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Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms for thinking carefully, and the thinking components on which they focus. Its adoption as an educational goal has been recommended on the basis of respect for students’ autonomy and preparing students for success in life and for democratic citizenship. “Critical thinkers” have the dispositions and abilities that lead them to think critically when appropriate. The abilities can be identified directly; the dispositions indirectly, by considering what factors contribute to or impede exercise of the abilities. Standardized tests have been developed to assess the degree to which a person possesses such dispositions and abilities. Educational intervention has been shown experimentally to improve them, particularly when it includes dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring. Controversies have arisen over the generalizability of critical thinking across domains, over alleged bias in critical thinking theories and instruction, and over the relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking.

2.1 Dewey’s Three Main Examples

2.2 dewey’s other examples, 2.3 further examples, 2.4 non-examples, 3. the definition of critical thinking, 4. its value, 5. the process of thinking critically, 6. components of the process, 7. contributory dispositions and abilities, 8.1 initiating dispositions, 8.2 internal dispositions, 9. critical thinking abilities, 10. required knowledge, 11. educational methods, 12.1 the generalizability of critical thinking, 12.2 bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, 12.3 relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking, other internet resources, related entries.

Use of the term ‘critical thinking’ to describe an educational goal goes back to the American philosopher John Dewey (1910), who more commonly called it ‘reflective thinking’. He defined it as

active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends. (Dewey 1910: 6; 1933: 9)

and identified a habit of such consideration with a scientific attitude of mind. His lengthy quotations of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill indicate that he was not the first person to propose development of a scientific attitude of mind as an educational goal.

In the 1930s, many of the schools that participated in the Eight-Year Study of the Progressive Education Association (Aikin 1942) adopted critical thinking as an educational goal, for whose achievement the study’s Evaluation Staff developed tests (Smith, Tyler, & Evaluation Staff 1942). Glaser (1941) showed experimentally that it was possible to improve the critical thinking of high school students. Bloom’s influential taxonomy of cognitive educational objectives (Bloom et al. 1956) incorporated critical thinking abilities. Ennis (1962) proposed 12 aspects of critical thinking as a basis for research on the teaching and evaluation of critical thinking ability.

Since 1980, an annual international conference in California on critical thinking and educational reform has attracted tens of thousands of educators from all levels of education and from many parts of the world. Also since 1980, the state university system in California has required all undergraduate students to take a critical thinking course. Since 1983, the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking has sponsored sessions in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA). In 1987, the APA’s Committee on Pre-College Philosophy commissioned a consensus statement on critical thinking for purposes of educational assessment and instruction (Facione 1990a). Researchers have developed standardized tests of critical thinking abilities and dispositions; for details, see the Supplement on Assessment . Educational jurisdictions around the world now include critical thinking in guidelines for curriculum and assessment.

For details on this history, see the Supplement on History .

2. Examples and Non-Examples

Before considering the definition of critical thinking, it will be helpful to have in mind some examples of critical thinking, as well as some examples of kinds of thinking that would apparently not count as critical thinking.

Dewey (1910: 68–71; 1933: 91–94) takes as paradigms of reflective thinking three class papers of students in which they describe their thinking. The examples range from the everyday to the scientific.

Transit : “The other day, when I was down town on 16th Street, a clock caught my eye. I saw that the hands pointed to 12:20. This suggested that I had an engagement at 124th Street, at one o’clock. I reasoned that as it had taken me an hour to come down on a surface car, I should probably be twenty minutes late if I returned the same way. I might save twenty minutes by a subway express. But was there a station near? If not, I might lose more than twenty minutes in looking for one. Then I thought of the elevated, and I saw there was such a line within two blocks. But where was the station? If it were several blocks above or below the street I was on, I should lose time instead of gaining it. My mind went back to the subway express as quicker than the elevated; furthermore, I remembered that it went nearer than the elevated to the part of 124th Street I wished to reach, so that time would be saved at the end of the journey. I concluded in favor of the subway, and reached my destination by one o’clock.” (Dewey 1910: 68–69; 1933: 91–92)

Ferryboat : “Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferryboat on which I daily cross the river is a long white pole, having a gilded ball at its tip. It suggested a flagpole when I first saw it; its color, shape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these reasons seemed to justify me in this belief. But soon difficulties presented themselves. The pole was nearly horizontal, an unusual position for a flagpole; in the next place, there was no pulley, ring, or cord by which to attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere on the boat two vertical staffs from which flags were occasionally flown. It seemed probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying.

“I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of the pole, and to consider for which of these it was best suited: (a) Possibly it was an ornament. But as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats carried poles, this hypothesis was rejected. (b) Possibly it was the terminal of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations made this improbable. Besides, the more natural place for such a terminal would be the highest part of the boat, on top of the pilot house. (c) Its purpose might be to point out the direction in which the boat is moving.

“In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the pole was lower than the pilot house, so that the steersman could easily see it. Moreover, the tip was enough higher than the base, so that, from the pilot’s position, it must appear to project far out in front of the boat. Moreover, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he would need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats would also need poles for such a purpose. This hypothesis was so much more probable than the others that I accepted it. I formed the conclusion that the pole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot the direction in which the boat pointed, to enable him to steer correctly.” (Dewey 1910: 69–70; 1933: 92–93)

Bubbles : “In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward on a plate, bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and then went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I note must come from inside the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase of heat, or by decrease of pressure, or both. Could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water. If heated air was the cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them. Some I take out holding mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my inference. Air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside. But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and also the air inside it. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse” (Dewey 1910: 70–71; 1933: 93–94).

Dewey (1910, 1933) sprinkles his book with other examples of critical thinking. We will refer to the following.

Weather : A man on a walk notices that it has suddenly become cool, thinks that it is probably going to rain, looks up and sees a dark cloud obscuring the sun, and quickens his steps (1910: 6–10; 1933: 9–13).

Disorder : A man finds his rooms on his return to them in disorder with his belongings thrown about, thinks at first of burglary as an explanation, then thinks of mischievous children as being an alternative explanation, then looks to see whether valuables are missing, and discovers that they are (1910: 82–83; 1933: 166–168).

Typhoid : A physician diagnosing a patient whose conspicuous symptoms suggest typhoid avoids drawing a conclusion until more data are gathered by questioning the patient and by making tests (1910: 85–86; 1933: 170).

Blur : A moving blur catches our eye in the distance, we ask ourselves whether it is a cloud of whirling dust or a tree moving its branches or a man signaling to us, we think of other traits that should be found on each of those possibilities, and we look and see if those traits are found (1910: 102, 108; 1933: 121, 133).

Suction pump : In thinking about the suction pump, the scientist first notes that it will draw water only to a maximum height of 33 feet at sea level and to a lesser maximum height at higher elevations, selects for attention the differing atmospheric pressure at these elevations, sets up experiments in which the air is removed from a vessel containing water (when suction no longer works) and in which the weight of air at various levels is calculated, compares the results of reasoning about the height to which a given weight of air will allow a suction pump to raise water with the observed maximum height at different elevations, and finally assimilates the suction pump to such apparently different phenomena as the siphon and the rising of a balloon (1910: 150–153; 1933: 195–198).

Diamond : A passenger in a car driving in a diamond lane reserved for vehicles with at least one passenger notices that the diamond marks on the pavement are far apart in some places and close together in others. Why? The driver suggests that the reason may be that the diamond marks are not needed where there is a solid double line separating the diamond lane from the adjoining lane, but are needed when there is a dotted single line permitting crossing into the diamond lane. Further observation confirms that the diamonds are close together when a dotted line separates the diamond lane from its neighbour, but otherwise far apart.

Rash : A woman suddenly develops a very itchy red rash on her throat and upper chest. She recently noticed a mark on the back of her right hand, but was not sure whether the mark was a rash or a scrape. She lies down in bed and thinks about what might be causing the rash and what to do about it. About two weeks before, she began taking blood pressure medication that contained a sulfa drug, and the pharmacist had warned her, in view of a previous allergic reaction to a medication containing a sulfa drug, to be on the alert for an allergic reaction; however, she had been taking the medication for two weeks with no such effect. The day before, she began using a new cream on her neck and upper chest; against the new cream as the cause was mark on the back of her hand, which had not been exposed to the cream. She began taking probiotics about a month before. She also recently started new eye drops, but she supposed that manufacturers of eye drops would be careful not to include allergy-causing components in the medication. The rash might be a heat rash, since she recently was sweating profusely from her upper body. Since she is about to go away on a short vacation, where she would not have access to her usual physician, she decides to keep taking the probiotics and using the new eye drops but to discontinue the blood pressure medication and to switch back to the old cream for her neck and upper chest. She forms a plan to consult her regular physician on her return about the blood pressure medication.

Candidate : Although Dewey included no examples of thinking directed at appraising the arguments of others, such thinking has come to be considered a kind of critical thinking. We find an example of such thinking in the performance task on the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA+), which its sponsoring organization describes as

a performance-based assessment that provides a measure of an institution’s contribution to the development of critical-thinking and written communication skills of its students. (Council for Aid to Education 2017)

A sample task posted on its website requires the test-taker to write a report for public distribution evaluating a fictional candidate’s policy proposals and their supporting arguments, using supplied background documents, with a recommendation on whether to endorse the candidate.

Immediate acceptance of an idea that suggests itself as a solution to a problem (e.g., a possible explanation of an event or phenomenon, an action that seems likely to produce a desired result) is “uncritical thinking, the minimum of reflection” (Dewey 1910: 13). On-going suspension of judgment in the light of doubt about a possible solution is not critical thinking (Dewey 1910: 108). Critique driven by a dogmatically held political or religious ideology is not critical thinking; thus Paulo Freire (1968 [1970]) is using the term (e.g., at 1970: 71, 81, 100, 146) in a more politically freighted sense that includes not only reflection but also revolutionary action against oppression. Derivation of a conclusion from given data using an algorithm is not critical thinking.

What is critical thinking? There are many definitions. Ennis (2016) lists 14 philosophically oriented scholarly definitions and three dictionary definitions. Following Rawls (1971), who distinguished his conception of justice from a utilitarian conception but regarded them as rival conceptions of the same concept, Ennis maintains that the 17 definitions are different conceptions of the same concept. Rawls articulated the shared concept of justice as

a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining… the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. (Rawls 1971: 5)

Bailin et al. (1999b) claim that, if one considers what sorts of thinking an educator would take not to be critical thinking and what sorts to be critical thinking, one can conclude that educators typically understand critical thinking to have at least three features.

• It is done for the purpose of making up one’s mind about what to believe or do.
• The person engaging in the thinking is trying to fulfill standards of adequacy and accuracy appropriate to the thinking.
• The thinking fulfills the relevant standards to some threshold level.

One could sum up the core concept that involves these three features by saying that critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking. This core concept seems to apply to all the examples of critical thinking described in the previous section. As for the non-examples, their exclusion depends on construing careful thinking as excluding jumping immediately to conclusions, suspending judgment no matter how strong the evidence, reasoning from an unquestioned ideological or religious perspective, and routinely using an algorithm to answer a question.

If the core of critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking, conceptions of it can vary according to its presumed scope, its presumed goal, one’s criteria and threshold for being careful, and the thinking component on which one focuses. As to its scope, some conceptions (e.g., Dewey 1910, 1933) restrict it to constructive thinking on the basis of one’s own observations and experiments, others (e.g., Ennis 1962; Fisher & Scriven 1997; Johnson 1992) to appraisal of the products of such thinking. Ennis (1991) and Bailin et al. (1999b) take it to cover both construction and appraisal. As to its goal, some conceptions restrict it to forming a judgment (Dewey 1910, 1933; Lipman 1987; Facione 1990a). Others allow for actions as well as beliefs as the end point of a process of critical thinking (Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b). As to the criteria and threshold for being careful, definitions vary in the term used to indicate that critical thinking satisfies certain norms: “intellectually disciplined” (Scriven & Paul 1987), “reasonable” (Ennis 1991), “skillful” (Lipman 1987), “skilled” (Fisher & Scriven 1997), “careful” (Bailin & Battersby 2009). Some definitions specify these norms, referring variously to “consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey 1910, 1933); “the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning” (Glaser 1941); “conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication” (Scriven & Paul 1987); the requirement that “it is sensitive to context, relies on criteria, and is self-correcting” (Lipman 1987); “evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations” (Facione 1990a); and “plus-minus considerations of the product in terms of appropriate standards (or criteria)” (Johnson 1992). Stanovich and Stanovich (2010) propose to ground the concept of critical thinking in the concept of rationality, which they understand as combining epistemic rationality (fitting one’s beliefs to the world) and instrumental rationality (optimizing goal fulfillment); a critical thinker, in their view, is someone with “a propensity to override suboptimal responses from the autonomous mind” (2010: 227). These variant specifications of norms for critical thinking are not necessarily incompatible with one another, and in any case presuppose the core notion of thinking carefully. As to the thinking component singled out, some definitions focus on suspension of judgment during the thinking (Dewey 1910; McPeck 1981), others on inquiry while judgment is suspended (Bailin & Battersby 2009, 2021), others on the resulting judgment (Facione 1990a), and still others on responsiveness to reasons (Siegel 1988). Kuhn (2019) takes critical thinking to be more a dialogic practice of advancing and responding to arguments than an individual ability.

In educational contexts, a definition of critical thinking is a “programmatic definition” (Scheffler 1960: 19). It expresses a practical program for achieving an educational goal. For this purpose, a one-sentence formulaic definition is much less useful than articulation of a critical thinking process, with criteria and standards for the kinds of thinking that the process may involve. The real educational goal is recognition, adoption and implementation by students of those criteria and standards. That adoption and implementation in turn consists in acquiring the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker.

Conceptions of critical thinking generally do not include moral integrity as part of the concept. Dewey, for example, took critical thinking to be the ultimate intellectual goal of education, but distinguished it from the development of social cooperation among school children, which he took to be the central moral goal. Ennis (1996, 2011) added to his previous list of critical thinking dispositions a group of dispositions to care about the dignity and worth of every person, which he described as a “correlative” (1996) disposition without which critical thinking would be less valuable and perhaps harmful. An educational program that aimed at developing critical thinking but not the correlative disposition to care about the dignity and worth of every person, he asserted, “would be deficient and perhaps dangerous” (Ennis 1996: 172).

