philosophy essay on social contract theory

Unit 5: Justice

Rousseau’s Social Contract Theory

Luke Tucker

“Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains.” [1] Thus begins Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s classic political treatise, The Social Contract , the aim of which is to offer a solution to the puzzle so memorably stated in its opening line.

Human beings are free beings, not just in the superficial political sense of desiring not to be dominated by tyrants, but also in the deep metaphysical sense of living as the will in each of us leads. Unlike other organisms found in nature, we are not under the full control of instinct or appetite or any other automatic biological force. On the contrary, we choose for ourselves what our ends will be and how we will pursue them. Indeed, Rousseau thinks our species is distinguished from all other animals not by our rationality or compassion, both of which animals also possess to a degree, but by our possessing free will.

Yet despite this capacity for deep freedom, we find ourselves living in societies that everywhere impose constraints on our exercise of freedom. Not only do our societies prohibit certain acts, such as trespassing, driving too fast, and smoking in restaurants, they also compel us to do certain acts we would otherwise have no desire for, such as paying taxes, serving on juries, and registering for the draft. We nevertheless obey, because we must, for anyone who does not willingly obey is either coerced into obedience or punished.

Whatever inconvenience such constraints may inflict on us, however, we typically do not view all constraints on human freedom as illegitimate. Lawlessness is an evil, same as tyranny. But some laws are indeed unjust. What factor, then, separates the just from the unjust? For Rousseau, the answer is consent. The only legitimate constraints on my choices, and likewise the only duties, obligations, and authorities that I am morally required to respect, are those which I have willingly accepted for myself. Without consent, constraints, duties, and authority lack all legitimacy.

If there is any exception to this rule for Rousseau, it may be within the family, where the authority of parents and the duty of children to obey arise naturally, from the total dependence of the latter on the former, not from consensual agreement. Still, even these natural obligations have an expiration date, when the child reaches maturity and becomes his or her own master. Beyond this crucial point, consent becomes a necessary condition for legitimate authority.

Thus, Rousseau parts with his modern predecessors, Hobbes and Locke, in important ways. First, against Hobbes, Rousseau does not recognize any ‘right of the strongest.’ A right is a claim that deserves respect even absent force. But if you subjugate me to your will by force, not by consent, I am only obligated to respect your command as long as your powers exceed mine. If at any moment I sense I can overpower you, or simply escape, my doing so is permitted. Your command is entirely contingent upon your strength and so is not a true right.

Second, against Locke, Rousseau rejects that people can ever legitimately forfeit their rights and be submitted to the arbitrary will of another. Whereas Locke argues that people can lose their rights – even those as precious as the right to life – if they willingly instigate an unjust war and suffer defeat, Rousseau argues to the contrary that our freedom makes us human and, as a matter of logic, cannot be traded away. The very idea is contradictory. Hence, even losers of war retain their rights.

So, for Rousseau, consent is a necessary condition for legitimate authority over human beings. Notice, though, that we have not solved our original puzzle so much as articulated it with more clarity. Human beings are free beings, over whom the exercise of legitimate authority absolutely and without exception requires consent, yet we find ourselves everywhere encumbered with constraints and duties imposed on us by coercive governments. How can these joint facts, the one moral and the other empirical, be reconciled theoretically, without denying the truth of either and without conceding the unintuitive conclusion that all our encumbrances are illegitimate?

This, according to Rousseau, is the fundamental question confronting the political philosopher. As he puts it, the task of the political philosopher is to “find a form of association which will defend the person and goods of each member with the collective force of all, and under which each individual, while uniting himself with the others, obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as before.” [2]

Rousseau has a ready answer to this fundamental question. He argues that a society can exercise an authority over citizens that is simultaneously legitimate and absolute, provided two conditions obtain. First, the society must have been founded upon unanimous consent, with all founding members giving equal approval to the terms. Consent is necessary here because, as previously established, it alone can legitimize authority, and the consent must be unanimous because no one can grant consent on anyone else’s behalf. Second, not just any pact will do but, crucially, only one that recognizes the general will to be absolutely sovereign over the society and its laws.

While the first of these conditions aligns Rousseau with a long social contract tradition, spanning from Hobbes to Rawls and which holds the concept of a social contract to be the ultimate standard of political legitimacy, the second condition is a unique contribution and so distinguishes Rousseau from other theorists. It is here where students of Rousseau will want to focus their attention.

What is the general will? In short, it is the will of the people considered as a unified whole. When the social contract is ratified, the wills of many individuals are incorporated into one, and what emerges, as though by a chemical reaction, is a new collective entity, a republic , in the original Latin sense of the word. It is more than the sum of its parts. It is like an organism, with a will of its own, and like all organisms it wills its own good. So, the notion of the general will, the will of the republic, is completely conceptually distinct from the private wills of individual citizens, which prioritize those citizens’ particular interests, and also from the ‘will of all’, which is just those private wills amassed in a messy, heterogenous clump. The general will is oriented not to any private interest, but to the common interest shared by all.

As an analogy it might help to think of a football team. Each of the players on the team has a private will as a player. Each may want to be a starter or the team captain or the quarterback’s favored passing target. But the team itself, as a unified whole, also has its own, general will, in which each player, in his or her capacity as a teammate, shares. Given no one can win the game solo, the questions of who should start, who should be team captain, and who the quarterback should target are questions for the general will, not any private will.

Why must the general will, in a republic, serve as the sovereign, the one power that decides what laws are enacted? The simple reason is that, for Rousseau, consent alone can confer legitimate authority. But again, not all consensual agreements are valid. No one can consent to the arbitrary rule of another, for instance. The very idea involves trading away your capacity as a human being to will things, and so is a contradiction. Again, Rousseau’s view here contrasts with Hobbes and Locke, both of whom suggest that mere consent is sufficient to legitimize, within certain bounds, almost any political arrangement. Individuals begin in the state of nature as their own sovereigns, but upon entering society they transfer their sovereignty either to the will of a single ruler, as in Hobbes, or to the will of the majority, as in Locke.

Rousseau, in contrast, rejects that such a transfer of sovereignty can legitimately occur. Only your own will can govern you. No democratic majority, and certainly no single ruler, can rightfully enact laws over you of which you disapprove. The genius, then, of the notion of the general will is that it allows society to coercively execute laws without encroaching on any citizen’s liberty. When the general will is sovereign, any law that you are forced to obey is a law that you commanded for yourself, to the extent that you, as with all other citizens, have a share in the general will. Even when coerced, therefore, you “remain as free as before.”

But why, if the general will is to be sovereign, must its sovereignty be absolute? Rousseau gives a few reasons, of which I will discuss the two most interesting. First, for the general will to place a legal limit on its power would require it to make a contract with itself. But contracts necessarily involve more than one party. No singular entity, whether private or collective, with a singular, unified will can be bound by a contract with itself. The very idea is incomprehensible. Thus, because the general will belongs to a singular entity, i.e. the republic, it cannot be bound by any contract with itself.

Second, it is vital to the very existence of the republic that each citizen’s private will be completely subordinate to the general will. Think again about the football team. If any player prizes his or her own private will over the general will of the team, they are not really a teammate in the proper sense, given to be a teammate is to commit oneself to the team’s common good. Further, if every player on the team prizes his or her will over the team’s general will, there is no team at all, just a mass of disunited players. Likewise, in the context of a republic, if anyone prioritizes his or her own will, they are not a citizen in the proper sense, and if all citizens prioritize their own wills, there is literally no republic, just a mass of disunited individuals.

Thus, Rousseau thinks, forming a republic requires each citizen to surrender all claims of liberty and place “all his powers under the supreme direction of the general will.” This may sound extreme, but again, because each citizen shares in the general will, all laws are commands given to themselves by themselves. No claims of liberty are needed.

Some readers may remain uneasy about the idea of surrendering all of one’s rights to an absolute sovereign. Why would anyone willingly bind themselves to such a society? This question may be better asked another way. What, on Rousseau’s account, do people gain by leaving the state of nature and entering society? The answer is that they exchange their natural liberty for a more advantageous form of liberty. In the state of nature, an imagined pre-political situation where no government exists to regulate behavior, you have no rights to anything that you cannot take, and keep, by your own powers. As such, no one has very much stuff, given the natural limitations of individual effort, and the stuff people do have is insecure, constantly at risk of being stolen by a stronger, smarter, sneakier or simply luckier competitor.

Of course, unlike Hobbes, Rousseau does not think the lives of pre-political people are miserable. He does, however, believe that life in the republic is better. Whereas in the state of nature there are only mere possessions, in civil society there is property, which is what one’s possessions become upon receiving the collective recognition and protection of the body politic. Thus, upon entering society, each person “recovers the equivalent of everything he loses, and in the bargain he acquires more power to preserve what he has.” [3]

To conclude, while Rousseau’s political theory has fascinated and inspired many readers through the centuries, it has also garnered fierce criticism. Scholars from Bertrand Russell to Karl Popper to Isaiah Berlin have labeled Rousseau an advocate of totalitarianism, given his emphasis on the absolute sovereignty of the general will. A cursory reading of The Social Contract may support this interpretation. Still, many scholars, such as Philip Pettit, regard Rousseau as a champion of classical republican and egalitarian values and principles, so the question of how to assess Rousseau is far from settled. Curious students will want to read Rousseau’s political texts and judge their value for themselves.

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Directions: Answer the question below and check your answer.  Use the arrow below on the right to move to the next question. When you have answered all five questions, click Finish.

Additional Resources

• “The Enlightenment”  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnoFj2cMRLY

A video on the history Enlightenment ideas, including discussions of Rousseau’s Emile and The Social Contract.

• “The Social Contract”  https://open.spotify.com/episode/0lE5GTU03vpNHYvavGuGR7

A podcast on the social contract tradition, with a heavy emphasis on Rousseau.

• “Jean-Jacques Rousseau” https://iep.utm.edu/rousseau/

An encyclopedic entry on Rousseau’s major ideas and texts.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract . Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1968. Print. Testing this line. Why is it stacked?

• Rousseau, The Social Contract, 49. ↵
• Rousseau, The Social Contract, 60. ↵
• Rousseau, The Social Contract, 61. ↵

Rousseau’s Social Contract Theory Copyright © 2020 by Luke Tucker is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology

Philosophy, One Thousand Words at a Time

Social Contract Theory

Author: David Antonini Category: Social and Political Philosophy , Historical Philosophy , Ethics Word Count: 997

When you make an agreement of some significance (e.g., to rent an apartment, or join a gym, or divorce), you typically agree to certain terms: you sign a contract. This is for your benefit, and for the other party’s benefit: everyone’s expectations are clear, as are the consequences of failing to meet those expectations.

Contracts are common, and some influential thinkers in the “modern” period of philosophy argued that the whole of society is created and regulated by a contract. [1] Two of the most prominent “social contract theorists” are Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704). [2]

This essay explains the origins of this tradition and why the concept of a contract is illuminating for thinking about the structure of society and government.

1. The State of Nature and the First Contract

To see why we might seek a contract, imagine if there was no contract, no agreement, on what society should be like: no rules, no laws, no authorities. This is called “the state of nature.”

What would life in the state of nature be like? Most think it would be very bad: after all, there would be no officials to punish anyone who did anything bad to us, resulting in no deterrent for bad behavior: it’d be every man, woman and child for him or herself, it seems.

Hobbes has famously described life in the state of nature as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” [3] Locke describes it as where everyone can be judge and jury in their own disputes, meaning they can personally decide when they have been wronged and how to punish the offender; clearly, this could get out of hand. [4]

Historically, we may not have ever been in a state of nature, but contract theorists use this idea to explain why rules for society, a contract, are desirable. It allows us to peacefully live together with the assurance that no one can simply harm us or take our property without consequence. Contract theorists argue that most people would freely enter into a contract to secure these benefits.

A contract has some costs though: to receive the advantages of an ordered society, everyone agrees to give up some benefits they had in the state of nature. Hobbes says we must give up “the right of nature” or the ability to judge for ourselves what counts as our “preservation.” This means that we could kill someone and claim it contributed to our “preservation,” [5] truthfully or not. Locke argues we must give up the right to be judge and jury of our own disputes.

Suppose, for mutual benefit, people contract to form some society. What are the details of that contract?

2. The Agreement to Form Government

A newly-formed society needs a mechanism for making decisions: who will make and enforce the rules? This authority needs to be established if the new community is to function together peacefully.

Hobbes argues that the sole decision-making authority should be an almighty ruler, who he calls the “Leviathan,” who rules by force so that citizens are afraid of whatever the ruler says. As Hobbes forebodingly reminds his readers: “And covenants [or contracts], without the sword , are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.” [6] The contract means that you obey the ruler and his laws or suffer severe consequences, such as imprisonment or even death.

Locke’s proposal for the creation of government reflects a more democratic approach in the sense of majority rule: “. . every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation . . . to submit to the determination of the majority.” [7] According to Locke, the primary function of government is to pass laws through a majority vote regarding the protection of rights, especially one’s right to property: “The great and chief end . . . of men putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property . [8]

Government requires our submitting to someone else’s authority. Submitting yourself to be ruled by someone else requires sacrifice: we give up the right to make laws, enforce those laws, and punish transgressions of them. We transfer these rights to some individual or group who does them on our behalf. These three basic activities—making, enforcing and punishing—form the basis for the three branches of government common in many countries.

3. Conclusion

Living under a contract is likely better than living in the state of nature. Questions remain, however.

First, we usually explicitly agree to contracts, but we’ve done no such thing for society. If it’s said we tacitly agree, meaning that we’ve implicitly agreed, Locke responds: “The difficulty is what ought to be looked at as tacit consent , and . . . how far any one shall be looked on to have consented, and thereby submitted to any government, where he has made no expression of it at all.” [9]

We haven’t explicitly agreed to any social contract. Do citizens agree simply by enjoying the benefits of things only made possible by living in society? For example, being able to drive on public roads is a benefit. But this is possible only through the existence of government-funded roads. Unless someone refuses to drive on public roads, by accepting such a benefit, is one tacitly “consenting”? 

Locke’s notion of tacit consent is problematic because it assumes agreement based on our receiving benefits. However, explicit consent is important because this kind of consent is the mark of voluntarily entering into a contract. Explicit consent is often extremely important –  consider consent in sexual relationships – but it is never obtained, or even sought, to participate in and receive benefits from being part of society.

A second, deeper problem with the notion of a social contract is who was and is left out of it. Who was not allowed to sign the contract or help create its terms? In many societies, women and non-Europeans were intentionally excluded, and certainly many individuals and groups of people would not consent to much of many governments’ policies and practices, past or present. [10]

[1] “Modern,” for the purposes of the history of philosophy, refers roughly to the time period from the mid-17th century to the late-18th century. However, “modern” does not only designate a time period but refers to the beginning of the Enlightenment, the rise of modern scientific thinking (Galileo, Newton), and to a turning away from the established order of the Church.

[2] Generally included with Hobbes and Locke is a third theorist, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Rousseau is not discussed here because his views are quite different from Hobbes’ and Locke’s. Rousseau is critical of both Hobbes’s and Locke’s views on the social contract because he is not convinced that society and government are an improvement over the state of nature. He outlines such an argument in his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1754). His own version of the social contract is found in On the Social Contract (1762). See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contact (Penguin Books, 1968) and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (Hackett, 1992)

[3] Thomas Hobbes Leviathan (1651), ed. Michael Oakeshott (Simon and Schuster, 1962), 100.

[4] Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1690), ed. C.B. Macpherson (Hackett, 1980), 10-11. Locke proposes that we give up the right to be judge and jury of our own disputes in order “to avoid, and remedy those inconveniences of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man’s being judge in his own case,” p. 48.

[5] Hobbes, Leviathan, 104 .

[6] Hobbes, Leviathan , 129

[7] Locke, Second Treatise , 52.

[8] In Chapter 5 of Locke’s Second Treatise , he famously argues we have a natural right to private property by mixing our labor with land. For example, if I pick an apple from the tree, because I own the labor I used (picking the apple), the apple becomes “mine.” Government is created to protect the property I have acquired.

[9] Locke, Second Treatise of Government , 64.

[10] For an account of how race factored into the terms of the contract, see Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract (Cornell University Press, 1997).

For an account of how gender factored into the contract, see Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford University Press, 1988)

Thomas Hobbes Leviathan (1651) , ed. Michael Oakeshott (Simon and Schuster, 1962)

John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1690) , ed. C.B. Macpherson (Hackett, 1980)

Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford University Press, 1988)

Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract (Cornell University Press, 1997)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762) (Penguin Books, 1968)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1754) (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992)

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About the Author

David Antonini received his PhD from Southern Illinois University Carbondale in 2018. He is the author of Public Space and Political Experience: An Arendtian Interpretation (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021). He is an instructor at Great Basin College in Pahrump, Nevada. davidantonini.wordpress.com  

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1 New Social Contract Theory

• Published: April 2024
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Social contract theory enjoys a long history in moral and political philosophy. Since the European Enlightenment, social contract theory has become one of the most important traditions in moral and political philosophy. This chapter provides a brief introduction to central concepts in social contract theory and their development over time. Most importantly, the chapter clarifies some of the distinct features of new approaches to social contract theory (or “new social contract theory” for short) that have evolved in the twenty-first century and are most suitable for capturing the circumstances of contemporary societies. The chapter also provides an overview of the contributions to this book and their connections both methodologically and thematically.

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6 Chapter 6: Bound by Agreement—The Principles of Social Contract Theory

Welcome to the sixth chapter of our journey through ethical philosophy, where we will dive into the fascinating world of Social Contract Theory. According to this approach to ethics, the reason that we should abide by (just) laws and ethical norms is because these are the rules that we would “agree to”.

To get us started, we will take you on a journey to the far-off planet of Equilium, in our opening story, “The Veil of Ignorance.” Here, a society of diverse beings, known as Equilibrians, will take us through a unique experiment inspired by the theories of the famous philosopher, John Rawls.

From there, we’ll come back to Earth to understand how thinkers of the past, like Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Locke, conceptualized social contracts and how these ideas shape our societies today. We will also discuss the concept of the “general will” and delve into the principles of justice, fairness, and individual rights.

Next, we’ll revisit Rawls’ idea of ‘justice as fairness’ and explore how these theories have been applied, critiqued, and expanded upon in contemporary debates within political philosophy. We will also review the Hobbesian and Libertarian perspectives and how they contribute to the dialogue on social contracts.

Throughout this chapter, we encourage you to challenge your preconceived notions, question established norms, and reflect upon the invisible agreements that shape our lives and societies.

Ready for the journey? Let’s set out to explore the invisible ties that bind us–the principles of Social Contract Theory.

Story: The Veil of Ignorance

Once upon a time, in a corner of the Universe that was rather confused, a planet called Equilium was host to a peculiar experiment. You see, the inhabitants of Equilium were a diverse group of sentient beings who had a remarkable penchant for fairness. They were collectively known as the Equilibrians. The Equilibrians were tired of the constant bickering and infighting that had come to define their existence. Desperate for a solution, they turned to the wisdom of an ancient philosopher who had been in cryogenic storage for centuries, Professor John Q. Rawls.

Upon being unfrozen, Professor Rawls looked around, blinked, and observed the bickering Equilibrians with a touch of melancholy. “Ah, I see you have a problem,” he said. “But fear not, for I have a solution: the Original Position.”

The Equilibrians, having tried everything from democracy to interpretative dance in an attempt to govern their society fairly, were more than willing to give the Original Position a try.

And so, Professor Rawls instructed them to create a grand device known as the “Veil of Ignorance,” which, once activated, would temporarily erase any knowledge of their individual identities, social status, and physical characteristics. The Equilibrians, despite their many differences, were all equally adept at building contraptions, and so they quickly assembled the Veil.

As they gathered in the Great Hall of Equilibrium, the air was thick with anticipation. The beings shuffled nervously, their tentacles, paws, and cybernetic appendages fidgeting as they prepared to engage the Veil. Professor Rawls stepped forward and addressed the assembled crowd.

“Remember,” he said, “once you pass through the Veil, you will forget who you are. Your task is to design the principles of justice that will govern your society. But you must do this without knowing who you will be when you emerge on the other side.”

With a flourish, Professor Rawls activated the Veil. One by one, the Equilibrians stepped through, each emerging with no memory of their previous selves. They looked around at the motley assortment of beings and realized they could no longer distinguish between rich and poor, intelligent and less so, or even what species they had been.

Together, they set to work devising a new social contract, guided by the idea that they might end up as any one of their fellow beings. The discussions were surprisingly civil and lighthearted, with some beings even cracking interdimensional jokes that only made sense if you were simultaneously in two different parallel universes.

Hobbesia’s Argument for Absolute Monarchy

Among the beings that entered the Veil of Ignorance, there was one character, named Hobbesia, who brought with her a deep-rooted admiration for the ideas of Thomas Hobbes. Rather than seeking to maximize happiness or protect rights, she argued for a strong central authority, reminiscent of Hobbes’ concept of the Leviathan. Her reasoning was that in the absence of an absolute ruler, the beings of Equilium would be trapped in a state of nature, where life would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

Before stepping through the Veil of Ignorance, Hobbesia was a well-respected scholar, known for her keen intellect and in-depth understanding of political philosophy. She was born into a family of humble means, but her exceptional mind earned her a scholarship to the prestigious Academy of Universal Thought. There, she encountered the works of Thomas Hobbes, and his ideas resonated deeply with her.

Her experiences growing up in a chaotic and unpredictable environment led her to believe that strong central authority was necessary for a functioning society. Despite having forgotten her past, her admiration for Hobbes’ philosophy remained, and she continued to argue for absolutism in the Original Position.

Hobbesia made her case by explaining that, once the Veil was lifted, the beings would remember their differences and conflicts. In such a diverse society, she argued, fear and distrust would lead to a state of perpetual strife. She contended that only an absolute ruler, a Leviathan, could maintain order and prevent a descent into chaos.

Hobbesia, her appearance reflecting deep shades of red and black, symbolizing the dangers of chaos and instability, began to provide concrete examples of the problems she hoped to address through her proposal of an absolute ruler.

Example 1: Resource Allocatio . Conflicts In their diverse society, various groups of beings had evolved to rely on different resources for survival. Once the Veil was lifted, beings would remember their specific needs and preferences, leading to potential conflicts over the control and distribution of these resources. Hobbesia argued that without a centralized authority, these conflicts could escalate into violent struggles and unrest.

For instance, two factions might claim the same energy-rich region to fuel their technology and habitats. Without a strong central authority to mediate and enforce decisions, these factions might engage in a destructive arms race, leading to suffering and instability for all beings of Equilium.

Example 2: Cultural and Ethical Disagreements . Equilium was home to a multitude of cultures and belief systems. Hobbesia cautioned that once their memories were restored, deep-seated disagreements over values and ethics could surface, potentially resulting in strife and polarization. For example, some beings might adhere to a belief system that prioritized collective happiness, while others might value individual rights and liberties above all else.

Hobbesia argued that only a Leviathan, an absolute ruler, could maintain order and prevent these disagreements from escalating into violent conflicts. A powerful central authority would be capable of enforcing a shared set of rules and norms that would ensure the stability and continuity of their society.

Despite the vivid examples Hobbesia provided, her fellow beings remained concerned about the dangers of tyranny and the abuse of power in an absolutist regime. They emphasized the importance of devising a social contract that would balance the need for security with the protection of individual rights and liberties.

As the Equilibrians continued to debate and refine their social contract, they incorporated elements from Hobbesia’s absolutist approach, but with checks and balances to prevent the concentration of power and potential abuse. This compromise allowed their society to maintain order and stability while also preserving individual freedoms and fostering a culture of cooperation and mutual respect.

Utilon and the Greatest Good

As the Equilibrians continued to debate the principles of justice that would govern their society, a new character emerged from the crowd. His name was Utilon, a rotund and jovial being with a mane of soft fur, large expressive eyes, and multiple arms that seemed to move independently of one another.

Utilon was a renowned economist in his previous life, having spent years studying the intricacies of resource allocation and the pursuit of happiness. Although he had forgotten his past accomplishments after passing through the Veil of Ignorance, his intuitive understanding of utilitarianism persisted.

