traffic assignment objective function

• school Campus Bookshelves
• menu_book Bookshelves
• perm_media Learning Objects
• login Login
• how_to_reg Request Instructor Account
• hub Instructor Commons

Margin Size

• Download Page (PDF)
• Download Full Book (PDF)
• Periodic Table
• Physics Constants
• Scientific Calculator
• Reference & Cite
• Tools expand_more
• Readability

selected template will load here

This action is not available.

3.6: 3-6 Route Choice

• Last updated
• Save as PDF
• Page ID 48085

• David Levinson et al.
• Associate Professor (Engineering) via Wikipedia

\( \newcommand{\vecs}[1]{\overset { \scriptstyle \rightharpoonup} {\mathbf{#1}} } \)

\( \newcommand{\vecd}[1]{\overset{-\!-\!\rightharpoonup}{\vphantom{a}\smash {#1}}} \)

\( \newcommand{\id}{\mathrm{id}}\) \( \newcommand{\Span}{\mathrm{span}}\)

( \newcommand{\kernel}{\mathrm{null}\,}\) \( \newcommand{\range}{\mathrm{range}\,}\)

\( \newcommand{\RealPart}{\mathrm{Re}}\) \( \newcommand{\ImaginaryPart}{\mathrm{Im}}\)

\( \newcommand{\Argument}{\mathrm{Arg}}\) \( \newcommand{\norm}[1]{\| #1 \|}\)

\( \newcommand{\inner}[2]{\langle #1, #2 \rangle}\)

\( \newcommand{\Span}{\mathrm{span}}\)

\( \newcommand{\id}{\mathrm{id}}\)

\( \newcommand{\kernel}{\mathrm{null}\,}\)

\( \newcommand{\range}{\mathrm{range}\,}\)

\( \newcommand{\RealPart}{\mathrm{Re}}\)

\( \newcommand{\ImaginaryPart}{\mathrm{Im}}\)

\( \newcommand{\Argument}{\mathrm{Arg}}\)

\( \newcommand{\norm}[1]{\| #1 \|}\)

\( \newcommand{\Span}{\mathrm{span}}\) \( \newcommand{\AA}{\unicode[.8,0]{x212B}}\)

\( \newcommand{\vectorA}[1]{\vec{#1}}      % arrow\)

\( \newcommand{\vectorAt}[1]{\vec{\text{#1}}}      % arrow\)

\( \newcommand{\vectorB}[1]{\overset { \scriptstyle \rightharpoonup} {\mathbf{#1}} } \)

\( \newcommand{\vectorC}[1]{\textbf{#1}} \)

\( \newcommand{\vectorD}[1]{\overrightarrow{#1}} \)

\( \newcommand{\vectorDt}[1]{\overrightarrow{\text{#1}}} \)

\( \newcommand{\vectE}[1]{\overset{-\!-\!\rightharpoonup}{\vphantom{a}\smash{\mathbf {#1}}}} \)

Route assignment , route choice , or traffic assignment concerns the selection of routes (alternative called paths) between origins and destinations in transportation networks. It is the fourth step in the conventional transportation forecasting model, following Trip Generation, Destination Choice, and Mode Choice. The zonal interchange analysis of trip distribution provides origin-destination trip tables. Mode choice analysis tells which travelers will use which mode. To determine facility needs and costs and benefits, we need to know the number of travelers on each route and link of the network (a route is simply a chain of links between an origin and destination). We need to undertake traffic (or trip) assignment. Suppose there is a network of highways and transit systems and a proposed addition. We first want to know the present pattern of travel times and flows and then what would happen if the addition were made.

Link Performance Function

The cost that a driver imposes on others is called the marginal cost. However, when making decisions, a driver only faces his own cost (the average cost) and ignores any costs imposed on others (the marginal cost).

• \[AverageCost=\dfrac{S_T}{Q}\]
• \[MarginalCost=\dfrac{\delta S_T}{\delta Q}\]

where \(S_T\) is the total cost, and \(Q\) is the flow.

BPR Link Performance Function

Suppose we are considering a highway network. For each link there is a function stating the relationship between resistance and volume of traffic. The Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) developed a link (arc) congestion (or volume-delay, or link performance) function, which we will term S a (Q a )

\[S_a(Q_a)=t_a(1+0.15\dfrac ({Q_a}{c_a})^4)\]

t a = free-flow travel time on link a per unit of time

Q a = flow (or volume) of traffic on link a per unit of time (somewhat more accurately: flow attempting to use link a )

c a = capacity of link a per unit of time

S a (Q a ) is the average travel time for a vehicle on link a

There are other congestion functions. The CATS has long used a function different from that used by the BPR, but there seems to be little difference between results when the CATS and BPR functions are compared.

Can Flow Exceed Capacity?

On a link, the capacity is thought of as “outflow.” Demand is inflow.

If inflow > outflow for a period of time, there is queueing (and delay).

For Example, for a 1 hour period, if 2100 cars arrive and 2000 depart, 100 are still there. The link performance function tries to represent that phenomenon in a simple way.

Wardrop's Principles of Equilibrium

User Equilibrium

Each user acts to minimize his/her own cost, subject to every other user doing the same. Travel times are equal on all used routes and lower than on any unused route.

• System optimal

Each user acts to minimize the total travel time on the system.

Price of Anarchy

The reason we have congestion is that people are selfish. The cost of that selfishness (when people behave according to their own interest rather than society's) is the price of anarchy .

The ratio of system-wide travel time under User Equilibrium and System Optimal conditions.

For a two-link network with linear link performance functions (latency functions), Price of Anarchy is < 4/3.

Is this too much? Should something be done, or is 33% waste acceptable? [The loss may be larger/smaller in other cases, under different assumptions, etc.]

Conservation of Flow

An important factor in road assignment is the conservation of flow. This means that the number of vehicles entering the intersection (link segment) equals the number of vehicles exiting the intersection for a given period of time (except for sources and sinks).

Similarly, the number of vehicles entering the back of the link equals the number exiting the front (over a long period of time).

Auto assignment

Long-standing techniques.

The above examples are adequate for a problem of two links, however real networks are much more complicated. The problem of estimating how many users are on each route is long standing. Planners started looking hard at it as freeways and expressways (motorways) began to be developed. The freeway offered a superior level of service over the local street system and diverted traffic from the local system. At first, diversion was the technique. Ratios of travel time were used, tempered by considerations of costs, comfort, and level of service.

The Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS) researchers developed diversion curves for freeways versus local streets. There was much work in California also, for California had early experiences with freeway planning. In addition to work of a diversion sort, the CATS attacked some technical problems that arise when one works with complex networks. One result was the Moore algorithm for finding shortest paths on networks.

The issue the diversion approach didn’t handle was the feedback from the quantity of traffic on links and routes. If a lot of vehicles try to use a facility, the facility becomes congested and travel time increases. Absent some way to consider feedback, early planning studies (actually, most in the period 1960-1975) ignored feedback. They used the Moore algorithm to determine shortest paths and assigned all traffic to shortest paths. That’s called all or nothing assignment because either all of the traffic from i to j moves along a route or it does not.

The all-or-nothing or shortest path assignment is not trivial from a technical-computational view. Each traffic zone is connected to n - 1 zones, so there are numerous paths to be considered. In addition, we are ultimately interested in traffic on links. A link may be a part of several paths, and traffic along paths has to be summed link by link.

An argument can be made favoring the all-or-nothing approach. It goes this way: The planning study is to support investments so that a good level of service is available on all links. Using the travel times associated with the planned level of service, calculations indicate how traffic will flow once improvements are in place. Knowing the quantities of traffic on links, the capacity to be supplied to meet the desired level of service can be calculated.

Heuristic procedures

To take account of the affect of traffic loading on travel times and traffic equilibria, several heuristic calculation procedures were developed. One heuristic proceeds incrementally. The traffic to be assigned is divided into parts (usually 4). Assign the first part of the traffic. Compute new travel times and assign the next part of the traffic. The last step is repeated until all the traffic is assigned. The CATS used a variation on this; it assigned row by row in the O-D table.

The heuristic included in the FHWA collection of computer programs proceeds another way.

