social norms case study

Lessons Learned from Diverse Efforts to Change Social Norms and Opportunities and Strategies to Promote Behavior Change in Behavioral Health: Proceedings of Two Workshops (2017)

Chapter: 5 case studies in changing social norms, 5 case studies in changing social norms.

Joanne Silberner introduced the last panel of the workshop, which focused on media and communication campaign strategies used to improve social norms, beliefs, and attitudes in health-related arenas in which negative social norms, chronicity, and behavior change are relevant. Joan Austin, professor emeritus, Indiana University, addressed stigma and negative attitudes toward epilepsy and efforts to change them. Janet Turan, associate professor of public health, University of Alabama at Birmingham, presented her research on HIV-related stigma in different settings, globally and in the United States. Kay Cofrancesco, who was scheduled to speak on the stigma of lung cancer, was unable to attend.

EPILEPSY: SOURCES OF STIGMA AND CAMPAIGN EFFORTS

Attitudes and beliefs.

Austin introduced herself as a psychiatric mental health nurse who works with children who are trying to decide whether to tell their friends they have epilepsy. She began her presentation by providing background on the scope of the problem. Gallup Polls carried out every 5 years from the 1950s to 1980s showed improvement in attitudes toward epilepsy ( Caveness and Gallup, 1980 ). The last survey was done in 1987 and although it showed better awareness, two-thirds of the respondents reported that they would put something in the mouth of a person having a seizure; one-third continued to think less of people with epilepsy and their

families; and one-sixth thought they could identify people with epilepsy just by looking at them ( LaMartina, 1989 ).

It was not until the early 2000s, Austin said, that the field began to understand the dimensions of attitudes related to epilepsy, and through use of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s instrument Attitudes and Beliefs about Living with Epilepsy, four dimensions were examined. The first dimension, Negative Stereotypes, has such items as “not as smart” and “should not marry.” Second, the Risk and Safety Concerns dimension has such items as “do not let your child ride in the car if the driver has epilepsy” or “you would not hire a babysitter with epilepsy.” The third dimension, Work and Role Expectations, has such items as people with epilepsy are “not able to cope with everyday life” and “not as successful at work as others.” The fourth dimension, Personal Fear and Social Avoidance, has items assessing whether people “feel nervous when they’re around people with epilepsy” or “would not date a person with epilepsy.”

Austin pointed out that surveys with nationally representative samples have shown that people are least likely to agree now with those negative stereotypes, but they are most likely to agree with risk and safety concerns. There is moderate agreement on work and role expectations, with some expectation that individuals with epilepsy are not going to do as well on the job and some discomfort around people with epilepsy ( Diiorio et al., 2004 ). Research is currently ongoing to examine how these attitudes and beliefs may have changed between 2005 and 2013.

Since 2000, Austin reported, the Epilepsy Foundation has conducted yearly multifaceted campaigns to increase awareness and public education about epilepsy. Because of limited funds coming only from donations, it has targeted groups with the lowest awareness, the most negative perceptions, or the most negative attitudes. The foundation has worked with teens, tweens, and young adults and with ethnic minority groups, including African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Asian Americans. Austin noted that the methods used have varied but have included mass media, such as DVD, the Internet, print, radio, social media, and television, as well as celebrity endorsement ( Price et al., 2015 ).

Entitled to Respect Campaign

Austin identified the most successful campaign as one conducted in 2001 to 2004 with the theme of Entitled to Respect. The main goals, she said, were to increase teens’ awareness of epilepsy and to increase self-esteem among teens with epilepsy. The campaign started with teens ages 13 to 18 and then was extended to tweens and then African American youth under the theme of Get the Word Out. Austin explained that one of the reasons for targeting teens was that, prior to the launch, a survey conducted

nationwide among approximately 20,000 teens found that two-thirds knew either nothing or very little about epilepsy. Five different conditions were compared (asthma, breast cancer, diabetes, HIV, Parkinson’s) against epilepsy, and knowledge about epilepsy was the lowest at 8 percent. Two-thirds of respondents did not know what to do if someone had a seizure. Austin asserted that, given that epilepsy is most prevalent among young people and those over 65, the fact that most young people did not know what to do when someone is having a seizure was not a good thing (especially because children with epilepsy may have their first seizure at school). She reported further that half of respondents were not sure whether epilepsy is contagious, and less than one-third would date a person with epilepsy ( Austin et al., 2002 ).

The campaign’s message, Austin said, was that youth with epilepsy are entitled to respect just like everyone else. She characterized this as an awareness and educational campaign, focused primarily on outreach through teen media channels. With support from the popular music group NSYNC, the campaign used “E2R” public-service radio messages with music from NSYNC’s recently released CD so teens could hear the music they liked with a message about epilepsy. The campaign’s webpage was linked to NSYNC’s website and six other sites that were popular with teens, and television, posters, brochures, and contests also were used.

A postcampaign survey in 2007 showed overall improvement, Austin reported, with Latino and Hispanic youth improving the most. The lack of awareness decreased from two-thirds to less than one-fourth; knowledge that epilepsy was not contagious increased from one-half to two-thirds; and teens were more informed that people with epilepsy could work and drive. Austin noted that one of the areas that did not improve was uncertainty and misinformation as to what to do if someone has a seizure. Youth with epilepsy were still seen by their peers as being less likely to be popular.

Regular Education and Outreach

Austin added that the Epilepsy Foundation also has ongoing efforts to educate specific groups of people who have regular contact with individuals with epilepsy and those who need to know how to handle seizures. These targeted groups include child and adult daycare workers, first responders, law enforcement personnel, middle and high school students, parents of children with epilepsy, and school nurses. Austin has been most involved in the effort for school nurses. She reported that regular evaluations have shown that school nurses have shown increased confidence in recognizing and handling seizures after the training ( Austin et al., 2002 ).

Progress in the Field and Challenges

According to Austin, a major event in the epilepsy field was the 2012 release of an Institute of Medicine (IOM) report on the public health dimensions of epilepsy ( Institute of Medicine, 2012 ). She asserted that the study’s recommendations had major impacts on the field. One recommendation was to inform the media to improve awareness and eliminate stigma by promoting more accurate storylines and depictions of epilepsy. A second was to coordinate public awareness efforts to develop shared messages, an area in which Austin said the IOM report had a large impact. There are about 30 voluntary organizations involved in various aspects of epilepsy. In the last year and for the first time, Austin said, they have all been working together. She added that because of all of the inaccurate information among the public, the IOM committee developed eight key messages with accurate information about epilepsy for use by health educators.

Austin also discussed the challenges that persist in the field. First, epilepsy is a spectrum disorder with a wide range of severity, seizure types, and co-occurring conditions. Two out of three people with epilepsy seizures are very well controlled and are able to function well. Others struggle with epilepsy, having frequent seizures that are not controlled and having tried every medication and every treatment. Austin explained that, given this wide spectrum, messaging is very complicated. The objectives can vary, she said, and messages can appear to conflict depending on the subgroups being targeted.

Another issue Austin noted is that campaigns often are not evaluated for change in follow-up surveys because of cost. In addition, she said, evaluations focus mainly on process outcomes, such as campaign reach ( Price et al., 2015 ).

An additional challenge Austin highlighted concerns two studies conducted 25 years apart, in 1981 and 2006 ( Collins et al., 2007 ). Findings showed that about one-half of the respondents believed that violence is possible or likely during a seizure. The results were unsettling, Austin said, because respondents were medical students, law students, and people with epilepsy. The items included such questions as how likely respondents thought certain violent acts were to be caused by seizures. Austin said there clearly is a great deal of work ahead. Despite years of educational campaigns about proper response to seizure, she noted, the field continues to be challenged by common myths that persist, such as putting something in someone’s mouth during a seizure and calling an ambulance for the person. She said the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is currently considering new communication methods, and she emphasized the need for research in the field to help identify appropriate messages.

REDUCING HIV-RELATED STIGMA IN HEALTH CARE SETTINGS: FROM AFRICA TO ALABAMA

Turan spoke about efforts to change and reduce HIV-related stigma and discrimination through face-to-face, hands-on, grassroots approaches in health care settings. She noted that people who live with stigmatized health conditions often have frequent contact with health care providers, and a large body of literature suggests that fears of stigma and discrimination and of lack of confidentiality can discourage people from accepting testing and diagnosis for their condition and linking to the services they need.

Turan showed a slide of a framework developed by Laura Nyblade of the Research Triangle Institute that summarizes some of the key lessons learned in the HIV field on the components of effective stigma reduction interventions. The first is to address the immediately actionable drivers of stigma and discrimination, such as lack of awareness, values that cause shame and blame, and fears and misconceptions (e.g., about how HIV is transmitted). The second is putting affected groups at the center of the response by developing and strengthening networks of people living with the condition, empowering them and strengthening their capacity, and addressing the issue of internalized or self-stigma. The third is creating partnerships between the affected groups and opinion leaders, service providers, or policy makers. According to Turan, the most successful interventions include all three components.

A Health Setting-Based Stigma Reduction Intervention in Five African Countries

Turan then described an intervention developed in sub-Saharan Africa that was adapted for a setting in the United States. The principal investigator of the study was William Holzemer, a committee member (see Uys et al., 2009 , for more information). The intervention has three important components, which correspond to those described above.

The first component, Turan said, is sharing information. During workshops, she reported, results of local data on HIV-related stigma are shared, and general information about how stigma impacts the lives of people living with HIV is provided. The second component involves increasing contact by bringing together the affected group and a group of health workers to plan stigma reduction activities. The third component is improving coping through empowerment. People who are living with HIV are involved in an activity in which they can address stigma directly, not just accept it, live with it, or cope with it.

Being inspired by this intervention and after discussing it with Holzemer, Turan, and colleagues decided to adapt the intervention for their setting

in Birmingham, Alabama. She noted that other pilots were being conducted to see how well the intervention would work in the United States. In Birmingham, local data were collected and analyzed initially to learn the current status of stigma and discrimination around HIV. Turan and colleagues also examined data on at-risk populations, and a large survey of public health and primary health care workers and focus groups with people living with HIV were conducted in the state.

Turan said she did not have time to describe all the modifications made to the original workshop model, but the workshop did have to be shortened to accommodate the busy schedules of the health workers and consumers. Importantly, a module on other intersecting stigmas and discrimination was added, addressing racism, stigma attached to poverty, and discrimination according to sexual orientation. Turan noted that the workshop also was adapted to include the development of stigma reduction projects that could reach the larger population of health workers in the region.

As implemented in Birmingham, Turan reported, the workshop was attended by health workers and consumers and was facilitated by a health worker (or social worker) and a consumer. It was conducted at the University of Alabama at Birmingham School of Public Health for a full day, followed by a half-day 2 weeks later. Topics addressed included understanding stigma, different intersecting stigmas, outcomes of stigma, coping with stigma, why stigma is difficult to change, stigma reduction strategies, and the design of a tool to reach public health and primary health care workers. According to Turan, a powerful part of the workshop was when people worked in pairs and told each other a story about when they experienced stigma and discrimination. Everyone, she said, had such a story to share.

In designing a tool to reach a wider group of public health and primary health care workers in the state, Turan said, attendees worked in small groups of health workers and consumers. Two iterations of the workshop have been conducted, the first with 13 participants and the second with 23. The health workers were from local and state health departments, local AIDS service organizations, and university clinics. Turan added that the workshops were evaluated with pre and post questionnaires.

Preliminary Results of the Birmingham Pilot

stigma and discrimination faced in health care settings does not necessarily come from nurses or doctors but from receptionists, record keepers, or lab personnel. She noted that clients often reported stigma from administrative staff or receptionists.

Turan added that the sample size was very small for this pilot, but it was found to be feasible to recruit and engage both health workers and consumers (people living with HIV). Fully 87 percent of consumers and 89 percent of health workers rated their workshop experience as “excellent.” According to Turan, preworkshop and postworkshop comparisons showed that consumers’ scores on negative self-image, disclosure concerns, and enacted stigma tended to be lower in the post-test than in the pretest. However, she said their concern about public attitudes was higher. She suggested that perhaps they were more aware of some of the public attitudes after the workshop. Among providers, empathy scores tended to be higher in the post-test than in the pretest. Turan said these were promising initial results that could be taken further. 1

Turan added that the ideas for reducing stigma in health care settings that emerged from the workshops focused on reaching medical personnel early, when they are in training, through interactive workshops, TED talks, or roleplay experiences. She closed by saying that combining informational, contact, and empowerment strategies holds promise for use in other areas involving stigma and discrimination that hinder the psychological well-being, health care utilization, and health outcomes of people living with the stigmatized conditions.

The discussant of this workshop session was William Holzemer, committee member. He noted first that the two presentations had brought out issues related to internalized stigma, whereas previous sessions had focused more on external, socially based, and structural stigma. Effecting change in social norms at these external, social, and structural levels may still be elusive in communities, he said, but the presentations had showed how it is possible to reach out to people and help them address how they react to the stigma themselves in terms of self-worth and self-care. He remarked that an important remaining frontier is to confront the large number of people who are living with HIV who do not receive the testing, care, and medications they need. Similarly, he asserted, much more work needs to be done to overcome the challenges in achieving real behavior change even though attitudes may change in desired directions.

___________________

1 Results from these pilot workshops have subsequently been further analyzed and published in Batey et al. (2016) .

Topics discussed at the end of this panel focused primarily on intersecting stigma. Others included approaches to promoting positive behaviors and the postcampaign survey of the Entitled to Respect campaign. The session ended with brief final remarks from the chair of the Committee on the Science of Changing Behavioral Health Social Norms.

Intersecting Stigma

In response to a question about how to address intersecting stigma in primary care, Turan replied that this is currently a cutting-edge area of intervention and research and is extremely complex. For example, if a black woman living with HIV who is poor and is also a lesbian presents in a primary care clinic, how does one understand her experience, and how do those different identities contribute to that experience? Turan noted that the University of Alabama has a study of this issue under way using mixed methods. A major focus is in-depth qualitative interviews with such women to try to understand how this experience of having multiple identities affects them and their health, well-being, and service utilization. Quantitative measures of poverty, stigma, racism, and homophobia are also being used to examine how these factors are associated with outcomes.

Austin said she deals with some populations in which mental health issues are very prominent in people with epilepsy, especially mood disorders in adults and attention deficit disorder and autism spectrum disorder in children. Families often will say that the seizures are not the problem, she explained, but rather the behavioral issues they are dealing with. Intervention starts with where the families’ issues are, she said.

Pescosolido remarked that conducting research on intersecting stigma is very challenging because every time a factor is added, whether in qualitative, experimental, or social survey research, there must be a corresponding increase in the number of cases, which makes studies more difficult to carry out. The other issue, she said, is that people themselves may have difficulty reporting accurately on their experiences of intersecting stigma because they may not be able to differentiate the effects of the stigma arising from each source.

An audience member commented that research is lacking at the national level concerning stigma itself, let alone multiple intersecting types. This speaker’s national surveys have included items about attitudes toward psychiatric medications and mental health. The surveys have found very few differences between Caucasians and African Americans, except with respect to medical research, a topic that elicited skepticism and evoked the history and trajectory of Tuskegee. People who had or saw serious problems with mental health wanted treatment regardless of their race. This same speaker also said that research on attention deficit hyperactivity

disorder and African American parents suggests there is certainly a stigma, but how it compares with that experienced by other groups is unknown. National surveys do not include large enough numbers of participants in different groups for comparison, this speaker noted, especially in panethnic communities.

Turan added that the study her group is conducting on this topic is within the Women’s Interagency HIV study, which includes a large national cohort of women living with HIV and a large representation of minorities. So at least for women, she said, there may be opportunities to examine some of these issues in a large dataset.

Audience member Vanessa Wellbery commented that she has learned from people working in the field of domestic violence that introducing the subject of intersecting mental illness further stigmatizes women who are suffering from domestic violence. Pescosolido responded that she sees this a great deal in the mental health community. At Indiana University, she is conducting a college toolbox project that is sponsored by Bring Change to Mind. The idea is to address differences in general, with mental illness being one of the prominent differences portrayed.

Promoting Positive Behaviors

The discussion of this topic started with a question about whether there is any research on the efficacy of promoting positive behaviors instead of discouraging negative ones. William Holzemer replied first, saying that Kate Lorig from Stanford had published a great deal on self-management, which really is an orchestrated training program on total health management with an emphasis on wellness, even for people with diagnosed chronic illnesses. Turan commented that in the HIV/AIDS arena, positive role models are now being used, with greater focus on such topics as coping, resilience, and how many people are doing well living with HIV/AIDS. From the research point of view, effort is focusing on how to measure such indicators as resilience, coping, social support, and other factors that help people deal with these conditions. Austin agreed, noting that her group’s interventions with people with epilepsy are more self-management oriented, focusing on their whole lives and using some of the material from Lorig’s research.

Follow-up Question on the Postcampaign Survey of the Entitled to Respect Campaign

then, which she finds unfortunate. She added that this is another reason why it is good news that all of the organizations focused on epilepsy are coming together now to coordinate planning and programs, which she said will also help support and sustain communication initiatives.

Austin was asked about the different approaches that have been used for messaging and which ones may be best, especially with lower resource levels. She replied that the focus is more on depth than on breadth. Part of the issue is money, but her group also is targeting those most at risk for poor care and is getting involved more with the community, churches, and health care providers.

Final Remarks

The last session of the day was to be a panel of committee members reflecting on the lessons learned during the workshop. However, because all of the prior discussions had been rich and the end of the day was near, it was decided that the workshop would be adjourned following brief remarks from David Wegman, chair of the Committee on the Science of Changing Behavioral Health Social Norms. Wegman remarked that the day’s presentations and discussions about the basic and applied science behind communication campaigns, as well as the implementation and evaluation of campaigns in various areas of public health, had indeed been very complex and thought provoking. He noted that it is apparent how challenging it would be to synthesize the multilayered evidence on planning communication strategies for changing social norms in behavioral health. He closed by saying that the April 2015 workshop would focus on applications of the science directly to campaigns and approaches in behavioral health.

In 2015, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine convened two workshops with oversight from the Committee on the Science of Changing Behavioral Health Social Norms. The workshops provided input to the committee's deliberations and contributed to the development of the report Ending Discrimination against People with Mental and Substance Use Disorders . That report was issued to help the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, utilize the scientific evidence base in improving public attitudes toward and understanding of behavioral health, specifically in the areas of mental health and substance use disorders. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions at the two workshops.

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Published: 17 December 2018

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Social norms and how they impact behaviour

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There is wide interest in the social norms construct across psychology, economics, law and social marketing. Now a study investigates an important missing piece in the social norms’ puzzle: what is the underlying process that explains how norms impact behaviour? The answer: self–other similarity (self-categorization) and internalization.

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National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education; Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences. Lessons Learned from Diverse Efforts to Change Social Norms and Opportunities and Strategies to Promote Behavior Change in Behavioral Health: Proceedings of Two Workshops. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2017 Jun 29.

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Lessons Learned from Diverse Efforts to Change Social Norms and Opportunities and Strategies to Promote Behavior Change in Behavioral Health: Proceedings of Two Workshops.

Hardcopy Version at National Academies Press

5 Case Studies in Changing Social Norms

EPILEPSY: SOURCES OF STIGMA AND CAMPAIGN EFFORTS

Attitudes and Beliefs

It was not until the early 2000s, Austin said, that the field began to understand the dimensions of attitudes related to epilepsy, and through use of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's instrument Attitudes and Beliefs about Living with Epilepsy, four dimensions were examined. The first dimension, Negative Stereotypes, has such items as “not as smart” and “should not marry.” Second, the Risk and Safety Concerns dimension has such items as “do not let your child ride in the car if the driver has epilepsy” or “you would not hire a babysitter with epilepsy.” The third dimension, Work and Role Expectations, has such items as people with epilepsy are “not able to cope with everyday life” and “not as successful at work as others.” The fourth dimension, Personal Fear and Social Avoidance, has items assessing whether people “feel nervous when they're around people with epilepsy” or “would not date a person with epilepsy.”

Entitled to Respect Campaign

Austin identified the most successful campaign as one conducted in 2001 to 2004 with the theme of Entitled to Respect. The main goals, she said, were to increase teens' awareness of epilepsy and to increase self-esteem among teens with epilepsy. The campaign started with teens ages 13 to 18 and then was extended to tweens and then African American youth under the theme of Get the Word Out. Austin explained that one of the reasons for targeting teens was that, prior to the launch, a survey conducted nationwide among approximately 20,000 teens found that two-thirds knew either nothing or very little about epilepsy. Five different conditions were compared (asthma, breast cancer, diabetes, HIV, Parkinson's) against epilepsy, and knowledge about epilepsy was the lowest at 8 percent. Two-thirds of respondents did not know what to do if someone had a seizure. Austin asserted that, given that epilepsy is most prevalent among young people and those over 65, the fact that most young people did not know what to do when someone is having a seizure was not a good thing (especially because children with epilepsy may have their first seizure at school). She reported further that half of respondents were not sure whether epilepsy is contagious, and less than one-third would date a person with epilepsy ( Austin et al., 2002 ).

The campaign's message, Austin said, was that youth with epilepsy are entitled to respect just like everyone else. She characterized this as an awareness and educational campaign, focused primarily on outreach through teen media channels. With support from the popular music group NSYNC, the campaign used “E2R” public-service radio messages with music from NSYNC's recently released CD so teens could hear the music they liked with a message about epilepsy. The campaign's webpage was linked to NSYNC's website and six other sites that were popular with teens, and television, posters, brochures, and contests also were used.

Regular Education and Outreach

Progress in the Field and Challenges

According to Austin, a major event in the epilepsy field was the 2012 release of an Institute of Medicine (IOM) report on the public health dimensions of epilepsy ( Institute of Medicine, 2012 ). She asserted that the study's recommendations had major impacts on the field. One recommendation was to inform the media to improve awareness and eliminate stigma by promoting more accurate storylines and depictions of epilepsy. A second was to coordinate public awareness efforts to develop shared messages, an area in which Austin said the IOM report had a large impact. There are about 30 voluntary organizations involved in various aspects of epilepsy. In the last year and for the first time, Austin said, they have all been working together. She added that because of all of the inaccurate information among the public, the IOM committee developed eight key messages with accurate information about epilepsy for use by health educators.