Dewey thought that education for reflective thinking would be of value to both the individual and society; recognition in educational practice of the kinship to the scientific attitude of children’s native curiosity, fertile imagination and love of experimental inquiry “would make for individual happiness and the reduction of social waste” (Dewey 1910: iii). Schools participating in the Eight-Year Study took development of the habit of reflective thinking and skill in solving problems as a means to leading young people to understand, appreciate and live the democratic way of life characteristic of the United States (Aikin 1942: 17–18, 81). Harvey Siegel (1988: 55–61) has offered four considerations in support of adopting critical thinking as an educational ideal. (1) Respect for persons requires that schools and teachers honour students’ demands for reasons and explanations, deal with students honestly, and recognize the need to confront students’ independent judgment; these requirements concern the manner in which teachers treat students. (2) Education has the task of preparing children to be successful adults, a task that requires development of their self-sufficiency. (3) Education should initiate children into the rational traditions in such fields as history, science and mathematics. (4) Education should prepare children to become democratic citizens, which requires reasoned procedures and critical talents and attitudes. To supplement these considerations, Siegel (1988: 62–90) responds to two objections: the ideology objection that adoption of any educational ideal requires a prior ideological commitment and the indoctrination objection that cultivation of critical thinking cannot escape being a form of indoctrination.

Despite the diversity of our 11 examples, one can recognize a common pattern. Dewey analyzed it as consisting of five phases:

• suggestions , in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution;
• an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought;
• the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis , to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material;
• the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition ( reasoning , in the sense on which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and
• testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. (Dewey 1933: 106–107; italics in original)

The process of reflective thinking consisting of these phases would be preceded by a perplexed, troubled or confused situation and followed by a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation (Dewey 1933: 106). The term ‘phases’ replaced the term ‘steps’ (Dewey 1910: 72), thus removing the earlier suggestion of an invariant sequence. Variants of the above analysis appeared in (Dewey 1916: 177) and (Dewey 1938: 101–119).

The variant formulations indicate the difficulty of giving a single logical analysis of such a varied process. The process of critical thinking may have a spiral pattern, with the problem being redefined in the light of obstacles to solving it as originally formulated. For example, the person in Transit might have concluded that getting to the appointment at the scheduled time was impossible and have reformulated the problem as that of rescheduling the appointment for a mutually convenient time. Further, defining a problem does not always follow after or lead immediately to an idea of a suggested solution. Nor should it do so, as Dewey himself recognized in describing the physician in Typhoid as avoiding any strong preference for this or that conclusion before getting further information (Dewey 1910: 85; 1933: 170). People with a hypothesis in mind, even one to which they have a very weak commitment, have a so-called “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998): they are likely to pay attention to evidence that confirms the hypothesis and to ignore evidence that counts against it or for some competing hypothesis. Detectives, intelligence agencies, and investigators of airplane accidents are well advised to gather relevant evidence systematically and to postpone even tentative adoption of an explanatory hypothesis until the collected evidence rules out with the appropriate degree of certainty all but one explanation. Dewey’s analysis of the critical thinking process can be faulted as well for requiring acceptance or rejection of a possible solution to a defined problem, with no allowance for deciding in the light of the available evidence to suspend judgment. Further, given the great variety of kinds of problems for which reflection is appropriate, there is likely to be variation in its component events. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize the critical thinking process is as a checklist whose component events can occur in a variety of orders, selectively, and more than once. These component events might include (1) noticing a difficulty, (2) defining the problem, (3) dividing the problem into manageable sub-problems, (4) formulating a variety of possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (5) determining what evidence is relevant to deciding among possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (6) devising a plan of systematic observation or experiment that will uncover the relevant evidence, (7) carrying out the plan of systematic observation or experimentation, (8) noting the results of the systematic observation or experiment, (9) gathering relevant testimony and information from others, (10) judging the credibility of testimony and information gathered from others, (11) drawing conclusions from gathered evidence and accepted testimony, and (12) accepting a solution that the evidence adequately supports (cf. Hitchcock 2017: 485).

Checklist conceptions of the process of critical thinking are open to the objection that they are too mechanical and procedural to fit the multi-dimensional and emotionally charged issues for which critical thinking is urgently needed (Paul 1984). For such issues, a more dialectical process is advocated, in which competing relevant world views are identified, their implications explored, and some sort of creative synthesis attempted.

If one considers the critical thinking process illustrated by the 11 examples, one can identify distinct kinds of mental acts and mental states that form part of it. To distinguish, label and briefly characterize these components is a useful preliminary to identifying abilities, skills, dispositions, attitudes, habits and the like that contribute causally to thinking critically. Identifying such abilities and habits is in turn a useful preliminary to setting educational goals. Setting the goals is in its turn a useful preliminary to designing strategies for helping learners to achieve the goals and to designing ways of measuring the extent to which learners have done so. Such measures provide both feedback to learners on their achievement and a basis for experimental research on the effectiveness of various strategies for educating people to think critically. Let us begin, then, by distinguishing the kinds of mental acts and mental events that can occur in a critical thinking process.

• Observing : One notices something in one’s immediate environment (sudden cooling of temperature in Weather , bubbles forming outside a glass and then going inside in Bubbles , a moving blur in the distance in Blur , a rash in Rash ). Or one notes the results of an experiment or systematic observation (valuables missing in Disorder , no suction without air pressure in Suction pump )
• Feeling : One feels puzzled or uncertain about something (how to get to an appointment on time in Transit , why the diamonds vary in spacing in Diamond ). One wants to resolve this perplexity. One feels satisfaction once one has worked out an answer (to take the subway express in Transit , diamonds closer when needed as a warning in Diamond ).
• Wondering : One formulates a question to be addressed (why bubbles form outside a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , how suction pumps work in Suction pump , what caused the rash in Rash ).
• Imagining : One thinks of possible answers (bus or subway or elevated in Transit , flagpole or ornament or wireless communication aid or direction indicator in Ferryboat , allergic reaction or heat rash in Rash ).
• Inferring : One works out what would be the case if a possible answer were assumed (valuables missing if there has been a burglary in Disorder , earlier start to the rash if it is an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug in Rash ). Or one draws a conclusion once sufficient relevant evidence is gathered (take the subway in Transit , burglary in Disorder , discontinue blood pressure medication and new cream in Rash ).
• Knowledge : One uses stored knowledge of the subject-matter to generate possible answers or to infer what would be expected on the assumption of a particular answer (knowledge of a city’s public transit system in Transit , of the requirements for a flagpole in Ferryboat , of Boyle’s law in Bubbles , of allergic reactions in Rash ).
• Experimenting : One designs and carries out an experiment or a systematic observation to find out whether the results deduced from a possible answer will occur (looking at the location of the flagpole in relation to the pilot’s position in Ferryboat , putting an ice cube on top of a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , measuring the height to which a suction pump will draw water at different elevations in Suction pump , noticing the spacing of diamonds when movement to or from a diamond lane is allowed in Diamond ).
• Consulting : One finds a source of information, gets the information from the source, and makes a judgment on whether to accept it. None of our 11 examples include searching for sources of information. In this respect they are unrepresentative, since most people nowadays have almost instant access to information relevant to answering any question, including many of those illustrated by the examples. However, Candidate includes the activities of extracting information from sources and evaluating its credibility.
• Identifying and analyzing arguments : One notices an argument and works out its structure and content as a preliminary to evaluating its strength. This activity is central to Candidate . It is an important part of a critical thinking process in which one surveys arguments for various positions on an issue.
• Judging : One makes a judgment on the basis of accumulated evidence and reasoning, such as the judgment in Ferryboat that the purpose of the pole is to provide direction to the pilot.
• Deciding : One makes a decision on what to do or on what policy to adopt, as in the decision in Transit to take the subway.

By definition, a person who does something voluntarily is both willing and able to do that thing at that time. Both the willingness and the ability contribute causally to the person’s action, in the sense that the voluntary action would not occur if either (or both) of these were lacking. For example, suppose that one is standing with one’s arms at one’s sides and one voluntarily lifts one’s right arm to an extended horizontal position. One would not do so if one were unable to lift one’s arm, if for example one’s right side was paralyzed as the result of a stroke. Nor would one do so if one were unwilling to lift one’s arm, if for example one were participating in a street demonstration at which a white supremacist was urging the crowd to lift their right arm in a Nazi salute and one were unwilling to express support in this way for the racist Nazi ideology. The same analysis applies to a voluntary mental process of thinking critically. It requires both willingness and ability to think critically, including willingness and ability to perform each of the mental acts that compose the process and to coordinate those acts in a sequence that is directed at resolving the initiating perplexity.

Consider willingness first. We can identify causal contributors to willingness to think critically by considering factors that would cause a person who was able to think critically about an issue nevertheless not to do so (Hamby 2014). For each factor, the opposite condition thus contributes causally to willingness to think critically on a particular occasion. For example, people who habitually jump to conclusions without considering alternatives will not think critically about issues that arise, even if they have the required abilities. The contrary condition of willingness to suspend judgment is thus a causal contributor to thinking critically.

Now consider ability. In contrast to the ability to move one’s arm, which can be completely absent because a stroke has left the arm paralyzed, the ability to think critically is a developed ability, whose absence is not a complete absence of ability to think but absence of ability to think well. We can identify the ability to think well directly, in terms of the norms and standards for good thinking. In general, to be able do well the thinking activities that can be components of a critical thinking process, one needs to know the concepts and principles that characterize their good performance, to recognize in particular cases that the concepts and principles apply, and to apply them. The knowledge, recognition and application may be procedural rather than declarative. It may be domain-specific rather than widely applicable, and in either case may need subject-matter knowledge, sometimes of a deep kind.

Reflections of the sort illustrated by the previous two paragraphs have led scholars to identify the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a “critical thinker”, i.e., someone who thinks critically whenever it is appropriate to do so. We turn now to these three types of causal contributors to thinking critically. We start with dispositions, since arguably these are the most powerful contributors to being a critical thinker, can be fostered at an early stage of a child’s development, and are susceptible to general improvement (Glaser 1941: 175)

8. Critical Thinking Dispositions

Educational researchers use the term ‘dispositions’ broadly for the habits of mind and attitudes that contribute causally to being a critical thinker. Some writers (e.g., Paul & Elder 2006; Hamby 2014; Bailin & Battersby 2016a) propose to use the term ‘virtues’ for this dimension of a critical thinker. The virtues in question, although they are virtues of character, concern the person’s ways of thinking rather than the person’s ways of behaving towards others. They are not moral virtues but intellectual virtues, of the sort articulated by Zagzebski (1996) and discussed by Turri, Alfano, and Greco (2017).

On a realistic conception, thinking dispositions or intellectual virtues are real properties of thinkers. They are general tendencies, propensities, or inclinations to think in particular ways in particular circumstances, and can be genuinely explanatory (Siegel 1999). Sceptics argue that there is no evidence for a specific mental basis for the habits of mind that contribute to thinking critically, and that it is pedagogically misleading to posit such a basis (Bailin et al. 1999a). Whatever their status, critical thinking dispositions need motivation for their initial formation in a child—motivation that may be external or internal. As children develop, the force of habit will gradually become important in sustaining the disposition (Nieto & Valenzuela 2012). Mere force of habit, however, is unlikely to sustain critical thinking dispositions. Critical thinkers must value and enjoy using their knowledge and abilities to think things through for themselves. They must be committed to, and lovers of, inquiry.

A person may have a critical thinking disposition with respect to only some kinds of issues. For example, one could be open-minded about scientific issues but not about religious issues. Similarly, one could be confident in one’s ability to reason about the theological implications of the existence of evil in the world but not in one’s ability to reason about the best design for a guided ballistic missile.

Facione (1990a: 25) divides “affective dispositions” of critical thinking into approaches to life and living in general and approaches to specific issues, questions or problems. Adapting this distinction, one can usefully divide critical thinking dispositions into initiating dispositions (those that contribute causally to starting to think critically about an issue) and internal dispositions (those that contribute causally to doing a good job of thinking critically once one has started). The two categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, open-mindedness, in the sense of willingness to consider alternative points of view to one’s own, is both an initiating and an internal disposition.

Using the strategy of considering factors that would block people with the ability to think critically from doing so, we can identify as initiating dispositions for thinking critically attentiveness, a habit of inquiry, self-confidence, courage, open-mindedness, willingness to suspend judgment, trust in reason, wanting evidence for one’s beliefs, and seeking the truth. We consider briefly what each of these dispositions amounts to, in each case citing sources that acknowledge them.