• Step 0: Start by loading all traffic using an all or nothing procedure.
• Step 1: Compute the resulting travel times and reassign traffic.
• Step 2: Now, begin to reassign using weights. Compute the weighted travel times in the previous two loadings and use those for the next assignment. The latest iteration gets a weight of 0.25 and the previous gets a weight of 0.75.
• Step 3. Continue.

These procedures seem to work “pretty well,” but they are not exact.

Frank-Wolfe algorithm

Dafermos (1968) applied the Frank-Wolfe algorithm (1956, Florian 1976), which can be used to deal with the traffic equilibrium problem.

Equilibrium Assignment

To assign traffic to paths and links we have to have rules, and there are the well-known Wardrop equilibrium (1952) conditions. The essence of these is that travelers will strive to find the shortest (least resistance) path from origin to destination, and network equilibrium occurs when no traveler can decrease travel effort by shifting to a new path. These are termed user optimal conditions, for no user will gain from changing travel paths once the system is in equilibrium.

The user optimum equilibrium can be found by solving the following nonlinear programming problem

\[min \displaystyle \sum_{a} \displaystyle\int\limits_{0}^{v_a}S_a(Q_a)\, dx\]

subject to:

\[Q_a=\displaystyle\sum_{i}\displaystyle\sum_{j}\displaystyle\sum_{r}\alpha_{ij}^{ar}Q_{ij}^r\]

\[sum_{r}Q_{ij}^r=Q_{ij}\]

\[Q_a\ge 0, Q_{ij}^r\ge 0\]

where \(Q_{ij}^r\) is the number of vehicles on path r from origin i to destination j . So constraint (2) says that all travel must take place: i = 1 ... n; j = 1 ... n

\(\alpha_{ij}^{ar}\)= 1 if link a is on path r from i to j ; zero otherwise.

So constraint (1) sums traffic on each link. There is a constraint for each link on the network. Constraint (3) assures no negative traffic.

Transit assignment

There are also methods that have been developed to assign passengers to transit vehicles. In an effort to increase the accuracy of transit assignment estimates, a number of assumptions are generally made. Examples of these include the following:

• All transit trips are run on a set and predefined schedule that is known or readily available to the users.
• There is a fixed capacity associated with the transit service (car/trolley/bus capacity).

Solve for the flows on Links a and b in the Simple Network of two parallel links just shown if the link performance function on link a :

\(S_a=5+2*Q_a\)

and the function on link b :

\(S_b=10+Q_b\)

where total flow between the origin and destination is 1000 trips.

Time (Cost) is equal on all used routes so \(S_a=S_b\)

And we have Conservation of flow so, \(Q_a+Q_b=Q_o=Q_d=1000\)

\(5+2*(1000-Q_b)=10+Q_b\)

\(1995=3Q_b\)

\(Q_b=665;Q_a=335\)

An example from Eash, Janson, and Boyce (1979) will illustrate the solution to the nonlinear program problem. There are two links from node 1 to node 2, and there is a resistance function for each link (see Figure 1). Areas under the curves in Figure 2 correspond to the integration from 0 to a in equation 1, they sum to 220,674. Note that the function for link b is plotted in the reverse direction.

\(S_a=15(1+0.15(\dfrac{Q_a}{1000})^4)\)

\(S_b=20(1+0.15(\dfrac{Q_a}{3000})^4)\)

\(Q_a+Q_b=8000\)

Show graphically the equilibrium result.

At equilibrium there are 2,152 vehicles on link a and 5,847 on link b . Travel time is the same on each route: about 63.

Figure 3 illustrates an allocation of vehicles that is not consistent with the equilibrium solution. The curves are unchanged, but with the new allocation of vehicles to routes the shaded area has to be included in the solution, so the Figure 3 solution is larger than the solution in Figure 2 by the area of the shaded area.

Assume the traffic flow from Milwaukee to Chicago, is 15000 vehicles per hour. The flow is divided between two parallel facilities, a freeway and an arterial. Flow on the freeway is denoted \(Q_f\), and flow on the two-lane arterial is denoted \(Q_a\).

The travel time (in minutes) on the freeway (\(C_f\)) is given by:

\(C_f=10+Q_f/1500\)

\(C_a=15+Q_a/1000\)

Apply Wardrop's User Equilibrium Principle, and determine the flow and travel time on both routes.

The travel times are set equal to one another

\(C_f=C_a\)

\(10+Q_f/1500=15+Q_a/1000\)

The total traffic flow is equal to 15000

\(Q_f+Q_a=15000\)

\(Q_a=15000-Q_f\)

\(10+Q_f/1500=15+(15000-Q_f)/1000\)

Solve for \(Q_f\)

\(Q_f=60000/5=12000\)

\(Q_a=15000-Q_f=3000\)

Thought Questions

• How can we get drivers to consider their marginal cost?
• Alternatively: How can we get drivers to behave in a “System Optimal” way?

Sample Problems

Given a flow of six (6) units from origin “o” to destination “r”. Flow on each route ab is designated with Qab in the Time Function. Apply Wardrop's Network Equilibrium Principle (Users Equalize Travel Times on all used routes)

A. What is the flow and travel time on each link? (complete the table below) for Network A

Link Attributes

B. What is the system optimal assignment?

C. What is the Price of Anarchy?

What is the flow and travel time on each link? Complete the table below for Network A:

These four links are really 2 links O-P-R and O-Q-R, because by conservation of flow Qop = Qpr and Qoq = Qqr.

By Wardrop's Equilibrium Principle, the travel time (cost) on each used route must be equal. Therefore \(C_{opr}=C_{oqr}\)

OR \(25+6*Q_{opr}=20+7*Q_{oqr}\)

\(5+6*Q_{opr}=7*Q_{oqr}\)

\(Q_{oqr}=5/7+6*Q_{opr}/7\)

By the conservation of flow principle

\(Q_{oqr}+Q_{opr}=6\)

\(Q_{opr}=6-Q_{oqr}\)

By substitution

\Q_{oqr}=5/7+6/7(6-Q_{oqr})=41/7-6*Q_{oqr}/7\)

\(13*Q_{oqr}=41\)

\(Q_{oqr}=41/13=3.15\)

\(Q_{opr}=2.84\)

\(42.01=25+6(2.84)\)

\(42.05=20+7(3.15)\)

Check (within rounding error)

or expanding back to the original table:

User Equilibrium: Total Delay = 42.01 * 6 = 252.06

What is the system optimal assignment?

Conservation of Flow:

\(Q_{opr}+Q_{oqr}=6\)

\(TotalDelay=Q_{opr}(25+6*Q_{oqr})+Q_{oqr}(20+7*Q_{oqr})\)

\(25Q_{opr}+6Q_{opr}^2+(6_Q_{opr})(20+7(6-Q_{opr}))\)

\(25Q_{opr}+6Q_{opr}^2+(6_Q_{opr})(62-7Q_{opr}))\)

\(25Q_{opr}+6Q_{opr}^2+372-62Q_{opr}-42Q_{opr}+7Q_{opr}^2\)

\(13Q_{opr}^2-79Q_{opr}+372\)

Analytic Solution requires minimizing total delay

\(\deltaC/\deltaQ=26Q_{opr}-79=0\)

\(Q_{opr}=79/26-3.04\)

\(Q_{oqr}=6-Q_{opr}=2.96\)

And we can compute the SO travel times on each path

\(C_{opr,SO}=25+6*3.04=43.24\)

\(C_{opr,SO}=20+7*2.96=40.72\)

Note that unlike the UE solution, \(C_{opr,SO}\g C_{oqr,SO}\)

Total Delay = 3.04(25+ 6*3.04) + 2.96(20+7*2.96) = 131.45+120.53= 251.98

Note: one could also use software such as a "Solver" algorithm to find this solution.

What is the Price of Anarchy?

User Equilibrium: Total Delay =252.06 System Optimal: Total Delay = 251.98

Price of Anarchy = 252.06/251.98 = 1.0003 < 4/3

The Marcytown - Rivertown corridor was served by 3 bridges, according to the attached map. The bridge over the River on the route directly connecting Marcytown and Citytown collapsed, leaving two alternatives, via Donkeytown and a direct. Assume the travel time functions Cij in minutes, Qij in vehicles/hour, on the five links routes are as given.

