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Aristotle’s Political Theory

Aristotle (b. 384–d. 322 BCE), was a Greek philosopher, logician, and scientist. Along with his teacher Plato, Aristotle is generally regarded as one of the most influential ancient thinkers in a number of philosophical fields, including political theory. Aristotle was born in Stagira in northern Greece, and his father was a court physician to the king of Macedon. As a young man he studied in Plato’s Academy in Athens. After Plato’s death he left Athens to conduct philosophical and biological research in Asia Minor and Lesbos, and he was then invited by King Philip II of Macedon to tutor his young son, Alexander the Great. Soon after Alexander succeeded his father, consolidated the conquest of the Greek city-states, and launched the invasion of the Persian Empire. Aristotle returned as a resident alien to Athens, and was a close friend of Antipater, the Macedonian viceroy. At this time (335–323 BCE) he wrote, or at least worked on, some of his major treatises, including the Politics . When Alexander died suddenly, Aristotle had to flee from Athens because of his Macedonian connections, and he died soon after. Aristotle’s life seems to have influenced his political thought in various ways: his interest in biology seems to be reflected in the naturalism of his politics; his interest in comparative politics and his qualified sympathies for democracy as well as monarchy may have been encouraged by his travels and experience of diverse political systems; he reacts critically to his teacher Plato, while borrowing extensively, from Plato’s Republic , Statesman , and Laws ; and his own Politics is intended to guide rulers and statesmen, reflecting the high political circles in which he moved.

Supplement: Characteristics and Problems of Aristotle’s Politics

Supplement: Presuppositions of Aristotle’s Politics

Supplement: Political Naturalism

4. Study of Specific Constitutions

5. aristotle and modern politics, glossary of aristotelian terms, a. greek text of aristotle’s politics, b. english translations of aristotle’s politics, c. anthologies, d. single-authored commentaries and overviews, e. studies of particular topics, other internet resources, related entries, 1. political science in general.

The modern word ‘political’ derives from the Greek politikos , ‘of, or pertaining to, the polis’. (The Greek term polis will be translated here as ‘city-state’. It is also commonly translated as ‘city’ or simply anglicized as ‘polis’. City-states like Athens and Sparta were relatively small and cohesive units, in which political, religious, and cultural concerns were intertwined. The extent of their similarity to modern nation-states is controversial.) Aristotle’s word for ‘politics’ is politikê , which is short for politikê epistêmê or ‘political science’. It belongs to one of the three main branches of science, which Aristotle distinguishes by their ends or objects. Contemplative science (including physics and metaphysics) is concerned with truth or knowledge for its own sake; practical science with good action; and productive science with making useful or beautiful objects ( Top . VI.6.145a14–16, Met . VI.1.1025b24, XI.7.1064a16–19, EN VI.2.1139a26–8). Politics is a practical science, since it is concerned with the noble action or happiness of the citizens (although it resembles a productive science in that it seeks to create, preserve, and reform political systems). Aristotle thus understands politics as a normative or prescriptive discipline rather than as a purely empirical or descriptive inquiry.

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle describes his subject matter as ‘political science’, which he characterizes as the most authoritative science. It prescribes which sciences are to be studied in the city-state, and the others — such as military science, household management, and rhetoric — fall under its authority. Since it governs the other practical sciences, their ends serve as means to its end, which is nothing less than the human good. “Even if the end is the same for an individual and for a city-state, that of the city-state seems at any rate greater and more complete to attain and preserve. For although it is worthy to attain it for only an individual, it is nobler and more divine to do so for a nation or city-state” ( EN I.2.1094b7–10). The two ethical works (the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics ) explain the principles that form the foundations for the Politics : that happiness is the highest human good, that happiness is the activity of moral virtue defined in terms of the mean, and that justice or the common advantage is the political good. Aristotle’s political science thus encompasses the two fields which modern philosophers distinguish as ethics and political philosophy. (See the entry on Aristotle’s ethics .) Political philosophy in the narrow sense is roughly speaking the subject of his treatise called the Politics . For a further discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary document:

2. Aristotle’s View of Politics

Political science studies the tasks of the politician or statesman ( politikos ), in much the way that medical science concerns the work of the physician (see Politics IV.1). It is, in fact, the body of knowledge that such practitioners, if truly expert, will also wield in pursuing their tasks. The most important task for the politician is, in the role of lawgiver ( nomothetês ), to frame the appropriate constitution for the city-state. This involves enduring laws, customs, and institutions (including a system of moral education) for the citizens. Once the constitution is in place, the politician needs to take the appropriate measures to maintain it, to introduce reforms when he finds them necessary, and to prevent developments which might subvert the political system. This is the province of legislative science, which Aristotle regards as more important than politics as exercised in everyday political activity such as the passing of decrees (see EN VI.8).

Aristotle frequently compares the politician to a craftsman. The analogy is imprecise because politics, in the strict sense of legislative science, is a form of practical knowledge, while a craft like architecture or medicine is a form of productive knowledge. However, the comparison is valid to the extent that the politician produces, operates, maintains a legal system according to universal principles ( EN VI.8 and X.9). In order to appreciate this analogy it is helpful to observe that Aristotle explains the production of an artifact such as a drinking cup in terms of four causes: the material, formal, efficient, and final causes ( Phys . II.3 and Met . A.2). For example, clay (material cause) is molded into a roughly cylindrical shape closed at one end (formal cause) by a potter (efficient or moving cause) so that it can contain a beverage (final cause). (For discussion of the four causes see the entry on Aristotle’s physics .)

One can also explain the existence of the city-state in terms of the four causes. It is a kind of community ( koinônia ), that is, a collection of parts having some functions and interests in common ( Pol . II.1.1261a18, III.1.1275b20). Hence, it is made up of parts, which Aristotle describes in various ways in different contexts: as households, or economic classes (e.g., the rich and the poor), or demes (i.e., local political units). But, ultimately, the city-state is composed of individual citizens (see III.1.1274a38–41), who, along with natural resources, are the “material” or “equipment” out of which the city-state is fashioned (see VII.14.1325b38–41).

The formal cause of the city-state is its constitution ( politeia ). Aristotle defines the constitution as “a certain ordering of the inhabitants of the city-state” (III.1.1274b32–41). He also speaks of the constitution of a community as “the form of the compound” and argues that whether the community is the same over time depends on whether it has the same constitution (III.3.1276b1–11). The constitution is not a written document, but an immanent organizing principle, analogous to the soul of an organism. Hence, the constitution is also “the way of life” of the citizens (IV.11.1295a40–b1, VII.8.1328b1–2). Here the citizens are that minority of the resident population who possess full political rights (III.1.1275b17–20).

The existence of the city-state also requires an efficient cause, namely, its ruler. On Aristotle’s view, a community of any sort can possess order only if it has a ruling element or authority. This ruling principle is defined by the constitution, which sets criteria for political offices, particularly the sovereign office (III.6.1278b8–10; cf. IV.1.1289a15–18). However, on a deeper level, there must be an efficient cause to explain why a city-state acquires its constitution in the first place. Aristotle states that “the person who first established [the city-state] is the cause of very great benefits” (I.2.1253a30–1). This person was evidently the lawgiver ( nomothetês ), someone like Solon of Athens or Lycurgus of Sparta, who founded the constitution. Aristotle compares the lawgiver, or the politician more generally, to a craftsman ( dêmiourgos ) like a weaver or shipbuilder, who fashions material into a finished product (II.12.1273b32–3, VII.4.1325b40–1365a5).

The notion of final cause dominates Aristotle’s Politics from the opening lines:

Since we see that every city-state is a sort of community and that every community is established for the sake of some good (for everyone does everything for the sake of what they believe to be good), it is clear that every community aims at some good, and the community which has the most authority of all and includes all the others aims highest, that is, at the good with the most authority. This is what is called the city-state or political community. [I.1.1252a1–7]

Soon after, he states that the city-state comes into being for the sake of life but exists for the sake of the good life (2.1252b29–30). The theme that the good life or happiness is the proper end of the city-state recurs throughout the Politics (III.6.1278b17–24, 9.1280b39; VII.2.1325a7–10).

To sum up, the city-state is a hylomorphic (i.e., matter-form) compound of a particular population (i.e., citizen-body) in a given territory (material cause) and a constitution (formal cause). The constitution itself is fashioned by the lawgiver and is governed by politicians, who are like craftsmen (efficient cause), and the constitution defines the aim of the city-state (final cause, IV.1.1289a17–18). Aristotle’s hylomorphic analysis has important practical implications for him: just as a craftsman should not try to impose a form on materials for which it is unsuited (e.g. to build a house out of sand), the legislator should not lay down or change laws which are contrary to the nature of the citizens. Aristotle accordingly rejects utopian schemes such as the proposal in Plato’s Republic that children and property should belong to all the citizens in common. For this runs afoul of the fact that “people give most attention to their own property, less to what is communal, or only as much as falls to them to give attention” ( Pol. II.3.1261b33–5). Aristotle is also wary of casual political innovation, because it can have the deleterious side-effect of undermining the citizens’ habit of obeying the law (II.8.1269a13–24). For a further discussion of the theoretical foundations of Aristotle’s politics, see the following supplementary document:

It is in these terms, then, that Aristotle understands the fundamental normative problem of politics: What constitutional form should the lawgiver establish and preserve in what material for the sake of what end?

3. General Theory of Constitutions and Citizenship

Aristotle states, “The politician and lawgiver is wholly occupied with the city-state, and the constitution is a certain way of organizing those who inhabit the city-state” (III.1.1274b36–8). His general theory of constitutions is set forth in Politics III. He begins with a definition of the citizen ( politês ), since the city-state is by nature a collective entity, a multitude of citizens. Citizens are distinguished from other inhabitants, such as resident aliens and slaves; and even children and seniors are not unqualified citizens (nor are most ordinary workers). After further analysis he defines the citizen as a person who has the right ( exousia ) to participate in deliberative or judicial office (1275b18–21). In Athens, for example, citizens had the right to attend the assembly, the council, and other bodies, or to sit on juries. The Athenian system differed from a modern representative democracy in that the citizens were more directly involved in governing. Although full citizenship tended to be restricted in the Greek city-states (with women, slaves, foreigners, and some others excluded), the citizens were more deeply enfranchised than in modern representative democracies because they were more directly involved in governing. This is reflected in Aristotle’s definition of the citizen (without qualification). Further, he defines the city-state (in the unqualified sense) as a multitude of such citizens which is adequate for a self-sufficient life (1275b20–21).

Aristotle defines the constitution ( politeia ) as a way of organizing the offices of the city-state, particularly the sovereign office (III.6.1278b8–10; cf. IV.1.1289a15–18). The constitution thus defines the governing body, which takes different forms: for example, in a democracy it is the people, and in an oligarchy it is a select few (the wealthy or well born). Before attempting to distinguish and evaluate various constitutions Aristotle considers two questions. First, why does a city-state come into being? He recalls the thesis, defended in Politics I.2, that human beings are by nature political animals, who naturally want to live together. For a further discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary document:

Aristotle then adds, “The common advantage also brings them together insofar as they each attain the noble life. This is above all the end for all both in common and separately” (III.6.1278b19–24). Second, what are the different forms of rule by which one individual or group can rule over another? Aristotle distinguishes several types of rule, based on the nature of the soul of the ruler and of the subject. He first considers despotic rule, which is exemplified in the master-slave relationship. Aristotle thinks that this form of rule is justified in the case of natural slaves who (he asserts without evidence) lack a deliberative faculty and thus need a natural master to direct them (I.13.1260a12; slavery is defended at length in Politics I.4–8). Although a natural slave allegedly benefits from having a master, despotic rule is still primarily for the sake of the master and only incidentally for the slave (III.6.1278b32–7). (Aristotle provides no argument for this: if some persons are congenitally incapable of governing themselves, why should they not be ruled primarily for their own sakes?) He next considers paternal and marital rule, which he also views as defensible: “the male is by nature more capable of leadership than the female, unless he is constituted in some way contrary to nature, and the elder and perfect [is by nature more capable of leadership] than the younger and imperfect” (I.12.1259a39–b4).

