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Himalayan Research Papers Archive

Submissions from 2023 2023.

A Chinese Fallacy of Communist Lynchpin and American Retort in Nepal , Ashis Adhikary

Current Developmental Challenges in Nepal: How Can The Diaspora Help? , Ambika P. Adhikari

Promoting Urban Farming for Creating Sustainable Cities in Nepal , Keshav Bhattarai and Ambika P. Adhikari

Reframing the Buffer State in Contemporary International Relations: Nepal’s Relations with India and China , Bibek Chand

Re-situating the Buffer State in International Relations: Nepal’s Relations with India and China , Bibek Chand

State of Urbanization in Nepal: The Official Definition and Reality , Keshav Bhattarai, Ambika P. Adhikari, and Shiva Gautam

Submissions from 2022 2022

An Anatomy of Nepal's Remarkable Export Decline , Rishi Sharma

A Review of Environmental Vulnerabilities Related to Nepal’s Graduation Process from Least Developed to a Developing Country Status , Ambika P. Adhikari, Keshav Bhattarai, and Basu Sharma

A Review of Nepali Diaspora and their Role in Nepal’s Development and Lessons for Developing Countries , Ambika P. Adhikari

Effect of COVID 19 pandemic on Pharmaceutical Industry in terms of Inventory and Logistics Management , Shubhabrata Basu and Rimu Chaudhuri

Hegemonic Instability? India’s Himalayan Hegemony in Theoretical and Historical Perspective , Philip Hultquist Ph.D. and Prakash Adhikari Ph.D.

Minimizing surface run-off, improving underground water recharging, and on-site rain harvesting in the Kathmandu valley , Ambika P. Adhikari and Keshav Bhattarai

Nature Of Health Insurance Demand In India , Brijesh C. Purohit Ph.D

Summary report of discussions at the forum “Nepali Diaspora Organizations in North America: Achievements, Opportunities, and Challenges”, Coppell, Texas, USA July 2022 , Ambika P. Adhikari

The Continuation of Civil War by Other Means? Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Nepal, Supplemental Materials , Prakash Adhikari Ph.D., Wendy L. Hansen Ph.D., and Adnan Shahid

The Vortex: A True Story of History's Deadliest Storm, an Unspeakable War, and Liberation , Jason Miklian

Submissions from 2021 2021

An Impact Evaluation of COVID-19 Training Program: Knowledge and Awareness of Public Health Professionals of Province Five, Nepal , Alok K. Bohara, Swati Thapa, Siobhan K. Yilmaz, and Spencer H. McBee

Climate Change and Community Resilience , Mani Nepal, Pranab Mukhopadhyay Dr., Md Rumi Shammin Dr., and AK Enamul Haque Dr.

Colonial Institutions and Civil War Indirect Rule and Maoist Insurgency in India , Shivaji Mukherjee

The Economics of Solid Waste Management and Drainage: A Sustainable Approach for Making South Asian Cities Climate-Resilient , Mani Nepal

Towards Creating Smart Cities in Nepal , Ambika P. Adhikari and Keshav Bhattarai

Submissions from 2020 2020

Covid-19 Pandemic and Nepal: Issues and Perspectives , Basu Sharma and Ambika P. Adhikari

Forest carbon stock assessment in selected red panda habitats in Ilam and Panchthar districts, Nepal , Trilochana Basnet, Niroj Timalsina, Rajesh Bahadur Thapa, Damber Bista, Basant Pant, Bhaskar Singh Karky, and Kai Windhorst

Issues and Perspective on the Covid-19 and Nepal: An Introduction , Ambika P. Adhikari and Basu Sharma

Sustainability, Urban Planning and Development: Sustainable and Self-Reliant Urban Development in Post- Pandemic Nepal , Ambika P. Adhikari and Keshav Bhattarai

Urban Development in Nepal and the Impacts of Covid-19 , Ambika P. Adhikari and Keshav Bhattarai

Value of cleaner neighborhoods: Application of hedonic price model in low income context , Mani Nepal and Rajesh K. Rai

Submissions from 2019 2019

A Pilot Study on Adolescent Mobile Phone Use, Indirect Mental Health Costs and Cultural Context Considerations – REPORT , Siobhan K. Yilmaz and Alok Bohara

Conference Summary Report, International Conference Role of Nepali Diaspora in Higher Education in Nepal , Ambika P. Adhikari, Govinda P. Dahal, Basu Sharma, and Dinesh Gajurel

Diaspora’s Role in Nepal’s Development: Summary of the Forum held at the Nepali National Convention. Baltimore, MD, USA. July 5-7, 2019 , Ambika P. Adhikari, Diwakar Dahal, and Rajendra Khatiwada

Sino-Indian Relations and EU Development Policies in Post-Conflict Nepal , Bibek Chand

Submissions from 2017 2017

Challenging Hegemonic Gender Norms through STEM Education in Nepal , Todd Wallenius and Barbara Grossman-Thompson

Disaster Relief as a Political Tool: Analysing Indian and Chinese Responses after the Nepal Earthquakes , Bibek Chand

The Effect of School Construction on Educational Outcomes among Females: Evidence from Nepal , Animesh Giri and Vinish Shrestha

Violence Against Children in Nyarugusu Refugees Camp: Reporting and Perceptions Across Generations , Erin K. Fletcher, Seth R. Gitter, and Savannah Wilhelm

Submissions from 2016 2016

Extension Service and Farm Productivity in Nepalese Agriculture , Dadhi Adhikari and Naresh Nepal

Submissions from 2015 2015

Education, Health and Inequality: Schooling infrastructure and educational outcomes in Nepal , Vinish Shrestha

How are School Dropout Rates Related to Household Characteristics: Analysis of Survey Data from Bangladesh , Nusrat Farah

Implications of the Dragon’s Rise for South Asia: Assessing China’s Nepal Policy , Bibek Chand and Lukas Karl Danner

Labor market changes and human capital investment: Evidence from migration boom in Nepal , Rashesh Shrestha

Sustainable Livelihood Systems in Nepal: Principles, Practices and Prospects , Ambika P. Adhikari, Govinda P. Dahal, Ishara Mahat, Bishwa Regmi, Kalidas Subedi, and Bharat Shrestha (eds.)

Submissions from 2014 2014

Reversing the Flood of Forced Displacement: Shedding Light on Important Determinants of Return Migration , Prakash Adhikari Ph.D. and Wendy L. Hansen Ph.D.

Submissions from 2013 2013

Can Improved Cooking Stoves Work? The Nepal Chulo Experience , Dipika Gawande, Bijendra Shrestha, and Amarsingh Gawande

Household-level Effects of Electricity on Income , Brandon Bridge, Dadhi Adhikari, and Matías Fontenla

Submissions from 2012 2012

Healthy Mothers, Healthy Children: Does Mothers' Demand for Antenatal Care Matter for Child Health in Nepal? , Nafisa Halim

Papers, Abstracts, and Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Himalayan Policy Research Conference , Vijaya R. Sharma, Mukti P. Upadhyay, Jeffry Drope, Naresh Nepal, and Alok Bohara

Submissions from 2011 2011

Building Community 'Gegran' Beneficiary Group: a case of Lothar Khola Watershed Chitwan, Central Nepal , Ramesh M. Tuladhar

Effectiveness of Some Local Baits for the Managment of Hornets in Apiaries of Kathmandu Valley , Chet Prasad Bhatta and Aananda Shova Tamrakar

Submissions from 2010 2010

An Opportunity to improve Service Delivery in Nepal through Local Governance , Yam Sharma and Abd Muwonge

A Proposal for an Open University of Nepal for Providing Higher Education to the Rural and Marginalized People , Pramod Dhakal, Ambika Adhikari, and Drona Rasali

Conflict Resolution and Institutional Arrangements for Flood Disaster Management on Indo Nepal Fringe: Focus on Kosi Basin , NMP Verma

Economic Growth and Human Development in South Asia: Experience of Selected Countries , Ranjit Singh Ghuman and Amarjit S. Bhullar

Economics of Sedimentation Management in Large Reservoirs , Biswo Poudel

Geographic Isolation and Poverty among Indigenous Peoples in Nepal , Gyanesh Lama, Marth N. Ozawa, and Palsang Lama

Impact of Industrial Environment on Socio-economic Conditions of Mine Workers: A study of Coal Industries in Odisha , Abhaya K. Naik and Krupasindh Pradhan

Local people's perception on Climate Change, its impact and adaptation practices in Himalaya to Terai regions of Nepal , Krishna R. Tiwari, Kashab D. Awasthi, Mohan K. Balla, and Bishal K. Sitaula

Media Contribution in Transfer of Power in Nepal , Binod C. Agrawal

Micro-level Estimation and Decomposition of Poverty and Inequality in Nepal , Mani Nepal and Alok Bohara

Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) and Economic Development of Odisha , Krupasindh Pradhan and Santosh Kumar Munda

Moving out of Chronic Poverty: Community Level Study on Poverty over the Time , S.A.N.C. Samaraweera and N.R. Abeynayake

Prospects of a Trilateral Trans-Himalayan Economic Cooperation Agreement (THECA): China, Nepal, and India , Alok K. Bohara

Protection and comparative advantage of rice production in Bangladesh: A policy analysis matrix , Abu Hayat Md. Saiful Islam and Dieter Kirschke

Swine Flu: A Preliminary Study of the Planning and Policy of Nepal to Combat the H1N1 Pandemic , Rojee Rajbanshi

The Economic Cost of Health Problems due to Indoor Air Pollution at the Household Level in Tamil Nad , B.P. Chandramohan, T.K.S. Villalan, and S. Karthikeyan

Use of Modern Technology in Rural Development — A case study of National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in Odisha , Abhaya K. Naik and Sukhamaya Swain

Submissions from 2009 2009

E-Prostitutions and its Impact in Society , Rashida Valika

Experience of Nepali Families with Foreign Remittance: Evidence from the Nepal Living Standard Survey , Udaya R. Wagle

Submissions from 2008 2008

Bullets, Ballots and Bounty: Maoist Victory in the Twenty-first Century, Nepal , Mahendra Lawoti

Cooperative Federal Structure: A Workable Political-economy Approach for a New Nepal , Alok Bohara

Determinants of Awareness and Usage of Best Available Local Maternal and Child Health Care Facility by Women in a Selected Rural Area of Nepal , Vijaya R. Sharma and Tirshana Sharma

Determinants of Deforestation in Nepal's Central Development Region , Keshav Bhattarai

Factors Affecting Application of New Public Management Oriented Reforms for Reforming Nepalese Public Administration , Bharat Raj Gautam

Faithful Leisure, Faithful Work: Religious Practice as an Act of Consumption in Nepal , Charis Boke

Financial Management of the Small Municipalities of Nepal: Sustainability Issues , Mahesh Baral

Heritage Conservation in Nepal: Policies, Stakeholders and Challenges , Neel Kamal Chapagain

Natural Disaster and Sickness Shocks: Evidence of Informal Social Insurance from Bangladesh , Pallab Mozumder

POLITICAL CONFLICT AND MIGRATION: How has Violence and Political Instability Affected Migration Patterns in Nepal? , Nathalie Williams and Meeta S. Pradhan

Reproductive Health Services: An Entry Point to Reach Labor Migrants and Their Wives for Providing HIV and STI Services in Nepal , Laxmi Bilas Acharya

Rural Poverty Analysis: A case study of a district of Nepal , Uddhab Bhandary

The Limits of Success? NGOs, Microfinance and Economic Development in Pakistans Northern Areas' , Feisal Khan

The Role of Land Reform in Reducing Poverty Across Nepal , Chandra Adhikari

Towards Developing Indicators of Environmental Sustainability for Kathmandu, Nepal , Ambika Prasad Adhikari

Submissions from 2007 2007

A Community Based Micro Hydro: A Promising Technology for Rural Development in Nepal , Bishwa Koirala

An Assessment of the Causes of Conflict in Nepal , Bishwa Nath Tiwari

Community based integrated natural resource management: Policy options and areas of intervention , Sabita Thapa, John Soussan, Dhruba Pant, Umesh Nath Parajuli, Khem Raj Sharma, and Binod Bhatta

Coping with Unreliable Water Supplies and Willingness to Pay for Improved Water Supplies in Kathmandu, Nepal , Hari Katuwal and Alok Bohara

Domestic Health Hazard and Indoor Air-Pollution: An Approach to Find Alternative Energy Source for Rural Bangladesh to Minimize the Threat , Reazul S.M. Ahsan and Jinia Afrin

Economic Inequality in the Democratic' Nepal: Dimensions and Implications' , Udaya R. Wagle

Effects of Deforestation on Tree Diversity and Livelihoods of Local Community A Case Study from Nepal , Krishna Karkee

Identification of natural resources at watershed level: an initial step of mainstreaming of the Federal restructure in Nepal , Madan Koirala

Inequality, Polarization and Violent Conflict: The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal , Mani Nepal, Alok K. Bohara, and Kishore Gawande

Peoples Perceptions of Green Space Park in Pokhara, Nepal' , Murari Suvedi, Krishna Shrestha, Bishwo Kallyan Parajuli, and Padam Giri

Political Participation and Civic Literacy in Bajung: An Empirical Study with Correlation Analysis , Khadga K.C.

Political predictions in Nepal , Aditya Man Shrestha

Poverty, Inequality, Violent Conflict, and Welfare Loss: Micro-Level Evidence from Nepal , Mani Nepal

Prioritizing and Estimating Hydropower Project Construction Risks: A Case Study of Nyadi Hydropower Project , Kamalesh Panthi

Pursuing Democracy: Explaining Political Transitions in Nepal , Prakash Adhikari and James D. Timberlake

Recruiting Rebels: Indoctrination and Political Education in Nepal , Kristine Eck

"Retainer" Bureaucracy: An Impediment to the Process of Democratic Governance in Nepal , Sucheta Pyakuryal

Rural Vulnerability and Tea Plantation Migration in Eastern Nepal and Darjeeling , Sarah Besky

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Article Contents

Introduction, 1 renewable energy in nepal, 2 renewable-energy options for nepal, 3 balancing high levels of solar electricity, 4 government policy, 5 conclusion, conflict of interest.

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100% renewable energy with pumped-hydro-energy storage in Nepal

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Sunil Prasad Lohani, Andrew Blakers, 100% renewable energy with pumped-hydro-energy storage in Nepal, Clean Energy , Volume 5, Issue 2, June 2021, Pages 243–253, https://doi.org/10.1093/ce/zkab011

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A radical transformation of the global energy system is underway. Solar photovoltaics and wind now comprise three-quarters of the global net new electricity-generation-capacity additions because they are cheap. The deep renewable electrification of energy services including transport, heating and industry will allow solar and wind to largely eliminate fossil fuels over the next few decades. This paper demonstrates that Nepal will be able to achieve energy self-sufficiency during the twenty-first century. Nepal has good solar and moderate hydroelectric potential but has negligible wind- and fossil-energy resources. The solar potential is about 100 times larger than that required to support a 100% solar-energy system in which all Nepalese citizens enjoy a similar per-person energy consumption to developed countries, without the use of fossil fuels and without the environmental degradation resulting from damming Nepal’s Himalayan rivers. Nepal has vast low-cost off-river pumped hydro-energy-storage potential, thus eliminating the need for on-river hydro storage and moderating the need for large-scale batteries. Solar, with support from hydro and battery storage, is likely to be the primary route for renewable electrification and rapid growth of the Nepalese energy system.

Energy is an essential commodity. Rapidly increasing populations and economic growth are causing global energy demand to increase, especially in emerging-market economies. Energy supply is interwoven with global warming, local pollution, national and international security, economic growth and the ability to meet basic human needs.

A radical and rapid transformation to a sustainable global energy system is underway. Solar photovoltaics (PV) and wind now comprise three-quarters of the global net new electricity-generation-capacity additions ( Fig. 1 ). Coal, oil, gas, nuclear, hydro and the other renewables comprise the balance [ 1 ]. Solar and wind energy are vast, ubiquitous, non-polluting and indefinitely sustainable, and accord well with the United Nations Sustainable Development Agenda for affordable and clean energy.

Global net new electricity-generation-capacity additions in 2020 [ 1 ]

The deep renewable electrification of energy services allows solar and wind to eliminate fossil fuels, not just from the electricity system. Renewable electrification includes conversion of land transport to electric vehicles; use of electric heat pumps for low-temperature air and water heating; powering of industrial heat with electric furnaces; and, for the chemical industry, replacement of hydrogen from fossil fuels with hydrogen from water splitting.

Many jurisdictions are committing to net-zero emissions by 2050–60 including Japan, the European Union, China, the USA and Korea. Most countries are expected to follow suit in the next few years.

Solar photovoltaics and wind energy are now the cheapest forms of electricity available in regions with good solar and wind resources, respectively, except perhaps for very favourable hydroelectric sites. A dramatic acknowledgement of the rapid pace of change in world energy markets comes from the 2020 World Energy Outlook from the International Energy Agency, which states that ‘[f]or projects with low cost financing that tap high quality resources, solar PV is now the cheapest source of electricity in history’ [ 2 ].

Fossil fuels produce three-quarters of global greenhouse gases [ 3 ]. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, to limit global warming to 1.5°C, rapid reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions are required [ 4 ]. Importantly, developing countries such as Nepal can bypass a fossil-fuel era and transition directly to zero-emission renewables at low cost.

Novel themes in this paper are that:

Nepal can meet all of its energy needs from solar PV by covering 1% of its area with panels, even after (i) Nepal catches up with the developed world in per-capita use of energy and (ii) all energy services are electrified, eliminating fossil fuels entirely (an increase of 70-fold in electricity production).

Identification of off-river pumped hydro as a vast, low-cost, mature storage opportunity; Nepal has 17 times more off-river pumped-hydro-energy-storage sites than it will ever need even under the zero-fossil-fuel scenario described above, thus eliminating the need for on-river hydro storage. Pumped hydro is much cheaper than batteries for overnight storage.

Damming of Nepalese Himalayan rivers is unnecessary because PV is competitive with and vastly more available than hydro and can be more readily implemented at both small and large scales.

