be the fetishistic concern of justice over how the means to happiness are distributed, rather than happiness itself.

The second obstacle is that utilitarianism judges outcomes by totalling up utility levels, and has no independent concern for how that utility is distributed between persons. So even if we set aside the currency issue, utilitarian theory seems unable to capture justice’s demand that each should receive what is due to her regardless of the total amount of benefit this generates. Defenders of utilitarianism will argue that when the conduct-guiding rules are being formulated, attention will be paid to distributive questions. In particular, when resources are being distributed among people we know little about individually, there are good reasons to favour equality, since in most cases resources have diminishing marginal utility – the more of them you have, the less satisfaction you derive from additional instalments. Yet this is only a contingent matter. If some people are very adept at turning resources into well-being – they are so-called ‘utility monsters’ – then a utilitarian should support a rule that privileges them. This seems repugnant to justice. As Rawls famously put the general point, ‘each member of society is thought to have an inviolability founded on justice which….even the welfare of every one else cannot override’ (Rawls 1971, p. 28; Rawls 1999, pp. 24–25).

The third and final difficulty stems from utilitarianism’s thoroughgoing consequentialism. Rules are assessed strictly in the light of the consequences of adopting then, not in terms of their intrinsic properties. Of course, when agents follow rules, they are meant to do what the rule requires rather than to calculate consequences directly. But for a utilitarian, it is never going to be a good reason for adopting a rule that it will give people what they deserve or what they are entitled to, when desert or entitlement are created by events in the past, such as a person’s having performed a worthwhile action or entered an agreement. Backward-looking reasons have to be transmuted into forward-looking reasons in order to count. If a rule such as pacta sunt servanda (‘agreements must be kept’) is going to be adopted on utilitarian grounds, this is not because there is any inherent wrongness in defaulting on a compact one has made, but because a rule that compacts must be kept is a useful one, since it allows people to co-ordinate their behaviour knowing that their expectations about the future are likely to be met. But justice, although not always backward-looking in the sense explained, often is. What is due to a person is in many cases what they deserve for what they have done, or what they are entitled to by virtue of past transactions. So even if it were possible to construct a forward-looking rationale for having rules that closely tracked desert or entitlement as these are normally understood, the utilitarian still cannot capture the sense of justice – why it matters that people should get what is due to then – that informs our common-sense judgements.

Utilitarians might reply that their reconstruction preserves what is rationally defensible in common sense beliefs while what it discards are elements that cannot survive sustained critical reflection. But this would bring them closer to Bentham’s view that justice, as commonly understood, is nothing but a ‘phantom’.

5. Contractarianism and Justice

The shortcomings of utilitarianism have prompted several recent philosophers to revive the old idea of the social contract as a better way of bringing coherence to our thinking about justice. The idea here is not that people actually have entered a contract to establish justice, or that they should proceed to do so, but that we can understand justice better by asking the question: what principles to govern their institutions, practices and personal behaviour would people choose to adopt if they all had to agree on them in advance? The contract, in other words, is hypothetical; but the search for agreement is meant to ensure that the principles chosen would, when implemented, not lead to outcomes that people could not accept. Thus whereas a utilitarian might, under some circumstances, be prepared to support slavery – if the misery of the slaves were outweighed by the heightened pleasures of the slave-owners – contractarians claims that no-one could accept a principle permitting slavery, lest they themselves were destined to be slaves when the principle was applied.

The problem that contractarians face is to show how such an agreement is possible. If we were to ask people, in the real world, what principles they would prefer to live under, they are likely to start from a position of quite radical disagreement, given their interests and their beliefs. Some might even be willing to endorse slavery, if they were fairly certain that they would not end up as slaves themselves, or if they were sado-masochists who viewed the humiliations inflicted on slaves in a positive light. So in order to show how agreement could be achieved, contractarians have to model the contracting parties in a particular way, either by limiting what they are allowed to know about themselves or about the future, or by attributing to them certain motivations while excluding others. Since the modelling can be done differently, we have a family of contractarian theories of justice, three of whose most important members are the theories of Gauthier, Rawls and Scanlon.

Gauthier (1986) presents the social contract as a bargain between rational individuals who can gain through co-operating with one another, but who are competing over the division of the resulting surplus. He assumes that each is interested only in trying to maximise his own welfare, and he also assumes that there is a non-co-operative baseline from which the bargaining begins – so nobody would accept a solution that left her less well off than in the baseline condition. Each person can identify the outcome under which they fare best – their maximum gain – but they have no reason to expect others to accept that. Gauthier argues that rational bargainers will converge on the principle of Minimax Relative Concession , which requires each to concede the same relative proportion of their maximum possible gain relative to the non-co-operative baseline. Thus suppose there is a feasible arrangement whereby each participant can achieve two-thirds of their maximum gain, but no arrangement under which they all do better than that, then this is the arrangement that the principle recommends. Each person has made the same concession relative to the outcome that is best for them personally – not accepting the same absolute loss of welfare, let it be noted, but the same proportionate loss.

There are some internal difficulties with Gauthier’s theory that need to be recorded briefly (for a full discussion, see Barry 1989, esp. Part III). One is whether Minimax Relative Concession is in fact the correct solution to the bargaining problem that Gauthier introduces, as opposed to the standard Nash solution which (in a simple two-person case) selects the outcome in which the product of the two parties’ utilities is maximised (for discussion of different solutions to the bargaining problem, see the entry on contemporary approaches to the social contract , § 3.2). A second is whether Gauthier is able to justify positing a ‘Lockean’ baseline, under which each is assumed to respect the natural rights of the others, as the starting point for bargaining over the surplus – as opposed to a more conflictual ‘Hobbesian’ baseline in which individuals are permitted to use their natural powers to threaten one another in the process of establishing what each could expect to get in the absence of co-operation. But the larger question is whether a contract modelled in this way is an appropriate device for delivering principles of justice. On the one hand, it captures the idea that the practice of justice should work to everyone’s advantage, while requiring all those involved to moderate the demands they make on one another. On the other hand, it prescribes a final distribution of benefit that appears morally arbitrary, in the sense that A ’s bargaining advantage over B – which stems from the fact that his maximum possible gain is greater than hers – allows him to claim a higher level of benefit as a matter of justice . This seems implausible: there may be prudential reasons to recommend a distribution that reflects the outcome that self-interested and rational bargainers would arrive at, but claims of justice need a different basis.

John Rawls’ theory of justice is the most widely-cited example of a contractarian theory, but before outlining it, two words of caution are necessary. First, the shape of the theory has evolved from its first incarnation in Rawls (1958) through his major work A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971) and on to Rawls (1993) and Rawls (2001). Second, although Rawls has consistently claimed that the principles of justice he defends are the principles that would be selected by people in a suitably designed ‘original position’ in which they are asked to choose the social and political institutions they will live under – this is what qualifies his theory as contractarian – it is less clear how important a role the contract itself plays in his thinking. His principles, which are discussed elsewhere (see the entry on John Rawls) , can be defended on their own merits as a theory of social justice for a modern liberal society, even if their contractual grounding proves to be unsound. Rawls presents the contracting parties as seeking to advance their own interests as they decide which principles to favour, but under two informational constraints. First, they are not allowed to know their own ‘conception of the good’ – what ends they personally find it most valuable to pursue – so the principles must be couched in terms of ‘primary goods’, understood as goods that it is better to have more rather than less of whatever conception of the good you favour. Second, they are placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ that deprives them of any knowledge of personal characteristics, such as their gender, their place in society, or the talents and skills they possess. This means that they have no basis on which to bargain for advantage, and have to consider themselves as generic persons who might be male or female, talented or untalented, and so forth. In consequence, Rawls argues, all will choose to live under impartial principles that work to no-one’s advantage in particular.

The problem for Rawls, however, is to show that the principles that would be selected in such an original position are in fact recognizable as principles of justice . One might expect the parties to calculate how to weigh the primary goods (which Rawls catalogues as ‘rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth’) against each other, and then to choose as their social principle ‘maximise the weighted sum of primary goods, averaged across all persons’. This, however, would bring the theory very close to utilitarianism, since the natural method of weighing primary goods is to ask how much utility having a given quantity of each is likely, on average, to bring (for the claim that utilitarianism would be chosen in a Rawlsian original position, see Harsanyi 1975). Since Rawls wishes to reject utilitarianism, he has to adjust the psychology of the parties in the original position so that they reason differently. Thus he suggests that, at least in developed societies, people have special reason to prioritise liberty over the other goods and to ensure that it is equally distributed: he argues that this is essential to safeguard their self-respect. In later writing his argument is less empirical: now the parties to the contract are endowed with ‘moral powers’ that must be exercised, and it is then fairly easy to show that this requires them to have a set of basic liberties.

When he turns to the distribution of income and wealth, Rawls has to show why his choosers would pick the difference principle, which considers only the position of the worst-off social group, over other principles such as maximising average income across the whole society. In Theory of Justice he does this by attributing special psychological features to the choosers that make it appropriate for them to follow the ‘maximin’ rule for decisions under uncertainty (choose the option whose worst possible outcome is least bad for you). For example, they are said to be much more concerned to achieve the minimum level of income that the difference principle would guarantee them than to enjoy increases above that level. In his later work, he abandons this reliance on maximin reasoning and gives greater prominence to another argument hinted at in Theory . This portrays the contracting parties as starting out from the presumption that income and wealth should be distributed equally, but then recognizing that all can benefit by permitting certain inequalities to arise. When these inequalities are governed by the difference principle, they can be justified to everyone, including the worst off, thus creating the conditions for a more stable society. But we need then to ask why equal distribution should be treated as the benchmark, departures from which require special justification. When Rawls says that it is ‘not reasonable’ for any of the parties initially to expect more than an equal share (Rawls 1971, p. 150; Rawls 1999, p. 130), is this simply a corollary of their position as rational choosers behind a veil of ignorance, or has Rawls in addition endowed them with a substantive sense of justice that includes this presumption of equality?

Although Rawls throughout presents his theory of justice as contractarian, we can now see that the terms of the contract are in part determined by prior normative principles that Rawls engineers the parties to follow. So in contrast to Gauthier, it is no longer simply a case of self-interested contractors negotiating their way to an agreement. Rawls candidly admits that the contractual situation has to be adjusted so that it yields results that match our pre-existing convictions about justice. But then we may ask how much work the contractual apparatus is really doing (see Barry 1989, ch. 9 for a critical appraisal).

Scanlon (1998) does not attempt to deliver a theory of justice in the same sense as Rawls, but his contractarian account of that part of morality that specifies ‘what we owe to each other’ covers much of the same terrain (for an explicit attempt to analyse justice in Scanlonian terms, see Barry 1995). Like Rawls, Scanlon is concerned to develop an alternative to utilitarianism, and he does so by developing a test that any candidate moral principle must pass: it must be such that no-one could reasonably reject it as the basis for informed, unforced general agreement (see the entry on contractualism ). Scanlon’s contractors are not positioned behind a veil of ignorance. They are able to see what effect adopting any proposed principle would have on them personally. If that effect is unacceptable to them, they are permitted to reject it. Each person has, so to speak, a veto on any general principle for regulating conduct. Those that survive this test are defensible as principles of justice – Scanlon concedes that there might be alternative sets of such principles appropriate to different social conditions.

It might seem, however, that giving each person a veto would lead straightforwardly to deadlock, since anyone might reject a principle under which he fared badly relative to some alternative. Here the idea of reasonable rejection becomes important. It would not, Scanlon thinks, be reasonable to reject a principle under which one does badly if the alternatives all involve someone else faring worse still. One needs to take account of other people’s reasons for rejecting these alternatives. It might then appear that Scanlon’s contractualism yields the difference principle, which requires the worst-off group in society to be as well of as they can be. But this is not the conclusion that Scanlon draws (though he acknowledges that there might be special reasons to follow Rawls in requiring basic social institutions to follow the difference principle). The claims of other groups must be considered too. If a policy greatly benefits many others, while slightly worsening the position of a few, though without leaving them very badly off, it may well not be rejectable. Scanlon’s position leaves some room for aggregation – it makes a difference how many people will be benefitted if a principle is followed – though not the simple form of aggregation that utilitarians defend.

Scanlon also says that a person can have a reason for rejecting a principle if it treats them unfairly, say by benefitting some but not others for arbitrary reasons. This presupposes a norm of fairness that the contractarian theory does not itself attempt to explain or justify. So it looks as though the purpose of the theory is to provide a distinctive account of moral reasoning (and moral motivation) but not to defend any substantive principles of distributive justice. In this respect, Scanlon’s contractualism is less ambitious than either Gauthier’s or Rawls’.

6. Egalitarianism and Justice

In the recent past, many philosophers have sought to establish a close connection between justice and equality: they ask the question ‘what kind of equality does justice require?’, and to that several competing answers have been given (see, for example Cohen 1989, Dworkin 2000, Sen 1980). But we should not be too hasty to assume that what justice demands is always equality, whether of treatment or of outcome. Perhaps it does so only in a formal sense. As we saw in sect 1.3, justice requires the impartial and consistent application of rules, from which it follows that when two people are alike in all relevant respects, they must be treated equally. But, as Aristotle among others saw, justice also involves the idea of proportional treatment, which implies recipients getting unequal amounts of whatever good is at issue (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , Book V, ch. 3). If A is twice as deserving or twice as needy as B , justice may require that she receives more than B does. So here formal equality of treatment – the same rule applied to both – leads to an unequal outcome. Again, when justice takes the conservative form of respect for existing entitlements or legitimate expectations (see para 2.1) there is no reason to anticipate that what is due to different people will be substantively the same.

