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Political political theory: Essays on institutions

Jeremy Waldron Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA and London, 2016, 416pp., ISBN: 978-0-674-74385-4

  • Published: 16 November 2016
  • Volume 16 , pages 553–556, ( 2017 )

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Recently political theorists and philosophers have taken a greater interest in theorising real-world politics. Practice-dependent methods, political realism, and non-ideal theory exemplify and contribute to this shift. In this context, Jeremy Waldron’s Political Political Theory can be considered as another move in these debates. In a similar vein to realists, Waldron argues that too much time is being devoted to theorising justice. In the everyday practice of politics, justice or any other ethical or political aim remains the object of disagreement. Consequently, Waldron argues, ‘we need to inquire into the structures that are to house and redefine our disputes and the processes that are to regulate the way we resolve them’ (p. 5). More specifically, political theorists should explore ‘the foundations’ of modern democratic institutions and constitutional principles, such as political parties and federalism. In this book, which consists of previously published essays edited for this collection and three completely new chapters, Waldron’s insightful reflections uncover many nuances in principles often taken for granted in designing political institutions.

The book consists of three parts. The first part is the introductory chapter, which sets the theoretical stage for the rest of the collection. Waldron’s point of departure is that political theory should take seriously that disagreement about many concepts, such as justice and freedom, is the reason for politics. Political institutions and constitutional principles are the real-world normative tools to address such disagreements. Because institutions are real-world constructs rather than abstract entities, this has the methodological implication that political philosophy should take into account empirical research on their real-world consequences. The work of the philosopher should not, or at least not solely, assess institutions based on a particular conception of justice, liberty, or another aim. Waldron adds that analytical political theorists ‘must reflect also on the deeper layers of dignitarian value’ (p. 9), such as respect and recognition. These values shape people’s expectations of their political institutions; hence they are intrinsic to institutions’ normative value.

These claims are not necessarily new to those familiar with recent debates on political realism, practice-dependent methods, and non-ideal theory—a body of literature with which Waldron’s engagement is rather brief and mostly limited to the work of Bernard Williams. He argues that Williams is interested in security rather than justice. Contrary to Waldron’s interpretation, there is much on which they agree. Both authors align in their conceptual claims about the nature of ‘the political’ as a realm of disagreement requiring authoritative decision-makers. Moreover, both authors agree on the need to be more relevant for the actual endeavour of politics than has been the norm in the Anglo-Saxon analytical tradition. Arguably Waldron does not intend to add to the methodological side of these debates. Nevertheless, substantively, his interest in political institutions that can funnel disagreement in practice constitutes an invaluable contribution to these debates.

A suggestion for readers is that, after reading the first chapter, they turn to the final two chapters before delving into the second part of the book. These essays analyse the work of two twentieth century political theorists: Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt, respectively. Both essays address how far these influential political theorists take political institutions seriously. Chapter 11, by Waldron’s own admission (p. 289), is a polemic on the political thought of Berlin. The central substantive thrust of the chapter is that Berlin overlooks the importance of political institutions. Although agreeing with Berlin’s analysis of value pluralism, his neglect of Enlightenment constitutionalism has impoverished British political thought, so claims Waldron (pp. 288–289). In stark contrast, chapter 12 celebrates the political thought of Hannah Arendt. According to Waldron, Arendt’s insistence on ‘the metaphor of the house’ when theorising politics indicates the central importance of institutions in her thought. That claim might be controversial; Arendt has written much on extraconstitutional politics rather than ordinary everyday politics. Waldron’s focus on the place of institutions in Arendt’s political thought can account for this partial picture. The more important point of these essays is that they further explicate many of Waldron’s commitments and concerns behind reflecting on political institutions and constitutional principles of modern democracies. The chapters in the middle of the book are Waldron’s contribution to reintroducing them into contemporary political thought.

The ‘second’ part of the book—chapters 2 through 10—is a heterogeneous collection of essays on various democratic institutions. These chapters explore topics such as constitutionalism, bicameralism, accountability, and the majoritarian decision-making principle. Waldron uses different argumentative logics in his reflections. For instance, in his reflection on bicameralism (ch. 4), Waldron relies on arguments by canonical political philosophers, such as Locke and Montesquieu, to offer ‘an anatomy lesson’ (p. 91) on the different principles to decide between alternative modes of representation in the legislator. On the other hand, in chapter 9 on judicial review, Waldron explicitly avoids ‘both [judicial review’s] historical manifestations and questions about its particular effects’ (p. 197) but starts his argument from an ‘imagined society’ (p. 203) instead. He thus advances a normative argument against judicial review. This diversity in topics and approaches results in a lack of consistency; but this is after all a collection of essays. One could also interpret the diversity as a strength; a focus on institutions can accommodate diverse normative political approaches. Substantively, the essays offer rich analyses of different norms behind democratic institutions, and while they may not always offer determinate answers, they always illuminate important normative issues.

Despite the diverse topics, and methods, a normative thread runs through these chapters. Waldron defends parliament as the legislative heart of modern mass democracy. Of course, his criticism of judicial review is well-known. But also when arguing for the dignity of the executive in the separation of powers (ch. 3), another upshot is that the legislator, that is parliament, should be autonomous from government. At several points, in this chapter and others, Waldron criticises the rise of executive power in modern democracies. This branch has been able to extract effective decision-making powers from the parliaments. His normative position thus defies empirical developments. However, as Waldron puts it, ‘Even if the principle [of the separation of powers] is dying a sclerotic death, even if it misconceives the character of modern political institutions, it still points to something that was once deemed valuable … and may still be valuable’ (pp. 70–71).

From the generalizability of the substantive concern, Waldron’s primary focus on Anglo-Saxon democracies (Great Britain, the United States, and to a lesser extent Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) might be seen as a problem. The rise of executive power is not limited to these democracies. Most modern democracies face an increasingly powerful executive. However, Waldron’s Anglo-Saxon orientation effectively excludes interesting normative questions. For instance, how do and should multi-party systems on the European continent institutionalise the principle of loyal opposition? Or does this system (rightfully) prioritise another democratic principle? Waldron sometimes touches upon these differences but does not delve into them in a systematic way.

A central contribution of this book is its orientation toward a set of highly relevant questions of practical consequence for modern democracies. Although questions of justice and freedom raise important policy questions, such as about the need for a basic income or about privacy rights in a digital age, these questions tend to remain the object of on-going debate in deeply pluralistic societies. Authoritative democratic institutions needed to decide peacefully on these issues, however, can no longer be taken for granted. Notwithstanding Waldron’s statist focus, we face immediate questions about how to legitimately institutionalise democratic politics in our age of globalisation. The recent Brexit illustrates that a legitimacy deficit can undermine the political institutions—in this case the European Union—needed for authoritative concerted action on such issues, even if the real-world solutions are often non-ideal compromises. These institutions are relevant because, in an age of mass migration, global capitalism, and transnational governance, concerns about justice and freedom are not contained within the boundaries of nation-states. The reorientation to political institutions is thus not merely valuable as a counterbalance to the contemporary preoccupation with conceptions of justice or other political aims. This reorientation also results in the theorisation of important questions facing democratic politics in the real world. Waldron’s essays illustrate that these questions of institutional design are not normatively barren soil. Instead, his book shows that institutions can provoke insightful normative reflections. In sum, Political Political Theory offers an excellent and enjoyable read for political theorists with an interest in real-world politics.

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Beetz, J.P. Political political theory: Essays on institutions. Contemp Polit Theory 16 , 553–556 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-016-0081-z

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In this collection of essays, John Dunn brings his characteristically acute and penetrative insight to a wide range of political issues. In the first essay, 'The history of political theory', Professor Dunn argues for the importance of a historical perspective in the study of political thought. Other pieces engage with central concepts of political philosophy such as obligation, trust, freedom of conscience and property. A group of studies tackle specific contemporary problems and future dangers, for example racism and the dilemma of humanitarian intervention. The volume as a whole articulates the many dangers, but also the huge importance of, contemporary politics, and provides a representative collection of work by one of the most astute political commentators writing today.

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Contents pp ix-x

Preface pp xi-xi, acknowledgements pp xii-xiv, 1 - introduction pp 1-10, 2 - the history of political theory pp 11-38, 3 - contractualism pp 39-65, 4 - political obligation pp 66-90, 5 - trust pp 91-99, 6 - the claim to freedom of conscience: freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of worship pp 100-120, 7 - property justice and common good after socialism pp 121-135, 8 - the dilemma of humanitarian intervention: the executive power of the law of nature, after god pp 136-147, 9 - specifying and understanding racism pp 148-159, 10 - political science, political theory and policy making in an interdependent world pp 160-177, 11 - democracy: the politics of making, defending and exemplifying community: europe 1992 pp 178-195, 12 - is there a contemporary crisis of the nation state pp 196-210, 13 - political and economic obstacles to rapid collective learning pp 211-218, 14 - the heritage and future of the european left pp 219-228, index pp 229-235, altmetric attention score, full text views.

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Aristotle’s Political Theory

Aristotle (b. 384–d. 322 BCE), was a Greek philosopher, logician, and scientist. Along with his teacher Plato, Aristotle is generally regarded as one of the most influential ancient thinkers in a number of philosophical fields, including political theory. Aristotle was born in Stagira in northern Greece, and his father was a court physician to the king of Macedon. As a young man he studied in Plato’s Academy in Athens. After Plato’s death he left Athens to conduct philosophical and biological research in Asia Minor and Lesbos, and he was then invited by King Philip II of Macedon to tutor his young son, Alexander the Great. Soon after Alexander succeeded his father, consolidated the conquest of the Greek city-states, and launched the invasion of the Persian Empire. Aristotle returned as a resident alien to Athens, and was a close friend of Antipater, the Macedonian viceroy. At this time (335–323 BCE) he wrote, or at least worked on, some of his major treatises, including the Politics . When Alexander died suddenly, Aristotle had to flee from Athens because of his Macedonian connections, and he died soon after. Aristotle’s life seems to have influenced his political thought in various ways: his interest in biology seems to be reflected in the naturalism of his politics; his interest in comparative politics and his qualified sympathies for democracy as well as monarchy may have been encouraged by his travels and experience of diverse political systems; he reacts critically to his teacher Plato, while borrowing extensively, from Plato’s Republic , Statesman , and Laws ; and his own Politics is intended to guide rulers and statesmen, reflecting the high political circles in which he moved.

Supplement: Characteristics and Problems of Aristotle’s Politics

Supplement: Presuppositions of Aristotle’s Politics

Supplement: Political Naturalism

4. Study of Specific Constitutions

5. aristotle and modern politics, glossary of aristotelian terms, a. greek text of aristotle’s politics, b. english translations of aristotle’s politics, c. anthologies, d. single-authored commentaries and overviews, e. studies of particular topics, other internet resources, related entries, 1. political science in general.

The modern word ‘political’ derives from the Greek politikos , ‘of, or pertaining to, the polis’. (The Greek term polis will be translated here as ‘city-state’. It is also commonly translated as ‘city’ or simply anglicized as ‘polis’. City-states like Athens and Sparta were relatively small and cohesive units, in which political, religious, and cultural concerns were intertwined. The extent of their similarity to modern nation-states is controversial.) Aristotle’s word for ‘politics’ is politikê , which is short for politikê epistêmê or ‘political science’. It belongs to one of the three main branches of science, which Aristotle distinguishes by their ends or objects. Contemplative science (including physics and metaphysics) is concerned with truth or knowledge for its own sake; practical science with good action; and productive science with making useful or beautiful objects ( Top . VI.6.145a14–16, Met . VI.1.1025b24, XI.7.1064a16–19, EN VI.2.1139a26–8). Politics is a practical science, since it is concerned with the noble action or happiness of the citizens (although it resembles a productive science in that it seeks to create, preserve, and reform political systems). Aristotle thus understands politics as a normative or prescriptive discipline rather than as a purely empirical or descriptive inquiry.

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle describes his subject matter as ‘political science’, which he characterizes as the most authoritative science. It prescribes which sciences are to be studied in the city-state, and the others — such as military science, household management, and rhetoric — fall under its authority. Since it governs the other practical sciences, their ends serve as means to its end, which is nothing less than the human good. “Even if the end is the same for an individual and for a city-state, that of the city-state seems at any rate greater and more complete to attain and preserve. For although it is worthy to attain it for only an individual, it is nobler and more divine to do so for a nation or city-state” ( EN I.2.1094b7–10). The two ethical works (the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics ) explain the principles that form the foundations for the Politics : that happiness is the highest human good, that happiness is the activity of moral virtue defined in terms of the mean, and that justice or the common advantage is the political good. Aristotle’s political science thus encompasses the two fields which modern philosophers distinguish as ethics and political philosophy. (See the entry on Aristotle’s ethics .) Political philosophy in the narrow sense is roughly speaking the subject of his treatise called the Politics . For a further discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary document:

2. Aristotle’s View of Politics

Political science studies the tasks of the politician or statesman ( politikos ), in much the way that medical science concerns the work of the physician (see Politics IV.1). It is, in fact, the body of knowledge that such practitioners, if truly expert, will also wield in pursuing their tasks. The most important task for the politician is, in the role of lawgiver ( nomothetês ), to frame the appropriate constitution for the city-state. This involves enduring laws, customs, and institutions (including a system of moral education) for the citizens. Once the constitution is in place, the politician needs to take the appropriate measures to maintain it, to introduce reforms when he finds them necessary, and to prevent developments which might subvert the political system. This is the province of legislative science, which Aristotle regards as more important than politics as exercised in everyday political activity such as the passing of decrees (see EN VI.8).

Aristotle frequently compares the politician to a craftsman. The analogy is imprecise because politics, in the strict sense of legislative science, is a form of practical knowledge, while a craft like architecture or medicine is a form of productive knowledge. However, the comparison is valid to the extent that the politician produces, operates, maintains a legal system according to universal principles ( EN VI.8 and X.9). In order to appreciate this analogy it is helpful to observe that Aristotle explains the production of an artifact such as a drinking cup in terms of four causes: the material, formal, efficient, and final causes ( Phys . II.3 and Met . A.2). For example, clay (material cause) is molded into a roughly cylindrical shape closed at one end (formal cause) by a potter (efficient or moving cause) so that it can contain a beverage (final cause). (For discussion of the four causes see the entry on Aristotle’s physics .)

