experience machine essay

Philosophical Disquisitions

Things hid and barr'd from common sense

Monday, January 23, 2017

Understanding the experience machine argument.

The Experience Machine : “Imagine a machine that could give you any experience (or sequence of experiences) you might desire. When connected to this experience machine, you can have the experience of writing a great poem or bring about world peace or loving someone and being loved in return. You can experience the felt pleasures of these things, how they “feel from the inside”. You can program your experiences for…the rest of your life. If your imagination is impoverished, you can use the library of suggestions extracted from biographies and enhanced by novelists and psychologists. You can live your fondest dreams “from the inside”. Would you choose to do this for the rest of your life?…Upon entering you will not remember having done this; so no pleasures will get ruined by realizing they are machine-produced.”  

( Nozick 1989, 104 )

• (1) Plugging into the experience machine would not be best for one.
• (2) Hedonism entails that plugging into the experience machine would be best for one.
• (3) Therefore, hedonism is false.
• (4) The intuition against plugging in is, in fact, consistent with hedonism because it is based on a reasonable fear of catastrophe.
• (5) You can modify the thought experiment to remove sources of reasonable fear or run an alternative version where you ask people to compare to experientially identical lives, one of which is lived in an experience machine and one of which is not. If people still prefer the non-plugged-in life, premise one holds.
• (6) It is very difficult to construct a thought experiment in which people have a fine-grained intuition about hedonism: it is likely that their thinking about the scenario is contaminated by other moral/normative considerations.
• (7) In imagining the case, you can also imagine that other people “can plug in to have the experiences they want, so there’s no need to stay unplugged to serve them.
• (8) Our unwillingness to plug in might be due to an irrational fear, revulsion or bias.
• (9) “Nozick could gladly accept that an important part of the reason we would be unwilling to plug in is that we have an irrational fear, revulsion or bias…His gripe with hedonism stands: it does not seem best for someone to plug in to the machine.” ( Bramble 2016, 139 )
• (10) The Debunking Problem: The fact that our intuitions about the Experience Machine are affected by things like status quo bias gives us reason not to trust those intuitions.
• (11) Proponents of debunking need to explain how our intuitions about well-being got to be affected in this way: how do our conditioned or hardwired preferences get to affect our pre-theoretical feeling that contact with reality is an important part of well-being.
• (12) Proponents of debunking need to be challenged to identify some uncontaminated intuitions. Since, presumably, theories of well-being ultimately rest on some intuitive beliefs about what makes for the good life we need to figure out which ones we can trust.
• (13) Proponents of debunking need to explain how some people can have the intuition that connecting reality is important without the deeper desire or belief that connecting to reality in intrinsically important. (Bramble gives himself as an example of such a person)

• (14) Truth-adjusted hedonism is likely to be true, i.e. we are likely to get more subjective well-being from pleasures taken in true things than in false things.
• (15) Truth-adjusted hedonism could be false: intuitively it is hard to see how the link to reality could make an experience subjectively superior if one is unaware of it.
• (16) Plugging-in would involve a kind of suicide because it would require memory erasure to ensure experiential indistinguishability.
• (17) The memory erasure involved is unlikely to require anything akin to suicide and, in any event, one could be plugged in without one’s awareness that this is happening.
• (18) There are certain pleasures that are only possible in the real world.
• (19) The pleasures that are alleged to only be possible in the real world might turn out not to be.
• (20) The pleasures in question would have to be so powerful and unique that they could not be compensated for by the pleasures possible inside the experience machine.

4 comments:

I don't think hedonism should be the main focus here. It's pretty obvious that people can get fulfillment/happiness in virtual reality. Those who are reluctant to plug in are those with responsibilities and skepticism. What should be anticipated is the futuristic technology that will emerge, whether it be temporary memory erasure/suppression or a simulation that decently simulates real life. Without being able to consider even a fraction of the infinite nuances that will decide how many and what kind of people will plug in, guessing about this future isn't too much fun.. Also, I realize we all have a conscience for what must be "right" or "wrong," but that doesn't quite matter to the other seven billion plus apes. What matters is what many people want, which is awesome games when life isn't awesome. It may be a surprise to some people, but life isn't always awesome.

This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.

I'm not convinced that there would still be some form of suicide, if only that of one's character. To plug in and experience all that you want, memory erased or maintained, removes the value of the real world and in my view the value of the person who dismisses those real experiences for those in the machine, if only because they are those which bring more pleasure.

Informative blog. Are you looking for the best gas chromatography manufacturers in India .

Pleasure or Reality? The Experience Machine Debate

Conclusions often drawn from the famous thought experiment seem problematic..

Posted March 13, 2019

In his famous 1974 book Anarchy, State and Utopia , Robert Nozick presents his famous experience machine thought experiment. In this thought experiment, we are asked to imagine a scenario in which technology is so advanced that we can plug ourselves into a virtual reality machine for a very long time. When plugged in, we will experience life as very pleasant indeed. Before we plug in we can decide for ourselves what types of experiences we will have. Once the electrodes are connected to our head we will not know, of course, that we are plugged into the machine; we will believe that we really are receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature for writing the best novel of the century; that we really are extremely clever and attractive; that we really are painting like Picasso; or that we really are having a passionate love affair. (In fact, for all we know, we may be right now in an experience machine and not "really" reading this post from the screen in front of us.) We need not worry, in this thought experiment, about nutrition , safety or health; they are all taken care of. Nor are there any problems with family members that need care: We have no families, or they are fine, or they too will plug into the experience machine if we do. (I have slightly altered some of the details Nozick presents.)

Now the question arises: If there were such an opportunity for you, the reader, to plug in, would you? For life? For 20 years? For four years? Why would or wouldn't you?

