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Managing the Mekong River – A transboundary water issue

Educas GCSE Geography > Case Studies > Managing the Mekong River – A transboundary water issue

The Mekong River, located in southeast Asia, is the twelfth longest river in the world. Six countries share the river and its tributaries. The source of the river is in China. The river flows southeast to its mouth in the South China Sea in Vietnam. The boundary of the river basin is shown in the map below.

The Mekong River has traditionally experienced seasonal changes in discharge. During the monsoon season, extensive flooding has occurred along the course of the river. Outside of the monsoon season, the region has experienced significant droughts.

The Mekong River

What are the impacts of building dams on the Mekon River in China?

The Xiaowan Dam on The Mekong River in China

Along the course of the River Mekong, each country relies on the river for water supply and food. For example, in Cambodia, fishermen catch around 2 million tonnes of fish a year. Also, flooding during the monsoon season deposits fertile sediment onto the flood plain , which supports 80% of rice production, which depends on these floods. However, constructing dams along the river in China has interfered with the river’s flow, leading to reduced flooding and lower fish stocks. Additionally, the reduced flow of the river has led to sediment banks forming downstream, which has led to larger boats, such as ferries, running aground.

The effects of dam-building projects in China include:

• Land has been flooded to form reservoirs behind dams, leading to the loss of land farmland and the displacement of people (over 200,000 had to be moved when the Xayaburi Dam in Laos was being built between 2010-2019);
• In September 2015, heavy monsoon rain led to dangerously high water levels behind a Chinese-built HEP Nuozhadu Damdam. Water was released to avoid the collapse of the dam, leading to homes being flooded, affecting 1,571 families;
• Cheap hydro-electric power has supported the growth of China’s economy;
• More people and industry have a safe and reliable water supply;
• Water supply is available throughout the year in areas that previously suffered from seasonal drought;
• Jobs in construction and hydroelectric power have provided opportunities for people in China.

The effects of dam-building projects in the lower river basin (Cambodia) include:

• Reduced water levels and river velocity cause increased deposition , which has led to the formation of sandbanks that impede navigation;
• Fish stocks have been reduced, leading to a drop in income for fishermen;
• Monsoon floods are much smaller, meaning less sediment is deposited, reducing the fertility of valuable agricultural land used for rice farming;
• In 2019, fishermen in the Lower Mekon Basin blamed the combination of low monsoon rainfall and the opening of the Xayburi dam on its most severe drought in 100 years;
• Dams are evening the river’s flow, reducing the flood’s size. This harms fishing as the seasonal rise and fall in the river flow is required to spread out fish into lakes and ponds on the flood plain where they are caught.

Sand bars and islands on the Mekong River in Cambodia formed by deposition due to reduced discharge.

Dams on international rivers, like the Mekong, can create conflict between the countries dependent on the water. Constructing a dam upstream alters the flow downstream. As more water is used in China, less arrives in Cambodia, risking the rice harvest.

What strategies are being used in Cambodia to reduce flood and drought impact?

The Cambodian government is considering a range of options to reduce the risk of flooding and drought:

• Collecting flood data and issuing forecasts through a flood control centre
• Risk assessing flooding in each community
• Providing advice to communities on how to protect households from flooding
• Constructing defences such as flood walls and embankments
• Building dams to control the flow of water
• Improving planning so homes are not constructed on floodplains
• Coordinating with neighbouring countries about the management of the river
• Run an annual flood conference with neighbouring countries
• Support neighbouring countries with aid during extreme events

Geography and Seasonal Patterns

The Mekong River, the twelfth longest in the world, flows through six Southeast Asian countries, from China to the South China Sea in Vietnam. It experiences seasonal changes, with monsoon-induced flooding and significant droughts outside the monsoon season.

Impact of Dams in China

Dam construction on the Mekong in China has reduced flooding and lowered fish stocks in downstream countries. Over 200,000 people were displaced due to the Xayaburi Dam in Laos, and water released from a Chinese dam in 2015 flooded homes, affecting 1,571 families.

Economic and Environmental Consequences

The dams have supported China’s economic growth and provided reliable water supply and hydroelectric jobs. However, they have caused land loss, sediment buildup, impeded navigation, and decreased fish stocks, affecting agriculture and fishing in Cambodia.

Reduced Fertility and Navigation Issues

In the lower Mekong basin, reduced water levels have led to sediment accumulation and the formation of sandbanks, hampering navigation. The decrease in monsoon floods has also reduced agricultural land fertility, which is crucial for rice farming.

Transboundary Conflicts

Dam construction alters the river flow, leading to conflicts between countries. As China uses more water, downstream countries like Cambodia face risks to their rice harvests due to reduced water flow.

Flood and Drought Management in Cambodia

Cambodia is adopting strategies to mitigate flood and drought impacts, including flood data collection, community risk assessments, construction of defences, improved planning, and international cooperation with neighbouring countries.

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Dam projects and disputes in the mekong river basin.

The Mekong basin is witnessing an enormous expansion of dam-building for hydropower generation, especially in China and Laos. This has led to diplomatic tensions as countries downstream of the dams fear the negative impacts they may bring about, from greater flooding to seasonal lack of water. The Mekong River Commission’s (MRC) effectiveness in resolving these tensions has so far been limited due to its lack of enforcement powers and China’s reluctance to join as a full member.

Conceptual Model

Conflict history.

The Mekong is the world’s seventh largest river in terms of discharge, and ranks tenth in terms of length. It originates in China, and then flows 4,200 km through Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, where it empties into the South China Sea. Often described as the “hydrologic backbone” or “current of life” of mainland Southeast Asia, the Mekong River Basin is exceptionally rich in natural resources, and is vital in supporting the livelihood of more than 70 million people ( Hudson-Rodd & Shaw, 2003 ; Jacobs, 2002 ).

Regional dam disputes

Harnessing the Mekong waters has been envisaged since the 1960s. However, political and financial obstacles inhibited the materialization of large-scale mainstream projects (for historic context, see: Lower Mekong Basin: Challenges and opportunities for early cooperation ). However, due to the region’s rising energy demands, interest in hydro-development on the Mekong has been revived, especially since the mid-2000s. At present, especially large dam-building projects along the Chinese and Lao stretches of the Mekong mainstream are a matter of concern for the other riparian states, and regional tensions have intensified as a result.

Disputes over dam construction in China

Hydro-power installation in China is currently going through a phase of high-speed development ( Chang et al., 2010 ). Large-scale hydro-power projects are strongly promoted across the country, with the Upper Mekong (called the Lancang in China) being one of the priority areas. The first dam of the Lancang dam cascade was completed in 1995. Today, seven hydro-power projects have already been constructed, and the government apparently has plans for 21 more dams ( International Rivers, 2014 ).

According to the official Chinese position, the adverse downstream effects of its hydro-power projects are negligible, given that only a small percentage of the Mekong’s total flow originates in China. To the contrary, it is argued, the construction of large dams on the Upper Mekong will benefit downstream users in terms of hydro-electricity generation and flood control, and efforts are being made to protect the river’s ecosystems and fisheries ( Xinhua, 2012 ).

The Lower riparian states (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam) have criticized the Chinese hydro-power push, and have tried to warn China about the conflict potential of its dams and the adverse effects they were already experiencing ( Radio Free Asia, 2012 ). Fears frequently expressed downstream revolve around water shortages, flow alterations, sediment trapping, habitat destruction, and devastation of important agricultural areas and fisheries resulting from Chinese damming of the Upper Mekong ( Liebman, 2005 ; Magee, 2012; Öjendal & Jensen, 2012). Especially the already threatened Tonle Sap could come under additional pressure due to upstream dam construction. The Tonle Sap is a combined lake and river system in Cambodia which has long supported community livelihoods thanks to its seasonal inundation and originally rich fishing grounds ( Radio Free Asia, 2015 ). Since fish from the Tonle Sap waters provide almost two-thirds of Cambodia's inland fish catch and constitute the country's main source of animal protein, a decline in fish stock due to damming and other factors could severley endanger food security in the affected areas. The fact that China discloses very little information on its dam projects further increases uncertainty downstream. As the population in Southeast Asia is expected to grow, the need for a reliable river flow is all the more pressing.

Climate change is likely to further increase competition for water resources. Shifts in rainfall patterns and longer droughts are already observable in the region, which could contribute to shortfalls in agricultural production ( Cronin & Hamlin, 2010 ). The Mekong delta in southern Vietnam is particularly threatened by climate change, with expected impacts including a rise in average temperatures, more severe storms, wetter wet seasons, and drier dry seasons. Climate-related increases in weeds and pests, as well as salt water intrusion into agricultural areas due to sea level rise, could hamper rice production in the delta, thereby threatening local livelihoods dependent on farming ( The Economist, 2016 ).

Despite these concerns, China’s dam projects are unlikely to be stopped. China’s upstream position and economic superiority leaves downstream countries with few options beyond trying to persuade China to take their interests into account. Indeed, “…with China holding a firm position that what it does within its own territorial boundaries is its own business, there seems no reason to expect that the projected dams on the Mekong will not be built” ( Osborne, 2000 , 439). As observers have noted, China’s hydro-development projects on the Lancang thus have the potential to make hydro-politics in the Mekong Basin more contentious, and increased tension can be expected between China and the Lower Basin states ( Pearse-Smith, 2012 ).

Disputes over dam construction in Laos

Apart from the Lancang dam cascade in China, the Mekong mainstream so far remains undammed. However, rapid changes are now underway within the Lower Mekong Basin. As the economic rise of Southeast Asian countries has dramatically increased their energy needs ( IEA, 2013 ), harnessing the Mekong waters for hydro-power generation has become an attractive solution to meet growing energy demands. To date, Cambodia has revealed plans for two mainstream dams, and Laos for up to nine (Öjendal & Jensen, 2012).

Unlocking the great hydro-electric potential of Laos has long been an important priority for the Lao government, given that electricity exports to Thailand rank among the country’s most important sources of revenue. Indeed, the potential for hydro-power generation within Laos is enormous, as it is estimated that more than 50 percent of the Mekong’s total hydro-power capacity lie in the Lao water resources (Middleton et al., 2009). Furthest advanced in the country’s hydro-power scheme along the Mekong is the Xayaburi dam in northern Laos, which is intended to generate electricity for export to Thailand (Öjendal & Jensen, 2012). The dam is the first mainstream dam to be constructed in the Lower Mekong Basin.

