essay about the economic crisis

The Great Recession and Its Aftermath

The period known as the Great Moderation came to an end when the decade-long expansion in US housing market activity peaked in 2006 and residential construction began declining. In 2007, losses on mortgage-related financial assets began to cause strains in global financial markets, and in December 2007 the US economy entered a recession. That year several large financial firms experienced financial distress , and many financial markets experienced significant turbulence. In response, the Federal Reserve provided liquidity and support through a  range of programs  motivated by a desire to improve the functioning of financial markets and institutions, and thereby limit the harm to the US economy. 1    Nonetheless, in the fall of 2008, the economic contraction worsened, ultimately becoming deep enough and protracted enough to acquire the label “the  Great Recession ." While the US economy bottomed out in the middle of 2009, the recovery in the years immediately following was by some measures unusually slow. The Federal Reserve has provided unprecedented monetary accommodation in response to the severity of the contraction and the gradual pace of the ensuing recovery.  In addition, the financial crisis led to a range of major reforms in banking and financial regulation, congressional legislation that significantly affected the Federal Reserve.

Rise and Fall of the Housing Market

The recession and crisis followed an extended period of expansion in US housing construction, home prices, and housing credit. This expansion began in the 1990s and continued unabated through the 2001 recession, accelerating in the mid-2000s. Average home prices in the United States more than doubled between 1998 and 2006, the sharpest increase recorded in US history, and even larger gains were recorded in some regions. Home ownership in this period rose from 64 percent in 1994 to 69 percent in 2005, and residential investment grew from about 4.5 percent of US gross domestic product to about 6.5 percent over the same period. Roughly 40 percent of net private sector job creation between 2001 and 2005 was accounted for by employment in housing-related sectors.

The expansion in the housing sector was accompanied by an expansion in home mortgage borrowing by US households. Mortgage debt of US households rose from 61 percent of GDP in 1998 to 97 percent in 2006. A number of factors appear to have contributed to the growth in home mortgage debt. In the period after the 2001 recession, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) maintained a low federal funds rate, and some observers have suggested that by keeping interest rates low for a “prolonged period” and by only increasing them at a “measured pace” after 2004, the Federal Reserve contributed to the expansion in housing market activity (Taylor 2007).  However, other analysts have suggested that such factors can only account for a small portion of the increase in housing activity (Bernanke 2010).  Moreover, the historically low level of interest rates may have been due, in part, to large accumulations of savings in some emerging market economies, which acted to depress interest rates globally (Bernanke 2005). Others point to the growth of the market for mortgage-backed securities as contributing to the increase in borrowing. Historically, it was difficult for borrowers to obtain mortgages if they were perceived as a poor credit risk, perhaps because of a below-average credit history or the inability to provide a large down payment. But during the early and mid-2000s, high-risk, or “subprime,” mortgages were offered by lenders who repackaged these loans into securities. The result was a large  expansion in access to housing credit , helping to fuel the subsequent increase in demand that bid up home prices nationwide.

Effects on the Financial Sector

After home prices peaked in the beginning of 2007, according to the Federal Housing Finance Agency House Price Index, the extent to which prices might eventually fall became a significant question for the pricing of mortgage-related securities because large declines in home prices were viewed as likely to lead to an increase in mortgage defaults and higher losses to holders of such securities. Large, nationwide declines in home prices had been relatively rare in the US historical data, but the run-up in home prices also had been unprecedented in its scale and scope. Ultimately, home prices fell by over a fifth on average across the nation from the first quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2011. This decline in home prices helped to spark the financial crisis of 2007-08, as financial market participants faced considerable uncertainty about the incidence of losses on mortgage-related assets. In August 2007, pressures emerged in certain financial markets, particularly the market for asset-backed commercial paper, as money market investors became wary of exposures to subprime mortgages (Covitz, Liang, and Suarez 2009). In the spring of 2008, the investment bank Bear Stearns was acquired by JPMorgan Chase with the assistance of the Federal Reserve. In September, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, and the next day the  Federal Reserve provided support to AIG , a large insurance and financial services company. Citigroup and Bank of America sought support from the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