• Attentiveness : One will not think critically if one fails to recognize an issue that needs to be thought through. For example, the pedestrian in Weather would not have looked up if he had not noticed that the air was suddenly cooler. To be a critical thinker, then, one needs to be habitually attentive to one’s surroundings, noticing not only what one senses but also sources of perplexity in messages received and in one’s own beliefs and attitudes (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Habit of inquiry : Inquiry is effortful, and one needs an internal push to engage in it. For example, the student in Bubbles could easily have stopped at idle wondering about the cause of the bubbles rather than reasoning to a hypothesis, then designing and executing an experiment to test it. Thus willingness to think critically needs mental energy and initiative. What can supply that energy? Love of inquiry, or perhaps just a habit of inquiry. Hamby (2015) has argued that willingness to inquire is the central critical thinking virtue, one that encompasses all the others. It is recognized as a critical thinking disposition by Dewey (1910: 29; 1933: 35), Glaser (1941: 5), Ennis (1987: 12; 1991: 8), Facione (1990a: 25), Bailin et al. (1999b: 294), Halpern (1998: 452), and Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo (2001).
• Self-confidence : Lack of confidence in one’s abilities can block critical thinking. For example, if the woman in Rash lacked confidence in her ability to figure things out for herself, she might just have assumed that the rash on her chest was the allergic reaction to her medication against which the pharmacist had warned her. Thus willingness to think critically requires confidence in one’s ability to inquire (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Courage : Fear of thinking for oneself can stop one from doing it. Thus willingness to think critically requires intellectual courage (Paul & Elder 2006: 16).
• Open-mindedness : A dogmatic attitude will impede thinking critically. For example, a person who adheres rigidly to a “pro-choice” position on the issue of the legal status of induced abortion is likely to be unwilling to consider seriously the issue of when in its development an unborn child acquires a moral right to life. Thus willingness to think critically requires open-mindedness, in the sense of a willingness to examine questions to which one already accepts an answer but which further evidence or reasoning might cause one to answer differently (Dewey 1933; Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b; Halpern 1998, Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). Paul (1981) emphasizes open-mindedness about alternative world-views, and recommends a dialectical approach to integrating such views as central to what he calls “strong sense” critical thinking. In three studies, Haran, Ritov, & Mellers (2013) found that actively open-minded thinking, including “the tendency to weigh new evidence against a favored belief, to spend sufficient time on a problem before giving up, and to consider carefully the opinions of others in forming one’s own”, led study participants to acquire information and thus to make accurate estimations.
• Willingness to suspend judgment : Premature closure on an initial solution will block critical thinking. Thus willingness to think critically requires a willingness to suspend judgment while alternatives are explored (Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Halpern 1998).
• Trust in reason : Since distrust in the processes of reasoned inquiry will dissuade one from engaging in it, trust in them is an initiating critical thinking disposition (Facione 1990a, 25; Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001; Paul & Elder 2006). In reaction to an allegedly exclusive emphasis on reason in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, Thayer-Bacon (2000) argues that intuition, imagination, and emotion have important roles to play in an adequate conception of critical thinking that she calls “constructive thinking”. From her point of view, critical thinking requires trust not only in reason but also in intuition, imagination, and emotion.
• Seeking the truth : If one does not care about the truth but is content to stick with one’s initial bias on an issue, then one will not think critically about it. Seeking the truth is thus an initiating critical thinking disposition (Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). A disposition to seek the truth is implicit in more specific critical thinking dispositions, such as trying to be well-informed, considering seriously points of view other than one’s own, looking for alternatives, suspending judgment when the evidence is insufficient, and adopting a position when the evidence supporting it is sufficient.

Some of the initiating dispositions, such as open-mindedness and willingness to suspend judgment, are also internal critical thinking dispositions, in the sense of mental habits or attitudes that contribute causally to doing a good job of critical thinking once one starts the process. But there are many other internal critical thinking dispositions. Some of them are parasitic on one’s conception of good thinking. For example, it is constitutive of good thinking about an issue to formulate the issue clearly and to maintain focus on it. For this purpose, one needs not only the corresponding ability but also the corresponding disposition. Ennis (1991: 8) describes it as the disposition “to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question”, Facione (1990a: 25) as “clarity in stating the question or concern”. Other internal dispositions are motivators to continue or adjust the critical thinking process, such as willingness to persist in a complex task and willingness to abandon nonproductive strategies in an attempt to self-correct (Halpern 1998: 452). For a list of identified internal critical thinking dispositions, see the Supplement on Internal Critical Thinking Dispositions .

Some theorists postulate skills, i.e., acquired abilities, as operative in critical thinking. It is not obvious, however, that a good mental act is the exercise of a generic acquired skill. Inferring an expected time of arrival, as in Transit , has some generic components but also uses non-generic subject-matter knowledge. Bailin et al. (1999a) argue against viewing critical thinking skills as generic and discrete, on the ground that skilled performance at a critical thinking task cannot be separated from knowledge of concepts and from domain-specific principles of good thinking. Talk of skills, they concede, is unproblematic if it means merely that a person with critical thinking skills is capable of intelligent performance.

Despite such scepticism, theorists of critical thinking have listed as general contributors to critical thinking what they variously call abilities (Glaser 1941; Ennis 1962, 1991), skills (Facione 1990a; Halpern 1998) or competencies (Fisher & Scriven 1997). Amalgamating these lists would produce a confusing and chaotic cornucopia of more than 50 possible educational objectives, with only partial overlap among them. It makes sense instead to try to understand the reasons for the multiplicity and diversity, and to make a selection according to one’s own reasons for singling out abilities to be developed in a critical thinking curriculum. Two reasons for diversity among lists of critical thinking abilities are the underlying conception of critical thinking and the envisaged educational level. Appraisal-only conceptions, for example, involve a different suite of abilities than constructive-only conceptions. Some lists, such as those in (Glaser 1941), are put forward as educational objectives for secondary school students, whereas others are proposed as objectives for college students (e.g., Facione 1990a).

The abilities described in the remaining paragraphs of this section emerge from reflection on the general abilities needed to do well the thinking activities identified in section 6 as components of the critical thinking process described in section 5 . The derivation of each collection of abilities is accompanied by citation of sources that list such abilities and of standardized tests that claim to test them.

Observational abilities : Careful and accurate observation sometimes requires specialist expertise and practice, as in the case of observing birds and observing accident scenes. However, there are general abilities of noticing what one’s senses are picking up from one’s environment and of being able to articulate clearly and accurately to oneself and others what one has observed. It helps in exercising them to be able to recognize and take into account factors that make one’s observation less trustworthy, such as prior framing of the situation, inadequate time, deficient senses, poor observation conditions, and the like. It helps as well to be skilled at taking steps to make one’s observation more trustworthy, such as moving closer to get a better look, measuring something three times and taking the average, and checking what one thinks one is observing with someone else who is in a good position to observe it. It also helps to be skilled at recognizing respects in which one’s report of one’s observation involves inference rather than direct observation, so that one can then consider whether the inference is justified. These abilities come into play as well when one thinks about whether and with what degree of confidence to accept an observation report, for example in the study of history or in a criminal investigation or in assessing news reports. Observational abilities show up in some lists of critical thinking abilities (Ennis 1962: 90; Facione 1990a: 16; Ennis 1991: 9). There are items testing a person’s ability to judge the credibility of observation reports in the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests, Levels X and Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). Norris and King (1983, 1985, 1990a, 1990b) is a test of ability to appraise observation reports.

Emotional abilities : The emotions that drive a critical thinking process are perplexity or puzzlement, a wish to resolve it, and satisfaction at achieving the desired resolution. Children experience these emotions at an early age, without being trained to do so. Education that takes critical thinking as a goal needs only to channel these emotions and to make sure not to stifle them. Collaborative critical thinking benefits from ability to recognize one’s own and others’ emotional commitments and reactions.

Questioning abilities : A critical thinking process needs transformation of an inchoate sense of perplexity into a clear question. Formulating a question well requires not building in questionable assumptions, not prejudging the issue, and using language that in context is unambiguous and precise enough (Ennis 1962: 97; 1991: 9).

Imaginative abilities : Thinking directed at finding the correct causal explanation of a general phenomenon or particular event requires an ability to imagine possible explanations. Thinking about what policy or plan of action to adopt requires generation of options and consideration of possible consequences of each option. Domain knowledge is required for such creative activity, but a general ability to imagine alternatives is helpful and can be nurtured so as to become easier, quicker, more extensive, and deeper (Dewey 1910: 34–39; 1933: 40–47). Facione (1990a) and Halpern (1998) include the ability to imagine alternatives as a critical thinking ability.

Inferential abilities : The ability to draw conclusions from given information, and to recognize with what degree of certainty one’s own or others’ conclusions follow, is universally recognized as a general critical thinking ability. All 11 examples in section 2 of this article include inferences, some from hypotheses or options (as in Transit , Ferryboat and Disorder ), others from something observed (as in Weather and Rash ). None of these inferences is formally valid. Rather, they are licensed by general, sometimes qualified substantive rules of inference (Toulmin 1958) that rest on domain knowledge—that a bus trip takes about the same time in each direction, that the terminal of a wireless telegraph would be located on the highest possible place, that sudden cooling is often followed by rain, that an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug generally shows up soon after one starts taking it. It is a matter of controversy to what extent the specialized ability to deduce conclusions from premisses using formal rules of inference is needed for critical thinking. Dewey (1933) locates logical forms in setting out the products of reflection rather than in the process of reflection. Ennis (1981a), on the other hand, maintains that a liberally-educated person should have the following abilities: to translate natural-language statements into statements using the standard logical operators, to use appropriately the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, to deal with argument forms and arguments containing symbols, to determine whether in virtue of an argument’s form its conclusion follows necessarily from its premisses, to reason with logically complex propositions, and to apply the rules and procedures of deductive logic. Inferential abilities are recognized as critical thinking abilities by Glaser (1941: 6), Facione (1990a: 9), Ennis (1991: 9), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 99, 111), and Halpern (1998: 452). Items testing inferential abilities constitute two of the five subtests of the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser 1980a, 1980b, 1994), two of the four sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), three of the seven sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), 11 of the 34 items on Forms A and B of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992), and a high but variable proportion of the 25 selected-response questions in the Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Experimenting abilities : Knowing how to design and execute an experiment is important not just in scientific research but also in everyday life, as in Rash . Dewey devoted a whole chapter of his How We Think (1910: 145–156; 1933: 190–202) to the superiority of experimentation over observation in advancing knowledge. Experimenting abilities come into play at one remove in appraising reports of scientific studies. Skill in designing and executing experiments includes the acknowledged abilities to appraise evidence (Glaser 1941: 6), to carry out experiments and to apply appropriate statistical inference techniques (Facione 1990a: 9), to judge inductions to an explanatory hypothesis (Ennis 1991: 9), and to recognize the need for an adequately large sample size (Halpern 1998). The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) includes four items (out of 52) on experimental design. The Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) makes room for appraisal of study design in both its performance task and its selected-response questions.

Consulting abilities : Skill at consulting sources of information comes into play when one seeks information to help resolve a problem, as in Candidate . Ability to find and appraise information includes ability to gather and marshal pertinent information (Glaser 1941: 6), to judge whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable (Ennis 1962: 84), to plan a search for desired information (Facione 1990a: 9), and to judge the credibility of a source (Ennis 1991: 9). Ability to judge the credibility of statements is tested by 24 items (out of 76) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) and by four items (out of 52) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). The College Learning Assessment’s performance task requires evaluation of whether information in documents is credible or unreliable (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Argument analysis abilities : The ability to identify and analyze arguments contributes to the process of surveying arguments on an issue in order to form one’s own reasoned judgment, as in Candidate . The ability to detect and analyze arguments is recognized as a critical thinking skill by Facione (1990a: 7–8), Ennis (1991: 9) and Halpern (1998). Five items (out of 34) on the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992) test skill at argument analysis. The College Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) incorporates argument analysis in its selected-response tests of critical reading and evaluation and of critiquing an argument.

Judging skills and deciding skills : Skill at judging and deciding is skill at recognizing what judgment or decision the available evidence and argument supports, and with what degree of confidence. It is thus a component of the inferential skills already discussed.

Lists and tests of critical thinking abilities often include two more abilities: identifying assumptions and constructing and evaluating definitions.

In addition to dispositions and abilities, critical thinking needs knowledge: of critical thinking concepts, of critical thinking principles, and of the subject-matter of the thinking.

We can derive a short list of concepts whose understanding contributes to critical thinking from the critical thinking abilities described in the preceding section. Observational abilities require an understanding of the difference between observation and inference. Questioning abilities require an understanding of the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness. Inferential abilities require an understanding of the difference between conclusive and defeasible inference (traditionally, between deduction and induction), as well as of the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions. Experimenting abilities require an understanding of the concepts of hypothesis, null hypothesis, assumption and prediction, as well as of the concept of statistical significance and of its difference from importance. They also require an understanding of the difference between an experiment and an observational study, and in particular of the difference between a randomized controlled trial, a prospective correlational study and a retrospective (case-control) study. Argument analysis abilities require an understanding of the concepts of argument, premiss, assumption, conclusion and counter-consideration. Additional critical thinking concepts are proposed by Bailin et al. (1999b: 293), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 105–106), Black (2012), and Blair (2021).

According to Glaser (1941: 25), ability to think critically requires knowledge of the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning. If we review the list of abilities in the preceding section, however, we can see that some of them can be acquired and exercised merely through practice, possibly guided in an educational setting, followed by feedback. Searching intelligently for a causal explanation of some phenomenon or event requires that one consider a full range of possible causal contributors, but it seems more important that one implements this principle in one’s practice than that one is able to articulate it. What is important is “operational knowledge” of the standards and principles of good thinking (Bailin et al. 1999b: 291–293). But the development of such critical thinking abilities as designing an experiment or constructing an operational definition can benefit from learning their underlying theory. Further, explicit knowledge of quirks of human thinking seems useful as a cautionary guide. Human memory is not just fallible about details, as people learn from their own experiences of misremembering, but is so malleable that a detailed, clear and vivid recollection of an event can be a total fabrication (Loftus 2017). People seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to their existing beliefs and expectations, often unconscious of their “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998). Not only are people subject to this and other cognitive biases (Kahneman 2011), of which they are typically unaware, but it may be counter-productive for one to make oneself aware of them and try consciously to counteract them or to counteract social biases such as racial or sexual stereotypes (Kenyon & Beaulac 2014). It is helpful to be aware of these facts and of the superior effectiveness of blocking the operation of biases—for example, by making an immediate record of one’s observations, refraining from forming a preliminary explanatory hypothesis, blind refereeing, double-blind randomized trials, and blind grading of students’ work. It is also helpful to be aware of the prevalence of “noise” (unwanted unsystematic variability of judgments), of how to detect noise (through a noise audit), and of how to reduce noise: make accuracy the goal, think statistically, break a process of arriving at a judgment into independent tasks, resist premature intuitions, in a group get independent judgments first, favour comparative judgments and scales (Kahneman, Sibony, & Sunstein 2021). It is helpful as well to be aware of the concept of “bounded rationality” in decision-making and of the related distinction between “satisficing” and optimizing (Simon 1956; Gigerenzer 2001).

Critical thinking about an issue requires substantive knowledge of the domain to which the issue belongs. Critical thinking abilities are not a magic elixir that can be applied to any issue whatever by somebody who has no knowledge of the facts relevant to exploring that issue. For example, the student in Bubbles needed to know that gases do not penetrate solid objects like a glass, that air expands when heated, that the volume of an enclosed gas varies directly with its temperature and inversely with its pressure, and that hot objects will spontaneously cool down to the ambient temperature of their surroundings unless kept hot by insulation or a source of heat. Critical thinkers thus need a rich fund of subject-matter knowledge relevant to the variety of situations they encounter. This fact is recognized in the inclusion among critical thinking dispositions of a concern to become and remain generally well informed.