Aristotle is persuasive when he argues that children need adult supervision because their rationality is “imperfect” ( ateles ) or immature. But he is unconvincing to modern readers when he alleges (without substantiation) that, although women have a deliberative faculty, it is “without authority” ( akuron ), so that females require male supervision (I.13.1260a13–14). (Aristotle’s arguments about slaves and women appear so weak that some commentators take them to be ironic. However, what is obvious to a modern reader need not have been so to an ancient Greek, so that it is not necessary to suppose Aristotle’s discussion is disingenuous.) It is noteworthy, however, that paternal and marital rule are properly practiced for the sake of the ruled (for the sake of the child and of the wife respectively), just as arts like medicine or gymnastics are practiced for the sake of the patient (III.6.1278b37–1279a1). In this respect they resemble political rule, which is the form of rule appropriate when the ruler and the subject have equal and similar rational capacities. This is exemplified by naturally equal citizens who take turns at ruling for one another’s advantage (1279a8–13). This sets the stage for the fundamental claim of Aristotle’s constitutional theory: “constitutions which aim at the common advantage are correct and just without qualification, whereas those which aim only at the advantage of the rulers are deviant and unjust, because they involve despotic rule which is inappropriate for a community of free persons” (1279a17–21).

The distinction between correct and deviant constitutions is combined with the observation that the government may consist of one person, a few, or a multitude. Hence, there are six possible constitutional forms ( Politics III.7):

This six-fold classification (which is doubtless adapted from Plato’s Statesman 302c–d) sets the stage for Aristotle’s inquiry into the best constitution, although it is modified in various ways throughout the Politics . For example, he observes that the dominant class in oligarchy (literally rule of the oligoi , i.e., few) is typically the wealthy, whereas in democracy (literally rule of the dêmos , i.e., people) it is the poor, so that these economic classes should be included in the definition of these forms (see Politics III.8, IV.4, and VI.2 for alternative accounts). Also, polity is later characterized as a kind of “mixed” constitution typified by rule of the “middle” group of citizens, a moderately wealthy class between the rich and poor ( Politics IV.11).

Aristotle’s constitutional theory is based on his theory of justice, which is expounded in Nicomachean Ethics book V. Aristotle distinguishes two different but related senses of “justice” — universal and particular — both of which play an important role in his constitutional theory. Firstly, in the universal sense “justice” means “lawfulness” and is concerned with the common advantage and happiness of the political community ( NE V.1.1129b11–19, cf. Pol. III.12.1282b16–17). The conception of universal justice undergirds the distinction between correct (just) and deviant (unjust) constitutions. But what exactly the “common advantage” ( koinê sumpheron ) entails is a matter of scholarly controversy. Some passages imply that justice involves the advantage of all the citizens; for example, every citizen of the best constitution has a just claim to private property and to an education ( Pol. VII.9.1329a23–4, 13.1332a32–8). But Aristotle also allows that it might be “in a way” just to ostracize powerful citizens even when they have not been convicted of any crimes (III.13.1284b15–20). Whether Aristotle understands the common advantage as safeguarding the interests of each and every citizen has a bearing on whether and to what extent he anticipates what moderns would understand as a theory of individual rights. (See Fred Miller and Richard Kraut for differing interpretations.)

Secondly, in the particular sense “justice” means “equality” or “fairness”, and this includes distributive justice, according to which different individuals have just claims to shares of some common asset such as property. Aristotle analyzes arguments for and against the different constitutions as different applications of the principle of distributive justice (III.9.1280a7–22). Everyone agrees, he says, that justice involves treating equal persons equally, and treating unequal persons unequally, but they do not agree on the standard by which individuals are deemed to be equally (or unequally) meritorious or deserving. He assumes his own analysis of distributive justice set forth in Nicomachean Ethics V.3: Justice requires that benefits be distributed to individuals in proportion to their merit or desert. The oligarchs mistakenly think that those who are superior in wealth should also have superior political rights, whereas the democrats hold that those who are equal in free birth should also have equal political rights. Both of these conceptions of political justice are mistaken in Aristotle’s view, because they assume a false conception of the ultimate end of the city-state. The city-state is neither a business enterprise to maximize wealth (as the oligarchs suppose) nor an association to promote liberty and equality (as the democrats maintain). Instead, Aristotle argues, “the good life is the end of the city-state,” that is, a life consisting of noble actions (1280b39–1281a4). Hence, the correct conception of justice is aristocratic, assigning political rights to those who make a full contribution to the political community, that is, to those with virtue as well as property and freedom (1281a4–8). This is what Aristotle understands by an “aristocratic” constitution: literally, the rule of the aristoi , i.e., best persons. Aristotle explores the implications of this argument in the remainder of Politics III, considering the rival claims of the rule of law and the rule of a supremely virtuous individual. Here absolute kingship is a limiting case of aristocracy. Again, in books VII-VIII, Aristotle describes the ideal constitution in which the citizens are fully virtuous.

Although justice is in Aristotle’s view the foremost political virtue ( Pol . III.9.1283a38–40), the other great social virtue, friendship, should not be overlooked, because the two virtues work hand in hand to secure every sort of association ( EN VIII.9.1159b26–7). Justice enables the citizens of a city-state to share peacefully in the benefits and burdens of cooperation, while friendship holds them together and prevents them from breaking up into warring factions (cf. Pol . II.4.1262b7–9). Friends are expected to treat each other justly, but friendship goes beyond justice because it is a complex mutual bond in which individuals choose the good for others and trust that others are choosing the good for them (cf. EE VII.2.1236a14–15, b2–3; EN VIII.2.1155b34–3.1156a10). Because choosing the good for one another is essential to friendship and there are three different ways in which something can be called ‘good’ for a human being—virtuous (i.e., good without qualification), useful, or pleasant—there are three types of friendship: hedonistic, utilitarian, and virtuous. Political (or civic) friendship is a species of utilitarian friendship, and it is the most important form of utilitarian friendship because the polis is the greatest community. Opposed to political friendship is enmity, which leads to faction or civil war ( stasis ) or even to political revolution and the breakup of the polis, as discussed in Book V of the Politics. Aristotle offers general accounts of political or civic friendship as part of his general theory of friendship in EE VII.10 and EN VIII.9–12.

The purpose of political science is to guide “the good lawgiver and the true politician” (IV.1.1288b27). Like any complete science or craft, it must study a range of issues concerning its subject matter. For example, gymnastics (physical education) studies what sort of training is best or adapted to the body that is naturally the best, what sort of training is best for most bodies, and what capacity is appropriate for someone who does not want the condition or knowledge appropriate for athletic contests. Political science studies a comparable range of constitutions (1288b21–35): first, the constitution which is best without qualification, i.e., “most according to our prayers with no external impediment”; second, the constitution that is best under the circumstances “for it is probably impossible for many persons to attain the best constitution”; third, the constitution which serves the aim a given population happens to have, i.e., the one that is best “based on a hypothesis”: “for [the political scientist] ought to be able to study a given constitution, both how it might originally come to be, and, when it has come to be, in what manner it might be preserved for the longest time; I mean, for example, if a particular city happens neither to be governed by the best constitution, nor to be equipped even with necessary things, nor to be the [best] possible under existing circumstances, but to be a baser sort.” Hence, Aristotelian political science is not confined to the ideal system, but also investigates the second-best constitution or even inferior political systems, because this may be the closest approximation to full political justice which the lawgiver can attain under the circumstances.

Regarding the constitution that is ideal or “according to prayer,” Aristotle criticizes the views of his predecessors in the Politics and then offers a rather sketchy blueprint of his own in Politics VII–VIII. Although his own political views were influenced by his teacher Plato, Aristotle is highly critical of the ideal constitution set forth in Plato’s Republic on the grounds that it overvalues political unity, it embraces a system of communism that is impractical and inimical to human nature, and it neglects the happiness of the individual citizens ( Politics II.1–5). In contrast, in Aristotle’s “best constitution,” each and every citizen will possess moral virtue and the equipment to carry it out in practice, and thereby attain a life of excellence and complete happiness (see VII.13.1332a32–8). All of the citizens will hold political office and possess private property because “one should call the city-state happy not by looking at a part of it but at all the citizens.” (VII.9.1329a22–3). Moreover, there will be a common system of education for all the citizens, because they share the same end ( Pol . VIII.1).

If (as is the case with most existing city-states) the population lacks the capacities and resources for complete happiness, however, the lawgiver must be content with fashioning a suitable constitution ( Politics IV.11). The second-best system typically takes the form of a polity (in which citizens possess an inferior, more common grade of virtue) or mixed constitution (combining features of democracy, oligarchy, and, where possible, aristocracy, so that no group of citizens is in a position to abuse its rights). Aristotle argues that for city-states that fall short of the ideal, the best constitution is one controlled by a numerous middle class which stands between the rich and the poor. For those who possess the goods of fortune in moderation find it “easiest to obey the rule of reason” ( Politics IV.11.1295b4–6). They are accordingly less apt than the rich or poor to act unjustly toward their fellow citizens. A constitution based on the middle class is the mean between the extremes of oligarchy (rule by the rich) and democracy (rule by the poor). “That the middle [constitution] is best is evident, for it is the freest from faction: where the middle class is numerous, there least occur factions and divisions among citizens” (IV.11.1296a7–9). The middle constitution is therefore both more stable and more just than oligarchy and democracy.

Although Aristotle classifies democracy as a deviant constitution (albeit the best of a bad lot), he argues that a case might be made for popular rule in Politics III.11, a discussion which has attracted the attention of modern democratic theorists. The central claim is that the many may turn out to be better than the virtuous few when they come together, even though the many may be inferior when considered individually. For if each individual has a portion of virtue and practical wisdom, they may pool these moral assets and turn out to be better rulers than even a very wise individual. This argument seems to anticipate treatments of “the wisdom of the multitude” such as Condorcet’s “jury theorem.” In recent years, this particular chapter has been widely discussed in connection with topics such as democratic deliberation and public reason.

In addition, the political scientist must attend to existing constitutions even when they are bad. Aristotle notes that “to reform a constitution is no less a task [of politics] than it is to establish one from the beginning,” and in this way “the politician should also help existing constitutions” (IV.1.1289a1–7). The political scientist should also be cognizant of forces of political change which can undermine an existing regime. Aristotle criticizes his predecessors for excessive utopianism and neglect of the practical duties of a political theorist. However, he is no Machiavellian. The best constitution still serves as a regulative ideal by which to evaluate existing systems.