Due to concerns on the part of Cambodia and Vietnam about possible downstream effects, the Xayaburi project was subjected to MRC consultations in September 2010. In December 2011, the Lower Mekong riparians issued a joint statement calling for further impact assessment studies, apparently in an understanding that no dam would be built until the study was completed ( The Economist, 2012a ). However, Laos reportedly began construction of the Xayaburi dam in March 2012 ( The Economist, 2012b ). The Thai government has agreed to buy 95 percent of the dam’s generated power. Six Thai banks have financed the dam, and a Thai firm is in charge of construction ( The Economist, 2016 ).

The Lao unilateral move to start construction of the Xayaburi dam met with strong protest from the Cambodian and Vietnamese governments, with the president of Vietnam, Truong Tan San, warning that “tensions over water resources are not only threatening economic growth in many countries, but also presenting a source of conflict” ( The Economist, 2012c ). At the same time, citizens and activists have also voiced their concerns through boycotts and petitions to draw attention to the dam’s potential environmental and social impacts ( International Rivers, 2013 ), and to protest against a lack of transparency and public consultation. Pressure from downstream countries and international NGOs has slowed Laos’s progress on its next two dams, the Don Sahong and the Pak Beng, and has forced developers to study potential downstream effects more carefully. However, given that “Laos is a poor country with few natural resources that sees hydropower as its route to development…concerned citizens and the governments of the downstream neighbours may be able to do little more than delay Laos” ( The Economist, 2016 ).

Conflict resolution

The mekong river commission’s lack of enforcement powers.

The MRC is the main mechanism to promote regional cooperation on Mekong water development and management. Since its establishment in 1995, it has achieved important results in conducting technical studies, and has served as a knowledge platform for the four Lower Mekong riparians (Litta, 2012). Yet, as the Xayaburi episode demonstrates, the MRC’s capabilities to prevent unilateral moves and solve regional tensions over dam construction among its members are limited. One of the main reasons for this lies in the MRC’s weak enforcement powers. Notably, there is a marked resistance among the riparian states to cede any sovereignty to the MRC over the shared resources in the basin. This is, however, an institutionally sanctioned position, since the 1995 Mekong Agreement only stipulates “…cooperation on the basis of sovereign equality and territorial integrity in the utilization of the water resources of the Mekong Basin” (Art. 4) (Earle et al., 2015, 76).

China and the MRC

The 1995 Mekong Agreement foresaw Chinese participation by specifying that “any other riparian State, accepting the rights and obligations under this Agreement, may become a party with the consent of the parties” (Art. 39). However, China never joined the MRC, and has remained a “dialogue partner” instead. China is therefore not compelled to disclose information and guarantee that its damming projects will not adversely affect downstream countries. China’s non-member status in the MRC, coupled with its upstream position and economic clout, limit the possibilities of the Lower Mekong riparians to influence upstream dam construction on the Lancang.

One possible solution could consist in China joining the MRC as a full member. This could be of interest to China for symbolic reasons, as it may help China to be perceived as a responsible international partner, and reassure the international community, and especially the Southeast Asian countries, of the benign intentions behind its rise. Also, China’s current approach to data-sharing could eventually backfire: If China continues to release Mekong data only partially and selectively, it may not in fact enhance cooperation, but sow further suspicion and speculation on the part of its co-riparians, who, thanks to the MRC, tend to focus their criticism on China instead of on each other. Thus, observers have argued that “…China’s participation in a multilateral decision-making mechanism would be of benefit to all involved” ( Hui, 2010 ). Intensifying trade relations with Southeast Asia could be an additional incentive for China to join the MRC, although emphasis on domestic economic growth has apparently so far outweighed the potential benefits of transboundary water cooperation. If China decided to join the MRC, actions should be taken to make sure that its membership does not lead to domination of the Commission, but would in fact result in stronger cooperation.

Upstream-downstream collaboration

Despite its absence from the MRC, China seems to be changing its approach towards downstream countries, and has engaged in more solid information-sharing over the past decade (Earle et al., 2015, 76). For example, in 2010, a tour of dams in China was organized for Lower Mekong government officials and the MRC Secretariat ( MRC, 2010 ). China has also participated in the Asian Development Bank’s Greater Mekong Subregion program and the ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation. These two initiatives, launched in the 1990s, focus on basin-wide development and integration (Onishi, 2008).

In April 2015, China proposed a “Mekong River community of common destiny,” to be established among all the riparian states ( China Daily, 2015 ). Such a community would stand in direct competition with the MRC. The fact that China has proposed an alternative governance mechanism suggests that it perceives the MRC as inadequate in meeting the region’s needs. The fear of growing U.S. influence in Southeast Asia could be an additional consideration to explain China’s more cooperative stance on the Mekong ( New Security Beat, 2010 ).

China now also offers logistical and financial assistance for dam construction on the Lower Mekong River. While China and Thailand have long enjoyed good relations, China has apparently succeeded in “[buying] goodwill in Laos and Cambodia with massive infrastructure investments” ( The Economist, 2016 ). Nevertheless, the situation remains characterized by a significant asymmetry of water access and general geopolitical influence, with the other riparians being extremely dependent on China. For example, the Xayaburi dam in Laos has been designed under the assumption that China would let enough water flow during the dry season ( East Asia Forum, 2015 ). Without any written water-sharing agreement, however, downstream countries have no guarantees that their upstream neighbor will respect their interests.

Resilience and Peace Building

Cooperation.

The Mekong River Commission (MRC) has functioned as the main institutional mechanism for regional cooperation on Mekong water development and governance since 1995. However, a stronger role in conflict prevention and management is precluded by its limited membership, mandate, and enforcement powers. While the MRC has attained important achievements, its institutional framework could be strengthened by including China (and Myanmar) as full members. While China shows no inclination to join the MRC as a full member, it has increased information-sharing and assistance to downstream countries in recent years.

Mediation & arbitration

Two initiatives, launched in the 1990s, focus on basin-wide development and integration; namely, the Asian Development Bank’s Greater Mekong Subregion program and the ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation.

Treaty/agreement

A written water-sharing agreement would guarantee that China will respect the water interests of its downstream neighbors, such as letting enough water flow during the dry season.

Resources and Materials

• Chang, X., Liu, X. & Zhou, W. (2010). Hydropower in China at Present and its Further Development. Energy, 35(11), 4400-4406
• China Daily (2015). China Proposes Lancang-Mekong River Community of Common Destiny
• Cronin, R. & Hamlin, T. (2010). Mekong Tipping Point: Hydropower Dams, Human Security and Regional Stability. The Henry L. Stimson Center
• East Asia Forum (2015). The Current of Discord on the Mekong
• Hudson-Rodd, N. & Shaw, B. J. (2003). Mekong River Development: Whose Dreams? Which Visions? Water International, 28(2), 268-275
• Hui, Q. (2010). On the Mekong, A Better Way (3). Chinadialogue
• IEA (2013). Southeast Asia Energy Outlook
• International Rivers (2013). The Lower Mekong Dams Factsheet
• International Rivers (2014). Understanding the Impacts of China’s Upper Mekong Dams
• Jacobs, J. W. (2002). The Mekong River Commission: Transboundary Water Resources Planning and Regional Security. The Geographical Journal, 168(4), 354-364
• Liebman, A. (2005). Trickle-down Hegemony? China’s “Peaceful Rise” and Dam Building on the Mekong. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27(2), 281-304
• MRC (2010). Mekong Commission Visits China Dams and Will Discuss Future Cooperation
• New Security Beat (2010). Managing the Mekong: Conflict or Compromise?
• Osborne, M. (2000). The Strategic Significance of the Mekong. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 22(3), 429-444
• Pearse-Smith, S. W. D. (2012). “Water War” in the Mekong Basin? Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 53(2), 147-162
• Radio Free Asia (2012). Water Wars Feared Over Mekong
• Radio Free Asia (2015). Dams, Climate Change Lead to Fish Decline in Cambodia’s Tonle Sap
• The Economist (2012a). The Mekong River: Lies, Dams and Statistics
• The Economist (2012b). A Dam on the Mekong: Opening the Floodgates
• The Economist (2012c). Damming the Mekong River: River Elegy
• The Economist (2016). Requiem for a River
• Xinhua (2012). Largest Hydropower Station on Mekong River Starts Operation
• Earle, A. et al. (2015). Transboundary Water Management and the Climate Change Debate. New York: Routledge
• Litta, H. (2012). Regimes in Southeast Asia: An Analysis of Environmental Cooperation. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften
• Magee, D. (2012). The Dragon Upstream: China’s Role in Lancang-Mekong Development. In: Öjendal, J., Hansson, S. & Hellberg, S. (eds.). Politics and Development in a Transboundary Watershed: The Case of the Lower Mekong Basin. Dordrecht & London: Springer,
• Middleton, C., Garcia, J. & Foran, T. (2009). Old and New Hydropower Players in the Mekong Region: Agendas and Strategies. In: Molle, F., Foran T. & Käkönen, M. (eds.). Contested Waterscapes in the Mekong Region: Hydropower, Livelihoods and Governance. Lo
• Öjendal, J. & Jensen, K. M. (2012). Politics and Development of the Mekong River Basin: Transboundary Dilemmas and Participatory Ambitions. In: Öjendal, J., Hansson, S. & Hellberg, S. (eds.). Politics and Development in a Transboundary Watershed: The Case
• Onishi, K. (2008). Water Governance of the Mekong River Basin and Chinese National Problems. In: Pachova, N. I., Nakayama, M. & Jansky, L. (eds.). International Water Security: Domestic Threats and Opportunities. Tokyo & New York: United Nations Universit

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Home > Books > River Basin Management - Sustainability Issues and Planning Strategies

Transboundary River Basin Governance: A Case of the Mekong River Basin

Submitted: 27 July 2020 Reviewed: 04 December 2020 Published: 21 April 2021

DOI: 10.5772/intechopen.95377

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Conflict and cooperation are key governance challenges in transboundary river basin governance, especially in the Mekong River Basin. Hydropower dams have been at the center of such a conflict and cooperation that are useful metrics to assess the level and intensity of conflict and cooperation in transboundary river basin governance. This study examines transboundary river basin cooperation in the Mekong through the lens of hydropower dam projects. It uses a literature review and a case study of the Lower Sasan 2 (LS2) Dam to analyze the conflict and cooperation in the Mekong region, from the era of the US influence in the Cold War, the post-Cold War period, and the present-day with the rise of China. It concludes that Mekong river basin cooperation has evolved as a result of external influences and internal competition by riparian states over Mekong resources. The LS2 was identified in 1961 by US-supported hydropower studies and then by the GMS/ADB in 1998, but left unattended until 2007 when Vietnam signed an agreement with Cambodia to undertake a feasibility study in 2008. It took 16 years to get the LS2 built by a Chinese company in 2014 and completed it in 2017. Through the process, the states, powerful external actors, financial institutions, and private sector actors have politicized the LS2 studies, design, and construction. Cambodia, as a weak downstream state, has had to and must continue to position itself strategically in its relationships with these hydro-hegemons to compete for hydropower dam projects and protect its interests. The rise of China has induced the changing relationship between riparian states. Many hydropower dams were built with Chinese funding. Cambodia has also enjoyed its close ties with China, and the building of the LS2 dam by a Chinese company contributes to changing its positions in the Mekong cooperation but suffers environmental and social impacts.