So we need to ask about the circumstances in which justice requires a substantively equal distribution of advantages. One rather obvious case occurs when the members of the group within which the distribution is going to occur have no relevant distinguishing features, so there are no grounds on which some can claim greater shares of benefit than others. Suppose a group experiences a windfall gain for which no-one can claim any credit: a pot of gold somehow appears in their midst. Then unless any member can make a justice-related claim for a larger-than-equal share – say that she has special needs that she lacks sufficient resources to meet – an equal distribution of the gold is what justice demands, since any other distribution would be arbitrary. Equality here is the default principle that applies in the absence of any special claims that can be presented as reasons of justice.

Equality also acts as a default in circumstances where, although people may indeed have unequal claims to whatever good is being distributed, we have no reliable way of identifying and measuring those claims. By sharing the good equally, we can at least ensure that every claim has been partially satisfied. Thus suppose we have limited supplies of a drug that can treat malaria, and a number of patients displaying symptoms of the disease, but lacking specialised medical knowledge we cannot tell whether one person’s condition is more serious than another’s; then by sharing out the drug equally, we can guarantee that each person at least receives the highest fraction of what they really need. Any other distribution must leave at least one person with less (this of course assumes that there is no threshold amount of the drug beneath which it is ineffective; if that assumption is wrong, justice under the stated conditions might require a lottery in which the chosen ones receive threshold-size doses).

If justice requires equality only by default, it might seem to apply only in a narrow range of cases. How could egalitarian justice be made more robust? One approach involves declaring a wider range of factors irrelevant to just distribution. Thus one formulation of the principle holds that no-one should be worse-off than anyone else as a result of their ‘morally arbitrary’ characteristics, where a characteristic is morally arbitrary when its possessor cannot claim credit for having it. This captures a widespread intuition that people should not be advantaged or disadvantaged by virtue of their race or gender, but extends it (more controversially) to all personal features with a genetic basis, such as natural talents and inborn dispositions. In doing so, it discounts most claims of desert, since when people are said to deserve benefits of various kinds, it is usually for performing actions or displaying qualities that depend upon innate characteristics such as strength or intelligence. In the following section, we will see how egalitarian theories of justice have tried to incorporate some desert-like elements by way of response. But otherwise justice as equality and justice as desert appear to be in conflict, and the challenge is to show what can justify equal treatment in the face of inequalities of desert.

A second approach answers this challenge by explaining why it is positively valuable to afford people equal treatment even if they do display features that might appear to justify differential treatment. A prominent advocate of this approach is Dworkin, who argues that fundamental to justice is a principle of equal concern and respect for persons, and what this means in more concrete term is that equal resources should be devoted to the life of each member of society (Dworkin 2000). (The reference to membership here is not redundant, because Dworkin understands egalitarian justice as a principle that must be applied within sovereign states specifically – so in the terms of 3.2, this is a relational view of justice.) The thought is that showing persons equal respect may sometimes require us to afford them equal treatment, even in the face of relevant grounds for discrimination. Thus we insist on political equality – one person, one vote – even though we know that there are quite large differences in people’s competence to make political decisions.

As noted above, justice as simple equality of treatment seems open to the objection that it fails to acknowledge the agency of the recipients, who may have acted in ways that appear to qualify them to receive more (or less) of whatever benefit is being distributed. To answer this objection, several recent philosophers have presented alternative versions of ‘responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism’ – a family of theories of justice that treat equal distribution as a starting point but allow for departures from that baseline when these result from the responsible choices made by individuals (see Knight and Stemplowska 2011 for examples). These theories differ along several dimensions: the ‘currency of justice’ used to define the baseline of equality, the conditions that must be fulfilled for a choice to qualify as responsible, and which among the consequences that follow from a choice should count when the justice of an outcome is being assessed (it may in particular appear unjust to allow people to suffer the full consequences of bad choices that they could not reasonably have anticipated). The label that is often used to describe a sub-class of these theories is ‘luck egalitarianism’. According to luck egalitarians, justice requires that no-one should be disadvantaged relative to others on account of ‘brute’ bad luck, whereas inequalities that arise through the exercise of personal responsibility are permissible (for a full discussion of luck egalitarianism, see the entry on justice and bad luck ). ‘Brute’ luck is interpreted widely to include not only external circumstances such as one person’s initially having access to more resources than another, but also internal factors such as possessing natural abilities or disabilities, or having involuntarily acquired expensive tastes. All such inequalities are to be ironed out by redistribution or compensation, while people’s choices about how to use the assets they are granted should be respected, even if this leads to significant inequality in the long run.

Luck egalitarianism has proved surprisingly influential in recent debates on justice, despite the evident difficulties involved in, for example, quantifying ‘brute luck disadvantage’ in such a way that a compensatory scheme could be established. There are, however, a number of problems it has to face. By giving scope to personal responsibility, it seeks to capture what is perhaps the most attractive part of the conventional idea of desert – that people should be rewarded for making good choices and penalised for making bad ones – while filtering out the effects of having (undeserved) natural talents. But in reality the choices that people make are influenced by the talents and other qualities that they happen to have already. So if we allow someone to reap advantages by, for example, devoting long hours to learning to play the piano at a high level, we must recognize that this is a choice that she would almost certainly not have made unless early experiment showed that she was musically gifted. We cannot say what she would have chosen to do in a counterfactual world in which she was tone deaf. There seems then to be no coherent half-way house between accepting full-blooded desert and denying that people can justly claim relative advantage through the exercise of responsibility and choice (see further Miller 1999, ch. 7) .

A second problem is that one person’s exercise of responsibility may prove advantageous or disadvantageous to others, even though they have done nothing to bring this change about, so from their point of view it must count as ‘brute’ luck. This will be true, for example, in any case in which people are competing to excel in some field, where successful choices made by A will worsen the comparative position of B , C , and D . Or again, if A acts in a way that benefits B , but does nothing comparable to improve the position of C and D , then an inequality is created that counts as ‘brute bad luck’ from the perspective of the latter. One of the most influential exponents of luck egalitarianism seems to have recognized the problem in a late essay: ‘unlike plain egalitarianism, luck egalitarianism is paradoxical, because the use of shares by people is bound to lead to a distribution flecked by luck’ (Cohen 2011, p. 142).

We have seen that equality can sometimes be understood as required by justice; but it can also be valued independently. Indeed there can be circumstances in which the two values collide, because what justice demands is inequality of outcome. The kind of inequality that is independently valuable is social equality, best understood as a property of the relationships that prevail within a society: people regard and treat each other as social equals, and the society’s institutions are designed to foster and reflect such attitudes. A society of equals contrasts with one in which people belong to different ranks in a social hierarchy, and behave towards one another as their relative ranking prescribes. Different reasons can be given for objecting to social inequality, and conversely for valuing social equality (see Scanlon 2003).

Those who find equality valuable for reasons other than reasons of distributive justice are often described as ‘relational egalitarians’ (see Anderson 1999, Wolff 1998, Fourie, Schuppert and Wallimann-Helmer 2015). It is tempting to regard relational egalitarianism as a rival theory of justice to the luck egalitarian theory outlined in §6.2, but it may be more illuminating to see it instead as providing an alternative account of why we should care about limiting material inequality. Thus, faced with a world like the one we currently inhabit in which income differences are very large, justice theorists are likely to criticize these inequalities on grounds that they are not deserved, or arise from brute luck, etc., whereas relational egalitarians will say that they create a divided society in which people are alienated from each other, and cannot interact in a mutually respectful way. Relational equality does not address issues of distribution directly, and so cannot function as a theory of justice itself, but it can provide grounds for preferring one theory of justice to its rivals – namely that implementing that particular theory is more likely to create or sustain a society of equals.

We saw at the beginning of this article that justice can take a number of different forms, depending on the practical context in which it is being applied. Although we found common elements running through this diversity of use – most readily captured in Justinian’s ‘suum cuique ’ formula – these were formal rather than substantive. In these circumstances, it is natural to look for an overarching framework into which the various contextually specific conceptions of justice can all be fitted. Three such frameworks were examined: utilitarianism, contractarianism and egalitarianism. None, however, passed what we might call the ‘Sidgwick/Rawls test’, namely that of incorporating and explaining the majority at least of our considered convictions about justice – beliefs that we feel confident in holding about what justice requires us to do in a wide and varied range of circumstances (for Rawls’ version of the test see the entry on reflective equilibrium ). So unless we are willing to jettison many of these convictions in order to uphold one or other general framework, we will need to accept that no comprehensive theory of justice is available to us; we will have to make do with partial theories – theories about what justice requires in particular domains of human life. Rawls himself, despite the bold title of his first book ( A Theory of Justice ), came to recognize that what he had outlined was at best a theory of social justice applied to the basic institutional structure of a modern liberal state. Other forms of justice – familial, allocative, associational, international – with their associated principles would be applicable in their respective domains (for an even more explicitly pluralist account of justice, see Walzer 1983; for a fuller defence of a contextual approach to justice, see Miller 2013, esp. ch. 2).

One way to loosen up our thinking about justice is by paying greater attention to the history of the concept. We can learn a great deal by reading what Aristotle, or Aquinas, or Hume, has to say about the concept, but as we do so, we also see that elements we would expect to find are missing (there is nothing about rights in Aristotle, for example), while others that we would not anticipate are present. This may in some part be due to the idiosyncrasies of each thinker, but more importantly it reflects differences in the form of social life in which each was embedded – its economic, legal and political structure, especially. Various attempts have been made to write histories of justice that are more than just catalogues of what individual thinkers have said: they aim to trace and explain systematic shifts in the way that justice has been interpreted (for contrasting examples, see MacIntyre 1988, Fleischacker 2004, Johnston 2011). These should not be read as enlightenment stories in which our understanding of justice steadily improves as the centuries roll by. MacIntyre’s view, for example, is that modern liberal societies cannot sustain the practices within which notions of justice find their proper home. We can get a better grasp of what justice means to us by seeing the various conceptions that compete for our attention as tied to aspects of our social world that did not exist in the past, and are equally liable to disappear in the future.

Anderson, Elizabeth, 1999, “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics , 109: 287–337.
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–––, The Politics , translated by Thomas Sinclair, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962.
Barry, Brian, 1989, Theories of Justice , Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.
–––, 1995, Justice as Impartiality , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bentham, Jeremy, The Principles of Morals and Legislation , ed. Laurence Lafleur, New York: Hafner Press, 1948.
Brighouse, Harry and Adam Swift, 2014, Family Values: the ethics of parent-child relationships , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Buchanan, Allen, 1987, “Justice and Charity,” Ethics , 97: 558–75.
Casal, Paula, 2007, “Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough,” Ethics , 117: 296–326.
Cohen, G.A., 1989, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” Ethics , 99: 906–44.
–––, 1995, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 2008, Rescuing Justice and Equality , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
–––, 2011, “Fairness and Legitimacy in Justice, and: Does Option Luck ever Preserve Justice?” in On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice and Other Essays in Political Philosophy , edited by Michael Otsuka, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Coleman, Jules, 1992, Risks and Wrongs , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Donaldson, Sue and Will Kymlicka, 2011, Zoopolis: a political theory of animals rights , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dworkin, Ronald, 2000, Sovereign Virtue: the theory and practice of equality , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Feinberg, Joel, 1970, “Justice and Personal Desert,” in Doing and Deserving: essays in the theory of responsibility , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
–––, 1974, “Noncomparative Justice,” Philosophical Review , 83: 297–338.
Fleischacker, Samuel, 2004, A Short History of Distributive Justice , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Fourie, Carina, Fabian Schuppert and Ivo Wallimann-Helmer (eds.), 2015, Social Equality: on what it means to be equals , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frankfurt, Harry, 2015, On Inequality , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth, 2003, Redistribution or Recognition? : a political-philosophical exchange , London: Verso.
Fricker, Miranda, 2007, Epistemic Injustice; power and the ethics of knowing , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Garner, Robert, 2013, A Theory of Justice for Animals , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gauthier, David, 1986, Morals by Agreement , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Harsanyi, John, 1975, “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’s Theory,” American Political Science Review , 69: 594–606.
Hayek, Friedrich, 1976, Law, Legislation and Liberty (Volume II: The Mirage of Social Justice ), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature , edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.
–––, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals , edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
Johnston, David, 2011, A Brief History of Justice , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Kagan, Shelly, 2012, The Geometry of Desert , New York: Oxford University Press.
Knight, Carl and Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), 2011, Responsibility and Distributive Justice , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lind, E. Allan and Tom Tyler, 1988, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice , New York and London: Plenum Press.
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 1988, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? , London: Duckworth.
Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarianism in Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Representative Government , ed. A.D. Lindsay, London: Dent, 1964.
Miller, David, 1999, Principles of Social Justice , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
–––, 2013, Justice for Earthlings: essays in political philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Montague, Phillip, 1980, “Comparative and Non-Comparative Justice,” Philosophical Quarterly , 30: 131–40.
Murphy, Liam, 1998, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 27, 251–91.
Nagel, Thomas, 2005, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 33, 113–47.
Nozick, Robert, 1974, Anarchy, State and Utopia , Oxford: Blackwell.
Nussbaum, Martha, 2006, Frontiers of Justice: disability, nationality, species membership , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Okin, Susan, 1989, Justice, Gender, and the Family , New York: Basic Books.
Olsaretti, Serena (ed.), 2003, Justice and Desert , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Paul, Jeffrey (ed.), 1982, Reading Nozick : essays on Anarchy, State, and Utopia , Oxford: Blackwell.
Perry, Stephen, 2000, “On the Relationship between Corrective and Distributive Justice,” in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Fourth Series , edited by Jeremy Horder, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Raphael, D. D., 2001, Concepts of Justice , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Rawls, John, 1958, “Justice as Fairness,” Philosophical Review , 67: 164–94.
–––, 1971, A Theory of Justice , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
–––, 1993, Political Liberalism , New York: Columbia University Press.
–––, 1999, A Theory of Justice , revised edition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
–––, 2001, Justice as Fairness: a restatement , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ripstein, Arthur, 2004, “The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort,” Fordham Law Review , 72: 1811–44.
Sandel, Michael, 1982, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scanlon, T. M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
–––, 2003, “The Diversity of Objections to Inequality,” in The Difficulty of Tolerance: essays in political philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sen, Amartya, 1980, “Equality of What?” in Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Volume 1 , ed. S. McMurrin, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sidgwick, Henry, 1874/1907, The Methods of Ethics , London: Macmillan.
Valentini, Laura, 2014, “Canine Justice: An Associative Account,” Political Studies , 62: 37–52.
Walzer, Michael, 1983, Spheres of Justice: a defence of pluralism and equality , New York: Basic Books.
Williams, Andrew, 1998, “Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 27: 225–47.
Wolff, Jonathan, 1991, Robert Nozick : property, justice and the minimal state , Cambridge: Polity.
–––, 1998, “Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 27: 97–122.
Young, Iris Marion, 2011, Responsibility for Justice , New York: Oxford University Press.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