An additional challenge Austin highlighted concerns two studies conducted 25 years apart, in 1981 and 2006 ( Collins et al., 2007 ). Findings showed that about one-half of the respondents believed that violence is possible or likely during a seizure. The results were unsettling, Austin said, because respondents were medical students, law students, and people with epilepsy. The items included such questions as how likely respondents thought certain violent acts were to be caused by seizures. Austin said there clearly is a great deal of work ahead. Despite years of educational campaigns about proper response to seizure, she noted, the field continues to be challenged by common myths that persist, such as putting something in someone's mouth during a seizure and calling an ambulance for the person. She said the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is currently considering new communication methods, and she emphasized the need for research in the field to help identify appropriate messages.

REDUCING HIV-RELATED STIGMA IN HEALTH CARE SETTINGS: FROM AFRICA TO ALABAMA

A Health Setting-Based Stigma Reduction Intervention in Five African Countries

Being inspired by this intervention and after discussing it with Holzemer, Turan, and colleagues decided to adapt the intervention for their setting in Birmingham, Alabama. She noted that other pilots were being conducted to see how well the intervention would work in the United States. In Birmingham, local data were collected and analyzed initially to learn the current status of stigma and discrimination around HIV. Turan and colleagues also examined data on at-risk populations, and a large survey of public health and primary health care workers and focus groups with people living with HIV were conducted in the state.

Preliminary Results of the Birmingham Pilot

In terms of the demographics of attendees, Turan reported, ages ranged from 23 to 70, 73 percent were African American/black, 27 percent were Caucasian/white, and 67 percent were women. She noted that the definition of health workers was broad and included physicians, nurses, health educators, social workers, research coordinators and staff, administrative support personnel, and radiology technicians. She explained that this array of health workers was included because it was recognized that much of the stigma and discrimination faced in health care settings does not necessarily come from nurses or doctors but from receptionists, record keepers, or lab personnel. She noted that clients often reported stigma from administrative staff or receptionists.

Turan added that the sample size was very small for this pilot, but it was found to be feasible to recruit and engage both health workers and consumers (people living with HIV). Fully 87 percent of consumers and 89 percent of health workers rated their workshop experience as “excellent.” According to Turan, preworkshop and postworkshop comparisons showed that consumers' scores on negative self-image, disclosure concerns, and enacted stigma tended to be lower in the post-test than in the pretest. However, she said their concern about public attitudes was higher. She suggested that perhaps they were more aware of some of the public attitudes after the workshop. Among providers, empathy scores tended to be higher in the post-test than in the pretest. Turan said these were promising initial results that could be taken further. 1

Intersecting Stigma

An audience member commented that research is lacking at the national level concerning stigma itself, let alone multiple intersecting types. This speaker's national surveys have included items about attitudes toward psychiatric medications and mental health. The surveys have found very few differences between Caucasians and African Americans, except with respect to medical research, a topic that elicited skepticism and evoked the history and trajectory of Tuskegee. People who had or saw serious problems with mental health wanted treatment regardless of their race. This same speaker also said that research on attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and African American parents suggests there is certainly a stigma, but how it compares with that experienced by other groups is unknown. National surveys do not include large enough numbers of participants in different groups for comparison, this speaker noted, especially in panethnic communities.

Turan added that the study her group is conducting on this topic is within the Women's Interagency HIV study, which includes a large national cohort of women living with HIV and a large representation of minorities. So at least for women, she said, there may be opportunities to examine some of these issues in a large dataset.

Promoting Positive Behaviors

The discussion of this topic started with a question about whether there is any research on the efficacy of promoting positive behaviors instead of discouraging negative ones. William Holzemer replied first, saying that Kate Lorig from Stanford had published a great deal on self-management, which really is an orchestrated training program on total health management with an emphasis on wellness, even for people with diagnosed chronic illnesses. Turan commented that in the HIV/AIDS arena, positive role models are now being used, with greater focus on such topics as coping, resilience, and how many people are doing well living with HIV/AIDS. From the research point of view, effort is focusing on how to measure such indicators as resilience, coping, social support, and other factors that help people deal with these conditions. Austin agreed, noting that her group's interventions with people with epilepsy are more self-management oriented, focusing on their whole lives and using some of the material from Lorig's research.

Follow-up Question on the Postcampaign Survey of the Entitled to Respect Campaign

Austin was asked to provide more information about the rationale and methods used for the 2007 survey conducted to follow up on the Entitled to Respect campaign. She replied that it was a Harris Interactive survey with a stratified sample. She added that no follow up had been carried out since then, which she finds unfortunate. She added that this is another reason why it is good news that all of the organizations focused on epilepsy are coming together now to coordinate planning and programs, which she said will also help support and sustain communication initiatives.

Final Remarks

The last session of the day was to be a panel of committee members reflecting on the lessons learned during the workshop. However, because all of the prior discussions had been rich and the end of the day was near, it was decided that the workshop would be adjourned following brief remarks from David Wegman, chair of the Committee on the Science of Changing Behavioral Health Social Norms. Wegman remarked that the day's presentations and discussions about the basic and applied science behind communication campaigns, as well as the implementation and evaluation of campaigns in various areas of public health, had indeed been very complex and thought provoking. He noted that it is apparent how challenging it would be to synthesize the multilayered evidence on planning communication strategies for changing social norms in behavioral health. He closed by saying that the April 2015 workshop would focus on applications of the science directly to campaigns and approaches in behavioral health.

Results from these pilot workshops have subsequently been further analyzed and published in Batey et al. (2016) .

Cite this Page National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education; Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences. Lessons Learned from Diverse Efforts to Change Social Norms and Opportunities and Strategies to Promote Behavior Change in Behavioral Health: Proceedings of Two Workshops. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2017 Jun 29. 5, Case Studies in Changing Social Norms.
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Social Norms

Social norms, the informal rules that govern behavior in groups and societies, have been extensively studied in the social sciences. Anthropologists have described how social norms function in different cultures (Geertz 1973), sociologists have focused on their social functions and how they motivate people to act (Durkheim 1895 [1982], 1950 [1957]; Parsons 1937; Parsons & Shils 1951; James Coleman 1990; Hechter & Opp 2001), and economists have explored how adherence to norms influences market behavior (Akerlof 1976; Young 1998a). More recently, also legal scholars have touted social norms as efficient alternatives to legal rules, as they may internalize negative externalities and provide signaling mechanisms at little or no cost (Ellickson 1991; Posner 2000).

With a few exceptions, the social science literature conceives of norms as exogenous variables. Since norms are mainly seen as constraining behavior, some of the key differences between moral, social, and legal norms—as well as differences between norms and conventions—have been blurred. Much attention has instead been paid to the conditions under which norms will be obeyed. Because of that, the issue of sanctions has been paramount in the social science literature. Moreover, since social norms are seen as central to the production of social order or social coordination, research on norms has been focused on the functions they perform. Yet even if a norm may fulfill important social functions (such as welfare maximization or the elimination of externalities), it cannot be explained solely on the basis of the functions it performs. The simplistic functionalist perspective has been rejected on several accounts; in fact, even though a given norm can be conceived as a means to achieve some goal, this is usually not the reason why it emerged in the first place (Elster 1989a, 1989b). Moreover, although a particular norm may persist (as opposed to emerge) because of some positive social function it fulfills, there are many others that are inefficient and even widely unpopular.

Philosophers have taken a different approach to norms. In the literature on norms and conventions, both social constructs are seen as the endogenous product of individuals’ interactions (Lewis 1969; Ullmann-Margalit 1977; Vandershraaf 1995; Bicchieri 2006). Norms are represented as equilibria of games of strategy, and as such they are supported by a cluster of self-fulfilling expectations. Beliefs, expectations, group knowledge and common knowledge have thus become central concepts in the development of a philosophical view of social norms. Paying attention to the role played by expectations in supporting social norms has helped differentiate between social norms, conventions, and descriptive norms: an important distinction often overlooked in the social science accounts, but crucial when we need to diagnose the nature of a pattern of behavior in order to intervene on it.

1. General Issues

2. early theories: socialization, 3. early theories: social identity, 4. early theories: cost-benefit models, 5. game-theoretic accounts, 6. experimental evidence, 7. evolutionary models, 8. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries.

Social norms, like many other social phenomena, are the unplanned result of individuals’ interaction. It has been argued that social norms ought to be understood as a kind of grammar of social interactions. Like a grammar, a system of norms specifies what is acceptable and what is not in a society or group. And, analogously to a grammar, it is not the product of human design. This view suggests that a study of the conditions under which norms come into being—as opposed to one stressing the functions fulfilled by social norms—is important to understand the differences between social norms and other types of injunction (such as hypothetical imperatives, moral codes, or legal rules).

Another important issue often blurred in the literature on norms is the relationship between normative beliefs and behavior. Some authors identify norms with observable, recurrent patterns of behavior. Others only focus on normative beliefs and expectations. Such accounts find it difficult to explain the complexity and heterogeneity of norm-driven behaviors, as they offer an explanation of conformity that is at best partial.

Some popular accounts of why social norms exist are the following. Norms are efficient means to achieve social welfare (Arrow 1971; Akerlof 1976), prevent market failures (Jules Coleman 1989), or cut social costs (Thibaut & Kelley 1959; Homans 1961); norms are either Nash equilibria of coordination games or cooperative equilibria of prisoner’s dilemma-type games (Lewis 1969; Ullmann-Margalit 1977), and as such they solve collective action problems.

Akerlof’s (1976) analysis of the norms that regulate land systems is a good example of the tenet that “norms are efficient means to achieve social welfare”. Since the worker is much poorer and less liquid than the landlord, it would be more natural for the landlord rather than the tenant to bear the risk of crop failure. This would be the case if the landlord kept all the crops, and paid the worker a wage (i.e., the case of a “wage system”). Since the wage would not directly depend on the worker’s effort, this system leaves no incentive to the worker for any effort beyond the minimum necessary. In sharecropping, on the contrary, the worker is paid both for the effort and the time he puts in: a more efficient arrangement in that it increases production.

Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) view of norms as substitutes for informal influence has a similar functionalist flavor. As an example, they consider a repeated battle of the sexes game. In this game, some bargaining is necessary for each party to obtain, at least occasionally, the preferred outcome. The parties can engage in a costly sequence of threats and promises, but it seems better to agree beforehand on a rule of behavior, such as alternating between the respectively preferred outcomes. Rules emerge because they reduce the costs involved in face-to-face personal influence.

Likewise, Ullman-Margalit (1977) uses game theory to show that norms solve collective action problems, such as prisoner’s dilemma-type situations; in her own words, “… a norm solving the problem inherent in a situation of this type is generated by it” (1977: 22). In a collective action problem, self-centered rational choices produce a Pareto-inefficient outcome. Pareto-efficiency is restored by means of norms backed by sanctions. James Coleman (1990), too, believes that norms emerge in situations in which there are externalities, that is, in all those cases in which an activity produces negative (positive) effects on other parties, without this being reflected in direct compensation; thus the producer of the externality pays no cost for (reaps no benefit from) the unintended effect of their activity. A norm solves the problem by regulating the externality-producing activity, introducing a system of sanctions (rewards).

Also Brennan, Eriksson, Goodin, and Southwood (2013) argue that norms have a function. Norms function to hold us accountable to each other for adherence to the principles that they cover. This may or may not create effective coordination over any given principle, but they place us in positions where we may praise and blame people for their behaviors and attitudes. This function of accountability, they argue, can help create another role for norms, which is imbuing practices with social meaning. This social meaning arises from the expectations that we can place on each other for compliance, and the fact that those behaviors can come to represent shared values, and even a sense of shared identity. This functional role of norms separates it from bare social practices or even common sets of desires, as those non-normative behaviors don’t carry with them the social accountability that is inherent in norms. The distinctive feature of the Brennan et al. account of norms is the centrality of accountability: this feature is what distinguishes norms from other social practices.

All of the above are examples of a functionalist explanation of norms. Functionalist accounts are sometimes criticized for offering a post hoc justification for the existence of norms (i.e., the mere presence of a norm does not justify inferring that that norm exists to accomplish some social function). Indeed, a purely functionalist view may not account for the fact that many social norms are harmful or inefficient (e.g., discriminatory norms against women and minorities), or are so rigid as to prevent the fine-tuning that would be necessary to accommodate new cases. There, one would expect increasing social pressure to abandon such norms.

According to some authors, we can explain the emergence of norms without any reference to the functions they eventually come to perform. Since the norms that are most interesting to study are those that emerge naturally from individuals’ interactions (Schelling 1978), an important theoretical task is to analyze the conditions under which such norms come into being. Because norms often provide a solution to the problem of maintaining social order—and social order requires cooperation—many studies on the emergence and dynamics of norms have focused on cooperation. Norms of honesty, loyalty, reciprocity and promise-keeping are indeed important to the smooth functioning of social groups. One hypothesis is that such cooperative norms emerge in close-knit groups where people have ongoing interactions with each other (Hardin 1982). Evolutionary game theory provides a useful framework for investigating this hypothesis, since repeated games serve as a simple approximation of life in a close-knit group (Axelrod 1984, 1986; Skyrms 1996; Gintis 2000). In repeated encounters people have an opportunity to learn from each other’s behavior, and to secure a pattern of reciprocity that minimizes the likelihood of misperception. In this regard, it has been argued that the cooperative norms likely to develop in close-knit groups are simple ones (Alexander 2000, 2005, 2007); in fact, delayed and disproportionate punishment, as well as belated rewards, are often difficult to understand and hence ineffective. Although norms originate in small, close-knit groups, they often spread well beyond the narrow boundaries of the original group. The challenge thus becomes one of explaining the dynamics of the norm propagation from small groups to large populations.

If norms can thrive and spread, they can also die out. A poorly understood phenomenon is the sudden and unexpected change of well-established patterns of behavior. For example, smoking in public without asking for permission has become unacceptable, and only a few years ago nobody would have worried about using gender-laden language. One would expect inefficient norms (such as discriminatory norms against women and minorities) to disappear more rapidly and with greater frequency than more efficient norms. However, Bicchieri (2016) points out that inefficiency is not a sufficient condition for a norm’s demise. This can be seen by the study of crime and corruption: corruption results in huge social costs, but such costs—even when they take a society to the brink of collapse—are not enough to generate an overhaul of the system. Muldoon (2018a, 2018b, 2020) has argued that social norms are a challenging form of social regulation precisely because there is no simple way to intentionally modify a social norm, as one can with a law or institutional rule. Social norms can even shape one's understanding of how much agency one has (Muldoon 2017).

An influential view of norms considers them as clusters of self-fulfilling expectations (Schelling 1960), in that some expectations often result in behavior that reinforces them. A related view emphasizes the importance of conditional preferences in supporting social norms (Sugden 2000). In particular, according to Bicchieri’s (2006) account, preferences for conformity to social norms are conditional on “empirical expectations” (i.e., first-order beliefs that a certain behavior will be followed) as well as “normative expectations” (i.e., second-order beliefs that a certain behavior ought to be followed). Thus, norm compliance results from the joint presence of a conditional preference for conformity and the belief that other people will conform as well as approve of conformity.

Note that characterizing norms simply as clusters of expectations might be misleading; similarly, a norm cannot simply be identified with a recurrent behavioral pattern either. If we were to adopt a purely behavioral account of norms there would be no way to distinguish shared rules of fairness from, say, the collective morning habit of tooth brushing. After all, such a practice does not depend on whether one expects others to do the same; however, one would not even try to ask for a salary proportionate to one’s education, if one expected compensation to merely follow a seniority rule. In fact, there are behavioral patterns that can only be explained by the existence of norms, even if the behavior prescribed by the norm in question is currently unobserved. For example, in a study of the Ik people, Turnbull (1972) reported that starved hunters-gatherers tried hard to avoid situations where their compliance with norms of reciprocity was expected. Thus they would go out of their way not to be in the position of gift-taker, and hunted alone so that they would not be forced to share their prey with anyone else. Much of the Ik’s behavior could be explained as a way of eluding existing reciprocity norms.

There are many other instances of discrepancies between expectations and behavior . For example, it is remarkable to observe how often people expect others to act selfishly, even when they are prepared to act altruistically themselves (Miller & Ratner 1996). Studies have shown that people’s willingness to give blood is not altered by monetary incentives, but typically those very people who are willing to donate blood for free expect others to donate blood only in the presence of monetary rewards. Similarly, all the interviewed landlords answered positively to a question about whether they would rent an apartment to an unmarried couple; however, they estimated that only 50% of other landlords would accept unmarried couples as tenants (Dawes 1972). Such cases of pluralistic ignorance are rather common; what is puzzling is that people may expect a given norm to be upheld in the face of personal evidence to the contrary (Bicchieri & Fukui 1999). Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that people who donate blood, tip on a foreign trip, give money to beggars or return a lost wallet often attempt to downplay their altruistic behavior (by supplying selfish motives that seemingly align their actions with a norm of self-interest; Wuthnow 1991, 77).

In a nutshell, norms refer to actions over which people have control, and are supported by shared expectations about what should or should not be done in different types of social situations. However, norms cannot be identified just with observable behavior, nor can they merely be equated with normative beliefs.

The varying degrees of correlation between normative beliefs and actions are an important factor researchers can use to differentiate among various types of norms. Such a correlation is also a key element to consider when critically assessing competing theories of norms: we begin by surveying the socialized actor theory, the social identity theory, and some early rational choice (cost-benefit) models of conformity.

In the theory of the socialized actor (Parsons 1951), individual action is intended as a choice among alternatives. Human action is understood within a utilitarian framework as instrumentally oriented and utility maximizing. Although a utilitarian setting does not necessarily imply a view of human motives as essentially egoistic, this is the preferred interpretation of utilitarianism adopted by Talcott Parsons and much contemporary sociology. In this context, it becomes crucial to explain through which mechanisms social order and stability are attained in a society that would otherwise be in a permanent Hobbesian state of nature. In short, order and stability are essentially socially derived phenomena, brought about by a common value system —the “cement” of society. The common values of a society are embodied in norms that, when conformed to, guarantee the orderly functioning and reproduction of the social system. In the Parsonian framework norms are exogenous: how such a common value system is created and how it may change are issues left unexplored. The most important question is rather how norms get to be followed, and what prompts rational egoists to abide by them. The answer given by the theory of the socialized actor is that people voluntarily adhere to the shared value system, because it is introjected to form a constitutive element of the personality itself (Parsons 1951).

In Parsons’ own words, a norm is

a verbal description of a concrete course of action, … , regarded as desirable, combined with an injunction to make certain future actions conform to this course. (1937: 75)

Norms play a crucial role in individual choice since—by shaping individual needs and preferences—they serve as criteria for selecting among alternatives. Such criteria are shared by a given community and embody a common value system. People may choose what they prefer, but what they prefer in turn conforms to social expectations: norms influence behavior because, through a process of socialization that starts in infancy, they become part of one’s motives for action. Conformity to standing norms is a stable, acquired disposition that is independent of the consequences of conforming. Such lasting dispositions are formed by long-term interactions with significant others (e.g., one’s parents): through repeated socialization, individuals come to learn and internalize the common values embodied in the norms. Internalization is conceived as the process by which people develop a psychological need or motive to conform to a set of shared norms. When norms are internalized norm-abiding behavior will be perceived as good or appropriate, and people will typically feel guilt or shame at the prospect of behaving in a deviant way. If internalization is successful external sanctions will play no role in eliciting conformity and, since individuals are motivated to conform, it follows that normative beliefs and actions will be consistent.

Although Parsons’ analysis of social systems starts with a theory of individual action, he views social actors as behaving according to roles that define their identities and actions (through socialization and internalization). The goal of individual action is to maximize satisfaction. The potential conflict between individual desires and collective goals is resolved by characterizing the common value system as one that precedes and constrains the social actor. The price of this solution is the disappearance of the individual actor as the basic unit of analysis. Insofar as individuals are role-bearers, in Parsons’ theory it is social entities that act: entities that are completely detached from the individual actions that created them. This consideration forms the basis for most of the criticisms raised against the theory of the socialized actor (Wrong 1961); such criticisms are typically somewhat abstract as they are cast in the framework of the holism/individualism controversy.

On the other hand, one may easily verify whether empirical predictions drawn from the socialized actor theory are supported by experimental evidence. For instance, the following predictions can be derived from the theory and easily put to test. (a) Norms will change very slowly and only through intensive social interaction. (b) Normative beliefs are positively correlated to actions; whenever such beliefs change, behavior will follow. (c) If a norm is successfully internalized, expectations of others’ conformity will have no effect on an individual’s choice to conform.

Some of the above statements are not supported by empirical evidence from social psychology. For example, it has been shown that there may not be a relation between people’s normative beliefs (or attitudes) and what people in fact do. In this respect, it should be noted that experimental psychologists have generally focused on “attitudes”, that is, “evaluative feelings of pro or con, favorable or unfavorable, with regard to particular objects” (where the objects may be “concrete representations of things or actions, or abstract concepts”; Insko & Schopler 1967: 361–362). As such, the concept of attitude is quite broad: it includes normative beliefs, as well as personal opinions and preferences. That said, a series of field experiments has provided evidence contrary to the assumption that attitudes and behaviors are closely related. LaPiere (1934) famously reported a sharp divergence between the widespread anti-Chinese attitudes in the United States and the tolerant behavior he witnessed. Other studies have pointed to inconsistencies between an individual’s stated normative beliefs and her actions (Wicker 1969): several reasons may account for such a discrepancy. For example, studies of racial prejudice indicate that normative beliefs are more likely to determine behavior in long-lasting relationships, and least likely to determine behavior in the transient situations typical of experimental studies (Harding et al. 1954 [1969]; Gaertner & Dovidio 1986). Warner and DeFleur (1969) reported that the main variable affecting discriminatory behavior is one’s belief about what society (e.g., most other people) says one should do, as opposed to what one personally thinks one should do.

In brief, the social psychology literature provides mixed evidence in support of the claim that an individual’s normative beliefs and attitudes influence her actions. Such studies, however, do not carefully discriminate among various types of normative beliefs. In particular, one should distinguish between “personal normative beliefs” (i.e., beliefs that a certain behavior ought to be followed) and “normative expectations” (i.e., what one believes others believe ought to be done, that is, a second-order belief): it then becomes apparent that oftentimes only such second-order beliefs affect behavior.

The above constitutes an important criticism of the socialized actor theory. According to Parsons, once a norm is internalized, members of society are motivated to conform by an internal sanctioning system; therefore, one should observe a high correlation among all orders of normative beliefs and behavior. However, experimental evidence does not support such a view (see also: Fishbein 1967; Cialdini et al. 1991). Another indication that the socialized actor theory lacks generality is the observation that norms can change rather quickly, and that new norms often emerge in a short period of time among complete strangers (Mackie 1996). Long-term or close interactions do not seem to be necessary for someone to acquire a given normative disposition, as is testified by the relative ease with which individuals learn new norms when they change status or group (e.g., from single to married, from student to faculty, etc.). Moreover, studies of emergent social and political groups have shown that new norms may form rather rapidly, and that the demise of old patterns of behavior is often abrupt (Robinson 1932; Klassen et al. 1989; Prentice & Miller 1993; Matza 1964). Given the aforementioned limitations, Parsons’ theory might perhaps be taken as an explanation of a particular conception of moral norms (in the sense of internalized, unconditional imperatives), but it cannot be viewed as a general theory of social norms.

