federalist persuasive essay

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Federalist Papers

By: History.com Editors

Updated: June 22, 2023 | Original: November 9, 2009

The Federalist Papers are a collection of essays written in the 1780s in support of the proposed U.S. Constitution and the strong federal government it advocated. In October 1787, the first in a series of 85 essays arguing for ratification of the Constitution appeared in the Independent Journal , under the pseudonym “Publius.” Addressed to “The People of the State of New York,” the essays were actually written by the statesmen Alexander Hamilton , James Madison and John Jay . They would be published serially from 1787-88 in several New York newspapers. The first 77 essays, including Madison’s famous Federalist 10 and Federalist 51 , appeared in book form in 1788. Titled The Federalist , it has been hailed as one of the most important political documents in U.S. history.

Articles of Confederation

As the first written constitution of the newly independent United States, the Articles of Confederation nominally granted Congress the power to conduct foreign policy, maintain armed forces and coin money.

But in practice, this centralized government body had little authority over the individual states, including no power to levy taxes or regulate commerce, which hampered the new nation’s ability to pay its outstanding debts from the Revolutionary War .

In May 1787, 55 delegates gathered in Philadelphia to address the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation and the problems that had arisen from this weakened central government.

A New Constitution

The document that emerged from the Constitutional Convention went far beyond amending the Articles, however. Instead, it established an entirely new system, including a robust central government divided into legislative , executive and judicial branches.

As soon as 39 delegates signed the proposed Constitution in September 1787, the document went to the states for ratification, igniting a furious debate between “Federalists,” who favored ratification of the Constitution as written, and “Antifederalists,” who opposed the Constitution and resisted giving stronger powers to the national government.

The Rise of Publius

In New York, opposition to the Constitution was particularly strong, and ratification was seen as particularly important. Immediately after the document was adopted, Antifederalists began publishing articles in the press criticizing it.

They argued that the document gave Congress excessive powers and that it could lead to the American people losing the hard-won liberties they had fought for and won in the Revolution.

In response to such critiques, the New York lawyer and statesman Alexander Hamilton, who had served as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, decided to write a comprehensive series of essays defending the Constitution, and promoting its ratification.

Who Wrote the Federalist Papers?

As a collaborator, Hamilton recruited his fellow New Yorker John Jay, who had helped negotiate the treaty ending the war with Britain and served as secretary of foreign affairs under the Articles of Confederation. The two later enlisted the help of James Madison, another delegate to the Constitutional Convention who was in New York at the time serving in the Confederation Congress.

To avoid opening himself and Madison to charges of betraying the Convention’s confidentiality, Hamilton chose the pen name “Publius,” after a general who had helped found the Roman Republic. He wrote the first essay, which appeared in the Independent Journal, on October 27, 1787.

In it, Hamilton argued that the debate facing the nation was not only over ratification of the proposed Constitution, but over the question of “whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.”

After writing the next four essays on the failures of the Articles of Confederation in the realm of foreign affairs, Jay had to drop out of the project due to an attack of rheumatism; he would write only one more essay in the series. Madison wrote a total of 29 essays, while Hamilton wrote a staggering 51.

Federalist Papers Summary

In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton, Jay and Madison argued that the decentralization of power that existed under the Articles of Confederation prevented the new nation from becoming strong enough to compete on the world stage or to quell internal insurrections such as Shays’s Rebellion .

In addition to laying out the many ways in which they believed the Articles of Confederation didn’t work, Hamilton, Jay and Madison used the Federalist essays to explain key provisions of the proposed Constitution, as well as the nature of the republican form of government.

'Federalist 10'

In Federalist 10 , which became the most influential of all the essays, Madison argued against the French political philosopher Montesquieu ’s assertion that true democracy—including Montesquieu’s concept of the separation of powers—was feasible only for small states.

A larger republic, Madison suggested, could more easily balance the competing interests of the different factions or groups (or political parties ) within it. “Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests,” he wrote. “[Y]ou make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens[.]”

After emphasizing the central government’s weakness in law enforcement under the Articles of Confederation in Federalist 21-22 , Hamilton dove into a comprehensive defense of the proposed Constitution in the next 14 essays, devoting seven of them to the importance of the government’s power of taxation.

Madison followed with 20 essays devoted to the structure of the new government, including the need for checks and balances between the different powers.

'Federalist 51'

“If men were angels, no government would be necessary,” Madison wrote memorably in Federalist 51 . “If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”

After Jay contributed one more essay on the powers of the Senate , Hamilton concluded the Federalist essays with 21 installments exploring the powers held by the three branches of government—legislative, executive and judiciary.

Impact of the Federalist Papers

Despite their outsized influence in the years to come, and their importance today as touchstones for understanding the Constitution and the founding principles of the U.S. government, the essays published as The Federalist in 1788 saw limited circulation outside of New York at the time they were written. They also fell short of convincing many New York voters, who sent far more Antifederalists than Federalists to the state ratification convention.

Still, in July 1788, a slim majority of New York delegates voted in favor of the Constitution, on the condition that amendments would be added securing certain additional rights. Though Hamilton had opposed this (writing in Federalist 84 that such a bill was unnecessary and could even be harmful) Madison himself would draft the Bill of Rights in 1789, while serving as a representative in the nation’s first Congress.

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Ron Chernow, Hamilton (Penguin, 2004). Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788 (Simon & Schuster, 2010). “If Men Were Angels: Teaching the Constitution with the Federalist Papers.” Constitutional Rights Foundation . Dan T. Coenen, “Fifteen Curious Facts About the Federalist Papers.” University of Georgia School of Law , April 1, 2007. 

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Course: US history   >   Unit 3

• The Articles of Confederation
• What was the Articles of Confederation?
• Shays's Rebellion
• The Constitutional Convention
• The US Constitution

The Federalist Papers

• The Bill of Rights
• Social consequences of revolutionary ideals
• The presidency of George Washington
• Why was George Washington the first president?
• The presidency of John Adams
• Regional attitudes about slavery, 1754-1800
• Continuity and change in American society, 1754-1800
• Creating a nation

• The Federalist Papers was a collection of essays written by John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton in 1788.
• The essays urged the ratification of the United States Constitution, which had been debated and drafted at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787.
• The Federalist Papers is considered one of the most significant American contributions to the field of political philosophy and theory and is still widely considered to be the most authoritative source for determining the original intent of the framers of the US Constitution.

The Articles of Confederation and Constitutional Convention

• In Federalist No. 10 , Madison reflects on how to prevent rule by majority faction and advocates the expansion of the United States into a large, commercial republic.
• In Federalist No. 39 and Federalist 51 , Madison seeks to “lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty,” emphasizing the need for checks and balances through the separation of powers into three branches of the federal government and the division of powers between the federal government and the states. 4 ‍  
• In Federalist No. 84 , Hamilton advances the case against the Bill of Rights, expressing the fear that explicitly enumerated rights could too easily be construed as comprising the only rights to which American citizens were entitled.

What do you think?

• For more on Shays’s Rebellion, see Leonard L. Richards, Shays’s Rebellion: The American Revolution’s Final Battle (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002).
• Bernard Bailyn, ed. The Debate on the Constitution: Federalist and Anti-Federalist Speeches, Articles, and Letters During the Struggle over Ratification; Part One, September 1787 – February 1788 (New York: Penguin Books, 1993).
• See Federalist No. 1 .
• See Federalist No. 51 .
• For more, see Michael Meyerson, Liberty’s Blueprint: How Madison and Hamilton Wrote the Federalist Papers, Defined the Constitution, and Made Democracy Safe for the World (New York: Basic Books, 2008).

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U.S. Constitution.net

Federalist Papers and the Constitution

During the late 1780s, the United States faced significant challenges with its initial governing framework, the Articles of Confederation. These issues prompted the creation of the Federalist Papers, a series of essays aimed at advocating for a stronger central government under the newly proposed Constitution. This article will examine the purpose, key arguments, and lasting impact of these influential writings.

Background and Purpose of the Federalist Papers

The Articles of Confederation, though a pioneer effort, left Congress without the power to tax or regulate interstate commerce, making it difficult to pay off Revolutionary War debts and curb internal squabbles among states.

In May 1787, America's brightest political minds convened in Philadelphia and created the Constitution—a document establishing a robust central government with legislative, executive, and judicial branches. However, before it could take effect, the Constitution needed ratification from nine of the thirteen states, facing opposition from critics known as Anti-Federalists.

The Federalist Papers, a series of 85 essays written by Alexander Hamilton , James Madison , and John Jay under the pseudonym "Publius," aimed to calm fears and win support for the Constitution. Hamilton initiated the project, recruiting Madison and Jay to contribute. Madison drafted substantial portions of the Constitution and provided detailed defenses, while Jay, despite health issues, also contributed essays.

The Federalist Papers systematically dismantled the opposition's arguments and explained the Constitution's provisions in detail. They gained national attention, were reprinted in newspapers across the country, and eventually collated into two volumes for broader distribution.

Hamilton emphasized the necessity of a central authority with the power to tax and enforce laws, citing specific failures under the Articles like the inability to generate revenue or maintain public order. Jay addressed the need for unity and the inadequacies of confederation in foreign diplomacy.

The Federalist Papers provided the framework needed to understand and eventually ratify the Constitution, remaining essential reading for anyone interested in the foundations of the American political system.

Key Arguments in the Federalist Papers

Among the key arguments presented in the Federalist Papers, three themes stand out:

• The need for a stronger central government
• The importance of checks and balances
• The dangers of factionalism

Federalist No. 23 , written by Alexander Hamilton, argued for a robust central government, citing the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation. Hamilton contended that empowering the central government with the means to enforce laws and collect taxes was essential for the Union's survival and prosperity.

In Federalist No. 51 , James Madison addressed the principle of checks and balances, arguing that the structure of the new government would prevent any single branch from usurping unrestrained power. Each branch—executive, legislative, and judicial—would have the means and motivation to check the power of the others, safeguarding liberty.

Federalist No. 10 , also by Madison, delved into the dangers posed by factions—groups united by a common interest adverse to the rights of others or the interests of the community. Madison acknowledged that factions are inherent within any free society and cannot be eliminated without destroying liberty. He argued that a well-constructed Union would break and control the violence of faction by filtering their influence through a large republic.

Hamilton's Federalist No. 78 brought the concept of judicial review to the forefront, establishing the judiciary as a guardian of the Constitution and essential for interpreting laws and checking the actions of the legislature and executive branches. 1

The Federalist Papers meticulously dismantled Anti-Federalist criticisms and showcased how the proposed system would create a stable and balanced government capable of both governing effectively and protecting individual rights. These essays remain seminal works for understanding the underpinnings of the United States Constitution and the brilliance of the Founding Fathers.

Analysis of Federalist 10 and Federalist 51

Federalist 10 and Federalist 51 are two of the most influential essays within the Federalist Papers, elucidating fundamental principles that continue to support the American political system. They were carefully crafted to address the concerns of Anti-Federalists who feared that the new Constitution might pave the way for tyranny and undermine individual liberties.

In Federalist 10 , James Madison addresses the inherent dangers posed by factions. He argues that a large republic is the best defense against their menace, as it becomes increasingly challenging for any single faction to dominate in a sprawling and diverse nation. The proposed Constitution provides a systemic safeguard against factionalism by implementing a representative form of government, where elected representatives act as a filtering mechanism.

Federalist 51 further elaborates on how the structure of the new government ensures the protection of individual rights through a system of checks and balances. Madison supports the division of government into three coequal branches, each equipped with sufficient autonomy and authority to check the others. He asserts that ambition must be made to counteract ambition, emphasizing that the self-interest of individuals within each branch would serve as a natural check on the others. 2

Madison also delves into the need for a bicameral legislature, comprising the House of Representatives and the Senate. This dual structure aims to balance the demands of the majority with the necessity of protecting minority rights, thereby preventing majoritarian tyranny.

