the ontological argument thesis statement

A Level Philosophy & Religious Studies

The Ontological Argument

Introduction.

In 1077 AD, St Anselm created an argument for the existence of God which came to be known (thanks to Kant) as the Ontological argument. Ontology refers to ‘being’ or ‘existing’ or the nature of being / what exists.

The argument has proven controversial, with many of its critics actually being religious themselves but doubtful about it’s validity.

Nonetheless, something about the argument has proven attractive for many great philosophers who have been motivated to pay it attention, whether to support or undermine it.

“it is easier to feel convinced that [the Ontological Argument] must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies.” – Bertrand Russell

Ontological arguments are a priori because they are based solely on an analysis of the concept of God. They essentially argue that if you think carefully about what God is, you’ll understand that God must exist. A strength of a priori arguments for God is that they can’t be undermined by new scientific evidence, unlike some a posteriori arguments.

Ontological arguments are deductive. The truth of their premises logically entails the truth of their conclusion. The strength of deductive arguments is that the only ways to attack them is to either deny that the conclusion really follows from the premises (deny validity) or attack the truth of the premises (deny soundness).

St Anselm’s Ontological argument

P1. God is the greatest conceivable being (by definition) P2. It is greater to exist in reality than the mind alone P3. God exists in the mind C1. Therefore, God exists in reality

Anselm uses the illustration of a painter who has an idea of what they will paint in their mind before painting it in reality. This illustrates the distinction between our idea of something existing in the mind alone, verses existing both in the mind and in reality.

Anselm points to Psalm 14:1 “the fool says in his heart, ‘there is no God’.”

An atheist says they do not believe in God. That implies they at least have an idea of God in their mind.

The force of Anselm’s argument is that God cannot be an idea that exists in the mind alone. That would be incoherent, since then we could conceive of something greater, i.e., God also existing in reality. Yet, God is the greatest being, so conceiving of anything greater is incoherent. So, our idea of God must therefore be of a being that exists in reality. To say that God does not exist in reality is to say that the greatest being is not the greatest being. It is self-contradictory.

“that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater. Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and reality.” – Anselm.

Proslogion chapter 3 & necessary existence.

Anselm’s ontological argument underwent a revival of interest in the 20 th century thanks to N. Malcolm and C. Hartshorne. They argued that the strongest form of the argument was in chapter 3 of the Proslogion. There, Anselm concludes not merely that God exists, but that God is a necessary being (one which contains its own reason for existence; whose existence doesn’t depend on anything else).

A necessary being whose nonexistence is impossible is greater than a contingent being whose non-existence is possible.

This is because, on Malcolm’s interpretation, Anselm links the concepts ‘greatness’, ‘dependence’ and ‘limitation’. God’s necessity implies being unlimited, positioning God as the ‘greatest’ conceivable being.

A being greater than which none may be conceived is one whose nonexistence is impossible.

Hartshorne calls this insight “Anselm’s discovery”. Later, in his response to critics, Anselm writes:

“If it [a being greater than which cannot be conceived] can be conceived at all it must exist.” – Anselm.

God is a being whose non-existence is impossible. So, if such a being is logically possible, then it must exist.

Whether God is within our understanding

A strength of the ontological argument its definition of God

Anselm uses a theologically and philosophically convincing definition of God, carefully designed to avoid the problem of defining something that is beyond our understanding. Anselm presents an analogy. We can’t fully look at the sun but can still see daylight. Similarly, we can’t fully know God, but can at least understand that he is the greatest conceivable being.

“If you say that what is not entirely understood is not understood and is not in the understanding: say, then, that since someone is not able to gaze upon the purest light of the sun does not see light that is nothing but sunlight.”  – Anselm

Weakness: God is not ‘in’ the mind/understanding

Gaunilo raises an objection to P3; the premise that the greatest conceivable being exists in the mind/understanding. Gaunilo draws on the traditional Christian premise that God is beyond our understanding to argue that God therefore cannot be in the understanding.

Anselm cannot then proceed to reason about whether it would be greater also in reality. The ontological argument seems to fail because it relies on our ability to understand and reason about things that are beyond our ability to understand or reason about.

Aquinas also made this argument against Anselm – that God’s nature, such as the ‘eternal law’ is beyond our understanding and that people have different understandings of God.

“Perhaps not everyone who hears this word “God” understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought” – Aquinas.

Gaunilo even doubts that we can understand this idea of the greatest conceivable being:  

“of God, or a being greater than all others, I could not conceive at all” – Gaunilo.

“So much for the assertion that this supreme nature already is in my understanding.” – Gaunilo.

Evaluation defending the ontological argument

However, Gaunilo’s argument is unsuccessful because a full understanding of the greatest conceivable being or of God’s nature is not required for the ontological argument to work.

Peter van Inwagen explains that Anselm would not accept that we either understand God fully or not at all. Our limited understanding of God is enough to justify attributing the name “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” to God.

God has traits but infinitely, i.e., omnipotence, omniscience etc. It is impossible to conceive of anything greater. So, we can understand enough of that idea. We may not be able to conceive of the ‘being’ itself, as Gaunilo says, but that seems to commit a straw man fallacy. Anselm doesn’t rely on conceiving the being itself. We can grasp the concept of a being greater than which none may be conceived. We can then follow Anselm’s reasoning that since it is greater to exist, that being must exist.

Evaluation criticizing the ontological argument

Gaunilo has a point. When we think about the concept of a being greater than anything we could possibly imagine, the idea of that actual being is not in our understanding.

Furthermore, the insights of Apophatic theology show that reasoning about God is impossible. Pseudo-Dionysius argues that if we are true to God’s transcendent unknowability, we would recognize that God is simply beyond any human concepts that we can understand. God therefore cannot be grasped by the understanding and so cannot be ‘in’ the understanding.

Pseudo-Dionysius explicitly says that God is ‘beyond assertion and denial’. So although the atheist is indeed wrong to deny God, proponents of the ontological argument are also wrong to assert God. God is beyond all these philosophical terms, even beyond truth and falsity itself.

Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ response to Anselm

Gaunilo denies that the ontological argument is actually a valid deductive argument, attacking the inference from the premises to the conclusion of God existing in reality

“I have in my understanding all manner of unreal objects” – Gaunilo.

“I should not admit that this being is in my understanding and concept even in the way in which many objects whose real existence is uncertain and doubtful, are in my understanding and concept. For it should be proved first that this being itself really exists somewhere; and then, from the fact that it is greater than all, we shall not hesitate to infer that it also subsists in itself.” – Gaunilo.

Anselm’s argument could succeed in showing that if God exists, then God is the greatest being and even that it subsists in itself, i.e., has necessary existence. However, this is not enough to show that God does exist necessarily.

“he who says that this being exists, because otherwise the being which is greater than all will not be greater than all, does not attend strictly enough to what he is saying. – Gaunilo.

Gaunilo illustrates this with the case of a perfect lost island, an illustration of a thing whose real existence is ‘uncertain and doubtful’ yet exists in his understanding as a concept.

Applying the logic of Anselm’s argument to this island has an absurd result (reductio ad absurdum). It is greater for this island to exist in reality, so it must exist. This would work not just for an island. The greatest or supremely perfect member of every category must exist. This is sometimes called the ‘overload’ objection because it suggests that reality would be overloaded with greatest/perfect things.

Firstly, Gaunilo’s critique is unsatisfying as far as it goes. Gaunilo asserts, but does not demonstrate, the absurdity of Anselm’s logic proving the existence of a perfect island. He merely asserts that such reasoning must either be a joke or a symptom of foolishness.

To demonstrate absurdity requires showing a contradiction, which Gaunilo has not shown. Proving existence a priori might seem counter-intuitive. Gaunilo remarks that the logic seems like joke or sign of foolishness when applied to the island. Nonetheless, Gaunilo has not demonstrated it actually absurd. Perhaps a perfect island does indeed exist.

Anselm himself made a different response to Gaunilo. He insisted that a proper understanding of his argument showed that it can only prove the existence of God. Testing the logic through applying it to a different case like an island is not valid.

Something is greater if it doesn’t depend on anything for its existence. By definition an island is land enclosed by water. Definitionally then, no matter how great or perfect an island is, in order to be an island it will be dependent on something else to exist, such as an ocean, planet, sun, etc. So, the greatest possible Island will be contingent, which means by definition it could either exist or not.

This is why a priori analysis of its definition cannot prove its existence. The existence of contingent beings cannot be proven a priori because their existence is not a matter of definition. Their existence is a matter of whether what they depend on exists.

There is nothing in the concept of the greatest being that involves dependence, making it a necessary being. So, the reason for the logic not working in the case of the island (or any contingent being) does not apply for God.

Anselm’s defense is successful and highlights the main issue with responses to the ontological argument even to this day. There is something unique about God’s existence. Our ordinary way of understanding existence does not apply.

Anselm successfully refutes the relevance of the perfect island.

However, Anselm arguably failed to respond to Gaunilo’s central contention.