• transboundary water governance
• asymmetric power
• hydro-hegemony
• hydropower dam
• climate change
• regional cooperation

Author Information

Mak sithirith *.

• Department of Natural Resources Management, Faculty of Development Studies, Royal University of Phnom Penh, Cambodia

*Address all correspondence to: [email protected]

1. Introduction

Conflict and cooperation have long been a key governance challenge in transboundary river basin governance. Hydropower dam projects have been at the centre of transboundary river basin cooperation but also the centre of conflicts. These projects have been utilized by riparian states to control water flow and other river resources within their territories, sometimes to the detriment of neighboring states. Therefore, hydropower dam projects are useful indicators for assessing the level and intensity of conflicts and cooperation in transboundary river basin governance. Thus, the purpose of this study is to examine the transboundary river basin cooperation in the Mekong through the lens of hydropower dam projects. The methodology used consists of a literature review and a case study of the Lower Sesan 2 (LS2) Dam in the Lower Mekong River Basin in Cambodia to explore the dynamics of riparian cooperation and conflict in the Mekong.

2. The Mekong River

The Mekong River is the tenth largest river in the world. The basin of the Mekong River drains a total land area of 795,000 km 2 from China’s Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to the Mekong Delta. The Mekong River is the twelfth longest river in the world, flowing approximately 4,909 km through three provinces of China, continuing into Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam before entering into the South China Sea. It originates in the northeastern rim of the Tibetan Plateau situated about 5,000 m above sea level. In China, the Mekong River is called the Lancang River, flowing over 2,200 km. At the end of China’s border, the altitude of the Mekong River has dropped to about 400 m above sea level, and it then flows for 2,709 km through Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam [ 1 ].

The Sesan, Srepok, and Sekong (3S) rivers form the largest tributaries of the Mekong River, located at the corners of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (see Figure 1 ). It is the second-largest sub-basin of the Mekong River system [ 2 , 3 ], covering an area of about 78,579 km 2 , accounting for about ten percent of the entire Mekong Basin, and spanning the three countries of Laos (29 percent), Cambodia (33 percent), and Vietnam (38 percent) [ 4 ]. The Sesan and Srepok rivers originate in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, flowing from Vietnam to Cambodia over a distance of 462 km and 425 km respectively, and meet the Sekong River in Stung Treng Province in Cambodia [ 3 ]. The Sekong River originates in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, flowing through Laos and then in Cambodia, where it joins the Mekong River in Stung Treng Province.

Map of the studied areas.

The Mekong is home to about 260 million people who are living dependent on the rivers, its water, and other natural resources. About 60 million people live in the Lower Mekong Basin (which does not include China or Myanmar), of which about 3.59 million people live in the 3S basin. Vietnam’s population in the 3S basin constitutes 86% of the 3S population. About 60% of the Mekong basin’s population relies on agriculture, and 70% of the water diverted from the Mekong each year is used for irrigation, with irrigated land covering 27% of the basin. The Mekong’s industrial uses include its potential as a transportation corridor between and inside riparian countries, in particular for the rapidly growing China-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) trade [ 5 ].

Capture fisheries make up the largest contribution to the Mekong’s fishery, contributing to 2 million tons a year. The 3S River Basin is also rich in fisheries [ 6 ]. Fisheries account for nearly 6–9% of Cambodia’s GDP and 7% of Laos’s GDP. However, the Mekong fishery sectors in Thailand and Vietnam add well over USD 750 million to each of these countries’ GDPs per year, although it is less significant to its national economies [ 7 ].

The Mekong River Basin has the potential to generate 30,000 megawatts (MW) of hydropower, with only 4,450 exploited as of 2012, of which only 1,600 of that is accounted for the Lower Mekong Basin. The 3S River Basin of the lower Mekong is a potential region for significant hydropower development, with estimated outputs at approximately 6,400 MW [ 8 ], mostly in Vietnam and Laos [ 9 ]. Hydropower development in the 3S Basin, consisting of individual dams and cascade dams, is rapidly increasing, particularly in Vietnam and Laos, following the pace of economic growth and a need for increased security in the production of electricity.

The LS2 Dam situates at the intersection of two international tributaries of the Mekong River—the Sesan and Srepok River. This chapter explores conflicts and cooperation in an international river basin. First, it examines hydro-hegemony in transboundary river basin management by analyzing the history and politics surrounding the development of the hydropower dams in the Mekong region. Secondly, it looks in depth at the case of the LS2 Dam hydropower project concerning the involvement of the US in Lower Mekong riparian politics and at its importance within the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) and the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle. Third, it analyzes the role of China in the Mekong and its involvement in hydropower dam development in the Mekong, especially how it is competing with Vietnam to take control of the LS2 Dam. Additionally, the Chapter details the construction of the LS2 Dam by a Chinese developer. It also explores the impacts of hydropower dam construction on local communities and how they respond to Chinese hydropower projects to attempt to protect their livelihoods. Finally, it concludes and makes recommendations regarding how to improve transboundary water governance in the 3S Basin. Further, the findings presented in this manuscript make valuable contributions to the research regarding the impacts of hydro-hegemonies in transboundary river basin governance as well as the growing literature on power and politics in influencing international water relations and shared transboundary discourse.

3. Conceptual framework: conflicts and cooperation in transboundary river basin governance

There are 261 international river basins around the world, where the water and other riparian resources from one river basin is shared by two or more countries. International rivers may be managed for multiple uses such as hydropower development, food production, industrial development, municipal water supplies, recreation, or a combination of these. Different user groups in different countries with different objectives often have difficulty in arriving at a common agreement regarding quantity, quality, and water distribution [ 10 ]. The increasing competition for limited freshwater resources along international rivers could escalate interstate conflicts. Thus, the international river basin is a source of a potential interstate conflict, particularly when it comes to negotiating the sharing of water between upstream and downstream states. Water conflicts can be further divided into problems of water quality, water quantity, and ecosystem issues [ 11 , 12 ]. However, the costs of armed conflict over a shared river far outweigh the benefits of potential victory [ 13 ]. So, rather than going to war over water, co-riparian states often choose to cooperate and share river resources and benefits. Globally, Wolf [ 10 ] found no water wars within the 261 international river basins across the globe. In the Mekong River Basin, several studies have identified no major conflicts and riparian states within the region cooperate to manage and share the benefits from the Mekong River, despite interstate tensions due to the building of large-scale dams [ 14 , 15 ]. Nonetheless, the absence of war does not mean the absence of conflict [ 16 ]. Indeed, cooperation is reached through a process of dialog, negotiation, discussion, and opposition. Some of these tensions co-exist to the point that they are too complex to be categorized as either conflict or cooperation. These complex tensions within transboundary riparian governance are best understood as water-related interactions rather than as cooperation or conflict [ 17 ].

Water-related interactions among many different actors have been driven by power asymmetries that influence decision-making and water allocation among riparians, and thus, it is difficult to represent the variations in these relations over time and through changing economic and political dynamics [ 18 ]. Zeitoun and Warner [ 16 ] provide a framework to analyze power asymmetry within transboundary river basin cooperation. From the existence of power asymmetries that drive water interactions, it can be seen that an arrangement understood as “cooperative” from a hydro-hegemon’s perspective may conceal an inequitable status quo. The weaker states in such an arrangement may have agreed to cooperate for tactical reasons, unrelated to the immediate water issues at hand, and, therefore, the degree to which this arrangement is truly “cooperative” should be questioned [ 18 ]. Stable situations of shared control may camouflage unjust outcomes for marginalized stakeholders [ 16 ]. The blind pursuit of “cooperation” can, therefore, be as detrimental to the equitable resolution of transboundary water issues as absolute conflict. Furthermore, cooperation between riparian states regarding transboundary water management traditionally has been seen and interpreted as infringing on the sovereignty of riparian states [ 19 ]. Hydro-hegemony in transboundary river basin cooperation has often been challenged by counter-hegemony [ 20 ]. Zeitoun and Warner [ 16 ] describe counter-hegemony as the various strategic responses employed by states sharing the international rivers against perceived negative forms of hydro-hegemony to improve their situation vis-à-vis the hegemon. These strategies could include recourse to ethical arguments and international law, de-securitization, issue linkage, economic development, alternative funding sources, negotiation, and generation of positive-sum outcomes [ 16 ]. Dinar [ 21 ] introduces side-payment and cost-sharing in international river basin governance as examples of ways to counterbalance the asymmetric geographical relationship between downstream and upstream states. On the other hand, Zawahri [ 22 ] points out that third-party involvement in transboundary river basin interactions can leverage the power of riparian states to encourage exploitation of river basin resources, and demonstrates that side-payments from third-party actors such as international organizations, bilateral aid, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could reinforce the hydro-hegemon status of riparian states by boosting their capacity for exploitation.

The employment of counter-hegemonic strategies has increased in the past few decades due to the rise of democratization in the post-Cold War era, which has empowered an increasing number of people in different states across the globe to exercise supreme political authority over a geographical region. The post-Cold War era of democratization and globalization has also seen a proliferation of non-state domestic actors influencing national decision-making, including foreign policy. Along these lines, Nicola Pratt [ 23 ] has described the rise of civil society as a force for political change, social awareness, and local resistance as a type of counter-hegemony through which challenges to hydropower dam projects by riparian states, including hydro-hegemons, have been made in places such as Thailand and some countries in Europe [ 24 ].

Hirsch [ 25 ] views the hydro-hegemony in the international shared water as a form of geopolitics. The World’s geopolitics has changed after the Cold War, transforming the global geopolitics, particularly the hydro-hegemony, into a more complex set of inter-state relations. The rise of China has resulted in changing inter-state relations and the hydro-hegemonic practices in the Mekong. The region has been re-arranging into overlapping blocs, such as ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), MRC, the GMS, and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation in the Mekong Region. The economic rise of China and its concomitant increase in demand for energy and water resources [ 26 ]. Burgos and Sophal [ 27 ] compare the rise of China to the hungry dragon that would need more resources to feed themselves, and so has looked into its neighboring countries to exploit those resources for its domestic needs. Liebman [ 28 ] argues that China has trickled down its hegemonies to its neighbors beyond the Mekong river and water resources, but to extract other resources such as mining, oils, timbers, and agriculture, pursuing its interests regardless of how these affect its downstream neighbors. However, these sometimes challenge the existing hydro-hegemonic structures in the Lower Mekong Basin and sometimes leverage the counter-hegemonies.