Marcytown - Rivertown Cmr = 5 + Qmr/1000

Marcytown - Citytown (prior to collapse) Cmc = 5 + Qmc/1000

Marcytown - Citytown (after collapse) Cmr = ∞

Citytown - Rivertown Ccr = 1 + Qcr/500

Marcytown - Donkeytown Cmd = 7 + Qmd/500

Donkeytown - Rivertown Cdr = 9 + Qdr/1000

Also assume there are 10000 vehicles per hour that want to make the trip. If travelers behave according to Wardrops user equilibrium principle.

A) Prior to the collapse, how many vehicles used each route?

Route A (Marcytown-Rivertown) = Ca = 5 + Qa/1000

Route B (Marcytown-Citytown-Rivertown) = Cb = 5 + Qb/1000 + 1 + Qb/500 = 6 + 3Qb/1000

Route C (Marcytown-Donkeytown-Rivertown)= Cc = 7 + Qc/500 + 9 + Qc/1000 = 16 + 3Qc/1000

At equilibrium the travel time on all three used routes will be the same: Ca = Cb = Cc

We also know that Qa + Qb + Qc = 10000

Solving the above set of equations will provide the following results:

Qa = 8467;Qb = 2267;Qc = −867

We know that flow cannot be negative. By looking at the travel time equations we can see a pattern.

Even with a flow of 0 vehicles the travel time on route C(16 minutes) is higher than A or B. This indicates that vehicles will choose route A or B and we can ignore Route C.

Solving the following equations:

Route A (Marcytown-Rivertown) = Ca = 5 + Qa /1000

Route B (Marcytown-Citytown-Rivertown) = Cb = 6 + 3Qb /1000

Qa + Qb = 10000

We can the following values:

Qa = 7750; Qb = 2250; Qc = 0

B) After the collapse, how many vehicles used each route?

We now have only two routes, route A and C since Route B is no longer possible. We could solve the following equations:

Route C (Marcytown- Donkeytown-Rivertown) = Cc = 16 + 3Qc /1000

Qa+ Qc= 10000

But we know from above table that Route C is going to be more expensive in terms of travel time even with zero vehicles using that route. We can therefore assume that Route A is the only option and allocate all the 10,000 vehicles to Route A.

If we actually solve the problem using the above set of equations, you will get the following results:

Qa = 10250; Qc = -250

which again indicates that route C is not an option since flow cannot be negative.

C) After the collapse, public officials want to reduce inefficiencies in the system, how many vehicles would have to be shifted between routes? What is the “price of anarchy” in this case?

TotalDelayUE =(15)(10,000)=150,000

System Optimal

TotalDelaySO =(Qa)(5+Qa/1000)+(Qc)(16+3Qc/1000)

Using Qa + Qc = 10,000

TotalDelaySO =(Qa2)/250−71Qa+460000

Minimize total delay ∂((Qa2)/250 − 71Qa + 460000)/∂Qa = 0

Qa/125−7 → Qa = 8875 Qc = 1125 Ca = 13,875 Cc = 19,375

TotalDelaySO =144938

Price of Anarchy = 150,000/144,938 = 1.035

• \(C_T\) - total cost
• \(C_k\) - travel cost on link \(k\)
• \(Q_k\) - flow (volume) on link \(k\)

Abbreviations

• VDF - Volume Delay Function
• LPF - Link Performance Function
• BPR - Bureau of Public Roads
• UE - User Equilbrium
• SO - System Optimal
• DTA - Dynamic Traffic Assignment
• DUE - Deterministic User Equilibrium
• SUE - Stochastic User Equilibrium
• AC - Average Cost
• MC - Marginal Cost
• Route assignment, route choice, auto assignment
• Volume-delay function, link performance function
• User equilibrium
• Conservation of flow
• Average cost
• Marginal cost

External Exercises

Use the ADAM software at the STREET website and try Assignment #3 to learn how changes in network characteristics impact route choice.

Additional Questions

1. If trip distribution depends on travel times, and travel times depend on the trip table (resulting from trip distribution) that is assigned to the road network, how do we solve this problem (conceptually)?

2. Do drivers behave in a system optimal or a user optimal way? How can you get them to move from one to the other.

3. Identify a mechanism that can ensure the system optimal outcome is achieved in route assignment, rather than the user equilibrium. Why would we want such an outcome? What are the drawbacks to the mechanism you identified?

4. Assume the flow from Dakotopolis to New Fargo, is 5300 vehicles per hour. The flow is divided between two parallel facilities, a freeway and an arterial. Flow on the freeway is denoted \(Q_f\), and flow on the two-lane arterial is denoted \(Q_r\). The travel time on the freeway \(C_f\) is given by:

\(C_f=5+Q_f/1000\)

The travel time on the arterial (Cr) is given by

\(C_r=7+Q_r/500\)

(a) Apply Wardrop's User Equilibrium Principle, and determine the flow and travel time on both routes from Dakotopolis to New Fargo.

(b) Solve for the System Optimal Solution and determine the flow and travel time on both routes.

5. Given a flow of 10,000 vehicles from origin to destination traveling on three parallel routes. Flow on each route A, B, or C is designated with \(Q_a\), \(Q_b\), \(Q_c\) in the Time Function Respectively. Apply Wardrop's Network Equilibrium Principle (Users Equalize Travel Times on all used routes), and determine the flow on each route.

\(T_A=500+20Q_A\)

\(T_B=1000+10Q_B\)

\(T_C=2000+30Q_C\)

• How does average cost differ from marginal cost?
• How do System Optimal and User Equilibrium travel time differ?
• Why do we want people to behave in an SO way?
• How can you get people to behave in an SO way?
• Who was John Glen Wardrop?
• What are Wardrop’s Two Principles?
• What does conservation of flow require in route assignment?
• Can Variable Message Signs be used to encourage System Optimal behavior?
• What is freeflow travel time?
• If a problem has more than two routes, where does the extra equation come from?
• How can you determine if a route is unused?
• What is the difference between capacity and flow
• Draw a typical volume-delay function for a deterministic, static user equilibrium assignment.
• Can Q be negative?
• What is route assignment?
• Is it important that the output travel times from route choice be consistent with the input travel times for destination choice and mode choice? Why?

Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.

To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to  upgrade your browser .

Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

• We're Hiring!
• Help Center

Stochastic Traffic Assignment, Lagrangian Dual, and Unconstrained Convex Optimization

2012, Transportation Research Part B

In this paper, traffic assignment problems with stochastic travel cost perceptions are reformulated and investigated in a new unconstrained nonlinear programming formulation. The objective function of the unconstrained formulation consists of two terms, in which the first term specifies the routing principle of the target problem through a satisfaction function and the sum of the first and second terms denotes the system cost or optimization objective. This formulation proves to be the Lagrangian dual of a generic primal formulation proposed by Maher et al. (2005) for the stochastic system-optimal problem. The primal–dual modeling framework presents such a common functional form that can accommodate a wide range of different traffic assignment problems. Our particular attention is given to the dual formulation in that its unconstrained feature opens the door of applying unconstrained optimization algorithms for its embraced traffic assignment problems. Numerical examples are provided to support the insights and facts derived from applying the primal and dual formulations to model stochastic system-optimal and user-equilibrium problems and justify the conjugate relationship between the primal and dual models.► A generalized unconstrained formulation is proposed that can potentially accommodate different traffic assignment problems. ► It is a Lagrangian dual of the generalized primal formulation originally proposed for the stochastic system-optimal problem. ► The primal–dual relationship is proved analytically and numerically. ► The unconstrained formulation can take advantage of unconstrained optimization algorithms for problem solutions.