Experimental educational interventions, with control groups, have shown that education can improve critical thinking skills and dispositions, as measured by standardized tests. For information about these tests, see the Supplement on Assessment .

What educational methods are most effective at developing the dispositions, abilities and knowledge of a critical thinker? In a comprehensive meta-analysis of experimental and quasi-experimental studies of strategies for teaching students to think critically, Abrami et al. (2015) found that dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring each increased the effectiveness of the educational intervention, and that they were most effective when combined. They also found that in these studies a combination of separate instruction in critical thinking with subject-matter instruction in which students are encouraged to think critically was more effective than either by itself. However, the difference was not statistically significant; that is, it might have arisen by chance.

Most of these studies lack the longitudinal follow-up required to determine whether the observed differential improvements in critical thinking abilities or dispositions continue over time, for example until high school or college graduation. For details on studies of methods of developing critical thinking skills and dispositions, see the Supplement on Educational Methods .

12. Controversies

Scholars have denied the generalizability of critical thinking abilities across subject domains, have alleged bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, and have investigated the relationship of critical thinking to other kinds of thinking.

McPeck (1981) attacked the thinking skills movement of the 1970s, including the critical thinking movement. He argued that there are no general thinking skills, since thinking is always thinking about some subject-matter. It is futile, he claimed, for schools and colleges to teach thinking as if it were a separate subject. Rather, teachers should lead their pupils to become autonomous thinkers by teaching school subjects in a way that brings out their cognitive structure and that encourages and rewards discussion and argument. As some of his critics (e.g., Paul 1985; Siegel 1985) pointed out, McPeck’s central argument needs elaboration, since it has obvious counter-examples in writing and speaking, for which (up to a certain level of complexity) there are teachable general abilities even though they are always about some subject-matter. To make his argument convincing, McPeck needs to explain how thinking differs from writing and speaking in a way that does not permit useful abstraction of its components from the subject-matters with which it deals. He has not done so. Nevertheless, his position that the dispositions and abilities of a critical thinker are best developed in the context of subject-matter instruction is shared by many theorists of critical thinking, including Dewey (1910, 1933), Glaser (1941), Passmore (1980), Weinstein (1990), Bailin et al. (1999b), and Willingham (2019).

McPeck’s challenge prompted reflection on the extent to which critical thinking is subject-specific. McPeck argued for a strong subject-specificity thesis, according to which it is a conceptual truth that all critical thinking abilities are specific to a subject. (He did not however extend his subject-specificity thesis to critical thinking dispositions. In particular, he took the disposition to suspend judgment in situations of cognitive dissonance to be a general disposition.) Conceptual subject-specificity is subject to obvious counter-examples, such as the general ability to recognize confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions. A more modest thesis, also endorsed by McPeck, is epistemological subject-specificity, according to which the norms of good thinking vary from one field to another. Epistemological subject-specificity clearly holds to a certain extent; for example, the principles in accordance with which one solves a differential equation are quite different from the principles in accordance with which one determines whether a painting is a genuine Picasso. But the thesis suffers, as Ennis (1989) points out, from vagueness of the concept of a field or subject and from the obvious existence of inter-field principles, however broadly the concept of a field is construed. For example, the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning hold for all the varied fields in which such reasoning occurs. A third kind of subject-specificity is empirical subject-specificity, according to which as a matter of empirically observable fact a person with the abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker in one area of investigation will not necessarily have them in another area of investigation.

The thesis of empirical subject-specificity raises the general problem of transfer. If critical thinking abilities and dispositions have to be developed independently in each school subject, how are they of any use in dealing with the problems of everyday life and the political and social issues of contemporary society, most of which do not fit into the framework of a traditional school subject? Proponents of empirical subject-specificity tend to argue that transfer is more likely to occur if there is critical thinking instruction in a variety of domains, with explicit attention to dispositions and abilities that cut across domains. But evidence for this claim is scanty. There is a need for well-designed empirical studies that investigate the conditions that make transfer more likely.

It is common ground in debates about the generality or subject-specificity of critical thinking dispositions and abilities that critical thinking about any topic requires background knowledge about the topic. For example, the most sophisticated understanding of the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning is of no help unless accompanied by some knowledge of what might be plausible explanations of some phenomenon under investigation.

Critics have objected to bias in the theory, pedagogy and practice of critical thinking. Commentators (e.g., Alston 1995; Ennis 1998) have noted that anyone who takes a position has a bias in the neutral sense of being inclined in one direction rather than others. The critics, however, are objecting to bias in the pejorative sense of an unjustified favoring of certain ways of knowing over others, frequently alleging that the unjustly favoured ways are those of a dominant sex or culture (Bailin 1995). These ways favour:

• reinforcement of egocentric and sociocentric biases over dialectical engagement with opposing world-views (Paul 1981, 1984; Warren 1998)
• distancing from the object of inquiry over closeness to it (Martin 1992; Thayer-Bacon 1992)
• indifference to the situation of others over care for them (Martin 1992)
• orientation to thought over orientation to action (Martin 1992)
• being reasonable over caring to understand people’s ideas (Thayer-Bacon 1993)
• being neutral and objective over being embodied and situated (Thayer-Bacon 1995a)
• doubting over believing (Thayer-Bacon 1995b)
• reason over emotion, imagination and intuition (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• solitary thinking over collaborative thinking (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• written and spoken assignments over other forms of expression (Alston 2001)
• attention to written and spoken communications over attention to human problems (Alston 2001)
• winning debates in the public sphere over making and understanding meaning (Alston 2001)

A common thread in this smorgasbord of accusations is dissatisfaction with focusing on the logical analysis and evaluation of reasoning and arguments. While these authors acknowledge that such analysis and evaluation is part of critical thinking and should be part of its conceptualization and pedagogy, they insist that it is only a part. Paul (1981), for example, bemoans the tendency of atomistic teaching of methods of analyzing and evaluating arguments to turn students into more able sophists, adept at finding fault with positions and arguments with which they disagree but even more entrenched in the egocentric and sociocentric biases with which they began. Martin (1992) and Thayer-Bacon (1992) cite with approval the self-reported intimacy with their subject-matter of leading researchers in biology and medicine, an intimacy that conflicts with the distancing allegedly recommended in standard conceptions and pedagogy of critical thinking. Thayer-Bacon (2000) contrasts the embodied and socially embedded learning of her elementary school students in a Montessori school, who used their imagination, intuition and emotions as well as their reason, with conceptions of critical thinking as

thinking that is used to critique arguments, offer justifications, and make judgments about what are the good reasons, or the right answers. (Thayer-Bacon 2000: 127–128)

Alston (2001) reports that her students in a women’s studies class were able to see the flaws in the Cinderella myth that pervades much romantic fiction but in their own romantic relationships still acted as if all failures were the woman’s fault and still accepted the notions of love at first sight and living happily ever after. Students, she writes, should

be able to connect their intellectual critique to a more affective, somatic, and ethical account of making risky choices that have sexist, racist, classist, familial, sexual, or other consequences for themselves and those both near and far… critical thinking that reads arguments, texts, or practices merely on the surface without connections to feeling/desiring/doing or action lacks an ethical depth that should infuse the difference between mere cognitive activity and something we want to call critical thinking. (Alston 2001: 34)

Some critics portray such biases as unfair to women. Thayer-Bacon (1992), for example, has charged modern critical thinking theory with being sexist, on the ground that it separates the self from the object and causes one to lose touch with one’s inner voice, and thus stigmatizes women, who (she asserts) link self to object and listen to their inner voice. Her charge does not imply that women as a group are on average less able than men to analyze and evaluate arguments. Facione (1990c) found no difference by sex in performance on his California Critical Thinking Skills Test. Kuhn (1991: 280–281) found no difference by sex in either the disposition or the competence to engage in argumentative thinking.

The critics propose a variety of remedies for the biases that they allege. In general, they do not propose to eliminate or downplay critical thinking as an educational goal. Rather, they propose to conceptualize critical thinking differently and to change its pedagogy accordingly. Their pedagogical proposals arise logically from their objections. They can be summarized as follows:

• Focus on argument networks with dialectical exchanges reflecting contesting points of view rather than on atomic arguments, so as to develop “strong sense” critical thinking that transcends egocentric and sociocentric biases (Paul 1981, 1984).
• Foster closeness to the subject-matter and feeling connected to others in order to inform a humane democracy (Martin 1992).
• Develop “constructive thinking” as a social activity in a community of physically embodied and socially embedded inquirers with personal voices who value not only reason but also imagination, intuition and emotion (Thayer-Bacon 2000).
• In developing critical thinking in school subjects, treat as important neither skills nor dispositions but opening worlds of meaning (Alston 2001).
• Attend to the development of critical thinking dispositions as well as skills, and adopt the “critical pedagogy” practised and advocated by Freire (1968 [1970]) and hooks (1994) (Dalgleish, Girard, & Davies 2017).

A common thread in these proposals is treatment of critical thinking as a social, interactive, personally engaged activity like that of a quilting bee or a barn-raising (Thayer-Bacon 2000) rather than as an individual, solitary, distanced activity symbolized by Rodin’s The Thinker . One can get a vivid description of education with the former type of goal from the writings of bell hooks (1994, 2010). Critical thinking for her is open-minded dialectical exchange across opposing standpoints and from multiple perspectives, a conception similar to Paul’s “strong sense” critical thinking (Paul 1981). She abandons the structure of domination in the traditional classroom. In an introductory course on black women writers, for example, she assigns students to write an autobiographical paragraph about an early racial memory, then to read it aloud as the others listen, thus affirming the uniqueness and value of each voice and creating a communal awareness of the diversity of the group’s experiences (hooks 1994: 84). Her “engaged pedagogy” is thus similar to the “freedom under guidance” implemented in John Dewey’s Laboratory School of Chicago in the late 1890s and early 1900s. It incorporates the dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring that Abrami (2015) found to be most effective in improving critical thinking skills and dispositions.

What is the relationship of critical thinking to problem solving, decision-making, higher-order thinking, creative thinking, and other recognized types of thinking? One’s answer to this question obviously depends on how one defines the terms used in the question. If critical thinking is conceived broadly to cover any careful thinking about any topic for any purpose, then problem solving and decision making will be kinds of critical thinking, if they are done carefully. Historically, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘problem solving’ were two names for the same thing. If critical thinking is conceived more narrowly as consisting solely of appraisal of intellectual products, then it will be disjoint with problem solving and decision making, which are constructive.

Bloom’s taxonomy of educational objectives used the phrase “intellectual abilities and skills” for what had been labeled “critical thinking” by some, “reflective thinking” by Dewey and others, and “problem solving” by still others (Bloom et al. 1956: 38). Thus, the so-called “higher-order thinking skills” at the taxonomy’s top levels of analysis, synthesis and evaluation are just critical thinking skills, although they do not come with general criteria for their assessment (Ennis 1981b). The revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy (Anderson et al. 2001) likewise treats critical thinking as cutting across those types of cognitive process that involve more than remembering (Anderson et al. 2001: 269–270). For details, see the Supplement on History .

As to creative thinking, it overlaps with critical thinking (Bailin 1987, 1988). Thinking about the explanation of some phenomenon or event, as in Ferryboat , requires creative imagination in constructing plausible explanatory hypotheses. Likewise, thinking about a policy question, as in Candidate , requires creativity in coming up with options. Conversely, creativity in any field needs to be balanced by critical appraisal of the draft painting or novel or mathematical theory.

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• The Nature of Critical Thinking: An Outline of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilities , by Robert H. Ennis

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Integrating Critical Thinking Into the Classroom

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‘Learning Conversations’

Dr. Kulvarn Atwal is currently the executive head teacher of two large primary schools in the London borough of Redbridge. Dr. Atwal is the author of The Thinking School: Developing a Dynamic Learning Community , published by John Catt Educational. Follow him on Twitter @Thinkingschool2 :

In many classrooms I visit, students’ primary focus is on what they are expected to do and how it will be measured. It seems that we are becoming successful at producing students who are able to jump through hoops and pass tests. But are we producing children that are positive about teaching and learning and can think critically and creatively? Consider your classroom environment and the extent to which you employ strategies that develop students’ critical-thinking skills and their self-esteem as learners.

Development of self-esteem

One of the most significant factors that impacts students’ engagement and achievement in learning in your classroom is their self-esteem. In this context, self-esteem can be viewed to be the difference between how they perceive themselves as a learner (perceived self) and what they consider to be the ideal learner (ideal self). This ideal self may reflect the child that is associated or seen to be the smartest in the class. Your aim must be to raise students’ self-esteem. To do this, you have to demonstrate that effort, not ability, leads to success. Your language and interactions in the classroom, therefore, have to be aspirational—that if children persist with something, they will achieve.

Use of evaluative praise

Ensure that when you are praising students, you are making explicit links to a child’s critical thinking and/or development. This will enable them to build their understanding of what factors are supporting them in their learning. For example, often when we give feedback to students, we may simply say, “Well done” or “Good answer.” However, are the students actually aware of what they did well or what was good about their answer? Make sure you make explicit what the student has done well and where that links to prior learning. How do you value students’ critical thinking—do you praise their thinking and demonstrate how it helps them improve their learning?

Learning conversations to encourage deeper thinking

We often feel as teachers that we have to provide feedback to every students’ response, but this can limit children’s thinking. Encourage students in your class to engage in learning conversations with each other. Give as many opportunities as possible to students to build on the responses of others. Facilitate chains of dialogue by inviting students to give feedback to each other. The teacher’s role is, therefore, to facilitate this dialogue and select each individual student to give feedback to others. It may also mean that you do not always need to respond at all to a student’s answer.

Teacher modelling own thinking

We cannot expect students to develop critical-thinking skills if we aren’t modeling those thinking skills for them. Share your creativity, imagination, and thinking skills with the students and you will nurture creative, imaginative critical thinkers. Model the language you want students to learn and think about. Share what you feel about the learning activities your students are participating in as well as the thinking you are engaging in. Your own thinking and learning will add to the discussions in the classroom and encourage students to share their own thinking.

Metacognitive questioning

Consider the extent to which your questioning encourages students to think about their thinking, and therefore, learn about learning! Through asking metacognitive questions, you will enable your students to have a better understanding of the learning process, as well as their own self-reflections as learners. Example questions may include:

• Why did you choose to do it that way?
• When you find something tricky, what helps you?
• How do you know when you have really learned something?