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These John Lewis Quotes Will Inspire You to Continue the Fight for Social Justice

Alongside Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X, John Lewis was a champion in the fight for civil rights and social justice. As an activist, politician, and statesman, he served in the US House of Representatives for 33 years.

It’s easy to think that the civil rights movement is a part of the distant past and that American society has made leaps and bounds since that time. But John Lewis only just passed away on July 17, 2020.

Black Americans and all people of color and minority groups have suffered intolerable injustices and this is not history. There is still so much work to be done in the fight for equality and justice.

Brave men and women like John Lewis fought for equality, social justice, and basic humanity, and as the next generation, it is up to us to continue their fight for a better, more equitable world.

Black Female Festival Founder Creates Global Wellness + Social Justice Event

These 17 John Lewis Quotes Will Inspire You to Continue the Fight for Lasting Change:

“Too many of us still believe our differences define us.”
“You cannot be afraid to speak up and speak out for what you believe. You have to have courage, raw courage.”

“Never let anyone – any person or any force – dampen, dim, or diminish your light.”

“You have to have the capacity and the ability to take what people did, and how they did it, and forgive them and move on.”
“If you see something that is not right, not fair, not just, you have a moral obligation to do something about it.”

“Never be afraid to make some noise and get in good trouble, necessary trouble.”

“Be hopeful. Be optimistic. Never lose that sense of hope.”
“Release the need to hate, to harbor division, and the enticement of revenge. Release all bitterness.”

“If not us, then who? If not now, then when?”

“Sometimes you have to get in the way. You have to make some noise by speaking up and speaking out against injustice and inaction.”
“Do not get lost in a sea of despair. Do not become bitter or hostile.”

“Nothing can stop the power of a committed and determined people to make a difference.”

“You have to take the long, hard look and just believe that if you’re consistent, you will succeed.”

“We may not have chosen the time, but the time has chosen us.”

“We must respect the dignity and worth of every human being.”

“Change often takes time. It rarely happens all at once.”
“Those of us who are committed to the cause of justice need to pace ourselves because the struggle does not last for one day, one week, or one year, but it is the struggle of a lifetime, and each generation must do its part.”

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Let These John Lewis Quotes Inspire You to Get Into Some Good Trouble

John Lewis was a giant to the many lives he touched with his noble work. The many inspiring quotes he spoke continue to ring through the ears of each life that he altered.

10 Thich Nhat Hanh Quotes to Cultivate Compassion, Empathy and Peace

May John Lewis’s memory be an inspiration to us all – to continue fighting for social justice, and continue getting into some “good trouble, necessary trouble” along the way.

May his memory and his inspiring words aid us in our quest to create a better world for all future generations to enjoy.

9 Personal Development Books by Black Authors That Will Seriously Inspire You

wonderful comments!

Leah Sugerman is a yoga teacher, writer, and passionate world traveler. An eternally grateful student, she has trained in countless traditions of the practice and teaches a fusion of the styles she has studied with a strong emphasis on breath, alignment, and anatomical integrity. Leah teaches workshops, retreats, and trainings both internationally and online.

leahsugerman.com

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Mahatma Gandhi Quotes About Justice

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Let the first act of every morning be to make the following resolve for the day: - I shall not fear anyone on Earth. - I shall fear only God. - I shall not bear ill will toward anyone. - I shall not submit to injustice from anyone. - I shall conquer untruth by truth. And in resisting untruth, I shall put up with all suffering.

There is a higher court than courts of justice and that is the court of conscience. It supercedes all other courts.

Truth never damages a cause that is just.

Civility does not ...mean the mere outward gentleness of speech cultivated for the occasion, but an inborn gentleness and desire to do the opponent good.

An unjust law is itself a species of violence. Arrest for its breach is more so.

Of all the evils for which man has made himself responsible, none is so degrading, so shocking, or so brutal as his abuse of the better half of humanity; to me, the female sex is not the weaker sex.

It is open to a war resister to judge between the combatants and wish success to the one who has justice on his side. By so judging he is more likely to bring peace between the two than by remaining a mere spectator.

No reform is possible unless some of the educated and the rich voluntarily accept the status of the poor, travel third, refuse to enjoy the amenities denied to the poor and, instead of taking avoidable hardships, discourtesies and injustice as a matter of course, fight for their removal.

A non-violent revolution is not a program of seizure of power. It is a program of transformation of relationships, ending in a peaceful transfer of power.

Peace will not come out of a clash of arms but out of justice lived and done by unarmed nations in the face of odds.

Justice does not help those who slumber but helps only those who are vigilant.

Justice that love gives is a surrender, justice that law gives is a punishment.

Non-cooperation is directed not against men but against measures. It is not directed against the Governors, but against the system they administer. The roots of non-cooperation lies not in hatred but in justice if not in love.

God is always the upholder of justice.

A weak man is just by accident. A strong but non-violent man is unjust by accident.

Be the change you want to see.

God, who is the embodiment of Truth and Right and Justice, can never have sanctioned a religion or practice which regards one - fifth of our vast population as untouchables.

It is impossible that God, who is the God of Justice, could have made the distinctions that men observe today in the name of religion.

The first condition of nonviolence is justice all round, in every department of life.

Even the dog is described by the poet to have received justice under Ramarajya.

God of Truth and Justice can never create distinctions of high and low among His own children.

There are unjust laws as there are unjust men.

The only true resistance to this Government... [is] to cease to co-operate with it.

Even a believer in nonviolence has to say between two combatants which is less bad or whose cause is just.

We win justice quickest by rendering justice to the other party.

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Mahatma Gandhi

Born: October 2, 1869
Died: January 30, 1948
Occupation: Civil rights leader
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Justice in The Merchant of Venice: 3 key ideas (with quotes, analysis & video)

(This post contains a detailed video on the topic.)

In my previous post on The Merchant of Venice , I argue that among Shakespeare’s many plays, Merchant is perhaps one of his most discomfiting for modern audiences.

For starters, despite its designation as a ‘comedy’, there’s actually not much about the play that inspires the sort of belly-up laughter we get from Falstaff in the Henry plays, or the chuckles we grant Bottom in A Midsummer Night’s Drea m.

And given Merchant ‘s clear ‘antisemitic’ undertones, this discomfort is especially felt in a post-Holocaust world. Indeed, part of what makes this play disturbing is the seeming normalisation – and at points, justification – of racial prejudice, and most problematically, it’s all done in the name of “the law”.

What is ‘justice’?

The question of what constitutes justice is especially complex in Merchant, if only because Shakespeare forces us to double back and examine the roots of justice, and to question if justice, like morality, can ever be objectively defined.

According to the Cambridge Dictionary, the noun ‘justice’ comes in several meanings, including:

Fairness in the way people are dealt with
The condition of being morally correct or fair
The system of laws by which people are judged and punished

There’s something paradoxical about the definitions here.

History shows us that what determines ‘moral fairness’ often depends on the dominant religious, social and political norms of a given era or society, but do the ‘systems of laws’ – which are ever evolving – always square with the codes of ‘moral fairness’?

Besides, if something’s legal, does it necessarily also make it just?

We know what happened with slavery – it was perfectly legal in America before 1865, but nowadays no one would consider penal labour to be anything less than a moral evil.

Or to use another example closer in time, homosexuality wasn’t legal in the United Kingdom until the Sexual Offences Act was passed in 1967 (Oscar Wilde was famously jailed in 1895 for “gross decency” – read: homosexual acts), and it remains illegal in more conservative societies even today. So goes miscegenation, which was illegal under the 1950 Immorality Act of South Africa as part of apartheid policies, until the Act was repealed in the 1980s.

merchant of venice justice prejudice law

Nowadays, virtually no one would agree that slavery, anti-miscegenation or persecuting homosexuals qualify as “fairness in the way people are dealt with”, but they were all legal at different points in history.

So one of the key problems that arise in Merchant , then, is this chasm between ‘what’s just’ versus ‘what’s legal’, and the moral issues that could result from the misalignment of ‘justice’ and ‘legality’.

The historical context of Merchant : ‘the Jewish problem’ in pre-Enlightenment England

In the play, law and justice are presented as two sides of the same coin, and is the basis on which opposite sides (the Christians vs the Jew) lodge their attack against each other.

In a society where Jewish stereotyping was run-of-the-mill, we see the Christians win out in what is essentially a ‘rigged’ race, which is staged as a combat of lexical wit and legal manipulation, rather than a trial of fair judgment and equal justice.

The Elizabethan audience, however, would have had little qualms about seeing the ‘unfair’ suffering of a Jew. This goes back to the 1290 Edict of Expulsion , which was promulgated by Edward I to resettle the entire Jewish population in England.

Thereafter, Jewish presence in English society was hidden and scant, and it wasn’t until Oliver Cromwell’s efforts to allow open Jewish faith practice in the 1650s that Jews started to slowly reassimilate into English society.

Edward I England Oliver Cromwell jewish question merchant of venice context

Having died in 1616, then, it’s likely that Shakespeare had never met a real Jew in his life. This would apply to the playgoers of Shakespeare’s time as well, so Jews back then weren’t so much thought of as actual people with flesh, blood (or indeed, to use Shylock’s famous words, “hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions”), but as a vague, vilified stereotype in the cultural imagination.

From what most sources can tell, Shakespeare himself was almost certainly not a ‘racist’ or an ‘anti-Semite’, so why did he choose to cast a Jew as a figure of “extreme cruelty” (as indicated on the cover of the 1623 First Folio) to explore the theme of justice?

Part of this was likely inspired by political events: in 1594, Elizabeth I’s physician, an ethnically Jewish converso named Roderigo Lopez, was executed for having allegedly conspired to poison the Queen.

At Lopez’s public execution, the Jew cried that he had “loved the Queen as much as he did Jesus Christ”, which invited no sympathy, only jeers of the cruellest sort.

Elizabeth I Roderigo Lopez merchant of venice context

As Lopez died at the scaffold, Shakespeare would most probably have been in the crowd, looking on at this harrowing sight. Given the flimsiness of the ‘evidence’ involved in Lopez’s case, whether the law was ‘right’ or ‘just’ seemed irrelevant to the Jew’s sentencing, and it’s possible that Lopez was given such a gruesome sentence largely because he was Jewish, and as such, assumed to be evil.

As a humanist playwright whose sensitivities would have been sharply attuned to the problems and limitations of the law, Shakespeare probably had his own suspicions as he set to work on another production for the Globe stage, the result of which was The Merchant of Venice, written between 1596 – 1599 but first performed in 1605.

3 key ideas of justice in The Merchant of Venice

In this post, I outline 3 key ideas of justice as presented in Merchant , which I’ll analyse in relation to relevant moments from the play:

Justice is not always granted by the law
Justice is a socio-economic necessity
Justice favours victors, not victims

The key moments I’ll reference include:

Act 2 Scene 8 : Salanio mocks Shylock’s frustration over the loss of his daughter and money
Act 3 Scene 2 : Bassanio picks the ‘casket’ that will win him Portia’s hand in marriage
Act 3 Scene 3 : Shylock insists that he will claim his ‘pound of flesh’ bond from Antonio
Act 4 Scene 1 : ‘The trial scene’, in which Portia-as-Balthazar wins the case against Shylock

… and watch my video lecture here:

Key idea 1: Justice is not always granted by the law

One of the most curious things about the play is Shylock’s unwavering faith in ‘the law’.