Even if Anselm is right that we cannot conceive of God without existence, that only proves that God is a necessary being, such that if God existed it would be in a special way where God could not cease to exist. This is not the same as proving that this necessary being actually does exist. Anselm doesn’t deal with this point.

Descartes’ Ontological argument

Descartes aimed to strengthen the ontological argument through founding it on his rationalist epistemology. This claimed that we can gain certain knowledge of some truths a priori.

Anselm is often called the father of Scholasticism, a theological movement influenced by Aristotle’s approach to argumentation. At its core is subject-predicate analysis. Propositions are combinations of subjects and predicates which assert something as true or false.

Descartes rejected scholasticism. He instead argued that the foundation of knowledge was intuition. Intuition operates through direct intellectual awareness, not the indirect analysis of linguistic representation employed by logical terms. Intuition provides absolute certainty. We can bring ideas before our mind and apprehend truths about them due to the psychological character in which they strike us.

E.g., we intuitively know that a triangle has three sides, because it is impossible to bring a triangle before our mind separated from having three sides. Similarly, we cannot conceive of a supremely perfect being separated from existence. We thus rationally appreciate that God contains the perfection of existence. Intuition shows us that God exists.

“t he idea of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one that I find within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number. And my understanding that it belongs to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct than is the case when I prove of any shape or number that some property belongs to its nature” – Descartes

Descartes did put it into the form of a deductive argument:

P1 – I have an idea of a supremely perfect being which contains all perfections P2 – Existence is a perfection C3 – God exists

The argument is deliberately short, suggestive of Descartes’ view that God’s existence can be known intuitively.

Hume’s empiricist response to the ontological argument

Hume is an empiricist who rejects a priori demonstrations of existence and the concept of a ‘necessary being’.

Truths of logic/definition are true or false no matter the factual state of the universe. There is no logically possible factual state of affairs that is incompatible with ‘1+1=2’, for example. Hume thinks this shows that logical truth and factual truth are distinct, including our means of knowing them. This is called ‘Hume’s fork’.

Analytic: true by definition. Cannot be denied without contradiction. E.g. “a bachelor is an unmarried man”. A priori reasoning involves the analysis of the relation between ideas. So, only analytic truths can be known a priori.

Synthetic: true because of the way the world is. Can be denied without contradiction.  “E.g. “The sun will rise tomorrow”. A posteriori reasoning involves experience of the factual state of the world. So, only synthetic truths can be known a posteriori.

Applying this to the ontological argument:

“there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori” – Hume.

“It will always be possible for us at any time to conceive the non-existence of something we formerly conceived to exist; the mind can never have to suppose some object to remain always in existence, in the way in which we always have to conceive twice two to be four” – Hume

A necessary being must exist. So, we shouldn’t even be able to conceive of it not existing. However, Hume claims that whatever we conceive of as existing, we can conceive of as not existing. It follows that there is no being that we cannot conceive to not exist. So, our mind is incapable of giving meaning to the idea of a being existing necessarily. Hume concludes:

“The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no meaning.” – Hume.

Any belief we have about what exists could be imagined as either true or false. Therefore, we cannot coherently understand any being to be logically necessary.

Whether something exists is a contingent matter of fact. It cannot be logically necessary. The term “necessary existence” seems to ignore the disconnect between logical and factual truth established by Hume’s fork.

The consequence is that any claim about what exists (existential propositions, like ‘God exists’) can be denied without contradiction.

Existential propositions are therefore always synthetic. So, they can only be known a posteriori. The premises of ontological arguments are claimed to be known priori. In that case, they cannot allow us to know the conclusion that God exists.

Kant’s objection that existence is not a predicate

Kant develops Hume’s criticism, arguing that the reason any being is conceivably non-existent is that existence is not a property a thing possesses. Existence thus cannot be an essential property of a thing, inconceivably separate from it.

Descartes implies that perfection is a defining attribute of God. Anselm argues God must exist in order to be God. They both try to show that denying God’s existence denies what God is. This seems to treat ‘existence’ as if it described a defining property a thing possesses. That would make the word ‘exists’ a predicate.

Kant objects. If existence were a predicate, it would be added to our concept of a thing that exists. A thing that exists would be conceptually different to that same thing when not existing.

If I say my cat exists, I do not describe a feature of the cat. I may be describing reality in a general sense, so Kant allows that existence can be a ‘logical predicate’. However, existence is not a ‘real predicate’, meaning it does not describe an attribute of a thing itself.

To use Kant’s example, if existence were a predicate, then 100 thalers (coins) in reality would be conceptually different to 100 thalers in the mind.

However, the concept ‘100 thalers’ is the same whether a mere concept in your mind or instantiated in reality. A thing is what it is, regardless of whether it exists or not. 100 thalers is just 100 thalers. It has the predicates of shininess, roundness, 100, etc. Being only in the mind doesn’t make the concept somehow less of a complete description of what 100 thalers is. So, existence is not a description of a thing. It is not a predicate.

We cannot determine whether a thing exists merely through understanding what it is. So, Anselm and Descartes are incorrect when they claim it’s incoherent to think of God not existing. This then blocks the ontological argument’s inference from the incoherence of God’s non-existence to the conclusion that God exists.

Counter: Kant’s criticism faces two counters.

Firstly, Kant’s objection fails to target Descartes’ version of the argument. Anselm understands ‘God exists’ as a subject-predicate relationship.

Descartes’ rejection of Aristotelian subject-predicate analysis means he can’t be accused of inferring God’s existence by assuming that existence is a predicate of God.

Descartes’ argument doesn’t operate by assigning predicates to subjects, but by determining whether the idea of a supremely perfect being can be clearly and distinctly perceived while excluding necessary existence from it through a purely intellectual operation.

Furthermore, Malcolm defended Anselm’s approach, arguing that Kant only shows that contingent existence is not a predicate.

Something is contingent if it is dependent on something else for its existence. The reason for the existence of a contingent thing is external to it and so does not describe or define it. However, a necessary being doesn’t depend on anything else for its existence. It contains the reason for its existence within itself. ‘necessary existence’ therefore does describe something about a being. It is a defining part of a thing in a way that contingent existence is not. So, necessary existence is a predicate.

So, Kant made the same mistake that Gaunilo did. We cannot test the logic of the ontological argument through its application to contingent things, such as islands or thalers. Like Gaunilo, Kant did not fully appreciate the significance of God’s necessity and the consequently truly unique nature of God’s relationship with existence.

Malcolm’s ontological argument

Norman Malcolm created his own version of the ontological argument, referring to God as an unlimited being.

Malcolm uses modal logic, which involves analysis of the logical consequences of necessity and possibility.

P1. God either exists or does not exist. P2. If God exists, God cannot go out of existence as that would require dependence on something else. So, if God exists, God’s existence is necessarily P3. If God does not exist, God cannot come into existence as that would make God dependent on whatever brought God into existence. So, if God does not exist, God’s existence is impossible. C1. So, God’s existence is either necessary or impossible P4. The concept of God is not self-contradictory (like a four-sided triangle), therefore God’s existence is not impossible. C2. Therefore, God exists necessarily.

Malcolm points to this quote from Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo:

“If it [the thing a greater than which cannot be conceived] can be conceived at all it must exist. For no one who denies or doubts the existence of a being a greater than which is inconceivable, denies or doubts that if it did exist its non-existence, either in reality or in the understanding, would be impossible. For otherwise it would not be a being a greater than which cannot be conceived. But as to whatever can be conceived but does not exist: if it were to exist its non-existence either in reality or in the understanding would be possible. Therefore, if a being a greater than which cannot be conceived, can even be conceived, it must exist.” – Anselm

Malcolm remarks:

“What Anselm has proved is that the notion of contingent existence or of contingent nonexistence cannot have any application to God. His existence must either be logically necessary or logically impossible. The only intelligible way of rejecting Anselm’s claim that God’s existence is necessary is to maintain that the concept of God, as a being a greater than which cannot be conceived, is self-contradictory or nonsensical” – Malcolm.

Malcolm’s interpretation of Anselm is that neither contingent existence nor contingent non-existence can apply to God. The only way to deny God’s existence is for God to be necessarily non-existent, i.e., incoherent.

Kant’s objection that the argument cannot prove actual existence

Gaunilo’s underlying point was to show the difference between existing in the mind and existing in reality. His lost island was an illustration of that. Anselm defeated the relevance of the lost island, but arguably not Gaunilo’s underlying point. Kant developed this type of objection.

Kant takes Descartes example of a triangle. It is necessary that ‘having three sides’ is part of the concept of a triangle. This doesn’t mean ‘three sides’ are necessary. It means that if a triangle exists, then it necessarily has three sides. We could not accept a triangle, but deny three sides, without contradiction. Yet we could deny the triangle exists, and then also its three sides.

Similarly, the ontological argument shows that ‘necessary existence’ is part of the concept of God. Kant’s objection is that this only shows that if God exists, then God exists necessarily. It doesn’t show that God-the-necessary-being does exist. If God does not exist, then neither does God’s necessity.