One can also explain the existence of the city-state in terms of the four causes. It is a kind of community ( koinônia ), that is, a collection of parts having some functions and interests in common ( Pol . II.1.1261a18, III.1.1275b20). Hence, it is made up of parts, which Aristotle describes in various ways in different contexts: as households, or economic classes (e.g., the rich and the poor), or demes (i.e., local political units). But, ultimately, the city-state is composed of individual citizens (see III.1.1274a38–41), who, along with natural resources, are the “material” or “equipment” out of which the city-state is fashioned (see VII.14.1325b38–41).

The formal cause of the city-state is its constitution ( politeia ). Aristotle defines the constitution as “a certain ordering of the inhabitants of the city-state” (III.1.1274b32–41). He also speaks of the constitution of a community as “the form of the compound” and argues that whether the community is the same over time depends on whether it has the same constitution (III.3.1276b1–11). The constitution is not a written document, but an immanent organizing principle, analogous to the soul of an organism. Hence, the constitution is also “the way of life” of the citizens (IV.11.1295a40–b1, VII.8.1328b1–2). Here the citizens are that minority of the resident population who possess full political rights (III.1.1275b17–20).

The existence of the city-state also requires an efficient cause, namely, its ruler. On Aristotle’s view, a community of any sort can possess order only if it has a ruling element or authority. This ruling principle is defined by the constitution, which sets criteria for political offices, particularly the sovereign office (III.6.1278b8–10; cf. IV.1.1289a15–18). However, on a deeper level, there must be an efficient cause to explain why a city-state acquires its constitution in the first place. Aristotle states that “the person who first established [the city-state] is the cause of very great benefits” (I.2.1253a30–1). This person was evidently the lawgiver ( nomothetês ), someone like Solon of Athens or Lycurgus of Sparta, who founded the constitution. Aristotle compares the lawgiver, or the politician more generally, to a craftsman ( dêmiourgos ) like a weaver or shipbuilder, who fashions material into a finished product (II.12.1273b32–3, VII.4.1325b40–1365a5).

The notion of final cause dominates Aristotle’s Politics from the opening lines:

Since we see that every city-state is a sort of community and that every community is established for the sake of some good (for everyone does everything for the sake of what they believe to be good), it is clear that every community aims at some good, and the community which has the most authority of all and includes all the others aims highest, that is, at the good with the most authority. This is what is called the city-state or political community. [I.1.1252a1–7]

Soon after, he states that the city-state comes into being for the sake of life but exists for the sake of the good life (2.1252b29–30). The theme that the good life or happiness is the proper end of the city-state recurs throughout the Politics (III.6.1278b17–24, 9.1280b39; VII.2.1325a7–10).

To sum up, the city-state is a hylomorphic (i.e., matter-form) compound of a particular population (i.e., citizen-body) in a given territory (material cause) and a constitution (formal cause). The constitution itself is fashioned by the lawgiver and is governed by politicians, who are like craftsmen (efficient cause), and the constitution defines the aim of the city-state (final cause, IV.1.1289a17–18). Aristotle’s hylomorphic analysis has important practical implications for him: just as a craftsman should not try to impose a form on materials for which it is unsuited (e.g. to build a house out of sand), the legislator should not lay down or change laws which are contrary to the nature of the citizens. Aristotle accordingly rejects utopian schemes such as the proposal in Plato’s Republic that children and property should belong to all the citizens in common. For this runs afoul of the fact that “people give most attention to their own property, less to what is communal, or only as much as falls to them to give attention” ( Pol. II.3.1261b33–5). Aristotle is also wary of casual political innovation, because it can have the deleterious side-effect of undermining the citizens’ habit of obeying the law (II.8.1269a13–24). For a further discussion of the theoretical foundations of Aristotle’s politics, see the following supplementary document:

It is in these terms, then, that Aristotle understands the fundamental normative problem of politics: What constitutional form should the lawgiver establish and preserve in what material for the sake of what end?

3. General Theory of Constitutions and Citizenship

Aristotle states, “The politician and lawgiver is wholly occupied with the city-state, and the constitution is a certain way of organizing those who inhabit the city-state” (III.1.1274b36–8). His general theory of constitutions is set forth in Politics III. He begins with a definition of the citizen ( politês ), since the city-state is by nature a collective entity, a multitude of citizens. Citizens are distinguished from other inhabitants, such as resident aliens and slaves; and even children and seniors are not unqualified citizens (nor are most ordinary workers). After further analysis he defines the citizen as a person who has the right ( exousia ) to participate in deliberative or judicial office (1275b18–21). In Athens, for example, citizens had the right to attend the assembly, the council, and other bodies, or to sit on juries. The Athenian system differed from a modern representative democracy in that the citizens were more directly involved in governing. Although full citizenship tended to be restricted in the Greek city-states (with women, slaves, foreigners, and some others excluded), the citizens were more deeply enfranchised than in modern representative democracies because they were more directly involved in governing. This is reflected in Aristotle’s definition of the citizen (without qualification). Further, he defines the city-state (in the unqualified sense) as a multitude of such citizens which is adequate for a self-sufficient life (1275b20–21).

Aristotle defines the constitution ( politeia ) as a way of organizing the offices of the city-state, particularly the sovereign office (III.6.1278b8–10; cf. IV.1.1289a15–18). The constitution thus defines the governing body, which takes different forms: for example, in a democracy it is the people, and in an oligarchy it is a select few (the wealthy or well born). Before attempting to distinguish and evaluate various constitutions Aristotle considers two questions. First, why does a city-state come into being? He recalls the thesis, defended in Politics I.2, that human beings are by nature political animals, who naturally want to live together. For a further discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary document:

Aristotle then adds, “The common advantage also brings them together insofar as they each attain the noble life. This is above all the end for all both in common and separately” (III.6.1278b19–24). Second, what are the different forms of rule by which one individual or group can rule over another? Aristotle distinguishes several types of rule, based on the nature of the soul of the ruler and of the subject. He first considers despotic rule, which is exemplified in the master-slave relationship. Aristotle thinks that this form of rule is justified in the case of natural slaves who (he asserts without evidence) lack a deliberative faculty and thus need a natural master to direct them (I.13.1260a12; slavery is defended at length in Politics I.4–8). Although a natural slave allegedly benefits from having a master, despotic rule is still primarily for the sake of the master and only incidentally for the slave (III.6.1278b32–7). (Aristotle provides no argument for this: if some persons are congenitally incapable of governing themselves, why should they not be ruled primarily for their own sakes?) He next considers paternal and marital rule, which he also views as defensible: “the male is by nature more capable of leadership than the female, unless he is constituted in some way contrary to nature, and the elder and perfect [is by nature more capable of leadership] than the younger and imperfect” (I.12.1259a39–b4).

Aristotle is persuasive when he argues that children need adult supervision because their rationality is “imperfect” ( ateles ) or immature. But he is unconvincing to modern readers when he alleges (without substantiation) that, although women have a deliberative faculty, it is “without authority” ( akuron ), so that females require male supervision (I.13.1260a13–14). (Aristotle’s arguments about slaves and women appear so weak that some commentators take them to be ironic. However, what is obvious to a modern reader need not have been so to an ancient Greek, so that it is not necessary to suppose Aristotle’s discussion is disingenuous.) It is noteworthy, however, that paternal and marital rule are properly practiced for the sake of the ruled (for the sake of the child and of the wife respectively), just as arts like medicine or gymnastics are practiced for the sake of the patient (III.6.1278b37–1279a1). In this respect they resemble political rule, which is the form of rule appropriate when the ruler and the subject have equal and similar rational capacities. This is exemplified by naturally equal citizens who take turns at ruling for one another’s advantage (1279a8–13). This sets the stage for the fundamental claim of Aristotle’s constitutional theory: “constitutions which aim at the common advantage are correct and just without qualification, whereas those which aim only at the advantage of the rulers are deviant and unjust, because they involve despotic rule which is inappropriate for a community of free persons” (1279a17–21).

The distinction between correct and deviant constitutions is combined with the observation that the government may consist of one person, a few, or a multitude. Hence, there are six possible constitutional forms ( Politics III.7):

Kingship Tyranny
Aristocracy Oligarchy
Polity Democracy

This six-fold classification (which is doubtless adapted from Plato’s Statesman 302c–d) sets the stage for Aristotle’s inquiry into the best constitution, although it is modified in various ways throughout the Politics . For example, he observes that the dominant class in oligarchy (literally rule of the oligoi , i.e., few) is typically the wealthy, whereas in democracy (literally rule of the dêmos , i.e., people) it is the poor, so that these economic classes should be included in the definition of these forms (see Politics III.8, IV.4, and VI.2 for alternative accounts). Also, polity is later characterized as a kind of “mixed” constitution typified by rule of the “middle” group of citizens, a moderately wealthy class between the rich and poor ( Politics IV.11).

Aristotle’s constitutional theory is based on his theory of justice, which is expounded in Nicomachean Ethics book V. Aristotle distinguishes two different but related senses of “justice” — universal and particular — both of which play an important role in his constitutional theory. Firstly, in the universal sense “justice” means “lawfulness” and is concerned with the common advantage and happiness of the political community ( NE V.1.1129b11–19, cf. Pol. III.12.1282b16–17). The conception of universal justice undergirds the distinction between correct (just) and deviant (unjust) constitutions. But what exactly the “common advantage” ( koinê sumpheron ) entails is a matter of scholarly controversy. Some passages imply that justice involves the advantage of all the citizens; for example, every citizen of the best constitution has a just claim to private property and to an education ( Pol. VII.9.1329a23–4, 13.1332a32–8). But Aristotle also allows that it might be “in a way” just to ostracize powerful citizens even when they have not been convicted of any crimes (III.13.1284b15–20). Whether Aristotle understands the common advantage as safeguarding the interests of each and every citizen has a bearing on whether and to what extent he anticipates what moderns would understand as a theory of individual rights. (See Fred Miller and Richard Kraut for differing interpretations.)

Secondly, in the particular sense “justice” means “equality” or “fairness”, and this includes distributive justice, according to which different individuals have just claims to shares of some common asset such as property. Aristotle analyzes arguments for and against the different constitutions as different applications of the principle of distributive justice (III.9.1280a7–22). Everyone agrees, he says, that justice involves treating equal persons equally, and treating unequal persons unequally, but they do not agree on the standard by which individuals are deemed to be equally (or unequally) meritorious or deserving. He assumes his own analysis of distributive justice set forth in Nicomachean Ethics V.3: Justice requires that benefits be distributed to individuals in proportion to their merit or desert. The oligarchs mistakenly think that those who are superior in wealth should also have superior political rights, whereas the democrats hold that those who are equal in free birth should also have equal political rights. Both of these conceptions of political justice are mistaken in Aristotle’s view, because they assume a false conception of the ultimate end of the city-state. The city-state is neither a business enterprise to maximize wealth (as the oligarchs suppose) nor an association to promote liberty and equality (as the democrats maintain). Instead, Aristotle argues, “the good life is the end of the city-state,” that is, a life consisting of noble actions (1280b39–1281a4). Hence, the correct conception of justice is aristocratic, assigning political rights to those who make a full contribution to the political community, that is, to those with virtue as well as property and freedom (1281a4–8). This is what Aristotle understands by an “aristocratic” constitution: literally, the rule of the aristoi , i.e., best persons. Aristotle explores the implications of this argument in the remainder of Politics III, considering the rival claims of the rule of law and the rule of a supremely virtuous individual. Here absolute kingship is a limiting case of aristocracy. Again, in books VII-VIII, Aristotle describes the ideal constitution in which the citizens are fully virtuous.

Although justice is in Aristotle’s view the foremost political virtue ( Pol . III.9.1283a38–40), the other great social virtue, friendship, should not be overlooked, because the two virtues work hand in hand to secure every sort of association ( EN VIII.9.1159b26–7). Justice enables the citizens of a city-state to share peacefully in the benefits and burdens of cooperation, while friendship holds them together and prevents them from breaking up into warring factions (cf. Pol . II.4.1262b7–9). Friends are expected to treat each other justly, but friendship goes beyond justice because it is a complex mutual bond in which individuals choose the good for others and trust that others are choosing the good for them (cf. EE VII.2.1236a14–15, b2–3; EN VIII.2.1155b34–3.1156a10). Because choosing the good for one another is essential to friendship and there are three different ways in which something can be called ‘good’ for a human being—virtuous (i.e., good without qualification), useful, or pleasant—there are three types of friendship: hedonistic, utilitarian, and virtuous. Political (or civic) friendship is a species of utilitarian friendship, and it is the most important form of utilitarian friendship because the polis is the greatest community. Opposed to political friendship is enmity, which leads to faction or civil war ( stasis ) or even to political revolution and the breakup of the polis, as discussed in Book V of the Politics. Aristotle offers general accounts of political or civic friendship as part of his general theory of friendship in EE VII.10 and EN VIII.9–12.

The purpose of political science is to guide “the good lawgiver and the true politician” (IV.1.1288b27). Like any complete science or craft, it must study a range of issues concerning its subject matter. For example, gymnastics (physical education) studies what sort of training is best or adapted to the body that is naturally the best, what sort of training is best for most bodies, and what capacity is appropriate for someone who does not want the condition or knowledge appropriate for athletic contests. Political science studies a comparable range of constitutions (1288b21–35): first, the constitution which is best without qualification, i.e., “most according to our prayers with no external impediment”; second, the constitution that is best under the circumstances “for it is probably impossible for many persons to attain the best constitution”; third, the constitution which serves the aim a given population happens to have, i.e., the one that is best “based on a hypothesis”: “for [the political scientist] ought to be able to study a given constitution, both how it might originally come to be, and, when it has come to be, in what manner it might be preserved for the longest time; I mean, for example, if a particular city happens neither to be governed by the best constitution, nor to be equipped even with necessary things, nor to be the [best] possible under existing circumstances, but to be a baser sort.” Hence, Aristotelian political science is not confined to the ideal system, but also investigates the second-best constitution or even inferior political systems, because this may be the closest approximation to full political justice which the lawgiver can attain under the circumstances.