Section 1 of this paper describes a scenario in which Nepal catches up with developed countries in terms of per-capita energy consumption. Section 2 describes the renewable-energy options for Nepal to meet this consumption and identifies solar PV as by far the most prospective. Section 3 describes methods of balancing high levels of solar PV. Section 4 summarizes policy implications and the conclusion follows.

Traditionally, energy from biomass has dominated the domestic energy supply for most people in Nepal and oil was important for motorized transport. However, electricity is becoming increasingly important. In the past, most developing countries followed a path of increasing dependence on fossil fuels as they industrialized and raised living standards for their populations. In the future, most developing countries will transition directly to solar and wind energy, and bypass a fossil-fuel era.

Nepalese people can expect to achieve a high living standard over the course of the twenty-first century. The per-capita electricity consumption in developed countries such as the European Union, Japan, China, the USA, Singapore and Australia is 5–15 megawatt-hours (MWh) per person per year. In developed countries, complete renewable electrification of all energy services and complete elimination of oil, gas and coal allow the avoidance of most greenhouse emissions. To achieve this, electricity production must double or triple to 15–30 MWh per person per year, depending substantially on the degree of participation of the country in the chemical industry [ 5 ]. Net-zero emissions in 2050 strictly require such a transformation.

Electricity demand in Nepal is rising because supply is being extended to the whole population, per-capita consumption is increasing and the population is growing. We adopt the following assumptions:

(i) that Nepal with catch up with developed countries in terms of per-capita energy consumption;

(ii) that the energy systems of Nepal are fully electrified, including transport, heating and industry, with zero fossil-fuel use; and

(iii) that the per-capita electricity consumption in the second half of the twenty-first century in Nepal will increase to 15 MWh per person per year for a population of 33 million people.

Thus, Nepal’s electricity consumption may reach in the range of 500 terawatt-hours (TWh) per year. This is referred to in this paper as the ‘500-TWh goal’. Of course, the exact number cannot be reliably predicted, but these assumptions are adopted to illustrate trends as Nepal catches up with developed countries in energy consumption. This 500-TWh goal compares with current consumption of electricity in Nepal of ~7 TWh per year [ 6 ].

2.1 Solar energy

Solar energy is by far the largest and most sustainable energy resource in Nepal. The solar resource is two orders of magnitude larger than Nepal will require to meet the 500-TWh goal.

Very rapid reductions in the price of solar PV over recent years has opened up enormous markets in developed and developing countries alike. The solar resource in Nepal is compatible with production of electricity at a cost of US$40 per MWh once the Nepalese solar industry becomes mature, falling to <US$30/MWh in 2030 [ 7 ].

The speed of development of the global solar industry, arising from rapid price reductions, is so fast that previous reports on energy options require updating.

Nepal is located at a latitude of 26–30° north latitude, with the sun shining for >300 days per year. It has relatively high insolation of an average of ~17 megajoules per m 2 per day (1.7 TWh per km 2 per year) and national average sunshine hours of 6.8 per day. This makes Nepal a country with moderately high solar potential [ 8 , 9 ]. All parts of the country are reasonably favourable for solar energy, as shown in Fig. 2 .

Global horizontal irradiation and solar photovoltaic power potential in Nepal (redder is better) [ 8 ]

A solar-energy-system conversion efficiency of 20% (utilizing solar cells with efficiency of 25% [ 10 ]) will soon become available, which corresponds to 0.2 gigawatts (GW) per km 2 . This assumes close-packing of solar modules to form a dense array. Nepal has an area of 148 000 km 2 . Thus, if Nepal were covered entirely by solar cells, it could generate 50 000 TWh per year (148 000 km 2 × 1.7 TWh per km 2 per year × 20% conversion efficiency). The nominal power capacity would be 30 000 GW.

This approximate calculation shows that Nepal can generate 100 times more solar electricity than would be needed for the 500-TWh goal of high per-capita consumption (similar to developed countries) coupled with the complete electrification of energy services and the elimination of fossil fuels. Equivalently, 1% of Nepal (1500 km 2 ) would need to be covered by solar panels.

Under our assumption of electricity consumption of 15 MWh per person per year, the area of land required for solar collectors is 44 m 2 per person with a nominal power capacity of ~9 kilowatts (kW).

Large amounts of solar PV can be accommodated on residential, commercial and industrial rooftops, building facades and in other urban areas. The global per-capita leader in rooftop solar, Australia, has 3 million rooftop solar systems with a combined capacity of ~13 GW (550 Watts (W) per person) [ 11 ]. Most of this is located on residential buildings, although other sectors are rising quickly. The amount of rooftop solar in Australia may increase to 3.7 kW per person according to the Step Change scenario of the Australian Energy Market Operator [ 12 ]. This represents 40% of the 9-kW-per-person target required to meet the 500-TWh goal for Nepal.

Solar PV systems can be located in food-growing areas (Agrivoltaics, APV) whereby widely spaced solar panels shade 10–30% of the crop or pasture but cause only a modest loss of production because the reduction in sunshine is offset by a reduction in wind speeds and evaporation rates [ 13–22 ]. Maize, wheat, millet, jute, sugarcane, tea, tobacco, coffee soybeans, beans, lentils, fruit and vegetables may all be suitable for APV in Nepal. However, rice farming appears to be incompatible, since partial shading proportionally reduces rice output. Animal husbandry (cows, buffaloes, goats, sheep, pigs, horses) is also compatible with APV. APV offers a second cash crop for farmers. Detailed research will be required to establish the trade-off between agricultural and electricity yields for each crop, and hence to determine the amount of electricity that could be provided through APV. The area of land devoted to agriculture in Nepal is ~41 000 km 2 [ 23 ]. Thus, an average shading of 3.6% of agricultural areas by APV is sufficient to meet the 500-TWh goal for Nepal.

Substantial numbers of panels may be accommodated on non-forested lower slopes of hills and mountains with a southerly aspect. Waste land can become productive through the installation of PV systems, including around the transport infrastructure. For example, the area occupied by roads in an advanced economy is a substantial fraction of the required solar PV area per person (44 m 2 ) to meet the 500-TWh goal. Some solar systems can be floated on lakes and hydroelectric reservoirs, although the area available is small compared with the 1500-km 2 target. Further work is required to quantify these opportunities.

To reach 9 kW of solar panel per person by 2065, Nepal would need to install 200 W per person per year (~6 GW per year). To put this in perspective, Australia is currently installing 250 W per person per year of new solar- and wind-energy systems ( Fig. 3 ) [ 1 ]. This is 10 times faster than the global average and 4 times faster than in the USA, China, Japan and Europe. About one-quarter of Australian electricity is now sourced from solar PV and wind, and this figure is tracking towards 50% in 2025. The state of South Australia sourced 60% of its electricity from solar PV and wind in 2020 [ 24 ] and is heading towards 100% by 2025. Plainly, rapid transition to solar and wind energy is feasible.

Deployment rate of renewables (principally solar PV and wind) in various regions in terms of Watts per person per year [ 1 ]

As the price of solar-energy systems continues to fall, solar energy becomes ever more affordable. The price of utility-scale solar systems (tens to hundreds of megawatts) in countries that have large-scale annual deployment (and have thereby achieved critical mass of people and capability) is ~US$0.7 per Watt and is likely to decline to <US$0.4 per Watt in 2030 [ 10 ]. These prices are affordable in most countries, including Nepal. However, prices for infrequent construction within a country can be much higher due to immature supply chains.

Solar PV is unique among energy technologies in that small-scale (kilowatts) and large-scale (gigawatts) installations are built using the same basic unit (a solar panel) and have similar energy costs. A roof-mounted system has low land, engineering, approval and financing costs while a large-scale system has low panel and deployment costs. Electrification can proceed both by grid extension and through house- and village-scale small solar systems with battery storage.

Small-scale solar systems for individual households or villages provide major benefits for lighting, telecommunications, water pumping, grain grinding and refrigeration. When many people in a village deploy household solar, then microgrids can form, comprising distributed solar panels and battery storage, which can gradually increase in scale and power by interconnection with other microgrids, eventually leading to widespread interconnection [ 25 , 26 ]. Larger-scale systems can power cooking, heating, industry and transport, particularly in combination with extension of the electricity grid to most citizens.

Nepal’s currently installed solar capacity is ~60 MW (2 W per person) [ 27 ]. Much of this is in the form of 1.1 million small home systems that are not grid-connected. Institutional solar PV systems up to a capacity of 2 kW have been installed in thousands of institutions such as schools, health posts and homestays. More than 10 000 solar streetlights have been installed [ 28 , 29 ].

The construction of Nepal’s largest solar-energy plant with an installed capacity of 25 MW began in April 2018 in the Nuwakot district and is now in the early stage of producing electricity [ 30 ].

An important advantage of solar is that millions of individuals can acquire and own their own rooftop solar system. These systems can connect to a battery or the grid, or both. This sidesteps institutional barriers at the national level.

To put this in perspective, Australia has a population of 25 million, only a little less than Nepal. Most people live in south-east coastal cities where the annual solar resource is similar to that of Nepal. According to the government’s Clean Energy Regulator, Australia is installing 3 GW per year of new rooftop solar systems and there is now a total of 3 million rooftop solar systems with a combined capacity of >13 GW [ 11 ]. Individuals install these systems because they compete with retail prices, which are much higher than wholesale prices.

2.2 Hydropower

Hydropower is one of the two sources of energy in Nepal that can play an important role in Nepal’s future economy. However, the hydro potential is a tiny fraction of the solar PV potential. Table 1 represents the annual energy estimate and power potential of four major river basins: Narayani, Saptakoshi, Karnali and Mahakali of Nepal. Though Saptakoshi is the largest river basin of Nepal, the Narayani river basin has the largest annual energy production of ~113 TWh and power potential of ~18 GW [ 31 ].

Annual energy and power potential of major river basins of Nepal [ 31 ]

Presently, hydropower plants with a combined capacity of 1.2 GW have been installed in Nepal. Most are run-of-river with output varying according to rainfall and provide little storage [ 32 ].

Approximately 50% of the total hydropower assets are owned by the Nepal Electricity Authority, a government agency, and the rest is owned by independent power producers. An important achievement in 2018 was the commissioning of a new Dhalkebar Muzaffarpur cross-country transmission line between Nepal and India, giving an additional boost to Nepal’s energy-trading system [ 33 ].

It is important to understand the environmental destruction usually associated with large-scale hydropower projects, particularly if they include energy storage in large reservoirs. These include displacement of people, flooding of farmland, destruction of river ecosystems, forest clearance and methane release due to the decay of a large number of plants and organic residues.

Importantly, the cost of solar energy has fallen below all but the most favourable hydroelectric systems.

2.3 Wind energy

Nepal has a low potential for the large-scale utilization of wind energy ( Fig. 4 ) [ 34 ]. Typical expected capacity factors are <20% except on the high ridges of the Himalayas, which are largely inaccessible for wind turbines. This means that wind energy will be much more expensive than solar energy.

Wind-capacity factors in Nepal (redder is better) [ 34 ]

There is potential for small turbines in some favourable locations. Various government and private organizations are taking initiatives to promote small-scale wind energy in Nepal [ 35 ]. At present, there is no ongoing wind-turbine-installation project that uses wind energy alone [ 36 ]. The Energy Sector Management Assistance Program of the World Bank has had a project since 2015 for the ground-based measurement of wind potential at 10 sites (Mustang (2); Morang; Siraha; Panchthar; Dang (2); Jumla; Ramecchap; Banke) [ 37 , 38 ]. This has allowed reliable wind-power estimation that can be used by potential wind-power developers in Nepal.

2.4 Biomass

Biomass in various forms, including wood, agricultural residue, animal dung and biogas, is an important small-scale energy source for millions of people in Nepal. However, biomass can never be a large-scale source of energy. The primary reason is that the conversion of solar energy into biomass and then into useful energy occurs with very low efficiency—orders of magnitude lower than via solar PV. This means that a great deal of land is required to supply energy services, and this competes directly with food and timber production and with environmental values.

Electricity can readily replace biomass and fossil fuels for heating, cooking and lighting. Importantly, electricity eliminates indoor air pollution. Use of biomass may decline over the next several decades, as has occurred in most other countries as their economies have developed.

Nepal produces a large amount of organic solid waste, manure and sewage sludge along with various types of organic industrial waste. This waste needs to be managed properly to protect the environment. Landfilling is not an environmentally friendly option. Anaerobic digestion of these wastes is an environmentally beneficial and energy-efficient waste-management option to recover biogas (about 60% methane) and digestate sludge as a by-product that is used as an organic fertilizer. This helps Nepal to replace chemical fertilizer and biogas can be used for cooking, heating and industrial applications.

Balancing high levels of variable solar energy over every hour of every year is straightforward. Storage via batteries and pumped hydro allows the daily solar cycle to be accommodated. Sharing power over large areas via high-power-transmission lines spanning Nepal from east to west allows the smoothing-out of local weather and demand variability.

Australia is installing variable solar and wind faster per capita than any other country. Australia only derives ~6% of its electricity from hydro, and hence lacks the smoothing ability of hydroelectric generation backed by large dams. In response, Australia is deploying multiple gigawatts of new off-river pumped hydro, gigawatt-scale batteries and new gigawatt-scale transmission [ 39 ]. Large-scale demand management is also being deployed through pricing structures to encourage the transference of consumption to times of excess renewable-energy availability.

3.1 Pumped-hydro-energy storage (PHES)

PHES entails pumping water from a lower to an upper reservoir when excess solar energy is available and allowing the water to run down through a turbine at a later time to recover the energy [ 40 ]. Typical round-trip efficiency is 80%.

PHES comprises ~95% of global electricity-storage power (~170 GW) and a higher fraction of storage energy [ 41 ]. Most existing pumped-hydro systems are associated with river-based hydroelectric projects with large reservoirs. This generally entails flooding large areas of land.

PHES systems can be located away from rivers. Since most of the land surface of Earth is not adjacent to a river, a vastly larger number of potential sites are available for off-river (closed-loop) PHES compared with river-based PHES. Off-river PHES comprises a pair of reservoirs (20–500 hectares (Ha)), separated by a few kilometres, but at different altitudes (200–1200 m altitude difference or ‘head’) and connected by a pipe or tunnel ( Fig. 5 ). Water is pumped uphill on sunny/windy days and energy is recovered by allowing the stored water to flow back through the turbine. The water oscillates indefinitely between the two reservoirs.

Google Earth synthetic image of a gigawatt-rated off-river PHES system [ 40 ] at Presenzano in Italy, showing the two reservoirs (upper right and lower left) with a head of 500 ms (vertical scale is exaggerated)

For example, a pair of 100-Ha reservoirs with a head of 600 m, an average depth of 20 m, a usable fraction of water of 90% and a round-trip efficiency of 80% (accounting for losses) can store 18 gigalitres of water with an energy potential of 24 GWh, which means that it could operate at a power of 1 GW for 24 hours. These reservoirs are very small compared with river-based hydros. Water requirements (initial fill and evaporation minus rainfall) are very small compared with a comparable coal-fired power station (cooling tower). It amounts to a few square metres of land per person for the 500-TWh goal, which is much less than the land needed for the associated solar PV systems and very much less than the land alienated by an equivalent river-based system.

Nepal has enormous potential for off-river PHES. The Global Pumped Hydro Storage Atlas [ 42 , 43 ] identifies ~2800 good sites in Nepal with combined storage capacity of 50 TWh ( Fig. 6 ). To put this in perspective, the amount of storage typically required to balance 100% renewable energy in an advanced economy is ~1 day of energy use [ 44 ]. For the 500-TWh goal, this amounts to ~1.5 TWh.

Hundreds of 50-GWh off-river pumped-hydro sites in Nepal [ 42 , 43 ]

Seasonal variation in solar-energy supply in Nepal is moderate, fluctuating from 75% of the mean in winter to 125% in spring [ 9 ]. This means that significant seasonal storage may be required. A simple analysis of data in [ 9 ] suggests an upper bound in seasonal storage of 50 TWh, which could be accommodated with off-river pumped-hydro storage [ 40 ]. In practice, far lower storage would be needed.

The amount of storage needed is a trade-off between the cost of the storage and the cost of providing additional solar generation to cover winter. The latter implies substantial excess solar electricity in summer. Because the cost of solar-energy systems continues to fall, the economic optimum is likely to favour the overbuilding of solar rather than the deployment of large amounts of seasonal storage.

Interconnection with neighbouring countries to the north and south, where large wind-energy resources are located, could substantially reduce the need for seasonal storage. Excess summer solar generation can be used for underground seasonal thermal storage and can be exported to neighbouring countries.

3.2 Batteries

Batteries have a typical round-trip efficiency of ~90% for battery chemistries based on lithium [ 45 ]. Batteries are being deployed at the gigawatt scale around the world to support rising levels of wind and solar. For storage-time periods of seconds to hours, batteries have an economic advantage. For several hours, overnight and seasonal storage, pumped hydro is much cheaper. Batteries and pumped hydro are complementary storage technologies.

3.3 Hydrogen

Hydrogen production in Nepal is unlikely to be significant. Hydrogen or hydrogen-rich chemicals such as ammonia could be used to store and transport energy in Nepal. However, this is unlikely to occur because the efficiency is very low compared with those of batteries, pumped hydro and thermal storage, which unavoidably translates into high costs.

Hydrogen can be sustainably produced using renewable electricity to electrolyse water. Hydrogen is difficult to store. Options include liquefaction at very low temperatures and conversion to a more tractable chemical such as ammonia. Conversion of hydrogen energy to a useful form such as electricity or motive power is a low-efficiency process. Typically, the round-trip efficiency of electricity–hydrogen–electricity is 20–30% [ 46 ] compared with 80–90% for batteries or pumped hydro. Basic physical constraints mean that hydrogen storage can never have a high round-trip efficiency. This is a large economic barrier to the use of hydrogen as an energy-storage medium.