It would be contradictory to say that God exists, but not necessarily. Yet we can still deny that God exists, and with that, deny that God’s necessity exists. God may be necessary, but if God does not exist then God’s necessity does not exist.

Like Gaunilo, Kant is drawing a distinction between judgement and reality. A priori reasoning showing that existence is necessary to the definition of God in our minds is not the same as showing that God necessarily exists in reality.

“The unconditioned necessity of judgements is not the same as an absolute necessity of things” – Kant.

“the illusion of this logical necessity has proved so powerful that when one has made a concept a priori of a thing that was set up so that its existence was comprehended within the range of its meaning, one believed one could infer with certainty that because existence necessarily pertains to the object of this concept, i.e., under the condition that I posit this thing as given (existing), its existence can also be posited necessarily” – Kant.

Counter : Malcolm argued this critique from Kant is incoherent.

“ I think that Caterus, Kant, and numerous other philosophers have been mistaken in supposing that the proposition ‘God is a necessary being’ (or “God necessarily exists”) is equivalent to the conditional proposition ‘If God exists then He necessarily exists’ … Can anything be clearer than that the conjunction ‘God necessarily exists but it is possible that He does not exist’ is self-contradictory?” – Malcolm

Kant seems to accept that the ontological argument shows that God is a necessary being. Malcolm argues this means God is a being which is characterised by the impossibility of non-existence. In that case, it can’t be possible for God to not exist.

Malcolm concludes It is incoherent of Kant to grant necessity to God while maintaining the possibility of God’s non-existence. So, the Ontological argument does show that God-the-necessary-being actually exists.

Hartshorne agrees with Malcolm, adding that the only valid way to suppose that God does not exist is to suppose that God’s existence is self-contradictory (logically impossible).

If one accepts the logical coherence of a being which contains the impossibility of non-existence, one must accept that it necessarily exists.

This is the insight behind Malcolm’s premise that God is either necessary or impossible.

Kant seems to want to propose a third option, that God is necessary and yet could not exist. Yet Malcolm argues that is a contradiction in terms.

Malcolm’s point is successful because it blocks what Hartshorne called ‘empirical’ attacks on the ontological argument. These attempt to accept the logical possibility of God yet deny the logical necessity of god’s existence.

If God’s existence is not necessary, it must be contingent.

However, it is very difficult it is to understand contingency when applied to God. God is an eternal being and thus causeless. Contingency is understood as some sort of causal dependency on something else.

“Such a causeless yet contingent existence is without connection with our ordinary ways of understanding contingency … They [Hume, Kant & Hick] accuse Anselm of violating rules; but they violate the elementary rule that logically contingent matters are intelligible in genetic and causal terms, or not at all.” – Hartshorne

Supposing that God’s non-existence could be logically contingent is absurd given what God is.

So, we are left with Malcolm and Hartshorne’s position, that God is either logically impossible or logically necessary.

Hick successfully defends Kant’s style of objection from Malcolm’s counter.

Hick argues the ontological argument fails to distinguish between two types of necessity.

Logical necessity refers to propositions that cannot be false.

Ontological necessity refers to beings that contain their own reason for existence and are not dependent on anything else (aseity).

God’s ‘impossibility of non-existence’ can be understood as ontological necessity, allowing us to accept the definition of God, yet deny God’s logical necessity.

Malcolm argues it is incoherent to think a necessary being could not exist. However, when we add Hick’s distinction, we get a less conspicuously incoherent claim:

It is logically possible for an ontologically necessary being to not exist.

This shows that Malcolm commits the fallacy of equivocation.

P2 & P3, Malcolm uses ‘necessary’ and ‘impossible’ in the ontological sense, of nothing being able to cause God to go out of or come into existence, respectively.

Malcolm’s inference to C1 is therefore not justified, since it uses ‘necessary’ and ‘impossible’ in the logical sense (as seen by P4 where God’s non-impossibility involves being logically coherent).

Similarly, when Anselm and Descartes define God as the greatest conceivable or supremely perfect being, that only justifies ascribing ontological necessity to God. Their inference to the conclusion of God’s existence being logically necessity is not justified.

So, the ontological argument at most proves that if God exists, then God exists in a special way, such as with ontological necessity.

The question of God’s logical impossibility

Hartshorne claims there are two ways one could attack the ontological argument. One is the ‘empirical’ method of Hume, Kant & Hick. They argued that existence can never be logically necessary, even for a being which contains the impossibility of non-existence. Hume says the concept of a necessary being is not even conceivable. Kant says the necessity is just in our mental judgement, Hick says it only involves ontological necessity, not logical.

Since Leibniz, proponents of the ontological argument have accepted that it depends on God being logically possible. If empiricist approaches fail, Hartshorne argues this is the only remaining other way to attack the ontological argument. That is, to argue that the God of classical theism, or the idea of a being that contains the impossibility of non-existence, is actually incoherent and thus impossible.

There are numerous philosophical debates about the coherence of God, including:

• The paradox of the stone
• The Euthyphro dilemma
• The incompatibility of free will and omniscience
• The logical problem of evil

These debates over the logical coherence of God are ongoing and have a long history. Neither side seems to have a knock-down criticism of the other.

Modern defenders of the Ontological argument, Malcolm, Hartshorne and Plantinga, agree that our inability to know for certain that God is coherent does limit what it can achieve by itself.

The ontological argument at most shows that if God is logically possible, then God necessarily exists.

Malcolm’s version incorporates this dependence, making God’s logical possibility a premise of the argument.

Plantinga accepts that the ontological argument can at most make religious belief rational, but cannot prove that God actually does exist.

“reformulated versions of St. Anselm’s argument … cannot, perhaps, be said to prove or establish their conclusion. But since it is rational to accept their central premise, they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion” – Plantinga.

Plantinga admits it is rational to believe that God’s existence is logically impossible. However, he maintains that it is also rational for a theist to believe that God’s existence is logically possible, from which the ontological argument then shows that it is rational to believe that God exists. If a being whose non-existence is impossible could exist, then it must exist. It must exist, because its non-existence is impossible. So it could only not exist if such a being is somehow logically absurd.

This was Anselm’s initial insight, that if God is even conceivable, then God must exist.

“if a being a greater than which cannot be conceived, can even be conceived, it must exist.” – Anselm

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The Ontological Argument from Descartes to Hegel

Kevin J. Harrelson, The Ontological Argument from Descartes to Hegel , Humanity Books, 2009, $39.98 (hbk), ISBN 9781591026396.

Reviewed by Charles Taliaferro, St. Olaf College

In 1945, Bertrand Russell announced in his famous The History of Western Philosophy (a brilliant but sometimes eccentric and flawed book) that the ontological argument has been proved to be invalid, despite the fact that the soundness of the argument would be very good news indeed for philosophy:

The real question is: Is there anything we can think of which, by the mere fact that we can think of it, is shown to exist outside our thoughts. Every philosopher would like to say yes, because a philosopher’s job is to find out things about the world by thinking rather than observing. 1

While Russell pronounced the argument dead (albeit with regret), perhaps Anthony Kenny was wiser in his four volume New History of Western Philosophy when he ended the fourth volume with a warning to those who think the argument has been refuted:

Plantinga’s reinstatement of the [ontological] argument, using logical techniques more modern than any available to Russell, serves as a salutary warning of the danger that awaits any historian of logic who declares a philosophical issue definitively closed. 2

Kevin J. Harrelson has written a welcome historical and critical analysis of the ontological argument in early modern European philosophy. In the Introduction, he writes:

In the following chapters I argue that the strategy for proving a priori the existence of God that remains in place during this period, from Descartes’ initial argument in the Discourse on the Method (1637) to Hegel’s final lectures in Berlin (1831), is both internally consistent and free of any easily identifiable error. More importantly, I try to show that the most common objections to the modern ontological proof, raised by the likes of Gassendi, Hobbes, Hume, and Kant, fail to identify any conclusive and universal fallacy. (p. 18)

His book is not, however, “an outright defense of the ontological argument”, for Harrelson is convinced most versions of the ontological argument face serious obstacles and are not persuasive to those not already committed to what he finds philosophically problematic. The book is rich with historical references and nuanced readings of canonical texts, and is packed with arguments and counter-arguments.

The book opens with a compact overview of the ontological arguments found in Anselm, the scholastics, Descartes, and Leibniz. Some of the arguments’ exposition is a bit hard to follow. In discussing the relationship between perfection and necessary existence (which Anselmians usually seek to secure on the grounds that existing necessarily is a perfection or great-making attribute), Harrelson writes: “If God is indeed identical to his own existence, then it could only represent a shortcoming of human reason to distinguish the notion of a ‘perfect being’ from that of ‘necessary existence’” (p. 25). Why is this a problem? Can’t a case for the ontological argument begin with a consideration of great-making properties and an inquirer come to reason that necessary existence plus theistic attributes would be (or is) more excellent than theistic attributes and contingent existence? If one does not realize this prior to entertaining the argument, perhaps that is a “shortcoming”, but no worse than if someone did not realize 6 is the smallest perfect number before she reasoned that 6 is equivalent to 3 + 2+ 1.