Together, Federalist 10 and Federalist 51 form a comprehensive blueprint for a resilient and balanced government. Madison's insights address both the internal and external mechanisms necessary to guard against tyranny and preserve individual liberties. These essays speak to the enduring principles that have guided the American republic since its inception, proving the timeless wisdom of the Founding Fathers and the genius of the American Constitution.

Impact and Legacy of the Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers had an immediate and profound impact on the ratification debates, particularly in New York, where opposition to the Constitution was fierce and vocal. Alexander Hamilton, a native of New York, understood the weight of these objections and recognized that New York's support was crucial for the Constitution's success, given the state's economic influence and strategic location. The essays were carefully crafted to address New Yorkers' specific concerns and to persuade undecided delegates.

The comprehensive detail and logical rigor of the Federalist Papers succeeded in swaying public opinion. They systematically addressed Anti-Federalist critiques, such as the fear that a strong central government would trample individual liberties. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay argued for the necessity of a powerful, yet balanced federal system, capable of uniting the states and ensuring both national security and economic stability.

In New York, the Federalist essays began appearing in newspapers in late 1787 and continued into 1788. Despite opposition, especially from influential Anti-Federalists like Governor George Clinton, the arguments laid out by "Publius" played a critical role in turning the tide. They provided Federalists with a potent arsenal of arguments to counter Anti-Federalists at the state's ratification convention. When the time came to vote, the persuasive power of the essays contributed significantly to New York's eventual decision to ratify the Constitution by a narrow margin.

The impact of the Federalist Papers extends far beyond New York. They influenced debates across the fledgling nation, helping to build momentum towards the required nine-state ratification. Their detailed exposition of the Constitution's provisions and the philosophic principles underlying them offered critical insights for citizens and delegates in other states. The essays became indispensable tools in the broader national dialogue about what kind of government the United States should have, guiding the country towards ratification.

The long-term significance of the Federalist Papers in American political thought and constitutional interpretation is substantial. Over the centuries, they have become foundational texts for understanding the intentions of the Framers. Jurists, scholars, and lawmakers have turned to these essays for guidance on interpreting the Constitution's provisions, shaping American constitutional law. Judges, including the justices of the Supreme Court, have frequently cited these essays in landmark rulings to elucidate the Framers' intent.

The Federalist Papers have profoundly influenced the development of American political theory, contributing to discussions about federalism, republicanism, and the balance between liberty and order. Madison's arguments in Federalist No. 10 have become keystones in the study of pluralism and the mechanisms by which diverse interests can coexist within a unified political system.

The essays laid the groundwork for ongoing debates about the role of the federal government, the balance of power among its branches, and the preservation of individual liberties. They provided intellectual support for later expansions of constitutional rights through amendments and judicial interpretations.

Their legacy also includes a robust defense of judicial review and the judiciary's role as a guardian of the Constitution. Hamilton's Federalist No. 78 provided a compelling argument for judicial independence, which has been a cornerstone in maintaining the rule of law and protecting constitutional principles against transient political pressures.

The Federalist Papers were crucial in the ratification of the Constitution, particularly in the contentious atmosphere of New York's debates. Their immediate effect was to facilitate the acceptance of the new governing framework. In the long term, their meticulously argued positions have provided a lasting blueprint for constitutional interpretation, influencing American political thought and practical governance for over two centuries. The essays stand as a testament to the foresight and philosophical acumen of the Founding Fathers, continuing to illuminate the enduring principles of the United States Constitution.

The Federalist No. 1: Annotated

Alexander Hamilton’s anonymous essay challenged the voting citizens of New York to hold fast to the truth when deciding to ratify (or not) the US Constitution.

In May 1788, the second volume of what would come to be called The Federalist Papers , a collection of both new and previously printed essays written to sell the ratification of the US Constitution to “The People of  the State of New York,” was published. Originally printed in newspapers in New York and elsewhere, The Federalist Papers are now foundational documents of American history and political thought.

Federalist No. 1, written by Alexander Hamilton using the pseudonym “Publius” , began as a response to two earlier essays written against the ratification (by “Cato” and “Brutus” respectively.) Hamilton proposed a series of writings “to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.” He was joined by James Madison and John Jay , ultimately producing eighty-five essays that are to this day used by scholars and Supreme Court justices alike to make their cases for the intent of the Constitution’s framers and its meanings.

Below is Hamilton’s opening salvo in the debate about the future of America: would it remain a confederation of states (as it had been under the Articles of Confederation ) or a new type of federalism, inspired by the Scottish Enlightenment, Montesquieu, and “Publius”? We have annotated the essay below, with scholarship on Constitutional history, the role The Federalist Papers continues to play in American legal and political life, and the style and rhetoric of the author(s). As always, these linked resources are free to read and download.

General Introduction

For the Independent Journal .

Author: Alexander Hamilton

To the People of the State of New York:

AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the subsisting federal government , you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world . It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force . If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government .

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable—the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears . So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society . This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at all times, characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.

And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion . A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty ; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.

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In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth.

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting particulars:

• THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY
• THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION
• THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT
• THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT
• ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly,
• THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State , and one, which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system , and that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole. *   This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.

*The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out in several of the late publications against the new Constitution. [ Editor’s Note: this note appeared in the margins of the original source. ]

[Text taken from the US Library of Congress: https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/full-text ]

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The Essential Federalist Essays

Although all 85 Federalist essays are worthy of study, there are a few that stand out, addressing key debates between the Founders and Americans of that generation, and thus providing us with clear positions on certain topics.

• Federalist 1 – Introduction, Alexander Hamilton, October 27, 1787
• Federalist 9 – The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and Insurrection, Alexander Hamilton, November 21, 1787
• Federalist 10 – The same Subject continued, James Madison, November 22, 1787
• Federalist 37 – Concerning the difficulties which the convention must have experienced in the formation of a proper plan, James Madison, January 11, 1788
• Federalist 39 – The conformity of the plan to republican principles: an objection in respect to the powers of the convention, examined, James Madison, January 16, 1788
• Federalist 51 – [The meaning of the maxim, which requires a separation of the departments of power, examined and ascertained] continued, with the same view, and concluded, James Madison, February 6, 1788
• Federalist 55 – [Concerning the house of representatives, with a view to the qualifications of the electors and elected, and the time of service of the members] continued, in relation to the total number of the body, James Madison, February 13, 1788
• Federalist 63 – A further view of the constitution of the senate, in regard to the duration of the appointment of its members, James Madison, March 1, 1788
• Federalist 70 – [Concerning the constitution of the president] continued, in relation to the unity of the executive, and with an examination of the project of an executive council, Alexander Hamilton, March 15, 1788
• Federalist 71 – The same view continued, in regard to the duration of the office, Alexander Hamilton, March 18, 1788
• Federalist 78 – A view of the constitution of the judicial department in relation to the tenure of good behaviour, Alexander Hamilton, May 28, 1788
• Federalist 84 – Concerning several miscellaneous objections, Alexander Hamilton, July 16, 1788

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The first amendment, constitution 101 resources, 3.5 info brief: the federalist papers.

This activity is part of  Module 3: Road to the Convention  from the Constitution 101 Curriculum.  

The Federalist Papers were a series of 85 essays printed in newspapers to persuade critics of the Constitution and those on the fence to support ratification. 

Alexander Hamilton wrote 51 of these essays, James Madison 29, and John Jay five.

All three authors wrote under the same famous pen name—“Publius.”

Broadly speaking, Madison focused on the big theoretical and structural questions of government and politics.

Hamilton focused on specific issues like the structure of (and framers’ vision for) the presidency and national courts.

The Federalist Papers—and their brilliant authors—were capable of both high-minded theory and persuasive political arguments.

Today, scholars and ordinary Americans alike recognize The Federalist Papers as some of the finest works of political theory. But it’s also important to understand them in context—as political documents written during the fight over the ratification of the U.S. Constitution.  

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Publius and Persuasion: Rhetorical Readings of [i]The Federalist Papers[/i]

Fame and The Federalist

Since its appearance in 1788 down to the present day, no praise has been too high, no tribute too exalted for The Federalist Papers . While written in the heat of the debate over ratifying the Constitution, the collection of eighty-five essays penned by “Publius” was almost instantly recognized as a work of great, even unprecedented merit. Thomas Jefferson, who was not uncritical of the handiwork of the Framers, nevertheless considered The Federalist “the best commentary on the principles of government which was ever written.” 1 George Washington, who had presided at the Federal Convention, correctly predicted that The Federalist would “merit the notice of Posterity.” 2 Even before the series of papers was completed and published as a single work, its pseudonymous author was praised as a “judicious and ingenious writer,” whose “greatness is acknowledged universally,” and who “in genius and political research, is not inferior to Gibbon, Hume, [or] Montesquieu.” 3

Following ratification and the formation of the new government under the Constitution, the reputation of The Federalist steadily spread. The work also grew in stature and authority when it was publicly revealed in the 1790s that the essays were the joint product of three men who had played key roles in the drafting and/or ratification of the Constitution: Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. Within a decade of its publication, The Federalist was being cited by Supreme Court justices to add weight and authority to their opinions. In Calder v. Bull (1798), Justice Samuel Chase appealed to Publius on the issue of ex post facto laws, an author he “esteem[ed] superior” even to Blackstone “for his extensive and accurate knowledge of the true principles of Government .” Chief Justice John Marshall, in the celebrated case of Madison v. Marbury (1803), defended the Court’s authority to overturn “unconstitutional” acts of Congress using arguments and language drawn from Federalist No. 78. Thus did the vital principle of “judicial review” (only implicit in the Constitution) enter into constitutional orthodoxy. In subsequent cases, Marshall affirmed that “[t]he opinion of the Federalist has always been considered of great authority,” and that “[n]o tribute can be paid to [the papers] which exceeds their merit.” 4

 James Kent, Chancellor of New York and second only to Joseph Story among antebellum jurists, eloquently praised The Federalist in his popular and influential Commentaries on American Law (1826-30). “[T]here is no work on the subject of the Constitution,” wrote Kent, “and on republican and federal government generally, that deserves to be more thoroughly studied . . . . No constitution of government ever received a more masterly and successful vindication.” The Federalist was not merely an unparalleled commentary on the Constitution; it was superior to even the great classics of political thought, “equally admirable in the depth of its wisdom, the comprehensiveness of its views, the sagacity of its reflections, and the fearlessness, patriotism, candor, simplicity, and elegance with which its truths are uttered and recommended.” 5 In his own famous Commentaries (1833), Justice Story sought to “employ . . . the whole substance of the Federalist,” which he considered an “incomparable commentary of three of the greatest statesmen of the age.” 6 John C. Calhoun called The Federalist “the fullest and, in many respects, the best” work on the principles of American government, 7 while John Quincy Adams affirmed that The Federalist was not only a “classical work in the English language,” but as a “commentary on the Constitution of the United States, of scarcely less authority than the Constitution itself.” 8

 The weight of such “authority” was reflected in the frequent use of The Federalist in Supreme Court opinions. While direct references abated in the decades following Reconstruction, the work was cited in many of the Court’s most important rulings in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 9 In more recent years, appeals (if not eulogies) to The Federalist have been increasing, and have figured prominently in a number of important decisions. 10 Nor have members of Congress hesitated to invoke the authority of Publius in disputes over the constitutionality of legislation, the actions of the co-ordinate branches, or the federal nature of the Union. Even presidents have sought the solicitude of The Federalist , as when Ronald Reagan pledged that his “administration [was] committed—heart and soul—to the principles of American Federalism, which are outlined in the original Federalist Papers of Hamilton, Madison, and Jay.” 11

