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Definition of Culture By Different Authors | 10 Definitions of Culture
Culture is the sum of human life, values, beliefs, language system, communication, and behavior. Although culture is a complex concept, it affects every aspect of our lives, both consciously and subconsciously.
Culture can be defined as a form of human life. For example, a culture is formed by combining how people in a particular region think, how they act, their behavior, attitudes, dress, their speech or language, their religious activities, music, literature, etc.
Definition of Culture By Different Authors
According to E. B. Tylor (1871), “Culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, moral, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.”
Ralph Linton (1940) defines, “The sum total of knowledge, attitudes and habitual behavior patterns shared and transmitted by the members of a particular society.”
Maclver defines, “Culture is the expression of our nature in our modes of living and our thinking, intercourse, in our literature, in religion, in recreation and enjoyment.”
According to John Paul Lederach, “Culture is the shared knowledge and schemes created by a set of people for perceiving, interpreting, expressing, and responding to the social realities around them.”
Geert Hofstede defines, “Culture is the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one category of people from another.”
“Culture is the framework of beliefs, expressive symbols, and values in terms of which individuals define their feelings and make their judgments.” — (Geertz 1957 American Anthropologist 59: 32 -54)
According to Ward Goodenough (1957), “The pattern of life within a community, the regularly recurring activities and material and social arrangements characteristic of a particular group.”
Malinowski defines, “Culture is the handiwork of man and the medium through which he achieves his ends.”
According to Spencer, “Culture is the super organic environment as distinguished from the organic, or physical, the worlds of plants and animals.”
According to Samuel Koenig, “Culture may be defined as the sum-total of man’s efforts to adjust himself to his environment and to improve his modes of living.”
Lundberg defines, “Culture refers to the social mechanisms of behavior and to the physical and symbolic products of these behaviors.”
H.T. Mazumdar defines, “Culture is the total of human achievements, material and non-material, capable of transmission, sociologically, i.e., by tradition and communication, vertically as well as horizontally.”
Definition of culture and discussions:
Culture is a term that refers to a large and varied set of the most essential aspects of social life. It is the values, beliefs, language, and methods of communication and the things that people share in general and which as a whole can be used to define the elements or material objects that are common to that group or society.
Culture is also what we are and what we behave and perform. It explains and understands how we walk, sit, carry our bodies, and communicate with others; How we behave depending on space, time, and audience.
The term culture is widely used in sociology. Culture encompasses all aspects of our lives in a broad sense. According to Tylor, culture is a complex combination of the combined knowledge, beliefs, arts, ethics, customs, laws, and various habits and skills acquired by the society.
Culture is one of the most important concepts in sociology because sociologists recognize that it plays an important role in our social life. It is important for maintaining social relationships, social maintenance and challenging, how we determine the knowledge of the world and our position in it, and the outline of our daily actions and experiences in society . It is made up of both non-material and material things.
Definition of Statistics by different authors
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2 The Culture Concept
Priscilla medeiros, women’s college hospital [email protected], emily cowall, mcmaster university [email protected].
Learning Objectives
Compare and contrast the ideas of ethnocentrism and cultural relativism.
Describe the role that early anthropologists Sir James Frazer and Sir E. B. Tylor played in defining the concept of culture in anthropology.
Identify the differences between armchair anthropology and participant-observer fieldwork and explain how Bronislaw Malinowski contributed to the development of anthropological fieldwork techniques.
Identify the contributions Franz Boas and his students made to the development of new theories about culture.
Assess some of the ethical issues that can arise from anthropological research.
THOUGHTS ON CULTURE OVER A CUP OF COFFEE
Do you think culture can be studied in a coffee shop? Have you ever gone to a coffee shop, sat down with a book or laptop, and listened to conversations around you? If you just answered yes, in a way, you were acting as an anthropologist. Anthropologists like to become a part of their surroundings, observing and participating with people doing day-to-day things. As two anthropologists writing a chapter about the culture concept, we wanted to know what other people thought about culture. What better place to meet than at our community coffee shop?