It has been argued that behavior is often closely embedded in a network of personal relations, and that a theory of norms should not leave the specific social context out of consideration (Granovetter 1985). Critics of the socialized actor theory have called for an alternative conception of norms that may account for the often weak relation between beliefs and behavior (Deutscher 1973). This alternative approach takes social relations to be crucial in explaining social action, and considers social identity as a key motivating factor. (A strong support for this view among anthropologists is to be found in the work of Cancian 1975.)

Since the notion of social identity is inextricably linked to that of group behavior, it is important to clarify the relation between these concepts. By “social identity” we refer, in Tajfel’s own words, to

that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership. (Tajfel 1981: 255)

Note that a crucial feature of social identity is that one’s identification with the group is in some sense a conscious choice: one may accidentally belong to a group, but we can meaningfully talk of social identification only when being a group-member becomes (at least in part) constitutive of who one is. According to Tajfel’s theory, when we categorize ourselves as belonging to a particular group, the perception and definition of the self—as well as our motives—change. That is, we start perceiving ourselves and our fellow group-members along impersonal, “typical” dimensions that characterize the group to which we belong. Such dimensions include specific roles and the beliefs (or actions) that accompany them.

Turner et al.’s (1987) “self-categorization theory” provides a more specific characterization of self-perception, or self-definition, as a system of cognitive self-schemata that filter and process information. Such schemata result in a representation of the social situation that guides the choice of appropriate action. This system has at least two major components, i.e., social and personal identity. Social identity refers to self-descriptions related to group memberships. Personal identity refers to self-descriptions such as individual character traits, abilities, and tastes. Although personal and social identities are mutually exclusive levels of self-definition, this distinction must be taken as an approximation (in that there are many interconnections between social and personal identities). It is, however, important to recognize that we often perceive ourselves primarily in terms of our relevant group memberships rather than as differentiated, unique individuals. So—depending on the situation—personal or group identity will become salient (Brewer 1991).

For example, when one makes interpersonal comparisons between oneself and other group-members, personal identity will become salient; instead, group identity will become salient in situations in which one’s group is compared to another group. Within a group, all those factors that lead members to categorize themselves as different (or endowed with special characteristics and traits) will enhance personal identity. If a group has to solve a common task, but each member is to be rewarded according to her contribution, personal abilities are highlighted and individuals will perceive themselves as unique and different from the rest of the group. Conversely, if all group-members are to equally share the reward for a jointly performed task, group identification will be enhanced. When the difference between self and fellow group-members is accentuated, we are likely to observe selfish motives and self-favoritism against other group-members. When instead group identification is enhanced, in-group favoritism against out-group members will be activated, as well as behavior contrary to self-interest.

According to Turner, social identity is basically a cognitive mechanism whose adaptive function is to make “group behavior” possible. Whenever social identification becomes salient, a cognitive mechanism of categorization is activated in such a way to produce perceptual and behavioral changes. Such categorization is called a stereotype, the prototypical description of what members of a given category are (or are believed to be). It is a cluster of physical, mental and psychological characteristics attributed to a “typical” member of a given group. Stereotyping, like any other categorization process, activates scripts or schemata, and what we call group behavior is nothing but scripted behavior. For example, the category “Asian student” is associated with a cluster of behaviors, personality traits, and values: we often think of Asian students as respectful, diligent, disciplined, and especially good with technical subjects. When thinking of an Asian student solely in terms of group membership, we attribute her the stereotypical characteristics associated with her group, so she becomes interchangeable with other group-members. When we perceive people in terms of stereotypes, we depersonalize them and see them as “typical” members of their group. The same process is at work when we perceive ourselves as group-members: self-stereotyping is a cognitive shift from “perceiving oneself as unique” to “perceiving oneself in terms of the attributes that characterize the group”. It is this cognitive shift that mediates group behavior.

Group behavior (as opposed to individual behavior) is characterized by features such as a perceived similarity between group-members, cohesiveness, a tendency to cooperate to achieve common goals, shared attitudes or beliefs, and conformity to group norms. Once an individual self-categorizes as member of a group, she will perceive herself as “depersonalized” and similar to other group-members in the relevant stereotypical dimensions. Insofar as group-members perceive their interests and goals as identical—because such interests and goals are stereotypical attributes of the group—self-stereotyping will induce a group-member to embrace such interests and goals as her own. It is thus predicted that pro-social behavior will be enhanced by group membership, and diluted when people act in an individualistic mode (Brewer 1979).

The groups with which we happen to identify ourselves may be very large (as in the case in which one self-defines as Muslim or French), or as small as a friends’ group. Some general group identities may not involve specific norms, but there are many cases in which group identification and social norms are inextricably connected. In that case group-members believe that certain patterns of behavior are unique to them, and use their distinctive norms to define group membership. Many close-knit groups (such as the Amish or the Hasidic Jews) enforce norms of separation proscribing marriage with outsiders, as well as specific dress codes and a host of other prescriptive and proscriptive norms. There, once an individual perceives herself as a group-member, she will adhere to the group prototype and behave in accordance with it. Hogg and Turner (1987) have called the process through which individuals come to conform to group norms “referent informational influence”.

Group-specific norms have (among other things) the twofold function of minimizing perceived differences among group-members and maximizing differences between the group and outsiders. Once formed, such norms become stable cognitive representations of appropriate behavior as a group-member. Social identity is built around group characteristics and behavioral standards, and hence any perceived lack of conformity to group norms is seen as a threat to the legitimacy of the group. Self-categorization accentuates the similarities between one’s behavior and that prescribed by the group norm, thus causing conformity as well as the disposition to control and punish transgressors. In the social identity framework, group norms are obeyed because one identifies with the group, and conformity is mediated by self-categorization as an in-group member. A telling historical example of the relationship between norms and group membership was the division of England into the two parties of the Roundheads and Cavaliers. Charles Mackay reports that

in those days every species of vice and iniquity was thought by the Puritans to lurk in the long curly tresses of the monarchists, while the latter imagined that their opponents were as destitute of wit, of wisdom, and of virtue, as they were of hair. A man’s locks were a symbol of his creed, both in politics and religion. The more abundant the hair, the more scant the faith; and the balder the head, the more sincere the piety. (Mackay 1841: 351)

It should be noted that in this framework social norms are defined by collective—as opposed to personal—beliefs about appropriate behaviors (Homans 1950, 1961). To a certain extent, this characterization of social norms is closer to recent accounts than it is to Parsons’ socialized actor theory. On the other hand, a distinct feature of the social identity framework is that people’s motivation to conform comes from their desire to validate their identity as group-members. In short, there are several empirical predictions one can draw from such a framework. Given the theory’s emphasis on identity as a motivating factor, conformity to a norm is not assumed to depend on an individual’s internalization of that norm; in fact, a change in social status or group membership will bring about a change in the norms relevant to the new status/group. Thus a new norm can be quickly adopted without much interaction, and beliefs about identity validation may change very rapidly under the pressure of external circumstances. In this case, not just norm compliance, but norms themselves are potentially unstable.

The experimental literature on social dilemmas has utilized the “priming of group identity” as a mechanism for promoting cooperative behavior (Dawes 1980; Brewer & Schneider 1990). The typical hypothesis is that a pre-play, face-to-face communication stage may induce identification with the group, and thus promote cooperative behavior among group-members. In effect, rates of cooperation have been shown to be generally higher in social dilemma experiments preceded by a pre-play communication stage (Dawes 1991). However, it has been argued that face-to-face communication may actually help group-members gather relevant information about one another: such information may therefore induce subjects to trust each other’s promises and act cooperatively, regardless of any group identification. In this respect, it has been shown that communication per se does not foster cooperation, unless subjects are allowed to talk about relevant topics (Bicchieri & Lev-On 2007). This provides support for the view that communication does not enhance cohesion but rather focuses subjects on relevant rules of behavior, which do not necessarily depend on group identification.

Cooperative outcomes can thus be explained without resorting to the concept of social identity. A social identity explanation appears to be more appropriate in the context of a relatively stable environment, where individuals have had time to make emotional investments (or at least can expect repeated future interactions within the same group). In artificial lab settings, where there are no expectations of future interactions, the concept of social identity seems less persuasive as an explanation of the observed rates of cooperation. On the other hand, we note that social identity does appear to play a role in experimental settings in which participants are divided into separate groups. (In that case, it has been shown that participants categorize the situation as “we versus them”, activating in-group loyalty and trust, and an equal degree of mistrust toward the out-group; Kramer & Brewer 1984; Bornstein & Ben-Yossef 1994.)

Even with stable environments and repeated interactions, however, a theory of norm compliance in terms of social identity cannot avoid the difficulty of making predictions when one is simultaneously committed to different identities. We may concurrently be workers, parents, spouses, friends, club members, and party affiliates, to name but a few of the possible identities we embrace. For each of them there are rules that define what is appropriate, acceptable, or good behavior. In the social identity framework, however, it is not clear what happens when one is committed to different identities that may involve conflicting behaviors.

Finally, there is ample evidence that people’s perceptions may change very rapidly. Since in this framework norms are defined as shared perceptions about group beliefs, one would expect that—whenever all members of a group happen to believe that others have changed their beliefs about core membership rules—the very norms that define membership will change. The study of fashion, fads and speculative bubbles clearly shows that there are some domains in which rapid (and possibly disruptive) changes of collective expectations may occur; it is, however, much less clear what sort of norms are more likely to be subject to rapid changes (think of dress codes rather than codes of honor). The social identity view does not offer a theoretical framework for differentiating these cases: although some norms are indeed related to group membership, and thus compliance may be explained through identity-validation mechanisms, there appear to be limits to the social identity explanation.

Early rational choice models of conformity maintained that, since norms are upheld by sanctions, compliance is merely a payoff-maximizing strategy (Rommetveit 1955; Thibaut & Kelley 1959): when others’ approval and disapproval act as external sanctions, we have a “cost-benefit model” of compliance (Axelrod 1986; James Coleman 1990). Rule-complying strategies are rationally chosen in order to avoid negative sanctions or to attract positive sanctions. This class of rational choice models defines norms behaviorally, equating them with patterns of behavior (while disregarding expectations or values). Such approach relies heavily on sanctions as a motivating factor. According to Axelrod (1986), for example, if we observe individuals to follow a regular pattern of behavior and to be punished if they act otherwise, then we have a norm. Similarly, Coleman (1990) argues that a norm coincides with a set of sanctions that act to direct a given behavior.

However, it has been shown that not all social norms involve sanctions (Diamond 1935; Hoebel 1954). Moreover, sanctioning works generally well in small groups and in the context of repeated interactions, where the identity of participants is known and monitoring is relatively easy. Still, even in such cases there may be a so-called second-order public goods problem. That is, imposing negative sanctions on transgressors is in everybody’s interest, but the individual who observes a transgression faces a dilemma: she is to decide whether or not to punish the transgressor, where punishing typically involves costs; besides, there is no guarantee that other individuals will also impose a penalty on transgressors when faced with the same dilemma. An answer to this problem has been to assume that there exist “meta-norms” that tell people to punish transgressors of lower-level norms (Axelrod 1986). This solution, however, only shifts the problem one level up: upholding the meta-norm itself requires the existence of a higher-level sanctioning system.

Another problem with sanctions is the following: a sanction, to be effective, must be recognized as such. Coleman and Axelrod typically take the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game as an example of the working of sanctions. However, in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma the same action (“C” or “D”) must serve as both the sanctioning action and the target action. By simply looking at behavior, it is unclear whether the action is a function of a sanction or a sanction itself. It thus becomes difficult to determine the presence of a norm, or to assess its effect on choice as distinct from the individual strategies of players.

A further consideration weakens the credibility of the view that norms are upheld only because of external sanctions. Often we keep conforming to a norm even in situations of complete anonymity, where the probability of being caught transgressing is almost zero. In this case fear of sanctions cannot be a motivating force. As a consequence, it is often argued that cases of “spontaneous” compliance are the result of internalization (Scott 1971): people who have developed an internal sanctioning system feel guilt and shame at behaving in a deviant way. Yet, we have seen that the Parsonian view of internalization and socialization is inadequate, as it leads to predictions about compliance that often run counter to empirical evidence.

In particular, James Coleman (1990) has argued in favor of reducing internalization to rational choice, insofar as it is in the interest of a group to get another group to internalize certain norms. In this case internalization would still be the result of some form of socialization. This theory faces some of the same objections raised against Parsons’ theory: norms that are passed on from parents to children, for example, should be extremely resistant to change; hence, one should expect a high degree of correlation between such norms and behavior, especially in those cases where norms prescribe specific kinds of actions. However, studies of normative beliefs about honesty—which one typically acquires during childhood—show that such beliefs are often uncorrelated with behavior (Freeman & Ataöv 1960).

Bicchieri (1990, 1997) has presented a third, alternative view about internalization. This view of internalization is cognitive, and is grounded on the assumption that social norms develop in small, close-knit groups where ongoing interactions are the rule. Once an individual has learned to behave in a way consistent with the group’s interests, she will tend to persist in the learned behavior unless it becomes clear that—on average—the cost of upholding the norm significantly outweighs the benefits. Small groups can typically monitor their members’ behavior and successfully employ retaliation whenever free-riding is observed. In such groups an individual will learn, maybe at some personal cost, to cooperate; she will then uphold the cooperative norm as a “default rule” in any new encounter, unless it becomes evident that the cost of conformity has become excessive. The idea that norms may be “sluggish” is in line with well-known results from cognitive psychology showing that, once a norm has emerged in a group, it will tend to guide the behavior of its members even when they face a new situation (or are isolated from the original group; Sherif 1936).

Empirical evidence shows that norm-abiding behavior is not, as the early rational choice models would have it, a matter of cost/benefit calculation. Upholding a norm that has led one to fare reasonably well in the past is a way of economizing on the effort one would have to exert to devise a strategy when facing a new situation . This kind of “bounded rationality” approach explains why people tend to obey norms that sometimes put them at a disadvantage, as is the case with norms of honesty. This does not mean, however, that external sanctions never play a role in compliance: for example, in the initial development of a norm sanctions may indeed play an important role. Yet, once a norm is established, there are several mechanisms that may account for conformity.

Finally, the view that one conforms only because of the threat of negative sanctions does not distinguish norm-abiding behavior from an obsession or an entrenched habit; nor does that view distinguish social norms from hypothetical imperatives enforced by sanctions (such as the rule that prohibits naked sunbathing on public beaches). In these cases avoidance of the sanctions associated with transgressions constitutes a decisive reason to conform, independently of what others do. In fact, in the traditional rational choice perspective, the only expectations that matter are those about the sanctions that follow compliance or non-compliance. In those frameworks, beliefs about how other people will act—as opposed to what they expect us to do—are not a relevant explanatory variable: however, this leads to predictions about norm compliance that often run counter to empirical evidence.

The traditional rational choice model of compliance depicts the individual as facing a decision problem in isolation: if there are sanctions for non-compliance, the individual will calculate the benefit of transgression against the cost of norm compliance, and eventually choose so as to maximize her expected utility. Individuals, however, seldom choose in isolation: they know the outcome of their choice will depend on the actions and beliefs of other individuals. Game theory provides a formal framework for modeling strategic interactions.

Thomas Schelling (1960), David Lewis (1969), Edna Ullmann-Margalit (1977), Robert Sugden (1986) and, more recently, Peyton Young (1993), Cristina Bicchieri (1993), and Peter Vanderschraaf (1995) have proposed a game-theoretic account according to which a norm is broadly defined as an equilibrium of a strategic interaction. In particular, a Nash equilibrium is a combination of strategies (one for each individual), such that each individual’s strategy is a best reply to the others’ strategies. Since it is an equilibrium, a norm is supported by self-fulfilling expectations in the sense that players’ beliefs are consistent, and thus the actions that follow from players’ beliefs will validate those very beliefs. Characterizing social norms as equilibria has the advantage of emphasizing the role that expectations play in upholding norms. On the other hand, this interpretation of social norms does not prima facie explain why people prefer to conform if they expect others to conform.

Take for example conventions such as putting the fork to the left of the plate, adopting a dress code, or using a particular sign language. In all these cases, my choice to follow a certain rule is conditional upon expecting most other people to follow it. Once my expectation is met, I have every reason to adopt the rule in question. In fact, if I do not use the sign language everybody else uses, I will not be able to communicate. It is in my immediate interest to follow the convention, since my main goal is to coordinate with other people. In the case of conventions, there is a continuity between the individual’s self-interest and the interests of the community that supports the convention. This is the reason why David Lewis models conventions as equilibria of coordination games . Such games have multiple equilibria, but once one of them has been established, players will have every incentive to keep playing it (as any deviation will be costly).

Take instead a norm of cooperation. In this case, the expectation that almost everyone abides by it may not be sufficient to induce compliance. If everyone is expected to cooperate one may be tempted, if unmonitored, to behave in the opposite way. The point is that conforming to social norms , as opposed to conventions, is almost never in the immediate interest of the individual. Often there is a discontinuity between the individual’s self-interest and the interests of the community that supports the social norm.

The typical game in which following a norm would provide a better solution (than the one attained by self-centered agents) is a mixed-motive game such as the prisoner’s dilemma or the trust game. In such games the unique Nash equilibrium represents a suboptimal outcome. It should be stressed that—whereas a convention is one among several equilibria of a coordination game—a social norm can never be an equilibrium of a mixed-motive game. However, Bicchieri (2006) has argued that when a norm exists it transforms the original mixed-motive game into a coordination one. As an example, consider the following prisoner’s dilemma game ( Figure 1 ), where the payoffs are B=Best, S=Second, T=Third, and W=Worst. Clearly the only Nash equilibrium is to defect (D), in which case both players get (T,T), a suboptimal outcome. Suppose, however, that society has developed a norm of cooperation; that is, whenever a social dilemma occurs, it is commonly understood that the parties should privilege a cooperative attitude. Should, however, does not imply “will”, therefore the new game generated by the existence of the cooperative norm has two equilibria: either both players defect or both cooperate.

Note that, in the new coordination game (which was created by the existence of the cooperative norm), the payoffs are quite different from those of the original prisoner’s dilemma. Thus there are two equilibria: if both players follow the cooperative norm they will play an optimal equilibrium and get (B,B), whereas if they both choose to defect they will get the suboptimal outcome (S,S). Players’ payoffs in the new coordination game differ from the original payoffs because their preferences and beliefs will reflect the existence of the norm. More specifically, if a player knows that a cooperative norm exists and has the right kind of expectations, then she will have a preference to conform to the norm in a situation in which she can choose to cooperate or to defect. In the new game generated by the norm’s existence, choosing to defect when others cooperate is not a good choice anymore (T,W). To understand why, let us look more closely to the preferences and expectations that underlie the conditional choice to conform to a social norm.

Bicchieri (2006) defines the expectations that underlie norm compliance, as follows:

Note that universal compliance is not usually needed for a norm to exist. However, how much deviance is socially tolerable will depend on the norm in question. Group norms and well-entrenched social norms will typically be followed by almost all members of a group or population, whereas greater deviance is usually accepted when norms are new or they are not deemed to be socially important. Furthermore, as it is usually unclear how many people follow a norm, different individuals may have different beliefs about the size of the group of followers, and may also have different thresholds for what “sufficiently large” means. What matters to conformity is that an individual believes that her threshold has been reached or surpassed. For a critical assessment of the above definition of norm-driven preferences, see Hausman (2008).

Brennan et al. (2013) also argue that norms of all kinds share in an essential structure. Norms are clusters of normative attitudes in a group, combined with the knowledge that such a cluster of attitudes exists. On their account, “A normative principle P is a norm within a group G if and only if:

A significant proportion of the members of G have P -corresponding normative attitudes; and
A significant proportion of the members of G know that a significant proportion of the members of G have P -corresponding attitudes” (Brennan et al. 2013: 29)

On this account, a “ P -corresponding normative attitude” is understood to be a judgment, emotional state, expectation, or other properly first personal normative belief that supports the principle P (e.g., Alice thinking most people should P would count as a normative attitude). Condition (i) is meant to reflect genuine first personal normative commitments, attitudes or beliefs. Condition (ii) is meant to capture those cases where individuals know that a large part of their group also shares in those attitudes. Putting conditions (i) and (ii) together offers a picture that the authors argue allows for explanatory work to be done on a social-level normative concept while remaining grounded in individual-level attitudes.

Consider again the new coordination game of Figure 1 : for players to obey the norm, and thus choose C, it must be the case that each expects the other to follow it. In the original prisoner’s dilemma, empirical beliefs would not be sufficient to induce cooperative behavior. When a norm exists, however, players also believe that others believe they should obey the norm, and may even punish them if they do not. The combined force of empirical and normative expectations makes norm conformity a compelling choice, be it because punishment may follow or just because one recognizes the legitimacy of others’ expectations (Sugden 2000).

It is important to understand that conformity to a social norm is always conditional on the expectations of what the relevant other/s will do. We prefer to comply with the norm as we have certain expectations. To make this point clear, think of the player who is facing a typical one-shot prisoner’s dilemma with an unknown opponent. Suppose the player knows a norm of cooperation exists and is generally followed, but she is uncertain as to whether the opponent is a norm-follower. In this case the player is facing the following situation ( Figure 2 ).

With probability p , the opponent is a norm-following type, and with probability $1 - p$ she is not. According to Bicchieri, conditional preferences imply that having a reason to be fair, reciprocate or cooperate in a given situation does not entail having any general motive or disposition to be fair, reciprocate or cooperate as such. Having conditional preferences means that one may follow a norm in the presence of the relevant expectations, but disregard it in its absence. Whether a norm is followed at a given time depends on the actual proportion of followers, on the expectations of conditional followers about such proportion, and on the combination of individual thresholds.

As an example, consider a community that abides by strict norms of honesty. A person who, upon entering the community, systematically violates these norms will certainly be met with hostility, if not utterly excluded from the group. But suppose that a large group of thieves makes its way into this community. In due time, people would cease to expect honesty on the part of others, and would find no reason to be honest themselves in a world overtaken by crime. In this case, probably norms of honesty would cease to exist, as the strength of a norm lies in its being followed by many of the members of the relevant group (which in turn reinforces people’s expectations of conformity).