In the same chapter, and on the same page as the claim just considered, Harrelson writes, “the peculiar identification of ‘God’ and ‘necessary existence’ renders misleading all theological statements about the existence of the deity” (p. 25). It is not clear, however, which philosopher (if any) claims that what we mean by “perfection” is “necessary existence” (as in “grandmother” is “a female whose child has a child”). Harrelson writes:

In early modern philosophy we find rather that theological propositions are understood to be akin to identical statements, and the philosophers in question fall just short of claiming that “perfect being” and “necessary existence” have the same meaning. “Necessary existence,” like God’s other predicates, is identical with God’s whole nature. This identity of subject and predicate would seem to exempt theological statements from the rules governing normal attributive statements. (p. 25)

Why, however, would a defender of the ontological argument claim that “necessary existence” means the same as “perfect being”, or claim that necessary existence “is identical with God’s whole nature”, rather than claim that necessary existence (or existing necessarily) is a mode of being distinct from being contingent (or having the property being contingent) ? Presumably, for an Anselmian theist, claiming that God exists necessarily involves claiming that there necessarily exists a being of unsurpassable excellence or perfection. I do not yet see how linking necessity and perfection is a theological disaster. At the least, some clarification of how the thesis of divine simplicity comes into play on this issue would have been desirable.

In the same chapter, Harrelson has an interesting treatment of Descartes’ analogy about the idea of a triangle in discussing the idea of God. The format Harrelson employs in clarifying the points at issue is complex.

The following is a short list of those objections, other than the possibility and Thomistic, that are prevalent in the modern period. After each objection I give a caricature of the kind of reply that is frequently found among proponents of the modern argument. I also give a brief explanation of the debate, in which I try to indicate, very roughly, the historical contexts in which the respective objections and replies appear and reappear. (p. 29)

The deliberate use of caricature made the reasoning less easy to follow (for me, anyway).

Thus, the problem with the argument is that it involves the existence of God (!), experience and/or intuition (perhaps especially theological intuition), and insight. One difficulty readers will have so far is that it is not easy to see “the downfall” of the argument without seeing more of “the rise”.

First, from the fact that our perception is incorporated in the premise of the argument it follows that the conclusion is not true for everyone. In other words, whoever does not actually perceive the connection between “a supremely perfect being” and “necessary existence” cannot assent to the claim in the minor premise, in which case the conclusion remains undemonstrated. It is not the case that these individuals fail to grasp a premise that is objectively true; rather, their perceiving a certain “truth” is itself part of the premise. The premise is in fact false in any instance in which the perception is lacking. The ontological argument is thus unsound in those cases. Regardless of whether the ontological argument is ever sound, then, it will sometimes be unsound. The objections will always be, in some sense, in the right, despite their inability to discover an internal flaw in the argument. (p. 67)

This strikes me as odd. Any argument in philosophy might well be considered unsound if not everyone grasps its entailment relations. Even a simple entailment like “if all humans are mortal, no immortal being is a human” might sometimes be unsound because someone, somewhere does not accept the entailment.

In “Refutation of Atheism”, there is a welcome discussion of Cambridge Platonist treatments of the ontological argument. Harrelson has some sympathy with Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, even if he thinks both present arguments with fatal flaws or fail to persuade. As before, I find Harrelson’s autopsy of the argument neither obvious or clear. Here is an analysis of More:

Like Descartes, [More] assents to the following maxim: "we are first to have a settled notion of what God is , before we go about to demonstrate that he is." The various subsidiary arguments to the minor premise (the proof of innateness, the deduction of necessary existence from the idea of God, etc.) serve this end, comprising a preliminary examination of the essence or notion of God. The inference to God’s actual existence appears only at the end of this discussion. This last fact, however, represents the fatal consequence of the systematic presentation of the ontological argument: in order to clarify the various steps in the argument, it was necessary to distinguish the essence of God (i.e., “what God is”) from his existence (“that he is”). The systematic presentation of the ontological argument thereby contradicts the basic presupposition of that same argument, viz., that the essence and existence of God are inseparable. (pp. 87-88)

I do not quite see the problem. More does not think God’s essence and existence can be metaphysically separated, but he thinks one can epistemically consider God’s essence and then come to see that it (together with the thesis that God exists either necessarily or God’s existence is impossible , plus the premise that God’s existence is possible ) entails that God exists.

Harrelson offers a helpful exposition of the work of Ralph Cudworth and Samuel Clark. He is probably correct that Locke’s attack on innate ideas undermined the popularity of the ontological argument, though there are many versions of the argument that do not require or presuppose the existence of innate ideas.

In the chapter “Being and Intuition”, Harrelson takes up the work of Malebranche. There is a useful examination of how Malebranche advances the ontological argument beyond Descartes. At least one of Harrelson’s objections to Malebranche seems strained: “the revised form of the argument is indefensible against the nominalist’s objection that ‘being’ is a mere concept” (p. 115). It is indefensible, unless of course nominalism turns out to be deeply problematic and then the objection carries no weight.

Chapter four contains a helpful analysis of Spinoza’s work, showing how his version of the ontological argument is closely tied in with the whole of Spinoza’s philosophy: "No one can accept [Spinoza’s] argument without accepting his other doctrines in toto , or at least without offering alternative versions of them." (p. 135)

Chapter five offers a detailed exploration of the ontological argument in pre-Kantian German philosophy. Arguments by Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, and Crusius are addressed.

Chapter six on Kant is excellent. Harrelson places Kant’s famous criticism of the ontological argument in perspective and shows why it is not decisive. Harrelson thinks Kant was effective in challenging the authority of the ontological argument largely because of Kant’s general case about the limits of human thought:

The ontological argument, in 1785, is still not the object of any directly successful critique. Its temporary disappearance is a product only of the belief that humans are incapable of obtaining any genuine cognition beyond the field of “experience,” as this term is defined in the opening chapters of the Critique of Pure Reason . (p. 191)

The final chapter on Hegel provides a good context for Harrelson’s thesis that the ontological argument might work for some people. If one can (in Hegel’s terms) “elevate” one’s mind to God, the argument succeeds:

Whoever “grasps” or comprehends that “being is the concept,” i.e., whoever gazes from the summit of absolute knowledge and thereby understands the inferences of Hegelian logic, also perceives the existence of God via participation in God’s self-knowledge. (p. 220)

In Harrelson’s view, while (to echo Russell) every philosopher would like to have such elevation, few of us succeed and so Hegel’s ontological argument (like Descartes’) fails in its ambition as a demonstration or proof.

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• How to Write a Thesis Statement | 4 Steps & Examples

How to Write a Thesis Statement | 4 Steps & Examples

Published on January 11, 2019 by Shona McCombes . Revised on August 15, 2023 by Eoghan Ryan.

A thesis statement is a sentence that sums up the central point of your paper or essay . It usually comes near the end of your introduction .

Your thesis will look a bit different depending on the type of essay you’re writing. But the thesis statement should always clearly state the main idea you want to get across. Everything else in your essay should relate back to this idea.

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A thesis statement summarizes the central points of your essay. It is a signpost telling the reader what the essay will argue and why.

The best thesis statements are:

• Concise: A good thesis statement is short and sweet—don’t use more words than necessary. State your point clearly and directly in one or two sentences.
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The thesis statement generally appears at the end of your essay introduction or research paper introduction .

The spread of the internet has had a world-changing effect, not least on the world of education. The use of the internet in academic contexts and among young people more generally is hotly debated. For many who did not grow up with this technology, its effects seem alarming and potentially harmful. This concern, while understandable, is misguided. The negatives of internet use are outweighed by its many benefits for education: the internet facilitates easier access to information, exposure to different perspectives, and a flexible learning environment for both students and teachers.

You should come up with an initial thesis, sometimes called a working thesis , early in the writing process . As soon as you’ve decided on your essay topic , you need to work out what you want to say about it—a clear thesis will give your essay direction and structure.

You might already have a question in your assignment, but if not, try to come up with your own. What would you like to find out or decide about your topic?

For example, you might ask:

After some initial research, you can formulate a tentative answer to this question. At this stage it can be simple, and it should guide the research process and writing process .

Now you need to consider why this is your answer and how you will convince your reader to agree with you. As you read more about your topic and begin writing, your answer should get more detailed.

In your essay about the internet and education, the thesis states your position and sketches out the key arguments you’ll use to support it.

The negatives of internet use are outweighed by its many benefits for education because it facilitates easier access to information.

In your essay about braille, the thesis statement summarizes the key historical development that you’ll explain.

The invention of braille in the 19th century transformed the lives of blind people, allowing them to participate more actively in public life.

A strong thesis statement should tell the reader:

• Why you hold this position
• What they’ll learn from your essay
• The key points of your argument or narrative

The final thesis statement doesn’t just state your position, but summarizes your overall argument or the entire topic you’re going to explain. To strengthen a weak thesis statement, it can help to consider the broader context of your topic.

These examples are more specific and show that you’ll explore your topic in depth.