Nozick believes that most people will choose not to plug into the machine. This may sound odd, since in the experience machine they are likely to experience life as far more pleasant than in real life. One way to interpret the refusal to plug into the machine is to suggest that people are not interested only, or mostly, in pleasure; it is not the only, or main, thing that people want in life. This may serve as an argument against what has come to be called hedonic theories of well-being , according to which people's well-being consists only of the balance of pleasure over pain. The refusal to plug into the machine suggests that we do not only want to feel subjective pleasure in our lives; we also want our lives to have some objective value . For example, we do not only want to be pleased by the thought that we wrote a good novel; we want to actually write a good novel. We want the achievement to be real, and we want to really be the ones making it.

The refusal to plug into the experience machine also has implications for discussions on meaning in life. Subjectivist theories of meaning in life hold that our sensation of meaningfulness or other subjective conditions is what makes life meaningful. Objectivist theories of meaning in life hold that attaining objective value in life is what makes life meaningful. Hybridist theories of meaning in life hold that both subjective and objective conditions have to be fulfilled in order that life be meaningful. The anticipated results of the experience machine thought experiment count against purely subjectivist views of meaning in life.

In his paper, "If You Like It, Does It Matter If It's Real?" Felipe de Brigard casts some doubt on both the anticipated results and on the way they are often interpreted. Brigard conducted experiments in which he presented to participants a somewhat different question than the one Nozick discussed: Brigard requested participants in the experiment to imagine that they already are connected to the experience machine, and then asked them whether they would like to disconnect . He presented three variations to the scenario: In the first, no information was given to participants about what they were in real life. In other words, participants were not told how real life would be for them if they unplugged from the machine. In the second variation, participants were told that in real life they were prisoners in a maximum security prison. In the third variation, participants were told that in real life they were multimillionaire artists living in Monaco.

Of those exposed to the first variation, only 54% said that they wanted to unplug. Thus, when told that they already are in the machine and that in order to live in reality they need to change the condition they are in, many did not prefer reality to the machine.

In the second variation, in which those unplugging would find themselves in a maximum security prison, only 13% preferred reality. This suggests that the pleasantness of life does, in fact, make a lot of difference to people thinking about the experience machine.

Somewhat surprisingly, in the third variation, in which moving to reality meant living the life of a multimillionaire artist in Monaco, 50% of the participants said that they would unplug. The difference between the second and third variations still shows that pleasantness of life does play an important role, but one would expect, if it played an important role, that the percentage of participants wishing to unplug would be higher in the third variation than in the first variation.

In his discussion, Brigard emphasizes what has come to be called in psychological research the status quo bias : People often show a preference to retain the conditions in which they find themselves rather than to change them; people like the status quo. For example, in an oft-mentioned experiment, Jack L. Knetsch gave rewards to two groups of undergraduate students. Each student in the first group got a mug bearing the university's logo, while each student in the second group got a chocolate bar. Then, all of the students were offered the option of trading the rewards they received with the students of the other group. But almost 90% of them preferred to keep the reward they had been given.

Brigard suggests that the many people's intuitive preference not to plug into the experience machine, in Nozick's version of the thought experiment, may well not have to do with the importance of retaining contact with reality or with the incorrectness of hedonism (or, it could be added, with the wrongness of subjectivism about meaning in life). It is likely, argues Brigard, that people's preference not to plug into the machine is mainly affected by the status quo bias.

Nozick's experience machine thought experiment, then, may prove less than it is often taken to. And it calls for much more discussion and deliberation. But this also brings up another issue that Brigard emphasizes at the end of his paper: Nozick and many of the philosophers who wrote about his thought experiment did not check empirically whether indeed most people do not wish to plug into the machine. They just predicted that this would be the case, without actually checking it. This is problematic, since the argument and much of the discussion following it relied on claims about how most people would react to this thought experiment without relying on any empirical data about how most people in fact choose. Many of those who wrote about the issue seem to have merely extrapolated from their own preferences to humanity at large. Some others seem to have extrapolated from their own preferences and from those of a few of their close friends to humanity at large. And yet some others also asked their philosophy students about their preferences, not always heeding the reasons the students raised. But these are surely not representative or reliable samples. There seems to be much more empirical and philosophical work to do on the topic before we draw conclusions about hedonism, subjectivism, and the nature of well-being and of meaning in life.

Robert Nozick Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 42–45.

Felipe De Brigard, "If You Like It, Does It Matter If It’s Real?" Philosophical Psychology 23 (2010): 43–57.

Jack L. Knetsch, "The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves," American Economic Review 79 (1989): 1277–1284.

Iddo Landau, Ph.D. , is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Haifa. He has written extensively on the meaning of life and is the author of Finding Meaning in an Imperfect World .

• Find a Therapist
• Find a Treatment Center
• Find a Psychiatrist
• Find a Support Group
• Find Online Therapy
• United States
• Brooklyn, NY
• Chicago, IL
• Houston, TX
• Los Angeles, CA
• New York, NY
• Portland, OR
• San Diego, CA
• San Francisco, CA
• Seattle, WA
• Washington, DC
• Asperger's
• Bipolar Disorder
• Chronic Pain
• Eating Disorders
• Passive Aggression
• Personality
• Goal Setting
• Positive Psychology
• Stopping Smoking
• Low Sexual Desire
• Relationships
• Child Development
• Self Tests NEW
• Therapy Center
• Diagnosis Dictionary
• Types of Therapy

At any moment, someone’s aggravating behavior or our own bad luck can set us off on an emotional spiral that threatens to derail our entire day. Here’s how we can face our triggers with less reactivity so that we can get on with our lives.

• Emotional Intelligence
• Gaslighting
• Affective Forecasting
• Neuroscience

Philosophy Break Your home for learning about philosophy

Introductory philosophy courses distilling the subject's greatest wisdom.

Reading Lists

Curated reading lists on philosophy's best and most important works.

Latest Breaks

Bite-size philosophy articles designed to stimulate your brain.