As the beings listened attentively, Utilon presented his argument for a society based on the principles of utilitarianism. He asserted that the ultimate goal should be to maximize happiness and minimize suffering for the greatest number of beings. To achieve this, Utilon proposed that they create a social contract with a focus on policies and institutions that would ensure the greatest overall good.

“Rights,” Utilon exclaimed, “are nothing more than nonsense on stilts! They are abstract concepts that distract us from our true purpose: the pursuit of happiness for the many. A society built upon the principles of utilitarianism would make decisions based on what brings the most happiness and the least suffering, rather than adhering to a rigid set of so-called ‘rights.'”

He offered a concrete example: In a situation where resources were scarce, a utilitarian society might allocate them to projects that would benefit the majority, even if it meant violating the rights of small number. Utilon argued that such an approach would lead to the greatest overall happiness, as more beings would benefit from the resources. Some of the Equilibrians were captivated by Utilon’s vision of a society driven by the pursuit of happiness. They imagined a world where their decisions were based on the common good and the interests of the many, rather than on the protection of individual rights.

However, others raised concerns about the potential consequences of a purely utilitarian approach. They argued that such a system could lead to the rights and needs of minority groups being sacrificed for the greater good, resulting in the oppression and marginalization of vulnerable beings.

Egalita, in particular, pointed out that a society solely focused on maximizing happiness could justify the violation of individual liberties if it served the interests of the majority. She emphasized the importance of a social contract that balanced the pursuit of happiness with the protection of individual rights and liberties, ensuring that all beings were treated with fairness and dignity.

The Equilibrians continued to deliberate, carefully considering the merits and drawbacks of each philosophical approach. As they worked to craft their social contract, they sought to incorporate elements of utilitarianism, while also addressing the concerns of those who feared the consequences of sacrificing individual rights and liberties for the greater good.

Egalita and the Difference Principle

As the Equilibrians continued to deliberate on the principles that would guide their society, another character, Egalita, stepped forward. She was a humanoid figure with a soothing voice and expressive features, her eyes filled with wisdom and kindness. Egalita’s outer appearance changed colors to reflect her emotions, and she emanated an aura of calm and balance.

In her life before the Veil of Ignorance, Egalita was a passionate advocate for social justice and a devoted student of John Rawls. Although she had forgotten her past, her deep understanding of liberal egalitarianism remained intact. As the beings listened intently, Egalita made her case for a society built on the principles of liberal egalitarianism.

Egalita began by defending a scheme of individual rights grounded in Rawls’ own argument. She explained that a just society must be based on a set of basic rights and liberties that are guaranteed to every individual, regardless of their circumstances. She referred to Rawls’ two principles of justice:

• The principle of equal basic liberties: Each person should have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. These liberties include political freedom, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of thought and conscience, and the rule of law.
• The difference principle: Social and economic inequalities should be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

Egalita emphasized that the difference principle did not seek to eliminate all inequalities, as doing so might hamper innovation, creativity, and the overall progress of society. Instead, she argued that by adopting the difference principle, the Equilibrians could create a society where inequalities were justified only if they led to the betterment of everyone, especially the least advantaged.

She explained that in a society governed by the difference principle, resources and opportunities would be distributed more equitably, reducing extreme disparities in wealth, power, and influence. This, in turn, would promote social cohesion and stability, as everyone would have a vested interest in the well-being of their fellow beings. She gave the following examples:

Example 1: Energy Crystals In their society, energy crystals were a rare and valuable resource, used to power advanced technology and life-support systems. Under absolute egalitarianism, these crystals would be distributed evenly among all beings, regardless of their specific needs, leading to potential inefficiencies and waste.

In contrast, a utilitarian approach would allocate the crystals to those who could generate the most overall happiness or societal productivity, which could result in a concentration of resources in the hands of a few.

Under the difference principle, however, the distribution of energy crystals would prioritize the needs of the least advantaged, ensuring they had access to essential life-support systems and opportunities for social mobility. At the same time, incentives for discovering and harnessing new energy sources would be maintained, promoting innovation and benefiting society as a whole.

Example 2: Intergalactic Education Centers . Equilium’s Intergalactic Education Centers offered cutting-edge training in various fields, from advanced engineering to telepathic communication. Under absolute egalitarianism, all beings would have equal access to these centers, regardless of their aptitude or interest in the subjects taught, leading to potential inefficiencies and underutilization of resources.

A utilitarian approach would prioritize allocating spots at these centers to those who could provide the most significant contributions to overall happiness or societal productivity, potentially leaving behind those who lacked access to early opportunities.

However, the difference principle would ensure that the least advantaged beings had a fair chance to attend these Intergalactic Education Centers, fostering social mobility and equal opportunities. At the same time, it would recognize that some inequalities in access might be necessary to maintain the high quality of education and attract top talent to these institutions.

These concrete examples demonstrated how the difference principle could lead to a more just and equitable society, by balancing the need for fairness and social mobility with the recognition that some inequalities could serve a greater purpose. The Equilibrians appreciated Egalita’s insights and incorporated the difference principle into their social contract, laying the foundation for a prosperous and harmonious society.

Reflective Equilibrium

As the Equilbrians concluded their deliberations within the Original Position, they reached a consensus in favor of Rawlsian liberal egalitarianism. They believed that this approach best balanced individual rights, social cooperation, and the needs of the least advantaged members of their society.

Once they stepped out from behind the Veil of Ignorance, the Equilbrians found themselves back in their diverse and complex society. Their memories of their individual backgrounds, abilities, and preferences returned, but they remained committed to the principles of justice they had agreed upon.

In their efforts to implement the principles of liberal egalitarianism, the Equilbrians soon discovered the importance of reflective equilibrium. As they sought to apply their chosen principles to real-life situations, they encountered new challenges and complexities that required them to refine their understanding of justice continually. Some of the more memorable issues they had to deal included the following:

• The AI Rights Dilemma: The Equilbrians’ society was home to advanced artificial intelligences (AIs) with varying degrees of sentience and autonomy. The Equilbrians initially struggled to apply their principles of justice to these non-human entities. Through reflective equilibrium, they came to recognize the moral significance of sentient AIs and gradually extended rights and protections to them, ensuring that AIs could also participate in society and contribute to the common good.
• The Terraforming Conflict: The Equilbrians faced a dilemma when they discovered a distant, uninhabited planet with rich resources and the potential for terraforming. While the resources could significantly benefit their society, especially the least advantaged, terraforming the planet would also destroy unique ecosystems and biodiversity. Through a process of reflective equilibrium, the Equilbrians developed new environmental principles that balanced the need for resource acquisition with the imperative of preserving the planet’s ecosystems.
• The Genetic Enhancement Debate: The Equilbrians’ society had access to advanced genetic technologies that allowed for the enhancement of physical and cognitive abilities. While some argued that these enhancements could improve overall well-being and even help address social inequalities, others worried about the ethical implications and the potential for creating an even more stratified society. Through reflective equilibrium, the Equilbrians devised policies that allowed for responsible use of genetic enhancements while ensuring that the benefits were equitably distributed and that the rights of those who chose not to undergo enhancements were protected.
• The Intergalactic Migration Crisis: The Equilbrians encountered a massive influx of refugees from a distant galaxy fleeing war and persecution. Although they were committed to the principle of fair equality of opportunity, they faced challenges in integrating the new arrivals into their society while still addressing the needs of their most vulnerable citizens. Reflective equilibrium led the Equilbrians to develop innovative solutions that balanced the needs of both the refugees and their existing population, fostering social cohesion and solidarity in the face of adversity.

The Equilbrians engaged in an ongoing process of reflection and adjustment, seeking to harmonize their principles with their intuitions and the realities of their society. Through this process of reflective equilibrium, they aimed to create a more just and equitable society that respected the rights, needs, and aspirations of all its members.

Over time, the Equilbrians learned that the pursuit of justice was not a one-time decision but an ongoing journey. They recognized that their society would always face new challenges, and they embraced their responsibility to adapt and refine their understanding of justice to meet those challenges. In doing so, the Equilbrians came to embody the spirit of liberal egalitarianism, working tirelessly to create a society where everyone could flourish and thrive.

Discussion Questions

• What are the key differences between the philosophical approaches of Hobbesia, Utilon, and Egalita in the story? How do these approaches reflect the ideas of Thomas Hobbes, utilitarianism, and liberal egalitarianism, respectively?
• How does the concept of Rawls’ original position and the Veil of Ignorance play a role in the Equilibrians’ decision-making process? What is its significance in the formation of their social contract?
• In the story, Egalita argues for the difference principle as a way to address social and economic inequalities. What are the main benefits and potential drawbacks of adopting the difference principle in a society?
• Hobbesia’s proposal of an absolute ruler, or Leviathan, to maintain order and stability raises concerns about tyranny and abuse of power. How can a society balance the need for security with the protection of individual rights and liberties?
• Utilon’s argument for a utilitarian society prioritizes the overall happiness of the majority, but it raises concerns about the rights and needs of minority groups. How can a social contract ensure that the pursuit of happiness does not lead to the oppression and marginalization of vulnerable beings?
• What are the implications of the Equilibrians’ decision-making process for our own society? How can the philosophical concepts presented in the story inform our understanding of justice, fairness, and the role of government in modern societies?
• Are there any other philosophical approaches that the Equilibrians could have considered when crafting their social contract? How might these alternative perspectives have influenced their decision-making process?

Big Idea: Social Contract Theory

Social Contract Theory is a philosophical concept that seeks to understand the origin and legitimacy of a government or a society’s authority over its citizens. It posits that individuals come together and voluntarily agree to form a society, surrendering certain freedoms in exchange for protection, stability, and the enjoyment of other benefits provided by the state or the society. This voluntary agreement forms the basis of the social contract. Some major thinkers in the history of social contract theory include:

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679): The War of All Versus All

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), an English philosopher and political theorist, is best known for his book Leviathan (1651), in which he expounds an influential formulation of social contract theory. Hobbes’s social contract theory is foundational to western political philosophy and has shaped the development of liberal political thought.

In Hobbes’ political philosophy, egoism plays a central role. He posits that human beings are fundamentally self-interested creatures. This perspective, often referred to as psychological egoism , suggests that all human actions are motivated by a desire for personal benefit or satisfaction. He then imagines these selfish being in a state of nature , a hypothetical condition characterized by the absence of political authority. In this state, individuals are entirely free, but their freedom is perilous because there are no laws to restrain human behaviour. Hobbes famously describes this state as a life that is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” For instance, imagine a society without laws or law enforcement where everyone is free to do as they please. This might seem liberating at first, but it would quickly become dangerous as there would be no protections against theft, violence, or any form of harm. This is the state of nature as Hobbes envisages it.

To escape the state of nature, individuals enter into a social contract . This is a mutual agreement to relinquish certain rights and abide by a common set of rules for the benefit of safety and order. In Hobbes’s view, individuals collectively agree to establish a sovereign authority to enforce these rules, thereby ensuring peace and social cooperation. Consider a group of people deciding to form a neighborhood watch to prevent crime. Each person agrees to take turns patrolling and to follow certain rules, like not stealing from each other. In return, they all benefit from increased safety. This is a simple example of a social contract.

The sovereign authority established by the social contract, according to Hobbes, must be absolute and indivisible. It could be a monarch, an assembly, or a group ruling in the interest of the people. The sovereign’s role is to maintain order and protect the people from the state of nature. However, the sovereign is not a party to the contract and is not subject to the laws that govern the people. For example, in a democratic country, the government (sovereign) is elected by the people to enforce laws and maintain order. The government has the power to enact laws that the citizens must follow, but the government itself is not bound by these laws in the same way.

Hobbes advocates for an absolute monarchy as the most effective form of this sovereign authority. He argues that a single, undivided ruler is best equipped to maintain peace and prevent the return to the state of nature. The absolute monarch, according to Hobbes, would have the power to make laws, judge disputes, and enforce punishments, all in the interest of preserving peace and social order. However, Hobbes’ support for absolute monarchy is not based on divine right or heredity, but rather on the practical need for a strong, central authority to manage the inherent self-interest of individuals. His theory is a response to the chaos and uncertainty of the state of nature, proposing a solution that prioritizes security and order above all else.

Jean-Jacques Rosseau and the “General Will”

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) was a pivotal figure in the history of philosophy, particularly within the realm of political philosophy. His work significantly influenced the French Revolution and the development of modern political, sociological, and educational thought.

Rousseau’s political philosophy, as outlined in his works “The Social Contract” and “Discourse on Inequality,” centers around the concept of popular sovereignty . This idea posits that the only legitimate political authority is the one consented to by the people, who are the sovereign. This popular sovereignty expresses itself through the “general will” . This is not merely the aggregate of individual wills but rather the collective will that aims at the common good or common interest. It is the will ofthe sovereign that aims at the common good. Finally, Rousseau introduces the idea of “civil liberty” . According to Rousseau, by entering into the social contract, individuals replace their physical freedom with civil liberty, which is limited by the general will.

Rousseau’s ideas stand in contrast to those of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Hobbes, in his “Leviathan,” argues that the state of nature is a state of war, and thus, individuals need a strong sovereign to maintain peace. Rousseau, on the other hand, believes that humans are peaceful in their natural state, and it is society that corrupts them. In comparison to Locke, who also advocates for government by consent, Rousseau takes a more collective approach. While Locke’s government aims to protect individual rights and property, Rousseau’s government is guided by the general will, which may not always align with individual desires.

John Locke (1632-1704): Pursuit of Life, Liberty, and Pursuit of Property

John Locke’s political philosophy, often referred to as Lockean contract theory , is a significant extension of Thomas Hobbes’ social contract theory. While both philosophers agree on the necessity of a social contract to ensure societal order, Locke’s theory introduces key concepts such as natural rights , the Lockean proviso , and the importance of consent .

In contrast to Hobbes, who posits that individuals in the state of nature would willingly surrender all their rights to a sovereign in exchange for security, Locke argues that individuals possess inalienable natural rights . These rights, which include the right to life, liberty, and property, are inherent to individuals and cannot be surrendered entirely to the government. Locke’s theory asserts that the primary purpose of the government is to protect these natural rights.

The Lockean proviso is a principle related to property rights. Locke posits that individuals have a right to appropriate natural resources as long as they leave “enough and as good” for others. This principle is a significant departure from Hobbesian philosophy, which does not explicitly address the issue of property rights. The Lockean proviso introduces a moral constraint on acquisition, emphasizing the importance of considering the welfare of others when claiming property.

Another key aspect of Locke’s contract theory is the emphasis on consent . Locke argues that the legitimacy of the government rests on the consent of the governed. This contrasts with Hobbes’ theory, which suggests that individuals would consent to absolute authority under a sovereign to escape the state of nature. Locke, however, posits that individuals would only agree to form a government that respects their natural rights. This concept of consent is crucial in Locke’s theory as it underpins the idea of a government’s responsibility towards its citizens and the citizens’ right to revolt if the government fails to uphold its end of the social contract. Locke’s ideas were widely shared by the “Founding Fathers” of the American Revolution (though they substituted “life, liberty and pursuit of happiness” for “life, liberty, and pursuit of property”.

John Rawls (1921-2002): Justice as Fairness

John Rawls, an influential political philosopher of the 20th century, proposed a unique version of contract theory that significantly differs from the traditional versions of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. His theory is often referred to as “Justice as Fairness” and is primarily outlined in his works “A Theory of Justice” and “Political Liberalism”.

• Original Position and Veil of Ignorance : Rawls’ theory begins with the concept of the “ Original Position “, a hypothetical situation where individuals select the principles of justice that will govern their society. In the Original Position, individuals are behind a “ Veil of Ignorance “, meaning they are unaware of their personal characteristics, social status, talents, or life goals. This ensures that the principles of justice chosen are fair and unbiased.
• Justice as Fairness : Rawls’ theory of justice is often referred to as “Justice as Fairness”. He proposes two principles of justice:
• The first principle guarantees the equal basic liberties for each person, such as freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, and freedom from arbitrary arrest.
• The second principle, known as the “ Difference Principle”, states that social and economic inequalities are permissible only if they benefit the least advantaged members of society. This principle reflects Rawls’ belief in the importance of reducing inequality and promoting social justice.
• Political Liberalism : In his later work, “Political Liberalism”, Rawls further develops his theory to address the problem of how a stable and just society of free and equal citizens can live in peace when deeply divided by reasonable but incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. He proposes that a political conception of justice should be independent of such comprehensive doctrines, and should be able to gain the support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines.
• Difference Principle : The Difference Principle is a key component of Rawls’ theory. It states that social and economic inequalities should be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

Rawls’ contract theory, with its emphasis on fairness, equality, and consideration for the least advantaged, represents a significant departure from the traditional contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. His work has had a profound impact on political philosophy and continues to be a major topic of discussion and debate.

What’s In the “Contract”? Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy

John Rawls’ theory of “Justice as Fairness” has been a significant influence on “left liberals” and their policy arguments. The principles of Rawls’ theory align with the core values of left liberalism, such as equality, fairness, and social justice. Here are a few ways in which Rawls’ ideas have been used to argue for certain policies:

• Healthcare : Rawls’ Difference Principle, which advocates for social and economic inequalities to be arranged to benefit the least advantaged, has been used to argue for universal healthcare. Left liberals argue that healthcare is a basic right and that a just society should ensure that all its members, especially the least advantaged, have access to healthcare services. This aligns with Rawls’ belief in providing equal opportunities and benefits to the least advantaged members of society.
• Civil Rights : Rawls’ first principle of justice guarantees equal basic liberties for each person. This principle has been used to argue for civil rights policies that aim to protect individuals from discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orientation, and other personal characteristics. Left liberals argue that these policies are necessary to ensure that all individuals have equal rights and liberties, as advocated by Rawls.
• Income Inequality and Wealth Redistribution : The Difference Principle has also been used to argue for policies aimed at reducing income inequality and redistributing wealth. Left liberals argue that a just society should take steps to reduce economic disparities and ensure that the least advantaged members of society benefit from economic growth. This could include policies such as progressive taxation, where the wealthy are taxed at a higher rate, and social welfare programs that provide assistance to those in need.
• Education : Left liberals have used Rawls’ theory to argue for equal access to quality education. They argue that education is a fundamental right and that a just society should ensure that all its members, particularly the least advantaged, have access to quality education. This aligns with Rawls’ belief in providing equal opportunities to all members of society.

In essence, Rawls’ theory of “Justice as Fairness” provides a philosophical foundation for left liberals to argue for policies that promote equality, fairness, and social justice. His principles have been used to advocate for a wide range of policies aimed at creating a more just and equitable society.

Hobbesian and Libertarian Reponses

Hobbesian absolutists and Lockean libertarians, each with their distinct philosophical underpinnings, offer contrasting responses to the ideas of John Rawls and left liberals.

Hobbesian Absolutists . Hobbesian absolutists, who advocate for a strong central authority, might critique the Rawlsian emphasis on equality and redistribution. They may argue that such policies could undermine the authority of the state and lead to instability. Hobbesian philosophy prioritizes order and security above all else, and Hobbesians might worry that policies aimed at reducing inequality could lead to social unrest or conflict.

A prime example of a government that aligns with Hobbesian absolutism is the Chinese government. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains a strong central authority and prioritizes social stability and unity. The CCP might argue against Rawlsian policies like free speech, religion, or fair opportunity on the grounds that they could lead to social division or resentment. For instance, the Chinese government has often prioritized economic growth over respecting rights or income inequality, arguing that a strong economy benefits everyone in the long run. They might see civil rights as a potential threat to economic growth, as it could discourage investment and entrepreneurship. Moreover, the Chinese government might argue that it’s the state’s role to maintain social order and prevent conflict, and that policies aimed at reducing inequality could undermine this role by stirring up social unrest.

Another example of a Hobbesian absolutist might be Alexander Dugin, a Russian political scientist known for his “Fourth Political Theory “. Dugin’s theory rejects liberal democracy and advocates for a strong state authority. He might argue that Rawlsian policies could undermine the unity and stability of the state by promoting individual interests over collective ones.

Lockean Libertarians . Robert Nozick, following in the footsteps of Locke, offered a notable critique of John Rawls’ theory of justice. Rawls’ theory, known as “Justice as Fairness,” posits that a just society is one in which the distribution of goods maximizes the position of the least advantaged. Nozick, however, challenged this view with his own theory of justice, known as the “Entitlement Theory.”

Nozick’s critique of Rawls is rooted in his belief in individual rights and the “ minimal state ” . He argues that any redistribution of goods, as proposed by Rawls, would infringe upon individual rights, particularly property rights. Nozick’s Entitlement Theory posits that a distribution is just if it arises from a just situation through just steps. This means that if individuals acquire their holdings in a way that is just, any pattern of distribution that arises from this is also just, regardless of how unequal it may be.

Nozick’s critique of Rawls extends to the role of the state. He argues against the idea of a distributive state, which Rawls advocates for, and instead proposes a minimal state. This minimal state would only have the function of protecting individual rights, particularly property rights, and would not interfere in the distribution of goods. This is based on Nozick’s belief that any more extensive state will violate individuals’ rights not to be used for the benefit of others.

The political implications of Nozick’s view are profound. His critique of Rawls and his advocacy for a minimal state align him with libertarian political philosophy. This philosophy emphasizes individual liberty, limited government, and free markets. Nozick’s view implies a rejection of welfare state policies that aim to redistribute wealth to address social inequalities. It also implies a rejection of any form of taxation used for redistributive purposes, as this would infringe upon property rights. Furthermore, Nozick’s view has implications for the role of the state in economic affairs. He argues for a minimal state that does not interfere in the economy, which implies a laissez-faire approach to economic policy.

Distributive Justice

Social contract theory provides a helpful way of thinking about d istributive justice , which concerns the equitable allocation of goods, resources, and benefits in society. The question central to distributive justice is: How should benefits and burdens be distributed among members of a society?

This question may sound simple, but it has generated vast and complex debates within the field of political philosophy. Different theorists and schools of thought offer varied responses, grounded in their own philosophical premises and values. These can range from advocating equal distribution of all goods to emphasizing the respect for individual property rights even at the expense of inequality.

Let’s look at how some major political theories answer the question of distributive justice:

Each of these theories grapples with the balance of liberty, equality, and community in its own way. Their visions of a just society differ significantly, offering diverse paths towards tackling the question of distributive justice. In studying them, we gain not only insight into their rich philosophical traditions, but also invaluable perspectives on contemporary policy debates.

• How does the conception of the “state of nature” differ among Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau? How do these differing views influence their theories of social contracts?
• Discuss the role of consent in the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. How does each philosopher’s conception of consent contribute to their understanding of the legitimacy of a government or society’s authority?
• How does Rawls’ theory of the social contract, with its concept of the “original position” and “veil of ignorance,” challenge or extend the traditional social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau?
• Compare and contrast Hobbes’ advocacy for absolute monarchy and Rousseau’s emphasis on the “general will.” How do these differing views impact their ideas about the form and function of government?
• What implications does Locke’s “Lockean proviso” have for modern discussions of wealth and resource distribution? How might this principle influence contemporary debates on economic inequality and social justice?
• How does Rawls’ theory of “Justice as Fairness” respond to the criticisms of Hobbesian Absolutists who argue that policies promoting equality and redistribution may lead to social unrest and conflict? How might Rawlsians argue that such policies could, in fact, enhance social stability?
• In the view of Lockean Libertarians, particularly from the perspective of Nozick’s “Entitlement Theory”, how could the state ensure the protection of individual rights, including property rights, without infringing upon them through wealth redistribution policies? Are there potential compromises or alternative solutions that could be seen as consistent with the Libertarian view?
• In the current sociopolitical landscape, how might the principles of Rawls’ “Justice as Fairness”, Hobbesian Absolutism, and Lockean Libertarianism influence the policy-making process? Can you identify specific policies or movements that clearly embody the principles of one or more of these philosophical approaches?

Ethical Explorations: Moral Dilemmas in a Universe of Possibilities Copyright © 2023 by Brendan Shea is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

Modern Social Contract Theory

Phil 22202 modern social contract theory.

Since the 17th century, the social contract has been a central metaphor to characterize the conditions under which political authority is legitimate.  However, the content of the social contract and its imagined mode of coming into being have varied widely.  In this course we will try to delineate the conditions that might make the concept of a social contract a plausible way to justify political authority.  We will read Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls.  We will focus on these writers’ conceptions of the person, on their views of how such conceptions generate specific institutional arrangements, and on their accounts of the justification of state power. (A)

McCombs School of Business

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Social Contract Theory

Social Contract Theory is the idea that society exists because of an implicitly agreed-to set of standards that provide moral and political rules of behavior.