These topics occupy the remainder of the Politics . Books IV–VI are concerned with the existing constitutions: that is, the three deviant constitutions, as well as polity or the “mixed” constitution, which are the best attainable under most circumstances (IV.2.1289a26–38). The mixed constitution has been of special interest to scholars because it looks like a forerunner of modern republican regimes. The whole of book V investigates the causes and prevention of revolution or political change ( metabolê ) and civil war or faction ( stasis ). Books VII–VIII are devoted to the ideal constitution. As might be expected, Aristotle’s attempt to carry out this program involves many difficulties, and scholars disagree about how the two series of books (IV–VI and VII–VIII) are related to each other: for example, which were written first, which were intended to be read first, and whether they are ultimately consistent with each other. Most importantly, when Aristotle offers practical political prescriptions in Books IV–VI, is he guided by the best constitution as a regulative ideal, or is he simply abandoning political idealism and practicing a form of Realpolitik?For a further discussion of this topic, see the following supplementary document:

Aristotle has continued to influence thinkers up to the present throughout the political spectrum, including conservatives (such as Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, and Eric Voegelin), communitarians (such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel), liberals (such as William Galston and Martha C. Nussbaum), libertarians (such as Tibor R. Machan, Douglas B. Rasmussen, and Douglas J. Den Uyl), and democratic theorists (such as Jill Frank and Gerald M. Mara).

It is not surprising that such diverse political persuasions can lay claim to Aristotle as a source. For his method often leads to divergent interpretations. When he deals with a difficult problem, he is inclined to consider opposing arguments in a careful and nuanced manner, and he is often willing to concede that there is truth on each side. For example, though he is critical of democracy, in one passage he allows that the case for rule by the many based on the superior wisdom of the multitude “perhaps also involves some truth” ( Pol. III.11.1281a39–42). Again, he sometimes applies his own principles in a questionable manner, for example, when he reasons that because associations should be governed in a rational manner, the household should be run by the husband rather than by the wife, whose rational capacity “lacks authority” (I.13.1260a13). Modern commentators sympathetic with Aristotle’s general approach often contend that in this case he applies his own principles incorrectly–leaving open the question of how they should be applied. Further, the way he applies his principles may have seemed reasonable in his socio-political context–for example, that the citizen of a polity (normally the best attainable constitution) must be a hoplite soldier (cf. III.7,1297b4)–but it may be debatable how these might apply within a modern democratic nation-state.

The problem of extrapolating to modern political affairs can be illustrated more fully in connection with Aristotle’s discussion of legal change in Politics II.8. He first lays out the argument for making the laws changeable. It has been beneficial in the case of medicine, for example, for it to progress from traditional ways to improved forms of treatment. An existing law may be a vestige of a primitive barbaric practice. For instance, Aristotle mentions a law in Cyme that allows an accuser to produce a number of his own relatives as witnesses to prove that a defendant is guilty of murder. “So,” Aristotle concludes, “it is evident from the foregoing that some laws should sometimes be changed. But to those who look at the matter from a different angle, caution would seem to be required” (1269a12–14). Since the law gets its force from the citizens’ habit of obedience, great care should be exercised in making any change in it. It may sometimes be better to leave defective laws in place rather than encouraging lawlessness by changing the laws too frequently. Moreover, there are the problems of how the laws are to be changed and who is to change them. Although Aristotle offers valuable insights, he breaks off the discussion of this topic and never takes it up elsewhere. We might sum up his view as follows: When it comes to changing the laws, observe the mean: don’t be too bound by traditional laws, but on the other hand don’t be overeager in altering them. It is obvious that this precept, reasonable as it is, leaves considerable room for disagreement among contemporary “neo-Aristotelian” theorists. For example, should the laws be changed to allow self-described transsexual persons to use sexually segregated restrooms? Conservatives and liberals might agree with Aristotle’s general stricture regarding legal change but differ widely on how to apply it in a particular case.

Most scholars of Aristotle advisedly make no attempt to show that he is aligned with any contemporary ideology. Rather, insofar as they find him relevant to our times, it is because he offers a remarkable synthesis of idealism and pragmatism unfolding in deep and thought-provoking discussions of perennial concerns of political philosophy: the role of human nature in politics, the relation of the individual to the state, the place of morality in politics, the theory of political justice, the rule of law, the analysis and evaluation of constitutions, the relevance of ideals to practical politics, the causes and cures of political change and revolution, and the importance of a morally educated citizenry.

• action: praxis
• citizen: politês
• city-state: polis (also ‘city’ or ‘state’)
• community: koinônia
• constitution: politeia (also ‘regime’)
• faction: stasis (also ‘civil war’)
• free: eleutheros
• friendship: philia
• good: agathos
• happiness: eudaimonia
• happy: eudaimôn
• justice: dikaiosunê
• lawgiver: nomothetês
• master: despotês
• nature: phusis
• noble: kalon (also ‘beautiful’ or ‘fine’)
• people ( dêmos )
• political: politikos (of, or pertaining to, the polis )
• political science: politikê epistêmê
• politician: politikos (also ‘statesman’)
• practical: praktikos
• practical wisdom: phronêsis
• revolution: metabolê (also ‘change’)
• right: exousia (also ‘liberty’)
• ruler: archôn
• self-sufficient: autarkês
• sovereign: kurios
• virtue: aretê (also ‘excellence’)
• without qualification: haplôs (also ‘absolute’)
• without authority: akuron

Note on Citations . Passages in Aristotle are cited as follows: title of treatise (italics), book (Roman numeral), chapter (Arabic numeral), line reference. Line references are keyed to the 1831 edition of Immanuel Bekker which had two columns (“a” and “b”) on each page. Politics is abbreviated as Pol. and Nicomachean Ethics as NE . In this article, “ Pol . I.2.1252b27”, for example, refers to Politics book I, chapter 2, page 1252, column b, line 27. Most translations include the Bekker page number with column letter in the margin followed by every fifth line number.

Passages in Plato are cited in a similar fashion, except the line references are to the Stephanus edition of 1578 in which pages were divided into five parts (“a” through “e”).

Caveat on Bibliography. Although fairly extensive, this bibliography represents only a fraction of the secondary literature in English. However, the items cited here contain many references to other valuable scholarly work in other languages as well as in English.

• Dreizehnter, Alois, Aristoteles’ Politik , Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1970 [generally the most reliable critical edition].
• Ross, W. D., Aristotelis Politica , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957.
• Barker, Ernest, revised by Richard Stalley, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
• Jowett, Benjamin, revised in The Complete Works of Aristotle (The Revised Oxford Translation), Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, vol. II, pp. 1986–2129.
• Lord, Carnes, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013, revised edition.
• Rackham, H., Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 1932.
• Reeve, C. D. C., Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2017 (new translation).
• Simpson, Peter L. P., Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
• Sinclair, T. A., revised by Trevor J. Saunders, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983.

The Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford University Press) includes translation and commentary of the Politics in four volumes:

• Trevor J. Saunders, Politics I–II (1995).
• Richard Robinson with a supplementary essay by David Keyt, Politics III–IV (1995).
• David Keyt, Politics V–VI (1999).
• Richard Kraut, Politics VII–VIII (1997).
• Also of interest is the Constitution of Athens , an account of the history and workings of the Athenian democracy. Although it was formerly ascribed to Aristotle, it is now thought by most scholars to have been written by one of his pupils, perhaps at his direction toward the end of Aristotle’s life. A reliable translation with introduction and notes is by P. J. Rhodes, Aristotle: The Athenian Constitution . Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984.
• Barnes, Jonathan, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji (eds.), Articles on Aristotle (Volume 2: Ethics and Politics), London: Duckworth, 1977.
• Boudouris, K. J. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, 2 volumes, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995.
• Deslauriers, Marguerite, and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
• Höffe, Otfried (ed.), Aristoteles Politik , Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001.
• Keyt, David, and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
• Kraut, Richard, and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.
• Lockwood, Thornton, and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
• Lord, Carnes, and David O’Connor (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
• Patzig, Günther (ed.), Aristoteles’ Politik: Akten des XI. Symposium Aristotelicum , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990.
• Aquinas, Thomas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics , translated by Richard J. Regan, Indianapolis Publishing Co.: Hackett, 2007.
• Barker, Ernest, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle , London: Methuen, 1906; reprinted, New York: Russell & Russell, 1959.
• Bodéüs, Richard, The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s Ethics , Albany: SUNY Press, 1993.
• Brill, Sara, Aristotle on the Concept of the Shared Life , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
• Hansen, Mogens Herman, Reflections on Aristotle’s Politics , Copenhagen: Tusculaneum Press, 2013.
• Keyt, David, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017.
• Kontos, Pavlos, Aristotle on the Scope of Practical Reason: Spectators, Legislators, Hopes, and Evils , Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2021.
• Kraut, Richard, Aristotle: Political Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
• Mulgan, Richard G., Aristotle’s Political Theory , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
• Newman, W. L., The Politics of Aristotle , 4 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1887–1902; reprinted Salem, NH: Ayer, 1985.
• Nichols, Mary, Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle’s Politics , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992.
• Pangle, Lorraine Smith, Reason and Character: The Moral Foundations of Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020.
• Pellegrin, Pierre, Endangered Excellent: On the Political Philosophy of Aristotle , translated by Anthony Preus, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2020.
• Riesbeck, David J., Aristotle on Political Community , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
• Roberts, Jean, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle and the Politics , London and New York: Routledge, 2009.
• Schütrumpf, Eckart, Aristoteles: Politik , 4 vols. Berlin and Darmstadt: Akademie Verlag, 1999–2005.
• Simpson, Peter, A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle , Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
• Strauss, Leo, “On Aristotle’s Politics,” in The City and Man , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, pp. 13–49.
• Susemihl, Franz, and R. D. Hicks, The Politics of Aristotle , London: Macmillan, 1894. [Includes books I–III and VII–VIII renumbered as IV–V.]
• Trott, Adriel M., Aristotle on the Nature of Community , New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
• Veogelin, Eric, Order and History (Vol. III: Plato and Aristotle ), Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1977.
• Yack, Bernard, The Problems of a Political Animal: Community, Justice, and Conflict in Aristotelian Political Thought , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

1. Biographical and Textual Studies

• Barker, Ernest, “The Life of Aristotle and the Composition and Structure of the Politics ,” Classical Review , 45 (1931), 162–72.
• Jaeger, Werner, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948.
• Kelsen, Hans, “Aristotle and the Hellenic-Macedonian Policy,” in Jonathan Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle (Volume 2: Ethics and Politics), London: Duckworth, 1977, pp. 170–94.
• Lord, Carnes, “The Character and Composition of Aristotle’s Politics ,” Political Theory , 9 (1981), 459–78.

2. Methodology and Foundations of Aristotle’s Political Theory

• Adkins, A. W. H., “The Connection between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 75–93.
• Cherry, Kevin M., Plato, Aristotle and the Purpose of Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
• Depew, David J., “The Ethics of Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Ryan K. Balot (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 399–418.
• Frank Jill, “On Logos and Politics in Aristotle,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 9–26.
• Frede, Dorothea, “The Political Character of Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 14–37.
• Gerson, Lloyd, “On the Scientific Character of Aristotle’s Politics,” in K. I. Boudouris, K. I. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995, vol. I, pp. 35–50.
• Irwin, Terence H., “Moral Science and Political Theory in Aristotle,” History of Political Thought , 6 (1985), pp. 150–68.
• Kahn, Charles H., “The Normative Structure of Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Günther Patzig (ed.) Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 369–84.
• Kamtekar, Rachana, “The Relationship between Aristotle’s Ethical and Political Discourses ( NE X 9),” in Ronald Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 370–82.
• Keyt, David, “Aristotle’s Political Philosophy,” in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 165–95.
• Lockwood, Thornton, “ Politics II: Political Critique, Political Theorizing, Political Innovation,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 64–83.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “The Unity of Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” in David Konstan and David Sider (eds.), Philoderma: Essays in Greek and Roman Philosophy in Honor of Phillip Mitsis (Siracusa: Parnassos Press, 2022), pp. 215–43.
• Ober, Joshua, “Aristotle’s Political Sociology: Class, Status, and Order in the Politics ,” in Carnes Lord and David O’Connor (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
• Pellegrin, Pierre, “On the ‘Platonic’ Part of Aristotle’s Politics ,” in William Wians (ed.) Aristotle’s Philosophical Development , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996, pp. 347–59.
• –––, “Is Politics a Natural Science?” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 27–45.
• –––, “Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Christopher Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 558–85.
• Peonids, F., “The Relation between the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics Revisited,” History of Political Thought 22 (2001): 1–12.
• Rowe, Christopher J., “Aims and Methods in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 57–74.
• Salkever, Stephen G., “Aristotle’s Social Science,” Political Theory , 9 (1981), pp. 479–508; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 27–64.
• –––, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
• Santas, Gerasimos X.,“The Relation between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” in K. I. Boudouris, K. I. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995, vol. I, pp. 160–76.
• Smith, Nicholas D. and Robert Mayhew, “Aristotle on What the Political Scientist Needs to Know,” in K. I. Boudouris (ed.) Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Athens: International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture, 1995, vol. I, pp. 189–98.
• Vander Waerdt, Paul A., “The Political Intention of Aristotle’s Moral Philosophy,” Ancient Philosophy 5 (1985), 77–89.
• –––, “The Plan and Intention of Aristotle’s Ethical and Political Writings,” Illinois Classical Studies 16 (1991), 231–53.

