montserrat volcano 1995 case study

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Soufrière Hills Volcano, Montserrat, West Indies.

Soufrière Hills Volcano , Montserrat, West Indies. Synopsis of events by former Montserrat resident, photographer and Author Lally Brown. 

Where is Montserrat? Montserrat is a small tropical island of approximately 40 sq. miles in the Caribbean, fifteen minutes flying time from Antigua. It is a British Overseas Territory and relies on UK Government aid money to survive. It is of volcanic origin with the Soufrière Hills above the capital of Plymouth the highest point of the island.

How and when did the volcano erupt? Prior to 1995 the volcano in the Soufrière Hills had been dormant for 350 years but on the morning of 18th July 1995 steam and fine ash could be seen coming from the flanks of the Soufrière Hills accompanied by a roaring sound, described as being like a jet engine. In the capital of Plymouth there was a strong smell of ‘bad eggs’ the hydrogen sulphide being emitted by the awakening volcano.

Montserrat was totally unprepared. No-one had ever imagined the dormant volcano would erupt. The Soufrière Hills was the breadbasket of the island where farmers worked the fertile agricultural land, while the busy capital and island port of Plymouth nestled at the foot of the hills.

Scientists arrived from the University of the West Indies to assess the situation. They said the volcano was producing ‘acoustic energy explosions’ at approximately half-hour intervals sending ash and vapour three to four hundred metres into the air.

What happened next? Before July 1995 Montserrat was a thriving tourist destination with a population of 10,000 people but over several weeks there was a mass exodus from the island and a run on the banks with people withdrawing cash.

Several areas near the vent that had opened up in the hillside were declared exclusion zones and residents were evacuated to the safe north of the island into schools and churches.

It was evident the volcano was becoming more active when a series of small earthquakes shook the island. Heavy rain from passing hurricanes brought mudflows down the hillsides into Plymouth. Sulphide dioxide emissions increased, a sure sign of heightened activity.

The scientists hoped to be able to give a six hour warning of any eruptive activity but when they discovered the magma was less than 1 km below the dome they said this could not be guaranteed, saying there was a 50% chance of an imminent eruption. An emergency order was signed by the Governor and new exclusion zones were drawn with people evacuated north.

The years 1995 to 1997 The Soufrière Hills volcano became increasingly active and more dangerous.

Montserrat Volcano Observatory (MVO) was established to monitor activity and advise the Government.

December 1995 saw the first pyroclastic flow from the volcano.

The capital of Plymouth was evacuated for the last time in April 1996.

Acid rain damaged plants.

Two-thirds of Montserrat became the new exclusion zone , including the fertile agricultural land.

Population dropped to 4,000 with residents leaving for UK or other Caribbean islands.

Frequent heavy ashfalls covered the island with blankets of thick ash.

On the seismic drums at the MVO swarms of small hybrid earthquakes frequently registered. Also volcano-tectonic earthquakes (indicating fracture or slippage of rock) and ‘Broadband’ tremors (indicating movement of magma).

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MVO Seismograph printout Dec 1997

‘Spines’ grew rapidly out of the lava dome to heights of up to 15 metres before collapsing back.

Rainfall caused dangerous mudflows down the flanks of the Soufrière Hills.

Temporary accommodation was built to house evacuees living in churches and schools.

25th June 1997 Black Wednesday For a period of twenty minutes at 12.59 pm the volcano erupted without warning with devastating consequences. A massive pyroclastic flow swept across the landscape and boulders up to 4 metres in diameter were thrown out of the volcano. Over 4 sq.km was destroyed including nine villages and two churches. The top 300ft had been blown off the lava dome. Tragically nineteen people were caught in the pyroclastic flow and died.

Post Office and War Memorial 1997

Lateral blast December 1997 Midnight on Christmas Day 1997 the MVO reported that hybrid earthquakes had merged into a near-continuous signal clipping the sides of the seismic drum. At 3am on Boxing Day there was a massive collapse of the dome. Approximately 55 million cubic metres of dome material shot down the flanks of the volcano into the sea. Travelling at speeds of 250-300 km per hour it took less than a minute to slice a 7 km wide arc of devastation across southern Montserrat. The evacuated villages of Patrick’s and O’Garros were blasted out of existence. A delta 2 km wide spilled into the sea causing a small tsunami .

Police checkpoint Montserrat

March 1999 After a year of apparent inactivity at the volcano the Scientists declared the risk to populated areas had fallen to levels of other Caribbean islands with dormant volcanoes. Arrangements were made to encourage overseas residents to return. Plans were put in place to reopen the abandoned airport.

2000 to 2003 One year after the volcano had been declared dormant there was a massive collapse of the dome, blamed on heavy rainfall.

In July 2001 another massive collapse of the dome described as ‘a significant eruption’ caused airports on neighbouring Caribbean islands to close temporarily due to the heavy ashfall they experienced. A Maritime Exclusion Zone was introduced around Montserrat and access to Plymouth and the airport prohibited.

Soufrière Hills volcano was now described as a ‘persistently active volcano’ that could continue for 10, 20 or 30 years. (ie possibly to 2032).

In July 2003 ‘the worst eruption to date’ took place, starting at 8 pm 12th July and continuing without pause until 4 am morning of 13th July. Over 100 metres in height disappeared from the mountain overnight. It was the largest historical dome collapse since activity began in July 1995.

A period of relative quiet followed.

2006 The second largest dome collapse took place with an ash cloud reaching a record 55,000 metres into the air. Mudflows down the flanks of the Soufrière Hills was extensive and tsunamis were reported on the islands of Guadeloupe and Antigua.

Another period of relative quiet followed.

Soufriere Hills volcano 2007

2010 Another partial dome collapse with pyroclastic flows reaching 400 metres into the sea and burying the old abandoned airport. There was extensive ashfall on neighbouring islands.

Again followed by a period of relative quiet.

2018 Although the Soufrière Hills volcano is described as ‘active’ it is currently relatively quiet. It is closely monitored by a team at the Montserrat Volcano Observatory (MVO). They advise the Government and residents on the state of the volcano.

Negative effects of the volcano:

·       Approximately two-thirds of Montserrat now inaccessible (exclusion zone);

·       Capital of Plymouth including hospital, government buildings, businesses, schools etc. buried under ash;

·       Fertile farming land in the south in exclusion zone and buried under ash;

·       Population reduced from 10,000 to 4,000;

·       Businesses left Montserrat;

·       Tourism badly affected;

·       Concern over long term health problems due to ash;

·       Volcano Stress Syndrome diagnosed;

·       Huge financial cost to British Tax Payer (£400 million in aid);

·       Loss of houses, often not insured;

·       Relocation to the north of Montserrat by residents from the south.

Positive effects:

·       Tourists visiting Montserrat to see the volcano, MVO and Plymouth, now described as ‘Caribbean Pompeii’;

·       Geothermal energy being investigated;

·       Sand mining for export;

·       Plans for a new town and port in north;

·       New housing for displaced residents built;

·       New airport built (but can only accommodate small planes);

·       New Government Headquarters built;

·       Businesses opening up in the north of the island;

·       Ferry to Antigua operating.

Lally Brown

You can follow Lally Brown on Twitter.

If you are interested in reading a dramatic eyewitness account of life with this unpredictable and dangerous volcano then the book ‘THE VOLCANO , MONTSERRAT AND ME’ by Lally Brown is highly recommended. You can order a paper back or Kindle version on Amazon .

“As time moves on and memories fade, this unique, compelling book will serve as an important and accurate first-hand record of traumatic events, faithfully and sensitively recounted by Lally Brown.”

Prof. Willy Aspinall Cabot Professor in Natural Hazards and Risk Science, Bristol University.

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Soufrière Hills 1995-present

Soufrière Hills in Montserrat has been erupting since 1995.

Chronic Medical Aspects

Crystalline silica in volcanic ash, when inhaled, adversely affects health..

The extended eruption of a lava dome at Soufrière Hills Volcano that began in 1995 generated large amounts of fine ash by (1) explosive events from the dome; and (2) frequent collapse of unstable parts of the growing dome that generated pyroclastic flows and associated plumes of ash. A detailed study of ash from both types of events determined that the sub-10 micron fraction of ash from the pyroclastic flows consisted of 10-24 percent crystalline silica , the highest yet documented for a historical eruption (Baxter and others, 1999). In contrast, the sub-10 micron fraction of ash from the explosive events consisted of 3-6 percent crystalline silica. The free silica minerals are produced within the lava dome over a period of many days or weeks.

Monitoring of the concentration of airborne respirable dust and ash around the volcano beginning in August 1997 showed that concentrations of ash have regularly exceeded 50 micrograms/m3 per 24-hour rolling average in areas subject to frequent ashfall. The exposures to cristobalite sometimes reached the 0.05 mg/m3 averaged over an 8-hour workday. Also, the monitoring consistently showed increased concentrations of airborne dust whenever there was human activity.

This study raises concern that exposure to long-lived eruptions of lava domes that produce persistent ashfall over many years may result in adverse health effects in affected communities.

Water Supply

The eruptions of Soufrière Hills during 1997 produced chemical contamination of rainwater and surface water. Water sampling in January 1997 indicated highly acidic water with high concentrations of sulphates, chloride and fluorides. Similar results were recorded until June 1997 although all fell within World Health Organization recommended levels for all measured components (see Smithsonian Institution Global Volcanism Program ).

• The 1995 Soufrière Hills Eruption

In 1995, the Soufrière Hills volcano on the Caribbean island of Montserrat became active. As a result, half of Montserrat became uninhabitable. As the volcano had been dormant for over 3 centuries and had been deemed inactive, this came as a devastating blow to the small island and its inhabitants.

Location And Geography

The Soufriere Hills volcano is situated in the Caribbean Island of Montserrat. The Island is a British Overseas Territory and is a part of the Leeward Islands which is a chain of islands known as the Lower Antilles. The total land area is about 100 square kilometers. The Soufrière Hills Volcano is part of the Lesser Antilles Volcanic Arc and is situated to the south of the island. The capital city was called Plymouth before it was buried in debris after the eruption.

History And Timeline

The early history of the volcano is relatively unknown due to inconsistent record keeping. The first explosive eruption is estimated to have been around 2,500 years ago. The last known eruption was in the 16th century where anywhere between 25 to 65 million cubic meters of lava erupted at Castle Peak. The 1995 eruption was preceded by seismic activity recorded in 1897, 1933 and lastly in 1966. The eruption in 1995 was also preceded by seismic activity but what ensued was mostly unexpected. Earthquake swarms had first been detected in 1992 and again in 1994.

Eruption Of The Soufrière Hills Volcano

The eruption of ash in July 1995 prompted an evacuation of almost 5,000 residents. The volcano grew a new dome on November 1995. By January 1996, the old dome was rapidly buried and between March and September of the same year, the first pyroclastic flows poured down the Tar river valley. This created a new delta and in April the south of the island was evacuated. The capital city of Plymouth was also abandoned. Pyroclastic flows and eruption columns are the main features of this volcano. They occur when the dome collapses or explodes. Tonnes of hot rock, lava and ash explode from the crater in a cloud moving at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour with temperatures reaching over 400°C. The fast moving cloud annihilates and incinerates everything in its way.

Aftermath Of The Eruption

The eruption left the southern two-thirds of the islands completely inhabitable. Pyroclastic flows still pour down the slopes of the volcano. The eruptions continued after the volcano became active. The disaster resulted in the collapse of the tourism and also the local rice processing industries. Unemployment shot up from a manageable 7% to over 50%. Agricultural activities became nearly impossible and living conditions were further worsened by respiratory problems caused by the spewing ash. The aid and relief activities were spearheaded by both British and Montserrat governments.

The 1995 eruption changed the landscape and living conditions of the Montserrat Island completely. It destroyed the economy and forced most residents to abandon the city. As a result of this eruption, several monitoring initiatives were undertaken like the establishment of an extensive seismograph network. The volcano is still active and subject to eruptions from time to time. It remains to be seen how long it will take until the island is habitable again.

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Setting, chronology and consequences of the eruption of Soufrière Hills Volcano, Montserrat (1995–1999)

• Published: January 01, 2002
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B. P. Kokelaar, 2002. "Setting, chronology and consequences of the eruption of Soufrière Hills Volcano, Montserrat (1995–1999)", The Eruption of Soufrière Hills Volcano, Montserrat from 1995 to 1999, T. H. Druitt, B. P. Kokelaar

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The eruption on Montserrat during 1995-1999 was the most destructive in the Caribbean volcanic arc since that of Mont Pelee (Martinique) in 1902. It began on 18 July 1995 at the site of the most recent previous activity, on the flank of a c. 350-year-old lava dome within a sector-collapse scar. Phreatic explosivity occurred for 18 weeks before the onset of extrusion of an andesitic lava dome. Dome collapses produced pyroclastic flows that initially were confined by the sector-collapse scar. After 60 weeks of unsteadily accelerating dome growth and one episode of sub-Plinian explosivity, the dome eventually overtopped the confining scar. During 1997 almost two-thirds of the island was devastated following major dome collapses, two episodes of Vulcanian explosivity with fountain-collapse pyroclastic flows, and a flank failure with associated debris avalanche and explosive disruption of the lava dome. Nineteen people were killed directly by the volcanic activity and several were injured. From March 1998 until November 1999 there was a pause in magma ascent accompanied by reduced seismic activity, substantial degradation of the dome, and considerable degassing with venting of ash.

The slow progress and long duration of the volcanic escalation, coupled with the small size of the island and the vulnerability of homes, key installations and infrastructure, resulted in a style of emergency management that was dominantly reactive. In order to minimize the disruption to life for those remaining on the island, following large-scale evacuations, scientists at the Montserrat Volcano Observatory had to anticipate hazards and their potential extents of impact with considerable precision. Based on frequent hazards assessments, a series of risk management zone maps was issued by administrative authorities to control access as the eruption escalated. These were used in conjunction with an alert-level system. The unpreparedness of the Montserrat authorities and the responsible UK government departments resulted in hardship, ill feeling and at times acrimony as the situation deteriorated and needs for aid mounted. Losses and stress could have been less if an existing hazards assessment had registered with appropriate authorities before the eruption.

The eruption of Soufrière Hills Volcano during 1995–1999 devastated the small Caribbean island of Montserrat, which is an Overseas Territory of the UK. Approximately 60% of the island, including the most densely populated districts, was designated unsafe for human habitation. Of the original population of c . 10 500, 92% suffered evacuations and many families were relocated two or three times. At the climax of the crisis, in 1997, almost 1600 people were accommodated in basic temporary shelters, and by early 1998 roughly 70% of the population had left the island. Most of the administrative, commercial and industrial facilities were destroyed or rendered inaccessible, as were the airport, harbour and prime agricultural land. Also lost was much of the verdant paradise that attracted tourists and numerous residential migrants from the North American winter, all of whom contributed significantly to Montserrat’s economy. More than two-thirds of businesses were closed by October 1998. Insurance companies curtailed or withdrew cover as the eruption escalated in August 1997, which was just before most of the losses were incurred. Consequently, the local financial institution concerned with mortgMore than two-thirds of businesses were closed by ages and savings collapsed. The Montserrat economy, only recently in budgetary surplus, was plunged back into dependency on UK financial aid. Unofficial insurance industry sources estimate that total losses could be as much as £1 billion if real estate is not recovered. Whereas health problems were less than in many other natural disasters with catastrophic onset (e.g. monsoon floods), the protracted emergency led to considerable psychological distress and related health problems for many Montserratians (Clay et al. 1999). Perhaps more challenging still for the future population will be the linking of disaster recovery with sustainable development (see 45 ).

The eruption and associated hazards escalated only slowly, step by step from 1995 through to 1997, and from the outset many inhabitants indicated a strong preference to remain on the island. Understandably, the Government of Montserrat wished to preserve life as near to normal as possible and to avoid jeopardizing the longterm viability of the island community. The UK Government policy was that people would be supported to remain on the island as long as there was a viable safe area. Given this scenario, a reactive strategy for emergency management was inevitable. The management strategy adopted was to react to changing levels of risk as they were identified, rather than immediate and complete evacuation to an entirely safe area. Consequently, considerable importance was placed on scientific monitoring, hazard anticipation, risk assessment and communication of risks to officials and the public.

There were no contingency plans. Many actions taken by both the UK Government and the Government of Montserrat were driven stepwise by events in the volcanic escalation. Initially, because there was no clear understanding of how the eruption might develop, much of the on-island emergency management involved solutions for the short term. Similarly, UK Government departments attempted initially to deal with the crisis using normal institutional arrangements. However, as the eruption escalated it became clear that some aspects of the handling of the emergency were unsatisfactory and that longer-term solutions were required. In 1997 the House of Commons Select Committee on International Development recommended an independent evaluation of the UK Government’s response to the Montserrat volcanic emergency (IDC 1997). The terms of reference requested identification of key findings and lessons learnt. The present author was asked to evaluate the scientific monitoring and risk assessment, and to lay out the course of the volcanic developments against which the emergency management response could be charted. Aspects of this paper originate in work for the evaluation study, which was published recently ( 14 ).

This paper is mainly to provide a factual record that sets the scene for the more analytical scientific contributions that follow. Plates 1–20 provide a pictorial narrative, principally concerning the characteristic styles of eruption and their effects. Some aspects of the handling of the emergency are analysed to distinguish problems and their possible solutions. Facets of the history of Montserrat are given (mainly tabulated), because they are relevant to understanding the plight of the people and their perceptions regarding both the handling of the emergency and the aid provided by the UK Government (see also 21 ; 43 ). The judgements in this paper are those of the author. However, the author has benefited from full co-operation of the scientists involved, with generous provision of information and guidance. Although not explicitly woven into the narrative, it should be noted that, in addition to the core scientific team from the Caribbean and the UK, scientists from France, Puerto Rico and the USA made valuable and considerable contributions in the crisis management.

Setting of the volcanic crisis

Geological setting.