The Fed’s support to specific financial institutions was not the only expansion of central bank credit in response to the crisis. The Fed also introduced a number of  new lending programs  that provided liquidity to support a range of financial institutions and markets. These included a credit facility for “primary dealers,” the broker-dealers that serve as counterparties for the Fed’s open market operations, as well as lending programs designed to provide liquidity to money market mutual funds and the commercial paper market.  Also introduced, in cooperation with the US Department of the Treasury, was the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which was designed to ease credit conditions for households and businesses by extending credit to US holders of high-quality asset-backed securities.

Initially, the expansion of Federal Reserve credit was financed by reducing the Federal Reserve’s holdings of Treasury securities, in order to avoid an increase in bank reserves that would drive the federal funds rate below its target as banks sought to lend out their excess reserves. But in October 2008, the Federal Reserve gained the authority to pay banks interest on their excess reserves. This gave banks an incentive to hold onto their reserves rather than lending them out, thus mitigating the need for the Federal Reserve to offset its expanded lending with reductions in other assets. 2

Effects on the Broader Economy

The housing sector led not only the financial crisis, but also the downturn in broader economic activity. Residential investment peaked in 2006, as did employment in residential construction. The overall economy peaked in December 2007, the month the National Bureau of Economic Research recognizes as the beginning of the recession. The decline in overall economic activity was modest at first, but it steepened sharply in the fall of 2008 as stresses in financial markets reached their climax. From peak to trough, US gross domestic product fell by 4.3 percent, making this the deepest recession since World War II. It was also the longest, lasting eighteen months. The unemployment rate more than doubled, from less than 5 percent to 10 percent. 

In response to weakening economic conditions, the FOMC lowered its target for the federal funds rate from 4.5 percent at the end of 2007 to 2 percent at the beginning of September 2008. As the financial crisis and the economic contraction intensified in the fall of 2008, the FOMC accelerated its interest rate cuts, taking the rate to its effective floor – a target range of 0 to 25 basis points – by the end of the year. In November 2008, the Federal Reserve also initiated the first in a series of large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs, buying mortgage-backed securities and longer-term Treasury securities. These purchases were intended to put downward pressure on long-term interest rates and improve financial conditions more broadly, thereby supporting economic activity (Bernanke 2012).

The recession ended in June 2009, but economic weakness persisted. Economic growth was only moderate – averaging about 2 percent in the first four years of the recovery – and the unemployment rate, particularly the rate of long-term unemployment, remained at historically elevated levels. In the face of this prolonged weakness, the Federal Reserve maintained an exceptionally low level for the federal funds rate target and sought new ways to provide additional monetary accommodation. These included additional LSAP programs, known more popularly as quantitative easing, or QE. The FOMC also began communicating its intentions for future policy settings more explicitly in its public statements, particularly the circumstances under which exceptionally low interest rates were likely to be appropriate. For example, in December 2012, the committee stated that it anticipates that exceptionally low interest rates would likely remain appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate was above a threshold value of 6.5 percent and inflation was expected to be no more than a half percentage point above the committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal. This strategy, known as “forward guidance,” was intended to convince the public that rates would stay low at least until certain economic conditions were met, thereby putting downward pressure on longer-term interest rates.

Effects on Financial Regulation

When the financial market turmoil had subsided, attention naturally turned to reforms to the financial sector and its supervision and regulation, motivated by a desire to avoid similar events in the future. A number of measures have been proposed or put in place to reduce the risk of financial distress. For traditional banks, there are significant increases in the amount of required capital overall, with larger increases for so-called “systemically important” institutions (Bank for International Settlements 2011a;  2011b).  Liquidity standards will for the first time formally limit the amount of banks’ maturity transformation (Bank for International Settlements 2013).  Regular stress testing will help both banks and regulators understand risks and will force banks to use earnings to build capital instead of paying dividends as conditions deteriorate (Board of Governors 2011).    