It is difficult to see how hydrogen could compete with batteries for short-term storage because batteries react in milliseconds to grid disturbances and have a 90% round-trip efficiency. It is difficult to see how hydrogen could compete with pumped-hydro storage for overnight and longer storage because pumped-hydro storage has an 80% round-trip efficiency and is mature and already low-cost.

Electric vehicles are being produced at the multi-million scale per year. In contrast, hydrogen-powered vehicles have a miniscule market share. The enormous advantage of incumbency means that electric vehicles are likely to dominate land transport in the future, which eliminates the automotive market for hydrogen. This includes heavy vehicles and long-distance transport. For example, the Tesla electric semi with a 35-tonne load has an expected range of ≤800 km (similar to the width of Nepal) [ 47 ].

Hydrogen is needed in the chemical industry for the synthesis of materials such as fertilizers, explosives, plastics, synthetic jet fuels and the reduction of iron oxide. Nepal is unlikely to play a significant part in the international hydrogen chemical industry because other countries have far better wind and solar resources and land availability, and will be able to produce hydrogen much more cheaply.

Government energy roadmaps in many countries are being overtaken and rendered obsolete by a sustained rapid decline in the cost of solar energy and sustained rapid growth in solar-energy deployment. New solar-energy-generation capacity is being deployed about twice as fast as the net new coal-, gas-, oil-, nuclear- and hydro-generation capacity combined. In leading countries such as Australia, solar and wind comprise 99% of the new generation capacity [ 1 ].

The demonstrated pathway to high levels of solar deployment in countries with leading per-capita deployment rates such as Australia and Germany is two-fold: deployment of millions of small residential rooftop solar systems of a few kilowatts each and the parallel development of multiple 10- to 500-MW solar farms. The experience gained is synergistic, since there is much in common between the markets.

Early deployment is relatively expensive because of the initial lack of skill and supply chains coupled with the perceived risk due to inexperience with solar technology. However, it is important to look beyond the initial high prices to understand the low and falling cost of solar energy in a mature market that has gained critical mass.

Government and international support for a few hundred megawatts of rooftop solar and solar farms in Nepal will help to overcome the initial hurdle, leading to rapidly increasing solar infrastructure and deployment skill, and a rapidly declining solar-electricity price.

Government can leave the development of solar farms and solar rooftop systems to the private sector. However, there is an important government role in facilitating adequate transmission and storage. In particular, government has an important role in selecting and facilitating the construction of several off-river PHES systems as and when they become necessary.

The federal, provincial and local governments of Nepal have been working for some time in coordination with energy-sector stakeholders of Nepal to promote clean and sustainable energy. The Ministry of Energy, Water Resources and Irrigation is the line ministry having the primary jurisdiction and authority to plan, develop and implement national energy policy and strategy. To ensure the promotion and development of sustainable energy, Nepal joined the UN Secretary General’s Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) initiative in 2012, targeting the provision of clean energy to all by 2030.

Concerning legislation, Part 4 of Article 51 of the Consitution of Nepal (2015) states that the government will adopt policies regarding the protection, promotion and use of natural resources to guarantee appropriate, affordable and sustainable energy to citizens. Nepal has established various relevant strategies and guidelines for the promotion and development of renewable energy. Some of these relevant to large-scale renewable-energy promotion include the White Paper on Energy, Water and Irrigation- Present Situation and Future Prospect 2018 and the Guidelines for Development of Alternative Electricity Connected to Grid 2018. These have elements that seek to support the large-scale promotion of renewable-energy technologies in Nepal. More specifically:

The White Paper on Energy, Water, and Irrigation: Present Situation and Future Prospect, released by the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources and Irrigation in 2018, sets targets of increasing household electricity usage to 700 kWh within 5 years and 1500 kWh within 10 years, and to have electric cookstoves in all households by 2030. It also aims to promote a renewable-energy mix mainly from solar, wind and biomass to reduce dependence on a single energy source and to improve energy security.

As per the Guidelines for Development of Alternative Electricity Connected to Grid 2018, published on 8 February, people can feed electricity generated from solar, wind and biogas plants into the national grid and get paid a fixed amount of money per kilowatt hour of energy. The generation licence will have a validity of 25 years and the Nepal Electricity Authority will pay producers US$62/MWh (1 USD = NRs 116 (exchange rate in February 2021)) [ 48 ].

This is an attractive price once the solar PV industry is mature enough to enable low costs. These policies and responses will require extensive modification once the low prices available from a mature solar industry in Nepal become available.

Nepal has good solar resources by world standards and moderate hydro resources, but negligible wind- and fossil-energy resources. The solar-energy resource is two orders of magnitude larger than the hydro resource. Solar energy is likely to be competitive with new hydro in Nepal. Government energy roadmaps made earlier than 2020 are largely outdated by the rapid progression of solar.

Solar collectors equivalent to ~1% of Nepal’s land area are required to allow Nepalese citizens to have the same per-capita energy consumption as those in developed countries and with zero fossil-fuel utilization. This includes the electrification of transport, heating and industry. These panels can be accommodated on rooftops, in conjunction with agriculture and on lakes and unproductive land.

Since most existing Nepalese hydro is run-of-river, substantial new storage is required to support a solar-based energy system. Nepal has enormous potential for the deployment of off-river PHES systems, which have a much lower environmental and social impact than river-based hydro storage.

The economic advantage of solar PV over fossil and hydro energy in a mature and competitive market is compelling. However, several factors can impede the rapid deployment of solar PV. Perhaps the most important is the relatively high cost of solar until the critical mass of skilled people and supply chains is obtained—then costs will fall rapidly towards international norms. Another important barrier can be unnecessary regulatory constraints on private citizens and companies feeding solar electricity into the grid, often based on spurious and thoroughly outdated technical arguments.

The government of Nepal can unlock the potential of solar PV by providing support for several tens of thousands of rooftop solar systems and several 10- to 100-MW solar farms in order to establish supply chains and a critical mass of knowledge. This support can be in the form of advantageous feed-in tariffs to unlock private capital. International experience shows that, once a private market is well established, prices for solar electricity fall rapidly. The main ongoing role for government is to facilitate the provision of adequate transmission and storage capacity. The private sector could provide the capital for this infrastructure through a regulated return-on-capital investment.

This study is at a ‘bird’s-eye’ level and does not delve into the detail of the best way to establish a vibrant solar market in Nepal. Future studies could identify the amount of solar electricity that could be harvested from Nepal’s rooftops; undertake analysis of the best sites for solar farms, off-river pumped-hydro sites and transmission corridors; conduct hour-by-hour studies over many years to determine the amount of storage needed to support high levels of solar electricity; investigate agrivoltaics in Nepal in detail; and identify social, regulatory and economic factors that will enhance or impede the rapid deployment of solar energy in Nepal.

None declared.

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Flora and Vegetation of Nepal

• © 2024
• Maan Bahadur Rokaya 0 ,
• Shalik Ram Sigdel 1

Institute of Botany, Czech Academy of Sciences, Pruhonice, Czech Republic

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Institute of Tibetan Plateau Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

• Provides a broad spectrum of species from low land (~60 m) to the alpine region (~5000 m) of Nepal
• Considers vascular and often neglected non-vascular species
• Supports species identification with unique photographs

Part of the book series: Plant and Vegetation (PAVE, volume 19)

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This volume highlights the plant life of Nepal, which accounts for 20% of the Himalayan biodiversity. For the first time, this group of authors compile over 200 years’ worth of local botanical research. Due to the high topographical diversity, Nepal has a very unique flora and vegetation.

The chapters focus on cryptogams, phanerogams and alien flora. As an added bonus, historical background for native and invasive species, is explained. Aside from botanical knowledge, the authors also shed a light on Nepali geography, soil, climate and land use. To complete the picture, readers will find data on different plants, maps and photographs of unique species.

• Phanerogams
• Himalayan region
• Invasive Species

Table of contents (15 chapters)

Front matter, nepal: an introduction.

• Sher Bahadur Gurung, Shalik Ram Sigdel, Maan Bahadur Rokaya

Flora and Phytogeography of Nepal

• Maan Bahadur Rokaya, Binu Timsina

Vegetation and Forest in Nepal

• Maan Bahadur Rokaya, Bidur Parajuli, Binu Timsina

An Overview of the Middle Miocene to Early Pleistocene Flora of the Siwalik Sediments in Nepal

• Purushottam Adhikari, Gaurav Srivastava, Khum N. Paudayal

A Comprehensive Review of Algal Exploration in Nepal

• Shiva Kumar Rai, Narayan Prasad Ghimire

Fungi of Nepal

• Hari Prasad Aryal

Bryophyta Plant Diversity in Nepal

• Giri Prasad Joshi, Menuka Paudel, Deepak Raj Pant

Lichens of Nepal

• Chitra Bahadur Baniya

Ferns and Fern-Allies of Nepal

Maan Bahadur Rokaya

Gymnosperms of Nepal: Diversity, Distribution, Economic Importance, and Future Perspectives

• Bikram Pandey, Arbindra Timilsina

Angiosperm Diversity in Nepal

• Prabin Bhandari

Economically Important Plants in Nepal

• Binu Timsina, Bidur Parajuli, Hem Raj Paudel, Maan Bahadur Rokaya

Plant Invasions in Nepal: What We Do Not Know?

• Bharat Babu Shrestha, Anju Sharma Poudel, Mohan Pandey

Impact of Climate Change on Plants in the Nepal Himalayas

• Shalik Ram Sigdel, Nita Dyola, Jayram Pandey, Eryuan Liang

Plant Diversity Conservation in the Nepal Himalaya: Status, Policies, and Legislative Frameworks

• Ram P. Chaudhary, Surya P. Joshi, Sagar K. Rimal, Narayan Belbase, Chandra K. Subedi

Editors and Affiliations

Shalik Ram Sigdel

About the editors

Maan Bahadur Rokaya is currently working as a research scientist at the Institute of Botany and the Global Change Research Institute, both affiliated with the Czech Academy of Sciences. Rokaya obtained his MSc in Botany, specializing in Plant Taxonomy and Systematics, from Tribhuvan University located in Kathmandu, Nepal, in 2001. Subsequently, he pursued his PhD in plant ecology from Charles University in Prague, completing his studies in 2011. The primary focus of his research is mainly on the plant population dynamics of important plant species, herbivory patterns along the elevational gradient, the effects of climate change on plant species, and the spatial distribution of plants, butterflies, and birds, mainly in the Himalayas. He has authored many scientific papers and book chapters.

Shalik Ram Sigdel is working as an Associate Researcher at the Institute of Tibetan Plateau Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences. Sigdel received his MSc in Botany (Ecology) from Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal, in 2004 and his PhD in Physical Geography (Treeline Ecology) from the Institute of Tibetan Plateau Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences in 2017. His research focuses on understanding alpine plant responses to changing climate at multiple spatial scales using dendroecological and trait-based approaches, particularly in the Himalayas. He has authored or co-authored about 30 scientific papers.

Bibliographic Information

Book Title : Flora and Vegetation of Nepal

Editors : Maan Bahadur Rokaya, Shalik Ram Sigdel

Series Title : Plant and Vegetation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50702-1

Publisher : Springer Cham

eBook Packages : Biomedical and Life Sciences , Biomedical and Life Sciences (R0)

Copyright Information : The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024

Hardcover ISBN : 978-3-031-50701-4 Published: 28 April 2024

Softcover ISBN : 978-3-031-50704-5 Due: 03 June 2024

eBook ISBN : 978-3-031-50702-1 Published: 26 April 2024

Series ISSN : 1875-1318

Series E-ISSN : 1875-1326

Edition Number : 1

Number of Pages : XXIII, 447

Number of Illustrations : 9 b/w illustrations, 80 illustrations in colour

Topics : Forestry , Plant Sciences , Ecology , Biodiversity , Conservation Biology/Ecology

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HIMALAYA, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies

Current issue: volume 40, number 1 (2020), research articles.

Giving God Glory: How Christian Tharus Negotiate Belonging through Ritual Music in Nepal Victoria M. Dalzell

Introduction | War and Suffering in Kashmir (Themed Section) Inshah Malik and Haley Duschinski

Everyday Suffocations, Smells and Sounds of Jung : Ethnography of Tear Gas in Downtown Srinagar Bhavneet Kaur

What about Insāniyat ? Morality and Ethics in the Pahars of Kashmir Omer Aijazi

The Dull Pain of Simmering Anger: Affective and Emotional Experiences among Displaced Kashmiri Pandits Ankur Datta

Fear and Othering in Delhi: Assessing Non-Belonging of Kashmiri Muslims Charlotte Thomas

Economics of Kashmir Conflict Bilal A. Pandow

Translating Loss – Reading Translation as Resistance Huzaifa Pandit

Conference Report

Nepal Mandala in an Early Modern South Asia Symposium Louis Copplestone

On Elsewhereness: Notes from the Road, 2016 Uzma Falak

Review of Mountainous Sound Spaces: Listening to History and Music in the Utarakhand Himalayas by Andrew Alter Jason Busniewski

Review of Trading Caterpillar Fungus in Tibet: When Economic Boom Hits Rural Area by Emilia Roza Sulek Geoff Childs

Review of The Great Game in the Buddhist Himalayas: India and China’s Quest for Strategic Dominance by Phunchok Stobdan Noé Dinnerstein

Review of The Life of Jamgon Kongtrul the Great by Alexander Gardner Renée L. Ford

Review of Routledge Handbook of Asian Borderlands , edited by Alexander Horstmann and Martin Saxer and Alessandro Rippa Nadine Plachta

Review of The Everest Effect: Nature, Culture, Ideology by Elizabeth Mazzolini Jolynna Sinanan

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Please note you do not have access to teaching notes, cbdrm in nepal: a matter of risk perceptions.

International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment

ISSN : 1759-5908

Article publication date: 9 February 2015

This paper aims to explore how different risk perceptions of experts, institutions and laymen have to be taken into consideration if non-governmental organizations and donors want to include the community in disaster risk reduction. Otherwise, community-based disaster risk management will not be community-based.

Design/methodology/approach

This research is based on an intensive literature review, as well as a four-month felt study in Kathmandu (November 2011-February 2012). This study explores, from a social constructive point of view, the relationship among international, national and local actors in the effort to conduct disaster risk reduction in Nepal through a community-based approach.

The Kathmandu Valley is at risk of being hit by an earthquake at anytime. If an earthquake hits, it will cause total devastation. Although the Nepalese are aware of the risks of a potential earthquake, very few have begun preparations. The author finds that the lack of preparation is partly caused by different risk perceptions among experts, institutions and laymen.

Originality/value

Involving the community in disaster risk reduction today is widely accepted as the right way to work with disaster risk reduction. But, rarely the question is made: are we really involving the community by taking their risk perception serious, and not just accepting the risk perceptions from experts and institutions of science as being the right way to perceive disaster risk. The author finds that there is a tendency to ignore the community in community-based earthquake preparedness in Nepal.

• Risk reduction
• Vulnerability
• Earthquakes
• Communication
• Disaster prevention
• Natural disasters

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the employees at NSET for giving an insight into their work and for their participation and wonderful help during the research. They are deeply committed to their work and to the goal of making Nepal an earthquake-safe country. Furthermore, the author extends gratitude to all the helpful and wonderful people and inhabitants of Nepal she met during her time in Kathmandu. The author also thanks Karen for editorial help.

Laursen, M.R. (2015), "CBDRM in Nepal: a matter of risk perceptions", International Journal of Disaster Resilience in the Built Environment , Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 73-85. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJDRBE-07-2014-0052

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Original research

Prevalence of diabetes mellitus and associated risk factors in nepal: findings from a nationwide population-based survey, namuna shrestha.

1 Research Section, Nepal Health Research Council, Kathmandu, Nepal

2 Department of Community Medicine, Maharajgunj Medical Campus, Kathmandu, Nepal

Anil Poudyal

Krishna kumar aryal.

3 Public Health Promotion and Development Organization, Kathmandu, Nepal

Namra Kumar Mahato

Nitisha gautam, dirghayu kc, pradip gyanwali, meghnath dhimal, anjani kumar jha, associated data.

Data are available on reasonable request. Data will be available on request.

The burden of diabetes mellitus (DM) has increased globally, particularly in low-income and middle-income countries, including Nepal. Population-based nationally representative data on the prevalence of DM is limited. This paper presents the prevalence of DM and its associated risk factors in Nepal.

Research designs and methods

This population-based study sampled 13 200 participants aged 20 years and above in 400 clusters of 72 districts of Nepal. The study used a standardised questionnaire adapted from the WHO STEPwise approach to non-communicable disease risk factor surveillance instrument and digitalised in Android-compatible mobile phones. Fasting and 2 hours postprandial blood samples were taken to test various biochemical parameters. Descriptive followed by multivariate analyses were done to assess the association between explanatory variables and the outcome variable.

Primary outcome measures

Prevalence of DM.

The prevalence of DM was found to be 8.5% (95% CI 7.8% to 9.3%). The odds of DM occurrence were higher in the upper age groups (40–59 years at adjusted OR (AOR) 3.1 (95% CI2.3 to 4.2) and 60+ years at AOR 4.7 (95% CI 3.3 to 6.6)), compared with the group aged 20–39 years. Men were found to have higher odds of DM (AOR 1.3, 95% CI 1.1 to 1.6) compared with women. Urban residents had almost twice higher odds of DM (AOR 1.7, 95% CI 1.4 to 2.2) compared with rural residents. Participants with raised blood pressure (BP) (AOR 2.2, 95% CI 1.8 to 2.7), those who were overweight and obese (AOR 2.0, 95% CI 1.6 to 2.4) and those who had high triglycride level (≥150 mg/dL) (AOR 2.1, 95% CI 1.8 to 2.6) also had twice higher odds of DM compared with those with normal BP, an average body mass index and normal triglyceride level, respectively.

Conclusions

Targeted interventions to higher risk groups as well as prevention and control of other associated biological risk factors might help to reduce the prevalence of DM in Nepal.