Montserrat is in the northern part of the Lesser Antilles volcanic island arc ( 1 ). The arc results from westward subduction of Atlantic oceanic lithosphere beneath the Caribbean plate. From Martinique southwards to Grenada the arc comprises a closely spaced double chain of volcanoes, the eastern elements of which date back to the Eocene. From Martinique northwards an extinct eastern volcanic chain, of Eocene to mid-Oligocene age, diverges via Marie Galante to Sombrero, while Montserrat lies in the western active chain that extends to seamounts up to 100 km NW of Saba. The northern arc volcanoes are founded on a Cretaceous oceanic island arc ( 8 ; 62 ). Earthquake studies indicate that the subducted oceanic slab is segmented into three main parts with differing dips and slip vectors ( 61 ). Montserrat is above the northern segment, overlying crust that is no more than 30 km thick, an asthenospheric wedge that extends to 130 km depth, and a Benioff zone that dips westwards at 50–60°. Montserrat is the top of a compound volcanic edifice that extends from 1 km above sea level, at Soufrière Hills Volcano, to 700–900 m below sea level, where the basal diameter is c . 25–30 km. Building of a volcano here probably initiated in the Miocene ( c . 9 Ma; 9 ), when the axis of the northern part of the arc migrated westwards. However, the oldest exposed rocks are Pliocene ( c . 2.6 Ma) and most are Pleistocene or younger in age (see 26 ).

Recent convergence of the Atlantic and Caribbean plates has been quite slow, at 20–40 mm a –1 , and magma productivity has consequently been low ( ≤ 3–5 km 3 Ma –1 km –1 of arc), especially in northern and southern parts of the arc (see 61 ; 34 ). Basalts of the northern volcanic chain are predominantly of low-K or medium-K type (low-K tholeiite and low-K calc- alkaline; 47 ), with compositional trends through to andesite and dacite mainly controlled by polybaric crystal fractionation with limited magma hybridization. Montserrat is predominantly composed of porphyritic andesites, with basaltic rocks represented in volumetrically minor outcrops (South Soufrière Hills; 46 ) and common mafic inclusions in the more evolved rocks. The Soufrière Hills andesites erupted during 1995–1998 clearly implicate basalt in their petrogenesis and ascent. Experimental and petrological

Location of Montserrat in the Lesser Antilles volcanic island arc (modified from 62 ).

Map showing Montserrat as it was before the eruption, which initiated in July 1995 through Castle Peak (lava dome).

studies show that basalt at 1050°C invaded and mingled with hydrous andesitic crystal mush ( c . 60–65% crystalline with interstitial melt containing c . 4–5 wt% H 2 O) at c . 830–860°C, heated it, and then erupted with it as inclusions ( 4 ; 18 ; 40 , 2000). These studies, together with analyses of seismic and deformation signals of conduit processes ( 2 ; 36 ; 59 ), are consistent with tapping of a long-lived reservoir ≥6 km below the vent. The form of the reservoir, however, is not well defined and the controls and duration of its replenishment are only just beginning to be understood (see 41 ). Cyclicity of seismic and magmatic activity detected on scales of about six to seven weeks can be related to processes in the conduit and magma chamber ( 17 ; 37 , 2002; 59 ; 71 ). The recurrence interval of approximately 30 years for volcanoseismic crises at Montserrat ( 1 ) seemingly reflects the frequency of substantial perturbation of the magmatic system by influx of basalt from greater depths. The understanding of this volcanic plumbing system behaviour is an exciting prospect for the future, with particular significance for possible quantitative forecasting of eruptions.

Maps of ( a ) prehistoric fans of pyroclastic and lahar deposits of Soufrière Hills Volcano (modified from 51 ), showing these as preferred sites for homes, key installations and infrastructure, and ( b ) the extent of areas devastated by pyroclastic flows during 1995–1999 (after 16 ).

Physiography

Montserrat is a small island, approximately 16.5 km north to south and 10 km east to west ( c . 100 km 2 ; 2 , 0 , 0 ). Its topography is dominated by four main volcanic massifs, each with many valleys and ridges radiating towards and truncated at a coastline predominantly of steep cliffs. The massifs, from north to south, Silver Hill (403 m), Centre Hills (740 m), Soufrière Hills (preeruption 914m at Chances Peak) and South Soufrière Hills (756m), each represent composite eruptive centres, mainly of andesitic lavas, although deep erosion has modified most original volcanic land- forms. The less substantial St George’s Hill, Garibaldi Hill and Roche’s Bluff mainly comprise volcaniclastic deposits. New representative 40 Ar/ 39 Ar age determinations are presented by Harford et al. (2002). Soufrière Hills Volcano, which is the youngest centre, retained little-modified primary features in its sector-collapse scar (English’s Crater) and Castle Peak lava dome within (see 2 , 0 ), although these are now substantially obliterated. Thermal waters found widely on Montserrat, including the numerous hot springs and fumaroles (soufrières) on the flanks of Soufrière Hills Volcano (main ones labelled 1–4 in 2 ), reflect a sustained deep supply of both magmatic heat and volatiles to overlying aquifers ( 12 ; 25 ). The gentler slopes flanking the volcanic massifs in the southern two-thirds of Montserrat are composed of volcaniclastic deposits from Soufrière Hills Volcano and were the sites favoured for habitation and infrastructure ( 2 , 3 , 0 , 0 ). The capital town, Plymouth, and its environs on the west coast, the airport on the east coast, and numerous communities in between on the northern flanks of the volcano, were all built on incised prehistoric fans primarily of pyroclastic flow and lahar deposits from the volcano ( 0 ; see 51 ).

Montserrat’s climate is maritime subtropical. In the period from 1992 to 1997, winds towards the west tended to prevail at low levels (1–5 km altitude) and high levels (20–30 km), and towards the east at intermediate levels (8–18 km), with standard deviations for directions over the 30 km of altitude of 30–162° ( 6 ). During 1997, ash plumes from dome-collapse pyroclastic flows and Vulcanian explosions commonly ascended to 15 km, and tephra was dispersed by intermediate-level winds, at different times, towards the north, NW, NE, south, SW and SE. Average rainfall ranges from 1 m a –1 near sea level to ≥2.5 m a –1 in the hills ( 45 ). Torrential rain is associated with hurricanes that all too frequently track northwestwards through the eastern Caribbean. Before the 1995 eruption the vegetation in the hills was mainly secondary forest (little indigenous forest remaining), whereas on the less steep slopes and volcaniclastic fans there was mainly bush or cultivated land ( 0 , 0 , 0 ). It was Montserrat’s originally lush and exotic vegetation that earned it the epithet‘Emerald Isle of the Caribbean’, recalling the verdant homeland of the early Irish colonists. Deforestation and inappropriate land use, however, coupled with the torrential rain, left many slopes eroded and susceptible to landslides.

Montserrat’s small size and predominantly rugged terrain severely constrained on-island options for volcanic risk mitigation. The location of most human activity and infrastructure in highly vulnerable areas maximized the impact of the eruption ( 3 )

A brief history of Montserrat leading to the eruption during 1995–1999

In 1998 Montserrat became a UK Overseas Territory, having previously been a UK Dependent Territory. Although tragically the eruption had just rendered Montserrat once more dependent on UK financial aid, the change of title constituted one further advance from a history of some 300 years of British colonial status, commercial exploitation and slavery (see 21 ). Basic features of social justice were secured only quite recently. Power invested in a Montserratian Chief Minister with a ministerial government dates from 1961, although issues concerning national security and international relations remain the business of the Governor of Montserrat, who is answerable to the UK Government. The duality of governance of Montserrat caused some problems in the management of the volcanic crisis, as described by Aspinall et al. (2002). 1 gives key developments in Montserrat’s emergence into a free and economically viable small-island nation. Alongside this are charted the volcanic activity and volcanoseismic surveillance, both on Montserrat and on other Caribbean islands, as they bear on Montserrat’s preparedness for the Soufrière Hills eruption. Prior to the devastation inflicted by Hurricane Hugo in 1989, Montserra- tians had acquired good standards of accommodation, education and health-care services, and, with UK aid following the storm, they were on the verge of almost complete recovery when disaster struck again.

Chronology, nature and nomenclature of the volcanic crisis

The 1995 eruption of Soufrière Hills Volcano involved a slow, incremental escalation of volcanic activity and associated hazards, after several years of precursory seismic activity. With the small size of the island, and with the population located mainly on the flanks of the active volcano ( 3 , 0 , 0 ), the slow escalation caused several distinct problems in emergency management. These are outlined both in the following narrative chronology of events and in succeeding sections. Key developments of the eruption, emergency responses and effects on the population of Montserrat are listed in 1 (see also Plates).

Increased seismicity in the vicinity of Montserrat was initially detected in April 1989. Eighteen low- to moderate-intensity swarms of volcanotectonic earthquakes close to Soufrière Hills Volcano were registered at intervals from January 1992 and particularly from mid- to late 1994, before the first phreatic explosion on 18 July 1995 (Ambeh & Lynch 1996; Aspinall et al. 1998; 1 , 4 ). Hot springs and fumaroles (soufrières) on the volcano flanks showed little change prior to the eruption, although in March 1995 Galway’s Soufrière showed pronounced magmatic signatures in 3 He/ 4 He and δ 13 C, like those subsequently measured in gas from the andesitic lava dome ( 25 ). The unrest was on schedule according to the previously recognized c . 30 year cyclicity of volcanoseismic crises at Montserrat ( 1 ; 64 ), but none of the detected precursors was a clear, unambiguous indicator of an imminent eruption.

Styles of eruption and pyroclastic fallout

Following an opening phreatic phase, most of the eruption from 1995 to 1998 involved slow, unsteady ascent and extrusion (0.51–11m 3 s –1 ) of andesitic magma of high to extremely high viscosity ( c . 10 6 to ≥10 14 Pa s), which formed a composite lava dome comprising numerous shear lobes ( 55 ; 59 ; 54 ; 68 ). However, magma also erupted explosively from the conduit on several occasions, including two protracted intervals. On the first occasion (17–18 September 1996), during sub-Plinian explosive activity, fragmentation in the conduit may have descended to depths close to the magma reservoir ( 49 ). By March 1998 a total cumulative volume of 0.3 km 3 of magma had been erupted (Watts et al. 2002). From March 1998 until November 1999 there was a pause in magma extrusion, during which time the dome became substantially reduced by collapses and ultimately divided by a deep chasm ( 42 ). The renewed extrusion from November 1999, which is not dealt with in this Memoir, is considered as forming a second dome ( 68 ; 54 ). Thus the adopted convention is that there is one eruption, ongoing at the time of writing (April 2001), and only one dome formed until November 1999. The growth and partial collapse behaviour of this first dome, however, was extremely varied and on several occasions involved rebuilding from the mouth of the volcanic conduit.

Historical development of Montserrat and the region leading to the 1995 eruption.

Progress of volcanic activity with related emergency responses and effects on the population of montserrat..

Hypocentres of earthquakes that occurred in early to middle stages of the Montserrat volcanic emergency (after 2 ).

The eruption during 1995–1999 involved five main styles of volcanic activity. Each characterized a distinctive phase in the eruptive history, but overlapped with other styles.

Phreatic explosions. These were produced by sudden and/or sustained jet-like releases primarily of heated groundwater. They blasted out mainly old volcanic rock, forming small craters, and characterized the opening phase of the eruption (see 0 , 0 ). A powerful explosion on 28 July was associated with the opening of a new vent and another, on 21 August, produced a slow-moving, cold, dilute pyroclastic density current that precipitated the first evacuation of Plymouth ( 2 ). Technically, if the explosions produced ash that included fragments of new (juvenile) magma, the explosions would be referred to as phreatomagmatic. Although juvenile fragments may have been included (e.g. Boudon et al. 1998), this was not clearly demonstrated. The term ‘phreatic phase’ applies to this early activity as it registers the significant involvement of groundwater, irrespective of whether explosions ejected any juvenile material. The heat source is inferred to have been newly arisen magma and associated released volatiles ( 23 ).

Lava-dome growth with dome-collapse pyroclastic flows. Extrusion of andesitic lava, at a rate mainly in the range 0.5–11 m 3 s –1 ( 55 ; 54 ), formed a steep-sided composite dome comprising numerous shear lobes and spines (e.g. 0 , 0 , 0 ). Partial dome collapse due to gravitational instability commonly produced, in genetic terms, dome-collapse pyroclastic flows ( 0 , 0 , 0 ). Watts et al. (2002) document the dome growth, while 11 ) tabulate volumes of deposits formed from dome-collapse pyroclastic flows, their runout parameters and the dates of occurrence. Cole et al. (2002) present sedi- mentological analyses of the pyroclastic deposits and their parent flows. To derive approximate dense-rock equivalent (DRE) volumes of andesite from deposit or collapse-scar volumes, Calder et al. (2002) utilize bulk densities of 2 × 10 3 kgm –3 for deposits, 2.2 –10 3 kg m –3 for the dome and associated carapace breccias and 2.6 ×10 3 kgm –3 for the andesite. In this paper, the volume of material given as having collapsed is that of the partially fragmental dome, with a bulk density of 2.2 ×10 3 kgm –3 . Minor collapses that formed the talus apron around the dome and had runouts of ≤0.5–1 km were designated as rockfalls ( 0 ; 11 ). In lithological terms, larger collapses produced high-concentration block-and-ash flows. These typically produced an over-riding low- concentration ash cloud, part of which commonly flowed down- slope as a pyroclastic surge while part ascended buoyantly to form a plume ( 0 , 0 ). These phenomena characterized most of the eruption during 1996, 1997 and early 1998. A spectrum of collapse types and associated flows has been recognized ( 15 ; 10 , 2002; 54 ; 54 ), in part related to gas content of the collapsing lava. Because deeper parts of the dome tended to have a greater content and pressure of gas, larger collapses that involved such deeper parts yielded lava fragments that decrepitated more and with greater explosivity. Thus increasingly substantial associated pyroclastic surges and plumes were formed, as well as flows with longer runouts. This occurred in the extreme when a large part of the dome collapsed almost instantaneously due to flank collapse on 26 December 1997 (see below).

Magmatic explosions, commonly with fountain-collapse pyroclastic flows. These followed substantial dome collapses and consequent depressurization of volatile-rich magma. Explosive disruption of the magma formed an eruptive jet, part of which ascended buoyantly as 1997) a plume to several kilometres (up to 15 km) and part of which commonly (not always) collapsed back to form fountain-collapse pyroclastic flows and associated pyroclastic surges ( 0 , 0 ). The first major explosive activity, during 17–18 September 1996 produced a short-lived sub-Plinian eruption plume after Vulcanian vent clearance that showered ballistics 1.5m in diameter up to 2.1 km from the vent ( 49 ). Two later episodes of cyclic Vulcanian explosive activity (August and September–October 1997) were associated with fountain-collapse pyroclastic flows that were directed radially down most valleys (Druitt et al. 2002 b). The relatively gas-rich nature of the magma was reflected in these flows being predominantly pumiceous (lithologically, pumice-and- ash flows; see deposits in 0 , 0 ), with upper parts forming less dense pyroclastic surges and buoyant ash plumes.

Risk management maps based on hazards assessments made by the Montserrat Volcano Observatory (see text and 2 ). Until July 1997, the maps were used in conjunction with an alert-level system that changed the advice and/or access status relating to specific zones (see 3 ). Moving from Zones 4 to 1 or G to A (earlier maps) represents increasing risk. The May 1996 map ( a ) utilized field assessment and simulation (modelling) of pyroclastic flow behaviour on the volcano slopes (e.g. 66 ). The October 1996 map ( b ) primarily reflected MVO consensus on the hazards of dome-collapse pyroclastic flows, with enhanced risks from major magmatic explosions (as occurred on 17 September). The November and December 1996 maps ( c and d ) reflected concern for a possible collapse to the SW of Galway's Wall, with a major explosion, and the February 1997 map ( e ) registered a diminishment of this. The 6 June 1997 map (f) took account of the new threats from pyroclastic flows travelling northwards. The 27 June 1997 map ( g ) registered the aftermath of the 25 June tragedy and continuing volcanic escalation. The 4 July 1997 map ( h ) constituted acknowledgement of the continued escalation and need for rationalization of the management system for simplicity; the September 1997 map ( i ) took account of a possible explosion with ten times the intensity of that of 17 September 1996. The 30 September 1998 map ( j ) reflects the cessation of emplacement of new magma but persistent threat of pyroclastic flows. The 12 April 1999 map ( k ) recognized diminished eruptive energy, although substantial ashfall rendered the Daytime Entry Zone far from comfortable.

Catastrophic sector collapse with associated explosive dome disruption and pyroclastic density current. This was caused by large-scale structural instability of the volcano leading to sudden flank failure and depressurization of gas-rich dome lava. It was anticipated during November–December 1996 ( 74 ), but occurred over a year later, on 26 December 1997, when failure of hydrothermally weakened flank rocks caused a debris avalanche ( 60 ), closely succeeded by a catastrophic flow from the explosively disintegrating unsupported dome (see 0 ). The term‘pyroclastic density current’ is adopted for the latter phenomenon ( 54 ; 70 ), recognizing that the catastrophic disintegration of the dome produced an exceptionally energetic particulate flow in which vertical and cross-flow changes in particle size and concentration were marked, but, at least initially, were probably not sharply gradational. The sector collapse is also referred to as the Boxing Day collapse, from the name given in the UK to 26 December, following Christmas Day, when gifts (‘boxes’) traditionally were given to trades folk.

Ash-venting. This occurred periodically from the actively growing lava dome, but also characterized the phase after mid-March 1998 when there was no substantial extrusion of magma. It occurred when copious volatiles (mainly water, with SO 2 and HCl) were released, transporting ash derived by magma fragmentation and conduit erosion. Some explosive releases were akin to Yulcanian activity and produced small-volume block-and-ash flow deposits with relatively long runouts ( 42 ).