Perhaps the most partisan use of The Federalist has occurred during impeachment proceedings, in which both accusers and defenders have made ready use of the relevant numbers. So frequent were such references during the impeachment of President Clinton, that popular media sources ran stories on The Federalist , while legal experts and political pundits scrambled for copies of the “venerable” text. 12 In conjunction with its other “official” uses, it may be said without exaggeration that “ The Federalist has long enjoyed a talismanic status in American constitutional interpretation.” 13

The authority vested in The Federalist by Congress, the Supreme Court, and presidents has been greatly augmented by generations of admiring scholars, including jurists, historians, and political scientists. Yet prior to the twentieth century (and the rise of modern scholarship) little of substance was written on The Federalist , although it was almost invariably praised in passing. John Fiske, in his influential history of the “critical period” under the Articles of Confederation, called it “perhaps the most famous of American books, and undoubtedly the most profound and suggestive treatise on government that has ever been written.” 14 Yet even after “progressive” historians such as J. Allen Smith, Charles Beard, and Vernon Parrington mounted the first major challenge to the “official” interpretation of the Constitution, it would be decades before The Federalist became the object of close, widespread, and sustained scrutiny. 15

Ironically, it was Beard himself who, thirty five-years after the appearance of his famous “economic” critique of the Constitution, praised The Federalist as not merely “the most instructive work on political science ever written in the United States,” but “owing to its practical character, it ranks first in the world’s literature of political science.” 16 Around the same time, Douglas Adair published a series of articles which, inter alias , firmly established the authorship of certain disputed numbers. 17 In the postwar era, scholarly interest in The Federalist rapidly spread, resulting in several new editions, a flood of articles, and a number of full-length studies. Even before the Constitution’s bicentennial (which prompted a further outpouring), it was possible to speak of a “growth industry” in Federalist scholarship. 18

In sheer weight, the production of the last fifty years has cemented The Federalist ‘s reputation as both the leading commentary on the Constitution and an enduring political classic. That it has attracted the serious attention of some of the best minds in law, history, and political science tends to confirm the assertion. In his influential treatise on Revolutionary-era political thought, Gordon Wood affirmed that The Federalist propounded “a political theory worthy of a high place in the history of Western thought.” 19 Jack Rakove, in a study which won a Pulitzer Prize, averred that among works of political science “[n]othing equals it in analytical breadth and conceptual power.” 20 The distinguished scholar Hans Morgenthau praised The Federalist as “an unsurpassed compendium of political truth,” 21 while Clinton Rossiter, an editor of the papers, called it “the most important work in political science that has ever been written, or is likely ever to be written in the United States. It is, indeed, the one product of the American mind that is rightly counted among the classics of political theory.” As for its status “among the sacred writings of American political history,” Rossiter observes, “[i]t would not be stretching the truth more than a few inches to say that The Federalist stands third only to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution itself.” 22

The fact that two or three of the most influential papers (Nos. 10, 51, 78) now regularly appear alongside these “sacred writings” in American government textbooks, indicates that Rossiter stretched the truth but a few pages. Indeed, it was Thomas Jefferson himself who, in preparing the curricula for the University of Virginia, placed The Federalist second only to the Declaration of Independence in a list of the “the best guides” for the study of the principles of American government. 23

Without denying its value or significance, the skeptical reader might suspect that the fame of The Federalist has actually been more parochial than its most zealous (American) admirers have suggested. Certainly, the rest of the world has not been so effusive in praising Publius. While no “foreign” history of The Federalist currently exists, one scholar’s summary of its reputation abroad puts to rest the suspicion that the fame of “Publius” is merely an affaire American . 24

In Great Britain the work was singled out for praise by reviewers and some of the leading political writers of the nineteenth-century. The Edinburgh Review effused that its authors exhibited a “profundity of research and an acuteness of understanding which would have done honour to the most illustrious statesman of modern times.” Similarly, Blackwood’s Magazine affirmed that The Federalist “may be called seriously, reverently, the Bible of Republicanism. It is a work altogether, which for comprehensiveness of design, strength, clearness, and simplicity has no parallel. We do not even except or overlook those of Montesquieu and Aristotle . . . .” Three eminent Victorians, each of whom contributed a political classic of his own, were hardly less enthusiastic. John Stuart Mill called The Federalist “the most instructive treatise we possess on federal government,” while Sir Henry Summer Maine concurred with Chancellor Kent’s exalted assessment of the work. Lord Bryce, whose The American Commonwealth (excepting The Federalist itself), is second only to Tocqueville’s Democracy in America as a commentary on the American polity, looked to “Publius” as the unsurpassed expositor of the Constitution; a document William Gladstone called “the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the hand and purpose of man.”

In the non-English speaking world, The Federalist made its debut in France, where it was translated in 1792—the same year the revolutionary government bestowed honorary citizenship upon its two principal authors, Hamilton and Madison. Even earlier the essays had been freely cited in the debates of the Constituent Assembly. Following the proclamation of the Republic, and the National Convention’s condemnation of “ le gouvernment federatif ,” the work fell into disrepute. Yet like the French governments of the time, such official disfavor did not long endure. Tallyrand, who placed Hamilton above Napoleon and Pitt among the luminaries of the age, warmly recommended the work, while Tocqueville called it “an excellent book, which ought to be familiar to the statesman of all countries.” Scholar-statesman François Guizot did “not know in the whole compass of my reading [on government and politics] . . . so able a book.” At the turn of the century The Federalist was newly translated, and has continued to attract the attention of French students of government.

In Germany The Federalist ‘s reception was less dramatic, but not without consequence. Robert von Mohl relied heavily on the work in his 1824 treatise on American government, and in a later study recognized its perennial value as classic of political science, adding that “it is absolutely impossible to speak with greater clarity” on the subject. It is thought that the authors of the short-lived Frankfurt Constitution (1848) were admirers of the essays, while in the 1860s, as Germany moved toward forging its own federal union, a book on The Federalist was published which included a partial translation of the papers. Both before and after unification in 1871, the nationalist historian Treitschke acknowledged that The Federalist bore the original conception of the German Bundesstaat or federal system of government. Nor was admiration for the work lacking among Wilhelmine scholars. Albert Haenel declared the work an unparalleled example of political reasoning, while Hugo Preuss, father of the Weimar Constitution, looked to The Federalist as “the canonical book of American constitutionalism.” In the 1950s, the first complete German translation appeared, and the work remains a relevant source on federalism and constitutional government.

The Federalist attracted little notice in Italy during the nineteenth century, although the few scholars familiar with the text found it a work of notable merit. As Italy considered decentralization after World War II, the papers suddenly became the object of considerable interest. In the mid-1950s, Aldo Garosci published one of the first full-length studies of The Federalist , which he considered “a book of great value,” and unsurpassed for the weight and cogency of its arguments. Shortly thereafter Gaspare Ambrosini, a justice on Italy’s Constitutional Court, translated the work into Italian for the first time, and declared the papers “a profound and suggestive commentary on the Constitution and a great treatise of political science.”

In Latin America The Federalist was translated into Spanish and Portuguese in the early nineteenth century and appears to have influenced constitutional developments in Argentina and Brazil. In Mexico it has attracted the attention of scholars, one of whom praised it as a “monumental work,” while others have attested to its world reputation and enduring value. The various experiments with constitutional government and federalism in Mexico and around the world have given the work a relevance and currency well beyond the interest of scholars.

Given its global reputation, it is not surprising that The Federalist has assumed an honored position among the pantheon of literary, scientific, and philosophical classics. Selected for inclusion in the Great Books of the Western World compiled by the University of Chicago, the newspaper essays of Publius took their place alongside Plato’s Dialogues , Newton’s Principii , and Darwin’s Origins of the Species as seminal testaments of the Western mind. The presence of The Federalist among the Harvard Classics and similar collections has confirmed the papers’ canonical status in the republic of letters.

Finally, the work of Publius has been singled out for its important place in the broader currents of intellectual history. Peter Gay, for instance, crowned his landmark study of the European Enlightenment with a remarkable tribute to the American authors of The Federalist . The papers, Gay writes, did not merely reflect the “spirit of the age;” they implicitly embodied “all the great themes of the Enlightenment . . . the dialectical movement away from Christianity to modernity; the pessimistic though wholly secular appraisal of human nature coupled with an optimistic confidence in instrumental arrangements; the pragmatic reading of history as an aid to political sociology; the humane philosophy underlying their plea for the proposed constitution; the commitment to the critical method and the eloquent advocacy of practicality.” The work of “Publius,” Gay concludes, “fully deserves immortality as a classic in the art of politics.” 25

The “Other” Federalist

Were the preceding account left to stand alone it might serve as a fitting encomium on The Federalist , but it would leave but a partial, indeed a distorted picture of the work’s actual reception and history. It will be recalled that Publius wrote as an advocate of the Constitution in the midst of a contentious, sometimes bitter struggle over the great question of ratification. Those who opposed adoption, the Antifederalists, denounced the document (in whole or part) as a dangerous innovation, and predicted that it would create a “consolidated” government of, by, and for the few at the expense of the many. Given their record of opposition, there is little reason to presume that Publius’s reassurances to the contrary were persuasive with many of the Constitution’s opponents. 26

Yet because they lost the struggle, and because their worst fears proved illusory, the Antifederalists fell into an obscurity from which they have only recently begun to emerge. Given the remarkable ascendance of the United States under the Constitution, it is not surprising that subsequent generations looked down on its original critics as false prophets and “men of little faith.” 27 But in light of history and the bright glare of Constitution-worship, it is often forgotten how perilously close the Antifederalists came to defeating the work of the Framers. In key states such as Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, sentiment against the Constitution ran high, and ratification was obtained by a only small margin, and then only after accepting certain Antifederalist objections in the form of proposed amendments. In North Carolina, the ratifying convention refused to approve the document, proposed amendments, and adjourned. So strong was the opposition in Rhode Island that the legislature failed to call a ratifying convention for two-and-a-half years after Congress first authorized the states to do so. 28

In New York City, where The Federalist essays were first published, the contest was particularly heated, and sparked an unprecedented outpouring of partisan literature. 29 As noted above, once ratification was secured, the letters of Publius shortly attained a privileged status as an authoritative commentary on the Constitution and a classic of political thought. While the outcome of the struggle was undecided, however, admiration for Publius was far from universal. As the Federalist essays began to blanket city newspapers at a rate of three to four a week, some readers complained of sheer “overkill.” A group of “Twenty-seven Subscribers” scolded the editor of the New-York Journal “for cramming us with the voluminous Publius,” who had “become nauseous.” 30 The sentiment was shared by others, who like one frustrated reader, could no longer stomach “the dry trash of Publius in 150 numbers.” 31

It was not merely the length and ostensible tedium of The Federalist that attracted criticism: Publius was also accused of sophistry, redundancy, even irrelevance. With an air of condescension, “Countryman,” one of the more able Antifederalist writers, confessed, “I really cannot find out what he would be at; he seems to me as if he was going to write a history . . . .” In a later essay, he compared Publius to a sophistic lawyer “when hard pushed, in a bad cause, with a rich client.” “They frequently say a good deal, which does not apply; but yet if it will not convince the judge nor jury, may, perhaps, help to make them forget some part of the evidence—embarrass their opponent, and make the audience stare, besides increasing the practice.” 32

In Philadelphia, where some of the Federalist numbers were reprinted, “Centinel” railed against Publius for “mistaking sound for argument” and “accumulat[ing] myriads of unmeaning sentences.” “[H]e might have spared his readers the fatigue of wading through his long winded disquisitions . . . as totally inapplicable to the subject he was professedly treating; this writer has devoted much time, and wasted more paper in combating chimeras of his own creation.” 33 Another critic compared “Publius” to a famous Scots preacher, whose long-winded sermons would “jade the brains of any poor sinner . . . .” 34 To these charges, Louis Otto, the French envoy, added that The Federalist was a practical failure—”of no value whatever to well-informed people, and . . . too learned and too long for the ignorant.” 35 Even some of the Constitution’s supporters considered the work ill-suited to the task of influencing popular opinion. 36