Nozick’s Experience Machine: Does it Refute Hedonism?

Robert Nozick’s experience machine is commonly invoked to argue that there’s more to life than pleasure. This article outlines the thought experiment, and discusses why hedonists think it’s deeply flawed.

9 -MIN BREAK  

W hat does it mean to live a good life? What makes a life intrinsically valuable? If we were to describe someone as ‘happy’, what quality or qualities would their life include?

To answer such questions, a common stance philosophers take is that of hedonism .

Not the kind of folk hedonism whereby someone indulges in endless carnal pleasures, but prudential hedonism , the philosophical position which states that, ultimately, when it comes to personal wellbeing, pleasure is the only intrinsic good, and pain the only bad.

While there are different types of hedonism, hedonists generally assert that, when you get right down to it, everything we recognize as ‘good’ — say, friendship, love, kindness, growth, solving problems, high achievement — is underpinned by feeling good. And everything we recognize as ‘bad’ — say, loneliness, vice, fear, shame, failure — is underpinned by feeling bad.

So, though living a good life can often seem like a very complicated matter, hedonists cut through this complexity to point out that, actually, it’s rather simple: living a good life means feeling good within ourselves . ‘Happiness’ is simply the preponderance of pleasure over pain.

Our approach to living well should thus be built around this insight: the good life involves experiencing more pleasure than pain.

This ‘pleasure principle’ is very influential in philosophy. It underpins, for instance, the philosophy of the ancient Greek thinker Epicurus , who advises us to approach our lives according to a hierarchy of pleasures (with long-term mental tranquility being the highest, and short-term physical pleasures being the lowest).

It forms the basis, too, of 18th-century philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s ethical theory of utilitarianism, that “ it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong.”

While hedonism is a popular and influential philosophical theory, however, it is not without its critics.

Isn’t there more to a good life than simply feeling good?

The philosopher Robert Nozick certainly thinks so, and in his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia he introduces a famous thought experiment aiming to knock down hedonism (along with other mental state theories of wellbeing) once and for all.

The Experience Machine

“S uppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience that you desired,” Nozick writes in Anarchy, State, and Utopia :

Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain.

The question is:

Should you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming your life’s experiences?

What do you think? Would you plug into the machine?

Nozick thinks most of us wouldn’t (and indeed shouldn’t).

And several empirical studies back up Nozick’s intuitions. Weijers (2014) , for instance, found that 84% of the participants asked about Nozick’s machine were averse to plugging in.

But, if the good life is only about having good experiences , as hedonists and proponents of other mental state theories of wellbeing claim, then why don’t we want to plug into a machine that guarantees good experiences?

What’s stopping us from plugging into the experience machine?

O f course, the simple answer — and the one Nozick wants us to have — is that we don’t want to plug into the experience machine because there is more to life than pleasurable experiences .

In other words, hedonism is false, for the good life is not just about feeling good, Nozick observes: we want to actually do something. We don’t just want to be a free-floating bundle of empty pleasures, we want to actually be a certain type of person. Nozick writes:

Someone floating in a tank is an indeterminate blob… Is he courageous, kind, intelligent, witty, loving? It’s not merely that it’s difficult to tell; there’s no way he is. Plugging into the machine is a kind of suicide.

The good life, then, is not just about having certain experiences, Nozick thinks: we want contact with reality . We want our lives to be rooted in the real.

As Nozick summarizes:

We learn that something matters to us in addition to experience by imagining an experience machine and then realizing that we would not use it.

However, while the experience machine is often taken as a knock-down argument against hedonism, some philosophers point out that the thought experiment exploits a number of psychological biases.

Sure, we might not want to plug into the machine — but that doesn’t mean not plugging in is the right answer, nor that hedonism is false; we are simply clouded by bias.

Once we expose that bias, the argument goes, we can see how Nozick’s thought experiment is no threat to hedonism whatsoever.

In one concise email each Sunday, I break down a famous idea from philosophy. You get the distillation straight to your inbox:

💭 One short philosophical email each Sunday. Unsubscribe any time.

Consider: technophobia and the status quo bias

O ne immediate thing to point out is that Nozick’s thought experiment isn’t just about pleasurable experiences; it’s about giving ourselves over to a big scary machine that we do not understand.

By rejecting the machine, we are not necessarily rejecting pleasure, we are simply expressing our unease with technology.

Related to this worry is what philosophers call the status quo bias: that we irrationally tend to prefer the way things are.

This bias reveals itself when we reverse Nozick’s thought experiment, notes the philosopher Lorenzo Buscicchi in a 2022 essay :

Imagine that a credible source tells you that you are actually in an experience machine right now. You have no idea what reality would be like. Given the choice between having your memory of this conversation wiped and going to reality, what would be best for you to choose?

Empirical studies show that most people, given these circumstances, would choose to stay in the experience machine. Buscicchi observes:

Comparing this result with how people respond to Nozick’s experience machine thought experiment reveals the following: In Nozick’s experience machine thought experiment people tend to choose a real and familiar life over a more pleasurable life, and in the reversed experience machine thought experiment people tend to choose a familiar life over a real life. Familiarity seems to matter more than reality, undermining the strength of Nozick’s original argument.

According to the status quo bias, then, we reject the experience machine not because we reject pleasure for reality, but because we are uncomfortable with such a radical departure from our familiar lives — including the abandonment of all our existing commitments.

The hedonistic bias

A nother way philosophers defend hedonism from Nozick’s thought experiment is by claiming that, far from counting against hedonism, our aversion to plugging in is in fact motivated by hedonism.

Nozick suggests we have a desire to remain rooted in the real world — but what motivates us to have this desire? Why do we want to remain attached to reality? Might it not be because we think that, by staying attached to the real world, we will ultimately feel better within ourselves..?

The so-called ‘paradox of hedonism’ is instructive here: pleasure is often best pursued indirectly.

