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Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation

Author: Dan Lowe Category: Social and Political Philosophy , Ethics , Historical Philosophy Word Count: 1000

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Karl Marx’s thought is wide-ranging and has had a massive influence, especially in philosophy and sociology.

Marx is best known for his unsparing criticism of capitalism. His first major critique maintains that capitalism is essentially  alienating . The second major critique maintains that capitalism is essentially  exploitative . [1]

This essay focuses specifically on Marx’s theory of alienation, which rests on Marx’s specific claims about both economics and human nature.

1. Marx’s Analysis of Capitalism

For Marx, the idea of the  means of production  is a crucial economic category. The means of production include nearly everything needed to produce commodities, including natural resources, factories, and machinery. In a capitalist economy, as opposed to a communist or socialist economy, the means of production are privately owned, as when a businessperson owns a factory. 

The key element  not  included as part of the means of production is labor. [2]  As a result, members of the capitalist economy find themselves divided into two distinct classes: those who own the means of production (the capitalist class [3]  or  bourgeoisie ) and those workers who do not (the  proletariat ).

2. Marx’s Concept of Species-Being

For Marx, whether capitalism and its class-division is a suitable arrangement for human beings depends on human nature.

Because humans are biological beings, and not merely free-floating immaterial minds, we must interact with and transform the natural world in order to survive. [4]  But what distinguishes us from all other animals, like bees, spiders, or beavers, which all transform the world based on instinct, is that we transform the world consciously and freely. [5]

Thus, the essence of a human being – what Marx calls our  species-being  – is to consciously and freely transform the world in order to meet our needs. Like many other philosophers, Marx believes that excellently doing what makes us distinctively human is the true source of fulfillment.

3. Alienation in Capitalist Society

We can now make clear Marx’s claim that capitalism is alienating.

The general idea of alienation is simple: something is  alienating  when what is (or should be) familiar and connected comes to seem foreign or disconnected. Because our species-being is our essence as human beings, it should be something that is familiar. To the extent that we are unable to act in accordance with our species-being, we become disconnected from our own nature. So if work in a capitalist society inhibits the realization of our species-being, then work is to that extent alienating. [6]  And since we are being alienated from our own nature, alienation is not merely a subjective feeling, but is about an objective reality.

So how are workers alienated from their species-being under capitalism? Marx distinguishes three specific ways. [7]

A. Workers are alienated from other human beings. In a capitalist economy, workers must compete with each other for jobs and raises. But just as competition between businesses brings down the price of commodities, competition between workers brings down wages. And so it is not the proletariat who benefits from this competition, but capitalists. This is not only materially damaging to workers, it estranges them from each other. Humans are free beings and can cooperate in order to transform the world in more sophisticated and helpful ways. As such, they should see each other as allies, especially in the face of a capitalist class that seeks to undermine worker solidarity for its own benefit. But under capitalism workers see each other as opposing competition.

B. Workers are alienated from the products of their labor. Capitalists need not do any labor themselves – simply by owning the means of production, they control the profit of the firm they own, and are enriched by it. But they can only make profit by selling commodities, which are entirely produced by workers. [8] Thus, the products of the worker’s labor strengthen the capitalists, whose interests are opposed to that of the proletariat. Workers do this as laborers, but also as consumers: Whenever laborers buy commodities from capitalists, that also strengthens the position of the capitalists. This again stands in opposition to the workers’ species-being. Humans produce in response to our needs; but for the proletariat at least, strengthening the capitalist class is surely not one of those needs.

C. Workers are alienated from the act of labor.  Because capitalists own the firms that employ workers, it is they, not the workers, who decide what commodities are made, how they are made, and in what working conditions they are made. As a result, work is often dreary, repetitive, and even dangerous. Such work may be suitable for machines, or beings without the ability to consciously and freely decide how they want to work, but it is not suitable for human beings. Enduring this for an extended period of time means that one can only look for fulfillment  outside of  one’s work; while “the activity of working, which is potentially the source of human self-definition and human freedom, is … degraded to a necessity for staying alive.” [9]  As Marx puts it in a famous passage:

[I]n his work, therefore, he [the laborer [10] ] does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside of work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home. [11]

If Marx is right about all of this, then contemporary complaints about the degrading nature of work are not hyperbole. Insofar as capitalism prevents us from realizing our own species-being, it is, quite literally, dehumanizing.

4. Conclusion

One may find great inspiration in the idea that true fulfillment can come from creative and meaningful work. Yet most people’s actual experience of work in capitalist economies is characterized by tedium, apathy, and exhaustion. Marx’s theory of alienation provides a conceptual framework for understanding the nature and cause of these experiences, and assures us that these subjective experiences are about an objective reality – and, crucially, a reality we can change.

[1] In general, Marx’s theory of alienation belongs to his earlier philosophy (the chapter “Estranged Labor” in his  Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 , an unfinished work that was unpublished at the time of his death), and his theory of exploitation belongs to his later philosophy (in  Capital ). It is a matter of scholarly debate to what extent this progression in his thinking represented a substantive change in his position, or merely a shift in emphasis.

[2] To keep things simple, I follow Marx in speaking of business being directed primarily at producing commodities. Of course, Marx was writing long before the development of an extensive service sector characteristic of late capitalism. Nevertheless, by tweaking some of the language, his general analysis can also be applied to service industries in capitalist economies.

[3] In classical political economy, a “capitalist” is someone who owns the means of production–not merely someone who is in favor of capitalism.

[4] This emphasis on biological embodiment distinguishes the Marxist conception of human nature from those which count rationality as the distinguishing feature of human beings — a feature which would equally apply to immaterial minds.

[5] Or as Marx puts it, in quasi-Hegelian language, “Conscious life-activity directly distinguishes man from animal life-activity. It is just because of this that he is a species being.” Karl Marx, “Estranged Labor,” in  The Marx-Engels Reader  (ed. Tucker), p. 76.

[6] Here we are focusing on whether workers – the proletariat – are alienated under capitalism. But Marx believes that the bourgeoisie experiences its own form of alienation: see Marx’s “Alienation and Social Classes” in  The Marx-Engels Reade r (ed. Tucker).

[7] Marx is usually interpreted as presenting  four  distinct ways in which workers are alienated under capitalism (see, e.g., Jonathan Wolff’s “Karl Marx,” section 2.3.), and there’s strong support for that within Marx’s own writing. When looked at in that way, the fourth form of alienation just is alienation from one’s species-being. But it is more perspicuous to think of the three ways as  constituting  workers’ alienation from their species-being, rather than being kinds of alienation  in addition to  alienation from species-being. I’m grateful to Jason Wyckoff for pointing out the heterodoxy of my interpretation.

[8] Here we see the seeds of the second critique of capitalism that Marx would develop later: that it is exploitative.

[9] Richard Schmitt,  Introduction to Marx and Engels: A Critical Reconstruction , p. 154.

[10] Marx almost always uses the masculine pronoun to refer to workers. For a discussion of applying Marx’s conceptual framework to women’s labor, both paid and unpaid, see Alison M. Jaggar’s  Feminist Politics and Human Nature , especially chapters 4, 6, 8, and 10.

[11] Karl Marx, “Estranged Labor,” in  The Marx-Engels Reader  (ed. Tucker), p. 74.

Jaggar, Alison M. Feminist Politics and Human Nature . Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1983.

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels.  The Marx-Engels Reader (ed. Robert C. Tucker). Second Edition. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978.

Schmitt, Richard. Introduction to Marx and Engels: A Critical Reconstruction . Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987.  

Wolff, Jonathan. “Karl Marx.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , ed. Edward N. Zalta. 2010.

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About the Author

Dan Lowe is a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He earned a PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado at Boulder and has a graduate certificate in Women and Gender Studies. He works on ethics broadly construed, political philosophy, and feminist philosophy. His current research is in naturalized moral epistemology and philosophical methodology in general. sites.google.com/site/danlowe161

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Alienation and Capitalism Essay

Introduction, human nature, alienation and capitalism, works cited.

The idea of alienation was developed by Karl Marx and it can be used to analyze the nature of human interaction in the current world. Alienation is widespread today and it can barely be witnessed in almost all societies. “Marx developed his theory of alienation to reveal the human activity that lies behind the seemingly impersonal forces dominating society” (Meszaros 45). Marx contends that the modern world is a product of past human activities.

He further explains that the future world will also be influenced by human activities. The materialist theory as put forward by Marx indicates that human beings were influenced by their societies. Marx believes that alienation is entrenched in materialism and not in religion or the psyche. However, Hegel and Feuerbach associated alienation with the former and not the latter. Alienation in essence meant loss of the capacity to have power over labor.

“Marx criticized the notion that humans possess a fixed nature regardless of their society” (Marx 398). He clearly explained how the myriad factors associated with the unchanging human character, vary considerably in various societies. He contended that the necessity to influence nature to fulfill human requirements was the only systematic aspect of all human cultures. Just like animals, people should work in order to stay alive. Nonetheless, human labor was differentiated from animal labor since human beings developed perception.

Ernest Fischer noted that human labor is unique since people consciously work on nature, and formulate new mechanisms of getting the items they require. Working on nature changes both the laborer and his environment. “Consequently, labor is a dynamic process through which the laborer shapes and moulds the world he lives in and stimulates himself to create and innovate” (Ollman 156). According to Marx, “the individual is the social being” (Ollman 157).

In this context, Marx implies that as people struggle to obtain their daily needs, they are all compelled to interact with others. Society is not merely comprised of people; it conveys the totality of relationships and connections that people find themselves in. labor makes people to interact physically with the world.

Development of humanity is partly determined by labor. Moreover, human relationships are a product of labor itself. “Our ability to work, to improve how we work and build on our successes, has tended to result in the cumulative development of the productive forces” (Macionis 456). This is what produced class society.

Surplus production caused division of societies into classes. This process was significant in developing and controlling dynamics of production. However, it also meant that most producers could no longer have control of other people’s labor. As a result, labor alienation emerged with social order.

“The emergence of class divisions in which one class had control over the means of producing what society needed, led to a further division between individuals and the society to which they belonged” (Marx 345). Even though alienation is persistent in the world, it can still be altered.