Such pointed criticisms may be ascribed to the heat of controversy, but the general sentiment was not restricted to an inconsequential minority. Indeed, it was a view shared by a majority of delegates elected to the New York Ratifying Convention, a principal target of the essays. Moreover, subsequent references to The Federalist were not always as exalted as suggested above. In fact, some of its warmest admirers voiced reservations about its merit as a work of political thought and questioned its authority on the meaning of the Constitution. Immediately after praising The Federalist as “the best commentary on the principles of government . . . ever written,” Jefferson observed that “[i]n some parts, it is discoverable that the author means only to say what may best be said in defense of opinions in which he did not concur.” Similarly, after asserting that “[n]o tribute . . . exceeds [its] merit,” John Marshall insisted that the Supreme Court retained “a right to judge of [its] correctness . . . .” The implication that The Federalist contained “errors” or omissions was also drawn by Justice Story, who observed that “it cannot in candor be admitted to be wholly satisfactory, or conclusive” in some of its arguments. 37 Spencer Roane, who sat on the Virginia Court of Appeals, did not doubt the “general ability” of Publius, but hastened to inform his fellow justices that The Federalist originated as “a mere newspaper publication, written in the heat and hurry of battle.” 38

Similar reservations (and some outright criticism) were also expressed by members of the antebellum Congress. In the first Congress, Senator William Maclay hoped to obtain a copy of the essays “without buying it,” considering the purchase “not worth it.” 39 During the dispute over whether Congress had the authority to charter a national bank—a debate in which both sides invoked the authority of Publius—Elbridge Gerry of Connecticut denounced “this part of his performance . . . as a political heresy” and argued that “[h]is doctrine, indeed, was calculated to lull the consciences of those who differed in opinion with him at the time . . . .” 40 William Lowdes of South Carolina recognized the merit of the work, but reminded his colleagues that its authors were “jealous advocates” who could not claim the authority of “an impartial judge” on matters of constitutional construction. 41 John Quincy Adams, who considered The Federalist “a classical work . . . of scarcely less authority than the Constitution itself,” nonetheless found it lacking in “that entire unity of design, or execution which might have been expected had it been the production of a single mind.” In the same breath in which he called The Federalist “the fullest and, in many respects, the best” treatise on American government, John C. Calhoun charged that “it takes many false views and by no means goes to the bottom of the system.” Later, he would speak of “its radical and dangerous” errors, which he believed had “contributed, more than all others combined, to cast a mist over our system of government, and confound and lead astray the minds of the community as to a true conception of its real character.” 42

Following the Civil War and Reconstruction, outright attacks on The Federalist were rare, although Woodrow Wilson did complain of its “strange, persistent longevity of power,” which he blamed for “obscuring much of [the] development of constitutional practice . . . .” 43 While Wilson qua scholar held distinctly “unorthodox” views regarding American government, his objection found expression among judges and jurists who questioned the relevance and validity of The Federalist as a aid to constitutional interpretation. Typically, the Supreme Court’s use of the papers has been entangled with the larger question of “original intent” and the propriety of using contemporaneous exposition as a guide for determining cases. 44 On occasion, however, the authority of The Federalist has been directly challenged, as when Justice Baldwin, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), bluntly observed that the Court could “expound the constitution without a reference to the definitions of a state or nation by any foreign writer, hypothetical reasoning, or the dissertations of The Federalist .” To do otherwise “would be to substitute individual authority in place of the declared will of the sovereign power of the union, in a written fundamental law.” Later, in a case involving jurisdiction over corporations, Justice Campbell raised what one scholar has called “the classic objection to the majority’s use of The Federalist —extrapolation from such dated sources.” 45 Since corporations were not “within the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution,” Campbell wrote, The Federalist could have no bearing in resolving jurisdictional disputes. 46

The belief that changed circumstances rendered Publius irrelevant to a widening range of constitutional controversies gained currency with the rise of industrial society and America’s emergence as a world power. It had never been possible to consult The Federalist in cases involving constitutional amendments, of which twelve were adopted by 1803. Indeed, Publius had defended the absence of a bill of rights in the Constitution, which he maintained was “itself in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.” (No. 84) So unpersuasive was such reasoning that many Federalists (including Hamilton, Madison, and Jay) were forced to concede the point and pledge support for adding a bill of rights once the new government convened. The need to remedy this “defect” in the Constitution was underscored by some of the ratifying conventions, which included a bill of rights among the proposed amendments attached to their articles of ratification. The Civil War amendments, particularly the Fourteenth, which reconfigured the relation between state and national governments, further reduced the relevance and authority of The Federalist in the Court’s adjudications. In a case involving the equal protection clause, Justice Douglas cited Federalist No. 68 as evidence that the arguments of Publius “belong to a bygone day.” 47 More recently, Justice White criticized Justice O’Connor’s selective use of The Federalist , which he dismissed as “elaborate window dressing,” possessing a “distinctly wooden quality.” 48

The notion that Publius is of dubious authority as a guide to the Constitution and “is invoked to affirm conclusions already reached” has been shared by students of the Supreme Court’s use of The Federalist . 49 In reviewing cases where the Court directly cited the work, Charles Pierson observed that its authors “were addressing the people at large and their aim was to influence public opinion, not to formulate principles for the guidance of the courts. No one foresaw the possibility that what they were writing would some day be cited in the law reports along with Blackstone and Kent.” 50 Jacobus tenBroek, in his influential critique of the use of “extrinsic aids” in constitutional construction, anticipated Justice White in noting that “[w]hether The Federalist is used [by the Court], seems to be determined solely by whether or not an appropriate passage can be found in it . . . .” 51

More recent students of the Supreme Court’s use of The Federalist have reached similar conclusions. A review of such uses, notes James Ducayet, “fails to provide any general consensus on why The Federalist ought to be regarded as an authoritative guide to the proper interpretation of the constitutional system.” 52 Similarly, James Wilson contends that “the Court has made no real effort to understand The Federalist ” and has “continually used it as an instrument of persuasion.” Indeed, “[p]assages have been cited (although frequently out of context), ignored (although The Federalist had been shown to support an opposing argument), or even rejected (when the changed times argument dictated a different result), depending on the position a justice wanted to advance. Rarely has the Court gone beyond its meaning or significance.” 53 More fundamentally, as Peter Quint notes, “ The Federalist is not of direct relevance to many of the major issues of contemporary constitutional litigation.” 54

While one should not confuse criticism of the Supreme Court’s “use” of The Federalist with criticism of the work itself, insofar as the pattern of (mis)use is attributed to certain “ambiguities” and “underlying tensions” within the papers themselves, the latter is often implied. Such criticism was initially suggested by contemporaries who considered the essays ill-suited for gaining adherents to the Constitution, a view supported by historians who affirm that their actual impact on ratification was “marginal.” 55 Rarely, however, has The Federalist been the subject of direct or sustained criticism. The “revisionist” interpretation of the Constitution by “progressive” historians, and specifically Charles Beard’s economic analysis of Federalist No. 10, did gain widespread currency but failed to produce a revised Publius.

This is not to say that the papers have entirely escaped scholarly detraction. While ranking The Federalist “first in the world’s literature of political science,” Beard himself complained that its arguments are “more than occasionally repetitious and defective in logical structure.” Similarly, political scientist Robert Dahl found Madison’s reasoning in Federalist No. 10 “shot through with assumptions and arguments that do not stand up under criticism” and concluded that “his nice distinctions were at bottom arbitrary.” 56 Even Clinton Roisster, who placed The Federalist “among the sacred documents” of American history, could speak of the work’s “startling omissions and uneven quality”—hardly words typically associated with the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution.

More curious, however, is Rossiter’s gloss on The Federalist ‘s defects as a work of “political theory,” which reads remarkably like a Antifederalist broadside:

As a piece of very special pleading—some have called it a lawyer’s brief—it says the same thing over and over in a half dozen ways, tiptoes delicately around many of the hard criticisms directed against the Constitution and slogs ponderously through some of the silliest, and makes at least a few arguments and appeals which its authors must have had trouble justifying to their own consciences. 57

The assertion that The Federalist suffers from bias, verbosity, obfuscation, and bad faith may sound odd in the midst of a eulogy, but it is not (as we have seen) without precedent. Nor have more recent scholars failed to note (if only in passing) the presence of such “defects.” As for the more substantive charges, some have located the source of the work’s chief “weakness”—its ambiguity of meaning—in the differing contributions of Hamilton and Madison. The seeds of this view were planted by John Quincy Adams, who found it “not difficult to perceive [in The Federalist ] that diversity of genius and character which afterwards separated [Madison and Hamilton] so widely from each other on questions of public interest, affecting the construction of the Constitution . . . .” 58

More than a century later, Douglas Adair sorted out the disputed essays, and in the process detected a “radical divergence” in the two men’s views on government, concluding that Publius suffered from a “split personalty.” 59 Exploring this diagnosis, Alpheus Mason supplied additional grounds for the contention that “Hamilton and Madison display a sharp theoretical split” in The Federalist . Given the discrepancy between the views each man expressed at the Federal Convention and the actual provisions of the Constitution, is it not probable that they were forced to make “concessions to views they could not honestly support”? Moreover, in light of the subsequent break between Madison and Hamilton into sharply divided camps, is it not possible that each deliberately wrote “in language so equivocal as to disguise the Constitution’s true import?” Indeed, “did not The Federalist , instead of elucidating and clarifying the points of contention within the fundamental law, actually gloss over these and thereby add to the confusion?” 60 Mason does not directly answer these questions, but his discussion suggests that the charges are entirely plausible.

While the “split personality” thesis has not gone unchallenged, many of its implications have been absorbed by subsequent observers. 61 Some have detected an “inherent ambiguity” in The Federalist , while others have suggested that its authors were placed in the “false position” of assuming views contrary to their “personal, considered thoughts about American politics.” 62 Others still have found that in meeting the objections of the Constitution’s opponents, The Federalist is less a model of persuasion than “a masterpiece of evasion.” 63

Further examples could be added, but such remarks are typically not intended to impugn the overall merit of The Federalist or the skill of its authors: more often they assume the form of passing criticism by a friendly source. In at least one case, however, a reputable scholar has unequivocally challenged the reputation of Publius. William Crosskey, in accounting for the “great mass of misconceptions” surrounding the Constitution, singles out the authors of The Federalist for especial censure. “[P]roperly understood” (that is, in the context of a highly-charged, partisan struggle), the papers “are seen to contain much of sophistry; much that is merely distractive; and some things . . . which come perilously near to falsehood.” 64 Not only was Publius guilty of employing “the various tricks of advocacy,” he displayed an “utter confusion” over the first principles of American government. And while “ The Federalist ‘s sophistries, its inconsistencies, distractions, and other tricks, are obvious today,” its canonization as the definitive commentary on the Constitution led to the confusion which has flourished over its meaning ever since.