Social contract theory says that people live together in society in accordance with an agreement that establishes moral and political rules of behavior. Some people believe that if we live according to a social contract, we can live morally by our own choice and not because a divine being requires it.

Over the centuries, philosophers as far back as Socrates have tried to describe the ideal social contract, and to explain how existing social contracts have evolved. Philosopher Stuart Rachels suggests that morality is the set of rules governing behavior that rational people accept, on the condition that others accept them too.

Social contracts can be explicit, such as laws, or implicit, such as raising one’s hand in class to speak. The U.S. Constitution is often cited as an explicit example of part of America’s social contract.  It sets out what the government can and cannot do. People who choose to live in America agree to be governed by the moral and political obligations outlined in the Constitution’s social contract.

Indeed, regardless of whether social contracts are explicit or implicit, they provide a valuable framework for harmony in society.

Related Terms

Justice is a complicated concept that at its core requires fairness.

Morals are society’s accepted principles of right conduct that enable people to live cooperatively.

Prosocial Behavior

Prosocial Behavior occurs when people voluntarily help others.

Veil of Ignorance

The Veil of Ignorance is a device for helping people more fairly envision a fair society by pretending that they are ignorant of their personal circumstances.

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John Locke (b. 1632, d. 1704) was a British philosopher, Oxford academic and medical researcher. Locke’s monumental An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) is one of the first great defenses of modern empiricism and concerns itself with determining the limits of human understanding in respect to a wide spectrum of topics. It thus tells us in some detail what one can legitimately claim to know and what one cannot. Locke’s association with Anthony Ashley Cooper (later the First Earl of Shaftesbury) led him to become successively a government official charged with collecting information about trade and colonies, economic writer, opposition political activist, and finally a revolutionary whose cause ultimately triumphed in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Among Locke’s political works he is most famous for The Second Treatise of Government in which he argues that sovereignty resides in the people and explains the nature of legitimate government in terms of natural rights and the social contract. He is also famous for calling for the separation of Church and State in his Letter Concerning Toleration . Much of Locke’s work is characterized by opposition to authoritarianism. This is apparent both on the level of the individual person and on the level of institutions such as government and church. For the individual, Locke wants each of us to use reason to search after truth rather than simply accept the opinion of authorities or be subject to superstition. He wants us to proportion assent to propositions to the evidence for them. On the level of institutions it becomes important to distinguish the legitimate from the illegitimate functions of institutions and to make the corresponding distinction for the uses of force by these institutions. Locke believes that using reason to try to grasp the truth, and determine the legitimate functions of institutions will optimize human flourishing for the individual and society both in respect to its material and spiritual welfare. This in turn, amounts to following natural law and the fulfillment of the divine purpose for humanity.

1.1 Locke’s Life up to His Meeting with Lord Ashley in 1666

1.2 locke and lord shaftesbury 1666 to 1688, 1.3 the end of locke’s life 1689–1704, 2.2 book ii, 2.3 book iii, 2.4 book iv, 2.5 knowledge and probability, 2.6 reason, faith and enthusiasm, 3. locke’s major works on education, 4.1 the second treatise of government, 4.2 human nature and god’s purposes, 4.3 of war and slavery, 4.4 of property, 4.5 the social contract theory, 4.6 the function of civil government, 4.7 rebellion and regicide, 5. locke and religious toleration, primary sources, secondary sources, other internet resources, related entries, 1. historical background and locke’s life.

John Locke (1632–1704) was one of the greatest philosophers in Europe at the end of the seventeenth century. Locke grew up and lived through one of the most extraordinary centuries of English political and intellectual history. It was a century in which conflicts between Crown and Parliament and the overlapping conflicts between Protestants, Anglicans and Catholics swirled into civil war in the 1640s. With the defeat and death of Charles I, there began a great experiment in governmental institutions including the abolishment of the monarchy, the House of Lords and the Anglican church, and the establishment of Oliver Cromwell’s Protectorate in the 1650s. The collapse of the Protectorate after the death of Cromwell was followed by the Restoration of Charles II—the return of the monarchy, the House of Lords and the Anglican Church. This period lasted from 1660 to 1688. It was marked by continued conflicts between King and Parliament and debates over religious toleration for Protestant dissenters and Catholics. This period ends with the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in which James II was driven from England and replaced by William of Orange and his wife Mary. The final period during which Locke lived involved the consolidation of power by William and Mary, and the beginning of William’s efforts to oppose the domination of Europe by the France of Louis XIV, which later culminated in the military victories of John Churchill—the Duke of Marlborough.

Locke was born in Wrington to Puritan parents of modest means. His father was a country lawyer who served in a cavalry company on the Puritan side in the early stages of the English Civil War. His father’s commander, Alexander Popham, became the local MP, and it was his patronage which allowed the young John Locke to gain an excellent education. In 1647 Locke went to Westminster School in London.

From Westminster school he went to Christ Church, Oxford, in the autumn of 1652 at the age of twenty. As Westminster school was the most important English school, so Christ Church was the most important Oxford college. Education at Oxford was medieval. Locke, like Hobbes before him, found the Aristotelian philosophy he was taught at Oxford of little use. There was, however, more at Oxford than Aristotle. The new experimental philosophy had arrived. John Wilkins, Cromwell’s brother in law, had become Warden of Wadham College. The group around Wilkins was the nucleus of what was to become the English Royal Society. The Society grew out of informal meetings and discussion groups and moved to London after the Restoration and became a formal institution in the 1660s with charters from Charles II. The Society saw its aims in contrast with the Scholastic/Aristotelian traditions that dominated the universities. The program was to study nature rather than books. [ 1 ] Many of Wilkins associates were people interested in pursuing medicine by observation rather than the reading of classic texts. Bacon’s interest in careful experimentation and the systematic collection of facts from which generalizations could be made was characteristic of this group. One of Locke’s friends from Westminster school, Richard Lower, introduced Locke to medicine and the experimental philosophy being pursued by the virtuosi at Wadham.

Locke received his B.A. in February 1656. His career at Oxford, however, continued beyond his undergraduate days. In June of 1658, Locke qualified as a Master of Arts and was elected a Senior Student of Christ Church College. The rank was equivalent to a Fellow at any of the other colleges, but was not permanent. Locke had yet to determine what his career was to be. Locke was elected Lecturer in Greek at Christ Church in December of 1660 and he was elected Lecturer in Rhetoric in 1663. At this point, Locke needed to make a decision. The statutes of Christ Church laid it down that fifty five of the senior studentships should be reserved for men in orders or reading for orders. Only five could be held by others, two in medicine, two in law and one in moral philosophy. Thus, there was good reason for Locke to become a clergyman. Since his graduation Locke had been studying medicine. Locke decided to become a doctor.

John Wilkins had left Oxford with the Restoration of Charles II. The new leader of the Oxford scientific group was Robert Boyle. He was also Locke’s scientific mentor. Boyle (with the help of his astonishing assistant Robert Hooke) built an air pump which led to the formulation of Boyle’s law and devised a barometer as a weather indicator. The work on the air pump led to a controversy with Thomas Hobbes because Boyle’s explanations of the working of the air pump were incompatible with Hobbes’ micro-corpuscular theory. This controversy continued for ten years. Boyle was, however, most influential as a theorist. He was a mechanical philosopher who treated the world as reducible to matter in motion. But he had no micro-corpuscular account of the air.

Locke read Boyle before he read Descartes. When he did read Descartes, he saw the great French philosopher as providing a viable alternative to the sterile Aristotelianism he had been taught at Oxford. In writing An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke adopted Descartes’ ‘way of ideas’; though it is transformed so as to become an organic part of Locke’s philosophy. Still, while admiring Descartes, Locke’s involvement with the Oxford scientists gave him a perspective that made him critical of the rationalist elements in Descartes’ philosophy.

In the Epistle to the Reader at the beginning of the Essay Locke remarks:

The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without master-builders, whose mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity: but everyone must not hope to be a Boyle or a Sydenham; and in an age that produces such masters as the great Huygenius and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some others of that strain, it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge …. (N: 9–10; all quotations are from the Nidditch edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [N])

Locke knew all of these men and their work. Locke, Boyle and Newton were all founding or early members of the English Royal Society. It is from Boyle that Locke learned about atomism (or the corpuscular hypothesis) and it is from Boyle’s book The Origin of Forms and Qualities that Locke took the language of primary and secondary qualities. Sydenham was an English physician and Locke did medical research with him. Sydenham championed careful observation of disease and rejected appeal to underlying causes. Both Boyle and Newton did work on colors that did not involve micro-corpuscular explanations. Locke read Newton’s Principia Mathematica Philosophiae Naturalis while in exile in Holland, and consulted Huygens as to the soundness of its mathematics. Locke and Newton became friends after Locke’s return from Holland in 1688. It may be that in referring to himself as an ‘under-labourer’, Locke is not only displaying a certain literary modesty, he is contrasting the positive discoveries of these men, with his own attempt to show the inadequacies of the Aristotelian and Scholastic and to some degree the Cartesian philosophies. There are, however, many aspects of Locke’s project to which this image of an under-labourer does not do justice (see Jolley 1999: 15–17). While the corpuscular philosophy and Newton’s discoveries clearly influenced Locke, it is the Baconian program of producing natural histories that Locke makes reference to when he talks about the Essay in the Introduction. He writes:

It shall suffice to my present Purpose, to consider the discerning Faculties of a Man, as they are employ’d about the Objects, which they have to do with: and I shall imagine that I have not wholly misimploy’d my self in the Thoughts I shall have on this Occasion, if in this Historical, Plain Method, I can give any Account of the Ways, whereby our Understanding comes to attain those Notions of Things, and can set down any Measure of the Certainty of our Knowledge…. (I.1.2, N: 43–4—the three numbers, are book, chapter and section numbers respectively, followed by the page number in the Nidditch edition)

The ‘Historical, Plain Method’ is apparently to give a genetic account of how we come by our ideas. Presumably this will reveal the degree of certainty of the knowledge based on such ideas. Locke’s own active involvement with the scientific movement was largely through his informal studies of medicine. Dr. David Thomas was his friend and collaborator. Locke and Thomas had a laboratory in Oxford which was very likely, in effect, a pharmacy. In 1666 Lord Ashley, one of the richest men in England, came to Oxford in order to drink some medicinal waters there. He had asked Dr. Thomas to provide them. Thomas had to be out of town and asked Locke to see that the water was delivered. As a result of this encounter, Ashley invited Locke to come to London as his personal physician. In 1667 Locke did move to London becoming not only Lord Ashley’s personal physician, but secretary, researcher, political operative and friend. Living with him Locke found himself at the very heart of English politics in the 1670s and 1680s.

Locke’s chief work while living at Lord Ashley’s residence, Exeter House, in 1668 was as Ashley’s physician. Locke used his medical training to organize a successful operation on Ashley. This was perhaps the most carefully documented operation in the 17th century. Locke consulted doctors across the country to determine what the best practices were for this operation and made cleanliness a priority. In doing so he saved his patron’s life and thus changed English history.

Locke had a number of other jobs. He worked as secretary of the Board of Trade and Plantations and Secretary to the Lords Proprietors of the Carolinas. Lord Ashley was one of the advocates of the view that England would prosper through trade and that colonies could play an important role in promoting trade. Ashley persuaded Charles II to create a Board of Trade and Plantations to collect information about trade and colonies, and Locke became its secretary. In his capacity as the secretary of the Board of Trade Locke was the collection point for information from around the globe about trade and colonies for the English government. Among Ashley’s commercial projects was an effort to found colonies in the Carolinas. In his capacity as the secretary to the Lords Proprietors, Locke was involved in the writing of the fundamental constitution of the Carolinas. There is some controversy about the extent of Locke’s role in writing the constitution. [ 2 ] In addition to issues about trade and colonies, Locke was involved through Shaftesbury in other controversies about public policy. There was a monetary crisis in England involving the value of money, and the clipping of coins. Locke wrote papers for Lord Ashley on economic matters, including the coinage crisis.

While living in London at Exeter House, Locke continued to be involved in philosophical discussions. He tells us that:

Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this Essay, I should tell thee, that five or six friends meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had awhile puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first inquiry. Some hasty and undigested thoughts, on a subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next meeting, gave the first entrance into this Discourse; which having been thus begun by chance, was continued by intreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as my humour or occasions permitted; and at last, in a retirement where an attendance on my health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order thou now seest it. (Epistle to the Reader, N: 7)

James Tyrrell, one of Locke’s friends was at that meeting. He recalls the discussion being about the principles of morality and revealed religion (Cranston 1957: 140–1). Thus the Oxford scholar and medical researcher came to begin the work which was to occupy him off and on over the next twenty years.

In 1674 after Shaftesbury had left the government, Locke went back to Oxford, where he acquired the degree Bachelor of medicine, and a license to practice medicine, and then went to France (Cranston 1957: 160). In France Locke went from Calais to Paris, Lyons and on to Montpellier, where he spent the next fifteen months. Much of Locke’s time was spent learning about Protestantism in France. The Edict of Nantes (promulgated by Henry IV in 1598) was in force, and so there was a degree of religious toleration in France. Louis XIV was to revoke the edict in 1685 and French Protestants were then killed while some 400,000 went into exile.

While Locke was in France, Shaftesbury’s fortunes fluctuated. In 1676 Shaftesbury was imprisoned in the tower. His imprisonment lasted for a year. In 1678, after the mysterious murder of a London judge, informers (most notably Titus Oates) started coming forward to reveal a supposed Catholic conspiracy to assassinate the King and put his brother on the throne. This whipped up public anti-Catholic frenzy. Though Shaftesbury had not fabricated the conspiracy story, nor did he prompt Oates to come forward, he did exploit the situation to the advantage of his party. In the public chaos surrounding the sensational revelations, Shaftesbury organized an extensive party network, exercised great control over elections, and built up a large parliamentary majority. His strategy was to secure the passage of an Exclusion bill that would prevent Charles II’s openly Catholic brother from becoming King. Although the Exclusion bill passed in the Commons it was rejected in the House of Lords because of the King’s strong opposition to it. As the panic over the Popish plot receded, Shaftesbury was left without a following or a cause. Shaftesbury was seized on July 21, 1681 and again put in the tower. He was tried on trumped-up charges of treason but acquitted by a London grand jury (filled with his supporters) in November.

At this point some of the Country Party leaders began plotting an armed insurrection which, had it come off, would have begun with the assassination of Charles and his brother on their way back to London from the races at Newmarket. The chances of such a rising occurring were not as good as the plotters supposed. Memories of the turmoil of the civil war were still relatively fresh. Eventually Shaftesbury, who was moving from safe house to safe house, gave up and fled to Holland in November 1682. He died there in January 1683. Locke stayed in England until the Rye House Plot (named after the house from which the plotters were to fire upon the King and his brother) was discovered in June of 1683. Locke left for the West country to put his affairs in order the very week the plot was revealed to the government and by September he was in exile in Holland. [ 3 ]

While in exile, Locke finished An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and published a fifty-page advanced notice of it in French. (This was to provide the intellectual world on the continent with most of their information about the Essay until Pierre Coste’s French translation appeared in 1704.) He also wrote and published his Epistola de Tolerentia in Latin. Richard Ashcraft, in his Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (1986) suggests that while in Holland, Locke was not only finishing An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and nursing his health, he was closely associated with the English revolutionaries in exile. The English government was much concerned with this group. They tried to get a number of them, including Locke, extradited to England. Locke’s studentship at Oxford was taken away from him. In the meanwhile, the English intelligence service infiltrated the rebel group in Holland and effectively thwarted their efforts—at least for a while. While Locke was living in exile in Holland, Charles II died on Feb. 6, 1685, and was succeeded by his brother, who became James II of England. Soon after this, the rebels in Holland sent a force of soldiers under the Duke of Monmouth to England to try to overthrow James II. The revolt was crushed, and Monmouth was captured and executed (Ashcraft 1986). For a meticulous, if cautious review, of the evidence concerning Locke’s involvement with the English rebels in exile see Roger Woolhouse’s Locke: A Biography (2007).

Ultimately, however, the rebels were successful. James II alienated most of his supporters, and William of Orange was invited to bring a Dutch force to England. After William’s army landed, James II, realizing that he could not mount an effective resistance, fled the country to exile in France. This became known as the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It is a watershed in English history. For it marks the point at which the balance of power in the English government passed from the King to the Parliament. Locke returned to England in February 1689.

After his return from exile, Locke published An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and The Two Treatises of Government . In addition, Popple’s translation of Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration was also published. It is worth noting that the Two Treatises and the Letter Concerning Toleration were published anonymously. Locke took up residence in the country at Oates in Essex, the home of Sir Francis and Lady Masham (Damaris Cudworth). Locke had met Damaris Cudworth in 1682 and became involved intellectually and romantically with her. She was the daughter of Ralph Cudworth, the Cambridge Platonist, and a philosopher in her own right. After Locke went into exile in Holland in 1683, she married Sir Francis Masham. Locke and Lady Masham remained good friends and intellectual companions to the end of Locke’s life. During the remaining years of his life, Locke oversaw four more editions of the Essay and engaged in controversies over the Essay most notably in a series of published letters with Edward Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester. In a similar way, Locke defended the Letter Concerning Toleration against a series of attacks. He wrote The Reasonableness of Christianity and Some Thoughts on Education during this period as well.

Nor was Locke finished with public affairs. In 1696 the Board of Trade was revived. Locke played an important part in its revival and served as the most influential member on it until 1700. The new Board of Trade had administrative powers and was, in fact, concerned with a wide range of issues, from the Irish wool trade and the suppression of piracy, to the treatment of the poor in England and the governance of the colonies. It was, in Peter Laslett’s phrase “the body which administered the United States before the American Revolution” (Laslett 1954 [1990: 127]). During these last eight years of his life, Locke was asthmatic, and he suffered so much from it that he could only bear the smoke of London during the four warmer months of the year. Locke plainly engaged in the activities of the Board out of a strong sense of patriotic duty. After his retirement from the Board of Trade in 1700, Locke remained in retirement at Oates until his death on Sunday 28 October 1704.

2. The Limits of Human Understanding

Locke is often classified as the first of the great English empiricists (ignoring the claims of Bacon and Hobbes). This reputation rests on Locke’s greatest work, the monumental An Essay Concerning Human Understanding . Locke explains his project in several places. Perhaps the most important of his goals is to determine the limits of human understanding. Locke writes:

For I thought that the first Step towards satisfying the several Enquiries, the Mind of Man was apt to run into, was, to take a Survey of our own Understandings, examine our own Powers, and see to what Things they were adapted. Till that was done, I suspected that we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for Satisfaction in a quiet and secure Possession of Truths, that most concern’d us whilst we let loose our Thoughts into the vast Ocean of Being , as if all the boundless Extent, were the natural and undoubted Possessions of our Understandings, wherein there was nothing that escaped its Decisions, or that escaped its Comprehension. Thus Men, extending their Enquiries beyond their Capacities, and letting their Thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure Footing; ’tis no Wonder, that they raise Questions and multiply Disputes, which never coming to any clear Resolution, are proper to only continue and increase their Doubts, and to confirm them at last in a perfect Skepticism. Wheras were the Capacities of our Understanding well considered, the Extent of our Knowledge once discovered, and the Horizon found, which sets the boundary between the enlightened and the dark Parts of Things; between what is and what is not comprehensible by us, Men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avow’d Ignorance of the one; and employ their Thoughts and Discourse, with more Advantage and Satisfaction in the other. (I.1.7, N: 47)

Some philosophers before Locke had suggested that it would be good to find the limits of the Understanding, but what Locke does is to carry out this project in detail. In the four books of the Essay Locke considers the sources and nature of human knowledge. Book I argues that we have no innate knowledge. (In this he resembles Berkeley and Hume, and differs from Descartes and Leibniz.) So, at birth, the human mind is a sort of blank slate on which experience writes. In Book II Locke claims that ideas are the materials of knowledge and all ideas come from experience. The term ‘idea’, Locke tells us “…stands for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding, when a man thinks” (I.1.8, N: 47). Experience is of two kinds, sensation and reflection. One of these—sensation—tells us about things and processes in the external world. The other—reflection—tells us about the operations of our own minds. Reflection is a sort of internal sense that makes us conscious of the mental processes we are engaged in. Some ideas we get only from sensation, some only from reflection and some from both.

Locke has an atomic or perhaps more accurately a corpuscular theory of ideas. [ 4 ] There is, that is to say, an analogy between the way atoms or corpuscles combine into complexes to form physical objects and the way ideas combine. Ideas are either simple or complex. We cannot create simple ideas, we can only get them from experience. In this respect the mind is passive. Once the mind has a store of simple ideas, it can combine them into complex ideas of a variety of kinds. In this respect the mind is active. Thus, Locke subscribes to a version of the empiricist axiom that there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses—where the senses are broadened to include reflection. Book III deals with the nature of language, its connections with ideas and its role in knowledge. Book IV, the culmination of the previous reflections, explains the nature and limits of knowledge, probability, and the relation of reason and faith. Let us now consider the Essay in some detail.

At the beginning of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke says that since his purpose is “to enquire into the Original, Certainty and Extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of Belief, Opinion and Assent” he is going to begin with ideas—the materials out of which knowledge is constructed. His first task is to “enquire into the Original of these Ideas…and the ways whereby the Understanding comes to be furnished with them” (I.1.3, N: 44). The role of Book I of the Essay is to make the case that being innate is not a way in which the understanding is furnished with principles and ideas. Locke treats innateness as an empirical hypothesis and argues that there is no good evidence to support it.

Locke describes innate ideas as “some primary notions…Characters as it were stamped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being; and brings into the world with it” (I.2.1, N: 48). In pursuing this enquiry, Locke rejects the claim that there are speculative innate principles (I.2), practical innate moral principles (I.3) or that we have innate ideas of God, identity or impossibility (I.4). Locke rejects arguments from universal assent and attacks dispositional accounts of innate principles. Thus, in considering what would count as evidence from universal assent to such propositions as “What is, is” or “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be” he holds that children and idiots should be aware of such truths if they were innate but that they “have not the least apprehension or thought of them”. Why should children and idiots be aware of and able to articulate such propositions? Locke says:

It seems to me a near Contradiction to say that there are truths imprinted on the Soul, which it perceives or understands not; imprinting if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain Truths to be perceived. (I.2.5, N: 49)

So, Locke’s first point is that if propositions were innate they should be immediately perceived—by infants and idiots (and indeed everyone else)—but there is no evidence that they are. Locke then proceeds to attack dispositional accounts that say, roughly, that innate propositions are capable of being perceived under certain circumstances. Until these circumstances come about the propositions remain unperceived in the mind. With the advent of these conditions, the propositions are then perceived. Locke gives the following argument against innate propositions being dispositional:

For if any one [proposition] may [be in the mind but not be known]; then, by the same Reason, all Propositions that are true, and the Mind is ever capable of assenting to, may be said to be in the Mind, and to be imprinted: since if any one can be said to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it; and so the Mind is of all Truths it ever shall know. (I.2.5, N: 50)

The essence of this argument and many of Locke’s other arguments against dispositional accounts of innate propositions is that such dispositional accounts do not provide an adequate criterion for distinguishing innate propositions from other propositions that the mind may come to discover. Thus, even if some criterion is proposed, it will turn out not to do the work it is supposed to do.

When Locke turns from speculative principles to the question of whether there are innate practical moral principles, many of the arguments against innate speculative principles continue to apply, but there are some additional considerations. Practical principles, such as the Golden Rule, are not self-evident in the way such speculative principles as “What is, is” are. Thus, one can clearly and sensibly ask reasons for why one should hold the Golden Rule true or obey it (I.3.4, N: 68). There are substantial differences between people over the content of practical principles. Thus, they are even less likely candidates to be innate propositions or to meet the criterion of universal assent. In the fourth chapter of Book I, Locke raises similar points about the ideas which compose both speculative and practical principles. The point is that if the ideas that are constitutive of the principles are not innate, this gives us even more reason to hold that the principles are not innate. He examines the ideas of identity, impossibility and God to make these points.