4. Methodology

This chapter uses the conceptual discussion above, based on the relevant literature, to analyze conflicts and cooperation in the Mekong River Basin. Based on this conceptual approach, it examines how the rise of China, as well as global and regional changes, have affected transboundary river cooperation in the Mekong. In addition to the conceptual framework based on the existing literature, a field study was carried out in two phases. The first phase was conducted between July 2013 and July 2014, before the construction of the LS2 Dam. The second phase was carried out between January 2016 and May 2017, during the construction of the dam.

Both primary and secondary data were collected to address the research issues and questions presented. Secondary data was collected from various archival sources at the national, provincial, and local levels. Primary data was collected from the study areas through semi-structured interviews with national and community-level stakeholders in addition to focusing group discussions (FGDs).

Fifty semi-structured interviews were conducted in the first phase and 25 semi-structured interviews were conducted in the second phase. Key stakeholders were purposely selected for interviews based on the time and resources available, including NGOs that worked to support dam-affected communities, representatives from the provincial departments of the Ministries of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and Water Resources and Meteorology (MOWRAM) as well as commune council members in Stung Treng Province.

Two FGDs were organized in old Kbal Romeas village—a men’s group and a women’s group, each participated in by nine villagers. One FGD was conducted in the old Srae Kor Muoy and Pir villages with six women and five men who had not left their villages. The interviews focused on water management, the impacts of dams on rivers and livelihoods, construction of the LS2 Dam ( Figure 1 ), compensation, resettlement, the role of NGOs and local government, the intervention of national government as well as support programs for dam-affected communities.

5. Conflicts and cooperation in the lower Mekong River basin

Cooperation in the Mekong River Basin has evolved and has been driven by geography, geopolitics, hydro-hegemons, and national interests. After the independence of Indochina states in the early 50s, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand joined the capitalist sphere led by the US, while North Vietnam joined the communist bloc with China, led by the USSR. In the early 60s, the USSR continued to influence China and North Vietnam to form the communist blocs in the Mekong region. These made the US and its allies uneasy about losing other Mekong countries to the communists. To prevent this to happen, the US and its allies made a concerted effort to curtail communist influence in the Mekong region [ 29 , 30 , 31 ].

Consequently, the Mekong River was strategically employed by the US to counter Communist influences. The US strategy employed the two fronts of transboundary cooperation regarding riparian management as well as modernization and development initiatives to harness the economic potential of the Mekong and its tributaries. Hydropower dams, especially, were considered symbols of modernization, generating hydroelectricity to fuel economic development in the region as a means of reducing or containing the influence of communism [ 30 , 31 ]. In 1957, with US support, four countries, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand established the Mekong Committee (MC). China was not invited to join the MC, as it was not interesting and the MC was specifically established to counter China’s power in the region. At that time, China was also not a member of the UN [ 32 ].

Between 1957 and 1970s, the US provided technical and financial support for the MC to establish a planning framework for the construction of a series of large dams in the Mekong Basin [ 33 ]. The riparian states in the MC were enthusiastic about the planned development of hydropower dams in the Mekong and 3S Basins. After the establishment in 1957, MC undertook a reconnaissance survey of the major tributaries of the Mekong Lower Basin between 1959 and 1960, and the findings published in a report entitled Comprehensive Reconnaissance Report on the Major Tributaries of the Lower Mekong Basin in September 1961, in which numbers of hydropower development projects were proposed to the MC.

The US-Vietnam war in the 1960s and 70s resulted in all of Indochina becoming part of the communist sphere in 1975. The MC was dismantled in 1975, and the development in the Mekong Region slowed to a crawl. However, in 1978, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand established the Interim Mekong Committee (IMC) to facilitate regional cooperation without Cambodia due to the Khmer Rouge’s refusal to establish regional or international ties. However, the work of the IMC was seriously hampered by the absence of Cambodia. In January 1979, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, overthrew the Khmer Rouge, and installed a new government [ 34 ]. With Laos and Cambodia as communist allies, Vietnam became a powerful hegemon in the Mekong region and pushed Cambodia to join the IMC. However, Thailand refused to recognize Cambodia’s Vietnam-backed government and therefore denied Cambodia’s entry into the IMC as Thailand was concerned that the Communist Indochinese states would collectively oppose Thailand’s plans to divert water from the Mekong River [ 31 ].

In 1988, Thailand changed its regional policy to transform the Mekong Region from ‘battlefields’ into ‘marketplaces’ and worked to speed up the process of both regional reconciliation and enhanced opportunities for hydropower dam development. The Paris Peace Accord in 1991 ended Cambodia’s international isolation and Cambodia was admitted to the IMC.

In 1992, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) initiated the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) cooperation, involving six Mekong region countries to boost regional cooperation, economic and infrastructure development, cross-border trade as well as encourage economically productive uses of untapped natural resources. Specifically, the GMS aims to promote large infrastructure projects in addition to facilitating connectivity among these states, especially increasing the flow of goods, investment capital, and people across borders. Unlike the MRC, China and Myanmar are also members of the GMS [ 35 , 36 ]. Since the founding of the GMS, the ADB has implemented more than 100 cooperative projects in infrastructure, energy, telecommunications, trade, tourism, and the environment in its efforts to foster multilateral cooperation and development [ 26 ].

In 1995, the UN facilitated the establishment of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and in April of that year, four lower Mekong countries – Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand – signed the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin [ 37 ]. The Agreement provides a legal mandate for the MRC to coordinate riparian activities in the Lower Mekong Region in developing and managing the Mekong River Basin. In late 1996, after the establishment of the MRC, less populated areas along the tributaries were being looked at for new hydropower projects [ 38 ].

Nevertheless, the connections between the US and the ADB/GMS have leveraged the power relations of the states in the Mekong and 3S regions [ 39 ]. In return, Vietnam has sought to work with Laos and Cambodia in establishing the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle (CLV) in 1999 to maintain its influence as well as to compete with China and other non-hydro-hegemons. The Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Areas (CLV-DTA) was set up by the Prime Ministers of three countries; focusing on security, external affairs, transportation, industry, agriculture, trade and investment, social areas, and environmental protection; covering 13 provinces—5 in Vietnam, 4 in Laos and 4 in Cambodia. The CLV-DTA covers various sectors and priority areas: transport, energy, telecommunications, irrigation and water supply, agriculture, tourism, industry, education and health, environmental protection and land management, security, and defense as well as trade and investment; aiming at promoting economic growth and encouraging the development cooperation between neighboring countries. The 2004 master plan of CLV-DTA drew on the three countries’ plans to develop hydropower and increase power-sharing between its neighbors, stating that the three countries will join their efforts and cooperate in hydropower development. The Vietnamese side can assist the Cambodian and Laos in the triangle area to prepare the technical design for and build small- and medium-scale hydropower projects [ 40 ].

After the Cold War ended in 1989, global geopolitics shifted from a “bi-polar” (communist and capitalist) focus toward regionalism. China has begun to revise its foreign policies and institutional arrangements toward those that promote regional economic cooperation [ 41 , 42 ]. In 1992, China joined the GMS as a member [ 35 , 36 ]. Furthermore, in March 2016, China founded the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, involving six other Mekong countries, to form a new cooperation framework. Following that, China has built more than 50 large-scale dams (over 50 MW) in Lower Mekong countries: 30 in Myanmar, 14 in Lao PDR, seven in Cambodia, and three in Vietnam [ 43 ]. China has built strong diplomatic and economic ties with Cambodia. These have contributed to the surge in Chinese investment in Cambodia. In 2016 alone, Chinese investment capital in Cambodia amounted to USD1.05 billion mainly in the areas of textiles, hydropower, rice milling, rubber production and processing, mining, and construction. By the end of 2017, China had invested USD12.6 billion in Cambodia. About 50 percent of Cambodian land concessions granted since 1994 (4.6 million hectares) are in the hands of 107 Chinese firms [ 44 ]. Some 23 Chinese firms are exploring mineral resources in the Kingdom of Wonder. China invested over USD1.6 billion to build seven hydropower projects between 2005 and 2015 and more are planned for the near future [ 43 ]. Five of the Cambodian hydropower dams, with a total capacity of 915 MW, were financed by Chinese investors and built in the coastal regions, including Kamchay, Stung Tatay, Stung Atay, Lower Stung Russey Chrum, Stung Cheay Areng, as well as one in the Mekong region, the LS2 [ 45 , 46 , 47 ].

6. Revisiting the Mekong River cooperation through the lower Sesan 2 dam

The conflicts and cooperation in the Mekong River Basin could be revealed through the case of the Lower Sesan 2 (LS2) dam in Cambodia. It politically involves the world power, regional power, sub-regional power, and riparian states in the process of identification, design, planning, construction, and operation of the LS2 Dam over a long period. These processes bind state, private sectors; quasi-state owned corporations, and international financing institutions together in a complex politics of regional cooperation that cut across the 3S River and cultural-ecological landscapes of ethnic groups in the north-eastern region in Cambodia.

6.1 The politics of the lower Sesan 2 dam—The US planted, the GMS planned, and the Chinese harvested the fruit

The LS2 dam was produced out of the US’s hydropower planning framework, a US strategy to contain the communist influence in the Mekong Region. It was identified in a reconnaissance survey on the major tributaries of the Mekong Lower Basin in September 1961, four years after the MC established (See Table 1 ). Following that, in the 1970s, the MC reviewed the hydropower projects and identified 180 dams on the tributaries of the Mekong River, including sixteen hydropower development sites on the Se San River Basin—5 projects in Cambodia, 10 in Vietnam, and one international project; and fifteen sites in the Sre Pok River Basin—5 sites in Cambodia, 9 in Vietnam and one international project. The LS2 Project was not included [ 48 ].

Major hydropower projects in the 3S river basin and the identification of the LS2.

Source: [ 51 ].

However, Cambodia did not support the US plans to construct a series of large dams in the Mekong and so, refused to accept it’s given the assertion of US influence and dominance in the planning process. In 1965, Cambodia ended its relationship with the US. In return, the US supported the military coup in Cambodia in the 1970s, but the country fell into the Indochina War led to the Khmer Rouge occupation in 1975 and the killing field between 1975 and 1978. In 1979, Vietnam overthrew the Khmer Rouge and controlled Cambodia until the 1989s. The hydropower plans, including the LS2 Project, were abandoned as a result [ 48 ].