Strengths and limitations of this study

• The study included a large sample spread across 400 clusters (wards-lowest administrative units) covering 72 districts out of 77 districts in Nepal.
• Blood glucose was measured through both fasting and postprandial blood sample.
• The study used digital data collection and feedback was given on a regular basis after data were uploaded on a real-time basis.
• Data quality was ensured through standard training processes and quality assurance procedures.
• The study does not have information on the physical activity and dietary habits of participants, which are known to be important predictors of diabetes mellitus.

Introduction

The burden of diabetes mellitus (DM) has increased globally. In 2019, approximately 463 million adults aged 20–79 years were living with diabetes worldwide, 1 causing an estimated 1.5 miliion deaths. 2 This number is expected to rise to 700 million by 2045 1 DM contributes to at least US$727 billion in health expenses, with 12% of total spending on adults. 3 The burden of DM in terms of prevalence and number has risen dramatically, particularly in low-income and middle-income countries. 4

The prevalence of DM and related risk factors, including overweight and obesity, has increased across South Asia in recent decades. 5 According to the International Diabetes Federation (IDF), an estimated 82 million adults aged 20–79 years were living with DM in the South East Asia Region in 2017, representing a regional prevalence of 8.5%. 6 Factors like decline in nutrition quality, reduction in physical activity and increase in sedentary behaviours are reflected in the increasing prevalence of type 2 diabetes and related risk factors in the region. 5 The IDF reported the national prevalence of DM among people 20–79 years in Nepal to be 4% in 2017, which is expected to rise to 6.1% by 2045. In the same age group, 11.7% of total deaths were attributed to DM in Nepal. 7 A systematic review carried out in 2014 showed a pooled prevalence of DM as 8.4%, with the variation in prevalence ranging from 1.4% to 19.0% in Nepal. 8 Even though, there are several national estimates available on the prevalence of DM in Nepal, 9–12 those studies were limited to small sample size or geographic location that would not be representative of the whole population in Nepal. In addition, criteria used for defining the prevalence of DM varied across studies. Furthermore, there is a lack of research identifying the predictors of type 2 diabetes in Nepal. 9 This warrants a large scale study that is representative of the whole population, which provides a national (including subnational) prevalence of type 2 diabetes using standard criteria and identifies its predictors.

This study reports the first nationally representative population-based prevalence of DM measured through both fasting and postprandial (PP) blood sample including that in different subgroups and factors associated with occurrence of DM in Nepal.

A population-based cross-sectional study was conducted covering all seven provinces of Nepal from 2016 to 2018. The sample size was calculated by considering the prevalence of raised blood glucose (p=4%) from the 2013 non-communicable diseases (NCD) risk factors STEPS survey, Nepal. 13 The study was carried out among 13 200 participants aged 20 years and above using mutlisatge cluster sampling technique. Men and women not providing consent to participate in either or both stages of the study (questionnaire and physical measurements, or biochemical measurements) were excluded from that particular stage or both the stages depending on the consent received. Detail methodology for this study has been explained elsewhere. 14

Data collection

Data collection was done in two steps: first as face-to-face interview with a questionnaire and as second step physical measurements and collection of blood sample of the same participant with the prior appointments. Additional details on data collection such as orientation of field team has been explained previously. 14 REMO-Research and Monitoring Software, was used to programme the questionnaires into the mobile phones. This software was developed by Rooster Logic, an Information and Communication Technology company led by local engineers with focus on database creation and management, research, and monitoring. This software has been extensively used for digital data collection in Nepal and allows small to large scale research projects to be conducted with ease and enables real-time monitoring of data. This software has been used by the Nepal Health Research Council in various previous surveys. 15 16

Sociodemographic and behavioural information

Information on sociodemographic and behavioural risk factors was collected through face-to-face interviews using an interviewer-administered questionnaire. Information was collected on age, sex, ethnicity, educational status, marital status, occupation type, history of raised blood pressure and DM, alcohol consumption, and smoking habits. The commonly used classification for ethnicity in Nepal has six categories: (1) Dalit (marginalised group of people, with relatively lower socioeconomic and education status); (2) Disadvantaged Janajatis (disadvantaged group of people and also indigenous, with relatively lower socioeconomic and education status); (3) Disadvantaged non Dalit Terai Caste Groups (disadvantaged group of people from the Terai, the lowlands, with relatively lower socio-economic and education status but not the dalit groups); (4) Religious Minorities (Muslim, Christian, etc); (5) Relatively advantaged Janajatis (indigenous group of people with relatively higher socioeconomic status, such as Newar, Thakali and Gurung) and (6) Upper Caste Groups (population with relatively higher socioeconomic and education status, mostly Brahmins, Chhetris and Thakuri). 17

Data on part of physical measurements, blood pressure measurement and biochemical measurement were done using respective equipment and procedures, and the detail including the information on quality control has been explained elsewhere. 14 Participants were defined as having DM if they had raised fasting glucose (≥126 mg) or raised PP blood glucose level ((≥200 mg), or if the participants were on anti-diabetic medication at the time of the study 18 19 whereas the key definition of the terms raised blood pressure, body mass index (BMI), tobacco use and alcohol consumption has been explained in the report published previously. 14

Data management and analysis

Data were extracted by the core team involved in data management, from the server where the collected data were stored. Data cleaning was performed using IBM SPSS Statistics software V,20.0 (IBM). The cleaned data were then exported to Stata V.13.0 for analysis (Stata). Descriptive results were produced for each of the outcome variables using complex sample analysis considering the PSUs, strata and weight. Bivariate and multivariate analyses were used to assess the association between explanatory variables and the outcome variable. All explanatory variables with p <0.05 in the bivariate analysis were inserted in the multivariate binary logistic regression model to see the independent effect of each variable on the occurrence of DM. The magnitude of the association was measured using the adjusted odds ratio (AOR) and 95% CI. A p<0.05 was considered as statistically significant. 20

Patient and public involvement statement

There was no involvement of patient in the study conception or design. However, experts in the relevant field were involved from the beginning and regular consultation was done with them. The findings from the study were disseminated to the general public and concerned stakeholders through a dissemination programme.

The following section describes the results. It is divided into a descriptive picture of sociodemographic, behavioural and biological characteristics, and followed by the factors associated with the occurrence of DM.

Sociodemographic characteristics

Out of the 13 200 targeted participants, 12 557 (95.3%) participated in the interview with a questionnaire (step 1), and 12 148 (92%) participated for the physical measurements and laboratory investigations (step 2). Sociodemographic characteristics of the participants are presented in table 1 . Among total of 12 557 participants, the majority of participants (76.8%) were in the age group 20–59 years. More than half of the participants (57.9%) were female. More people belonged to the upper caste groups (32.7%), followed by disadvantaged janajatis (20.7%). More than half (53.1%) were illiterate or never had formal schooling. Geographically, about one-fourth of the participants were from Bagmati province (24.7%), as it contained the capital city with dense population with the lowest proportion from Karnali province (4.8%). More than half (51.5%) of the participants were urban dwellers.

Sociodemographic characteristics of the participants

Behavioural and biological characteristics

About one-third of the participants (31.9%) said that they were smokers. Nearly one-fourth of the participants (24.6%) reported that they were current alcohol drinkers. Raised blood pressure was prevalent among 36.9% of the participants. The proportion of participants who were either overweight or obese was 30.7%. More than one-third (35.7%) of participants had raised triglycerides. Behavioural and biological characteristics of the participants are presented in table 2 .

Behavioural and biological characteristics of the participants

Factors associated with DM

The overall prevalence of DM was 8.5% (95% CI 7.8% to 9.3%). The following two tables ( tables 3 and 4 ) show the results on factors associated with DM, along with prevalence of DM among the different subgroups examined. Table 3 shows the prevalence of DM across subgroups by different background characteristics, and the factors associated with occurrence of DM through multivariate analysis in terms of AOR. The prevalence of DM is seen to have increased with age. Participants in the age group of 60 years and above had about five times higher odds of having DM (AOR 4.7, 95% CI 3.3 to 6.6) compared with those in the age group of 20–39 years. Similarly, male participants had higher odds of having DM (AOR 1.3, 95% CI 1.1 to 1.6) compared with female participants. Urban residents had about two times higher odds of having DM (AOR 1.7, 95% CI 1.4 to 2.2) compared with those residing in rural area. Table 4 shows the prevalence of DM across subgroups by different behavioural and biological characteristics and the factors associated with occurrence of DM through multivariate analysis in terms of AOR. Participants with raised blood pressure had about two times higher odds of having DM compared with those whose blood pressure was normal (AOR 2.2, 95% CI 1.8 to 2.7). Regarding BMI, participants who were overweight and obese had two times higher odds of having DM than those with normal BMI (AOR 2.0, 95% CI 1.6 to 2.4). Participants who had high triglyceride level (≥150 mg/dL) had about two times higher odds of having DM than their counterparts (AOR 2.1, 95% CI 1.8 to 2.6).

Association of sociodemographic factors with diabetes mellitus (DM)

*P<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

AOR, adjusted OR; COR, crude OR.

Association of behavioural and biological factors with diabetes mellitus (DM)

*P<0.05, ***p<0.001.

The first nationally representative study identified high prevalence of DM among the participants, which is higher than the IDF’s estimate for Nepal, that is, 4% in 2017. 21 However, the prevalence of DM is similar to the findings observed in a systematic review (pooled prevalence—8.4%, 95% CI 6.2% to 10.5%), which summarised the prevalence of type 2 diabetes in Nepal for a period of 14 years. 8 Similar figure (8.5%, 95% CI 6.9% to 10.4%) was reported in another systematic review conducted in Nepal. 22 Our finding is also in line with the WHO estimates for DM in Nepal which reported a prevalence of 9.1% in 2016. 23 The latest estimates from the global burden of disease study, however, show a national prevalence of 4.4% of diabetes type 2. 24 Likewise, WHO global report on DM also estimated a regional prevalence of 8.6% in South East Asia in 2014, which is consistent with the findings from our study. 4 The finding from our study is similar to estimates of DM prevalence from different studies in the neighbouring countries, including India (8.7%), 25 China (10.9%), 26 Sri Lanka (8.4%), Bhutan (7.7%), Maldives (7.5%) and Bangladesh (6.8%). 21 The prevalence of DM in our study may be attributed to a combination of factors including rapid urbanisation, changing lifestyles, unhealthy diets, tobacco use, and increasing life expectancy. Adding to this, several challenges prevailing around diabetes management such as high treatment cost, availability of limited health facilities, lack of awareness about the disease and particularly no specific guideline available for the prevention and treatment of the disease in Nepal might have exacerberated the burden of this disease. 10

Our study reports that age was significantly associated with DM, with older aged people (60 years and above) having higher odds of having DM. Older age as an important predictor for DM is consistent with the findings of studies from different contexts. 8 9 27–30 The life expectancy of Nepalese people has increased from 58 years in 1990 to 71 years in 2019 24 and the proportion of the older population is growing, 31 which further tends to increase in future. 32 With ageing, skeletal muscle insulin sensitivity might be impaired which in turn increase the risk of insulin resistance and type 2 diabetes. 33 The findings of the study and these factors underscore the need of tailored interventions for management and control of DM among population with higher age. Further to this our study showed that, male had higher odds of having DM than females. This finding is supported by an another study conducted in Nepal, which identified being female as significant protective factor for DM (AOR 0.4, 95% CI 0.3 to 0.7). 9 A systematic review conducted in South Asia also supported the findings from our study, indicating being male as a significant risk factor for DM. 34 However, this is in contrast to the findings reported in a different systematic review suggesting that females were at higher risk of DM in Nepal (OR 1.6, 95% CI 1.3 to 1.9). 8 Higher prevalence of DM among men has been associated with large amount of visceral fat in men. 35 Besides, lower tendency of women to develop visceral adiposity may explain that women are protected from DM in comparison to men. 36

Our study reported that urban residents were more likely to have DM compared with those residing in rural areas. Nepal has been experiencing an increasing rate in urbanisation. 37 Increasing urbanisation leading to change in dietary pattern, sedentary lifestyle, reduction in physical activity might have contributed to the higher burden of DM. Complementing this result, findings from NCDs STEPS survey 2019 suggests inadequate intake of fruits and vegetables and lower participation in physical activity among urban population compared with their rural counterparts. 38 All these factors might have some contributing role towards higher prevalence of DM among urban population. Similar to the findings from this study, an epidemiological survey conducted by the Nepal Diabetes Association found higher prevalence (14.6%) of DM in urban area in comparison to rural area (2.5%). 39 40 Consistent with the findings from our study, a systematic review also found the pooled prevalence of DM to be higher (8.1%, 95% CI 7.3% to 8.9%) in urban areas compared with rural areas in Nepal (1.03%, 95% CI 0.7% to 1.3%). 8 A study from Myanmar also presented similar findings of higher prevalence in urban areas compared with rural areas (12.1% vs 7.1%). 41 Studies have reported between two and five times higher odds of having DM and pre-DM in association with urban residence. 42 43

Our study showed that participants with raised blood pressure had about two times higher odds of having DM compared with those whose blood pressure was normal. This result is consistent with findings from South Asia, 34 Ethiopia 44 and Nepal. 8 The prevalence of hypertension and DM has been increasing in Nepal, however, the progress towards its effective prevention, treatment and control is found to be low. 9 45 With the coexisting conditions of hypertension and DM, the importance of secondary prevention (screening, timely diagnosis and treatment) of both these conditions is of paramount importance.

Overweight and obesity are important risk factors for DM. 5 44 46 Our study showed that participants who were overweight and obese had about two times higher odds of having DM than those with a normal BMI. Consistent with the findings from our study, a meta-analysis performed among Indian adults showed a statistically significant association between obesity and type 2 DM (OR 1.14, 95% CI 1.0 to 1.2). 47 Similar findings were observed in different studies conducted in South Asia, 34 USA, 48 Ethiopia 44 and Nepal. 49 Overweight and obesity has been increasing in Nepal particularly among women. 50 Obesity being a strong predictor for DM, there is a need to take preventive actions to control obesity which might in turn provide some level of control of growing DM prevalence in the country.

The other variable that showed significant association with the prevalence of DM was triglyceride level. Participants with a high triglyceride level (≥150 mg/dL) had about two times higher odds of having DM than their counterparts. This is in line with findings from studies conducted elsewhere, including in Ethiopia, 44 Bangladesh 51 and China. 52 Similar findings have been reported by different previous studies from Nepal. 53–55 This also highlights the need of interventions for prevention and control of several of these metabolic risk factors such as dyslipidaemia so as to achieve DM control in Nepal.

Besides the factors explained above, the provincial differences in prevalence of DM (though not seen as statistically significant after multivariate analysis) also highlights the importance of tailoring interventions to the provinces with higher prevalence such as province 1, 2, 5 and Bagmati province.

Our study has several strengths and limitations. Major strengths include: a large sample size, coverage of rural and urban residences; all three ecological belts of the country (the Terai, hills and mountains); and all provinces of Nepal. This approach provided nationally representative data and increased its generalisability among the Nepalese population. The study also provided detailed information on the possible association with a wide range of risk factors for DM. However, the cross-sectional nature of the study did not allow for a causal relationship to be established between these risk factors and the prevalence of DM. In addition, no information was collected on the physical activity and dietary habits of participants, which have been established as important predictors of DM in other studies. 56–59

Our study showed DM to be more prevalent among individuals aged 20 years and above. Older age, male gender, residing in urban areas, high BMI, raised blood pressure and raised triglyceride level independently predicted the occurrence of DM in this study. Findings suggest that targeted DM prevention and control interventions, especially to those population groups with higher chances of DM occurrence, in addition to prevention and control of the biological risk factors associated with DM through appropriate measures, would help curb the prevalence of DM in Nepal.

Supplementary Material

Acknowledgments.

The authors would like to acknowledge all the study participants and field enumerators for their invaluable support. We further acknowledge the Steering Committee members and the Technical Working Group members who guided the study. We sincerely acknowledge the support of Matilda Nash from Abt Britain in reviewing and copyediting the manuscript.

Twitter: @Kriessh

NS and KK contributed equally.

Correction notice: This article has been corrected since it was first published. One of the author's name has been updated.

Contributors: NS is the guaranter for this study. KK, KKA and MD conceived the study. NG and DKC helped in data entry and management. KKA and NS was involved in conducting data analysis. NS, KKA, AP and NKM wrote the manuscript. PG and AKJ supported in monitoring overall data quality. All authors reviewed the manuscript. NS and KK contributed equally.

Funding: The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

Competing interests: None declared.

Patient and public involvement: Patients and/or the public were not involved in the design, or conduct, or reporting, or dissemination plans of this research.

Provenance and peer review: Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.

Data availability statement

Ethics statements, patient consent for publication.

Consent obtained directly from patient(s)

Ethics approval

The study was approved by the Ethical Review Board of Nepal Health Research Council under registration number: 110/2016. Participants gave informed consent to participate in the study before taking part.

Editorial comment

(30 March 2023) How inclusive is the Nepali state? Let's ask the 2021 census!