In Book I Locke says little about who holds the doctrine of innate principles that he is attacking. For this reason he has sometimes been accused of attacking straw men. John Yolton has persuasively argued (Yolton 1956) that the view that innate ideas and principles were necessary for the stability of religion, morality and natural law was widespread in England in the seventeenth century, and that in attacking both the naive and the dispositional account of innate ideas and innate principles, Locke is attacking positions which were widely held and continued to be held after the publication of the Essay . Thus, the charge that Locke’s account of innate principles is made of straw, is not a just criticism. But there are also some important connections with particular philosophers and schools that are worth noting and some points about innate ideas and inquiry.

At I. 4. 24. Locke tells us that the doctrine of innate principles once accepted “eased the lazy from the pains of search” and that the doctrine is an inquiry stopper that is used by those who “affected to be Masters and Teachers” to illegitimately gain control of the minds of their students. Locke rather clearly has in mind the Aristotelians and scholastics at the universities. Thus Locke’s attack on innate principles is connected with his anti-authoritarianism. It is an expression of his view of the importance of free and autonomous inquiry in the search for truth. Ultimately, Locke holds, this is the best road to knowledge and happiness. Locke, like Descartes, is tearing down the foundations of the old Aristotelian scholastic house of knowledge. But while Descartes focused on the empiricism at the foundation of the structure, Locke is focusing on the claims that innate ideas provide its first principles. The attack on innate ideas is thus the first step in the demolition of the scholastic model of science and knowledge. Ironically, it is also clear from II.1.9. that Locke sees Descartes’ claim that his essence is to be a thinking thing as entailing a doctrine of innate ideas and principles.

In Book II of the Essay , Locke gives his positive account of how we acquire the materials of knowledge. Locke distinguishes a variety of different kinds of ideas in Book II. Locke holds that the mind is a tabula rasa or blank sheet until experience in the form of sensation and reflection provide the basic materials—simple ideas—out of which most of our more complex knowledge is constructed. While the mind may be a blank slate in regard to content, it is plain that Locke thinks we are born with a variety of faculties to receive and abilities to manipulate or process the content once we acquire it. Thus, for example, the mind can engage in three different types of action in putting simple ideas together. The first of these kinds of action is to combine them into complex ideas. Complex ideas are of two kinds, ideas of substances and ideas of modes. Substances are independent existences. Beings that count as substances include God, angels, humans, animals, plants and a variety of constructed things. Modes are dependent existences. These include mathematical and moral ideas, and all the conventional language of religion, politics and culture. The second action which the mind performs is the bringing of two ideas, whether simple or complex, by one another so as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them. This gives us our ideas of relations (II.12.1, N: 163). The third act of the mind is the production of our general ideas by abstraction from particulars, leaving out the particular circumstances of time and place, which would limit the application of an idea to a particular individual. In addition to these abilities, there are such faculties as memory which allow for the storing of ideas.

Having set forth the general machinery of how simple and complex ideas of substances, modes, relations, and so forth are derived from sensation and reflection, Locke also explains how a variety of particular kinds of ideas, such as the ideas of solidity, number, space, time, power, identity, and moral relations arise from sensation and reflection. Several of these are of particular interest. Locke’s chapter on power gives rise to a discussion of free will and voluntary action (see the entry on Locke on freedom ). Locke also made a number of interesting claims in the philosophy of mind. He suggested, for example, that for all we know, God could as easily add the powers of perception and thought to matter organized in the right way as he could add those powers to an immaterial substance which would then be joined to matter organized in the right way. His account of personal identity in II. xxvii was revolutionary. (See the entry on Locke on personal identity) . Both of these topics and related ones are treated in the supplementary document: Some Interesting Issues in Locke’s Philosophy of Mind

In what follows, we focus on some central issues in Locke’s account of physical objects. (See also the entry Locke’s philosophy of science , which pursues a number of topics related to Locke’s account of physical objects that are of considerable importance but largely beyond the scope of this general account of Locke’s philosophy.) These include Locke on knowledge in natural philosophy, the limitations of the corpuscular philosophy and Locke’s relation to Newton.

Locke offers an account of physical objects based on the mechanical philosophy and the corpuscular hypothesis. The adherents of the mechanical philosophy held that all material phenomena can be explained by matter in motion and the impact of one body on another. They viewed matter as passive. They rejected the “occult qualities” and “causation at a distance” of the Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy. Robert Boyle’s corpuscularian hypothesis treated the material world as made up of particles. Some corpuscularians held that corpuscles could be further divided and that the universe was full of matter with no void space. Atomists, on the other hand, held that the particles were indivisible and that the material world is composed of atoms and the void or empty space in which the atoms move. Locke was an atomist.

Atoms have properties. They are extended, they are solid, they have a particular shape and they are in motion or rest. They combine together to produce the familiar stuff and physical objects, the gold and the wood, the horses and violets, the tables and chairs of our world. These familiar things also have properties. They are extended, solid, have a particular shape, and are in motion and at rest. In addition to these properties that they share with the atoms that compose them, they have other properties such as colors, smells, tastes that they get by standing in relation to perceivers. The distinction between these two kinds of properties goes back to the Greek atomists. It is articulated by Galileo and Descartes as well as Locke’s mentor Robert Boyle.

Locke makes this distinction in Book II Chapter 8 of the Essay and using Boyle’s terminology calls the two different classes of properties the primary and secondary qualities of an object. This distinction is made by both of the main branches of the mechanical philosophy of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Both the Cartesian plenum theorists, who held that the world was full of infinitely divisible matter and that there was no void space, and the atomists such as Gassendi, who held that there were indivisible atoms and void space in which the atoms move, made the distinction between these two classes of properties. Still, the differences between these two branches of the mechanical philosophy affect their account of primary qualities. In the chapter on Solidity (II.4) Locke rejects the Cartesian definition of body as simply extended and argues that bodies are both extended and impenetrable or solid. The inclusion of solidity in Locke’s account of bodies and of primary qualities distinguishes them from the void space in which they move.

The primary qualities of an object are properties which the object possesses independent of us—such as occupying space, being either in motion or at rest, having solidity and texture. The secondary qualities are powers in bodies to produce ideas in us like color, taste, smell and so on that are caused by the interaction of our particular perceptual apparatus with the primary qualities of the object. Our ideas of primary qualities resemble the qualities in the object, while our ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble the powers that cause them. Locke also distinguishes a second class of secondary properties that are the powers that one substance has to effect another, e.g. the power of a fire to melt a piece of wax.

There has been considerable scholarly debate concerning the details of Locke’s account of the distinction. Among the issues are which qualities Locke assigns to each of the two categories. Locke gives several lists. Another issue is what the criterion is for putting a quality in one list rather than another. Does Locke hold that all the ideas of secondary qualities come to us by one sense while the ideas of primary qualities come to us through two or is Locke not making the distinction in this way? Another issue is whether there are only primary qualities of atoms or whether compounds of atoms also have primary qualities. And while Locke claims our ideas of primary qualities resemble the primary qualities in objects, and the ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble their causes in the object, what does ‘resemble’ mean in this context? Related to this issue is how we are supposed to know about particles that we cannot sense. It seems clear that Locke holds that there are certain analogies between the middle sized macroscopic objects we encounter in the world, e.g. porphyry and manna for example, and the particles that compose these things. Maurice Mandelbaum called this process ‘transdiction’. These analogies allow us to say certain things about the nature of particles and primary and secondary qualities. For example we can infer that atoms are solid and that heat is a greater rate of motion of atoms while cold is a slower motion. But these analogies may not get us very far in grasping the necessary connections between qualities in nature. Yet another issue is whether Locke sees the distinction as reductionistic. If what we mean by reductionistic here is that only the primary qualities are real and these explain the secondary qualities then there does not seem to be a clear answer. Secondary qualities surely are nothing more than certain primary qualities that affect us in certain ways. This seems to be reductionistic. But on Locke’s account of “real ideas” in II.30 both the ideas of primary and secondary qualities count as real. And while Locke holds that our ideas of secondary qualities are caused by primary qualities, in certain important respects the primary qualities do not explain them. Locke holds that we cannot even conceive how the size, figure and motion of particles could cause any sensation in us. So, knowing the size, figure and motion of the particles would be of no use to us in this regard (see IV.3.11–40, N: 544–546).

Locke probably holds some version of the representational theory of perception, though some scholars dispute this. On such a theory what the mind immediately perceives are ideas, and the ideas are caused by and represent the objects which cause them. Thus perception is a triadic relation, rather than simply being a dyadic relation between an object and a perceiver. Such a dyadic relational theory is often called naive realism because it suggests that the perceiver is directly perceiving the object, and naive because this view is open to a variety of serious objections. Some versions of the representational theory are open to serious objections as well. If, for example, one treats ideas as things, then one can imagine that because one sees ideas, the ideas actually block one from seeing things in the external world. The idea would be like a picture or painting. The picture would copy the original object in the external world, but because our immediate object of perception is the picture we would be prevented from seeing the original just as standing in front of a painting on an easel might prevent us from seeing the person being painted. Thus, this is sometimes called the picture/original theory of perception. Alternatively, Jonathan Bennett called it “the veil of perception” to emphasize that ‘seeing’ the ideas prevents us from seeing the external world. One philosopher who arguably held such a view was Nicholas Malebranche, a follower of Descartes. Antoine Arnauld, by contrast, while believing in the representative character of ideas, is a direct realist about perception. Arnauld engaged in a lengthy controversy with Malebranche, and criticized Malebranche’s account of ideas. Locke follows Arnauld in his criticism of Malebranche on this point (Locke, 1823, Vol. IX: 250). Yet Berkeley attributed the veil of perception interpretation of the representational theory of perception to Locke as have many later commentators including Bennett. A.D. Woozley puts the difficulty of doing this succinctly:

…it is scarcely credible both that Locke should be able to see and state so clearly the fundamental objection to the picture-original theory of sense perception, and that he should have held the same theory himself. (Woozley 1964: 27)

Just what Locke’s account of perception involves, is still a matter of scholarly debate. A review of this issue at a symposium including John Rogers, Gideon Yaffe, Lex Newman, Tom Lennon, and Vere Chappell at a meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association in 2003 and later expanded and published in the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2004, volume 85, issue 3) found most of the symposiasts holding the view that Locke holds a representative theory of perception but that he is not a skeptic about the external world in the way that the veil of perception doctrine might suggest.

Another issue that has been a matter of controversy since the first publication of the Essay is what Locke means by the term ‘substance’. The primary/secondary quality distinction gets us a certain ways in understanding physical objects, but Locke is puzzled about what underlies or supports the primary qualities themselves. He is also puzzled about what material and immaterial substances might have in common that would lead us to apply the same word to both. These kinds of reflections led him to the relative and obscure idea of substance in general. This is an “I know not what” which is the support of qualities which cannot subsist by themselves. We experience properties appearing in regular clumps, but we must infer that there is something that supports or perhaps ‘holds together’ those qualities. For we have no experience of that supporting substance. It is clear that Locke sees no alternative to the claim that there are substances supporting qualities. He does not, for example, have a theory of tropes (tropes are properties that can exist independently of substances) which he might use to dispense with the notion of substance. (In fact, he may be rejecting something like a theory of tropes when he rejects the Aristotelian doctrine of real qualities and insists on the need for substances.) He is thus not at all a skeptic about ‘substance’ in the way that Hume is. But, it is also quite clear that he is regularly insistent about the limitations of our ideas of substances. Bishop Stillingfleet accused Locke of putting substance out of the reasonable part of the world. But Locke is not doing that.

Since Berkeley, Locke’s doctrine of the substratum or substance in general has been attacked as incoherent. It seems to imply that we have a particular without any properties, and this seems like a notion that is inconsistent with empiricism. We have no experience of such an entity and so no way to derive such an idea from experience. Locke himself acknowledges this point (I.4.18, N: 95). In order to avoid this problem, Michael Ayers has proposed that we must understand the notions of ‘substratum’ and ‘substance in general’ in terms of Locke’s distinction between real and nominal essences and particularly his doctrine of real essences developed in Book III of the Essay rather than as a separate problem from that of knowing real essences. The real essence of a material thing is its atomic constitution. This atomic constitution is the causal basis of all the observable properties of the thing, from which we create nominal essences. Were the real essence known, all the observable properties could be deduced from it. Locke claims that the real essences of material things are quite unknown to us. Locke’s concept of substance in general is also a ‘something I know not what’. Thus, on Ayers’ interpretation ‘substance in general’ means something like ‘whatever it is that supports qualities’ while the real essence means ‘this particular atomic constitution that explains this set of observable qualities’. Thus, Ayers wants to treat the unknown substratum as picking out the same thing as the real essence—thus eliminating the need for particulars without properties. This proposed way of interpreting Locke has been criticized by scholars both because of a lack of textural support, and on the stronger grounds that it conflicts with some things that Locke does say (see Jolley 1999: 71–3). As we have reached one of the important concepts in Book III, let us turn to that Book and Locke’s discussion of language.

Locke devotes Book III of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding to language. This is a strong indication that Locke thinks issues about language were of considerable importance in attaining knowledge. At the beginning of the Book he notes the importance of abstract general ideas to knowledge. These serve as sorts under which we rank all the vast multitude of particular existences. Thus, abstract ideas and classification are of central importance in Locke’s discussion of language and its importance for knowledge. Without general terms and classes we would be faced with the impossible task of trying to know a vast world of particulars.

There is a clear connection between Books II and III in that Locke claims that words stand for ideas. In his discussion of language Locke distinguishes words according to the categories of ideas established in Book II of the Essay . So there are ideas of substances, simple modes, mixed modes, relations and so on. It is in this context that Locke makes the distinction between real and nominal essences noted above. Perhaps because of his focus on the role that kind terms play in classification, Locke pays vastly more attention to nouns than to verbs. Locke recognizes that not all words relate to ideas. There are also the many particles, words that “…signify the connexion that the Mind gives to Ideas, or Propositions, one with another” (II.7.1, N: 471). Still, it is the relation of words and ideas that gets most of Locke’s attention in Book III.

Norman Kretzmann calls the claim that “words in their primary or immediate signification signify nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them ” (III.2.2) “Locke’s main semantic thesis” (see Kretzmann 1968:179). This thesis has often been criticized as a classic blunder in semantic theory. Thus Mill, for example, wrote, “When I say, ‘the sun is the cause of the day’, I do not mean that my idea of the sun causes or excites in me the idea of day” (Mill 1843: bk 1, ch. 2, § 1). This criticism of Locke’s account of language parallels the “veil of perception” critique of his account of perception and suggests that Locke is not distinguishing the meaning of a word from its reference. Kretzmann, however, argues persuasively that Locke distinguishes between meaning and reference and that ideas provide the meaning but not the reference of words. Thus, the line of criticism represented by the quotation from Mill is ill founded.

In addition to the kinds of ideas noted above, there are also particular and abstract ideas. Particular ideas have in them the ideas of particular places and times which limit the application of the idea to a single individual, while abstract general ideas leave out the ideas of particular times and places in order to allow the idea to apply to other similar qualities or things. There has been considerable philosophical and scholarly debate about the nature of the process of abstraction and Locke’s account of it. Berkeley argued that the process as Locke conceives it is incoherent. In part this is because Berkeley is an imagist—that is he believes that all ideas are images. If one is an imagist it becomes impossible to imagine what idea could include both the ideas of a right and equilateral triangle. Michael Ayers has recently argued that Locke too was an imagist. This would make Berkeley’s criticism of Locke very much to the point. Ayers’ claim, however, has been disputed (see, for example, Soles 1999). The process of abstraction is of considerable importance to human knowledge. Locke thinks most words we use are general (III.1.1, N: 409). Clearly, it is only general or sortal ideas that can serve in a classificatory scheme.

In his discussion of names of substances and in the contrast between names of substances and names of modes, a number of interesting features of Locke’s views about language and knowledge emerge. Physical substances are atoms and things made up of atoms. But we have no experience of the atomic structure of horses and tables. We know horses and tables mainly by secondary qualities such as color, taste and smell and so on and primary qualities such as shape, motion and extension. So, since the real essence (the atomic constitution) of a horse is unknown to us, our word ‘horse’ cannot get its meaning from that real essence. What the general word signifies is the complex of ideas we have decided are parts of the idea of that sort of thing. These ideas we get from experience. Locke calls such a general idea that picks out a sort, the nominal essence of that sort.

One of the central issues in Book III has to do with classification. On what basis do we divide things into kinds and organize those kinds into a system of species and genera? In the Aristotelian and Scholastic tradition that Locke rejects, necessary properties are those that an individual must have in order to exist and continue to exist. These contrast with accidental properties. Accidental properties are those that an individual can gain and lose and yet continue in existence. If a set of necessary properties is shared by a number of individuals, that set of properties constitutes the essence of a natural kind. The borders between kinds are supposed to be sharp and determinate. The aim of Aristotelian science is to discover the essences of natural kinds. Kinds can then be organized hierarchically into a classificatory system of species and genera. This classification of the world by natural kinds will be unique and privileged because it alone corresponds to the structure of the world. This doctrine of essences and kinds is often called Aristotelian essentialism. Locke rejects a variety of aspects of this doctrine. He rejects the notion that an individual has an essence apart from being treated as belonging to a kind. He also rejects the claim that there is a single classification of things in nature that the natural philosopher should seek to discover. He holds that there are many possible ways to classify the world each of which might be particularly useful depending on one’s purposes.

Locke’s pragmatic account of language and the distinction between nominal and real essences constitute an anti-essentialist alternative to this Aristotelian essentialism and its correlative account of the classification of natural kinds. He claims that there are no fixed boundaries in nature to be discovered—that is there are no clear demarcation points between species. There are always borderline cases. There is debate over whether Locke’s view is that this lack of fixed boundaries is true on both the level of appearances and nominal essences, and atomic constitutions and real essences, or on the level of nominal essences alone. The first view is that Locke holds that there are no Aristotelian natural kinds on either the level of appearance or atomic reality. The second view holds that Locke thinks there are Aristotelian natural kinds on the atomic level, it is simply that we cannot get at them or know what they are. On either of these interpretations, the real essence cannot provide the meaning to names of substances. A.O. Lovejoy in the Great Chain of Being , and David Wiggins are proponents of the second interpretation while Michael Ayers and William Uzgalis argue for the first (Uzgalis 1988; Ayers 1991: II. 70).

By contrast, the ideas that we use to make up our nominal essences come to us from experience. Locke claims that the mind is active in making our ideas of sorts and that there are so many properties to choose among that it is possible for different people to make quite different ideas of the essence of a certain substance. This has given some commentators the impression that the making of sorts is utterly arbitrary and conventional for Locke and that there is no basis for criticizing a particular nominal essence. Sometimes Locke says things that might suggest this. But this impression should be resisted. Peter Anstey has characterized Locke’s conventionalism about classificatory terms as both constrained and convergent (Anstey 2011: 209, 212). Locke claims that while the making of nominal essences is the work of the understanding, that work is constrained both by usage (where words stand for ideas that are already in use) and by the fact that substance words are supposed to copy the properties of the substances they refer to. Locke says that our ideas of kinds of substances have as their archetype the complex of properties that produce the appearances we use to make our nominal essences and which cause the unity of the complex of ideas that appear to us regularly conjoined. The very notion of an archetype implies constraints on what properties (and hence what ideas) can go together. If there were no such constraints there could be no archetype. (For further discussion of the nominal-real essence distinction see the entry Locke on Real Essences) .

Let us begin with the usage of words. It is important in a community of language users that words be used with the same meaning. If this condition is met it facilitates the chief end of language which is communication. If one fails to use words with the meaning that most people attach to them, one will fail to communicate effectively with others. Thus one would defeat the main purpose of language. It should also be noted that traditions of usage for Locke can be modified. Otherwise we would not be able to improve our knowledge and understanding by getting more clear and determinate ideas.

In the making of the names of substances, there is a period of discovery as the abstract general idea is put together (e.g. the discovery of violets or gold) and then the naming of that idea and then its introduction into language. Language itself is viewed as an instrument for carrying out the mainly prosaic purposes and practices of everyday life. Ordinary people are the chief makers of language.

Vulgar Notions suit vulgar Discourses; and both though confused enough, yet serve pretty well for the Market and the Wake. Merchants and Lovers, Cooks and Taylors, have Words wherewith to dispatch their ordinary affairs; and so, I think, might Philosophers and Disputants too, if they had a mind to understand and to be clearly understood. (III.11.10, N: 514)

These ordinary people use a few apparent qualities, mainly ideas of secondary qualities to make ideas and words that will serve their purposes.

Natural philosophers (i.e. scientists) come along later to try to determine if the connections between properties which the ordinary folk have put together in a particular idea in fact holds in nature. Scientists are seeking to find the necessary connections between properties. Still, even scientists, in Locke’s view, are restricted to using observable (and mainly secondary) qualities to categorize things in nature. Sometimes, the scientists may find that the ordinary folk had erred, as when they called whales ‘fish’. A whale is not a fish, as it turns out, but a mammal. There is a characteristic group of qualities that fish have that whales do not have. There is a characteristic group of qualities that mammals have that whales also have. To classify a whale as a fish, therefore, is a mistake. Similarly, we might make an idea of gold that only included being a soft metal and gold color. If so, we would be unable to distinguish between gold and fool’s gold. Thus, since it is the mind that makes complex ideas (they are ‘the workmanship of the understanding’), one is free to put together any combination of ideas one wishes and call it what one will. But the product of such work is open to criticism, either on the grounds that it does not conform to already current usage or that it inadequately represents the archetypes that it is supposed to copy in the world. We engage in such criticism in order to improve human understanding of the material world and thus the human condition. This is the convergent character of Locke’s conventionalism. In becoming more accurate, the nominal essence converges on the real essence.

However, we should not forget the master-builders that Locke mentions at the beginning of the Essay . Stephen Gaukroger (2010) claims that Locke’s great achievement was to provide a philosophical justification for the kind of experimental philosophy that Boyle’s work on the air pump, and his and Newton’s work on colors, as well as Sydenham’s observational medicine. All of these had been attacked for not providing explanations in terms of matter theory. Thus, Locke is justifying the autonomy of experimental philosophy. Such experimental explanations depend solely on the relation between phenomena, even when there is some micro-corpuscular basis for the phenomena being explained. According to Gaukroger, this is Locke’s contribution to the collapse of mechanism. For the details of the problem and its solution, see Chapters 4 and 5 of Gaukroger (2010).

The distinction between modes and substances is surely one of the most important in Locke’s philosophy. In contrast with substances, modes are dependent existences—they can be thought of as the ordering of substances. These are technical terms for Locke, so we should see how they are defined. Locke writes:

First, Modes I call such complex Ideas , which however compounded, contain not in themselves the supposition of subsisting by themselves; such are the ideas signified by the Words Triangle, Gratitude, Murther, etc . (II.12.4, N: 165)

Locke goes on to distinguish between simple and mixed modes. He writes:

Of these Modes , there are two sorts, which deserve distinct consideration. First, there are some that are only variations, or different combinations of the same simple Idea , without the mixture of any other, as a dozen or score; which are nothing but the ideas of so many distinct unities being added together, and these I call simple Modes , as being contained within the bounds of one simple Idea . Secondly, There are others, compounded of Ideas of several kinds, put together to make one complex one; v.g. Beauty , consisting of a certain combination of Colour and Figure, causing Delight to the Beholder; Theft , which being the concealed change of the Possession of any thing, without the consent of the Proprietor, contains, as is visible, a combination of several Ideas of several kinds; and these I call Mixed Modes . (II.12.5, N: 165)

When we make ideas of modes, the mind is again active, but the archetype is in our mind. The question becomes whether things in the world fit our ideas, and not whether our ideas correspond to the nature of things in the world. Our ideas are adequate. Thus we define ‘bachelor’ as an unmarried, adult, male human being. If we find that someone does not fit this definition, this does not reflect badly on our definition, it simply means that that individual does not belong to the class of bachelors. Modes give us the ideas of mathematics, of morality, of religion and politics and indeed of human conventions in general. Since these modal ideas are not only made by us but serve as standards that things in the world either fit or do not fit and thus belong or do not belong to that sort, ideas of modes are clear and distinct, adequate and complete. Thus in modes, we get the real and nominal essences combined. One can give precise definitions of mathematical terms (that is, give necessary and sufficient conditions), and one can give deductive demonstrations of mathematical truths. Locke sometimes says that morality too is capable of deductive demonstration. Though pressed by his friend William Molyneux to produce such a demonstrative morality, Locke never did so. The entry Locke’s moral philosophy provides an excellent discussion of Locke’s views on morality and issues related to them for which there is no room in this general account. The terms of political discourse also have some of the same modal features for Locke. When Locke defines the states of nature, slavery, and war in the Second Treatise of Government , for example, we are presumably getting precise modal definitions from which one can deduce consequences. It is possible, however, that with politics we are getting a study that requires both experience as well as the deductive modal aspect.