Pyroclastic fallout was associated with all five styles of activity and generally increased as the eruption escalated. Ash plumes lower than c . 5 km were commonly deflected westwards by the prevailing winds and substantial ashfall was frequent over the most densely inhabited western and northwestern parts of the island ( 0 , 0 , 0 ). Taller plumes, reaching to 15 km altitude from explosive activity, produced fallout in many sectors through time owing to the variability of the wind direction between 8 and 18 km altitude ( 6 ). While the ashfall constituted a major nuisance and caused some secondary hazards (e.g. from roof- collapse and reduced visibility; 0 ), its effects were mainly in the risk domain of long-term health. Respirable cristobalite, abundant in the dome-derived ash, is a matter of concern regarding lung-scarring silicosis (see 5 ). Ballistic projectiles capable of causing serious injury or death (fragments larger than c . 50 mm in diameter) fell mainly within zones that had been previously evacuated because of the possibilities of other hazards, e.g. pyroclastic surges. Almost half of the houses in Long Ground ( 2 ; 0 ), c . 2 km NE of the vent, were hit by ballistic blocks up to 1.5 m in diameter from the initial Vulcanian explosion(s) of 17 September 1996.

Seismicity and ground deformation

Monitoring of seismicity and ground deformation throughout the eruption in 1995–1999 was a major part of the scientific effort and was used to anticipate volcanic activity and thus to mitigate risk ( 39 ; 57 , 1999; 23 ). The effects of earthquakes were trivial relative to those of the volcanic activity. Earthquakes centred beneath Montserrat during initial through to advanced stages of the eruption are shown in 4 The dense clusters of hypocentres extending to 5 km below sea level (6 km below the vent of Soufrière Hills Volcano) preclude existence of a large magma body shallower than that. Earthquakes early in the crisis beneath St George’s Hill ( 4 ), and in a linear array trending SW towards the volcano, are interpreted as due to localized stress relief triggered by changes in the Soufrière Hills magmatic plumbing system, rather than from peripheral movement of magma ( 2 ). Volcanotectonic earthquakes (with a distinct shear-wave component) characterized the opening phase of the activity (see also 23 ), but these soon became subordinate to signals due to gas and magma movement (lacking identifiable shear waves), with hypocentres focused in a relatively narrow cylindrical volume mostly ≤4 km beneath the vent ( 4 ). As lava extrusion escalated, swarms of‘hybrid’ earthquakes ( sensu 39 ) occurred, sometimes merging into periods of harmonic tremor. From December 1996, and particularly at the height of the emergency in May to August 1997, distinctive inflation-deflation cycles of 6–30 hours’ duration, linked with seismicity, were recognized. Inflation at the volcano summit accompanied by hybrid earthquakes or tremor was followed by deflation, hybrid-earthquake quiescence, lava extrusion and rockfall or pyroclastic flow activity. The inflation climax and following deflation were marked by long-period seismic signals, due to resonance from high-pressure gas flowing in cracks, while degassing also was marked. Hybrid earthquakes virtually ceased with the temporary cessation of lava extrusion from March 1998 (see 39 ; 57 , 1999; Sparks & Young 2002). Global positioning system (GPS) geodesy and electronic distance measurement (EDM) were employed at various times throughout the crisis, and proved deformation both in the near-field of the conduit and further afield due to fault movements (see 29 ; 36 ; 53 ; 54 ).

Emergency management

2 outlines the progress of the eruption against the responses in terms of emergency management. By early April 1996 most homes in southern Montserrat were evacuated. However, wholesale withdrawal was neither desirable nor readily achievable on the island. In order to manage access to the evacuated area, the administrative authorities in May 1996 published the first of a series of 11 risk management maps. These changed as the eruption escalated and then paused ( 5 ; see below). The zones of each map reflected the nature and extents of hazards anticipated by the Montserrat Volcano Observatory (MVO; 3 ). Up to July 1997, the maps depicted zones with limits placed according to fine judgements of the possible impacts of hazardous phenomena. This microzonation procedure was to minimize the disruption affecting those people living on Montserrat. There was a pressure to keep risk management zones as narrow and precisely located as possible, (1) because of the stresses caused by evacuations, access restrictions and losses of property, (2) because there was a general determination not to leave the island, and (3) because there was a political wish to keep life as near to normal as possible (although it was quite abnormal).

The microzonation maps were used in conjunction with an alert- level system ( 3 ; see also 3 ), which could alter the access regulations of the zones according to changing levels of risk. At a particular alert level, certain restrictions and/or actions applied to the various zones. For example, with a change of alert level from Orange to Red, Zones C and D, previously with limited access only, would become exclusion zones and hence rapidly evacuated (see 3 ). To a certain extent the restrictions were treated flexibly by administrative officials and by the general public. If new scientific consensus found it necessary, information was provided by the MVO as a basis for the maps and/or alert levels to be changed. In this process, during early stages of the eruption, it was in the main helpful that the Governor and Chief Minister attended many scientific meetings. At times, however, the changing regulations of the complex zone maps and alert system could be difficult to communicate to the public. Significantly prompted by the 25 June 1997 tragedy and the continuing escalation of volcanic activity ( 2 ), the management system was modified, in July 1997,to a simpler and more conservative division of the island into an Exclusion Zone and a Northern Zone, with an intervening Central (buffer) Zone.

Alert system for Montserrat, March 1999

Recommended actions to minimize significant casualties. Zones as defined on the Volcanic Risk Management Map.

Through the early stages of the eruption, the processes of achieving and communicating scientific consensus evolved towards formal quantitative risk assessment. From December 1997 there were periodic (about twice yearly) formal elicitations of international scientific expertise to assess hazards and report on risks ( 2 ; 3 ; 54 ). These involved Monte Carlo statistical treatments of eruption-scenario models and related uncertainties in expert opinions, and the structured approach constituted a significant advance in volcanic emergency management. It improved communication of crucial information to those decision-makers responsible for policies and actions regarding evacuations and/or various types of preparedness. A fully formalized assessment by the MVO in August 1997 served to focus the attention of the UK Government on the seriousness of the situation ( 2 ). Nevertheless, quantitative assessments remain difficult for administrators to use in making decisions that involve risk to life, because in fact some uncertainty always remains and the cutoff for what is acceptable risk, decided by political and/or humanitarian considerations, is subjectively set and can change with circumstances. Indeed, the UK Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser, in his appraisal and validation of the report of the comprehensive December 1997 scientific elicitation, initially expressed a degree of scepticism centred on the extent of uncertainty regarding the understanding of lava-dome eruptions. Had his view prevailed, it might have critically reduced the scientific contribution to the decision-making process in this particular case, when the safety of the north of the island was a problematic issue.

Course of the volcanic crisis in 1995

On 18 July 1995 phreatic explosions and jetting of gases started from a vent that opened on the western flank of Castle Peak dome, in English’s Crater ( 2 ; 0 , 0 ). The first fallout of ash was towards the populated western coast of Montserrat. Personnel from the Seismic Research Unit (SRU) in Trinidad, who were primarily responsible for providing advice in such emergencies in the region, arrived on 19 July, and the US Geological Survey’s Volcanic Crisis Assistance Team arrived on 25 July (see Aspinall et al. (2002) regarding scientific personnel). By 26 July, UK military personnel, who were in the region coincidentally, had formulated both on- island and off-island evacuation plans. In the first six weeks of the eruption other vents opened around and across the old dome, and the explosions became more energetic. An increasing flux of SO 2 peaked and then diminished ( 50 ; 23 ). On 21 August at 08:02 local time (LT), on what became known as Ash Monday, a particularly energetic phreatic explosion produced an ash plume that reached c . 3 km altitude, as well as a slow-moving, cold, dilute pyroclastic surge that enveloped Plymouth for approximately 15 minutes. Car headlights were virtually useless in the darkness there. The surge cloud appeared menacing (more threatening than the actuality) and many inhabitants became frightened and spontaneously evacuated the town. As there could be no guarantee that conditions would not rapidly become dangerous, an official evacuation was ordered. Areas south of Richmond Hill, including Plymouth ( 2 ), were evacuated on 22 August ( c . 5000 people), and, with explosions continuing, the entire area south of the Belham River was evacuated on 23 August (a further c . 1000 people). On 27 August a new vent opened on the north flank of Castle Peak dome as explosions continued. There was controversy between the scientific teams regarding the safety of a return of the population to the south, but partial reoccupation north of Plymouth was permitted on 4 September in order to allow evacuees to gain shelter and prepare for Hurricane Luis. Many had been accommodated only in tents. Hurricane Luis struck on 5 September, with storm noise disrupting much of the ongoing seismic recording. Remaining evacuated areas, including Plymouth, were reoccupied on 7 September or shortly afterwards, while there were more phreatic explosions. The US Geological Survey’s Volcanic Crisis Assistance Team departed on 10 September.

On 25 September, a new, small ( c . 4 × 10 4 m 3 ) mound-like mass of lava with a central spine was confirmed to be growing on the SW side of Castle Peak dome (see 0 ; 50 , 3 ). This growth was thought to reflect either upheaval of old rock due to the shallow emplacement of new magma, or possibly the emergence of a cooled part of a new plug. Throughout the period from the initial explosions until 25 September, there was no clear evidence within the seismic activity of ascent of a substantial amount of new magma, and, similarly, ground deformation monitors in position at that time detected none. However, the flux of S0 2 and the variety of seismic signals at shallow levels are taken to indicate that magma may already have migrated to a shallower level before and/or soon after the first phreatic explosion ( 23 ). This being the case, the upheaval of late September represented renewed ascent of magma.

Between 25 September and 30 November (65 days), the volcano was mostly obscured by low atmospheric cloud and there was disagreement concerning the risk attributable to the presence of new magma. Scientists from the UK and USA, mindful of the rapid onset of dangerous activity at St Vincent (1979), Mount St Helens (1980) and Pinatubo (1991), were concerned that the risk on the volcano flanks might be considerable and they recommended evacuation of Long Ground, near to the open side of English’s Crater ( 2 ). Concern was also expressed that the probable existence and implications of the occurrence of new magma had not yet been communicated to Montserratians. On the other hand, the leader of the scientific team (from SRU) adopted a less precautionary stance, which was supported by the Chief Minister. This position was probably influenced by the considerable economic impacts of the evacuation of 72 000 people from the flanks of La Soufrière on Guadeloupe in 1976, which was deemed, by some, to have been unnecessary (see 22 ). The elderly and infirm were re-evacuated from southern Montserrat on 5 October. The airport was temporarily closed owing to ash fallout on 23 October, Plymouth was inundated with ash on 31 October, 4 November and 9 November, and southern villages were similarly affected in early November, all due to continued phreatic explosivity.

The initiation of continuous lava-dome growth, on 15 November, was marked by remotely monitored deformation in the area of English’s Crater and by intense hybrid earthquake activity at depths ≤3 km beneath the vent ( 2 ; 30 ; 69 ; see 4 ). Eventually the vulnerable eastern communities of Long Ground and White’s Yard were evacuated, on 29 November, and a new andesite dome was first observed on 30 November. It was incandescent and lay within the enlarged crater at the site of the initial (18 July) explosions. A minor collapse from the dome and associated minor pyroclastic flow (rockfall) occurred on 1 December, and by 2 December all sectors east, south and west of the volcano, including Plymouth, were again evacuated. Some 6000 people were relocated to the northern part of Montserrat.

Course of the volcanic crisis in 1996

While the new andesitic dome grew slowly ( c .0.5m 3 s –1 ; 55 ; 0 , 0 ), the population returned to the southern and western areas of Montserrat on 1–2 January 1996 and to the eastern villages on 16 January. In mid-February the dome-growth rate had increased ( c . 2m 3 s –1 ) and the stability of the western volcano flank above Plymouth gave cause for concern (Gages Wall; 2 , 0 ). However, in early March the focus of dome growth switched to the NE, where a steep unstable flank developed. On 27 March, dome collapse produced the first really significant block-and-ash flow. It travelled 1 km into the upper reaches of the Tar River valley, where trees were burned, and its associated ash cloud rose to c . 2 km. On 27 and 28 March both the Governor and the Chief Minister were advised by volcanologists that Long Ground was at risk if part of a large pyroclastic flow or pyroclastic surge overtopped the northern wall of the Tar River valley ( 2 ), or if there was a NE-directed explosion. They were advised to consider the immediate evacuation of the village. The leader of the scientific team, however, did not advocate this. On 31 March, at 20:43 LT, a substantial flow travelled some 1.5 km and consequently Long Ground was evacuated early on 1 April. (See Cole et al. (1998, 2002) and Calder et al. (1999) for details of all substantial dome-collapse pyroclastic flows and their deposits.) Collapses continued into early April ( 0 ), Plymouth was evacuated for the third and final time on 3 April, and the remainder of the southern part of the island was evacuated on the following day. The plumes above the pyroclastic flows reached 9 km altitude, becoming a significant aviation hazard.

On 12 May block-and-ash flows travelled 2.7 km east of the growing dome, via the Tar River valley, and reached the sea for the first time. (Tar River valley is the general topographic depression within and east of English’s Crater. The main drainage to the sea, initially followed by block-and-ash flows, was via Hot River; see 2 and 0 & 0 ) Prevailing winds deflected the associated ash plumes westwards and northwestwards, adversely affecting Cork Hill and areas further north. Numerous large spines were extruded and their collapse formed flanking talus slopes. On 19 May, the first map depicting risk management zones was produced, based on hazards anticipated by the MVO ( 5 ). Zones were delimited according to judgements regarding the limits of possible dome- collapse block-and-ash flows and the pyroclastic surges that might detach from them. These projections were aided by computer modelling of pyroclastic flow runout (see 64 ; 66 ), although detailed field examination of the topography was the main basis. During the period of late July to early September, several major dome-growth pulses ( ≥4m 3 s –1 ) were marked by increases in shallow seismicity and ground deformation determined by EDM ( 29 ; 55 ). These led to protracted collapses that produced multiple or sustained pyroclastic flows down the Tar River valley and extended a pyroclastic fan some 400 m into the sea ( 15 , 2002).

On 17 September 1996, nine hours of dome collapse(s) with pyroclastic flows ( 0 ), followed by 2.5 hours of quiescence, led to the first major magmatic explosive activity at 23:42 LT. Overall the explosivity lasted c.40 minutes and 3.2 (±0.9) × 10 6 m 3 of new magma (DRE) was erupted, producing a sub-Plinian ash plume that reached between 11.3 and 15 km altitude. Magma drawdown, 3–5 km into the conduit, probably approached close to the magma storage depth. In an initial Vulcanian vent-clearing phase, ballistic blocks up to 1.5 m in diameter were thrown 2.1 km northeastwards, into Long Ground ( 0 ). During the precursory collapse(s) approximately one-third of the dome (c. 11 × 10 6 m 3 ) was removed and a pyroclastic surge destroyed the Tar River Estate House on the north flank of the Tar River valley ( 0 ; 49 ; 11 ). Pumice clasts 50 mm in diameter fell 3 km north of the airport on the NE coast and near the NW coast (Olde Towne; 2 ), and some roofs collapsed beneath accumulated ash. Cork Hill was partially evacuated on 18 September and dome growth resumed on 1 October. As a result of these developments a second risk management map was issued in October ( 5 ). On 30 October, with seismicity intensifying again and a perception of increased risk WNW of the volcano, Richmond Hill was evacuated and Cork Hill schools were closed.

Near the end of November and into December, earthquake swarms developed as cracks opened in Galway’s Wall, the steep southern flank of the volcano summit above Galway’s Soufrière ( 2 , 0 , 0 ), and numerous small cold-rock avalanches were shed from it (see 74 ). The 17 September collapse scar had refilled ( 0 ) and this activity was accompanied by internal dome growth against the wall. It caused concern that the southwestern volcano flank might collapse catastrophically with an associated laterally directed explosion, as had occurred at Mount St Helens (USA) in 1980. Such a collapse had the potential to generate a hazardous tsunami if a large mass of debris rapidly impacted the sea, with consequences for coastal Montserrat and possibly for nearby Guadeloupe ( 1 ). This new increased risk to the southwestern flank resulted in two revisions of the risk management map ( 5 ) in November and December (the latter labelled ‘Temporary Revision’). At an advanced stage during this Galway’s Wall crisis, on 19 December, a Red Alert warning was issued with the consequent implication that large numbers of inhabitants should retreat further northwards, especially from the vicinity of Cork Hill (see 5 and 3 ). This warning originated automatically as an administrative stipulation according to terms of the alert scheme established earlier in the autumn. However, few people responded. External dome growth had previously resumed, on 11–12 December, and pyroclastic flows reached the sea again via the Tar River valley on 19 December, following a somewhat explosive collapse (these were the first flows with pumiceous fragments). The lack of any SW-directed threatening activity that was obvious for the public to see, both before and following the Red Alert, did not advance public confidence in the scientific advice that was given then, but it was not a simple matter for the MYO to prevent or rescind the warning. Galway’s Wall did not collapse catastrophically until 13 months later (see below). Towards the end of December and into the New Year, rapid dome growth ( 0 ) and increased seismicity were accompanied by 6–8 hourly cyclic inflation and deflation of the dome and nearby flanks ( 57 , 1999).

Course of the volcanic crisis in 1997

During January 1997 the stability of Galway’s Wall again gave cause for concern and several eastward-directed dome collapses sent more pyroclastic flows to the sea down the Tar River valley, the floor of which by now was mainly buried by pyroclastic flow deposits ( 6 ). On 10 February, dome material cascaded southwards over Galway’s Wall for the first time and from the end of March through to 11 April a series of collapses produced pyroclastic flows down the White River valley. One on 11 April reached 4.1 km from the dome ( 6 ). A new risk management zone map was issued in February ( 5 ), reverting to the November 1996 version. However, in mid-May, dome growth switched to the north and collapses in the following month led to numerous minor pyroclastic flows and several large ones. These travelled down Tuitt’s Ghaut as far as 2.8 km on 5 June, Fort Ghaut as far as 2 km on 16 June, and Mosquito Ghaut as far as 4 km on 17 June (e.g. 0 ; data from 16 ). Dome growth was sustained at ≥4 m 3 s –1 ( 55 ). A revised risk management zone map was issued on 6 June ( 5 ), explicitly showing the airport to be at increased risk in changing from Zone E to Zone C.