The UN-supported election in 1993 resulted in opening up Cambodia to regional and international integrations. In 1992, the GMS was established and Cambodia joined it as a member. In the early 1990s, the GMS funded two major preliminary technical and economic feasibility studies for hydropower projects in the region. The first study, undertaken in 1994, provided an initial inventory of potential hydropower projects in the Mekong region. The second study, begun in 1998, specifically focused on the feasibility of hydropower projects in the Sekong, Sesan, and Nam Thoeun River Basins (SKSSNT). The SKSSNT study was completed in two phases and analyzed 37 potential hydropower sites in the three basins. The 11 highest-ranked projects were then selected (See Table 1 ), 1 from which six dams, were selected for further study: the Sesan 3 and Thoung Kontum in Vietnam, the Lower Srepok 2 and Sesan 4 in Cambodia, and the Xe Kaman 3 and Nam Kong 1 in Lao PDR. 2 These proposed projects were formally prioritized largely because of their high potential for electricity generation and because their economic and financial benefits were more favorable than other proposed projects [ 49 , 50 ].

The Lower Sesan 2 and Lower Srepok 2 projects in Cambodia were not originally included in the list of proposed projects ( Table 2 ) for economic reasons. A subsequent listing politically moved these schemes to the 7th and 8th positions, respectively. Large differences in feasibility and expected economic benefits existed between the projects on the list. The addition of two Cambodian projects to the list was motivated by the fact that projections were almost profitable and that its economic standing was only slightly below the other 11 projects. In pushing the idea of two sites in Cambodia, the study suggested an alternative dam site for the Lower Sesan 2; eventually, that proposal proved uncompetitive and was ranked with lower economic value than the existing projects. Despite this, the original Lower Sesan 2 still appears among the six priority schemes. Reportedly, the addition of the Cambodian projects to the priority list was due to political pressure rather than economic feasibility. Two different locations were proposed for the Lower Sesan 2 [ 35 , 50 ], although the economic feasibility of the remaining proposal has also been questioned, and it is still included as a priority project in the SKSSNT study, possibly due to the pressure to include two priority dams for each of three countries.

Hydropower project in the Sekong, Sesan, and Nam Thoeun River basins.

MOU = Memorandum of Understanding.

Vietnam takes the GMS/ADB hydropower plan forward. During the second Summit of CLV-DTA in 2003, Vietnam signed the MOU on feasibility studies for three hydropower plants of Lower Se San 1/Se San 5 with a capacity of 90 MW located on the border of the two countries, Lower Se San 2 with an electricity generating capacity of 400 MW in the lower basin of Se San river and Stung Treng hydropower plant with capacity of 980 MW. Vietnam agreed with Cambodia to build the LS2 Project during the five years from 2012–2017 in addition to completing the Lower Sesan 1/5 (LS1/5), LS2, LS3, Prek Leang 1, and Prek Leang 2 projects between 2015 and 2020 [ 2 , 40 ]. As part of the CLV, Electricité du Viet Nam (EVN), Vietnam’s electric power utility company, signed a memorandum of understanding with the Cambodian government to connect the LS2 and LS1/5 projects to the Cambodian and Vietnamese power grids [ 52 ]. The agreement between Cambodia and Vietnam on the LS2 project said that about 50 percent of electricity generated from the LS2 project would be sold in Cambodia and the remaining would be exported to Vietnam, as the power grid in Cambodian beyond the northeastern provinces remains undeveloped and electricity demand in northeast Cambodia is far less than what the LS2 could produce [ 44 ].

The LS2 Project was finally selected by China among seven hydropower projects to be built in the Mekong River in Cambodia. China’s investment in the LS2 dam in Cambodia serves as a placeholder for larger political and economic issues that are not necessarily energy security or profit-driven. The individual projects, the LS2 Project, do not necessarily need to be profitable to be approved, but rather contribute to magnificent relationship goals between Cambodia and China and their political and economic strategies [ 43 ]. On the one hand, Cambodia occupies a unique geographical location in the Mekong and Southeast Asia. Through this relationship with Cambodia, it is strategically important for China to exert greater influence in Southeast Asia and to counterbalance the power of the US in the region. The Cambodian port city of Sihanoukville is a precious “pearl” among China’s “string of pearls” and access to these ports provides an excellent base for projecting maritime power into the Gulf of Thailand and the Straits of Malacca [ 53 ].

6.2 The conflict and cooperation between China and Vietnam over the building of the lower Sesan 2 (LS2) dam

The building of the LS2 project, though planned, did not happen between the late 90s and early 2000s due to a lack of funding. Vietnam is concerned about China’s trickle-down hegemony into the LS2 project and the rest of the 3S region and grabs the economic opportunities to tackle the LS2 project, fulfilling its CLV panning framework. On 15 June 2007, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC), represented by the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), granted permission for Electricité du Viet Nam (EVN) to conduct a detailed feasibility study for the LS2 project. In 2008, EVN hired Vietnamese and Cambodian consulting companies to conduct feasibility studies, including social and environmental impact assessments [ 54 , 55 ].

The feasibility study was completed in late 2008. Many concerns were raised about the possible negative impacts of the LS2 project and so, Cambodia’s Ministry of Environment delayed approving the project, but requested more studies, particularly on fisheries. In response, the Prime Minister of Vietnam, Nguyễn Tấn Dũng, publicly requested in November 2010 that Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia to speed up the project’s approval. The approval came shortly after that request by RGC. As a result, Vietnam’s Ministry of Planning and Investment licensed EVN in January 2011 to make a USD816 million investment in the project. The LS2 project was a joint venture between an EVN subsidiary, the EVN International Joint Stock Company, and Cambodia’s Royal Group, which together incorporated the Cambodia–Vietnam Hydropower Company as the project owner.

In return, Vietnam was concerned about the high cost of building the LS2 project and so, the EVN looked for a joint venture with private investors. Finally, in January 2011, the Royal Group of Cambodia agreed to shoulder 49 percent of the project cost, although technically, it has no previous experience in energy development. But it was rumored that Prime Minister Hun Sen personally asked the Royal Group to invest in the project as it had close political ties to Hun Sen. Nevertheless, the project was also economically attractive to the Royal Group as the LS2 site was covered by huge forest areas, which had the potential to generate millions of dollars in timber sales. However, the EVN wanted to withdraw completely from the project, which they finally took about two months before the approval of the project on November 2, 2012, by the Cabinet of the Royal Government of Cambodia, despite the funding commitment of about 50% from the Royal Group.

The uncertainty of the EVN opens up the opportunity for China’s Huaneng Group, whose subsidiary Hydrolancang International Energy, to grab the economic opportunity to invest in the LS2 dam and eventually replaced the EVN in the joint venture. The entry of the Chinese into the project meant that Chinese banks provided the capital needed to proceed with the project. The Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Cambodia approved the LS2 project with a capacity of 400 megawatts (MW), to be built by China’s Huaneng Group and the Royal Group on 26 November 2012 [ 56 ].

In late November 2012, Hydrolancang International Energy Co. (HIE), a subsidiary of China Huaneng Group signed a memorandum of understanding with the Royal Group for an “initial two-year cash injection” into the LS2 project [ 57 ]. Since that time, the project developer has been Hydropower Lower Sesan 2, a joint venture between the Royal Group and HIE, which together own 90 percent of the stakes. The LS2 dam has a 45-year concession period that includes five years for construction. The new arrangement led to a revision regarding sharing investment costs. The joint venture directly financed 30 percent of the project with the remaining 70 percent financed by an undisclosed bank loan. HIE provided the largest share (51 percent) of the project’s costs, while the Royal Group reduced its share from 49 percent to 39 percent. The EVN eventually decided to purchase the remaining 10 percent of shares. Finally, the joint venture created the Hydropower Lower Sesan 2 Co. Ltd. to construct the LS2 Dam [ 58 ].

The dam was built by Hydro Power Lower Sesan 2 Co. Ltd. at an estimated cost of USD816 million [ 59 ]. The LS2 Dam is located near the confluence of the Sesan and Srepok rivers, about 1.5 km downstream from where the Sesan meets the Srepok and 25 km from the confluence with the Mekong mainstream. Clearing of the reservoir area for the LS2 dam began in March 2013. The resettlement and compensation plan was published in January 2014. The construction of the LS2 dam began in February 2014 and was completed in 2017. Prime Minister Hun Sen presided over the ceremonial opening of the LS2 dam on 25 September 2017. At full capacity, the LS2 dam will generate 400 MW of electricity. Moreover, it will reduce the country’s reliance on imported electricity from Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, lower electricity tariffs, and stimulate industrial development. The LS2 dam is the first large dam on the Cambodian section of the 3S rivers [ 55 ].

6.3 Ecological, biophysical and environmental impacts

The landscapes of the 3S Rivers consist of biophysical and spiritual landscapes. The biophysical landscape comprises of rich river ecology, the Sesan, and Srepok Rivers, with water flow and fish in rivers. Along the riverbank, forests cover huge areas and communities settled on the riverbanks. Forest and rivers are homes to terrestrial wildlife and aquatic animals. The area is rich in biodiversity. However, villagers believe that forests and rivers are homes to spirits known as ‘neak ta’ [ 60 ]. Four different types of spiritual landscapes have existed in the areas—(1) the land spirit (neak ta), (2) the forest spirit (prey neak ta); and (3) water/river spirit (neakta krahamkor) and (4) ancestral burial grounds. Villages argue that these spirits protect them, bring them happiness and harmonies, and provide them with good businesses and agricultural activities, and protect them when they travel on the river. Villagers pay respects to their respective spirits day, night, and year.

The LS2 dam removes the river landscape and replaces it with a concrete structure, blocking the river flow and fish migration and dividing the river system into the upstream and the downstream areas of the dam. The upstream area creates a huge reservoir, covering an area of 340 km 2 and the downstream area is characterized by the increased water flow throughout the year. The construction of the LS2 dam led to the clearance of 33,564 ha of forest and destruction of biodiversity, of which about 350 ha were evergreen forest, some 5073 ha semi-evergreen forest, and 27,711 ha deciduous forest. Matthews and Motta [ 43 ] state: “in the Lower Sesan 2, where reservoir clearing began inside the concession area before dam designs were even approved. The tree clearing at the Lower Sesan 2 was also illegal as it extended well beyond the borders defined in the concession agreement. Many speculate that the central government and the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are signing dam concession agreements to access the valuable timber reserves”. On 6th June 2016, an article in the Cambodia Daily calls the LS2 dam a means of laundering illegal timber.