‘Adventures of Discovery’

Elena Quagliarello is the senior editor of education for Scholastic News , a current events magazine for students in grades 3–6. She graduated from Rutgers University, where she studied English and earned her master’s degree in elementary education. She is a certified K–12 teacher and previously taught middle school English/language arts for five years:

Critical thinking blasts through the surface level of a topic. It reaches beyond the who and the what and launches students on a learning journey that ultimately unlocks a deeper level of understanding. Teaching students how to think critically helps them turn information into knowledge and knowledge into wisdom. In the classroom, critical thinking teaches students how to ask and answer the questions needed to read the world. Whether it’s a story, news article, photo, video, advertisement, or another form of media, students can use the following critical-thinking strategies to dig beyond the surface and uncover a wealth of knowledge.

A Layered Learning Approach

Begin by having students read a story, article, or analyze a piece of media. Then have them excavate and explore its various layers of meaning. First, ask students to think about the literal meaning of what they just read. For example, if students read an article about the desegregation of public schools during the 1950s, they should be able to answer questions such as: Who was involved? What happened? Where did it happen? Which details are important? This is the first layer of critical thinking: reading comprehension. Do students understand the passage at its most basic level?

Ask the Tough Questions

The next layer delves deeper and starts to uncover the author’s purpose and craft. Teach students to ask the tough questions: What information is included? What or who is left out? How does word choice influence the reader? What perspective is represented? What values or people are marginalized? These questions force students to critically analyze the choices behind the final product. In today’s age of fast-paced, easily accessible information, it is essential to teach students how to critically examine the information they consume. The goal is to equip students with the mindset to ask these questions on their own.

Strike Gold

The deepest layer of critical thinking comes from having students take a step back to think about the big picture. This level of thinking is no longer focused on the text itself but rather its real-world implications. Students explore questions such as: Why does this matter? What lesson have I learned? How can this lesson be applied to other situations? Students truly engage in critical thinking when they are able to reflect on their thinking and apply their knowledge to a new situation. This step has the power to transform knowledge into wisdom.

Adventures of Discovery

There are vast ways to spark critical thinking in the classroom. Here are a few other ideas:

• Critical Expressionism: In this expanded response to reading from a critical stance, students are encouraged to respond through forms of artistic interpretations, dramatizations, singing, sketching, designing projects, or other multimodal responses. For example, students might read an article and then create a podcast about it or read a story and then act it out.
• Transmediations: This activity requires students to take an article or story and transform it into something new. For example, they might turn a news article into a cartoon or turn a story into a poem. Alternatively, students may rewrite a story by changing some of its elements, such as the setting or time period.
• Words Into Action: In this type of activity, students are encouraged to take action and bring about change. Students might read an article about endangered orangutans and the effects of habitat loss caused by deforestation and be inspired to check the labels on products for palm oil. They might then write a letter asking companies how they make sure the palm oil they use doesn’t hurt rain forests.
• Socratic Seminars: In this student-led discussion strategy, students pose thought-provoking questions to each other about a topic. They listen closely to each other’s comments and think critically about different perspectives.
• Classroom Debates: Aside from sparking a lively conversation, classroom debates naturally embed critical-thinking skills by asking students to formulate and support their own opinions and consider and respond to opposing viewpoints.

Critical thinking has the power to launch students on unforgettable learning experiences while helping them develop new habits of thought, reflection, and inquiry. Developing these skills prepares students to examine issues of power and promote transformative change in the world around them.

‘Quote Analysis’

Dr. Donna Wilson is a psychologist and the author of 20 books, including Developing Growth Mindsets , Teaching Students to Drive Their Brains , and Five Big Ideas for Effective Teaching (2 nd Edition). She is an international speaker who has worked in Asia, the Middle East, Australia, Europe, Jamaica, and throughout the U.S. and Canada. Dr. Wilson can be reached at [email protected] ; visit her website at www.brainsmart.org .

Diane Dahl has been a teacher for 13 years, having taught grades 2-4 throughout her career. Mrs. Dahl currently teaches 3rd and 4th grade GT-ELAR/SS in Lovejoy ISD in Fairview, Texas. Follow her on Twitter at @DahlD, and visit her website at www.fortheloveofteaching.net :

A growing body of research over the past several decades indicates that teaching students how to be better thinkers is a great way to support them to be more successful at school and beyond. In the book, Teaching Students to Drive Their Brains , Dr. Wilson shares research and many motivational strategies, activities, and lesson ideas that assist students to think at higher levels. Five key strategies from the book are as follows:

• Facilitate conversation about why it is important to think critically at school and in other contexts of life. Ideally, every student will have a contribution to make to the discussion over time.
• Begin teaching thinking skills early in the school year and as a daily part of class.
• As this instruction begins, introduce students to the concept of brain plasticity and how their brilliant brains change during thinking and learning. This can be highly motivational for students who do not yet believe they are good thinkers!
• Explicitly teach students how to use the thinking skills.
• Facilitate student understanding of how the thinking skills they are learning relate to their lives at school and in other contexts.

Below are two lessons that support critical thinking, which can be defined as the objective analysis and evaluation of an issue in order to form a judgment.

Mrs. Dahl prepares her 3rd and 4th grade classes for a year of critical thinking using quote analysis .

During Native American studies, her 4 th grade analyzes a Tuscarora quote: “Man has responsibility, not power.” Since students already know how the Native Americans’ land had been stolen, it doesn’t take much for them to make the logical leaps. Critical-thought prompts take their thinking even deeper, especially at the beginning of the year when many need scaffolding. Some prompts include:

• … from the point of view of the Native Americans?
• … from the point of view of the settlers?
• How do you think your life might change over time as a result?
• Can you relate this quote to anything else in history?

Analyzing a topic from occupational points of view is an incredibly powerful critical-thinking tool. After learning about the Mexican-American War, Mrs. Dahl’s students worked in groups to choose an occupation with which to analyze the war. The chosen occupations were: anthropologist, mathematician, historian, archaeologist, cartographer, and economist. Then each individual within each group chose a different critical-thinking skill to focus on. Finally, they worked together to decide how their occupation would view the war using each skill.

For example, here is what each student in the economist group wrote:

• When U.S.A. invaded Mexico for land and won, Mexico ended up losing income from the settlements of Jose de Escandon. The U.S.A. thought that they were gaining possible tradable land, while Mexico thought that they were losing precious land and resources.
• Whenever Texas joined the states, their GDP skyrocketed. Then they went to war and spent money on supplies. When the war was resolving, Texas sold some of their land to New Mexico for $10 million. This allowed Texas to pay off their debt to the U.S., improving their relationship.
• A detail that converged into the Mexican-American War was that Mexico and the U.S. disagreed on the Texas border. With the resulting treaty, Texas ended up gaining more land and economic resources.
• Texas gained land from Mexico since both countries disagreed on borders. Texas sold land to New Mexico, which made Texas more economically structured and allowed them to pay off their debt.

This was the first time that students had ever used the occupations technique. Mrs. Dahl was astonished at how many times the kids used these critical skills in other areas moving forward.

Thanks to Dr. Auwal, Elena, Dr. Wilson, and Diane for their contributions!

Please feel free to leave a comment with your reactions to the topic or directly to anything that has been said in this post.

Consider contributing a question to be answered in a future post. You can send one to me at [email protected] . When you send it in, let me know if I can use your real name if it’s selected or if you’d prefer remaining anonymous and have a pseudonym in mind.

You can also contact me on Twitter at @Larryferlazzo .

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Critical thinking

Advice and resources to help you develop your critical voice.

Developing critical thinking skills is essential to your success at University and beyond.  We all need to be critical thinkers to help us navigate our way through an information-rich world. 

Whatever your discipline, you will engage with a wide variety of sources of information and evidence.  You will develop the skills to make judgements about this evidence to form your own views and to present your views clearly.

One of the most common types of feedback received by students is that their work is ‘too descriptive’.  This usually means that they have just stated what others have said and have not reflected critically on the material.  They have not evaluated the evidence and constructed an argument.

What is critical thinking?

Critical thinking is the art of making clear, reasoned judgements based on interpreting, understanding, applying and synthesising evidence gathered from observation, reading and experimentation. Burns, T., & Sinfield, S. (2016)  Essential Study Skills: The Complete Guide to Success at University (4th ed.) London: SAGE, p94.

Being critical does not just mean finding fault.  It means assessing evidence from a variety of sources and making reasoned conclusions.  As a result of your analysis you may decide that a particular piece of evidence is not robust, or that you disagree with the conclusion, but you should be able to state why you have come to this view and incorporate this into a bigger picture of the literature.

Being critical goes beyond describing what you have heard in lectures or what you have read.  It involves synthesising, analysing and evaluating what you have learned to develop your own argument or position.

Critical thinking is important in all subjects and disciplines – in science and engineering, as well as the arts and humanities.  The types of evidence used to develop arguments may be very different but the processes and techniques are similar.  Critical thinking is required for both undergraduate and postgraduate levels of study.

What, where, when, who, why, how?

Purposeful reading can help with critical thinking because it encourages you to read actively rather than passively.  When you read, ask yourself questions about what you are reading and make notes to record your views.  Ask questions like:

• What is the main point of this paper/ article/ paragraph/ report/ blog?
• Who wrote it?
• Why was it written?
• When was it written?
• Has the context changed since it was written?
• Is the evidence presented robust?
• How did the authors come to their conclusions?
• Do you agree with the conclusions?
• What does this add to our knowledge?
• Why is it useful?

Our web page covering Reading at university includes a handout to help you develop your own critical reading form and a suggested reading notes record sheet.  These resources will help you record your thoughts after you read, which will help you to construct your argument. 

Reading at university

Developing an argument

Being a university student is about learning how to think, not what to think.  Critical thinking shapes your own values and attitudes through a process of deliberating, debating and persuasion.   Through developing your critical thinking you can move on from simply disagreeing to constructively assessing alternatives by building on doubts.

There are several key stages involved in developing your ideas and constructing an argument.  You might like to use a form to help you think about the features of critical thinking and to break down the stages of developing your argument.

Features of critical thinking (pdf)

Features of critical thinking (Word rtf)

Our webpage on Academic writing includes a useful handout ‘Building an argument as you go’.

Academic writing

You should also consider the language you will use to introduce a range of viewpoints and to evaluate the various sources of evidence.  This will help your reader to follow your argument.  To get you started, the University of Manchester's Academic Phrasebank has a useful section on Being Critical. 

Academic Phrasebank

Developing your critical thinking

Set yourself some tasks to help develop your critical thinking skills.  Discuss material presented in lectures or from resource lists with your peers.  Set up a critical reading group or use an online discussion forum.  Think about a point you would like to make during discussions in tutorials and be prepared to back up your argument with evidence.

For more suggestions:

Developing your critical thinking - ideas (pdf)

Developing your critical thinking - ideas (Word rtf)

Published guides

For further advice and more detailed resources please see the Critical Thinking section of our list of published Study skills guides.

Study skills guides  

This article was published on 2024-02-26

On the Relationship Between “Education” and “Critical Thinking”

• First Online: 03 January 2020

Cite this chapter

• Klaus Beck 2  

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In view of recent international efforts to identify and measure the ability “critical thinking,” this paper attempts to trace and reconstruct the core meaning of this concept in the light of its conceptual history in the German terminology of educational philosophy and research. In doing so, it becomes evident that it is necessary to clarify the relationship between “critical thinking” and “education,” both understood as terms designating a mental state. In German as well as in English educational research, it seems to be the prevailing view that “critical thinking” is a partial meaning, a facet, of “education” (in the sense of “being well educated”). The German language, however, differentiates between “education” in this latter sense (“Bildung”) and “education” as a label designating the approximate equivalent of the English term (“Erziehung”). Moreover, there is a long tradition and discussion in German-speaking countries around the meaning of “Bildung,” which has shaped “critical thinking” into one of its facets, setting it apart from its understanding in the English terminology with its own special history of this concept. Therefore, trying to make international comparisons with regard to measuring “critical thinking” first requires efforts to reach a common understanding of this concept.

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This goes so far that each individual, in principle, is completely free to attribute a meaning to a sequence of letters or sounds (or to any sign at all), be it already established in written or spoken language or newly invented—a nominalistic position (Essler 1972 , p. 198ff.). Supporters of a humanities viewpoint, on the other hand, represent a (hyper-)platonistic viewpoint in these matters, which assumes that all terms of our languages, including logic operators, are to be understood as names of “real” facts, thus including also immaterial entities, and that it is therefore an empirical matter to correctly describe the meaning of a term (ibid.).

For example, the agreement to meet “at the bar” works out because, during the conversation, you are just crossing the railway tracks and not sitting in front at the counter of a tavern.

Examples include not only “critique” and “thinking” but also “morality”, “motivation” or even “theory”.

See on the “untranslatability thesis ” Quine ( 1960/1980 , Chap. II) and Davidson ( 1984 ) as well as Sukale ( 1988 ); on linguistic relativity the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, presented in Gipper ( 1972 ).

The connection between descriptive and normative meaning , i.e., between definition and requirement, is established by requiring that, with regard to the denotatum of the defined term, it should be brought about, maintained, removed, or similar. In many, if not most, contexts of definitions, such an application is not readily obvious. One thinks, for example, of elementary terms from the natural sciences such as “temperature” or “volume,” but also from social sciences, for example, “socialization,” “interaction,” or even in economics, for example, “balance” or “exchange rate.” It has been criticized on occasion that all terms inherently transport a normative meaning from the very beginning as even the definition itself is nothing more than a normative statement. However, this view mixes different language levels (definitions are of a meta-linguistic nature) on the one hand and confuses the functions of language regulation and language use on the other hand.

This ultimately includes all teaching and learning aims as well as all overarching pedagogical goals.

“ Ought implies capability ” or “ultra posse nemo obligatur ”—a bridging principle between “be and ought”, as was recently tried to justify, with good reason, in Critical Rationalism (Albert 1980 , p. 76f.).

However, it would require an own basis of legitimation, which is not given if what we propose as a language regulation were to be demanded of a certain group of people (e.g., pupils, students, applicants, voters, office holders) as a requirement to strive for or even achieve the defined state.

Corresponds approximately to the suffix “- tion ” in English nouns.