We rarely set out to simply grant ourselves pleasure; instead, we go for a walk, we spend time with our loved ones, we read a book, we work on a favored project — and thereby obtain pleasure.

As Epicurus observes , going after every single promise of immediate, short-term pleasure is not a good strategy for maximizing our pleasure overall, and so we often forgo short-term pleasures — and even tolerate pain — in order to secure longer-term pleasures like mental tranquility.

Nozick’s experience machine exploits this gap between short-term pleasure and longer-term pleasures. We are suspicious, perhaps subconsciously, that it offers pleasures only of the instant gratification kind, and thus reject it because we think that by staying attached to reality we have a better chance of attaining longer-term peace of mind — failing to realize that this longer-term peace of mind is itself a form of pleasure .

The philosopher Matthew Silverstein nicely articulates this view in his 2000 paper, In Defense of Happiness (note: he uses ‘pleasure’ and ‘happiness’ interchangeably):

[O]ur experience machine intuitions reflect our desire to remain connected to the real world, to track reality. But… the desire to track reality owes its hold upon us to the role it has played in the creation of happiness…. Our intuitive views about what is prudentially good, the views upon which the experience machine argument relies, owe their existence to happiness. We miss the mark, then, if we take our intuitions about the experience machine as evidence against hedonism…. Even though it leads us away from happiness in the case of the experience machine, our desire to track reality points indirectly to happiness…. The mere existence of our intuitions against the experience machine should not lead us to reject hedonism. Contrary to appearances, those intuitions point — albeit circuitously — to happiness. And as a result, they no longer seem to contradict the claim that happiness is the only thing of intrinsic prudential value.

So, according to this position, we reject the experience machine because we think our lives would feel better outside of it. Far from a rejection of hedonism, then, our response to the experience machine reveals our deep-rooted hedonic motivations.

The experience machine says nothing about the truth or falsity of hedonism

F inally, some philosophers argue that, regardless of whether we choose to plug in or not, our response to the experience machine actually says nothing about the truth or falsity of hedonism whatsoever.

We might not want to plug into the experience machine, but that doesn’t suddenly mean we can conclude that hedonism is false. That’s like arguing that (i) since we wouldn’t plug in, we aren’t hedonists and that (ii) since we aren’t hedonists, hedonism is false.

Harriet Baber expresses this argument well in her 2008 paper, The Experience Machine Deconstructed . She writes:

Regardless of what subjects choose, the Experience Machine cannot either confirm or disconfirm any philosophical theory of wellbeing. It merely tests the empirical hypothesis that informed choosers prefer hedonically optimal states.

In other words: all the experience machine thought experiment tests, Baber says, is whether we ourselves would choose lives of maximal pleasure / happiness.

Our suspicion towards this kind of life says nothing about whether pleasure / happiness is the only intrinsic good; it merely reveals that we are not very good at choosing what is best for ourselves.

Defending the experience machine

I n response to the concerns just raised, some philosophers offer staunch defenses of Nozick’s experience machine, tweaking the conditions of the thought experiment to account for certain biases, and to make it less focused on our own individual preferences.

Eden Lin, for instance, in his 2016 paper How to Use the Experience Machine , suggests that we can refocus the thought experiment to turn up the heat on hedonism as follows.

Suppose A and B have exactly the same lives, and go through exactly the same experiences. The only difference is that A lives in reality, and B is plugged into an experience machine.

Who has the better life?

If hedonism is true, then we must answer that the quality of A and B’s lives, the value of their lives, is exactly the same.

But Lin thinks most of us would say that, in terms of their personal wellbeing, A’s life is better than B’s — because A’s life is actually happening . If we had to pick one, we would prefer to live A’s life than B’s.

While Lin’s new version of the thought experiment protects against the status quo and hedonistic biases, a hedonist might take issue with it in a different way: it exploits the so-called ‘freebie problem’.

If faced with two identical options, but one includes an extra bonus, we are likely to choose the extra bonus even if we’re not convinced it will make any difference; we pick it just in case .

So, in the context of Lin’s thought experiment, we say A has a better life not because we’re convinced, but because we’re hedging our bets that ‘living in reality’ has some kind of intrinsic value that increases A’s overall wellbeing. As Buscicchi puts it,

Most people will choose the life with the free bonus just in case it has intrinsic value, not necessarily because they think it does have intrinsic value.

What do you make of Nozick’s experience machine?

• Do you think the experience machine thought experiment is a successful argument against hedonism?
• Would you plug into a machine that offered to maximize your happiness?
• What do you make of the criticisms of Nozick’s thought experiment? Which do you find most convincing? Which do you find least persuasive?
• Does Eden Lin’s redesign of the thought experiment make it more powerful as an argument against hedonism?
• Where do you stand on hedonism? Does everything important in life ultimately come back to increasing pleasure / decreasing pain? What matters to you in life?

Learn more about Nozick, hedonism, and other philosophical approaches to the good life

I f you’re interested in learning more about Nozick and how other philosophers approach ethics and the good life, you might enjoy the following related reads:

• On Living Meaningfully in a Vast Universe: Robert Nozick
• Epicureanism Defined: Philosophy is a Form of Therapy
• The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number: What Bentham Really Meant
• Peter Singer On the Life You Can Save
• Iris Murdoch: ‘Unselfing’ is Crucial for Living a Good Life
• Ethics and Morality: the Best 10 Books to Read
• How to Live a Good Life (According to 7 of the World’s Wisest Philosophies)

Finally, if you enjoyed this article, you might like my free Sunday breakdown. I distill one piece of wisdom from philosophy each week; you get the summary delivered straight to your email inbox, and are invited to share your view. Consider joining 12,000+ subscribers and signing up below:

From the Buddha to Nietzsche: join 12,000+ subscribers enjoying my free Sunday Breakdown

In one concise email each Sunday, I break down a famous idea from philosophy. You get the distillation straight to your inbox.