Your thesis statement should match the goals of your essay, which vary depending on the type of essay you’re writing:

• In an argumentative essay , your thesis statement should take a strong position. Your aim in the essay is to convince your reader of this thesis based on evidence and logical reasoning.
• In an expository essay , you’ll aim to explain the facts of a topic or process. Your thesis statement doesn’t have to include a strong opinion in this case, but it should clearly state the central point you want to make, and mention the key elements you’ll explain.

If you want to know more about AI tools , college essays , or fallacies make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples or go directly to our tools!

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A thesis statement is a sentence that sums up the central point of your paper or essay . Everything else you write should relate to this key idea.

The thesis statement is essential in any academic essay or research paper for two main reasons:

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Without a clear thesis statement, an essay can end up rambling and unfocused, leaving your reader unsure of exactly what you want to say.

Follow these four steps to come up with a thesis statement :

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The thesis statement should be placed at the end of your essay introduction .

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Graham Oppy, editor: Ontological arguments

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018, x and 284 pp, $34.99 (paper)

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• Volume 86 , pages 91–96, ( 2019 )

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The Many - Faced Argument (ed. Hick and McGill, Macmillan 1967). A very large volume, edited by Miroslaw Szatkowski, appeared in 2013 ( Ontological Proofs Today, Ontos Verlag). That includes much advanced work, but is expensive and much less accessible than the volume under review.

See especially p. 57.

“The Ontological Argument as Cartesian Therapy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35(4), pp. 521–562.

“Ontological Arguments” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ; https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/ , accessed May 22, 2019.

Lewis, David, "Anselm and Actuality," Nous volume 4, number 2 (1970), pp. 175–188.

The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 221.

See his “Three Versions of the Ontological Argument” in Ontological Proofs Today, Miroslaw Szatkowski (editor), Ontos Verlag 2012, pp. 143–162.

NB: Descartes gives such a restriction, but this involves “clear and distinct perception” by the meditator.

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Anselm of Canterbury

Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) was the outstanding Christian philosopher and theologian of the eleventh century. He is best known for the celebrated “ontological argument” for the existence of God in the Proslogion , but his contributions to philosophical theology (and indeed to philosophy more generally) go well beyond the ontological argument. In what follows I examine Anselm’s theistic proofs, his conception of the divine nature, and his account of human freedom, sin, and redemption.

1. Life and Works

2.1 “faith seeking understanding”: the character and purpose of anselm’s theistic proofs, 2.2 the arguments of the monologion, 2.3 the argument of the proslogion, 3.1 proving the divine attributes, 3.2 the consistency of the divine attributes, 4.1 truth in statements and in the will, 4.2 freedom and sin, 4.3 grace and redemption.

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Anselm was born in 1033 near Aosta, in those days a Burgundian town on the frontier with Lombardy. Little is known of his early life. He left home at twenty-three, and after three years of apparently aimless travelling through Burgundy and France, he came to Normandy in 1059. Once he was in Normandy, Anselm’s interest was captured by the Benedictine abbey at Bec, whose famous school was under the direction of Lanfranc, the abbey’s prior. Lanfranc was a scholar and teacher of wide reputation, and under his leadership the school at Bec had become an important center of learning, especially in dialectic. In 1060 Anselm entered the abbey as a novice. His intellectual and spiritual gifts brought him rapid advancement, and when Lanfranc was appointed abbot of Caen in 1063, Anselm was elected to succeed him as prior. He was elected abbot in 1078 upon the death of Herluin, the founder and first abbot of Bec. Under Anselm’s leadership the reputation of Bec as an intellectual center grew, and Anselm managed to write a good deal of philosophy and theology in addition to his teaching, administrative duties, and extensive correspondence as an adviser and counselor to rulers and nobles all over Europe and beyond. His works while at Bec include the Monologion (1075–76), the Proslogion (1077–78), and his four philosophical dialogues: De grammatico (probably 1059–60, though the dating of this work is much disputed), and De veritate , De libertate arbitrii , and De casu diaboli (1080–86).

In 1093 Anselm was enthroned as Archbishop of Canterbury. The previous Archbishop, Anselm’s old master Lanfranc, had died four years earlier, but the King, William Rufus, had left the see vacant in order to plunder the archiepiscopal revenues. Anselm was understandably reluctant to undertake the primacy of the Church of England under a ruler as ruthless and venal as William, and his tenure as Archbishop proved to be as turbulent and vexatious as he must have feared. William was intent on maintaining royal authority over ecclesiastical affairs and would not be dictated to by Archbishop or Pope or anyone else. So, for example, when Anselm went to Rome in 1097 without the King’s permission, William would not allow him to return. When William was killed in 1100, his successor, Henry I, invited Anselm to return to his see. But Henry was as intent as William had been on maintaining royal jurisdiction over the Church, and Anselm found himself in exile again from 1103 to 1107. Despite these distractions and troubles, Anselm continued to write. His works as Archbishop of Canterbury include the Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi (1094), Cur Deus Homo (1095–98), De conceptu virginali (1099), De processione Spiritus Sancti (1102), the Epistola de sacrificio azymi et fermentati (1106–7), De sacramentis ecclesiae (1106–7), and De concordia (1107–8). Anselm died on 21 April 1109. He was canonized in 1494 and named a Doctor of the Church in 1720.

2. The Theistic Proofs

Anselm’s motto is “faith seeking understanding” ( fides quaerens intellectum ). This motto lends itself to at least two misunderstandings. First, many philosophers have taken it to mean that Anselm hopes to replace faith with understanding. If one takes ‘faith’ to mean roughly ‘belief on the basis of testimony’ and ‘understanding’ to mean ‘belief on the basis of philosophical insight’, one is likely to regard faith as an epistemically substandard position; any self-respecting philosopher would surely want to leave faith behind as quickly as possible. The theistic proofs are then interpreted as the means by which we come to have philosophical insight into things we previously believed solely on testimony. But Anselm is not hoping to replace faith with understanding. Faith for Anselm is more a volitional state than an epistemic state: it is love for God and a drive to act as God wills. In fact, Anselm describes the sort of faith that “merely believes what it ought to believe” as “dead” ( M 78). (For the abbreviations used in references, see the Bibliography below.) So “faith seeking understanding” means something like “an active love of God seeking a deeper knowledge of God.”

Other philosophers have noted that “faith seeking understanding” begins with “faith,” not with doubt or suspension of belief. Hence, they argue, the theistic arguments proposed by faith seeking understanding are not really meant to convince unbelievers; they are intended solely for the edification of those who already believe. This too is a misreading of Anselm’s motto. For although the theistic proofs are borne of an active love of God seeking a deeper knowledge of the beloved, the proofs themselves are intended to be convincing even to unbelievers. Thus Anselm opens the Monologion with these words:

If anyone does not know, either because he has not heard or because he does not believe, that there is one nature, supreme among all existing things, who alone is self-sufficient in his eternal happiness, who through his omnipotent goodness grants and brings it about that all other things exist or have any sort of well-being, and a great many other things that we must believe about God or his creation, I think he could at least convince himself of most of these things by reason alone, if he is even moderately intelligent. ( M 1)

And in the Proslogion Anselm sets out to convince “the fool,” that is, the person who “has said in his heart, ‘There is no God’ ” (Psalm 14:1; 53:1).

Having clarified what Anselm takes himself to be doing in his theistic proofs, we can now examine the proofs themselves. In the first chapter of the Monologion Anselm argues that there must be some one thing that is supremely good, through which all good things have their goodness. For whenever we say that different things are F in different degrees, we must understand them as being F through F -ness; F -ness itself is the same in each of them. Thus, for example, all more or less just things “must be more or less just through justice, which is not different in diverse things” ( M 1). Now we speak of things as being good in different degrees. So by the principle just stated, these things must be good through some one thing. Clearly that thing is itself a great good, since it is the source of the goodness of all other things. Moreover, that thing is good through itself ; after all, if all good things are good through that thing, it follows trivially that that thing, being good, is good through itself. Things that are good through another (i.e., things whose goodness derives from something other than themselves) cannot be equal to or greater than the good thing that is good through itself, and so that which is good through itself is supremely good. Anselm concludes, “Now that which is supremely good is also supremely great. There is, therefore, some one thing that is supremely good and supremely great – in other words, supreme among all existing things” ( M 1). In chapter 2 he applies the principle of chapter 1 in order to derive (again) the conclusion that there is something supremely great.

In chapter 3 Anselm argues that all existing things exist through some one thing. Every existing thing, he begins, exists either through something or through nothing. But of course nothing exists through nothing, so every existing thing exists through something. There is, then, either some one thing through which all existing things exist, or there is more than one such thing. If there is more than one, either (i) they all exist through some one thing, or (ii) each of them exists through itself, or (iii) they exist through each other. (iii) makes no sense. If (ii) is true, then “there is surely some one power or nature of self-existing that they have in order to exist through themselves” ( M 3); in that case, “all things exist more truly through that one thing than through the several things that cannot exist without that one thing” ( M 3). So (ii) collapses into (i), and there is some one thing through which all things exist. That one thing, of course, exists through itself, and so it is greater than all the other things. It is therefore “best and greatest and supreme among all existing things” ( M 3).