Since 1990, the Nepali state has committed itself in its constitutions to multiethnicity, multilingualism and religious diversity in its society. This reality was reaffirmed in the current constitution of 2015. At the same time, another commitment was added, namely that of ending the existing unequal participation of diverse social groups in the state. In 2006, during Jana Andolan II, this had been one of the most urgent concerns of the people and had subsequently been declared a priority goal by all political parties. Yet this concern was not entirely new in 2006. It had been raised by members of disadvantaged groups as early as 1990, but had not really been heard. The Nepal Janajati Mahasangh, now Nepal Adivasi Janajati Mahasangh, the alliance of representative organisations of ethnic groups, was still in its infancy at the beginning of the 1990s. Similar representations of the interests of the Madheshi and Dalits were more or less nowhere in sight. Historical manipulations of the census In order to be able to estimate the extent of the participation of the various population groups today, one must first know how high the population share of the respective groups is in the total society. Until now, a look at the published data of the census, which has been published more or less regularly every ten years since 1911, has provided information on this. For a long time, the last well-founded census with detailed data on ethnic groups/castes, languages and religions had been the 1961 census, which was compiled immediately after Mahendra's royal coup in 1960 and was still largely free of the manipulations of the panchayat system. The party-less royal panchayat system focused on faking a cultural unitary state in the decades that followed. The impact of this policy can be seen in the published data of the 1971 and 1981 censuses. The number of ethnic groups listed constantly decreased, as did the number of mother tongues and their speakers. At the same time, the pretended number of practising Hindus rose to almost 90 per cent. The evidence for the obviously fake data was provided by the censuses after the democratisation of 1990, according to which the proportion of Hindus fell to around 80 per cent (2001). The proportion of native Nepali speakers fell from 58.4 per cent (1981) to 44.6 per cent (2011). While 44 mother tongues were counted in 1952/3, their number dropped to 17 (1971). In the 2011 census, 123 mother tongues were then listed by name. All this was to be seen as a positive development with regard to the appropriate inclusion of all social groups. Shortcomings of the 2021 Census And now the census of 2021, whose data was published barely one and a half years after it was collected. However, if you look for the latest data on the aforementioned social and cultural areas, you will be surprised to find that there are absolutely no figures. This did not even happen under the royal panchayat system, although this system actually aimed at avoiding such data. At best, a justification is provided by point 13.5 of the introductory notes of the new census, which states: "People’s aspirations and expectations have been elevated by the new Constitution. Issues of identities and capturing government’s attention are high. As a result, some interest groups tried to manipulate the respondents’ independent answers and dictated the enumerators to write a particular response. But this was independently verified and a press note was released from the CBS no fying all the concerned parties for possible legal action if they did not seize campaigning with prejudice. Moreover, a number of interest groups especially related to caste/ethnicity, religion and language have shown serious concern on census results and presented their specific demands which need to be dealt with higher government or political level." This explanation is very significant in many respects. First of all, the very special importance of identity is emphasised. This can only be emphatically confirmed. It gives people a very individual personal position in the multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious state of Nepal. Beyond that, however, it also has very special political and administrative significance. Let's just take the right to vote, which in the proportional system refers to the very figures published in the census for percentage allocation. The figures must also be made public in order to comply with the inclusion regulations in the political and administrative sphere. Then the above quote goes on to say that some vested interests have tried to manipulate the data collection in this regard. Nepal's constitution guarantees the fundamental right to information. If the CBS makes such allegations in such an important document as the census report, then these vested interests must be named and legal action must be taken immediately. While the CBS speaks of having threatened such legal action, it remains unclear whether it has been initiated. In this context, there is talk of "concerned parties". Does this refer to political parties or to "groups" in general? The next sentence talks about "interest groups related to caste/ethnicity, religion and language", which obviously had concerns about such social data. Who are these groups and what are the reasons for their concerns? The bottom line is that, while passage 13.5 of the introductory remarks to the census explains problems encountered during the survey, it does not explain why, for the first time, the census does not include any data on ethnicity, languages and religions. In view of the special political, electoral and administrative significance of such data, the Census loses quite considerably in value, however good and informative the data now published may be. Here, the public interest of the population and the state is clearly to be valued higher than possible reservations of certain groups or individuals. So to return to the initial question: What has been achieved so far of the inclusion promised by all political parties in 2006? For this, the public would not only have to be provided with new basic social data on ethnicity, languages and religions, but the respective proportion would also have to be shown for all possible areas of public life. It would be one of the most important tasks of the census in general to provide such data. In order to recognise that male Khas Arya, especially Bahun, hold many times the posts and functions in the state system that are appropriate to them on the basis of their population share, new census data is not necessarily needed. But it is also important to recognise changes in the field of inclusion. This is also and especially important for classifying possible positive changes with regard to traditionally excluded population groups. So the vague hope remains that the missing data will still be supplied. There is no indication of this. Such data should actually be taken into account and integrated in the tables already published. But this is hardly likely to happen. Only then would it be possible to see whether the various social groups in the areas covered by the census are affected or involved differently. The question remains: Are there specific reasons why the social data were swept under the table? Possibly, they could prove the failure of the previous inclusion policy and, on the other hand, give impetus to demands of the excluded groups to remedy deficiencies.

(19 February 2023) Let's celebrate National Oligarchy Day!

In Nepal, they celebrate Democracy Day for three days, whatever there is to celebrate. 72 years ago, the then King Tribhuvan returned to Nepal from exile in India and promised the people democracy, which is still celebrated today. In reality, of course, it was all stink and lies, as we all know. In the years that followed, the monarchy did everything it could to regain and secure its absolutist power, which ultimately ended in the almost 30-year-long party-less Panchayat system. The last king, Gyanendra, who was deposed in 2008, has just once again proposed a cooperation between the monarchy and political parties, for the "preservation of democracy", as he explained. The question remains why an institution that has been rightly abolished is allowed to speak at all; this only exacerbates the crisis. What is celebrated today as democracy is in reality an oligarchy of a few ageing politicians, all of whom have failed repeatedly, but who still consider themselves irreplaceable. Twice since 1951 it looked like democracy would prevail: in 1990 after the first people's movement (Jana Andolan I) and in 2006 after Jana Andolan II and the ending of Gyanendra's coup. The new constitution of 2015 was the work of the top politicians of the major parties and brought no real democratic advantage for the people; it served primarily to secure the power of the aforementioned party elites. In recent weeks, symbols and ideals of Nepali history that had long been hoped to be overcome have been repeatedly celebrated. On 11 January, for example, the birthday of Prithvi Narayan Shah, the founder of modern Nepal, was officially celebrated for the first time in years. This may have been a gesture towards the increasingly vocal supporters of a return to monarchy and the Hindu state. After all, the party that had taken up this unconstitutional cause had to be integrated into the allegedly Maoist-communist government for reasons of securing power. The Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) was founded in 1990 as a rallying point for the top politicians of the party-less royal Panchyat system, has split and merged again and again, and is bobbing along in elections in low single-digit percentages. So much only for the significance of this party. Prithvi Narayan deserves credit for unifying the country to a certain political greatness with his brutal campaigns of conquest. Otherwise, Nepal would probably not exist today. However, he did not do this out of great political foresight, as is repeatedly claimed, but simply for reasons of personal power and economic advantage. But this nation-wide seizure of power by the Shah dynasty of Gorkha also had very serious disadvantages for the people in the conquered areas, which are generally kept quiet: Destruction of traditional local land tenure rights, granting of ethnic land to supporters of the monarchy, suppression of ethnic and regional cultures and languages, integration of these groups at a lower level into the Hindu caste system, to name but a few. This laid the foundations for the unitary state later sought by King Mahendra and his son Birendra: one language, one religion, one culture, one ethnicity, all united by the glorious bond of attachment of the "subjects" to the Shah monarchy. The next big celebration this year was the anniversary of the Maoist uprising on 13 February. Prime Minister PK Dahal has now declared it a National Holiday for the first time because of the glorious achievements of the uprising. The uprising, which was marked by heavy losses and serious crimes and human rights violations by both Maoists and state security forces, has brought few significant changes, some of which are increasingly being challenged: Secularism, federalism, republic. The social inclusion promised by all political parties in 2006 is more distant than ever. Thousands of victims of the uprising continue to wait in vain for justice. Only a few perpetrators from the time of the uprising have been convicted so far. It is significant that one of those perpetrators has now been pardoned as part of the usual action on the occasion of Democracy Day. And so now, three-day celebrations of democracy, that is, the rule of the people. These people have recently expressed in elections what they want and what they do not want. For example, they have made it clear that they no longer want this old failed guard of male Khas Arya politicians, including those of the previous ruling alliance, who had tried to maintain their power through extreme anti-democratic manipulation of the electoral system, or those who in 2020/21 had accepted the destruction of Nepal's parliamentary system in order to maintain their personal power. Only the PR system allows a statement on the status of the political parties and here the losses of the three big parties were clear: Nepali Congress -7%, CPN (UML) -6.3%, CPN (MC) -2.5%. At the same time, parties that offered themselves as alternatives experienced a huge boost. Unfortunately, after the elections, some of these alternative forces turned out to be renewed kingmakers to keep the failed old politicians in power, instead of finally forcing them to make a generational change. Nepal has already experienced something similar after the 2017 elections, when the Bibeksheel Sajha Party managed positive approaches of an alternative political force before its leader Rabindra Mishra then outed himself as a monarchist, who is now a member of the RPP. Positive approaches like those of the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) obviously lose their impact as soon as the traditional power merry-go-round of the ruling oligarchy takes effect. Thus, Nepal now has a prime minister whose party received just 11 per cent of the vote and which won at least some of the direct mandates only thanks to the manipulative electoral alliance of the then ruling parties. So Dahal is prime minister thanks to the direct votes of, for example, traditional NC voters, but this has forced it into opposition, which this party, in turn, does not see that way. Democracy in Nepal supposedly does not need an opposition. At the same time, the strings in the background of the current government are pulled by KP Oli, who two years ago led Nepal's political system to the brink of ruin. It took his removal by the Supreme Court to stop him and his state president who was loyal to him. And Oli would not be Oli if he did not focus everything on his quick return to power. A year and a half ago, Dahal had played a decisive role in Oli's downfall, allegedly because he no longer considered him tenable. Now, however, the post of prime minister was more important to Dahal than his blather of yesterday. But Dahal was to pay dearly for his post. Oli insisted on about a third of the ministerial posts for his party. In addition, he wanted all important new state posts to be reserved for the UML. At some point, Dahal must have realised that he was only a puppet in Oli's power game. Since Dahal knows better than anyone else how to fly his flag with the wind and to throw away yesterday's promises, the signs within the governing coalition are now pointing to a storm. Oli and Dahal have agreed that the post of prime minister should switch to Oli after two and a half years, however this is to be handled legally, but constitutional rules do not interest Nepal's failed top politician anyway. Of utmost importance for Oli is that he then has a state president at his side who will rubber-stamp his every potential executive decision unchecked, as Bidya Devi Bhandari has willingly done repeatedly. So Oli still needs this post of state president for his party to have the state machinery more or less under his control. Within no time, Oli would then be back where he was dishonourably dismissed in 2021. Why the latter did not have further political consequences for him remains incomprehensible anyway. If the election of a new state president were in the interest of the country and its people, then this choice would fall on a neutral personality from the realm of civil society. But as it is, it is once again an important element in the power game of the failed political elites and parties. Nepal remains an oligarchy and not a democracy. So let's celebrate National Oligarchy Day!

(25 December 2022) The dishonesty of Nepal's top politicians Free and fair elections are the best non-violent way for the citizens of the country to express their views to the politicians and their parties. Despite tremendous manipulation and restriction of the freedom of choice through the formation of electoral alliances, especially those of the ruling parties, the voters managed to express a few things clearly;     - They did not want "business as usual".     - They did not want the same old failed politicians.     - They wanted a generational change in political responsibility. And the signals were clear. The electoral alliance of the five governing parties was voted out because it could no longer obtain the number of MPs needed to form a government. The main opposition party CPN (UML) led by former two-time prime minister KP Oli also lost not only 36 direct mandates compared to 2017, which was probably due to the electoral alliance of the ruling parties, but also 6.3 per cent of the PR votes, which was a significant drop in terms of voters' favour. Similarly, the CPN (MC)'s support dropped again by 2.5 per cent to only 11.1 per cent of the PR vote, a trend that has continued unabated since 2008. Presumably, this party was only able to win many of its 18 direct mandates thanks to the electoral alliance, in which the other participating parties asked their voters to vote for the candidate of the Maoist party. And what was the reaction of the ageing leaders of these three parties to the clear statement of the voters? They saw themselves as winners despite their defeats, a phenomenon that is not entirely untypical after elections worldwide. A compromise solution might have been to transfer the responsibility to a younger generation. With Gagan Thapa, a certainly suitable candidate had come forward. But the old, failed top politicians rigorously ignored this option. Instead, the parties in the Deuba government, for example, tried to bring other parties on board in order to come up with the number of MPs needed to continue the government. At the same time, a fierce battle began between two top leaders of the ruling coalition, PK Dahal and SB Deuba, for the post of the future prime minister. Meanwhile, the opposition leader KP Oli pretended to accept defeat and to remain in opposition. In reality, however, he did not miss any opportunity to drive discord into the government coalition by repeatedly calling for a coalition of left parties, preferably under his leadership. These power struggles over the new government formation had one thing in common. They showed that the top politicians of the three big parties were once again not concerned with the welfare of the state and society, but solely with fulfilling their own personal claims to power. In this respect, PK Dahal's statement on 25 December that he now had to change sides because SB Deuba had broken his promise when he refused to accept Dahal as the new prime minister is striking. Yet the voters had expressed that they no longer wanted either of them. It is shocking that Dahal justifies his switch to the Oli camp by saying that he was cheated by Deuba. But how should the voters who voted for the candidates of the ruling alliance feel, even if these candidates came from parties they would never have voted for if their freedom of choice had not been so restricted by the agreements of the top politicians of the alliance? So now a politician whose party was elected by just 11 per cent of the electorate, and thanks to the direct mandates won by his alliance pledges came a distant third, allows himself to be made prime minister at the head of a completely different coalition. If anything is fraud, it is surely this, and it is fraud against the electorate! Now Nepal gets a new prime minister who long ago testified that he was responsible for 5,000 deaths during the Maoist insurgency. For long, he has not held any top office. Nepal's top politicians, regardless of party, usually only accept the office of prime minister for themselves. Otherwise, they prefer to pull strings in the background. So now someone who has pleaded guilty to a capital crime has taken over the highest executive office. This is only possible because KP Oli, with his 78 MPs, supports Dahal as prime minister. In view of Oli's past, the legitimate question remains how long this will be. At the same time, Oli is also an extremely questionable figure after all that he afforded himself in 2021. Both parliamentary dissolutions at the time were unconstitutional, as the Supreme Court has confirmed, but Oli still does not accept this. At least the second parliamentary dissolution was nothing but a coup, which was only made possible thanks to the active support of the state president. It is also questionable to look at the other parties that want to participate in the new government. There is, for example, the RPP, which fundamentally rejects secularism and federalism and instead strives for a return to the Hindu state and monarchy, i.e. a clearly unconstitutional proposal. And in general, the question arises how such a party and a party that calls itself revolutionary-Maoist can sit together in a government. Then there are three parties that were elected to parliament by many voters primarily because they had contested as alternative political forces, notably the Rastriya Swatantra Party, which got only 0.4 per cent less PR votes than Dahal's CPN (MC), but also the two regional parties, Janamat Party and Nagarik Unmukti Party. These three parties are now actually admitting to ensuring the stay in power of old failed politicians. Do these parties actually believe that they can initiate the changes they promised to their voters from within the government? Not one of the top politicians of the major parties has ever explained why he had to become prime minister. What they have all been spreading is merely empty phrases that are out of touch with reality and have been delivered monotonously for years.

(27 November 2022) Attempt of a first election analysis The national and provincial elections have been held and have sent shock waves. Despite massive manipulation in the nomination of candidates, continued blatant disregard for social inclusion, utopian and fairytale-like election manifestos and the subversion of democratic principles, the eternally same and long since repeatedly failed ageing party leaders have not succeeded in deceiving the electorate once again. The top politicians were only concerned with one thing: they wanted to have their personal position of power confirmed once again by the elections so that they could continue their state-destroying power struggles for five years afterwards. All according to the motto: Keep it up, it has always worked so far.