As for the claim that Publius reflects the views of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution, Crosskey claims that “[n]othing could be much further from the truth.” Indeed, these views “were diametrically opposed to those expressed in The Federalist .” As such, “discerning men” who supported the Constitution found many of its arguments embarrassing and “ridiculous,” while the Antifederalists were given “in permanent form, a body of sophistry, innuendo, and near-falsehood, as to the meaning of the Constitution, which was of unique value to that party.” Measured against its “great vogue” among subsequent generations of jurists, scholars, and politicians, such unflattering revelations suggest that The Federalist occupies a “very questionable place in American history.” 65

Whatever the merit of this assessment, Crosskey does underscore a critical aspect of The Federalist that has frequently escaped the attention of scholars; viz., the partisan , rhetorical , and polemical context in which it was written. Most know that the papers were part of an effort to elect pro-Constitution delegates to the New York Ratifying Convention, but few have given more than passing notice to the papers’historical origins inpolitical controversy or the authors’ immediate aim ofpersuadingthe electorate. Invariably, students of The Federalist have engaged the text from an analytical perspective, with slight consideration for its historical context or literary quality. The author of a leading study of The Federalist found “no alternatives to an analytical approach,” and pronounced “the literary style” of the work of “no concern.” 66 Few have been so categorical, but rarely have the papers been approached from a non-analytical perspective. Crosskey suggests that the emphasis on theoretical analysis at the expense of historical, political, and linguistic factors has served to conceal the true significance of the papers. Accordingly, to know something of this significance is

. . . to know something of certain peculiarities of America speech at the time the papers were written; to know something of the legal and political ideas and terminology of the period; to know what was being said about the Constitution in the other states, . . . And most important of all, it is necessary to put the “Federalist Papers” back into their native context, that is, of the constitutional controversy that raged, in 1787 and 1788, in the newspapers of New York. 67

If Crosskey found it odd that “[n]o attempt to evaluate The Federalist upon such a basis” had yet been made, it must appear all the more so a half-century later. More recent studies have shown a greater concern for the work’s linguistic, philosophical, and ideological dimensions, and for the historical circumstances of its composition. 68 Yet the suggestion that it is necessary to read The Federalist within the context of partisan controversy—that is, as a work of deliberative rhetoric —has failed to attract much attention. On the few occasions when the “rhetorical” aspect of the papers has been addressed, it is typically treated as a blemish and not infrequently associated with deception, confusion, and inconsistency.

Echoing the sentiments of earlier observers, John Zvesper has suggested that the confused, partisan use The Federalist by later generations “was made possible, perhaps even inevitable, by Publius’s rhetorical position.” 69 Elsewhere it has been noted that Madison and Hamilton’s support for federalism “could only be rhetorical,” given their hidden bias for a strong national government. 70 The compilers of The Federalist Concordance have observed that the “internal inconsistencies” of the papers were due more to “the demands of political rhetoric than . . . an excess of ideological symmetry.” 71

More frequently, however, the rhetorical element in The Federalist is politely by-passed or simply ignored. This practice suggests that it is possible, indeed appropriate, to separate the rhetoric of Publius from his political science , his polemic from his logic . Under this assumption, a leading student of The Federalist has observed that, “although its authors used much rhetoric” in making the case for the Constitution, “they also argued logically.” 72 Another has drawn a distinction between Publius’s “substantive arguments (political science) and his techniques of persuasion (rhetoric),” 73 while a third suggests that the authors of The Federalist used “rhetoric” much in the manner of a political confidence man:

Their aim was not to discuss an idea logically, but to prevail in a political contest, and they were fully prepared to do a bit of fudging in order to achieve that objective. They skirted issues and molded their phrases to suit their audience, in the manner of our public relations experts. 74

Again, such observations are rarely intended to diminish or even challenge The Federalist ‘s reputation. They do, however, reflect a common attitude towards its “rhetorical” dimension—and to rhetoric in general. The former is commonly treated as an extrinsic element, peripheral to the work’s “substantive” teaching, while the latter implies mere technique. Insofar as The Federalist has been almost exclusively valued as a commentary on the Constitution and explication of the American polity, it is not altogether surprising that Publius should fail to garner much attention as a rhetorician. The common (if unfortunate) practice of equating rhetoric with “ideology,” “propaganda,” or “sophistry” also helps explain the lack of interest in the rhetorical Federalist . On the other hand, the simple fact that the papers were written in the context of a momentous political struggle by advocates seeking to influence the outcome, suggests that the role of rhetoric in The Federalist is neither as marginal nor inconsequential as most observers have indicated.

With this in mind, a plain reading of The Federalist reveals that its authors not only employ conventions commonly associated with deliberative rhetoric, but that the entire work is written from a rhetorical standpoint: that is, with the immediate aim of persuasion. True, in some parts the papers are more patently “rhetorical” than in others, such as those which involve direct appeals to the patriotism, good sense, and candor of the reader. Yet an attention to the forms of argument and peculiarities of usage in The Federalist clearly indicates that its rhetorical dimension is anything but peripheral. On the contrary, its authors habitual use of persuasive language and rhetorical forms of discourse strongly support the conclusion that rhetoric (properly understood) is intrinsic to The Federalist , and largely inseparable from the work’s “logical” arguments as they actually appear. 75 Read in this light, one will labor in vain to find a single page free of advocacy or a single argument untouched by rhetoric. In no case, however, does rhetoric function as a mere appendage or ornament of disputation. Rather, Publius’s overt appeals to the reader serve to reinforce his more substantive reasoning, while this reasoning itself is thoroughly infused with the language of persuasion . Remarkably, what was obvious to contemporary readers has left remarkably little impression on posterity.

Publius and the Rhetoricians

Bower Aly’s The Rhetoric of Alexander Hamilton (1941) was the first major study devoted to the oratory of an American Founder. Focusing on his speeches at the New York Ratifying Convention, Aly analyzed Hamilton’s rhetoric according to classical (Aristotelian) standards, and judged the performance worthy of “the highest commendation.” 76 While he did not consider Hamilton’s Federalist essays, Aly’s emphasis on Hamilton the speaker , his audience , his means of persuasion , and the occasion of ratification is highly relevant to a rhetorical reading of Publius. More specifically, in applying the analytical framework of Aristotle’s Rhetoric to Hamilton’s speeches on behalf of the Constitution, Aly properly underscored the vital importance of rhetoric in the ratification campaign, and provided a model for reading The Federalist as a work of oratory.

Despite the original and suggestive nature of The Rhetoric of Alexander Hamilton , a half-century would elapse before an effort was made to examine The Federalist by the standards of classical oratory. In the interim, only a handful of scholars bothered to address its rhetorical dimension at all, much less under the aegis of Aristotle.

Writing shortly after the appearance of Aly’s study, Clarence Faust devoted much of an article on the “rhetoric of ratification” to a discussion of The Federalist . Beyond illustrating the fundamentally rhetorical character of the papers, Faust developed a general theory of the rhetorical task faced by Madison and Hamilton under the assumption that “[t]he problems . . . [they] faced as rhetoricians can best be understood by reference to their problems as statesmen during the deliberations of the Philadelphia Convention.” 77 Just as Convention delegates were charged with persuading their colleagues of the need to establish “a more perfect union,” Madison and Hamilton faced the task of “persuading their readers that the proposed government promised them many advantages and that it conformed to the political principles cherished in America.” By definition each man had to bury the objections he had raised at the Convention and lay aside personal reservations regarding the propriety of the Constitution and the relative merit of its various provisions. Conversely, each labored to “specify at length the ways in which the national government would serve the various interests of the country, and to stress the aspects in which it conformed to certain prevailing political doctrines.” In doing so, Publius not only showed a “shrewd recognition of the rhetorical problem,” but “in a measure prepared his readers to agree with him.”

More specifically, Faust observes, the authors of The Federalist consistently used two basic types of argument in attempting to demonstrate the “utility of union” on the one hand, and the Constitution’s conformity with republican principles on the other. Proofs for the former were largely built upon “premises concerning causes and effects—general maxims . . . about the causes of peace and war, domestic tranquility and disturbance, of commercial success or failure, together with propositions concerning matters drawn from the experiences of earlier political societies.” Proofs for the latter were “developed largely by definition.” Both types of argument, whether grounded in a practical “consideration of interests” or a theoretical “concern with principle,” had the ultimate aim of persuading readers that the Constitution not only answered the minimum requirements, but provided an “ideal” solution to the problem of reconciling societal interests and republican principles. As with the related task of demonstrating the insoluble link between “energy” in government, national security, and individual liberty, it was the chief aim of Publius “to prove that what was right was also useful, and that what was useful was also right.” 78

Given the admitted “novelty of the undertaking” ( Federalist No. 37)—the establishment of an extended, federal republic—”[f]ormulas had to be invented or discovered” that would persuasively exhibit the compatibility of bedrock principles and divergent interests, and thereby “compel” support for the Constitution. According to Faust, the most important of these rhetorical maneuvers was “the way in which [Publius] elevated the conflict of interests to a principle of good government.” Contrary to accepted wisdom, which held that private right and public good were inherently competing principles, the authors of The Federalist argued that both might be served within a properly constituted republic: viz., one that contained specific institutional safeguards and “provided for the expression and interplay of numerous and divergent interests.” 79

While Faust did not detail the specific arguments or persuasive techniques used in The Federalist , his focus on the rhetorical problems and general aims of its authors represents a notable landmark. In light of subsequent scholarship, however, it was an isolated event. The same may be said of an article by James Scanlon, who touched on the rhetorical element of The Federalist while exploring its authors’ views on human nature and politics. Like Faust, Scanlon underscored the rhetorical nature of the papers, and averred that an attention to this feature “throws more light on the specific qualities of The Federalist as a political argument” than does a strictly analytical approach. 80 Scanlon’s chief contribution, however, was to illustrate how the authors’ understanding of human nature informed their arguments and guided their appeals. At the broadest level, they could assume an obvious fact: i.e., that their readers had the “capacity to be moved to action by motives of certain sorts.”

Given the variety of human motives, it was necessary for Publius to address a wide range of interests and employ different types of arguments in order to strengthen his overall appeal. Cold logic and reasoned discourse might suffice to move some readers to support the Constitution, but since men were not equally susceptible to rational persuasion, other motives had to be solicited. Furthermore, even the most dispassionate reader was subject to considerations of a more prosaic nature and could be expected to act on the basis of mixed motives. Accordingly, appeals based on reason had to be supplemented with appeals of a more direct and tangible kind. As Scanlon points out, The Federalist is replete with both, a clear indication that its authors considered it “foolish to omit any avenue of influence.” Passion no less than reason, emotion no less than logic was looked to as a primitive source of motivation, and Publius spared no pains in soliciting “the most active springs of the human heart.” ( Federalist No. 27) 81

While recognizing the usefulness of such appeals, the need to cultivate a disposition “favorable to the ascertainment of fact and the exercise of judgment” prevented Publius from placing too great an emphasis on non-rational motives. However, arguments grounded in an anemic rationalism—whether expressed in appeals to abstract principle, historical precedent, or theoretical propriety—could hardly be expected to provide the basis for “a correct and durable consciousness of interest” on the part of his readers. Given Publius’s tacit recognition of these limitations, Scanlon concludes, “it is not surprising that the chief rhetorical targets in The Federalist , in paper after paper, are immediate and personal interests.” The emphasis on interest , moreover, was not merely an effort to persuade on the basis of the lowest common denominator, although there is certainly no greater or more universal principle in politics. Rather, appeals to motives of self-interest, no less than appeals to reason and passion, share a common source in Publius’s understanding of the human condition, particularly in its political dimension. The rhetoric of The Federalist , then, is “fully consistent with the authors’ expressed and implied views on the subject of ‘human nature. ‘” 82 As Scanlon explains:

The theory of motivation is presupposed by the rhetoric of The Federalist : it guides the authors in the selection of arguments. Human ‘rationality’ is not denied; intellectual capacities sufficient to grasp the authors arguments are clearly assumed. The arguments themselves are directed to the many sources of human action, wherever possible to those powerful sources which are most to be depended upon. 83

Like Aly’s study, those of Faust and Scanlon provided persuasive grounds for a rhetorical reading of The Federalist , yet subsequent students of the papers showed little interest in building on their suggestive findings. More than two decades after Scanlon’s essay, Forrest McDonald drew attention to this general neglect, not just of The Federalist , but of the political literature of the Founding era. In the course of discussing “The Rhetoric of Alexander Hamilton,” McDonald confirmed many of the findings Aly reached in applying classical categories to Hamilton’s speeches. He concluded that Hamilton and the Founders “studied and practiced the art [of rhetoric] in accordance with the Aristotelian model . . . .” 84 More significantly, McDonald placed the “classical” rhetoric of Hamilton and his colleagues on a par with their monumental practical achievements. Indeed, it was their rhetoric which made these very accomplishments possible.