Get one mind-opening philosophical idea distilled to your inbox every Sunday (free):

About the author.

Jack Maden Founder Philosophy Break

Having received great value from studying philosophy for 15+ years (picking up a master’s degree along the way), I founded Philosophy Break in 2018 as an online social enterprise dedicated to making the subject’s wisdom accessible to all. Learn more about me and the project here.

If you enjoy learning about humanity’s greatest thinkers, you might like my free Sunday email. I break down one mind-opening idea from philosophy, and invite you to share your view.

Subscribe for free here , and join 12,000+ philosophers enjoying a nugget of profundity each week (free forever, no spam, unsubscribe any time).

Get one mind-opening philosophical idea distilled to your inbox every Sunday (free)

From the Buddha to Nietzsche: join 12,000+ subscribers enjoying a nugget of profundity from the great philosophers every Sunday:

★★★★★ (50+ reviews for Philosophy Break). Unsubscribe any time.

Take Another Break

Each break takes only a few minutes to read, and is crafted to expand your mind and spark your philosophical curiosity.

The Buddha’s Four Noble Truths: the Cure for Suffering

7 -MIN BREAK

Compatibilism: Philosophy’s Favorite Answer to the Free Will Debate

10 -MIN BREAK

The Last Time Meditation: a Stoic Tool for Living in the Present

5 -MIN BREAK

Nietzsche On Why Suffering is Necessary for Greatness

3 -MIN BREAK

View All Breaks

PHILOSOPHY 101

• What is Philosophy?
• Why is Philosophy Important?
• Philosophy’s Best Books
• About Philosophy Break
• Support the Project
• Instagram   /   Threads   /   Facebook
• TikTok   /   Twitter

Philosophy Break is an online social enterprise dedicated to making the wisdom of philosophy instantly accessible (and useful!) for people striving to live happy, meaningful, and fulfilling lives. Learn more about us here . To offset a fraction of what it costs to maintain Philosophy Break, we participate in the Amazon Associates Program. This means if you purchase something on Amazon from a link on here, we may earn a small percentage of the sale, at no extra cost to you. This helps support Philosophy Break, and is very much appreciated.

Access our generic Amazon Affiliate link here

Privacy Policy | Cookie Policy

© Philosophy Break Ltd, 2024

• Meta-Ethics
• Normative Ethics
• Applied Ethics

Utilitarianism In Nozick’s “The Experience Machine”

What is the meaning of life? It is a question that theologians and philosophers alike have tried to tackle. The proposed answers frequently relate to morality: “To help others” or “To make a difference.” If we follow in this line of thought, utilitarianism might say that the meaning of life is to maximize utility and minimize pain (Bennet 55). However, Robert Nozick calls this idea into question in “The Experience Machine,” proposing that maybe there is something more to life than happiness.

Many philosophers have long regarded happiness as the ultimate goal in life. In Nicomachean Ethics , Aristotle describes happiness as “something complete and self-sufficient, it being an end of our actions” (Aristotle 12). Here Aristotle seems to state that happiness is the ultimate end to the means of living— the meaning of life, even. This is something that the hedonist would likely agree with. However Nozick seems to question the truth of that idea. In “The Experience Machine,” he proposes a hypothetical situation in which humans have the option to plug into a machine that would give you any experience you wanted. While in it, you would have no idea that what was happening wasn’t real. At the surface, this seems to be an ideal scenario. You can do, feel, and experience anything you want to; you can achieve a state of total bliss by handpicking the way your life will go. But Nozick argues that most people would not choose to plug into the machine. He states that there are more things that matter to us than just the way that we feel; if our internal emotional state is all that matters, why not plug in? Nozick says that we want to do things, and not just to experience doing them (Nozick 43). He says that what we are matters, not just what we do. And he argues that humans crave contact with a “deeper reality” (Nozick 43). All of these aspects of living are stripped away when you plug into the machine. And these parts of living seem to be ignored by utilitarianism, by just focusing on what causes you or others pleasure. Nozick states that “what we desire is to live ourselves, in contact with reality” (Nozick 45). This emphasis on wanting to stay in touch with reality implies that we want more than just the happiness that the machine would be able to supply. We crave the fabric of reality, including the hardships and the struggles that make happiness distinct. This mentality is echoed by other philosophers, such as Peter Singer. In his video “ Let’s Talk About Your Hedonism ,” he argues that we achieve meaning in our life through something deeper than just pursuing happiness. He says that “people that don’t aim at pleasure, but aim at something else, some activity that’s worthwhile in itself, and they get absorbed in the moment of doing what they’re doing… they actually get enjoyment and fulfillment out of it.” This idea directly supports Nozick’s argument that humans crave more than just pleasure in life, but something deeper and more personal.

While aiming to do what will make others happy is certainly noble, looking at it through the lens of Nozick’s article and supporting points of view, it just does not seem like enough to encompass all of it what is moral and all of what is important in life. Utilitarianism seems to miss out on a big part of life that Nozick seems to pick up on. What is just as important as happiness is the person, with the motivations and intentions that utilitarianism dubs as meaningless. What is important is a deeper reality that we can discover and get in touch with, which utilitarianism never addresses. What makes human life what it is is how we live in reality, with all of the different emotions beyond just happiness. All of these things are vital parts of the human experience, vital parts of the meaning of life.

While Nozick’s article never directly addresses utilitarianism, it seems to provide sufficient evidence to question the simplicity of the theory. He seems to argue that happiness is not all there is to be had. We cannot ignore the people we are, our motivations and intentions, or the importance of seeking a deeper reality than the surface on which hedonism and utilitarianism operate. The point of life, and the meaning of morality, are deeper and more complex than utilitarianism would suggest.

Works Cited

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics . Trans. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011. Print.