“Alienation arose from the low level of the productive forces, from human subordination to the land and from the domination of the feudal ruling class” (Macionis 134). Nonetheless, these types of alienation exhibited some restrictions. For instance, peasants labored independently on their land, and produced their necessities within their autonomous family systems.

Capitalism had dynamics and constraints that were different from those of feudalism. The bourgeoisie envisaged a society where transactions could primarily be based on money. In this case, alienation is practiced through selling. In the capitalist society, many individuals were restrained from accessing the vital modes of production.

As such, the majority of people were rendered landless. This compelled them to sell their labor in order to meet their daily necessities. Hence, labor was commoditized and it could be sold just like other items in the market. “Capitalism involved a fundamental change in the relations between men, instruments of production and the materials of production” (Marx 234).

Production shifted from homes to factories. Division of labor came into sight with the onset of factory production, and it was really devastating. Workers became over dependent on the bourgeoisie, who dominated production. Forced labor also emerged because laborers had no influence in their jobs.

Alienation was worsened by capitalism. In this case, workers were extremely alienated from the items they produced. “Marx argued that the alienation of the worker from what he produces is intensified because the products of labor actually begin to dominate the laborer” (Macionis 367).

Part of a worker’s produce is embezzled by his employer. Therefore, the worker is continuously exploited. Workers also use their wages to purchase what they have produced themselves. The labor patterns today have been seriously fragmented by the current production models.

From this discussion, it is evident that alienation has consistently developed from the ancient world to present. At present, alienation is manifested clearly by the kind of interaction that prevails between modern industrialists and their laborers. In this parasitic interaction, the capitalists have a tight grip on production channels. Conversely, workers are only left with the option of selling their skills. Therefore, Marx’s alienation concept is relevant in examining the existing production systems.

Macionis, John. Sociology. New York: Pearson Prentice Hall, 1997.

Marx, Karl. Theories of Surplus Value. New York: Humanity Books, 2000.

Meszaros, Istvan. Marx’s Theory of Alienation. New York: Merlin Press, 1986.

Ollman, Bertell. Alienation: Marx’s Conception of Man in a Capitalist Society. London: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

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The concept of alienation identifies a distinct kind of psychological or social ill; namely, one involving a problematic separation between a self and other that belong together. So understood, alienation appears to play a largely diagnostic or critical role, sometimes said to suggest that something is awry with both liberal societies and liberal political philosophy. Theories of alienation typically pick out a subset of these problematic separations as being of particular importance, and then offer explanatory accounts of the extent of, and prognosis for, alienation, so understood. Discussions of alienation are especially, but not uniquely, associated with Hegelian and Marxist intellectual traditions.

The present entry clarifies the basic idea of alienation. It distinguishes alienation from some adjacent concepts; in particular, from ‘fetishism’ and ‘objectification’. And it elucidates some conceptual and normative complexities, including: the distinction between subjective and objective alienation; the need for a criterion by which candidate separations can be identified as problematic; and (some aspects of) the relation between alienation and ethical value. The empirical difficulties often generated by ostensibly philosophical accounts of alienation are acknowledged, but not resolved.

1.1 Introduced

1.2 elaborated, 1.3 modesty of, 2.1 introduced, 2.2 fetishism, 2.3 objectification.

• 3.1 The Distinction Between Subjective and Objective Alienation

3.2 Diagnostic Schema

3.3 applications, 4.1 criteria of ‘impropriety’, 4.2 essential human nature, 4.3 an alternative criterion, 5.1 negative element, 5.2 positive element, 5.3 morality as alienating, 6.1 content, 6.3 prognosis, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the basic idea.

The term ‘alienation’ is usually thought to have comparatively modern European origins. In English, the term had emerged by the early fifteenth century, already possessing an interesting cluster of associations. ‘Alienation’, and its cognates, could variously refer: to an individual’s estrangement from God (it appears thus in the Wycliffe Bible); to legal transfers of ownership rights (initially, especially in land); and to mental derangement (a historical connection that survived into the nineteenth-century usage of the term ‘alienist’ for a psychiatric doctor). It is sometimes said that ‘alienation’ entered the German language via English legal usage, although G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831), for one, typically uses ‘ Entäusserung ’, and not ‘ Entfremdung ’ to refer to property transfer (Hegel 1991a: §65). (It is only the latter term which has an etymological link to ‘ fremd ’ or ‘alien’.) Moreover, perhaps the first philosophical discussion of alienation, at least of any sophistication, was in French. In the Second Discourse , Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) diagnoses ‘inflamed’ forms of amour propre —a love of self (which is sometimes rendered as ‘pride’ or ‘vanity’ in older English translations)—whose toxicity is amplified by certain social and historical developments, as manifesting themselves in alienated forms of self; that is, in the actions and lives of individuals who have somehow become divided from their own nature (see Rousseau 1997, and Forst 2017, 526–30).

There are limits to what can usefully be said about the concept of alienation in general; that is, what can usefully be said without getting involved in the complexities of particular accounts, advanced by particular authors, or associated with particular intellectual traditions. However, there is a basic idea here which seems to capture many of those authors and traditions, and which is not unduly elusive or difficult to understand.

This basic idea of alienation picks out a range of social and psychological ills involving a self and other. More precisely, it understands alienation as consisting in the problematic separation of a subject and object that belong together.

That formulation of the basic idea is perhaps too abbreviated to be easily intelligible, and certainly benefits from a little elaboration. The characterisation of alienation offered here—as a social or psychological ill involving the problematic separation of a subject and object that belong together—involves three constituent elements: a subject, an object, and the relation between them. It will be helpful to say a little more about each of these in turn.

First, the subject here is a self; typically, but not necessarily, a person, an individual agent. ‘Not necessarily’ because the subject could also be, for instance, a group of some kind. There seems to be no good reason to deny that a collective as well as an individual agent might be alienated from some object. For instance, as well as Anna being alienated from her government, it might be that women or citizens find themselves alienated from their government.

Second, the relevant object can take a variety of forms. These include: entities which are not a subject; another subject or subjects; and oneself. The object here might be an entity which is not a subject; for example, Beatrice might be alienated from the natural world, from a social practice, from an institution, or from a social norm, where none of those entities are understood as agents of any kind. In addition, the object might be an entity which is another subject, another person or group; for example, Beatrice might be alienated from her childhood friend Cecile, and Beatrice might also be alienated from her own family. Lastly, the object here might be the original subject; that is, there might be reflexive variants of the relation, for example, in which Beatrice is alienated from herself.

Third, the relation is one of problematic separation between a subject and object that belong together. All of these elements are required: there has to be a separation; the separation has to be problematic; and it has to obtain between a subject and object that properly belong together.

The idea of separation is important. Not all problematic relations between relevant entities involve alienation. For instance, being overly integrated into some other object might also be a problematic or dysfunctional relation but it is not what is typically thought of as alienation. Imagine, for instance, that Cecile has no life, no identity, finds no meaning, outside of her family membership. It is tempting, at least for modern individuals, to say that she has an ‘unhealthy’ relationship with her family, but it would seem odd to say that she was alienated from it. Alienation typically involves a separation from something.

These problematic separations can be indicated by a wide variety of words and phrases. No particular vocabulary seems to be required by the basic idea. The linguistic variety here might include words suggesting: breaks (‘splits’, ‘ruptures’, ‘bifurcations’, ‘divisions’, and so on); isolation (‘indifference’, ‘meaninglessness’, ‘powerlessness’, ‘disconnection’, and so on); and hostility (‘conflicts’, ‘antagonism’, ‘domination’, and so on). All these, and more, might be ways of indicating problematic separations of the relevant kind. Of course, particular authors may use language more systematically, but there seems little reason to insist that a specific vocabulary is required by the basic idea.

The idea of the relevant separation having to be, in some way, problematic , is also important. Separations between a subject and object do not necessarily appear problematic. Relations of indifference, for example, might or might not be problematic. For an unproblematic instance, consider Daniela, a distinguished Spanish architect, who—when it is brought to her attention—discovers that she is unconcerned with, and apathetic towards, the complex constitutional relationship between the Pacific islands of Niue and New Zealand. Her indifference in this case looks unproblematic. Less obviously perhaps, the same might be true of relations of hostility; that is, that hostility also might or might not be problematic. For an unproblematic instance, consider Enid and Francesca, two highly competitive middleweight boxers competing in the Olympics for the first time. It may well be that a certain amount of antagonism and rancour between these two individual sportswomen is entirely appropriate; after all, if Enid identifies too closely with Francesca—imagine her experiencing every blow to Francesca’s desires and interests as a defeat for her own—she is not only unlikely to make it to the podium, but is also, in some way, failing qua boxer.

The suggestion here is that to be appropriately problematic—appropriate, that is, to constitute examples of alienation—the separations have to obtain between a subject and object that properly belong together (Wood 2004: 3). More precisely, that the candidate separations have to frustrate or conflict with the proper harmony or connectedness between that subject and object. Imagine, for instance, that both the indifference of Daniela, and the hostility of Enid, now also take appropriately problematic forms. Perhaps we discover that Daniela has become increasingly indifferent to her lifelong vocation, that she no longer cares about the design and construction issues over which she had previously always enthused and obsessed; whilst Enid has started to develop feelings of loathing and suspicion for her domestic partner who she had previously trusted and loved. What makes these examples of separation (indifference and hostility) appear appropriately problematic is that they violate some baseline condition of harmony or connectedness between the relevant entities. (A baseline condition that does not seem to obtain in the earlier examples of un problematic separation.) Alienation obtains when a separation between a subject and object that properly belong together, frustrates or conflicts with that baseline connectedness or harmony. To say that they properly belong together is to suggest that the harmonious or connected relation between the subject and object is rational, natural, or good. And, in turn, that the separations frustrating or conflicting with that baseline condition, are correspondingly irrational, unnatural, or bad. (For some resistance to this characterisation, see Gilabert 2020, 55–56.) Of course, that is not yet to identify what might establish this baseline harmony as, say, rational, natural, or good. Nor is it to claim that the disruption of the baseline harmony is all-things-considered bad, that alienation could never be a justified or positive step. (These issues are discussed further in sections 4.1 and 5.2, respectively.)