Some 329 fish species used to live in the 3S river systems −133 species reside in the Sesan river, 213 species in the Sekong River, and 240 species in Srepok River [ 61 ]. At least 41 migratory fish species are commonly caught by fishermen in the Sesan River, and these migratory species represent 60% of the fishermen’s total catch. The Yali Dam in Vietnam alone would reduce fish populations and fish yields by 70% [ 62 ]. The LS2 dam has modified the river ecology, disconnecting the upstream with the downstream, destroying the fish habitats and migratory routes of fish, and changing river flow between the dry and wet season. The scientist predicts that the LS2 dam is likely to have the most significant impact on fish biomass levels, which are expected to drop by 9.3% basin-wide, amounting to approximately 200,000 tons of fish each year and further affecting fisheries productivity levels in the Sesan and Srepok river basins [ 63 ].

In Srae Kor commune, about 2031 ha of community forestry established in 2013 by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries along the Sesan River were cleared by the Hydro Power Lower Sesan 2 Co. Ltd. Inside the area, about 280 ha of prey neak ta or ‘forest spirit’ that were protected and sacred to villagers for a long time were destroyed on short notice in late 2014 and early 2015. Four burial grounds of about 50 ha each, two located along the Sesan and the other two about 300 m from the river, were removed by the company, which paid compensation of USD150–160 for each grave. Furthermore, about 1248 ha of ‘wet ricefield’ and 57 ha of upland ricefields were lost to dam construction.

In Kbal Romeas commune, the government granted an economic land concession to Anmady Investment Group for planting rubber, covering about 3000 ha in the north-east part of the commune, denying villagers access to forest resources and agriculture. Furthermore, the Hydro Power Lower Sesan 2 Co. cleared the lands used by villagers for wet rice, covering 620 ha. In Kbal Romeas village, clearance by the company destroyed ‘three burial places’ covering about 60 ha, 348 ha of the forest spirits, 358 ha of upland fields, a health center, and 232 ha of rice paddies. The compensation covered only the burial land, rice field, and housing.

Neakta Krahamkor is a water/river spirit, the ancient spirit with a red neck, who protects the river and the villagers who depend on it. Villagers gather annually and begin a traditional ritual, offering incense, a bowl of rice, and a pig’s head, requesting their pleas and protection. This practice has happened since the early 1900s when a Chinese merchant was rewarded with a successful journey up the river when he paid his respects to the spirit with the red neck. At present, this site has been lost to LS2, an indication that the life of people will be ruined as the protector has disappeared.

6.4 Local resistance to the LS2 dam

Six villages, namely Srae Kor Muoy, Pir, Kbal Romeas, Srae Sranok, and Phluk, were submerged in the reservoir. About 846 families were directly affected by the LS2 dam and a further 15 villages downstream, home to 3,794 families, and a population of 19,066 were indirectly affected. About 70 other villages situated along the Sesan and Srepok upstream of the dam, home to 6,387 households and a total population of 32,864, were also expected to be negatively affected by the project [ 55 ].

The affected populations were relocated to four different resettlement areas, covering 4,000 ha, organized by the Project Owners. The project owners proposed the resettlement sites and the provincial government and the relocated chose the locations that best suited them. Villagers from Chrab, Srae Sranok, and Kbal Romeas chose to resettle along National Road No. 78, known locally as the ASEAN Road, linking Stung Treng and Ratanakkiri provinces. However, villagers from Srae Kor Muoy and Pir chose to resettle in the northern part of the Sesan, about 3 km from the river.

The compensation took two forms: (1) a land and housing package and (2) cash. The cash payments for loss of land were USD500 per hectare for the lowland paddy field, USD740 per hectare for garden land, and USD230 per hectare for fallow swidden [ 55 ]. The 12 families from Phluk chose the cash package [ 64 ]. As part of this package, compensation for fruit trees was very low. For a banana tree grove, for instance, compensation was only USD6. Local people said they could sell the fruit from a single banana tree for much more over the course of a year than the compensation that was provided for an entire grove.

The affected households were eligible for the land and housing package, which was to provide each displaced household with: (1) 5 ha of farmland (2) land for the housing of 1000 m 2 , and (3) a house of 80 m 2 . For housing, the relocated had two options: a company-built house or a lump-sum cash payment of USD 6,000 to build their own house. Two types of houses were offered – wooden and concrete. About 50 percent of resettled families opted for the wooden houses built by the company, 18 percent chose concrete houses, 20 percent chose to build their own houses and eight percent received only plots of land for housing without a house. They also received a financial package for livelihood restoration during the transition period. However, the lowland paddy soil lost in places such as Kbal Romeas and Srae Kor was of very good quality while the replacement land is not nearly as good and even this low-quality land is available only in limited amounts, often scattered over wide areas. The compensation for lost agricultural land was inappropriate and inadequate.

Interviews with many of them indicated they did not want to move, but the project owners and government required them to relocate. At the same of the studies, about 85 percent of the affected families had relocated to new resettlement sites, but about 15 percent refused to leave their villages. All villagers from Srae Sranok and Chrab villages were completely relocated to the resettlement villages organized by the project, while 126 families from Srae Kor Muoy, Pir, and Kbal Romeas refused to move and decided to stay in their houses and land in the old villages. Unlike the other displaced villagers, 12 families from Phluk were completely removed from their areas to make way for the construction of the LS2 dam( Table 3 ). Adding to the problem, the original plan was changed from offering five different house sizes or types to just one standard-sized house. Thus, housing compensation failed to take into account the size of the household and the number of families in a household.

Number of families accepting and refusing compensation.

The reasons that families agreed to relocate included fear of negative project impacts and, importantly, promises of compensation. However, they indicated that relocation was a “no choice” option for them. Mr. Chhang Chhoeun and his wife, Ms. Chrab Veth, with four children, one married, said that he agreed to relocate to a new village and received a wooden house with a land area of 20 x 50 m, and 5 ha of agricultural land. For him and his family, this was acceptable as it is better than what he had in his old village of Kbal Romeas, where he had only 4 ha of farmland and a tiny wooden house for the entire family, including the married daughter’s family. In the new village, his married daughter has her own new house and that puts his family in a better position. Chheum Kea, a councilor of Kbal Romeas commune, decided to relocate to the resettlement village to avoid being seen as against the government project. His house in old Kbal Romeas village was about 99 m 2 and his kitchen was 30 m 2 . He has three married children. In the new village, he received a two-roomed house of only 80 m 2 , which is not big enough for all his married children. His married children did not receive their own houses because they married after the project started. Thus, he was not happy but had to move anyway. These are just two of many stories of relocation bringing both satisfaction and dissatisfaction, although many did not want to move.

Some families refused to relocate because they had built a good house in a good location in the old village, with access to rivers for water, forests for non-timber forest products, and personal religious sites, including the tombs of their parents and grandparents as well as shrines of the forest spirit that they believe provides security for their lives. The new villages cannot guarantee this same quality of life, as many project-constructed houses in the resettlement locations are smaller and made of low-quality wood. Also, many of the new sites lack access to water and drinking water because many of the hand pumps built by the companies did not work and the water quality was not acceptable. More importantly to the villagers, they would be separated from the tombs of their ancestors and the forest spirit.

The livelihoods of ethnic peoples from Srae Kor, Kbal Romeas, Phluk, and Srae Sranok are very much dependent on rivers, forest, non-timber forest products, livestock raising, and agriculture. The Sesan and Srepok rivers provide them a moderate lifestyle: river water is used for both drinking and agriculture and fish, rice, and aquatic vegetables are the main foods. The forest has for generations provided villagers with a source of food, energy, materials, and spiritual life. Land along the rivers and surrounding the villages is cultivated and rice is the main crop. According to the villagers, the rivers, water, forest, and agricultural lands are home to spirits with whom the villagers have lived well and to whom they pay respect through traditional ritual practices. Livestock raising is not only for income and food but social and traditional rituals and practices as well. The villagers in these areas believe that any action leading to damaging rivers, forests or land angers the spirits and without a warm relationship with these spirits, they cannot look forward to a long, happy and healthy life.

Relocation to a new area means that various ethnic groups will have to adopt a new lifestyle based on markets. From a cashless tradition, ethnic groups of Lao, Phnong, and Kreung must switch to the common livelihood of buying and selling. Free collection of resources from rivers, forests, and land will be replaced by paying to obtain them. This is evident in the resettlement sites, where the relocated households now have to buy water, fish, and meat for their families, unlike before in their previous villages. Some of the relocated households have used some of the cash compensation to buy motorcycles, TVs, and other items, such as phones. In the long run, they may face a big dilemma as the cash dries up. Shortage of water, extra expenses, limited income-earning opportunities, and changing cultural practices in the new villages worry the relocated immensely. They feel uncertain about their lives and cannot predict what might happen next. They are calling on the government and the hydropower company to address these issues, but the authorities have been slow to respond.

7. Discussion and conclusion

Cooperation among riparian states in the Mekong River Basin has evolved. As argued by scholars researching transboundary river basin governance, before the 1990s, China, the upstream state of the Mekong River Basin, had little motivation to cooperate with other Mekong riparian states [ 26 , 28 , 33 ]. However, contrary to arguments by scholars researching hydro-hegemonies [ 13 , 16 ], cooperation in the Mekong River Basin among the four lower Mekong Countries, first through the Mekong Committee (MC) and later the Mekong River Commission (MRC), was not driven by either the upstream or downstream hegemons, but by hegemons from outside the Mekong region, particularly the US. The communist threat and the resulting Cold War paradoxes drove the Mekong cooperation and the four lower riparian Mekong states formed a downstream hydro-hegemony to counter China’s upstream hegemony. Thus, hydropower dam theory was actualized by the lower Mekong cooperation. As a result, China and the four lower Mekong countries squabbled for many years over the management and utilization of the Mekong water resources. China utilized its upstream hegemon status on the Mekong or Lancang River to assert power over the other riparian states along the Mekong. China built many hydropower dams on the mainstream of the Mekong River in Yunnan Province, which caused severe negative social and environmental impacts downstream.

Within the Lower Mekong River Basin Cooperation, the hydro-hegemonic dynamics drive the cooperation. Riparian countries in the Lower Mekong basins cooperate to manage, utilize, and share river resources [ 14 ], but they compete in hydropower dam construction as well. For instance, as an upstream hegemon of the Lower Mekong River Basin, Laos continues to build hydropower dams and sells the electricity to Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam. At the same time, Thailand finances Laos’ Xayaburi Dam, and Vietnam finances Cambodia’s LS2 Dam. On the other hand, cooperation in the Lower Mekong River Basin is driven by collusion among riparian states as well, in which the weaker and more powerful states exploit the Mekong River in their ways according to their capacity and resources. Further, powerful and wealthy states assist the poorer and weaker state to exploit the Mekong resources on a larger scale than the weaker states would be able to manage on their own in return for a large share of the proceeds. The consequences of such overexploitation risk the sustainability of the Mekong River Basin.