By mid-June, the dome was approximately twice as large as it had been at around the time of the 17 September 1996 magmatic explosion(s). Its growth had increased to moderately high rates in April and May ( 55 ), while the shedding of mass by collapse had not been commensurate. Nevertheless, successive pyroclastic flows travelled further and further down valleys in the north and east sectors, gradually filling the upper reaches with deposits and thus increasing the possibility that later flows might surmount barriers and spill into adjacent valleys ( 15 , 2002; 10 ). The increasing risk of pyroclastic flows impacting the airport was generally acknowledged, and on 16 June the airport was closed for the day owing to a surge in activity on the dome ( 0 ). At this time activity at the volcano was characterized by cyclic episodes of hybrid earthquake swarms that peaked with inflation, followed by deflation and relative seismic quiescence with increased dome growth and collapse-flow activity ( 57 , 1999). SO 2 emission (measured by COSPEC) increased in concert with intensifying earthquake and inflation activity ( 67 ).

At 12:55 LT on 25 June 1997 a collapse of roughly 6 × 10 6 m 3 of the lava dome started. It produced a pyroclastic flow that travelled initially down Mosquito Ghaut and then mainly via Paradise River and Pea Ghaut (refer to 2 ). In three main pulses over a period of about 20 minutes it devastated villages in central and eastern areas, killed 19 people, and reached to within 200 m of the airport terminal buildings, which were successfully evacuated and immediately closed ( 32 a, b; see 0 , 0 0 , 0 ). The upper, dilute parts of the second and third pulses detached at a constriction and bend in Mosquito Ghaut and travelled as pyroclastic surges northwards and westwards across the gentle slopes around Farrell’s Yard and towards Streatham, ultimately running onto Windy Hill ( 0 ). Here seven people fleeing the rapid but silent advance of the searing clouds were killed ( 32 b). As the pyroclastic surges lost capacity they rapidly dumped much of their suspended load into a thin, dense, granular flow of ash that drained into Tyre’s Ghaut ( 0 ) and Dyer’s River valley and then along the Belham River valley. This surge-derived pyroclastic flow ( 10 ; 19 a) terminated in the vicinity of Cork Hill ( 2 , 0 ), close to the school but 50 m topographically below it. The flows prompted evacuation of some 1500 persons from western areas, and a new risk management zone map was issued on 27 June ( 5 ). On 28 and 30 June, dome material avalanched over Gages Wall and pyroclastic flows encroached the outskirts of Plymouth. For two to threee days, pyroclastic flows swept down Mosquito Ghaut and Fort Ghaut regularly every 8-12 hours ( 16 ). 6 shows the marked increase in the extent of impact by pyroclastic flows due to the May-June escalation. On 4 July, a new and simpler risk management map designated all western areas along and south of Belham River valley as Exclusion Zone ( 5 ) with a Central (buffer) Zone to the north.

Through July, increased extrusion rates (5–10 m 3 s –1 ; 50 ) and collapses caused infilling of the upper reaches of northern and western valleys. On 3 August a major dome collapse ( c . 8 × l0 6 m 3 of dome material) formed pyroclastic flows that reached the harbour and destroyed much of Plymouth ( 6 ). This led to the first of two dramatic series of repetitive Vulcanian explosions, from a vent on the NW side of the dome ( 19 b; 13 ). From 4 to 12 August, 13 magmatic explosions, mostly on a 10-12 hour cycle, produced eruption plumes up to c . 14 km altitude as well as radially directed pumiceous pyroclastic flows and pyroclastic surges that formed by eruptive-fountain collapse. These travelled up to several kilometres down most flanks of the volcano ( 0 ).

Scientific concern for further large, northward-directed collapses and increased explosivity resulted in another revision of the risk management map, dated September 1997 ( 5 ), and further northward evacuation. This involved Salem and Old Towne, substantial communities north of the Belham River ( 2 ), and for many evacuees it constituted a third or fourth upheaval and relocation. The MVO itself, then in Old Towne, was moved to Mongo Hill, to the north of Centre Hills ( 3 ).

On 21 September another major dome collapse ( c . 13 × 10 6 m 3 of dome material) occurred. This had been to an extent anticipated, according to the emerging pattern from May 1997 of a six to seven week cyclicity (B. Voight pers. comm.). It produced pyroclastic flows NE of the dome that wrecked Tuitt’s village, destroyed the airport and entered the sea nearby ( 0 , 0 ). The collapse led to the second series of Vulcanian explosions. This started on 22 September, lasted until 21 October, and involved 75 major explosions recurring on an average 9.5 hour cycle with plumes to between 3 and 15 km altitude. These were mostly associated with radially directed pumiceous fountain-collapse pyroclastic flows ( 0 , 0 ; 19 b ). A crater 300 m wide was reamed out in a scar on the northern part of the dome at the location of the initial (18 July 1995) phreatic vent, ballistics landed as far as 1.6 km away, and ash from the explosions was distributed over much of the northeastern Caribbean ( 73 ). 6 shows the increased extent of pyroclastic flows from this dome-collapse and explosion episode.

Progressive inundation of southern Montserrat by pyroclastic flow deposits during 1995–1999 (modified from 16 ). Each map shows the extent of deposits at the end of the time indicated (see text for details). The areas impacted by pyroclastic flows are almost entirely the same as those anticipated in the hazards assessment made by 64 ) before Hurricane Hugo damaged many key installations in Plymouth. Despite the contrary advice in the assessment, key installations were rebuilt in Plymouth, only to be lost to the volcano.

Heightened activity in November was more confidently anticipated according to the six to seven week cyclicity ( 54 ). Renewed dome growth rapidly filled the vent of the September–October explosions (at c . 7–8 m 3 s –1 ) and on 4 and 6 November dome collapses (c. 7 × 10 6 m 3 of dome material) sent pyroclastic flows down the White River valley, building a significant fan at the coast ( 6 ). Following continued dome growth and increasing hybrid earthquake activity, the flank sector including Galway’s Wall collapsed at 03:01 LT on 26 December (Boxing Day). A portion of the old edifice, with a large overburden of the new dome and its talus, detached at the hydrothermally altered and hence structurally weak level of Galway’s Soufrière. The flank rocks and some dome talus formed an extensive debris avalanche that spread deposit along the lower reaches of the White River valley ( 60 ). The dome, suddenly unsupported, disrupted explosively to produce a violent pyroclastic density current with unconfined upper parts that swept devastatingly across a broad swath ( c . 10 km 2 ) radially towards the SW ( 0 ). The villages of St Patrick’s and Morris’ were all but obliterated (see 6 , 0 ; 54 ; 48 ). The duration of the main collapse and associated pyroclastic density current was about 15 minutes, and the associated ash plume rose to c . 15 km altitude. The volume of explosively disrupted dome lava and talus (35–45 × 10 6 m 3 ; 54 ) was considerably greater than any previous collapse volume, and the amount of collapsed flank material, including a significant volume of dome talus, was also large ( c . 46 × 10 6 m 3 ). Much of the explosively disrupted dome debris entered the sea and a small tsunami impacted the shore at Old Road Bay to the north, at the mouth of the Belham River ( 2 ).

Course of the volcanic crisis in 1998

In January the UK Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser and Chief Medical Officer recommended in the strongest possible terms that everyone, but especially children and asthmatics, should leave the Central Zone, including Woodlands, near the west coast ( 5 ). This recommendation was based on their reading of a scientific assessment that had been validated by the Chief Scientific Adviser on 19 December 1997. It was founded on a perception of significant primary volcanic risk in this zone and the uncertainties concerning health deterioration due to protracted exposure to respirable ash. The recommendation, issued by the administrative authorities, was largely ignored. It was not practical to enforce an evacuation of the Central Zone (using emergency regulations) and still maintain a viable island community. This was because there was insufficient accommodation available further north, and because the area concerned included residences of key personnel and had by this stage of the crisis become the administrative and commercial centre. There really was nowhere left on-island for the personnel or various facilities to move to. The insufficient provision in the north of the island of accommodation for evacuees and storage facilities for businesses was a continuing problem in the emergency management. It was poignantly reflected in the large numbers of evacuees who inhabited basic temporary shelters for many months ( 2 ), and in the considerable losses of capital assets and stocks not removed from the evacuated zone into storage. This insufficient provision was also held to be partly responsible for some of the deaths on 25 June (Inquest Report published January 1999). The situation that had evolved during the slow volcanic escalation reflected inadequate medium- to long-term foresight in UK and Montserrat government departments, and tardiness in implementation of emergency administration in the UK ( 14 ). (Establishment of the Montserrat Action Group by the UK Government’s Foreign Secretary in August 1997 ( 2 ) effectively altered this for the better.) This was one occasion when the full implementation of emergency actions for risk mitigation according to scientific advice was not feasible, owing both to inadequate provision for relocation and to the likelihood that full implementation would render the continued function of the remaining community non-viable.

The scars of the 26 December (1997) collapse were filled by early February, with the dome initially growing at an estimated 10–11 m 3 s –1 , but then more slowly ( 54 ). By 10 March 1998, when the total (cumulative) volume of erupted magma was c . 0.3 km 3 , the ascent of new magma effectively ceased. A prominent summit spine took the final elevation to 1031 m a.s.l. ( 0 ; 42 ). Subsequent minor collapses and pyroclastic flows were related mainly to gravitational stabilization of the slowly cooling and degassing dome. On 3 July a protracted collapse and pyroclastic flow down the Tar River valley to the sea was accompanied by an ash plume to 14 km altitude, with fallout of coarse ash and lapilli over Salem to the NW. The collapse involved roughly 22 × 10 6 m 3 of lava and talus, removing about one-fifth of the dome, and was followed by an explosion that hurled ballistic blocks 1 km from the vent ( 50 ; 42 ) . It left a deep elongate scar in the dome and a pyroclastic surge impacted Long Ground for the first time (see 6 ). Two small collapses on 13 August left horseshoe-shaped scars on the dome and sent pyroclastic flows 1.8 km down the White River valley, and on 16 August a pyroclastic flow reached the coastal fan below the Tar River valley (see 0 ). Emission of S0 2 waxed and waned through August and September, with periods of vigorous degassing and venting of ash that correlated with low- amplitude seismic tremor ( 50 ). Three small pyroclastic flows occurred in September and torrential rain associated with Hurricane Georges (20–21 September) formed large- volume lahars down the main drainages. The lahars encroached on the (abandoned) airport runway, further buried Plymouth and incised a new channel there, and extended the delta at the mouth of Belham River ( 0 , 0 ). Ash-venting episodes recurred frequently on the north side of the dome in the period 26-30 September, along with increased SO 2 emissions. On 30 September a revision of the Exclusion Zone boundary ( 5 ) returned Salem and Old Towne to habitable status.

A small lava spine ( ≤10m) that appeared in October 1998 possibly registered a very minor extrusion. Collapses during mid- to late October left minor deposits up to 3 km from the dome in several valleys and were accompanied by substantial venting of gas with entrained ash. Significant collapses occurred on 3, 5, 8, 9 and 12 November. That on 12 November sent an ash plume to 8 km altitude and pyroclastic flows into the sea via the Tar River and White River valleys, as well as into Plymouth ( 42 ). The October and November collapses left a WNW-trending chasm, 150 m deep, through the dome. Ash-venting occurred throughout December and collapses on 14 and 19 December were accompanied by significant explosivity and large ash clouds that rose rapidly to 6 km altitude. Associated pyroclastic flows reached the sea again along the Tar River valley, producing loosely packed, gas-rich deposits (very high voidage). Explosions on 21 December blasted black jets of ash and blocks to heights of 80 m above the vent, after which vigorous ash-venting persisted for at least 30 minutes. The last significant event of 1998 was a minor collapse on 27 December. Ground deformation studies suggested that fault-block movement had occurred east of the volcano after March 1998.

Course of the volcanic crisis to mid-November 1999

Small explosions, vigorous ash-venting and minor dome collapses continued through January 1999, and by the end of the month the chasm had deepened so as to cut some 100 m into the pre-1995 edifice ( 42 ). Explosive ash-venting characterized activity in the next two months, with plumes to 7 km altitude and some fountain-collapse pyroclastic flows. Ground deformation was slight. In April 1999 a revised risk management map ( 5 ) reflected the perceived reduced risk of large-scale explosions or flows. The map removed communities just south of Belham River (lies Bay; 2 ) from the Exclusion Zone and established a Daytime Entry Zone north of Plymouth. However, substantial ash from explosions and continued collapses westwards into the catchment of Fort Ghaut (Gages valley) restricted access and posed serious problems for reoccupation. In May and June further explosions produced ash plumes to up to 9 km altitude and pyroclastic flows entered several drainages, reaching the sea via the Tar River valley. A moderate-sized collapse on 20 July left the remnant dome, estimated at 63 × 10 6 m 3 , split into three parts. Although six to seven week cyclicity of residual activity was discerned from March through to August, there were few hybrid earthquakes and diminishing exhalation of SO 2 , so that there appeared to be a general decline in eruptive energy. Hurricanes in September, October and November all produced major lahars. Explosions in the period 23–28 October produced plumes to 7.5 km altitude.

During 3–8 November, a swarm of hybrid earthquakes heralded renewed ascent of magma. Juvenile vesicular ash was erupted explosively on 8 and 9 November, a plug of old lava was extruded shortly afterwards, and new lava was emergent by 19 November. This was the initiation of the second dome of the eruption (as defined in this Memoir), which started to grow at rates comparable to those measured early in 1996, despite 20 months of magma stagnation and degassing. Scientific appraisal of the situation by December 1999 concluded that further protracted dome growth was likely, and hence that the pre-April 1999 Exclusion Zone–Safe Zone boundary would be valid for the foreseeable future. (At the time of writing (April 2001), with the large size of the second dome, it is conceivable that the boundary might have to be moved further north again if growth occurs in the western sector; G. E. Norton pers. comm.)

Preparedness for the Soufrière Hills eruption

Despite considerably increased awareness in the Caribbean region of the hazards of volcanism, largely due to the efforts of the Seismic Research Unit in Trinidad and particularly following the eruptions in the 1970s at St Vincent and nearby Guadeloupe ( 1 ), it is clear that in 1995 the governing authorities on Montserrat were not prepared for the Soufrière Hills eruption. Similarly, the branches of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK Government) with responsibility for Dependent Overseas Territories were unprepared ( 14 ). In its first report on the Montserrat emergency (IDC 1997), the House of Commons Select Committee on International Development concluded (para. 20 iv):‘Many of the imperfections and difficulties in the delivery of aid are simply due to the complicated, ongoing and unpredictable nature of the volcanic activity. ... There are numerous lessons to be learned from events in Montserrat both from the viewpoint of science and of emergency planning’. The sixth report of the Select Committee (IDC 1998, para. 2), in the section‘The Unanswered Recommendations’, noted that the Committee’s findings with regard to the Wadge and Isaacs Report were‘ignored by the Government’ (of the UK), and went on (para. 6) to urge‘that there are organisational lessons for the future that can be learned’.

The Wadge and Isaacs report was an up-to-date hazards assessment for Montserrat, published in 1987, in which it was anticipated that Plymouth might be seriously impacted during an eruption. The tale regarding the lack of notice taken of the assessment does embody organizational lessons for the future, as well as pathos, and it is briefly reviewed here. A particularly poignant facet regarding the state of preparedness in 1995 concerns the fact that Montserrat had only recently recovered from devastation in 1989 by Hurricane Hugo, which post-dated the Wadge and Isaacs hazards assessment. With UK aid, Montserrat had rebuilt its key facilities in Plymouth (see 1 ). When the volcano erupted, the new hospital was not yet fully commissioned, the new library was still unfinished, and the new government buildings were yet to see a full Legislative Council meeting. All were lost to the volcano, as had been anticipated as a possibility in the hazards assessment.

The Wadge and Isaacs report (1987)

The study entitled Volcanic Hazards from Soufrière Hills Volcano, Montserrat, West Indies was commissioned in 1986 under the umbrella of the Pan-Caribbean Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Program and funded by the UK Natural Environment Research Council. It was commissioned on the understanding that Soufrière Hills Volcano was potentially dangerous. According to the report ( 63 ), the impetus for the study came from the Government of Montserrat, which wanted a full assessment to be made. Apparently there were plans to combine the hazards analysis with new census data to produce a risk assessment. The latter never materialized.

The report ( 63 ) discussed a range of eruption scenarios, provided maps that implied devastation on various scales up to and including most of southern Montserrat (as actually occurred), made reference to the likelihood of an eruption, and advocated local emergency planning. The study utilized three main classes of data: (1) the distribution of prehistoric pyroclastic flow (and other) deposits on Montserrat ( 3 ); (2) age determinations of the pyroclastic deposits; and (3) computer models of pyroclastic flows down the (digital terrain) slopes of the volcano. The modelling simulated phenomena akin to the fountain-collapse pyroclastic flows of the August and September–October 1997 explosions, and predicted extremes of runout likely to be valid for dome-collapse pyroclastic flows. The existing deposits confirmed the extent of impact inferred by the modelling, and the age data yielded some information on prehistoric frequency. The focus on pyroclastic flow behaviour was highly relevant for Montserrat, because the favoured sites for the towns and villages, as well as the airport and farming sites, were on the gentle slopes of pyroclastic flow deposits derived from Soufrière Hills Volcano ( 2 , 3 , 0 , 0 ).

The report concluded that eruption emergency planning should allow for three types of eruptions: (1) a small eruption that would directly threaten Long Ground, which should be evacuated as soon as the eruption began; (2) a moderate to large eruption for which most of southern Montserrat should be evacuated according to priorities indicated in the sequential hazard zone map; (3) a collapsing dome/lateral blast eruption – a very remote but dangerous possibility requiring immediate evacuation of the relevant 180° sector of the volcano. It went on to suggest that some consideration be given to strategies for mitigating the damage done to Montserrat by the loss during an eruption of the centralized facilities at Plymouth. Copies of the report were delivered to the Governor’s office and to the Commissioner of Police on Montserrat, but not to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the UK.

In 1988 a distillation of the report was published and distributed internationally ( 64 ). In 1989 one of the hazard maps was reproduced in a children’s book in a series on World Disasters ( 31 ). The caption (abbreviated) reads:‘This computer map shows one way the volcano on Montserrat may erupt. It shows areas where people need to be evacuated. The government can also use these maps to show areas where it is safe to build in the future. Hospitals and control centers should all be placed away from danger spots’. The text states:‘The latest scientific techniques have been used to help the government of the Caribbean island of Montserrat to make plans in case there should be an eruption in the future.... Scientists have pinpointed the likely danger spots so that evacuation plans can be prepared taking these spots into account’.