What we have discussed is a “rational reconstruction” of what a social norm is. Such a reconstruction is meant to capture some essential features of norm-driven behavior; also, this analysis helps us distinguish social norms from other constructs such as conventions or personal norms. A limit of this account, however, is that it does not indicate how such equilibria are attained or, in other terms, how expectations become self-fulfilling.

While neoclassical economics and game theory traditionally conceived of institutions as exogenous constraints, research in political economy has generated new insights into the study of endogenous institutions . Specifically, endogenous norms have been shown to restrict the individual’s action set and drive preferences over action profiles (Bowles 1998; Ostrom 2000). As a result, the “standard” economic framework positing exogenous (and in particular self-centered) preferences has come under scrutiny. Widely documented deviations from the predictions of models with self-centered agents have informed alternative accounts of individual choice (for one of the first models of “interdependent preferences”, see Stigler & Becker 1977).

Some alternative accounts have helped reconcile insights about norm-driven behavior with instrumental rationality (Elster 1989b). Moreover, they have contributed to informing the design of laboratory experiments on non-standard preferences (for a survey of early experiments, see Ledyard 1995; more recent experiments are reviewed by Fehr & Schmidt 2006 and Kagel & Roth 2016). In turn, experimental findings have inspired the formulation of a wide range of models aiming to rationalize the behavior observed in the lab (Camerer 2003; Dhami 2016).

It has been argued that the upholding of social norms could simply be modeled as the optimization of a utility function that includes the others’ welfare as an argument. For instance, consider some of the early “social preference” theories, such as Bolton and Ockenfels’ (2000) or Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) models of inequity aversion. These frameworks can explain a good wealth of evidence on preferences for equitable income distributions; they cannot however account for conditional preferences like those reflecting principles of reciprocity (e.g., I will keep the common bathroom clean, if I believe my roommates do the same). As noted above, the approach to social norms taken by philosophically-inclined scholars has emphasized the importance of conditional preferences in supporting social norms. In this connection, we note that some of the social preference theories do account for motivations conditional on empirical beliefs, whereby a player upholds a principle of “fair” behavior if she believes her co-players will uphold it too (Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk & Fischbacher 2006; Charness & Rabin 2002). These theories presuppose that players are hardwired with a notion of fair or kind behavior, as exogenously defined by the theorist. Since they implicitly assume that all players have internalized a unique—exogenous—normative standpoint (as reflected in some notion of fairness or kindness), these theories do not explicitly model normative expectations. Hence, players’ preferences are assumed to be conditional solely on their empirical beliefs; that is, preferences are conditional on whether others will behave fairly (according to an exogenous principle) or not.

That said, we stress that social preferences should not be conflated with social norms. Social preferences capture stable dispositions toward an exogenously defined principle of conduct (Binmore 2010). By contrast, social norms are better studied as group-specific solutions to strategic problems (Sugden 1986; Bicchieri 1993; Young 1998b). Such solutions are brought about by a particular class of preferences (“norm-driven preferences”), conditional on the relevant set of empirical beliefs and normative expectations. In fact, we stress that “what constitutes fair or appropriate behavior” often varies with cultural or situational factors (Henrich et al. 2001; Cappelen et al. 2007; Ellingsen et al. 2012). Accounting for endogenous expectations is therefore key to a full understanding of social norms.

Relatedly, Guala (2016) offers a game-theoretic account of institutions, arguing that institutions are sets of rules in equilibrium. Guala’s view incorporates insights from two competing accounts of institutions: institutions-as-rules (perhaps best rendered by North 1990), and institutions-as-equilibria. From the first account, he captures the idea that institutions create rules that help to guide our behaviors and reduce uncertainty. With rules in place, we more or less know what to do, even in new situations. From the second, he captures the idea that institutions are solutions to coordination problems that arise from our normal interactions. The institutions give us reasons to follow them. The function of the rules, then, is to point to actions that promote coordination and cooperation. Because of the equilibrium nature of the rules, each individual has an incentive to choose those actions, provided others do too. Guala relies on a correlated equilibrium concept to unite the rules and equilibria accounts. On this picture, an institution is simply a correlated equilibrium in a game, where other correlated equilibria would have been possible.

Thrasher (2018) offers a comparative-functional analysis of norms that broadly aligns with the Bicchieri (2006) framework to help understand the durability of “bad norms.” Abbink et al. (2017) use public goods-like experiments to show how peer punishment can hold inefficient norms in place. This general framework can be helpful to understand why duels and honor killings can become stable (e.g. Thrasher and Handfield 2018, Handfield and Thrasher 2019). This work explores the signaling function of socially costly norms.

An alternative class of models explains norm compliance in terms of social image or self-image concerns (e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim 2009; Bénabou and Tirole 2006, 2011). These models assume that one tries to signal (to others or to one’s future self) that one has good “personal traits”, with such type-specific traits being imperfectly observed. More precisely, Bénabou and Tirole (2006) model the individual’s utility from contributing to a public good as a function of (i) material payoffs, (ii) intrinsic rewards from behaving altruistically, and (iii) reputational returns; in particular, the authors assume that reputational returns depend on the observers’ posterior expectations of the individual’s type. Bénabou and Tirole then consider (a refinement of) signaling equilibria, thereby allowing for multiple solutions to occur as a result of the interplay of individual motivations and of the level of observability of the actions. While models with reputational concerns do not explicitly define normative expectations, they generally posit that players care about their reputation under the assumption that acting altruistically is good or appropriate. Looking ahead, there is still work to do to fully formalize the interplay of (endogenous) normative expectations and empirical beliefs within a general model that is applicable to any game setting. Such a model should probably build on the “psychological game theory” framework (for discussion, see Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2022, p. 857; see also Bicchieri and Sontuoso 2015).

In what follows we focus on lab experiments that identify social norms by explicitly measuring both empirical and normative expectations.

Xiao and Bicchieri (2010) designed an experiment to investigate the impact on trust games of two potentially applicable—but conflicting—principles of conduct, namely, equality and reciprocity . Note that the former can be broadly defined as a rule that recommends minimizing payoff differences, whereas the latter recommends taking a similar action as others (regardless of payoff considerations). The experimental design involved two trust game variants: in the first one, players started with equal endowments; in the second one, the investor was endowed with twice the money that the trustee was given. In both cases, the investor could choose to transfer a preset amount of money to the trustee or keep it all. Upon receiving the money, the trustee could in turn keep it or else transfer back some of it to the investor: in the equal endowment condition (“baseline treatment”), both equality and reciprocity dictate that the trustee transfer some money back to the investor; by contrast, in the unequal endowment condition (“asymmetry treatment”), equality and reciprocity dictate different actions as the trustee could guarantee payoff equality only by making a zero back-transfer. Xiao and Bicchieri elicited subjects’ first- and second-order empirical beliefs (“how much do you think other participants in your role will transfer to their counterpart?”; “what does your counterpart think you will do?”) and normative expectations (“how much do you think your counterpart believes you should transfer to her?”). The experimental results show that a majority of trustees returned a positive amount whenever reciprocity would reduce payoff inequality (in the baseline treatment); by contrast, a majority of trustees did not reciprocate the investors’ transfer when doing so would increase payoff inequality (in the asymmetry treatment). Moreover, investors correctly believed that less money would be returned in the asymmetry treatment than in the baseline treatment, and most trustees correctly estimated investors’ beliefs in both treatments. However, in the asymmetry treatment empirical beliefs and normative expectations conflicted: this highlights that, when there is ambiguity as to which principle of conduct is in place, each subject will support the rule of behavior that favors her most.

Reuben and Riedl (2013) examine the enforcement of norms of contribution to public goods in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups, such as groups whose members vary in their endowment, contribution capacity, or marginal benefits. In particular, Reuben and Riedl are interested in the normative appeal of two potentially applicable rules: the efficiency rule (prescribing maximal contributions by all) and the class of relative contribution rules (prescribing a contribution that is “fair” relative to the contributions of others; e.g., equality and equity rules). Reuben and Riedl’s results show that, in the absence of punishment, no positive contribution norm emerged and all groups converged toward free-riding. By contrast, with punishment, contributions were consistent with the prescriptions of the efficiency rule in a significant subset of groups (irrespective of the type of group heterogeneity); in other groups, contributions were consistent with relative contribution rules. These results suggest that even in heterogeneous groups individuals can successfully enforce a contribution norm. Most notably, survey data involving third parties confirmed well-defined yet conflicting normative views about the aforementioned contribution rules; in other words, both efficiency and relative contribution rules are normatively appealing, and are indeed potential candidates for emerging contribution norms in different groups.

Bicchieri and Chavez (2010) designed an experiment to investigate norm compliance in ultimatum games. Specifically, their experiment involved a variant of the ultimatum game whereby the proposer could choose one of the following three options: ($5, $5) , ($8, $2) , or Coin (in which case one of the other two allocations would be selected at random). This design allows for two plausible notions of fairness: as an equal outcome ($5, $5) or as a fair procedure (Coin). The experimenters elicited subjects’ normative expectations about the actions they thought would be considered fair by most participants: proposers and responders showed a remarkable degree of agreement in their notions of fairness, as most subjects believed that a majority of participants deemed both ($5, $5) and Coin to be appropriate. Further, the experimenters had subjects play three instances of the above ultimatum game under different information conditions. In the “full information” condition, all participants knew that the Coin option was available, and that responders would know if their respective proposer had chosen Coin. In the “private information” condition, responders did not know that Coin was available to proposers, and proposers were aware of responders’ ignorance. In the “limited information” condition, participants knew that the Coin option was available, but responders would not be able to distinguish whether their respective proposer had implemented one of the two allocations directly or had chosen Coin instead. The experimental results show that when normative expectations supporting the Coin option were either absent (in the private condition) or could be defied without consequence (in the limited condition), the frequency of choice of ($5, $5) and ($8, $2), respectively, were considerably higher than those of Coin. Moreover, the frequency of Coin choices was highest in the public information condition, where such option was common knowledge and its outcome transparent: this shows that there proposers followed the rule of behavior that favored them most, and that such a rule was effectively a social norm. On the other hand, substantial norm evasion characterized proposers’ behavior in the limited information condition, where ($8, $2) was the most frequent choice.

In a subsequent study, Chavez and Bicchieri (2013) measured empirical and normative expectations (as well as behavior) of third parties who were given the opportunity to add to or deduct from the payoffs of subjects who had participated in an ultimatum game. Third parties tended to reward subjects involved in equal allocations and to compensate victims of unfair allocations (rather than punish unfair behavior); on the other hand, third parties were willing to punish when compensation was not an available option. The experimental results further show that third parties shared a notion of fairness (as indicated by their normative expectations), and that such notion was sensitive to contextual differences.

Krupka and Weber (2013) introduced an interesting procedure for identifying social norms by means of pre-play coordination games. In brief, using alternative (between-subjects) variants of the dictator game, Krupka and Weber had participants assess the extent to which different actions were collectively perceived as socially appropriate: subjects providing these ratings effectively faced a coordination game, as they were incentivized to match the modal response given by others in the same situation (such a pre-play coordination game was intended to verify the presence of shared normative expectations). Krupka and Weber went on to use these elicited assessments to predict other subjects’ compliance with the relevant social norm in each dictator game variant (for another application of the same elicitation procedure, see Gächter et al. 2013).

Similarly, Schram and Charness’ (2015) proposed a procedure for inducing a shared understanding of the relevant rule of behavior, in the lab. In short, Schram and Charness had participants in dictator games receive advice from a group of third parties. The information received simply revealed what a group of uninvolved subjects thought dictators ought to do : as such, the information received generated an exogenous variation in the dictators’ normative expectations. Schram and Charness’ results show that choices are indeed affected by this information.

Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) designed an experiment to investigate what happens when empirical and normative expectations conflict. To that end, participants in a dictator game were exposed to different pieces of information. Specifically, two groups of dictators were given some “descriptive information”; that is, they were told what other subjects had done in another session (i.e., one group was told that previous participants had made for the most part a generous offer, while the other group was told that most participants had made a selfish offer). Further, another two groups of dictators were given some “normative information”; that is, they were told what previous subjects said ought to be done (i.e., one group was told that most previous participants thought that one should make a generous offer, while the other group was told that most participants thought that one should make a selfish offer). Other groups were given both descriptive and normative information. The experimental results show that—whenever such information did not conflict—both descriptive and normative messages had a significant influence on dictators’ own expectations and subsequent choices. When messages conflicted in that one indicated generosity and the other indicated selfishness, only the descriptive information affected dictators’ behavior. This suggests that if people recognize that others are breaching the norm, then they will no longer feel compelled to follow the relevant rule of behavior themselves.

To conclude, the studies surveyed here provide evidence of the role played by expectations in affecting behavior in a variety of social dilemmas. In this regard, we note that in contrast to the vast literature on empirical beliefs, the number of lab studies that directly measure normative expectations is relatively limited: more research is clearly needed to investigate the interplay of empirical and normative information about applicable rules of behavior.

Thus far we have examined accounts of social norms that take for granted that a particular norm exists in a population. However, for a full account of social norms, we must answer two questions related to the dynamics of norms. First, we must ask how a norm can emerge. Norms require a set of corresponding beliefs and expectations to support them, and so there must be an account of how these arise. Second, we must investigate the conditions under which a norm is stable under some competitive pressure from other norms. Sometimes, multiple candidate norms vie for dominance in a population. Even if one norm has come to dominate the population, new norms can try to “invade” the existing norm’s population of adherents.

Let us now turn to the question of norm emergence. Here we can see three classes of models: first, a purely biological approach, second, a more cognitive approach, and third, a structured interactions approach. The most famous of the biological approaches to norms seek to explain cooperative behavior. The simplest models are kin selection models (Hamilton 1964). These models seek to explain altruistic tendencies in animals by claiming that, as selection acts on genes, those genes have an incentive to promote the reproductive success of other identical sets of genes found in other animals. This mode of explanation can provide an account of why we see cooperative behaviors within families, but being gene-centered, cannot explain cooperative behavior toward strangers (as strangers should not be sufficiently genetically related to merit altruistic behavior).

Models of “reciprocal altruism” (Trivers 1971, 1985), on the other hand, tell us that cooperative behavior has no chance of evolving in random pairings, but will evolve in a social framework in which individuals can benefit from building reputations for being nice guys. Reciprocal altruism, however, does not require an evolutionary argument; a simple model of learning in ongoing close-knit groups will do, and has the further advantage of explaining why certain types of cooperative behavior are more likely to emerge than others. All that matters in these models is that agents can properly identify other agents, such that they can maintain a record of their past behavior. This allows for the possibility of reputations: people who have the reputation of being cooperative will be treated cooperatively, and those who have a reputation of being unfair will be treated unfairly.

A variation on the idea of reciprocal altruism can be seen in Axelrod (1986). Axelrod presents a “norms game” in which agents probabilistically choose to comply with the norm, or deviate from it, and then other agents can probabilistically choose to punish any deviations at some cost to them. Agents can choose over time to be more or less “bold”, which determines the rate at which they attempt defections, and they can likewise choose to be more or less “vengeful”, which determines how often they punish. Axelrod noted that if the game is left like this, we find that the stable state is constant defection and no punishment. However, if we introduce a meta-norm—one that punishes people who fail to punish defectors—then we arrive at a stable norm in which there is no boldness, but very high levels of vengefulness. It is under these conditions that we find a norm emerge and remain stable. Axelrod’s model aims to illustrate that norms require meta-norms. That is, failure to retaliate against a defection must be seen as equivalent to a defection itself. What Axelrod does not analyze is whether there is some cost to being vigilant. Namely, watching both defectors and non-punishers may have a cost that, though nominal, might encourage some to abandon vigilance once there has been no punishment for some time.

Bicchieri, Duffy and Tolle (2004) present an alternative model of norm emergence to explain how a norm of impersonal trust/reciprocity can emerge and survive in a heterogeneous population. This model does not rely on a meta-norm of punishment; instead, it is purely driven by repeated interactions of conditional strategies. In their model, agents play anywhere from 1 to 30 rounds of a trust game for 1,000 iterations, relying on the 4 unconditional strategies, and the 16 conditional strategies that are standard for the trust game. After each round, agents update their strategies based on the replicator dynamic. As the number of rounds grows, a norm of impersonal trust/reciprocity emerges in the population. Most interestingly, however, the norm is not associated with a single strategy, but it is supported by several strategies behaving in similar ways. This model suggests that Trivers’ basic model works well in normal social contexts, but we can further enrich the story by allowing a social norm to supervene on several behavioral strategies.

Muldoon et al. (2012) explore a simpler approach to norm emergence that relies on individual reasoners weighing their individual interests against their social sensitivity. This is done across a number of model variants based on a simple standing ovation. A striking finding of their “symmetric” model is that norm emergence is fairly rare, but can also be distinguished from merely common behaviors. A more cognitively demanding approach was taken by Muldoon, Lisciandra and Hartmann (2012), in which bayesian reasoners can learn to “discover” norms that were not present, and have no particular value. This can happen when agents think there might be a social rule, and then over-interpret social evidence. These models combine to suggest that we should expect many arbitrary norms, rather than a functionalist argument for the presence of norms.

The third prominent model of norm emergence comes from Brian Skyrms (1996, 2004) and Jason Alexander (2007). In this approach, two different features are emphasized: relatively simple cognitive processes and structured interactions. Both have explored a variety of games (such as the prisoner’s dilemma, the stag hunt, divide the dollar, and the ultimatum game) as exemplars of situations that offer the possibility of the emergence of a moral norm. Though Skyrms occasionally uses the replicator dynamic, both tend to emphasize simpler mechanisms in an agent-based learning context. In particular, learning rules like “imitate the best” or best response are used, as they are much less cognitively demanding. Alexander justifies the use of these simpler rules on the grounds that, rather than fully rational agents, we are cognitively limited beings who rely on fairly simple heuristics for our decision-making. Rules like imitation are extremely simple to follow. Best response requires a bit more cognitive sophistication, but is still simpler than a fully Bayesian model with unlimited memory and computational power. These simpler learning rules provide the same function as the replicator dynamic: in between rounds of play, agents rely on their learning rule to decide what strategy to employ. Note that both Skyrms and Alexander tend to treat norms as single strategies.

The largest contribution of this strain of modeling comes not from the assumption of boundedly rational agents, but rather the careful investigation of the effects of particular social structures on the equilibrium outcomes of various games. Much of the previous literature on evolutionary games has focused on the assumptions of infinite populations of agents playing games against randomly-assigned partners. Skyrms and Alexander both rightly emphasize the importance of structured interaction. As it is difficult to uncover and represent real-world network structures, both tend to rely on examining different classes of networks that have different properties, and from there investigate the robustness of particular norms against these alternative network structures. Alexander (2007) in particular has done a very careful study of the different classical network structures, where he examines lattices, small world networks, bounded degree networks, and dynamic networks for each game and learning rule he considers. A final feature of Skyrms and Alexander’s work is a refinement on this structural approach: they separate out two different kinds of networks. First, there is the interaction network, which represents the set of agents that any given agent can actively play a game with. Second is the update network , which is the set of agents that an agent can “see” when applying her learning rule. The interaction network is thus one’s immediate community, whereas the update network is all that the agent can see. To see why this is useful, we can imagine a case not too different from how we live, in which there is a fairly limited set of other people we may interact with, but thanks to a plethora of media options, we can see much more widely how others might act. This kind of situation can only be represented by clearly separating the two networks.

Thus, what makes the theory of norm emergence of Skyrms and Alexander so interesting is its enriching the set of idealizations that one must make in building a model. The addition of structured interaction and structured updates to a model of norm emergence can help make clear how certain kinds of norms tend to emerge in certain kinds of situation and not others, which is difficult or impossible to capture in random interaction models.

Now that we have examined norm emergence, we must examine what happens when a population is exposed to more than one social norm. In this instance, social norms must compete with each other for adherents. This lends itself to investigations about the competitive dynamics of norms over long time horizons. In particular, we can investigate the features of norms and of their environments, such as the populations themselves, which help facilitate one norm becoming dominant over others, or becoming prone to elimination by its competitors. An evolutionary model provides a description of the conditions under which social norms may spread. One may think of several environments to start with. A population can be represented as entirely homogeneous, in the sense that everybody is adopting the same type of behavior, or heterogeneous to various degrees. In the former case, it is important to know whether the commonly adopted behavior is stable against mutations. The relevant concept here is that of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS; Maynard Smith & Price 1973; Taylor & Jonker 1978): when a population of individuals adopts such a strategy, it cannot be successfully invaded by isolated mutants, since the mutants will be at a disadvantage with respect to reproductive success. An evolutionarily stable strategy is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium in game theory. Unlike standard Nash equilibria, evolutionarily stable strategies must either be strict equilibria , or have an advantage when playing against mutant strategies. Since strict equilibria are always superior to any unilateral deviations, and the second condition requires that the ESS have an advantage in playing against mutants, the strategy will remain resistant to any mutant invasion. This is a difficult criterion to meet, however. For example, a classic Tit-For-Tat strategy in the prisoner’s dilemma is not an ESS. Many strategies perform equally well against it, including the very simple “Always Cooperate” strategy, let alone Tit-For-Two-Tats, and any number of variations. Tit-For-Tat is merely an evolutionarily neutral strategy relative to these others. If we only consider strategies that are defection-oriented, then Tit-For-Tat is an ESS, since it will do better against itself, and no worse than defection strategies when paired with them.

A more interesting case, and one relevant to a study of the reproduction of norms of cooperation, is that of a population in which several competing strategies are present at any given time. What we want to know is whether the strategy frequencies that exist at a time are stable, or if there is a tendency for one strategy to become dominant over time. If we continue to rely on the ESS solution concept, we see a classic example in the hawk-dove game. If we assume that there is no uncorrelated asymmetry between the players, then the mixed Nash equilibrium is the ESS. If we further assume that there is no structure to how agents interact with each other, this can be interpreted in two ways: either each player randomizes her strategy in each round of play, or we have a stable polymorphism in the population, in which the proportion of each strategy in the population corresponds to the frequency with which each strategy would be played in a randomizing approach. So, in those cases where we can assume that players randomly encounter each other, whenever there is a mixed solution ESS we can expect to find polymorphic populations.

If we wish to avoid the interpretive challenge of a mixed solution ESS, there is an alternative analytic solution concept that we can employ: the evolutionarily stable state. An evolutionarily stable state is a distribution of (one or more) strategies that is robust against perturbations, whether they are exogenous shocks or mutant invasions, provided the perturbations are not overly large. Evolutionarily stable states are solutions to a replicator dynamic. Since evolutionarily stable states are naturally able to describe polymorphic or monomorphic populations, there is no difficulty with introducing population-oriented interpretations of mixed strategies. This is particularly important when random matching does not occur, as under those conditions, the mixed strategy can no longer be thought of as a description of population polymorphism.