Bennett, Christopher. “Chapter 4: Utilitarianism.” What Is This Thing Called Ethics? London: Routledge, 2010. Print.

Nozick, Robert. “The Experience Machine.” Anarchy, State, and Utopia . New York: Basic Books, 1974. Print.

Let’s Talk About Your Hedonism . Prod. Big Think. Perf. Peter Singer. Y ouTube/Let’s Talk About Your Hedonism . Big Think, 16 Mar. 2009. Web. 3 Oct. 2014. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vfkcg05_uUg>.

2 responses to “ Utilitarianism In Nozick’s “The Experience Machine” ”

Leave a reply cancel reply.

You must be logged in to post a comment.

Recent Posts

• Warren Animal Rights Theory
• Refutation Against Animal Rights
• A Better Animal Rights Theory
• Animal Rights- Inherent Value
• Moral Consistency: Animal Rights and Abortion

Recent Comments

• What is the Difference Between Kantianism and Utilitarianism – In4arts.com on Kantianism > Utilitarianism
• Assignment 1: Analysis of a Philosopher’s Views - thePaper Writers on Rachels Psychological and Ethical Egoism
• assignment 1 analysis of a philosopher s views - nurseshomeworkhelp on Rachels Psychological and Ethical Egoism
• Patrick’s Final Decision in Gone Baby Gone Film » Uswritingconsultants on Duty and Morality
• Assignment 1: Analysis of a Philosopher’s Views - Top Level writers on Rachels Psychological and Ethical Egoism
• Entries feed
• Comments feed
• WordPress.org

The Experience Machine Thought Experiment

Imagine scientists have come up with an amazing new technology called the Experience Machine. It works like this:

You go into the lab and sit down with the staff and talk to them about everything you’ve ever wanted to do in life—you describe your perfect, most ideal, most pleasurable, most joyous, most satisfying possible life. Then they induce you into a coma that you’ll never emerge from. They put your unconscious body into a tank of fluid in a pitch black room and cover your head with electrodes. Here’s an artist’s rendition:

Once you’re in the tank, the simulation begins. You’ll experience everything you said you dreamed of, for the duration of your life (or what can feel like a lot longer if you choose), and you’ll have no memory of going into the experience machine or knowledge that your world is only a simulation. You will experience your perfect life in its entirety, exactly as if it really happened—but in reality, none of it is real and you’re actually floating in a vat of fluid in a pitch black room. You’ll never again wake up to experience the actual world or interact with actual people, but you won’t know that, and you’ll feel like you did.

The question is: If the experience machine were available to you and guaranteed to work flawlessly, would you do it? If not, why not?

___________

Tim’s Answer:

This is a thought experiment proposed by philosopher Robert Nozick in order to refute the philosophy of ethical hedonism. Hedonism suggests that the only thing that matters is human pleasure, and that the only goal should be to maximize pleasure. If hedonism is legit, said Nozick, then everyone would immediately elect to plug into the experience machine. But Nozick thinks most people wouldn’t do it, and to him, this proves that there are things humans value more than their own pleasure, and that pleasure for the sake of pleasure leaves us lacking something important.

My first thought when I heard this was, “No, I wouldn’t do it.” I thought about the real world going on all around me while I lay unconscious in a vat forever, missing everything. Meanwhile, all the people I’d think I was interacting with would be nothing other than figments of my imagination. If I designed my experience to be the life of a rock star, or a scientist who solved the cancer puzzle, or someone who can fly through the universe exploring everything— or all three— doesn’t it matter that there aren’t any real people hearing my rock star music and no actual cancer patients being saved and everything I’m exploring is just rendered in a lab?

Further, I like feeling like I have free will, and in the vat, everything I think is my own free will is all pre-determined—the second the simulation begins, everything that I’m about to experience is already written, like a video playing. I won’t know that, but that’ll be what’s happening.

But am I being irrational? Once I’m plugged in, I won’t know that the whole thing is fake, so who cares? And what if all humans could plug into experience machines, ending all suffering and letting everyone live in their own utopia. Isn’t that a much better world than we live in now? Or is it horribly depressing?

As I thought about this, I also went down the inevitable rabbit hole of wondering if I’m currently in a simulation. What if I had previously been living some terrible life of suffering and I got out of it using an experience machine, leaving me with my current pleasant existence in New York, a city that doesn’t actually exist. That would be kind of an upsetting thing to learn, right? But if, after learning that, I was given the option to permanently opt out of the experience and go back to my real life of suffering, would I do it? I might be inclined to stay here—and if so, wouldn’t that be an argument in favor of doing the experience machine in the first place?

In the end, I think I probably would skip the machine. And that’s probably a dumb choice.

How about you?

You can sign up for the Dinner Table email list here to be notified about the new topic each week, and remember to submit future topic suggestions to [email protected] .

Oh also: I didn’t forget about the spanking survey—more on that coming soon.

Join others and have our posts delivered to you by email.

(No spam, ever. We promise.)

LOOK AT THIS BIG BUTTON WE MADE

About Tim Urban

Recommended posts.

All My Thoughts After 40 Hours in the Vision Pro

10 Thoughts From the Fourth Trimester

A Short History of My Last Six Years

Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.

To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to  upgrade your browser .

Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

• We're Hiring!
• Help Center

What's Wrong with the Experience Machine

2012, European Journal of Philosophy

Nozick's thought experiment is less effective than is often believed. Certainly, there could be reasons to enter the machine. Possibly, life there might be among the best of all those available. Yet we need to distinguish between two versions. On the first, I retain my beliefs, memories, dispositions, some knowledge. On the second, all these too are determined by the scientists. Nozick alludes to both versions. But only on the first will machine life have appeal.

Related Papers

Dan Weijers

Abstract Robert Nozick's experience machine thought experiment (Nozick's scenario) is widely used as the basis for a‗ knockdown 'argument against all internalist mental state theories of well-being. Recently, however, it has been convincingly argued that Nozick's scenario should not be used in this way because it elicits judgements marred by status quo bias and other irrelevant factors.