But it didn't this time. The voters were, to put it bluntly, fed up and taught the top politicians and their parties a lesson. The fact that this did not turn out even more clearly is due to various circumstances. For one thing, the insane electoral alliances led to the competition between the parties in the constituencies, which is typical of a democratic system, being considerably restricted. Voters could no longer decide freely. They had to be satisfied with the candidates that the party leaders had chosen for them, basta! Or else they had to resort to a protest vote. In some constituencies, a not inconsiderable number of independent candidates have favoured the re-election of prominent top politicians. The nationwide cadre system of the major parties also had a supportive effect on incumbent politicians. Another plus for them is the so-called Constituency Development Fund, through which only directly elected MPs can specifically promote development projects in their constituencies and thus already work towards re-election during the ongoing legislative period. Finally, it is also worth mentioning the effort to weaken or exclude potential competitors through accusations or even lawsuits already in the run-up to the elections. Sometimes, the Election Commission seems to have supported such processes while turning a blind eye to the misconduct of many established politicians. Unfortunately, even a week after the elections, not even the FPTP votes have been fully counted. Regarding the PR system, only constantly updated figures are published on the Election Commission's website, although it is precisely here that percentage figures could already reveal a trend. If you want to get this one, you have to calculate the expected PR seats yourself. It is therefore too early to draw up a comprehensive analysis, but some things can already be clearly seen. First, there is the winner of the 2017 elections, the CPN (UML), whose chairperson had announced in his grandiloquent manner that his party would emerge from the elections with an absolute majority of seats. In 2017, the party had won 121 of the 275 seats in an electoral alliance with the CPN (MC). This time, it will be about 40 MPs less, mainly due to losses in the FPTP system. But even in the proportional system, the party is expected to drop by about six percent to just over 27 percent. In this system, however, the CPN (UML) remains ahead with about the same lead over the Nepali Congress (NC) as five years ago. So, under the PR system, the NC also loses about six per cent compared to 2017. Hence, it is only in the PR system that one can make out the status of the parties among the electorate. The FPTP system this time was all about manipulation by the electoral alliances. Thus, the declared aim of the alliance of the five ruling parties [NC, CPN (MC), CPN (US), LSP and Janamorcha Nepal] was to ensure a continuation of the ruling coalition after the elections by means of their electoral alliance. For this purpose, the re-election of as many leading politicians of the coalition as possible was to be made possible. This plan has obviously failed. Thanks to candidate manipulation, at least the NC was able to gain almost as many seats in the FPTP system as the CPN (UML) lost compared to 2017. Together with the seats from the proportional system, the party is likely to have around 90 MPs in the new House of Representatives. For a governing majority of at least 138 MPs, the other four governing parties would thus have to bring in around 50 more MPs, but it does not look like that will happen. Pushpa Kamal Dahal's CPN (MC), still an alliance partner of the CPN (UML) in 2017, is the second big loser of these elections. The number of its FPTP seats will be halved compared to 2017, with an expected 18. Just as a reminder: as early as 2008, voters had placed great hope in this party and gave it exactly 50 per cent of the 240 direct mandates at the time. Since then, the party has been declining from election to election, which is certainly also due to the fact that it has forgotten almost all of its former ideals. In the PR system, too, it will drop by another two percent, with only about eleven percent. In total, this will probably mean 33 seats in total. Madhav Kumar Nepal's CPN (US), which emerged from the CPN (UML), is contesting elections for the first time. The election results make it clear that this party has not yet reached the electorate. Although it is the third strongest party in the ruling coalition with 10 direct mandates, it fails to clear the three-percent hurdle in the PR system. The Loktantrik Samajbadi Party (LSP), which recently replaced the Janata Samajbadi Party (JSP) in the ruling coalition, has only four direct seats, while Rastriya Janamorcha has only one direct seat, as in 2017. These two parties did not win PR seats either. From this point of view, a continuation of the current governing coalition seems at least difficult, if not impossible. Four parties can be described as election winners due to their significant gains. First and foremost is the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), founded by Rabi Lamichhane in June 2022. It has won eight direct mandates and, thanks to a good eleven per cent of the PR votes, is expected to win another 15 seats through the PR system. As the party's name suggests, it wants to establish itself independently of the political quagmire of the major parties, and this seems to have resonated with the electorate, despite all the defamation campaigns against this young party. KP Oli nevertheless describes the emergence of this party as a trivial matter. The question arises whether this expresses arrogance or sheer shock. The winner from among the established parties is the RPP, which many had already seen as a outdated model in 2017 in view of only one direct mandate and its failure to clear the three-percent hurdle in the PR system. In 2022, the party won seven direct mandates and, thanks to six per cent of the PR votes, has a total of 15 MPs. The party stands for a return to Hindu state and monarchy, a clearly unconstitutional aspiration. The improved popularity in the PR system is probably largely due to a protest against the manipulations of the major parties. However, the mere six percent or so of the PR vote also makes it clear that the RPP's aspirations do not enjoy broad popular support, contrary to what is claimed at rallies of this party. The two smaller winners of these elections are based in the Tarai. One is CK Raut's Janamat Party (Referendum Party). Raut has long advocated an independent Madheshi state in the Nepali Tarai, which of course also contradicts the constitution. Although Raut's movement did not always establish itself with greater militancy, the state often dealt with him quite harshly. In 2019, the then Prime Minister KP Oli concluded an agreement with Raut, which, according to Oli, meant that Raut would distance himself from his separatist aspirations. This was countered by Raut's immediate formation of his Janamat Party, which, as its name suggests, wants to achieve the creation of a Tarai state not through militancy but through a referendum. CK Raut has now won the direct mandate in his constituency with a large majority. More than 2.5 per cent of the PR votes are also remarkable. The party is also winning a number of seats in the provincial elections, which will not be discussed further here. The second smaller party from the Tarai that successfully attracted attention in the elections is the Nagarik Unmukti Party (NUP). In the PR system, like the Janamat Party, it achieved a good 2.5 per cent of the votes and also three direct mandates. It was equally successful in the provincial elections. The party was not officially registered until January 2022. Its initiator is Resham Chaudhary, who is currently serving a life sentence. He is considered a prime suspect in the Tikapur riots, in which eight policemen and a child were murdered in 2015. Chaudhary was elected to the House of Representatives in 2017, although he was officially in hiding. His appeal against his conviction and its rejection by the Dipayal High Court has been pending before the SC for some time. He had wanted to run himself in 2022, which was rejected. The rise of the two aforementioned Tarai parties can be seen in the direct context of the decline of the two successful Tarai parties of the 2017 elections. The Rastriya Janata Party (RJP) and the Sanghiya Samabadi Forum (SSF) managed to win 5.45 per cent of the PR votes each and a total of 33 assembly seats at that time. In the intervening period, the two parties even merged to form the Rastriya Janajata Party Nepal (RJPN), which meant a strong presence of the Tarai people in parliament. At times, Baburam Bhattarai, who had won a direct mandate through his Naya Shakti Party, also became involved in this party. The infighting among the top leaders of the major parties in recent years also left its mark on the Tarai politicians. First, the RJPN broke into the Janata Samajbadi Party (JSP) and the Loktantrik Samajbadi Party (LSP). Initially, the JSP became a member of the ruling coalition. When this party felt disadvantaged in the electoral alliance, it switched to an alliance with KP Oli's CPN (UML). Within the government coalition, the LSP then took its place. In the end, it became apparent that the top politicians of the Tarai parties were also primarily concerned with their own power and chances of personal re-election and not with the concerns of the people they claimed to represent. They have now been taught a lesson by the electorate in the parliamentary elections. The share of the PR vote fell by more than 1.5 per cent for the JSP and by a good 3.5 per cent for the LSP. The JSP lost six seats, the LSP 13, the latter even failing to clear the three-percent hurdle. In the Tarai, too, people seem to be voting more consciously. It remains to mention that the Nepal Majdur Kisan Party was able to defend its direct mandate in Bhaktapur. Five independent candidates were also elected. This, too, may be seen as a sign of voter dissatisfaction with the major parties and their misguided and, in some respects, anti-democratic policies. What do the elections mean for political stability? What might a future government look like? The new House of Representatives will include twelve parties and five independents. In 2017, only five parties had more than one MP; this time there are nine. The then governing coalition of CPN (UML) and CPN (MC) did not bring any political stability to the country, despite a near two-thirds majority in parliament, but rather exacerbated the chaos and infighting. Rational coalition governments with a clear majority of MPs are not in sight at all this time. Only a coalition of NC and CPN (UML) could have a majority of about 60 percent of the MPs. But such a coalition makes no sense whatsoever if it is led by the failed prime ministers of the previous legislature, who might then also want to take turns in office. If the voters have expressed anything definitively, it is that they want a new beginning with fresh faces in positions of responsibility. The RSP was also so successful because it relied on a much younger generation of politicians. At best, it can be criticised for not having considered the aspect of social inclusion much better than the established parties (for example, only 12 women among 131 direct candidates). But this party is still very young and this should not be overrated here. Calls for a generational change have also been on the agenda of the numerical winner of these elections, the NC, for some time. Immediately after his re-election, Gagan Thapa, a younger politician, laid claim to the office of the future prime minister. Within the party, several politicians from the old guard will challenge his claim. Apart from the incumbent Prime Minister and party president Sher Bahadur Deuba, these are at least Ram Chandra Poudel, Shekhar Koirala, Shashank Koirala and Prakash Man Singh. With a turn towards the younger generation, there may finally be options for a more hopeful political future of the country.

(21 October 2022) The declared ideals of 2006 and today's political impasse

The scorn of Nepali politicians knows no bounds. The top leaders of the ruling coalition, for example, repeat in monotone that their electoral alliance is necessary to preserve the constitution, stability and prosperity. Yet, the ruling coalition has failed miserably on all these three aspects in a similar manner as the Oli government before it.

In reality, the leaders of all the major parties are only concerned with securing their re-election. If only one candidate from the camp of an electoral alliance stands in a constituency, his chances of re-election increase enormously. Only independent candidates can counteract this speculation, if voters realise in sufficient numbers that the same failed top candidates cannot be re-elected under any circumstances in the interest of the country, the people, democracy and the constitution. Another complicating factor is that this alliance system extremely reduces the number of potential alternative candidates of a party. Only the same old and long-since failed people are up for election.

None of the so-called top politicians respects the constitution and laws. Indeed, they obviously do not even know them. Should they intentionally violate them, they would have to be brought to justice immediately. Their behaviour would be highly malicious and therefore not covered by any passage in the constitution and subordinate laws.

The failed "top politicians" are a collection of male, predominantly high-caste politicians who want nothing to have to do with their own slogans of 2006, namely advocacy of social inclusion, democracy, federalism and secularism. For all of them, only their own very personal interests in power and all the privileges that go with it count.

16 years have passed since 2006. There can be no talk of social inclusion at all. It may have been in evidence at the time of the first Constituent Assembly election in 2008, but it was systematically dismantled thereafter. Even the inclusion provisions of the interim constitution were fundamentally disregarded. With the adoption of the new constitution in 2015, this was taken further in a decisive way. For example, the provision of the interim constitution to respect inclusion in the selection of direct candidates, which was never respected anyway, was removed altogether. Their proportion, mostly hand-selected males from predominantly so-called high Hindu castes, was increased at the same time. Only 110 of the 275 MPs are now elected by the people through the proportional representation system (PR). The latter is increasingly misused by top politicians in a nepotistic manner to infiltrate relatives, associates and friends into parliament. Since hardly any women are nominated as FPTP candidates, the prescribed 33 percent share of women in parliament must be ensured via the PR system. For example, putting the prime minister's wife on the PR list guarantees her safe election to parliament. In view of the fact that most of the FPTP candidates are men from the Tagadhari castes or Khas Arya (societal share of these men = 15 per cent), it seems downright grotesque that another 30 per cent Khas Arya are elected to parliament via the PR system. In this way, an adequate inclusion of "all" social groups, as pompously promised by the top politicians in 2006, will never be achieved. They don't even want this, and in 2006 they only talked about it like so many other things that they still pompously promise today but never really mean.

Democracy means the rule of the people. The alliance politicians declare in all seriousness that they are standing up for this when they form an alliance. In reality, however, this is a paternalism of the voters. They are obviously to be declared too stupid to recognise which politicians are best suited to represent their interests and the needs of the state. Therefore, the alliance politicians take this agony of choice away from them. Voters are only supposed to cast their votes for the common candidate that the top politicians have previously negotiated in weeks of discussion, regardless of which party that candidate belongs to. That is not democracy, that is oligarchy and the dumbing down of voters.

The idea of federalism was brought up in the 1990s by stakeholders of the Janajati groups and the then insurgent CPN (Maoist). Considering the fact that Nepal had hitherto been an extremely centralised state and that numerous regions and social groups were not really participated, this proposal seemed rational and later found its way into the basis for discussion in the Constituent Assembly. When the top politicians realised that the proposals put forward on the federal state threatened their privileges and state control, they increasingly took over the constitutional discussion themselves. Their disagreement on the issue of federalism ultimately led to the failure of the first Constituent Assembly. It was only with the change of majority in the second Constituent Assembly that the NC and CPN (UML) were able to push through their ideas of the federal state, which were more oriented towards the system of the Development Regions of the Panchayat period and denied any historical and ethnic reference even in the naming. Then, when the constitution was adopted, the inclusively elected representatives in the assembly were not allowed to introduce the concerns and ideas of the social groups they represented anyway.

Article 3 of the 2015 Constitution defines Nepal as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual and multi-cultural state. Such a state cannot possibly be linked to the religion, language and culture of a single one of these social groups. In this respect, it was obvious to declare Nepal a secular state. A look at the history of modern Nepal from the days of Prithvinaran Shah to the last days of the monarchy makes it clear that the close linkage with Hindu political ideas and ideals has been one of the main causes of social inequalities, discrimination and participatory exclusion. Despite the now official commitment to secularism in the constitution (Article 4), there are repeated calls for a revival of the Hindu state. These come not only from those circles that are party-ideologically committed to this albeit unconstitutional idea, such as the RPP groups, but there are also a number of politicians within the major parties who occasionally flirt with this idea and closely link their notion of Nepali nationalism to Hindu ideals. The best example of the latter has been provided by former Prime Minister Oli on different occasions. This may also be related to the fact that most top politicians belong to a cultural environment that is closely linked to Hindu values and ways of thinking and lack necessary understanding of the multi-ethnic society. If adequate social inclusion had taken place since 2006, democracy, federalism and secularism would certainly not be questioned today.

(24 October 2021) Worsening of the national crisis

The crisis of the Nepali state is progressing. After the coup-like dissolution of parliament twice and his removal by the Supreme Court, KP Oli with his CPN-UML continues to "successfully" prevent parliament from working. His successor as prime minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba (Nepali Congress, NC), is still not getting anything done after more than 100 days in office. A partly anti-democratic approach and cracks are also emerging in this government, the latter not least because of the possible signing of the MCC agreement with the USA, strongly advocated by Deuba.

With his appointment of a brother-in-law of the Chief Justice (CJ) as minister, Deuba has also brought the Supreme Court under criticism. Assurances by the CJ that he strongly advised Deuba not to do so look implausible. The Bar Association is on the barricades, as are the CJ's colleagues in the Supreme Court. The judiciary has been permanently damaged.

The NC party convention, which legally should have taken place by March 2021 at the latest, keeps being postponed. The upcoming party convention of the CPN-UML also seems to be experiencing problems. All four major parties are showing that they are not willing to learn. According to schedule, new elections are due in autumn 2022 at all three levels of the federal system. Moving them up significantly has long been called for by the CPN-UML and is now also being discussed by the ruling parties.

But no matter when they are actually held, nothing is likely to change in the messy situation. The old and long-since failed leaders of all parties do not want to give up a millimetre of their power and control. In the NC, only veteran politicians, some of them 75-76 years old, are fighting for the leadership of the party for the next five years and, of course, for their candidacy for prime minister next year. Oli claims to have set in motion a huge rejuvenation process in the CPN-UML, but has enforced that the maximum age for election as party president and for candidacy for prime minister is 70. He himself will be 70 in February, so he is on the safe side. Meanwhile, the question of whether Oli has any legitimacy for state and party office after his attacks on parliamentary democracy, the constitution and the rule of law remains undiscussed.

Pushpa Kamal Dahal's CPN-MC has forgotten all its once revolutionary claims. It has become a mainstream party whose leaders have long been concerned primarily with their own profit and power influence. The ideals they stood for in the ten-year militant uprising no longer count. Not only the Maoist fighters who put their lives and health at risk for these ideals feel betrayed, but also all those who had hope for the promised social and political changes and who in 2008 voted the Maoist party as by far the strongest political force in the first elections to a Constituent Assembly. Nothing is left and nothing will come.

What remains of the major parties is the recently formed CPN-US (Unified Socialist) led by Madhav Kumar Nepal, which recently split from the CPN-UML. This party is still too young to really classify it. At best, one can see that even in this new party, the traditional patriarchal orientations have been preserved in the nominations to the various party bodies. At most, it will be interesting to see how many votes the two moderate communist parties, CPN-UML and CPN-US, will lose in the next elections. In 1998, the CPN-UML had already split over personal power claims. In the 1999 parliamentary elections, the two groups together received the most votes for the first time, but in the fight for seats in the then single-majority system they took the decisive votes from each other and helped the NC to an absolute majority of seats despite losing votes.

The question remains: What will the next elections bring for the country and for the people? All indications are that the voters will once again have no real choice. They will probably only be allowed to decide which of the numerous failed high-caste male top politicians they will vote for. Hopeful younger politicians of both sexes and with a view to balanced social inclusion will probably continue to be few and far between. The old heads in all parties will ensure that. It already seems certain that no party will win an absolute majority of seats. And Nepal has not been able to cope with such a situation so far.

(10 October 2021) Will everything be better with PM Deuba?

Exactly 90 days ago today, Sher Bahadur Deuba was sworn in as Prime Minister for the fifth time. The background is well known. KP Oli had tried to cover up his incompetence in an authoritarian manner. Several breaches of the constitution, repeated contempt of court and subversion of basic democratic norms ultimately left the Supreme Court with no choice but to remove Oli. Previously, Oli saw no reason to resign, neither in a clear vote of no confidence by the House of Representatives, nor in the explicit provisions of the Constitution, nor in the crumbling support within his own party.

In a democratic state, these would be ample reasons to deny KP Oli the right to hold political office for all time to come. But Oli does not care about any of this. Internally, he has preferred to divide and possibly weaken in the long run his CPN-UML, which had developed into a formidable left force over the past decades - definitely not to Oli's credit. At the national level, even after his ouster, he has continued his efforts to destroy parliamentary democracy. Most notable here is the continuous blockade of both houses of parliament, sometimes enforced with considerable militancy. With hollow slogans, Oli and his closest confidants are trying to give the impression that an overwhelming electoral victory for the CPN-UML in the next elections is beyond all doubt. Actually, a clear age limit was supposed to initiate a rejuvenation process in the party. But in a recent amendment to the constitution, Oli ensured that the age limit with regard to running for political office was only set at 70. In February 2022, Oli will turn 70; before that, of course, he wants to be confirmed as party leader for another five years at the party convention in November and then also be his party's top candidate in the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2022.

For about a year, Oli as prime minister had blocked the legislative work of the people's elected representatives because he could be less and less sure of majority parliamentary support for his increasingly abstruse policies. With the help of the president, who was compliant with him in every respect, laws were no longer passed by parliament, but were signed by Oli and then by the president in the form of ordinances. Oli's latest coup was the second dissolution of the House of Representatives despite an explicit interdict by the Supreme Court. In doing so, the PM and President knowingly and single-mindedly disregarded the fact that a majority of the members of the House of Representatives had expressed in writing their support for replacing Prime Minister Oli with Sher Bahadur Deuba. Only another Supreme Court ruling could put an end to their unconstitutional action.

So, Deuba has been Prime Minister for three months now. On 18 July, he was confirmed in office by a narrow two-thirds majority of MPs in a vote of confidence. What has changed since then? In short, remarkably little. It was clear that Deuba's power would depend on support from several opposition parties or party factions.

In his vote of confidence, he had even received some votes from the Oli faction of the CPN-UML. At that time, the Supreme Court had explicitly ruled out negative consequences for voting in a way that deviated from the party line. But after that, the Political Party Act of 2017, in which top politicians had given priority to a party line constraint over a free vote of conscience by MPs on votes, was again in effect. In the worst case, the party leadership can revoke the status of MPs who disobey the party leadership's voting instructions. All that is needed is a simple notification to the secretariat of the House of Representatives. In order for a party's faction to split from the parent party without the MPs losing their parliamentary status, it had to get at least 40 per cent of the MPs behind it.