Now that we have seen the prominent approaches to both norm emergence and norm stability, we can turn to some general interpretive considerations of evolutionary models. An evolutionary approach is based on the principle that strategies with higher current payoffs will be retained, while strategies that lead to failure will be abandoned. The success of a strategy is measured by its relative frequency in the population at any given time. This is most easily seen in a game theoretic framework. A game is repeated a finite number of times with randomly selected opponents. After each round of the game, the actual payoffs and strategies of the players become public knowledge; on the basis of this information, each player adjusts her strategy for the next round. The payoff to an individual player depends on her choice as well as on the choices of the other players in the game, and players are rational in the sense that they are payoff-maximizers. In an evolutionary model, however, players learn and adapt in a non-Bayesian way, that is, they do not condition on past experience using Bayes’ Rule. In this sense, they are not typical rational learners (Nachbar 1990; Binmore & Samuelson 1992).

In an evolutionary approach behavior is adaptive, so that a strategy that did work well in the past is retained, and one that fared poorly will be changed. This can be interpreted in two ways: either the evolution of strategies is the consequence of adaptation by individual agents, or the evolution of strategies is understood as the differential reproduction of agents based on their success rates in their interactions. The former interpretation assumes short timescales for interactions: many iterations of the game over time thus represent no more than a few decades in time in total. The latter interpretation assumes rather longer timescales: each instance of strategy adjustment represents a new generation of agents coming into the population, with the old generation dying simultaneously. Let us consider the ramifications of each interpretation in turn.

In the first interpretation, we have agents who employ learning rules that are less than fully rational, as defined by what a Bayesian agent would have, both in terms of computational ability and memory. As such, these rules tend to be classified as adaptive strategies: they are reacting to a more limited set of data, with lower cognitive resources than what a fully rational learner would possess. However, there are many different adaptive mechanisms we may attribute to the players. One realistic adaptive mechanism is learning by trial and error; another plausible mechanism is imitation: those who do best are observed by others who subsequently emulate their behavior (Hardin 1982). Reinforcement learning is another class of adaptive behavior, in which agents tweak their probabilities of choosing one strategy over another based on the payoffs they just received.

In the second interpretation, agents themselves do not learn, but rather the strategies grow or shrink in the population according to the reproductive advantages that they bestow upon the agents that adhere to them. This interpretation requires very long timescales, as it requires many generations of agents before equilibrium is reached. The typical dynamics that are considered in such circumstances come from biology. A standard approach is something like the replicator dynamic. Norms grow or shrink in proportion to both how many agents adhere to them at a given time, and their relative payoffs. More successful strategies gain adherents at the expense of less-successful ones. This evolutionary process assumes a constant-sized (or infinite) population over time. This interpretation of an evolutionary dynamic, which requires long timescales, raises the question of whether norms themselves evolve slowly. Norms can rapidly collapse in a very short amount of time. This phenomenon could not be represented within a model whose interpretation is generational in nature. It remains an open question, however, as to whether such timescales can be appropriate for examining the emergence of certain kinds of norms. While it is known that many norms can quickly come into being, it is not clear if this is true of all norms.

Another challenge in using evolutionary models to study social norms is that there is a potential problem of representation. In evolutionary models, there is no rigorous way to represent innovation or novelty. Whether we look at an agent-based simulation approach, or a straightforward game-theoretic approach, the strategy set open to the players, as well as their payoffs, must be defined in advance. But many social norms rely on innovations, whether they are technological or social. Wearing mini-skirts was not an option until they were invented. Marxist attitudes were largely not possible until Marx. The age at which one gets married and how many children one has are highly linked to availability of and education about birth control technologies. While much of the study of norms has focused on more generic concepts such as fairness, trust, or cooperation, the full breadth of social norms covers many of these more specific norms that require some account of social innovation.

This representational challenge has broad implications. Even when we can analytically identify evolutionarily stable states in a particular game, which is suggestive of norms that will be converged upon, we now have a problem of claiming that this norm has prospects for long-term stability. Events like the publication of the Kinsey report can dramatically shift seemingly stable norms quite rapidly. As the underlying game changes in the representation, our previous results no longer apply. In the face of this representational problem, we can either attempt to develop some metric of the robustness of a given norm in the space of similar games, or more carefully scope the claims that we can make about the social norms that we study with this methodology.

Although some questions of interpretation and challenges of representation exist, an important advantage of the evolutionary approach is that it does not require sophisticated strategic reasoning in circumstances, such as large-group interactions, in which it would be unrealistic to assume it. People are very unlikely to engage in full Bayesian calculations in making decisions about norm adherence. Agents often rely on cognitive shortcuts to determine when norms ought to be in effect given a certain context, and whether or not they should adhere to them. Evolutionary models that employ adaptive learning strategies capture these kinds of cognitive constraints, and allow the theorist to explore how these constraints influence the emergence and stability of norms.

The study of social norms can help us understand a wide variety of seemingly puzzling behaviors. According to some accounts, a social norm results from conditional preferences for conforming to a relevant behavioral rule. Such preferences are conditional on two different kinds of beliefs: empirical and normative expectations.

This and other accounts of social norms still leave much to be investigated. Explaining how normative expectations come to exist remains an open question. Another open question to consider is how one could intervene to change socially harmful norms. While there have been initial investigations into these questions (Bicchieri 2016, Muldoon 2018a, 2018b), there is much more work to be done. One frontier in this area is in deploying behavioral tools such as nudging for fostering norm changes (Bicchieri 2022, 2023).

Finally, we stress that different contextual factors (such as the framing and characteristics of the strategic problem, the role one is assigned, the social category with which one identifies, as well as historical and chance events) often come to be associated with different notions of “appropriate behavior”. Accounting for endogenous expectations is therefore key to a full understanding of norm-driven behavior. More research—both theoretical and experimental—is needed to further illuminate the impact of expectations on strategic decisions.

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Acknowledgments

A portion of section 6 of this entry has been adapted from “Game-Theoretic Accounts of Social Norms”, by Cristina Bicchieri and Alessandro Sontuoso, in The Handbook of Experimental Game Theory , Mónica Capra, Rachel Croson, Tanya Rosenblatt, and Mary Rigdon (eds.), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020.

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Please note you do not have access to teaching notes, is social norms marketing effective a case study in domestic electricity consumption.

European Journal of Marketing

ISSN : 0309-0566

Article publication date: 20 September 2013

The purpose of this paper is to present details of a large-scale experiment that evaluated the impact of communicating two types of feedback to householders regarding their domestic electricity consumption: feedback on their own consumption and feedback of both their own consumption and that of others in their locality.

Design/methodology/approach

Digital technologies were used to automatically measure and communicate the electricity consumption of 316 UK residents for a period of 16 weeks. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: one involving no feedback; one involving feedback about a household's own usage, and one involving a household's own usage plus social norms feedback (the average consumption of others in the locality). At the end of the study, a selection of participants took part in interviews or focus groups.

Both types of feedback (individual and individual-plus-social-norms) led to reductions in consumption of about 3 per cent. Those receiving social norms feedback were significantly more likely to engage with the information provided. However, the social norms information had no additional impact on consumption. Survey and interview data confirmed that participants from both conditions had been encouraged to adopt new energy-saving practices. The study concludes that near real-time individual feedback can be sufficient for usage reduction if it is provided in a historical format. It also suggests that the impact of social norms information may previously have been confounded with that of individual feedback.

Originality/value

This is the first time that a controlled experiment in the field of domestic electricity consumption has compared the impact of real-time social norm information with that of information that only contains individual household usage.

Social norms approach
Green marketing
Sustainability
Behaviour change
Electricity consumption
Social marketing
Digital marketing
United Kingdom

Harries, T. , Rettie, R. , Studley, M. , Burchell, K. and Chambers, S. (2013), "Is social norms marketing effective? A case study in domestic electricity consumption", European Journal of Marketing , Vol. 47 No. 9, pp. 1458-1475. https://doi.org/10.1108/EJM-10-2011-0568

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The role of perceptions and social norms in shaping women’s fertility preferences: a case study from Ethiopia

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Published: 07 May 2022
Volume 17 , pages 2473–2488, ( 2022 )

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Patrícia Rodrigues ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-0992-7585 1 ,
Aisa O. Manlosa 2 ,
Joern Fischer 1 ,
Jannik Schultner 3 ,
Jan Hanspach 1 ,
Feyera Senbeta 4 &
Ine Dorresteijn 5

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The population–environment–food nexus is a sustainability challenge for the Global South, and for Africa in particular, where rapid human population growth typically overlaps with high levels of food insecurity and environmental degradation. In this context, it is important to understand the reasons driving high fertility in these regions. Here, we examined possible determinants of women’s fertility preferences in rural southwestern Ethiopia. Using a survey tool ( n = 120), we assessed women’s perceptions of four key environmental stressors, namely food insecurity, environmental degradation, human population growth, and land scarcity. Through statistical modelling we tested whether there was a relationship between perceptions of future trends in these stressors and women’s fertility preferences; expressed as their desired number of children and use of family planning methods. This analysis was complemented by a qualitative content analysis of the survey’s open-ended questions, to contextualize and interpret the quantitative data. Our quantitative results indicated that perceptions of future trends in key stressors had little effect on fertility preferences of respondents, with the exception of perceptions of human population growth. Our qualitative data suggested that this may be due to the influence of social-cultural norms and religion, decision-making with the husband, as well as a perceived utilitarian value of children. These findings have important implications for the development of interventions to slow down human population growth. Our findings suggest the need to look beyond improved physical access to family planning, and develop a new suite of deliberative approaches that engage with social norms, religion, and gender equity.

Perceived risk of child mortality and fertility choices in climate-vulnerable regions of Bangladesh

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The links between environmental issues and childbearing behaviour: a review of literature

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Introduction

Human population growth is a key driver underlying environmental degradation and food insecurity (Crist et al. 2017 ). Especially, the indirect influence of human population growth on the degradation of natural resources, e.g. through deforestation, overexploitation or pollution, is well established (Marques et al. 2019 ; Díaz et al. 2019 ). Population growth also exacerbates food insecurity and poverty (Hall et al. 2017 ). The population–environment–food nexus is especially challenging in the Global South and in Africa in particular. Here, vulnerabilities to food insecurity are high (FAO 2019 ), environmental degradation rapidly increasing (Laurance et al. 2014 ), and fertility rates are the highest worldwide (Bongaarts 2017 ). Compared to Latin America & Caribbean and South Asia, the decline in fertility rates in Sub-Saharan Africa has been much slower (as of 2019, 2.0, 2.4, and 4.6 births per women, respectively) (World Bank 2019 ), despite general improvements in access to family planning services and increased contraception uptake (Sharan et al. 2011 ; Ahmed et al. 2019 ). To facilitate and contribute to the long-term sustainability on the African continent, it is, therefore, vital to better understand which factors drive high fertility, not only at a regional level but importantly, within the local context. Knowing the current key determinants of fertility preferences of women, in turn, would help to better target measures to slow down human population growth.

To date, research focusing on fertility determinants has been primarily focused on the role of demographic factors, education (Martin 1995 ; Bongaarts et al. 2017 ) and the social-cultural context (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987 ). In contrast, perceived environmental stressors—such as land scarcity or food insecurity—could also influence fertility but have received far less attention. Further, existing studies on potentially important environmental stressors have typically explored the relationships between a given stressor and fertility preferences in isolation (e.g. Ghimire and Mohai 2005 ; DiClemente et al. 2021 ) whereas studies that jointly examine different stressors and their influence on fertility preferences are missing (but see Rovin et al. 2013 ; Ezra 2001 for an approximated approach). Moreover, the majority of research that examines determinants of fertility preferences is derived from cross-sectional studies such as demographic health surveys, while detailed local accounts of how people perceive different environmental stressors are typically lacking.

These knowledge gaps—on the influence of multiple environmental stressors and locally contextualized fertility preferences—hamper the ability to fully understand, and subsequently counteract, the drivers behind current patterns of rapid population growth, which is an issue of global importance (IPBES 2019 ). Understanding how individuals perceive the state of their environment and potential threats to their livelihoods, and understanding if and how these perceptions influence their reproductive preferences and their decision-making can help elicit some of the key drivers of high fertility. Such insights, in turn, are vital to design appropriate reproductive health programs and to inform population and sustainable development policies.

Here, we examined the determinants of women’s fertility preferences in southwestern Ethiopia, including the influence of perceptions of different environmental stressors. We focused on perceptions because these represent the way in which people organize and interpret information (Bennett 2016 ). As such, perceptions have a key influence on decision-making processes and behavior (Pyhälä et al. 2016 ), and may be particularly important in contexts of subsistence livelihoods and resource constraints, where households are vulnerable to both food insecurity and environmental degradation. We considered four key environmental stressors, namely food (in)security, environmental degradation, human population growth, and land scarcity. Previous studies have found these stressors key issues for livelihoods in the case study (e.g. Manlosa et al. 2019a ). We examined to what extent these stressors could explain women’s fertility preferences, in terms of desired number of children and use of family planning methods. We had three specific objectives: (1) to explore women’s perceptions regarding future trends in local environmental conditions, food security, human population growth, and land scarcity; (2) to examine women’s fertility preferences in relation to their perceptions of environmental stressors; and (3) to consider the influence of social-cultural factors on fertility preferences. Before introducing the empirical part of our study, we provide an additional section of background on existing literature examining the determinants of fertility preferences and fertility behavior, including the role of perceptions of environmental stressors. This section serves as a theoretical foundation for our research and includes important contextual information on our focal study area.

Background and study area

Women’s fertility preferences—including the desired number of children and the use of modern family planning—are influenced by and construed within a collection of social, economic, and cultural factors that operate at multiple scales with feedbacks that can balance or reinforce one another. Demographic factors (such as age and geographic context), educational attainment (Martin 1995 ; Bongaarts 2003 ; Bongaarts et al. 2017 ), religion (Adsera 2006 ) and social norms and cultural beliefs (Caldwell and Caldwell 1987 ) are known to influence women’s fertility preferences and the uptake of family planning methods, and consequently to influence fertility levels. For instance, in developing regions, urban women typically have considerably fewer children than rural women (Shapiro and Gebreselassie 2013 ). Also, increases in the educational attainment of young girls and women tend to increase the age of marriage and to delay the timing of the first child (Ikamari 2005 ; Smith et al. 2012 ). Education also promotes the uptake of family planning methods, ultimately contributing to a decrease in the desired family size (Bongaarts 2010 ; Dynes et al. 2012 ; Kebede et al. 2021 ). On the other hand, the influence of religion on fertility preferences and fertility behavior is mixed and interplays closely with social-economic context (Heaton 2011 ). Furthermore, fertility preferences are also formed within social-cultural contexts that include different norms, beliefs and expectations around fertility behavior. A norm is a prevailing behavioral pattern in a social group which is maintained through collectively held understandings of acceptable actions and through social interactions (Nyborg et al. 2016 ). For instance, in the context of contraceptive use, Dynes and colleagues ( 2012 ) found that in Kenya, community acceptance of contraceptive use was a strong determinant in the uptake of contraception by both men and women.

Throughout much of Africa, many households’ livelihoods depend primarily on subsistence farming and on the collection of natural resources, such as firewood, fodder and water. These are time-consuming activities for the household unit (Kes and Swaminathan 2006 ), and thus children can have a utilitarian value as a source of labor (Robinson 1997 ; Admassie 2002 ). Especially when natural resources deteriorate or become scarce, the perceived need to increase family sizes may, therefore, rise (Dasgupta 1995 ; de Sherbinin et al. 2008 ; Brauner-Otto and Axinn 2017 ). On the other hand, in situations of resource scarcity, it may be more difficult to support a household with many children (Abernethy 1997 ; Biddlecom et al. 2005 ) and individuals might perceive a future in which their livelihoods are troubled by food insecurity. Such perceptions of resource scarcity could then contribute to a smaller desired number of children, out of concern of not having enough means to adequately provide for all family members. For instance, DiClemente and colleagues ( 2021 ) found that in Tanzania, women who experienced periods of hunger in the household were 19% less likely to desire more children when compared to women whose households did not face hunger periods. Another study in Burkina Faso, shows that for women living in the periphery of Ouagadougou, there were unfavorable periods in the year to bear children, due to the experienced seasonal food insecurity (Grace et al. 2017 ). Further, in Northern Ethiopia Ezra ( 2001 ) found that the demographic changes observed between 1984 and 1994 (including declines in fertility and increased acceptance of contraception), were closely related with long periods of drought and persistent food insecurity. Likewise, in subsistence economies where access to land is a critical determinant of food security, land scarcity and high population density can represent an additional source of concern, and may motivate a preference for a smaller family size. Shreffler and Nii-Amoo Dodoo ( 2009 ) suggest that in rural Kenya the lack of land availability for farming together with inheritance norms and human population pressure influenced fertility decisions, and in general interplayed with education and contributed to the decline of family sizes. On the other hand, Sasson and Weinreb ( 2017 ) show that in Western Africa, in communities with already low and declining natural resources, the desire for additional children was high although variation existed between the rich and the poor. These examples illustrate the ambiguity associated with the relationships between fertility preferences and fertility outcomes and environmental stressors. Improving the understanding of this relationship is particularly important in light of the unabated global human population growth and the worsening environmental crisis.

Ethiopia is an interesting area to study fertility preferences in the context of environmental degradation, food insecurity and human population growth. It is the second most populous country in Africa, and its population has doubled from nearly 50 million people in 1990 to 100 million in 2015 (UN 2019 ), of which nearly half (47%) are children under the age of 15 years (CSA 2016 ). Since the 1990s, the government has implemented a series of interventions to slow down human population growth in the country, including an increase in the availability of family planning methods (Olson and Piller 2013 ) and legislation against underage marriage, along with efforts to expand and improve access to education and health care in rural areas (Hailemariam 2016 ). These efforts have led to a decrease in fertility rates to 2.3 children per woman in urban areas (CSA 2016 ). Nonetheless in rural areas, where the majority of people reside (ca. 78%, World Bank 2020 ), the total fertility rate is 5.2 children per woman (CSA 2016 ). In these areas, per capita average farm size is declining, and high fertility rates pose challenges not only for environmental conservation, but also for food security and the general welfare of households.

Our focal research area is located in Jimma zone, Oromia, in southwestern Ethiopia and includes four kebeles (smallest administrative unit) located in three woredas (districts, namely Setema , Gumay , and Gera ). The landscape in this region of Ethiopia typically consists of a mosaic of agricultural land interspersed with scattered trees, live fences, homegardens, and small to large fragments of natural forests and shade coffee forests. Livelihoods are characterized by subsistence agriculture based on food crops mixed with the production of cash crops (i.e. coffee and khat) (Manlosa et al. 2019a ). Food insecurity is seasonally experienced by many households (for further details on food insecurity in the region see the study by Manlosa et al. ( 2019a ). The agrarian and subsistence nature of livelihoods and substantial distance to larger towns classify the region as predominantly rural. Forests in the region support high biodiversity (Rodrigues et al. 2018 , 2019 ; Shumi et al. 2019 ) and provide many important ecosystem goods and services (Dorresteijn et al. 2017 ), but have been progressively encroached upon by farmland since the 1970s, leading to a decrease in forest cover from 79 to 60% between 1973 and 2010 (Ango et al. 2020 ). Environmental degradation is also apparent in agricultural land through for example increased erosion and soil depletion (Taddese 2001 ). Human population in Jimma zone has increased by 26.7% between 1994 and 2007 (UNDP-EUE 2000 ; CSA 2010 , author’s own calculation).

In the state of Oromia, the fertility rate is 5.4 children per woman, and the proportion of married women using modern methods of family planning is around 28%, whereas the unmet need for family planning is estimated at 29% (CSA 2016 ). The median age at first marriage is 17.4 years, and of 19.1 at first birth (CSA 2016 ). About half of the population in Oromia is Muslim, and social organization reflects a male dominated society where patriarchal values and polygamy are common.

Sampling and data collection

The data for this study are based on a mixed methods approach, including a household survey of randomly selected women in four k ebeles ( n = 120), and key informant interviews with local health experts ( n = 5) for background information on family planning services in the study area. The surveys were conducted in the local Oromo language in the kebeles by two trained female enumerators with backgrounds on health issues. The answers were translated into English by the enumerators. Interviews with health professionals in the kebeles were conducted in Oromo, and in English in the woredas (by choice of the interviewed health workers). Data collection took place in two periods: data for a pilot study were collected during July 2016; and the main survey was conducted between February and March 2017.

For the household survey, we used a face-to-face questionnaire for data collection. An initial pilot questionnaire was developed and tested in the rural setting with 22 women. This pilot survey helped to train the enumerators and allowed the fine-tuning of questions for the survey tool, especially regarding the wording in Oromo. We used proportional cluster sampling, meaning that the number of women surveyed in each kebele was proportional to the kebele’s total population, and we used a spatial map of all the roofs in the kebeles to randomly select our households. One woman was interviewed per household. This resulted in a survey of 159 women, but after exclusion of problematic and incomplete key answers, we included information for 120 women aged between 18 and 50 years in the analysis. We decided to focus on women only for three reasons. First, eliciting women’s perceptions and preferences in relation to fertility is particularly important for patriarchal societies where men naturally have a stronger voice. Second, we intended to be sensitive to the local cultural context and to carefully engage with local people. By only engaging with women we avoided that talking about this sensitive issue would trigger tensions between women and men in a household. Finally, it is female bodies that are directly affected by pregnancy (and its associated risks) and the majority of modern contraception methods available in the study area.