This basic idea of alienation appears to give us a diverse but distinct set of social and psychological phenomena; picking out a class of entities which might have little in common other than this problematic separation of subject and object. The problematic separations here are between the self (including individual and collective agents) and other (including other selves, one’s own self, and entities which are not subjects). So understood, the basic idea of alienation seems to play largely a diagnostic or critical role; that is, the problematic separations might indicate that something is awry with the self or social world, but do not, in themselves, offer an explanation of, or suggest a solution to, those ills.

On this account, the basic idea of alienation looks conceptually rather modest. In particular, this idea is not necessarily committed to certain stronger claims that might sometimes be found in the literature. That all these social and psychological ills are characterised by a problematic separation, for example, does not make alienation a natural kind, anymore than—to borrow an example associated with John Stuart Mill—the class of white objects is a natural kind (Wood 2004: 4). Nor, for instance, need there be any suggestion that the various forms of alienation identified by this account are necessarily related to each other; that, for example, they are all explained by the same underlying factor. Of course, particular theorists may have constructed—more or less plausible—accounts of alienation that do advance those, or similar, stronger claims. For instance, the young Karl Marx (1818–1883) is often understood to have suggested that one of the systematic forms of alienation somehow explains all the other ones (Wood 2004: 4). The claim here is simply that these, and other, stronger claims are not required by the basic idea.

That said, the basic idea of alienation appears to require only a few additions in order to extend its critical reach significantly. Consider two further suggestions often made in this context: that alienation picks out an array of non-trivial social and psychological ills that are prevalent in modern liberal societies; and that the idea of ‘alienation’ is distinct from that of ‘injustice’ on which much modern liberal political philosophy is focused. These familiar claims are not extravagant, but, so understood, the concept of alienation would appear to have some critical purchase on both contemporary liberal societies (for containing alienation) and contemporary liberal political philosophy (for neglecting alienation). The implied critical suggestion—that the concept of alienation reveals that something significant is awry with both liberal society and liberal understandings—looks far from trivial. (Of course, establishing that those purported failings reveal fundamental flaws in either liberal society, or liberal political philosophy, is rather harder to accomplish.)

Particular theories of alienation typically restrict the range of problematic separations that they are interested in, and introduce more explanatory accounts of the extent and prognosis of alienation so characterised. They might, for instance, focus on social rather than psychological ills, and maintain that these are caused by certain structural features—particular aspects of its economic arrangements, for instance—of the relevant society. Such explanatory claims are of considerable interest. After all, understanding the cause of a problem looks like a helpful step towards working out whether, and how, it might be alleviated or overcome. However, these explanatory claims are not readily open to general discussion, given the significant disagreements between particular thinkers and traditions that exist in this context. Note also that introducing these various restrictions of scope, and various competing explanatory claims, increases the complexity of the relevant account. However, these complexities alone scarcely explain the—somewhat undeserved—reputation that the concept of alienation has for being unduly difficult or elusive. It might be that their impact is compounded—at least in the intellectual traditions with which the concept of alienation is most often associated (Hegelianism and Marxism)—by language and argumentative structures that are unfamiliar to some modern readers.

2. Adjacent Concepts

It may be helpful to say something about the relation of alienation to what can be called ‘adjacent’ concepts. The two examples discussed here are both drawn from Hegelian and Marxist traditions; namely, the concepts of fetishism and objectification. Disambiguating the relationship between these various concepts can help clarify the general shape of alienation. However, they are also discussed because particular accounts of alienation, both within and beyond those two traditions, are sometimes said—more or less plausibly—to conflate alienation either with fetishism, or with objectification. Even if some particular treatments of alienation do equate the relevant concepts with each other, alienation is better understood as synonymous with neither fetishism nor objectification. Rather, fetishism is only one form that alienation can take, and not all objectification involves alienation.

The first of these adjacent ideas is fetishism. ‘Fetishism’ refers here to the idea of human creations which have somehow escaped (we might say that they have inappropriately separated out from) human control, achieved the appearance of independence, and come to enslave or dominate their creators.

Within Hegelian and Marxist traditions, a surprisingly wide range of social phenomena—including religion, the state, and private property—have been characterised as having the character of a fetish. Indeed, Marx sometimes treats the phenomenon of fetishism as a distinguishing feature of modernity; where previous historical epochs were characterised by the rule of persons over persons, capitalist society is characterised by the rule of things over persons. ‘Capital’, we might say, has come to replace the feudal lord. Consider, for instance, the frequency with which ‘market forces’ are understood and represented within modern culture as something outside of human control, as akin to natural forces which decide our fate. In a famous image—from the Communist Manifesto —Marx portrays modern bourgeois society as ‘like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells’ (Marx and Engels 1976: 489).

In order to elaborate this idea of fetishism, consider the example of Christian religious consciousness, as broadly understood in the writings of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872). (Feuerbach was a contemporary of, and important influence on, the young Marx, amongst others.) The famous, and disarmingly simple, conclusion of Feuerbach’s philosophical analysis of religious consciousness is that, in Christianity, individuals are worshipping the predicates of human nature, freed of their individual limitations and projected onto an ideal entity. For Feuerbach, however, this is no purely intellectual error, but is rather ripe with social, political, and psychological consequences, as this ‘deity’ now comes to enslave and dominate us. Not least, the Christian God demands real world sacrifices from individuals, typically in the form of a denial or repression of their essential human needs. For instance, the Christian idea of marriage is portrayed as operating in a way that represses and punishes, rather than hallows and satisfies, the flesh of humankind (Leopold 2007: 207–210).

Religious consciousness, on this Feuerbachian account, looks to be a case where alienation takes the form of fetishism. That is, there is both a problematic separation here between subject and object (individuals and their own human nature), and it takes the form of a human creation (the idea of the species embodied in God) escaping our control, achieving the appearance of independence, and coming to enslave and dominate us. The same looks to be true, on Marx’s account, of production in contemporary capitalist societies. Capital takes on the appearance of an independent social power which determines what is produced, how it is produced, and the economic (and other) relations between producers. Marx himself was struck by the parallel, and in the first volume of Capital , offers the following analogy: ‘As, in religion, man is governed by the products of his own brain, so in capitalistic production, he is governed by the products of his own hand’ (Marx 1996: 616). However, rather than equating alienation and fetishism, fetishism is better thought of as a particular form that alienation might take. (To be clear, there looks to be no reason to think that Marx would, or should, disagree with this claim.)

Note, in particular, that although Marx’s discussions of alienation often utilise the language of fetishism, not all of them take that form. Consider, for instance, the problematic separation sometimes said to exist between modern individuals and the natural world, as the former think of themselves and behave as if they were isolated, or cut off, or estranged, from the latter. The idea here is reflected in the less ‘Promethean’ moments of Marx’s work, for example, in the suggestion that the appropriate relation between humankind and nature would involve not our instrumental domination of ‘the other’, but rather a sympathetic appreciation of our complex interdependence with the natural world of which we are, in reality, a part. Those moments are perhaps most evident in Marx’s discussion of contemporary ‘ecological’ threats—including deforestation, pollution, and population growth—and typically involve his ‘metabolic’ account of the appropriate relation between humankind and nature (Foster 1999). The inappropriate modern relation between humankind and nature here looks like an example of alienation—there is a problematic separation of self and other—but certain central characteristics of fetishism would appear to be absent. Most obviously, the natural world is not a human creation which has escaped our control; not least, because nature is not a human creation. Moreover, the impact on humankind of this particular separation does not comfortably suit the language of enslavement and domination. Indeed, if anything, our inappropriate separation from the natural world seems to find expression in our own ruthlessly instrumental treatment of nature, rather than in nature’s tyranny over us.

The second of these adjacent ideas is objectification. The concept in question is not the idea of objectification—familiar from certain feminist and Kantian traditions—which concerns the moral impropriety of systematically treating a human being as if she were an object, thing, or commodity (Nussbaum 1995). That is a distinct and important phenomenon, but it is not the one that is relevant here. In the present context, objectification refers rather to the role of productive activity in mediating the evolving relationship between humankind and the natural world. This association is most familiar from certain Hegelian and Marxist traditions, with Marx often using the German term ‘ Vergegenständlichung ’ to capture what is here called ‘objectification’ (e.g., 1975: 272).

Humankind is seen as being part of, and dependent upon, the natural world. However, nature is initially somewhat stingy with its blessings; as a result, human beings confront the natural world from an original position of scarcity, struggling through productive activity of various kinds to change the material form of nature—typically through making things—in ways that make it better reflect and satisfy their own needs and interests. In that evolving process, both the natural world and humankind come to be transformed. Through this collective shaping of their material surroundings, and their increasing productivity, the natural world is made to be, and seem, less ‘other’, and human beings thereby come to objectify themselves, to express their essential powers in concrete form. These world transforming productive activities, we might say, embody the progressive self-realisation of humankind.

On this account, all productive activity would seem to involve objectification. However, Marx insists that not all productive activity involves alienation. Moreover, some other forms of alienation—unrelated to productive activity—have no obvious connection with objectification.

Marx maintains that productive activity might or might not take an alienated form. For instance, productive activity in capitalist societies is typically said to take an alienated form; whereas productive activity in communist societies is typically predicted to take an unalienated or meaningful form. Schematically, we might portray alienated labour (characteristic of capitalist society) as: being forced; not involving self-realisation (not developing and deploying essential human powers); not intended to satisfy the needs of others; and not appropriately appreciated by those others. And, schematically, we might portray unalienated or meaningful work (characteristic of communist society) as: being freely chosen; involving self-realisation (the development and deployment of essential human powers); being intended to satisfy the needs of others; and being appropriately appreciated by those others (Kandiyali 2020). Productive activity mediates the relationship between humankind and the natural world in both of these societies, but alienation is found only in the former (capitalist) case.