Related Papers

Transportation Letters

In a traffic assignment problem with perception stochasticity and demand elasticity, the equilibrium conditions are achieved on two levels, namely, the stochastic user equilibrium on the path level and the supply-demand equilibrium on the origin-destination level. By recognizing that both equilibrium levels imply random individual perceptions and decision makings, this paper reinvestigates the mathematical formulations of this kind of problems in both the system optimum and user equilibrium principles. Unlike previous research devoted to the development of solution methods for some specific versions of this kind of traffic assignment problems, our focus is given to a pair of new general formulations that pose a duality relationship to each other. The primal formulation has a convex programming form with nonlinear constraints, while the dual one poses a concave programming problem. In this primal-dual modeling framework, we found that the equilibrium or optimality conditions of a traffic assignment problem with perception stochasticity and demand elasticity can be redefined as a combination of three sets of equations and an arbitrary feasible solution of either the primal or dual formulation satisfies only two of them. We further rigorously proved the solution equivalency and uniqueness of both the primal and dual formulations, by using derivative-based techniques. We also found that when a problem of this type collapses to a logit-based case, both formulations can be conveniently written into a tractable (i.e., analytically evaluable) path flow-based form and the primal formulation becomes a convex programming problem with linear constraints. While the two formulations pose their respective modeling advantages and drawbacks, our preliminary algorithmic analysis and numerical test results indicate that the dual formulation-based algorithm, i.e., the Cauchy algorithm, can be more readily implemented for large-scale problems and converge evidently faster than the primal formulation-based one, i.e., the Frank-Wolfe algorithm, at least in the logit-based case.

Transportation Research Part B: Methodological

Joseph Prashker

Benjamin Heydecker

Optimization

Torbjörn Larsson , Michael Patriksson

2019 IEEE 58th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

Kshama Dwarakanath

International Transactions in Operational Research

Mario Binetti

Nailya Salihova

Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board

william lam

International Journal of Modelling in Operations Management

Doraid Dalalah

RELATED PAPERS

Jocelyne Guilbault

ANALECTA NIPPONICA JOURNAL OF POLISH ASSOCIATION FOR JAPANESE STUDIES

Jacek Splisgart

Genetics and molecular research : GMR

Luciano Pinheiro da Silva

Piyoosh Rautela

sabine sten

Chemistry of Materials

K. Priolkar

2014 ASEE Annual Conference & Exposition Proceedings

John Matsson

Scientific Reports

Farideh Ordikhani

Academic Radiology

Mafalda magalhaes

Susanne Kolle

Agen British Propolis

Jualan P R O D U K Kecantikan

Animus. Revista Interamericana de Comunicação Midiática

Jairo Ferreira

Marie Fierens

Matthias Bernt

Journal of Sustainable Underground Exploration

Ahmad Khairul Abd Malik

Transactions of the IMF

International journal of engineering & technology

Thanawuth Khunthong

The Journal of Organic Chemistry

David Rodriguez

Journal of Psychiatric Research

Mariama Zaami

JURNAL PENDIDIKAN TEKNOLOGI KEJURUAN

Deni Saputra

Rafael F-Cuenca

RELATED TOPICS

•   We're Hiring!
•   Help Center
• Find new research papers in:
• Health Sciences
• Earth Sciences
• Cognitive Science
• Mathematics
• Computer Science
• Academia ©2024

Search form

• Publications
• Get Involved
• Planned Giving

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 4, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 4, 2023, 8:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2pm ET on July 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces appear to be focusing on creating an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment. Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov reported on July 4 that Ukrainian forces are performing their main task of destroying Russian manpower, equipment, fuel depots, artillery, and air defenses and that a “war of destruction is equal to a war of kilometers.”[1] Danilov’s assessment underlines the prioritization of Ukraine’s ongoing campaign to attrit Russian manpower and assets over attempting to conduct massive sweeping mechanized maneuvers to regain large swaths of territory rapidly. NATO Military Committee Chair Admiral Bob Bauer reported on July 3 that Ukrainian forces are correct to proceed cautiously and avoid high casualties in the counteroffensive and acknowledged that the counteroffensive is difficult due to landmines and other obstacles up to 30km deep into Russian-occupied territory.[2] Bauer stated that Ukrainian forces should not face criticism or pressure for moving slowly.

Ukrainian forces have liberated territory in multiple areas of the front since the start of the counteroffensive in early June. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on July 3 that Ukrainian forces have liberated a total of 37.4 square kilometers in eastern and southern Ukraine in the past week.[3] Ukrainian forces are continuing to make steady, gradual advances.

The current pace of Ukrainian operations is not indicative of a stalemate or evidence that Ukraine cannot retake large areas. Ukrainian forces conducted slow and gradual interdiction campaigns against Russian concentration areas in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and limited ground attacks on the west (right) bank between August and November of 2022, before finally forcing the Russian withdrawal from the right bank in mid-November.[4] The situation in southern Ukraine is different, of course, because there is no natural bottleneck of the sort created by Russian reliance on the two bridges over the Dnipro. The Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson nevertheless alternated phases of relatively rapid advance with long periods of preparation, combat focused on attritting Russian forces, and limited gains that ultimately made Russian positions on the west bank of the river untenable.  By contrast, the Russian winter-spring offensive culminated in just over one month without making significant gains along the Luhansk-Kharkiv Oblast border.[5]  The current Ukrainian counter-offensive is less dramatic and rapid than the one that liberated much of Kharkiv Oblast, more successful than the failed Russian winter offensive, and generally most like the slower but ultimately successful Kherson counteroffensive in its pace and initial progress.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least four sectors of the front and advanced on July 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks in the Lyman direction.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area, in the western Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[7] Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian forces have made some unspecified advances on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks, and a prominent Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Bakhmut.[8] Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Valery Shershen stated that Ukrainian forces advanced up to two kilometers in the western Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reached Pryyutne, 15 kilometers southwest of Velyka Novosilka in western Donetsk Oblast.[9] Geolocated footage confirms that Ukrainian forces made additional advances south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[10]

Russian and Ukrainian officials escalated their rhetoric surrounding the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 4, but Russia is likely focused on accusing Ukraine of irresponsible actions around the ZNPP including setting conditions for a possible false flag attack . Russia remains unlikely to generate a radiological incident at the ZNPP at this time. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 4 that Ukrainian officials have begun preparations for a potential Russian provocation at the ZNPP “in the near future” and warned that Russian forces placed objects “resembling explosive devices” on the outer roofs of the ZNPP’s third and fourth reactors in order to blame damage to these areas on Ukrainian shelling.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky echoed this statement in his nightly address on July 4, and other Ukrainian military sources warned of possible Russian provocations at the plant.[12] As ISW has previously reported, it is unlikely that limited Russian sabotage at the ZNPP that Russia could hope to blame on Ukraine would be able to generate a massive radiological incident, as the ZNPP’s reactors were constructed to withstand considerable damage.[13] Ukrainian military sources reiterated this assessment and noted that even if the purported explosive devices detonate, the damage would not harm the reactor but would rather create the false impression that Ukrainian forces had shelled the reactors.[14] Advisor to the head of Russian nuclear energy operator Rosenergoatom, Renat Karchaa, also claimed on July 4 that Ukraine is planning to strike the ZNPP overnight on July 4-5.[15] ISW has previously assessed that such provocative Russian statements, and even the possibility of a tangible provocation at the plant, are likely part of a Russian wider information operation meant to accuse Ukraine of irresponsibility at the ZNPP ahead of the upcoming NATO summit and dissuade Ukrainian forces from conducting counteroffensive operations against occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[16]

The reported reorganization of Russian internal security organs suggests that the Kremlin has not yet concluded that it has effectively neutralized the threats of future armed rebellions following the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 rebellion. Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on July 3, citing internal law enforcement sources, that Russian law enforcement authorities are considering reassigning the “Grom” special units of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service (part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) to Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard).[17] Vedomosti noted that this reported change follows Russian President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with heads of various Russian law enforcement agencies on June 26 in the wake of the Wagner armed rebellion.[18] Several Russian sources spoke out against the reported transfer of ”Grom” to Rosgvardia, citing overall poorer equipment, training, and leadership quality.[19] Vedomosti claimed that Alexander Khinstein, former advisor to Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov, warned that the assignment of ”Grom” units to Rosgvardia would be a ”dangerous experiment.”[20] The alleged restructuring of Russia’s internal security forces suggests that the Kremlin is working to build an effective anti-rebellion force following Wagner’s armed rebellion. The fact that these purported changes are happening following the rebellion indicates that the Kremlin was correctly dissatisfied with the performance of security forces, which failed to stop or even contest Wagner’s march on Moscow, and suggests that the Kremlin has not ruled out the risk of future such rebellions.