[I]t was their commitment to and practice of open, dispassionate, informed, and reasoned discussion of public questions which made their achievements possible. Their rhetoric, in other words, was not a mere by-product of their accomplishments: rather, their accomplishments were the product of their rhetorical interchange. 85

In addition to illustrating the conformity of Hamilton’s writings with Aristotelian standards, his maturation as a rhetorician, and the symbiotic relationship between his oratory and statecraft, McDonald provides a compelling argument for placing greater stress on the rhetorical character of the Founders’ writings. “Historians,” he writes, “have paid too much attention to the ‘justice of their reasonsings’ and not enough to their ‘vehemence.'” In neglecting the later—the “disdain, anger, boldness, freedom, involved in a continual stream of argument”—students of the Revolutionary era had failed to credit the instrumental role of rhetoric in shaping the course of the American Founding. To seriously examine the rhetoric of the Founders, particularly as an instrument of statecraft and nation-building, would, according to McDonald, represent “an enormous contribution to our understanding of them.” 86

Despite the suggestiveness of McDonald’s remarks, his call for a rhetorical approach to the political literature of the American Founding failed to resonate with students of the period. As for The Federalist specifically, a decade would pass before the papers were examined in the spirit of McDonald’s injunction. Of the numerous books and articles on The Federalist published in the 1980s, only a few bothered to address the rhetorical nature of the work.

In his preface to The Authority of Publius (1984), Albert Furtwangler did propose to “reassess these papers by looking closely at their form—by recognizing the literary strategies that shape their arguments and the conventions of political journalism which give meaning to the series as a whole.” 87 Yet as an ostensible study of the work’s “rhetoric and structure,” Furtwangler’s alternative “reading” promised more than it delivered. Often indistinguishable in its analysis from conventional (non-rhetorical) approaches, The Authority of Publius suffers from a series of ambiguities. On one hand, the papers are said to “reflect a timely approach to a very particular occasion,” and “share a commonplace eighteenth-century form.” On the other hand, however, the papers are singled out as “unique among the arguments over ratification,” and credited with having “modified the tradition of eighteenth-century newspaper campaigning.” Further ambiguity is apparent in Furtwangler’s observation that The Federalist was a failure from the standpoint of “propaganda,” but as a “campaign effort” directed at confronting the objections of the Constitution’s opponents, “it is hard to see how it could have been surpassed.” Similarly, for all the “tension of arguments that are not conclusive,” the occasionally “strained, rhetorical, and legalistic” answers, the transformations “in the course of [the papers] development,” and the fact that Hamilton and Madison wrote “against their deepest convictions,” the papers “remain very consistent if one looks upon them as efforts of active statesmanship, as high political rhetoric.” 88

While there are solid grounds for Furtwangler’s conclusion, it rubs against the grain of many of his specific observations. Moreover, the assertion that the “authority” of The Federalist lies less with the sanctity of its doctrines, wisdom of its insights, erudition of its authors, or soundness of its arguments, and more with Publius’s “imaginative grasp of how to address an American audience” is dubious on face—and too vague to bear scrutiny. As an epitaph for The Federalist , it is only slightly less amorphous than the claim that “the authority of Publius is strong because of his high civility.” 89

Just as Furtwangler’s “reading” of Publius failed to tangibly augment our understanding of The Federalist as a work of deliberative rhetoric, Paul Peterson’s “rhetorical” reading of the tenth paper constitutes a similar disappointment. Like Furtwangler, Peterson correctly observes that the “rhetorical dimension” of the papers had been largely ignored, and proposes to “recover the rhetorical design of Federalist No. 10 and to show the relationship of that design to the essay’s theoretical teaching.” 90 While his analysis represents a competent summary of Madison’s famous argument, it is largely indistinguishable from the many accounts that make no claim to “recover” the paper’s rhetorical element. No less than Furtwangler, Peterson shows no real interest in relating The Federalist to classical or conventional categories of deliberative rhetoric, and simply ignores the important work of Aly, Faust, Scanlon, and McDonald. 91 More substantive is Daniel Howe’s discussion of “The Political Psychology of The Federalist ,” in which many of the general observations of Faust and Scanlon are recapitulated under the rubric of eighteenth-century “faculty” psychology. Drawing on the influential work of J. G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner, who sought to understand early modern political thought in terms of “language paradigms” and “historical setting,” Howe claimed to have found the key to “the original meaning and context” of The Federalist ‘s core terminology in the “new rhetoric” associated with eighteenth-century Scottish “common-sense” philosophy. 92

In addition to echoing Scanlon’s observations on Publius’s need to “combine rationality with motivation in order to persuade effectively,” Howe addressed the manner in which Publius “defined his audience” with the same intent. On one hand, Publius “credits his audience with being members of the wise and virtuous elite,” yet gives little support for the presumption that he viewed the majority of his readers, much less the American people at large, truly worthy of the appellation. As Howe notes, the frank recognition that “political institutions must take account of the perversity of human nature posed a great problem for the political advocate. How could one persuade the public to adopt the institutions it so sorely needed?” Howe claims that Publius “found the key to his rhetorical problem in eighteenth-century faculty psychology, in the concept of enlightened self-interest.” Implicit in this solution—which entailed enlisting “prudential motives on the side of reason and virtue”—was the articulation of arguments aimed at two separate audiences: “the direct audience of dispassionate inquirers and the larger, indirect audience capable of enlightened self-interest.” While the former could be expected to support the Constitution on largely rational grounds, the latter might be persuaded to do so on the basis of prudential considerations, and thereby assist in containing the “passionate multitude” who often mistook their own self-interest or nourished untoward motives. Yet unlike Hugh Blair, the influential Scot rhetorician who advocated a judicious appeal to the passions in persuasive speech, Howe observes that “Publius does not invoke them; indeed, he deplores them.” 93

As we shall see, the notion that Publius does not appeal to the “passions” of his readers, that his “own rhetoric is coldly and carefully rationalistic,” will not withstand scrutiny. Yet Howe’s emphasis on the intellectual context of The Federalist ‘s oratory, and the strategic considerations of its authors, provides additional grounds for a rhetorical reading of the papers. A similar impetus may be found in the work of political theorist Judith Shklar, who contra Howe argues that Publius not only made calculated appeals to the passions of his audience, but was even guilty of alarmism. Unlike the Antifederalists, who “did not see immediate dangers ahead, but anticipated distant, irreversible consequences” attending the adoption of the Constitution, it was “Publius who saw utter disaster around every corner threatening the thirteen states. Military danger from abroad, corruption by foreign agents, and war among the states were the immediate dangers in his view.” According to Shklar, it was on the basis of such fear-mongering that “Publius and the federalists generally were perceived as rash and visionary” by the Constitution’s opponents. 94

In a subsequent essay on “Alexander Hamilton and the Language of Political Science,” Shklar did not directly address The Federalist but did underscore Hamilton’s vital role in “setting the terms of what is now called political science.” In contrast to McDonald and Howe, who suggest that the key elements of the Founders’ political vocabulary (e.g., reason, experience, passion, interest, virtue) have changed so dramatically that contemporary readers are bound to be mislead without the assistance of Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary or an immersion in Scottish philosophy, Shklar marvels at the “continuity of the language of social science”—that “the structure of political discourse has changed so little” since the days of the Founding. Shklar also touches on the general character of Hamilton’s discourse, locating its roots in “Baconian” science and historical reasoning. 95 While Aly and McDonald summarized Hamilton’s rhetoric in greater detail and in accordance with classical categories, Shklar highlighted the deliberative dimension of The Federalist and lent support to the notion that its rhetorical nature may be sufficiently grasped without an ex

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The federalist no. 56, [16 february 1788], the federalist no. 56 1 by james madison or alexander hamilton.

[New York, February 16, 1788]

To the People of the State of New-York.

THE second charge against the House of Representatives is, that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents.

As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed number of representatives, with the great extent of the United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests, without taking into view at the same time the circumstances which will distinguish the Congress from other legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given to it, will be a brief explanation of these peculiarities.

It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no farther than to those circumstances and interests, to which the authority and care of the representative relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative trust. In determining the extent of information required in the exercise of a particular authority, recourse then must be had to the objects within the purview of that authority.

What are to be the objects of federal legislation? Those which are of most importance, and which seem most to require local knowledge, are commerce, taxation, and the militia.

A proper regulation of commerce requires much information, as has been elsewhere remarked; 2 but as far as this information relates to the laws and local situation of each individual state, a very few representatives would be very 3 sufficient vehicles of it to the federal councils.

Taxation will consist, in great measure, of duties which will be involved in the regulation of commerce. So far the preceding remark is applicable to this object. As far as it may consist of internal collections, a more diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of the state may be necessary. But will not this also be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men diffusively elected within the state. Divide the largest state into ten or twelve districts, and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local interest in either, which will not be within the knowledge of the representative of the district. Besides this source of information, the laws of the state framed by representatives from every part of it, will be almost of themselves a sufficient guide. In every state there have been made, and must continue to be made, regulations on this subject, which will in many cases leave little more to be done by the federal legislature, than to review the different laws, and reduce them into one general act. A skilful individual in his closet, with all the local codes before him, might compile a law on some subjects of taxation for the whole union, without any aid from oral information; and it may be expected, that whenever internal taxes may be necessary, and particularly in cases requiring uniformity throughout the states, the more simple objects will be preferred. To be fully sensible of the facility which will be given to this branch of federal legislation, by the assistance of the state codes, we need only suppose for a moment, that this or any other state were divided into a number of parts, each having and exercising within itself a power of local legislation. Is it not evident that a degree of local information and preparatory labour would be found in the several volumes of their proceedings, which would very much shorten the labours of the general legislature, and render a much smaller number of members sufficient for it? The federal councils will derive great advantage from another circumstance. The representatives of each state will not only bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and a local knowledge of their respective districts; but will probably in all cases have been members, and may even at the very time be members of the state legislature, where all the local information and interests of the state are assembled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the legislature of the United States.

The observations made on the subject of taxation apply with greater force to the case of the militia. For however different the rules of discipline may be in different states; They are the same throughout each particular state; and depend on circumstances which can differ but little in different parts of the same state. 4

The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives, does not in any respect contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the extensive information which the representatives ought to possess, and the time that might be necessary for acquiring it. 5 This information, so far as it may relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and difficult, not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a single state; but of those among different states. Taking each state by itself, its laws are the same, and its interests but little diversified. A few men therefore will possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper representation of them. Were the interests and affairs of each individual state, perfectly simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in one part would involve a knowledge of them in every other, and the whole state might be competently represented, by a single member taken from any part of it. On a comparison of the different states together, we find a great dissimilarity in their laws, and in many other circumstances connected with the objects of federal legislation, with all of which the federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance. Whilst a few representatives therefore from each state may bring with them a due knowledge of their own state, every representative will have much information to acquire concerning all the other states. The changes of time, as was formerly remarked, 6 on the comparative situation of the different states, will have an assimilating effect. 7 The effect of time on the internal affairs of the states taken singly, will be just the contrary. At present some of the states are little more than a society of husbandmen. Few of them have made much progress in those branches of industry, which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation. These however will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced population; and will require on the part of each state a fuller representation. The foresight of the Convention has accordingly taken care that the progress of population may be accompanied with a proper increase of the representative branch of the government.