The cooperation in the Mekong is also driven by external actors, such as the ADB, which has engaged China through the GM’s Initiative. Along these lines, hydropower dam projects have been utilized by states and regional hegemons to effect cooperation, conflict, and competition in the region. One of these hydropower projects is the LS2 Dam. Through the GMS, the ADB leverages the hydro-hegemons, such as China and Vietnam to capitalize on the hydropower dam projects in the 3S and the Mekong basins as a strategy to compel resource exploitation, forest clearance, land grants (economic land concessions), and license issuance for agro-plantations, mineral extraction, and infrastructure development.

This chapter has detailed how the US influenced Cambodia and several other riparian states in the Mekong region to come together and first identified the LS2 as a potential hydroelectric development project. US hegemony was carried forward through the continued development of the LS2 project by the ADB/GMS, then the CLV Development Triangle, and the Chinese company. In the end, it was China that successfully competed with Vietnam for a dominant role in the LS2 project and, through this role, China has harvested the bounty from the seeds planted by the US in the 1960s.

These processes transform natural resources and public entities into vehicles for the production and accumulation of wealth for the state, private sector, and powerful political elites in each riparian state. The capital accumulation process binds the state and private interests in the so-called development processes that cut across sectoral boundaries and local communities. Those who criticize these developments are called out for being “anti-development”. The impacts of these development patterns extend beyond the rivers, fisheries, and political boundaries into forests, wildlife, spiritual traditions, uplands, and mountains.

Cooperation operates as a factor within power relations, power asymmetries, hydro-hegemony as well as the interests of strong and weak hegemons, which might together be termed “riparian realpolitik”. Cambodia, as a weak downstream riparian state in the Mekong, has reoriented itself several times from the 1960s through the present to adjust its interests with hegemonic interests to better its position. This has held over the course of the Kingdom’s regime change from monarchy to the killing fields, to totalitarian, socialist, and finally a democratic state. Even now, Cambodia cannot escape from this type of cooperation. Rather, it continues to cooperate with riparian states in the Mekong River Basin to manage, use and share river resources, while at the same time, navigating conflicts, competing for advantage, and colluding with others to exploit the river resources. Thus, cooperation, collusion, and competition enable the riparian states in the Mekong region to extract resources, depending on the country’s capacity, economic power, geography, and resource endowment. On the one hand, the smaller, weaker, and poorer countries might exploit resources in one way, while richer and more powerful states exploit these resources in others. On the other hand, cooperation can be used by powerful and rich countries to collude with poorer and weaker states to exploit resources on a larger scale than they could manage in isolation, and, in return, they share the benefits. The consequences of overexploitation of river resources might risk the sustainability of the 3S and the Mekong, thereby imperiling the future of all of these countries.

Through these processes, riparian states politicize relationships, positions, and power relations through cooperation. Within the context of riparian cooperation downstream states act as upstream states, such as Vietnam’s efforts to build more dams in the 3S region in central Vietnam, and an upstream state, such as Laos, reinforces its position to build hydropower dams, regardless of opposition from Vietnam and other riparian states. At the same time, Cambodia is climbing the energy ladder, swapping its passive position as a mere complainant for that of a dam builder, with the LS2 Dam set to begin operations soon and rapidly underway for developing the Sambo Dam. These developments are made possible because of China’s presence in the region.

Cambodia is vulnerable to regional cooperation. The chapter points to three key issues as ways to counter the hegemony of individual states: the lack of jurisdiction of the MRC on the tributaries, the lack of formalized cooperation between state and non-state actors, and the inability of weak states to counter the strength of hydro-hegemons, not simply because of their weaker power but due as well to their narrower access to information. Building dams is one option for addressing these challenges and the LS2 dam proof that Cambodia can compete for water with other riparians. However, the weaponizing of water in the 3S Basin is about the competition to build dams to retain position and negotiating power in transboundary cooperation, without which Cambodian voices will not be heard.

While China financed the building of the LS2 dam and leveraged the downstream position of Cambodia to compete in the dam building in the Mekong, the Chinese dam has caused social and environmental impacts on local communities living all along the rivers of the basin. As a result, local resistance to the LS2 dam has occurred, as communities seek solutions from the dam builders and government to the problems caused by the development. Lack of experience by the government of Cambodia in addressing the impacts of the dam on local communities and the unaccountability of the Chinese dam builders to social and environmental impacts have only led to an increase in critical local resistance to Chinese dam builders. The local resistance has publicly painted the Chinese in a bad light concerning the LS2 Dam development. If China does not pay attention to improving its performances in overseas investment and development, particularly in Cambodia, local resistance to Chinese investments will increase.

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• WATCO is a Dutch Consulting group, who specialized in hydropower development and water resources management.
• SWECO is a Sweden’s leading consulting engineering company and the group employs 2,300 people with 40 offices in Sweden and 10 others worldwide. The SWECO Group covers a wide range of work in addition to hydropower

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Transboundary Water Conflict: A case study of the Mekong River Basin

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Conflict Over Water

International conflict over water.

Limited water supply can lead to the conflict of water users and players. The River Nile and the River Mekong flow through multiple countries and so conflicts arise internationally.

River Nile background

• The Nile is 6,700km long and is shared between 11 nations including; Uganda, Burundi, Sudan, Kenya and Egypt. There is a history of conflict between these nations over the river that is a vital resource.
• Egypt has even threatened any country upstream of them that tries to dam the Nile River with War.

River Nile controversy

• In 1929, a Nile agreement between Egypt and the UK (Sudan was a British Colony at the time), gave Egypt complete anonymity over developments on the Nile. This agreement did not include any other countries that border the Nile.
• In 2011, Ethiopia began the construction of a Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam, which Egypt contested.
• In March 2015, Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan signed an agreement over the Dam. This has still not resolved the problems surrounding other Nations rights to water.

River Mekong

• The Mekong River provides water for Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and China.
• Chinese dams at the headwaters threaten the water availability to nations that are further downstream.
• These nations are also damming the river and taking in more water from the river.

National Conflict over Water

Limited water supply can lead to the conflict of water users and players. Ethiopia is an example of where limited water supply has caused conflicts within a country.

• In Ethiopia, internal controversy has happened over the Gilgel Gibe III Dam on the Omo River, which began in 2008.
• The cost of the dam was US$1.8 billion and it started generating electricity in late 2015.
• 200,000 people (largely indigenous residents) downstream of the Dam rely on the seasonal floodwaters to replenish the dry soils for their subsistence farming.

• Many ethnic groups (i.e. Mursi and Nyangatom) are already threatened by poor crop yield and the Gilgel Gibe III Dam threatens their livelihood and survival.
• Tribal conflict is a concern because of the minimal water supplies.
• The Dam’s potential impact on Lake Turkana (a World Heritage Site) did lead to UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee calling for the construction to be halted in 2011.
• Lake Turkana's water levels could drop 10 metres, increasing the salinity of the water and threatening 300,000 people and local wildlife.

Controversy

• Those in favour of the Gilgel Gibe III Dam say artificial floods could continue supporting the indigenous population and establishing large plantations of cotton and sugar cane could economically benefit these populations.
• The Ethiopian army has been accused of human rights violations against those opposing the Dam and plantations.