Evidently, the Wadge and Isaacs report was never received in a way that allowed it to be used as advocated in the children’s book. On 25 July 1995, one week into the eruption, the Governor of Montserrat and the leader of the scientific team from the Seismic Research Unit, in a telegram to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, expressed astonishment that recommendations in the report had not been noted and also that there were no contingency plans. On Montserrat, losses of documents from the Governor’s office and other government offices were attributed to Hurricane Hugo ( 43 ). The regional organization charged with ensuring preparedness, which commissioned the report in 1986 (Pan-Caribbean Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Program), was found wanting after Hurricanes Gilbert and Hugo respectively devastated Jamaica in 1988 and Montserrat in 1989, and it was superseded in 1991 (by the Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Response Agency). Evidently, institutional memory can be as short as the period leading to a change of key personnel, organizational structure or government.

It is conceivable that if the report had been read thoroughly by interested parties in Montserrat, its findings on the long-term recurrence probability of pyroclastic-flow inundation of Plymouth, of about 1 % per century, might have been interpreted as acceptable odds justifying no action on rethinking the island’s infrastructure. Similarly, a sentence near the end of the report, under Long-Term Planning –‘Soufrière Hills Volcano is not a very active volcano and it may be centuries before it erupts again on the scale requiring mass evacuation’ – might have been interpreted as a rationale for doing nothing. The estimation of future-event probability was necessarily crude. It is nevertheless remarkable that the report’s recommendations were not recollected when, in mid- to late 1994, earthquakes very obviously located beneath Soufrière Hills Volcano were detected and escalating. Although this escalation constituted no strong reason to expect an eruption (at the highest level of probability), evacuation plans, at least, should have been considered then. Former volcanoseismic crises of greater seismic energy had not led to eruption, but the key issue, recognized in the commissioning of the Wadge and Isaacs study in 1986 and so pertinent for the region, is one of disaster preparedness.

Just before the eruption in 1995, a National Disaster Action Plan (handbook) was published (Government of Montserrat 1995). It dealt primarily with hurricanes, floods, earthquakes and‘man- caused disasters’, and, surprisingly, contained only one sentence referring to the threat of volcanic eruption, on the basis of Montserrat being a volcanic island. This occurred despite the earlier impetus from the government that led to the Wadge and Isaacs study, and despite the presentation of volcanic hazards information to Montserratian officials by the Seismic Research Unit, via both seminars (in Trinidad 1988) and poster displays (in Plymouth 1994).

It is regrettable that the Wadge and Isaacs study did not register fully in Montserrat or with the UK Government Department responsible for the administration of its Overseas Territory. Full consideration of it would: (1) have forced authorities in advance to evaluate the priorities and possible consequences of their actions or inaction, particularly with regard to rebuilding key installations in Plymouth; and (2) have provided them with enhanced forward- looking capability at the onset of the eruption. Montserrat was less prepared than it might have been had the Wadge and Isaacs report found its mark. As regards institutional planning for risk mitigation, it should be acknowledged that political prioritization tends to operate for the short term. Wadge and Isaacs used no language that referred to volcanic risks in the short term. Census data were never utilized to produce risk assessments, which might have transformed the findings into terms more readily understood by planners and policy-makers. The lessons in this for other communities at risk from volcanoes are non-trivial. With hindsight, the tragic losses on Montserrat could have been considerably fewer if the volcanic hazards assessment had triggered institutional planning for risk mitigation. The challenge for the future in vulnerable areas lies in ensuring that full institutional preparedness actually does follow from soundly based scientific appraisal of hazards and robust assessments of consequent risks.

Keeping the airport open until 25 June 1997

At times during the crisis, MVO scientists were inexorably drawn towards informal or unstructured interactions with politicians and the public (for an overview of MVO developments, see 3 ). Although MVO Chief Scientists interpreted their role as advisory, some interactions with Montserrat authorities concerning emergency management went significantly further. It is now well known, acknowledging the peculiarities of the crisis (slow escalation, long duration, small island, problems of evacuation; see above), that the evolved practices of MVO were worthwhile and crucial to the mitigation of risk and saving of many lives (see 57 ). However, the circumstances relating to the operation of the airport up to and on 25 June 1997, until its evacuation during the advance of a pyroclastic flow that reached 200 m from the terminal building ( 0 ), invite reflective consideration.

The airport is situated NNE of Soufrière Hills Volcano, on a coastal fan of prehistoric pyroclastic and laharic debris ( 3 , 0 ). The Government of Montserrat wished to keep it open for two linked main reasons. First, the airport was symbolic for Montserratians regarding the future viability of the island, even after almost two years of the crisis and the related depopulation ( 2 ). It provided the major connection with the outside world for Montserratians, foreign residents and tourists. Closure of the airport would mark the end of any pretence of a near-future return to‘business as usual’. Second, it provided an important evacuation route (e.g. for medical emergencies). The new small jetty in the north (Little Bay; 2 ), intended for evacuation, only became functional in February 1997 (formally handed over on 18 June 1997), but even so it could be rendered inoperable if there was much sea swell or wave activity.

In early June 1997 pyroclastic flows on the northern flanks of Soufrière Hills Volcano posed the most serious risks to date, and it was clear that the potential for dangerous activity was escalating (see above). The MVO’s worst-case scenario for the northern flanks at this time was a collapse involving 10 × 10 6 m 3 of the dome, directed down Tuitt’s or Mosquito Ghauts. It was estimated that 3–4 × 10 6 m 3 discharged in a single collapse into Tuitt’s Ghaut could generate a pyroclastic flow capable of reaching the airport in as little as 90 seconds. Moderate flows in Fort Ghaut with some also in Mosquito Ghaut ( 0 ) resulted in temporary closure of the airport on 16 June. A large pyroclastic flow reached the vicinity of Harris via Mosquito Ghaut on 17 June and, on the following day, a passenger aeroplane was turned back by its pilot during a flight to Montserrat because of conditions there.

Despite the volcanic escalation, the administrative authorities certainly wanted the airport to be kept open. The MVO made it clear, in a written statement of 9 June, and in discussions the next day (involving two Chief Scientists, the Acting Governor, the Chief Minister, plus other officials), that there was a serious risk involved in continuing to use the airport. Nevertheless, the scientists made a commitment to help, if the authorities decided on a course of action to keep the facility operational for as long as possible. A temporary commitment was made to post a scientist at the airport to provide up-to-the-minute advice to the operating airline company, who required this as a precondition for continuing flights to Montserrat. The scientist was also to assist with the implementation of official evacuation procedures in the event of a volcanic emergency.

The MVO had autonomy over its own activities in the current restricted areas on the volcano. For internal operational purposes, the team decided upon a threshold length of pyroclastic flow runout towards the airport, which, if closely approached or passed, would signal that the direct threat to any scientist there (or in the field on eastern sides of the volcano) was then too great. The threshold runout was placed at the bridge at the lower end of the Paradise River valley, near Bethel and the head of the volcaniclastic fan, 1.6 km from the airport terminal buildings ( 2 ; see 0 ). Once this threshold was passed and the eastern sector hence closed to MVO personnel on their own initiative, the corollary would be that operation of the airport would be untenable. The temporary arrangements for using the airport, however, lasted far longer than was expected. They became a significant drain on MVO staff in terms of both availability and stress on individuals, with an impact on scientific work, and in the event it might be judged that they became critically dangerous.

By 24 June, MVO personnel were seriously concerned that their role at the airport was becoming untenable, and that unreasonable responsibilities were being put on the individuals involved. One of them referred to the role as‘front-line defence’. When there was poor visibility, the MVO observer at the airport would be unable to see any flows initiated and so needed to rely on the seismic interpretation communicated from the operations room at the MVO, or other observers, to trigger the alarm. Even with good visibility, the middle of the course down Mosquito Ghaut to Paradise River valley was hidden from view. Late on 24 June a switch in the direction of collapse activity on the top of the dome, back in the direction of Mosquito Ghaut, was noted, and at dawn on 25 June small pyroclastic flows were observed descending into the top of that drainage.

The collapse that initiated at 12:55 LT on 25 June involved c .6 × 10 6 m 3 of the dome, roughly twice the amount of material involved in all but one of the previous collapses (17 September 1996), but only 60% of that of the MVO worst-case scenario. While the collapse volume was well within the range of possible scenarios anticipated by the MVO, the associated pyroclastic flow easily exceeded the (internal MVO) threshold runout distance that had been set ( 0 ). The flow comprised three main pulses, reflecting unsteady retrogressive failure of the dome rather than an abrupt single collapse, and it was material of the second pulse that extended furthest towards the airport. Mainly because a significant collapse was anticipated and employees were alert, the airport was evacuated very quickly. Phased evacuation was advised by the MVO at 12:58 and immediate evacuation at 13:00. This took about 3 minutes. The evacuees included passengers who had only just arrived, one of whom was the returning Governor of Montserrat. The aeroplane took off as the flow front approached the sea near the end of the runway (see 0 ). Another part of the flow reached to within 200 m of the terminal building. This was at 13:07, about 4 minutes after the evacuation and 12 minutes after initiation of the collapse. It took c. 7 minutes for the pyroclastic debris to reach here from the dome (the second flow pulse initiated c . 5 minutes into the collapse; data from 32 a , b ).

It is inescapable to conclude that risk had increased and safety margins reduced to extremely dangerous levels. Apparently the situation deteriorated progressively without there being a major stimulus for changing arrangements for keeping the airport open. Seemingly, on 25 June, the only things that could have stopped the continuation of airport operations were the withdrawal of services by individuals or groups (e.g. the airline, airport staff or MVO staff), or an event of dramatic scale and consequence. The latter occurred just as staff withdrawal from the airport was imminent, but the official call should have been sooner. It has been suggested that the Governor’s absence from the island created to some extent an official-decision vacuum during this most critical stage in the emergency management.

The problem here is epitomized in the adage:‘Throw a frog into hot water – it jumps out and survives; place it in cold water and slowly heat it – the frog stays put and dies’. Akin to the latter scenario, the slowly progressive escalation of the eruption apparently affected the way in which the emergency was handled by authorities. For example, agencies of the UK Government seemingly procrastinated as if unwilling to accept what really was happening ( 14 ; 43 ). Similarly, the maintenance of the airport function until 25 June became increasingly dangerous gradually while the functional role there of the scientists became increasingly inappropriate.

On Montserrat the credibility of the MVO was all-important for the successful implementation and periodical adjustment by the authorities of what was a fairly complex microzonation and alert- level system (see above, and 3 ). The civil authorities wished to maximize access and preserve as much as possible of a normal life, and the scientists had to be concerned not to give advice that would be interpreted as unduly precautionary. The working margin for maintaining the operation of the airport was very tight. The official status of the airport location (Zone C Alert-stage Orange) was‘access limited to short visits by residents and workers with means of rapid exit’, and the scientists were concerned that the civil authorities who set the status (with MVO information) would not appreciate the increases in risk immediately at the times when they developed. Also, while the public watched and was influenced by the scientists’ activities in the field, there was a danger that people would be tempted to guide their own risk-taking practices accordingly, failing to recognize that the scientists were better equipped to receive warnings and evacuate quickly. As conditions worsened there was a distinct possibility that the civil authorities’ emergency arrangements and response capabilities could be outstripped by events. Additionally, there were some people, on the volcano flanks, who relied entirely on their own judgement, rather than on the official advice being given. All this contributed to the increasing concern at the MVO that the progressively worsening situation was rapidly becoming untenable.

Such problems deriving from progressive escalation of risks (as opposed to rapid onset) might be reduced if civil plans for disaster preparedness necessarily embed formal requirements for any emergency management team, comprising both scientists and officials, (1) to check regularly and deliberately, perhaps daily or even more frequently, for actual or potential progressive development towards dangerous or inappropriate activity, and (2) to moderate any such activity by default unless actions can be proved safe and/or appropriate to a high degree of probability. The slowly heated frog should be obliged to ask itself‘Is this comfortable?’ and, if it is not quite certain, must jump out. The scientists, however, should always be careful not to force issues by withdrawing their involvement before their own objectively determined conservative safety margins are reached.

The eruption on Montserrat during 1995–1999 was the most destructive in the West Indies since 1902 (Mont Pelée, Martinique). By 1998, when magma ascent paused and it was hoped that the eruption had ended, the resources deployed by agencies of the UK Government for scientific monitoring of the volcano, risk assessment and dissemination of advice, amounted to more than£3.8 million, including provision of a helicopter ( c .£1.2 million). This appears as quite a small proportion of the total cost of the emergency, especially when compared with the expenditure on, for example, other advice and technical assistance ( 7 ).

The slow progress of the volcanic escalation coupled with the small size of the island seems to have had several key effects. While initially it was considered that evacuation of the entire island might be needed, and early contingency plans were formulated ( 2 ), that prospect receded as the eruption became established. Had the island been much smaller, total evacuation would have been inevitable. The island was just sufficiently large for it to have a‘safe zone’ throughout the eruption, with the Centre Hills providing an important protective barrier, but the majority of the inhabited areas and associated infrastructure were not in the safe zone and had progressively to be abandoned. While conditions slowly worsened, the MVO was under pressure to provide robust advice for risk mitigation without excessive precaution, and, with the advent of the risk management maps, to keep risk zones as narrow and precisely located as possible. This pressure arose from the political desire to keep life as near to normal as possible (albeit quite abnormal) and the general public determination not to leave the island. The‘microzonation system’ developed by the MVO for Montserrat (see 5 ) was at first appropriate, although it was at times difficult to communicate efficiently and to enforce. The 25 June 1997 tragedy and subsequent volcanic developments that placed numerous sectors simultaneously at risk inevitably led to abandonment of the complex zone maps in favour of the simpler tripartite division of the island into an Exclusion Zone and a (safe) Northern Zone, with an intervening Central Zone. Had the eruption escalated rapidly the microzonation system probably would never have been developed.

UK Government expenditure in Montserrat owing to the volcanic crisis, by functional use over the three fiscal years corresponding to the escalating crisis, 1995/1996-1997/1998 (after 14 ). External transport costs include c .£1.2 million for the helicopter used by the MVO. The total expenditure represented is almost £ 56 million, which was disbursed by the Department for International Development (DFID).

The slow volcanic escalation also seems partly to underlie the tardiness with which departments of the UK Government responded to the emergency. The various shortcomings in the provisions for adequate shelter in the north of the island at the time of, and long after, the evacuations, relate to the departments attempting to manage the emergency within normal institutional arrangements. Early establishment of an inter-departmental crisis management team with executive authority to fast-track procedures and with direct access to responsible government ministers would have been more effective (see 14 ), but the slow volcanic escalation gave little impetus for this. Even in 1997, after the tragic deaths of 25 June and while the Vulcanian explosions were gaining international media attention, it was believed by the MVO scientists and the Governor of Montserrat that politicians and civil servants in London still did not appreciate the seriousness of the situation (e.g. see 43 ). This state of affairs can be contrasted with other natural disasters that involved a more catastrophic onset and were immediately followed by visits by high-ranking government officials. Shortly following the 18 May 1980 debris avalanche and blast at Mount St Helens, the US President (Carter) visited the site and the scale of the disaster was immediately and effectively communicated to the US Government.

In terms of emergency management at Montserrat, the slow escalation also caused some problems with enforcement of evacuations. Whereas risk could be assessed and evacuations advised according to robust criteria, long periods with little change perceptible to the population contributed to several instances of hazardous disregard of advice or instructions. One such instance contributed to some of the tragic deaths on 25 June 1997. Some survivors commented that had they really known what the volcano could do, they might not have exposed themselves to the hazard ( 32 b ). A more catastrophic onset to the eruption might have engendered more cautious attention to given advice and to issued risk notices.

The slow eruption escalation did, however, allow the development of scientific understanding, monitoring techniques, reporting procedures and public awareness campaigns that, together with the training of many tens of personnel, did succeed in protecting many lives.

This paper is dedicated to all of the staff and other scientists who have served the Montserrat Volcano Observatory and hence given vital assistance to the beleaguered people of Montserrat. The author is greatly indebted to W. Aspinall, S. Loughlin, S. Sparks, B. Voight and S. Young for their patient guidance and substantial contributions to the paper. W. Aspinall, P. Cole, T. Druitt, C. Gardner, R. Herd, S. Loughlin, G. Norton and G. Wadge assisted with material for the figures and plates, K. Lancaster drafted the figures, and T. Druitt and M. Howells improved the text. Helen Kokelaar patiently assisted in many ways, for which I am grateful.

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The weathering and element fluxes from active volcanoes to the oceans: a Montserrat case study

• Research Article
• Published: 08 October 2010
• Volume 73 , pages 207–222, ( 2011 )

Cite this article

• Morgan T. Jones 1 , 5 ,
• Deborah J. Hembury 1 ,
• Martin R. Palmer 1 ,
• Bill Tonge 2 ,
• W. George Darling 3 &
• Susan C. Loughlin 4  

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The eruptions of the Soufrière Hills volcano on Montserrat (Lesser Antilles) from 1995 to present have draped parts of the island in fresh volcaniclastic deposits. Volcanic islands such as Montserrat are an important component of global weathering fluxes, due to high relief and runoff and high chemical and physical weathering rates of fresh volcaniclastic material. We examine the impact of the recent volcanism on the geochemistry of pre-existing hydrological systems and demonstrate that the initial chemical weathering yield of fresh volcanic material is higher than that from older deposits within the Lesser Antilles arc. The silicate weathering may have consumed 1.3% of the early CO 2 emissions from the Soufrière Hills volcano. In contrast, extinct volcanic edifices such as the Centre Hills in central Montserrat are a net sink for atmospheric CO 2 due to continued elevated weathering rates relative to continental silicate rock weathering. The role of an arc volcano as a source or sink for atmospheric CO 2 is therefore critically dependent on the stage it occupies in its life cycle, changing from a net source to a net sink as the eruptive activity wanes. While the onset of the eruption has had a profound effect on the groundwater around the Soufrière Hills center, the geochemistry of springs in the Centre Hills 5 km to the north appear unaffected by the recent volcanism. This has implications for the potential risk, or lack thereof, of contamination of potable water supplies for the island’s inhabitants.