Our small coffee shop was filled with the aroma of coffee beans, and the voices of people competed with the sound of the coffee grinder. At the counter a chalkboard listed the daily specials of sandwiches and desserts. (Coffee shops have their own language, with vocabulary such as macchiato and latte . It can feel like entering a foreign culture.) We found a quiet corner that would allow us to observe other people (and hopefully identify a few to engage with) without disturbing them too much with our conversation. We understand the way that anthropologists think about culture, but we were also wondering what the people sitting around us might have to say. Would having a definition of culture really mean something to the average coffee-shop patron? Is a definition important? Do people care? We were very lucky that morning because sitting next to us was a man working on his laptop, a service dog lying at his feet.
Meeting Bob at the Coffee Shop
Having an animal in a food-service business is not usually allowed, but in our community people can have their service dogs with them. This young golden retriever wore a harness that displayed a sign stating the owner was diabetic. This dog was very friendly; in fact, she wanted to be touched and would not leave us alone, wagging her tail and pushing her nose against our hands. This is very unusual because many service dogs, like seeing eye dogs, are not to be touched. Her owner, Bob, let us know that his dog must be friendly and not afraid to approach people: if Bob needs help in an emergency, such as a diabetic coma, the dog must go to someone else for help.
We enjoyed meeting Bob and his dog, and we asked if he would like to answer our question: what is culture? Bob was happy to share his thoughts and ideas.
Bob feels that language is very important to cultural identity. He believes that if one loses language, one also loses important information about wildlife, indigenous plants, and ways of being. As a member of a First Nations tribe, Bob believes that words have deep cultural meaning. Most importantly, he views English as the language of commerce. Bob is concerned with the influence of Western consumerism and how it changes cultural identity.
Bob is not an anthropologist. He was just a person willing to share his ideas. Without knowing it, though, Bob had described some of the elements of anthropology. He had focused on the importance of language and the loss of tradition when it is no longer spoken, and he had recognized that language is a part of cultural identity. He was worried about globalization and consumerism changing cultural values.
With Bob’s opinions in mind, we started thinking about how we, two cultural anthropologists, would answer the same question about culture. Our training shapes our understandings of the question, yet we know there is more to culture concepts than a simple definition. Why is asking the culture concept question important to anthropologists? Does it matter? Is culture something that we can understand without studying it formally?
In this chapter, we will illustrate how anthropology developed the culture concept. Our journey will include the importance of storytelling and the way that anthropology became a social science. Along the way, we will learn about some important scholars and be introduced to anthropology in North America. Let’s begin with our discussion of storytelling by taking a look at Gulliver’s Travels .
STORIES AS A REFLECTION ON CULTURE
Stories are told in every culture and often teach a moral lesson to young children. Fables are similar, but often set an example for people to live by or describe what to do when in a dangerous situation. They can also be a part of traditions, help to preserve ways of life, or explain mysteries. Storytelling takes many different forms such as tall tales and folktales. These are for entertainment or to discuss problems encountered in life. Both are also a form of cultural preservation, a way to communicate morals or values to the next generation. Stories can also be a form of social control over certain activities or customs that are not allowed in a society.
A fable becomes a tradition by being retold and accepted by others in the community. Different cultures have very similar stories sharing common themes. One of the most common themes is the battle between good and evil. Another is the story of the quest. The quest often takes the character to distant lands, filled with real-life situations, opportunities, hardships, and heartaches. In both of these types of stories, the reader is introduced to the anthropological concept known as the Other . What exactly is the Other ? The Other is a term that has been used to describe people whose customs, beliefs, or behaviors are “different” from one’s own.
Can a story explain the concept of the Other? Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels is about four different voyages that Gulliver undertakes. His first adventure is the most well-known; in the story, Lemuel Gulliver is a surgeon who plans a sea voyage when his business fails. During a storm at sea, he is shipwrecked, and he awakens to find himself bound and secured by a group of captors—the Lilliputians—who are six inches tall. Gulliver, having what Europeans consider a normal body height, suddenly becomes a giant. During this adventure, Gulliver is seen as an outsider, a stranger with different features and language. Gulliver becomes the Other.
What lessons about culture can we learn from Gulliver’s Travels ? Swift’s story offers lessons about cultural differences, conflicts occurring in human society, and the balance of power. It also provides an important example of the Other. The Other is a matter of perspective in this story: Gulliver thinks the Lilliputians are strange and unusual. To Gulliver, the Lilliputians are the Other, but the Lilliputians equally see Gulliver as the Other—he is their captive and is a rare species of man because of his size.