In chapter 4 Anselm begins with the premise that things “are not all of equal dignity; rather, some of them are on different and unequal levels” ( M 4). For example, a horse is better than wood, and a human being is more excellent than a horse. Now it is absurd to think that there is no limit to how high these levels can go, “so that there is no level so high that an even higher level cannot be found” ( M 4). The only question is how many beings occupy that highest level of all. Is there just one, or are there more than one? Suppose there are more than one. By hypothesis, they must all be equals. If they are equals, they are equals through the same thing. That thing is either identical with them or distinct from them. If it is identical with them, then they are not in fact many, but one, since they are all identical with some one thing. On the other hand, if that thing is distinct from them, then they do not occupy the highest level after all. Instead, that thing is greater than they are. Either way, there can be only one being occupying the highest level of all.

Anselm concludes the first four chapters by summarizing his results:

Therefore, there is a certain nature or substance or essence who through himself is good and great and through himself is what he is; through whom exists whatever truly is good or great or anything at all; and who is the supreme good, the supreme great thing, the supreme being or subsistent, that is, supreme among all existing things. ( M 4)

He then goes on (in chapters 5–65) to derive the attributes that must belong to the being who fits this description. But before we look at Anselm’s understanding of the divine attributes, we should turn to the famous proof in the Proslogion .

Looking back on the sixty-five chapters of complicated argument in the Monologion , Anselm found himself wishing for a simpler way to establish all the conclusions he wanted to prove. As he tells us in the preface to the Proslogion , he wanted to find

a single argument that needed nothing but itself alone for proof, that would by itself be enough to show that God really exists; that he is the supreme good, who depends on nothing else, but on whom all things depend for their being and for their well-being; and whatever we believe about the divine nature. ( P , preface)

That “single argument” is the one that appears in chapter 2 of the Proslogion . (Or so it is commonly said: but some interpreters understand the “one argument” as extending into chapter 3, and Holopainen 1996 argues that it is the formula “that than which a greater cannot be thought.”)

The proper way to state Anselm’s argument is a matter of dispute, and any detailed statement of the argument will beg interpretative questions. But on a fairly neutral or consensus reading of the argument (which I shall go on to reject), Anselm’s argument goes like this. God is “that than which a greater cannot be thought”; in other words, he is a being so great, so full of metaphysical oomph, that one cannot so much as conceive of a being who would be greater than God. The Psalmist, however, tells us that “The fool has said in his heart, ‘There is no God’ ” (Psalm 14:1; 53:1). Is it possible to convince the fool that he is wrong? It is. All we need is the characterization of God as “that than which a greater cannot be thought.” The fool does at least understand that definition. But whatever is understood exists in the understanding, just as the plan of a painting he has yet to execute already exists in the understanding of the painter. So that than which a greater cannot be thought exists in the understanding. But if it exists in the understanding, it must also exist in reality. For it is greater to exist in reality than to exist merely in the understanding. Therefore, if that than which a greater can be thought existed only in the understanding, it would be possible to think of something greater than it (namely, that same being existing in reality as well). It follows, then, that if that than which a greater cannot be thought existed only in the understanding, it would not be that than which a greater cannot be thought; and that, obviously, is a contradiction. So that than which a greater cannot be thought must exist in reality, not merely in the understanding.

Versions of this argument have been defended and criticized by a succession of philosophers from Anselm’s time through the present day (see ontological arguments ). Our concern here is with Anselm’s own version, the criticism he encountered, and his response to that criticism. A monk named Gaunilo wrote a “Reply on Behalf of the Fool,” contending that Anselm’s argument gave the Psalmist’s fool no good reason at all to believe that that than which a greater cannot be thought exists in reality. Gaunilo’s most famous objection is an argument intended to be exactly parallel to Anselm’s that generates an obviously absurd conclusion. Gaunilo proposes that instead of “that than which a greater cannot be thought” we consider “that island than which a greater cannot be thought.” We understand what that expression means, so (following Anselm’s reasoning) the greatest conceivable island exists in our understanding. But (again following Anselm’s reasoning) that island must exist in reality as well; for if it did not, we could imagine a greater island – namely, one that existed in reality – and the greatest conceivable island would not be the greatest conceivable island after all. Surely, though, it is absurd to suppose that the greatest conceivable island actually exists in reality. Gaunilo concludes that Anselm’s reasoning is fallacious.

Gaunilo’s counterargument is so ingenious that it stands out as by far the most devastating criticism in his catalogue of Anselm’s errors. Not surprisingly, then, interpreters have read Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo primarily in order to find his rejoinder to the Lost Island argument. Sympathetic interpreters (such as Klima 2000 and Ward 2018) have offered ways for Anselm to respond, but at least one commentator (Wolterstorff 1993) argues that Anselm offers no such rejoinder, precisely because he knew Gaunilo’s criticism was unanswerable but could not bring himself to admit that fact.

A more careful look at Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo, however, shows that Anselm offered no rejoinder to the Lost Island argument because he rejected Gaunilo’s interpretation of the original argument of the Proslogion . Gaunilo had understood the argument in the way I stated it above. Anselm understood it quite differently. In particular, Anselm insists that the original argument did not rely on any general principle to the effect that a thing is greater when it exists in reality than when it exists only in the understanding. [ 1 ] And since that is the principle that does the mischief in Gaunilo’s counterargument, Anselm sees no need to respond to the Lost Island argument in particular.

Correctly understood, Anselm says, the argument of the Proslogion can be summarized as follows:

• That than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought.
• If that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought, it exists in reality.
• That than which a greater cannot be thought exists in reality.

Anselm defends (1) by showing how we can form a conception of that than which a greater cannot be thought on the basis of our experience and understanding of those things than which a greater can be thought. For example,

it is clear to every reasonable mind that by raising our thoughts from lesser goods to greater goods, we are quite capable of forming an idea of that than which a greater cannot be thought on the basis of that than which a greater can be thought. Who, for example, is unable to think … that if something that has a beginning and end is good, then something that has a beginning but never ceases to exist is much better? And that just as the latter is better than the former, so something that has neither beginning nor end is better still, even if it is always moving from the past through the present into the future? And that something that in no way needs or is compelled to change or move is far better even than that, whether any such thing exists in reality or not? Can such a thing not be thought? Can anything greater than this be thought? Or rather, is not this an example of forming an idea of that than which a greater cannot be thought on the basis of those things than which a greater can be thought? So there is in fact a way to form an idea of that than which a greater cannot be thought. (Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo 8)

Once we have formed this idea of that than which a greater cannot be thought, Anselm says, we can see that such a being has features that cannot belong to a possible but non-existent object – or, in other words, that (2) is true. For example, a being that is capable of non-existence is less great than a being that exists necessarily. If that than which a greater cannot be thought does not exist, it is obviously capable of non-existence; and if it is capable of non-existence, then even if it were to exist, it would not be that than which a greater cannot be thought after all. So if that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought – that is, if it is a possible being – it actually exists. (This reading of the argument of the Proslogion is developed at length in Visser and Williams 2008, chapter 5.)

3. The Divine Nature

Recall that Anselm’s intention in the Proslogion was to offer a single argument that would establish not only the existence of God but also the various attributes that Christians believe God possesses. If the argument of chapter 2 proved only the existence of God, leaving the divine attributes to be established piecemeal as in the Monologion , Anselm would consider the Proslogion a failure. But in fact the concept of that than which nothing greater can be thought turns out to be marvelously fertile. God must, for example, be omnipotent. For if he were not, we could conceive of a being greater than he. But God is that than which no greater can be thought, so he must be omnipotent. Similarly, God must be just, self-existent, invulnerable to suffering, merciful, timelessly eternal, non-physical, non-composite, and so forth. For if he lacked any of these qualities, he would be less than the greatest conceivable being, which is impossible.

The ontological argument thus works as a sort of divine-attribute-generating machine. Admittedly, though, the appearance of theoretical simplicity is somewhat misleading. The “single argument” produces conclusions about the divine attributes only when conjoined with certain beliefs about what is greater or better. That is, the ontological argument tells us that God has whatever characteristics it is better or greater to have than to lack, but it does not tell us which characteristics those are. We must have some independent way of identifying them before we can plug them into the ontological argument and generate a full-blown conception of the divine nature. Anselm identifies these characteristics in part by appeal to intuitions about value, in part by independent argument. To illustrate Anselm’s method, I shall examine his discussions of God’s impassibility, timelessness, and simplicity.