3. Political Naturalism

• Ambler, Wayne, “Aristotle’s Understanding of the Naturalness of the City,” Review of Politics , 47 (1985), 163–85.
• Annas, Julia, “Aristotle on Human Nature and Political Virtue,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 731–54.
• Berryman, Sylvia, Aristotle on the Sources of the Ethical Life , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2919, esp. Ch. 3 “Naturalism in Aristotle’s Politics. ”
• Chan, Joseph, “Does Aristotle’s Political Theory Rest on a Blunder?” History of Political Thought , 13 (1992), 189–202.
• Chappell, Timothy, “‘Naturalism’ in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy,” in Ryan K. Balot (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 382–98.
• Cherry, K. and E. A. Goerner, “Does Aristotle’s Polis Exist ‘By Nature’?” History of Political Thought , 27 (2006), 563–85.
• Cooper, John M., “Political Animals and Civic Friendship,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 220–41; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 65–89.
• DePew, David J., “Humans and Other Political Animals in Aristotle’s Historia Animalium ,” Phronesis , 40 (1995), 156–76.
• –––, “Political Animals and the Genealogy of the Polis : Aristotle’s Politics and Plato’s Statesman ,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 238–57.
• Everson, Stephen, “Aristotle on the Foundations of the State,” Political Studies , 36 (1988), 89–101.
• Karbowski, Joseph, “Political Animals and Human Nature in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 221–37.
• Keyt, David, “The Meaning of BIOS in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics ,” Ancient Philosophy , 9 (1989), 15–21; reprinted in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 101–9.
• –––, “Three Basic Theorems in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 118–41; reprinted in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 111–38.
• Kullmann, Wolfgang, “Man as a Political Animal in Aristotle,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 94–117.
• Lloyd, Geoffrey, “Aristotle on the Natural Sociability, Skills and Intelligence of Animals,” in Verity Harte and Melissa Lane (eds.), Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 277–94.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle: Naturalism,” in Christopher J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 321–43.
• Mulgan, Richard, “Aristotle’s Doctrine that Man is a Political Animal,” Hermes , 102 (1974), 438–45.
• Reeve, C. D. C., “The Naturalness of the Polis in Aristotle,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 512–25.
• Roberts, Jean, “Political Animals in the Nicomachean Ethics ,” Phronesis , 34 (1989), 185–202.

4. Household: Women, Children, and Slaves

• Booth, William James, “Politics and the Household: A Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics Book One,” History of Political Thought , 2 (1981), 203–26.
• Brunt, P. A., “Aristotle and Slavery,” in Studies in Greek History and Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 434–88.
• Chambliss, J. J., “Aristotle’s Conception of Children and the Poliscraft,” Educational Studies , 13 (1982), 33–43.
• Cole, Eve Browning, “Women, Slaves, and ‘Love of Toil’ in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 127–44.
• Deslauriers, Marguerite, “The Virtues of Women and Slaves,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 25 (2003), 213–31.
• –––, “Political Rule Over Women in Politics ,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 46–63.
• Fortenbaugh, W. W., “Aristotle on Slaves and Women,” in Jonathan Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle , vol. 2, Ethics and Politics. London: Duckworth, 1977, pp. 135–9.
• Frank, Jill, “Citizens, Slaves, and Foreigners: Aristotle on Human Nature,” American Political Science Review , 98 (2004), 91–104.
• Freeland, Cynthia, Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle , University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998.
• Garnsey, Peter, Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
• Lindsay, Thomas K., “Was Aristotle Racist, Sexist, and Anti-Democratic?: A Review Essay,” Review of Politics 56 (1994), 127–51.
• Lockwood, Thornton, “Justice in Aristotle’s Household and City,” Polis , 20 (2003), 1–21.
• –––, “Is Natural Slavery Beneficial?” Journal of the History of Philosophy , 45 (2007), 207–21.
• Mayhew, Robert, The Female in Aristotle’s Biology: Reason or Rationalization , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
• Modrak, Deborah, “Aristotle: Women, Deliberation, and Nature,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 207–21.
• Mulgan, Robert G., “Aristotle and the Political Role of Women,” History of Political Thought , 15 (1994), 179–202.
• Nagle, D. Brendan, The Household as the Foundation of Aristotle’s Polis , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
• Pellegrin, Pierre, “Natural Slavery,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 92–116.
• Saxenhouse, Arlene W., “Family, Polity, and Unity: Aristotle on Socrates’ Community of Wives,” Polity , 15 (1982), 202–19.
• Schofield, Malcolm, “Ideology and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Theory of Slavery,” in Günther Patzig (ed.) Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 1–27; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 91–119.
• Senack, Christine M., “Aristotle on the Woman’s Soul,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 223–36.
• Simpson, Peter, “Aristotle’s Criticism of Socrates’ Communism of Wives and Children,” Apeiron , 24 (1991), 99–114.
• Smith, Nicholas D., “Plato and Aristotle on the Nature of Women,” Journal of the History of Philosophy , 21 (1983), 467–78.
• –––, “Aristotle’s Theory of Natural Slavery,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 142–55.
• Spelman, E. V., “Aristotle and the Politicization of the Soul,” in Sandra Harding and M. B. Hintikka (eds) Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science , Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983, pp. 17–30.
• –––, “Who’s Who in the Polis,” in Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle , Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, pp. 99–125.
• Stauffer, Dana J., “Aristotle’s Account of the Subjection of Women,” Journal of Politics , 70 (2008), 929–41.

5. Political Economy

• Ambler, Wayne H., “Aristotle on Acquisition,” Canadian Journal of Political Science , 17 (1984), 487–502.
• Crespo, Ricardo F., A Re-assessment of Aristotle ’ s Economic Thought . London: Routledge, 2014.
• Dobbs, Darrell, “Aristotle’s Anticommunism,” American Journal of Political Science , 29 (1985), 29–46.
• Finley, M. I., “Aristotle and Economic Analysis,” in Jonathan Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle , vol. 2, Ethics and Politics. London: Duckworth, 1977, pp. 140–58.
• Gallagher, Robert L., Aristotle’s Critique of Political Economy with a Contemporary Application. London: Routledge, 2018.
• Hadreas, Peter, “Aristotle on the Vices and Virtue of Wealth,” Journal of Business Ethics, 39 (2002), 361–76.
• Hartman, Edwin M., “Virtue, Profit, and the Separation Thesis: An Aristotelian View,” Journal of Business Ethics ,99 (2011), 5–17.
• –––, Virtue in Business: Conversations with Aristotle . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
• Inamura, Kazutaka, “The Role of Reciprocity in Aristotle’s Theory of Political Economy,” History of Political Thought , 32 (2011), 565–87.
• Irwin, Terence H., “Aristotle’s Defense of Private Property,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.). A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 200–25.
• Judson, Lindsay, “Aristotle on Fair Exchange,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy , 15 (1997), 147–75.
• Keyt, David, “Aristotle and the Joy of Working,” in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, pp. 223–39.
• Mathie, William,“Property in the Political Science of Aristotle,” in Anthony Parel & Thomas Flanagan(eds.), Theories of Property: Aristotle to the Present . Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1979, pp. 12–35.
• Mayhew, Robert, “Aristotle on Property,” The Review of Metaphysics , 46 (1993), 802–31.
• McNeill, D., “Alternative Interpretations of Aristotle on Exchange and Reciprocity,” Public Affairs Quarterly , 4 (1990), 55–68.
• Mei, Todd S., “The Preeminence of Use: Reevaluating the Relation between Use and Exchange in Aristotle’s Economic Thought,” American Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2009), 523–48.
• Meikle, Scott, “Aristotle on Money” Phronesis 39 (1994), 26–44.
• –––, Aristotle’s Economic Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
• Miller, Fred D. Jr., “Property Rights in Aristotle,” in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 121–44.
• –––, “Was Aristotle the First Economist?” Apeiron , 31 (1998), 387–98.
• –––, “Aristotle and Business: Friend or Foe?” in Eugene Heath and Byron Kaldis (eds.), Wealth, Commerce and Philosophy: Foundational Thinkers and Business Ethics , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017, pp. 31–52.
• Morris, Tom, If Aristotle Ran General Motors: The New Soul of Business , New York: Henry Holt, 1997.
• Nielsen, Karen Margrethe, “Economy and Private Property,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 67–91.
• Solomon, Robert C., “Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics,” Business Ethics Quarterly , 2 (1992), 317–39.
• –––, “Aristotle, Ethics, and Business Organizations,” Organization Studies, 25 (2004), 1021–43.

6. Political Justice and Injustice

• Brunschwig, Jacques, “The Aristotelian Theory of Equity,” in Michael Frede and Gisela Striker (eds.), Rationality in Greek Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 115–55.
• Marguerite Deslauriers, “Political Unity and Inequality,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 117–43.
• Georgiadis, Constantine, “Equitable and Equity in Aristotle,” in Spiro Panagiotou (ed.), Justice, Law and Method in Plato and Aristotle , Edmonton: Academic Printing & Publishing, 1987, pp. 159–72.
• Keyt, David, “Aristotle’s Theory of Distributive Justice,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 238–78.
• –––, “The Good Man and the Upright Citizen in Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics ,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), Freedom, Reason, and the Polis: Essays in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 220–40. Reprinted in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, 197–221.
• –––, “Nature and Justice,” in David Keyt, Nature and Justice: Studies in the Ethical and Political Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle , Leuven: Peeters, 2017, pp. 1–19.
• Lockwood, Thornton, “Polity, Political Justice, and Political Mixing,” History of Political Thought , 27 (2006), 207–22.
• Morrison, Donald, “The Common Good,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 176–98.
• Nussbaum, Martha C., “Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 153–87.
• Roberts, Jean, “Justice and the Polis,” in Christopher J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 344–65.
• Rosler, Andrés, “Civic Virtue: Citizenship, Ostracism, and War,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 144–75.
• Saxonhouse, Arlene W., “Aristotle on the Corruption of Regimes: Resentment and Justice,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 184–203.
• Schütrumpf, Eckart, “Little to Do With Justice: Aristotle on Distributing Political Power,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 163–83.
• Young, Charles M., “Aristotle on Justice,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy , 27 (1988), 233–49.
• Zingano, Marco, “Natural, Ethical, and Political Justice,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 199–222.