The  Dodd-Frank Act of 2010  also created new provisions for the treatment of large financial institutions. For example, the Financial Stability Oversight Council has the authority to designate nontraditional credit intermediaries “Systemically Important Financial Institutions” (SIFIs), which subjects them to the oversight of the Federal Reserve. The act also created the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), which allows the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to wind down certain institutions when the firm’s failure is expected to pose a great risk to the financial system. Another provision of the act requires large financial institutions to create “living wills,” which are detailed plans laying out how the institution could be resolved under US bankruptcy code without jeopardizing the rest of the financial system or requiring government support.

Like the  Great Depression  of the 1930s and the  Great Inflation  of the 1970s, the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing recession are vital areas of study for economists and policymakers. While it may be many years before the causes and consequences of these events are fully understood, the effort to untangle them is an important opportunity for the Federal Reserve and other agencies to learn lessons that can inform future policy.

• 1  Many of these actions were taken under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which at that time authorized lending to individuals, partnerships, and corporations in “unusual and exigent” circumstances and subject to other restrictions. After the amendments to Section 13(3) made by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Federal Reserve lending under Section 13(3) is permitted only to participants in a program or facility with “broad based eligibility,” with prior approval of the secretary of the treasury, and when several other conditions are met.
• 2  For more on interest on reserves, see Ennis and Wolman (2010).

Bibliography

Bank for International Settlements. “ Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking system .” Revised June 2011a.

Bank for International Settlements. “ Global systemically important banks: Assessment methodology and the additional loss absorbency requirement .” July 2011b.

Bernanke, Ben, “The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit,” Speech given at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economists, Richmond, Va., March 10, 2005.

Bernanke, Ben,“Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble,” Speech given at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, Atlanta, Ga., January 3, 2010.

Bernanke, Ben, “Monetary Policy Since the Onset of the Crisis,” Speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyo., August 31, 2012.

Covitz, Daniel, Nellie Liang, and Gustavo Suarez. “The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Collapse of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market.” Journal of Finance 68, no. 3 (2013): 815-48.

Ennis, Huberto, and Alexander Wolman. “Excess Reserves and the New Challenges for Monetary Policy.” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Brief   no. 10-03 (March 2010).   

Federal Reserve System, Capital Plan , 76 Fed Reg. 74631 (December 1, 2011) (codified at 12 CFR 225.8).

Taylor, John,“Housing and Monetary Policy,” NBER Working Paper 13682, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, December 2007.     

Written as of November 22, 2013. See disclaimer .

Essays in this Time Period

• Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
• Federal Reserve Credit Programs During the Meltdown
• The Great Recession
• Subprime Mortgage Crisis
• Support for Specific Institutions

Related People

Ben S. Bernanke Chairman

Board of Governors

2006 – 2014

Timothy F. Geithner President

New York Fed

2003 – 2008

Related Links

• FRASER: Text of Dodd Frank Act

Federal Reserve History

Chapter 1. The economic impacts of the COVID-19 crisis

The COVID-19 pandemic sent shock waves through the world economy and triggered the largest global economic crisis in more than a century. The crisis led to a dramatic increase in inequality within and across countries. Preliminary evidence suggests that the recovery from the crisis will be as uneven as its initial economic impacts, with emerging economies and economically disadvantaged groups needing much more time to recover pandemic-induced losses of income and livelihoods . 1

In contrast to many earlier crises, the onset of the pandemic was met with a large, decisive economic policy response that was generally successful in mitigating its worst human costs in the short run. However, the emergency response also created new risks—such as dramatically increased levels of private and public debt in the world economy—that may threaten an equitable recovery from the crisis if they are not addressed decisively.