Russian authorities are absolving Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of financial responsibility for damages caused by the Wagner Group rebellion and reportedly returned significant liquid assets to Prigozhin, possibly as part of the deal negotiated between Putin, Prigozhin, and Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko. The Rostov-on-Don administration claimed that the total damages from Prigozhin’s rebellion amounted to 92.5 million rubles (roughly $1 million), and that the administration will not recover damages from Prigozhin or the Wagner Group.[21] St. Petersburg news outlet Fontanka claimed, citing internal sources, that Russian authorities returned over 10 billion rubles (roughly $111 million) in cash, five gold bars, and hundreds of thousands of US dollars in cash to Prigozhin on July 2 that authorities had seized from Prigozhin-affiliated facilities in St. Petersburg on June 24.[22] Fontanka claimed that authorities only reversed their decision to hold onto Prigozhin‘s liquid assets on July 2 but did not specify a reason for the reversal. The legal basis that Russian authorities would have had for seizing Prigozhin’s assets remains unclear in any case, as Russian authorities dropped criminal charges against Prigozhin for the rebellion.[23] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that part of Prigozhin’s liquid assets were supposed to be compensation to the families of Russian pilots whom Wagner forces killed during the rebellion, but it is now uncertain whether Wagner will make those payments.[24] The milblogger assessed that Wagner will likely use at least part of the returned assets to support transferring Wagner Group personnel to Belarus.

The official Chechen response to an attack against a Russian opposition journalist in Chechnya may impact Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s standing in the Russian ultranationalist information space. Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta reported on July 4 that unspecified, masked actors in Grozny, Chechnya intercepted a car containing one of its journalists, Yelena Milashina, severely assaulted Milashina, destroyed her equipment and documents, and warned Milashina against writing “anything.”[25] Milashina traveled to Chechnya in order to cover the trial of Zarema Musayeva, the mother of an exiled Chechen opposition activist, and the attackers also assaulted Musayeva’s lawyer, Alexander Nemov, who was in the car with Milashina. Chechen courts sentenced Musayeva to five and a half years in prison on July 5 for alleged fraud and attacking Chechen authorities, but some Russian opposition voices claimed that Chechen authorities prosecuted Musayeva due to her son‘s activism.[26] Prominent Russian ultranationalist voices seized on Milashina’s attack despite its lack of relevance to the war in Ukraine likely out of concern for broader press censorship.[27] The voices condemned attacks against journalists – including Milashina – as unacceptable even though they disagree with Milashina.[28] The Russian Union of Journalists and the Russian Human Rights Council both issued statements of condemnation and opened investigations into the attack.[29]

Kadyrov’s prominence in the broader Russian information space will likely force Kadyrov to choose between preserving his regime and his support in the ultranationalist information space, however. Kadyrov’s response was a brief acknowledgment that the relevant Chechen authorities are investigating the ”incident” - a response inconsistent in tone and content with Kadyrov’s usual flamboyant, long-winded messaging.[30] Kadyrov previously condemned Milashina as a ”terrorist” and demanded her detention, which is largely consistent with his overall effort to retain his authoritarian rule in Chechnya.[31] If Kadyrov supports the investigation into Milashina’s attack, he risks undermining his domestic regime and crackdowns against Chechen opposition voices. But if Kadyrov refuses to support the investigation, then he risks undermining his standing within an information space that is hypersensitive to the prospect of increased censorship. Kadyrov already struggles to balance these dual aims in his force arrayment in Ukraine; Kadyrov portrays Akhmat forces as capable fighters against Ukraine but has simultaneously largely avoided committing them intensive and attritional combat, and some Russian milbloggers have complained that Chechen forces are distracted posing online while other Russian forces actually fight.[32]  Chechen forces notably failed to engage Prigozhin’s rebels despite ostentatiously mobilizing and moving ostensibly to fight them, although Putin might have directed Kadyrov to avoid combat with Wagner forces.[33]

Russia is reportedly forming a new combined arms army as part of the Northern Fleet, likely in order to posture its preparedness against NATO. Russian news outlet Izvestia reported that Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) sources claimed that the existing 14th Army Corps of the Northern Fleet will be reformed into the new combined arms army with motorized rifle brigades, divisions, and regiments subordinate to it.[34] Izvestia suggested that the 14th Army Corps‘ 200th and 80th Brigades will be reorganized into a division under the new combined arms army.[35] Russian army corps before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine existed only within fleets and largely performed the same functions as combined arms armies. The reported decision to form a new combined arms army is thus likely posturing ahead of the NATO summit on July 11-12 intended to show Russia’s military response to the accession of Finland and possibly Sweden to the alliance. The promotion of the 14th Army Corps to a combined arms army level will not by itself increase Russian combat capacity, and it is unclear where the Russian military leadership could find the personnel and equipment that would be needed for the new organization to generate a material difference.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone attack on Moscow Oblast and Novaya Moskva on July 4. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses shot down and electronic warfare suppressed five of five Ukrainian drones.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed two drones near Valuevo, electronic warfare suppressed one in the Odinstovo Raion, one drone fell near Krivosheino, and one flew toward a military unit in Kubinka - likely the Russian airbase there.[37] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may have intended to strike Vnukovo Airport, and Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin announced that Russian authorities temporarily redirected some flights from Vnukovo Airport in response to the drones.[38] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may have conducted the drone attack in retaliation for an alleged Russian strike on a Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) building in Sumy Oblast.[39]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces appear to be focusing on creating an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment. The current pace of Ukrainian operations is not indicative of a stalemate or evidence that Ukraine cannot retake large areas.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least four sectors of the front and advanced on July 4.
• Russian and Ukrainian officials escalated their rhetoric surrounding the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 5, but Russia is likely focused on accusing Ukraine of irresponsible actions around the ZNPP including setting conditions for a possible false flag attack. Russia remains unlikely to generate a radiological incident at the ZNPP at this time.
• The reported reorganization of Russian internal security organs suggests that the Kremlin has not yet concluded that it has effectively neutralized the threats of future armed rebellions following the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 rebellion.
• Russian authorities are absolving Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of financial responsibility for damages caused by the Wagner Group rebellion and reportedly returned significant liquid assets to Prigozhin, possibly as part of the deal negotiated between Putin, Prigozhin, and Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko.
• The official Chechen response to an attack against a Russian opposition journalist in Chechnya may impact Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s standing in the Russian ultranationalist information space.
• Kadyrov’s prominence in the broader Russian information space will likely force Kadyrov to choose between preserving his regime and his support in the ultranationalist information space, however.
• Russia is reportedly forming a new combined arms army as part of the Northern Fleet, likely in order to posture its preparedness against NATO.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone attack on Moscow Oblast and Novaya Moskva on July 4.
• Russian conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and south of Kreminna.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces escalated ground attacks in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on July 4.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russia continues efforts to mobilize its defense industrial base (DIB).

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) 

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 4 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups made unsuccessful attempts to cross the northern international border between Ukraine and Russia in unspecified areas in the Siversk and Slobozhansk directions.[40]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and south of Kreminna on July 4. Geolocated footage published on July 4 shows that Russian forces made limited advances east of Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna).[41]  The Ukrainian General Staff reported that  Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove), Novovodyane (16km southwest of Svatove), Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna), the Serebrianske forest area (10km south of Kreminna), and Vesele (30km south of Kreminna).[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces attempted to advance in the Svatove direction and that Russian forces conducted attacks near Kuzemivka (14km northwest of Svatove).[43] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on June 3 that Russian forces have about 180,000 troops in the area of responsibility of the Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces, 120,000 of which are operating in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction, including Airborne (VDV) forces, mechanized units, BARS (Russian Combat Reserve) units, Territorial Defense units, and Storm-Z assault units.[44] Footage published on July 4 purportedly shows the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating near Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[45]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Novoselivske, Novovodyane, and Yampolivka (16km west of Kreminna).[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks from Torske (16km west of Kreminna) and that artillery and UAV units of the Russian 120th Guards Artillery Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) repelled Ukrainian attacks near Dibrova.[47] 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian and Ukrainian forces escalated ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on July 4. Ukranian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that the situation in Bakhmut has escalated, and that Russian and Ukrainian forces are dueling for the initiative and control of terrain.[48] Malyar also stated that Ukrainian forces are advancing on the southern flank of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and that fighting continues on Klishchiivka’s northern flank.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled nine Russian attacks near Hryhorivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut), Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), west of Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut), and southeast of Bila Hora (15km southwest of Bakhmut).[50] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations north and south of Bakhmut, entrenching themselves in new positions.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[52] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Klishchiivka, Ozarianivka (16km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdiumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[53] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces held their positions and counterattacked from Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut) and along the M-03 highway in the direction of Minkivka (13km northwest of Bakhmut).[54] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that units of the Russian Southern Group of Forces repelled 10 Ukrainian attacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Yahidne, and Klishchivka.[55]