For an example of a view which might be said to equate objectification with alienation, consider what is sometimes called the ‘Christian’ view of work. On this account, work is seen as a necessary evil, an unpleasant activity unfortunately required for our survival. It owes its name to Christianity’s embrace of the claim that alienated work is part of the human condition: at least since the Fall, human beings are required to work by the sweat of their brows (see Genesis 31:9). On Marx’s account, or something like it, one might characterise this Christian view as mistakenly equating objectification and alienation, confusing productive activity as such with its stunted and inhuman forms. Indeed, one might go further and suggest that this kind of confusion reflects the alienated social condition of humankind, embodying an emblematic failure to understand that material production is a central realm in which human beings can express, in free and creative ways, the kind of creatures that they are.

In addition, according to the basic idea defended here, equating alienation and objectification fails to appreciate that certain forms of alienation might have nothing at all to do with productive activity. Their mutual hostility and undisguised contempt confirm that Gillian and her sister Hanna are alienated from each other, but there seems little reason to assume that their estrangement is necessarily related to the world of work or their respective place in it. The sisters’ engagement in productive activity and the forms that it takes, might well have nothing to do with the problematic separation here. Imagine that the latter arose from a combination of sibling rivalry, stubbornness, and a chance misunderstanding at a time of family crisis involving the death of a parent. This possibility gives us another reason not to equate alienation and objectification.

In short, neither fetishism, nor objectification, are best construed as identical with alienation. Rather than being synonymous, these concepts only partially overlap. Fetishism can be understood as picking out only a subset—on some accounts perhaps a large subset—of cases of alienation. And there are forms of objectification which do not involve alienation (the meaningful work in communist societies, for instance), as well as forms of alienation—outside of productive activity—with no obvious connection to objectification.

3. Subjective and Objective Alienation

3.1 the distinction between subject and objective alienation.

The basic idea of alienation may not be unduly elusive or difficult to understand. However, it obviously does not follow that there are no complexities or slippery issues here, perhaps especially once we venture further into the relevant literature.

Three interesting complexities are introduced here. They concern, respectively: the distinction between subjective and objective alienation; the need for a criterion identifying candidate separations as problematic; and the relation between alienation and value.

This section provides an introduction to, and some initial reflections on, the first of these interesting complexities; namely, the division of alienation into subjective and objective varieties (Hardimon 1994: 119–122). Not all theorists or traditions operate (either, explicitly or implicitly) with this distinction, but it can be a considerable help in understanding the diagnosis offered by particular authors and in handling particular cases.

First, alienation is sometimes characterised in terms of how subjects feel, or think about, or otherwise experience, the problematic separation here. This can be called subjective alienation. For instance, Ingrid might be said to be alienated because she feels estranged from the world, because she experiences her life as lacking meaning, because she does not feel ‘at home [ zu Hause ]’ in the world—to adopt the evocative shorthand sometimes used by Hegel—and so on (e.g. 1991a: §4A, §187A, and §258A).

Second, alienation is sometimes characterised in terms which make no reference to the feelings, thoughts, or experience of subjects. This can be called objective alienation. For instance, Julieta might be said to be alienated because some separation prevents her from developing and deploying her essential human characteristics, prevents her from engaging in self-realising activities, and so on. Such claims are controversial in a variety of ways, but they assume alienation is about the frustration of that potential, and they make no reference to whether Julieta herself experiences that lack as a loss. Maybe Julieta genuinely enjoys her self-realisation-lacking life, and even consciously rejects the goal of self-realisation as involving an overly demanding and unattractive ideal.

Subjective alienation is sometimes disparaged – treated, for example, as concerning ‘merely’ how an individual ‘feels’ about ‘real’ alienation. However, subjective alienation is better understood as a full-blown, meaningful, variety of alienation, albeit not the only one. If you genuinely feel alienated, then you really are (subjectively) alienated.

This distinction between subjective and objective alienation can give us a useful diagnostic schema. Let us assume—no doubt controversially—that all combinations of these two forms of alienation are possible. That gives us four social outcomes to discuss:

Social Situation: Subjective Alienation: Objective Alienation: (i) ◼ ◼ (ii) ◻ ◼ (iii) ◼ ◻ (iv) ◻ ◻ Where: ◻ = Absent and ◼ = Present

These various alternative combinations—numbered (i) to (iv) above—correspond, very roughly, to the ways in which particular authors have characterised particular kinds of social arrangement or types of society. Consider, for example, the different views of modern class-divided society taken by Hegel and Marx.

Marx can be characterised as diagnosing contemporary capitalist society as corresponding to situation (i); that is, as being a social world which contains both objective and subjective alienation. On what we might call his standard view, Marx allows that objective and subjective alienation are conceptually distinct, but assumes that in capitalist societies they are typically found together sociologically (perhaps with the subjective forms tending to track the objective ones). However, there are passages where he deviates from that standard view, and—without abandoning the thought that objective alienation is, in some sense, more fundamental—appears to allow that, on occasion, subjective and objective alienation can also come apart sociologically. At least, that is one way of reading a well-known passage in The Holy Family which suggests that capitalists might be objectively but not subjectively alienated. In these remarks, Marx recognises that capitalists do not get to engage in self-realising activities of the right kind (hence their objective alienation), but observes that—unlike the proletariat—the capitalists are content in their estrangement; not least, they feel ‘at ease’ in it, and they feel ‘strengthened’ by it (Marx and Engels 1975: 36).

In contrast, Hegel maintains that the modern social world approximates to something more like situation (iii); that is, as being a social world not containing objective alienation, but still containing subjective alienation. That is, for Hegel, the social and political structures of the modern social world do constitute a home, because they enable individuals to realise themselves, variously as family members, economic agents, and citizens. However, those same individuals fail to understand or appreciate that this is the case, and rather feel estranged from, and perhaps even consciously reject, the institutions of the modern social world. The resulting situation has been characterised as one of ‘pure subjective alienation’ (Hardimon 1994: 121).

That Hegel and Marx diagnose modern society in these different ways helps to explain their differing strategic political commitments. They both aim to bring society closer to situation (iv)—that is, a social world lacking systematic forms of both objective and subjective alienation—but, since they disagree about where we are starting from, they propose different routes to that shared goal. For Marx, since we start from situation (i), this requires that the existing world be overturned; that is, that both institutions and attitudes need to be revolutionised (overcoming objective and subjective alienation). For Hegel, since we start from situation (iii), this requires only attitudinal change: we come to recognise that the existing world is already objectively ‘a home’, and in this way ‘reconcile’ ourselves to that world, overcoming pure subjective alienation in the process.

Situation (ii) consists of a social world containing objective, but not subjective, alienation – a situation that can be characterised as one of ‘pure objective alienation’ (Hardimon 1994: 120). It is perhaps not too much of a stretch to think of this situation as corresponding, very roughly, to one of the Frankfurt School’s more nightmarish visions of contemporary capitalist society. (The Frankfurt School is the colloquial label given to several generations of philosophers and social theorists, in the Western Marxist tradition, associated—more or less closely—with the Institute for Social Research founded in 1929–1930.) For example, in the pessimistic diagnosis of Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), articulated in One-Dimensional Man (1964), individuals in advanced capitalist societies appear happy in their dysfunctional relationships—they ‘identify themselves’ with their estranged circumstances and gain ‘satisfaction’ from them (2002: 13). Objective alienation still obtains, but no longer generates social conflict, since the latter is assumed—not implausibly—to require agents who feel, or experience, some form of hostility or rebelliousness towards existing social arrangements.

That latter assumption raises the wider issue of the relation between alienation and, what might be called ‘revolutionary motivation’. Let us assume that radical social change requires, amongst other conditions, an agent—typically a collective agent—with both the strength and the desire to bring that change about. The role of alienation in helping to form that latter psychological prerequisite—the desire to bring about change on the part of the putative revolutionary agent—looks complicated. First, it would seem that the mere fact of objective alienation cannot play the motivating role, since it does not involve or require any feeling, or thinking about, or otherwise experiencing, the problematic separation here. It remains possible, of course, that a subject’s knowledge of that alienation might—depending, not least, on one’s views on the connections between reasons and motivations—provide an appropriately psychological incentive to revolt. Second, the relation between subjective alienation and motivation looks more complex than it might initially seem. Note, in particular, that some of the experiential dimensions of subjective alienation look less likely than others to generate the psychological prerequisites of action here. Feelings of powerlessness and isolation, for instance, might well generate social withdrawal and individual atomism, rather than radical social engagement and cooperative endeavour, on the part of the relevant agents. In short, whether subjective alienation is a friend or an enemy of revolutionary motivation would seem to depend on the precise form that it takes.

Interestingly, situation (ii)—that is, the case of ‘pure objective alienation’—might also be thought to approximate to the social goal of certain thinkers in the tradition of existentialism (the tradition of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), Albert Camus (1913–1960), and others). Some interpretative generosity may be needed here, but existentialists appear to think of (something like) objective alienation as a permanent feature of all human societies. Rejecting both substantive accounts of essential human nature, and the ethical embrace of social relations that facilitate the development and deployment of those human characteristics, they rather maintain that the social world will always remain ‘other’, can never be a ‘home’. However, although this ‘otherness’ can never be overcome, there do look to be better and worse ways of dealing with it. What is essential to each individual is what they make of themselves, the ways in which they choose to engage with that other. The preferred outcome here seems to involve individuals embodying a norm of ‘authenticity’, which amongst other conditions—such as choosing, or committing, to their own projects—may require that they have the ‘courage’ to ‘grasp, accept, and, perhaps even affirm’ the fact that the social world is not a home for them (Hardimon 1994: 121).

This also clarifies that situation (iv)—which contains systematic forms of neither objective or subjective alienation—is the social goal of some but not all of these authors (of Hegel and Marx, for instance, but not the existentialists). Of course, (iv) might also be a characterisation of the extant social world according to a hypothetical, and over-optimistic, apologist for the present.

4. What Makes a Separation Problematic?

The second of the interesting complexities broached here concerns what we can call the need for a criterion of ‘impropriety’ – that is, a criterion by which candidate separations might be identified as problematic or not. Recall the earlier suggestion that accounts of alienation require some benchmark condition of harmony or connectedness against which separations might be assessed as problematic or not.

Historically, this role—identifying whether candidate separations are problematic—has often been played by accounts of our essential human nature. However, motivated by suspicion of that latter idea, theorists of alienation have sometimes sought alternatives to fulfil that role.