We used the desired number of children and the use of family planning as indicators of fertility preferences, since the desired number of children gives an idea about future-oriented aspirations and use of family planning indicates a present-view of actions. However, although it is possible that the use of family planning does not always align with fertility preferences, for simplicity, we here refer to fertility preferences as encompassing both the desired number of children and the use of family planning. Further, the use of family planning methods refers to modern methods only (such as injectable, implants, the pill, condoms) and excluded traditional methods (such as the rhythm method or medicinal plants) since previous studies suggest that the former are used much more frequently than the latter (CSA 2016 ). Our questionnaire had both close-ended and open-ended questions regarding women’s perceptions of different stressors and their fertility preferences. We selected a survey questionnaire over other research tools because we were interested in assessing and quantifying the potential effect of perceptions on fertility preferences. The close-ended questions included in the questionnaire allowed us to statistically model this potential effect, whereas the open-ended questions enabled us to capture qualitative explanations. The questionnaire consisted of twenty questions structured into five sections: ( i ) household background, ( ii ) perceptions, ( iii ) desired number of children, ( iv ) family planning use, and ( v ) aspirations and expectations for children (see Supporting Information Tool S1). Section i elicited the age of marriage, age at first child, education level, marital status, religion, current number of children and their education. Section ii assessed a respondent’s perceptions regarding future trends (i.e. in the forthcoming ten years) in food security, environmental conditions, human population, and current perceptions of land scarcity. Questions on perceptions of future trends were asked on a Likert scale, from 1 to 5 (“‘much better” to “much worse”, or, in the case of human population growth, “decreasing a lot” to “increasing a lot”), and were followed by an open-ended question (“why?”) aimed at collecting a justification for the reported perceptions (see supporting information for details). Section iii focused on the desired number of children. Women were asked to report their desired number of children, why they would like to have more or fewer children than they already had, and about the benefits and disadvantages of having many or few children. Section iv asked about the use of contraceptives, and the frequency of use, as well as about women’s views on the advantages and disadvantages of contraceptive use. This section also included questions to understand spousal communication and fertility preferences. Section v examined women’s aspirations for their daughters and sons in terms of age of marriage. We included this section because (1) it could provide insights on the type of knowledge women will pass on to their children, and (2) it could help to understand whether women take into account potential concerns emerging from their perceptions in the aspirations they have for their children’s future.

Finally, we interviewed five rural health extension workers to assess (1) local availability of family planning methods; (2) acceptance and reasons for the uptake of family planning methods; and (3) outreach activities regarding family planning. We opted to conduct interviews with local health experts to obtain in-depth information about the context in relation to the above topics, which were not covered in the household questionnaire. Interviews were held with both female and male nurses from both kebele and woreda levels: three female nurses were interviewed in two kebeles in Setema and Gumay woredas , two male nurses were jointly interviewed at Gatira town (in Setema woreda ), and one informal conversation was held with a female nurse in Gera woreda .

Data analysis

Our mixed-method approach included both quantitative and qualitative analyses (Fig. 1 ). The quantitative data analysis followed three main steps. First, we summarized respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics, perceptions, preferences and aspirations for their children using descriptive statistics. Second, we modeled the relationships between women’s perceptions, their background characteristics and two response variables, i.e. the desired number of children and the use of family planning. We used generalized linear models with a Poisson distribution to model the desired number of children, and a binomial distribution to model the use of family planning (use versus non-use). A set of different variables entered the models depending on the response variable of interest (see Table S1). The number of complete cases varied between questions and we, therefore, report the total and the partial number of respondents along with percentages. The aspired age of marriage for children was summarized using age classes (12–15 years, 16–17, 18–25, > 25). A few respondents reported an age interval (e.g. between 16 and 20 years old) rather than an absolute age value (i.e. at 15 years old). In these instances, the intervals reported were attributed to the age class with the largest overlap. The final step in our data analysis consisted of a content analysis of the qualitative data from open-ended questions, to capture information not represented by the quantitative data. Specifically, qualitative data were analyzed using a content reduction approach, based on summarizing content analysis (Mayring 2000 ). We first read all the answers to get familiar with the content. We then identified major coding units, at a second reading. Finally, we classified the answers according to the coding units (with answers allowed to have more than one coding unit), and we summarized their frequency.

Illustration of methodological approach. The role of perceptions of different stressors (green box) on fertility preferences (i.e. the desired number of children and the use of family planning), was assessed through a modelling approach using quantitative data derived from close-ended questions in the survey tool. Other known determinants of fertility preferences such as demographic background and household decision-making (yellow boxes) were also included in the modelling approach. Qualitative data were derived from open-ended questions in the survey tool and from information derived from interviews with key informants (i.e. health experts), and was used to complement the characterization of the underlying social-cultural context of the study area

Ethical considerations

Prior to our surveys, we obtained permission from kebele leaders and woreda officials to conduct the research. After a clear explanation of the research and data handling we sought voluntary informed consent from each participant of the survey. All respondents were informed of their right to terminate the interviews at any time. Consent was given verbally in the presence of a witness. Anonymity was granted to all respondents during the period of study and in all outputs from the research. Respondents were differentiated using an alphanumeric ID. Research was approved by the Ethics Committee of Leuphana University.

In this section, we first give an overview of the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents. We then provide a detailed account of women’s perceptions of trends of different environmental stressors. We continue by presenting women’s fertility preferences followed by the influence of perceptions on fertility preferences and the role of social-cultural factors within the broad context in shaping fertility preferences. Finally, quantitative findings are complemented by qualitative results from open-ended questions and interviews with health experts.

Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents

Approximately 85% of respondents were at least 25 years old. The vast majority were Muslim (97%) and illiterate (66%) or had only attended primary education (27%). Households had on average 7.2 ± 2.9 members (adults and children), and women had on average 4.8 ± 2.2 children (Table 1 and Table 2 ). Approximately 98% of respondents were married, and the average age at marriage was 15.5 ± 2.5 years (Table 2 ).

Women’s perceptions of environmental stressors

Perceptions of food security trends.

The majority of respondents (74% of n = 120) expected an overall improvement in the food security of their household within the next ten years (Fig. 2 a). The reasons given for expected improvements were associated with the notion of “working hard”, which was reported by 69% of rural respondents. The idea of “hard work” refers to strong dedication expressed in committing substantial time for working and diversification of livelihood activities that can lead to an increase in farm production and enable future investment. Respondents mentioned the importance of sowing and harvesting on time, sharecropping, diversifying products and the performance of off-farm income generating activities as forms of hard work: “Through hard work. There is a shortage of land but we try to improve our production by intercropping crops like maize, coffee and sorghum, and by trading khat and coffee” [R43]. The use of improved crop varieties, fertilizer and access to knowledge and technology were also perceived to contribute to expected future improvements in rural food security. Respondents who expected a deterioration of food security (17%) identified crop raiding by wild animals and land scarcity as the main reasons for such deterioration.

Respondents were then asked about the relationship between their family size and the amount of food produced by the household and the amount of food that each individual in the family was able to consume. Perceptions were mixed and varied among respondents. About 30% of respondents perceived a positive effect or a beneficial relationship between the family size (and having children in the family) and the food produced by the household. The positive relationship resulted from the contribution of children with labour in the fields and in the household, as illustrated by the following statement: “Children help during sowing, harvesting and by protecting our crops from wild animals on field. Children have an important role during production. Our crop production improved due to children’s assistance.” [R22]. On the other hand, about 33% of respondents mentioned that the size of the family (and the children in the family) had no influence on production, mostly because children were still too young to help the family with their labour or because the family size was too small to have an influence.

Further, when asked about the effect of family size on the amount of food that each individual was able to consume, about 38% of rural respondents perceived no relationship between household size and the food available for consumption, with some reporting that food was enough, and that their family size was small relative to their assets, and with a few respondents mentioning problems with damages to crops due to wild animals, soil degradation and land scarcity. This is illustrated by the following statement: “ No, the size of the family doesn’t affect the intake of our food. The problem is we cannot harvest our expected yield due to crop damage by wild animals. Therefore, our family size doesn’t matter for our food intake, but we eat less or skip meals due to crop loss caused by animals ” [R121]. Nearly 30% of rural respondents perceived a negative effect of household size on food availability, with some explaining that their harvest was insufficient and with many reporting that adults and children skip meals or consume less food per meal: “Yes it [household size] has a negative effect on food … because our production is not enough for my family. Sometimes they consume less due to shortage of food in the house” [R38]. 31% of respondents were ambiguous about the existence of such a relationship, but often reported that skipping meals or eating smaller meals was common among adults and children during periods of food shortage.

Perceptions of environmental trends

About half of the respondents (48% of n = 116) expected improvements in the environmental conditions of their kebele , whereas about 32% expected no changes. Government afforestation initiatives and regulation of the use and extraction of forest products, together with increasing community participation in forest protection were identified as key factors underpinning expected improvements in the environment (Fig. 1 b): “ Most people need to plant coffee in the forest and need shade trees, and government made a law for forest protection. If someone cuts trees from the forest, they will receive punishment” [R41] . Respondents expecting no change in the environment commonly reported a lack of forest in the area around their house. Among the respondents who perceived some level of deterioration in their environment (ca. 20%), the destruction of forest was reported as the main reason for the degradation of environmental conditions. Deforestation was perceived to be the result of the need to expand farmland area and to build new houses: “ People started to clear land to build their home and to expand their farmland for production; the forest is shrinking rapidly” [R45] .

Perceptions of human population growth

Most respondents (74% of n = 119) expected an overall increase in the regional population (Fig. 2 c). Childbirth was identified as the main reason for such an increase (reported by 55% of respondents), combined with low child mortality (Fig. 2 c). Other reasons, mentioned by 16% of respondents, included cultural or religious motives such as early marriage of girls, no use of family planning methods due to religious beliefs, polygamy, and the Sharia law. Two respondents mentioned: “ 95% of people in our kebele abide by Sharia law. Girls and boys are getting married at an early age ” [R139]; “ Many women give birth without having a gap and without using family planning method because it’s not permitted by God to limit the amount of children obtained” [R115] .

Summary of perceptions on future trends in a food security, b environmental conditions, c human population growth and d current trends in land scarcity. The panel below each plot lists the main topics reported by respondents as contributing to the perceived trends. The proportion of respondents mentioning each topic is given either on the left or right of the topic. Dashed lines in between topics separates reasons for “yes–no”, “better–worse”, and “increasing–decreasing” gradients

Perceptions and influence of land scarcity

Most respondents (77% of n = 112) perceived that land available for farming was scarce in their kebele , especially for the younger generation. Large family sizes, inheritance practices, and limited options for acquiring new land were identified as the main reasons: “In our area one husband can have three wives, from three wives he gets many children. During division of land for inheritance, some children are unable to get land” [R84]. Respondents also noted the unequal distribution of land during the Derg regime (after 1975), human population growth, resettlement of people and issues related with land transactions (e.g. when people migrate and lend their land) (Fig. 2 d). 23% of respondents perceived no land scarcity in their kebele with a few providing justifications mentioning large family sizes and inheritance practices and the lack of will to work the land as general factors associated with issues of land scarcity: “ There is enough land in our area but people don’t want to work on it” [R10] ; “Most people have [small plots of] land but have many children and their children do not get land after division (…) [R3]. Asked about the relationship between land availability and fertility decisions, 61% of rural respondents (of n = 119) reported no perceived relationship, with nearly half of them mentioning religious motivations for having children: “ Because in our religion having children does not depend on having land or wealth, it is God/Allah’s will ” [R18]. The possibility of having other options, such as sharecropping when land is lacking was also noted by some respondents: “ If people have no land they can work and produce crops with other people to get a share of the production and the size of land doesn’t affect the family size ” [R23]. The other share of respondents (39%, of n = 119) reported a perceived effect of the amount of available farmland on fertility, with land availability related to the ability to support more children and as an important asset for food production and for children’s future security through inheritance.

Women’s fertility preferences and their determinants

Fertility preferences.

On average, rural respondents reported 6.1 ± 2.6 children as their desired number. Around 56% of respondents reported wanting to have more children, 18% reported wanting to have fewer children (than the ones they already have), and 25% report they already have their desired number of children. Less than half of rural respondents (44% of n = 120) reported to have used family planning methods at some point in their lives. The frequency of contraceptive use varied between “rarely” (34% of users), “sometimes” (26% of users), and “often” (26% of users). Hormonal injections and combined methods (contraceptive pills, injections and patch) were the most frequently used methods. In terms of the advantages and disadvantages of using family planning methods, rural women reported benefits for the health of mother and child, spending less time being pregnant and breastfeeding, being able to take care of children, and benefits for the family economy (Table S2). Side-effects dominated the identified disadvantages (Table S2).

Modelling the influence of perceptions on fertility preferences

The desired number of children of respondents was significantly and positively associated with the respondent’s current number of children ( β = 0.044, p < 0.05) and with a perception of increasing human population growth ( β = 0.107, p < 0.01) (Table 3 ). In addition, women who discussed fertility preferences with their husbands ( β = 1.421, p < 0.01) were more likely to use birth control compared to those who did not discuss fertility preferences with their husbands (Table 3 ).

Social-cultural factors

Four main social-cultural topics emerged from the combination of the quantitative summaries and qualitative analysis along the questionnaire, as relevant in the context of fertility preferences: utilitarian value of children, religious beliefs, spousal communication and underage marriage of girls. Most respondents (80% of n = 80) indicated the help that children can provide (e.g. work in the fields, household chores and financial support once they become adults) as advantages of having more children than the ones they already had. Happiness was the second most frequently reported advantage of having more children (50% of n = 80) followed by receiving Allah’s or God’s will (29% of n = 80) (Table 4 ). Disadvantages of having many children included the lack of material resources to support children (e.g. clothes and school supplies), parents being frequently tired, and a lack of time to look after children (Table 4 ). Some of the respondents reporting discussing family planning with the husband mentioned the importance of joint decision-making in deciding the gap between births, deciding the number of children and in preventing disagreement between husband and wife. Women who did not discuss with their husband and that reported reasons mentioned the lack of need to discuss because they were not interested in using family planning and because the use of family planning goes against their religion.

Respondents’ aspirations for the age at which their children would get married differed according to the gender of the child (Fig. 3 ). Around 42% of women aspired for their daughters to be married before the legal age of 18 years. Respondents who aspired for their daughters to marry while underage, and that provided reasons, explained that the culture and the desire to follow the Sharia law were the primary motivations. The aspired age of marriage for sons was higher than the one for daughters (Fig. 3 ). Respondents reasoned that prior to entering marriage, sons should have work and savings to support their new family.

Female aspirations for their children in terms of age of marriage, disaggregated by child gender and respondent setting

Availability of family planning services and outreach activities

Health workers indicated that family planning methods had been freely available at the kebeles’ health clinics since the late 2000s. Two nurses from one woreda identified compliance with religious rules as one of the main constraints to the use of family planning methods, in addition to fear and misinformation about side effects. A health worker from another woreda identified male dominance and lack of women’s agency as factors limiting the uptake of contraception. The absence of engagement with reproductive health issues among community and religious leaders were also reported by the same health worker as obstacles to the uptake of family planning methods. Health workers also reported inconsistency in the use of family planning methods, regarding the use of short-term methods (such as injections and pills). Healthcare providers perceived illiteracy as an important factor in inconsistency of use because illiterate women were unable to read their health schedule and were more likely to miss their healthcare appointments. At the kebele level, nurses similarly reported the influence of religion and of husbands on the uptake of contraception. Notably, kebele and woreda nurses suggested that unsupportive social norms appeared to be changing, and that communities and leaders were beginning to gain a better understanding of the side effects and the advantages of family planning, but this change seems to happen at a different pace in different locations. Two nurses from the same kebele reported a wide acceptance of family planning and mentioned that many people are using it on their own will whereas another health worker, from another kebele reported that acceptability has been increasing but is not yet prevalent.

The reported outreach activities differed between woredas . Setema health workers reported outreach interventions that included engaging with community and religious leaders, and the use of school media at elementary and high school education levels to disseminate information regarding family planning. Furthermore, nurses from Setema and Gumay woredas reported regular visits to the kebeles’ households. A health worker from Gera mentioned the absence of outreach activities engaging with community and religious leaders and stressed the need to include men in interventions that target family planning.

This study examined fertility preferences of rural women in relation to perceptions of future trends of key environmental stressors affecting local livelihoods (i.e. environmental degradation, food insecurity, land scarcity and human population growth) and in relation to social-cultural factors. Our findings are synthesized in Fig. 4 . Overall, the quantitative results indicate that perceptions of future trends in human population growth had a positive effect on fertility preferences, and that perceptions of the remaining environmental stressors had little influence on women’s fertility preferences. The quantitative results also indicate that the number of children already born was linked to a desire for more children, whereas joint decision-making with the husband was linked to the more likely use of contraception. Further, findings from the qualitative analysis indicate that social-cultural aspects held at the community level, such as religious influence, underage marriage, and male-dominance in the household, as well as a widely held view of the utilitarian value of children, influenced women’s fertility preferences in the region. Our results have implications for the development of policies and interventions aiming to encourage and promote the acceptance and voluntary use of modern family planning methods and the slowdown of human population growth.

Synthesis of the variables influencing fertility preferences (i.e. the desired number of children and the use of family planning) by rural female respondents

Perceptions of environmental stressors

Previous research in our study area shows that rural households experience numerous stressors that can impede their livelihoods. For instance, during food shortages in the lean season, households often reduce the intake of food (Manlosa et al. 2019a ). Findings from this study confirm perceived land scarcity for farming activities. However, despite this, the majority of respondents expected an improvement in food security in the next ten years. This perception rests not only on a prevailing ethic to “work hard”, either by devoting more effort to farming activities or by diversifying livelihoods, but also on the use of technology, knowledge and improved crop varieties, irrespective of environmental constraints.

Similar patterns emerged for perceived environmental trends. Past trends in forest cover show progressive deforestation and degradation of natural forests at least since the 1970s (Hylander et al. 2013 ; Ango et al. 2020 ). However, the majority of respondents perceived an improvement in forest cover in their kebeles . This perception was based on afforestation initiatives promoted by the government, on the enforcement of forest protection laws and training and awareness campaigns directed to the community, as well as community engagement in forest protection activities. Whereas human population growth is seen as an underlying pressure on the natural environment and likely to exacerbate food insecurity globally (Dasgupta 1995 ; Godfray et al. 2010 ; Crist et al. 2017 ), locally, many women expected improvements in their food security and in the future state of natural resources, despite also acknowledging ongoing human population growth. Thus, our findings suggest a disconnection between what is perceived locally versus global discourses on human population growth and the environment; and arguably a disconnection between local perceptions and measurable indices of environmental degradation, such as forest clearing. However, further research is needed to disentangle the relationships between local perceptions and indices of degradation because despite the documented forest clearing in the region (Hylander et al. 2013 ; Ango et al. 2020 ), a series of landscape restoration initiatives are being implemented across the country (Abera et al. 2020 ).

Determinants of fertility preferences

We discuss two potentially important determinants of women’s fertility preferences—perceptions about future environmental stressors and social-cultural factors. Generally speaking, the perception of future stressors seemed to only poorly explain fertility preferences. Indeed, the influence of perceptions on fertility preferences of women was limited to the perception of future trends in human population growth. Respondents who expected ongoing human population growth were more likely to desire more children than women who did not share this expectation. Similarly, the current number of children had a positive effect on the desired number of children of respondents. Among various possibilities, both relationships can be the result of social norms and cultural values that incentivize large family sizes. This approximates what Barrett et al. ( 2020 ) described as “conformist” reproductive behaviour, that is, “when the family size that a household desires is positively related to the average family size in the community”, so that it conforms with the community norm. In addition to this potential “conformist” view, it is also possible that large family sizes can be beneficial for households in terms of access and availability to labour and in terms of future security (in some dimensions). Further, and as perceived by urban residents in Ethiopia, “rural and illiterate households” may invest in larger family sizes in pursuit of higher social status and respect in the community (Sahleyesus et al. 2009 ). Furthermore, in the rural context of southwestern Ethiopia, where gendered social norms are still strong (Manlosa et al. 2019b ) with men as the primary decision-makers and mainly responsible for the farm and the production of food, and women responsible for household chores and attending to children, narratives on environmental degradation and declining crop production may not be rationales on which the majority of women would base their fertility preferences.

Indeed, social-cultural norms and mindsets appeared to be strong underlying forces influencing fertility preferences in the study area. Local mindsets around the utilitarian value of children (i.e. extra labour that can contribute to the household economy), around children as a divine will, or around children as an “insurance in old age” that can help with money and knowledge when adults, were frequently mentioned, and are consistent with descriptions for sub-Saharan Africa—(see the review of Dyer ( 2007 ) on the value of children in Africa, but derived from studies in infertility). A minority of respondents also held the view that once born, a child “ grows up by taking its chances or opportunities ”, which according to Newmarch and Bekere ( 2016 ) means that if children have luck they can succeed through life, a finding similarly reported by urban residents of Jimma in the study of Sahleyesus et al. ( 2009 ). An important point to raise here is the potential influence of children already born on the desired number of children reported. It is possible that women who desired the same number of children might feel uncomfortable reporting they would have desired fewer children because these children are already born, in what Bongaarts and Casterline ( 2013 ) call a “rationalization bias”. However, our results show that 18% of women do report wanting fewer children, either because women consider only having enough means to support a small family, because it is difficult to provide care and goods for many children, or because it is beneficial for the health of both mother and child.

Another important and pervasive social norm elicited from respondents’ statements was the support for underage marriage of girls. Almost half of the respondents expected their daughters to get married before the age of 18 years, and about a fourth preferring an age between 12 and 15 years. Younger marriage ages in girls can result in earlier motherhood and potentially in larger families (Wodon et al. 2018 ; Efevbera et al. 2019 ). Further, and as highlighted by the Population Reference Bureau ( 2015 ) “early marriage undermines the rights and livelihood opportunities of girls by leaving them vulnerable to the health risks of early pregnancy and childbearing, and by prematurely ending their schooling”. For instance, Delprato and colleagues ( 2015 ) show that the years of primary education attendance could increase by 39% if marriage of girls was delayed to the legal age and Omoeva and Hatch ( 2020 ) show that in East Africa, married adolescent girls are 31% less likely to be engaged in school compared to unmarried adolescent girls.

Another key determinant in the use of family planning methods was whether women discussed family planning with their husbands—a topic identified as important in many sub-Saharan African countries (reviewed in Blackstone et al. 2017 ). In our study, women who reported discussing family planning with their husbands were more likely to use family planning methods than those who did not. For this group of respondents, discussing with the husband was important not only to decide on the number of children and the gap between births, but also to prevent disagreement between husband and wife. Further, while some respondents mentioned that when faced with disagreement with the husband they would still follow their own will, for others their will would be overruled by the husband’s decision, as “ giving respect for husband is our culture” . This highlights the importance of including husbands in future research in the region aiming to understand fertility preferences and fertility outcomes. Indeed, considerable research in sub-Saharan Africa confirms that the inclusion of husbands in the process of decision-making increases the likelihood of the use of family planning (Terefe and Larson 1993 ; Bawah 2002 ; Ezeanolue et al. 2015 ). Overall, our findings illustrate that in addition to women’s choice and to the joy and happiness brought by children, fertility preferences are also influenced by social-cultural factors, such as norms and mindsets and gender-power relations within the household (Kane et al. 2016 ).