Pervasive issues with Russian combat capabilities likely continue to affect the ability of Russian forces to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Bakhmut area. Former Russian officer and prominent critical milblogger Igor Girkin claimed that Ukrainian forces are advancing north of Bakhmut where understaffed units of the Russian 3rd Army Corps (Western Military District) have been deployed.[56] ISW previously reported the formation and failure of the 3rd Army Corps, a new formation created in 2022 that was decimated during its first deployment to Kharkiv Oblast in September 2022 and again in its subsequent deployments to the Bakhmut area.[57] ISW previously assessed that issues with the ad hoc commitment of various depleted force groupings to the Bakhmut axis, alongside apparent command and control failures, were likely preventing Russian forces in the area from conducting sound defensive operations and would likely offer Ukrainian forces opportunities to exploit with limited counterattacks.[58]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on July 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces defended against Russian offensive operations near Avdiivka and repelled 15 Russian ground attacks near Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction.[60] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces carried out unsuccessful offensive operations in Marinka and on the southwestern approach to Avdiivka.[61]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on July 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Rivnopil, 10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border.[62] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks in the Vuhledar area east of Velyka Novosilka and south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reached the borders of Pryyutne, 15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[64] Ukrainian Tavrisk Direction Spokesperson Valeriy Shershen noted on July 4 that Ukrainian forces have advanced up to 2km into Russian defenses in an unspecified area of the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts) direction.[65]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 4. Geolocated footage posted on July 4 shows elements of the 810 th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) shelling Ukrainian positions south of Orikhiv, indicating that Ukrainian forces have advanced to within 2km north of Robotyne.[66] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks towards Robotyne but that elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) repelled Ukrainian attacks west of Robotyne.[67] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that several small Ukrainian assault groups launched an attack southwest of Orikhiv towards the Pyatykhatyky-Zherebryanky line (about 25km southwest of Orikhiv) and reported that elements of the Crimea and Sudoplatov volunteer battalions and the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are defending in this area.[68]

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike in the Russian rear of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on July 4. Geolocated footage posted on July 4 shows the aftermath of a reported Ukrainian Storm Shadow missile strike on an unspecified Russian warehouse facility in Yakymivka, about 23km southwest of Melitopol along the T2209 Melitopol-Chonhar highway.[69] Russian sources additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Vasylivka (35km north of Melitopol along the E105 highway).[70]

Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are active near the Antonivsky Bridge on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast despite the Russian MoD’s efforts to claim that Russian forces have full control of this area.[71] One Russian milblogger claimed that there are heavy battles ongoing near the Antonivsky Bridge, and another warned that Ukrainian troops are regrouping and replenishing units to prepare for further attacks across the Dnipro River.[72] The Russian MoD claimed on July 1 that Russian troops fully restored their positions along the eastern shoreline of the Dnipro River, but milbloggers have continued to warn that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence on the east bank and are preparing for additional attacks.[73] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk also noted that Russian forces near the Dnipro River are trying to retake positions previously flooded by the explosion of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam.[74]

An influx of Russian tourists to Crimea is generating serious traffic jams along one of Russia’s most important ground lines of communication, prompting Putin and other senior Russian officials to direct state resources to help tourists move closer to a zone of active hostilities. Russian Transport Minister Vitaly Saveliev met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 4 to report on the situation at the entrance to the Kerch Strait Bridge and to ask for increased ferry crossings to reduce traffic jams.[75] Putin called for maximizing the use of ferries to ”normalize” the transport situation across the Kerch Strait and indicated that the Russian MoD should also lend transport assets to the area.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that the traffic at the entrance of the Kerch Strait Bridge in Krasnodar Krai has increased by 40% since July 1 and is expected to increase further in the coming days as the summer tourist season is in full swing.[77] Another Russian milblogger called on the Black Sea Fleet to provide two large landing ships for the crossing of civilian vehicles to solve traffic issues and emphasized that Russian authorities have seriously underestimated the desire of Russians to continue vacationing in occupied Crimea despite ongoing hostilities.[78] Russian authorities are dealing with pervasive civilian and transport issues to Crimea partially because of their continued refusal to fully mobilize Russian society onto a wartime footing, resulting in the continued promotion of tourism to occupied Crimea despite the fact it is a legitimate rear-area target for continued Ukrainian strikes.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia continues efforts to mobilize its defense industrial base (DIB). Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, Industry and Trade Minister Denis Manturov, and unspecified other military leaders and DIB representatives discussed the implementation of the Russian state defense order to increase DIB production, but the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) did not provide details on the topics discussed or agreed plans.[79] Yelabuga, Tatarstan regional entity “Alabuga Start” advertised a program for women aged 16 to 22 to develop careers building drones.[80] The program claims to offer benefits including a 52,000 ruble ($577) monthly salary, training, housing, relocation aid, and opportunities for further education. ISW has previously reported that a Russo-Iranian contract is providing for the manufacture of Shahed drones in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ).[81]

Russian officials continue to posture Russia as able to generate enough manpower to maintain the war effort in Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed that Russian forces have recruited over 185,000 contract and conscripted personnel since January 1, 2023, 109,000 of whom are in reserve.[82] Medvedev claimed that Russian forces recruited 1,400 people per day for contract service in June 2023.

Russia continues efforts to expand international military cooperation. Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Nikolai Yevmenov and Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu met in Beijing on July 3 and discussed ongoing mutual cooperation and organizing joint military exercises.[83] Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Alexander Fomin met with Kuwaiti Army Assistant Chief of Staff Brigadier General Fawaz Al-Harbi in Moscow on July 4 and confirmed Russian and Kuwaiti intent to further defense cooperation.[84]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems) 

Russian officials continue to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of providing pediatric healthcare. Russian Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova claimed on July 4 that Russian authorities sent 23 disabled children from occupied Donetsk Oblast to a rehabilitation center in Krasnogorsk, Moscow Oblast and 12 children to a rehabilitation center in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast.[85] Lvova-Belova claimed that Russian authorities plan to send about 370 more children in at least four more trips to rehabilitation centers by the end of 2023.[86] Lvova-Belova did not specify if the children have returned or will return to occupied Donetsk Oblast. ISW has previously reported on Russian authorities using access to pediatric healthcare as a guise to deport children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.[87]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://twitter.com/OleksiyDanilov/status/1676116133819170817

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-right-be-cautious-with-counter-offensive-top-nato-official-says-2023-07-03/

[3] https://t.me/annamaliar/899

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2023

[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/28072

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9ev...

[8] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/04/syly-oborony-prodovzhuyut-vesty-nastupalni-operacziyi-na-bahmutskomu-melitopolskomu-i-berdyanskomu-napryamkah/; https://t.me/strelkovii/5874 ; https://t.me/annamaliar/903

[9] https://suspilne dot media/521387-na-berdanskomu-napramku-zaporizkoi-oblasti-vijskovi-zsu-prosunulisa-do-dvoh-kilometriv-vpered/;  https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/videos/932914671129838/

[10] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1676197514641387521; https://t.me/wargonzo/13655

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ABo9LEqPDXC5mk6WF1Y8DnZ7p1DBLvQt2gWt1TwufuY7FfCaM7yYvYP6eBhn7uYHl  

[12] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/svit-bachit-sho-yedinim-dzherelom-nebezpeki-dlya-zaporizkoyi-84065; https://t.me/AFUStratCom/18805 ; https://t.me/spravdi/31142

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112122 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062223

[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-accuse-each-other-pl...