The processes thus distinguished, including those of “throughput ”, can in fact all be reconstructed as temporal sequences. The proposed distinction is only made at a psychological meso-level for reasons of clarity.

Ironically, Niklas Luhmann writes: “The word education [“Bildung”] provides the contingency formula of the educational system with an indisputably beautiful body of words. It flows easily from the tongue” ( 2002 , p. 187; translated from German by DeepL [ https://www.deepl.com/translator ] and author).

The relevant deliberations of Greek and Roman antiquity can be dispensed with here as they are enclosed in the modern discussions on the concept of education.

Translation German-English retrieved from http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3589 (2018, June 15).

Similarly: “The most important revolution in the interior of man is: «the outcome of his self-incurred tutelage». Instead of others thinking f o r him until then and merely imitating him or letting himself be guided by leading-strings, he now dares to move forward with his own feet on the ground of experience, if still shaking” (Kant 1798/1981 , vol. 10, p. 549; translation from German by DeepL and author).

Thus Bernhard ( 2011 ) speaks of a “concept of liberation education ” for that time: ‘Western’ populations are dependent “on the cultural industries that incapacitate them” (p. 90). “Education (provides) an early warning system regarding the mechanisms of the incorporation of capital that must not be underestimated” (p. 99).—In contrast to the original function of serving as a category for distinguishing social stratification, a normative interpretation of the concept of education as a “battle concept” (Ribolits 2011 ) comes into play here and stands for the exact opposite, the leveling of all social differences.

This—momentous—separation of general and specialized, i.e., vocational training, still takes place today, citing a passage in the Lithuanian school plan: “There is a certain amount of knowledge that must be general, and even more a certain formation of attitudes and character that no one should lack. Everyone is obviously only a good craftsman, merchant, soldier and businessman if he is a good, decent man and citizen, enlightened according to his status, in himself and without regard to his particular profession. If the school education gives him what is necessary for this, he subsequently acquires the special ability of his profession so easily and always retains the freedom, as so often happens in life, to pass from one to the other” (von Humboldt 1809/1960 –1981, p. 218).

Women were far from being mentioned in this context at the time. In 1900, the physician Möbius was still able to publish a paper entitled “On the physiological imbecility of women”, which by no means brought him violent opposition (Steinberg 2005 ). In contrast, the “Memorandum” of the “First German General Assembly of Conductors and Teachers of the Higher Girls’ Schools” of 1872 proclaims: “It is necessary to allow the woman an education equal to the spiritual formation of the man in the generality of species and interests, so that the German man is not bored by the spiritual short-sightedness and narrow-mindedness of his wife in the domestic flock and the warmth of feeling for the same stands by his side” (cited from Lange and Bäumer 1901 , p. 64f.; translation from German by DeepL and author)—a sign that “pedagogy” was a considerable step ahead of “medicine” at the time.

Whether Humboldt himself would have accepted this claim is still controversial and must remain unanswered (Zabeck 1974 ).

Keyword “Encyclopédia”. “La double vocation de cet ouvrage est de répertorier les connaissances et les savoirs de son siècle et aussi d’ouvrir une réflexion critique, de “ changer la façon commune de penser ”” (Wikipédia 2018 ).

The regulations for the study of political science in the “Kingdom of Bavaria” state, for example: “The complete course of general sciences includes the following subjects: (1) philosophy (2) elementary mathematics (3) philology (4) general world history (5) physics (6) natural history” (Döllinger 1823 , p. 204). “(T)o the study of special sciences...”count as “auxiliary sciences”…“encyclopedia and methodology” (ibid. s: 206). However, the students were forbidden, among other things, “all deliberative meetings” (ibid. p. 219), i.e., meetings under a motto that today we would describe as “critical thinking”.

Their “individual position” (“Individuallage”), as Pestalozzi put it (Lichtenstein 1971 , Col. 925).

This term reappears in a polemic by Th. W. Adorno in the first half of the twentieth century, where it is positioned against the “cultural industry” ( 1959/1998 ).

Except for the shortening it experienced during the second half of the nineteenth century, as described above.

Dewey instead still uses the term “reflective thinking”: “Active, persistent, and careful consideration of a belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds which support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey 1916 , p. 9).

See the “Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (WGCTA) ” (Watson and Glaser 1964 ), for which a German adaptation exists (Sourisseaux et al. 2007 ) and which is sometimes labeled to be the “gold standard” in measuring CT.

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Beck, K. (2019). On the Relationship Between “Education” and “Critical Thinking”. In: Zlatkin-Troitschanskaia, O. (eds) Frontiers and Advances in Positive Learning in the Age of InformaTiOn (PLATO). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26578-6_6

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What are the Bounds of Critical Rationality in Education?

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Christiane Thompson, What are the Bounds of Critical Rationality in Education?, Journal of Philosophy of Education , Volume 38, Issue 3, August 2004, Pages 485–492, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0309-8249.2004.00399.x

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Since Dilthey we have become used to thinking of reason as having a cultural and historical setting . If we take this insight seriously, then critical rationality or critical thinking can no longer be conceived of as context-free skills . This paper takes up the line of thought that is elaborated by Christopher Winch in his ‘Developing Critical Rationality as a Pedagogical Aim’ and seeks to explicate it by drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘language games’ and on the re-evaluation of ‘thinking’ by Theodor Ballauff (a German philosopher of education who was influenced by Martin Heidegger) . The overcoming of a solipsistic and idealistic conception of thinking raises questions regarding the pedagogical settings and aims, as well as the problems over the limits of critique in education . A comparison of Ballauff’s and Winch’s positions reinforces the sense of the significance of critique: although the role of critical rationality within education is ambiguous and precarious, the investigation of autonomy (as an educational goal) shows that critique cannot be limited in any straightforward way .

In ‘Developing Critical Rationality as a Pedagogical Aim’, Christopher Winch explores the ambiguous role of critical rationality in late modern societies and (consequently) its problems arising within the context of concrete educational practice. 1 Being able to take up a critical stance is crucial in the different facets of life, as Winch seeks to show by investigating the challenges we face in order to change or improve our situation as citizens, workers and individuals. At the same time, however, critical rationality could bear negative implications for liberal society by provoking precisely that mentality or attitude that questions or even contradicts the ideals of that society. Education and educational practices that intend to provoke critical rationality are confronted with precisely this problematic, that is, they need to take a position regarding the ambiguity of critical rationality. To what extent is critical rationality a desirable pedagogical aim? The counterpart to this question of necessity is that of possibility: Is it at all possible to ‘make’ somebody think critically with respect to his or her life-goals, citizenship or even contributions as worker in a company—and if so, how? These questions form Winch’s guiding perspective in his article when evaluating commonly held conceptions of critical rationality and their relationship to autonomy and education; they reflect the philosophical framework of critical rationality.

In my comment, I would like to bring into view this framework and point out the different systematic problems that the concept of ‘critical rationality’ entails. Here, I also want to compare Winch’s argumentation with a position in the contemporary German philosophy of education, specifically the pedagogical conception proposed by Theodor Ballauff (1911–1995). His unique approach might offer a means of comparison to Winch’s investigation and direct our attention to aspects that have not yet been exhaustively discussed. Finally, I would like to address the necessary scope of critique in the liberal society by offering some criticism regarding the excessively used concept of ‘autonomy’ in pedagogical discourse.

Christopher Winch critically evaluates the strongly held position of critical rationality within the English speaking tradition, that is, the position that critical rationality is to be regarded as a cognitive and context independent skill based on deductive logic. This definition of critical rationality entails the assumption that formal logic forms a sufficient basis for enabling and legitimating critique. Winch’s objections to this point are indeed plausible. A large number of disputes cannot be settled by uncovering ‘faults’ in the logic of argumentation. Rather, people argue from different background assumptions (often not being aware of them); they have subject-specific ways of truth validation as well as forms of argumentation; their reasoning cannot be translated into formal logic without hindrance.

What is formulated, here, in logical terms can also be made plausible by referring to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later conception of language games. Wittgenstein denies that there exists one form of rationality or argumentation that would universally serve every subject matter or form of dialogue ( Wittgenstein, 2001 ). Rather, the configuration of arguments is dependent on specific rules or norms that determine whether a proposition is true or false and even whether a proposition is meaningful in the first place. As an example one can take Mendel’s discoveries in genetics (an example also used by Foucault in his discourse analysis ( Foucault, 1992 )). The biologists of Mendel’s time could not follow his ideas because he was speaking of objects , methods and a theoretical horizon that differed radically from the prevailing biological discourse. Although addressing what he considered a biological problem, Mendel’s work was, at first, not recognised—for his propositions were not in alignment with the structure of the leading language game of nineteenth-century biology. The meaning and validity of a proposition depend on the underlying rules or norms of the corresponding language game. One needs to be acquainted with them in order to be able to regard a given argument as plausible. The overall consequence is that one cannot arrange for a general argumentation topology to match any subject area (cf. Ruhloff, 2004 ). In contrast to the assumption that there exists a language game that would encompass all other games (that is, a super language game), one finds that arguments are given at a certain occasion to which they are inextricably linked ( Ruhloff, 2004 ). In other words, they pertain to concrete contexts including the ‘signature’ of specific discourse practices (which are, in turn, shaped by historical, cultural, epistemological etc. dimensions). The term ‘argument’ is, therefore, misleading insofar as it implies an entity to be unequivocally determined by logical means.

Consequently, it seems questionable that there can be a context-free skill of critical thinking or critical rationality. It is, then, doubtful that the teaching of critical rationality can be limited to the ‘technique’ of argumentation. However, if critical rationality does not simply merge in the application of a merely logical procedure, the question arises of how one can be taught to be critical and thus: what it means to be a ‘critical individual’.

These questions have—in different ways—preoccupied the Western tradition of the philosophy of education as Winch illustrates with a reference to Plato, whose disputes with the Sophists were indeed centred around the question of how the citizens could acquire the ability to responsibly and critically participate in the Polis. Today, these issues, surrounding the possibility of critical rationality, remain relevant. In contemporary German philosophy of education, efforts have been undertaken to clarify these questions and determine the scope of possible answers. Theodor Ballauff proposed a very unusual conception of critical rationality that I would like to introduce in the following (cf. Ballauff, 2004 ).

Ballauff attempted to re-shape critical rationality by going back to thinking and describing it on a phenomenal level. In his re-evaluation of thinking, he included the ideas of prominent philosophical figures such as Heidegger and Lyotard; for they both criticised the Western philosophical tradition in its understanding of thinking and rationality. Ballauff takes up Heidegger’s criticism of the Aristotelian definition of human being as a zoon logon echon —as a reason possessing living being . Is thinking something that can be regarded as a faculty or capability that we have at our disposal? Ballauff suspects that we are overlooking important aspects of ‘thinking’ when we understand it as a function of the subject. Instead of putting the origin of thought into the thinking subject, Ballauff suggests (following Heidegger) that it is from the already granted openness or ‘disclosedness’ of thinking that we come to terms with ourselves and the world. In other words, thinking is given to us—Ballauff also denotes it as a ‘gift’ that makes the world present to us. Furthermore, ‘we’ ourselves (only) come-to-being in the light of thinking. One could say that thinking is transcendental, that is, it is the condition for the possibility of the world.

Speaking from a philosophical point of view, Ballauff seeks to avoid the subject-object dichotomy as well as the problems inherent to a solipsistic and idealistic conception of ‘thinking’. The latter can be contextualised by the phenomenological term ‘horizon’ that Ballauff attributes to thinking. Thinking is structured and limited (to be more precise) in specific ways. These horizons or structures are comparable to Wittgenstein’s idea of language games: thinking takes place on the basis of specific rules and norms or, as Ballauff puts it, pre-judices . Here, Ballauff makes use of another concept that originally stems from the phenomenological or hermeneutical tradition: Gadamer used the term in order to describe the historicity of understanding ( Gadamer, 1990 ). Similarly, Ballauff uses the concept ‘pre-judice’ to denote our cultural, historical etc. situatedness. We understand the world on the basis of assumptions and ideas that are taken for granted ( Ballauff, 1988 ). Whereas Gadamer stresses that prejudices are something productive for our historical understanding, Ballauff is eager to emphasise both the enabling as well as the limiting function of prejudices in thinking. It is an ambiguous concept that calls into question the total self-transparency and self-sufficiency that hermeneutics seems to suggest. According to Ballauff, prejudices guide our thoughts in a rarely noticed fashion. However, it is still important and meaningful to achieve clarity regarding our prejudices in thought. Following Wittgenstein’s thoughts on certainty, prejudices do not gain their certainty because of their plausibility but because they form the unthematised ground or basis for specific language games ( Wittgenstein, 1971 ). This unawareness is also recognised by Winch who points out that (everyday) argumentations are mostly enthymematic.

This very concise exposition of Ballauff’s conception allows for the determination of the problem of critique and consequently, that of critical rationality. According to Ballauff, critical rationality or critical thinking is far from being a skill or ability that just needs to be applied correctly. Rather, we need to turn towards our own prejudiced thinking and reconsider the underlying statements and assumptions that have not come to our attention—and we need to do this time and again. Ultimately, we are never free from prejudices because thinking always remains bound to unthematised conditions. The blind spot in the eye that moves with our changing view might be a useful illustration of this point. This makes critique a very difficult as well as ambiguous task. It might be that positions and their underlying premises that had previously been plausible become later questionable and possibly dismissed. Another consequence is that the predicate ‘critical’ cannot be applied to a person in the sense of a feature or characteristic. For Ballauff, critical thinking becomes a momentary activity in thought, in which I perform a change of perspective. However, this does not necessarily make me a critical person in every respect nor does it guarantee critique.

From here, one can point out the similarities and differences between Winch’s and Ballauff’s approaches to critical rationality and the corresponding traditions. They both attempt to bring into view that by referring to the question of critical rationality, one touches all the different areas of human life today. While Winch analyses the three dimensions ‘vocational’, ‘individual’ and ‘civic’ on the way to the conclusion that in all of these dimensions critical rationality cannot be dismissed, Ballauff uses a wide definition of thinking to show (bringing in the term ‘pre-judice’) the general necessity of critical thinking.