Worsening inequality within and across countries

The economic impacts of the pandemic were especially severe in emerging economies where income losses caused by the pandemic revealed and worsened some preexisting economic fragilities. As the pandemic unfolded in 2020, it became clear that many households and firms were ill-prepared to withstand an income shock of that scale and duration. Studies based on precrisis data suggest, for example, that more than 50 percent of households in emerging and advanced economies were not able to sustain basic consumption for more than three months in the event of income losses . 2 Similarly, the average business could cover fewer than 55 days of expenses with cash reserves . 3  Many households and firms in emerging economies were already burdened with unsustainable debt levels prior to the crisis and struggled to service this debt once the pandemic and associated public health measures led to a sharp decline in income and business revenue.

The crisis had a dramatic impact on global poverty and inequality. Global poverty increased for the first time in a generation, and disproportionate income losses among disadvantaged populations led to a dramatic rise in inequality within and across countries. According to survey data, in 2020 temporary unemployment was higher in 70 percent of all countries for workers who had completed only a primary education. 4   Income losses were also larger among youth, women, the self-employed, and casual workers with lower levels of formal education . 5   Women, in particular, were affected by income and employment losses because they were likelier to be employed in sectors more affected by lockdown and social distancing measures . 6

Similar patterns emerge among businesses. Smaller firms, informal businesses, and enterprises with limited access to formal credit were hit more severely by income losses stemming from the pandemic. Larger firms entered the crisis with the ability to cover expenses for up to 65 days, compared with 59 days for medium-size firms and 53 and 50 days for small and microenterprises, respectively. Moreover, micro-, small, and medium enterprises are overrepresented in the sectors most severely affected by the crisis, such as accommodation and food services, retail, and personal services.

The short-term government responses to the crisis

The short-term government responses to the pandemic were extraordinarily swift and encompassing. Governments embraced many policy tools that were either entirely unprecedented or had never been used on this scale in emerging economies. Examples are large direct income support measures, debt moratoria, and asset purchase programs by central banks. These programs varied widely in size and scope (figure 1.1), in part because many low-income countries were struggling to mobilize resources given limited access to credit markets and high precrisis levels of government debt. As a result, the size of the fiscal response to the crisis as a share of the gross domestic product (GDP) was almost uniformly large in high-income countries and uniformly small or nonexistent in low-income countries. In middle-income countries, the fiscal response varied substantially, reflecting marked differences in the ability and willingness of governments to spend on support programs.

Figure 1.1 Fiscal response to the COVID-19 crisis, selected countries, by income group

Similarly, the combination of policies chosen to confront the short-term impacts differed significantly across countries, depending on the availability of resources and the specific nature of risks the countries faced (figure 1.2). In addition to direct income support programs, governments and central banks made unprecedented use of policies intended to provide temporary debt relief, including debt moratoria for households and businesses. Although these programs mitigated the short-term liquidity problems faced by households and businesses, they also had the unintended consequence of obscuring the true financial condition of borrowers, thereby creating a new problem: lack of transparency about the true extent of credit risk in the economy.

Figure 1.2 Fiscal, monetary, and financial sector policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis, by country income group 

The large crisis response, while necessary and effective in mitigating the worst impacts of the crisis, led to a global increase in government debt that gave rise to renewed concerns about debt sustainability and added to the widening disparity between emerging and advanced economies. In 2020, 51 countries—including 44 emerging economies—experienced a downgrade in their government debt risk rating (that is, the assessment of a country’s creditworthiness) . 7

Emerging threats to an equitable recovery

Although households and businesses have been most directly affected by income losses stemming from the pandemic, the resulting financial risks have repercussions for the wider economy through mutually reinforcing channels that connect the financial health of households, firms, financial institutions, and governments (figure 1.3). Because of this interconnection, elevated financial risk in one sector can spill over and destabilize the economy as a whole. For example, if households and firms are under financial stress, the financial sector faces a higher risk of loan defaults and is less able to provide credit. Similarly, if the financial position of the public sector deteriorates (for example, as a result of higher government debt and lower tax revenue), the ability of the public sector to support the rest of the economy is weakened.