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-accuse-each-other-pl...

[16] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept22 ;

[17] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/07/04/983567-vedomstva-prorabativayut-vopros-o-perepodchinenii-politseiskogo-spetsnaza-rosgvardii

[18] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/07/04/983567-vedomstva-prorabativayut-vopros-o-perepodchinenii-politseiskogo-spetsnaza-rosgvardii; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71530; https://t.me/mod_russia/27870    

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/20216; https://t.me/dva_majors/20220 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/10678 ; https://t.me/rosich_ru/44861

[20] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/07/04/983567-vedomstva-prorabativayut-vopros-o-perepodchinenii-politseiskogo-spetsnaza-rosgvardii

[21] https://www.kavkazr dot com/a/administratsiya-rostova-ne-budet-trebovatj-vozmescheniya-uscherba-ot-prigozhina-posle-myatezha-v-gorode/32488862.html; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/03/vlasti-rostova-na-donu-otsenili-pochti-v-sto-millionov-rubley-uscherb-gorodu-ot-myatezha-chvk-vagnera; https://rtvi dot com/news/glava-rostova-na-donu-rasskazal-o-summe-ushherba-ot-myatezha-chvk-vagner/

[22] https://www.fontanka dot ru/2023/07/04/72460373/

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[24] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91216

[25] https://t.me/novaya_pishet/41030 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/04/v-chechne-napali-na-zhurnalistku-novoy-gazety-elenu-milashinu-i-advokata-aleksandra-nemova-ih-zhestko-izbili-zhurnalistke-slomali-paltsy

[26] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2023/07/04/chechen-court-sentences-mother-of-prominent-activist-to-55-years-in-prison-a81728

[27] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18182187; https://t.me/sashakots/40758; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/14692

[28] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18182187; https://t.me/sashakots/40758 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/14692

[29] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18182187

[30] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3743;

[31] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/02/03/obozrevatel-novoy-gazety-elena-milashina-uedet-iz-rossii-posle-ugroz-kadyrova; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/04/razberemsya-ramzan-kadyrov-o-napadenii-na-elenu-milashinu-i-aleksandra-nemova; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20April%2016.pdf

[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2023

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20May%2031%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[34] https://iz dot ru/1538203/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/poliarnyi-okrug-v-sostave-severnogo-flota-sozdadut-obshchevoiskovuiu-armiiu

[35] https://iz dot ru/1538203/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/poliarnyi-okrug-v-sostave-severnogo-flota-sozdadut-obshchevoiskovuiu-armiiu

[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/28057 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/28057; https://t.me/severrealii/18203 ; https://t.me/shot_shot/53667 ; https://t.me/shot_shot/53668 ; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/2376 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/19166 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/62267; https://t.me/vrogov/10743; https://t.me/istories_media/2957; https://t.me/astrapress/31717; https://t.me/astrapress/31721; https://t.me/astrapress/31723; https://t.me/astrapress/31724 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48938 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103099 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103100 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103102 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103107

[37] https://t.me/rybar/49303; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48650; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37131 ; https://gfsis.org.ge/maps/russian-military-forces

[38] https://t.me/rybar/49303; https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/5854

[39] https://t.me/milinfolive/103104

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9ev...

[41] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1676238337202331648?s=20

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9ev...

[43] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91146

[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/03/vorog-namagayetsya-nastupaty-na-lymano-kupyanskomu-napryamku-sergij-cherevatyj/

[45] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/10707

[46] https://t.me/mod_russia/28072

[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644 ; https://t.me/rybar/49287; https://t.me/kremlinprachka/24720

[48] https://t.me/annamaliar/903

[49] https://t.me/annamaliar/903

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkdwwHKJ5eZcJc9FQ6u2pJAfj4vkxsmmVQTVdqqNbJFGN4KTPEKy7wywg3ATtH9ol

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9evCzYCUKw7ZJdEccNPotT5BoeWZaKcopvwQGEWDWtirJjwTfl

[52] https://t.me/grey_zone/19409 ; https://t.me/strelkovii/5874  

[53] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644  

[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644  

[55] https://t.me/mod_russia/28072

[56] https://t.me/strelkovii/5874 

[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[58] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2023

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9evCzYCUKw7ZJdEccNPotT5BoeWZaKcopvwQGEWDWtirJjwTfl  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkdwwHKJ5eZcJc9FQ6u2pJAfj4vkxsmmVQTVdqqNbJFGN4KTPEKy7wywg3ATtH9ol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9evCzYCUKw7ZJdEccNPotT5BoeWZaKcopvwQGEWDWtirJjwTfl   

[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91146

[61] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644

[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkdwwHKJ5eZcJc9FQ6u2pJAfj4vkxsmmVQTVdqqNbJFGN4KTPEKy7wywg3ATtH9ol

[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/28072; https://t.me/mod_russia/28066

[64] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644

[65] https://suspilne dot media/521387-na-berdanskomu-napramku-zaporizkoi-oblasti-vijskovi-zsu-prosunulisa-do-dvoh-kilometriv-vpered/ ;  https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/videos/932914671129838/

[66] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1676197514641387521 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/13655

[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48680 ; https://t.me/berloga_life/13918; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48664  

[68] https://t.me/rybar/49306; https://t.me/batalyon15/2205; https://t.me/batalyon15/2202; https://t.me/batalyon15/2200; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/8536; https://t.me/voin_dv/3520; https://t.me/rusich_army/9742; https://t.me/rusich_army/9741; https://t.me/rusich_army/9739; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48667  

[69] https://t.me/vrogov/10736 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1676220226902294528?s=20; https://t.me/rybar/49304

[70] https://t.me/vrogov/10733 ; https://t.me/vrogov/10734; https://t.me/rybar/49304

[71] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[72] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91146; https://t.me/readovkanews/61932; https://t.me/dva_majors/20233 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/20234 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/20196 ; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37139   

[73] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[74] https://suspilne dot media/521107-v-lavah-armii-rf-pevna-panika-tomu-voni-tak-golosno-kricat-pro-antonivskij-mist-gumenuk-pro-situaciu-na-hersonsini/

[75] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18188277

[76] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18188277

[77] https://t.me/southtower/8821  

[78] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91215

[79] https://t.me/mod_russia/28067 

[80] https://t.me/rusich_army/9749; https://t.me/AlabugaService/57

[81] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070323

[82] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/18189843 ; https://ria dot ru/20230704/kontraktniki-1882224486.html

[83] http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/qwfb/16234721.html; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-03/china-says-it-wants-m...

[84] https://t.me/mod_russia/28080

[85] https://t.me/malvovabelova/1675

[86] https://t.me/malvovabelova/1675

[87] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2023

• Bahasa Indonesia
• Eastern Europe
• Moscow Oblast

Elektrostal

Elektrostal Localisation : Country Russia , Oblast Moscow Oblast . Available Information : Geographical coordinates , Population, Area, Altitude, Weather and Hotel . Nearby cities and villages : Noginsk , Pavlovsky Posad and Staraya Kupavna .

Information

Find all the information of Elektrostal or click on the section of your choice in the left menu.

• Update data

Elektrostal Demography

Information on the people and the population of Elektrostal.

Elektrostal Geography

Geographic Information regarding City of Elektrostal .

Elektrostal Distance

Distance (in kilometers) between Elektrostal and the biggest cities of Russia.

Elektrostal Map

Locate simply the city of Elektrostal through the card, map and satellite image of the city.

Elektrostal Nearby cities and villages

Elektrostal weather.

Weather forecast for the next coming days and current time of Elektrostal.

Elektrostal Sunrise and sunset

Find below the times of sunrise and sunset calculated 7 days to Elektrostal.

Elektrostal Hotel

Our team has selected for you a list of hotel in Elektrostal classified by value for money. Book your hotel room at the best price.

Elektrostal Nearby

Below is a list of activities and point of interest in Elektrostal and its surroundings.