In the fourth book of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke tells us what knowledge is and what humans can know and what they cannot (not simply what they do and do not happen to know). Locke defines knowledge as “the perception of the connexion and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas” (IV.1.1, N: 525). This definition of knowledge contrasts with the Cartesian definition of knowledge as any ideas that are clear and distinct. Locke’s account of knowledge allows him to say that we can know substances in spite of the fact that our ideas of them always include the obscure and relative idea of substance in general. Still, Locke’s definition of knowledge raises in this domain a problem analogous to those we have seen with perception and language. If knowledge is the “perception of … the agreement or disagreement … of any of our Ideas”—are we not trapped in the circle of our own ideas? What about knowing the real existence of things? Locke is plainly aware of this problem, and very likely holds that the implausibility of skeptical hypotheses, such as Descartes’ Dream hypothesis (he doesn’t even bother to mention Descartes’ malin genie or Evil Demon hypothesis), along with the causal connections between qualities and ideas in his own system is enough to solve the problem. It is also worth noting that there are significant differences between Locke’s brand of empiricism and that of Berkeley that would make it easier for Locke to solve the veil of perception problem than Berkeley. Locke, for example, makes transdictive inferences about atoms where Berkeley is unwilling to allow that such inferences are legitimate. This implies that Locke has a semantics that allows him to talk about the unexperienced causes of experience (such as atoms) where Berkeley cannot. (See Mackie’s perceptive discussion of the veil of perception problem, in Problems from Locke , 1976: 51 through 67.)

What then can we know and with what degree of certainty? We can know that God exists with the second highest degree of assurance, that of demonstration. We also know that we exist with the highest degree of certainty. The truths of morality and mathematics we can know with certainty as well, because these are modal ideas whose adequacy is guaranteed by the fact that we make such ideas as ideal models which other things must fit, rather than trying to copy some external archetype which we can only grasp inadequately. On the other hand, our efforts to grasp the nature of external objects are limited largely to the connection between their apparent qualities. The real essence of elephants and gold is hidden from us: though in general we suppose them to be some distinct combination of atoms which cause the grouping of apparent qualities which leads us to see elephants and violets, gold and lead as distinct kinds. Our knowledge of material things is probabilistic and thus opinion rather than knowledge. Thus our “knowledge” of external objects is inferior to our knowledge of mathematics and morality, of ourselves, and of God. We do have sensitive knowledge of external objects, which is limited to things we are presently experiencing. While Locke holds that we only have knowledge of a limited number of things, he thinks we can judge the truth or falsity of many propositions in addition to those we can legitimately claim to know. This brings us to a discussion of probability.

Knowledge involves the seeing of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas. What then is probability and how does it relate to knowledge? Locke writes:

The Understanding Faculties being given to Man, not barely for Speculation, but also for the Conduct of his Life, Man would be at a great loss, if he had nothing to direct him, but what has the Certainty of true Knowledge … Therefore, as God has set some Things in broad day-light; as he has given us some certain Knowledge…So in the greater part of our Concernment, he has afforded us only the twilight, as I may say so, of Probability, suitable, I presume, to that State of Mediocrity and Probationership, he has been pleased to place us in here, wherein to check our over-confidence and presumption, we might by every day’s Experience be made sensible of our short sightedness and liableness to Error… (IV.14.1–2, N: 652)

So, apart from the few important things that we can know for certain, e.g. the existence of ourselves and God, the nature of mathematics and morality broadly construed, for the most part we must lead our lives without knowledge. What then is probability? Locke writes:

As Demonstration is the shewing of the agreement or disagreement of two Ideas, by the intervention of one or more Proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connexion one with another: so Probability is nothing but the appearance of such an Agreement or Disagreement, by the intervention of Proofs, whose connection is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is or appears, for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition to be true, or false, rather than the contrary. (IV.15.1, N: 654)

Probable reasoning, on this account, is an argument, similar in certain ways to the demonstrative reasoning that produces knowledge but different also in certain crucial respects. It is an argument that provides evidence that leads the mind to judge a proposition true or false but without a guarantee that the judgment is correct. This kind of probable judgment comes in degrees, ranging from near demonstrations and certainty to unlikeliness and improbability in the vicinity of impossibility. It is correlated with degrees of assent ranging from full assurance down to conjecture, doubt and distrust.

The new science of mathematical probability had come into being on the continent just around the time that Locke was writing the Essay . His account of probability, however, shows little or no awareness of mathematical probability. Rather it reflects an older tradition that treated testimony as probable reasoning. Given that Locke’s aim, above all, is to discuss what degree of assent we should give to various religious propositions, the older conception of probability very likely serves his purposes best. Thus, when Locke comes to describe the grounds for probability he cites the conformity of the proposition to our knowledge, observation and experience, and the testimony of others who are reporting their observation and experience. Concerning the latter we must consider the number of witnesses, their integrity, their skill in observation, counter testimony and so on. In judging rationally how much to assent to a probable proposition, these are the relevant considerations that the mind should review. We should, Locke also suggests, be tolerant of differing opinions as we have more reason to retain the opinions we have than to give them up to strangers or adversaries who may well have some interest in our doing so.

Locke distinguishes two sorts of probable propositions. The first of these have to do with particular existences or matters of fact, and the second that are beyond the testimony of the senses. Matters of fact are open to observation and experience, and so all of the tests noted above for determining rational assent to propositions about them are available to us. Things are quite otherwise with matters that are beyond the testimony of the senses. These include the knowledge of finite immaterial spirits such as angels or things such as atoms that are too small to be sensed, or the plants, animals or inhabitants of other planets that are beyond our range of sensation because of their distance from us. Concerning this latter category, Locke says we must depend on analogy as the only help for our reasoning. He writes:

Thus the observing that the bare rubbing of two bodies violently one upon the other, produce heat, and very often fire it self, we have reason to think, that what we call Heat and Fire consist of the violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of the burning matter…. (IV.16.12, N: 665–6)

We reason about angels by considering the Great Chain of Being; figuring that while we have no experience of angels, the ranks of species above us is likely as numerous as that below of which we do have experience. This reasoning is, however, only probable.

The relative merits of the senses, reason and faith for attaining truth and the guidance of life were a significant issue during this period. As noted above James Tyrrell recalled that the original impetus for the writing of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding was a discussion about the principles of morality and revealed religion. In Book IV Chapters 17, 18, and 19 Locke deals with the nature of reason, the relation of reason to faith and the nature of enthusiasm. Locke remarks that all sects make use of reason as far as they can. It is only when this fails them that they have recourse to faith and claim that what is revealed is above reason. But he adds:

And I do not see how they can argue with anyone or even convince a gainsayer who uses the same plea, without setting down strict boundaries between faith and reason. (IV.18.2, N: 689)

Locke then defines reason as

the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths, which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, as it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz, by the use of sensation or reflection. (IV.18.2, N: 689)

Faith, on the other hand, is assent to any proposition “…upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication”. That is we have faith in what is disclosed by revelation and which cannot be discovered by reason. Locke also distinguishes between the original revelation by God to some person, and traditional revelation which is the original revelation “…delivered over to others in Words, and the ordinary ways of our conveying our Conceptions one to another” (IV.18.3, N: 690).

Locke makes the point that some things could be discovered both by reason and by revelation—God could reveal the propositions of Euclid’s geometry, or they could be discovered by reason. In such cases there would be little use for faith. Traditional revelation can never produce as much certainty as the contemplation of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas. Similarly revelations about matters of fact do not produce as much certainty as having the experience oneself. Revelation, then, cannot contradict what we know to be true. If it could, it would undermine the trustworthiness of all of our faculties. This would be a disastrous result. Where revelation comes into its own is where reason cannot reach. Where we have few or no ideas for reason to contradict or confirm, these are the proper matters for faith.

…that Part of the Angels rebelled against GOD, and thereby lost their first happy state: and that the dead shall rise, and live again: These and the like, being Beyond the Discovery of Reason, are purely matters of Faith; with which Reason has nothing to do. (IV.18.8, N: 694)

Still, reason does have a crucial role to play in respect to revelation. Locke writes:

Because the Mind, not being certain of the Truth of that it evidently does not know, but only yielding to the Probability that appears to it, is bound to give up its assent to such Testimony, which, it is satisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet, it still belongs to Reason, to judge of the truth of its being a Revelation, and of the significance of the Words, wherein it is delivered. (IV.18.8, N: 694)

So, in respect to the crucial question of how we are to know whether a revelation is genuine, we are supposed to use reason and the canons of probability to judge. Locke claims that if the boundaries between faith and reason are not clearly marked, then there will be no place for reason in religion and one then gets all the “extravagant Opinions and Ceremonies, that are to be found in the religions of the world…” (IV.18.11, N: 696).

Should one accept revelation without using reason to judge whether it is genuine revelation or not, one gets what Locke calls a third principle of assent besides reason and revelation, namely enthusiasm. Enthusiasm is a vain or unfounded confidence in divine favor or communication. It implies that there is no need to use reason to judge whether such favor or communication is genuine or not. Clearly when such communications are not genuine they are “the ungrounded Fancies of a Man’s own Brain” (IV.19.2, N: 698). This kind of enthusiasm was characteristic of Protestant extremists going back to the era of the civil war. Locke was not alone in rejecting enthusiasm, but he rejects it in the strongest terms. Enthusiasm violates the fundamental principle by which the understanding operates—that assent be proportioned to the evidence. To abandon that fundamental principle would be catastrophic. This is a point that Locke also makes in The Conduct of the Understanding and The Reasonableness of Christianity . Locke wants each of us to use our understanding to search after truth. Of enthusiasts, those who would abandon reason and claim to know on the basis of faith alone, Locke writes:

…he that takes away Reason to make way for Revelation, puts out the Light of both, and does much what the same, as if he would perswade a Man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote Light of an invisible Star by a Telescope. (IV.19.4, N: 698)

Rather than engage in the tedious labor required to reason correctly to judge of the genuineness of their revelation, enthusiasts persuade themselves that they are possessed of immediate revelation. This leads to “odd Opinions and extravagant actions” that are characteristic of enthusiasm and which should warn that this is a wrong principle. Thus, Locke strongly rejects any attempt to make inward persuasion not judged by reason a legitimate principle.

We turn now to a consideration of Locke’s educational works.

Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education and his Conduct of the Understanding form a nice bridge between An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and his political works. Ruth Grant and Nathan Tarcov write in the introduction to their edition of these works:

The idea of liberty, so crucial to all of Locke’s writings on politics and education, is traced in the Essay to reflection on the power of the mind over one’s own actions, especially the power to suspend actions in the pursuit of the satisfaction of one’s own desires until after a full consideration of their objects (II.21.47, N: 51–52). The Essay thus shows how the independence of mind pursued in the Conduct is possible. (G&T 1996: xvi)

Some Thoughts Concerning Education was first published in 1693. This book collected together advice that Locke had been giving his friend Edward Clarke about the education of Clarke’s son (and also his daughters) since 1684. In preparing the revision for the fourth edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke began writing a chapter called “The Conduct of the Understanding”. This became quite long and was never added to the Essay or even finished. It was left to Locke’s literary executors to decide what to do with it. The Conduct was published by Peter King in his posthumous edition of some of Locke’s works in 1706. As Locke was composing these works, some of the material from the Conduct eventually made its way into the Thoughts . Grant and Tarcov write that the Thoughts and the Conduct “complement each other well: the Thoughts focuses on the education of children by their parents, whereas the Conduct addresses the self-education of adults” (G&T 1996: vii). Though they also note tensions between the two that illustrate paradoxes in liberal society. The Thoughts is addressed to the education of the sons and daughters of the English gentry in the late seventeenth century. It is in some ways thus significantly more limited to its time and place than the Conduct . Yet, its insistence on the inculcating such virtues as

justice as respect for the rights of others, civility, liberality, humanity, self-denial, industry, thrift, courage, truthfulness, and a willingness to question prejudice, authority and the biases of one’s own self-interest

very likely represents the qualities needed for citizens in a liberal society (G&T 1996: xiii).

Locke’s Thoughts represents the culmination of a century of what has been called “the discovery of the child”. In the Middle Ages the child was regarded as

only a simple plaything, as a simple animal, or a miniature adult who dressed, played and was supposed to act like his elders…Their ages were unimportant and therefore seldom known. Their education was undifferentiated, either by age, ability or intended occupation. (Axtell 1968: 63–4)

Locke treated children as human beings in whom the gradual development of rationality needed to be fostered by parents. Locke urged parents to spend time with their children and tailor their education to their character and idiosyncrasies, to develop both a sound body and character, and to make play the chief strategy for learning rather than rote learning or punishment. Thus, he urged learning languages by learning to converse in them before learning rules of grammar. Locke also suggests that the child learn at least one manual trade.

In advocating a kind of education that made people who think for themselves, Locke was preparing people to effectively make decisions in their own lives—to engage in individual self-government—and to participate in the government of their country. The Conduct reveals the connections Locke sees between reason, freedom and morality. Reason is required for good self-government because reason insofar as it is free from partiality, intolerance and passion and able to question authority leads to fair judgment and action. We thus have a responsibility to cultivate reason in order to avoid the moral failings of passion, partiality and so forth (G&T 1996: xii). This is, in Tarcov’s phrase, Locke’s education for liberty.

We turn now to Locke’s political writings. (See the entry on Locke’s political philosophy , which focuses on five topics (the state of nature, natural law, property, consent and toleration) and goes into these topics in more depth than is possible in a general account and provides much useful information on the debates about them.)

4. The Two Treatises Of Government

Lord Shaftsbury had been dismissed from his post as Lord Chancellor in 1673 and had become one of the leaders of the opposition party, the Country Party. In 1679 the chief issue was the attempt by the Country Party leaders to exclude James, Duke of York from succeeding his brother Charles II to the throne. They wanted to do this because James was a Catholic, and England by this time was a firmly Protestant country. They had acquired a majority in the House of Commons through serious grass roots election campaigns, and passed an exclusion bill, but given the King’s unwillingness to see his brother excluded from the throne, the bill failed in the House of Lords. They tried a couple of more times without success. Having failed by parliamentary means, some of the Country Party leaders started plotting armed rebellion.

The Two Treatises of Government were published in 1689, long after the rebellion plotted by the Country party leaders had failed to materialize and after Shaftsbury had fled the country for Holland and died. The introduction of the Two Treatises was written after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and gave the impression that the book was written to justify the Glorious Revolution. We now know that the Two Treatises of Government were written during the Exclusion crisis in 1681 and may have been intended in part to justify the general armed rising which the Country Party leaders were planning.

There were serious obstacles to a rebellion to force James’ exclusion from the throne. The English Anglican gentry needed to support such an action. But the Anglican church from childhood on taught that: “…men’s political duties were exhaustively determined by their terrestrial superiors, that under grave conscientious scruples they might rightly decline to carry out those decrees of authority which were in direct breach of divine law, they could under no circumstances have a right to resist such authority”. (Dunn, 1968, 48) Since by 1679 it was abundantly clear that the King opposed excluding his brother from the throne, to favor exclusion implied “explicit and self-conscious resistance to the sovereign”. Passive resistance would simply not do. On the other hand, the royal policy “outraged their deepest religious prejudices and stimulated their most obscure emotional anxieties.” So, the gentry were deeply conflicted and neither of the choices available to them looked very palatable. John Dunn goes on to remark: “To exert influence upon their choice it was above all necessary to present a more coherent ordering of their values, to show that the political tradition within which the dissenters saw their conduct was not necessarily empirically absurd or socially subversive. The gentry had to be persuaded that there could be reason for rebellion which could make it neither blasphemous or suicidal.” (Dunn, 1968, 49) To achieve this goal Locke picked the most relevant and extreme of the supporters of the divine right of Kings to attack. Sir Robert Filmer (c 1588–1653), a man of the generation of Charles I and the English Civil War, who had defended the crown in various works. His most famous work, however, Patriarcha , was published posthumously in 1680 and represented the most complete and coherent exposition of the view Locke wished to deny. Filmer held that men were born into helpless servitude to an authoritarian family, a social hierarchy and a sovereign whose only constraint was his relationship with God. Under these circumstances, anything other than passive obedience would be “vicious, blasphemous and intellectually absurd.” So, Locke needed to refute Filmer and in Dunn’s words: “rescue the contractarian account of political obligation from the criticism of impiety and absurdity. Only in this way could he restore to the Anglican gentry a coherent basis for moral autonomy or a practical initiative in the field of politics.” (Dunn, 1968, 50)

The First Treatise of Government is a polemical work aimed at refuting the theological basis for the patriarchal version of the Divine Right of Kings doctrine put forth by Sir Robert Filmer. Locke singles out Filmer’s contention that men are not “naturally free” as the key issue, for that is the “ground” or premise on which Filmer erects his argument for the claim that all “legitimate” government is “absolute monarchy”—kings being descended from the first man, Adam, and their subjects being naturally slaves. Early in the First Treatise Locke denies that either scripture or reason supports Filmer’s premise or arguments. In what follows in the First Treatise , Locke minutely examines key Biblical passages.

While The Second Treatise of Government provides Locke’s positive theory of government, it also continues his argument against Sir Robert Filmer’s claims that monarchs legitimately hold absolute power over their subjects. Locke holds that Filmer’s view is sufficiently incoherent to lead to governments being established by force and violence. Thus, Locke claims he must provide an alternative account of the origin of government “lest men fall into the dangerous belief that all government in the world is merely the product of force and violence” ( Treatises II,1,4). Locke’s account involves several devices which were common in seventeenth and eighteenth century political philosophy—natural rights theory and the social contract. Natural rights are those rights which we are supposed to have as human beings before ever government comes into being. We might suppose, that like other animals, we have a natural right to struggle for our survival. Locke will argue that we have a right to the means to survive. When Locke comes to explain how government comes into being, he uses the idea that people agree that their condition in the state of nature is unsatisfactory, and so agree to transfer some of their rights to a central government, while retaining others. This is the theory of the social contract. There are many versions of natural rights theory and the social contract in seventeenth and eighteenth century European political philosophy, some conservative and some radical. Locke’s version belongs on the radical side of the spectrum. These radical natural right theories influenced the ideologies of the American and French revolutions.

Locke’s strategy for refuting Filmer’s claims that monarchs have absolute power over their subjects is to show that Filmer is conflating a whole variety of limited powers, all of which might be held by one man and thus give the false appearance that a king has absolute power over wives, children, servants and slaves as well as subjects of a commonwealth. When properly distinguished, however, and the limitations of each displayed, it becomes clear that monarchs have no legitimate absolute power over their subjects.

An important part of Locke’s project in the Second Treatise is to figure out what the role of legitimate government is, thus allowing him to distinguish the nature of illegitimate government. Once this is done, the basis for legitimate revolution becomes clear. Figuring out what the proper or legitimate role of civil government is would be a difficult task indeed if one were to examine the vast complexity of existing governments. How should one proceed? One strategy is to consider what life is like in the absence of civil government. Presumably this is a simpler state, one which may be easier to understand. Then one might see what role civil government ought to play. This is the strategy which Locke pursues, following Hobbes and others. So, in the first chapter of the Second Treatise Locke defines political power.

Political power , then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the common-wealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good. ( Treatises, II, 1,3)

In the second chapter of The Second Treatise Locke describes the state in which there is no government with real political power. This is the state of nature. It is sometimes assumed that the state of nature is a state in which there is no government at all. This is only partially true. It is possible to have in the state of nature either no government, illegitimate government, or legitimate government with less than full political power. (See the section on the state of nature in the entry on Locke’s political philosophy.)

If we consider the state of nature before there was government, it is a state of political equality in which there is no natural superior or inferior. From this equality flows the obligation to mutual love and the duties that people owe one another, and the great maxims of justice and charity. Was there ever such a state? There has been considerable debate about this. Still, it is plain that both Hobbes and Locke would answer this question affirmatively. Whenever people have not agreed to establish a common political authority, they remain in the state of nature. It’s like saying that people are in the state of being naturally single until they are married. Locke clearly thinks one can find the state of nature in his time at least in the “inland, vacant places of America” ( Second Treatise V. 36) and in the relations between different peoples. Perhaps the historical development of states also went though the stages of a state of nature. An alternative possibility is that the state of nature is not a real historical state, but rather a theoretical construct, intended to help determine the proper function of government. If one rejects the historicity of states of nature, one may still find them a useful analytical device. For Locke, it is very likely both.

According to Locke, God created man and we are, in effect, God’s property. The chief end set us by our creator as a species and as individuals is survival. A wise and omnipotent God, having made people and sent them into this world:

…by his order and about his business, they are his property whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another’s pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our’s. ( Treatises II,2,6)

It follows immediately that “he has no liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, yet when some nobler use than its bare possession calls for it” ( Treatises II.2.6). So, murder and suicide violate the divine purpose.

If one takes survival as the end, then we may ask what are the means necessary to that end. On Locke’s account, these turn out to be life, liberty, health and property. Since the end is set by God, on Locke’s view we have a right to the means to that end. So we have rights to life, liberty, health and property. These are natural rights, that is they are rights that we have in a state of nature before the introduction of civil government, and all people have these rights equally.

There is also a law of nature. It is the Golden Rule, interpreted in terms of natural rights. Thus Locke writes:

The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: and reason which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions…. ( Treatises II.2.6)

Locke tells us that the law of nature is revealed by reason. Locke makes the point about the law that it commands what is best for us. If it did not, he says, the law would vanish for it would not be obeyed. It is in this sense that Locke means that reason reveals the law. If you reflect on what is best for yourself and others, given the goal of survival and our natural equality, you will come to this conclusion. (See the section on the law of nature in the entry on Locke’s Political Philosophy.)

Locke does not intend his account of the state of nature as a sort of utopia. Rather it serves as an analytical device that explains why it becomes necessary to introduce civil government and what the legitimate function of civil government is. Thus, as Locke conceives it, there are problems with life in the state of nature. The law of nature, like civil laws can be violated. There are no police, prosecutors or judges in the state of nature as these are all representatives of a government with full political power. The victims, then, must enforce the law of nature in the state of nature. In addition to our other rights in the state of nature, we have the rights to enforce the law and to judge on our own behalf. We may, Locke tells us, help one another. We may intervene in cases where our own interests are not directly under threat to help enforce the law of nature. This right eventually serves as the justification for legitimate rebellion. Still, in the state of nature, the person who is most likely to enforce the law under these circumstances is the person who has been wronged. The basic principle of justice is that the punishment should be proportionate to the crime. But when the victims are judging the seriousness of the crime, they are more likely to judge it of greater severity than might an impartial judge. As a result, there will be regular miscarriages of justice. This is perhaps the most important problem with the state of nature.

In chapters 3 and 4, Locke defines the states of war and slavery. The state of war is a state in which someone has a sedate and settled intention of violating someone’s right to life (and thus all their other rights). Such a person puts themselves into a state of war with the person whose life they intend to take. In such a war the person who intends to violate someone’s right to life is an unjust aggressor. This is not the normal relationship between people enjoined by the law of nature in the state of nature. Locke is distancing himself from Hobbes who had made the state of nature and the state of war equivalent terms. For Locke, the state of nature is ordinarily one in which we follow the Golden Rule interpreted in terms of natural rights, and thus love our fellow human creatures. The state of war only comes about when someone proposes to violate someone else’s rights. Thus, on Locke’s theory of war, there will always be an innocent victim on one side and an unjust aggressor on the other.