To see how the appeal to human nature works, imagine two hypothetical theorists—Katerina and Laura—seeking to assess whether alienation exists in a particular society. We can stipulate that the institutions and culture of this particular society are individualistic—in the sense that they systematically frustrate cooperation and sociability—and that the two theorists share many, but not all, of the same views. In particular, assume that our two theorists agree that: alienation is a coherent and useful concept; the account of alienation given here is, broadly speaking, plausible; the only serious candidate for a problematic separation in this particular society are those arising from its individualism; and our essential human nature provides the benchmark of ‘propriety’ for assessing separations. Simply put, separations are problematic if they frustrate, and unproblematic if they facilitate, ‘self-realisation’. Self-realisation is understood here as a central part of the good life and as consisting in the development and deployment of an individual’s essential human characteristics. However, assume also that Katerina and Laura disagree about what comprises human nature. In particular, they disagree about whether cooperation and sociability are essential human characteristics, with Katerina insisting that they are and Laura insisting that they are not. It seems to follow that Katerina will conclude, and Laura will deny, that this society is one containing alienation. For Katerina, the widespread lack of cooperation and sociability confirm that the basic social institutions here frustrate our self-realisation. For Laura, the very same widespread lack of cooperation and sociability confirm that the basic social institutions facilitate , or at least do not frustrate, our self-realisation.

Note that in sub-section 1.2, where the basic idea of alienation was elaborated, various relations between subject and object were distinguished, only one of which was characterised as reflexive. However, in the light of the present discussion, we might now think it more accurate to say that—on this kind of account, which uses our essential human nature to identify alienation—only one of them was directly reflexive, because there is some sense in which all of those dimensions of alienation involve a separation from some aspect of our own human nature. After all, this is precisely what picks out the relevant separation as problematic. For example, the separation of individuals from each other is, for Katerina, indirectly also a separation from human nature, from the cooperation and sociability that characterises our essential humanity.

As already noted, this benchmark—by which candidate separations are assessed as problematic or not—is often, but not always, played by accounts of our essential human nature. Given the widespread contemporary suspicion of such accounts—not least, by those opposed to what is sometimes called ‘essentialism’ about human nature—it might be helpful to sketch a recent account of alienation which is not dependent on such assumptions (or, at least, consciously strives to avoid them). There is also a potential benefit here for those of us who do not fully share that suspicion, namely, that such an example might provide some sense of the diversity of available theories of alienation.

Rahel Jaeggi offers an account of alienation of this kind, and situates it explicitly in the tradition of Critical Theory – the kind of emancipatory theory associated with the Frankfurt School. On this account, the idea of alienation has the potential to help us understand and change the world, but only if it receives some significant conceptual reconstruction. Alienation is still associated with the frustration of freedom, with disruptions to something like ‘self-realisation’. However, this account—unlike its forerunners and associates—is said not to be fatally compromised by a commitment to either ‘strongly objectivistic’ theories of the good life or ‘essentialist’ conceptions of the self (Jaeggi 2014: 40).

The crucial term of art here is ‘appropriation’, which Jaeggi uses to refer to the capacity for, and process of, relating to our own actions and projects in ways which engage ‘something like self-determination and being the author of one’s own life’ (2014: 39). Appropriation is successful—and alienation is absent—when ‘one is present in one’s actions, steers one’s life instead of being driven by it, independently appropriates social roles and is able to identify with one’s desires, and is involved in the world’ (Jaeggi 2014: 155). In contrast, appropriation is unsuccessful—and alienation is present—when there is ‘an inadequate power and a lack of presence in what one does, a failure to identify with one’s own actions and desires and to take part in one’s own life’ (Jaeggi 2014: 155). Alienation is thus identified with systematic disruptions of the process of appropriation – in particular, in those systematic disruptions which lead us to fail to experience our actions and projects as our own. These disruptions are said typically to take one of four forms: first, ‘powerlessness’ or the experience of losing control over one’s own life; second, ‘loss of authenticity’ especially when one is unable to identify with one’s own social roles; third, ‘internal division’ where one experiences some of one’s own desires and impulses as alien; and fourth, ‘indifference’ or a detachment from one’s own previous projects and self-understandings.

This model fits happily enough with our basic idea of alienation as consisting in a problematic separation between self and other that belong together. However, the conditions for identifying the relevant dysfunctional relation here are intended to be less demanding and controversial than those involving claims about our essential human nature. There is a kindred notion of freedom as self-realisation, but it is said to be the realisation of a thin kind of self-determining agency and not the actualisation of some thick ‘pre-given’ identity of an essentialist sort. A normative dimension remains, but it is presented as expansive and broadly procedural. It is expansive in that a wide range of actions and projects might be included within its remit. And it is procedural in that the benchmark for judging the success of these various actions and projects is that they were brought about in the right kind of self-determination delivering way, and not that their content reflects a narrow and controversial account of what human beings are ‘in essence’.

Modern culture is said to recognise and value the kind of freedom at the heart of this picture of appropriation. As a result, this account of alienation can be presented as a form of immanent critique – that is, as utilising a standpoint which judges individuals and forms of life according to standards that those individuals have themselves propounded or which those forms of life presuppose. At the individual level, this critique might involve identifying potential tensions between the conditions for treating people as responsible agents, and the obstructions to such agency that characterise alienated selves – for instance, the feelings of powerlessness that prevent individuals from directing and embracing their own lives. And at the social level, this critique might involve identifying potential discrepancies between modern ideals of freedom and their actual realisation in the contemporary world – for instance, the existence of social or political roles that an individual can never make their own (Jaeggi 2014: 41–42).

Of course, there remain questions about this account, and three are broached here. First, one might doubt whether the contrast between essentialist accounts of human nature, on the one hand, and a thinner kind of self-governing agency, on the other, can either be sustained or play the role intended. Second, one might wonder about the ground(s) of normativity; after all, that the kind of subjectivity or self-determination which appropriation embodies is recognised and valued in modern culture does not in itself establish its ethical worth. (More generally, it can seem easier to dismiss Hegelian teleology, or Marxist perfectionism, than it is to find wholly satisfactory replacements for them.) Third, one might be sceptical about the degree of social criticism here, since both the sources of, and solutions to, Jaeggi’s paradigmatic examples of unsuccessful appropriation (‘powerless’, ‘loss of authenticity’, ‘internal division’, and ‘indifference’) seem to focus on the ‘thoughts and dispositions’ of individuals rather than the structures of particular societies (Haverkamp 2016, 69). Of course, there might be plausible responses to these critical worries, some of which could draw on Jaeggi’s own subsequent work (see espcially 2018).

5. Alienation and Value

The third of these interesting complexities concerns the ethical dimension of alienation. The connections between alienation and ethics are many and diverse, and there is no attempt here to sketch that wider landscape in its entirety. Instead, attention is drawn to two topographical features: the claim that alienation is necessarily a negative, but not a wholly negative, phenomenon, is elaborated and defended; and the suggestion that some forms of moral theory or even morality itself might encourage or embody alienation is briefly outlined.

The claim that alienation is necessarily a negative, but not a wholly negative, phenomenon can be addressed in two parts. Defending the first part of that claim looks straightforward enough. Alienation, on the present account, consists in the separation of certain entities – a subject and some object—that properly belong together. As a result, alienation always involves a loss or lack of something of value, namely, the ‘proper’—rational, natural, or good—harmony or connectedness between the relevant subject and object.

It is the second part of the claim which looks less obvious: that alienation is not a wholly negative phenomena, that is, that the loss or lack here may not always be the whole story, ethically speaking. Note, in particular, that some well-known accounts also locate an achievement of something of value in the moment of alienation. The resulting ethical ‘gains’ and ‘losses’ would then need to be weighed and judged overall.

In order to illustrate this possibility—that alienation can involve the achievement of something of value—consider the nuanced and critical celebration of capitalism found, but not always recognised, in Marx’s writings. One pertinent way of introducing this account involves locating the moment of alienation within a pattern of development that we might call ‘dialectical’ in one sense of that slippery term.

The dialectical pattern here concerns the developing relationship between a particular subject and object: the individual, on the one hand, and their social role and community, on the other. By a dialectical progression is meant only a movement from a stage characterised by a relationship of ‘undifferentiated unity’, through a stage characterised by a relationship of ‘differentiated disunity’, to a stage characterised by a relationship of ‘differentiated unity’. There are no further claims made here about the necessity, the naturalness, or the prevalence, of such progressions (Cohen 1974: 237).

The dialectical progression here involves three historical stages:

First, past (pre-capitalist) societies are said to embody undifferentiated unity. In this stage, individuals are buried in their social role and community, scarcely conceptualising, still less promoting, their own identity and interests as distinguishable from those of the wider community.

Second, present (capitalist) societies are said to embody differentiated disunity. In this stage, independence and separation predominate, and individuals care only for themselves, scarcely thinking of the identity and interests of the wider community. Indeed, they are typically isolated from, and indifferent or even hostile towards, the latter.

Third, future (communist) societies are said to embody differentiated unity. In this stage, desirable versions of community and individuality flourish together. Indeed, in their new forms, communal and individual identities and communal and individual interests presuppose and reinforce each other. It is sometimes said that the contents of the first two stages (community and individuality, respectively) have thereby been ‘sublated’—that is, elevated, cancelled, and preserved—in this third stage. ‘Sublated’ is an attempted English translation of the German verb ‘ aufheben ’and its cognates, which Hegel occasionally uses to suggest this elusive combination of ideas (e.g. Hegel 1991b: §24A3, §81A1).

In the present context, the crucial historical stage is the second one. This is the stage of alienation, the stage of disunity which emerges from a simple unity before reconciliation in a higher (differentiated) unity (Inwood 1992: 36). This is the stage associated with present (capitalist) societies involving the problematic separation of individuals from their social role and community. In the first historical stage (of past pre-capitalist societies) there is a problematic relation, but no separation. And in the third historical stage (of future communist societies) there is a separation but it is a healthy rather than problematic one. In this second historical stage of alienation, there is a loss, or lack, of something of value; roughly speaking, it is the loss or lack of the individuals’ attachment to their social role and community. (More precisely, we might say that they have lost a sense of, and connection to, the community, and that they lack a healthy sense of, and connection to, the community.)