Elektrostal Page

• Information /Russian-Federation--Moscow-Oblast--Elektrostal#info
• Demography /Russian-Federation--Moscow-Oblast--Elektrostal#demo
• Geography /Russian-Federation--Moscow-Oblast--Elektrostal#geo
• Distance /Russian-Federation--Moscow-Oblast--Elektrostal#dist1
• Map /Russian-Federation--Moscow-Oblast--Elektrostal#map
• Nearby cities and villages /Russian-Federation--Moscow-Oblast--Elektrostal#dist2
• Weather /Russian-Federation--Moscow-Oblast--Elektrostal#weather
• Sunrise and sunset /Russian-Federation--Moscow-Oblast--Elektrostal#sun
• Hotel /Russian-Federation--Moscow-Oblast--Elektrostal#hotel
• Nearby /Russian-Federation--Moscow-Oblast--Elektrostal#around
• Page /Russian-Federation--Moscow-Oblast--Elektrostal#page
• Terms of Use
• Copyright © 2024 DB-City - All rights reserved
• Change Ad Consent Do not sell my data

Current time by city

For example, New York

Current time by country

For example, Japan

Time difference

For example, London

For example, Dubai

Coordinates

For example, Hong Kong

For example, Delhi

For example, Sydney

Geographic coordinates of Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast, Russia

City coordinates

Coordinates of Elektrostal in decimal degrees

Coordinates of elektrostal in degrees and decimal minutes, utm coordinates of elektrostal, geographic coordinate systems.

WGS 84 coordinate reference system is the latest revision of the World Geodetic System, which is used in mapping and navigation, including GPS satellite navigation system (the Global Positioning System).

Geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude) define a position on the Earth’s surface. Coordinates are angular units. The canonical form of latitude and longitude representation uses degrees (°), minutes (′), and seconds (″). GPS systems widely use coordinates in degrees and decimal minutes, or in decimal degrees.

Latitude varies from −90° to 90°. The latitude of the Equator is 0°; the latitude of the South Pole is −90°; the latitude of the North Pole is 90°. Positive latitude values correspond to the geographic locations north of the Equator (abbrev. N). Negative latitude values correspond to the geographic locations south of the Equator (abbrev. S).

Longitude is counted from the prime meridian ( IERS Reference Meridian for WGS 84) and varies from −180° to 180°. Positive longitude values correspond to the geographic locations east of the prime meridian (abbrev. E). Negative longitude values correspond to the geographic locations west of the prime meridian (abbrev. W).

UTM or Universal Transverse Mercator coordinate system divides the Earth’s surface into 60 longitudinal zones. The coordinates of a location within each zone are defined as a planar coordinate pair related to the intersection of the equator and the zone’s central meridian, and measured in meters.

Elevation above sea level is a measure of a geographic location’s height. We are using the global digital elevation model GTOPO30 .

Elektrostal , Moscow Oblast, Russia

The Federal Register

The daily journal of the united states government, request access.

Due to aggressive automated scraping of FederalRegister.gov and eCFR.gov, programmatic access to these sites is limited to access to our extensive developer APIs.

If you are human user receiving this message, we can add your IP address to a set of IPs that can access FederalRegister.gov & eCFR.gov; complete the CAPTCHA (bot test) below and click "Request Access". This process will be necessary for each IP address you wish to access the site from, requests are valid for approximately one quarter (three months) after which the process may need to be repeated.

An official website of the United States government.

If you want to request a wider IP range, first request access for your current IP, and then use the "Site Feedback" button found in the lower left-hand side to make the request.

Centralized Intelligent Traffic Routing in the Light of Disobedience of Drivers

• First Online: 16 February 2024

Cite this chapter

• Lukáš Chrpa   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-9713-7748 5  

Part of the book series: Wireless Networks ((WN))

In urban traffic control, centralised intelligent traffic routing techniques aim to plan routes for vehicles from the global point of view, that is, assigning routes to all vehicles not having their routes yet at once while considering some global objective function such as average travel time. Consequently, it might happen that different vehicles might get assigned different routes despite having the same origin and destination. Different routes might, however, entail different costs such as travel time and/or expected fuel consumption. Such differences might, however, motivate drivers to disobey their assigned routes if such routes are more expensive (e.g. take more time and/or more fuel). Disobedient drivers might then negatively affect costs of drivers who obeyed their routes. This chapter will elaborate on how disobedient drivers can affect the quality of the routes and what remedies might be taken to mitigate the problem.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

• Available as PDF
• Read on any device
• Instant download
• Own it forever
• Available as EPUB and PDF
• Durable hardcover edition
• Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
• Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

https://www.london.gov.uk/press-releases/mayoral/cost-of-congestion-in-capital-revealed .

Alvarez, I., Poznyak, A.: Game theory applied to urban traffic control problem. In: ICCAS 2010, pp. 2164–2169 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCAS.2010.5670234

Google Scholar  

Arena, F., Pau, G.: An overview of vehicular communications. Future Internet 11 (2), 27 (2019)

Article   Google Scholar  

Chang, K.H., Hsu, P.Y., Lin, C.J., Lin, C.L., Juo, S.H.H., Liang, C.L.: Traffic-related air pollutants increase the risk for age-related macular degeneration. J. Investig. Med. 67 (7), 1076–1081 (2019)

Chrpa, L., Vallati, M., Parkinson, S.: Exploiting automated planning for efficient centralized vehicle routing and mitigating congestion in urban road networks. In: Proceedings of the 34th ACM/SIGAPP Symposium on Applied Computing, SAC 2019 (2019)

Cortés-Berrueco, L., Gershenson, C., Stephens, C.: Traffic games: modeling freeway traffic with game theory. PLoS One 11 , e0165381 (11 2016). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0165381

Forward, S.: What motivates drivers to disobey traffic regulations and how can we change this behaviour. In: 16th International Conference Road Safety on Four Continents. Beijing, China (RS4C 2013), 15–17 May 2013 (2013)

McMahan, H.B., Gordon, G.J., Blum, A.: Planning in the presence of cost functions controlled by an adversary. In: ICML, pp. 536–543 (2003)

Narayanan, P.S., Joice, C.S.: Vehicle-to-vehicle (v2v) communication using routing protocols: a review. In: 2019 International Conference on Smart Structures and Systems (ICSSS), pp. 1–10. IEEE, New York (2019)

Rasheed, A., Gillani, S., Ajmal, S., Qayyum, A.: Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET): a survey, challenges, and applications. In: Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks for Smart Cities, pp. 39–51. Springer, Berlin (2017)

Vallati, M., Chrpa, L.: A principled analysis of the interrelation between vehicular communication and reasoning capabilities of autonomous vehicles. In: Proceedings of ITSC, pp. 3761–3766 (2018)

Vallati, M., Chrpa, L.: Effective real-time urban traffic routing: an automated planning approach. In: 7th International Conference on Models and Technologies for Intelligent Transportation Systems, MT-ITS, pp. 1–6 (2021)

Zhao, Z., Chen, X., Zhang, X., Zhou, Y.: Dynamic car dispatching and pricing: revenue and fairness for ridesharing platforms. In: Raedt, L.D. (ed.) Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2022, Vienna, Austria, 23–29 July 2022, pp. 4701–4708 (2022)

Download references

Acknowledgements

This research was funded by the Czech Science Foundation (project no. 23-05575S) and the OP VVV project no. EF15_003/0000470 “Robotics 4 Industry 4.0.”

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Czech Institute of Informatics, Robotics and Cybernetics, Czech Technical University in Prague, Prague, Czechia

Lukáš Chrpa

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Lukáš Chrpa .

Editor information

Editors and affiliations.

Department of Computer Science, University of Huddersfield, Huddersfield, UK

Simon Parkinson

Department of Accountancy, Finance, Logistics, and Economics, University of Huddersfield, Huddersfield, UK

Alexandros Nikitas

Mauro Vallati

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2024 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Chrpa, L. (2024). Centralized Intelligent Traffic Routing in the Light of Disobedience of Drivers. In: Parkinson, S., Nikitas, A., Vallati, M. (eds) Deception in Autonomous Transport Systems. Wireless Networks. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-55044-7_6

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-55044-7_6

Published : 16 February 2024

Publisher Name : Springer, Cham

Print ISBN : 978-3-031-55043-0

Online ISBN : 978-3-031-55044-7

eBook Packages : Computer Science Computer Science (R0)

Share this chapter

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Publish with us

Policies and ethics

• Find a journal
• Track your research