Despite Shylock’s awareness of the deep-rooted anti-Semitism in Venice, he seems to have absolute trust in the Venetian law’s impartiality.

And yet, we know that the law is far from a set of objective rules that one can rely on for definitive judgment or justice, but rather, is of a nature that requires subjective interpretation, skilful litigation, and heavy contextualisation.

Given the inherent bias that Venetian Christians hold against Jews, then, one would imagine that most Jews at the time would be savvy enough not to rely on Christian justices (and they would most certainly have been Christians) for a truly fair sentence, even though ‘fairness’ is strictly speaking, the spirit of the law.

In Act 2 Scene 8, we hear about Shylock’s insistence on legal justice, when Salanio recounts the usurer’s frustration over his loss of both daughter and ducats through an unflattering report –

SALANIO: I never heard a passion so confused, So strange, outrageous, and so variable, As the dog Jew did utter in the streets: ‘My daughter! O my ducats! O my daughter! Fled with a Christian! O my Christian ducats! Justice! The law! My ducats, and my daughter! A sealed bag, two sealed bags of ducats, Of double ducats, stolen from me by my daughter! And jewels, two stones, two rich and precious stones, Stolen by my daughter! Justice! Find the girl; She hath the stones upon her, and the ducats.’ (2.8)

While it must be caveated that these are reported words provided by an anti-Semitic Christian (and as such, the veracity of which is doubtful), it’s worth noting that Shylock apparently equates “justice” with “the law”, just as he equates “my daughter” with “my ducats”.

And while Salanio’s characterisation of Shylock is one of mockery, his comment of Shylock’s passion as one that’s “so strange” is telling.

After all, there’s nothing “strange” about a father’s rage over his daughter’s thievery and abandonment, so why is Shylock’s response deemed unnatural?

To the Christian Salanio, perhaps what’s “strange” isn’t Shylock’s reaction to Jessica’s escape, but instead, his blind – almost laughable – trust in the Venetian courts of law. The fact that Shylock would expect Christian justice for a “dog Jew” is maybe a bit too naïve, and indeed, foreboding of the lack of justice (or at least vindication) that Shylock will be met later at court in Act 4 Scene 1.

On the other hand, Bassanio is under no illusions about the prejudices inherent in Venetian law, notwithstanding his favourable position as a Christian.

We see this in Act 3 Scene 2 (the ‘casket’ scene), when Bassanio delivers his speech on how “outward shows” shouldn’t be trusted –

BASSANIO: So may the outward shows be least themselves: The world is still deceived with ornament. In law, what plea so tainted and corrupt, But, being seasoned with a gracious voice, Obscures the show of evil? […]

This is a damning, but sobering, diagnosis of the justice system, and exposes the unreliability of the law.

The point Bassanio makes is one that continues to hold true in the 21st century: the law isn’t above deceit, nor is it always capable of seeing through the “show of evil” to deliver true justice for all.

Even the most “tainted and corrupt… plea” can escape legal punishment, as long as it’s skilfully concealed and “seasoned with a gracious voice”.

It’s interesting, then, that Portia (as Balthasar) should later use rhetorical skill to lawyer Shylock out of his pursuit of justice. In her famed ‘mercy’ speech, she echoes the word Bassaonio uses – “season” – when she says that “earthly power doth then show likest God’s/When mercy seasons justice”.

This idea that justice is ‘seasonable’ – in the sense of alterable, is surely problematic for someone like Shylock, who fails to recognise that justice isn’t composed of decrees carved in stone, but is instead pliable to the bending and twisting of whoever administers it.

Bassanio’s use of performative diction – “shows”, “the show”, “ornament”, “voice” etc. – suggests a cheeky parallel between the court and the stage, which undercuts the traditional seriousness one would associate with the law, and invites one to consider if the law deserves the level of trust that most would invest in it, especially when it appears that rhetoric sometimes overrides truth in the determination of ‘justice’.

Considering the law’s intimidating, and at times, intervening, presence in Renaissance theatre (and in Shakespeare’s professional career), it wouldn’t seem unlikely for the Bard to make a subtle dig at the legal institutions of his time.

Key idea 2: Justice is a socio-economic necessity

merchant of venice justice mercy quotes analysis summary act 3 scene 1 Antonio bassanio shylock

Why is justice necessary?

In a modern liberal democracy, justice is necessary because people subscribe to values like human rights, liberty, equality etc. (which are all Enlightenment ideas that didn’t gain popular currency until the 17th century).

But in the Renaissance, justice was a concept inseparable from God, and specifically, a result of divine judgment. What was deemed ‘just’ would have been based on Christian doctrine, and yet, between the Hebrew Old Testament and the Christian New Testament, views on what constitutes ‘justice’ diverge radically.

Is justice the ‘eye for an eye’ sort as prescribed in the Deuteronomy and reflected in the Book of Exodus?

Or is it of the ‘turn the other cheek’ variety that Jesus exhorts in his Sermon on the Mount?

For Shylock, whose worldview aligns with the Old Testament, he sees it his Old Testament God-given right to demand retributive justice, especially when his ‘pound of flesh’ bond was agreed to by the opposite party, Antonio, in the first place.

Technically, there’s nothing wrong with his insistence on Antonio’s fulfilment of the bond, but it’s clear that he wants Antonio’s flesh out of spite, bitterness, and a desire to avenge the long-standing abuse he’s suffered at the hands of the Christian merchant.

In Shylock’s mind, the prospect of turning the Christian law against a Christian, and to witness this as a Jew relegated to the social side lines, is more than just schadenfreude – it is God’s way of finally vindicating him, and is his one shot at justice on his own terms.

shylock Antonio merchant of venice pound of flesh Old Testament quotes summary analysis

Seen from the lens of Venetian racial power dynamics, Shylock’s pursuit of justice is his way of asserting power as a relatively powerless figure, and as such, a matter of emotional and existential necessity. As he cries –

SHYLOCK: I’ll have my bond; speak not against my bond: I have sworn an oath that I will have my bond. Thou call’dst me dog before thou hadst a cause; But, since I am a dog, beware my fangs: The duke shall grant me justice. […] (3.3)

The triple epistrophe of “my bond” suggests Shylock’s borderline obsession with exacting the ‘justice’ he believes is due him, and highlights just how important he sees this as an opportunity to one-up Antonio in return for being called “a dog”.

Shylock even implies that he’s the more reasonable of the two (despite the cruelty of his bond), because unlike the Christian, who insulted him “before thou hadst a cause”, his “cause” is apparent and mutually agreed to: to have his loan repaid on time, or to fulfil the bond of his desire, and it’s now come to the latter because Antonio couldn’t live up to his own promise.

What’s striking, though, is the colon that follows Shylock’s zoomorphic reference of “since I am a dog, beware my fangs:/The duke shall grant me justice”. This creates a non sequitur; while a colon normally functions to introduce supplementary and related information, the latter line here doesn’t logically follow from the former.

What link is there between ‘being a dog’ and having justice granted?

Is Shylock perhaps suggesting that because he has suffered Christian persecution and bigotry for so long, it is high time that the state compensates him by granting him the justice he wants?

Notwithstanding the ambiguity of this reading, it shows Shakespeare’s humanistic sensitivity as a playwright, in that he can capture even the slightest psychological inflections of his characters through the interplay of punctuation and style.

Antonio’s understanding of justice, on the other hand, is neither ‘Old Testament’ retributive nor, curiously enough, charitable in the New Testament sense (which would be closer to Portia’s appeal for ‘mercy’). Instead, Antonio sees justice as a matter of political necessity and commercial leverage, which he expresses after failing to persuade Shylock –

SALARINO: I am sure the duke Will never grant this forefeiture to hold. ANTONIO: The duke cannot deny the course of law: For the commodity that strangers have With us in Venice, if it be denied, Will much impeach the justice of his state; Since that the trade and profit of the city Consisteth of all nations. […] (3.3)

This is spoken like a true merchant, and of course, we know that Antonio, rather than Shylock, is the titular ‘Merchant of Venice’.

The string of mercenary diction – “commodity”, “trade” and “profit” – highlights that Antonio’s identity is a merchant first, and a Christian second.

He believes that justice and the law make foreigners want to do business in Venice, which relies on international “trade and profit” to thrive. Antonio’s sacrifice, then, is for an economic imperative, and as such, of a secular, not Christian, nature.

The largesse he shows towards the state is noble, but not exactly virtuous, and his willingness to give his life up for the reputation of the state is contrasted against Shylock’s narrow-minded obsession with pursuing justice for his own “cause”.

It is important to remember, however, that Shakespeare doesn’t intend for us to view this contrast through moral filters, because Antonio’s belief in justice is merely pragmatic, not morally superior.

Ultimately, the merchant believes in the importance of justice not because he prizes fairness, goodwill or fellow feeling, but because he views it as what ensures the continuation of Venetian commerce, which is the only lineage he claims kin with.

Key idea 3: Justice favours victors, not victims

merchant of venice justice mercy quotes analysis summary act 4 scene 1 shylock portia trial scene the quality of mercy is not strained

Finally, we come to what is probably one of the two most famous speeches in Merchant (the other being Shylock’s ‘Hath not a Jew eyes’ monologue): Portia’s eloquent appeal on “the quality of mercy”.

It’s a rhetorical tour de force with a power perhaps not even the most ardent Shylock sympathisers can deny, and yet, it reveals the central problematics that lie at the heart of Venetian ‘justice’ –

PORTIA: The quality of mercy is not strained, It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven Upon the place beneath: it is twice blest; It blesseth him that gives and him that takes: ‘Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes The throned monarch better than his crown; His sceptre shows the force of temporal power, The attribute to awe and majesty, Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings; But mercy is above this sceptred sway; It is enthroned in the hearts of kings, It is an attribute to God himself; And earthly power doth then show likest God’s When mercy seasons justice. Therefore, Jew, Though justice be thy plea, consider this, That, in the course of justice, none of us Should see salvation: we do pray for mercy; And that same prayer doth teach us all to render The deeds of mercy. I have spoke thus much To mitigate the justice of thy plea; Which if thou follow, this strict court of Venice Must needs give sentence ‘gainst the merchant there.

Portia is speaking to a Jew in Christian terms, which exposes a fundamental mismatch between the two parties.

She argues that merciful, not punitive, justice, is “an attribute to God himself”, but Portia’s God isn’t Shylock’s God, who is the wrathful Yahweh of Abraham, Lot, Sodom and Gomorrah, not the forgiving God of Jesus Christ.

The “salvation” that Portia speaks of is alien to Shylock, because Judaic soteriology points to true salvation as the vindication of the Jewish people.

And indeed, Shylock’s demand for justice in the form of a Christian’s flesh isn’t simply a matter of legalistic adherence, but also ethnic vengeance.

This is why, despite Portia having “spoke thus much”, all her words seem to fall on deaf ears. When Shylock cries “my deeds upon my head! I crave the law”, we see that Portia’s eloquence is no more than gibberish talk to the Jew.

Portia, The Merchant of Venice. Sir James Dromgole Linton. Oil painting, ca. 1895. Folger Shakespeare Library. | The merchant of venice, Venice photos, Venice

As such, despite the rhetorical brilliance Portia demonstrates in this moment, her extensive use of Christian imagery reveals that she is an ineffective communicator, because she doesn’t speak in a language that is familiar to her target of persuasion.

It is surely ironic, then, that after Portia’s appeal to charity, she should deliver such a harsh, vindictive, pronouncement against Shylock.

By dint of lexical attention, she is able to exploit the semantics of the law and turn the tables on her Jewish adversary –

Tarry a little; there is something else. This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood; The words expressly are ‘a pound of flesh:’ Take then thy bond, take thou thy pound of flesh; But, in the cutting it, if thou dost shed One drop of Christian blood, thy lands and goods Are, by the laws of Venice, confiscate Unto the state of Venice.

Now, it’s hard to believe that any law would be so ludicrous as to allow for the cutting of flesh without the expectation that blood should be shed.

But of course, Shakespeare’s point isn’t to have his audience question the semantic loopholes of the Venetian law; it’s likelier that he wanted to give his Christian viewers a triumphant reprieve, and to have them leave the theatre having had the politically correct ‘last laugh’, as it were.

Not content with simply pandering to the crowds, however, Shakespeare draws our attention to the unequal justice that undergirds the system of law in a heavily biased society, which only ever leaves the marginalised ‘others’ with a thin veil of protection.

And when a society operates only by the law of the majority identity or belief (i.e. Venetian Christians), it’s perhaps little wonder that those who are persecuted (i.e. Jews) would be doubly adamant in their efforts to pursue their own course of justice, or be doubly vehement that their wishes be granted when the opportunity arises.

Still, if history has taught us anything, the marginalised don’t always win.

As if it wasn’t clear enough that Shylock is the ‘other’, the ‘alien’, the ‘Jew’ in the play, the 1623 First Folio reinforces our sense of his otherness by abruptly changing Shylock’s name to the racial tag – “Jew” – upon his entering the court scene.

For modern sensitivities, though, the “Jew’s” rapid defeat will probably inspire more pathos than laughter –

JEW: Is that the law? PORTIA: Thyself shalt see the act: For, as thou urgest justice, be assured Thou shalt have justice, more than thou desirest.

The parallelism of Portia’s “thou urgest justice…/Thou shalt have justice” smacks of the cadence in Deuteronomy 19:21, which states, in similar parallel echoes –

Your eye shall not pity. It shall be life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.