Regarding the constitution that is ideal or “according to prayer,” Aristotle criticizes the views of his predecessors in the Politics and then offers a rather sketchy blueprint of his own in Politics VII–VIII. Although his own political views were influenced by his teacher Plato, Aristotle is highly critical of the ideal constitution set forth in Plato’s Republic on the grounds that it overvalues political unity, it embraces a system of communism that is impractical and inimical to human nature, and it neglects the happiness of the individual citizens ( Politics II.1–5). In contrast, in Aristotle’s “best constitution,” each and every citizen will possess moral virtue and the equipment to carry it out in practice, and thereby attain a life of excellence and complete happiness (see VII.13.1332a32–8). All of the citizens will hold political office and possess private property because “one should call the city-state happy not by looking at a part of it but at all the citizens.” (VII.9.1329a22–3). Moreover, there will be a common system of education for all the citizens, because they share the same end ( Pol . VIII.1).

If (as is the case with most existing city-states) the population lacks the capacities and resources for complete happiness, however, the lawgiver must be content with fashioning a suitable constitution ( Politics IV.11). The second-best system typically takes the form of a polity (in which citizens possess an inferior, more common grade of virtue) or mixed constitution (combining features of democracy, oligarchy, and, where possible, aristocracy, so that no group of citizens is in a position to abuse its rights). Aristotle argues that for city-states that fall short of the ideal, the best constitution is one controlled by a numerous middle class which stands between the rich and the poor. For those who possess the goods of fortune in moderation find it “easiest to obey the rule of reason” ( Politics IV.11.1295b4–6). They are accordingly less apt than the rich or poor to act unjustly toward their fellow citizens. A constitution based on the middle class is the mean between the extremes of oligarchy (rule by the rich) and democracy (rule by the poor). “That the middle [constitution] is best is evident, for it is the freest from faction: where the middle class is numerous, there least occur factions and divisions among citizens” (IV.11.1296a7–9). The middle constitution is therefore both more stable and more just than oligarchy and democracy.

Although Aristotle classifies democracy as a deviant constitution (albeit the best of a bad lot), he argues that a case might be made for popular rule in Politics III.11, a discussion which has attracted the attention of modern democratic theorists. The central claim is that the many may turn out to be better than the virtuous few when they come together, even though the many may be inferior when considered individually. For if each individual has a portion of virtue and practical wisdom, they may pool these moral assets and turn out to be better rulers than even a very wise individual. This argument seems to anticipate treatments of “the wisdom of the multitude” such as Condorcet’s “jury theorem.” In recent years, this particular chapter has been widely discussed in connection with topics such as democratic deliberation and public reason.

In addition, the political scientist must attend to existing constitutions even when they are bad. Aristotle notes that “to reform a constitution is no less a task [of politics] than it is to establish one from the beginning,” and in this way “the politician should also help existing constitutions” (IV.1.1289a1–7). The political scientist should also be cognizant of forces of political change which can undermine an existing regime. Aristotle criticizes his predecessors for excessive utopianism and neglect of the practical duties of a political theorist. However, he is no Machiavellian. The best constitution still serves as a regulative ideal by which to evaluate existing systems.

These topics occupy the remainder of the Politics . Books IV–VI are concerned with the existing constitutions: that is, the three deviant constitutions, as well as polity or the “mixed” constitution, which are the best attainable under most circumstances (IV.2.1289a26–38). The mixed constitution has been of special interest to scholars because it looks like a forerunner of modern republican regimes. The whole of book V investigates the causes and prevention of revolution or political change ( metabolê ) and civil war or faction ( stasis ). Books VII–VIII are devoted to the ideal constitution. As might be expected, Aristotle’s attempt to carry out this program involves many difficulties, and scholars disagree about how the two series of books (IV–VI and VII–VIII) are related to each other: for example, which were written first, which were intended to be read first, and whether they are ultimately consistent with each other. Most importantly, when Aristotle offers practical political prescriptions in Books IV–VI, is he guided by the best constitution as a regulative ideal, or is he simply abandoning political idealism and practicing a form of Realpolitik?For a further discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary document:

Aristotle has continued to influence thinkers up to the present throughout the political spectrum, including conservatives (such as Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, and Eric Voegelin), communitarians (such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel), liberals (such as William Galston and Martha C. Nussbaum), libertarians (such as Tibor R. Machan, Douglas B. Rasmussen, and Douglas J. Den Uyl), and democratic theorists (such as Jill Frank and Gerald M. Mara).

It is not surprising that such diverse political persuasions can lay claim to Aristotle as a source. For his method often leads to divergent interpretations. When he deals with a difficult problem, he is inclined to consider opposing arguments in a careful and nuanced manner, and he is often willing to concede that there is truth on each side. For example, though he is critical of democracy, in one passage he allows that the case for rule by the many based on the superior wisdom of the multitude “perhaps also involves some truth” ( Pol. III.11.1281a39–42). Again, he sometimes applies his own principles in a questionable manner, for example, when he reasons that because associations should be governed in a rational manner, the household should be run by the husband rather than by the wife, whose rational capacity “lacks authority” (I.13.1260a13). Modern commentators sympathetic with Aristotle’s general approach often contend that in this case he applies his own principles incorrectly–leaving open the question of how they should be applied. Further, the way he applies his principles may have seemed reasonable in his socio-political context–for example, that the citizen of a polity (normally the best attainable constitution) must be a hoplite soldier (cf. III.7,1297b4)–but it may be debatable how these might apply within a modern democratic nation-state.

The problem of extrapolating to modern political affairs can be illustrated more fully in connection with Aristotle’s discussion of legal change in Politics II.8. He first lays out the argument for making the laws changeable. It has been beneficial in the case of medicine, for example, for it to progress from traditional ways to improved forms of treatment. An existing law may be a vestige of a primitive barbaric practice. For instance, Aristotle mentions a law in Cyme that allows an accuser to produce a number of his own relatives as witnesses to prove that a defendant is guilty of murder. “So,” Aristotle concludes, “it is evident from the foregoing that some laws should sometimes be changed. But to those who look at the matter from a different angle, caution would seem to be required” (1269a12–14). Since the law gets its force from the citizens’ habit of obedience, great care should be exercised in making any change in it. It may sometimes be better to leave defective laws in place rather than encouraging lawlessness by changing the laws too frequently. Moreover, there are the problems of how the laws are to be changed and who is to change them. Although Aristotle offers valuable insights, he breaks off the discussion of this topic and never takes it up elsewhere. We might sum up his view as follows: When it comes to changing the laws, observe the mean: don’t be too bound by traditional laws, but on the other hand don’t be overeager in altering them. It is obvious that this precept, reasonable as it is, leaves considerable room for disagreement among contemporary “neo-Aristotelian” theorists. For example, should the laws be changed to allow self-described transsexual persons to use sexually segregated restrooms? Conservatives and liberals might agree with Aristotle’s general stricture regarding legal change but differ widely on how to apply it in a particular case.

Most scholars of Aristotle advisedly make no attempt to show that he is aligned with any contemporary ideology. Rather, insofar as they find him relevant to our times, it is because he offers a remarkable synthesis of idealism and pragmatism unfolding in deep and thought-provoking discussions of perennial concerns of political philosophy: the role of human nature in politics, the relation of the individual to the state, the place of morality in politics, the theory of political justice, the rule of law, the analysis and evaluation of constitutions, the relevance of ideals to practical politics, the causes and cures of political change and revolution, and the importance of a morally educated citizenry.

  • action: praxis
  • citizen: politês
  • city-state: polis (also ‘city’ or ‘state’)
  • community: koinônia
  • constitution: politeia (also ‘regime’)
  • faction: stasis (also ‘civil war’)
  • free: eleutheros
  • friendship: philia
  • good: agathos
  • happiness: eudaimonia
  • happy: eudaimôn
  • justice: dikaiosunê
  • lawgiver: nomothetês
  • master: despotês
  • nature: phusis
  • noble: kalon (also ‘beautiful’ or ‘fine’)
  • people ( dêmos )
  • political: politikos (of, or pertaining to, the polis )
  • political science: politikê epistêmê
  • politician: politikos (also ‘statesman’)
  • practical: praktikos
  • practical wisdom: phronêsis
  • revolution: metabolê (also ‘change’)
  • right: exousia (also ‘liberty’)
  • ruler: archôn
  • self-sufficient: autarkês
  • sovereign: kurios
  • virtue: aretê (also ‘excellence’)
  • without qualification: haplôs (also ‘absolute’)
  • without authority: akuron

Note on Citations . Passages in Aristotle are cited as follows: title of treatise (italics), book (Roman numeral), chapter (Arabic numeral), line reference. Line references are keyed to the 1831 edition of Immanuel Bekker which had two columns (“a” and “b”) on each page. Politics is abbreviated as Pol. and Nicomachean Ethics as NE . In this article, “ Pol . I.2.1252b27”, for example, refers to Politics book I, chapter 2, page 1252, column b, line 27. Most translations include the Bekker page number with column letter in the margin followed by every fifth line number.

Passages in Plato are cited in a similar fashion, except the line references are to the Stephanus edition of 1578 in which pages were divided into five parts (“a” through “e”).

Caveat on Bibliography. Although fairly extensive, this bibliography represents only a fraction of the secondary literature in English. However, the items cited here contain many references to other valuable scholarly work in other languages as well as in English.

  • Dreizehnter, Alois, Aristoteles’ Politik , Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1970 [generally the most reliable critical edition].
  • Ross, W. D., Aristotelis Politica , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957.
  • Barker, Ernest, revised by Richard Stalley, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
  • Jowett, Benjamin, revised in The Complete Works of Aristotle (The Revised Oxford Translation), Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, vol. II, pp. 1986–2129.
  • Lord, Carnes, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013, revised edition.
  • Rackham, H., Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 1932.
  • Reeve, C. D. C., Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2017 (new translation).
  • Simpson, Peter L. P., Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
  • Sinclair, T. A., revised by Trevor J. Saunders, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983.

The Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford University Press) includes translation and commentary of the Politics in four volumes:

  • Trevor J. Saunders, Politics I–II (1995).
  • Richard Robinson with a supplementary essay by David Keyt, Politics III–IV (1995).
  • David Keyt, Politics V–VI (1999).
  • Richard Kraut, Politics VII–VIII (1997).
  • Also of interest is the Constitution of Athens , an account of the history and workings of the Athenian democracy. Although it was formerly ascribed to Aristotle, it is now thought by most scholars to have been written by one of his pupils, perhaps at his direction toward the end of Aristotle’s life. A reliable translation with introduction and notes is by P. J. Rhodes, Aristotle: The Athenian Constitution . Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984.
  • Barnes, Jonathan, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji (eds.), Articles on Aristotle (Volume 2: Ethics and Politics), London: Duckworth, 1977.
  • Boudouris, K. J. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, 2 volumes, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995.
  • Deslauriers, Marguerite, and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
  • Höffe, Otfried (ed.), Aristoteles Politik , Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001.
  • Keyt, David, and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
  • Kraut, Richard, and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.
  • Lockwood, Thornton, and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
  • Lord, Carnes, and David O’Connor (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
  • Patzig, Günther (ed.), Aristoteles’ Politik: Akten des XI. Symposium Aristotelicum , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990.
  • Aquinas, Thomas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics , translated by Richard J. Regan, Indianapolis Publishing Co.: Hackett, 2007.
  • Barker, Ernest, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle , London: Methuen, 1906; reprinted, New York: Russell & Russell, 1959.
  • Bodéüs, Richard, The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s Ethics , Albany: SUNY Press, 1993.
  • Brill, Sara, Aristotle on the Concept of the Shared Life , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
  • Hansen, Mogens Herman, Reflections on Aristotle’s Politics , Copenhagen: Tusculaneum Press, 2013.
  • Keyt, David, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017.
  • Kontos, Pavlos, Aristotle on the Scope of Practical Reason: Spectators, Legislators, Hopes, and Evils , Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2021.
  • Kraut, Richard, Aristotle: Political Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
  • Miller, Fred D., Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
  • Mulgan, Richard G., Aristotle’s Political Theory , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
  • Newman, W. L., The Politics of Aristotle , 4 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1887–1902; reprinted Salem, NH: Ayer, 1985.
  • Nichols, Mary, Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle’s Politics , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992.
  • Pangle, Lorraine Smith, Reason and Character: The Moral Foundations of Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020.
  • Pellegrin, Pierre, Endangered Excellent: On the Political Philosophy of Aristotle , translated by Anthony Preus, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2020.
  • Riesbeck, David J., Aristotle on Political Community , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
  • Roberts, Jean, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle and the Politics , London and New York: Routledge, 2009.
  • Schütrumpf, Eckart, Aristoteles: Politik , 4 vols. Berlin and Darmstadt: Akademie Verlag, 1999–2005.
  • Simpson, Peter, A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle , Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
  • Strauss, Leo, “On Aristotle’s Politics,” in The City and Man , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, pp. 13–49.
  • Susemihl, Franz, and R. D. Hicks, The Politics of Aristotle , London: Macmillan, 1894. [Includes books I–III and VII–VIII renumbered as IV–V.]
  • Trott, Adriel M., Aristotle on the Nature of Community , New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
  • Veogelin, Eric, Order and History (Vol. III: Plato and Aristotle ), Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1977.
  • Yack, Bernard, The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

1. Biographical and Textual Studies

  • Barker, Ernest, “The Life of Aristotle and the Composition and Structure of the Politics ,” Classical Review , 45 (1931), 162–72.
  • Jaeger, Werner, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948.
  • Kelsen, Hans, “Aristotle and the Hellenic-Macedonian Policy,” in Jonathan Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle (Volume 2: Ethics and Politics), London: Duckworth, 1977, pp. 170–94.
  • Lord, Carnes, “The Character and Composition of Aristotle’s Politics ,” Political Theory , 9 (1981), 459–78.