However, this disvalue is not the whole of the historical story, ethically speaking. In comparison with the first stage, the second stage also involves a liberation of sorts from the object in which subjects were previously ‘engulfed’ (Cohen 1974: 239). The ‘of sorts’ is a way of acknowledging that this is a rather distinctive kind of liberation. The individual here is not necessarily rid of the constraints of the other (of their social position and community), but they do now at least identify and experience them as such—that is, as constraints on the individual—whereas previously the individual was engulfed by that other and failed to think of themselves as having any identity and interests outside of their social position. In short, the loss or lack of something of value is not the only feature of the second stage of alienation. There is also an important gain here, namely, the achievement of what we can call ‘individuality’. This significant good was missing in the first pre-capitalist stage, and—freed from its present distorting capitalist form—it will be preserved and developed in the communist future of the third historical stage.

This claim goes beyond the familiar suggestion that alienation forms a necessary step in certain Hegelian and Marxist developmental narratives. The suggestion here is that internal to the second stage, the stage of alienation, there is both a problematic separation from community and a positive liberation from engulfment. Those who see only the negative thread in alienation, and fail to see ‘what is being achieved within in and distorted by it’, will miss an important, albeit subtle, thread in Marx’s account of the progressive character of capitalism (Cohen 1974: 253).

There is a lot going on in this schematic discussion of historical stages. The point emphasised here is that theorists—even critics—of alienation need not assume that it is a wholly negative phenomena, ethically speaking. Marx, for example, recognises that the moment of alienation, for all its negative features, also involves the emergence of a good (individuality), which, in due course (and freed from the limitations of its historical origins), will be central to the human flourishing achieved in communist society.

This claim—that alienation might not be a wholly negative phenomenon—concerns the normative dimensions of alienation. However, it is sometimes suggested that the concept of alienation might provide a standpoint from which morality itself, or at least some forms of it, can be criticised. This looks to be a very different kind of thought.

The broad suggestion is that morality, or certain conceptions of morality, might embody, or encourage, alienation. More precisely, morality, or certain conceptions of morality, might embody or encourage a problematic division of self and a problematic separation from much that is valuable in our lives. Consider, for example, accounts of the moral standpoint as requiring universalisation and equal consideration of all persons (Railton 1984: 138). It could seem that adopting such a standpoint requires individuals to disown or downplay the relevance of their more personal or partial (as opposed to impartial) beliefs and feelings. The picture of persons divided into cognitive and affective parts, with the partial and personal relegated to the downgraded sphere of the latter (perhaps conceptualised as something closer to mere sentiment than reason) is a familiar one. In addition to that problematic bifurcation of the self, such accounts might seem to cut us off from much that is valuable in our lives. If these impersonal kinds of moral consideration are to dominate our practical reasoning, then it seems likely that an individual’s particular attachments, loyalties, and commitments will have, at best, a marginal place (Railton 1984: 139). In aspiring to adopt ‘the point of view of the universe’—to use the well-known phrase of Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) – there can sometimes seem to be precious little security or space remaining for, say, friendship, love, and family (Sidgwick 1907: 382). So understood, morality, or certain conceptions of morality, are charged with embodying and encouraging alienation in the form of both a divided self, and a separation of self and world.

The weight and scope of these kinds of concerns about alienation can obviously vary; that is, they might be thought to have more or less critical purchase on a wider or narrower range of targets. There are various possibilities here. These concerns might, for example, be said to apply: first, only to certain kinds of personality types inclined to adopt particular moral theories, and not to the theories themselves (Piper 1987); second, only to certain ways of formulating particular moral theories (the objections here being overcome by a more adequate formulation of the particular theories in question); third, only to particular moral theories (such as act utilitarianism, certain forms of consequentialism, or all impartial moral theories) to which they constitute foundational objections (but not to morality as such); and, fourth, as a foundational objection that counts against ‘the peculiar institution’ of morality itself (Williams 1985: 174). Given both that variety and the subject matter of this entry, it may not be helpful to generalise much more here. However, the point is hopefully made that the ethical dimensions of the present topic extend beyond the normative assessment of the relevant separations. Indeed, taking alienation seriously might lead us to think more critically about some familiar moral standpoints and theories.

6. Some (Unresolved) Empirical Issues

The above discussion of the concept of alienation—clarifying its basic shape, sketching some of its theoretical forms, and introducing a few complexities—still leaves many issues unresolved. These include many empirical and quasi-empirical issues. The present section is concerned with some of the empirical assumptions and claims that appear in what might be called broadly philosophical accounts of alienation of the kind discussed above. It is not directly concerned with the extensive social scientific literature on alienation. That latter literature is often preoccupied with ‘operationalising’ the concept—for instance, treating job satisfaction or absenteeism as proxies of alienated work—in order to engineer predictive models in disciplines (including education, psychology, sociology, and management studies) dealing with a variety of real world contexts (see e.g. Chiaburu et al 2014).

As an example of some of the empirical dimensions of broadly philosophical accounts of alienation, consider Marx’s characterisation of capitalist society as characterised by separations which frustrate self-realisation, especially self-realisation in work. To come to a considered judgement about the plausibility of his views on this topic, one would have to be in a position to assess, amongst other issues, whether work in capitalist societies is necessarily alienated. One would need to judge not only whether existing work is rightly characterised as alienated (as forced, frustrating self-realisation, not intended to satisfy the needs of others, and not appropriately appreciated by those others), but also, if so, whether it could be made meaningful and unalienated without undermining the very features which made the relevant society a capitalist one. (There are, of course, also many more normative-looking issues here regarding that account of human flourishing: whether, for example, Marx overestimates the value of creative and fulfilling work, and underestimates the value of, say, leisure and intellectual excellence.) Reaching anything like a considered judgment on these empirical and quasi-empirical issues would clearly require some complicated factual assessments of, amongst other issues, the composition and functioning of human nature and the extant social world.

A range of complex empirical and quasi-empirical issues also look to be woven into Marx’s views about the historical extent of alienation. Consider the various claims about the historical location and comparative intensity of alienation that can be found in his writings (and in certain secondary interpretations of those writings). These include: first, that certain systematic forms of alienation—including alienation in work—are not a universal feature of human society (not least, they will not be a feature of a future communist order); second, that at least some systematic forms of alienation—presumably including the alienation that Marx identifies as embodied in religious belief —are widespread in pre-capitalist societies; and third, that systematic forms of alienation are greater in contemporary capitalist societies than in pre-capitalist societies. There seems no good textual or theoretical reason to lumber Marx with the view that less systematic forms of alienation—such as the hypothetical estrangement of Gillian from her sister Hanna (which arose from sibling rivalry, stubbornness, and a chance misunderstanding at a time of family crisis)—could never exist under communism.

Take the last of these assorted empirical claims attributed to Marx – the comparative verdict about the extent or intensity of systematic forms of alienation in capitalist societies. Its plausibility is scarcely incontrovertible given the amount of sheer productive drudgery, and worse, in pre-capitalist societies. Nor is it obvious how one might attempt to substantiate the empirical dimensions of the claim. The empirical difficulties of measuring subjective alienation look considerable enough (especially given the limitations of historical data), but alienation for Marx is fundamentally about the frustration of objective human potentials, those separations that prevent self-realisation, perhaps especially self-realisation in work. One suggestion, made in this context, is that the scale of alienation in a particular society might be indicated by the gap between the liberating potential of human productive powers, on the one hand, and the extent to which that potential is reflected in the lives actually lived by producers, on the other (Wood 2004: 44–48). Whatever the appeal of that suggestion, the social scientific details of how one might actually apply that kind of measure in particular historical cases remain unclear.

Related worries might also apply to claims about the prognosis for alienation, in particular, about whether and how alienation might be overcome. Consider, for instance, Marx’s view that communist society will be free of certain systematic forms of alienation, such as alienation in work. Marx’s view about communism rests crucially on the judgement that it is the social relations of capitalist society, and not its material or technical arrangements, which are the cause of systematic forms of alienation. For instance, he holds that it is not the existence of science, technology, and industrialisation, as such, which are at the root of the social and psychological ills of alienation, but rather how those factors tend to be organised and used in a capitalist society. (For present purposes, just assume that a society is capitalist when its economic structure is based on a particular class division – in which producers can only access means of production by selling their labour power—and when production, and much else, is driven by a remorseless search for profit.) In volume one of Capital , Marx writes approvingly of workers who, through time and experience, had learnt ‘to distinguish between machinery and its employment by capital, and to direct their attacks, not against the material instruments of production, but against the mode in which they are used’ (1996: 432). If this had not been his view, Marx could not have, consistently, also suggested that communist society – which, on his account, is similarly technologically advanced and industrial—could avoid this kind of alienation. This suggestion is, nonetheless, strikingly sanguine. Marx is confident, for instance, that the considerable gulf between the gloomy results of adopting machinery in the capitalist present (where it increases the repetitiveness of tasks, narrows talents, promotes ‘deskilling’, and so on) and the bright promise of its adoption in the communist future (where it will liberate us from uncreative tasks, create greater wealth, develop all-round abilities, and so on) is easily bridged. However, Marx’s ‘utopophobia’—that is, his reluctance to say very much, in any close detail, about the future shape of socialist society – prevents him from offering any serious discussion about how precisely this might be done (Leopold 2016). As a result, even the mildest of sceptics could reasonably worry that a range of difficult empirical and other questions are evaded rather than answered here.

This issue—whether, and to what extent, alienation can be overcome in modern societies—is sometimes conflated with the issue of whether, and to what extent, alienation is a historically universal phenomena. To see that these are distinct questions, imagine that alienation only emerges in economically developed societies, that it is a necessary feature of economically developed societies, and that economically developed societies never revert voluntarily to economically undeveloped ones. These are not implausible claims, but together they seem to entail that, although only a subset of historical societies are scarred by alienation, if you happen to live in an economically developed society, then—involuntary Armageddon apart—alienation will remain the fate of you and your successors.