Where Winch and Ballauff have the most in common has already been pointed out—that is, the dependency of both critique and of argumentative plausibility on context. As a consequence, both conceptions advert that critical rationality is a precarious pedagogical aim. The possibilities of making somebody gain a critical stance and maintain it appear to be severely compromised in the light of the self-limitations of critique: if critique remains a limited and specific task, then how can we formulate critical rationality as the result of a pedagogical process ? This question somewhat implies another question regarding our own role as teachers who offer specific rational standards and draw upon a privileged standpoint in the classroom. In a manner similar to the modern paradox ‘How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of restraint?’ ( Kant, 1960 , pp. 27–28), we are forced to ask: how can we make students think critically ? Winch speaks of the systematic scrutiny of authoritative claims that eventually has to reach the educational setting of critical rationality itself. Ballauff attempts to reflect the latter in his pedagogical terminology. What Ballauff concludes from taking critical rationality seriously is the criticism of terms like ‘instruction’ that imply that learning and education could be reduced to a technique or a mere transmission of information. However, it does not follow that learning and education are entirely independent of ‘techniques’ and of other human beings who support the educational processes (which is also an age-related issue).

Ballauff claims that children and adolescents should neither be regarded as the ‘objects’ nor as the ‘subjects’ of learning. For Ballauff, education is centred around the issues that matter (not the learner, the teacher or the society). Yet, these issues do not form a body of knowledge to be transmitted. Rather, they should allow for an unrestricted discussion and critical evaluation, where the students take an active part. Analogously to Kant, who thinks that freedom and morality cannot be cultivated in a merely mechanical fashion, Ballauff points out that the development of critical rationality does not emerge in processes of instruction . An educational arrangement that is supposed to espouse critical rationality will always have to be open for discussing its own institutional and didactical setting.

Here, the point is reached where discussions about the actual possibilities of espousing critical rationality include the questions of its desirable limitations for the liberal society. Winch considers the desirable extent of critical rationality in reference to the goals that society attributes to education, specifically the preparation for life as introduction to a normative order of society. The distinction between a strong and a weak autonomy can illustrate this consideration. Should individuals be allowed to decide (independently of the moral code of society) on their course of life? Or alternatively, should the choice of life-goals be in accordance with the society? Either way, the choice is still left to the individual; they only differ regarding the degree of critique that is considered acceptable. Here, Winch does not argue explicitly for one position but points out the difficulties that confronts both options. Briefly, it should be pointed out that Winch sees the contradicting pedagogical aims regarding critical rationality and tradition as not having been exhaustively debated. Nevertheless, it is, according to Winch, possible to argue for critical rationality in a thoroughgoing way: In the different areas of life, Winch states, critique plays a constitutive role that exceeds the connotation of negation and destruction of the traditional. Therefore, it is inevitable for modern societies to accept the risks that critical rationality might entail for them.

Ballauff has reservations regarding the heavily used and proclaimed concept of autonomy today: it is a concept that might require a critical evaluation itself. If we discuss the concept of critical rationality on the basis of the possibility of autonomous life-goals, then the scope of critique might be immensely restricted. The concept seems to bear a one-sidedness: to claim that we are or should be ‘in command of our lives’ (autonomy is the Ancient Greek term for ‘giving oneself the law’) does not reflect adequately our life conditions (a life that is essentially shared with others and located in a specific social context; cf. Meyer-Drawe, 1990 ). This is not to say that autonomy is generally impossible and that we are always determined in our course of life. Both extremes fail to capture our situation, that is, the possibility that we (can) take a stance toward something and make a decision, but at the same time are ‘locked’ in a perspective. It is here that the precarious role of critique lies: both the determinist perspective (impossibility of critique, submission to society) as well as the subjectivist perspective (unproblematic reference point of critique, autonomous life-plan) are the result of a one-sided perspective of the relationship between the individual and the society (cf. Bourdieu, 1993 ). Ballauff mentions another important aspect regarding the usage of the concept of autonomy today. Looking more closely, this attractive term is applied to very specific contexts (for example, economic contexts). Ballauff suspects that the rhetoric of autonomy leads us to believe that we are the author of our plans, while at the same time, we are more and more forced to follow others’ thoughts and plans and submit ourselves to specific choices. Michel Foucault has investigated modern forms of individualisation and elaborated their disciplinary traits ( Foucault, 1977 ). In other words, autonomy appears to be a form of discipline: the control that is exerted within the society is transferred into the interior. Thus, the freedom and flexibility that the term ‘autonomy’ suggests might distract us from the fact that a very specific understanding of ourselves is implied in it, an understanding that is, in turn, hardly criticised. Ballauff emphasises the immunisation against critique regarding concepts like ‘autonomy,’‘modernisation’ and so on. It seems impossible to question the processes behind them without being accused by a supposedly humanistic position.

Therefore, I propose that critical rationality needs to exceed the dimension of possible choices for life-goals. With respect to Winch’s contribution, I would like to argue that the debate between weak and strong autonomists does not go far enough in order to assess the necessity of critique: We particularly need to critically evaluate the setting in that we are given choices. Reminiscent of Socrates’ elenctic method in the early Platonic dialogues, the ‘sceptical view’ has to be applied in order to make visible which choices are not given to us, and which choices are excluded by choosing . Critical rationality, or critical thinking especially, has to focus on those particular issues that are taken for granted and thus rarely become the focus of our attention. To an extent, this includes our (supposedly) own requests and interests. Lastly, I would like to bring into view the self-centredness in the rhetoric of autonomy, where everybody is focused on him- or herself. In this interpretation, the educational system functions as a means of the production of personal progress and success. The autonomy or focus on oneself is the necessary complement to school selection and the so-called learning society, where everyone continuously must prove his or her flexibility ( Masschelein, 2001 ). Should this perspective itself not be scrutinised?

These arguments concerning ‘autonomy’ show that the ‘preparation for life’ cannot form a sufficient scope for determining the critical rationality that is required today. In contrast to Winch, Ballauff calls into question the seemingly undisputable idea of education as ‘preparation for life’. The pretensions and demands of critique are radical in that it is impossible to exclude issues from critique in advance. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to associate the wide scope of critique with the dogmatic refusal of our everyday life or nihilism. Critique does not happen for the sake of critique or dissolution. Its significance lies in the support to enable the discussion of unquestioned perspectives and open alternatives.

Correspondingly, critical rationality in the classroom amounts neither to destruction nor to rejection, but rather implies constitutive provocations of ‘getting to know’ what was formerly taken for granted. Therefore, Ballauff does not solely advocate the critical pedagogical category of ‘emancipation’. Emancipation and participation form the two complementary sides of the critical endeavour, that is, criticism is impossible without knowledge and taking part regarding the formerly held standpoint. Without such an intensive argumentation (regarding our prejudices) we would just remain unaware of how much we are still ‘walking on the very same paths’ as before. Dörpinghaus has recently presented fragments of a ‘didactics of retardation’ that follows along these lines: instead of continuously attempting and requiring critique as ‘progress’ and ‘advancement,’ a strong emphasis is put on self-clarification through the analysis of language games within the language community ( Dörpinghaus, 2002 ).

In conclusion, I want to offer a few brief comments on the issue of the necessity and possibility of critical rationality today. Contemporary philosophical and pedagogical discourse is preoccupied with the historical and cultural relativity of reason. It seems difficult to show the necessity of critical rationality today for one can no longer refer to uniform rational standards. Furthermore, one has to face a ‘rigid discourse’ today: whenever pointing out the relativity of reason one is often challenged to react to the problems of relativism and the danger to the liberal society and so on. Here, my concern is that we are forced into extreme dichotomies, such as universalism versus relativism or autonomy versus heteronomy. However, these dichotomies fail to grasp the problems that we are actually facing. Are these not strategies that either limit our scope of critique or even undermine our critical efforts? The rigorous breach and mutual exclusiveness that is postulated between modernity and postmodernity might restrict and corrupt our options of discourse. A quote from Foucault’s ‘What is Enlightenment?’ might elucidate this ‘blackmail of Enlightenment’. One is presented a stark alternative ‘either accept the Enlightenment and remain within the tradition of its rationalism (this is considered a positive term by some and used by others, on the contrary, as a reproach); or else you criticise the Enlightenment and then try to escape from its principles of rationality (which may be seen once again as good or bad)’ ( Foucault, 1990 , pp. 45–46).

I would like to conclude this response with the reminder that ‘critical rationality’ is not only a difficult and precarious pedagogical aim but that its theoretical discussion is itself faced with severe difficulties.

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Critical thinking definition

Critical thinking, as described by Oxford Languages, is the objective analysis and evaluation of an issue in order to form a judgement.

Active and skillful approach, evaluation, assessment, synthesis, and/or evaluation of information obtained from, or made by, observation, knowledge, reflection, acumen or conversation, as a guide to belief and action, requires the critical thinking process, which is why it's often used in education and academics.

Some even may view it as a backbone of modern thought.

However, it's a skill, and skills must be trained and encouraged to be used at its full potential.

People turn up to various approaches in improving their critical thinking, like:

• Developing technical and problem-solving skills
• Engaging in more active listening
• Actively questioning their assumptions and beliefs
• Seeking out more diversity of thought
• Opening up their curiosity in an intellectual way etc.

Is critical thinking useful in writing?

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Lesson Plan

Teaching and Learning About the Pro-Palestinian Student Protests on College Campuses

A collection of resources and critical-thinking questions to help students better understand the protest movement and consider the complex issues it raises.

By The Learning Network

Since the start of Israel’s war in Gaza in retaliation for the Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas, students at scores of colleges and universities across the United States and in other countries have protested in support of Palestinians and called for their schools to divest from Israel.

As the war in Gaza has escalated, universities have been caught in an often bitter debate over how to handle the protests. And over the past few weeks, students at many universities have intensified their protests and built encampments on campus. Several universities have begun calling in the police to arrest the protesters and to clear these encampments.

In this teaching resource, we draw on recent articles, photos, audio, video and maps to help students understand what is happening and why. Use the list below to choose the topics and materials that are right for your students. (For instance, some teachers may wish to begin with the personal questions we pose in our final section, about high schools, rather than to end with them.)

You might also borrow from the advice and strategies suggested by Facing History and Ourselves in centering humanity while following news of the Israel-Gaza war, or via the many teacher guides on the conflict offered by Solutions Not Sides .

Part I: What’s happening on college campuses

Part ii: more background and context, part iii: connections to student-led movements in history, part iv: a range of perspectives, part v: formulating your own opinion, part vi: how high schools are handling the conflict and its questions.

Over the past few weeks, tensions have escalated over pro-Palestinian student encampments at college campuses nationwide, with a growing number of colleges and universities turning to the police to remove protesters and threatening them with disciplinary action.

Here are some Times resources to help students understand these events:

Overview: An explainer article “ What to Know About the Campus Protests Over the Israel-Hamas War ” addresses some basic questions: who, why, where and how.

Photos and videos: The collection “ Scenes From the Student Protests Churning Across the Country ” is regularly updated.

Audio: “ The Crackdown on Student Protesters ,” the April 25 episode of “The Daily,” features both a Times reporter and the editor in chief of Columbia’s college newspaper. A May 4 episode, “ The Protesters and the President, ” includes President Biden’s response.

Map: See where protesters have been arrested or detained on U.S. college campuses since April 18.

Voices of student journalists: If your students are already familiar with what is happening and why, perhaps the best way to get fuller context is to hear from student reporters on the ground. Below, some places to start:

PBS NewsHour, in the above video: “ Student journalists discuss covering the campus protests against Israel’s war in Gaza .”

Columbia Daily Spectator: “ Our Campus. Our Crisis .” Inside the encampments and crackdowns that shook American politics. A report by the student journalists of the Columbia Daily Spectator in collaboration with New York magazine.

NPR: “ How these University of Texas-Austin students view Gaza war protests on their campus .”

Teen Vogue: “ Student journalists covering the campus protests at U.C.L.A., the University of Texas-Austin, City College of New York are writing history ” and “ College students reflect on graduation amid massive campus protests .”

Politico: “ What’s really happening on college campuses, according to student journalists .”

In addition, students might consult the campus newspapers of any of the colleges or universities that interest them, whether of the City College of New York , U.C.L.A. , University of Texas-Austin or any other.

Responding and Discussing

Students might begin by “noticing” and “wondering” about what they read and saw, using questions like the ones below. They can do this privately in their journals, as partners, via small group discussions, as a whole class — or in some combination:

What do you notice? What quotes or images stand out for you, and why?

What do you wonder? What questions do you have about what is happening and why it is happening?

What connections can you make? How does this issue relate to you and your community?

However you handle class discussion of these sensitive topics, Facing History has additional ideas for protocols. You might consider trying strategies like Save the Last Word for Me ; Head, Heart, Conscience ; or Big Paper .

To give your students a bit more context for what is happening on college campuses, and to help them appreciate some of the underlying issues and questions, we provide brief explanations of various topics as well as links to related Times articles. (Please remember that all links from The Learning Network to Times content are free, but only if you access them by clicking directly from our site.)

Hamas’s attack on Israel: On Oct. 7, Hamas, the Islamic group that controls the Gaza Strip, mounted a highly coordinated invasion of Israel , with terrorists attacking towns and killing people in their homes and on the streets. More than 1,200 Israelis died, including more than 100 young revelers who were dancing at an outdoor rave . Over 240 Israelis were taken hostage by Hamas, around 100 of whom remain in Gaza. The attack was the deadliest on Israel since its founding.

Israel’s war in Gaza and the ensuing humanitarian crisis: In response, Israel launched in Gaza one of the most intense military campaigns in modern history. So far, Israel’s forces have killed more than 33,000 Palestinians , a majority of them women and children , according to Gaza health officials, and have displaced more than 80 percent of the enclave’s surviving population, according to the United Nations. The leader of the World Food Program recently said that parts of the Gaza Strip were experiencing a “ full-blown famine ” that is spreading across the territory.

A long, contested history: The current war is part of a long history of conflict in the region. Students can learn more in this detailed Times explainer from The Times. It uses as a starting point 1920, when the British mandate for Palestine was established: “Over the following decades, two nationalisms, Palestinian and Jewish, took root on the same land and began to compete in a way that has ever since proved irreconcilable. The Arab population wanted what every native majority wants — self-determination. Jews who immigrated in growing numbers wanted what persecuted minorities almost never attain — a haven, in their ancient homeland.”