The experience of Great Britain which presents to mankind so many political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary kind, and which has been frequently consulted in the course of these enquiries, corroborates the result of the reflections which we have just made. The number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland, cannot be stated at less than eight millions. The representatives of these eight millions in the House of Commons, amount to five hundred fifty eight. Of this number one ninth are elected by three hundred and sixty four persons, and one half by five thousand seven hundred and twenty three persons. * It cannot be supposed that the half thus elected, and who do not even reside among the people at large, can add any thing either to the security of the people against the government; or to the knowledge of their circumstances and interests, in the legislative councils. On the contrary it is notorious that they are more frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive magistrate, than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights. They might therefore with great propriety be considered as something more than a mere deduction from the real representatives of the nation. We will however consider them, in this light alone, and will not extend the deduction, to a considerable number of others, who do not reside among their constituents, are very faintly connected with them, and have very little particular knowledge of their affairs. With all these concessions two hundred and seventy nine persons only will be the depository of the safety, interest and happiness of eight millions; that is to say: There will be one representative only to maintain the rights and explain the situation of twenty eight thousand six hundred and seventy constituents, in an assembly exposed to the whole force of executive influence, and extending its authority to every object of legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree diversified and complicated. Yet it is very certain not only that a valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these circumstances, but that the defects in the British code are chargeable in a very small proportion, on the ignorance of the legislature concerning the circumstances of the people. Allowing to this case the weight which is due to it: And comparing it with that of the House of Representatives as above explained, it seems to give the fullest assurance that a representative for every thirty thousand inhabitants will render the latter both a safe and competent guardian of the interests which will be confided to it.

The [New York] Independent Journal: or, the General Advertiser , February 16, 1788. This essay appeared in New-York Packet on February 19. In the McLean description begins The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788). description ends edition this essay is numbered 56, in the newspapers it is numbered 55.

1 .  For background to this document, see “The Federalist. Introductory Note,” October 27, 1787–May 28, 1788 .

Essay 56 is one of those disputed essays the authorship of which cannot be assigned on the basis of internal evidence to either Madison or H. Edward G. Bourne (“The Authorship of the Federalist,” The American Historical Review , II [April, 1897], 453) gives the following example to demonstrate Madison’s authorship:

Bourne argues that because the Constitution assigned Virginia ten representatives and New York six, Madison would be more likely than H to use the figure ten as an example. He further states that some months later in the New York Ratifying Convention H in illustrating the adequacy of the representation provided by the Constitution spoke of a state as being divided into six districts. The argument is not convincing because the author of essay 56 spoke of “ten or twelve districts” which might mean, using the same kind of logic employed by Bourne, that H, unlike Madison, did not remember the exact number of districts into which Virginia was divided; also, in the same paragraph in essay 56 it is stated, “suppose … that this or any other state were divided into a number of parts …,” a statement which suggests that the author arbitrarily had selected his figures. Bourne also adduces as evidence of Madison’s authorship the fact that in the closing paragraph of this essay the word “monitory … almost a favorite word with Madison,” is used. For an example of H’s use of the same word, see note 36 to “The Federalist. Introductory Note,” October 27, 1787–May 28, 1788 .

J. C. Hamilton ( The Federalist , I, cxxviii), also using internal evidence, gives the following example to prove that essay 56 was written by H:

One might give as further evidence of H’s authorship the fact that in revising the essays for publication by McLean he deleted paragraph seven and substituted another paragraph for it. Although in the McLean description begins The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788). description ends edition H occasionally altered or changed a word in Madison’s essays, in no other instance did he make a major change. Had he not believed that he was the author of the essay, one might argue, it is unlikely he would have made the substitution.

As suggested by the research of Bourne and J. C. Hamilton, however, the evidence is contradictory. One could, for example, indicate passages that are remarkably similar to statements made by H in essay 36; one could, on the other hand, point out statements which are almost the same as statements made by Madison in essay 53. An example of these similarities follows:

Examples might be multiplied, but they would all lead to the same question: Did Madison borrow from essay 36, or did H borrow from essay 53? The question, it seems, is not susceptible of an answer. Both Bourne and Douglass Adair (“The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers,” Part II, The William and Mary Quarterly , I [July, 1944], 260) give as evidence for Madison’s authorship a reference to James Burgh’s Political Disquisitions . They argue that because the Virginian took notes from Burgh in his “Additional Memorandum for the Convention of Virginia” ( Madison, Letters description begins James Madison, Letters and Other Writings of James Madison (Philadelphia, 1867). description ends , I, 393, note), and because no reference to Burgh can be found in the writings of H, Madison must have written essay 56. The argument is based on the erroneous assumption that because H did not again refer to Burgh in other writings he could not have read him. In the first place, there is no positive evidence that H had not read Burgh and, in the second place, H referred in The Federalist to many authors who are not mentioned in his other writings. For example, in essay 70 , definitely written by H, there is a reference to “the celebrated Junius,” the famous English letter writer of the eighteenth century. So far as can be determined, H made no other reference to Junius.

Since one can demonstrate the authorship of either man by carefully looking for parallels in his other writings, it is obvious that internal evidence cannot decide the problem of authorship. For the reasons why Madison’s claim to the authorship of this essay outweighs (but does not necessarily obviate) that of H, see “The Federalist. Introductory Note,” October 27, 1787–May 28, 1788 .

2 .  See essay 53 .

3 .  “very” omitted in Hopkins description begins The Federalist On The New Constitution. By Publius. Written in 1788. To Which is Added, Pacificus, on The Proclamation of Neutrality. Written in 1793. Likewise, The Federal Constitution, With All the Amendments. Revised and Corrected. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by George F. Hopkins, at Washington’s Head, 1802). description ends .

4 .  The following was substituted in McLean description begins The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, As Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787. In Two Volumes (New York: Printed and Sold by J. and A. McLean, 1788). description ends and Hopkins for this paragraph:

“With regard to the regulation of the militia, there are scarcely any circumstances in reference to which local knowledge can be said to be necessary. The general face of the country, whether mountainous or level, most fit for the operations of infantry or cavalry, is almost the only consideration of this nature that can occur. The art of war teaches general principles of organization, movement, and discipline, which apply universally.”

5 .  See essay 53 .

6 .  See essay 53 .

7 .  “tendency” substituted for “effect” in Hopkins.

8 .  The reference is to James Burgh, Political Disquisitions: Or, an Enquiry into public Errors, Defects, and Abuses … (London, 1774), I, 45, 48.

Authorial notes

[The following note(s) appeared in the margins or otherwise outside the text flow in the original source, and have been moved here for purposes of the digital edition.]

*   Burgh’s polit. disquis. 8

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The Federalist Papers

By alexander hamilton , james madison , john jay, the federalist papers summary and analysis of essay 51.

James Madison begins his famous federalist paper by explaining that the purpose of this essay is to help the readers understand how the structure of the proposed government makes liberty possible. Each branch should be, in Madison's opinion, mostly independent. To assure such independence, no one branch should have too much power in selecting members of the other two branches. If this principle were strictly followed, it would mean that the citizens should select the president, the legislators, and the judges. But the framers recognized certain practical difficulties in making every office elective. In particular, the judicial branch would suffer because the average person is not aware of the qualifications judges should possess. Judges should have great ability, but also be free of political pressures. Since federal judges are appointed for life, their thinking will not be influenced by the president who appoints them, nor the senators whose consent the president will seek.

The members of each branch should not be too dependent on the members of the other two branches in the determination of their salaries. The best security against a gradual concentration of power in any one branch is to provide constitutional safeguards that would make such concentration difficult. The constitutional rights of all must check one man's personal interests and ambitions. We may not like to admit that men abuse power, but the very need for government itself proves they do: "if men were angels, no government would be necessary." Unfortunately, all men are imperfect, the rulers and the ruled. Consequently, the great problem in framing a government is that the government must be able to control the people, but equally important, must be forced to control itself. The dependence of the government on the will of the people is undoubtedly the best control, but experience teaches that other controls are necessary.

Dividing power helps to check its growth in any one direction, but power cannot be divided absolutely equally. In the republican form of government, the legislative branch tends to be the most powerful. That is why the framers divided the Congress into two branches, the House of Representatives and the Senate, and provided for a different method of election in each branch. Further safeguards against legislative tyranny may be necessary.

In a representative democracy it is not only important to guard against the oppression of rulers, it is equally important to guard against the injustice which may be inflicted by certain citizens or groups. Majorities often threaten the rights of minorities. There are only two methods of avoiding evil. The first is to construct a powerful government, a "community will." Such a "will' is larger than, and independent of, the simple majority. This "solution" is dangerous because such a government might throw its power behind a group in society working against the public good. In our country, the authority to govern comes from the entire society. In addition, under the Constitution society is divided into many groups of people who hold different views and have different interests. This makes it very difficult for one group to dominate or threaten the minority groups.

Justice is the purpose of government and civil society. If government allows or encourages strong groups to combine together against the weak, liberty will be lost and anarchy will result. And the condition of anarchy tempts even strong individuals and groups to submit to any form of government, no matter how bad, which they hope will protect them as well as the weak.

Madison concludes that self-government flourishes in a large country containing many different groups. Some countries are too large for self-government, but the proposed plan modifies the federal principle enough to make self-government both possible and practical in the United States.

In this essay, Madison's thoughts on factionalism are delineated clearly. As we observed earlier, he assumed that conflicts of interests are inherent in human nature, and he recognized that, as a consequence, people fall into various groups. He wanted to avoid a situation in which any one group controlled the decisions of a society. Free elections and the majority principle protected the country from dictatorship, that is, the tyranny of a minority. However, he was equally concerned about the greater risk of tyranny of the majority. A central institutional issue for him was how to minimize this risk.

Madison's solution characteristically relied not only on formal institutions, which could be designed, but also on the particular sociological structure of American society, which he took as a fortunate starting point for the framers of the new constitution. The institutional component in his solution was checks and balances, so that there were multiple entry points into the government and multiple ways to offset the power that any one branch of the government might otherwise acquire over another. In this system, "the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on each other."

These institutional arrangements were reinforced by the sociological fact that the Republic contained a multiplicity of interests that could, and did, offset one another: "While all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority." It is good that there are many group interests; that they be numerous is less important than that they be impermanent and shifting alliances whose components vary with the specific policy issue.

Madison commenced the statement of his theory in Federalist 51 with an acknowledgement that the "have nots" in any society are extremely likely to attack the "haves." Like Hamilton, the Virginian believed class struggle to be inseparable from politics. "It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard against the oppression of its rulers," Madison writes, "but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest the rights of the minority will be insecure."

Madison, it is clear, had emancipated himself from the sterile dualistic view of society that was so common in the eighteenth century and that so obsessed Hamilton. Madison was one of the pioneers of "pluralism" in political thought. Where Hamilton saw the corporate spirit of the several states as poisonous to the union, Madison was aware that the preservation of the state governments could serve the cause of both liberty and union. Finally, the vastness of the United States, a fact that Hamilton considered the prime excuse for autocracy, was recognized by Madison as the surest preservative of liberty. To assert after reading this passage that Alexander Hamilton wrote Federalist 51 is to imply, first, that he was a magician in mimicking Madison's very words and tone of vote, and second that he was the most disingenuous hypocrite that ever wrote on politics. No unprejudiced or informed historian would accept this latter charge against Hamilton.

It is interesting to note that the Federalist papers are unique, as shown in this paper, because of the extreme amount of thought that was put into the design of the Constitution, as shown in Madison's original thought process that were penned in 51. Many, if not most, changes in institutional design, occur as the reactions of shortsighted people to what they perceive as more-or-less short-range needs. This is one reason the Constitutional Convention was a remarkable event. The Founding Fathers set out deliberately to design the form of government that would be most likely to bring about the long-range goals that they envisaged for the Republic. What is most unusual about Madison, in contrast to the other delegates, is the degree to which he thought about the principles behind the institutions he preferred. Not only did he practice the art of what nowadays is deemed institutional design, but he developed, as well, the outlines of a theory of institutional design that culminated in this essay.