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Acknowledgements

This work was funded by the National Environment Research Council (NERC). The authors would like to thank the staff of the Montserrat Volcano Observatory for their valuable assistance during excursions into the exclusion zone, particularly Nico Fournier, Thomas Christopher, and Racquel Tappy Syers. Reuel Lee and Mervin Tuitt of the Montserrat Water Authority are thanked for their able assistance in sample collection. Many thanks are due to Johan Varekamp and Jérôme Gaillardet for constructive reviews and to Pierre Delmelle for handling this manuscript.

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Morgan T. Jones, Deborah J. Hembury & Martin R. Palmer

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Jones, M.T., Hembury, D.J., Palmer, M.R. et al. The weathering and element fluxes from active volcanoes to the oceans: a Montserrat case study. Bull Volcanol 73 , 207–222 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00445-010-0397-0

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Beyond the volcanic crisis: co-governance of risk in Montserrat

• Emily Wilkinson 1  

Journal of Applied Volcanology volume  4 , Article number:  3 ( 2015 ) Cite this article

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Disaster risk governance is concerned with how institutions change in response to perturbations or, conversely, are able to remain static for long periods of time. In Montserrat, the volcanic eruption in 1995 produced unprecedented challenges for both local government authorities and the UK Government. The sharp and sustained rise in the level of volcanic risk combined with an inadequate response from UK and local authorities prompted a shift in governance arrangements, and when levels of risk declined these new configurations did not go back to their pre-crisis state.

This paper focuses on one aspect of this governance transition: the relationship between the local Montserratian government and the UK government. Before the eruption Montserrat enjoyed high levels of political and fiscal independence from the UK in disaster risk management and other investment decisions, but the volcanic crisis highlighted low levels of capacity and the inherent instability in this system. A new co-governance regime was established after the crisis, characterised by greater UK intervention in local investment decisions and some loss of political sovereignty. On the other hand, Montserrat has become more integrated in regional and international disaster risk governance systems, and today the division of local and central responsibilities for different aspects of disaster risk management is much clearer than before the volcanic crisis.

This paper demonstrates how disasters can create spaces for existing risk governance systems to be questioned and modified. The volcanic crisis led to a reconsideration of responsibilities and risk management practices by both Montserratian and UK authorities, and initiated a process of transformation in land-use and development planning that has substantially reduced levels of volcanic risk on the island. However, these benefits have to be weighed against loss of livelihoods for a significant proportion of the population and considerable social upheaval.

Critical to the success of this new development model is the need for vertical coherence and dialogue between different stakeholders. Montserrat and UK risk governance systems are more integrated now, but unless communities are engaged in risk management decisions, Montserrat's low- risk development model could come unstuck. Small islands with large risks can learn a lot from the Montserrat experience.

A disaster risk governance system comprises a complex web of actors and networks involved in formulating and implementing polices to manage disaster risk, institutional arrangements that determine the relationships, roles and responsibilities of these actors, coordinating mechanisms and political culture, including different perceptions of risk (Renn 2008 ; Wilkinson 2013 ). The system is therefore characterised by a number of elements of interaction such as stakeholder participation in policies to reduce risk (Pelling 2011 ).

This paper is concerned with multiple levels of risk governance and (a) whether crisis leads to changes in the system; (b) the nature of the shift (key aspects of the system that are altered); and (c) the change process. This is assessed in the context of Montserrat in the British West Indies, where a long-duration volcanic crisis in the 1990s highlighted internal contradictions inherent in the broader system of governance. Other volcanic eruptions in the eastern Caribbean have resulted in greater loss of life than the 1995–1997 eruption of Soufrière Hills Volcano–most notably the 1902 eruption of Mont Pelée in Martinique, which killed 29,000 people (Tanguy 1994 ) – but the Montserrat volcanic crisis has attracted special interest from natural and social scientists alike because of the unpredictable and incremental escalation of volcanic activity, coupled with vulnerability and exposure characteristics found only on small islands.

A series of forced evacuations and delineation of risk zones in Montserrat avoided the mass casualties of Martinique, but on 25 June 1997, 19 people returning to the exclusion zone were killed by pyroclastic flows (see Figure  1 ). Two months later pyroclastic flows engulfed the capital, Plymouth, putting an end to discussions on whether the port and other major facilities could be used for the foreseeable future. Before these tragic events the Government of Montserrat and the UK Government had been struggling to manage a crisis for which they were relatively unprepared and when rehabilitation and reconstruction began, they continued to face difficulties and public criticism.

Map of Montserrat. Katy Mee, British Geological Survey.

The purpose of this paper is not to provide a summary of events, or attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of collective responses to the volcanic crisis. Numerous reports and papers have been commissioned and written on the events and decisions taken by UK and Montserrat authorities, each presenting a view of what went wrong (see, for example, Clay et al . 1999 ; Donovan et al . 2012 ; Kokelaar 2002 ). More recently, studies have focussed on post-disaster reconstruction and the UK government’s performance in promoting long-term development on the island (ICAI 2013 ; Sword-Daniels et al . 2013 ). Rather, the paper takes a longer term view of changes in disaster risk governance, analysing the critical shifts that occurred in response to an extreme event, as well as the change processes themselves (for a summary of key disaster risk governance events see Additional file 1 ).

Conceptual framework

Concepts of ‘systems’ and ‘scale’ are used to study the nature of changes in response to perturbations. These draw on the socio-economic systems, resilience and natural resource governance literature. ‘Scale’ is defined as the spatial, temporal, quantitative, or analytical dimensions used to measure and study any phenomenon (Gibson et al. 2000 ). This paper focusses on two scales: the jurisdictional scale, which can be divided into different bounded and organised political units, with linkages between them; and the temporal scale, which can be divided into different ‘time frames’ related to rates, durations, or frequencies (Ostrom et al . 1999 ). Effective disaster risk management (DRM) depends on the cooperation of international, national, regional and local institutions across temporal and jurisdictional and geographical scales, so understanding these interactions is critical.

Within the jurisdictional scale, the vertical power relationships between local and central political units are of particular interest. Building on work by Claudia Pahl-Wostl ( 2009 ) on multi-level learning processes and adaptation, two key aspects of vertical governance dialectics can be identified: (a) dispersion of decision-making authority and (b) vertical coherence.

The dispersion of decision-making authority refers to the authority of different centres of decision making that are formally independent of each other (Ostrom, 1997 ; McGinnis 2000 ; Heinelt 2002 ). Local governments are thought to require autonomy from higher levels of government so that they can define their own priorities and implement DRM measures without too much interference, and thus gain credibility and trust from their citizens; both of which have proven critical for disaster risk management (Wilkinson 2012 ). However, this kind of autonomous, inclusive style of governance is not the modus operandi of most local governments. This paper focusses on the political and fiscal autonomy of the Montserrat government to develop its own risk management policies, as well as its capacity to do so. It discusses the evolution of co-governance arrangements through which UK authorities and the Montserrat government jointly make decisions to manage exposure to volcanic risk.

Vertical coherence is concerned with the division of roles and responsibilities for risk management between different political units, from local government to tiers higher up the scale – including provincial governments (or states in federal systems of governance), national government and regional authorities like the European Union (EU). Incoherence in service delivery often occurs because of poorly defined and overlapping mandates (resulting in omission and/ or replication in service delivery), overly complex structures (Pahl-Wostl 2009 ), capacity constraints and unfunded mandates (Posner 1998 ), as well as centrist and paternalistic tendencies in public administration systems (Wilkinson 2012 ); all of which can constrain progress on managing disaster risk. Hence, an alignment of interests between governance scales can help to promote more effective DRM. This includes not only the participation of actors from one level in decision-making processes at another but also institutions and knowledge produced at one level influencing processes at another (Pahl-Wostl 2009 ).

Particularly critical for DRM is the alignment of risk perceptions across scales of governance through bi-directional process (Slovic 1987 ). Different people and cultures respond to disaster risk differently (Gaillard 2008 ; Heijmans 2001 ; Paton et al. 2001 ; Paton et al. 2010 ), and in the context of volcanic hazards, proximity to the hazard (Gregg et al . 2004 ), living memory of an eruption and level of impact (Paton et al . 2001 ) all shape risk perceptions amongst individuals and groups. Even if risk perception is high, people may still put concerns about convenience and living costs ahead of their desire to lessen their exposure (Gaillard 2008 ). This suggests that the idea of an acceptable level of risk is inappropriate. Rather, people do not accept risks but tolerate them to secure certain benefits (Pidgeon et al . 1992 ; Simmons and Walker 1999 ). The values underlying any notion of tolerable risk may not be shared by everyone; in fact much research on risk analysis and societal reactions to different threats highlights the differences between institutional responses such as regulation and public responses (Barnes 2002 ). In particular, disaster events can result in the creation of new official rules to control risk that minimise exposure - for example through the creation of exclusion zones and resettlement policies - but these values may not be shared by those that live in exposed areas and whom are to be resettled. Dialogue and negotiation between authorities and communities is therefore required to reach more sustainable solutions (Haynes et al . 2008 ).

The analysis of the disaster risk governance system in this paper draws heavily on resilience thinking, and in particular resilience frameworks that emphasise the capacity of a system to respond to shocks and stresses in different ways – such as by coping, adapting and transforming (Bené et al . 2012 ; Cutter et al. 2008 ; Pelling 2011 ). Disaster risk governance systems are highly sensitive to rates, durations and frequencies of disaster events and changes in the system often occur as a result of these events as well as in response to other external pressures. The feedback processes are however non-linear and unpredictable (Ramalingam et al . 2008 ).

Notwithstanding their idiosyncrasies, volcanic eruptions can be characterised in terms of their spatial and temporal dimensions: they are often slow onset and long duration event that allow for changes in policy and behaviour while the event is still unfolding. It is usually possible to identify sharp increases in the level of risk, resulting in crisis period(s) for affected populations and decision-makers. Hence volcanic disaster risk can be considered to have three temporal phases within which feedback processes occur, with accompanying options for institutional learning and collective action:

Pre-crisis period, in which action may be taken to mitigate existing and anticipate future risk, such as land-use planning, retrofitting roofs, the development and enforcement of building codes, education and training programmes. Land-use planning is a prospective tool that can be used to prevent or limit construction in unsafe areas, while relocation and re-zoning of space is a corrective tool to reduce existing exposure to hazards. Education related to building practices that reduce ash entry into homes is a risk management activity that anticipates and reduces risk in the future, while training on early warning systems manages current levels of risk by encouraging evacuations and reducing loss of life.

Crisis period, which we can sub-divide into: a) start of the eruption and potentially long period of unrest (often characterised by seismic activity), which can be treated as a preparedness phase; and b) heightening of the crisis, usually initiated by an eruption, prompting emergency response activities to reduce negative impacts on people, such as food aid and shelter provision. These sub-phases vary widely across settings however and some volcanoes may do (a) and not (b), while some have (b) with no (a).

Post-crisis period, characterised by short- and longer-term recovery measures (the first of which may commence during the crisis period) to restore livelihoods and infrastructure as well as control future risk and promote sustainability (Alexander 2002 ; Tierney 2012 ). These corrective and prospective risk reduction measures are more likely to occur in the post-crisis period than before an event has occurred as disasters highlight previous failures and can act as catalysts for policy reform (Birkland 2006 ).

These three temporal phases may overlap if time between subsequent eruptions is short. Also, the shift from one state to another is not necessarily demarcated by the volcanic hazards themselves: there may still be low-impact hazards occurring in in the post-crisis period; and changes in the level of risk might also be caused by non-volcanic events that alter the level of exposure or vulnerability to different hazards. Nor do the phases identified above represent a cycle in the social system (from stability-to crisis-returning to a stable state). Indeed, the concept of a ‘disaster cycle’ has been heavily criticised by social scientists for representing disasters as temporary interruptions of a linear development process and governance systems, after which society returns to normal (Christoplos et al. 2001 ; Hewitt 1983 ; Twigg 2004 ). Governance systems do sometimes return to pre-crisis states, demonstrating the stability or persistence of institutions in the face of extreme social events (Schreyögg and Sydow 2010 ). However, more often in environmental and social systems, regime changes occur following significant perturbations, whereby the system moves to another stable state and sometimes this regime shift is irreversible (Whitten et al . 2012 ). Similarly, for disaster risk governance systems, we can expect disasters to alter components of the system, at least temporarily – whether perturbations are low-intensity but frequent or singular, high-intensity events. Changes in the disaster risk governance system during and following a protracted crisis can therefore be characterised in terms of their stability , from temporary alterations to permanent, irreversible shifts.

Another aspect of the change process is the extent to which the governance system is altered by the event – whether it undergoes fundamental changes or not. Levels of organisational change are described in the literature on adaptation and resilience, where differences are drawn between single and double-loop (and sometimes even triple-loop) learning; incremental and radical reform; transitions and transformations (Pelling 2011 ). According to Mark Pelling ( 2011 : 74) transitions or incremental changes can be seen when ‘the aims and practices of geographically or sectorally-bound activities push but do not overturn established political regimes’, while transformation ‘is an extreme case where profound change alters the distribution of rights and responsibilities and visions of development across society’. Similarly, while single-loop learning describes the detection of an error and correction without questioning the underlying values of the system, double-loop learning occurs ‘when mismatches are corrected by first examining and altering the governing variables and then the actions’ (Argyris 1999 : 68).

The nature of disaster risk governance shifts and change processes described above can be summarised in a matrix (see Table  1 ) and form the conceptual basis for analysing institutional change in Montserrat. The unique co-governance characteristics in Montserrat and other UK overseas territories present a number of challenges to studying institutional change of any sort. Institutions and individuals interact in ways that are very different to other governance settings a , making generalisations or lesson drawing about drivers of change particularly difficult. However, in focussing on the dynamics of vertical governance, direct comparisons can be made to governance arrangements in other contexts, including in federal governance systems such as Mexico and India, decentralised systems such as those found elsewhere in the Caribbean and other multi-layered systems of governance, such as the European Union. Conclusions are tentative and caution must be applied in making generalisations, but the Montserrat case is instructive of a more permanent co-governance transition that can occur following a volcanic crisis.

The analysis of vertical governance arrangements in Montserrat presented below is based on qualitative primary data collected through a ‘forensic’ workshop b held in September 2012 with 70 participants representing five stakeholder groups: scientists, UK government officials, Montserrat government officials (including disaster managers), regional agency staff and community representatives. The aim was to explore components of resilience during and after the volcanic crisis as well as internal and external factors that have undermined it. Moderated focus group discussions on key events, tipping points and phases of change were held and recorded. In addition, 16 semi-structured interviews were conducted with local and UK government officials and community leaders. Workshop and interview recordings were transcribed and coded and analysed using Atlas-ti software.

The coding categories were derived from the conceptual framework to capture data on: (i) risk management policies and key decisions taken during different time periods (before, during and after the crisis); (ii) roles and responsibilities of different actors for DRM activities; (iv) relationships between UK and local government authorities; and (v) public perceptions of government decisions on risk management policies (both UK and local). Interview and focus group data was also coded for issues of (vi) risk perception, (vii) trust and (viii) participation. Data was triangulated across the five stakeholder groups and with secondary literature, to help explain differences in judgements about decisions taken by local and UK authorities. Tensions arose as roles and responsibilities changed during and after the crisis and these are highlighted, as are the contrasting views of citizens and formal institutions on levels of tolerable risk.

It is important to point out that primary data was collected from the focus group discussions and interviews to supplement existing data and analysis of the Montserrat crisis and recovery processes. This explains the very limited number of interviews. While this has its limitations, the research team felt that governance during the crisis and its immediate aftermath had already been studied in depth, albeit from the perspective of science-policy interface (see, for example, Donovan et al . 2012 ; Donovan and Oppenheimer 2013 ). Further data was therefore collected to complement this and bring it up to date, situating the analysis of risk governance within broader decisions about development and the future of the island.

Disaster risk governance in Montserrat – an unstable state

On the 18th July 1995, the Soufrière Hills Volcano became active after a long period of dormancy. Approximately 6,000 people were evacuated from the capital Plymouth and nearby towns to temporary shelters. They returned to their homes, were evacuated again, and on 3rd April 1996 Plymouth was evacuated for the last time. Approximately 1,300 people were housed in temporary public shelters, which suffered from overcrowding, lack of privacy, poor sanitation and lack of access to good nutrition. Many Montserratians left the island, supported by UK resettlement packages, family and friends. By 2001, the population of Montserrat had dropped by 60%, from 11,314 in 1991 to 4,491 in 2001 (CARICOM 2009 ). For those that stayed, some were still in shelters three years after the eruption. Those that decided to stay and resettle in the north of the island, which is much drier and less fertile than the south and more exposed to hurricanes and flooding, faced severe challenges in re-establishing their livelihoods (Rozdilsky 2001 ).

Re-settlement in the south meanwhile has been controlled and in some areas prohibited. Exclusion zones have been set up to control access to areas close to the volcano according to the level of volcanic activity (see Figure  2 ). These and other major risk management decisions are listed in Annex 1. The governance arrangements and relationships shaping these decisions and collective responses to volcanic risk are discussed below.

Map of exclusion zones, settlements in 2011 and pre-eruption settlements. Katy Mee, British Geological Survey.

Risk governance before the volcanic crisis

Governance arrangements in UK overseas territories are unique because of their colonial history, although they have some similarities to structures found in decentralised systems of governance elsewhere. Local governments have autonomy over day-to-day decision-making and planning with regard to social and economic policy, receiving some budget support to do so, but defer to central government over decisions regarding internal security and defence. This includes emergency management functions, if the capacity of local government to respond is surpassed, but in pre- and post-disaster risk reduction decisions, local government is expected to play a dominant role.