My aim here is not to make significant progress in resolving any of these empirical and quasi-empirical issues, but rather to acknowledge their existence and extent. Since the concept of alienation diagnoses a complex range of social ills involving self and other, it is perhaps not surprising that a variety of such issues are implicated in these various accounts of its proper characterisation, its historical scope, and the possibilities for overcoming it. Nonetheless, it remains important to acknowledge the existence and complexity of these empirical and quasi-empirical threads, not least because they are not always adequately recognised or dealt with in the broadly philosophical discussions of alienation which are the focus of the discussion here.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

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existentialism | feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on class and work | Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich | Marx, Karl | Rousseau, Jean Jacques | socialism

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Jan Kandiyali, Paul Lodge, Lucinda Rumsey, and two anonymous SEP referees, for comments on a previous version of this entry.

Copyright © 2022 by David Leopold < david . leopold @ politics . ox . ac . uk >

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Marx’s Theory of Alienation In Sociology

Olivia Guy-Evans, MSc

Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology. She has previously worked in healthcare and educational sectors.

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Saul Mcleod, PhD

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Saul Mcleod, PhD., is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

In sociology, alienation is when humans feel disconnected or estranged from some part of their nature or from society. Individuals can be alienated from themselves and from others, often resulting in feeling powerless or without control over their own lives.

The term alienation was conceptualized by Karl Marx when he used alienation to describe the effects of capitalism on the working class. Before this, the meaning of alienation changed over the centuries.

In theology, alienation referred to the distance between humanity and God; in social contact theories, it meant the loss of an individual’s original freedom, whereas, in political economy, it referred to the transfer of property ownership (Musto, 2010).

In Marx”s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, he presented alienation as the phenomenon through which the labor product confronts labor ‘as something alien, as a power independent of the producer.’

According to Marx, the product of a worker’s labor under a capitalist system results in feeling alienated.

The production of labor is felt to belong to someone else and is simply a way for the worker to meet the needs of physical life – purely for wages. Thus, alienation can make an individual or society feel isolated, unworthy, and insignificant (Mukhopadhyay, 2020).

Marx widened the problem of alienation to the economic sphere of material production. Further, he proposed that the economic sphere was essential to understanding and overcoming alienation in other spheres (Musto, 2010).

What Causes Alienation?

According to Marx, workers’ labor was less alienating in past societies. He claimed this was because the workers had more control over their working conditions, the work was highly skilled, and they would make the whole product from start to finish.

This means that the work was more satisfying because the workers could see themselves in what they produced.

However, with the introduction of capitalism and industrial factories in the 19th century, this craftsmanship decreased. Workers had less control over their work, were often unskilled, and were often just part of a production line.

This, according to Marx, generates high levels of alienation, feelings of powerlessness, and not being in control.

According to Marx, the economic system itself is what causes alienation. The introduction of machines increases the division of labor within society; the worker’s task becomes less skilled, capital is accumulated, and thus workers become increasingly fragmented (Boudon & Bourricaud, 1989).

Other sociologists have developed concepts that were later associated with alienation. The economic instability and social upheaval that tends to go along with capitalism lead to what Émile Durkheim coined ‘anomie.’

Anomie is used to indicate a set of phenomena whereby the norms of social structures enter into crisis following an extension of the division of labor (Musto, 2010).

People who experience anomie are more likely to feel isolated from their society. This happens because they no longer see their personal values and norms reflected in the world around them.

Note that alienation and anomie are not the same thing. Alienation occurs when an individual feels disconnected from their work or surroundings. Anomie occurs when there is a lack of shared values and norms in society.

While this can lead to individuals feeling lost and alienated, alienation, in Marx’s sense, is caused by the overlying structure of capitalism, while anomie is a social fact pertaining to individuals.

Marx 4 Types of Alienation

Alienation means the lack of power, control and fulfillment experienced by workers in capitalist societies which the means of producing goods are privately owned and controlled.

According to Karl Marx in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, the capitalist system leads to four distinct ways in which workers are alienated:

Alienation From the Product of Labor

Instead of the workers crafting products from the initial idea to completion, under capitalism, the product is entirely directed by someone else.

The product is highly specific in nature, is repetitive, and workers may only produce one aspect of a larger product on a production line.

Thus, the final product does not feel like the worker’s own and is creatively unrewarding. The product becomes an alien object, one that the worker produces only for the means of wages and survival.

Marx stated:

‘…the object which labor produces – labor’s product – confronts it (the worker) as something alien, as a power independent of the producer… Under these conditions, this realization of labor appears as loss of realization of the workers.’

Alienation From the Process of Labor

Instead of having the freedom to choose how and when they work, workers under a capitalist system must work as and when their employer requires.

They also must complete the tasks set by their employer, meaning that the process of labor is something external to the worker.

According to Marx, the process of labor:

‘does not belong to his intrinsic nature… in his work he does not affirm himself but denies himself… does not freely develop his physical and mental energy.’

Marx perceived the process of labor as directed against the worker as if it ‘does not belong to him.’ While the process of labor is not physically forced upon workers, it is forced in the sense that it becomes non-voluntary.

If the worker does not want to starve and must pay for their home, they feel forced to engage in the process of labor under capitalism.

Alienation From the Self

According to Marx, satisfying work is an essential part of being human. Since workers under capitalism feel alienated from the product and the process, it is not satisfying.

Karl Marx asserted that capitalism is a system that alienates the masses and that workers do not have control over the goods they produce for the market.

Marism is criticial of capitalism because that the people who are the laborers behind the goods and services lose their value over time. When once the workers would have crafted the whole product, they may now be reduced to producing one component on the production line.

Work under capitalism alienated individuals from themselves since work is no longer a joy, but simply a means to earn wages to survive.

Marx implied that the work:

‘…estranges from man… his human aspect.’

Workers become alienated from their true selves, desires, and the pursuit of happiness by the demands placed on them by capitalists.

They are essentially converted into objects by the production method, meaning they are viewed and treated not as humans but as replaceable elements of a system.

Alienation From Other Workers

Under capitalism, workers are encouraged to compete against each other for jobs, better products, and higher profits. This pits individuals against each other in a competition to sell their labor for the lowest possible value.

Instead of seeing and understanding their shared experiences and developing class consciousness, alienation prevents this and instead fosters false consciousnesses.

According to Marx, alienation:

‘(leads to)…the estrangement of man from man… Hence within the relationship of estranged labor each man views the other in accordance with the standard and the relationship in which he finds himself as a worker.’

Under capitalism, workers become profit-maximizing and self-interested individuals. Workers treat others as objects and as instruments to reach an end goal.

How to Overcome Alienation According to Marx

To overcome alienation, Marx suggested that changing perception is not enough. Rather, a reorganization of society is required. According to his historical materialist approach, this is the next step to liberate workers.

Marx predicted that there would be a proletariat revolution that would put an end to capitalism and bring about communism. The continued exploitation of the capitalists would cause the revolution.

A proletariat revolution is a social revolution in which working-class laborers attempt to overthrow the capitalist bourgeoisie. In the Communist Manifesto , written in 1848, Marx and Engels proposed that the proletariat revolution was inevitable and would be caused by the continued exploitation of the capitalists. The workers will eventually revolt due to increasingly worse working conditions and low wages.

In a communist society, there would be shared resources, wealth, and no social classes. The accumulated labor would widen and enrich the laborer’s existence rather than exploit it.

Since there would be no private property, it can be assumed that the workers would have control over their work, meaning that feelings of alienation would lessen.

Frequently Asked Questions

How does alienation affect workers’ sense of control .

Alienation can make workers feel powerless. Alienation in a capitalist society can make individuals believe that what happens in their lives is outside their control and that whatever they do does not matter.

If they feel controlled by the capitalists at work, this may extend into other areas of control in their lives.

Interacting with their boss may increase the lack of a sense of control. If the worker does not feel empowered enough to speak their opinions or give honest feedback, they are less inclined to do so. This can result in less control over their work and more power for the capitalists.

How Does Alienation Influence Job Satisfaction?

Alienation is believed to result in decreased job satisfaction. Specifically, alienation increases need deprivation, resulting in lower job involvement and ultimately decreased identification with their work organization (Efraty et al., 1991).

Other findings indicate that feeling powerless and meaningless in work (work alienation) influences organizational commitment and work effort. When workers feel that they have little to no influence in their labor and feel that their labor is not worthwhile, this can have adverse effects on these outcomes (Tummers & Den Dulk, 2013).

How is Alienation Relevant Today?

A Marxist theory of alienation can explain the paradox of social power and loneliness that is often seen in capitalist societies today (Øversveen, 2021).

There is a global rise in self-reported loneliness, isolation, and mental illness, which may result from cultural, technological, and environmental change, along with the rise of political movements that seek to capitalize on feelings of social frustration in societies (Berardi, 2017)

Berardi, F. (2017).  Futurability: the age of impotence and the horizon of possibility . Verso Books.

Boudon, R., & Bourricaud, F. (1989).  A critical dictionary of sociology . University of Chicago Press.

Efraty, D., Sirgy, M. J., & Claiborne, C. B. (1991). The effects of personal alienation on organizational identification: a quality-of-work-life model.  Journal of Business and Psychology, 6 (1), 57-78.

G. Tummers, L., & Den Dulk, L. (2013). The effects of work alienation on organizational commitment, work effort and work‐to‐family enrichment.  Journal of nursing management, 21 (6), 850-859.

Marx, K. (1992).  Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844 .

Mukhopadhyay, R. (2020). Karl Marx”s Theory of Alienation.  Available at SSRN 3843057.

Musto, M. (2010). Revisiting Marx”s concept of alienation.  Socialism and Democracy, 24 (3), 79-101.

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Translator’s Introduction

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rahel jaeggi’s alienation is one of the most exciting books to have appeared on the German philosophical scene in the last decade. 1 Close It has two significant strengths that are rarely joined in a single book: it presents a rigorous and enlightening analysis of an important but now neglected philosophical concept (alienation), and it illuminates, far better than any purely historical study could do, fundamental ideas of one of the most obscure figures in the history of philosophy (G. W. F. Hegel). That the latter is one of the book’s chief achievements may not be apparent to many of its readers, for Hegel is rarely mentioned by name, and the book does not present itself as a study of his thought. Nevertheless, the philosophical resources that Jaeggi brings to bear on the problem of alienation are thoroughly Hegelian in inspiration. Her book not only rejuvenates a lagging discourse on the topic of alienation; it also shows how an account of subjectivity elaborated two centuries ago can be employed in the service of new philosophical insights.