7. Political Friendship and Enmity

• Hatzistavrou, Antony, “Faction,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 301–23.
• Irrera, Elena, “Between Advantage and Virtue: Aristotle’s Theory of Political Friendship,” History of Political Thought , 26 (2005), 565–85.
• Jang, Misung, “Aristotle’s Political Friendship as Solidarity,” in Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer, & Nuno M.S. Coelho (eds.), Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics, Dordrecht: Springer, 2018. pp. 417–33.
• Kalimtzis, Kostas, Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease: An Inquiry into Stasis , Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000.
• Kreft, Nora, “Aristotle on Friendship and Being Human,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 182–99.
• Kronman, Anthony, “Aristotle’s Idea of Political Fraternity,” American Journal of Jurisprudence , 24 (1979),114–138.
• Leontsini, Eleni, “The Motive of Society: Aristotle on Civic Friendship, Justice, and Concord,” Res Publica , 19 (2013), 21–35.
• Ludwig, Paul W., Rediscovering Political Friendship: Aristotle’s Theory and Modern Identity, Community, and Equality , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle on Deviant Constitutions,” in K. I. Boudouris, K. I. (ed.), Aristotelian Political Philosophy, Athens: Kardamitsa Publishing Co., 1995, vol. II, pp. 105–15.
• Mulgan, Richard, “The Role of Friendship in Aristotle’s Political Theory,” in Preston King, and Heather Devere (eds.), The Challenge to Friendship in M odernity , London: Frank Cass, 2000, pp. 15–32.
• Schofield, Malcolm, “Political Friendship and the Ideology of Reciprocity,” in Saving the City , London: Routledge, 1999, pp. 82–99.
• Schwarzenbach, Sibyl, “On Civic Friendship,” Ethics , 107 (1996), 97–128.
• Skultety, Steven C.,. “Defining Aristotle’s Conception of Stasis in the Politics ,” Phronesis 54 (2009), 346–70.
• –––, Conflict in Aristotle ’ s Political Philosophy , Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 2019.
• Sosa, Javier Echeñique & Jose Antonio Errázuriz Besa, “Aristotle on Personal Enmity,” Ancient Philosophy , 62 (2022), 215–31.
• Ward, Ann, “Friendship and politics in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics ,” European Journal of Political Theory , 10 (2011), 443–62.
• Weed, Ronald, Aristotle on Stasis: A Psychology of Political Conflict , Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2007.
• Yack, Bernard, “Community and Conflict in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy,” Review of Politics , 47 (1985), 92–112.
• –––, “Natural Right and Aristotle’s Understanding of Justice,” Political Theory , 18 (1990), 216–37.

8. Citizenship, Civic Obligation, and Political Rights

• Allan, D. J., “Individual and State in the Ethics and Politics ,” Entretiens sur l’Antiquité Classique IX, La ‘Politique’ d’Aristote , Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1964, pp. 53–95.
• Barnes, Jonathan, “Aristotle and Political Liberty,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 249–63; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 185–201.
• Collins, Susan D., Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
• Frede, Dorothea, “Citizenship in Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 167–84.
• Horn, Christoph, “Law, Governance, and Political Obligation,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 223–46.
• Irwin, Terence H., “The Good of Political Activity,” in Günther Patzig (ed.), Aristoteles’ ‘Politik’ , Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, pp. 73–98.
• Kraut, Richard, “Are There Natural Rights in Aristotle?” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 755–74.
• Lane, Melissa, “Claims to Rule: The Case of the Mutlitude,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 247–74.
• Long, Roderick T., “Aristotle’s Conception of Freedom,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 775–802; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 384–410.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle and the Origins of Natural Rights,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 873–907.
• –––, “Aristotle’s Theory of Political Rights,” in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 309–50.
• Morrison, Donald, “Aristotle’s Definition of Citizenship: A Problem and Some Solutions,” History of Philosophy Quarterly , 16 (1999), 143–65.
• Mulgan, Robert G., “Aristotle and the Value of Political Participation,” Political Theory , 18 (1990), 195–215.
• Roberts, Jean, “Excellences of the Citizen and of the Individual,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 555–65.
• Samaras, Thanassis, “Aristotle and the Question of Citizenship,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 123–41.
• Schofield, Malcolm, “Sharing in the Constitution,” The Review of Metaphysics , 49 (1996), 831–58; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 353–80.
• Zuckert, Catherine H., “Aristotle on the Limits and Satisfactions of Political Life,” Interpretation , 11 (1983), 185–206.

9. Constitutional Theory

• Balot, Ryan, “The ‘Mixed Regime’ In Aristotle’s Politics ,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 103–22.
• Bates, Clifford A., Aristotle’s “Best Regime”: Kingship, Democracy, and the Rule of Law , Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003.
• Bobonich, Christopher, “Aristotle, Decision Making, and the Many,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 142–62.
• Cherry, Kevin M., “The Problem of Polity: Political Participation in Aristotle’s Best Regime,” Journal of Politics , 71 (2009), 406–21.
• Coby, Patrick, “Aristotle’s Three Cities and the Problem of Faction,” Journal of Politics , 50 (1988), 896–919.
• Destrée, Pierre, “Aristotle on Improving Imperfect Cities,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 204–23.
• Dietz, Mary G., “Between Polis and Empire: Aristotle’s Politics ,” American Political Science Review 106 (2012), 275–93.
• Garsten, Bryan, “Deliberating and Acting Together,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 324–49.
• Huxley, G., “On Aristotle’s Best State,” in Paul Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (eds.), Crux: Essays Presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix , London: Duckworth, 1985, pp. 139–49.
• Johnson, Curtis N., Aristotle’s Theory of the State , New York: Macmillan, 1990.
• Keyt, David, “Aristotle and Anarchism,” Reason Papers , 18 (1993), 133–52; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety. Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 203–22.
• Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle’s Critique of False Utopias,” in Otfried Höffe (ed.), Aristoteles Politik , Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001, pp. 59–73.
• Lintott, Andrew, “Aristotle and Democracy,” The Classical Quarterly (New Series), 42 (1992), 114–28.
• Mayhew, Robert, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Republic , Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.
• –––, “Rulers and Ruled,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 526–39.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle on the Ideal Constitution,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 540–54.
• –––, “The Rule of Reason,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 38–66.
• Mulgan, Richard, “Aristotle’s Analysis of Oligarchy and Democracy,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 307–22.
• –––, “Constitutions and the Purpose of the State,” in Otfried Höffe (ed.), Aristoteles Politik , Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001, pp. 93–106.
• Mulhern, J. J., “ Politeia in Greek Literature, Inscriptions, and in Aristotle’s Politics : Reflections on Translation and Interpretation,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 84–102.
• Murray, O., “Polis and Politeia in Aristotle,” in Mogens Herman Hansen (ed.), The Ancient Greek City-State , Copenhagen: Muksgaard, 1993, pp. 197–210.
• Ober, Joshua, “Aristotle’s Natural Democracy,” in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 223–43.
• –––, “Democracy’s Wisdom: An Aristotelian Middle Way for Collective Judgment,” American Political Science Review , 107 (2013), 104–22.
• –––, “Nature, History, and Aristotle’s Best Possible Regime,” in Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: A Critical Guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 224–43.
• Polansky, Ronald, “Aristotle on Political Change,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 322–45.
• Rosler, Andres, Political Authority and Obligation in Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
• Rowe, C. J., “Reality and Utopia,” Elenchos , 10 (1989), 317–36.
• –––, “Aristotelian Constitutions,” in Christopher J. Rowe and Malcolm Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 366–89.
• Strauss, Barry, “On Aristotle’s Critique of Athenian Democracy,” in Carnes Lord and David O’Connor (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, pp. 212–33.
• Vander Waert, Paul A., “Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle’s Best Regime,” Phronesis , 30 (1985), 249–73.
• Waldron, Jeremy, “The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle’s Politics ,” Political Theory , 20 (1992), 613–41; reprinted in Richard Kraut and Steven Skultety (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics: Critical Essays , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, pp. 145–65.
• Wilson, James L., “Deliberation, Democracy, and the Rule of Reason in Aristotle’s Politics ,” American Political Science Review , 105 (2011), 259–74.

10. Education

• Burnyeat, Myles F., “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good,” in Amelie O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, pp. 69–92.
• Curren, Randall R., Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education , Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000.
• Depew, David J., “Politics, Music, and Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ideal State,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 346–80.
• Destrée, Pierre, “Education, Leisure, and Politics,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 301–23.
• Frede, Dorothea, “The Deficiency of Human Nature: The Task of a ‘Philosophy of Human Nature’,” in Geert Keil and Nora Kreft (eds.), Aristotle’s Anthropology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, pp. 258–74.
• Jimenez, Marta, Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.
• Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle on Method and Moral Education,” in Jyl Gentzler (ed.), Method in Ancient Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 171–90.
• –––, “Aristotle on Becoming Good: Habituation, Reflection, and Perception,” in Christopher Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 529–57.
• Lord, Carnes, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982.
• Lynch, John Patrick, Aristotle’s School , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
• Muzio, G. D., “Aristotle on Improving One’s Character,” Phronesis , 45 (2000), 205–19.
• Reeve, C. D. C,  “Aristotelian Education,” in A. O. Rorty (ed.), Philosophers on Education , London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 51–65.
• Stalley, Richard, “Education and the State,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 566–76.
• Brooks, Richard O. and James B. Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003.
• Burns, Tony, “Aristotle and Natural Law,” History of Political Thought , 19 (1998), 142–66.
• Duke, George, Aristotle and Law: The Politics of Nomos , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Gordley, James R., “Tort Law in the Aristotelian Tradition,” in Salvador Rus Rufino (ed.), Aristoteles: El Pensamiento Politico y Juridico . León & Seville: University of León & University of Seville, 1999, pp. 71–97.
• Hamburger, Max, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle’s Legal Theory , New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951.
• Huppes-Cluysenaer, Liesbeth & Nuno M..S. Coelho (eds.), Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics , Dordrecht: Springer, 2018.
• Miller, Eugene, “Prudence and the Rule of Law,” American Journal of Jurisprudence , 24 (1979), 181–206.
• Miller, Fred D., Jr., “Aristotle’s Philosophy of Law,” in Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Carrie-Ann Biondi (eds.), A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics [vol. 6 of A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence , ed. Enrico Pattaro]. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007, pp.79–110.
• Schroeder, Donald N., “Aristotle on Law,” Polis , 4 (1981), 17–31; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 37–51.
• Wormuth, F. D., “Aristotle on Law,” in M. R. Korvitz and A. E. Murphy (eds.), Essays in Political Theory Presented to G. H. Sabine,  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1948, pp. 45–61.
• Zanetti, Gianfrancesco, “Problematic Aspects of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Law,” Archiv f ü r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie , 81 (1995), 49–64.