Slavery is the state of being in the absolute or arbitrary power of another. On Locke’s definition of slavery, there is only one rather remarkable way to become a legitimate slave. In order to do so, one must be an unjust aggressor defeated in war. The just victor then has the option to either kill the aggressor or enslave them. Locke tells us that the state of slavery is the continuation of the state of war between a lawful conqueror and a captive, in which the conqueror delays taking the life of the captive, and instead makes use of him. This is a continued war because if conqueror and captive make some compact for obedience on the one side and limited power on the other, the state of slavery ceases and becomes a relation between a master and a servant in which the master only has limited power over his servant. The reason that slavery ceases with the compact is that “no man, can, by agreement pass over to another that which he hath not in himself, a power over his own life” ( Treatises II.4.24). Legitimate slavery is an important concept in Locke’s political philosophy largely because it tells us what the legitimate extent of despotic power is and defines and illuminates by contrast the nature of illegitimate slavery. Illegitimate slavery is that state in which someone possesses absolute or despotic power over someone else without just cause. Locke holds that it is this illegitimate state of slavery which absolute monarchs wish to impose upon their subjects. It is very likely for this reason that legitimate slavery is so narrowly defined. This shows that the chapter on slavery plays a crucial role in Locke’s argument against Sir Robert Filmer and thus could not have been easily dispensed with. Still, it is possible that Locke had an additional purpose or perhaps a quite different reason for writing about slavery.

There has been a steady stream of articles and books over the last sixty years arguing that given Locke’s involvement with trade and colonial government, the theory of slavery in the Second Treatise was intended to justify the institutions and practices of Afro-American slavery. If this were the case, Locke’s philosophy would not contradict his actions as an investor and colonial administrator. However, there are strong objections to this view. Had he intended to justify Afro-American slavery, Locke would have done much better with a vastly more inclusive definition of legitimate slavery than the one he gives. It is sometimes suggested that Locke’s account of “just war” is so vague that it could easily be twisted to justify the institutions and practices of Afro-American slavery. This, however, is also not the case. In the chapter “Of Conquest” Locke explicitly lists the limits of the legitimate power of conquerors. These limits on who can become a legitimate slave and what the powers of a just conqueror are ensure that this theory of conquest and slavery would condemn the institutions and practices of Afro-American slavery in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. Nonetheless, the debate continues. One element of the debate has to do with Locke’s role in the writing of the Fundamental Constitutions of the Carolinas . David Armitage in his 2004 article “John Locke, Carolina and the Two Treatises of Government” argues that Locke was involved in a revision of the Fundamental Constitution of the Carolinas at the very time he was writing The Two Treatises of Government . The provision that “Every Freedman of the Carolinas has absolute power and authority over his negro slaves” remained in the document unchanged. In his 2016 book The Ashley Cooper Plan , Thomas Wilson gives a detailed account of Ashley Cooper’s intentions for the Carolina colony and how Cooper’s intent was thwarted by Barbadian slave owners who changed Carolina society from a society with slaves to a slave society. L. H. Roper, in his 2004 book Conceiving Carolina: Property, Planters and Plots 1662–1729 , offers a different account of what went wrong, focusing on conflicts over the trade in Indian slaves. James Farr’s article “Locke, Natural Law and New World Slavery” (2008) is one of the best statements of the position that Locke intended his theory of slavery to apply to English absolutism and not Afro-American slavery while noting that Locke’s involvement with slavery has ruined his reputation as the great champion of liberty Roger Woolhouse in his recent biography of Locke (Woolhouse 2007: 187) remarks that “Though there is no consensus on the whole question, there certainly seems to be ‘a glaring contradiction between his theories and Afro-American slavery’”.

Recently, there has been a debate over whose theory of slavery and absolutism Locke was attacking. Johan Olsthoorn and Laurens van Apeldoorn (2020) argue that Locke’s account of slavery and in particular, that no person can consensually establish absolute rule over themselves with all its consequences has little force against other classical contract theories, in particular those of Grotius and Puffendorf. Both Grotius and Puffendorf defended both absolutism and colonial slavery.

Felis Waldmann in “Slavery and Absolutism in Locke’s Two Treatises: A Response to Olsthoorn and van Apeldoorn” objects to a number of their claims finding others not relevant. Most notably, he objects to these claims: First, “Locke is working with an idiosyncratic conception of slavery and absolute rule repudiated by prominent early modern thinkers defending political absolutism.” Second: “Like Filmer, Locke maintains that absolute rulers may arbitrarily kill and maim their subjects at will, by dint of having a dominium in the latter’s lives.” Finally, he objects to the claim that: “Early modern natural lawyers, from Grotius onward, conceptualized slavery rather differently, insisting that enslaved people were not owned in the way we own things (which may be destroyed at will)” (Waldmann 7).

In brief, Waldmann’s response to the first claim is that Filmer accurately represented the Royalist position in the late 1670s and early 1680s and so Locke’s account is not a straw man. Thus, Locke is attacking Filmer’s account of slavery and not some weak and extreme version of the argument for absolutism that no one held. Waldmann suggests that the second claim magnifies this tendency of the two authors’ portrayal of Locke’s argument as not responding to the standard arguments for absolutism. Thus, Olsthoorn and van Apeldoorn attribute Filmer’s position to Locke. Waldmann concludes that the claims of Olsthoorn and van Apeldoorn that since Locke’s position on slavery was significantly different from those of Grotius and Puffendorf, it had little force against them is, in fact, the case. But he thinks this is of little importance since Locke was not arguing against them. One suggestion he considers plausible is that Locke is aiming his argument against the possibility of self-enslavement at Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes was recognized by his contemporaries as asserting both that one could by contract enslave oneself and that the king had dominium, over his subjects.

William Uzgalis, in his 2017 chapter “John Locke, Slavery and Indian Lands,” holds that Locke has two theories of slavery, one of them of legitimate slavery and the other of illegitimate slavery. Note that the authors discussed above simply don’t make this distinction. If they had, it would be plain that while Locke shares with Filmer the dominium conception of slavery that allows a master to kill or maim a slave, neither theory belongs to Filmer, and if Locke is correct about royal absolutism and given the character of the practices of the slave trade and colonial slavery, both absolutism at home and the slave trade and colonial slavery fall under the theory of illegitimate slavery. Neither Grotius, Puffendorf or Hobbes has an explicit theory of illegitimate slavery. Uzgalis also notes that Grotius and Puffendorf provided claims that Locke could have adopted had he wished to justify the slave trade and slavery in the colonies. Still, he denies them all, and with good reason. He would have substantially weakened his argument against the kind of absolutism he attributed to Filmer and the Stuarts had he done so. This suggests that he was crafting an alternative theory and not arguing against its competitors, with the exception, perhaps, of Hobbes.

Holly Brewer in her 2017 article “Slavery, Sovereignty, and ‘Inheritable Blood’, Reconsidering John Locke and the Origins of American Slavery” argues for a different approach to these questions. She presents evidence that the Stuart kings, and Charles II and his brother James, Duke of York, in particular, were not just interested in absolute government at home; they actively promoted the Royal Africa Company, the slave trade and slavery in the colonies as it provided considerable amounts of money to the royal coffers. James was the Governor (the President) of the Royal Africa Company and Admiral of the English fleet. Lord Shaftesbury, Locke’s patron, was the sub-governor, and Locke assisted him. Using the fleet, James attacked and captured Dutch forts on the coast of Africa to make bases for the Royal Africa Company and deprive the Dutch of them. The Stuarts minted guinea coins to celebrate these efforts. After becoming King, James continued as Governor of the Royal Africa Company. Thus Brewer underlines the similarities and connections between the absolutism Locke objected to at home and the slave trade and slavery in the colonies. She argues that the spread of slavery needs to be understood as an English imperial policy and not something that occurred in different times and places unconnected with one another. She also claims that while Locke was a member of King William III’s Board of Trade in the waning years of the seventeenth century, he sought to undo Stuart policies concerning slavery in the colonies.

Chapter 5 “Of Property” is one of the most famous, influential and important chapters in the Second Treatise of Government . Indeed, some of the most controversial issues about the Second Treatise come from varying interpretations of it. In this chapter Locke, in effect, describes the evolution of the state of nature to the point where it becomes expedient for those in it to found a civil government. So, it is not only an account of the nature and origin of private property but leads up to the explanation of why civil government replaces the state of nature (see the section on property in the entry on Locke’s political philosophy).

In discussing the origin of private property Locke begins by noting that God gave the earth to all men in common. Thus there is a question about how private property comes to be. Locke finds it a serious difficulty. He points out, however, that we are supposed to make use of the earth “for the best advantage of life and convenience” ( Treatises II.5.25). What then is the means to appropriate property from the common store? Locke argues that private property does not come about by universal consent. If one had to go about and ask everyone if one could eat these berries, one would starve to death before getting everyone’s agreement. Locke holds that we have property in our own person. And the labor of our body and the work of our hands properly belong to us. So, when one picks up acorns or berries, they thereby belong to the person who picked them up. There has been some controversy about what Locke means by “labor”. Daniel Russell claims that for Locke, labor is a goal-directed activity that converts materials that might meet our needs into resources that actually do (Russell 2004). This interpretation of what Locke means by “labor” connects nicely with his claim that we have a natural law obligation first to preserve ourselves and then to help in the preservation and flourishing of others.

One might think that one could then acquire as much as one wished, but this is not the case. Locke introduces at least two important qualifications on how much property can be acquired. The first qualification has to do with waste. Locke writes:

As much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much by his labor he may fix a property in; whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. ( Treatises II.5.31)

Since originally, populations were small and resources great, living within the bounds set by reason, there would be little quarrel or contention over property, for a single man could make use of only a very small part of what was available.

Note that Locke has, thus far, been talking about hunting and gathering, and the kinds of limitations which reason imposes on the kind of property that hunters and gatherers hold. In the next section he turns to agriculture and the ownership of land and the kinds of limitations there are on that kind of property. In effect, we see the evolution of the state of nature from a hunter/gatherer kind of society to that of a farming and agricultural society. Once again it is labor which imposes limitations upon how much land can be enclosed. It is only as much as one can work. But there is an additional qualification. Locke says:

Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land , by improving it, any prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the as yet unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there was never the less for others because of his inclosure for himself: for he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all. No body could consider himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left to quench his thirst: and the case of land and water, where there is enough, is perfectly the same. ( Treatises II.5.33)

The next stage in the evolution of the state of nature involves the introduction of money. Locke remarks that:

… before the desire of having more than one needed had altered the intrinsic value of things, which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man; or had agreed, that a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay, should be worth a great piece of flesh, or a whole heap of corn; though men had a right to appropriate by their labor, each one of himself, as much of the things of nature, as he could use; yet this could not be much, nor to the prejudice of others, where the same plenty was left to those who would use the same industry. ( Treatises II.5.37)

So, before the introduction of money, there was a degree of economic equality imposed on mankind both by reason and the barter system. And men were largely confined to the satisfaction of their needs and conveniences. Most of the necessities of life are relatively short lived—berries, plums, venison and so forth. One could reasonably barter one’s berries for nuts which would last not weeks but perhaps a whole year. And says Locke:

…if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased with its color, or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a sparkling pebble or diamond, and keep those by him all his life, he invaded not the right of others, he might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his property not lying in the largeness of his possessions, but the perishing of anything uselessly in it. ( Treatises II.5.146)

The introduction of money is necessary for the differential increase in property, with resulting economic inequality. Without money there would be no point in going beyond the economic equality of the earlier stage. In a money economy, different degrees of industry could give men vastly different proportions.

This partage of things in an inequality of private possessions, men have made practicable out of the bounds of society, and without compact, only by putting a value on gold and silver, and tacitly agreeing to the use of money: for in governments, the laws regulate the rights of property, and the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions. ( Treatises II.5.50)

The implication is that it is the introduction of money, which causes inequality, which in turn multiplies the causes of quarrels and contentions and increased numbers of violations of the law of nature. This leads to the decision to create a civil government. Before turning to the institution of civil government, however, we should ask what happens to the qualifications on the acquisition of property after the advent of money? One answer proposed by C. B. Macpherson in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism is that the qualifications are completely set aside, and we now have a system for the unlimited acquisition of private property. This does not seem to be correct. It seems plain, rather, that at least the non-spoilage qualification is satisfied, because money does not spoil. The other qualifications may be rendered somewhat irrelevant by the advent of the conventions about property adopted in civil society. This leaves open the question of whether Locke approved of these changes. Macpherson, who takes Locke to be a spokesman for a proto-capitalist system, sees Locke as advocating the unlimited acquisition of wealth. James Tully, on the other side, in A Discourse of Property holds that Locke sees the new conditions, the change in values and the economic inequality which arise as a result of the advent of money, as the fall of man. Tully sees Locke as a persistent and powerful critic of self-interest. This remarkable difference in interpretation has been a significant topic for debates among scholars over the last forty years. Though the Second Treatise of Government may leave this question difficult to determine, one might consider Locke’s remark in Some Thoughts Concerning Education that

Covetousness and the desire to having in our possession and our dominion more than we have need of, being the root of all evil, should be early and carefully weeded out and the contrary quality of being ready to impart to others inculcated. (G&T 1996: 81)

Let us then turn to the institution of civil government.

Just as natural rights and natural law theory had a fluorescence in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, so did the social contract theory. Why is Locke a social contract theorist? Is it merely that this was one prevailing way of thinking about government at the time which Locke blindly adopted? The answer is that there is something about Locke’s project which pushes him strongly in the direction of the social contract. One might hold that governments were originally instituted by force, and that no agreement was involved. Were Locke to adopt this view, he would be forced to go back on many of the things which are at the heart of his project in the Second Treatise , though cases like the Norman conquest force him to admit that citizens may come to accept a government that was originally forced on them. Remember that the Second Treatise provides Locke’s positive theory of government, and that he explicitly says that he must provide an alternative to the view

that all government in the world is merely the product of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules than that of the beasts, where the strongest carries it … . ( Treatises II, 1, 4)

So, while Locke might admit that some governments come about through force or violence, he would be destroying the most central and vital distinction, that between legitimate and illegitimate civil government, if he admitted that legitimate government can come about in this way. So, for Locke, legitimate government is instituted by the explicit consent of those governed. (See the section on consent, political obligation, and the ends of government in the entry on Locke’s political philosophy.) Those who make this agreement transfer to the government their right of executing the law of nature and judging their own case. These are the powers which they give to the central government, and this is what makes the justice system of governments a legitimate function of such governments.

Ruth Grant has persuasively argued that the establishment of government is in effect a two step process. Universal consent is necessary to form a political community. Consent to join a community once given is binding and cannot be withdrawn. This makes political communities stable. Grant writes: “Having established that the membership in a community entails the obligation to abide by the will of the community, the question remains: Who rules?” (1987: 114–115). The answer to this question is determined by majority rule. The point is that universal consent is necessary to establish a political community, majority consent to answer the question who is to rule such a community. Universal consent and majority consent are thus different in kind, not just in degree. Grant writes:

Locke’s argument for the right of the majority is the theoretical ground for the distinction between duty to society and duty to government, the distinction that permits an argument for resistance without anarchy. When the designated government dissolves, men remain obligated to society acting through majority rule. (1987: 119)

It is entirely possible for the majority to confer the rule of the community on a king and his heirs, or a group of oligarchs or on a democratic assembly. Thus, the social contract is not inextricably linked to democracy. Still, a government of any kind must perform the legitimate function of a civil government.

Locke is now in a position to explain the function of a legitimate government and distinguish it from illegitimate government. The aim of such a legitimate government is to preserve, so far as possible, the rights to life, liberty, health and property of its citizens, and to prosecute and punish those of its citizens who violate the rights of others and to pursue the public good even where this may conflict with the rights of individuals. In doing this it provides something unavailable in the state of nature, an impartial judge to determine the severity of the crime, and to set a punishment proportionate to the crime. This is one of the main reasons why civil society is an improvement on the state of nature. An illegitimate government will fail to protect the rights to life, liberty, health and property of its subjects, and in the worst cases, such an illegitimate government will claim to be able to violate the rights of its subjects, that is it will claim to have despotic power over its subjects. Since Locke is arguing against the position of Sir Robert Filmer who held that patriarchal power and political power are the same, and that in effect these amount to despotic power, Locke is at pains to distinguish these three forms of power, and to show that they are not equivalent. Thus at the beginning of chapter 15 “Of Paternal, Political and Despotic Power Considered Together” he writes:

THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these before, yet the great mistakes of late about government, having as I suppose arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another, it may not be amiss, to consider them together.

Chapters 6 and 7 give Locke’s account of paternal and political power respectively. Paternal power is limited. It lasts only through the minority of children, and has other limitations. Political power, derived as it is from the transfer of the power of individuals to enforce the law of nature, has with it the right to kill in the interest of preserving the rights of the citizens or otherwise supporting the public good. Legitimate despotic power, by contrast, implies the right to take the life, liberty, health and at least some of the property of any person subject to such a power.

At the end of the Second Treatise we learn about the nature of illegitimate civil governments and the conditions under which rebellion and regicide are legitimate and appropriate. As noted above, scholars now hold that the book was written during the Exclusion Crisis, and may have been written to justify a general insurrection and the assassination of the king of England and his brother. The argument for legitimate revolution follows from making the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate civil government. A legitimate civil government seeks to preserve its subjects’ life, health, liberty, and property insofar as this is compatible with the public good. Because it does this, it deserves obedience. An illegitimate civil government seeks to systematically violate the natural rights of its subjects. It seeks to make them illegitimate slaves. Because an illegitimate civil government does this, it puts itself in a state of nature and a state of war with its subjects. The magistrate or king of such a state violates the law of nature and so makes himself into a dangerous beast of prey who operates on the principle that might makes right, or that the strongest carries it. In such circumstances, rebellion is legitimate, as is the killing of such a dangerous beast of prey. Thus Locke justifies rebellion and regicide under certain circumstances. Presumably, this justification was going to be offered for the killing of the King of England and his brother had the Rye House Plot succeeded. Even if this was not Locke’s intention, it still would have served that purpose admirably.

The issue of religious toleration was of widespread interest in Europe in the seventeenth century, largely because religious intolerance with accompanying violence was so pervasive. The Reformation had split Europe into competing religious camps, and this provoked civil wars and massive religious persecutions. John Marshall, in his massive study John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture notes that the 1680s were the climactic decade for this kind of persecution. The Dutch Republic, where Locke spent years in exile, had been founded as a secular state which would allow religious differences. This was a reaction to the Catholic persecution of Protestants. However, once the Calvinist Church gained power, they began persecuting other sects, such as the Remonstrants, who disagreed with them. Nonetheless, The Dutch Republic remained the most tolerant country in Europe. In France, religious conflict had been temporarily quieted by the edict of Nantes. But in 1685, the year in which Locke wrote the First Letter concerning religious toleration, Louis XIV had revoked the Edict of Nantes, and the Huguenots were being persecuted. Though prohibited from doing so, some 200,000 emigrated, while probably 700,000 were forced to convert to Catholicism. People in England were keenly aware of the events taking place in France.

In England itself, religious conflict dominated the seventeenth century, contributing in important respects to the coming of the English Civil War, and the abolishing of the Anglican Church during the Protectorate. After the Restoration of Charles II, Anglicans in parliament passed laws that repressed both Catholics and Protestant sects such as Presbyterians, Baptists, Quakers and Unitarians who did not agree with the doctrines or practices of the state Church. Of these various dissenting sects, some were closer to the Anglicans, others more remote. One reason, among others, why King Charles may have found Shaftesbury useful was that they were both concerned about religious toleration. They parted when it became clear that the King was mainly interested in toleration for Catholics, and Shaftesbury for Protestant dissenters.

One widely discussed strategy for reducing religious conflict in England was called comprehension. The idea was to reduce the doctrines and practices of the Anglican church to a minimum so that most, if not all, of the dissenting sects would be included in the state church. For those which even this measure would not serve, there was to be toleration. Toleration we may define as a lack of state persecution. Neither of these strategies made much progress during the course of the Restoration.

When Locke fled to Holland after the discovery of the Rye house plot, he became involved with a group of scholars advocating religious toleration. This group included Benjamin Furly, a quaker with whom Locke lived for a while, the noted philosopher Pierre Bayle, several Dutch theologians, and many others. This group read all the arguments for religious intolerance and discussed them in book and conversation clubs. Members of the group considered toleration not only for Protestants and Protestant dissenters but Jews, Moslems, and Catholics. A recent discovery of a page of Locke’s reflections on toleration of Catholics shows that Locke considered even the pros and cons of toleration for Catholics (Walmsley and Waldmann 2019). Some members of the group also wrote tolerationist articles and books. They helped each other get jobs. Some of their members founded journals that reviewed books and articles on religious, scientific, and other topics. The group took the notion of free speech, civility, and politeness in discourse seriously. They called themselves the ‘the Republic of Letters’ or in Locke’s phrase ‘the commonwealth of learning.’

What were Locke’s religious views and where did he fit into the debates about religious toleration? This is a quite difficult question to answer. Religion and Christianity in particular, is perhaps the most important influence on the shape of Locke’s philosophy. But what kind of Christian was Locke? Locke’s family were Puritans. At Oxford, Locke avoided becoming an Anglican priest. Still, Locke himself claimed to be an Anglican until he died and Locke’s nineteenth-century biographer Fox Bourne thought that Locke was an Anglican. Others have identified him with the Latitudinarians—a movement among Anglicans to argue for a reasonable Christianity that dissenters ought to accept. Still, there are some reasons to think that Locke was neither an orthodox Anglican or a Latitudinarian. Locke got Isaac Newton to write Newton’s most powerful anti-Trinitarian tract. Locke arranged to have the work published anonymously in Holland though in the end, Newton decided not to publish (McLachlan 1941). This strongly suggests that Locke too was by this time an Arian or unitarian. (Arius, c. 250–336, asserted the primacy of the Father over the Son and thus rejected the doctrine of the Trinity and was condemned as a heretic at the Council of Nicaea in 325. Newton held that the Church had gone in the wrong direction in condemning Arius.) Given that one main theme of Locke’s Letter on Toleration is that there should be a separation between Church and State, this does not seem like the view of a man devoted to a state religion. It might appear that Locke’s writing The Reasonableness of Christianity in which he argues that the basic doctrines of Christianity are few and compatible with reason make him a Latitudinarian. Yet Richard Ashcraft has argued that comprehension for the Anglicans meant conforming to the existing practices of the Anglican Church; that is, the abandonment of religious dissent. Ashcraft also suggests that Latitudinarians were thus not a moderate middle ground between contending extremes but part of one of the extremes—“the acceptable face of the persecution of religious dissent” (Ashcraft 1992: 155). Ashcraft holds that while the Latitudinarians may have represented the “rational theology” of the Anglican church, there was a competing dissenting “rational theology”. Thus, while it is true that Locke had Latitudinarian friends, given Ashcraft’s distinction between Anglican and dissenting “rational theologies”, it is entirely possible that The Reasonableness of Christianity is a work of dissenting “rational theology”.

Locke had been thinking, talking and writing about religious toleration since 1659. His views evolved. In the early 1660s he very likely was an orthodox Anglican. He and Shaftesbury had instituted religious toleration in the Fundamental Constitutions of the Carolinas (1669). He wrote the Epistola de Tolerantia in Latin in 1685 while in exile in Holland. He very likely was seeing Protestant refugees pouring over the borders from France where Louis XIV had just revoked the Edict of Nantes. Holland itself was a Calvinist theocracy with significant problems with religious toleration. But Locke’s Letter does not confine itself to the issues of the time. Locke gives a principled account of religious toleration, though this is mixed in with arguments which apply only to Christians, and perhaps in some cases only to Protestants. He excluded both Catholics and atheists from religious toleration. In the case of Catholics it was because he regarded them as agents of a foreign power. Because they do not believe in God, atheists, on Locke’s account: “Promises, covenants and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist” (Mendus 1991: 47). He gives his general defense of religious toleration while continuing the anti-Papist rhetoric of the Country party which sought to exclude James II from the throne.

Locke’s arguments for religious toleration connect nicely to his account of civil government. Locke defines life, liberty, health and property as our civil interests. These are the proper concern of a magistrate or civil government. The magistrate can use force and violence where this is necessary to preserve civil interests against attack. This is the central function of the state. One’s religious concerns with salvation, however, are not within the domain of civil interests, and so lie outside of the legitimate concern of the magistrate or the civil government. In effect, Locke adds an additional right to the natural rights of life, liberty, health and property—the right of freedom to choose one’s own road to salvation. (See the section on Toleration in the entry on Locke’s Political Philosophy.)