So while Portia preaches what Matthew advises in the New Testament – “if anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also”, her actions seem more Old Testament-esque.

What this suggests isn’t so much religious hypocrisy as the sobering reality that in any society, the dominant party always has the wherewithal and leeway to interpret and reinterpret whatever code or law in its favour.

So even if there was a ‘law’ to which all citizens in a given society are subject, it can never be fairly or justly administered to those who have the short end of the socio-political stick.

Realising that he’s been checkmated, Shylock relents and agrees to “take this offer… And let the Christian go”, but this time, Portia won’t let him go so easily, as she proceeds to taunt him with her ‘insistence’ on him having “all justice” –

PORTIA: Soft! The Jew shall have all justice; soft! No haste: He shall have nothing but the penalty. Ironically, the “penalty” here, while ostensibly referring to Antonio’s ‘pound of flesh’, has become Shylock’s penalty at the hands of the Venetian state – for threatening the life of a Christian as “an alien”. Finally, Portia declares her victory when she asks – PORTIA: Art thou contented, Jew? What dost thou say? SHYLOCK: I am content.

The Shylock at this point cuts a very different figure from his earlier self.

Having been indignant, bitter and blustering for most of the play, he is now reduced to a submissive husk, whose sole function is to echo the words of his Christian superiors, and to swallow consent where no consent is felt and no ‘justice’ is given.

So the only justice that remains at the end of the play rests solely with the Christians, as the way it should be in a cultural cosmos where Jews and ‘aliens’ are viewed not as individuals with rights, but simply agents that exist and are barely tolerated in society, let alone protected by law.

Through Shylock’s portrayal, we see Shakespeare’s greatness not only as a master of dramatic craft, but also a pioneer in humanistic thinking: instead of presenting ‘the Jew’ as an abhorrent stereotype (which would have been the prevailing view of his time), he opens up the possibility for his audiences to consider that the Jew’s “extreme cruelty” is as much a product of structural oppression as it is a human trait, and that the jeering, sneering Christians both at Roderigo Lopez’s execution and in the audience of the Globe are all complicit in that oppression.

So, is Shakespeare serving up a slice of the moral pie? Not quite, but a refusal to moralise or ‘virtue signal’ doesn’t mean the need to hold back from reflecting human cruelty, or to poke holes at the gossamer of social ‘justice’.

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Does Shylock deserve our sympathy? Watch the video below to find out!

For a detailed analysis on other Shakespearean plays, check out my posts below:

What does Romeo & Juliet show us about love?
Why is Hamlet such a fascinating character?
What does King Lear show us about blindness?
Ambition in Macbeth : 4 key ideas
What does Shakespeare show us about self-conscious men? Reading Othello and Cymbeline to find out

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3 thoughts on “ Justice in The Merchant of Venice: 3 key ideas (with quotes, analysis & video) ”

I bookmarked this and look forward to coming back to it soon for reading and reflection. – Joseph (Biblecia.com)

Great to hear, and thanks for reading Joseph!

Just finished rereading the play and love it’s deep irony and construction. Sadly one that will be buried: “The Holocaust changed everything.” Indeed. Am tickled though with Portia being so completely manipulative and a perfect liar to the court and her new husband – the ring trick. Of course she perverts justice by faking while easily preaching – “justice.” Antonio is also so evil, a violent hater, and irresponsible. Both casually conspire to destroy S-lock, Antonio – on a whim – the only principled and responsible man in the play and much of S-speare. Thru their lies and irresponsibility stripping Shylock not only of his wealth but his daughter and thus his culture, since Judaism being passed on thru the female. Who in the play is causing harm for the love of gold? S-lock, even being hated and attacked has husbanded his along with his coreligionists. Psychopathic, pure evil portrayed as “good.” Love it.

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Essay on Social Justice

Students are often asked to write an essay on Social Justice in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Social Justice

Understanding social justice.

Social justice is the fair treatment of all people in society. It’s about making sure everyone has equal opportunities, irrespective of their background or status.

Importance of Social Justice

Social justice is important because it promotes equality. It helps to reduce disparities in wealth, access to resources, and social privileges.

Role of Individuals

Every person can contribute to social justice. By treating others fairly, respecting diversity, and standing against discrimination, we can promote social justice.

In conclusion, social justice is vital for a balanced society. It ensures everyone has a fair chance to succeed in life.

Also check:

Paragraph on Social Justice

250 Words Essay on Social Justice

Social justice, a multifaceted concept, is the fair distribution of opportunities, privileges, and resources within a society. It encompasses dimensions like economic parity, gender equality, environmental justice, and human rights. The core of social justice is the belief that everyone deserves equal economic, political, and social opportunities irrespective of race, gender, or religion.

The Importance of Social Justice

Social justice is pivotal in fostering a harmonious society. It ensures that everyone has access to the basic necessities of life and can exercise their rights without discrimination. It is the cornerstone of peace and stability in any society. Without social justice, the divide between different socio-economic classes widens, leading to social unrest.

Challenges to Social Justice

Despite its importance, achieving social justice is fraught with challenges. Systemic issues like discrimination, poverty, and lack of access to quality education and healthcare are significant roadblocks. These challenges are deeply ingrained in societal structures and require collective efforts to overcome.

The Role of Individuals in Promoting Social Justice

Every individual plays a crucial role in promoting social justice. Through conscious efforts like advocating for equal rights, supporting policies that promote equality, and standing against discrimination, individuals can contribute to building a just society.

In conclusion, social justice is a fundamental principle for peaceful coexistence within societies. Despite the challenges, each individual’s conscious effort can contribute significantly to achieving this noble goal. The journey towards social justice is long and arduous, but it is a path worth treading for the betterment of humanity.

500 Words Essay on Social Justice

Introduction to social justice.

Social justice, a multifaceted concept, is often described as the fair and equitable distribution of resources and opportunities, where outside factors that categorize people into social strata are irrelevant. It encompasses the idea that all individuals should have equal access to wealth, health, well-being, justice, privileges, and opportunity irrespective of their legal, political, economic, or other circumstances.

Origins and Evolution of Social Justice

The concept of social justice emerged during the Industrial Revolution and subsequent civil revolutions as a counter to the vast disparities in wealth and social capital. It was a call for societal and structural changes, aiming to minimize socio-economic differences. The term was first used by Jesuit priest Luigi Taparelli in the mid-19th century, influenced by the teachings of Thomas Aquinas. Since then, the concept has evolved and expanded, encompassing issues like environmental justice, health equity, and human rights.

The Pillars of Social Justice

Social justice rests on four essential pillars: human rights, access, participation, and equity. Human rights are the fundamental rights and freedoms to which all individuals are entitled. Access involves equal opportunities in terms of resources, rights, goods, and services. Participation emphasizes the importance of all individuals contributing to and benefiting from economic, social, political, and cultural life. Equity ensures the fair distribution of resources and opportunities.

Social Justice in Today’s World

In the 21st century, social justice takes many forms and intersects with various areas such as race, gender, sexuality, and class. It is increasingly associated with the fight against systemic issues like racism, sexism, and classism. The Black Lives Matter movement, for instance, is a social justice movement fighting against systemic racism and violence towards black people. Similarly, the #MeToo movement is a fight for gender justice, aiming to end sexual harassment and assault.

Despite the progress, numerous challenges to social justice persist. Systemic and structural discrimination, political disenfranchisement, economic inequality, and social stratification are just a few. Moreover, the rise of populism and nationalism worldwide has further complicated the fight for social justice, as these ideologies often thrive on division and inequality.

Promoting social justice requires collective action. Individuals can contribute by becoming more aware of the injustices around them, advocating for policies that promote equity, and standing up against discrimination. Education plays a crucial role in this process, as it can foster a deeper understanding of social justice issues and equip individuals with the tools to effect change.

In conclusion, social justice is a powerful concept that advocates for a fairer, more equitable society. While significant strides have been made, numerous challenges remain, necessitating a continued commitment to promoting social justice. Through education and advocacy, individuals can play a crucial role in this ongoing effort. The pursuit of social justice, therefore, is not just a societal or institutional responsibility, but an individual one as well.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

If you’re looking for more, here are essays on other interesting topics:

Essay on Justice
Essay on Journalism
Essay on Job Experience

Apart from these, you can look at all the essays by clicking here .

Happy studying!

10 Most Influential Quotes By Indian Judges

Among other things, the judges of the Indian judiciary are known for their immense wisdom. In this article, we bring you some of the top quotes from our pillars of justice.

History owes an apology to LGBT persons for ostracization, discrimination. – Justice Indu Malhotra
Government alone will never be able to do it. It is only the people themselves who must utilize law for the purpose of bringing justice at the doorstep of the large masses of the people of the country. – Justice P.N Bhagwati
Bring up your sons like you bring up your daughters, so that they learn the tenderness. – Justice Leila Seth
The most important things- justice, equality, liberty, secularism – these are concepts if you teach your child when six or seven, they keep for the rest of their lives. Children have to realize you have to share with others. It’s not just enough to make money. – Justice Leila Seth
Education took us from thumb Impression to signature; Technology has taken us from signature to thumb impression, again. – Justice AK Sikri
It is better to be unique than to be best – Justice AK Sikri
A charter of morality made [gays’ and lesbians’] relationships hateful – Justice Chandrachud
Any system treating a woman with indignity, inequity and inequality or discrimination invites the wrath of the Constitution – Justice Dipak Mishra
To treat women as children of a lesser god is to blink at the Constitution itself – Justice Chandrachud
Our quest for technology should not be oblivious to the country’s real problems: social exclusion, impoverishment and marginalisation. Dignity and rights of individuals cannot be based on algorithms or probabilities- Justice Chandrachud .

YLCC would like to thank Simran Kaur for her valuable insights in this article.

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Useful Quotes For UPSC Mains Exam Gs And Essay Papers

Important Quotes for UPSC Civil Services Mains Exam General Studies and Essay Papers

Using quotes from revered personalities to emphasise your point adds a lot of value to your answers in the IAS exam. With the introduction of the GS 4 paper (Ethics, Integrity and Aptitude) and the changing nature of the Essay paper (UPSC mains 2018 Essay paper had four topics related to quotes/philosophy/character), it has become quite necessary to include some relevant quotes in the answers.

For the UPSC Exam , selecting quotes is important as quoting some celebrity/non-entity is likely to do more harm than good. During the preparation phase, an IAS aspirant can either classify quotes based on the source or organise them under broad pertinent categories such as education, Justice, etc.

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In this article, we have compiled a list of quotes which are important from the UPSC syllabus point of view. Also, the two ways to categorise the quotes for quick revision are illustrated below. Candidates are advised to use the approach that suits their study process.

Important Quotes for UPSC GS and Essay

Issue-based categories

The list given above is just a brief example. Aspirants should identify issues/keywords and make their list of UPSC relevant quotes.

Quotes categorised by author/personality

Although comprehensive, the table of odd quotes above is by no means exhaustive. IAS aspirants should go through UPSC mains GS and essay papers from past years to understand how these quotes can come in handy and then compile and categorise their own lists.

Also, read:

IAS 2024 - Your dream can come true!

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Natural Law—the idea of a moral code integral to and inseparable from whatever it is that makes us human—is tested in the events of Medea when characters make decisions contrary to their nature, when Jason , a husband, abandons his wife or when Medea , a mother, murders her children . Medea's decision to kill her children, even as a form of retribution, was as shocking to the ancient Athenians as it is to us today. It was then, as it is now, considered a violation of Natural Law. What is less intuitive for the modern reader is that Medea's being a "wild" woman from an uncivilized (i.e. non-Greek) country, rather than a Greek citizen of a city-state, suggests, at least for the other characters in the play, that she is volatile and poised to do something "unnatural." It is Natural Law as well that governs The Roles of Men and Women.

The purpose of justice in the play is to restore the natural balance disrupted by Jason's violation of Natural Law, his "unmanliness," in betraying his marriage vows to Medea. Creon , too, is guilty of injustice. His decision to exile Medea is doubly, perhaps even trebly, unjust. First, it is unjust for him to disrupt Natural Law by ignoring, when giving his daughter to Jason in marriage, the simple fact that Jason is already married. Second, he punishes Medea for his own violation of the natural order. Then based on hearsay and fear, he rhetorically justifies his unjust action by suggesting that Medea might harm his daughter: the crime he fears has not been committed. His ultimately being right (correct) does not make the original decision just (fair). There is an overarching sense in the play that Medea isn't seeking justice in response to Jason and Creon's crimes alone, but, rather, is seeking to correct one of Nature's fundamental injustices—the unequal suffering allotted to women and men. And yet, in seeking this justice, Medea commits the most violent act against Natural Law: she kills her own children. And in that action the entire idea of Natural Law becomes more complicated, as Medea's effort to seek justice leads to the deepest injustice, the inconsistencies of Natural Law and the justice required to maintain is revealed as problematic and irresolvable.

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Justice and Natural Law Quotes in Medea

I hear the first danger sign, Her wailing. It is a cloud she will ignite To flame as her fury grows.

Do you think I would have fawned on Creon Except to win some profit by my schemes? I would not have spoken to him – nor touched him. But he is such a fool that, When he could have arrested all my plans By banishing me, he has allowed me To stay this one day, in which three of my enemies I'll send to their death…

The direct way is best, the one at which I am most skilled: I'll poison them.