12. Aristotle and Contemporary Politics

• Biondi, Carrie-Ann, “Aristotle on the Mixed Constitution and Its Relevance for American Political Thought,” in David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, Jr. (eds.), Freedom, Reason, and the Polis: Essays in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 176–98.
• Frank, Jill, A Democracy of Distinction: Aristotle and the Work of Politics , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
• Galston, William A., Justice and the Human Good , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
• Garver, Eugene, Aristotle’s Politics: Living Well and Living Together , Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011.
• Goodman, Lenn E. and Robert Talise (eds.), Aristotle’s Politics Today , Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.
• Kraut, Richard, “Aristotle and Rawls on the Common Good,” in Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 350–74.
• Lord, Carnes, “Aristotle and the Idea of Liberal Education,” in Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick (eds.), Demokrateia: A Conversation of Democracy, Ancient and Modern , Princeton: Princeton University Press Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, pp. 271–88.
• Machan, Tibor R., “Aristotle and the Moral Status of Business,”  Journal of Value Inquiry , 38 (2004), 217–33.
• Mara, Gerald M., “The Culture of Democracy: Aristotle’s Athênaiôn Politeia as Political Theory,” in Aristide Tessitore (ed.), Aristotle and Modern Politics: The Persistence of Political Philosophy , Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002, 307–41.
• Mulgan, Robert G., “Was Aristotle an ‘Aristotelian Social Democrat’?” Ethics , 111 (2000), 79–101.
• Murphy, James Bernard, The Moral Economy of Labor: Aristotelian Themes in Economic Theory , New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.
• Nussbaum, Martha C., “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” in R. Bruce Douglas, Gerald M. Mara, and Henry S. Richardson (eds.) Liberalism and the Good , London: Routledge, 1990, pp. 203–52.
• –––, “Capabilities and Human Rights,” Fordham Law Review , 66 (1997), 273–300; reprinted in Richard O. Brooks and James Bernard Murphy (eds.), Aristotle and Modern Law , Aldershot Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003, pp. 413–40.
• –––, “Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities: A Response to Anthony, Arneson, Charlesworth, and Mulgan,” Ethics , 111 (2000), 102–40.
• Pack, Spencer J., “Aristotle’s Difficult Relationship with Modern Economic Theory,” Foundations of Science , 13 (2008), 256–80.
• Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Douglas J. Den Uyl, Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order , La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991.
• –––, Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics , University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005.
• Schollmeier, Paul, Rewriting Contemporary Political Philosophy with Plato and Aristotle: An Essay on Eudaimonic Politics,  London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019.
• Salkever, Stephen S., Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
• Tessitore, Aristide (ed.), Aristotle and Modern Politics: The Persistence of Political Philosophy , Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002.
• Wallach, John C., “Contemporary Aristotelianism,” Political Theory , 20 (1992), 613–41.

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Michael Walzer (collected by David Miller) Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2007, xxi+337pp., £18.99, ISBN: 978-0300118162

This is a valuable collection of essays. Michael Walzer is one of the most important contemporary political theorists, but his major book-length studies of general interest date from a generation ago – Just and Unjust Wars (1977) and Spheres of Justice (1983) . Since then he has produced a series of short monographs, several based on his prestigious lecture series, but his main focus has been on the specialized field of Jewish political thought and traditions, and his contributions to the wider discourse have been in the form of scholarly papers and chapters, as well as many op-ed pieces in Dissent , the democratic socialist journal that he co-edits. The best of his papers on war were collected in Arguing About War (2004) , and David Miller has now pulled together a further 18 essays on political theory more generally – though there is still a substantial international component to these papers, with important essays on humanitarian intervention and the War on Terror. One of these papers is published here for the first time, and also reproduced is the very revelatory interview Walzer gave to the online journal Imprints in 2003. As well, a bibliography of Walzer's writings is provided.

Why is Walzer an important theorist? The key to his appeal for this reviewer was provided, inadvertently, by Jon Elster when he referred to Walzer as a ‘phenomenologist of the moral life’ ( Elster, 1992 , p. 14). This was intended to be mildly disparaging, to suggest that Walzer is not a real political philosopher, someone who digs deep to get to the truth, but rather a thinker who is satisfied with working on surface phenomena, exploring moral dilemmas when and where they appear. Turn the implicit minus here into a plus and you have the key to Walzer's appeal. Running through these essays is a rejection of liberal political philosophy in favour of liberal (in a European context, social democratic) political theory – Walzer has little time for abstract constructs such as Rawls's ‘original position’ or Habermas's ‘ideal speech situation’, or for the hypothetical examples beloved of authors favoured by journals such as Philosophy and Public Affairs . Attempts to resolve political arguments via the production of philosophical truths are, he would argue, not simply doomed to fail, they are positively harmful because they draw attention and brainpower away from the real political problems and foster an anti-democratic frame of mind; ever more elaborate investigations into the hypothetical problems of an egalitarian society should be no substitute for political engagement devoted to attacking current inequalities and injustices. The findings of philosophers should not be substituted for the outcomes of democratic politics.

What all this means in practice for Walzer is a very social democratic version of liberalism. He is firmly situated within both the anti-communist American left – a proud tradition to which many of the Company of Critics , such as C. Wright Mills and Michael Harrington, belong ( Walzer, 1988 ) – and the socialist wing of the Zionist movement in the United States. This is a location that confuses many European critics, who pick up on Walzer's Zionism without recognizing that his radical commitments lead him to condemn many Israeli policies, while wholeheartedly defending the right of Israel to exist. Similarly, his nuanced response to 9/11 – no blank cheque for the Bush administration but a willingness to support them when they did the right thing – was not appreciated by those who see the world in black and white, but was wholly consistent with the approach he has taken throughout his career. His classic essay on ‘Dirty Hands’ (the only pre-1980 essay included in this collection) contains more wisdom on the War on Terror and the debates on torture than any other 17 pages I know.

The Zionist and the explicitly American dimensions of Walzer's work makes him particularly sensitive to issues of nationality, identity and multiculturalism (all topics discussed brilliantly in this collection), but his democratic socialism ensures that he leaves some room for universal values; his account of when humanitarian intervention in defence of basic human rights is legitimate, even possibly obligatory, is simply masterly. At the heart of his political theory are real people living real lives, and, ultimately, abstractions such as the nation have to take second place to this reality; by the same token his socialism makes him willing to countenance state-action at a level that would offend many liberals, but always contained within the appropriate sphere and never at the expense of human individuality.

Each one of these essays merits re-reading, and some are of seminal importance. Moreover – and here is another difference between Walzer and many contemporary political philosophers – they are a joy to read. He is one of the great modern political writers, up there with George Orwell and very few others. In this collection David Miller has chosen well, and his introduction is brief, lucid and helpful. One very minor gripe; it would have been good to have had the date of these essays noted somewhere in the body of each work or the table of contents – the information is there but only in the list of published works. A point for the paperback perhaps?

Elster, J. (1992) Local Justice. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

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Walzer, M. (1977) Just and Unjust Wars. New York: Basic Books.

Walzer, M. (1983) Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic Books.

Walzer, M. (1988) The Company of Critics. New York: Basic Books.

Walzer, M. (2004) Arguing About War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

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Brown, C. Thinking politically: Essays in political theory. Contemp Polit Theory 8 , 240–242 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1057/cpt.2008.53

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How to Study Political Theory

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A Student Companion to Graham and Hoffman, Introduction to Political Theory

Intended learning outcomes – developing your transferable skills.

University courses have what are called ‘intended learning outcomes’ (ILOs). An intended learning outcome is what a student should be able to achieve on the completion of a course and can be tested through, for example, tutorial/seminar participation, unseen written exams, seen exams (‘takeaway papers’), multiple choice questions, and course essays. There are at least four different kinds of ILO: transferable skills; generic academic skills; cognate academic skills; and, subject-specific skills. This guide concentrates on the last of these: the skills specific to the understanding of political theory (the ‘10 rules’). However, it is worth saying something about the other three kinds of ILO:

Transferable skills

These are skills useful in employment situations. Specifically, the study of political theory should strengthen the following:

• General reasoning abilities – recognising valid and invalid arguments.
• Capacity to make valid conceptual distinctions – the consistent use of concepts.
• Writing skills.
• Oral skills – the ability to argue a case through, for example: (a) defending your own position; or (b) playing ‘devil’s advocate’.
• A deeper understanding of social relations, including the ability to abstract from everyday situations – reflection on ‘case studies’ is particularly important here.
• Ethical reasoning.
• Empathy – the ability to recognise other people’s points of view.

Generic academic skills

These are skills which can be ‘transferred’ to other university subjects, especially in the arts (or humanities) and social sciences. They include the skills listed above under ‘transferable skills’, but additionally:

• The ability to write grammatically and syntactically correct and properly referenced academic essays.
• The capacity to construct arguments under examination conditions – that is, in a specified time and without notes.
• The framing of an oral argument and ability to defend it in group discussion.

Cognate - subject academic skills

Political theory ‘interfaces’ with a number of other disciplines, or sub-disciplines, and skills gained in the study of political theory are ‘transferable’ to these other sub-disciplines. Cognate disciplines and sub-disciplines include:

• History, especially the history of ideas.
• Economics – e.g., welfare economics and rational choice.
• Law – e.g., legal philosophy and legal theory.
• Sociology and anthropology.
• Social and public policy.
• Literature – e.g., textual analysis.
• Biology – e.g., sociobiology.

It is important to recognise that different disciplines pose different questions and these should not be confused. However, it is also important to avoid arbitrary distinctions between disciplines – knowledge, understanding, and skills acquired in one discipline can be transferred to another.

Ten rules for studying political theory

Rule 1: think for yourself.

So long as you acknowledge alternative positions, it is better to present your own arguments rather than a boring list of alternative claims. Have confidence in your own position! There is, however, a difference between presenting your own argument and engaging in a polemic: you must provide a reasoned defence of a particular position. Furthermore, while political theorists disagree, it does not follow that political values are ‘subjective’ – you are giving other people reasons for accepting a certain claim and not simply banging the table and saying (in effect) I feel strongly about something (you can, of course, communicate reasons and feel strongly, but the reasons are crucial).

Rule 2: Use concepts with precision

Concepts are central to all academic disciplines, but especially the humanities and social sciences. Some political theorists claim we can agree on the meaning of concepts, such as (say) freedom or democracy while disagreeing about the value attached to each, or how we settle conflicts between values. Other political theorists argue that disagreement pertains to the meaning, as well as the value, of concepts. Whichever view you take, it is important to define your concepts, even if other people may disagree with your definition. You must also be consistent in your definition and application of concepts.

Rule 3: Recognise the importance of everyday experience

Even before you began studying political theory you had engaged in ‘political theory’: reflections on the fairness or unfairness of wealth distribution, or the legitimacy or illegitimacy of restrictions on freedom, involve theorising about politics and morality. Although few politicians read works of political theory (or philosophy), they often (implicitly) make moral judgements about ‘political issues’. Case studies are a particularly good way of drawing out the moral implications of everyday experience. These contrast with artificial thought experiments, where the aim is quite deliberately to remove contingent elements or to force you to think in a certain way – both case studies and thought-experiments can be useful.

Rule 4: Be critical of everyday assumptions

While everyday experience is valuable – because it demonstrates the relevance of political theory – it is also important to be critical of everyday assumptions. The ‘person in the street’ might say ‘it’s just common sense that such and such is (ought to be) the case’. It may be that after critical reflection you come to endorse the ‘common sense’ view, but then in defending the view you would not be appealing to common sense.

Rule 5: Read texts critically

There is a great deal of published work in political theory, some good and some bad. Even the work of the greatest and most respected political theorists are open to challenge. In studying political theory think of a building. Buildings have ‘stress points’ and ‘loadbearing’ elements, and so do theories – but the precise location of these will vary from one theory to another. When you read a work of a great theorist, such as Hobbes or Locke or Marx, you need to identify the stress points, because these are the points that are most open to attack.

Rule 6: Learn to analyse texts

Continuing with the building analogy, just as a building can be deconstructed so can texts. While it is important to respect the text as a whole rather than pick out the supposedly ‘good bits’ from what may appear to be a great deal of ‘padding’, nonetheless, some sentences carry greater weight than others, and the more you engage with texts the better will be your ability to identify the central arguments.