Figure 1.3 Conceptual framework: Interconnected balance sheet risks

This relationship is, however, not predetermined. Well-designed fiscal, monetary, and financial sector policies can counteract and reduce these intertwined risks and can help transform the links between sectors of the economy from a vicious doom loop into a virtuous cycle.

One example of policies that can make a critical difference are those targeting the links between the financial health of households, businesses, and the financial sector. In response to the first lockdowns and mobility restrictions, for example, many governments supported households and businesses using cash transfers and financial policy tools such as debt moratoria. These programs provided much-needed support to households and small businesses and helped avert a wave of insolvencies that could have threatened the stability of the financial sector.

Similarly, governments, central banks, and regulators used various policy tools to assist financial institutions and prevent risks from spilling over from the financial sector to other parts of the economy. Central banks lowered interest rates and eased liquidity conditions, making it easier for commercial banks and nonbank financial institutions such as microfinance lenders to refinance themselves, thereby allowing them to continue to supply credit to households and businesses.

The crisis response will also need to include policies that address the risks arising from high levels of government debt to ensure that governments preserve their ability to effectively support the recovery.   This is an important policy priority because high levels of government debt reduce the government’s ability to invest in social safety nets that can counteract the impact of the crisis on poverty and inequality and provide support to households and firms in the event of setbacks during the recovery. 

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CHAPTER SUMMARIES

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Confronting the Crisis: Priorities for the Global Economy

April 9, 2020

As prepared for delivery

Introduction: A Crisis Like No Other

I want to begin by wishing my personal best to everyone—for you and your families’ health and safety during these difficult times.

Today we are confronted with a crisis like no other . Covid-19 has disrupted our social and economic order at lightning speed and on a scale that we have not seen in living memory. The virus is causing tragic loss of life, and the lockdown needed to fight it has affected billions of people. What was normal just a few weeks ago—going to school, going to work, being with family and friends—is now a huge risk.

I have no doubt that we will overcome this challenge. Our doctors and nurses are fighting it around the clock, often risking their lives to save the lives of others. Our scientists will come up with solutions to break COVID-19’s grip. Between now and then, we must marshal the determination of all—individuals, governments, businesses, community leaders, international organizations—to act decisively and act together, to protect lives and livelihoods. These are the times for which the IMF was created—we are here to deploy the strength of the global community, so we can help shield the most vulnerable people and revitalize the economy.

The actions we take now will determine the speed and strength of our recovery. That will be the focus of the IMF’s 189 member countries when we meet in our virtual Spring Meetings next week.

It is what I will concentrate on today.

Where We Stand: the Status of the Global Economy

First, let’s look at where we stand. We are still faced with extraordinary uncertainty about the depth and duration of this crisis.

It is already clear, however, that global growth will turn sharply negative in 2020, as you will see in our World Economic Outlook next week. In fact, we anticipate the worst economic fallout since the Great Depression.

Just three months ago, we expected positive per capita income growth in over 160 of our member countries in 2020. Today, that number has been turned on its head: we now project that over 170  countries will experience negative per capita income growth this year.

The bleak outlook applies to advanced and developing economies alike. This crisis knows no boundaries. Everybody hurts.

Given the necessary containment measures to slow the spread of the virus, the world economy is taking a substantial hit. This is especially true for retail, hospitality, transport, and tourism. In most countries, the majority of workers are either self-employed or employed by small and medium-sized enterprises. These businesses and workers are especially exposed.

And just as the health crisis hits vulnerable people hardest, the economic crisis is expected to hit vulnerable countries hardest.

Emerging markets and low-income nations—across Africa, Latin America, and much of Asia—are at high risk. With weaker health systems to begin with, many face the dreadful challenge of fighting the virus in densely populated cities and poverty-stricken slums—where social distancing is hardly an option. With fewer resources to begin with, they are dangerously exposed to the ongoing demand and supply shocks, drastic tightening in financial conditions, and some may face an unsustainable debt burden.