…But we are women too: We may not have the means to achieve nobility; Our cleverness lies in crafting evil.

Sacred rivers flow uphill: Justice and all things are reversed.

I'll send her gifts, the finest in the world: A finely woven dress and crown of beaten gold. The boys will take them.

All for nothing tortured myself with toil and care, And bore the cruel pains when you were born. Once I placed great hopes in you, that you Would care for my old age and yourselves Shroud my corpse. That would make me envied. Now that sweet thought is no more. Parted from you I shall lead a grim and painful life.

Hateful creature! O most detestable of women To the gods and me and all the human race! You could bring yourself to put to the sword The children of your womb. You have taken my sons and destroyed me.

No Greek woman Could ever have brought herself to do that. Yet I rejected them to marry you, a wife Who brought me enmity and death, A lioness, not human…

Postcolonial prophet or advocate of ‘barbaric justice’? A new take on the life and times of influential revolutionary writer Frantz Fanon

Lecturer, Literature and Creative Writing, Macquarie University

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Soldier. Psychiatrist. Revolutionary. Writer. More than half a century after his death, Frantz Fanon remains a powerful, polemical figure. Fanon wrote fiercely against racism and colonial violence at a time when Third Worldism – the idea of a united front between countries and peoples exploited by colonialism – seemed possible.

The Rebel’s Clinic: The Revolutionary Lives of Frantz Fanon – Adam Shatz (Head of Zeus)

Amid Algeria’s brutal war of independence from France (1954-62), Fanon wrote of the necessity of counter-violence in overthrowing colonial rule. In Algeria’s case, after 130 years of French indifference to the suffering of Algerians, he was right.

Fanon’s two best known books are Black Skin, White Masks , written when he was 27, and The Wretched of the Earth , finished six months before his death at 36 from leukaemia.

Black Skin, White Masks identified, analysed and denounced the impact racism had on the lives and minds of Black and colonised peoples in compelling, uncompromising terms.

The Wretched of the Earth is an anti-colonial manifesto, a case study of violence, and a history of the struggle for decolonisation written through the lens of the Algerian war for independence.

The searing language of these books, along with Fanon’s embrace of violence as a means to an end, have helped forge his reputation either as prophet – The Wretched of the Earth is sometimes referred to as the bible of decolonisation – or as an advocate of “barbaric justice”, in the words of Fanon’s contemporary the French author and journalist Jean Daniel Bensaid.

Fanon’s work has informed political movements and academic disciplines, from Black liberation movements and African decolonisation to post-colonialism and critical race theory.

In The Rebel’s Clinic, Adam Shatz examines the life and times of Fanon. Shatz is the US editor of The London Review of Books and a contributor to the New Yorker. His extensive research and analysis makes The Rebel’s Clinic as much a comprehensive guide to an era, as a biography of man.

For Shatz, Fanon – the man and his work – are of increasing relevance and importance today. Indeed the headline of a New York Times essay he wrote earlier this year was: “The World Has Caught Up to Frantz Fanon”.

For Shatz, in “an age consumed with racism, police violence and the legacy of European colonialism in the Middle East and Africa”, Fanon is all too relevant.

Doctor and ‘chief theoretician’

Born in the West Indian island of Martinique, a French department , Fanon left the island in March 1944 to fight in the second world war for a “free France”. He was 19. Believing in the values of the French republic – equality, brotherhood and liberty – Fanon was shocked at the racial hierarchy he encountered in the French army. Race determined a person’s rank, role and how they were treated,

Having grown up middle-class and “French educated” in Martinique, Fanon had anticipated being welcomed as a full French citizen, especially since he had chosen to fight. Wounded in the chest while fighting, he returned to Martinique briefly. He then went to France to study medicine, where he trained to become a psychiatrist.

Working in Lyon, Fanon encountered North African migrant workers whose “phantom pains” had been dismissed by French psychiatrists. Fanon saw the psychological impact of racism on these workers. This informed his practice as a psychiatrist, but also his thinking as a theorist and philosopher. In his work on disalienation, the processes by which patients could be healed from states of alienation and/or psychosis, Fanon would look to the role social factors played in mental health.

His residency at Saint Albans hospital under François Tosquelles, a reformist, Marxist/Freudian Catalan psychiatrist, was a crucial early experience.

In 1953, Fanon accepted a post as director of a clinic in Blida, Algeria. Here, he became fully appraised of the situation for Algerians living under French colonial rule. The founder of the Algiers psychiatry school Antoine Porot had described the Algerian Muslim as

hysterical, predisposed to criminality, and intellectually inferior: a primitive being driven by instinct and incapable of rational thought.

A group of medicos, including Fanon, and nurses at the Blida clinic.

The French colonial apparatus had created a radical, deliberate system of inequality. Yet in the Algerian people, Fanon saw an unrelenting resistance to assimilation to French values and culture. He admired this quality, joining the National Liberation Front (FLN). A resistance movement and the political branch of the Armed Liberation Front the FLN eventually rose to primacy in the war against France. It remains the ruling party in Algeria today.

While running the Blida clinic, Fanon was known for treating torturers, often French, in the morning, and their victims in the evening. Though his political loyalty lay with Algerians, his practice as a doctor was to treat whoever was in need: French or Algerian, torturer or tortured.

Eventually, however, Fanon was expelled from Algeria by the French for his revolutionary work. This included sedating battle-weary, resistance fighters for days at a time to help them return to the field.

Shatz describes Fanon as the FLN’s “roving ambassador” and “chief theoretician”. He spent the last years of his life running a clinic in Tunisia, taking part in military manoeuvres and political activities with the FLN and attending congresses in Africa and Europe, lobbying for the decolonisation of Africa.

Fanon was such an important figure in the struggle for decolonisation he was flown to Russia for medical treatment when first diagnosed with leukaemia. Later, with the assistance of the CIA, he went to the United States for a last ditch effort to save his life. The CIA’s role in trying to save Fanon was, according the Shatz, “a friendly overture” to the future government of Algeria. It was clear to the CIA, by then, that independence was inevitable.

Fanon died in the US in December 1961, just a few months before Algeria achieved independence from France.

According to his wishes, he was buried on Algerian soil. He spoke none of the languages of Algeria other than French; had lived in Algeria for a handful of years, yet saw this as no obstacle to national identity — his own as Algerian.

Homophobia and misogyny

Fanon’s works meld philosophy, psychiatry, lived experience and literature into a unique prose, oratorical in style. This is unsurprising given he dictated his early writing, firstly to his wife Josie Fanon, and later to a social worker at the clinic, Marie-Jeanne Manuellan.

Shatz wants to emphasise what is productive and relevant about Fanon’s work in our present moment. Fanon’s vision of nation-building, for instance, was one that went beyond identity politics.

A group of writers, including Fanon, sit around a conference table.

Shatz reassembles the parts of Fanon’s life often overshadowed by his reputation as an apologist for violence. He acknowledges what is difficult about Fanon. His admiration for him is “not unconditional”, and Fanon’s memory “is not well served by sanctification”. Indeed in 2001, reviewing an earlier biography of Fanon, Shatz observed,

Fanon’s apocalyptic aphorisms have not aged well […] While his faith in the therapeutic value of violence is now hard to fathom, much of what he wrote was eerily prescient.

Fanon is known for writing about the “cleansing” nature of violence in societies where colonialism wreaked existential and material destruction on colonised peoples. Revolutionary violence, he believed would recreate society, and “man”, from the ground up.

In his book, however, Shatz offers a different translation of Fanon’s French, substituting “cleansing” with the softer “dis-intoxicating”. Whether the latter word, with its suggestions of freeing from intoxication or enchantment, is any less morally loaded than “cleansing” is up for debate.

But Fanon’s prose and thinking are also characterised by homophobic and misogynistic language. In his case studies in The Wretched of the Earth, which include the rape of women, there is little to no consideration of the subjectivity of women. He deploys the idea of repressed homosexuality as an insult, and the language he uses to consider both the colonial and decolonised world focuses on men: both white and black. The gendering runs deep.

While there’s no doubt Fanon sought a new sense of nationhood, providing equality for all citizens, regardless of gender or race, this doesn’t mean it’s necessary or desirable to sidestep what is problematic in his work.

Rather it calls for the kind of reading Fanon himself was gifted at: a reading against the grain, as well as with it. Shatz certainly doesn’t ignore the problematic elements in Fanon’s work, but his emphasis remains on what was remarkable and productive about Fanon, rather than unpacking or navigating the difficult elements.

Still, Shatz’s framing of Fanon is sophisticated and erudite. He reconstructs an intellectual, political and cultural history of the mid-20th century. In the final chapters, he situates Fanon’s work amidst contemporary thinkers and movements, from Black Lives Matter to the struggles of the Palestinian people.

Very occasionally, Shatz teeters on the edge of trying to say more than is possible about Fanon given how little there is to recover about his private life. Fanon eschewed diaries. His wife Josie, who is largely absent from the biography, died in the late 1980s. (One of the few primary living resources Shatz had access to was Marie-Jeanne Manuellan to whom Fanon dictated The Wretched of The Earth.)

Shatz seems awkward when talking about Fanon’s affair with Elaine Klein, a Jewish woman and activist. Critic Jennifer Szalai, in her New York Times review of The Rebel’s Clinic, has criticised Shatz for not tackling the charge of Fanon’s violence towards his wife Josie, which came up in interviews conducted by scholar Félix Germain for his book Decolonising the Republic . In interviews with poet and journalist Paulin Joachim and Guadeloupean writer and academic Maryse Condé, Fanon was accused of being a violent man, of slapping his wife in public and private. And it’s possible to sense uncertainty in Shatz’s treatment of Fanon’s affairs. Shatz seems to suggest, but not declare outright, that the marriage was an open one, with Josie also having an affair.

Occasionally, Shatz leans into Fanon’s Martinican heritage and its place in his thought in ways that one feels Fanon himself might have resented, given his often disparaging remarks about Martinican culture.

Reading against the grain

In an earlier study of Fanon published in 2001, his biographer David Macey writes of Fanon’s notion of nationhood as based on a willing to be, rather than the place of one’s birth. In some respects, Macey allows Algeria’s story to both speak for and overshadow Fanon’s.

Shatz’s approach is to emphasise Fanon the man: the psychiatrist, the writer, the theorist, the anti-colonialist, drawing in Algeria’s history, alongside other influences on him. These included French existentialism, decolonisation, and Négritude , a literary movement whose chief proponents were the authors, poets and eventually politicians, Léopold Sédar Senghor (former president of Senegal) and Aimé Césaire (former president of the regional council of Martinique).

These two men influenced Fanon, however he diverged from the movement’s more essentialist ideas about black identity.

Both Shatz and Macey capture the extreme violence of both French and Algerian forces during the war of independence. Both sides planted bombs and massacred and tortured men and women, using techniques such as waterboarding and genital mutilation. The FLN severed limbs, lips and noses of villagers who broke bans on smoking – smoking is haram in Islam – as a way of demanding absolute loyalty to a future Arabic Islamic Algerian identity. The French guillotined captured Algerians, often without trial.

Fanon wrote The Wretched of the Earth knowing the Algerian revolutionaries he supported were matching the violence of the French, blow-for-blow.

If we read Fanon against the grain, not just to grapple with the limitations of his misogyny and homophobia, we can also see his life was one of complicity with the violence of the oppressed. Any act, from the severing of arms to the massacre of rivals, he argues, is justified if it results in overthrowing the oppressor. No matter the cost.

A sign featuring a quote from Frantz Fanon at a protest.

On the one hand, Fanon was a passionate advocate of the violence that would free colonised peoples from the oppressive degradation of the yoke of colonialism. On the other, he was in no way deluded about the psychic devastation caused by violence, whether experienced as perpetrator or victim.

This complicated nexus produced some of his most powerful insights into the social formation of the psyche. His was an almost devout belief in the necessity of striving towards a way of being that resisted traditionalism, particularities, and tribalisms.

He warned, too, of the prospect of a violent, class colonialism in which a “native elite” might take the place of their colonial masters. Shatz writes that Fanon anticipated the “ Mobutus and the Mugabes ” of the future, the “big men” who would “drape themselves in African garb”, yet rule by corruption and exploitation of power.

How we read Fanon – whether as literature, history, philosophy, psychiatric case study, or manifesto – will shape our views on his thoughts about violence. Good reading is itself a work in progress, a work requiring the kinds of exhaustive research and thinking Shatz brings to Fanon.

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Illinois just gave $1.6 million to 'justice-focused' community solar projects

T hanks to a new infusion of state funding, three projects benefiting traditionally under-resourced Black, Brown and Indigenous communities in the greater Chicago area have taken one important step closer to fruition.

In April, the Illinois Climate Bank unanimously passed a resolution to authorize loan funds of up to $1.6 million for three community-based solar projects owned by Green Energy Justice Cooperative, launched in 2022 by Blacks in Green (BIG).

This increases the total funding to $2.9 million for GEJC's community solar projects, a portion of which is privately funded.

The money will be devoted to the pre-development phase of the project, including public outreach, an interconnection study, and a deposit for renewable energy credits awarded through the Climate and Equitable Jobs Act (CEJA), said Naomi Davis, founder and CEO of Blacks in Green.

"Our $2.9 million in predevelopment costs include payments to our electric utility, ComEd - fees to connect our solar system to their grid and a 5% down payment for our renewable energy credits - like buying a house, you have the financing and the down payment," Davis said.