Rule 7: Engage with the argument

Some theories will appeal to you, others will not – indeed, you may even find some arguments obnoxious. While there is nothing wrong with disliking a theory (see rule 1), it is important to engage with it, which means trying to put the most credible interpretation on it. It is also important to avoid ‘naming’ an argument as a substitute to criticising it: for example, some people might regard the term ‘classical liberal’ as derogatory. They then identify a particular thinker’s work as ‘classical liberal’ as if that were a sufficient ground for rejection. Genuine criticism involves drawing out the truth of an argument – it is not simple rejection

Rule 8: Employ lateral thinking

It may be quite challenging to employ lateral thinking at an introductory level, but some moral problems in politics look intractable because we make false assumptions, or because there are considerations at play which are not obvious from the way the problem is explained (a ‘problem’ is here defined as a puzzle). Lateral thinking involves looking at a problem from new and possibly strange angles. In political theory, the term is rarely used, but nonetheless, there is much lateral thinking, and it often takes the form of analogical thinking – using something from outside politics to explain a political problem. The Prisoner's Dilemma is a classic example, for it helps elucidate the problem of why people who are in profound conflict with one another might cooperate.

Rule 9: Argue cogently and coherently

Arguments in political theory do not always depend on ‘logic’ in the strict sense of the word – that is, conclusions do not follow in a linear manner from a set of premises. There is reliance on empirical claims about the nature of human beings and society, which can reasonably be challenged. Nonetheless, there are standards of cogency and coherence, and while an argument will always be open to challenge, it is usually obvious when a person has advanced obviously contradictory claims.

Rule 10: Form matters

Writing grammatically and syntactically correct sentences is not only an important transferable skill, but can be indicative of cogent and coherent argumentation – form (good writing) and substance (good arguments) are not independent of one another. Writing comes more easily to some students than others, but it is important to take pride in what you write.

Using the Graham & Hoffman resources

This part of the guide explains the various features of the textbook and the Companion Website and how to use them most effectively.

Case studies

Each chapter begins with a case study. Your tutor/instructor will provide further guidance on how to approach them, but there are some general points to be made about the case studies:

• Tackle the case study before you read the rest of the chapter.
• Engage in a ‘brainstorming’ exercise: write down anything relevant to the case under consideration, then:
• Go through the list, deleting what, on reflection, you think is unimportant, and put the remaining points in categories according to the type of argument or claim being made (e.g., factual versus normative, or ‘evaluative’), and then rank the points in order of importance.
• When you have read the chapter, return to the case study and consider whether your views have changed (it may be that your conclusion has not changed, but that you have revised the arguments which lead you to that conclusion).

There are further case studies on this website.

Web resources

Web resources can be found on this website. Obviously the idea of the web is that one website leads to another and your journey through the web may take you to some weird and wacky places. Some academics are quite dismissive of websites, and although this may be partly a reflection of age and generation, there are some dangers with web resources:

• Although a great deal of rubbish appears in print, there is greater ‘quality control’ on books and journal articles than on web-based material. After all, it takes no more than ten minutes to start a blog. On the other hand, there are many intelligent blogs, often with links to interesting articles and websites. Be discerning in your use of web-based materials.
• Arguments should be assessed on their merits rather than ad hominem from their source, but given limited time, there are some tests which can help you discriminate useful and useless websites:
• How well-established is a website? The longer, the better. How many ‘hits’ has it got? The more, the better. How many other websites link to it? The more the better.
• What is the quality of the backlinks (that is, links from the website)? High status web extensions are .edu and .ac.uk.
• Is the material available in published form? Some websites, such as www.jstor.org are, in effect, online libraries, where everything on the website is available in hard copy in university libraries. Other websites contain legal documents, which, likewise, are available published in hard copy.
• You should avoid excessive reliance on websites in writing course essays (see section on writing essays).
• You should not break any laws or regulations in your web search. Some of the topics discussed in the Graham & Hoffman textbooks are controversial, and using certain keywords, such as ‘pornography’, will produce web pages which contravene your college or university regulations, if not laws. The same issue may apply to ‘guns’. If you have any concerns, you should contact your course tutors/instructors.

Further Reading

At the end of each chapter is a guide to further reading. Practices vary between countries, but in Britain lecturers tend to put more items on their reading lists than they expect students to read, with the intention being that students can choose what to read. Items may be more or less relevant depending upon what essay question you are answering. (Furthermore, there can be intense pressure on libraries, so that having a fairly long reading list to some extent reduces that pressure).

In other countries, students assume that everything on a reading list must be read. We have followed the British practice.

Finally: note-taking

Note-taking in lectures and from books is an important skill. Lecturers’ styles and approaches vary greatly – some lecture without notes and/or PowerPoint, while others have detailed notes and overheads which are made available to students. Do not be obsessed with overheads – many lecturers use them simply to give some visual structure to the lecture and it is not intended that students write everything down. It is important to listen to lectures. If you do take notes then consider whether or not a ‘linear’ technique is the best – sometimes ‘trees’ with branches leading from one point to another is better than writing sentences.

Taking notes from books is quite different to note-taking in lectures. Try to avoid writing very long notes – try to condense the argument. If you photocopy from books then avoid underlining or highlighting large chunks – when you come back to the text you want to be able quickly to identify key arguments (do not write in or mark library books!).

Writing essays (papers) in political theory

In this section, we provide guidance specific to writing essays (papers) in political theory.

Some important general points:

• There are no ‘model answers’ to essay questions – two students can answer the same essay question and both get A grades, but their essays may be very different in style and argument.
• Answer the question asked and not a question you would like to have been asked – be relevant!
• You should express your own reasoned views.
• You should develop your own style of writing, but pay attention to grammar, syntax and spelling.
• Think about the structure of the essay.
• Read carefully and with discrimination – develop note-taking skills. Do not read too much.
• Organise your time – there may be many students on your course and a great deal of pressure on library and computing services.
• Be aware that plagiarism is a serious offence.

Essays should have a beginning, middle, and end. Very roughly speaking, the beginning, or opening part, should constitute about 10-15% of the essay and tell the reader what the essay is going to say. The middle part, or ‘core’, should be about 70% of the essay and contain the central arguments and discussion, while the end, or concluding part, should provide a strong conclusion, and may be slightly longer than the opening part (say, about 20% of the essay).

Here is an example, but please note this is not presented as a ‘model answer’, but rather is intended to be an illustration of a well-structured essay:

Question: Should the state prevent people harming themselves?

• Introduction and Core:

• Define the concepts in the question: state (= coercive); prevention (= interference); harm to self.
• Introduce the concept of paternalism.
• Discuss ‘extreme cases’ of harm to self. Pose the question: could anyone reasonably argue that the state should not intervene?
• Is there a danger of a ‘slippery slope’ from extreme to ‘moderate’ cases of harm to self? Discuss the ‘moderate’ cases.
• Could we consent to paternalism?

• Closing part: tell the reader what you think – but the conclusion must follow from the arguments set out in the 'core'.

Referencing – house style

Different academic departments recommend different forms of referencing (‘house styles’). A relatively easy one to use is the Harvard System, which is the one adopted in the Graham & Hoffman textbooks.

Whatever style you adopt, you should:

• Use a house correctly and consistently – if you are unsure look at a book on the Further Reading lists and follow its style of referencing.
• Always reference – failure to reference may open you to the charge of plagiarism.

Other style issues include:

• Margins and spacing – always give the marker space to write comments. There should be reasonably sized margins and at least 1.5 spacing, if not double spacing.
• Font – use a clear and attractive font. Arial, Calibri and Times New Roman are good fonts.
• Use a reasonable font size – the size will depend on the font used, but anything smaller than 11 point is probably too small.
• Avoid excessive use of bullet points.
• Depending on the length of the essay, it may be appropriate to divide the essay into sections with section headings. A section should run for at least a couple of pages.

Grammar, syntax and spelling

Do not assume spelling and grammar checks are infallible – there are many mistakes which they will not identify. There is no alternative to checking the essay yourself. Below are listed some common errors made in politics and political theory essays:

• English, like any other language, has different ‘registers’: using English in an academic essay is quite different to using it in a bar. This is obvious. However, sometimes there is a slippage between levels. For example, in lower registers, such as conversation, we contract: I am becomes I’m ; they are becomes they’re . In higher registers, such as essay writing, we avoid such contractions. Likewise, colloquialisms should be avoided.
• Use of the ‘first person’: I and we . There is a division of opinion here – in political theory it is common to write in the first person (single or plural), whereas in political science it is not regarded as good practice. So long as the use of the first person does not lead to a lazy spouting of unjustified claims it is acceptable.
• Confusion of possessive and plural – this arises because both use the s. The possessive uses apostrophe + s: Mill's argument not Mills argument . The plural does not use an apostrophe: workers of the world unite not worker’s of the world unite. Regular plural + possessive is expressed with an apostrophe after the s: workers’ rights (but not with irregular plurals: women’s rights not womens’ rights ).
• Its and it’s : its is a possessive pronoun – the government’s policies = its policies. An apostrophe is not necessary because there can be no plural of it and hence no confusion of plural and possessive. It’s is simply a contraction of it is .
• Latin and Greek endings: the standard ‘Anglo-Saxon’ ending is with s but as well as Anglo-Saxon irregulars, such as women, children, mice, geese, there are also Latin and Greek endings: criter ion > criter ia ; strat um > strat a ; spectr um > spectr a . However, there is a tendency to standardise: referend um > either referend a or referend ums (both are now acceptable, although the Oxford English Dictionary argues that referendums is the correct plural). If unsure, check the plural in the dictionary.
• Principle and principal are often confused.
• Some people write loose , when they mean lose .
• There and their are sometimes confused.
• A normal sentence should have a verb (in the indicative): Mill attempts to reconcile utilitarianism and individual rights.
• Number agreement. A subject in the singular should correspond to ('govern') other elements (verbs, pronouns) in the sentence – so a singular subject should be complemented by a verb and pronoun in the singular.
• Subjunctive: this is a mood of the verb which expresses an unreal condition. It has virtually disappeared from the English language but is retained in the verb to be: if I were a woman not if I was a woman.

Paul Graham

Revised July 2022

Political Science

What this handout is about.

This handout will help you to recognize and to follow writing standards in political science. The first step toward accomplishing this goal is to develop a basic understanding of political science and the kind of work political scientists do.

Defining politics and political science

Political scientist Harold Laswell said it best: at its most basic level, politics is the struggle of “who gets what, when, how.” This struggle may be as modest as competing interest groups fighting over control of a small municipal budget or as overwhelming as a military stand-off between international superpowers. Political scientists study such struggles, both small and large, in an effort to develop general principles or theories about the way the world of politics works. Think about the title of your course or re-read the course description in your syllabus. You’ll find that your course covers a particular sector of the large world of “politics” and brings with it a set of topics, issues, and approaches to information that may be helpful to consider as you begin a writing assignment. The diverse structure of political science reflects the diverse kinds of problems the discipline attempts to analyze and explain. In fact, political science includes at least eight major sub-fields:

• American politics examines political behavior and institutions in the United States.
• Comparative politics analyzes and compares political systems within and across different geographic regions.
• International relations investigates relations among nation states and the activities of international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and NATO, as well as international actors such as terrorists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and multi-national corporations (MNCs).
• Political theory analyzes fundamental political concepts such as power and democracy and foundational questions, like “How should the individual and the state relate?”
• Political methodology deals with the ways that political scientists ask and investigate questions.
• Public policy examines the process by which governments make public decisions.
• Public administration studies the ways that government policies are implemented.
• Public law focuses on the role of law and courts in the political process.