They are also exposed to massive external pressure.

In the last two months, portfolio outflows from emerging markets were about $100 billion —more than three times larger than for the same period of the global financial crisis. Commodity exporters are taking a double blow from the collapse in commodity prices. And remittances—the lifeblood of so many poor people—are expected to dwindle.

We estimate the gross external financing needs for emerging market and developing countries to be in the trillions of dollars, and they can cover only a portion of that on their own, leaving residual gaps in the hundreds of billions of dollars. They urgently need help.

The encouraging news is that all governments have sprung into action and, indeed, there has been significant coordination. Our Fiscal Monitor next week will show that countries around the world have taken fiscal actions amounting to about $8 trillion . In addition, there have been massive monetary measures from the G20 and others.

Many of the poorer nations are also taking bold fiscal and monetary action, even as they grapple with this fundamental shock to their systems—and with far less firepower than their rich-country counterparts.

So this is a snapshot of where the global economy stands today.

There is no question that 2020 will be exceptionally difficult. If the pandemic fades in the second half of the year—thus allowing a gradual lifting of containment measures and reopening of the economy—our baseline assumption is for a partial recovery in 2021. But again, I stress there is tremendous uncertainty around the outlook : it could get worse depending on many variable factors, including the duration of the pandemic.

And crucially, everything depends on the policy actions we take now.

What Needs to be Done: a 4-Point Plan

My next point is about building the bridge to recovery. We see four priorities:

• First, continue with essential containment measures and support for health systems. Some say there is a trade-off between saving lives and saving livelihoods. I say it is a false dilemma. Given this is a pandemic crisis, defeating the virus and defending people’s health are necessary for economic recovery. So the message is clear: prioritize health spending for testing and medical equipment; pay doctors and nurses; make sure hospitals and makeshift clinics can function. For many countries—particularly in the emerging and developing world—this means carefully reallocating limited public resources. It also means increasing the flow of resources to these countries. That includes the flow of vital goods: we must minimize disruptions to supply chains and, with immediate effect, refrain from export controls on medical supplies and food.
• Second, shield affected people and firms with large, timely, targeted fiscal and financial sector measures. This varies according to country circumstances, but it includes tax deferrals, wage subsidies and cash transfers to the most vulnerable; extending unemployment insurance and social assistance; and temporarily adjusting credit guarantees and loan terms. Some of these measures have been taken in the first wave of policy support. Many countries are already working on a second wave. Lifelines for households and businesses are imperative. We need to prevent liquidity pressures from turning into solvency problems and avoid a scarring of the economy that would make the recovery so much more difficult.
• Third, reduce stress to the financial system and avoid contagion. Our upcoming Global Financial Stability Report will analyze the range of vulnerabilities in the financial sector. Banks have built up more capital and liquidity over the past decade, and their resilience will be tested in this rapidly changing environment. The financial system is facing significant pressures, and monetary stimulus and liquidity facilities play an indispensable role. Interest rates have been lowered in many countries. Major central banks have activated swap lines and created new ones to reduce financial market stress. Enhancing liquidity for a broader range of emerging economies would provide further relief. Importantly, it would also lift confidence.
• Fourth, even as we move through this containment phase, we must plan for recovery. Again, we must minimize the potential scarring effects of the crisis through policy action now. This requires careful consideration of when to gradually ease restrictions, based on clear evidence that the epidemic is retreating. As measures to stabilize the economy take hold and business starts to normalize, we will need to move swiftly to boost demand. Coordinated fiscal stimulus will be essential. Where inflation remains low and well-anchored, monetary policy should remain accommodative. Those with greater resources and policy space will need to do more ; others, with limited resources will need more support.

The IMF: All Hands on Deck

This leads me to the role of the IMF.

We are working 24/7 to support our member countries—with policy advice, technical assistance and financial resources:

— We have $1 trillion in lending capacity and are placing it at the service of our membership.