"The sweet spot of this pre-development funding is what we invest in building relationships, educating them about the power of cooperative ownership and management, and collaborating with them to build a clean energy economy right where they live," she said. "We've got two years before we flip the switch and start monthly savings and clean energy comfort… and between now and then we'll be enrolling thousands of community subscribers in conversations for organizing, training and hopefully inspiring them."

"A community stake in clean energy"

Energy self-sufficiency is one of the eight key principles of BIG's Sustainable Square Mile concept, which the organization aims to replicate around the country.

"We say communities should own, develop, and manage their land and energy, and with our $10 million EPA Thriving Communities Technical Assistance Center (TCTAC) award , BIG is offering free/open source access to our energy justice portfolio, which includes this 9 MW solar project and community geothermal and wind," said Davis in a news release.

41 Best Teacher Appreciation Quotes To Show Gratitude

"With our energy affordability bill before the Illinois General Assembly, and our energy auditing workforce launching this summer, we aim to connect the dots of community-driven, community-scale energy solutions for low and moderate-income communities across America."

In December 2023, the Illinois Power Agency recommended awarding the three solar projects, valued at $25.7 million, with $12.5 million in renewable energy credits . The three projects, located in Aurora, Naperville, and Romeoville, Illinois, would each generate 3 megawatts. Once completed, they will provide the dual benefit of lowering the disproportionate energy burden in BIPOC and low-income households, while providing a community stake in clean energy generation.

"When this project is completed over the next couple of years, it will be the largest non-governmental, non-utility, minority-community-owned solar project in Illinois. And as such, it will be the fulfillment of years of dreams and work by our Green Energy Justice Cooperative, to share middle-class jobs and wealth-building with historically deprived and distressed individuals and families throughout this area." said Rev. Tony Pierce, GEJC board member and CEO of Sun Bright Energy, in a news release.

"In doing so, it will be the beginning of lifting these kinds of individuals and families from the bottom of our economic pyramid into the middle class," Pierce said. "And it will therefore be the beginning of bringing some closure to the Black and White wealth gap that exists in metro Chicago; in addition to reducing the carbon footprint in our area, to reduce climate change."

For Davis, this level of recognition and financial support reflects more than a decade of advocacy and effort to ensure energy independence for her community of West Woodlawn on Chicago's South Side - and beyond.

"The cooperative (GEJC) that we organized and funded fits in with our overall mission because we have, as a stated pillar of our work [intend] to increase the rate at which neighbor-owned businesses are created and sustained," Davis told the Energy News Network in December.

"We understand that the number one employer of Black folks in America is Black folks in America. And we are very committed in our understanding of the whole-system problem common to Black communities everywhere, that we are committed to being a solution."

This article was originally published by The Energy News Network . and was reshared under a CC BY-NC 4.0 DEED license.

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Illinois just gave $1.6 million to 'justice-focused' community solar projects

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Justice Department says Boeing breached 2021 737 MAX criminal prosecution agreement

Boeing said that that they had 'honored the terms of that agreement'.

Whistleblower says Boeing must ground all 787 Dreamliners

Former Department of Transportation official Diana Furchtgott-Roth says the Federal Aviation Administration 'is investigating' on 'The Evening Edit.'

The Justice Department said that Boeing breached its obligations from a 2021 agreement that shielded the embattled corporation from criminal prosecution from two fatal 737 MAX crashes in 2018 and 2019 that killed 346 people.

In a filing in federal court in Texas on Tuesday, the DOJ said that Boeing failed to make changes to prevent it from violating federal anti-fraud laws.

The changes were a condition of the deferred prosecution agreement that the airline manufacturer agreed to in 2021.

The DOJ said that Boeing broke the agreement by "failing to design, implement, and enforce a compliance and ethics program to prevent and detect violations of the U.S. fraud laws throughout its operations."

SEC TO INVESTIGATE BOEING OVER STATEMENTS ON SAFETY PRACTICES: REPORT

A worker walks near Boeing 737 fuselages outside the Boeing Co. manufacturing facility in Renton, Wash., Feb. 5, 2024. (David Ryder/Bloomberg via Getty Images / Getty Images)

The ruling means that Boeing could face prosecution "for any federal criminal violation of which the United States has knowledge."

It was not immediately clear if the DOJ will prosecute Boeing for their past misdeeds.

"The Government is determining how it will proceed in this matter," the Justice Department said.

Paul Cassell, an attorney for the victims’ families and a professor of law at the University of Utah College of Law, said that this was a "positive first step."

"This is a positive first step, and for the families, a long time coming. But we need to see further action from DOJ to hold Boeing accountable, and plan to use our meeting on May 31 to explain in more detail what we believe would be a satisfactory remedy to Boeing’s ongoing criminal conduct," Cassell said in a press release.

The Boeing Co. manufacturing facility in Renton, Wash. (David Ryder/Bloomberg via Getty Images / Getty Images)

In a statement to Fox News Digital, Boeing confirmed that they received notice from the DOJ, and said that they "believe that we have honored the terms."

"We can confirm that we received a communication today from the Justice Department, stating that the Department has made a determination that we have not met our obligations under our 2021 deferred prosecution agreement, and requesting the company's response," Boeing said.

FAA LAUNCHES NEW INVESTIGATION INTO BOEING AFTER COMPANY MAY HAVE MISSED SOME 787 DREAMLINER INSPECTIONS

"We believe that we have honored the terms of that agreement, and look forward to the opportunity to respond to the Department on this issue," Boeing added. "As we do so, we will engage with the Department with the utmost transparency, as we have throughout the entire term of the agreement, including in response to their questions following the Alaska Airlines 1282 accident."

A worker walks past Boeing's new 737 MAX-9 under construction at their production facility in Renton, Wash. (Reuters/Jason Redmond / Reuters Photos)

Prior to the agreement, the DOJ conducted a two-year probe into whether Boeing had concealed information about its 737 Max aircraft.

In 2021, Boeing agreed to pay $2.5 billion to resolve a criminal investigation into the company's conduct surrounding the fatal crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia.

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In Oct. 2018, Indonesia's Lion Air flight 610, which was a Boeing 737 MAX 8 jet, plunged into the Java Sea, killing all 189 people on board.

Similarly, 157 passengers died from the Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 Max 8 crash in March 2019.

In their agreement, Boeing promised to compensate victims' relatives and overhaul its compliance practices.

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Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada announces judicial appointments in the province of Ontario

From: Department of Justice Canada

News release

The Honourable Arif Virani, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, today announced the following appointments under the judicial application process established in 2016.

May 13, 2024 – Ottawa, Ontario – Department of Justice Canada

The Honourable Arif Virani, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, today announced the following appointments under the judicial application process established in 2016. This process emphasizes transparency, merit, and the diversity of the Canadian population, and will continue to ensure the appointment of jurists who meet the highest standards of excellence and integrity.

Ira G. Parghi, a sole practitioner in Toronto, is appointed a Judge of the Superior Court of Justice of Ontario in Toronto. Justice Parghi replaces Justice C.A. Gilmore (Toronto), who elected to become a supernumerary judge effective August 23, 2023.

Benita Wassenaar , Crown Counsel at the Crown Law Office (Criminal) of the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario in Toronto, is appointed a Judge of the Superior Court of Justice of Ontario in Toronto. Justice Wassenaar replaces Justice T. Ducharme (Toronto), who elected to become a supernumerary judge effective October 1, 2023.

“I wish Justices Parghi and Wassenaar every success as they take on their new roles. I am confident they will serve Ontarians well as members of the Superior Court of Justice of Ontario.”

—The Hon. Arif Virani, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada

Biographies

Justice Ira G. Parghi was born and raised in Kamloops and is the proud daughter of Indian immigrants. She holds a Bachelor of Arts in Public Policy (with distinction) from Stanford University, a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Toronto, and a Master of Public Policy from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. She was admitted to the bars of Ontario, New York, and California.

Justice Parghi’s practice encompassed litigation and advisory work and spans several jurisdictions. She has expertise in privacy and information law, health regulatory law, tort law, digital health, and artificial intelligence. She has spoken and published widely in these areas. Her clients have included hospitals, health care facilities, medtech companies, universities, research institutes, and non-profits. She is an experienced adjudicator, having served for many years as a Co-Chair of the University of Toronto Tribunal. She is recognized in the Canadian Legal Lexpert Directory. She has worked at Torys, Lax O’Sullivan Cronk (now Lax O’Sullivan Lisus Gottlieb), Borden Ladner Gervais, Ropes & Gray, and INQ Law.

Justice Parghi has served the legal profession and community as a member of the Canadian Blood Services Research Ethics Board and the boards of directors of the South Asian Bar Association – Toronto, South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario, and Gerstein Crisis Centre. She has mentored dozens of lawyers, most of them racialized and/or internationally trained.

Justice Benita Wassenaar was born and raised in Toronto. She received an Honours degree in Business Administration from Western University and a Masters in Environmental Studies from York University. She attended law school at the University of British Columbia and clerked at the Court of Appeal for British Columbia. She then articled at the Crown Law Office – Criminal (“CLO-C”), part of the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario. She was called to the Bar of Ontario in 2001.

Justice Wassenaar has been counsel at CLO-C. She has appeared at every level of court in Ontario. She has argued many large, complex appeals in the Court of Appeal for Ontario, and has appeared as a party and intervener in the Supreme Court of Canada. She held a number of administrative and managerial roles at CLO-C, including Summer Student Program Coordinator, Counsel to the Director, and Deputy Director. She was a member of the F/P/T Heads of Prosecution sub-committee on the Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice. In 2023, she was appointed to the Death Investigation Oversight Council, an independent body overseeing Ontario’s death investigation system.

Justice Wassenaar is deeply committed to mentorship. She has been an articling principal to law students and a mentor to lawyers. She ran an annual Crown school course on Appellate Advocacy, taught Legal Research and Writing to law students, assisted with a variety of moots, and volunteered with the Ontario Justice Education Network.

Justice Wassenaar enjoys spending time with her husband, three wonderful children, and dog.

Quick facts

The Government of Canada has appointed more than 733 judges since November 2015. This includes 106 appointments since the Honourable Arif Virani became Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada on July 26, 2023.These exceptional jurists represent the diversity that strengthens Canada. Of these judges, more than half are women, and appointments reflect an increased representation of racialized persons, Indigenous, 2SLGBTQI+, and those who self-identify as having a disability.

To support the needs of the courts and improve access to justice for all Canadians, the Government of Canada is committed to increasing the capacity of superior courts. Budget 2022 provides for 22 new judicial positions, along with two associate judges at the Tax Court of Canada. Along with the 13 positions created under Budget 2021, this makes a total of 37 newly created superior court positions. Since Budget 2017, the government has funded 116 new judicial positions.

Changes to the Questionnaire for Federal Judicial Appointments were announced in September 2022. The questionnaire continues to provide for a robust and thorough assessment of candidates but has been streamlined and updated to incorporate, among other things, more respectful and inclusive language for individuals to self-identify diversity characteristics.

Federal judicial appointments are made by the Governor General, acting on the advice of the federal Cabinet and recommendations from the Minister of Justice.

The Judicial Advisory Committees across Canada play a key role in evaluating judicial applications. There are 17 Judicial Advisory Committees, with each province and territory represented.

Significant reforms to the role and structure of the Judicial Advisory Committees, aimed at enhancing the independence and transparency of the process, were announced on October 20, 2016 .

The Government of Canada is committed to promoting a justice system in which sexual assault matters are decided fairly, without the influence of myths and stereotypes, and in which survivors are treated with dignity and compassion. Changes to the Judges Act and Criminal Code that came into force on May 6, 2021, mean that in order to be eligible for appointment to a provincial superior court, candidates must agree to participate in continuing education on matters related to sexual assault law and social context, which includes systemic racism and systemic discrimination. The new legislation enhances the transparency of decisions by amending the Criminal Code to require that judges provide written reasons, or enter them into the record, when deciding sexual assault matters.

For more information, media may contact:

Chantalle Aubertin Deputy Director, Communications Office of the Minister of Justice and Attorney General 613-992-6568 [email protected]

Media Relations Department of Justice Canada 613-957-4207 [email protected]

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A newsletter briefing on the health-care policy debate in Washington.

Fetterman, Smith want a Senate mental health commission

with research by McKenzie Beard

Thank goodness it’s Friday. I’m Dan Diamond, and I don’t understand my colleague’s quest to find the best ice cream place in the District. (It’s obviously Happy Ice Cream .) Send scoops of all flavors to [email protected] . Not a subscriber? Sign up here .

Today’s edition: The Justice Department is launching a new task force focused on antitrust issues in the health-care sector. How one high-ranking senator would modernize the National Institutes of Health . But first …

Senators team up on mental health plan

Sen. John Fetterman (D-Pa.), the hulking, hoodie-wearing Democrat, is impossible to miss as he wanders the Capitol or takes outspoken stands on social media. Sen. Tina Smith (D-Minn.) is known more for her subtlety and sharp wit — and her backroom diplomacy as “ the velvet hammer .”

But both lawmakers share a bond: They’ve been laid low by depression — a condition that doesn’t discriminate between size or personality. Fetterman checked himself into a hospital last year for treatment, a decision that moved his Minnesota colleague who’s spoken about her own challenges, too.