Academia Letters

Mathias L Kofoed-Ottesen

Frank Hindriks , Igor Douven

Many philosophers deny that happiness can be equated with pleasurable experiences. In influential work, Nozick introduced an experience machine thought experiment to support the idea that happiness requires pleasurable experiences that are " in contact with reality. " In this thought experiment, people can choose to plug into a machine that induces exclusively pleasurable experiences. We test Nozick's hypothesis that people will reject this offer. We also contrast Nozick's experience machine scenario with scenarios that are less artificial and offer options which are less invasive or disruptive than being connected to a machine, specifically scenarios in which people are offered an experience pill or a pill that improves overall functioning. In order to show that happiness cannot be equated with pleasurable experiences, Robert Nozick (1974) invented a thought experiment involving an experience machine. In this thought experiment, we are to imagine that we can choose to plug into an experience machine that ensures our having exclusively pleasurable experiences. Nozick (1974: 646) supposes that we will reject this offer, because we want to live a life that is " in contact with reality " (more on this below). This paper takes Nozick's thought experiment as a starting point for a survey study, aiming to thereby determine the level of support for the intuition this thought experiment seeks to bring into relief. Empirical work on Nozick's " contact intuition " revealed that this intuition is not as universally shared as many in the philosophical community have supposed (De Brigard 2010, Weijers 2014). We probe deeper by considering variations of Nozick's original scenario that feature interventions which are both more realistic and less invasive than hooking someone up to a machine. Specifically, in Experiment 1 we also present the option of taking an experience pill that has the same effect as the experience machine as well as the option of taking a functioning pill that improves one's overall functioning. Inspired by Nozick, we predict that the less invasive an intervention is—the less it severs contact with reality—the more people will be prepared to accept it. We contrast our findings with those of the aforementioned earlier empirical studies. In a second experiment , we consider still further variations of Nozick's scenarios, which are parallel to the materials from Experiment 1 except that now instead of offering an improvement over the status quo the scenarios promise to prevent a pending loss. Recent research suggests that the difference in " valence " between the scenarios from Experiment 1 and those * All Supplementary Information as well as all data and the script for the statistical analyses are available at https://osf.io/nrx2x/?view_only=d001aeff6ea24503b7e844e05f71419f.

Can We Test the Experience Machine?

Basil Smith

Robert Nozick famously asks us whether we would plug in to an experience machine, or whether we would insist upon ‘living in contact with reality’. Felipe De Brigard, after conducting a series of empirical ‘inverted’ experience machine studies, suggests that this is a false dilemma. Rather, he says, '…the fact is that people tend to prefer the state of affairs they are in currently,' or the status quo. In this paper, I argue that these studies are a test case for ‘experimental philosophy’ as such. Specifically, I argue that De Brigard offers a series of faulty studies, and so, reaches unfounded conclusions. More generally, I argue that certain philosophical thought experiments cannot be tested empirically at all, and this limits what experimental philosophy can do.

Ben Bramble

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy

Rach Cosker-Rowland

Felipe De Brigard, Adam Kolber, Wayne Sumner, Dan Weijers and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer have argued that our intuitions about Nozick's experience machine are untrustworthy because they are distorted by biases and irrelevant factors. De Brigard and Weijers recently conducted empirical studies regarding peoples' intuitions about versions of the experience machine our intuitions about which are not distorted by such biases and irrelevant factors. De Brigard and Weijers claim that the results of these studies show that our intuitions about the experience machine do not undermine hedonism (§I). I argue, on the basis of further empirical studies, that De Brigard and Weijers fail to establish that our intuitions about the experience machine do not undermine hedonism (§II).

In this essay I argue that Nozick’s (1974) ‘experience machine’ thought experiment is not as useful a tool for challenging hedonistic theories of rational action as it has previously been considered. I first define a standard model of rational action, before focusing in upon rational goals. This leads into an overview of a hedonistic theory of rational action. I then move onto describe Nozick’s ‘experience machine’ and the reasons why he believes most people will share his intuitions for not plugging into the machine. Against Nozick, I then present De Brigard’s (2010) argument that individual intuitions ought not to be relied upon because they can be affected by status-quo biases. I then look to support my own argument against the usefulness of the ‘experience machine’ thought experiment by discussing Weijirs’ arguments against De Brigard.

MA Student Conference – Aarhus University

In this talk I present a critique of Robert Nozick's 'Experience Machine'; a thought experiment in which we are asked to consider whether we would prefer to live in a simulated world if the simulation would present us with a better life than we actually live. Nozick claims that we would not, because we value a "connection to reality". Further, he claims he is only asking a question of value that is separable from questions of metaphysics and epistemology. I will argue, that the conclusions he draws from the thought experiment actually rely on the answers to such questions. By drawing on F. H. Jacobi's notion of immediate knowing I will show that we cannot have knowledge of whether or not we are in such a simulation and therefore accepting Nozick's conclusion would implausibly require us to remain agnostic with regard to the value of our lives. Therefore, we should reject Nozick and accept that a life in the experience machine could be at least as good as our own.