— We are responding to an unprecedented number of calls for emergency financing—from over 90 countries so far. Our Executive Board has just agreed to double access to our emergency facilities, which will allow us to meet the expected demand of about $100 billion in financing. Lending programs have already been approved at record speed—including for the Kyrgyz Republic, Rwanda, Madagascar, and Togo—with many more to come.

— We are reviewing our tool kit to see how we might better use precautionary credit lines to encourage additional liquidity support, establish a short-term liquidity line, and help meet countries’ financing needs via other options—including the use of SDRs. And where we might be unable to lend because a country’s debt is unsustainable , we will look for solutions that can unlock critical financing.

— We have revamped our Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust to provide immediate debt relief to low-income countries affected by the crisis, thereby creating space for spending on urgent health needs rather than debt repayment. We are now working with donors to increase the CCRT to $1.4 billion to extend the duration of the debt relief.

— And together with the World Bank, we are calling for a standstill of debt service to official bilateral creditors for the world’s poorest countries.

I am proud of the staff of the IMF for stepping up in this crisis. And I look forward to the discussions during the Spring Meetings next week on what more we can do .

Conclusion: A Test of Our Humanity

Let me conclude with a line from Victor Hugo who once said: “ Great perils have this beauty, that they bring to light the fraternity of strangers ”.

It is this common threat that brings us all together, to harness the greatest strengths of our humanity—solidarity, courage, creativity, and compassion. We don’t know yet how our economies and way of life will change, but we do know we will come out of this crisis more resilient.

Thank you very much.

Lessons learned from the breadth of economic policies during the pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in the sharpest and most synchronized reduction in global economic activity in history. The U.S. economy experienced a V-shaped recovery of a type not seen in recent recessions. The rapid recovery was due to two factors. First, the recession itself was caused by a shock associated with COVID-19; as that shock retreated—and people learned to better live with the pandemic—the economy was poised to recover quickly, just as it typically does after natural disasters. Second, the policy response protected household incomes and kept many businesses intact so that they were in a position to resume more normal levels of economic activity when it was safe to do so.

Recession Remedies podcast episode: What should we learn from the economic policy response to COVID-19?

Real disposable personal incomes actually rose in 2020 and 2021 as transfer payments from the government vastly exceeded lost incomes from other sources. As a result, poverty, after accounting for taxes and transfers, fell in 2020 to the lowest level since the data series began in 1967. Initially, observers and policymakers worried that a cascade of bankruptcies and defaults could precipitate a financial crisis. But improvements to make the financial system more resilient in the wake of the global financial crisis and the policy response to the COVID-19 crisis quickly addressed potential issues. 

The economy experienced major side effects from the pandemic and associated policy response, most notably the highest inflation rate in 40 years, far outpacing the increase in wages and leading to the largest real wage declines in decades. Ultimately, the economic policy response to the COVID-19 recession should be judged not just by its consequences in the spring of 2020, not what happened over the next two years, but also by the longer-term effects, and whether the response will prove to have contributed to a stronger and more sustainable economy going forward. 

Evidence on the COVID-19 economic policy response  

• The initial fiscal response in the U.S. was large. It waned in mid-2020 and then surged again in late 2020 and early 2021.
• Economic Impact Payments, Unemployment Insurance, forbearance programs on mortgages and student loans, and an enhanced CTC played the largest roles in lifting household finances, while businesses received support largely through grants and subsidized loans.
• Even after the initial substantial fiscal assistance, observers generally expected a much slower economic recovery from the second quarter 2020 trough than actually came to pass.
• The U.S. government incurred substantial debt. Moreover, inflationary pressures and the efforts to moderate those pressures might bring an end to the expansion.
• The U.S. fiscal response appears to have been larger than any other country.