1 Tectonic Processes & Hazards

1.1 Tectonic Processes & Hazards

1.1.1 Tectonic Plates

1.1.2 Distribution of Tectonic Hazards

1.1.3 Theoretical Frameworks

1.1.4 Earthquakes

1.1.5 Earthquake Hazards

1.1.6 Volcanoes

1.1.7 Tsunamis

1.1.8 End of Topic Test - Tectonic Processes

1.1.9 Exam-Style Question - Earthquakes

1.2 Natural Disasters

1.2.1 Introduction to Natural Disasters

1.2.2 Impacts of Hazards

1.2.3 Comparing Hazards

1.2.4 Development & Governance

1.3 Natural Disaster Case Studies

1.3.1 Tohoku Earthquake & Tsunami

1.3.2 Gorkha Earthquake

1.3.3 Mount Merapi Eruption

1.4 Trends & Patterns

1.4.1 Disaster Trends

1.4.2 Prediction

1.5 Disaster Modification

1.5.1 Hazard Management

1.5.2 Modifications

1.5.3 End of Topic Test - Natural Disasters

1.5.4 Exam-Style Question - Disaster Modification

2 Option 2A: Glaciated Landscapes & Change

2.1 Glaciated Landscapes Over Time

2.1.1 Timeline of Glacial Change

2.1.2 Natural Causes

2.1.3 Ice Distributions

2.2 Periglacial Landscapes

2.2.1 Periglacial Processes

2.2.2 Periglacial Landforms

2.3 Glacial Processes

2.3.1 Mass Balance

2.3.2 Glacial Movement

2.4 Glacial Landforms

2.4.1 Landscapes

2.4.2 Erosional Landforms

2.4.3 Erosional Landforms 2

2.4.4 Erosional Landforms 3

2.4.5 Depositional Landforms

2.4.6 Fluvioglaciation

2.5 The Future of Glaciated Landscapes

2.5.1 The Value of Glaciated Landscapes

2.5.2 The Value of Glaciated Landscapes 2

2.5.3 Threats to Glaciated Landscapes

2.5.4 Managing the Threats to Glaciated Landscapes

3 Option 2B: Coastal Landscapes & Change

3.1 Coastal Landscapes

3.1.1 The Wider Coastal Landscape

3.1.2 Geological Structure

3.1.3 Lithology & Vegetation

3.2 Coastal Erosion & Deposition

3.2.1 Shaping Coastlines

3.2.2 Coastal Formations

3.2.3 Sediment Transportation

3.2.4 Subaerial Processes

3.3 Coastal Risks

3.3.1 Sea Level Change

3.3.2 Coastal Retreat

3.3.3 Coastal Flooding

3.4 Managing Coastlines

3.4.1 Consequences of Coastal Recession

3.4.2 Engineering Management Approaches

3.4.3 Governance Approaches

4 Globalisation

4.1 Globalisation

4.1.1 Intro to Globalisation

4.1.2 Development of Globalisation

4.1.3 Economic Policy & Globalisation

4.1.4 Government Policy & Globalisation

4.1.5 International Organisations & Globalisation

4.1.6 Measuring Globalisation

4.1.7 TNCs & Globalisation

4.1.8 TNCs - Aramco & Anglo-Iranian Oil

4.2 Negatives of Globalisation

4.2.1 'Switched Off' Places

4.3 Global Shift

4.3.1 Global Shift for Developing Nations

4.3.2 Global Shift for Developing Nations 2

4.3.3 Global Shift for Developed Nations

4.3.4 End of Topic Test - Globalisation

4.4 Migration

4.4.1 Megacities

4.4.2 International Migration

4.4.3 Country Interdependence

4.5 Culture

4.5.1 Global Culture

4.5.2 Cultural Erosion

4.6 Measuring Development

4.6.1 Measuring Development

4.7 Responses to Globalisation

4.7.1 Tensions Caused by Globalisation

4.7.2 Government Control of Globalisation

4.7.3 Ethical Responses to Globalisation

4.7.4 End of Topic Test - Migration, Culture, & Response

5 Option 4A: Regenerating Places

5.1 Types of Economies

5.1.1 Economic Activity

5.1.2 Employment

5.1.3 Economic Activity - Health & Life

5.1.4 Economic Activity - Education & Inequality

5.2 Function of Places

5.2.1 Characteristics of Places

5.2.2 Changes in Places

5.2.3 International Influences on Places

5.2.4 Historic Influences on Places

5.2.5 The Perception of Places

5.2.6 Lived Experience & Attachment

5.3 Regeneration

5.3.1 Migration & Capital

5.3.2 Success & Regeneration

5.3.3 Tensions & Conflict in Communities

5.3.4 Regeneration in the UK

5.3.5 Local Government Policies

5.3.6 Regeneration Strategies

5.3.7 Measuring Regeneration Success

5.4 Regeneration Case Studies

5.4.1 Stratford

5.4.2 Salford Quays

5.4.3 Croyde

6 Option 4B: Diverse Places

6.1 Population Structure

6.1.1 The UK

6.1.2 Population Characteristics

6.1.3 Government & Change

6.2 Past & Present Connections

6.2.1 International Influence on Places

6.2.2 Historic Influences on Places

6.2.3 The Perception of Places

6.2.4 Image & Identity

6.3 Urban & Rural Spaces

6.3.1 Perceptions of Urban Places

6.3.2 Perceptions of Rural Places

6.3.3 Evaluating Living Space

6.4 Diversity

6.4.1 UK Migrations

6.4.2 Challenges

6.4.3 Tensions & Conflict

6.4.4 Wider Outcomes of Tensions

6.4.5 Managing Tensions

6.5 Urban & Rural Case Studies

6.5.1 Stakeholders

6.6 Case Study - Tower Hamlets

6.6.1 Background

6.6.2 Characteristics

6.6.3 Issues

6.7 Case Study - Sturton-le-Steeple

6.7.1 Background

6.7.2 Characteristics

6.7.3 Issues

7 The Water Cycle & Water Insecurity (A2 only)

7.1 Hydrological Processes Global to Local

7.1.1 Global Hydrological Cycle

7.1.2 Drainage Basin Hydrological Cycle

7.1.3 Water Budgets

7.1.4 River Regimes

7.1.5 Storm Hydrographs

7.2 Influences on the Water Cycle

7.2.1 Causes of Drought

7.2.2 Impacts of Drought

7.2.3 Causes of Flooding

7.2.4 Impacts of Flooding

7.2.5 Climate Change & The Water Cycle

7.2.6 Impacts of Climate Change

7.2.7 End of Topic Test - The Water Cycle

7.3 Water Insecurity

7.3.1 Water Stress

7.3.2 Causes of Water Insecurity

7.3.3 Water Insecurity Risk

7.3.4 Conflict Over Water

7.4 Water Supply Management

7.4.1 Hard Engineering Schemes

7.4.2 Sustainable Management

7.4.3 Water Treaties & Framework

7.4.4 End of Topic Test - Water Insecurity & Management

8 The Carbon Cycle & Energy Security (A2 only)

8.1 The Carbon Cycle

8.1.1 Carbon Stores

8.1.2 Carbon Stores 2

8.1.3 Biological Carbon

8.1.4 Atmospheric Carbon

8.1.5 Burning Fossil Fuels

8.2 Energy Consumption

8.2.1 Consumption

8.2.2 Access to Energy

8.2.3 Energy Players

8.2.4 Supply & Demand

8.2.5 Pathways

8.2.6 End of Topic Test - Carbon & Consumption

8.3 Alternative Energy

8.3.1 Unconventional Fuels

8.3.2 Non-Fossil Fuels

8.3.3 Non-Fossil Fuels 2

8.4 Growing Demand for Resources

8.4.1 Deforestation

8.4.2 Water

8.4.3 Climate Change

8.5 The Future

8.5.1 Future Uncertainty

8.5.2 Adaptation Strategies

8.5.3 Mitigation Strategies

9 Superpowers (A2 only)

9.1 Superpowers

9.1.1 Introduction to Superpowers

9.1.2 Superpowers - Economic Power & Size

9.1.3 Superpowers - Political & Military Power

9.1.4 Superpowers - Culture, Demography & Resources

9.1.5 Geo-Strategic Location

9.2 Hard & Soft Power

9.2.1 Hard & Soft Power

9.2.2 Emerging Powers - China Rivalry

9.2.3 Emerging Powers - Chinese Sources of Power

9.2.4 Emerging Powers - Brazil

9.2.5 Emerging Powers - Russia

9.2.6 Emerging Powers - India

9.2.7 Theories of Development

9.2.8 Power Case Studies: Chinese One Belt One Road

9.2.9 Power Case Studies: Pakistan Nuclear Arms

9.2.10 Power Case Studies: OPEC

9.3 IGOs, TNCs & Alliances

9.3.1 Superpowers & IGOs

9.3.2 Superpowers & TNCs

9.3.3 Superpowers & Global Action

9.3.4 Superpowers & Alliances

9.3.5 Superpowers & the Environment

9.4 Changing Global Influence

9.4.1 Recent Tensions between Powers

9.4.2 China in Africa & Asia

9.4.3 Tensions in the Middle East

9.4.4 Economic Problems for Superpowers

9.4.5 Future Pattern of Power

10 Option 8A: Health & Human Rights (A2 only)

10.1 Human Development

10.1.1 Measuring Development

10.1.2 Factors Improving Development

10.1.3 Variations in Health

10.2 Role of Governments & IGOs

10.2.1 Targets & Attitudes

10.2.2 Financial IGOs

10.2.3 The United Nations (UN)

10.2.4 The UN's MDGs & SDGs

10.3 Human Rights

10.3.1 Human Rights

10.3.2 Differences Between Countries

10.3.3 Transitions to Democracy

10.3.4 Differences Within Countries

10.3.5 The Demand for Equality

10.4 Interventions

10.4.1 Geopolitical Interventions

10.4.2 International Intervention Players

10.4.3 Evaluating Geopolitical Intervention

10.4.4 Military Interventions

10.4.5 Evaluating Military Interventions

10.5 Development Aid

10.5.1 Forms

10.5.2 Successes

10.5.3 Criticisms

10.5.4 Development Aid & the Environment

10.5.5 Evaluating Development Aid

10.5.6 Economic Inequalities

11 Option 8B: Migration & Identity (A2 only)

11.1 Globalisation & Migration

11.1.1 Intro to Migration

11.1.2 Trends in Migration

11.1.3 Common Migration Patterns

11.1.4 Causes of Migration

11.1.5 Restrictions on Migration

11.2 Consequences of Migration

11.2.1 Intro to Culture

11.2.2 Social & Demographic Tensions of Migration

11.2.3 Political & Economic Tensions of Migration

11.3 Nation States

11.3.1 Intro to Nation States

11.3.2 Borders

11.3.3 Nationalism

11.4 Responses to Global Migration

11.4.1 Responses to Global Migration

11.4.2 Global Organisations

11.4.3 IGOs and World Trade

11.4.4 Financial IGOs

11.4.5 Environmental IGOs

11.5 Sovereignty & Identity

11.5.1 Sovereignty & Nationalism

11.5.2 Complex Identities

11.5.3 Challenges to National Identities

11.5.4 Tensions within Nations

11.5.5 Failed States

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• Conflicts and Resolutions in the Mekong River Basin
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Geographic Aspects of Hydropolitics: The Case of Nile and Mekong River Basins

• First Online: 01 September 2021

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• Daniel K. Waktola 10  

Part of the book series: Springer Geography ((SPRINGERGEOGR))

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The filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in 2020 raised the age-old confrontation between upstream Ethiopia and downstream Egypt to a new level. In this study, a geographic approach is used to ascertain whether Ethiopia could survive without touching the Blue Nile water by investigating  the balance between quality of land resources and demographic pressures against the backdrop of the geohyropolitics in the Mekong River. We used a set of geospatial databases acquired from measured and modeled scientific data sources. DEM, slope, and contours were generated from the terrain data. Rasterized population data were used to discern the temporal trend and plot population density across topographic gradients. Global Climate Model (GCM) generated temperature, and precipitation data, averaged for 2020–2040, 2040–2060, 2060–2080, and 2080–2100, were extracted from five sample locations in each river basin and analyzed for December and June, representing Winter and Summer seasons, respectively. To explore alternative water sources for Egypt, multiple buffer zones were created from the Red Sea and Mediterranean Seas. Results revealed (1) In light of intensifying demographic pressure, dwindling carrying capacity of land resources, warming atmospheric temperature, and growing uncertainty of rainfall patterns, Ethiopia’s vulnerability to food and economic insecurity is bound to worsen in the foreseeable future, which ultimately calls for equitable and reasonable utilization of the Blue Nile water. (2) Over 75% of settlements and over 97% of Egypt’s population are seated within a 300-km distance from the two seas where desalinated water could be harvested for domestic and agricultural uses. The study concludes that Egypt should come to terms with the biophysical and demographic dynamics of the Nile Basin and diversify its water sources rather than hoping to cling to obsolete treaties of the Nile, which the upper riparian countries were not a party to.

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If this sinister equation is implemented, vegetations, only present in the upper parts of the Nile River, would enlarge the total volume of water for sharing. This means, the volume of water to be allocated for Egypt, contributing neither blue-water nor green-water to the equation, would be derived only from the blue-water, i.e., River Nile. On the contrary, the upper riparian states would get their share in the form of green-water. In short, Egypt would have an exclusive use of the Nile water.

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful for the support provided by Omi Kassahun, organizers of the International Conference on the Nile and Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, and reviewers of the draft manuscript.

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Waktola, D.K. (2021). Geographic Aspects of Hydropolitics: The Case of Nile and Mekong River Basins. In: Melesse, A.M., Abtew, W., Moges, S.A. (eds) Nile and Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Springer Geography. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76437-1_7

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76437-1_7

Published : 01 September 2021

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Online ISBN : 978-3-030-76437-1

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