“For me, depression drained hope away, and the promise that I’d ever feel hopeful again,” Smith wrote in an essay last year.

Now Fetterman and Smith are unveiling a bill to establish a bipartisan Senate mental health commission they say would address gaps in patient care, provider payment and other persistent problems, among other goals they shared exclusively with The Health 202.

“Before I sought help for my depression, I was the biggest cynic — but it truly worked,” Fetterman said in a statement to The Post. “I’m committed to ensuring that everyone suffering from mental health challenges has access to the same resources and treatment that I did.”

How it would work

The U.S. Senate Commission on Mental Health Act would create an independent commission charged with investigating barriers to care delivery; crafting an annual report that reviews ongoing research; and making recommendations to congressional leaders and the White House.

Panel members would probably include senators in the mental health caucus — which Smith co-founded last year with Sens. Alex Padilla (D-Calif.) and Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) — as well as outside experts. Specific priorities for the first year include examining mental health reimbursement rates within federal health plans and workforce challenges.

Does Congress really need another commission? While an estimated 1 in 5 U.S. adults experience mental illness, there are persistent disagreements over how best to fund the national response, boost workforce and address other challenges.

Fetterman’s office said the commission would fill a void, establishing a federal entity explicitly charged with reviewing ongoing evidence on mental health and making policy recommendations.

A commission could help “take the politics out of this issue,” agreed Hannah Wesolowski , chief advocacy officer of the National Alliance on Mental Illness , one of several organizations that support the legislation. (The American Academy of Pediatrics , the American Association of Suicidology and others are also on board.)

The legislation would go through the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee , which counts Smith as a member.

“We owe it to everyone struggling with mental health issues to treat this issue with the priority and urgency it deserves,” Smith said in a statement. “Big problems call for big solutions, and a Commission would give this topic the focus it deserves in Congress.”

Wesolowski commended Fetterman and Smith for being open about their depression.

“It was not that long ago that talking about your own mental health struggles would have been a career-ender for any politician,” she said.

Agency alert

Justice department unveils health-care antitrust task force.

The Justice Department is establishing a new task force focused on antitrust issues within the health-care sector.

Jonathan Kanter , assistant attorney general for the antitrust division, announced the initiative in an interview yesterday with The Post’s Cat Zakrzewski , saying the country is at a “turning point in antitrust enforcement.”

A closer look: The Health Care Monopolies and Collusion task force will concentrate on identifying and addressing antitrust concerns in the industry, including issues related to payer-provider consolidation, serial acquisitions, medical billing, labor practices and quality of care.

The panel, to be led by longtime antitrust prosecutor Katrina Rouse , will also facilitate the division’s policy advocacy, investigations, and — when warranted — civil and criminal enforcement in health-care markets.

“ We are upping our game ,” Kanter told Cat. “It’s really important that we adjust to the market realities and make sure that we have not only the resources devoted to addressing these concerns, but also the expertise.”
Kanter side-stepped Cat’s question about whether UnitedHealth Group had grown too large — a question detailed in The Post’s recent investigation into the health-care conglomerate — but acknowledged he was worried about cyberattacks and other risks to patient care. “ When certain large entities are controlling so much of our health-care decision-making … it can often create massive risk of failure ,” Kanter said.

Meanwhile …

A government watchdog found that Veterans Affairs leaders improperly handed out almost $11 million in bonuses to more than 180 senior executives last year, with several taking home over $100,000 , our colleague Lisa Rein scooped.

The bonuses were sources from funds earmarked by Congress to recruit and retain staff for processing new benefits for veterans exposed to toxic burn pits — not to reward top officials in Washington, according to a report from Inspector General Michael Missal ’s office.

The vast majority of the payouts went to senior executives inside the sprawling veterans health system, led by Shereef Elnahal , undersecretary for health. Elnahal authorized 148 bonuses for headquarters executives averaging $61,666 each, without informing Secretary Denis McDonough .

Upon learning of these payments in September, McDonough instructed all the executives to reimburse VA. However, eight months later, the bonuses are still being recouped due to recipients having already spent the money, with some contesting the order, Missal’s office found.

The view from VA: McDonough concurred with numerous recommendations in the report, including the need for better assessments of future bonuses, a new review of previous awards and more oversight from the agency’s legal office. He will also decide whether the leaders who approved the improper payments should face discipline.

On the Hill

Cassidy outlines proposals to revamp nih.

The top Republican on the Senate HELP Committee is pushing to modernize the National Institutes of Health.

Sen. Bill Cassidy (La.) released a white paper yesterday outlining proposals aimed at improving the federal research agency as it seeks to recapture public trust eroded during the coronavirus pandemic. The report follows his request for stakeholder feedback on the issue last year. His suggestions include:

Using machine learning tools to assess its programs and streamline its research portfolio.
Piloting secure processes for sharing of NIH application and review data , while exploring strategies to promote the voluntary disclosure of null or inconclusive clinical trial results.
Developing a process for public input on agency practices , while leveraging NIH’s Scientific Management Review Board for feedback on its structure and operations.

New this a.m.: Roughly 1 in 8 adults report having taken one of an increasingly popular class of prescription drugs known as GLP-1s, which include Ozempic, Wegovy and Mounjaro, according to a KFF poll .

List prices for the blockbuster weight loss and diabetes drugs can exceed $1,000 for a month’s supply before insurance coverage, rebates and discounts. More than half of those who report having used the medications said it was difficult to afford them, with 1 in 5 calling it “very difficult.”

In the courts

A gay couple couldn’t access ivf benefits. they’re suing new york city..

A first-of-its-kind class-action lawsuit accuses New York City of denying in vitro fertilization benefits to thousands of gay male employees of the city and their partners, The Post’s Maham Javaid reports.

Nicholas Maggipinto , 38, and Corey Briskin , 35, claim the city is discriminating against male same-sex couples and violating federal, state and local laws by denying them IVF insurance benefits that other city employees are able to access.

The couple are seeking reimbursements for all city employees who have been denied coverage since the benefits were made available, and they’re trying to force the city to change its policy to include gay men. The case hinges on whether the city can lawfully bar same-sex male couples from accessing IVF benefits.

The view from NYC: A spokeswoman for City Hall, Liz Garcia , told The Post they will review the lawsuit. The administration of Mayor Eric Adams (D) “proudly supports the rights of LGBTQ+ New Yorkers to access the health care they need,” she added.

In other health news

On the move: The Better Medicare Alliance has tapped Don Dempsey to serve as its vice president of policy and research. Additionally, Jennifer Nord Mallard has been appointed vice president of government affairs, alongside a slate of other new hires .
On our radar: The Biden administration is crafting a rule that would require hospitals to meet minimum cybersecurity standards, Anne Neuberger , deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology, said in an interview yesterday at the Bloomberg Tech Summit .
In Missouri: Gov. Mike Parson (R) signed a bill kicking Planned Parenthood off the state’s Medicaid program, a goal pursued by Republicans for several years, despite the organization halting abortion services in Missouri.

Quote of the week

“ Roe was never enough … We've been handed crumbs and told it's a meal. It's not.” — Lizz Winstead, co-creator and former head writer of “The Daily Show,” on advancing reproductive freedom advocacy.

Health reads

On a D.C. sidewalk, a race to save a Marine general’s life (By Dan Lamothe | The Washington Post )

Hack targeting hospital chain Ascension is impacting patient care (By Daniel Gilbert, Joseph Menn and Dan Diamond | The Washington Post)

U.S. to post influenza A wastewater data online to help with bird flu probe, official says (By Julie Steenhuysen | Reuters)

Thanks for reading! See you Monday.

‘Every Dollar Counts’: Prosecutors Use Quotes From Trump’s Books Against Him

Donald J. Trump’s books provided prosecutors with passages they believe can help their case, as they argue that he knew that his company falsified business records to cover up a hush-money payment to Stormy Daniels.

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By Kate Christobek , Ben Protess and Jonah E. Bromwich

May 7, 2024

Prosecutors cannot force Donald J. Trump to testify at his criminal trial in Manhattan, but that does not mean they can’t use his words against him.

On Tuesday, the prosecutors unearthed a series of damaging excerpts from books that the former president wrote, plucking out passages to help make their case against Mr. Trump. In essence, they called a past version of Mr. Trump to testify against his future self.

In his own words, Mr. Trump described how he kept a focus on minute details and watched every penny that left his accounts, corroborating a core component of the prosecution’s case as they argue that he knew that his company falsified business records to cover up a hush-money payment to Stormy Daniels, a porn star.

On cross-examination, Mr. Trump’s lawyer, Todd Blanche, suggested that a ghost writer had been responsible for these words.

Mr. Trump’s written words also described how he sees sexual potential in women that he encounters, a salient point in a trial tethered to encounters with women that he is accused of covering up. “All the women on ‘The Apprentice’ flirted with me,” he wrote.

Prosecutors introduced the damning excerpts by questioning Sally Franklin, a witness who is an executive and editor, to read excerpts from “Trump: How to Get Rich” and “Trump: Think Like a Billionaire,” both of which were published by Ballantine, a Penguin Random House imprint.

The jury heard Trump’s written words: “Every dollar counts in business, and for that matter, every dime.” The text continued, “Even in high end shops, I bargain,” adding, “I hate paying retail.”

This was not the first time jurors heard Trump in his own words. Last week, prosecutors played video clips of him talking, and they have questioned witnesses about Mr. Trump’s infamous statement on the set of “Access Hollywood” that he would grab women by the genitals.

But the judge would not allow prosecutors to play the tape for jurors, a decision that elevated the importance of the book passages, or any other opportunity to use Mr. Trump as a witness against himself.

It might not be the only opportunity for jurors to hear from the former president. Although the prosecution cannot legally call him to testify, Mr. Trump could take the witness stand in his own defense, though it is unclear whether he will do so.

For now, jurors heard his words via Ms. Franklin, who read ominous passages in which Mr. Trump spoke of how he treated his perceived enemies.

“For many years I’ve said that if someone screws you, screw them back,” she read from a book by Mr. Trump. It continued: “When somebody hurts you, just go after them as viciously and as violently as you can. Like it says in the Bible, an eye for an eye.”

As jurors listened, Mr. Trump’s smiling image on a book cover was plastered on screens across the courtroom, a sharp contrast from the scowl he sported throughout the testimony.

Kate Christobek is a reporter covering the civil and criminal cases against former president Donald J. Trump for The Times. More about Kate Christobek

Ben Protess is an investigative reporter at The Times, writing about public corruption. He has been covering the various criminal investigations into former President Trump and his allies. More about Ben Protess

Jonah E. Bromwich covers criminal justice in New York, with a focus on the Manhattan district attorney’s office and state criminal courts in Manhattan. More about Jonah E. Bromwich

Our Coverage of the Trump Hush-Money Trial

News and Analysis

Michael Cohen, Donald Trump’s former fixer, faced a fierce cross-examination in the trial, as the defense tried to tear down the prosecution’s key witness.

Over the course of two days of testimony, Cohen has detailed the $130,000 he gave to the porn star Stormy Daniels to silence her account of a sexual encounter with Trump, and how Trump repaid him after winning the presidency.

Trump’s trial has become a staging ground for Republicans, including House Speaker Mike Johnson and Senator J.D. Vance of Ohio , to prove their fealty to the former president.

COMMENTS

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15 inspiring human rights quotes

1. “To deny people their human rights is to challenge their very humanity.”

2. “Activism works. So what I’m telling you to do now, is to act. Because no one is too small to make a difference.”

3. “It means a great deal to those who are oppressed to know that they are not alone. Never let anyone tell you that what you are doing is insignificant.”

4. “If you want to improve your quality of life and the quality of life for all women, never stop questioning society or calling for change. ”

5. “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”

6. “The candle burns not for us, but for all those whom we failed to rescue from prison, who were shot on the way to prison, who were tortured, who were kidnapped, who ‘disappeared’. That’s what the candle is for.”

7. “Peace can only last where human rights are respected, where the people are fed, and where individuals and nations are free.”

8. “Letters aren’t just a simple gesture of solidarity, they become a source of hope and they have the potential to change people’s lives. I am living proof .”

9. “People put up walls between each other – and it’s largely down to ignorance or negative media portrayals. We fail to realize there are so many good things and so many good people in this world.”

10. “A political struggle that does not have women at the heart of it, above it, below it, and within it is no struggle at all.”

11. “Let us remember: One book, one pen, one child, and one teacher can change the world.”

12. “My government makes me angry. The police force makes me angry. Homophobia makes me angry. Luckily, anger is what motivates me.”

13. “I never thought I’d be talking about police brutality and standing up for human rights. You never know what people are going through until it happens to you.”

14. “Get up, stand up, Stand up for your rights. Get up, stand up, Don’t give up the fight.”

15. “Humanitarian work isn’t criminal, nor is it heroic. Helping others should be normal.”

Michael J. Sandel

Lectures 1 & 2

The Lifeboat Case

Lectures 3 & 4

The Cost of Life & the EPA

Opera & Dogfights

Lectures 5 & 6

Motorcycle Helmets

Sports Money & Taxes

Lectures 7 & 8

Property Rights & Boston Parking

Lectures 9 & 10

Military Service: Markets & Morals

Surrogacy: Market & Morals

Lectures 11 & 12

The Shopkeeper's Action

Kant and Human Dignity: The Case of Torture

Lectures 13 & 14

Lying to a Murderer