Lessons learned from the breadth of economic policies during the pandemic  

Policymakers should take the lesson from the past two years that vigorous fiscal and monetary policy can boost income for most households and disproportionately for lower-income households and can speed economic recoveries. However, doing too much can have serious downsides that might be difficult to mitigate.

Macroeconomic support for an economy deep in recession with many underused resources can increase output and employment with little effect on inflation. But as the economy gets closer to its capacity, additional macroeconomic support will feed increasingly into inflation instead of improvements in output and employment. Going forward, the magnitude and timing of the response should be improved through more automatic stabilizers, and the targeting of the response should be as well. The good news is such responses can be implemented efficiently if policies are developed in advance of a crisis.

Policymakers should take the lesson from the past two years that vigorous fiscal and monetary policy can boost income for most households and disproportionately for lower-income house-holds and can speed economic recoveries.

It is important to draw lessons not just from what happened, but also from what did not happen during the COVID-19 recession: for example, there was no financial crisis in the United States or worldwide. The initial, robust response by monetary policy-makers was critical to keeping the financial sector on an even keel. Better preparation in the form of more robust and stress-tested balance sheets for banks prior to the recession also helped.

The preexisting social safety net is inadequate in the face of recessions: it is not generous enough and has too many gaps, which is why it needed to be supplemented by policy action both in the Great Recession and to a much greater degree in the COVID-19 recession. Additional automatic stabilizers are likely part of the answer but are unlikely to be sufficient to avoid the need for well-timed and wise discretionary fiscal responses in the future.

It is still not clear what policies would work better in the United States to lessen the impact of a GDP decline on employment and preserve worker attachment to their employers. Job retention schemes were heavily utilized in European countries compared to state-based work sharing programs in the U.S.—these programs should be explored in greater detail for future downturns.

For more information or to speak with the authors, contact:

Marie Wilken

202-540-7738

[email protected]

About the Authors

Wendy edelberg, director – the hamilton project, jason furman, former brookings expert, timothy geithner, president – warburg pincus.

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Home / Essay Samples / Economics / Economic Crisis / The Global Economic Crisis: Ripples and Repercussions

The Global Economic Crisis: Ripples and Repercussions

• Category: Economics
• Topic: Economic Crisis , Economic Problem

Pages: 1 (457 words)

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• Widespread Economic Contraction: During a crisis, economies experience substantial declines in economic growth and output, leading to negative GDP growth and diminished productivity.
• Financial Instability: Financial markets turn volatile, and doubts arise regarding the stability of financial institutions, triggering credit crunches and liquidity shortages.
• High Unemployment Rates: The crisis sparks widespread job losses as businesses struggle to sustain themselves, resulting in soaring unemployment rates and reduced consumer spending.
• Reduced Trade and Investment: International trade and investments witness a decline as countries confront economic uncertainty and adopt protectionist measures.
• Government Interventions: Governments step in with monetary and fiscal policies, including stimulus packages and bailouts, to stabilize the economy and support struggling industries.

Causes of a Global Economic Crisis

• Financial Market Speculation: Excessive speculation and risk-taking in financial markets can create asset bubbles, eventually leading to market crashes.
• Financial Deregulation: Insufficient regulation in the financial sector enables risky practices, such as subprime lending, to go unchecked.
• Global Imbalances: Trade deficits and surpluses between countries can create imbalances in the global economy, resulting in vulnerabilities and economic shocks.
• Geopolitical Events: Political instability, conflicts, or natural disasters can disrupt global supply chains and trade, impacting economic activity.
• Loss of Jobs and Income: Rising unemployment rates inflict financial hardships on individuals and families.
• Business Closures: Many businesses, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, may succumb to financial losses and be forced to close down.
• Financial Strain: Families encounter challenges in meeting basic needs, resulting in increased poverty rates and social adversities.
• Government Debt: Governments incur substantial debts from stimulus measures and bailouts, impacting public finances in the long run.
• Global Economic Slowdown: The crisis triggers a global recession, affecting trade, investment, and economic growth on a global scale.

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