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Home — Essay Samples — Literature — Metamorphosis — Themes of Alienation and Identity in Franz Kafka’s ‘The Metamorphosis

Themes of Alienation and Identity in Franz Kafka's 'The Metamorphosis

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Introduction, literature review, alienation in 'the metamorphosis', identity crisis in 'the metamorphosis', symbolism and metaphor in 'the metamorphosis', interpretations and critical debates.

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Theories of Alienation pp 169–187 Cite as

On ‘Alienation’: An Essay in the Psycholinguistics of Science

• David G. Hays 3  

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My assignment is to contribute to the conceptual and terminological analysis of ‘alienation’. The assignment is worth the effort it demands because the concept is widely used in social science; because phenomena ordered under this rubric are widespread (Toynbee calls this the century of alienation, and my morning newspaper informs me that even working-class youth in America are alienated); and because linguistics may be able to supply a crucial element in the solution of the longstanding puzzle of social science methodology. These reasons are adequate; indeed, they suffice to arouse anxiety.

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Bloomfield, Leonard, Linguistic aspects of science. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science , edited by Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, and Charles W. Morris. Volume 1, Part I, pp. 215–217. University of Chicago Press, 1955.

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Gamson, William A., Power and discontent . Dorsey Press, 1968.

Gerson, Walter, Alienation in mass society: some causes and responses. Sociology and Social Research , volume 49, pp. 143–152.

Hays, David G., Linguistics as a focus for intellectual integration. Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics 1974 , edited by Francis P. Dinneen, S. J. Pp. 165–178. Georgetown University Press, 1974.

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Popper, Karl, Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach . Oxford University Press, 1972.

Sapir, Edward, Culture, language and personality: selected essays . University of California Press, 1966.

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Seeman, Melvin, On the meaning of alienation. American Sociological Review , volume 24, pp. 783–791.

Toynbee, Arnold, The century of alienation. Review of The Twentieth Century: A Promethean Age , edited by Alan Bullock. International Affairs , volume 48, pp. 267–270.

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Hays, D.G. (1976). On ‘Alienation’: An Essay in the Psycholinguistics of Science. In: Geyer, R.F., Schweitzer, D.R. (eds) Theories of Alienation. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-8813-5_8

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Alienation as an Art Form

© Copyright 2018 Marisa Tortola, Ryerson University

Introduction

In the video essay, Alienation as an Art Form , the concept of something invisible to society has been explored as an art form. Alienation has been set up in contrast to Marx’s idea of alienation being a “capitalist mode of production” (Elwell 2). What I introduce is an artistic and cultural way of seeing alienation and how it brings people together rather than apart simply due to our connectivity to each other. Subway culture has been explored and analyzed within the video essay as a space in which one must submit to as a mass identity that comes with a mass of emotions, subjects and ideas.

Challenging this idea introduced by Edward Relph in his book, Place and Placelessness, my video essay explores how these mass identities show we are ultimately connected to each other despite our differences and further more because of our similarities. In this essay, I will explore the process of creation taken to prove alienation can be looked at as an art form. Calling upon historical contexts from Karl Marx to modern ideas of psychogeography from Shawn Micaleff, I will differentiate alienation and how admiring it as an art form is more effective than Marx’s capitalist views on the concept.  

Process of Creation

The process taken to create this video essay started with the observation of alienation on the subway physically being heavily present. Looking closely at this it became an area of interest in which critiquing the concept demonstrated something of an art form visually to the eye. Alienation visually can be seen since we all subject to ignore one another and claim a place or mind our business in the space. But after closer critique, I was able to recognize that alienation moves in an art form that plays on this ignorance to illustrate we all connect to each other, and it is so obvious to the naked eye we just ignore it.

Rowan Wilken states the following in his paper Proximity and Alienation: Narratives of City, Self, and Other in the Locative Games of Blast Theory , “it is possible for an urban dweller to take pleasure ‘in being draw out of oneself’ by the diversity of people and locations in the city” (178). This ignorance therefore became an area of interest because those who are not ignorant to the space of the subway, such as myself, notice this opportunity to grow within the diversities of one another.  

However, when this ignorance clouds our judgement, we cannot do what geographer Sean Micallef encourages. He takes on a contemporary approach through the concept of psychogeography. What he encourages people to do is to fall victim to the “drift” in one’s daily routine and abandon the normal of it. This ultimately here is what drove my project and my idea on alienation being something more than just a word or a physical observation within the subway. This concept of letting the alienation take over us introduces the ability to let go of our differences and our similarities and just be with one another. To be present in what is in front of us as we all share the same space because when we do that, when we let the small details of each other shine through, we grow in alienation. This is what creates the art form, and ultimately this is what breaks the cycle of being strange to one another when we are in fact closely connected.  

Exploration Into My Way of Seeing ‘Alienation as an Art Form’

In choosing the medium of a video essay, I have taken a first-person perspective and narrative approach therefore creating content as a means of my eyes and words. The power to this choice of medium has created a narrative in which I have taken viewers on a journey not only through our subway system but through the evolution of the word alienation. I decided to include all the stations in the “horse-shoe” of our TTC subway because that is where the most traffic is therefore the most content.

The idea of having myself enter into the story, introducing the whole video with “come follow me” created an experience of a “vlog”. A vlog is a video blog and I believe having this structure allowed my video essay to closely critique the ideas I was speaking of in the video making them come to life. It creates an experience that the viewer submerges in, falling subject to the infamous drift I speak of time and time again. It also opens up a connection between me and the viewer and creates a narrative one can follow and relate to.

Alienation when first critiqued will be seen in that capitalist view Marx proposes. But what this method of exploration offers is a close way of seeing how through becoming lost within a familiar place, we can see alienation in a new light. We can see alienation in a positive light, a light that offers familiarity between strangers. It formulates an argument around Marx standing incorrect when discussing alienation only to the lengths of the product and producer. Explored and stressed in this video essay is the critique that alienation is rather cultural, poetic and simply something artistic with incredible beauty. It as an art form that challenges us to become more aware everyday the moment we enter the subway and carry out our daily routine. Alienation challenges us to cherish all the little details of one another that we visually can see right there while sharing the same place.  

Historical and Cultural Context

In the essay A History of Alienation , written by Martin Jay, alienation is described as a term that came to existence in the modern era of the 50s and 60s. Scholars and intellectuals started to use the word as a means to explain the outpour of poverty, social immobility, inequality and other cultural differences of the time. Karl Marx later transformed this idea to a “concrete social condition” where he believed it was found in the production process. (Jay 2018).   It then became a place in which the worker’s activity becomes something alien and no longer belonging to him. It was critiqued by Marx as an act of suffering where the producer became powerless. Everything around him was now against him, independent of himself and ultimately not belonging to him. This lead to Marxist Humanism and ultimate alienation from human life and other men.  

Bringing in Edward Relph and his book, Place and Placelessness , the idea of spaces and places are now introduced as a mode of critique to Marx’s ideas. Using his ideas of how spaces and places differ but both create meaning to an individual, I began to tease out alienation as an art form relating it to spaces. Relph argues, “to be human is to live in a world that is filled with significant spaces; to be human is to have and to know your place” (1).   So what I did was take this idea and show how even though we are all strange to one another on the subway, we all have a place in the communal space we are sharing. The space of our subway carries and creates multiple mass identities but ultimately it is just an existential place in which we all identify with. It is a space we share full of places that carry so many emotions and ideas we just choose to ignore because of the mass identities that we subject to.  

Taking on a even more contemporary view of Relph, the introduction to the concept of psychogeography becomes highlighted as the way to further defy against Marx’s capitalist views. Pyschogeographer Sean Micaleff wrote the book, Strolling in Toronto , in which he highlights the act of walking as a mode of drifting from our normal routines. Inspired from many geographers the notion of, “getting lost in a city is a sure fire way to learn how to get found again” (Ridgeway 2014) is initiated as the critique one must do in order to understand the whole premise of alienation as an art form.  

Concluding Thoughts

It will only be in the moments that one subjects to notice things outside their everyday lives, that small details of people become more apparent. Strangers on the subway who once seemed odd or weird are now closer to you and familiar. It shows the power that alienation is holding over us and how we let it control us when in reality it is the answer to connecting to one another. Alienation will always be there on the subway physically, that is not what I am arguing or denying. Rather what strikes importance and what this video essay argues is that alienation is a mode of art and medium in itself. It alone represents all the identities you’ve ever encountered on the subway, all the places you’ve ever identified with and all the strangers you’ve subconsciously connected to at one point or another. Alienation represents art because it makes you reality check in realizing we are all more similar to one another than we choose to believe. Therefore alienation as an art form encourages connectivity, respect and art towards one another ironically through the mode of drifting, distancing and alienating in itself. Simply poetic.  

Works Cited

Elwell, Frank, 2013, “Alienation and Exploitation,” Retrieved March, 2018,  http://www.faculty.rsu.edu/~felwell/Theorists/Essays/Marx5.htm

Jay, Martin. “In the 1950s Everybody Cool Was a Little Alienated. What Changed?” Aeon ,  Aeon Essays, 14 Mar. 2018,  aeon.co/essays/in-the-1950s-everybody-cool-was-a-little-alienated-what-changed .

Lyons, Siobhan. “Psychogeography: a way to delve into the soul of a city.” The Conversation , 18 June 2017, https://theconversation.com/psychogeographyawaytodelveintothesoulofacity .

Relph, E. C. Place and Placelessness . SAGE, 2016.

Ridgeway, Maisie. “The Double Negative » An Introduction To Psychogeography.” The Double Negative , 10 Dec. 2014,   www.thedoublenegative.co.uk/2014/12/an-introduction-to-psychogeography/ .

Rowan Wilken. “Proximity and Alienation: Narratives of City, Self, and Other in the Locative Games of Blast Theory.”,  The Mobile Story: Narrative Practices with Locative Technologies , 2013, pp. 175–191.

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