What is scientific about political science?

Investigating relationships.

Although political scientists are prone to debate and disagreement, the majority view the discipline as a genuine science. As a result, political scientists generally strive to emulate the objectivity as well as the conceptual and methodological rigor typically associated with the so-called “hard” sciences (e.g., biology, chemistry, and physics). They see themselves as engaged in revealing the relationships underlying political events and conditions. Based on these revelations, they attempt to state general principles about the way the world of politics works. Given these aims, it is important for political scientists’ writing to be conceptually precise, free from bias, and well-substantiated by empirical evidence. Knowing that political scientists value objectivity may help you in making decisions about how to write your paper and what to put in it.

Political theory is an important exception to this empirical approach. You can learn more about writing for political theory classes in the section “Writing in Political Theory” below.

Building theories

Since theory-building serves as the cornerstone of the discipline, it may be useful to see how it works. You may be wrestling with theories or proposing your own as you write your paper. Consider how political scientists have arrived at the theories you are reading and discussing in your course. Most political scientists adhere to a simple model of scientific inquiry when building theories. The key to building precise and persuasive theories is to develop and test hypotheses. Hypotheses are statements that researchers construct for the purpose of testing whether or not a certain relationship exists between two phenomena. To see how political scientists use hypotheses, and to imagine how you might use a hypothesis to develop a thesis for your paper, consider the following example. Suppose that we want to know whether presidential elections are affected by economic conditions. We could formulate this question into the following hypothesis:

“When the national unemployment rate is greater than 7 percent at the time of the election, presidential incumbents are not reelected.”

Collecting data

In the research model designed to test this hypothesis, the dependent variable (the phenomenon that is affected by other variables) would be the reelection of incumbent presidents; the independent variable (the phenomenon that may have some effect on the dependent variable) would be the national unemployment rate. You could test the relationship between the independent and dependent variables by collecting data on unemployment rates and the reelection of incumbent presidents and comparing the two sets of information. If you found that in every instance that the national unemployment rate was greater than 7 percent at the time of a presidential election the incumbent lost, you would have significant support for our hypothesis.

However, research in political science seldom yields immediately conclusive results. In this case, for example, although in most recent presidential elections our hypothesis holds true, President Franklin Roosevelt was reelected in 1936 despite the fact that the national unemployment rate was 17%. To explain this important exception and to make certain that other factors besides high unemployment rates were not primarily responsible for the defeat of incumbent presidents in other election years, you would need to do further research. So you can see how political scientists use the scientific method to build ever more precise and persuasive theories and how you might begin to think about the topics that interest you as you write your paper.

Clear, consistent, objective writing

Since political scientists construct and assess theories in accordance with the principles of the scientific method, writing in the field conveys the rigor, objectivity, and logical consistency that characterize this method. Thus political scientists avoid the use of impressionistic or metaphorical language, or language which appeals primarily to our senses, emotions, or moral beliefs. In other words, rather than persuade you with the elegance of their prose or the moral virtue of their beliefs, political scientists persuade through their command of the facts and their ability to relate those facts to theories that can withstand the test of empirical investigation. In writing of this sort, clarity and concision are at a premium. To achieve such clarity and concision, political scientists precisely define any terms or concepts that are important to the arguments that they make. This precision often requires that they “operationalize” key terms or concepts. “Operationalizing” simply means that important—but possibly vague or abstract—concepts like “justice” are defined in ways that allow them to be measured or tested through scientific investigation.

Fortunately, you will generally not be expected to devise or operationalize key concepts entirely on your own. In most cases, your professor or the authors of assigned readings will already have defined and/or operationalized concepts that are important to your research. And in the event that someone hasn’t already come up with precisely the definition you need, other political scientists will in all likelihood have written enough on the topic that you’re investigating to give you some clear guidance on how to proceed. For this reason, it is always a good idea to explore what research has already been done on your topic before you begin to construct your own argument. See our handout on making an academic argument .

Example of an operationalized term

To give you an example of the kind of rigor and objectivity political scientists aim for in their writing, let’s examine how someone might operationalize a term. Reading through this example should clarify the level of analysis and precision that you will be expected to employ in your writing. Here’s how you might define key concepts in a way that allows us to measure them.

We are all familiar with the term “democracy.” If you were asked to define this term, you might make a statement like the following:

“Democracy is government by the people.”

You would, of course, be correct—democracy is government by the people. But, in order to evaluate whether or not a particular government is fully democratic or is more or less democratic when compared with other governments, we would need to have more precise criteria with which to measure or assess democracy. For example, here are some criteria that political scientists have suggested are indicators of democracy:

• Freedom to form and join organizations
• Freedom of expression
• Right to vote
• Eligibility for public office
• Right of political leaders to compete for support
• Right of political leaders to compete for votes
• Alternative sources of information
• Free and fair elections
• Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference

If we adopt these nine criteria, we now have a definition that will allow us to measure democracy empirically. Thus, if you want to determine whether Brazil is more democratic than Sweden, you can evaluate each country in terms of the degree to which it fulfills the above criteria.

What counts as good writing in political science?

While rigor, clarity, and concision will be valued in any piece of writing in political science, knowing the kind of writing task you’ve been assigned will help you to write a good paper. Two of the most common kinds of writing assignments in political science are the research paper and the theory paper.

Writing political science research papers

Your instructors use research paper assignments as a means of assessing your ability to understand a complex problem in the field, to develop a perspective on this problem, and to make a persuasive argument in favor of your perspective. In order for you to successfully meet this challenge, your research paper should include the following components:

• An introduction
• A problem statement
• A discussion of methodology
• A literature review
• A description and evaluation of your research findings
• A summary of your findings

Here’s a brief description of each component.

In the introduction of your research paper, you need to give the reader some basic background information on your topic that suggests why the question you are investigating is interesting and important. You will also need to provide the reader with a statement of the research problem you are attempting to address and a basic outline of your paper as a whole. The problem statement presents not only the general research problem you will address but also the hypotheses that you will consider. In the methodology section, you will explain to the reader the research methods you used to investigate your research topic and to test the hypotheses that you have formulated. For example, did you conduct interviews, use statistical analysis, rely upon previous research studies, or some combination of all of these methodological approaches?

Before you can develop each of the above components of your research paper, you will need to conduct a literature review. A literature review involves reading and analyzing what other researchers have written on your topic before going on to do research of your own. There are some very pragmatic reasons for doing this work. First, as insightful as your ideas may be, someone else may have had similar ideas and have already done research to test them. By reading what they have written on your topic, you can ensure that you don’t repeat, but rather learn from, work that has already been done. Second, to demonstrate the soundness of your hypotheses and methodology, you will need to indicate how you have borrowed from and/or improved upon the ideas of others.

By referring to what other researchers have found on your topic, you will have established a frame of reference that enables the reader to understand the full significance of your research results. Thus, once you have conducted your literature review, you will be in a position to present your research findings. In presenting these findings, you will need to refer back to your original hypotheses and explain the manner and degree to which your results fit with what you anticipated you would find. If you see strong support for your argument or perhaps some unexpected results that your original hypotheses cannot account for, this section is the place to convey such important information to your reader. This is also the place to suggest further lines of research that will help refine, clarify inconsistencies with, or provide additional support for your hypotheses. Finally, in the summary section of your paper, reiterate the significance of your research and your research findings and speculate upon the path that future research efforts should take.

Writing in political theory

Political theory differs from other subfields in political science in that it deals primarily with historical and normative, rather than empirical, analysis. In other words, political theorists are less concerned with the scientific measurement of political phenomena than with understanding how important political ideas develop over time. And they are less concerned with evaluating how things are than in debating how they should be. A return to our democracy example will make these distinctions clearer and give you some clues about how to write well in political theory.

Earlier, we talked about how to define democracy empirically so that it can be measured and tested in accordance with scientific principles. Political theorists also define democracy, but they use a different standard of measurement. Their definitions of democracy reflect their interest in political ideals—for example, liberty, equality, and citizenship—rather than scientific measurement. So, when writing about democracy from the perspective of a political theorist, you may be asked to make an argument about the proper way to define citizenship in a democratic society. Should citizens of a democratic society be expected to engage in decision-making and administration of government, or should they be satisfied with casting votes every couple of years?

In order to substantiate your position on such questions, you will need to pay special attention to two interrelated components of your writing: (1) the logical consistency of your ideas and (2) the manner in which you use the arguments of other theorists to support your own. First, you need to make sure that your conclusion and all points leading up to it follow from your original premises or assumptions. If, for example, you argue that democracy is a system of government through which citizens develop their full capacities as human beings, then your notion of citizenship will somehow need to support this broad definition of democracy. A narrow view of citizenship based exclusively or primarily on voting probably will not do. Whatever you argue, however, you will need to be sure to demonstrate in your analysis that you have considered the arguments of other theorists who have written about these issues. In some cases, their arguments will provide support for your own; in others, they will raise criticisms and concerns that you will need to address if you are going to make a convincing case for your point of view.

Drafting your paper

If you have used material from outside sources in your paper, be sure to cite them appropriately in your paper. In political science, writers most often use the APA or Turabian (a version of the Chicago Manual of Style) style guides when formatting references. Check with your instructor if they have not specified a citation style in the assignment. For more information on constructing citations, see the UNC Libraries citation tutorial.

Although all assignments are different, the preceding outlines provide a clear and simple guide that should help you in writing papers in any sub-field of political science. If you find that you need more assistance than this short guide provides, refer to the list of additional resources below or make an appointment to see a tutor at the Writing Center.

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Political theory and the modern state : essays on state, power, and democracy

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Political Political Theory: Essays on Institutions Hardcover – March 7, 2016

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Political institutions are the main subject of political theory―or they ought to be. Making the case with his trademark forcefulness and intellectual aplomb, Jeremy Waldron argues in favor of reorienting the theory of politics toward the institutions and institutional principles of modern democracy and the mechanisms through which democratic ideals are achieved. Too many political theorists are preoccupied with analyzing the nature and importance of justice, liberty, and equality, at the cost of ignoring the governmental institutions needed to achieve them. By contrast, political scientists have kept institutions in view, but they deploy a meager set of value-conceptions in evaluating them. Reflecting on an array of issues about constitutional structure, Waldron considers the uses and abuses of diverse institutions and traditions, from separation of powers and bicameralism to judicial review of legislation, the principle of loyal opposition, the nature of representation, political accountability, and the rule of law. He refines his well-known argument about the undemocratic character of judicial review, providing a capacious perspective on the proper role of courts in a constitutional democracy, and he offers an illuminating critique of the contrasting political philosophies of Hannah Arendt and Isaiah Berlin. Even if political theorists remain fixated on expounding the philosophical foundations of democracy, they need to complement their work with a firmer grasp of the structures through which democracy is realized. This is what political political theory means: theory addressing itself to the way political institutions frame political disagreements and orchestrate resolutions to our disputes over social ideals.

• Print length 416 pages
• Language English
• Publisher Harvard University Press
• Publication date March 7, 2016
• Dimensions 6.25 x 1.25 x 9.25 inches
• ISBN-10 9780674743854
• ISBN-13 978-0674743854
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• ASIN ‏ : ‎ 0674743857
• Publisher ‏ : ‎ Harvard University Press; 1st edition (March 7, 2016)
• Language ‏ : ‎ English
• Hardcover ‏ : ‎ 416 pages
• ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 9780674743854
• ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-0674743854
• Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 1.65 pounds
• Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 6.25 x 1.25 x 9.25 inches
• #572 in Constitutions (Books)
• #1,002 in General Constitutional Law
• #1,406 in Democracy (Books)

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