2. Methodology and Foundations of Aristotle’s Political Theory

  • Adkins, A. W. H., “The Connection between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 75–93.
  • Cherry, Kevin M., Plato, Aristotle and the Purpose of Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
  • Depew, David J., “The Ethics of Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Ryan K. Balot (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 399–418.
  • Frank Jill, “On Logos and Politics in Aristotle,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 9–26.
  • Frede, Dorothea, “The Political Character of Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 14–37.
  • Gerson, Lloyd, “On the Scientific Character of Aristotle’s Politics,” in K. I. Boudouris, K. I. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995, vol. I, pp. 35–50.
  • Irwin, Terence H., “Moral Science and Political Theory in Aristotle,” History of Political Thought , 6 (1985), pp. 150–68.
  • Kahn, Charles H., “The Normative Structure of Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Günther Patzig (ed.) Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 369–84.
  • Kamtekar, Rachana, “The Relationship between Aristotle’s Ethical and Political Discourses ( NE X 9),” in Ronald Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 370–82.
  • Keyt, David, “Aristotle’s Political Philosophy,” in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 165–95.
  • Lockwood, Thornton, “ Politics II: Political Critique, Political Theorizing, Political Innovation,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 64–83.
  • Miller, Fred D., Jr., “The Unity of Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” in David Konstan and David Sider (eds.), Philoderma: Essays in Greek and Roman Philosophy in Honor of Phillip Mitsis (Siracusa: Parnassos Press, 2022), pp. 215–43.
  • Ober, Joshua, “Aristotle’s Political Sociology: Class, Status, and Order in the Politics ,” in Carnes Lord and David O’Connor (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
  • Pellegrin, Pierre, “On the ‘Platonic’ Part of Aristotle’s Politics ,” in William Wians (ed.) Aristotle’s Philosophical Development , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996, pp. 347–59.
  • –––, “Is Politics a Natural Science?” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 27–45.
  • –––, “Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Christopher Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 558–85.
  • Peonids, F., “The Relation between the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics Revisited,” History of Political Thought 22 (2001): 1–12.
  • Rowe, Christopher J., “Aims and Methods in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 57–74.
  • Salkever, Stephen G., “Aristotle’s Social Science,” Political Theory , 9 (1981), pp. 479–508; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 27–64.
  • –––, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
  • Santas, Gerasimos X.,“The Relation between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” in K. I. Boudouris, K. I. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995, vol. I, pp. 160–76.
  • Smith, Nicholas D. and Robert Mayhew, “Aristotle on What the Political Scientist Needs to Know,” in K. I. Boudouris (ed.) Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Athens: International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, 1995, vol. I, pp. 189–98.
  • Vander Waerdt, Paul A., “The Political Intention of Aristotle’s Moral Philosophy,” Ancient Philosophy 5 (1985), 77–89.
  • –––, “The Plan and Intention of Aristotle’s Ethical and Political Writings,” Illinois Classical Studies 16 (1991), 231–53.

3. Political Naturalism

  • Ambler, Wayne, “Aristotle’s Understanding of the Naturalness of the City,” Review of Politics , 47 (1985), 163–85.
  • Annas, Julia, “Aristotle on Human Nature and Political Virtue,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 731–54.
  • Berryman, Sylvia, Aristotle on the Sources of the Ethical Life , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2919, esp. Ch. 3 “Naturalism in Aristotle’s Politics. ”
  • Chan, Joseph, “Does Aristotle’s Political Theory Rest on a Blunder?” History of Political Thought , 13 (1992), 189–202.
  • Chappell, Timothy, “‘Naturalism’ in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy,” in Ryan K. Balot (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 382–98.
  • Cherry, K. and E. A. Goerner, “Does Aristotle’s Polis Exist ‘By Nature’?” History of Political Thought , 27 (2006), 563–85.
  • Cooper, John M., “Political Animals and Civic Friendship,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 220–41; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 65–89.
  • DePew, David J., “Humans and Other Political Animals in Aristotle’s Historia Animalium ,” Phronesis , 40 (1995), 156–76.
  • –––, “Political Animals and the Genealogy of the Polis : Aristotle’s Politics and Plato’s Statesman ,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 238–57.
  • Everson, Stephen, “Aristotle on the Foundations of the State,” Political Studies , 36 (1988), 89–101.
  • Karbowski, Joseph, “Political Animals and Human Nature in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 221–37.
  • Keyt, David, “The Meaning of BIOS in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics ,” Ancient Philosophy , 9 (1989), 15–21; reprinted in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 101–9.
  • –––, “Three Basic Theorems in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 118–41; reprinted in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 111–38.
  • Kullmann, Wolfgang, “Man as a Political Animal in Aristotle,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 94–117.
  • Lloyd, Geoffrey, “Aristotle on the Natural Sociability, Skills and Intelligence of Animals,” in Verity Harte and Melissa Lane (eds.), Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 277–94.
  • Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle: Naturalism,” in Christopher J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 321–43.
  • Mulgan, Richard, “Aristotle’s Doctrine that Man is a Political Animal,” Hermes , 102 (1974), 438–45.
  • Reeve, C. D. C., “The Naturalness of the Polis in Aristotle,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 512–25.
  • Roberts, Jean, “Political Animals in the Nicomachean Ethics ,” Phronesis , 34 (1989), 185–202.

4. Household: Women, Children, and Slaves

  • Booth, William James, “Politics and the Household: A Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics Book One,” History of Political Thought , 2 (1981), 203–26.
  • Brunt, P. A., “Aristotle and Slavery,” in Studies in Greek History and Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 434–88.
  • Chambliss, J. J., “Aristotle’s Conception of Children and the Poliscraft,” Educational Studies , 13 (1982), 33–43.
  • Cole, Eve Browning, “Women, Slaves, and ‘Love of Toil’ in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 127–44.
  • Deslauriers, Marguerite, “The Virtues of Women and Slaves,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 25 (2003), 213–31.
  • –––, “Political Rule Over Women in Politics ,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 46–63.
  • Fortenbaugh, W. W., “Aristotle on Slaves and Women,” in Jonathan Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle , vol. 2, Ethics and Politics. London: Duckworth, 1977, pp. 135–9.
  • Frank, Jill, “Citizens, Slaves, and Foreigners: Aristotle on Human Nature,” American Political Science Review , 98 (2004), 91–104.
  • Freeland, Cynthia, Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle , University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998.
  • Garnsey, Peter, Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
  • Lindsay, Thomas K., “Was Aristotle Racist, Sexist, and Anti-Democratic?: A Review Essay,” Review of Politics 56 (1994), 127–51.
  • Lockwood, Thornton, “Justice in Aristotle’s Household and City,” Polis , 20 (2003), 1–21.
  • –––, “Is Natural Slavery Beneficial?” Journal of the History of Philosophy , 45 (2007), 207–21.
  • Mayhew, Robert, The Female in Aristotle’s Biology: Reason or Rationalization , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
  • Modrak, Deborah, “Aristotle: Women, Deliberation, and Nature,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 207–21.
  • Mulgan, Robert G., “Aristotle and the Political Role of Women,” History of Political Thought , 15 (1994), 179–202.
  • Nagle, D. Brendan, The Household as the Foundation of Aristotle’s Polis , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
  • Pellegrin, Pierre, “Natural Slavery,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 92–116.
  • Saxenhouse, Arlene W., “Family, Polity, and Unity: Aristotle on Socrates’ Community of Wives,” Polity , 15 (1982), 202–19.
  • Schofield, Malcolm, “Ideology and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Theory of Slavery,” in Günther Patzig (ed.) Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 1–27; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 91–119.
  • Senack, Christine M., “Aristotle on the Woman’s Soul,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 223–36.
  • Simpson, Peter, “Aristotle’s Criticism of Socrates’ Communism of Wives and Children,” Apeiron , 24 (1991), 99–114.
  • Smith, Nicholas D., “Plato and Aristotle on the Nature of Women,” Journal of the History of Philosophy , 21 (1983), 467–78.
  • –––, “Aristotle’s Theory of Natural Slavery,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 142–55.
  • Spelman, E. V., “Aristotle and the Politicization of the Soul,” in Sandra Harding and M. B. Hintikka (eds) Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science , Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983, pp. 17–30.
  • –––, “Who’s Who in the Polis,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 99–125.
  • Stauffer, Dana J., “Aristotle’s Account of the Subjection of Women,” Journal of Politics , 70 (2008), 929–41.

5. Political Economy

  • Ambler, Wayne H., “Aristotle on Acquisition,” Canadian Journal of Political Science , 17 (1984), 487–502.
  • Crespo, Ricardo F., A Re-assessment of Aristotle ’ s Economic Thought . London: Routledge, 2014.
  • Dobbs, Darrell, “Aristotle’s Anticommunism,” American Journal of Political Science , 29 (1985), 29–46.
  • Finley, M. I., “Aristotle and Economic Analysis,” in Jonathan Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle , vol. 2, Ethics and Politics. London: Duckworth, 1977, pp. 140–58.
  • Gallagher, Robert L., Aristotle’s Critique of Political Economy with a Contemporary Application. London: Routledge, 2018.
  • Hadreas, Peter, “Aristotle on the Vices and Virtue of Wealth,” Journal of Business Ethics, 39 (2002), 361–76.
  • Hartman, Edwin M., “Virtue, Profit, and the Separation Thesis: An Aristotelian View,” Journal of Business Ethics ,99 (2011), 5–17.
  • –––, Virtue in Business: Conversations with Aristotle . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
  • Inamura, Kazutaka, “The Role of Reciprocity in Aristotle’s Theory of Political Economy,” History of Political Thought , 32 (2011), 565–87.
  • Irwin, Terence H., “Aristotle’s Defense of Private Property,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.). A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 200–25.
  • Judson, Lindsay, “Aristotle on Fair Exchange,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 15 (1997), 147–75.
  • Keyt, David, “Aristotle and the Joy of Working,” in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, pp. 223–39.
  • Mathie, William,“Property in the Political Science of Aristotle,” in Anthony Parel & Thomas Flanagan(eds.), Theories of Property: Aristotle to the Present . Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1979, pp. 12–35.
  • Mayhew, Robert, “Aristotle on Property,” The Review of Metaphysics , 46 (1993), 802–31.
  • McNeill, D., “Alternative Interpretations of Aristotle on Exchange and Reciprocity,” Public Affairs Quarterly , 4 (1990), 55–68.
  • Mei, Todd S., “The Preeminence of Use: Reevaluating the Relation between Use and Exchange in Aristotle’s Economic Thought,” American Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2009), 523–48.
  • Meikle, Scott, “Aristotle on Money” Phronesis 39 (1994), 26–44.
  • –––, Aristotle’s Economic Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
  • Miller, Fred D. Jr., “Property Rights in Aristotle,” in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 121–44.
  • –––, “Was Aristotle the First Economist?” Apeiron , 31 (1998), 387–98.
  • –––, “Aristotle and Business: Friend or Foe?” in Eugene Heath and Byron Kaldis (eds.), Wealth, Commerce and Philosophy: Foundational Thinkers and Business Ethics , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017, pp. 31–52.
  • Morris, Tom, If Aristotle Ran General Motors: The New Soul of Business , New York: Henry Holt, 1997.
  • Nielsen, Karen Margrethe, “Economy and Private Property,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 67–91.
  • Solomon, Robert C., “Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics,” Business Ethics Quarterly , 2 (1992), 317–39.
  • –––, “Aristotle, Ethics, and Business Organizations,” Organization Studies, 25 (2004), 1021–43.

6. Political Justice and Injustice

  • Brunschwig, Jacques, “The Aristotelian Theory of Equity,” in Michael Frede and Gisela Striker (eds.), Rationality in Greek Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 115–55.
  • Marguerite Deslauriers, “Political Unity and Inequality,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 117–43.
  • Georgiadis, Constantine, “Equitable and Equity in Aristotle,” in Spiro Panagiotou (ed.), Justice, Law and Method in Plato and Aristotle , Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 1987, pp. 159–72.
  • Keyt, David, “Aristotle’s Theory of Distributive Justice,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 238–78.
  • –––, “The Good Man and the Upright Citizen in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), Freedom, Reason, and the Polis: Essays in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 220–40. Reprinted in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 197–221.
  • –––, “Nature and Justice,” in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, pp. 1–19.
  • Lockwood, Thornton, “Polity, Political Justice, and Political Mixing,” History of Political Thought , 27 (2006), 207–22.
  • Morrison, Donald, “The Common Good,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 176–98.
  • Nussbaum, Martha C., “Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 153–87.
  • Roberts, Jean, “Justice and the Polis,” in Christopher J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 344–65.
  • Rosler, Andrés, “Civic Virtue: Citizenship, Ostracism, and War,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 144–75.
  • Saxonhouse, Arlene W., “Aristotle on the Corruption of Regimes: Resentment and Justice,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 184–203.
  • Schütrumpf, Eckart, “Little to Do With Justice: Aristotle on Distributing Political Power,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 163–83.
  • Young, Charles M., “Aristotle on Justice,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy , 27 (1988), 233–49.
  • Zingano, Marco, “Natural, Ethical, and Political Justice,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 199–222.