Implications

The findings from our study are of significance for policy and practice. Here, we found a mismatch between the global discourse on the population–environment–food nexus (Crist et al. 2017 ) and local women’s perceptions. This mismatch can have implications for the implementation of policies relating to demography, sustainable use of natural resources and livelihoods. This is because policies are typically developed at the national scale (and often are internationally influenced), but they are implemented at the local level, and, therefore, such mismatches in discourses and understandings can result in the design of inappropriate and ineffective policies and consequently in the misallocation of resources. Understanding and tackling underlying paradigms (such as “hard work”) that contribute to the disassociation of knowledge among scales is, therefore, critical for the design and prioritization of appropriate interventions.

Likewise, our study highlights the need to consider the socio-economic and cultural context in which fertility preferences are based and fertility decisions taken. Ethiopia’s cultural background is extremely diverse, with more than 80 ethnic groups and more than 80 languages, five widespread religions and many traditional faiths (Adamu 2013 ). Such a diversity of cultures implies that many different views, motivations and desires can be held regarding fertility preferences. Despite significant improvements in education and access to reproductive health care in the study area (Assefa et al. 2019 ), the desired number of children (currently 6.0) is well above the replacement rate of 2.1 (Searchinger et al. 2013 ) while the unmet need for family planning (currently at 29%, CSA 2016 ) is still high. These indicators suggest that the transition from high to low fertility rates will require more than technical interventions—such as improving the availability of family planning methods.

In the presence of strong and deep forces such as social-cultural norms, technical interventions alone are unlikely to trigger and sustain profound changes in fertility preferences and fertility outcomes (Abson et al. 2017 ). Therefore, and given the important role of social norms demonstrated in this paper and elsewhere (Nyborg et al. 2016 ), new deliberative approaches are needed to engage with those social norms that currently incentivize unsustainably large family sizes, to the possible detriment of both children and women. Despite this knowledge, the majority of interventions to slow down population growth continue to be oriented towards population control and the administration of contraceptives. The findings of this study point to the need to shift from a discourse of population control through contraceptives to one rooted on deliberative approaches and community-led critical reflections on norms and on helping women and men engage in shared decision-making about their family size. As discussed in Kane et al. ( 2016 ), deliberative approaches that promote inclusive conversations among boys and girls, couples, parents (Coast et al. 2019 ), and the wider community and society should be encouraged; these should engage with topics such as social norms and cultural beliefs, family planning and adolescent health services (Coast et al. 2019 ) and education (McClendon et al. 2018 ). Importantly, as cautioned by Boyden and colleagues ( 2012 ), such approaches should identify and address the rationale behind the prevailing norms to prevent undesired outcomes. Information shared by health workers and by a previous study in the region (Manlosa et al. 2019b ) show that a shift towards this direction is already being observed. However, for widespread change to happen, stronger governmental support and adequate investment to design and facilitate participatory processes is needed. Only through a broader household and community-level shift in norms and relations can the potential of family planning to slow down population growth be realised. Carrying on with business as usual, it seems, will not be a sustainable path for the region.

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Acknowledgements

We wish to thank all the female respondents who kindly shared their time, thoughts and experiences with us. We also wish to thank the health experts who shared their knowledge with us, and the kebele , woreda and Oromia authorities for granting permits and for supporting the research. We also thank Tolani Asirat, Sintayehu Telila and Lemane Gebeyehu for collecting data and for translating. We thank Amelie Schöber for facilitating interviews with health experts, Kristoffer Hylander for helpful conversations in the field, and Maraja Riechers for commenting on an earlier draft of the manuscript. This research was financed by a European Research Council (ERC) Consolidator Grant (FP7-IDEAS-ERC, Project ID 614278) to Joern Fischer (SESyP).

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Rodrigues, P., Manlosa, A.O., Fischer, J. et al. The role of perceptions and social norms in shaping women’s fertility preferences: a case study from Ethiopia. Sustain Sci 17 , 2473–2488 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-022-01152-9

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Understanding corruption and social norms: A case study in natural resource management

By Richard Nash, Cheyanne Scharbatke-Church, Zita Toribio, Peter Woodrow, Derick W. Brinkerhoff .

September 29, 2023 Open Access Peer Reviewed

DOI: 10.3768/rtipress.2023.op.0089.2309

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Corruption undermines many outcomes across development sectors, yet little is known about how social norms drive corruption or undermine anticorruption efforts in sector work. The conservation sector is no exception. The current study examined corruption and social norms related to infrastructure investments and site planning decisions and their subsequent effect on conservation outcomes. The study focused on the Puerto Princesa Subterranean River National Park, one of four protected areas under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Sustainable Interventions for Biodiversity, Oceans and Landscapes (SIBOL) project in the Philippines, implemented by RTI International. The study was undertaken through a partnership between RTI and Besa Global. Based on a site visit, key informant interviews, and extensive document analysis, our findings elucidate a unique governance structure that enabled project partners to navigate the significant corruption risks present. Direct social norms were not found to be driving corrupt decision making. However, indirect norms played a role by dictating inaction or silence—powerful behaviors—in the face of abuse of entrusted power for personal gain. Our analysis highlights the challenges and importance of having practitioners clearly define and understand what they mean by “corruption” as well as the importance of undertaking a systems analysis that incorporates the influence of social norms on behaviors within that system.

Introduction

Social norms, methodology, literature review, causal loop mapping, ppsrnp governance structure, ongoing corruption risks, indirect social norms do influence ppsrnp pamb members, recommendations, recommendations specific to ppsrnp/philippines, general recommendations for practitioners working on social norms and corruption, concluding thoughts, acknowledgments, understanding corruption and social norms: a case study in natural resource management.

Corruption undermines all sectors and development outcomes. It erodes trust in democracy, deters foreign investment, acts as a recruitment stream for extremists, and in the worst cases, supports regimes that actively repress their citizens. For more than 20 years, donors, governments, civil society, and individuals worldwide have adopted numerous approaches to prevent and counter corruption. There have been many successes, but in too many countries, corruption continues to be a significant and evolving problem. Even before a new “solution” to address one aspect of corruption is fully implemented, those behind corrupt schemes have often adapted and moved on to new schemes.

There is no internationally agreed-upon definition of “corruption.” In recent years, development practitioners have broadly coalesced around the Transparency International (n.d.) definition: “ The abuse of entrusted power for private gain .” The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) used this definition until late 2022, when the organization updated it to “ the abuse of entrusted power and influence for personal or political gain ” ( USAID, 2022 ).

Within academia, a specialized definition of corruption in natural resource management has been proposed by Paul Robbins (2000) : “ a system of normalized rules, transformed from legal authority, patterned around existing inequalities, and cemented through cooperation and trust.” Robbins’s definition of corruption has several key distinctions, such as treating corruption as a “system” in which a series of interconnected factors produce specific behaviors over time. Corruption must be understood as being embedded within wider social dynamics.

At the international level, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption does not include a definition of corruption but instead enumerates a series of activities conducted by public officials that state parties must pass legislation to criminalize (e.g., bribery).

For the purposes of this study, the research team used USAID's definition of corruption as the basis of investigations.

There is a vast amount of scholarship examining corruption and strategies to combat it. The dominant theoretical frame within this scholarship posits that corrupt practices result from the monopoly of people with decision-making power in a country or sector with little to no accountability ( Klitgaard, 1988 ). In response, anticorruption programs have typically used one of three strategies: first, increasing the transparency and accountability of government activities and decision-making processes; second, increasing participation and inclusion of citizens in decision-making processes; and third, improving sanctions and enforcement approaches by supporting independent anticorruption agencies as well as making broader investments in specialized criminal law approaches with the police, prosecutors, and courts to respond to corruption. In turn, donor programs have focused on top-down legal and governance system strengthening and bottom-up civil society “watchdogs” (see, for example, Department for International Development, 2015; USAID, 2014 ; or Brinkerhoff, 2010).

Despite the significant investment in these strategies, donors, academics, and civil society are increasingly concerned that the effectiveness of these approaches is limited, especially in fragile states. Researchers have proposed several alternative approaches (see, for example, Jackson, 2020 ), one of which is founded on the premise that corruption is a systemic problem requiring broad-based collective responses. Similarly gaining traction are integrated approaches to corruption that address not only compliance, enforcement, and transparency approaches but also broader political economy and social science understanding of why corrupt systems are so resilient and hard to change. Within corrupt systems are social norms —the unspoken and informal behavioral rules shared by people in a given society/group that define what is considered appropriate behavior—that serve to drive, or even enforce, corrupt actions (see Scharbatke-Church & Chigas, 2019 , and Baez Camargo & Kassa, 2017 ). Social norms are experiencing a moment in the spotlight but viewing corruption through a social norms lens is far from a tried and tested strategy.

This paper summarizes the results of a case study that was undertaken to better understand how social norms drive corrupt practices. To increase utilization of the results, the case site selection was performed in conjunction with the ongoing USAID Sustainable Interventions for Biodiversity, Oceans and Landscapes (SIBOL) program in the Philippines. The questions explored included:

What, if any, corrupt acts were undermining the project’s outcomes?

What social norms might be driving these actions?

What could the project do about them?

The case study contributes to the practice gap in the field by explaining the process of investigating these issues as well as the lessons learned for others to draw upon. We first provide a brief overview of social norms as the conceptual foundation for the case study. Next, we explain our methodology and case selection and then present and discuss the findings from our research, followed by our core lessons learned.

There are many factors an individual considers, implicitly and explicitly, when making choices about how to act. These commonly include the law, feelings of self-efficacy, aspirations, economic options, and values, as well as social norms which are the mutual expectations within a group about the right way to behave . Social norms represent what a group of people accept as appropriate and typical behaviors and are enforced—to varying degrees—by the group itself.

Social norms can either be “direct” or “indirect” ( Cislaghi & Heise, 2018 ). Direct social norms are the unwritten rules about the right way to behave within a group. These rules take the form of mutual expectations about what is appropriate and typical behavior for that group in a particular context and are held in place through positive and negative sanction ( Scharbatke-Church & Chigas, 2019 ). Indirect social norms are mutual expectations about the right thing to do in a particular situation that manifest in a range of behaviors, thus acting more like principles rather than specific directives.

Direct social norms are made up of descriptive and injunctive beliefs. Descriptive norms or beliefs are what one perceives others in their group to do in a particular situation. Injunctive norms are what one perceives others in their group think they should do.

Norms differ from behaviors because behaviors are acts performed by individuals and are not beliefs or attitudes ( Scharbatke-Church & Chigas, 2019 ). These behaviors are influenced by a variety of factors, including social norms, but also by attitudes, circumstances, values, abilities, etc. ( Cislaghi & Heise, 2016 ). Regularized or habitual behaviors are those that are commonly conducted by people.

Social norms matter because they are a significant influence on behavior. In fact, studies show that social norms can influence decisions more than individual attitudes or laws ( Chang & Sanfey, 2013 ). Research in other fields (e.g., public health and gender) has found social norms to act as a brake on the behavior change sought by a program ( Heise & Manji, 2016 ). In other words, even if one can change the technical factors, such as legal loopholes, that drive a particular corrupt behavior, sustainable shifts are out of reach without norm change.

Sanctions—both positive and negative—enforce social norms ( Bicchieri, 2016 ). Those who comply with the group’s expectations receive subtle, positive reinforcements (e.g., smiles, nods, approval), and those who do not are negatively sanctioned, typically through social means (e.g., rumors, cold shoulder). However, sanctions are not always only “social” in nature. Where members of the group (e.g., supervisors) also possess official power, they also may give professional rewards (e.g., training opportunities or promotion) and consequences (e.g., demotion, being side-lined or transferred) (Miller, 2023). In these environments, social norms may be more appropriately labeled “workplace” norms, which are the mutual expectations within a workplace about the right way to behave.

The distinction between the two forms of social norms—direct and indirect (see the “Key Terms on Social Norms” text box)—is important, because it impacts how one might support a norm change in relation to corrupt behaviors.

Direct social norms dictate a specific behavior . For direct norms, mutual expectations require a specific action. For instance, doctors might be expected by other doctors to demand a fee for service from patients, even if the service is legally free.

Indirect social norms can manifest in a variety of actions . Indirect norms act more like principles, and there are numerous behaviors that could be deemed appropriate to fulfill expectations. For instance, the expectation that members of a militia should be loyal to each other could result in a range of behaviors, such as physical protection or refusal to provide information on a fellow member to the authorities.

In this paper, we summarize the results of a study conducted in partnership between RTI, the Corruption, Justice and Legitimacy (CJL) Program, and USAID’s SIBOL program in the Philippines (SIBOL is implemented by RTI). This research was motivated by the increasing interest among anticorruption practitioners in the potential of social norms as drivers of corrupt practices and blocks to anticorruption efforts. Although there has been much academic debate and interest in this area ( Jackson & Köbis, 2018 ), there have been very few applied research studies working directly with projects to date; this effort sought to contribute to the practice gap.

SIBOL works to strengthen the governance of key natural resources by clarifying authority and coordination—both nationally and at a site level—to understand the political climate and current political practices. SIBOL also strengthens land and coastal resource management by supporting the effective participation of communities and other underrepresented groups in governance structures, as well as by developing cutting-edge decision-making tools to improve biodiversity and socioeconomic monitoring and analysis.

USAID recognized during the SIBOL program design process that weak natural resource governance feeds corruption, hinders effective management, and minimizes efforts to reduce environmental crime. For instance, there are limited mechanisms to resolve contested claims in the Philippines. Moreover, the mandate and authority of protected area management board (PAMB) members are unclear, causing inaction and noninclusive engagement of local natural resource user groups and communities. The study sought to offer SIBOL decision makers further insights into the corruption dynamics within PAMB decision making to inform the ongoing program and to develop a case study from which broader lessons learned could be extracted for the wider practitioner community working on these issues.

The research team consisted of CJL, RTI, and SIBOL staff as well as a conservation specialist from the Philippines. Our first step was to align our research question to our resources and to consider the ongoing uncertainty generated by COVID, which resulted in limiting our inquiry to the PAMB decision-making mechanisms. This offered a feasible, yet important, focus to the case.

Next, we identified which site within the four protected areas (PAs) under the SIBOL project to study. Focusing on a single PA allowed the research team to understand the specific corruption problem that social norms might be driving. In CJL’s experience, corrupt systems may appear similar across a country, but there are local nuances, particularly in the way norms are exhibited within reference groups. These nuances become important to understand if one is planning to develop a robust theory of change with locally grounded assumptions.

Criteria for PA selection included: perception of the existence of regularized corrupt practices, access to the PAMB and key actors in the area, and the capacity of the SIBOL local office to support the research. To gain a better understanding of the types of corruption and where they were happening in the PAs, the research team conducted a virtual focus group with members of the SIBOL team, followed up by remote interviews with key informants from that group. Simultaneously, the research team conducted a rapid literature review to provide a baseline for understanding how corruption manifests in the Philippines as well as in natural resource management.

Based on the conversations with SIBOL members, the research team chose the Puerto Princesa Subterranean River National Park (PPSRNP). There was anecdotal evidence and references in open-source literature that corruption was undermining effective conservation outcomes at PPSRNP ( Global Witness, 2019 ). Further, SIBOL had a high-functioning team in Puerto Princesa that had excellent relationships with the PAMB and its support office, the Protected Area Management Office (PAMO).

The site selection process highlighted several gaps in knowledge around the corruption dynamics within decision-making processes of the PPSRNP. Specifically:

To what degree were there issues of regularized corrupt practices within the PAMB decision-making process?

If there were examples of regularized corrupt practices, what was the influence of social norms?

To answer the first question, the Philippines researcher reviewed PAMB meeting minutes and conducted 21 qualitative interviews with key PPSRNP informants (which included a mix of people from government, civil society, the larger local community, the Indigenous community, and the private sector). The review analyzed 3 years of decisions around a broad range of projects, investments, and business enterprises (private or government owned or operated) that use land, water, and other significant natural resources in ways that have the potential for major conservation impacts within the PA. The researcher’s inquiry focused on identifying deviations from the official processes and rules governing PAMB decisions on investments and projects within PPSRNP.

In parallel, CJL developed causal loop maps ( Figures 1 , 2 , 3 , and 4 ) that visualize the relationships between the factors involved in PAMB decision making to understand the PAMB’s operational context. Understanding the relationships between factors is useful because it facilitates the identification of strategic responses and enables one to hypothesize potential unintended negative impacts of programming ( Scharbatke-Church & Barnard-Webster, 2017 ).

To address the second question, two international members of the research team joined the Philippines researcher to gather qualitative data at PPSRNP from September 10 to 16, 2022. The team developed a semi-structured interview protocol before travel to the site and further refined the questions once in country. The protocol was translated into Tagalog by our Philippines researcher and was tested with several Tagalog native speakers. The research team then interviewed a total of 20 people.

This methodology had some limitations that are worth noting. Due to exogenous factors such as COVID travel restrictions at the start of the research, the devastation caused by Typhoon Odette in 2021, and the uncertainty of the elections in May 2022, the research was repeatedly delayed, pushing it to the end of the funding window. Consequently, the scope of investigation was narrowed slightly to focus solely on decision-making within the PAMB. The team had to omit other areas that affect the park that might also have had corruption within them (e.g., local government offices in Puerto Princesa City).

It also became apparent as the process unfolded that the decision to focus solely on PPSRNP had limitations, given the somewhat unique governance and management structure of PPSRNP. However, there was insufficient time to compare PPSRNP to other PA sites in Palawan or elsewhere to determine the overall impact of differing governance structures on park management and corruption.

Finally, many of the meetings were set up at the request of the Protected Area Superintendent (PASU), and representatives of the PAMO accompanied the research team into interviews. These factors may have impacted the answers provided by some interviewees. However, these factors were beyond the control of the research team because the PASU/PAMO introductions were the only way the research team could gain access to key informants.

PAMB Decision Making Is Not Impacted by Regularized Corrupt Practice

The review of PAMB meeting minutes and site visit interviews with key informants revealed that, contrary to the initial macro analysis, literature review, and anecdotal discussion, PAMB decision making was not impacted by any one regularized corrupt practice. Abuse of power for personal gain was happening in the PA, but it varied in form and did not distort the decision-making process itself.

Out of 43 projects reviewed, 9 were identified as “irregular.” Although this constituted 21 percent of the projects in our sample 3-year period, the problematic cases formed a minority of investments and development activities. The projects were wide-ranging and included a basketball court, a slaughterhouse, a tourism hub, a major solar electrification project, a fishpond, roads, and the redevelopment of a large hotel.

All nine irregular projects were in violation of key national laws. With the exception of the tourism hub, the projects were either already ongoing or completed before key players applied for PAMB clearance and relevant permits/clearances (e.g., building permits, locational clearances) from other agencies. Four of these projects (the community slaughterhouse, the hotel redevelopment, and two road projects) were specifically given orders by the PAMB to stop their activities; however, all of the projects continued their activities despite the PAMB order. In all cases, the PAMB attempted to remedy the harm and damage done by these projects proceeding without appropriate clearance.

Ignoring the clearance process and violating orders from the PAMB raise corruption concerns because several of the proponents for these projects were also members of the PAMB. This, at a minimum, raises conflict-of-interest issues as well as concerns about abusing patronage systems.

For the tourism hub project, the private-sector representative on the PAMB was the owner/representative of a travel booking office. In the case of the basketball court, the local barangay captain, a member of the PAMB, was the proponent, and the project was strongly supported by another PAMB member with business interests in the barangay. * * A barangay captain/chairman is the highest elected official in a barangay, which is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines. The proponent for one of the road projects was a barangay captain and member of the PAMB, while the proponent for the other road project was the city mayor. The proponent of the slaughterhouse was the barangay, represented by the barangay captain, who was also a member of the PAMB.

The proponents of these problematic projects appear to have been acting for individual reasons and exploiting the weaknesses and gaps in the governance structure in the PPSRNP. These actions can be deemed corrupt—per Transparency International’s definition—because these individuals appear to have been abusing the power entrusted to them as members of the PAMB for personal gain. Because the proponents of the projects sit on the PAMB, they should have been aware of both the formal process and the important rationale for gaining PAMB approval for commencing work. Given their position, they had more knowledge of the potential consequences (or lack thereof) and were able to take advantage of the gaps in the oversight, enforcement, and sanctions mechanisms for these self-dealing projects. They could willfully ignore the rules because they knew that doing so would not have significant consequences.

Despite the similarities between the nine cases, deeper investigation did not reveal a commonality in the specific behaviors that individuals were using to pursue their interests. The conflict of interest in each case manifested in unique ways. Further, the actions did not distort PAMB decision making itself because individual members were avoiding the PAMB process entirely. As such, our review determined that there was not a regularized corrupt practice (i.e., behavior) occurring within PAMB decision making. This was a critical finding for our research because the regularized nature of a specific behavior is an essential requirement for the existence of direct social norms.

Discussion on the Absence of Regularized Corruption

The research team was somewhat surprised to find that although there may be corruption risks and corrupt acts occurring, the PPSRNP decision-making process itself is not characterized by regular abuses of power for personal gain. This finding was particularly counterintuitive given the initial scoping discussion, literature review, and broader mapping of the sociopolitical context in the Philippines, all of which had identified corruption as a central driving theme. We provide a brief discussion of why we believe this is the case; the findings will be of interest to anticorruption and good governance practitioners more broadly.

The literature review conducted as part of our initial research found that corruption has long been recognized as systemic in the Philippines. Batalla (2000) and Quimpo (2007, 2009) highlight how the endemic nature of corruption in the Philippines derives from the country’s historical context going back to the Spanish colonial era and the early emergence of patron-client social relations. These longstanding historical power dynamics and patron-client relations are referred to as the padrino (Spanish for “godparent” or “patron”) system. Originally based on Catholic rituals, such as marriages and baptisms, the padrino system extends to those relationships connecting the powerful and wealthy to clients through distribution of favors and protection (Wong & Lara-de-Leon, 2018). These padrino relationships have been shown to form a chain reaching from the national to local levels, with benefits being exchanged for votes and other forms of loyalty and cooperation ( Quimpo 2007, 2009 ).

Under the Marcos regime, political clientelism morphed into patrimonial authoritarianism, where Marcos and his cronies milked the state for personal enrichment to an unprecedented degree. Despite Marcos’ 1986 ouster and the restoration of democracy, patrimonial politics continued, enriching an expanded elite of powerful families and their friends and allies (see also Rivera, 2016 ).