From 1961 up until the volcanic crisis, the local government in Montserrat enjoyed very high levels of autonomy from the UK. The 1960s saw a period of decolonisation in the Caribbean and although Montserrat’s leaders chose to remain part of Britain, the island became self-governing with the formation of a locally elected ministerial government. From then on, Montserrat, like the Turks and Caicos, Cayman Islands and Anguilla, was treated as a quasi-independent state. A new constitution in 1989 set the parameters for these governance arrangements, giving the local government close to full autonomy over decision-making within the territory. The governor of Montserrat, a UK government representative and civil servant in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), was responsible for defence, external affairs and internal security but performed mainly ceremonial roles. The local government meanwhile carried out most normal areas of government activity such as provision of health and education, policing and land-use planning with relatively little interference from the UK government, requiring minimal budget support and even developing some infrastructure projects independently (Clay et al . 1999 ).

In terms of vertical coordination, a set of ‘ad-hoc’ and ‘personalised’ governance arrangements had evolved between the UK and its Caribbean Overseas Territories before the volcanic crisis. These reflected neither a sense of shared sovereignty (as in the French Caribbean) nor negotiated autonomy (as in the Dutch Caribbean), but rather an assumption by the UK government that these territories would become independent (Hintjens and Hodge 2012 : 202). Even the constitution created ambivalence, recognising Montserrat’s separateness, but maintaining the UK’s constitutional power to invoke emergency orders and intervene directly in domestic affairs.

In-line with this broad level of independence before the volcanic crisis, Montserrat was also free to design and implement its own policies in response to perceived disaster risks; however, limited local capacity to identify and analyse risk was only part of the problem. Concentration of political power within a few wealthy families, party politicking and personalised politics, common to other island states (Skinner 2002 ) meant that policies were geared towards favouring interest groups not serving the needs of the most vulnerable.

Like many of its Caribbean neighbours, Montserrat is prone to a range of geological and hydro-meteorological hazards and yet risk management knowledge was not well developed and had not been incorporated into mainstream development (World Bank 2002 ). Knowledge of volcanic risk was extremely low amongst local politicians and UK government representatives on island despite the publication of the Wadge and Isaacs report ( 1986 ), which had been commissioned by the Pan Caribbean Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Project (CDPPP). The report warned of volcanic activity and the potential impact that an eruption would have to the island’s capital, Plymouth. An early version of the report was discussed with the Permanent Secretary in the Chief Minister’s office, yet there was no long-term planning for a volcanic eruption (Shepherd et al . 2002 ). Many explanations have been offered for this omission, including a lack of previous experience with volcanic eruptions and the impenetrability of the scientific language, both of which meant that it was difficult for policy-makers to take the findings of the report seriously; as well as limited resources and the more immediate focus of dealing with hurricanes (interviews, local and UK government officials, Montserrat, 2–4 October 2012).

In 1989, Hurricane Hugo hit the island leaving 11 dead and over 3,000 homeless, as well as causing substantial damage to approximately 85 per cent of homes and to a number of the storm shelters (Berke and Wenger 1991 ). A Hurricane Preparedness Scheme had been in place since 1980, but Hurricane Hugo revealed serious weaknesses in planning, including poor emergency shelter construction and lack of maintenance. Moreover, the risk control measures that were in place for this type of hazard, including local development regulations and inspection and enforcement procedures, had not been effectively implemented, and the housing stock was not designed using storm-resistant construction techniques. Unable to respond to the crisis with local resources, a state of emergency was declared and day-to-day control of the island passed away from the locally-elected Chief Minister to the FCO (Skinner 2006 : 57). The UK government took over emergency management efforts and the support was well received (£3 m in emergency aid and £16 m in long-term reconstruction) promoting a quick material recovery and allowing Montserrat to achieve a budgetary surplus by 1995 (Clay et al . 1999 ).

Hurricane Hugo prompted a temporary alteration in the prevailing governance arrangements, with the local government losing decision-making autonomy and the UK becoming directly involved in local affairs. Montserrat is a contingent liability for the UK government, so when local capacity to respond was surpassed, the UK recognised its responsibility to intervene and assist the islanders (Hintjens and Hodge 2012 ). Lack of planning and heavy dependency of foreign assistance led to a ‘loss of control on the part of Montserrat authorities’ (Berke and Wenger 1991 : 77), but this was not permanent and six months after the hurricane, Montserratian authorities were exerting substantial control over the recovery process and development plans.

Abrupt social events allow hitherto marginalised issues to get on the agenda, by opening up ‘policy windows’ and creating spaces for policy reform (Kingdon 1995 ). In the same way, major disasters can act as ‘focusing events’ by bringing the failures of existing disaster policies to the attention of the public and policy makers, opening up policy windows for DRM reform (Birkland 2006 ). Hurricane Hugo made it clear to local authorities that a more coordinated effort was needed to prepare for and respond to extreme events and in 1994 a National Disaster Action Plan was drawn up and an Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) established in 1995. However, for the reasons described above a volcanic eruption was not on the political radar either for inclusion in the plan or reconstruction efforts after Hurricane Hugo. Indeed, the £16 million investment in reconstructing Plymouth, building a new hospital and housing, would have acted as a major disincentive to investing elsewhere even if volcanic risk had been taken seriously. As such, reducing risk to hurricanes in the post-disaster reconstruction efforts locked Montserrat in to high exposure to volcanic risk and a development trajectory that would prove difficult to alter in the face of an abrupt change in the volcanic hazard.

Prior to the volcanic crisis Monserrat was poorly integrated in regional and international risk governance systems. There was no formal mechanism through which Montserratian authorities could access resources or advice on disaster scenarios, potential impact and risk reduction options, although in fairness the international community as a whole understood little about the social or political sources of disaster risk in 1995. International and regional organisations at that time were promoting scientific, engineering and bureaucratic (or ‘technocratic’) solutions to disaster problems (Hewitt 1995 ; Cannon 1994 ). The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA), set up in under the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) in 1991, was, as its name suggests, a response-focussed agency with objectives of coordinating relief efforts, channelling aid from NGOs and other governments, mitigating the immediate consequences of disaster and improving disaster response capacity amongst participating states. As such, it provided little guidance as to how to assess and manage risk. Montserrat could not expect much in the way of technical support or guidance from the UK government either, as it did not have a DRM plan of its own at that time - the Civil Contingencies Act was not brought into force until November 2005. Overall, the lack of coherence across knowledge systems, resulted in a limited consideration of any hazards in development policies and plans. In particular, it made Montserrat highly susceptible to the unknown risks associated with the Soufrière Hills volcano.

During the crisis

Emergency management during the crisis has been characterised as unplanned, reactive and short term (Clay et al . 1999 ). Lack of preparedness meant that ‘actions taken by the UK Government and the Government of Montserrat were driven stepwise by events in the volcanic escalation’ (Kokelaar 2002 : 1). Unlike Hurricane Hugo, where Montserrat’s independence from the UK remained largely unaltered despite huge investments in reconstruction, the volcanic crisis brought about an abrupt realignment of vertical governance arrangements, with the UK government’s position towards this overseas territory shifting radically towards greater intervention as the crisis unfolded. Even as Montserrat moves beyond recovery into processes of longer-term development, central-local relations have not returned to their pre-eruption state.

The EOC was the key local government entity managing the response to the volcanic eruption (Clay et al . 1999 ). Though a nominally ‘local’ institution led by the chief minister’s office, the EOC is activated by the governor who on 3 April 1996 declared a state of emergency, thus rendering the EOC subservient to the governor’s office and ultimately the FCO. At the beginning of the crisis the EOC made some decisions about planning and coordination of evacuations, supplies and shelters; but once the state of emergency was declared it no longer made any substantive decisions without the governor’s consent. In small face-to-face societies ‘people take on a number of roles and might interact with each other in different capacities at different times of the day [and] [t]his can make communication very difficult’ (Skinner 2002 : 307). During the crisis these norms of communication were suddenly altered by changes in the already complex functions of different actors, often creating tension – for example between the chief minister and the governor.

In addition to this shift in decision-making authority, the capacity of the EOC to make decisions regarding emergency response was tested and found wanting, as decisions during the crisis became more complex. In shelter management, for example, the EOC had no special expertise or sensitivity to the importance of engaging people in decisions (Clay et al . 1999 : 70). Moreover, as people (and particularly the middle class) began to leave the island as the crisis intensified, local management capacity was further eroded.

The volcanic crisis was marked by a lack of contingency planning or strategy for how the FCO and the then the Overseas Development Agency (ODA) would manage a complex and long duration emergency in an overseas territory: ‘Ad-hoc arrangements had to be put in place and this was done reactively as the eruption progressed’ (Clay et al. 1999 ). The strategy adopted was to react to changing hazard levels as they were identified but this lack of planning, coupled with low levels of communication and community consultation, meant that UK and ‘local’ ideas about how to manage emergency response often diverged.

Weaknesses in planning were also partly due to poor horizontal coordination between the FCO, which delegated advice on external affairs, civil order and financial matters to the Dependent Territories Regional Secretariat (DTRS) in Barbados, set up in 1993, and ODA. Each had responsibilities and roles to play in an emergency situation but there were some unclear areas of responsibility within this complex set of horizontal institutional arrangements, resulting in a fragmentation in authority (Clay et al . 1999 : 16). Prior to the crisis, Montserratian authorities had become accustomed to dealing only with the DTRS but as the crisis evolved, other departments and individuals would become more directly involved in emergency aid, splitting the decision-making responsibility and resources across branches of government. This ‘bizarre situation’, as it was referred to by journalist Polly Pattullo ( 2000 : 137), was compounded by insufficient mechanisms for inter-departmental coordination of responsibilities in London (Clay et al . 1999 : 16). In addition, aid coordination was complicated by donations coming in from a range of sources including bilateral aid from CARICOM countries, regional/multilateral aid from the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), and from NGOs. Montserrat was not short of emergency relief, according to local residents, but there were not enough trained people to handle it and this, along with delays at customs because packages were not properly labelled, slowed down the process (focus group discussions, 27 September 2012).

Trust between the state and society can be caused and aggravated by low levels of formal public consultation on – as well as public willingness to participate in - decisions regarding emergency management (Wilkinson 2012 ). The emergency aid programme in Montserrat was implemented with little local consultation creating tensions between UK and local authorities, a deepening sense of insecurity amongst residents and growing mistrust between local stakeholders and UK government. As tents, cots and army rations were distributed, the inappropriateness of many of the supplies became apparent (interviews and focus groups, various, 28 September - 3 October 2013). Examples included bringing in pit latrines, which had never before been used on the island, and tents to be used as shelters, which would not withstand tropical storms and were inappropriate for the heat; all of which could have been avoided by consulting local authorities. Conversely, although citizens were able to express their views on both local and UK government handling of affairs through radio programmes, they were reluctant to go to town meetings. Hence, formal channels of social participation in decisions-making were very limited (interviews, local government officials and residents, 1 and 3 October 2012).

Lack of coherence between local and UK authorities over policy direction also contributed to growing mistrust. The local government preferred a ‘wait and see’ approach during the early phases of the emergency, assuming less serious impacts from the eruption, which resulted in deferral of UK-funded public housing construction in the north. The UK government, on the other hand, preferred to plan for the worst case, because of its ultimate responsibility for Montserrat (Clay et al., 1999 : 54). This included drawing up a plan for the complete evacuation of the island, known as Operation Exodus. Operation Exodus had existed since the early days, but did not become public knowledge until May 1998, which generated rumours of ‘relocation schemes’ and plans by the UK government to ‘de-populate the island’ (interviews, local residents, 3 October 2012). The UK government was unlikely to have had any genuine desire to empty the island but the lack of a public communications strategy on shelters, evacuations and recovery plans had negative repercussions with Montserratians commonly expressing the view that ‘the UK Government wanted us off the island’ (interview, local resident, 3 October 2012).

Coherence in emergency management was complicated by the various vertical lines of communication that existed between different UK departments and local authorities and between the scientists on and off the island and UK and local authorities. In particular, the volcanic crisis highlighted the lack of local capacity to translate and communicate scientific information and this had repercussions for awareness of risk amongst local government officials and the public:

There was not a systematic analysis of scientific advice and policy-makers did not know what questions to ask… The Wadge Report was a perfect example of that: no one took any notice because it was not translated into practical advice (interview, UK government official, 2 October 2012).

From a local government perspective, clearer messages were needed and expected to help interpret volcanic hazard information, as one local government official explained (interview, local government official, 4 October 2012):

We had little experience with scientists. With hurricanes they are more hands off; they can show you on a computer and it is easier to understand. With a volcano it is difficult to see anything on which to base a decision, plus the scientists kept saying ‘this is not an exact science’. In an effort to be cautious they actually reduced their own credibility and the public started to doubt.

The failure to articulate and coordinate policy direction also delayed reconstruction efforts and crucially, the decision to invest in the north and hence drastically reduce levels of volcanic risk on the island. The UK had put money into rebuilding Plymouth and continued to see it as the island’s capital, and for this reason the Department for International Development (DFID) was reluctant to start buying up land in the north and building houses there (Clay et al. 1999 ). More broadly, the UK government was waiting for the volcano to stabilise before re-investing in the island’s infrastructure, and at the same time, Montserratian authorities wanted to avoid sending out the wrong signals and were keen to maintain a ‘business as usual’ atmosphere to keep people on the island and keep the economy going (Skinner 2002 ). This may explain why it did not put more pressure on the UK government or ask for money to start building in the north; but the result was that two years after destruction of Plymouth, over 300 people were still living in temporary shelters (Haynes et al. 2008 ; Skelton 2003 ).

Despite complex organisational structures and unclear mandates, coordination of emergency management did improve as the crisis progressed. The administration of shelters improved for example when the UK government responded to complaints about aid in 1996 by introducing a food voucher scheme. In 1997, the vouchers were replaced by cheques as a pragmatic response to pressure for more flexibility, so people could use the income to pay other expenses such as rent (focus groups, various, 28 September - 3 October 2013). This also reduced the heavy administrative burden of the voucher scheme (Clay et al. 1999 ).

After the volcanic crisis

It is difficult to identify the exact point at which emergency management ended and longer-term recovery planning began, as recovery has not been a geographically evenly distributed phenomenon, with ‘different areas of the island… in different stages of the recovery process’ (Rozdilsky 1999 : 6). Similarly, it is hard to identify the time when the people of Montserrat accepted and began to plan for a new future in the north of the island. Certainly, the 19 deaths on 25 June 1997 were ‘a game changer’ (interview, UK government official, 2 October 2012).

A major turning point relates to the type of support Montserrat received from the UK. From late 1997 onwards, emergency aid was increasingly outweighed by budget support and substantial capital investments to re-establish basic services, develop infrastructure and provide incentives and an enabling environment for private investment and longer-term development. From 1997 to 2012, DFID spent £325 million on technical assistance, budgetary support and capital investments, representing 50 per cent of the total spent on Overseas Territories during that period. Six capital investment projects alone (an airport, roads, water, power and education) involved an investment of over £34 million (ICAI 2013 ). However, the scale of this investment came at the price of heavy reliance on the UK, and although the local government is keen to avoid long-term dependency and achieve self-sufficiency but there is no realistic plan for doing so. The 2011 Strategic Growth Plan, for example, creates ‘no overall picture of self-sufficiency for the island’ (ICAI 2013 : 8). A reliance on the UK for capital is compounded by the fact that Montserrat cannot access development finance from other sources. It is not eligible for loans from the World Bank or International Monetary Fund, although it receives some funds from the EU and CDB - £4.8 million from 2012 to 2015, but this merely supplements the £24 million committed by DFID for the same period (ICAI 2013 ).

A change of government in the UK in May 1997 had far-reaching consequences for risk management in Montserrat, with the UK government at senior level taking more of an interest. The Montserrat Action Group was formed and the then Secretary of State for International Development Claire Short established a joint DFID-FCO review of off- and on-island options, and £6.5 m was allocated by the UK government for development in the north. Coordination of recovery efforts improved thanks to a clarification of mandates in London within one department - the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department of DFID – which was made responsible for coordination of all financial aid and equipment to Montserrat. However, this had the impact of separating UK development and foreign policy, with Montserrat’s governor reporting to the FCO and the Aid Office reporting to DFID, essentially separating safety from funding.

Despite its financial dependency on the UK, improvements in DRM policy and organisational structures owe more to Montserrat’s insertion in the regional disaster risk governance system. The new unit in government in 1997, now called the Disaster Risk Management Coordination Agency (DMCA), set up to coordinate DRM activities, and the Disaster Preparedness and Response Act of 1999, were based more on examples from around the Caribbean than the UK disaster management system. CDERA (which later became the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) in 2009) adopted a comprehensive disaster management approach and national emergency management offices across the Caribbean have followed suit. These strategies also reflect the language and priority areas of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015; demonstrating the influence that international policy has had on regional risk management.

Integration in the regional risk governance system deepened in 1999, when the Montserrat Volcano Observatory Act was passed, bringing it under local legislation and encouraging ‘collaborative links with regional and extra-regional centres of expertise in scientific disciplines relevant to monitoring volcanic activity’ (1999, Art.8). It was now seen as a locally owned institution (interview, UK government official, 2 October 2012). Montserrat also began to receive advice and support from CDEMA, as one of 18 participating states and was included in the Action Plan 2011–2012 for the Caribbean, promoted by the disaster preparedness programme of the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Directorate General (DIPECHO). Montserrat’s Sustainable Development Plan 2008–2020 now reflects a comprehensive disaster management mentality, with a Strategic Goal on environmental management and disaster mitigation that emphasises governance structures, training and education on DRM and building response capacity at all levels.

Even more encouragingly DRM is now seen to be an integral part of the development process, at least on paper. Local government authorities recognise that disasters can lead to major disruptions to the island’s developmental agenda (Government of Montserrat 2005 ). The Montserrat Corporate Plan 2003–2006, health, water and education sector plans all included DRM elements, although these mainly focussed on streamlining disaster preparedness and response. In 2003, for example, the Ash Clearing Assistance Project concentrated on reducing air pollution and health hazards in the environment after the volcano dome collapse. Local ownership over emergency response was clearly demonstrated at this time: the Montserrat government declared the disaster and activated the emergency operations centre, which then acted as the coordination body for response and relief efforts.