Just the Arguments

RELATED PAPERS

Carlos Díaz

robert sciberras

Septi Duwi Astuti

The American Journal of Cardiology

Giuseppe M C Rosano

Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica

María Aurelia Di Berardino

A cultural and linguistic study for two shrouds "Bey Najm Al-Awal and Shroud of Houry"

Hossam Yaser

Astronomy and Astrophysics

Willem Schutte

Arquivo Brasileiro de Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia

Marciano Rubini

American Journal of Psychiatric Rehabilitation

Ilanit Hasson-ohayon

RUDN Journal of Agronomy and Animal Industries

Meisam Zargar Ph.D/DSc

South African Journal of Psychiatry

lennart Eriksson

tyghfg hjgfdfd

Jurnal KEJAORA (Kesehatan Jasmani dan Olah Raga)

Nerri Lestari

실시간카지노 토토사이트

Klinika Oczna

Justyna Izdebska

International Journal of Molecular Sciences

Roberta Ghidoni

The EMBO Journal

Angélique DELERIS

Geophysical Research Letters

Stéphane Gaffet

The American Journal of Medicine

Alain Nitenberg

International Journal of Psychology and Educational Studies

Ceren Utkugün

Eduardo Spinedi

•   We're Hiring!
•   Help Center
• Find new research papers in:
• Health Sciences
• Earth Sciences
• Cognitive Science
• Mathematics
• Computer Science
• Academia ©2024

• How It Works
• United States
• View all categories

The Nozick's Experience Machine - Essay Sample

Introduction.

Humans have always tried to understand the balance between pleasure and pain in life. Robert Nozick presented his philosophical thought experiment "The Experience Machine", in an attempt to disprove ethical hedonism. Humans always want to enjoy the happy moments to their maximum potential. Hedonism claims that happiness is the highest and most essential part of life. This seeks to bring an understanding that any other component in life that is not pleasurable does not increase one's well -being. Nozick thought experiment brings in an image of a choice between the everyday life reality and a preferable simulated reality by use of an experience machine.

Is your time best spent reading someone else’s essay? Get a 100% original essay FROM A CERTIFIED WRITER!

This is the machine designed to give pleasurable experiences that humans desired.In the thought experiment, people can choose to plug into the machine which induces exclusively pleasurable experiences while in reality, one will be floating in a tank with electrodes attached to his or her brain.It is stipulated that while one is hooked up to the machine they are not aware of that. He believed that if pleasure was the most significant thing then people would have a solid reason to be plugged on to the experience machine that would provide the desired sensations. From his thought experiment, a majority of people shared his intuition justifying that people preferred not to be connected to the machine.The justification fitted well with the reasons that he had presented for rejecting the offer.

Nozick's thought experiment weakens hedonism by showing that there are other things that are more important than pleasurable experiences in life. The response to the question of whether I would plug into the experience machine if I had a chance is no. This is solely because as a human I have the ability to reason and understand life occurrences differently. The human personality develops greatly by experiencing true events that occur in real time and not while hooked to the experience machine. As a human, my greatest desire is to achieve real-life goals that are experienced in reality and not through the designed simulation.

Experiencing much pleasure is not all that matters in life more so if one is hooked up on a machine.The machine could fail to work as desired or be controlled by bad people and produce undesired results. Human desire is to do actions and experience the feeling that comes along with it. Being plugged on to an experience machine limits us to a mere manmade reality since there is no actual contact to the reality. In my view, I would desire to live a real life with a certain sort of personality.

The idea of the experience machine could pose a challenge to hedonism since humans desire to do much more than pleasurable experiences that can be simulated. Nozick discovered that people would not plug into the experience machine since it seems like a form of suicide that kills the personality. Humans would not want to reduce them to human created reality as it lacks contact with the deeper reality.

Being plugged to the machine would imply that one is giving up the reality of life and choosing unsubstantial illusions. This means that there are other things that matter to humans besides pleasure. Unpredictable experiences are better than programmed ones and bad experiences are required in order to appreciate the good ones. Therefore, if happiness is not the only thing that enhances the wellbeing of humans then the notion of hedonism is weakened.

Nozick's attempt to disprove the idea that hedonism is successful since the reasons for not plugging into the machine is strong. Plugging on the experience machine is not the best thing for one yet hedonism suggests that plugging in would provide one with desired pleasurable experiences. Therefore hedonism is false. Subjective experiences are not determinants of a good life. He argues that being hooked to the machine would result in memory erasure so that one can distinguish the experiences. He also proves that there are some pleasures that can only be realized in the real world. Some of the pleasures that can be accessed in the real world include free will and the expression of love to friends, family and even the experience in love affair.

In conclusion, it can be deduced that most people would not plug in the experience machine because humans desire to live a life that is connected to the reality rather than a simulated one. According to my view, Nozick managed to disprove hedonism since there is much more to be desired in life other than pleasure. Happiness just forms a part of the life's experiences but is not the most important thing.

External experiences matter as much as the internal feelings. Life in the machine would only provide illusory satisfaction. Nozick considers the truth to have an intrinsic value even if it is unpleasant. It is better than illusionary experience. Since hedonism is false then there are other things that are able to make our lives worthwhile. According to Nozick's point of view, it is clear that people value their mental states and their experiences in the real world.

Cite this page

The Nozick's Experience Machine - Essay Sample. (2022, Nov 02). Retrieved from https://midtermguru.com/essays/the-nozicks-experience-machine-essay-sample

so we do not vouch for their quality

If you are the original author of this essay and no longer wish to have it published on the midtermguru.com website, please click below to request its removal:

• Essay Sample on the Ethical Theory of Subjectivism
• Essay on Marxs Theory of Alienation and Philosophical Categories
• The Marxist Alienation - Essay Sample
• Essay Sample on Three Unanswered Questions about Faith, Morals, and Ethics
• My Opinion About Chris McCandless and Transcendentalism
• Moral Philosophy: Examining Right and Wrong in Existence - Essay Sample
• Utilitarianism Case Study

Liked this essay sample but need an original one?

Hire a professional with VAST experience!

24/7 online support

NO plagiarism

Submit your request

Sorry, but it's not possible to copy the text due to security reasons.

Would you like to get this essay by email?

Interested in this essay?

Get it now!

Unfortunately, you can’t copy samples. Solve your problem differently! Provide your email for sample delivery

By clicking “I want to recieve an essay” you agree to be contacted via email

Sample is in your inbox

Avoid editing or writing from scratch! Order original essay online with 25% off. Delivery in 6+ hours!