Locke holds that the use of force by the state to get people to hold certain beliefs or engage in certain ceremonies or practices is illegitimate. The chief means which the magistrate has at her disposal is force, but force is not an effective means for changing or maintaining belief. Suppose then, that the magistrate uses force so as to make people profess that they believe. Locke writes:

A sweet religion, indeed, that obliges men to dissemble, and tell lies to both God and man, for the salvation of their souls! If the magistrate thinks to save men thus, he seems to understand little of the way of salvation; and if he does it not in order to save them, why is he so solicitous of the articles of faith as to enact them by a law? (Mendus 1991: 41)

So, religious persecution by the state is inappropriate. Locke holds that “Whatever is lawful in the commonwealth cannot be prohibited by the magistrate in the church”. This means that the use of bread and wine, or even the sacrificing of a calf could not be prohibited by the magistrate.

If there are competing churches, one might ask which one should have the power? The answer is clearly that power should go to the true church and not to the heretical church. But Locke claims this amounts to saying nothing. For every church believes itself to be the true church, and there is no judge but God who can determine which of these claims is correct. Thus, skepticism about the possibility of religious knowledge is central to Locke’s argument for religious toleration.

Finally, for an account of the influence of Locke’s works, see the supplementary document: Supplement on the Influence of Locke’s Works

Locke’s Works

Oxford University Press is in the process of producing a new edition of all of Locke’s works. This will supersede The Works of John Locke of which the 1823 edition is probably the most standard. The new Clarendon editions began with Peter Nidditch’s edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1975. The Oxford Clarendon editions contain much of the material of the Lovelace collection, purchased and donated to Oxford by Paul Mellon. This treasure trove of Locke’s works and letters, which includes early drafts of the Essay and much other material, comes down from Peter King, Locke’s nephew, who inherited Locke’s papers. Access to these papers has given scholars in the twentieth century a much better view of Locke’s philosophical development and provided a window into the details of his activities which is truly remarkable. Hence the new edition of Locke’s works will very likely be definitive.

• [N] An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , Peter H. Nidditch (ed.), 1975. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198243861.book.1/actrade-9780198243861-book-1
• Some Thoughts Concerning Education , John W. Yolton and Jean S. Yolton (eds.), 1989. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245827.book.1/actrade-9780198245827-book-1
• Drafts for the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and Other Philosophical Writings: In Three Volumes , Vol. 1: Drafts A and B, Peter H. Nidditch and G. A. J. Rogers (eds.), 1990. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245452.book.1/actrade-9780198245452-book-1
• The Reasonableness of Christianity: As Delivered in the Scriptures , John C. Higgins-Biddle (ed.), 2000. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245254.book.1/actrade-9780198245254-book-1
• An Essay Concerning Toleration: And Other Writings on Law and Politics, 1667–1683 , J. R. Milton and Philip Milton (eds.), 2006. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780199575732.book.1/actrade-9780199575732-book-1
• Vindications of the Reasonableness of Christianity , Victor Nuovo (ed.), 2012. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780199286553.book.1/actrade-9780199286553-book-1
• volume 1, 1987. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198248019.book.1/actrade-9780198248019-book-1
• volume 2, 1987. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198248064.book.1/actrade-9780198248064-book-1
• Volume 1, 1991. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245469.book.1/actrade-9780198245469-book-1
• Volume 2, 1991,. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198248378.book.1/actrade-9780198248378-book-1
• Vol. 1: Introduction; Letters Nos. 1–461 , 2010. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780199573615.book.1/actrade-9780199573615-book-1
• Vol. 2: Letters Nos. 462–848 , 1976. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245599.book.1/actrade-9780198245599-book-1
• Vol. 3: Letters Nos. 849–1241 , 1978. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245605.book.1/actrade-9780198245605-book-1
• Vol. 4: Letters Nos. 1242–1701 , 1978. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245612.book.1/actrade-9780198245612-book-1.
• Vol. 5: Letters Nos. 1702–2198 , 1979. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245629.book.1/actrade-9780198245629-book-1
• Vol. 6: Letters Nos. 2199–2664 , 1980. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245636.book.1/actrade-9780198245636-book-1
• Vol. 7: Letters Nos. 2665–3286 , 1981. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245643.book.1/actrade-9780198245643-book-1
• Vol. 8: Letters Nos. 3287–3648 , 1989. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245650.book.1/actrade-9780198245650-book-1

In addition to the Oxford Press edition, there are a few editions of some of Locke’s works which are worth noting.

• An Early Draft of Locke’s Essay, Together with Excerpts from his Journal , Richard I. Aaron and Jocelyn Gibb (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936.
• John Locke, Two Tracts of Government , Phillip Abrams (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967.
• Locke’s The Two Treatises of Civil Government , Richard Ashcraft (ed.), London: Routledge, 1987.
• [Axtell 1968], The Educational Writings of John Locke: A Critical Edition , James L. Axtell (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• [Gay 1964], John Locke on Education , Peter Gay (ed.), New York: Bureau of Publications, Columbia Teachers College, 1964.
• Epistola de Tolerantia: A Letter on Toleration , Latin text edited with a preface by Raymond Klibansky; English translation with an introduction and notes by J. W. Gough, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.
• [G&T 1996] “Some Thoughts Concerning Education” and “The Conduct of the Understanding” , Ruth W. Grant and Nathan Tarcov (eds), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1996.
• [Laslett 1960] Locke’s Two Treatises of Government , Peter Laslett (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.
• [Woozley 1964], An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , abridged, A.D. Woozley (ed.), London: Fontana Library, 1964.

Other Primary Sources

• Boyle, Robert, 1675 [1979], “Some Physico-Theological Considerations About the Possibility of the Resurrection”, in Selected Philosophical Papers of Robert Boyle , M.A. Stewart (ed.), New York: Manchester University Press.
• Mill, John Stuart, 1843, A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive , London: John W. Parker.

Biographies

• King, Lord Peter, 1991, The Life of John Locke: with extracts from his correspondence, journals, and common-place books , Bristol: Thoemmes.
• Fox Bourne, H.R., 1876, Life of John Locke , 2 volumes, New York: Harper & Brothers. Reprinted Scientia Aalen, 1969.
• Cranston, Maurice, 1957, John Locke, A Biography , reprinted Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.
• Woolhouse, Roger, 2007, Locke: A Biography , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Books and Articles

• Aaron, Richard, 1937, John Locke , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Aarsleff, Hans, 1982, From Locke to Saussure: Essays on the Study of Language and Intellectual History , Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
• –––, 1994 “Locke’s Influence”, in Vere Chappell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 252–289. doi:10.1017/CCOL0521383714.011
• Alexander, Peter, 1985, Ideas Qualities and Corpuscles: Locke and Boyle on the External World , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Alston, William and Jonathan Bennett, 1988, “Locke on People and Substances”, The Philosophical Review , 97(1): 25–46. doi:10.2307/2185098
• Anstey, Peter R., 2011, John Locke and Natural Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589777.001.0001
• Armitage, David, 2004, “John Locke, Carolina and the Two Treatises of Government ”, Political Theory , 32(5): 602–27. doi:10.1177/0090591704267122
• Arneil, Barbara, 1996, John Locke and America , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Ashcraft, Richard, 1986, Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of Civil Government , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• –––, 1992, “Latitudinarianism and Toleration: Historical Myth versus Political History”, in Kroll, Ashcraft, and Zagorin 1992: 151–177. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511896231.008
• Ayers, Michael, 1991, Locke: Epistemology and Ontology , 2 volumes, London: Routledge.
• Barresi, John, and Raymond Martin, 2000, Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the 18th Century , London: Routledge.
• Bennett, Jonathan, 1971, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Bolton, Martha Brandt, 2004, “Locke on the Semantic and Epistemic Role of Simple Ideas of Sensation”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 85(3): 301–321. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00200.x
• Brandt, Reinhard (ed.), 1981, John Locke: Symposium Wolfenbuttel 1979 , Berlin: de Gruyter.
• Brewer, Holly, 2017, “Slavery, Sovereignty, and ‘Inheritable Blood’: Reconsidering John Locke and the Origins of American Slavery”, The American Historical Review , 122(4): 1038–1078. doi:10.1093/ahr/122.4.1038
• Chappell, Vere, 1992, Essays on Early Modern Philosophy, John Locke—Theory of Knowledge , London: Garland Publishing, Inc.
• –––, 1994, The Cambridge Companion to Locke , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2004a, “Symposium: Locke and the Veil of Perception: Preface”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 85(3): 243–244. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00196.x
• –––, 2004b, “Comments”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 85(3): 338–355. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00202.x
• Chomsky, Noam, 1966, Cartesian Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Rationalist Thought , New York: Harper & Row.
• Dunn, John, 1969, The Political Thought of John Locke , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Farr, James, 2008, “Locke, Natural Law and New World Slavery”, Political Theory , 36(4): 495–522. doi:10.1177/0090591708317899
• Fox, Christopher, 1988, Locke and the Scriblerians , Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Garrett, Don, 2003, “Locke on Personal Identity, Consciousness and ‘Fatal Errors’”, Philosophical Topics , 31: 95–125. doi:10.5840/philtopics2003311/214
• Geach, Peter, 1967, “Identity”, The Review of Metaphysics , 21(1): 3–12.
• Gibson, James, 1968, Locke’s Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Gordon-Roth, Jessica, 2015, “Locke’s Place-Time-Kind Principle”, Philosophy Compass , 10(4): 264–274. doi:10.1111/phc3.12217
• Grant, Ruth, 1987, John Locke’s Liberalism , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Gaukroger, Stephen, 2010, The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility: Science and the Shaping of Modernity 1680–1760 , Oxford, Clarendon Press.
• Kretzmann, Norman, 1968, “The Main Thesis of Locke’s Semantic Theory”, The Philosophical Review , 77(2): 175–196. Reprinted in Tipton 1977: 123–140. doi:10.2307/2183319
• Kroll, Peter, Richard Ashcraft, and Peter Zagorin (eds), 1992, Philosophy, Science and Religion in England 1640–1700 , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511896231
• Jolley, Nicholas, 1984, Leibniz and Locke , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 1999, Locke, His Philosophical Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2015, Locke’s Touchy Subjects: Materialism and Immortality , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198737094.001.0001
• Laslett, Peter, 1954 [1990], “John Locke as Founder of the Board of Trade”, The Listener , 52(1342): 856–857. Reprinted in J.S. Yolton 1990: 127–136.
• Lennon, Thomas M., 2004, “Through a Glass Darkly: More on Locke’s Logic of Ideas”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 85(3): 322–337. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00203.x
• LoLordo, Antonia, 2010, “Person, Substance, Mode and ‘the moral Man’ in Locke’s Philosophy”, Canadian Journal Of Philosophy , 40(4); 643–668. doi:10.1080/00455091.2010.10716738
• Lott, Tommy, 1998, Subjugation and Bondage: Critical Essays on Slavery and Social Philosophy , New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.
• Lovejoy, Arthur O., 1936, The Great Chain of Being; a Study of the History of an Idea , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Lowe, E.J., 1995, Locke on Human Understanding , London: Routledge Publishing Co.
• Mackie, J. L. 1976, Problems from Locke , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Macpherson, C.B., 1962, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Mandelbaum, Maurice, 1966, Philosophy, Science and Sense Perception: Historical and Critical Studies , Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
• Marshall, John, 2006, John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture , Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press.
• Martin, C. B. and D. M. Armstrong (eds.), 1968, Locke and Berkeley: A Collection of Critical Essays , New York: Anchor Books.
• Mattern, Ruth, 1980, “Moral Science and the Concept of Persons in Locke”, The Philosophical Review , 89(1): 24–45. doi:10.2307/2184862
• McCann, Edwin, 1987, “Locke on Identity, Life, Matter and Consciousness” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie , 69(1): 54–77. doi:10.1515/agph.1987.69.1.54
• McLachlan, Hugh, 1941, Religious Opinions of Milton, Locke and Newton , Manchester: Manchester University Press.
• Mendus, Susan, 1991, Locke on Toleration in Focus , London: Routledge.
• Newman, Lex, 2004, “Locke on Sensitive Knowledge and the Veil of Perception—Four Misconceptions”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 85(3): 273–300. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00199.x
• Olsthoorn, Johan and Laurens van Apeldoorn, 2020, “‘This man is my property’: Slavery and political absolutism in Locke and the classical social contract tradition”, European Journal of Political Theory , 21(2): 253–275. doi:10.1177/1474885120911309
• Rogers, G.A. John, 2004, “Locke and the Objects of Perception”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 85(3): 245–254. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00197.x
• Roper, John, April 2004, Conceiving Carolina: Proprietors, Planters and Plots 1662–1729 , New York, Palgrave/Macmillan.
• Russell, Daniel, 2004, “Locke on Land and Labor”, Philosophical Studies , 117(1–2): 303–325. doi:10.1023/B:PHIL.0000014529.01097.20
• Schouls, Peter, 1992, Reasoned Freedom: John Locke and the Enlightenment , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
• Simmons, A. John, 1992, The Lockean Theory of Rights , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Soles, David, 1999, “Is Locke an Imagist?” The Locke Newsletter , 30: 17–66.
• Strawson, Galen, 2011, Locke on Personal Identity , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Stuart, Matthew, 2013, Locke’s Metaphysics , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645114.001.0001
• Thiel, Udo, 2011, The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542499.001.0001
• Tarcov, Nathan, 1984, Locke’s Education for Liberty , Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
• Tipton, I.C. (ed.), 1977, Locke on Human Understanding: Selected Essays , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Tully, James, 1980, A Discourse on Property , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1993, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Uzgalis, William L., 1988, “The Anti-Essential Locke and Natural Kinds”, The Philosophical Quarterly , 38(152): 330–339. doi:10.2307/2220132
• –––, 1990, “Relative Identity and Locke’s Principle of Individuation”, History of Philosophy Quarterly , 7(3): 283–297.
• –––, 2007, Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding—A Reader’s Guide , London: Continuum.
• –––, 2017, “John Locke, Racism, Slavery and Indian Lands”, in Naomi Zack (ed.), The Oxford Handbook to Philosophy and Race , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Walmsley, Jonathan and Waldman Felix, 2019 “John Locke and Toleration of Catholics: A New Manuscript”, Historical Journal , 62: 1093–1115. [Includes transcription of “Reasons for tolerating papists with others” St. Johns College, Annapolis, Maryland, Greenfield Library.]
• Wilson, Margaret Dauler, 1999, Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modern Philosophy , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Wilson, Thomas D., 2016, The Ashley Cooper Plan: The Founding of Carolina and the Origins of Southern Political Culture , Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
• Wood, Neal, 1983, The Politics of Locke’s Philosophy , Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Woolhouse, R.S., 1971, Locke’s Philosophy of Science and Knowledge , New York: Barnes and Noble.
• –––, 1983, Locke , Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
• –––, 1988, The Empiricists , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Yaffe, Gideon, 2000, Liberty Worth the Name: Locke on Free Agency , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• –––, 2004, “Locke on Ideas of Substance and the Veil of Perception”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 85(3): 252–272. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00198.x
• Yolton, Jean S., 1990, A Locke Miscellany , Bristol: Thoemmes Antiquarian Books.
• Yolton, John, 1956, John Locke and the Way of Ideas Oxford, Oxford University Press; reprinted, Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996.
• –––, 1969, John Locke: Problems and Perspectives: New Essays , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1970, John Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1983, Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth Century Britain , Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
• –––, 1984, Perceptual Acquaintance: From Descartes to Reid , Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Bibliographies

• Hall, Roland, and Roger Woolhouse, 1983, 80 Years of Locke Scholarship: A Bibliographical Guide , Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press.
• Locke Studies (formerly The Locke Newsletter) , edited by Timothy Stanton, Heslington: University of York.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• “John Locke” , entry on Locke, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
• Images of Locke , National Portrait Gallery, Great Britain.

Berkeley, George | Hume, David | Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm | liberalism | Locke, John: moral philosophy | Locke, John: on freedom | Locke, John: on personal identity | Locke, John: philosophy of science | Locke, John: political philosophy | Masham, Lady Damaris | personal identity | substance | tropes

Acknowledgments

The editors would like to thank Sally Ferguson for carefully proofreading the text.

Copyright © 2022 by William Uzgalis < buzgalis @ gmail . com >

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Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy

Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy , Oxford University Press, 2007, 340pp., $55.00 (hbk), ISBN 0195301412.

Reviewed by Paul Weithman, University of Notre Dame

This book [1] brings together nine papers by the political philosopher Samuel Freeman, seven of them previously published.   Freeman edited the Collected Papers [2] of John Rawls, the Cambridge Companion to Rawls [3] and Rawls's recently published Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy [4] .   The subtitle of the volume under review, together with Freeman's editorial work, might suggest that the nine papers collected here are primarily devoted to explaining Rawls's thought.   But Freeman insists they are not, or not exactly.   He says:

A good deal of the discussion in these chapters is not directly interpretation or defense of Rawls, but rather involves extensions or applications of Rawls's positions. ( JSC , p. 8)

This is why, he adds immediately, "rather than subtitling the book 'Essays on Rawls', I have used 'Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosoph y '".

In fact, Freeman could have subtitled his book "Essays in Rawlsian Political Philosophy", since 'in' would better suit the lingering resonances of the French 'essai' from which the English 'essay' is derived.   For the papers collected in this volume are really trials in or attempts to engage in Rawlsian political philosophy -- attempts, that is, to address a variety of philosophical problems and questions in a way that draws on what Rawls wrote and, as Freeman says, "shares the spirit of [Rawls's] position" ( JSC , p. 8).

Freeman's papers range over some of the most important subjects in liberal political theory:   the nature and varieties of contractarianism, the meaning of the priority of right, the idea of public reason, the problem of stability, the challenge of luck egalitarianism, the democratic character of judicial review, and the demands of international justice.   In taking up these subjects, Freeman partakes of the Rawlsian spirit by drawing on and creatively elaborating Rawls's assumptions and arguments as he understands them, and by posing and dividing questions as he thinks Rawls would.

If Freeman can justifiably claim to have produced work on these subjects that is in "the spirit of [Rawls's] position" -- as I believe he can -- that is because he is so thoroughly acquainted with the letter of Rawls's texts.   The papers in this volume are essais in Rawlsian political philosophy, but they are most definitely not desultory forays into that field.   Freeman seems to have read almost all of the classical philosophical sources on which Rawls drew, to have assimilated large stretches of contemporary and secondary literature, and to have thought deeply about every sentence Rawls ever wrote.

The result is an extraordinarily substantial set of papers.   The shortest of them is 30 pages of small print with narrow margins.   All nine are dense with arguments and exegesis.   Taken together, the nine essays make for very demanding reading.   Students who are looking for an introduction to Rawls would be well advised to start elsewhere.   The readers who will benefit -- and benefit greatly -- are those with a serious interest in contemporary political philosophy, especially those who know Rawls's work and ask what a convinced and thoroughly informed Rawlsian would say about a number of debates and objections that enjoy some currency in the philosophical literature.

It is hard to exaggerate how important a contribution Freeman has made by answering that question.   Rawls rarely addressed objections to his view, and rarely contended with the positions staked out by others in the debates of the day.   Knowing how Rawls might have addressed objections, and knowing what he might have said about the positions of others, are very valuable.   It seems unlikely we will ever see a more faithful and better informed set of replies and interventions than those that Freeman provides here.   The blending of "interpretation or defense" with "extension[]" is so seamless in this book that there are generally good grounds for thinking that Rawls would have said what Freeman does say. 5]

The secondary literature on Rawls is voluminous.   Singling out the best essay on any one subject is, in most cases, virtually impossible.   Every one of the essays Freeman has chosen for this book belongs in the small set of articles that is essential reading to accompany the sections or questions in Rawls with which it deals.   If a graduate seminar or an advanced undergraduate class that deals with Rawls in depth is going to require any books at all beyond the primary texts, then Justice and the Social Contract ought to be among them.

Despite the fact that Justice and the Social Contract is already a long book, it could have been still longer.   Freeman has left out some pieces that would have fit nicely into this collection.   His "Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review," [6 ] would have fit very well into Part II of the book.   His "Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation and the Constitution" [ 7 ] would have fit in just as well, and is -- for my money -- a terrific paper, one of Freeman's very best.   It would have been good to have included it, even at the expense of lengthening the volume.

Objections to Rawls are generally treated so as to make them more tractable from a Rawlsian point of view.   Some readers will wish that Freeman had developed objections in such a way that they can see why those who offer objections and alternative positions have found them compelling -- especially the objections and alternatives offered by those who Freeman says "reject the entire Rawlsian framework (Joseph Raz, John Finnis, et al.)" (p. 261).   It would be interesting to see how Freeman might have responded on Rawls's behalf to their arguments. [8]

But the complaint that Justice and the Social Contract should have included one or two more essays is a minor one.   And the objections offered to "the entire Rawlsian framework" by philosophers like Raz and Finnis are so fundamental that it might have been impossible for Freeman to have developed the sort of nuanced replies he offers to objections which start closer to home.   There might be little beyond the obvious to be said in response to such basic objections.   And so there may be a good case for not developing the objections after all.

As I have indicated, this is a very valuable book.   The value lies, of course, in what the reader learns by working through it.   That value is most profitably extracted by grappling with its arguments with the rigor that Freeman's own painstaking argument invites.   And so rather than commenting briefly on the essays singly, I want to explore in some depth one question on which I disagree with Freeman's reading: the important but underexplored question of what accounts for the differences between Rawls's two major books, A Theory of Justice [9 ] and Political Liberalism [10] .   There is a great deal to be learned about justice as fairness, and about the appeal of political liberalism, from the answer to that question.   Freeman's attempt to answer it is the best published treatment of it of which I am aware.   While I disagree with Freeman about how the question is to be answered, I cannot overstate how much I have learned from his essay.

Speaking of the differences between TJ and PL , Rawls himself says:

to understand the nature and extent of the differences, one must see them as arising from trying to resolve a serious problem internal to justice as fairness, namely from the fact that the account of stability in part III of Theory is not consistent with the view as a whole.   I believe all differences are consequences of removing that inconsistency. ( PL , pp. xvii-xviii)

In "Congruence and the Good of Justice" (pp. 143-72), Freeman insists that we take Rawls at his word.   He says that the differences between TJ and PL were not introduced in response to communitarian critiques of justice as fairness.   They are to be explained, he thinks, by deficiencies Rawls found in his argument that justice as fairness would be stable -- just as Rawls says.

Somewhat more specifically:   In chapter 8 of TJ , Rawls argues that citizens growing up in a well-ordered society (WOS) would acquire a sense of justice.   That is, they would acquire the desire to act from principles of justice and to treat those principles as regulative of their plans of life.   In chapter 9, Rawls then argues that those citizens would affirm or endorse this desire and its satisfaction as parts of their good -- they would, he says, affirm that justice is "congruent" with their good.   Freeman maintains that the changes between TJ and PL were made because of deficiencies Rawls found in the argument for congruence.   I believe Freeman is correct about this.   I disagree with him about exactly how the congruence argument goes and about what parts of the argument Rawls found deficient. [11]

The congruence argument has to show that the exercise of our capacity for a sense of justice is experienced as a good.   How does the argument for that conclusion go?

Rawls provides what Freeman takes to be a promising clue when he remarks in PL : "the exercise of the two moral powers is experienced as a good.   This is a consequence of the moral psychology used in justice as fairness.   … In Theory this psychology uses the so-called Aristotelian Principle" ( PL, p. 203).   Because the capacity for a sense of justice is one of the two moral powers, Freeman says of this passage: "This makes it seem as if the congruence argument involves a straightforward appeal to the Aristotelian Principle" ( JSC , pp. 156-7).   He continues:

The idea here would be that the capacity for a sense of justice is among our higher capacities.   It involves the ability to understand, apply, and act from requirements of justice.   This capacity admits of complex development and refinement.   Since all have a sense of justice in a well-ordered society, it is rational for each to develop it as part of his or her plan of life. ( JSC , p. 157)

The Aristotelian Principle enters into this argument, on Freeman's read, because the Principle states that the development and exercise of complex capacities is experienced as a good.   That is why it is rational for each "to develop [the sense of justice] as part of his or her plan of life" (cf. also TJ , p. 390).