7. Political Friendship and Enmity

  • Hatzistavrou, Antony, “Faction,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 301–23.
  • Irrera, Elena, “Between Advantage and Virtue: Aristotle’s Theory of Political Friendship,” History of Political Thought , 26 (2005), 565–85.
  • Jang, Misung, “Aristotle’s Political Friendship as Solidarity,” in Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer, & Nuno M.S. Coelho (eds.), Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics, Dordrecht: Springer, 2018. pp. 417–33.
  • Kalimtzis, Kostas, Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease: An Inquiry into Stasis , Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000.
  • Kreft, Nora, “Aristotle on Friendship and Being Human,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 182–99.
  • Kronman, Anthony, “Aristotle’s Idea of Political Fraternity,” American Journal of Jurisprudence , 24 (1979),114–138.
  • Leontsini, Eleni, “The Motive of Society: Aristotle on Civic Friendship, Justice, and Concord,” Res Publica , 19 (2013), 21–35.
  • Ludwig, Paul W., Rediscovering Political Friendship: Aristotle’s Theory and Modern Identity, Community, and Equality , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.
  • Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle on Deviant Constitutions,” in K. I. Boudouris, K. I. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995, vol. II, pp. 105–15.
  • Mulgan, Richard, “The Role of Friendship in Aristotle’s Political Theory,” in Preston King, and Heather Devere (eds.), The Challenge to Friendship in M odernity , London: Frank Cass, 2000, pp. 15–32.
  • Schofield, Malcolm, “Political Friendship and the Ideology of Reciprocity,” in Saving the City , London: Routledge, 1999, pp. 82–99.
  • Schwarzenbach, Sibyl, “On Civic Friendship,” Ethics , 107 (1996), 97–128.
  • Skultety, Steven C.,. “Defining Aristotle’s Conception of Stasis in the Politics ,” Phronesis 54 (2009), 346–70.
  • –––, Conflict in Aristotle ’ s Political Philosophy , Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 2019.
  • Sosa, Javier Echeñique & Jose Antonio Errázuriz Besa, “Aristotle on Personal Enmity,” Ancient Philosophy , 62 (2022), 215–31.
  • Ward, Ann, “Friendship and politics in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics ,” European Journal of Political Theory , 10 (2011), 443–62.
  • Weed, Ronald, Aristotle on Stasis: A Psychology of Political Conflict , Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2007.
  • Yack, Bernard, “Community and Conflict in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy,” Review of Politics , 47 (1985), 92–112.
  • –––, “Natural Right and Aristotle’s Understanding of Justice,” Political Theory , 18 (1990), 216–37.

8. Citizenship, Civic Obligation, and Political Rights

  • Allan, D. J., “Individual and State in the Ethics and Politics ,” Entretiens sur l’Antiquité Classique IX, La ‘Politique’ d’Aristote , Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1964, pp. 53–95.
  • Barnes, Jonathan, “Aristotle and Political Liberty,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 249–63; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 185–201.
  • Collins, Susan D., Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
  • Frede, Dorothea, “Citizenship in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 167–84.
  • Horn, Christoph, “Law, Governance, and Political Obligation,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 223–46.
  • Irwin, Terence H., “The Good of Political Activity,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 73–98.
  • Kraut, Richard, “Are There Natural Rights in Aristotle?” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 755–74.
  • Lane, Melissa, “Claims to Rule: The Case of the Mutlitude,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 247–74.
  • Long, Roderick T., “Aristotle’s Conception of Freedom,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 775–802; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 384–410.
  • Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle and the Origins of Natural Rights,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 873–907.
  • –––, “Aristotle’s Theory of Political Rights,” in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 309–50.
  • Morrison, Donald, “Aristotle’s Definition of Citizenship: A Problem and Some Solutions,” History of Philosophy Quarterly , 16 (1999), 143–65.
  • Mulgan, Robert G., “Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation,” Political Theory , 18 (1990), 195–215.
  • Roberts, Jean, “Excellences of the Citizen and of the Individual,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 555–65.
  • Samaras, Thanassis, “Aristotle and the Question of Citizenship,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 123–41.
  • Schofield, Malcolm, “Sharing in the Constitution,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 831–58; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 353–80.
  • Zuckert, Catherine H., “Aristotle on the Limits and Satisfactions of Political Life,” Interpretation , 11 (1983), 185–206.

9. Constitutional Theory

  • Balot, Ryan, “The ‘Mixed Regime’ In Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 103–22.
  • Bates, Clifford A., Aristotle’s “Best Regime”: Kingship, Democracy, and the Rule of Law , Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003.
  • Bobonich, Christopher, “Aristotle, Decision Making, and the Many,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 142–62.
  • Cherry, Kevin M., “The Problem of Polity: Political Participation in Aristotle’s Best Regime,” Journal of Politics , 71 (2009), 406–21.
  • Coby, Patrick, “Aristotle’s Three Cities and the Problem of Faction,” Journal of Politics , 50 (1988), 896–919.
  • Destrée, Pierre, “Aristotle on Improving Imperfect Cities,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 204–23.
  • Dietz, Mary G., “Between Polis and Empire: Aristotle’s Politics ,” American Political Science Review 106 (2012), 275–93.
  • Garsten, Bryan, “Deliberating and Acting Together,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 324–49.
  • Huxley, G., “On Aristotle’s Best State,” in Paul Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (eds.), Crux: Essays Presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix , London: Duckworth, 1985, pp. 139–49.
  • Johnson, Curtis N., Aristotle’s Theory of the State , New York: Macmillan, 1990.
  • Keyt, David, “Aristotle and Anarchism,” Reason Papers , 18 (1993), 133–52; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety. Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 203–22.
  • Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle’s Critique of False Utopias,” in Otfried Höffe (ed.), Aristoteles Politik , Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001, pp. 59–73.
  • Lintott, Andrew, “Aristotle and Democracy,” The Classical Quarterly (New Series), 42 (1992), 114–28.
  • Mayhew, Robert, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Republic , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.
  • –––, “Rulers and Ruled,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 526–39.
  • Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle on the Ideal Constitution,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 540–54.
  • –––, “The Rule of Reason,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 38–66.
  • Mulgan, Richard, “Aristotle’s Analysis of Oligarchy and Democracy,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 307–22.
  • –––, “Constitutions and the Purpose of the State,” in Otfried Höffe (ed.), Aristoteles Politik , Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001, pp. 93–106.
  • Mulhern, J. J., “ Politeia in Greek Literature, Inscriptions, and in Aristotle’s Politics : Reflections on Translation and Interpretation,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 84–102.
  • Murray, O., “Polis and Politeia in Aristotle,” in Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), The Ancient Greek City-State , Copenhagen: Muksgaard, 1993, pp. 197–210.
  • Ober, Joshua, “Aristotle’s Natural Democracy,” in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 223–43.
  • –––, “Democracy’s Wisdom: An Aristotelian Middle Way for Collective Judgment,” American Political Science Review , 107 (2013), 104–22.
  • –––, “Nature, History, and Aristotle’s Best Possible Regime,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 224–43.
  • Polansky, Ronald, “Aristotle on Political Change,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 322–45.
  • Rosler, Andres, Political Authority and Obligation in Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
  • Rowe, C. J., “Reality and Utopia,” Elenchos , 10 (1989), 317–36.
  • –––, “Aristotelian Constitutions,” in Christopher J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 366–89.
  • Strauss, Barry, “On Aristotle’s Critique of Athenian Democracy,” in Carnes Lord and David O’Connor (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, pp. 212–33.
  • Vander Waert, Paul A., “Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Best Regime,” Phronesis , 30 (1985), 249–73.
  • Waldron, Jeremy, “The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle’s Politics ,” Political Theory , 20 (1992), 613–41; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 145–65.
  • Wilson, James L., “Deliberation, Democracy, and the Rule of Reason in Aristotle’s Politics ,” American Political Science Review , 105 (2011), 259–74.

10. Education

  • Burnyeat, Myles F., “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good,” in Amelie O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, pp. 69–92.
  • Curren, Randall R., Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000.
  • Depew, David J., “Politics, Music, and Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ideal State,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 346–80.
  • Destrée, Pierre, “Education, Leisure, and Politics,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 301–23.
  • Frede, Dorothea, “The Deficiency of Human Nature: The Task of a ‘Philosophy of Human Nature’,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 258–74.
  • Jimenez, Marta, Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.
  • Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle on Method and Moral Education,” in Jyl Gentzler (ed.), Method in Ancient Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 171–90.
  • –––, “Aristotle on Becoming Good: Habituation, Reflection, and Perception,” in Christopher Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 529–57.
  • Lord, Carnes, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982.
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  • Muzio, G. D., “Aristotle on Improving One’s Character,” Phronesis , 45 (2000), 205–19.
  • Reeve, C. D. C,  “Aristotelian Education,” in A. O. Rorty (ed.), Philosophers on Education , London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 51–65.
  • Stalley, Richard, “Education and the State,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 566–76.
  • Brooks, Richard O. and James B. Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003.
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  • Gordley, James R., “Tort Law in the Aristotelian Tradition,” in Salvador Rus Rufino (ed.), Aristoteles: El Pensamiento Politico y Juridico . León & Seville: University of León & University of Seville, 1999, pp. 71–97.
  • Hamburger, Max, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle’s Legal Theory , New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951.
  • Huppes-Cluysenaer, Liesbeth & Nuno M..S. Coelho (eds.), Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics , Dordrecht: Springer, 2018.
  • Miller, Eugene, “Prudence and the Rule of Law,” American Journal of Jurisprudence , 24 (1979), 181–206.
  • Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle’s Philosophy of Law,” in Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Carrie-Ann Biondi (eds.), A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics [vol. 6 of A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence , ed. Enrico Pattaro]. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007, pp.79–110.
  • Schroeder, Donald N., “Aristotle on Law,” Polis , 4 (1981), 17–31; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 37–51.
  • Wormuth, F. D., “Aristotle on Law,” in M. R. Korvitz and A. E. Murphy (eds.), Essays in Political Theory Presented to G. H. Sabine,  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1948, pp. 45–61.
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12. Aristotle and Contemporary Politics

  • Biondi, Carrie-Ann, “Aristotle on the Mixed Constitution and Its Relevance for American Political Thought,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), Freedom, Reason, and the Polis: Essays in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 176–98.
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  • Garver, Eugene, Aristotle’s Politics: Living Well and Living Together , Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011.
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  • Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle and Rawls on the Common Good,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 350–74.
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  • –––, “Capabilities and Human Rights,” Fordham Law Review , 66 (1997), 273–300; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 413–40.
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  • Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Douglas J. Den Uyl, Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order , La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991.
  • –––, Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics , University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005.
  • Schollmeier, Paul, Rewriting Contemporary Political Philosophy with Plato and Aristotle: An Essay on Eudaimonic Politics,  London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019.
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Political Political Theory Theory

POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY: ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS . By Jeremy Waldron. [1] Harvard University Press. 2016. Pp. 403. $35.00 (cloth).

Jeremy D. Farris [2] and William A. Edmundson [3]

INTRODUCTION

Political theory has not always been a self-confident discipline. In 1961, Isaiah Berlin, the Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford, wondered whether it continued to exist. His answer was irresolute. Berlin thought that political theory’s existence was assured because it poses normative questions that are unanswerable by empirical political science. [4] Certain questions elude resolution by empirical observation— e.g. , How should scarce goods be distributed? Why should persons comply with law? What actions may a state permissibly coerce? Ironically, such normative questions also seem to have eluded Berlin. Instead of positing and defending a coherent set of answers to these questions, Berlin’s approach to political theory was far more circumspect, concerned foremost to recite the history of answers supplied by the mighty dead, whom he chided for ignoring either the irreducible plurality of value or the mischievous tendency of “positive” liberty.

Then came John Rawls. After the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, Rawls’s critic and colleague Robert Nozick wrote, “Political philosophers now must either work within Rawls’s theory or explain why not.” [5] Most have chosen to work within or against Rawls’s framework, using tools supplied by analytic philosophy. The lion’s share of the work has been focused on clarifying the meaning and requirements of justice and explaining the relationship of justice to other normative concepts. Representative of this tradition is G.A. Cohen, late Quain Professor at University College London and previously Chichele Professor at Oxford. Cohen began his Oxford graduate seminar on contemporary political philosophy by teaching that the subject, properly understood, concerned three distinct questions: What are the correct principles of justice? What should the state do? And which social states of affairs ought to be brought about? [6]

Today, those normative questions delineate much of the discipline of political theory. But compare those questions with this one: Are there decisive reasons for or against a supermajoritarian cloture rule in the upper chamber of a legislative assembly? Like Cohen’s triptych of questions, the “filibuster question” is neither empirical nor legal, but straightforwardly normative. As such, the inquiry about the filibuster rule falls somewhere within the discipline-organizing question about what the state should do. Yet, having begun at Cohen’s high level of generality, it is unclear how, or even if, the specific “filibuster question” will be addressed. This is because the general question––What should the state do?––leads naturally to subsequent inquiry about which goals states should pursue and what states must not do in their pursuit. From that point of departure, a political theorist likely proceeds to further discussion of the justification of those goals that the state should promote and the foundation of the rights that constrain state action. Political theory never gets to questions about cloture rules; unless, of course, it begins there.

And that is just what Jeremy Waldron has in mind. With the publication of Political Political Theory , the latest (though, not current) holder of Oxford’s Chichele Professorship, now University Professor at New York University Law School, hopes to “encourage young political theorists to understand that there is life beyond Rawls” (p. ix). Although one may doubt whether the refocusing that Waldron has in mind really is to be found “beyond Rawls”—for Rawls was also deeply focused on the justification of democratic institutions—Waldron’s meaning is clear: For those working in political theory, he says, there is life “beyond the abstract understanding of liberty, justice, and egalitarianism. . .” (p. ix). Instead of attempting to elucidate the meaning of our largest normative concepts, instead of testing the soundness of hypothesized normative principles against all manner of counterfactual thought experiments, political theory should focus on the evaluation of the rules and structure of state institutions.

  • THE REORIENTATION OF POLITICAL THEORY

With the exception of three chapters, the book collects part of Waldron’s already-published work on law and political theory. Together, the individual pieces amount to a program to reorient the focus of political theory toward constitutional law and institutional design. For Waldron, political theory ought to be more concerned, in the first instance, with the design and justification of the institutions that comprise constitutional, democratic republics. This is what he means by calling for a return to political political theory. Three chapters, the first and the two last, frame Waldron’s project— viz. , Chapter 1, “ Political Political Theory” (pp. 1-22), Chapter 12, “Isaiah Berlin’s Neglect of Enlightenment Constitutionalism” (pp. 274-289), and Chapter 13, “The Constitutional Politics of Hannah Arendt,” (pp. 290-307). It is in these chapters that Waldron most clearly issues his call to refocus the task of political theory. There, he most clearly provides the reasons demanding a reorientation.