Quimpo (2007, 2009) argues that today’s political parties, referred to as trapo (“traditional politician”), far from exemplifying weak state dynamics, are in fact strongly entrenched in and highly capable of continuing the deeply rooted elite practice of capturing state resources for personal gain. Filipino political parties do not offer coherent policies and programs; rather, their role is to act as temporary and shifting coalitions assembled to win elections ( Dela Cruz, 2021 ) and retain power and access to resources.

Nuancing the strong-families/weak-state interpretation of Philippine politics, recent political economy analyses demonstrate how trapo parties are relatively strong, having managed to capture the state’s formal legal and institutional structures at national and subnational levels ( Dela Cruz, 2021 ). Locally, these dynamics are referred to as “bossism,” where local politicians operate as mafia-style bosses, exercising legislative, regulatory, and economic power and distributing state-sponsored patronage. Decentralization has strengthened the authority and power of these local officials, who are the lowest-level links in the padrino chains of patronage.

Discussions with key government officials and the SIBOL team suggested that this national-level dynamic equally applied to the Puerto Princesa conservation management structure; particularly given the role of the city mayor in chairing the PAMB.

The research team then undertook a process of “causal loop mapping” to understand how the social, political, economic, and conservation factors at the national level interacted with each other. The causal loop map was based on the literature review and was validated in two interviews with key informants from Puerto Princesa. Given the complex dynamics of the system involved, the map is composed of three “cycles,” each setting out a particular part of the process (cycles R1, R2 and R3). These are then combined to produce the overall causal loop map demonstrating how each of these cycles interact with each other. Figure 1 (cycle R1) presents the larger political system within which the PAMBs across the Philippines are embedded.

Patronage system in the Philippines (R1)

Source: Developed by Peter Woodrow.

The national political system operates through networks of allegiance, in which the participants gain tangible and intangible benefits, in the form of material rewards, as well as power and influence (the red/black arrows on the right of the figure). These benefits reinforce the dominance of the patronage system and elite privilege.

The system of networks of allegiance gaining benefits does not operate in isolation. It fuels political influence in the decision making of the PAMBs themselves. This analysis is represented in Figure 2 .

Dynamics of political influence (R2)

According to the available literature, the politicized atmosphere generated by the R1 patronage system (shown on the left-hand side of Figure 2 with the red/black arrows repeated from Figure 1 ), directly affects the way that people are appointed to a PAMB, and those people are subject to the same broader political forces at play. Before the in-country interviews, anecdotal reports suggested there might be multiple pressures that could lead to regularized corrupt decision making in a PAMB:

PAMB members may feel pressure to approve investment decisions from those they are allied with or related to, particularly if they are “clients” of more powerful patrons.

Members may have clear conflicts of interests (often business interests) that could lead them to support bypassing the regulations governing protection of the PA.

Issues may be completely local and involve curbing or yielding to the power of local business and political allies through enforcing regulations (or submitting to pressure and bypassing regulations).

Issues might involve interests at a higher (provincial, regional, national) level and even more powerful voices of support for actions that undermine the natural resource in the long term.

Even if a PAMB is able to resist pressure, members may need to consider whether a decision (imposition of a fine, blocking of a project) is enforceable, which depends on the independence of the judiciary and police or other administrative personnel, who are subject to political pressures as well. This consideration might affect how the PAMB would view the utility of reaching a decision that requires enforcement and might not be carried through.

The mapping identified that despite the laws dictating membership on a PAMB, people either holding defined government positions or representing civil society organizations do not always get appointed. This is unfortunate, because individuals in these roles can often provide a countervailing force and independent voice against undue influence. This is represented with a dotted line in Figure 2 because the appointment of such people is not guaranteed. Such countervailing forces could act as a significant bulwark against the risk of the PAMB being captured and corrupted. This overall dynamic is labeled “R2.”

Influences on PAMB membership are important because they also impact the internal dynamics of the PAMB, especially in terms of the PAMB’s ability to enforce rules and regulations. Although the PAMB oversees the management of the PA, it has no separate enforcement function. Although it is considered the highest policy-making body, the PAMB can only recommend actions to enforcers, such as the PASU and other government bodies.

Internal dynamics of the PAMB (R3)

Building off the idea of possible countervailing forces from Figure 2 (shown in the top left corner of Figure 3 as the dotted line), the analysis identified two possible outcomes for the PAMB based on the appointment process (together shown as the R3 system in Figure 3 ):

Outcome 1—a virtuous circle: With sufficient countervailing forces and political support for their overall conservation activities, an empowered PAMB could decide to protect the resource, informed by reliable data and following the guidance of a management plan and clear rules and standards. That is, the PAMB could resist pressures from political and business interests. Over time, these protective decisions result in a well-managed/protected resource and a stream of community benefits that generate revenues and public support for the PAMB’s role, strengthening, in turn, the PAMB’s ability to enforce rules/regulations. There would still be tensions between people who may want to see shorter-term gains (e.g., around job creation) versus longer-term conservation goals.

Outcome 2—a vicious circle: If the countervailing forces were not able to support good governance outcomes, then decisions could be influenced by political and economic forces to bypass regulations and, over time, damage the health of the protected area. This could result in reduced benefits, lower revenues, and deteriorating public support for an empowered PAMB. Under this dynamic, short-term interests prevail over long-term protection. In addition, revenues generated by the PA/natural resource may be used to support the health of the PA or be diverted to other uses, generally with a political agenda.

Figure 4 shows the three reinforcing loops (R1, R2, R3) combined in an overall systems map of the dynamics surrounding PAMB decision making. It was clear that how this system would function could differ significantly from PA site to PA site across the country reflecting local social, economic, political, and conservation conditions.

Systems map of PAMB dynamics (R1, R2, and R3)

The site visit interviews revealed details of how the members of the PPSRNM PAMB were able to navigate these system dynamics to deliver positive conservation outcomes and resist corruption. This is partly due to the commitment, motivations, and work of members of the PAMB itself. However, the broader governance structure of the PPSRNP PAMB contributes to their ability to avoid the pressures present in the wider environment.

The PPSRNP enjoys a special status within the PA management system of the Philippines. The PPSRNP was first established as a national park in 1971 by virtue of a Presidential Proclamation. Following the passage of the National Integrated Protected Area Systems law in 1992, the PPSRNP moved from local city control to control by the Department of Natural Resources, which was true of all PAs in the Philippines. The same year, the Department of Natural Resources and the City Government of Puerto Princesa signed a memorandum of agreement to devolve the management of PPSRNP to the city. The city’s control over day-to-day decision making for the PPSRNP is unique in the Philippines. The research team speculates that this local control over the PPSRNP PAMB might be what insulates it from some of the broader corruption dynamics within the Philippines, although we were not able to confirm this through engagement with other sites.

The research team did not find a single type of corrupt behavior that was regularly carried out within PAMB decision making in PPSRNP. Yet there were several potential corruption risks—representing different types of behavior—that became apparent in the course of the study. Depending on how individuals navigate the current system, the positive outcomes could also be changed into negative outcomes based on a vicious circle of political interference fueling corruption, as described in the R2 loop. In the case of PPSRNP, if the composition of the PAMB members were changed to individuals who were intent on subverting the system, a vicious cycle would be highly possible. While we did not undertake a full corruption-risk/vulnerability assessment, other risks that came up during our site visit include:

Employment conditions: The PASU holds a dual role, acting as the executive assistant to the city mayor as well as the superintendent of the PA. This creates an additional avenue for the city to politically influence the PAMB. Additionally, PAMO staff hold contract positions rather than full-time regular civil service positions referred to as plantilla positions in the Philippines. The tenuous nature of their employment creates the risk of individuals being more susceptible to external influences over fear of losing their jobs and livelihoods.

Investment approval process: There is no formal, publicly available procedure in place to obtain approval from the PAMB for projects in the PA. Not having a formal procedure makes it easier for individuals to simply ignore the process entirely and undermines the ability of the PAMB to enforce its decisions in a timely manner. It also creates the risk that projects may be commenced in good faith but cause environmental harm that cannot be appropriately mitigated. At the time of writing, a manual of operations with the recommended procedures had been drafted, but the PAMB had not yet approved it.

Absence of key guiding documents: PPSRNP has been without an updated Protected Area Management Plan (PAMP) for more than a decade at the time of writing. The absence of a PAMP has been noted as a conservation risk of “Some Concern” by the International Union for Conservation of Nature World Heritage Outlook (2020), stating that in the absence of such a plan, “effective protection and management will remain challenging.” Coupled with the lack of an approved manual of operations to clarify and control the overall process for obtaining approvals from the PAMB for investments, this increases the risk that the PAMB could engage in corrupt approvals.

Social Norms Are Not Driving the Behaviors That Are Problematic.

The review of the PAMB meeting minutes identified two problematic behaviors that have the potential for corruption and that could be driven by social norms:

Behavior one: Some elected officials advance projects in the PAs without following official procedure, even though they are PAMB members.

Behavior two: PAMB members do not regularly enforce punitive sanctions on transgressions, allowing “creative” solutions—for example, having a project proponent pay to repair some of the environmental damage caused by the building of a road—to be advanced.

Social norms influence an individual’s choice of behavior by exerting social pressure (actual or perceived) to conform to a group’s expectations. To determine whether behaviors are social norm driven , the research team explored two criteria. First, is the behavior perceived to be typical and appropriate by those who perform the acts? A typical behavior is one that occurs regularly within the same circumstances. If this criterion is met, the second criterion is whether the decision maker would face negative consequences (e.g., to their reputation or their relationships) if they made an alternative choice.

As explained earlier, although there were examples of elected officials advancing projects before gaining PAMB permission, the interviews revealed such behavior to be atypical and in general viewed as inappropriate by their peers on the PAMB. Thus, these behaviors did not meet the first criterion.

With regards to creative solutions used to resolve the negative environmental impact of projects that were advanced without PAMB approval, the creativity was a functional response to the situation. They were not driven by social pressure or expectations. Thus, the research team concluded that there was no evidence of direct social norms driving the observed behaviors.

Indirect norms, unlike direct social norms, manifest in a variety of different behaviors, some positive, some negative. One can think of an indirect norm as a mutually held principle about the right thing to do. The study found indirect norms might influence PPSRNP PAMB choices but, at this time, the research team found no evidence that this influence supported potentially or actually corrupt practices.

The research team used a literature review to identify several indirect norms prevalent in the Philippines that hypothetically could drive corrupt practices. These interpretations were validated with SIBOL and PAMO staff, resulting in the exploration of whether and how six indirect norms influenced PAMB decision making:

Awa : pity for others

Malasakit : caring for others

Hiya : shame or shyness

Utang na loob : depth of gratitude

Pakikisama : unity, cohesion, harmony

Delicadeza : sense of propriety

Based on our interviews, four of the indirect norms, malasakit, awa , hiya , and utang na loob, appear to have influenced the actions of decision makers, but none were deemed to be driving problematic behavior at this time. The final two, pakikisama and delicadeza , did not have sufficient data to draw conclusions on from our interviews.

Awa (pity for others)/ Malasakit (caring for others): Many involved in the park management process perceive these indirect norms to cause the PAMB to temper punishments or consider modifications to the rules as an act of compassion toward the poor and marginalized, especially those in Indigenous communities. While acknowledging that this happens, many of the same individuals were quick to stress that the desire to be compassionate does not override the law.

Most of the residents interviewed from within the PA had a markedly different perception. They perceived that awa and malasakit were being insufficiently honored in decisions, thereby generating a sense of resentment and negative sentiment toward PAMB members. For instance, residents viewed the PAMB as “cold hearted,” a significant slight in a Philippines context. Locally elected officials found these assertions much more personally impactful than the other PAMB representatives. This is possibly due to their long-standing relationships within the communities, the negative impact on their and their families’ reputation, and potential consequences on re-election.

The research team was unable to assess how much influence the negative assessment (i.e., the PAMB being viewed as cold hearted) had on the behavior of local officials compared with the negative political impact on a local official who is seen to not help their constituents. In other words, did local officials argue for tempering of actions because of malasakit, because they wanted to get re-elected, or for both reasons?

It is possible that these individuals may indeed be more strongly influenced by awa and malasakit in their actions. It is equally true that democracy is premised on the notion that your constituents can vote you out if they are not happy with your performance. Parsing out the mechanics of how these two dynamics—political expectations versus social group pressure—are intertwined would be an important facet to continue to explore.

Hiya (shame/shy ) : Hiya appears to catalyze “silence” in conversations and decisions by PAMB members who feel they do not have the same level of professional expertise as other members. Indigenous representatives were regularly named as examples of those influenced by hiya . As one member of the PAMB explained, “members do not voice their opinion during deliberations because of being shy. Also, because of being shy, they just follow/accept what others in the PAMB say.” What is not clear is whether there is an indirect social norm driving this or a simpler descriptive norm (i.e., what one perceives others in their group typically do in a particular situation).

Utang na loob (debt of gratitude): Interviewees were split on the prevalence of utang na loob in PAMB interactions. Some felt it did not play a role in PAMB decision making, while others indicated that “debt of gratitude” influences elected officials to align with those to whom they are politically indebted. This alignment typically takes the form of inaction. Examples included not asking questions of someone above them in the hierarchy, agreeing with positions due to “blind obedience,” or not proceeding with punitive actions when infractions are committed by those who have been political supporters.

Interviewees did not comment on their perception of whether this expectation was appropriate or what the consequences of breaching this indirect norm might be. The limited number of interviews suggested that acting against the interests of a political benefactor would be perceived as antagonistic. In that case, the actor may be seen as “an unreliable person, ingrate, or someone who cannot be trusted.” These negative social consequences for one’s reputation are not the only consequences. There are also political consequences of losing the support of the political benefactor and of their networks. Given the limited time for key informant interviews, it was difficult to determine whether utang na loob is simply a descriptive norm or a social norm among politicians and their supporters.

The study of corruption and social norms at the PPSRNP site offers a range of recommendations applicable across countries and sectors. The recommendations are intended to catalyze important questions for practitioners to consider in their work but are not to be taken as prescriptions. More research and validation would be needed before one can go to scale with formal recommendations. The conclusions are organized into two areas: (1) those specific to PPSRNP and (2) general conclusions applicable more broadly.

Continue to improve good governance mechanisms of the PAMB. There were investments in the PA where individuals exploited weaknesses in the current management system to advance these projects for personal gain; however, these were not prevalent enough to be considered regularized behaviors. These weaknesses enable numerous corruption risks that continue to be present in the PAMB. To mitigate these risks:

The PAMB should work to finalize, implement, and make public the PAMP and operations manual as soon as possible.

Additional support may need to be provided to the PAMB to work with the city government of Puerto Princesa to streamline and make transparent all the processes required to obtain licenses and other approvals for investment and development activities within PPSRNP.

The PAMB should advocate to the city to make all core PAMO staff employed in official plantilla positions. This would reduce a significant corruption risk by providing increased job security.

Improving public access to PAMB decision meetings and deepening community participation in decision-making processes could also help reduce corruption risks.

For future projects, particularly outside of PPSRNP, carefully consider the role of indirect social norms when designing interventions. The broader contextual analysis suggests that regularized patterns of corruption occur in the management of PAs. The research team’s work in the PPRSNRP suggests that indirect social norms common to the Philippines could be central to sustaining these corrupt patterns of behavior and/or serving to block anticorruption efforts. Accounting for these indirect social norms early in the program conceptualization process could significantly enhance the results of USAID/donor/Philippines programming. This would require integrating a social norms assessment into the preliminary analysis conducted by USAID or other donors as they build their country development cooperation strategy and sector-specific program plans.

Our analysis offers some preliminary assessment of how the indirect norms we examined could be driving corrupt practices or hindering anticorruption ones, and some suggestions for programmatic responses:

Hiya (shame/shyness): It is important to take hiya into account when promoting anticorruption efforts if an element of the programming is to encourage individuals to act against those with more expertise or status. For instance, programs that promote speaking out at meetings in favor of accountability or transparency may be met with inaction by members of the Indigenous community due to hiya .

Conversely, hiya , in the context of concern for one’s personal or family honor, can prevent a person from engaging in corrupt practices to prevent bringing shame to oneself or one’s family. An anticorruption program could consider building on this positive aspect of hiya as part of a prevention effort.

Utang na loob (debt of gratitude): It is easy to imagine the possibility of taking advantage of utang na loob to engage in corrupt acts (e.g., requiring someone who has a debt of gratitude to co-sign a falsified document or to stay silent in the face of a corruption allegation). It is also likely that this indirect norm buttresses the padrino system. Understanding what behaviors utang na loob catalyzes, among whom, and the strength of the consequences of breaching the norm would be important for practitioners to understand.

Equally concerning is the role this indirect norm could have in diminishing the likelihood of people standing up to the abuse of power for personal gain. This implicit sense that one must align to those who helped them in the past, could catalyze silence and inaction when faced with problematic behaviors. This would be particularly salient to anyone working on complaint mechanisms, whistle-blower, or sanctions processes.

Work toward a common understanding of “corruption.” Given the range of definitions of and terminology around corruption, future program design, including context analysis and theory of change development, could be more effective if teams have a common understanding of what counts as corruption and why. What a donor might determine as corruption, for instance, may not align with perceptions within a local community. An analysis that specifically develops a common—locally grounded—understanding of corruption would be one way to achieve this. Some useful questions to ask as part of such an analysis would include ( Scharbatke-Church & Nash, 2022 ):

Who is allowed to decide what is corrupt? And why (what is their role in the system and what are their motivations)?

Is there a difference between how the government defines corruption and what civil society or communities define as corruption?

What is the normative lens through which corruption is being discussed? Is the problem being framed as a criminal law problem, a social issue, or a moral issue?

Is this a “national” problem? Or are there forms of corruption specific to the place or community the project would be working on?

What impact does a “zero tolerance” approach to corruption have if local actors consider corruption to be a useful problem-solving mechanism?

Having a common understanding of corruption can help assess the applicability of anticorruption ideas generated through theory of change or strategic planning processes (see, for example, Gargule, 2021 ) and can avoid reverting to “cookie cutter” project interventions.

Check that perceptions align with reality of the degree of corruption. Through this process, we find that it is imperative to develop a clear understanding—based on documented evidence rather than on only anecdotes and hearsay—of the specific nature of the corruption that is undermining project outcomes. Anecdotal evidence may be insufficient proof of regularized corrupt practices, and indirect social norms can exert a powerful force in undermining good governance efforts.

Think of anticorruption as behavior change. Social norms drive or inhibit behaviors. “A behavior is what an individual does, such as placing a cash-filled envelope on a contract officer’s desk or demoting someone who refused to comply with a request to lose a file” ( Scharbatke-Church & Nash, 2022 ). If we are interested in diminishing corruption, then pinpointing the specific behavior that needs to change is essential to developing an effective theory of change.

When applying a behavioral lens, it can be helpful to start with corruption typologies, as they expand the aperture beyond classic fiscal forms of corruption to include nepotism, sextortion, political interference, etc. However, that is not where specifying behaviors ends. The behavior—or regularized behavior, if one is concerned about social norms—then needs to be identified. For instance, in discussing nepotism, one would want to understand the different ways it is being practiced and by whom. Are qualified family members going through the full recruitment process and then being nudged over the finish line after a call from a superior? In this case, the corrupt behavior is the act of reaching out to pressure the hiring manager. Or is the entire recruitment process being ignored to hire unqualified family members of the recruiting manager or a powerful member of the organization? Here, the behavior is the sidestepping of the official processes within the human resources team. Responding to each of these behaviors requires different tactics. If there is evidence that these behaviors are common or regularized practices, then the response will also need to consider whether social norms are playing a role.

Remember silence and inaction are powerful behaviors. Most behaviors involve taking action—for example, hiding evidence to aid a politically powerful individual, changing the rules of the game, accepting cash to set a court date, or requiring a sexual act to secure a job. Yet we should not omit silence or inaction from our repertoire of ways in which abuses of power for personal gain occur. In the PPSRNP case, the research team did not find regularized corrupt practices, but the questionable incidents that were found involved some decision makers electing to remain silent—in other words, employing inaction—in the face of abuse of power for personal or political gain. This finding is supported by Scharbatke-Church et al. (2016) , who found that in Uganda, inaction by civil servants is also used to exert pressure on citizens needing services (e.g., set a court date or renew a passport).

The role of inaction can also be seen in anticorruption work. Members of Kuleta Haki—a network of individuals from the criminal justice sector in Lubumbashi, DRC, known for their integrity—would commonly talk about the power of not taking action when faced with political pressure to do something that did not align with official processes. Instead, they would “wait rather than immediately acting in response to ‘orders from above’ to see if the demand [was] repeated” ( Scharbatke-Church et al., 2017, p. 7). If there was no follow-up, the individual proceeded according to the rules. In effect, inaction was used as a tool to resist pressure to be corrupt ( Scharbatke-Church et al., 2017 ).

The process of undertaking this study and peeling back the layers around what was occurring at PPSRNP demonstrates the importance of local, data-driven analysis to accurately identify what corrupt acts may or may not be occurring . Because of the existence of a broader system of corruption and based on the anecdotal evidence, we had expected PPSRNP to have experienced significant corruption that undermined its conservation outcomes. Relying solely on this broad national assessment and anecdotal evidence to design a program and response at PPSRNP would have proven ineffective. Going further, the research team surmises that there may be significant differences between every PAMB—even if they fall under the same national laws—that may affect whether they are also prone to corruption, what the effect of that corruption might be, and therefore what appropriate interventions might be. Thus, local, site-level analysis of corruption risks and issues is critical to be able to design and tailor effective interventions.

This research also demonstrates that that is critical to use data to test conclusions about corruption, because perceptions do not always represent reality . To develop evidence-based anticorruption approaches, it is critical to invest early in data analysis about how institutions are managed. Although corruption is often hidden, researchers can use open-source data and information to establish a more nuanced picture of what may be occurring. In this case, the open-source data were the minutes from the PAMB meetings. For practitioners working in other systemically corrupt environments, the research team encourages them to ensure they are using publicly available data to feed into their assessment and to counter what may be inaccurate narratives.

The team would like to acknowledge and thank the contributions and support from the City Government of Puerto Princesa who supported the team’s work, as well as the members of the community and Indigenous peoples in Puerto Princesa Subterranean River National Park whose information, views, and thoughts made this research possible. The team would also like to thank members of the Sustainable Interventions for Biodiversity, Oceans and Landscapes team including Ernie Guiang, Elmer Mercado, and Marlito Guidote for their input and support throughout the process as well as Lisa McGregor and Sarah Frazer of RTI who provided considerable guidance and constructive feedback throughout the process.

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Lessons Learned from Diverse Efforts to Change Social Norms and Opportunities and Strategies to Promote Behavior Change in Behavioral Health: Proceedings of Two Workshops (2017)

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