Freeman offers two objections to this argument.   First, it does not show why it is rational for everyone in a WOS to develop this complex capacity rather than some other.   Second, the simplified argument does not support the conclusion that it is rational to make justice "supremely regulative of all our pursuits" ( JSC , p. 157). [12 ]   Freeman concludes:

The simplified argument from the Aristotelian Principle is not Rawls's argument for congruence.   But it is extremely difficult to piece together what his argument is.   The best way to uncover his argument is by seeing how he would respond to the two objections just stated. ( JSC , p. 157)

The argument to be uncovered in this way is what Freeman refers to as "the Kantian congruence argument".   The differences between TJ and PL are to be explained, Freeman says, by Rawls's attempts to remedy the deficiencies he found in this argument.

I think Freeman is mistaken about how best to "uncover [Rawls's] argument", if "uncover his argument" for congruence is meant as "uncover how Rawls's argument for congruence actually goes".   Attending to the two objections can bring to light important features of the arguments Rawls offers for congruence.   But it can also mislead about the place of the Kantian congruence argument in the treatment of congruence, about the relationship between that argument and the other arguments Rawls offers, about the sequence of each argument, about the deficiencies Rawls found in them and hence about how the differences between TJ and PL are to be explained.

Freeman presents the Kantian congruence argument in twelve steps ( JSC , pp. 158-59).   For my purposes, the most important are (1) and (2):

(1) "on the basis of the Kantian interpretation, persons regarded as moral agents are by their nature free and equal rational beings.   Rational agents in a well ordered society conceive of themselves in this way 'as primarily moral persons'";

(2) "rational members of a WOS 'desire to express their nature as free and equal moral persons'";

together with (8) through (11):

(8) "Thus, for individuals in the WOS to achieve their desire to realize their nature as free and equal moral persons entails that they act from their sense of justice and as the principles require";

(9) "By the Aristotelian Principle, it is rational to realize one's nature by affirming the sense of justice";

(10) "The sense of justice is, by virtue of its content (what it is a desire for), a supremely regulative disposition: it requires giving first priority to the principles of right and justice in deliberation and action";

(11) "To affirm the sense of justice is to recognize and accept it as supreme by adopting it as a highest-order regulative desire in one's rational plan".

As we saw, Freeman says that the Aristotelian Principle plays an important role in the congruence argument.   Freeman introduces the principle at (9), and (9) does indeed play a pivotal role in answering the two objections Freeman introduces.   Together with (8), (9) implies that it is rational for each member of the well-ordered society to affirm his sense of justice.   This answers the first objection.   When conjoined with (11), (9) gets us to the claim that "it is rational to realize one's nature by … adopting [the sense of justice] as a highest-order regulative desire in one's rational plan".   This answers the second objection.

Of course, (9) can play this pivotal role only because Rawls supposes that people have the desire referred to in (8), the desire postulated in (2).   Of this desire, Freeman writes "Rawls evidently sees this as a nonarbitrary rational desire" ( JSC , p. 158).   Freeman says that the problem with the argument is that, under circumstances of ethical pluralism, not everyone will regard it as a good to express his nature as free -- where freedom is understood as autonomy.   So, though Freeman does not put it exactly this way, either there will be people who lack the desire (2) asserts or there will be people who have the desire but will not find sufficient satisfaction in its fulfillment.   If this is so, then what Freeman takes to be Rawls's most important argument for congruence fails.   Since Rawls's argument for the stability of justice as fairness depends upon congruence, the failure of the most important argument for congruence spells the failure of the stability argument as well.   Thus according to Freeman, the deficiency Rawls came to see in his treatment of stability is a deficiency in the Kantian congruence argument ( JSC , p. 168).

One difficulty with Freeman's discussion is that the twelve-step argument Freeman presents is not the argument Rawls actually offers for congruence.   To see how Rawls's argument goes, recall that in introducing Freeman's discussion, I said the congruence argument has to show that citizens of the WOS experience being just as a good.   But showing that is not enough.   For what Rawls needs to show is not merely that each person would experience being just as a good, but also that -- from her own point of view -- she would affirm that the good of being just normally outweighs competing goods.   But what does 'outweigh' mean here, and how can Rawls show what needs to be shown?

To see the answer, consider a passage Freeman introduces when asking how Rawls would reply to the second objection.   Rawls says:

The real problem of congruence is what happens if we imagine someone to give weight to his sense of justice only to the extent that it satisfies other descriptions which connect it with reasons specified by the thin theory of the good. ( TJ , p. 499)

The person Rawls asks us to imagine is a citizen C of a WOS who (i) has acquired a sense of justice, (ii) sees acting on his sense of justice as coincident with other ends he has reason to pursue, and (iii) takes his reasons to act justly to be just exactly as weighty as the reasons he has to pursue those other ends. [13]

Somewhat more crudely: Rawls asks us to imagine a citizen C who realizes various goods by acting justly and whose reasons for acting justly are exactly as weighty as the reasons he has to realize those other goods.   If C's reasons for realizing those other goods normally outweigh his reasons for acting unjustly, then he can affirm his sense of justice as part of his overall good.   Thus whether C will find justice congruent with his overall good depends upon whether the reasons he has to realize those goods are weighty enough to tip the balance of reasons in favor of being a just person.   That, in turn, depends upon what the ends are with which acting justly is coincident -- it depends, that is, upon what other "descriptions" the desire to act justly satisfies.

Consider first the other ends with which acting justly is coincident or, as I shall say -- following Rawls -- with which it is "practically identical" (cf. TJ , p. 501).   "The theory of justice," Rawls says, "supplies other descriptions of what the sense of justice is a desire for"   ( TJ , p. 499).   Rawls cites four.   Roughly stated, the descriptions are:

(a) To avoid the psychological costs of hypocrisy and deception, which will be especially high in a just society because citizens will want to appear just to those they care about, and because ties of affection extend so widely. ( TJ , p. 499)

(b) To "protect[] in a natural and simple way the institutions and persons we care for."     Since in the WOS, "effective bonds are extensive to both persons and social forms, and we cannot select who is to lose by our defections", we can do this if and only if we are just persons. ( TJ , pp. 499-500)

(c) To participate in a social union of social unions, which "bring[s] to fruition our latent powers" so that "each enjoys the greater richness and diversity of the collective activity.   Because of this enjoyment, the social union of social unions "extends the ties of identification over the whole community".   We can be participants in such a union, Rawls says, if and only if we are just persons. ( TJ , pp. 500-501)

(d) To satisfy the desire to "express our nature as free moral persons" ( TJ , p. 501) -- which, as Freeman notes, Rawls assumes we all have a desire to do.   Let's call the identity of a desire to be just with desire (d) the Kantian Practical Identity .   Why does this identity hold?   Because, Rawls says, the desire to act justly is a desire to act on mutually justifiable principles [14]   -- on principles which would be chosen in the Original Position (OP).   And because of the conditions of the OP, the principles chosen there are such that, by acting on them, we express our nature.

Because in a WOS, the desire to be just is practically identical with the desires to attain the ends these four descriptions pick out, the reasons C has for pursuing these ends "are the chief reasons (or typical thereof)" ( TJ , p. 501) that C has for maintaining his sense of justice.   The reasons C has for maintaining and acting from his sense of justice are just exactly as weighty as the reasons he has for pursuing those ends.

To establish congruence, we need to see whether the reasons C has to pursue these ends are weighty enough, or whether they are outweighed by the reasons that C has to pursue other, countervailing ends.   "Here," Rawls says, "we confront the familiar problem of the balance of motives" ( TJ , p. 501).   And so Rawls offers three arguments that the reasons to pursue the four ends are sufficiently weighty.

One argument is for the modest conclusion that "however improbable the congruence of the right and the good in justice as fairness, it is surely more probable than on the utilitarian view."   It follows from this that the WOS of justice as fairness is more likely to be stable than a utilitarian society.   So we have an argument from congruence for the relative stability of justice as fairness (cf. TJ , p. 436 for a statement of the question of relative stability).

The second argument is, I believe, the primary argument for congruence.   It is far more complex and interesting than the first.   It draws on all four practical identities established by the theory to show that maintaining our sense of justice is coincident with maintaining a wide system of affective ties.   Thus according to identities (a), (b) and (c), citizens of a WOS have reason to be just because doing so is coincident with avoiding deception in their relations with others, with protecting those they care about and with participating in a social union of social unions -- all of which they are presumed to want to do.   Furthermore, because of the Kantian Practical Identity , upholding the institutions that make all these ties possible is coincident with expressing their human nature and so is experienced as good in itself (see TJ , pp. 462-63).

But maintaining ties to others in a WOS may prove costly, for maintaining them is coincident with being just and being just can be costly.   C may ask whether the reasons he has for maintaining these ties are compelling enough to outweigh the risk the hazards pose.   Thus Rawls says that the "question is on a par with the hazards of love; indeed it is simply a special case" ( TJ , p. 502).   But clearly in the world as it is, Rawls says, the reasons we have to love outweigh the liability to loss to which love opens us.   In the WOS, in which all others are just, C would not be liable to betrayal or treachery by others.   The risk of loss by being just in the WOS would therefore be less than the risk to which love opens us in our world.   And so Rawls concludes, "Taking as a bench mark the balance of reasons that leads us to affirm our loves as things are, it seems that we should be ready once we come of age to maintain our sense of justice in the more favorable conditions of a just society" ( TJ , pp. 502-3).

The third argument is the one Freeman refers to as the "Kantian Congruence Argument" and reconstructs in twelve steps.   Rawls says that this argument "strengthens th[e] conclusion" of the second argument ( TJ , p. 503).   To see how Rawls intends the Kantian Congruence Argument to go, it is important to see what he means by this, and to see just what the conclusion of the second argument is that is being strengthened.   It would be easy to suppose that that conclusion is

KC:   It is rational for C to "adopt [his sense of justice] as a highest-order regulative desire in [his] rational plan".

This is what Freeman's twelve-step reconstruction of the argument may suggest.   But I do not think KC is the conclusion to be strengthened; rather, I think KC follows from that conclusion.   The conclusion to be strengthened is, I believe,

KC':   The balance of reasons tells in favor of C's pursuing ends which are coincident with "adopt[ing his sense of justice] as a highest-order regulative desire in [his] rational plan".

What does Rawls mean by saying that the third argument strengthens KC'?

According to the second argument, the balance of reasons tells in favor of members of the WOS avoiding deception and hypocrisy, protecting those they care about and participating in wider society.   And so that balance tells in favor of C's incorporating these ends into his plans of life in some form.   But honoring the balance is compatible with, say, pursuing a partial and unsystematic policy of deception.   This is because C can fulfill his desire not to deceive by being truthful and just toward some people, while dealing unjustly in other circumstances and deceiving others about his injustice.   And so even if C wants to avoid deception, protect those close to him and participate in a social union of social unions, honoring the balance of reasons is compatible with his not treating his sense of justice as completely regulative.   Rawls presented the second argument as if this were not so "for simplicity" ( TJ , p. 503).   But once the simplifying assumption is dropped, the part of the second argument which appeals to (a), (b) and (c) has an obvious weakness.

At the heart of the Kantian Congruence Argument is Rawls's claim that the desire to express our nature differs from the other three "inclinations of the self" appealed to in the second argument.   It differs because the theory of justice shows that this desire is practically identical with the desire to act from principles chosen in the OP, and principles chosen in the OP are subject to the finality condition.   Someone can act from principles subject to this condition only if he treats those principles as regulative.   So C can satisfy his desire to express his nature only if he treats the principles that way.   What Rawls is doing in the third argument is therefore drawing attention to a special feature of one of the practical identities appealed to in the second argument, and arguing that -- because of that feature -- a worrisome possibility is foreclosed which the second argument seemed to leave open.

My summary of the Kantian Congruence Argument requires a great deal of unpacking.   I cannot explicate it here.   Instead, I want to highlight some of my differences with Freeman that the survey of Rawls's three arguments brings to light.

First, I have stressed, as Freeman does not, that Rawls's arguments for congruence are "balance of reasons" arguments. [15]   Crudely put: showing that justice is congruent with C's good is a matter of showing that the goods C can achieve by being a just person in WOS outweigh goods he can realize by being just only some of the time.   It is for this reason that I think the conclusion of the second argument is KC' rather than KC.

Second, apparently unlike Freeman, I take the second congruence argument to be the most important one, and I think that in that argument, Rawls tacitly appeals to the Kantian Practical Identity as well as to the identities which depend on (a), (b) and (c).   And so I think, as Freeman apparently does not, that we can see what Rawls was up to in the third argument -- the Kantian Congruence Argument -- only by seeing the weakness in part of the second argument for KC' and the way in which the third argument "strengthens this conclusion".

These differences would be relatively minor if Freeman were correct that the differences between TJ and PL are to be explained just by the problems Rawls found in the Kantian Congruence Argument.   But I do not think this is so.   This brings me to another and more important disagreement.   I do not doubt that Rawls came to see deficiencies in the Kantian Congruence Argument, though I differ with Freeman on where that argument goes wrong.   But I also think that Rawls came to see much more extensive problems in the second congruence argument as well -- problems not implied by the failure of the Kantian Congruence Argument.

If my thesis is correct, then it has important consequences.

The failure of the Kantian Congruence Argument would raise the question of whether the possibility that that argument was intended to foreclose could still be foreclosed by some other argument instead.   It would raise the question, for example, of whether citizens of a WOS would find full participation in a social union of social unions so irresistibly satisfying that their reasons for full participation would be sufficient to establish KC' after all.   If they would, then Rawls could salvage the congruence and stability arguments of TJ with only modest changes -- a possibility Freeman does not address.   Given the modesty of the first congruence argument, however, the failure of the second argument as well as the third would imply that there were serious difficulties and would force revisions of great magnitude -- perhaps changes of the same magnitude as those Rawls in fact made.

Moreover, a great deal of Part III of TJ , including the important section on a "Social Union of Social Unions", is intended to lay the groundwork for the practical identities that depend on descriptions (a), (b) and (c).   These practical identities are appealed to in the second argument. [16]   If the second argument fails, it forces us squarely to confront the question of how much of that groundwork remains essential to political liberalism.

What deficiencies might Rawls have seen in the second argument?

That argument depends upon the claim that citizens in a WOS want to express their nature as free moral persons.   The problems Freeman sees with this claim will therefore, as he would quite rightly point out [17] , tell against the second congruence argument as well as the third.   But the second argument also depends on the claim that citizens of a WOS want to preserve extensive ties to individuals and institutions, and to "enjoy[] the greater richness and diversity of the collective activity" in a social union of social unions (p. 500).   To see what Rawls might have found deficient about the argument, it is useful to ask why Rawls would have endorsed this claim in the first place.

Part of the answer, I believe, is that in a social union of social unions, each member sees others realizing the diverse powers which are latent in our nature, but which -- given various constraints -- no one person can realize herself.   According to what Rawls calls the "companion effect" of the Aristotelian Principle, we find enjoyment in seeing and appreciating this ( TJ , p. 376).   And so Rawls thought that we want to preserve extensive ties and take part in a social union of social unions because we find it satisfying or enjoyable to see others realizing the powers of human nature that we cannot exercise, and to be part of a society that makes that realization possible.   But if we find such enjoyment or satisfaction, then it must be because there is some desire or interest which is satisfied by seeing others realizing human nature in ways that we cannot.

Thus as Freeman thought that the Aristotelian Principle itself was crucial to the Kantian Congruence Argument because of the pivotal role of his step (9), so I think the companion effect to that Principle is crucial to the second -- and main -- argument for congruence.   Appeal to the Aristotelian Principle in the Kantian Congruence Argument presupposes that we have a desire to express our nature as free rational beings -- the desire postulated in Freeman's step (2).   I believe appeal to the companion effect presupposes that we have a desire to see the powers of human nature realized in free or autonomous activity.

But in a pluralistic society, citizens may not take satisfaction or pleasure in all the diverse activities freely engaged in by just persons.   Some they may regard as not especially worthwhile or admirable, even if they are permissible by the best standards of political justice.   Some they may even regard as blasphemous or depraved.   If this is so, then in the kind of pluralistic society a WOS would be, there may be some who lack a desire which the second congruence argument presupposes or who have the desire but do not find its fulfillment sufficiently satisfying.   For such people, the balance of reasons will not tell decisively in favor of participating fully in a social union of social unions or of maintaining an extensive range of affective ties.   In that case, not only can Rawls not foreclose the possibility that the second congruence argument leaves open, but the whole of that argument for KC' fails.

Crudely put, the problem with Rawls's argument for congruence is not just with what it assumes about the value members of the WOS attach to their own autonomous activity or to their own expression of their nature.   The problem also lies with what the argument assumes about the value they attach to the autonomous activity of others and to the realization of human nature in the "richness and diversity of the collective activity" in a WOS.   It is the failure of the primary congruence argument, and not just the Kantian Congruence Argument, that led Rawls to think that TJ 's treatment of congruence -- and hence of stability -- needed to be rethought.   Hence it is the difficulties Rawls saw with the main argument, and not just with the Kantian Congruence Argument, that explains the differences between TJ and PL . [18]   It is on this significant point that I most profoundly disagree with Freeman's magisterial treatment.

Why did Rawls use the idea of an overlapping consensus to respond to the problems with his earlier treatment of congruence?   Though Freeman does not pose this question, I think he and I would agree on the answer.

I said earlier that to establish congruence, Rawls needed to show that each person would, from her own point of view, affirm that the good of being just outweighs competing goods.   To show this, the Rawls of TJ appealed to desires he thinks all members of the WOS would have regardless of their point of view.   Rawls thought all members of the WOS would have those desires, I believe, because he thought the institutions of a WOS would normally encourage those desires in its members.   Encouraging those desires is one of the ways the Rawls of TJ thought just institutions engender their own support.

Rawls came to realize that just institutions, because they are free institutions, would encourage reasonable pluralism about the good.   Reasonable pluralism implies that some people's good may not include the satisfaction of the desires and interests that the congruence arguments of TJ assume they have. [19]   Thus Rawls came to realize, not just that the congruence arguments of TJ failed, but that TJ 's strategy of demonstrating congruence failed.   The strategy failed because it depended upon the assumption that just institutions would make all points of view -- all conceptions of the good -- converge in respects that were essential for Rawls's argument.   Once he came fully to appreciate that free institutions would encourage divergence rather than convergence, Rawls realized that congruence could be achieved only if each member of the WOS located sufficiently weighty reasons to be just within his own reasonable conception of the good.   It could be achieved, that is, only by an overlapping consensus.

I have tried to indicate just how deeply I and other readers of Rawls are indebted to Freeman for this collection of essays.   But Rawls, too, would be in Freeman's debt, for Freeman has done Rawls's legacy a real service by having worked in the Rawlsian spirit so carefully and so well.   Justice and the Social Contract closes with two moving tributes to Rawls written by Freeman at the time of Rawls's death.   These tributes show clearly that the essays in this book were labors of love by an accomplished scholar who was Rawls's friend as well as his student.   In a biographical essay on Rawls, Thomas Pogge remarks that Rawls had a lifelong feeling of having been "terribly lucky " [20] .   In having a student as creative and acute as Freeman -- and a friend as devoted -- Rawls's luck held. [21]

[1 ] I shall hereafter refer to Freeman's book in citations as ' JSC '; page references will be given parenthetically in the body of the text.

[2] John Rawls, Collected Papers (Harvard University Press, 1999), ed. Freeman.

[3] The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge University Press, 2002), ed. Freeman.

[4] John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 2007) ed. Freeman.

[5] Indeed, so pervasively does Rawlsian spirit animate Freeman's work that the distinction he draws between "interpretation or defense" on the one hand, and "extension[] or application" on the other is practically erased.   I sometimes suspect that Freeman draws the distinction in the first place less to clarify his own methodology than to insulate Rawls from criticism for some of the positions Freeman himself develops.   Having drawn the distinction, Freeman can then deflect criticism to himself, saying that problems and over-simplifications are his responsibility rather than Rawls's (cf. p. 186, note 27).

[6] Samuel Freeman, "Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review," Law and Philosophy 9 (1990): 327-70.

[7] Samuel Freeman, "Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation and the Constitution", Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (1992): 3-42.

[8] Speaking for myself, I would especially have liked an elaboration of the response to Raz that Freeman offers at p. 194, note 43.

[9] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1999).   I shall hereafter refer to this work as ' TJ ' and cite it parenthetically in the body of the text.   All page references are to the revised edition of 1999, rather than to the original 1971 edition.

[10] John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1996).   I shall hereafter refer to this work as ' PL ' and cite it parenthetically in the body of the text.

[11] Unfortunately I cannot go into these matters in the detail that I would like.   I go into this matter in much greater detail in Why Political Liberalism (in progress).

[12] Showing the rationality of treating a sense of justice as regulative -- roughly, of treating the principles of justice as "final" -- is supposed to be one of the advantages the contract doctrine enjoys over other accounts of the characteristic motive of justice.   This is clear from Rawls's critique of the intuitionist doctrine of the purely conscientious act, according to which the motive to do what is right is simply a desire to do the right the thing for its own sake "no other description being appropriate" ( TJ , p. 418).

Freeman very usefully discusses that critique ( JSC , pp. 147-9).   But Freeman's discussion suggests that the problem with this doctrine, from Rawls's point of view, is that it ignores the existence of an alternative "description" of that desire: namely, that it can be described as a desire to act from mutually justifiable principles (see pp. 148-9).   In fact, the real difficulty with the doctrine lies elsewhere.  

In a very important passage Rawls says of the doctrine:

But on this interpretation the sense of right lacks any apparent reason; it resembles a preference for tea rather than coffee.   Although such a preference might exist, to make it regulative of the basic structure of society is utterly capricious [.] ( TJ , p. 418, emphasis added)

One advantage the contract doctrine enjoys over intuitionism, according to Rawls, is that it shows that making the sense of right regulative is perfectly rational rather than "utterly capricious".   He continues: "In light of the theory of justice we understand how moral sentiments can be regulative in our life and have the role attributed to them by the formal conditions on moral principles" ( TJ , p. 418) -- including the finality condition.   Freeman is clearly interested in showing the rationality of each individual's taking the principles as regulative.   It is surprising that he does not refer to these passages in his discussion of intuitionism.

[13] Freeman interprets the passage somewhat differently; see JSC , p. 163.

[14] See above, note 12.   On my reading, the arguments for congruence show how Rawls can make good on his promise cited there: "In light of the theory of justice we understand how moral sentiments can be regulative in our life and have the role attributed to them by the formal conditions on moral principles [chosen in the OP]" ( TJ , p. 418; for the formal conditions, see TJ , pp. 112ff.).

[15] Somewhat more precisely, the first and second congruence arguments are conditional balance of reasons arguments, for they are conditional on what Rawls calls the "benchmarks".

[16] Indeed, I think Part III would be much better appreciated if readers were generally aware of how intricately the theoretical apparatus of Part III is contrived for this purpose.   Consider, for example, one of the critical claims in the second congruence argument -- Rawls's remark that the liability to loss that C would incur by maintaining his sense of justice "is on a par with the hazards of love; indeed it is simply a special case " ( TJ , p. 502, emphasis added).   I believe that this claim is supposed to follow from Rawls's earlier claim that "the sense of justice is continuous with the love of mankind" ( TJ , p. 417).   This latter claim, in turn, presupposes a great deal of complicated reasoning, one of the ultimate points of which is, I believe, to establish a premise of the second congruence argument.

[17] I am grateful to him for helpful correspondence on this point.

[18] Did Rawls also come to have doubts about the first congruence argument, the one I have described as modest?   I cannot take up this question here, but I explore it in Why Political Liberalism? .

[19] This is why Rawls says "the account of stability in part III of Theory is not consistent with the view as a whole"? ( PL , pp. xvii-xviii , emphasis added).

[20] Thomas Pogge, "A Brief Sketch of Rawls's Life", Philosophy of Rawls (Garland, 1999) volume 1, ed. Richardson and Weithman, p. 4.