This arrangement was critical for Madhav Kumar Nepal's UML faction MPs. They could not support Deuba, nor could they possibly agree to an amendment to the Political Party Act in parliament. However, without such an amendment, they could not separate.

In this situation, Deuba resorted to the method previously practised by Oli and rightly criticised harshly. Deuba abruptly ended the session of the House of Representatives, changed the number of MPs required for a party split to 20 per cent by ordinance signed by the president, and reconvened the parliamentary chamber. Shortly after, the faction of MK Nepal split as CPN-US (Unified Socialist). As the opportunity was favourable, the faction around Mahanta Thakur also split from the Janata Samajbadi Party-Nepal (JSP-N), which also supported Deuba, under the name Loktantrik Samajbadi Party (LSP). Soon after, the Deuba government withdrew the ordinance amending the Political Party Act, so the law is again in force in the form it was before the party splits. Deuba had, after all, achieved what he wanted. With the parties supporting him, he could now hope for the necessary majority of MPs in votes. But this had nothing to do with democracy and constitutional procedure.

Even after this "clarification" of the majority situation, however, it was to take weeks before Deuba could complete his rudimentary cabinet - four ministers had been sworn in together with him, and later Narayan Khadka was also added so that he could represent Nepal at the United Nations General Assembly. The reasons now lay in the dispute between the coalition partners over the respective number of ministerial posts and the division of the portfolio.

It was only 88 days after he was sworn in that Deuba was able to complete this process. His cabinet now comprises 25 people, 22 ministers and three ministers of state. His NC has nine ministers and one state minister, while the CPN-MC, as the second strongest coalition party, has five ministers. The CPN-US and the JSP-N each have four ministers and one minister of state; after protests, the NC had given another ministerial post to the CPN-US.

The fact that there are five women in the cabinet this time can be seen as a positive development to a limited extent. This corresponds to a share of 20 percent. This is the highest figure, at least since the Council of Ministers was limited to a maximum of 25 persons by the new constitution. However, Nepal has set itself a target of at least 33 per cent women at all levels of the state, so this is still a long way off.

The high proportion of members of the Newar caste of the Shrestha is striking. They make up about one percent of the population. As Newars, they actually belong to the Janajati groups, but in the Hindu hierarchical thinking of the state elite on the basis of the Muluki Ain of 1854, they are classified as Tagadhari (bearers of the sacred string), to which above all the Bahun, Thakuri and Chhetri belong. Including the Shrestha, the Council of Ministers once again includes 16 Tagadhari (64 per cent, share in the total population around 30 per cent). In this respect, therefore, little has changed compared to previous governments. The Janajati are only reasonably represented according to their share of the population if the Shrestha are also assigned to them. The Madhesi are only involved through the JSP-N and are also slightly under-represented. Surprisingly, once again there is a Dalit as a minister (through the CPN-MC) Since about 12 per cent of the population is Dalit according to the 2011 Census, this continues to be an extremely blatant exclusion.

Of course, it is difficult to put social participation in the Council of Ministers in relation to social shares. In view of the traditional imbalance, however, one can still speak of a continuation of the previous personnel policy. At most, it is still noticeable that the share of Bahuns in the Council of Ministers has declined significantly compared to the Oli government, although they continue to be overrepresented. Perhaps this is also related to the fact that the prime minister himself is a Chhetri this time. Given their population share, to have not more than two Bahuns in the Council of Ministers would be appropriate.

The completion of the cabinet was overshadowed by another affair. Even before the final nomination and swearing-in of ministers, there were strong rumours that Chief Justice Cholendra Shamsher JB Rana was trying to gain influence over the composition of the executive. There were already strong protests from the media, civil society and lawyers about this mixing of the judiciary and the executive.

Unfortunately, the ministerial list reinforced these initial fears. Gajendra Bahadur Hamal, a brother-in-law of the Chief Justice, was appointed Minister of Industry, Commerce and Supplies. He was not even a member of parliament and came from the district level of the Nepali Congress, so if in doubt, he would have had to become a member of parliament within six months if he wanted to retain his post. Another shadow fell on him because he had clearly advocated a return to the Hindu state in the past. But he is not alone in this in the NC; even general secretary Shashanka Koirala has repeatedly expressed this view. In view of the escalating turmoil, Hamal resigned from office on the second day after his swearing-in.

There is fierce criticism over the composition of the Council of Ministers both within the NC and the JSP-N. Deuba, in any case, has already amply demonstrated that he has not changed compared to previous terms. Clearly, he is well on his way to his fifth failure as prime minister.

(5 July 2021) Constitutional crisis : Can it be solved?

Corona infection numbers may temporarily decline. However, in view of the unchanged low tests, the lack of vaccines and the global developments, it is to be feared that a third wave will soon hit. The vaccination optimism spread by Prime Minister Oli seems misplaced.

Meanwhile, the political situation is escalating. The Supreme Court has already rejected unconstitutional measures of the Oli government in various cases. Perhaps outstanding is the decision that the personnel change in the Council of Ministers was clearly defined as unconstitutional, thus reducing the Council of Ministers to five members. Oli could have easily read this in Article 77 (3) of the Constitution before making his decision. Presumably, however, he does not see himself as an interim prime minister at all.

Yet Oli should not even be an interim prime minister after the elected MPs of the people in the House of Representatives withdrew their confidence in him. Due to the disunity of his political opponents, no alternative prime minister could initially stand for election. Therefore, President Bidya Devi Bhandari appointed Oli to continue in office as interim Prime Minister. As such, according to Article 76, he would have had to seek another vote of confidence in the House of Representatives within 30 days. Had he lost this one too, his time as prime minister would have been history.

However, the situation changed within a few days with the nomination of a new candidate for prime minister through a list signed by 146 of 265 possible MPs. Realising that he no longer had a chance to maintain his power through legal means, Oli staged a coup with the active support of President Bhandari. Oli declared that he had even more MPs behind him than Sher Bahadur Deuba, the candidate of the opposition forces, of course without a list of signatures, because this was not possible at all in terms of numbers.

Bidya Devi Bhandari declared the situation as unclear, although she only had to ask the House of Representatives for a vote. In order to avoid any more opposition from the House, she, in consultation with KP Oli, dissolved the parliamentary chamber again, set new elections for November 2021 and reappointed Oli, who already had lost the confidence of the people's representatives, as interim prime minister until these elections. In explaining this action, Oli cited contradictory or unclear provisions of the Constitution and the Political Parties Act. Oli claimed that in a democracy, elected representatives are not allowed to vote according to their conscience, but must respect party discipline. In other words, according to Oli, democracy is not a rule of the people, but a rule of the parties. This is complicated by the fact that all of Nepal's political parties lack democratic structures and processes. They are all controlled by a very small group of mostly male Bahuns (recruited from six percent of the total population). These small party elites determine party policy and the voting behaviour of their MPs.

Even more serious is the fact that the respective party leaders are given an almost absolute power. All major parties are characterised by factionalism. As a rule, the party chairman is the top politician who has the most members behind him at the two highest party levels. The party chairman is then largely free to decide on personnel appointments as well as on the party's political stances. Resistance comes at most from the other factions within the party if he does not take them sufficiently into account in personnel policy.

In this sense, KP Oli sees himself as an almost absolutist ruler over his CPN-UML. His "world view" came into crisis when last year many MPs of his then still united party NCP opposed him and eventually even wanted to replace him as chairman and prime minister with another person from his party. This situation was aggravated when the Supreme Court annulled the merger of CPN-UML and CPN-MC. This meant that the CPN-UML was still the strongest party in parliament, but had lost its absolute majority. This majority was further reduced when the intra-party factions of MK Nepal and JN Khanal continued to oppose Oli and flirted with supporting a joint opposition prime ministerial candidate. Some of them then also signed the list submitted to the president.

Since then, Oli has been clamouring that it is undemocratic for MPs of his party to disregard his directives as chairman and support the opposition candidate. This aspect will also play a role when the Supreme Court has to decide in the next few days on the renewed dissolution of parliament and the machinations of Oli and Bhandari.

It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will decide in favour of preserving democracy, the constitution and the rule of law. It will not be able to avoid better defining the understanding of democracy. It is also not acceptable for the Supreme Court to make the opposition candidate prime minister as is demanded by some lawyers on the plaintiff's side. This is not a task of the court, but of parliament. The Prime Minister must be elected solely by the elected representatives of the people by secret ballot and without party coercion. This alone is democracy! The Supreme Court should therefore order an immediate restoration of the House of Representatives..

This is a personal analysis of the legal situation. The bottom line, however, is that the question remains whether Nepal will find its way back to political rationality without new elections. Without a radical democratisation of the parties and the status of MPs, a weeding out of the failed old political guard and a much better social inclusion based on federalism and secularism, however, new elections will not change much .

(24 May 2021) Proposals for an immediate rescue attempt of the people, the constitution and democracy Step 1 : The Supreme Court has already made it clear to KP Oli and President Bidya Devi Bhandari that a prime minister has no right to dissolve the House of Representatives for the sole purpose of retaining power, but must adhere precisely to the provisions of Article 76 of the Constitution. It should therefore be easy for the SC to immediately confirm this to the two of them once again. The utter disregard for the pandemic suffering of the people on the part of the Oli government alone calls for utmost urgency. To seek elections in this situation borders on attempted manslaughter. Oli, but certainly also the leaders of the other parties, have already contributed greatly to the renewed escalation of the pandemic with their calls for mass meetings on the streets at the beginning of the year. Step 2 : After the SC has restored the House of Representatives as soon as possible, the opposition must immediately, and without further discussion and infighting in parliament, move a motion of no confidence against Oli and elect a new prime minister. Without the opposition taking action itself, Oli will not budge. He has proved that sufficiently. Sher Bahadur Deuba has exposed numerous flaws and mistakes in the past over the course of four terms in office, but he is the leader of the second strongest party in the House of Representatives and Oli must be removed from power immediately to prevent him from doing worse. Step 3 : As small a national government as possible should be formed under the leadership of Deuba, in which the portfolios should be filled according to competence and not according to party affiliation. The priority tasks of this national government should be thoughtful measures to contain and combat the pandemic. In addition, an annual budget must be prepared and passed by parliament without delay. Finally, all ordinances enforced by Oli in bypassing Parliament and signed by the President, must be immediately repealed and, where necessary, replaced by legislation passed by Parliament. Several ordinances enforced by Oli may have long since become invalid under Article 114 anyway, as Oli unconstitutionally prevented their discussion and decision by the House of Representatives during its first session after the reconstitution. Step 4 : If the majority situation in both Houses of Parliament appears sufficient, consideration should also be given to initiating impeachment proceedings against President Bidya Devi Bhandari for her repeated and increasing disregard for her outstanding obligation to respect and uphold the Constitution. Instead, she has blindly supported the man to whom she owes her presidency in the first place in his often unconstitutional and unlawful efforts to maintain personal power. Step 5 : KP Oli has disregarded many requirements of the constitution. These included, for example, the implementation of the federal state and the appointment of many constitutional bodies. In the few commissions that were actually created, he disregarded the Constitution's requirement for an inclusive composition and instead selected in a nepotistic manner. The federal state was actually created to decentralise and contribute to better social and regional inclusion. However, Oli's policy since he took office has meant more of a backward-looking centralisation. He virtually increased his efforts to keep all power under the control of the central government. Above all, there is still a lack of clear fiscal regulations and demarcations, which are an essential prerequisite for greater autonomy of the provinces and the local level in connection with the fulfilment of their intended tasks. With these steps, the national government and the reinstated House of Representatives should be fully busy until the next elections due in autumn 2022. Moreover, many laws are hanging in parliament because Oli has simply not allowed them to be discussed and passed. In parallel, however, the political parties should also make a serious effort by then to finally introduce democratic structures and equal opportunities in their own ranks. How would it be, for example, if at least the already existing, albeit still insufficient, laws in this regard were finally applied? It would also be necessary to make inclusion according to gender and ethnicity mandatory when nominating candidates for the next elections. This should come from the party base and not from the national party leadership. Only then would the people of Nepal finally have a real choice in the election.

(8 March 2021) Has the Supreme Court thought through its latest decision to the end? The SC's decision to judge the May 2018 form of merger of CPN-UML and CPN-MC into the NCP as illegitimate resolves some of the conflicts that have been simmering for weeks between the two factions of this ruling NCP, but at the same time it creates new problems and contradictions. The SC has to face the accusation that it has allowed the decision on the case filed by Rishi Ram Kattel's NCP, which was already officially registered and licensed under that name in 2018, to stew for more than two and a half years. At the same time, the Election Commission must be aware that it should never have registered the ruling NCP under that name at that time, according to the existing law. Already on 14 June 2018, there had been a first complaint against the new registration of the ruling party under the name NCP at the SC. However, that case was about the failure to meet the statutory requirement of at least 33 per cent women. Moreover, despite an appeal by the Kattel group, the EC had reaffirmed its decision on the party name on 26 October 2018. Following Kattel's complaint, the SC called on the EC and the ruling party for comments on 11 December 2018. It seems that the ruling party always had the bonus on its side, although the legal position was clearly in favour of Kattel's party. With its present judgement, the SC has finally done justice, but there are doubts whether the judges were aware of the consequences of their late judgement. The judgement implies that the ruling party is once again considered non-merged, that its original components CPN-UML and CPN-MC have been revived. This, however, has consequences that once again manoeuvre Nepal into an extremely precarious situation. One problem, for example, is that there is a party led by Gopal Kiranti which has since been registered and admitted to the EC under the name CPN-MC. A lawsuit by this party has already been announced. This is also likely to be a problem from a jurisdictional point of view. Does Kiranti's party now have to give itself a new name, although its current party name was unoccupied when it registered? Or must the original CPN-MC now adopt a new name, thereby losing any historical identification? There are also problems within the UML, as over the last year the internal split of the ruling NCP into an Oli faction and a Dahal and Nepal-led faction have caused the boundaries between the original UML and the CPN-MC to shift. There are no longer camps within the ruling party that could be so easily transformed back into a CPN-UML and a CPN-MC according to their early 2018 compositions. PM Oli once again sees himself as the big winner in the whole mess and is already mocking and ridiculing the defecting politicians of his original UML because he believes that they now automatically belong to the CPN-UML again, but that they no longer have a chance to split the party there because they need 40 percent of the party's MPs to do so. However, he fails to realise that his long overdue democratic removal as prime minister by parliament does not require a prior split of the UML. Members of his party may also vote against him in a vote of confidence or a vote of no confidence. This is perfectly normal in a democratic state. However, the SC's decision has solved one problem abruptly: the Election Commission no longer has to worry about the legality, names and symbols of the two factions of the ruling party. On the other hand, as already indicated, the EC will have to face new problems. The Election Commission itself has contributed decisively to this with its wrong decision in 2018. Meanwhile, the old, thoroughly failed top politicians of the parties represented in parliament are once again lacking any political culture and knowledge of democratic rules of the game. On the one hand, Prime Minister Oli, who is still in office, is trying by all means and flimsy moves to prevent the ordinances he has pushed through Parliament, with the active help of the President, from being discussed and then inevitably withdrawn in Parliament. The leaders of the opposition - and that means all parliamentarians except for the small remaining bunch of Oli - must once again be reproached for their continued inability, or rather unwillingness, to put aside their personal interests and ambitions for power and finally put a deserved end to the Oli-archy. What is the use of the completely justified re-establishment of parliament if it is not used for this purpose at its very first session? Nepal quo vadis with these politicians?

(2 March 2021) State and democracy still in danger despite SB decision!   On 23 February 2021, the Supreme Court finally delivered its long-awaited verdict on the constitutionality of Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli's dissolution of the House of Representatives on 20 December 2020 in cooperation with President Bidya Devi Bhandari. The Supreme Court's upholding of the unconstitutionality was a victory for democracy and confirmed for all time to come that Nepal's prime ministers have no right to dissolve parliament purely to satisfy their personal power needs. This breathed life back into the 2015 Constitution, which was thought to be dead after all. Oli's action can be considered a coup d'état.

A constitutionally and democratically oriented prime minister would have drawn the only possible moral conclusion from this verdict and would have resigned. Oli obviously does not belong to this category of politicians. He clings to his office and declares that he will never resign. After all, he is the best and most successful government Nepal has ever had; only he knows where he sees evidence for this. As he did before the court verdict, he ridicules the breakaway faction of his inner-party rivals Pushpa Kamal Dahal and Madhav Kumar Nepal with the greatest possible scorn because they would never manage to win the majority of votes in parliament necessary for his ouster. At the same time, he surrounds himself with the aura of a potential martyr whose life is endangered by his rivals.

Apart from the clear immorality of Oli's behaviour, the question arises how it is possible that a prime minister whose faction only has about a quarter of the members of the House of Representatives behind him is nevertheless not forced to resign by the remaining representatives of the people. The explanation lies in the equally lacking morality and democratic attitude of the opposition leaders. All top politicians are also primarily concerned with personal power, not with the people and the nation, be they called Dahal, Nepal, Deuba, Paudel or whatever. They are all unwilling to put aside their personal ambitions for power to get Nepal's democracy back on track.

A second factor mentioned in this context is the unclear situation within the NCP. Both factions insult each other with accusations that go beyond any framework of politeness and exclude each other from the party. Yet an official split of the NCP has never been carried out. Both factions are demanding that the Election Commission recognise them as the legitimate NCP under that very name and with the electoral symbol of the sun. Although early parliamentary elections are off the table for the time being thanks to the court ruling, at some point the Election Commission will have to make a decision and the two factions will have to make a clear separation.

However, they both clearly do not want the latter, as they are aware that the split is likely to make a parliamentary majority for the communists impossible in the long run, as was the case after the 2017 elections. Although the Nepali Congress (NC), as the main opposition party, has not been able to gain many points despite the Oli government's numerous advantageous proposals, the party is likely to win significantly more direct mandates again if the NCP splits. Oli's then CPN-UML was also just ahead of the NC in percentage vote share in 2017. Already within the NCP, the Oli group is the smaller faction today. Oli's failures on almost all fronts of governance, his authoritarian and in many cases human rights-suppressing policies, and most recently the utterly senseless waste of taxpayers' money through the unconstitutional dissolution of parliament and the forced preparation of early new elections are likely to cost the Oli faction further votes. In any case, if the NCP were to split, the votes in favour of that party in new elections would be split between two parties. This too would probably play into the hands of the NC.