The Federalist Papers Questions and Answers

The Question and Answer section for The Federalist Papers is a great resource to ask questions, find answers, and discuss the novel.

how are conflictstoo often decided in unstable government? Whose rights are denied when this happens?

In a typical non-democratic government with political instability, the conflicts are often decided by the person highest in power, who abuse powers or who want to seize power. Rival parties fight each other to the detriment of the country.

How Madison viewed human nature?

Madison saw depravity in human nature, but he saw virtue as well. His view of human nature may have owed more to John Locke than to John Calvin. In any case, as Saul K. Padover asserted more than a half-century ago, Madison often appeared to steer...

How arguable and provable is the author of cato 4 claim

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Study Guide for The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers study guide contains a biography of Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, literature essays, a complete e-text, quiz questions, major themes, characters, and a full summary and analysis.

• About The Federalist Papers
• The Federalist Papers Summary
• The Federalist Papers Video
• Character List

Essays for The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers essays are academic essays for citation. These papers were written primarily by students and provide critical analysis of The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.

• A Close Reading of James Madison's The Federalist No. 51 and its Relevancy Within the Sphere of Modern Political Thought
• Lock, Hobbes, and the Federalist Papers
• Comparison of Federalist Paper 78 and Brutus XI
• The Paradox of the Republic: A Close Reading of Federalist 10
• Manipulation of Individual Citizen Motivations in the Federalist Papers

Lesson Plan for The Federalist Papers

• About the Author
• Study Objectives
• Common Core Standards
• Introduction to The Federalist Papers
• Relationship to Other Books
• Bringing in Technology
• Notes to the Teacher
• Related Links
• The Federalist Papers Bibliography

E-Text of The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers e-text contains the full text of The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.

• FEDERALIST. Nos. 1-5
• FEDERALIST. Nos. 6-10
• FEDERALIST. Nos. 11-15
• FEDERALIST. Nos. 16-20
• FEDERALIST. Nos. 21-25

Wikipedia Entries for The Federalist Papers

• Introduction
• Structure and content
• Judicial use
• Complete list

Home — Essay Samples — Government & Politics — Political Participation — Anti Federalists vs. Federalists

Anti Federalists Vs. Federalists

• Categories: Political Participation

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Words: 1554 |

Published: Jul 17, 2018

Words: 1554 | Pages: 3 | 8 min read

The essay analyzes the ideological and historical conflict between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists in the early years of the United States. This division emerged in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War when the country faced economic challenges due to the war's cost and resulting debt. Anti-Federalists, primarily from rural areas, opposed the development of a strong federal government and instead advocated for power to remain with state and local governments. On the other hand, Federalists, often wealthy individuals from larger urban areas, supported a stronger national government and the ratification of the Constitution as a means to manage post-Revolution debt and tensions effectively.

The essay draws parallels between this historical division and contemporary political divides, such as Democrats vs. Republicans, highlighting how differing socioeconomic groups tended to align with one side or the other. It emphasizes the economic and political context of the time, where the Articles of Confederation proved insufficient in governing the young nation.

The essay also discusses the role of key figures like Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, as well as the debates surrounding the ratification of the Constitution, leading to the inclusion of the Bill of Rights. It highlights the Federalists' belief in the necessity of a strong national government while preserving state sovereignty.

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Echoes of Dissent: the Anti-Federalist Narrative Reimagined

This essay about the Anti-Federalist movement sheds light on their diverse perspectives and concerns regarding the proposed United States Constitution. It explores their staunch advocacy for individual liberties, states’ rights, and the need for checks and balances to prevent tyranny. Through a rich tapestry of voices, from prominent leaders to ordinary citizens, the essay reveals the depth of dissent that shaped early American democracy. Ultimately, it highlights the enduring legacy of the Anti-Federalists in shaping the nation’s governance and the adoption of the Bill of Rights as a testament to their advocacy for fundamental freedoms and accountable government.

How it works

Within the annals of American history lies a tale of dissent, woven from the threads of individual liberty, state sovereignty, and the quest for accountable governance. The Anti-Federalist movement, a heterogeneous coalition of voices, stands as a testament to the enduring struggle against centralized authority and the preservation of fundamental freedoms. In reimagining their narrative, we unearth a mosaic of perspectives that enrich our understanding of the complexities inherent in the forging of a young nation.

At its core, Anti-Federalist ideology springs from a deep-rooted skepticism towards concentrated power and its potential for encroachment upon the rights of the individual.

Emerging in the wake of revolutionary fervor, Anti-Federalists found themselves at odds with the proposed Constitution, wary of its perceived deficiencies in safeguarding against governmental overreach. Their clarion call for a Bill of Rights resonated with a belief in the inalienable rights of all citizens, including the freedom of expression, religion, and the press. Through their advocacy, Anti-Federalists sought to imbue the fabric of the fledgling republic with the principles of liberty and justice for all.

Beyond their commitment to individual freedoms, Anti-Federalists championed the cause of state sovereignty, viewing it as a bulwark against the homogenizing forces of federal authority. They feared that a centralized government, divorced from the realities of local governance, would erode the autonomy of states and diminish their capacity to address the unique needs of their diverse populations. This conviction, born of a profound respect for the inherent wisdom of local communities, underscored Anti-Federalists’ vision of a nation built upon the foundation of decentralized power and participatory democracy.

Central to the Anti-Federalist critique of the Constitution was the specter of unchecked power and the attendant threat of tyranny. Drawing inspiration from the lessons of history, Anti-Federalists warned against the perils of entrusting authority to a select few, advocating instead for a system of government characterized by robust checks and balances. Their proposals, which included measures such as term limits for elected officials and the equitable distribution of power between federal and state governments, sought to temper the allure of absolute power with the sobering reality of accountability.

The tapestry of Anti-Federalist thought encompassed a diverse array of voices, from the lofty rhetoric of statesmen to the quiet resolve of ordinary citizens. Figures such as Patrick Henry and George Mason emerged as luminaries within the movement, their impassioned pleas for liberty reverberating across the political landscape. Yet, the heart of the Anti-Federalist cause beat not in the halls of power but in the hearts of the people, whose collective yearning for self-determination propelled the movement forward. It was in the taverns and town squares, amidst the clamor of debate and dissent, that the true spirit of Anti-Federalism found expression.

In hindsight, the Anti-Federalist movement serves as a testament to the enduring power of dissent in shaping the course of history. While the Constitution ultimately prevailed, the principles espoused by Anti-Federalists found resonance in the adoption of the Bill of Rights, which enshrined essential freedoms and safeguards against governmental overreach. The legacy of their struggle endures, a reminder of the perpetual tension between authority and autonomy, unity and diversity, that lies at the heart of the American experiment.

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Guest Essay

How Trump’s Team Blew It

By Renato Mariotti

Mr. Mariotti, a partner at Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner in Chicago, is a former federal prosecutor.

The criminal trial of Donald Trump didn’t have to end this way.

The prosecution’s case had flaws that couldn’t be wallpapered over even with weeks of testimony, over 200 exhibits and a polished and persuasive presentation by Alvin Bragg, the Manhattan district attorney, and his team. If Mr. Trump’s lawyers had played their cards right, they most likely would have ended up with a hung jury or a misdemeanor conviction.

The defense lost a winnable case by adopting an ill-advised strategy that was right out of Mr. Trump’s playbook. For years, he denied everything and attacked anyone who dared to take him on. It worked — until this case.

I have practiced criminal law for over 20 years, and I have tried and won cases as both a federal prosecutor and criminal defense attorney. I’ve almost never seen the defense win without a compelling counternarrative. Jurors often want to side with prosecutors, who have the advantage of writing the indictment, marshaling the witnesses and telling the story.

The defense needs its own story, and in my experience, the side that tells the simpler story at trial usually wins.

Instead of telling a simple story, Mr. Trump’s defense was a haphazard cacophony of denials and personal attacks. That may work for a Trump rally or a segment on Fox News, but it doesn’t work in a courtroom. Perhaps Mr. Trump’s team was also pursuing a political or press strategy, but it certainly wasn’t a good legal strategy. The powerful defense available to Mr. Trump’s attorneys was lost amid all the clutter.

At the beginning of the trial, Mr. Trump’s team had a clear path to victory. He was charged with 34 counts of falsifying business records related to the cover-up of a $130,000 hush-money payment that was made to the porn star Stormy Daniels. Yet the only direct evidence of Mr. Trump’s knowledge was the testimony of Michael Cohen — who has pleaded guilty to lying to Congress and charges of bank fraud, tax evasion and campaign finance violation — who hates Mr. Trump and makes money off his public commentary on Mr. Trump’s legal woes.

You don’t need to be a lawyer to see how this could be a powerful legal defense. The prosecution had to prove that Mr. Trump knew about and caused — or at least was an accomplice in creating — the false business records. But at the time the records were created, Mr. Trump was in the White House. The defense could argue that Mr. Cohen and Allen Weisselberg, the Trump Organization’s chief financial officer, who has pleaded guilty to lying under oath and tax fraud, came up with that scheme on their own. Mr. Trump, his lawyers could argue, was focused on his role as president.

Mr. Trump’s team did say something similar at various points in the trial, including during Todd Blanche’s roughly three-hour closing argument. The problem is that the defense made so many other points, and fought so many other things, that it failed to focus the jury on the weaknesses in the prosecution’s case and instead tried to fight everything and everyone, even when it gained little by doing so.

Although the prosecution’s evidence of Mr. Trump’s personal approval of the falsification of business records was thin, the evidence for most of the other relevant facts was rock solid. Yet the defense destroyed its own credibility by denying the undeniable, as in its laughable claim that the large lump-sum payments to Mr. Cohen really were payments for legal services, including the amount that he embezzled from Mr. Trump.

The trial dragged on for weeks largely because of Mr. Trump’s “deny everything” approach. A savvy defense counsel would have stipulated that Mr. Trump had an intimate affair with Ms. Daniels. Instead, the defense forced the prosecution to prove that the affair occurred and proceeded to aggressively attack Ms. Daniels, whom some of the jury likely found sympathetic in her testimony. That attack gained no ground legally for the defense — little turned on whether Mr. Trump had a sexual encounter with her — but distracted from his actual defense.

Similarly, the cross-examination of Mr. Cohen dragged on for days because the defense sought to confront him with every lie it could identify, seemingly every misdeed he ever committed and every potential line of attack it could come up with.

Because the defense denied everything and attacked Mr. Cohen on every point, prosecutors were able to focus on the many points where Mr. Cohen’s testimony was corroborated by documents, phone records, text messages and a recording. If the defense had narrowly focused on the key points on which that testimony was not corroborated, it could have undermined the prosecution’s advantage.

It may be that a not-guilty verdict was always a long shot. But if the defense had been more effective, one of the two lawyers on the jury might have voted to acquit, all that is needed for a hung jury. Or perhaps the jury would have compromised and rendered a verdict that Mr. Trump committed only a misdemeanor, which most defense attorneys would view as a win, given the circumstances.

But Mr. Trump’s team went for broke, deciding not to seek a jury instruction that would have permitted jurors to find that Mr. Trump committed a misdemeanor rather than a felony. It’s unclear whether that decision to deny the jury an option that would have given the defense a win was an act of hubris or a refusal to compromise, but both are characteristics of Mr. Trump that don’t translate well into a criminal trial.

Mr. Trump’s team was a reflection of its client, always attacking and never backing down. That playbook has worked for Mr. Trump again and again. For this trial and in a Manhattan courtroom, the attitude and strategy backfired.

Renato Mariotti, a partner at Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner in Chicago, is a former federal prosecutor and a co-host with Asha Rangappa of the “It’s Complicated” podcast .

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

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