According to the doctrine of divine impassibility, God is invulnerable to suffering. Nothing can act upon him; he is in no way passive. He therefore does not feel emotions, since emotions are states that one undergoes rather than actions one performs. Anselm does not find it necessary to argue that impassibility is a perfection; he thinks it is perfectly obvious that “it is better to be … impassible than not” ( P 6), just as it is perfectly obvious that it is better to be just than not-just. His intuitions about value are shaped by the Platonic-Augustinian tradition of which he was a part. Augustine took from the Platonists the idea that the really real things, the greatest and best of beings, are stable, uniform, and unchanging. He says in On Free Choice of the Will 2.10, “And you surely could not deny that the uncorrupted is better than the corrupt, the eternal than the temporal, and the invulnerable than the vulnerable”; his interlocutor replies simply, “Could anyone?” Through Augustine (and others) these ideas, and the conception of God to which they naturally lead, became the common view of Christian theologians for well over a millennium. For Anselm, then, it is obvious that a being who is in no way passive, who cannot experience anything of which he is not himself the origin, is better and greater than any being who can be acted upon by something outside himself. So God, being that than which nothing greater can be thought, is wholly active; he is impassible.

Notice that Augustine also found it obvious that the eternal is better than the temporal. According to Plato’s Timaeus , time is a “moving image of eternity” (37d). It is a shifting and shadowy reflection of the really real. As later Platonists, including Augustine, develop this idea, temporal beings have their existence piecemeal; they exist only in this tiny sliver of a now, which is constantly flowing away from them and passing into nothingness. An eternal being, by contrast, is (to use my earlier description) stable, uniform, and unchanging. What it has, it always has; what it is, it always is; what it does, it always does. So it seems intuitively obvious to Anselm that if God is to be that than which nothing greater can be thought, he must be eternal. That is, he must be not merely everlasting, but outside time altogether. [ 2 ]

In addition to this strong intuitive consideration, Anselm at least hints at a further argument for the claim that it is better to be eternal than temporal. He opens chapter 13 of the Proslogion by observing, “Everything that is at all enclosed in a place or time is less than that which is subject to no law of place or time” ( P 13). His idea seems to be that if God were in time (or in a place), he would be bound by certain constraints inherent in the nature of time (or place). His discussion in Monologion 22 makes the problem clear:

This, then, is the condition of place and time: whatever is enclosed within their boundaries does not escape being characterized by parts, whether the sort of parts its place receives with respect to size, or the sort its time suffers with respect to duration; nor can it in any way be contained as a whole all at once by different places or times. By contrast, if something is in no way constrained by confinement in a place or time, no law of places or times forces it into a multiplicity of parts or prevents it from being present as a whole all at once in several places or times. ( M 22)

So at least part of the reason for holding that God is timeless is that the nature of time would impose constraints upon God, and of course it is better to be subject to no external constraints.

The other part of the reason, though, is that if God were in place or time he would have parts . But what is so bad about having parts? This question brings us naturally to the doctrine of divine simplicity, which is simply the doctrine that God has no parts of any kind. Even for an Augustinian like Anselm, the claim that it is better to lack parts than to have them is less than intuitively compelling, so Anselm offers further arguments for that claim. In the Proslogion he argues that “whatever is composed of parts is not completely one. It is in some sense a plurality and not identical with itself, and it can be broken up either in fact or at least in the understanding” ( P 18). The argument in the Monologion goes somewhat differently. “Every composite,” Anselm argues, “needs the things of which it is composed if it is to subsist, and it owes its existence to them, since whatever it is, it is through them, whereas those things are not through it what they are” ( M 17). The argument in the Proslogion , then, seeks to relate simplicity to the intuitive considerations that identify what is greatest and best with what is stable, uniform, and unchanging; the argument in the Monologion , by contrast, seeks to show that simplicity is necessary if God is to be – as the theistic proofs have already established – the ultimate source of his own goodness and existence.

Anselm’s success in generating a whole host of divine attributes through the ontological argument does present him with a problem. He must show that the attributes are consistent with each other – in other words, that it is possible for one and the same being to have all of them. For example, there seems at first glance to be a conflict between justice and omnipotence. If God is perfectly just, he cannot lie. But if God is omnipotent, how can there be something he cannot do? Anselm’s solution is to explain that omnipotence does not mean the ability to do everything; instead, it means the possession of unlimited power. Now the so-called “ability” or “power” to lie is not really a power at all; it is a kind of weakness. Being omnipotent, God has no weakness. So it turns out that omnipotence actually entails the inability to lie.

Another apparent contradiction is between God’s mercy and his justice. If God is just, he will surely punish the wicked as they deserve. But because he is merciful, he spares the wicked. Anselm tries to resolve this apparent contradiction by appeal to God’s goodness. It is better, he says, for God “to be good both to the good and to the wicked than to be good only to the good, and it is better to be good to the wicked both in punishing and in sparing them than to be good only in punishing them” ( P 9). So God’s supreme goodness requires that he be both just and merciful. But Anselm is not content to resolve the apparent tension between justice and mercy by appealing to some other attribute, goodness, that entails both justice and mercy; he goes on to argue that justice itself requires mercy. Justice to sinners obviously requires that God punish them; but God’s justice to himself requires that he exercise his supreme goodness in sparing the wicked. “Thus,” Anselm says to God, “in saving us whom you might justly destroy … you are just, not because you give us our due, but because you do what is fitting for you who are supremely good” ( P 10). In spite of these arguments, Anselm acknowledges that there is a residue of mystery here:

Thus your mercy is born of your justice, since it is just for you to be so good that you are good even in sparing the wicked. And perhaps this is why the one who is supremely just can will good things for the wicked. But even if one can somehow grasp why you can will to save the wicked, certainly no reasoning can comprehend why, from those who are alike in wickedness, you save some rather than others through your supreme goodness and condemn some rather than others through your supreme justice. ( P 11)

In other words, the philosopher can trace the conceptual relations among goodness, justice, and mercy, and show that God not only can but must have all three; but no human reasoning can hope to show why God displays his justice and mercy in precisely the ways in which he does. (For a detailed and sympathetic reconstruction of Anselm’s arguments concerning justice and mercy, see Mann 2019.)

4. Freedom, Sin, and Redemption

In On Freedom of Choice ( De libertate arbitrii ) Anselm defines freedom of choice as “the power to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake” ( DLA 3). He explores the notion of rectitude of will most thoroughly in On Truth ( De veritate ), so in order to understand the definition of freedom of choice, we must look first at Anselm’s discussion of truth. Truth is a much broader notion for Anselm than for us; he speaks of truth not only in statements and opinions but also in the will, actions, the senses, and even the essences of things. In every case, he argues, truth consists in correctness or “rectitude.” Rectitude, in turn, is understood teleologically; a thing is correct whenever it is or does whatever it ought, or was designed, to be or do. For example, statements are made for the purpose of “signifying that what-is is” ( DV 2). A statement therefore is correct (has rectitude) when, and only when, it signifies that what-is is. So Anselm holds a correspondence theory of truth, but it is a somewhat unusual correspondence theory. Statements are true when they correspond to reality, but only because corresponding to reality is what statements are for . That is, statements (like anything else) are true when they do what they were designed to do; and what they were designed to do, as it happens, is to correspond to reality.

Truth in the will also turns out to be rectitude, again understood teleologically. Rectitude of will means willing what one ought to will or (in other words) willing that for the sake of which one was given a will. So, just as the truth or rectitude of a statement is the statement’s doing what statements were made to do, the truth or rectitude of a will is the will’s doing what wills were made to do. In DV 12 Anselm connects rectitude of will to both justice and moral evaluation. In a broad sense of ‘just’, whatever is as it ought to be is just. Thus, an animal is just when it blindly follows its appetites, because that is what animals were meant to do. But in the narrower sense of ‘just’, in which justice is what deserves moral approval and injustice is what deserves reproach, justice is best defined as “rectitude of will preserved for its own sake” ( DV 12). Such rectitude requires that agents perceive the rectitude of their actions and will them for the sake of that rectitude. Anselm takes the second requirement to exclude both coercion and “being bribed by an extraneous reward” ( DV 12). For an agent who is coerced into doing what is right is not willing rectitude for its own sake; and similarly, an agent who must be bribed to do what is right is willing rectitude for the sake of the bribe, not for the sake of rectitude.

Since, as we have already seen, Anselm will define freedom as “the power to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake,” the arguments of On Truth imply that freedom is also the capacity for justice and the capacity for moral praiseworthiness. Now it is both necessary and sufficient for justice, and thus for praiseworthiness, that an agent wills what is right, knowing it to be right, because it is right. That an agent wills what is right because it is right entails that he is neither compelled nor bribed to perform the act. Freedom, then, must be neither more nor less than the power to perform acts of that sort.

Thus Anselm takes it to be obvious that freedom is a power for something: its purpose is to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake. God and the good angels cannot sin, but they are still free, because they can (and do) preserve rectitude of will for its own sake. In fact, they are freer than those who can sin: “someone who has what is fitting and expedient in such a way that he cannot lose it is freer than someone who has it in such a way that he can lose it and be seduced into what is unfitting and inexpedient” ( DLA 1). It obviously follows, as Anselm points out, that freedom of choice neither is nor entails the power to sin; God and the good angels have freedom of choice, but they are incapable of sinning.