In a way, Waldron’s call for reform seems to issue from the oak-paneled Senior Common Room. No one would seriously dispute that the United Kingdom is undergoing a period of constitutional change and institutional upheaval. Only a few reminders are needed: Brexit, the potential secession of Scotland or Northern Ireland, the establishment of the UK Supreme Court, the reform of the House of Lords, and the Fixed Term Parliament Act. There is a concern that the present curriculum of the “Theory of Politics” course, which is compulsory for Oxford’s flagship Philosophy, Politics, and Economics degree, is not endowing its graduates with a better-than-par understanding of the normative issues involved in the United Kingdom’s institutional transformation. Waldron suggests that the academies in the United States may be more attuned to institutional questions, given the acute public sensitivity to the countermajoritarian aspect of judicial review (p. 18). One would like to hope so; however, we cannot help but wonder if American law students, much less undergraduates majoring in public policy or political science, are comparatively better prepared than their Oxonian counterparts to analyze analogous American institutional questions concerning, for example, the basis of reapportionment, the institutional actors responsible for redistricting, or the growth of executive power and the possible limits thereto. Perhaps American law students were at a comparative advantage during the days when the legal process school informed the curriculum, but those days have passed.

Waldron’s project to reorient political theory toward questions of the value and design of institutions is not only motivated by the pedagogical concern that students of politics should be able to think through the institutional challenges that they will inherit. His call for reorientation seems to be motivated by a much darker concern—specifically, the threat posed to constitutional democracies by the concentration of executive power. We, the inheritors of “Enlightenment constitutionalism,” should deeply understand how our institutions legitimate and channel the exercise of state power, lest we sign such power over to an executive who neither apprehends the values of constitutionalism, nor cares.

Hinting at this greatest concern, Waldron refers, both in the first and the last chapter, to Christian Meier’s biography of Julius Caesar. [7] The reference illuminates what Waldron perceives ought to be political theory’s animating fear. In the book, Waldron quotes Meier twice for the particular threat that Caesar represents:

Caesar was insensitive to political institutions and the complex ways in which they operate …. He could see them only as instruments in the interplay of forces. His cold gaze passed through everything that Roman society still believed in, lived by, valued and defended. He had no feeling for the power of institutions … but only what he found useful or troublesome about them.… In Caesar’s eyes no one existed but himself and his opponents.… The scene was cleared of any suprapersonal elements (pp. 14-15, 306).

The reader is to take the lesson that, from a certain viewpoint, those institutions that structure and limit state power may be de-reified —that is, seen through, as really nothing more than the individuals who comprise them and, thus, as nothing more than sets of friends or enemies. Once the institutions that separate and protect individuals from concentrated executive power are bathed away, warns Waldron, what remains is politics at its most unmediated and perilous. Once institutional bulwarks are discredited and are seen to be nothing more than “parchment barriers” after all, only unmediated power remains.

Such unmediated power can manifest in different forms. For instance, it can be highly concentrated in the executive branch. Waldron succinctly characterizes the view of the executive who, like Caesar, successfully devalues, discredits, and even “sees through” the institutions that previously existed to constrain his or her power: “Now there is just you, and me, and the issue of my greatness” (p. 15).

By contrast, the unmediated power that threatens constitutional institutions may also be highly diffuse. The political action characteristic of mass movements that express impatience with and suspicion of representation, political parties, and parliamentary procedure, is no less pathological for being diffuse. Waldron offers a formulation that captures exactly what is so terrifying about mob rule when the de-reification and disappearance of constitutional structures is complete: “Now there is just you and me and our interest in justice” (p. 15).

For Waldron, either way, the emergence of unmediated power heralds the end of both constitutional government and the preconditions for deliberative democracy. Whether shaped by a Caesar or by a Jacobin mass, the de-institutionalized landscape lies worlds away from the green and pleasant fields of constitutional democracy. Waldron’s implication for the activity of political theory is unmistakable: because the raison d’être of modern, constitutional republics is to prevent exactly the emergence of such unmediated power, so too should it be the organizing concern of academic political theory.

Waldron claims that the channeling, and thus the avoidance, of unmediated power was the also the organizing project of Enlightenment constitutionalism —“one of the most important achievements of the eighteenth century Enlightenment” (p. 274). Under the banner of “Enlightenment constitutionalism” we may group a core set of interrelated, institutional ideas that, although having previously emerged, became clear in the late eighteenth century. In abbreviated statement, they are: (1) the premise that sovereignty, i.e. , the ultimate authority to make and enforce law, inheres in the People itself (or themselves); (2) the notion that a constitution is fundamental law—distinct in both prestige and pedigree from ordinary legislation—and that such fundamental law grants and limits the powers of government; (3) the idea that the powers of government are susceptible to both definition and separation and, accordingly, may be located in different branches; (4) the commitment to the idea of actual, not virtual, representation of the People by government, such that governmental actors may be understood to be agents of specific groupings of the People and subject to their direction and recall; (5) the conviction that the People have rights against some types of governmental interference and that those rights are enshrined in fundamental law; and (6) the empowerment of the judiciary to review the actions of other branches of government for conformity with the powers both granted and limited by the fundamental law. [8]

Waldron identifies the main current of the history of political theory as the genealogy of exactly this set of ideas, whose canon he bookends with Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (1680) and the constitutional sections of Kant’s Rechtslehre (1797). Belonging to the canon, Waldron includes the writings of Madison, Sieyès, Voltaire, Diderot, Paine, Jefferson, Condorcet, Hamilton, Montesquieu, and Rousseau (p. 276). What these disparate members of the Enlightenment pantheon shared, first and foremost, was a predominant interest in the institutions of government and how those institutions channel political power to preclude tyranny. Their shared project concerning the makings of constitutional theory is the most significant tradition of political thought in the Enlightenment or since. Thus, Political Political Theory not only contains a call for reorientation in the objects of theory, but also suggests that the way the history of political thought is conceptualized and taught is also due for realignment.

And so, it is Isaiah Berlin—the much celebrated historian of ideas—who is the object of special criticism for neglecting Enlightenment constitutionalism in his ambitious but desultory writings. After “ransacking” this oeuvre , Waldron concludes that Berlin, at best, was just not interested in questions about institutional structure. Furthermore, Waldron holds Berlin responsible in part for the neglect of institutional concerns in political theory as it is conducted and taught in the United Kingdom. That might be unfair, and it likely overemphasizes the contribution of a single academician, even Berlin. In any event, as Waldron impishly puts it, “[t]he old man’s reputation can take it” (p. 289).

  • THE ACTIVITY OF POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY

How then does political political theory approach questions regarding the design of political institutions? From the book’s title, empirical political scientists might understand Waldron to be offering some appreciation of the importance of empirical and quantitative analysis in the study of choices that various polities face in the area of institutional design. They would be disappointed. The book contains very little in the way of empirical or quantitative analysis that might guide inquiry into institutional design. Even if it proposes to be political , “political political theory” remains theory , through and through.

Not that the aloofness from empirical work is necessarily grounds for objection. Much in political political theory is exemplary of what, by now, amounts to “best practices” in political theory, as it is conducted in analytically attuned philosophy and political science faculties. Waldron’s most often-used tool is common to (not-especially-political) political theory—namely, straightforward conceptual analysis to illuminate and parse variations in the meanings of our normative concepts. It is just that in political political theory, the lens of conceptual analysis is turned toward institutional concepts that have received comparatively less attention than the marquee concepts of justice and liberty.

The value of such conceptual analysis is easy to underestimate. The illumination and arrangement of institutional concepts gives clarity and precision to normative argument about institutional design. It also permits us to consider options in the design of political institutions that might have remained hidden from view, behind some elision or equivocation. For Waldron, this is the major lesson of Locke’s dissection of the executive power in the Second Treatise —“to disaggregate and analyze the different powers traditionally assigned to the Crown, to identify the limits to each one, and to make sure that the Crown does not escape these limits by blurring the public’s understanding of its various functions” (p. 92 n. 78). Locke’s analysis of the different components of the executive power was a necessary step for subsequent development in the argument for the separation of powers and the accountability and oversight of the executive.

Throughout the chapters, Waldron deploys the tools of conceptual analysis, dissecting the “theoretical anatomy” of our political institutions—legislatures especially—in thought-provoking ways. For example, the chapter entitled “Representative Lawmaking” separates the features of legislation that make it a distinct form of lawmaking, as compared to the lawmaking by judges and executive agencies, treaty, or custom (pp. 125-144). Better still, the chapter entitled “Accountability and Insolence” which is first published in this collection, offers an abbreviated “anatomy lesson” in republicanism (pp. 167–194). Republicanism, in its most encompassing definition, is the view “that the business conducted by government is the public business … rather than the patrimony of any privileged individual or family” (p. 175). Waldron cleverly uses the legal concepts of trust and agency to analyze variations in republican thought regarding the relationship between the government and the People.

On the one hand, republican government may be structured along the lines of a trust, wherein a settlor establishes a legal entity for the advantage of a beneficiary and empowers a trustee to act for the beneficiary. Although the beneficiary (the People) may hold the trustee (the government) accountable in certain ways that are formally structured according to the terms of the settlement, the beneficiary may not instruct or remove the trustee. There may be several lines of accountability in which one office of government formally oversees another office to verify that the latter is acting for the People’s benefit in accordance with the terms of the settlement. The government as trustee, however, is not directly responsive to the People: neither may the People instruct the government, nor may government officials be directly called to account or replaced by popular demand. Waldron associates the trust model of republican thought with the structure of the Venetian republic where, as he reads the history, the public was the beneficiary of the official conduct and the work of the officials was scrutinized by the senate for compliance with the rule of law and civic virtue (pp. 176-177).

On the other hand, a republican government may be better explained by the concept of agency , in which an agent (the government) acts on behalf of a principal (the People). Under the agency model, the principal may call the agent to give an account of the agent’s actions taken on behalf of principal, and the principal may sanction or replace or terminate the agency relationship. The analogy might even extend to include a principal’s power to instruct the agent and the agent’s duty to keep the principal informed. This agency model of republican thought introduces a particularly democratic form of accountability, and Waldron points (p. 177), as an example, to Madison’s description in Federalist 57 of the comparatively short term of electoral office in the House of Representatives:

[T]he House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members a habitual recollection of their dependence on the people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which they were raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it. [9]

The trust and the agency models of the accountability of government in republican thought are predicated on very different premises about the relationship of a people and a state that governs them. Under the agency model, the state belongs to the People; it is not just set up for their benefit. Therefore, the agency conception of republicanism entails the need to establish democratic structures by which the People themselves can actively demand an account of, if not instruct, their agents in government because the government acts for them and in their name. The trust model, by contrast, does not begin with a premise of popular sovereignty. Nor does it necessarily entail democratic procedures.

Waldron’s use of the legal concepts of trust and agency as analogies for thinking about the state is not novel (and the book makes no reference to Maitland), but these analogies shine light on conceptual variations of accountability. They also prompt questions regarding the accountability of our own institutions. For example, Waldron invites the reader to ponder whether the federal judiciary in the United States is better described in terms of the trust or the agency model of accountability. [10] He suggests that the exercise of judicial review of legislation is a “mediated form of democratic accountability” in which “court procedures operat[e] insistently to require legislators and other officials to give an account of themselves. . . .” (p. 193).

If by a “form of democratic accountability” Waldron means to refer to an agency-based characterization of the accountability of the federal judiciary, this view is doubtful. The relationship between the federal judiciary and the People is arguably better reflected by the trust analogy. Judicial review of legislation for conformance with both the powers and the individual rights conferred by the Constitution appears more akin to the internal oversight of trustees who ensure that some directors act in conformance with the settlement and for the beneficiary’s interest. Federal judges are not subject to popular instruction or to recall by popular will. Nor is it obvious that judges are, in any significant sense, representatives. Moreover, at least some federal judges on the highest bench have denied it. For example, when interpreting the ordinary meaning of “elected representatives” in a federal statute to exclude judges, the late Justice Scalia, joined by two other Justices, flatly said that “judges are not representatives.” [11] This pronouncement, at least with respect to federal judges, might easily command agreement: The People cannot easily call federal judges to account for their exercise of the power of judicial review, even through their representative agents in Congress. Nor can the People replace them or easily terminate their tenure. However, the defensibility of Scalia’s view with respect to state judges who are subject to periodic partisan or recall elections (or both) is more complicated. The accountability of democratically controllable state judges may tend more toward the agency-based model.

In addition to conceptual dissection, which Waldron does deftly and innovatively, another common movement in normal political theory is to stake out a set of normative principles and then evaluate some state of affairs by reference to those normative principles. Often in political theory this move involves the evaluation of some distribution of benefits and burdens under some principle of distributive justice. Surveying Waldron’s disparate book chapters, this movement also occurs in political political theory, but there the normative principles staked out are geared to evaluate some aspect of institutional design.

So, for example, in “Principles of Legislation,” Waldron maps out seven principles by which we may evaluate the legitimacy of legislation (pp. 149-150). By legitimacy, we mean that the law admits of a justification for compliance that might reasonably be demanded by those persons whose preferences or moral views were not enacted. As Waldron notes, the concept of legitimacy has a “more focused aspect … to reconcile the losing party in particular to the decision that has been made” (p. 255). A lawmaking procedure increases in legitimacy—that is, it produces laws that better satisfy the demand for a justification of coercion—to the extent it satisfies such “principles of legislation.” Under these principles, a law is more legitimate to the extent that it is (1) made explicitly (2) by representatives, who (3) take due care, (4) deliberate, (5) respect disagreement and (6) respect formality in decision-making, and is the outcome of (7) majority decision. Waldron posits this non-exhaustive set of values as especially appropriate to evaluate whether a particular procedural rule increases or decreases the legitimacy of laws that are the outcome of legislative procedures the rule, in part, comprises.

Now, these individual principles can point in different directions with respect to how a particular procedural rule contributes to, or detracts from, the legitimacy of law.  To complicate matters further, a rule’s satisfaction of one principle may depend on the satisfaction of other principles. Consider the above-mentioned Senate filibuster rule, Senate Rule XXII, and the evaluation of that rule under Waldron’s “principles of legislation.” A supermajoritarian cloture rule in effect requires a supermajority vote for the passage of legislation, thus failing to satisfy the majoritarianism principle and, consequently, detracting from the legitimacy of the procedure of which it forms a part. Yet, in so doing, the same supermajoritarian cloture rule might also render a law-making procedure more deliberative and more respectful of disagreement, and thus might add to the legitimacy of the laws it works to produce. But these legitimacy-conferring benefits of a supermajoritarian cloture rule depend on how the rule is invoked and received by the legislators on all sides of legislative debate. Hence, the legislators’ respect for the formality of the procedural rules and the legislators’ satisfaction of their duty to take care also inform whether a supermajoritarian cloture rule adds to or detracts from the legitimacy of law.