The themes in Gulliver’s Travels describe different cultures and aspects of storytelling. The story uses language, customary behaviors, and the conflict between different groups to explore ideas of the exotic and strange. The story is framed as an adventure, but is really about how similar cultures can be. In the end, Gulliver becomes a member of another cultural group, learning new norms, attitudes, and behaviors. At the same time, he wants to colonize them, a reflection of his former cultural self.
Stories are an important part of culture, and when used to pass on traditions or cultural values, they can connect people to the past. Stories are also a way to validate religious, social, political, and economic practices from one generation to another. Stories are important because they are used in some societies to apply social pressure, to keep people in line, and are part of shaping the way that people think and behave.
Anthropologists as Storytellers
People throughout recorded history have relied on storytelling as a way to share cultural details. When early anthropologists studied people from other civilizations, they relied on the written accounts and opinions of others; they presented facts and developed their “stories,” about other cultures based solely on information gathered by others. These scholars did not have any direct contact with the people they were studying. This approach has come to be known as armchair anthropology . Simply put, if a culture is viewed from a distance (as from an armchair), the anthropologist tends to measure that culture from his or her own vantage point and to draw comparisons that place the anthropologist’s culture as superior to the one being studied. This point of view is also called ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism is an attitude based on the idea that one’s own group or culture is better than any other.
Early anthropological studies often presented a biased ethnocentric interpretation of the human condition. For example, ideas about racial superiority emerged as a result of studying the cultures that were encountered during the colonial era. During the colonial era from the sixteenth century to the mid–twentieth century, European countries (Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Dutch Republic, Spain, Portugal) asserted control over land (Asia, Africa, the Americas) and people. European ideas of wrong and right were used as a measuring stick to judge the way that people in different cultures lived. These other cultures were considered primitive, which was an ethnocentric term for people who were non-European. It is also a negative term suggesting that indigenous cultures had a lack of technological advancement. Colonizers thought that they were superior to the Other in every way.
Armchair anthropologists were unlikely to be aware of their ethnocentric ideas because they did not visit the cultures they studied. Scottish social anthropologist Sir James Frazer is well-known for his 1890 work The Golden Bough: A Study of Comparative Religions . Its title was later changed to A Study in Magic and Religion , and it was one of the first books to describe and record magical and religious beliefs of different culture groups around the world. Yet, this book was not the outcome of extensive study in the field. Instead, Frazer relied on the accounts of others who had traveled, such as scholars, missionaries, and government officials, to formulate his study.
Another example of anthropological writing without the use of fieldwork is Sir E. B. Tylor’s 1871 work Primitive Culture. Tylor, who went on to become the first professor of anthropology at Oxford University in 1896, was an important influence in the development of sociocultural anthropology as a separate discipline. Tylor defined culture as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” [1] His definition of culture is still used frequently today and remains the foundation to the culture concept in anthropology.
Tylor’s definition of culture was influenced by the popular theories and philosophies of his time, including the work of Charles Darwin. Darwin formulated the theory of evolution by natural selection in his 1859 book On the Origin of Species . Scholars of the time period, including Tylor, believed that cultures were subject to evolution just like plants and animals and thought that cultures developed over time from simple to complex. Many nineteenth century anthropologists believed that cultures evolved through distinct stages. They labeled these stages with terms such as savagery, barbarism, and civilization. [2] These theories of cultural evolutionism would later be successfully refuted, but conflicting views about cultural evolutionism in the nineteenth century highlight an ongoing nature versus nurture debate about whether biology shapes behavior more than culture.
Both Frazer and Tylor contributed important and foundational studies even though they never went into the field to gather their information. Armchair anthropologists were important in the development of anthropology as a discipline in the late nineteenth century because although these early scholars were not directly experiencing the cultures they were studying, their work did ask important questions—questions that could ultimately only be answered by going into the field.
Anthropologists as Cultural Participants
The armchair approach as a way to study culture changed when scholars such as Bronislaw Malinowski, Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, Franz Boas, and Margaret Mead took to the field and studied by being participants and observers. As they did, fieldwork became the most important tool anthropologists used to understand the “complex whole” of culture.