But if free choice is the power to hold on to what is fitting and expedient, and it is not the power to sin, does it make any sense to say that the first human beings and the rebel angels sinned through free choice? Anselm’s reply to this question is both subtle and plausible. In order to be able to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake, an agent must be able to perform an action that has its ultimate origin in the agent him- or herself rather than in some external source. (For convenience I will refer to that power as “the power for self-initiated action.”) Any being that has freedom of choice, therefore, will thereby have the power for self-initiated action. The first human beings and the rebel angels sinned through an exercise of their power for self-initiated action, and so it is appropriate to say that they sinned through free choice. Nonetheless, free choice does not entail the power to sin. For free choice can be perfected by something else, as yet unspecified, that renders it incapable of sinning.

In On the Fall of the Devil ( De casu diaboli ) Anselm extends his account of freedom and sin by discussing the first sin of the angels. In order for the angels to have the power to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake, they had to have both a will for justice and a will for happiness. If God had given them only a will for happiness, they would have been necessitated to will whatever they thought would make them happy. Their willing of happiness would have had its ultimate origin in God and not in the angels themselves. So they would not have had the power for self-initiated action, which means that they would not have had free choice. The same thing would have been true, mutatis mutandis , if God had given them only the will for justice.

Since God gave them both the will for happiness and the will for justice, however, they had the power for self-initiated action. Whether they chose to subject their wills for happiness to the demands of justice or to ignore the demands of justice in the interest of happiness, that choice had its ultimate origin in the angels; it was not received from God. The rebel angels chose to abandon justice in an attempt to gain happiness for themselves, whereas the good angels chose to persevere in justice even if it meant less happiness. God punished the rebel angels by taking away their happiness; he rewarded the good angels by granting them all the happiness they could possibly want. For this reason, the good angels are no longer able to sin. Since there is no further happiness left for them to will, their will for happiness can no longer entice them to overstep the bounds of justice. Thus Anselm finally explains what it is that perfects free choice so that it becomes unable to sin.

Like the fallen angels, the first human beings willed happiness in preference to justice. By doing so they abandoned the will for justice and became unable to will justice for its own sake. Apart from divine grace, then, fallen human beings cannot help but sin. Anselm claims that we are still free, because we continue to be such that if we had rectitude of will, we could preserve it for its own sake; but we cannot exercise our freedom, since we no longer have the rectitude of will to preserve. (Whether fallen human beings also retain the power for self-initiated action apart from divine grace is a tricky question, and one I do not propose to answer here.)

So the restoration of human beings to the justice they were intended to enjoy requires divine grace. But even more is needed than God’s restoration of the will for justice. In Cur Deus Homo ( Why God Became A Human Being , or Why the God-Man? ) Anselm famously attempts to show on purely rational grounds that the debt incurred by human sin could be suitably discharged, and the affront to God’s infinite dignity could be suitably rectified, only if one who was both fully divine and fully human took it upon himself to offer his own life on our behalf.

References in this article to Anselm’s works use the following abbreviations:

All translations are my own.

Critical Editions

• Niskanen, Samu, 2019. Letters of Anselm of Canterbury, Vol. I: The Bec Letters , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Schmitt, Franciscus Salesius, 1936. “Ein neues unvollendetes Werk des hl. Anselm von Canterbury,” Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters Band 33, Heft 3 (1936): 22–43.
• Schmitt, Franciscus Salesius, 1968. S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia . Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Fromann Verlag.
• Frölich, Walter, 1990.  The Letters of Saint Anselm of Canterbury . 3 vols. Cistercian Studies 96, 97, 142. The only complete translation in English of Anselm’s letters. For the Bec letters (vol. 1), however, it is best to use the edition and translation in Niskanen 2019 (see Critical Editions, above).
• Ward, Benedicta, 1979.  The Prayers and Meditations of Saint Anselm, with the Proslogion . New York: Penguin Classics. The only complete translation in English of Anselm’s prayers and meditations: idiomatic and elegant, if also rather free.
• Williams, Thomas, 2022. Anselm: The Complete Treatises, with Selected Letters and Prayers and the Meditation on Human Redemption . Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. The only complete translation in English by a single hand of all of Anselm’s philosophical and theological treatises, with some letters and devotional material as well.
• Baker, Lynne Rudder, 2013. “Updating Anselm Again,” Res Philosophica , 90: 23–32.
• Burgess-Jackson, Keith, 2014. “Does Anselm Beg the Question?,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion , 76: 5–18.
• Campbell, Richard, 2018. Rethinking Anselm’s Arguments: A Vindication of His Proof for the Existence of God , Leiden: Brill.
• Davies, Brian, and Brian Leftow (eds.), 2004. The Cambridge Companion to Anselm , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Ekenberg, Tomas, 2016. “Voluntary Action and Rational Sin in Anselm of Canterbury,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion , 24: 215–230.
• Evans, G. R., 1978. Anselm and Talking about God , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 1984. A Concordance to the Works of Saint Anselm , Millwood, NY: Kraus International Publications.
• –––, 1989. Anselm , London: G. Chapman; reprinted 2001, London and New York: Continuum.
• Gasper, G. E. M., and I. Logan (eds.), 2012. Saint Anselm of Canterbury and His Legacy , Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies.
• Heathwood, Chris, 2011. “The Relevance of Kant’s Objection to Anselm’s Ontological Argument,” Religious Studies , 47: 345–357.
• Henry, Desmond Paul, 1967. The Logic of Saint Anselm , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Holopainen, Toivo, 1996. Dialectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century , Leiden: E. J. Brill.
• –––, 2020. A Historical Study of Anselm’s Proslogion Argument: Argument, Devotion and Rhetoric , Leiden: E. J. Brill.
• Hopkins, Jasper, 1972. A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm , Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
• Klima, Gyula, 2000. “Saint Anselm’s Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding”, in G. Hintikka (ed.), Medieval Philosophy and Modern Times (Proceedings of “Medieval and Modern Philosophy of Religion”, Boston University, August 25–27, 1992), Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 69–88. [ Preprint of Klima 2000 available online ]
• Leftow, Brian, 1997. “Anselm on the Cost of Salvation,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology , 6: 73–92.
• –––, 2009. “Anselmian Presentism,” Faith and Philosophy , 26: 297–319. [ Leftow 2009 available online .]
• Logan, Ian, 2009. Reading Anselm’s Proslogion: The History of Anselm’s Argument and its Significance Today , Aldershot: Ashgate.
• Mann, William E., 2019. “Anselm on Divine Justice and Mercy,” Religious Studies , 55: 469–485.
• Nash-Marshall, Siobhan, 2012. “Saint Anselm and the Problem of Evil, or On Freeing Evil from the Problem of Evil,” International Philosophical Quarterly , 52: 455–470.
• Oppenheimer, P., and Zalta, E., 1991. “On the Logic of the Ontological Argument,” Philosophical Perspectives 5: 509–529; reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual: 1991 , XIV (1993): 255–275.
• –––, 2007. “Reflections on the Logic of the Ontological Argument,” Studia Neoaristotelica , 4(1): 28–34.
• –––, 2011. “A Computationally-Discovered Simplification of the Ontological Argument,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 89(2): 333–349.
• Plantinga, Alvin (ed.), 1965. The Ontological Argument , Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
• –––, 1974. God, Freedom, and Evil , Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans.
• Rogers, Katherin A., 2007. “Anselmian Eternalism: The Presence of a Timeless God,” Faith and Philosophy , 24: 3–27. [ Rogers 2007 available online .]
• –––, 2009. Anselm on Freedom , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2012. “Anselm on the Ontological Status of Choice,” International Philosophical Quarterly , 52: 183–198.
• Smith, A.D., 2014. Anselm’s Other Argument , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Southern, R. W., 1990. Saint Anselm: A Portrait in Landscape , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Stone, Jim, 1989. “Anselm’s Proof,” Philosophical Studies , 57: 79–94.
• Special Issue, 2011. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion , Volume 69.
• Special Issue, 2024.  American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly , Volume 98.
• Sweeney, Eileen, 2012. Anselm of Canterbury and the Desire for the Word , Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press.
• Uckelman, Sara L., 2010. “The Ontological Argument and Russell’s Antinomy,” Logic and Logical Philosophy , 18: 309–312.
• Visser, Sandra, and Thomas Williams, 2008. Anselm (Great Medieval Thinkers), New York: Oxford University Press.
• Ward, Thomas M., 2018. “Losing the Lost Island,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion , 83: 127–134.
• Williams, Thomas, 2016. “Anselm’s Quiet Radicalism,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy , doi:10.1080/09608788.2015.1047734, [ Preprint of Williams 2016 available online ]
• –––, 2023. Anselm: A Very Short Introduction , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Wolterstorff, Nicholas, 1993. “In Defense of Gaunilo’s Defense of the Fool,” in C. Stephen Evans and Merold Westphal (eds.), Christian Perspectives on Religious Knowledge , Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, pp. 87–111.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Catholic Encyclopedia article on Anselm
• Prof. Jasper Hopkins’s homepage , including links to the Hopkins-Richardson translations of Anselm’s complete theological and philosophical treatises, as well as some essays on Anselm.

Augustine of Hippo | Duns Scotus, John | free will | medieval philosophy | ontological arguments

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