This abbreviated evaluation of the filibuster rule is offered as an example to suggest that the full normative analysis of procedural rules might become quite complicated. The satisfaction of “principles of legislation” by any given procedural rule will likely be interdependent, polycentric, and fact-sensitive. In the chapter devoted to “principles of legislation,” Waldron does not investigate the legitimacy of any particular procedural rule in light of the particular principles he stakes out. Rather, he offers a way of evaluating “the rulebook” in a light that is distinct from an analysis about the outcomes of the legislative procedure—statutes and their effects on the distribution of benefits and burdens. In so doing, Waldron anticipates the shape of normative arguments about choices we encounter in the design of a law-making institutions. After all, Political Political Theory is meant to be a paradigm-introducing work, not a commentary on, say, Riddick’s Senate Procedure . [12]

III. POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY AND NON-IDEAL THEORY

Like the empirical political scientists who may be tempted by the book’s title, other readers may come to Waldron’s book with forgivable yet incorrect assumptions about his project. From its calling card, one might suspect that political political theory will differentiate itself as offering a non-ideal version of political theory. Non-ideal theory seeks to offer normative principles about what the state should do, and what the obligations of citizens are, given that the current state of affairs is deeply unjust, that we can realistically expect that individuals will, at best, only partially comply with the demands of justice, and that a just distribution of benefits and burdens might not be accessible from here . In a sense, non-ideal theory takes people as they are and laws as they might be; however, depending on the assumptions about people as they are––and particularly that set of people who aspire to public office—that Rousseauvian methodological premise can result in a political theory that is deeply interested in questions of institutional design in order to achieve stability, not justice. And the worse one assumes people to be (and, again, especially those people who aspire to public office), the greater the emphasis on a theory of politics that privileges stability.

Think, for example, of the premise that Hume advised in questions of constitutional design:

Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought supposed to be a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest. [13]

The purpose of the person-as-knave design principle serves to protect governmental institutions from the ambition of the people who inhabit them. Madison also made reference to the knavery principle in his argument for the ratification of the federal constitution: “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition … it may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.” [14]

Waldron references Hume and Madison’s non-ideal interest in institutional design very early in the book to give a sense of the institutionalist turn he believes is required of political theory. But unlike the aforementioned passages, Waldron’s argument is not that normative theory should be more concerned with questions of institutional design because he believes that persons are knaves and, therefore, political theory should focus on how institutions can embank and direct the currents of their self-interest and irrationality. To the contrary, Waldron resists approaches to questions of institutional design that begin by taking people as they are, in the pejorative sense. To see this in the round, it is helpful to recall Waldron’s skepticism of the latest deployment of a kind of knavery principle in popular writing about questions of institutional design.

The knavery premise is not limited to great questions of constitutional design, posited with the purpose to preserve constitutional structures and to achieve stability. Rather, the same knavery premise has lately been employed, albeit in a slightly modified form, in the design of governmental institutions to promote various welfare-related ends. Imagine, then, that people are not only knaves, concerned only with their private interest, but also that they are not very capable of making decisions that best promote their interest. In short, imagine persons are unclever knaves. Confronted with a world populated with unclever knaves, so-called libertarian paternalists like Cass Sunstein recommend that government ought to ensure the design of a choice architecture that leverages the unclever knaves’ heuristics, biases, and laziness in ways that promote their interest. So, for example, because unclever knaves must save something for retirement, the government should ensure that employee 401(k) savings plans are not only offered, but that both enrollment and a certain contribution level are the default position, subject to an opt-out. And because unclever knaves must also eat lunch, the lunch staff should ensure that the broccoli appears first in the lunch line, where one has to request a tray or large cup. In other words, “nudging,” a well popularized approach to governmental regulation, assumes a form of the eighteenth century methodological assumption of person-as-knave.

Beyond the pages of the book under review, Waldron has expressed skepticism of “nudging” exactly because that theory of government regulation views persons as little more than unclever means toward their own ends, a view that falls far short of how government ought to apprehend and to respond to the dignity of persons. [15] While Political Political Theory begins by adverting to Hume’s and Madison’s use of the knavery premise as a ready example of thinking about institutional design, Waldron is quick to recommend that the design of government institutions should be evaluated not only according to how those institutions promote interests, but also according to how political institutions respect the voice and dignity of citizens. Waldron says, “It is people’s capacity for judgment that is at stake when we look for a democratic mode of lawmaking and if we are to respect that capacity, we must respect the forms, structures, and processes that can house and frame it” (pp. 141-142). This passage amounts to a rejection of approaches to the structure of governmental institutions that begin from a knavery premise, and it is of a piece with Waldron’s suspicion about “nudging.”

These sidebar comments about Waldron’s reaction to the emphasis on “nudging” allows an important insight into the paradigm he offers: in an important sense, political political theory is not non-ideal at all. Its approach to the design and evaluation of political institutions is not premised on human failings. Nor does it begin with the recognition of unavoidable facts that constrain the achievement of justice. Moreover, political political theory is not especially interested in evaluating the design of political institutions by reference to their achievement of a particular social goal. Political political theory is not, in the first instance, interested in welfare-denominated patterns of distribution.

Waldron asks us to understand the value of political institutions beyond their instrumental value in promoting some independent end. Unlike Hume’s and Madison’s maxim to understand institutions as means to control the ambition of the participants, and unlike the soft paternalists who, aware of our biases and inertia, understand institutions as means to more efficiently promote our interests, political political theory challenges the theorist to see the worth of institutions beyond their ability to promote some independently valuable state of affairs. The value of political institutions lies, at bottom, not in the distributive outcomes they produce, but rather in their ability to enable the ultimate sovereignty of the People by ensuring democratic participation and government accountability. In other words, it is most important that political institutions are designed to achieve legitimacy, even if not justice.

The focus on the value of political institutions that exists apart from the justice of the laws they enact and enforce, is connected with political political theory’s motivating concern about a Caesarian executive who, neither understanding nor caring for the importance of constitutions, is able to “see through” institutional entities. Political political theory suggests that understanding the value of political institutions primarily by reference to their legitimacy makes those institutions more concrete, such that they cannot be easily de-reified or suddenly made to disappear. And making institutions more concrete— i.e. , reifying institutions that are born of parchment—is an imperative in view of their proper normative justification, which regards them as valuable in ways that are not necessarily connected to their outcomes. This is the central thesis of political political theory and the single theme that unites Waldron’s disparate essays on institutions.

Concerns about accountability, voice, and dignity are latent in relationships not only between political institution and persons, but also as between institutions themselves. Waldron introduces this point by reference to William Forbath’s Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement , [16] where Forbath reviews the history of judicial review of progressive-era labor legislation. After labor organizers and sympathetic legislators successfully enacted statutes regulating hours and conditions, the courts invalidated them as unconstitutional. The frustration of those in the labor movement was immense: “I would kill them all and see if that would be considered unconstitutional.” [17] Waldron’s emphasis is not that the exercise of judicial review in this period was a setback for the justice of the labor legislation enacted by progressives (although he does not deny that); rather, his emphasis is on the disrespect of the legislative institutions shown by some members of the judiciary. Although the workers had grounds to complain of injustice suffered, Waldron suggests that an equal, if not deeper, concern is the indignity and disrespect that governmental participants in one branch accorded to the work of another. There, the legislative institutions—the voices and concerns they amplified—were seen as a nullity, were seen through, were made to disappear. And that disrespect of a representative lawmaking institution should leave an impression as deep as the injustice in the distribution of benefits and burdens that the laborers were forced to bear.

  • A LIFE BEYOND RAWLS?

For all its emphasis on the design of representative institutions to ensure their legitimacy, Political Political Theory has surprisingly little to say about the pervasive power, and tendency, of money to corrupt institutions and officials and to erode political legitimacy. [18] In these essays, he ignores the corrupting influence of money not only in general but also where it is obviously pertinent to his specific treatment of alternative institutional designs. For example, the choice between unicameral and bicameral legislatures is fraught with consequences for the economically less-advantaged citizen. A second legislative chamber creates an additional “veto point” likely to obstruct—in fact, typically intended to obstruct—the will of electoral majorities, particularly when that will is directed toward redistributive ends.

The problem of money in politics is not a merely valetudinarian concern.  Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz have shown that there is a striking correlation between an increasing number of veto points in a constitutional structure and an increased pattern of economic inequality. [19] The greater the number of veto points, the more likely that greater private economic resources may be converted into unequal opportunities to shape legislation. A political theory attentive to questions of institutional design should not ignore empirical studies about the myriad ways that the hydrologic pressure of money might break through to influence the functioning of political institutions.

Waldron promises “life beyond Rawls,” but the book distracts attention from the central and truly hard problem of institutionalizing constitutional democracy, the problem that Rawls despairingly once called “the curse of money.” [20] A constitutional democracy will inevitably generate unequal wealth, just as it will inevitably engender a plurality of incompatible but equally reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good life. As Rawls explained, these circumstances are inherent to the operation of a liberal constitutional democracy over time. They do not merely derive from the version of the knavery principle that Waldron excusably elects to set aside. Moreover, unlike the fact of reasonable pluralism, disparately greater amounts of wealth tend inevitably to impart political advantages. The tendency of political institutions necessarily to create the conditions for unequal political influence is not a fact that a political political theory can ignore. An utter disregard of the money problem is Political Political Theory ’s most glaring omission. Waldron chides “Rawls and his followers” for failing to understand that the burdens of judgment apply to “issues of justice and social policy” as well as to “religion, ethics, and comprehensive conceptions” (p. 94). Set aside the question whether this charge is adequately substantiated by what Waldron has “written elsewhere” (one of the more common phrases in the book); it does not even begin to illuminate why he has chosen to ignore the money problem when setting out a political political theory.

Waldron laments that Berlin’s “lack of interest in institutions and constitutions has turned out to be contagious.” Yet, Berlin’s inattention was not singlehandedly responsible for political theory’s excessive focus on the meaning of concepts such as justice or liberty, to the exclusion of thinking about institutional design. “This,” according to Waldron, “is something that would have happened any-way, under the influence of Rawls …” (p. 288, emphasis added). This is an astonishing claim. And this passage, along with the book as a whole, reflects an almost reckless misunderstanding of Rawls. Rawls deliberately chose not to bookend “Enlightenment constitutionalism” between Locke and Kant. Rawls chose not to, in part, because he read Marx as a friendly critic rather than an implacable foe of this very project. Just as Berlin had no serious interest in institutions, Waldron shows no serious interest in “the curse of money,” not even to acknowledge it by expressly setting it aside. Unlike Rawls, Waldron, at least in this collection, shows no interest in how institutional and constitutional designs might cabin (or “house”) the money problem without squelching liberty.

True, one might plead realism on Waldron’s behalf. The United States Supreme Court, in a line of decisions running from Buckley v. Valeo [21] to McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission , [22] has declared that the Constitution forbids Congress to legislate with the aim of promoting what Rawls called the “fair value of political liberty”— i.e. , a roughly equal actual (not merely formal) chance of each citizen to affect political outcomes. [23] But political theory is not constrained by what the United States Supreme Court happens to have held; the discipline has aspirations about choices in institutional design that go beyond the constraints on what may be reasonably advocated for in a legal brief. And Waldron does not say that Rawls’s concern about fair value, and with the institutional devices that might assure it, is utopian or passé. In fact, he does not mention the Rawlsian institutionalist concern with fair value at all. This quiet insouciance about the problem of reconciling political equality and economic inequality gives the collection not merely a debating-society flavor, but also an ideological tinge. [24] If it is a taste of “life beyond Rawls,” one must ask whether it is a way of life a political theorist—especially a political political theorist—ought to be living.

The “curse of money,” then, is not only a justice problem. It is also a legitimacy problem. There is no reason for political political theory, which, as Waldron convincingly shows, is a fruitful and necessary corrective for contemporary political theory, not to address it as such.

        [1].    University Professor, New York University.

        [2].    D.Phil. (Oxon.), J.D. (Harvard), Law clerk to Hon. James O. Browning, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.

        [3].    Regents Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, Georgia State University.

        [4].    Isaiah Berlin, Does Political Theory Still Exist? , in Concepts and Categories 143–172 (Henry Hardy ed., 1979).

        [5].    Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 183 (1974).

        [6].    G.A. Cohen, How to do Political Philosophy , in On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays in Political Philosophy 227 (Michael Otsuka ed., 2011).

        [7].    Christian Meier, Caesar 358–59 (David McLintock trans., Basic Books 1995) (1982).

        [8].    See generally Gordon Wood, The Origins of American Constitutionalism , in The Idea of America: Reflections on the Birth of the United States 171-187 (2011).

        [9].    The Federalist No. 57 (James Madison).

      [10].    The question is latent in The Federalist No. 78, in which Hamilton writes that it is “rational to suppose … that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority.” The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).

      [11].    Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

      [12].    Floyd M. Riddick & Alan S. Frumin, Riddick’s Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices (Alan S. Furmin ed., 1992).

      [13].    David Hume, On the Independence of Parliament , in Essays: Moral, Political, Literary 42 (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty Classics 1985) (1742).

      [14].    The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison).

      [15].    Jeremy Waldron, It’s All for Your Own Good , N.Y. Rev., Oct. 9, 2014, at 21–23.

      [16].    William Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 47 (1991).

      [17].    Id.

      [18].    Granted, Waldron does, in passing, deplore the “conservative strategy of appropriating the rule of law as an ideal for something like an IMF/World Bank agenda, which sees its aim as that of securing property rights and external investment against legislative encroachment” (p. 33).

      [19].    See Alfred Stepan & Juan J. Linz, Comparative Perspectives on Inequality and the Quality of Democracy in the United States , 9 Persp. Pol. 841, 841–56 (2011); see also Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens , 12 Persp. Pol. 564, 564–81 (2014).

      [20].    John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 139 (1999).

      [21].    421 U.S. 1 (1976).

      [22].    134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).