Notwithstanding these improvements however, decision-making authority on island and the coordination of DRM activities is still limited by the absence of an inclusive DRM plan. As of October 2012, the Disaster Management Plan was still not finalised and had only been updated in an ad-hoc manner by the DMCA director. Hence the content of the plan and allocation of responsibilities remains unclear to other government officials (interviews, local government officials, 3–4 October 2012). The DMCA is an operational not regulatory agency with a mandate to prepare for emergencies, not reduce levels of risk in society and so can only play a limited role in strengthening local DRM capacity on-island. As one local government official commented:

Institutions are stronger, but high staff turnover and lack of technical experience mean that an effective disaster response in the future will require quick funding and external support. The Government of Montserrat will be able to respond in a limited way for a week or two but will need financial support and technical assistance (interview, local government official, 3 October 2012).

By the end of 1997 the north was deemed safe for occupation but people were still living in shelters. A Sustainable Development Plan was produced identifying health, education and housing investments needed for economic and social recovery, but many of these investments were undertaken with only a short-term focus: the hospital was upgraded at the St John’s site, not rebuilt; an emergency jetty was built at Little Bay instead of a harbour; and only a temporary government headquarters were set up in Brades (Sword-Daniels et al. 2013 ). For many, it was not until 1999 that the emergency phase really ended. Eruptive activity continued, but a new governance regime was beginning to emerge with a vision of the island’s future development. This ‘co-governance’ regime would continue to dominate central-local relations in Montserrat to the present day. The local government began to take the lead on day-to-day management functions, such as the procurement and management of development projects and some control over spending decisions, but with strong oversight and financial control from the UK. Montserrat regained some autonomy with respect to the crisis period, but compared with the pre-crisis situation, economic dependency remained high:

DFID keep changing the rules of the game, including greater scrutiny of expenditures, increasing limits to what officers can approve now (compared to 1995). All this affects our ability to respond quickly to people’s needs (interview, UK government official, 3 October 2012).

Greater coherence between UK and local risk perceptions and DRM activities can be observed from 2001 onwards with the development of a strategy to sustain the on-island community and promote long-term investment in the north of the island (Clay et al. 1999 : 13). By restricting access to proximal areas (the boundaries of which have changed over time (Aspinall et al. 2002 )) and investing in basic and road infrastructure, housing and services in the north, levels of exposure to pyroclastic flows and lahars have all been dramatically reduced (Sword-Daniels et al. 2013 ). For the Montserrat Government these decisions marked an important turning point in the recovery process:

In 2001 the economy began to recover and economic plans were made, based on scientific advice. The Scientists said that the far north was of low negligible risk. Once that was said they set the foundations for serious thinking about investment for those who stayed. They realised it would have to be in the north (interview, local government official, 3 October 2012).

There was no formal public consultation process to establish how different actors viewed volcanic risk on the island (Haynes et al . 2008 ), however, perceptions of risk appear to have been broadly aligned at this point with residents beginning to consider the north their permanent home (interviews, local residents, 1–3 October 2012). Many had already left the island after by the Boxing Day collapse in 1997 and facilitated by relocation packages offered in 1998, but even for those that stayed and had lost their houses, land and jobs, the north did not represent an ‘acceptable option’ in terms of levels of risk and livelihood options until housing reconstruction began (interview, UK government official, 2 October 2012). This perception of the south being dangerous (approximately 60 percent of the island) and the north being safe for habitation was broadly in line with the scientific assessments, through which areas were established as exclusion zones – some permanently, and others in accordance with the level of volcanic activity. Despite informal reports of people entering the permanent exclusion area (Zone V) without permission, the current general perception amongst islanders is that this area will continue to be highly exposed to volcanic hazards and they will never be able to return (interviews and focus groups, various, 28 September - 3 October 2013).

In the transition from recovery to longer-term development, greater vertical coherence in development planning has emerged. This owes much to harmonisation across departments in the UK, with ODA being upgraded to ministry status and re-named DFID, with overall responsibility for the aid budget. A team of programme officers for Montserrat was created within DFID and on island (a resident lead, an infrastructure adviser and two programme officers) (ICAI 2013 ). Forced on to the political agenda in the UK by the volcanic crisis, these changes –outlined in the 1999 White Paper Partnership for Progress and Prosperity and 2002 British Overseas Territories Act– have had important implications for inter-governmental mandates: any laws adopted by the UK or through the European Union, are now applicable to Montserrat. This includes more stringent EU environmental laws. The Act has brought about increased consultation between political cadres of territories and the UK government, and a more proactive dialogue has opened up (interviews, UK and local government officials, 1–2 October 2012).

The volcanic crisis had uncovered some of the inherent contradictions in the autonomous system of governance in Montserrat, but it also prompted UK and local authorities to consider their own levels of risk tolerance and responsibilities for reducing exposure. A tacit alignment of UK and local government risk perceptions was established in 1999 and endorsed through the definition of an exclusion zone and subsequent investment in the north. Yet more recent studies suggest that these formal notions of tolerable risk may not be shared by the local population or even the local government (Haynes et al . 2008 ). Exposure to high-impact events such as pyroclastic flows has been dramatically reduced through officially prescribed norms intended to reduce risk (relocation and establishing exclusion zones), but the north of the island had been affected by ash fall and acid rain until recenly, representing a low-level, intermittent but widespread risk that is given low consideration in development planning. Ash fall presents health risks and asthma sufferers in particular have reported suffering respiratory problems from heavy ash fall (interviews, local residents, 1 to 3 October 2012). Infrastructure built during the recovery period has also been affected and needs constant cleaning, replacement and repair. Most buildings (and homes) have tropical slatted windows, which allow ash to enter buildings because they cannot be properly sealed (Sword-Daniels et al. , 2013 ).

The negative impacts of relocating people in the north of the island and of the social upheaval of Montserratians moving to the UK should not be overlooked. Most Montserratians on the island today, are worse off economically that before the eruption. Farming activities are less lucrative and farmers are reluctant to invest as they do not have security of tenure and are aware of the threat of future ash fall and acid rain (Halcrow Group and the Montserrat National Assessment Team 2012 ). Land shortages in the north have meant that new houses have been erected in unsafe and unsuitable locations such as ravines (Hicks and Few, 2014 ). Although resettlement has reduced exposure to volcanic hazards, these policies have created new vulnerabilities for the island population that may be more tolerable than volcanic hazard exposure for now, but this may not always be the case.

There are instances of individuals not subscribing to official rules, which suggests that levels of risk tolerance vary and are not static. People entering the exclusion zone for livelihood reasons, such as tending to crops and illegal scrap metal collecting, as well as those building too close to the exclusion zone, are examples of this. Expatriate residents continue to live in Old Towne, which can become part of the exclusion zone with heightened volcanic activity, and have expressed their reluctance to evacuate and lack of confidence in the alert levels issued by the MVO and temporary evacuations decisions (interviews, local residents, 3 October 2012). Nearby Salem has a secondary school and a primary healthcare clinic and is home to a growing immigrant population and an ad-hoc business district (Sword-Daniels et al . 2013 ). Rental housing is cheaper in this area and new arrivals appear to be less aware of the risks associated with volcanic activity than Montserratians (interviews, local residents and local government, 1 to 3 October 2012). Overall, the view that the future of the island is in the north appears not be as unanimous as official views and recent patterns of infrastructure investments suggest.

Another factor suggesting that local authorities may not entirely endorse the idea of development in the north is the temporary nature of much of the island’s vital infrastructure. Sword-Daniels et al . ( 2013 ) note that many of the buildings and essential services that were put up during the recovery period were not permanent structures. These facilities have been upgraded incrementally over time but the perception of sites as temporary has in some cases obstructed funding leaving some buildings in an inadequate state. These ‘quick fixes’ need to be re-addressed to enable further progress towards development goals.

The disaster risk governance regime in Montserrat has undergone a radical shift as a result of the volcanic crisis of 1995–1997 and alterations in central and local perceptions of volcanic risk. Essentially, a longer-term view of risk has been adopted by UK and local authorities, scientists and local communities, and this has brought with it substantial investments in safer locations further north and a belief that the future of the island is in the north. DRM in Montserrat is no longer concerned with the circumstances under which a return to south will be possible or how to make lives and livelihoods safer in former settlements. The longer term view of risk management being taken and new investments being made in safer locations further from the volcano, represents an important shift in the risk governance system (see Table  2 ).

A transformation towards greater vertical coherence has also taken place but is not complete, and there are signs that local and external-scientific assessments of volcanic risk in Montserrat are diverging. In particular, scientists and UK government officials have raised concerns about increasing settlement in areas close to the exclusion zone plus the low consideration given to ash fall in development planning (interviews, UK government officials and scientists, Montserrat, 2–4 October 2012). These comments and trends collectively suggest that the tolerable level of risk for local residents is higher in some cases than that established by UK and Montserratian authorities. Similarly, international development agencies have expressed concern that public awareness of hazards other than volcanoes needs to be improved. According to a review of disaster risk management capacity in Montserrat carried out by UNDP ( 2010 ), the focus of DRM activities is too often related to the Soufrière Hills volcano, with insufficient emphasis on a multi-hazard approach.

These local perceptions of risk and the cognitive processes through which risks are deemed insignificant or adequately controlled by individuals and groups need to be explored further and contrasted with external and scientific judgements. Calculations of tolerable risk are not static and the analysis presented above demonstrates how both new people coming into a volcanic area and the passing of time may change ‘local’ perceptions of risk. The Montserrat case does however suggest that transformational shifts in disaster risk governance can only occur when tolerable levels of risk are agreed on by stakeholders and this will require high levels of horizontal as well as vertical and coherence.

In analysing continuities and discontinuities in Montserrat’s disaster risk governance system from the late 1980s to the present day, alterations in the governance system can be observed on two occasions: in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo and during the volcanic crisis period. For both events, abrupt changes in levels of disaster risk and limited local capacity to respond led to greater external interference in local DRM decisions. Although Hurricane Hugo was a high impact event, the hazard subsided quickly and these alterations were temporary. The volcanic eruption, on the other hand, occurred over a long period of time and produced more permanent changes in the disaster risk governance regime and in the island’s governance system more broadly. The sharp and sustained rise in the level of volcanic risk combined with a weak response from local and UK authorities led to a sustained reduction in local autonomy but also an increase in vertical coherence and when levels of risk declined and post-disaster recovery ended these new configurations did not return to their pre-crisis state.

This transformation may not prove to be irreversible, although there could be a latent ‘tendency towards dependency’ in Montserrat common to all UK overseas territories (Pattullo 2000 ; Skinner 2002 ). For critics of UK colonialism these territories ‘will always struggle to develop and will always be dependent upon other places and people’ (Skinner 2002 : 316). One aspect of the shift in risk governance in particular that may be permanent is that of increased vertical coherence. Although local capacity to assess risk and implement risk reduction measures is still limited by lack of human and technical resources, Montserrat is now better integrated into a regional disaster risk governance system that can offer this support and advice. This is unlikely to change.

Conclusions

This research draws a number of conclusions about volcanic crises and regime change in Montserrat of relevance to multi-tiered governance regimes elsewhere and to different hazardous contexts. The examples of Hurricane Hugo and Soufrière Hills both suggest that crises brought about by sharp increases in the level of risk are likely to provoke temporary alterations in central-local relations, and in particular a sharp decline in local autonomy over DRM decisions. This intervention by external actors can have both negative and positive consequences for disaster risk management, creating dependency but also enhancing vertical coherence, offering opportunities for learning and capacity building.

The Montserrat experience is atypical however and caution should be exercised in drawing lessons for other contexts. In particular, the relationship between the UK and its overseas territories is unique and different even from French and Dutch overseas territories in the Caribbean. Central governments elsewhere may not be so inclined to provide ongoing financial support to local governments after the recovery process is considered to have ended. Similarly, local governments with significant levels of autonomy in decentralised and particularly federal systems of governance elsewhere are likely to reject sustained central government interference in local affairs following a protracted crisis. Governance reform in Montserrat was the product of conflict, but ultimately compromise, and in other contexts consensus between central and local authorities on tolerable levels of risk may be harder to achieve. Notwithstanding these caveats, however, the transition to co-governance and the re-framing of disaster risk that have taken place in Montserrat provide useful examples of how transformations can occur in disaster risk governance systems following high-intensity, long-duration volcanic events.

The experience of Montserrat also provides useful insights for volcanic islands elsewhere and small island states with disaster risks more generally. Small islands have few options for resettlement when significant parts of the territory are destroyed by a disaster, or when the decision is taken to move populations before a disaster to prevent loss of life. The benefits in terms of reducing disaster risk have to be weighed against loss of livelihoods for a significant proportion of the population, considerable social upheaval and often economic decline. Critical to the success and sustainability of these risk management decisions is the need for vertical coherence and dialogue between different scales of governance. In Montserrat this has been partly achieved through greater integration into the regional risk governance system and via the establishment of an economically dependent but politically autonomous system of co-governance with the UK. But unless communities are also engaged in risk governance decisions and consensus is built, this tacit agreement to pursue a low-volcanic-risk development model could come unstuck. Small islands with large risks can learn from the Montserrat experience. They can anticipate and plan for how these dialogues might take place in the event of a major disaster.

a For a more detailed discussion of complex social relations and personal politics of small societies as well as the dependency mentality of overseas territories ad former colonies see Skinner ( 2002 ).

b The Montserrat workshop was run by the STREVA programme as part of a ‘forensic’ research process, from 25-29th September 2012.

Abbreviations

Caribbean Community and Common Market

Caribbean Development Bank

Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency

Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency

Caribbean Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Project

Department for International Development

Disaster Management Coordination Agency

• Disaster risk management

Dependent Territories Regional Secretariat

European Commission Humanitarian Office

Emergency Operations Centre

European Union

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Overseas Development Agency

Montserrat Volcano Observatory

Strengthening Resilience in Volcanic Areas.

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Edward Clay for early discussions on UK-Montserrat relations, Richie Robertson, Barbara Carby and Peter Simmons for providing comments and suggestions on how to improve this paper and to three anonymous reviews who provided useful comments. Research was conducted under the STREVA project, funded by the NERC/ESRC Increasing Resilience to Natural Hazards in Earthquake-prone & Volcanic Regions programme.

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Wilkinson, E. Beyond the volcanic crisis: co-governance of risk in Montserrat. J Appl. Volcanol. 4 , 3 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1186/s13617-014-0021-7

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Received : 07 July 2014

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To evaluate the causes and effects of the Montserrat eruption and suggest sustainable ways to rebuild the island

Starter : Read the intro of the wikipedia page on Montserrat and take five notes of the features you find most relevant about this island. 

Task 1 - Study the Google maps below and make three notes of the physical characteristics of the island of Montserrat. 

Task 2 - Study the BBC bitesize case study in the textbox below and, on your exercise book, answer the questions that follow it.  (Click to open) 

Case study: Chances Peak, Montserrat, 1995-97 - an LEDC

Plymouth covered in ash from volcanic eruptions on Montserrat

Montserrat is a small island in the Caribbean. There is a volcanic area located in the south of the island on Soufriere Hills called Chances Peak . Before 1995 it had been dormant for over 300 years. In 1995 the volcano began to give off warning signs of an eruption (small earthquakes and eruptions of dust and ash). Once Chances Peak had woken up it then remained active for five years. The most intense eruptions occurred in 1997.

During this time, Montserrat was devastated by pyroclastic flows . The small population of the island (11,000 people) was evacuated in 1995 to the north of Montserrat as well as to neighbouring islands and the UK.

Despite the evacuations, 19 people were killed by the eruptions as a small group of people chose to stay behind to watch over their crops.

Volcanic eruptions and lahars have destroyed large areas of Montserrat. The capital, Plymouth, has been covered in layers of ash and mud. Many homes and buildings have been destroyed, including the only hospital, the airport and many roads.

The graphic shows the progress of the eruption and its impact on the island.

Montserrat - eruption progress and impact

Short-term responses and results

• Evacuation.
• Abandonment of the capital city.
• The British government gave money for compensation and redevelopment.
• Unemployment rose due to the collapse of the tourist industry.

Long-term responses and results

• An exclusion zone was set up in the volcanic region.
• A volcanic observatory was built to monitor the volcano.
• New roads and a new airport were built.
• Services in the north of the island were expanded.
• The presence of the volcano resulted in a growth in tourism.

Volcanic activity has calmed down in recent years and people have begun to return to the island.

You might be asked to consider the values and attitudes or opinions of people involved in the eruption, such as refugees or aid workers for example.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/geography/natural_hazards/volcanoes_rev6.shtml 

https://www.bbc.com/bitesize/guides/zgh79qt/revision/6

Click here to view http://www.coolgeography.co.uk/A-level/AQA/Year%2013/Plate%20Tectonics/Extra_case_studies/Montserrat.htm As a precaution, Firefly only embeds content that has a certificate to prove it's sent over the web securely.

http://www.coolgeography.co.uk/A-level/AQA/Year%2013/Plate%20Tectonics/Extra_case_studies/Montserrat.htm

Questions :       a. Define i. pyroclastic flows, ii. evacuated, iii. lahar                                                 b. Describe the short-term and long-term responses and results.

Task 3 - Watch the video below and complement your notes with additional information. 

Task 4 - You have been asked to rebuild Montserrat following the volcanic eruption. You have been given £84,000 (£21,000 per year) to spend over 4 years but must make sure you spend it wisely and consider where to put your new facilities on your map. Your teacher will give you a copy of the document below: 

• montserrat restructuring priorities SEN.docx

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Join get revising, already a member, geography volcanooes case study - montserrat, 1995-7.

My revision notes on the Volcanic eruption on the island of Monterrat between the years of 1995 and 1997.

- A timeline of the volcanic activity

- Impacts (human and enviromental)

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• Created on: 22-05-09 19:48
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GCSE LEDC Volcano Case Study Montserrat 1995-1997

Subject: Geography

Age range: 14-16

Resource type: Lesson (complete)

Last updated

16 December 2019

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Learning Objective of lesson: To investigate the volcanic eruption of Montserrat, 1995-1997. Students locate Montserrat on a map, watch a short video from National Geographic (link to the video in the lesson), they will then complete a table of facts and keywords before moving on to the main activity which is working in groups to create a report on the eruption. The lesson finishes on a fun game of Taboo using keywords from the Restless Earth unit of study within AQA A syllabus.

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