These considerations have now also reached the top politicians of the Dahal Nepal faction. Since it has become clear that neither of the two opposition parties, the NC and the Rastriya Samajbadi Party Nepal (RSPN), is prepared to support a vote of no confidence against Oli in the reinstated parliament as long as the NCP's internal party relations have not been clarified, there have been tentative considerations to restore the NCP's unity after all. But that would mean accepting all of Oli's misconduct and continuing to accept him as prime minister and party leader. That would indeed be a change of mind that would be difficult to convince rationally and democratically minded people in Nepal of.

The very misery of Nepali democracy, which is particularly evident in the current crisis, has a lot to do with the lack of democratic structures in the parties. All parties are extremely centrist and oriented towards a few leaders, who in turn usually form factions within the party over time. Whoever makes it to the top level of the party is almost impossible to get out of it, no matter what he is guilty of and how miserably he fails in the fulfilment of his tasks; all prime ministers of the last few years can be cited as examples here. This is also due to the fact that the lower party levels have hardly any influence on the top party levels. The top politicians decide to a large extent on the composition of the two highest party bodies and are careful to ensure that the proportion of their clientele is maintained there. Even in the nomination of candidates for parliamentary and provincial elections, the decision-making power lies largely with the central party leadership. This is the same for all parties. It also contributes to the fact that at least the upper levels of the party are far from reflecting the composition of society: In extremely patriarchal Nepal, men dominate quite predominantly, especially those from the Bahun and Chhetri circles. Given the aforementioned party structures, it is not to be expected that this will change quickly.

Another significant aspect is the inability to realise justice in relation to past crimes or misconduct, or strictly speaking, the denial of such justice. Here, too, all parties are involved. If one takes the massive international call for justice for the victims of the Maoist insurgency alone, it is clear that many of today's top politicians had to bear responsibility at that time, whether as direct participants such as the former Maoist leaders or as state politicians who were responsible for the deployment and conduct of the security forces.

Only two examples should be mentioned here. Pushpa Kamal Dahal declared some time ago that he was responsible for the deaths of around 5,000 people as the then head of the Maoists. But that does not stop him from continuing to aspire to leading state and party offices. It does not even occur to him to take responsibility before a court.

A second example is Sher Bahadur Deuba, the chairman of the NC and four-time prime minister. He paved the way for the Maoist insurgency when, as prime minister in 1995, he militantly yet unsuccessfully tried to suppress the initial organisation of the Maoist party in mid-western Nepal. In early 1996, he refused to even discuss the 40 demands of the Maoists, although most of them were completely rational and many dealt with the state policy guidelines of the then constitution, which the government paid little attention to. In 2001, Deuba then pushed through the mobilisation of the army against the Maoists, which led to a complete escalation of the conflict. The fact that in 2002 he also called on King Gyanendra to dissolve parliament, thus dealing a death blow to the political system of 1990, is also worth mentioning in view of Oli's current misconduct.

Against this background, it is legitimate to ask whether the current party political leaderships are not mainly responsible for the permanent crisis and the constant setbacks of Nepal's democracy. If one answers this question with a yes, one should discuss how Nepal can move towards a better democratic path. However, it should not be enough to replace the old failed leaders with a new generation. This generational change must be accompanied by a complete renewal of the political parties, whereby in the multi-ethnic state of Nepal, adequate social inclusion is finally needed.

(23 February 2021) Democracy is still alive in Nepal! For a good two months, Prime Minister Oli could pretend that he was an absolute ruler, that he was above the Constitution and any legislation. Like Oli, his closest henchmen and his defenders proclaimed in the Supreme Court that the prime minister had every right on his side. Early elections in April and May would be completely out of the question. Now the Supreme Court has finally delivered its verdict. In the end, it was very quick and unequivocal: the dissolution of parliament and all of Oli's machinations in recent months were unconstitutional. Parliament must be reconstituted and convened within 13 days. This is the verdict that everyone convinced of democracy and the rule of law had expected from the Supreme Court. Thanks be to the court for putting all this in such a clear form. What is missing now is the accounting of Oli as a person. In relation to him, the ruling means that Oli's actions cannot be described as anything other than a coup. This must result in the harshest measures against him personally and also against all those who justified his actions with hair-raising justifications in court. The statements maliciously violated better knowledge. Let us hope that those responsible at the top of the other political parties finally come to their senses and are able to democratically elect a new government into office. It will be their task in the remaining one and a half years to complete the numerous shortcomings of the Oli government with regard to the implementation of the constitution and a socially inclusive and secular federal state.

(3 February 2021)   Even 45 days after the dissolution of parliament by Prime Minister KP Oli and President Bidya Devi Bhandari, the proceedings on the constitutionality of this action continue in the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the submissions of the lawyers of the plaintiff sides have been completed. Since Monday, the lawyers of the government side have had the floor.

It is striking that the latter, in contrast to the lawyers of the plaintiff side, hardly refer to the constitution in their justification of Oli's and Bhandari's action. This is probably due to the fact that the Constitution does not really provide a justification. Thus, the defenders of the Oli government declare that such action is perfectly normal for a parliamentary democracy. Or they claim that Oli's action was necessary to preserve Nepal's sovereignty and nationalism.

One has to think several times about what lies behind these arguments. According to the constitution, Nepal's sovereignty lies with the people. The representatives legitimately and democratically elected by the people are the members of the House of Representatives. They therefore represent the sovereign people in Nepal's parliamentary system.

Dependent on this House of Representatives is the executive power. The representatives of the people elect a Prime Minister, who then forms a Council of Ministers to carry out and coordinate the official business of the country. To be elected, the prime minister needs the approval of a majority of the MPs within the House of Representatives. If a party has a clear majority in the House of Representatives, that party's top candidate is usually confirmed as prime minister, as provided by Article 76 (1) of the Constitution. If no party has an absolute majority, the candidate additionally needs the votes of one or more other parties, according to Article 76 (2).

When KP Oli was elected Prime Minister in February 2018, his CPN-UML did not have an absolute majority in the House of Representatives. Oli was therefore elected under Article 76 (2) as he was also still elected by CPN-MC MPs who had already formed an alliance with CPN-UML in the elections. Therefore, as required under Article 76 (4), Oli faced a vote of confidence in the House of Representatives within 30 days, in which he received almost 75 per cent of the votes. This whopping majority was further consolidated two months later when the two parties merged to form the NCP. Now, in a parliamentary democracy, it can happen that over time the approval a prime minister receives from parliament or even within his own party changes. This is a perfectly normal democratic process. The reason may be, for example, that the prime minister has pursued bad policies and has not fulfilled his duties in the necessary manner. It can also be that inner-party rivals have their own claims to power and therefore question the office of prime minister. These are all processes that occur in every democracy.

In such a case, it is the task of a prime minister to prove that he or she still has the confidence of the representatives of the sovereign people. In accordance with the basic principles of a democracy, this is done by the prime minister asking the House of Representatives for a vote of confidence. If he wins this, he automatically remains in office and his opponents have failed. If he loses the vote, he is automatically voted out and another candidate must seek the majority of MPs. In addition, his political opponents can also bring a vote of no confidence in parliament on their part. If a prime minister sees no chance of winning the vote of confidence in parliament from the outset, he can of course resign right away. These would have been the only options for the hard-pressed Prime Minister Oli in December 2020 at the latest. In fact, he should have faced these democratic options much earlier in order to avert greater damage to Nepal's state and society, especially in times of pandemic.

But Oli seems to understand and interpret the constitution and democracy differently. He probably sees parliament as representing the sovereign people only until they have elected the prime minister. After that, sovereignty passes to the latter. This is evidenced by Oli's dealings with parliament over the past three years. When parliament was active, important laws were often simply not passed. Time and again, Oli bypassed parliament by issuing ordinances in close cooperation with the president when parliament was not in session. This was easier for him, because then he was not bound by any votes and could push through what he liked.

The amendment to the Constitutional Council's decision-making procedure on 20 December was tantamount to a constitutional amendment by ordinance. The dissolution of the House of Representatives just five days later was a stab in the back for Nepal's fledgling democracy. It turned the constitution's provisions on sovereignty upside down. The Prime Minister, dependent on Parliament and accountable to it in every respect, dissolved the elected body of representatives of the sovereign people to preserve his personal power and impose policies that marginalised his political opponents. The argument of Oli's lawyers now before the Supreme Court that he had no other choice to preserve sovereignty, which is actually that of the people, is probably understood only by himself and his most adamant supporters. And the argument of preserving nationalism bodes ill. For months, Oli has presented himself as a Hindu fundamentalist. That would be the last thing Nepal needs now.

Oli and Bhandari undoubtedly bear the main responsibility for the escalation of the political and constitutional situation. But one should not absolve Oli's inner-party opponents, as well as the top politicians of opposition parties, from a more or less large share of the blame. In particular, in the context of the disputes on the streets and in the media, no real separation is discernible on all sides between the question of the legitimacy of Oli's steps and their own respective ambitions for power.

(10 January 2021)   The unresolved legal situation continues unchanged , while PM Khaga Prasad Sharma Oli continues to intensify his campaign for the new elections he has called for the House of Representatives.  He accuses the four former chief justices, who had clearly declared themselves on the unconstitutionality of the dissolution of parliament, of interfering in an ongoing court case and attempting to influence the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, he himself continues to claim every right to call his action constitutional; that the House of Representatives will not be reinstated under any circumstances and that the elections will be held as announced. But such words from the mouth of the Prime Minister, of course, have nothing to do with influencing the decision of the judiciary.

At the same time, Oli is trying to keep the state apparatus under his unrestricted control. Thus, in order to preserve the appearance of democracy, the winter session of the remaining parliamentary chamber, the National Assembly, was convened on 2 January, but on 10 January Oli had the session ended again after only four meetings. The fact that he spat on the floor of the National Assembly on this occasion makes it clear what he thinks of this democratic institution. Also, why does Oli need a legislature at all when Nepal has such an able and powerful PM? This way, Oli can pass laws, as he wants them, by ordinance and have them signed by his president. He has repeatedly used this as an ideal way in the past almost three years of his tenure.

Meanwhile, demonstrations against Oli's unconstitutional actions (here called so with no hidden agenda of influencing the court out of full conviction) are taking place in all corners of the country. Meanwhile, Oli also likes to have such demonstrators arrested by the police. At his own election rallies, the wearing of black masks is strictly forbidden, as this could be a symbol of protest. Even black breathing masks have to be removed. What does Oli care about protective measures against the spread of the pandemic? Any other kind of demonstration is also prevented at such events. In Dhangadhi, for example, a group of young people were arrested because they wore appropriate shirt inscriptions to remind people of the continuing lack of investigation into the rape and murder of Nirmala Pant and demanded justice. Since the crime, there have been accusations that the highest political circles are deliberately preventing the investigation.

Finally, the camp of the advocates of a return to monarchy and the Hindu state must unfortunately also be addressed. The anniversary of Prithvinarayan Shah's birth is a welcome occasion to remember the founder and military unifier of modern Nepal. While it is true that Nepal owes it to this Shah king that it still exists today as an independent state and has not been absorbed into the Indian Union, it must also be remembered that the policies of Prithvinarayan Shah and his successors are responsible for the system of patriarchy, inequality, exclusion and discrimination that makes it so difficult today to transform Nepal into a modern democratic state.

Significantly, ex-king Gyanendra once again spoke out today, pretending that his main concern was the preservation of the country. What is meant by this was made clear by Kamal Thapa, the chairman of the RPP, when he once again called for a return to monarchy and the Hindu state. Criticism of today's supposedly democratic politicians is made easy for the monarchists these days. Oli and the other so-called top politicians are well on their way to destroying the country. But they are only completing what the monarchy could not complete before. Only a younger charismatic generation of politicians from among Nepali citizens with a commitment to inclusion, democracy and secularism and an aversion to theocracy and overrated political ideologies can save the country!

(8 January 2021) How similar things are : When the US president incites his most diehard supporters to initiate a coup from above against the state and democracy for the purpose of retaining power, statesmen all over the world condemn his action.  Not so PM Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli and his government in Nepal. Why should they, Oli has behaved similarly to Trump after he could no longer hold on to power through democratic means. Trump has the American parliament stormed, which was about to confirm his ouster, Oli dissolves the Nepalese parliament so that the democratically elected representatives of the sovereign people there cannot deprive him of executive power.The latter, by the way, is a legitimate democratic right of parliament. Yet Trump in the US and Oli in Nepal have, in four respectively three years of failed politics, provided ample grounds for voting out or removing from executive power. What is missing in Nepal is a binding decision by the Supreme Court. Despite numerous shortcomings, the Nepali constitution speaks clearly about Oli's actions. Numerous constitutional experts and leading jurists have taken a clear stand. Objections and justifications have already been explained. Why does the Supreme Court not come to a judgement immediately? Every day seems valuable in this case. Democracy and the nascent federal state are in danger of collapsing if the constitutional issue is not resolved quickly. The political parties are already in an election mode, so to speak. Although they continue to protest pro forma against Oli's actions, this seems more like a means to an end. Ultimately, the leaders of the different party-political camps are concerned with personal power. They have always been willing to use any means to achieve this. Thus, Oli travels the country and declares to his remaining supporters at mass meetings (What does he care about the pandemic?) that everything he has done has been done on the basis of the constitution; the new elections are coming as he ordered; this cannot be reversed at all. Thus, Oli also decides on the rule of law of his actions. He does not need a Supreme Court for this. His current journey through the country is already pure election campaigning. Let us hope that he will at least pay for the costs of the trips and the events; they have nothing to do with his PM office.

The Dahal-Nepal faction of the NCP continues to pretend that its primary concern is the withdrawal of the dissolution of parliament. In keeping with the media, its leaders position themselves in a strictly hierarchical order at the forefront of the sit-ins on the streets. However, since it became clear that the other parties are not willing to join them in protest actions, the focus for Dahal and Nepal has also shifted more towards new elections. The visible sign at the moment is the effort to be recognised by the Election Commission as the legitimate NCP with a view to the future. Although the main opposition party NC continues to protest against the dissolution of parliament independently of the Dahal-Nepal group, its leader Sher Bahadur Deuba has already repeatedly expressed that he is hopeful of becoming prime minister for a fifth time through possible new elections, after all he has only failed miserably four times. Meanwhile, Oli as well as Dahal and Nepal are courting Deuba, as new majorities are needed to form a government in the event of a restoration of parliament. One party whose votes could also play a role in this is the Janata Samajbadi Party - Nepal (JSPN), as the third strongest faction in parliament so far. This party is also protesting against Oli's actions, but is also shying away from joint action with the other demonstrating parties.

Of the other parties, the RPP should be mentioned here, although this party seems completely insignificant in view of the election results of 2017. The problem is that this party of die-hards is trying to use the chaos caused by Oli and the NCP to promote a return to monarchy and the Hindu state through mass demonstrations.  Their leaders are proving that they have clearly not understood the history and society of Nepal. The demand for such a step backwards is unlikely to be successful, but it further exacerbates the current chaos. (Tsak Sherpa)

(6 January 2021) The political crisis continues . Today, the Supreme Court began hearing the 13 constitutional petitions that followed the dissolution of parliament by Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and President Bidya Devi Bhandari. Of the 5 judges of the Constitutional Bench, Hari Krishna Karki has retired. He had been accused of bias as he had served as Attorney General during the first Oli government. The trial is scheduled to resume on 13 January 2021.

Meanwhile, both infighting between the two factions of the NCP at all levels of the federal system and protests by other parties continue unabated. Both NCP groups are showering accusations on each other and trying to damage the other group and push it out of power. For a long time now, this dispute has been endangering the very foundations of the entire state, especially since the leaders of the two factions seem to be mainly interested in their personal ambitions for power.

PM Oli is continually escalating into a defence of the legality of his actions. In the meantime, he is even claiming that this was a purely political measure on which the Supreme Court is not even entitled to judge.

One can only hope that the Supreme Court will reach a verdict on the constitutionality of the dissolution of parliament as soon as possible. In a democratic state, a prime minister has only two options if his government loses its majority: resignation or at least a vote of confidence in parliament. The elected representatives of the sovereign people sit in parliament. Oli owes his office only to the election by this Parliament, which alone has the right to deprive the PM of legitimacy. The dissolution of the House of Representatives, avowedly for Oli's personal retention of power, is therefore tantamount to a coup d'état.

But even if the Supreme Court reverses the dissolution of parliament, there remain legitimate doubts that this parliament will last much longer. The top politicians of the two factions have already destroyed Nepal's democratic system too much. There will be no stable governing majorities either at the central level or in the provinces after a possible restoration of parliament. In any case, the question of legitimacy remains. At the top of all the major parties are ageing leaders, some of whom have already failed several times or whose legitimacy to exercise power is at least questionable because of their political past. As a logical consequence, even if the House of Representatives is reinstated, there will probably be early elections sooner or later. However, with the current, largely over-aged party leaders, even these could be forgotten. Given the large parliamentary majority, the Oli government would have had a unique opportunity to stabilise Nepal politically and advance the country's development. Oli has miserably squandered this opportunity.

Meanwhile, the Corona pandemic continues to affect all aspects of life. But that does not seem to interest the politicians of all parties at all. The daily announced case numbers may seem low compared to western industrialised countries, but the value of the numbers mentioned is doubtful in view of the extremely low number of daily tests. While in most countries of the world the numbers of infections and deaths are steadily increasing or at least have remained at a high level for weeks, the numbers in Nepal continue to fall unabated. And this despite the fact that the Oli government continues to do absolutely nothing to control the spread of the pandemic.

Related Websites: Nepal Research Human Rights Forum Nepal (HURFON) Nepal Research Videos Nepal Research Languages Nepal Observer (ISSN 2626-2924) Hewa-Nepal Sherwa mi

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