      [23].    In an uncharacteristicly overt tone of despondence, Rawls wrote, “Historically one of the main defects of constitutional government has been the failure to insure the fair value of political liberty. The necessary corrective steps have not been taken, indeed, they never seem to have been seriously entertained.” John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 198–99 (rev. ed., Harvard University Press, 1999). It would be tragic, we think, if political theory, under the guise of realism, were to internalize this attitude.

      [24].    “[P]olitical philosophy is always in danger of being used corruptly as a defense of an unjust and unworthy status quo, and thus of being ideological in Marx’s sense. From time to time we must ask whether justice as fairness, or any other view, is ideological in this way; and if not, why not?” John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 4 n. 4 (2001).

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Compares and evaluates alternative ideas of justice, legitimacy, and the common good as they apply to the institutions and conduct of domestic and global life.

Political theory involves the study of the history of political thought as well as problems in contemporary political life that have a philosophical dimension. 

The Princeton political theory faculty, one of the largest in the U.S., has depth in both aspects of the subject. Areas of particular interest among our political theorists are democratic theory, global political theory, ethics in public policy, ancient political thought, and 19th- and 20-century American, British and continental political thought.

Political theory at Princeton is interdisciplinary, with many faculty and student theorists also involved in philosophy , classics , religion , history , the Program in Political Philosophy   and  the University Center for Human Values . Several politics faculty members enjoy affiliate status in these units. Many faculty from other academic units with strong profiles in political theory enjoy the same status in politics. Our theorists also work closely with colleagues in the empirical subfields of the politics department.

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The Program in Political Philosophy enables graduate students interested in political theory to integrate work in politics with work in four other participating departments (philosophy, classics, religion, and history).

The Program on Race, Ethnicity, and Identity in Politics (PREIP) organizes thematic events and other initiatives linked to the study of race, ethnicity, and identity, including a department-wide speakers’ series and workshops on research issues related to the study of the politics of racial, ethnic, and other minoritized subpopulations. This inter-subfield program intends to create a supportive and generative community of faculty and graduate students working on a range of related topics including racism, colonialism, citizenship, contentious politics, social movements, and gender inequalities.

Established in 1990 through the generosity of Laurance S. Rockefeller ‘32, the University Center for Human Values fosters ongoing inquiry into important ethical issues in private and public life and supports teaching, research, and discussion of ethics and human values throughout the curriculum and across the disciplines at Princeton University.

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Political Political Theory

Political Political Theory

Essays on Institutions

Jeremy Waldron

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ISBN 9780674743854

Publication date: 03/07/2016

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Political institutions are the main subject of political theory—or they ought to be. Making the case with his trademark forcefulness and intellectual aplomb, Jeremy Waldron argues in favor of reorienting the theory of politics toward the institutions and institutional principles of modern democracy and the mechanisms through which democratic ideals are achieved.

Too many political theorists are preoccupied with analyzing the nature and importance of justice, liberty, and equality, at the cost of ignoring the governmental institutions needed to achieve them. By contrast, political scientists have kept institutions in view, but they deploy a meager set of value-conceptions in evaluating them. Reflecting on an array of issues about constitutional structure, Waldron considers the uses and abuses of diverse institutions and traditions, from separation of powers and bicameralism to judicial review of legislation, the principle of loyal opposition, the nature of representation, political accountability, and the rule of law. He refines his well-known argument about the undemocratic character of judicial review, providing a capacious perspective on the proper role of courts in a constitutional democracy, and he offers an illuminating critique of the contrasting political philosophies of Hannah Arendt and Isaiah Berlin.

Even if political theorists remain fixated on expounding the philosophical foundations of democracy, they need to complement their work with a firmer grasp of the structures through which democracy is realized. This is what political political theory means: theory addressing itself to the way political institutions frame political disagreements and orchestrate resolutions to our disputes over social ideals.

The problem with revolutionary politics, in short, is that it tends to be naïve about political institutions. I can recommend no better corrective than liberal political philosopher Jeremy Waldron, and no better introduction to his thinking than his recently published collection of essays, Political Political Theory … To read Waldron is to reawaken ideas that so shape our world that they typically only live in the background of political theory and debate. It is to survey the pantheon of constitutional liberalism—Locke, Montesquieu, Condorcet, Madison, Kant, Mill, et al.—to step into their shoes and think hard about bicameralism, bills of rights, and judicial review, and appreciate the enormity of their intellectual and real-world achievements. —David V. Johnson, Dissent
This is a brilliant book. It will excite readers and spark a revival of constitutional concerns that people might once have believed had been consigned to the history of ideas. —Marc Stears, University of Oxford
  • Jeremy Waldron is University Professor in the School of Law at New York University.

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Political Political Theory: Essays on Institutions

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Political Political Theory: Essays on Institutions Hardcover – March 7, 2016

Political institutions are the main subject of political theory―or they ought to be. Making the case with his trademark forcefulness and intellectual aplomb, Jeremy Waldron argues in favor of reorienting the theory of politics toward the institutions and institutional principles of modern democracy and the mechanisms through which democratic ideals are achieved. Too many political theorists are preoccupied with analyzing the nature and importance of justice, liberty, and equality, at the cost of ignoring the governmental institutions needed to achieve them. By contrast, political scientists have kept institutions in view, but they deploy a meager set of value-conceptions in evaluating them. Reflecting on an array of issues about constitutional structure, Waldron considers the uses and abuses of diverse institutions and traditions, from separation of powers and bicameralism to judicial review of legislation, the principle of loyal opposition, the nature of representation, political accountability, and the rule of law. He refines his well-known argument about the undemocratic character of judicial review, providing a capacious perspective on the proper role of courts in a constitutional democracy, and he offers an illuminating critique of the contrasting political philosophies of Hannah Arendt and Isaiah Berlin. Even if political theorists remain fixated on expounding the philosophical foundations of democracy, they need to complement their work with a firmer grasp of the structures through which democracy is realized. This is what political political theory means: theory addressing itself to the way political institutions frame political disagreements and orchestrate resolutions to our disputes over social ideals.

  • Print length 416 pages
  • Language English
  • Publisher Harvard University Press
  • Publication date March 7, 2016
  • Dimensions 6.12 x 1.36 x 9.25 inches
  • ISBN-10 9780674743854
  • ISBN-13 978-0674743854
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political theory essays

IMAGES

  1. Write an essay on the revival of political theory. In 500 words

    political theory essays

  2. Political Theory Essay 1

    political theory essays

  3. (DOC) Contemporary Political Theory Essay 2

    political theory essays

  4. Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory, Michael Walzer, ed

    political theory essays

  5. What is Political Theory and Why Do We Need It? (Collected Essays

    political theory essays

  6. Political Theory and Practice: Eight Essays on a Theme

    political theory essays

VIDEO

  1. Essays on Political Economy by Frederic Bastiat

  2. Political Theory, Ch-1, NCERT, (Last Part)

  3. Introduction to Political Theory Notes Explanation

  4. Political Theory/ राजनीतिक सिद्धांत(1) । Civics । Political Science Imp Objective Questions ।

  5. Political Theory Ch-1( Part-2)

  6. Political theory: An introduction ।+2 1st year political science Chapter 1 in Odia medium ।

COMMENTS

  1. PDF ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL POLITICAL THEORY PAPER

    A successful political theory paper in part depends to a huge extent on its architecture: the introduction (1.1), thesis statement (1.2), body (1.3) and conclusion (1.4). Understanding the role that each of these components are meant to play within the essay will hopefully aid you in crafting a strong, argumentative essay. !

  2. PDF Writing Political Theory Papers

    Writing Political Theory Papers. Political theory is a little bit different than political science. Here are some important differences. 1) It's more like philosophy than social science: it is more concerned with theoretical issues. • It is crucial to make a logical argument rather than causal or empirical claim.

  3. PDF Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Politics Political Analysis

    3 Grant, Ruth, John Locke's Liberalism: A Study of Political Thought in its Intellectual Setting, (1987) * Hirschmann, Nancy J., and Kirstie M. McClure, eds. Feminist Interpretations of John Locke (2010). * Simmons, A. J, The Lockean Theory of Rights, (1992) * Tully, James, A Discourse on Property, John Locke and his adversaries, (1980) Tully, James, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke ...

  4. Thinking politically: Essays in political theory

    Running through these essays is a rejection of liberal political philosophy in favour of liberal (in a European context, social democratic) political theory - Walzer has little time for abstract constructs such as Rawls's 'original position' or Habermas's 'ideal speech situation', or for the hypothetical examples beloved of authors ...

  5. Political political theory: Essays on institutions

    These essays analyse the work of two twentieth century political theorists: Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt, respectively. Both essays address how far these influential political theorists take political institutions seriously. Chapter 11, by Waldron's own admission (p. 289), is a polemic on the political thought of Berlin.

  6. The History of Political Theory and Other Essays

    Metrics. In this collection of essays, John Dunn brings his characteristically acute and penetrative insight to a wide range of political issues. In the first essay, 'The history of political theory', Professor Dunn argues for the importance of a historical perspective in the study of political thought. Other pieces engage with central concepts ...

  7. Political Theory: Sage Journals

    Political Theory (PT), peer-reviewed and published bi-monthly, serves as the leading forum for the development and exchange of political ideas.Broad in scope and international in coverage, PT publishes articles on political theory from a wide range of philosophical, ideological and methodological perspectives. Articles address contemporary and historical political thought, normative and ...

  8. PDF Essays in Political Philosophy

    978--521-70004-7 - War: Essays in Political Philosophy Edited by Larry May Frontmatter More information. Contributors ix Norms, and Identities. He has recently published "Preventive War in Classical Just War Theory" in the Journal of the History of International

  9. Political Theory

    Political Theory is an international journal of political thought open to contributions from a wide range of methodological, philosophical, and ideological perspectives. Essays in contemporary and historical political thought, normative and cultural theory, history of ideas, and assessments of current work are welcome.

  10. Political Theory

    Political Theory (PT), peer-reviewed and published bi-monthly, serves as the leading forum for the development and exchange of political ideas.Broad in scope and international in coverage, PT publishes articles on political theory from a wide range of philosophical, ideological and methodological perspectives. Articles address contemporary and historical political thought, normative and ...

  11. Aristotle's Political Theory

    Schollmeier, Paul, Rewriting Contemporary Political Philosophy with Plato and Aristotle: An Essay on Eudaimonic Politics, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019. Salkever, Stephen S., Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

  12. How to Write a Political Essay, With 5 Tips

    A few examples of political theories include these: Anarchism. Conservatism. Liberalism. Libertarianism. Objectivism. Populism. Political essays can be persuasive essays, with the goal of guiding the reader to agree with a specific position. In some cases, they're analytical essays.

  13. Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and ...

    PART I. The essays in this book were written over a period of thirty years. They might have spanned six years more, my first article having appeared in 1955.¹ Political science was very different then, and not just because of its operative "paradigm.". The journal in which my first article appeared still paid, its contributors.

  14. PDF How to Write Term Papers and Essays in Political Theory

    A Guide for Courses in Political Theory. at the Otto-Friedrich University of Bamberg. Compiled by Moritz Schulz (as of 11/2022) In this guide you will find: An explanation of what constitutes a written paper in Political Theory. A more detailed characterisation of particularly common types of term papers or essays that you will encounter in our ...

  15. Political Political Theory : Essays on Institutions

    Political institutions are the main subject of political theory—or they ought to be. Making the case with his trademark forcefulness and intellectual aplomb, Jeremy Waldron argues in favor of reorienting the theory of politics toward the institutions and institutional principles of modern democracy and the mechanisms through which democratic ideals are achieved.Too many political theorists ...

  16. Political Political Theory Theory

    POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY: ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS. By Jeremy Waldron. Harvard University Press. 2016. Pp. 403. $35.00 (cloth). Jeremy D. Farris and William A. Edmundson. INTRODUCTION. Political theory has not always been a self-confident discipline. In 1961, Isaiah Berlin, the Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford ...

  17. Essay writing guide

    Guide to Writing a Political Theory Essay. Reading and Planning Read the philosophical texts with your question in mind and think critically as you read them. Don't rely too much on introductory texts or material from the lectures. Go deeper. Read in a focused and selective way (e. read the relevant chapters of a book, not necessarily the ...

  18. Political Theory

    Political theory involves the study of the history of political thought as well as problems in contemporary political life that have a philosophical dimension. The Princeton political theory faculty, one of the largest in the U.S., has depth in both aspects of the subject. Areas of particular interest among our political theorists are ...

  19. Political Political Theory

    The problem with revolutionary politics, in short, is that it tends to be naïve about political institutions. I can recommend no better corrective than liberal political philosopher Jeremy Waldron, and no better introduction to his thinking than his recently published collection of essays, Political Political Theory…To read Waldron is to reawaken ideas that so shape our world that they ...

  20. Journal Description: Political Theory: Sage Journals

    Articles address contemporary and historical political thought, normative and cultural theory, the history of ideas, and critical assessments of current work. The journal encourages essays that address pressing political and ethical issues or events. Political Theory serves as the leading forum for the development and exchange of political ideas.

  21. Political philosophy

    Philosophy Essays from Aeon. World-leading thinkers explore life's big questions and the history of ideas from Socrates to Simone de Beauvoir, political philosophy to philosophy of mind, the Western canon and the non-Western world.

  22. Political Theory Essays (Examples)

    Our semester plans gives you unlimited, unrestricted access to our entire library of resources —writing tools, guides, example essays, tutorials, class notes, and more. Get Started Now. At paperdue.com, we provide students the tools they need to streamline their studying, researching, and writing tasks. [email protected].

  23. Political Political Theory: Essays on Institutions

    Political institutions are the main subject of political theory―or they ought to be. Making the case with his trademark forcefulness and intellectual aplomb, Jeremy Waldron argues in favor of reorienting the theory of politics toward the institutions and institutional principles of modern democracy and the mechanisms through which democratic ideals are achieved.

  24. The Naked 'Survivor' Guy Theory of U.S. Politics

    Opinion Guest Essay. How a Naked Man on a Tropical Island Created Our Current Political Insanity ... Section A, Page 21 of the New York edition with the headline: The Reality TV Theory of U.S ...