Understanding the Protests

Calls for a cease-fire: Most immediately, protesters are demanding an end to Israel’s war in Gaza. They say that Israel is committing what they see as genocide against the Palestinian people, and they aim to keep a spotlight on the suffering in Gaza. (Facing History provides an explainer for what genocide means .)

Demands for university divestment: Students are also calling on their colleges and universities to make transparent all financial holdings and to divest from , or cut financial ties with, Israel or companies they say are profiting from its invasion of Gaza. But, as the Times has reported, divesting can be challenging for universities to do, even if they want to.

Links to a broader global struggle: In many activists’ eyes, the Gaza conflict is a struggle for justice , tied to issues closer to home, such as policing, mistreatment of Indigenous people, discrimination toward Black Americans and the impact of global warming.

Key Issues and Questions

Charges of antisemitism: Many Jewish students have reported feeling unsafe on campus — either because of overt threats or attacks, or because of speech that the students consider offensive and antisemitic. Part of the problem for universities is defining when pro-Palestinian political speech during a time of war crosses the line into antisemitism. And the question is made even more complicated because there is no consensus about what, precisely, constitutes antisemitism. Students can read this article about how universities are struggling to define what makes a protest antisemitic, and this article about how even the definition of antisemitism is the subject of bitter debate.

Concerns about freedom of speech: Protesters on college campuses have often cited the First Amendment as grounds for allowing their protests to continue unhampered. But while college administrators have called the right to free speech “vital,” they have also pointed out that it is not unlimited. And universities have said that they needed to call in the police, arrest students and clear encampments to restore order. Students can read this article to learn more about the thorny issues related to freedom of expression on college campuses. And they can read this Opinion piece about freedom of speech and prohibitions of harassment, including against students because of their identity.

Campus disruption and the police response: Protests have been taking place at college campuses since the war began in October. However, the nature and tenor of the protests and of universities’ responses changed on April 18, when Columbia University called in the police, who arrested more than 100 protesters and removed dozens of tents that protesters had set up. Within hours, a new group of protesters pitched tents at Columbia, and within days, protesters at other schools across the country established their own pro-Palestinian encampments . The demonstrations have also attracted counterprotesters , and clashes between the two groups have occasionally become violent, as seen at U.C.L.A. In the weeks since, universities have cracked down on these escalating protests and encampments, citing issues of safety and campus disruption, and more than 2,700 people have been arrested or detained on campuses so far. Students can read this article about how administrators at some of the country’s most influential universities have struggled to calm campuses torn by this conflict.

After reading, students might discuss the following questions:

In your own words, what did you learn?

What questions do you still have?

What might you need to research further to better understand?

How does what you read change your understanding of or thinking about these issues?

The protests against Israel’s war in Gaza are merely the latest in a tradition of student-led, left-leaning activism dating back at least to the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War protests of the 1960s, Richard Fausset reports in “ From Free Speech to Free Palestine: Six Decades of Student Protest .”

Invite students to read the article and to compare one or more of the older student-led movements with the pro-Palestinian demonstrations we are witnessing today. Students could also choose one of the featured protests to research further on their own.

Then they might discuss the following questions:

In the historical protest movement you studied, what did the students want? What actions did they take to get it? What impact did their actions have, and why?

What connections can you make between the current demonstrations and another youth-led movement from history? What do these movements have in common? How are they different?

Why do you think college campuses have often been the site of protest and activism for broader political issues? What role do young people have to play in such issues?

What lessons can we take from history for this particular moment? What predictions can you make about what might happen with the pro-Palestinian demonstrations, based on your historical research?

The Times’s editorial pages have explored the practical, political and ethical dimensions of the campus protests from a variety of perspectives: Are protests an essential part of education? When does a protest cross a line? Are the college protesters’ tactics hurting their cause? How should colleges and universities respond to the campus unrest spreading across the country?

Here are some Times essays that cover the topic from a variety of perspectives. You might pair them with opinion pieces from other sources, including college newspapers.

Lydia Polgreen, a Times Opinion columnist, explores the moral complexities of the protests and seeks to explain why some students feel intimated by them, while others are moved to join them, in her essay “ The Student-Led Protests Aren’t Perfect. That Doesn’t Mean They’re Not Right. ”

“Whether you are watching student protesters on social media or experiencing the protests in person, the way you understand these protests depends on your perception of what they are protesting. It could not be otherwise. If you feel that what is happening in Gaza is a moral atrocity, the student protests will look like a brave stand against American complicity in what they believe is genocide — and a few hateful slogans amid thousands of peaceful demonstrators will look like a minor detail. If you feel the Gaza war is a necessarily violent defense against terrorists bent on destroying the Jewish state, the students will seem like collaborators with murderous antisemitism — even if many of them are Jewish.”

In “ Student Protest Is an Essential Part of Education ,” Serge Schmemann, a member of the Times editorial board who participated in antiwar protests at Columbia University in 1968, writes about the value of dissent and protest for young people:

The hallowed notion of a university as a bastion of discourse and learning does not and cannot exclude participation in contemporary debates, which is what students are being prepared to lead. From Vietnam to apartheid to the murder of George Floyd, universities have long been places for open and sometimes fiery debate and inquiry. And whenever universities themselves have been perceived by students to be complicit or wrong in their stances, they have been challenged by their communities of students and teachers. If the university cannot tolerate the heat, it cannot serve its primary mission.

In “ What Is Happening on College Campuses Is Not Free Speech ,” Gabriel Diamond, Talia Dror and Jillian Lederman — students at Yale, Cornell and Brown — write about their experiences of being Jewish on campus since the Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas on Israel. In their essay, they argue that universities have a moral responsibility to counter expressions of antisemitism and harassment:

Free speech, open debate and heterodox views lie at the core of academic life. They are fundamental to educating future leaders to think and act morally. The reality on some college campuses today is the opposite: open intimidation of Jewish students. Mob harassment must not be confused with free speech. Universities need to get back to first principles and understand that they have the rules on hand to end intimidation of Jewish students. We need to hold professors and students to a higher standard.

It continues:

All students have sacred rights to hold events, teach-ins and protests. And university faculty members must present arguments that make students uncomfortable. University campuses are unique hubs of intellectual discovery and debate, designed to teach students how to act within a free society. But free inquiry is not possible in an environment of intimidation. Harassment and intimidation fly in the face of the purpose of a university.

In “ Why the Campus Protests Are So Troubling ,” Thomas L. Friedman, a Times Opinion columnist, argues that “the dominant messages from the loudest voices and many placards reject important truths about how this latest Gaza war started and what will be required to bring it to a fair and sustainable conclusion.” He writes:

My problem is not that the protests in general are “antisemitic” — I would not use that word to describe them, and indeed, I am deeply uncomfortable as a Jew with how the charge of antisemitism is thrown about on the Israel-Palestine issue. My problem is that I am a hardheaded pragmatist who lived in Beirut and Jerusalem, cares about people on all sides and knows one thing above all from my decades in the region: The only just and workable solution to this issue is two nation-states for two indigenous peoples. If you are for that, whatever your religion, nationality or politics, you’re part of the solution. If you are not for that, you’re part of the problem. And from everything I have read and watched, too many of these protests have become part of the problem — for three key reasons.

And in “ How Protesters Can Actually Help Palestinians ,” Nicholas Kristof, a Times Opinion columnist, says that while he admires the protesters’ empathy for Gazans, be believes that their tactics are hurting their own cause:

Student protesters: I admire your empathy for Gazans, your concern for the world, your moral ambition to make a difference. But I worry about how peaceful protests have tipped into occupations of buildings, risks to commencements and what I see as undue tolerance of antisemitism, chaos, vandalism and extremism. I’m afraid the more aggressive actions may be hurting the Gazans you are trying to help.

Have students read one or more of the essays. Then, through writing or discussion, they might respond to the following questions:

What did you learn from these voices and perspectives? How do they help you to better understand the current crisis on college campuses?

Which arguments for and against the school protests were strongest? Which were less persuasive?

What questions would you want to ask any of the authors? Which viewpoints and ideas, if any, do you think were missing from the debate?

What do you still want to learn about the campus protests — or about the Israel-Hamas war more generally?

The previous sections of this teaching resource invited students to read, watch and listen to information and opinion about these protests and their causes. Now we invite them to formulate their own opinions about the different approaches colleges have taken.

Some have sent in police to clear encampments and to shut down demonstrations. Some have canceled in-person classes and main commencement ceremonies . Other universities have met students at the negotiating table and even agreed to protesters’ demands to review institutional investments .

As a case study, students might compare the responses from Columbia and Brown by reading “ As Protests Grow, Universities Choose Different Ways to End Unrest .” They might discuss: How did these two universities handle the protests differently? Why might they have taken such approaches? Which approach do you think was more effective, and why?

Then invite students to take everything they have learned so far — about what is happening on college campuses, the issues protesters are raising, free speech protections and accusations of antisemitism, the history of youth-led political movements, the various opinions from around The Times, and how universities have responded — into account and share their own opinions in our student forum “ How Should Colleges Handle Student Protests? ”

Here, for instance, is what Emily, from Glenbard West High School in Glen Ellyn, Ill., posted:

Student protests are an important piece of campus culture. These protests matter because students are able to stand up for what they believe in as independent adults, likely for the first time in their lives. However, there are consequence to brash actions. The destruction of property and personnel injuries are unacceptable, no matter how noble the cause. Peaceful demonstrations, marches and speeches are all appropriate modes of protest for student populations. Yes, colleges should inspire debate, but they should teach civility. Violent protests are often ineffective anyway, as onlookers rarely side with those breaking the law for their cause. Colleges have the right to step in when a protest becomes violent, but they have a responsibility to foster an environment where peaceful, respectful protest is accepted.

What do your students think? Why?

In many communities, the questions roiling college campuses are dividing younger students, their parents, teachers and administrators.

Since the conflict began, public schools have struggled with how to address it. Recently, pro-Palestinian protests have moved from college campuses to high schools, and there have been demonstrations and walkouts at schools in Chicago; Seattle; Austin, Texas; and elsewhere around the United States. In early May, after focusing on universities, House Republicans began questioning school district leaders from New York, California and Maryland about antisemitism.

To look at the complexities of how one community is responding, you and your students might read the May 7 article “ In Berkeley Public Schools, a War Gives Rise to Unusual Tensions .” As students read, they might do an exercise such as a double-entry journal , in which they record lines from the text on one side and their reactions, questions and thoughts on the other. To what extent do aspects of this piece remind them of what their own schools and communities are experiencing? Why?

When your students are ready, here are just a few questions they might address in journals or discuss as a class. They might also create new work in response to one or more of the questions, whether by conducting their own investigative reporting, writing opinion pieces for the school or local paper, addressing administrators or their school board, writing poetry or making visual art, recording a podcast, or anything else.

How is this conflict playing out locally? How is it affecting you? Your school? Your family and friends? Your community?

Have there been protests at any schools, whether high schools or colleges, near you? What happened? How did students, parents, administrators and other stakeholders respond? What do you think of those responses?

Is any aspect of this conflict being taught about or discussed in your classes? What are your thoughts about how such discussion has been handled? Why?

Do you feel comfortable sharing your opinions and/or expressing your identity in school?

Do you ever feel pressured to take a side, whether in school, with friends and family or on social media ? How have you handled that?

What rules, guidelines or protocols, if any, would you like to see put in place for the discussion of sensitive topics in school in general?

What advice, if any, do you have for the adults in your life — teachers, parents, religious leaders or anyone else — about handling discussion of this conflict? Why?

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Missouri proposes ‘media literacy and critical thinking act’, to prepare students for a world of misinformation, legislation expected to pass in early 2025 would establish guidelines to teach digital media literacy in k-12 based on pilot programs at a handful of schools..

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Cultivating Critical Thinking Skills: Montessori vs. Traditional Education

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At both Montessori schools or traditional schools fostering critical thinking skills is one of the keystones of each child’s school experience. But how educators develop their students’ critical thinking skills differs when each program is compared.

Commonly, traditional preschools and elementary schools encourage memorization skills to develop critical thinking and problem-solving. In the Montessori pedagogy, the focus is on open-ended questions that encourage students to analyze and think through the possible end results.

Let’s look a little closer at the differences.

Traditional teaching is based on teacher-led instruction in a structured curriculum. Standardized testing is used for assessing student learning. Pre-defined timelines are utilized to move students through concepts, and students generally learn in large groups.

The teacher is an authoritative figure responsible for delivering content, managing the class and assessing student performance. Goals are geared to academic achievement, performance on standardized tests and meeting benchmarks. Although this system is consistent and familiar, sometimes a child might not grasp the material and feels lost when they must move on to more challenging concepts in the next lesson. For student academic success, memorization plays a critical role.

In contrast, the Montessori method focuses on the whole child and the development of their academic, social, emotional and practical skills. Goals include fostering independence, critical thinking and a love of learning throughout life. Teachers in Montessori education observe and support each child’s interests, providing guidance and assistance when needed. Their mission also includes ensuring children’s safety during activities.

Montessori education promotes individualized learning, self-discipline, and creativity. The ability to evaluate and analyze a problem leads to solutions, which is why at Country Montessori School in Poway, our curriculum is designed to develop students’ art of thinking as early as preschool.

The Montessori curriculum embraces critical thinking as the foundation for problem-solving, analysis, and decision-making. These skills are developed so that children learn how to access and self-correct after making mistakes.

At CMS, it is common to hear teachers ask open-ended questions that promote thinking, such as “What would happen if…?” To strengthen critical thinking skills, children might be asked to predict an ending to a story, discuss other choices a character in a story could have made or imagine how the characters feel.

For more than 100 years, the Montessori Method of teaching has cultivated environments to encourage independent thinking in children and built upon each child’s natural curiosity. To learn more about how the Montessori teaching method can foster learning and curiosity in your child, Country Montessori School can be reached at (858) 673-1756.

Country Montessori School offers programs for children beginning at age 2.5 and continuing through the age of 11 through Early Childhood (Preschool and Kindergarten), for Lower Elementary (ages 6-9) and Upper Elementary (ages 9-12) programs.

Country Montessori School is located at 12642 Monte Vista Road, Poway, CA, 92064. Check out our informational video at

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Jose Bolaños is a sponsored columnist for Country Montessori School in Poway.

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