Bronislaw Malinowski, a Polish anthropologist, was greatly influenced by the work of Frazer . However , unlike the armchair anthropology approach Frazer used in writing The Golden Bough , Malinowski used more innovative ethnographic techniques, and his fieldwork took him off the veranda to study different cultures. The off the veranda approach is different from armchair anthropology because it includes active participant-observation : traveling to a location, living among people, and observing their day-to-day lives.
What happened when Malinowski came off the veranda? The Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922) was considered the first modern ethnography and redefined the approach to fieldwork. This book is part of Malinowski’s trilogy on the Trobriand Islanders. Malinowski lived with them and observed life in their villages. By living among the islanders, Malinowski was able to learn about their social life, food and shelter, sexual behaviors, community economics, patterns of kinship , and family. [3]
Malinowski went “native” to some extent during his fieldwork with the Trobriand Islanders. Going native means to become fully integrated into a cultural group: taking leadership positions and assuming key roles in society; entering into a marriage or spousal contract; exploring sexuality or fully participating in rituals. When an anthropologist goes native, the anthropologist is personally involved with locals. In The Argonauts of the Western Pacific , Malinowski suggested that other anthropologists should “grasp the native’s point of view, his relations to life, to realize his vision of his world.” [4] However, as we will see later in this chapter, Malinowski’s practice of going native presented problems from an ethical point of view. Participant-observation is a method to gather ethnographic data, but going native places both the anthropologist and the culture group at risk by blurring the lines on both sides of the relationship.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEORIES OF CULTURE
Anthropology in europe.
The discipline of cultural anthropology developed somewhat differently in Europe and North America, in particular in the United States, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with each region contributing new dimensions to the concept of culture. Many European anthropologists were particularly interested in questions about how societies were structured and how they remained stable over time. This highlighted emerging recognition that culture and society are not the same. Culture had been defined by Tylor as knowledge, beliefs, and customs, but a society is more than just shared ideas or habits. In every society, people are linked to one another through social institutions such as families, political organizations, and businesses. Anthropologists across Europe often focused their research on understanding the form and function of these social institutions.
European anthropologists developed theories of functionalism to explain how social institutions contribute to the organization of society and the maintenance of social order. Bronislaw Malinowski believed that cultural traditions were developed as a response to specific human needs such as food, comfort, safety, knowledge, reproduction, and economic livelihood. One function of educational institutions like schools, for instance, is to provide knowledge that prepares people to obtain jobs and make contributions to society. Although he preferred the term structural-functionalism , the British anthropologist A.R. Radcliffe-Brown was also interested in the way that social structures functioned to maintain social stability in a society over time. [5] He suggested that in many societies it was the family that served as the most important social structure because family relationships determined much about an individual’s social, political, and economic relationships and these patterns were repeated from one generation to the next. In a family unit in which the father is the breadwinner and the mother stays home to raise the children, the social and economic roles of both the husband and the wife will be largely defined by their specific responsibilities within the family. If their children grow up to follow the same arrangement, these social roles will be continued in the next generation.
In the twentieth century, functionalist approaches also became popular in North American anthropology, but eventually fell out of favor. One of the biggest critiques of functionalism is that it views cultures as stable and orderly and ignores or cannot explain social change. Functionalism also struggles to explain why a society develops one particular kind of social institution instead of another. Functionalist perspectives did contribute to the development of more sophisticated concepts of culture by establishing the importance of social institutions in holding societies together. While defining the division between what is cultural and what is social continues to be complex, functionalist theory helped to develop the concept of culture by demonstrating that culture is not just set of ideas or beliefs, but consists of specific practices and social institutions that give structure to daily life and allow human communities to function.
Anthropology in the United States
During the development of anthropology in North America (Canada, United States, and Mexico), the significant contribution made by the American School of Anthropology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was the concept of cultural relativism , which is the idea that cultures cannot be objectively understood since all humans see the world through the lens of their own culture. Cultural relativism is different than ethnocentrism because it emphasizes understanding culture from an insider’s view. The focus on culture, along with the idea of cultural relativism, distinguished cultural anthropology in the United States from social anthropology in Europe.
The participant-observation method of fieldwork was a revolutionary change to the practice of anthropology, but at the same time it presented problems that needed to be overcome. The challenge was to move away from ethnocentrism, race stereotypes, and colonial attitudes, and to move forward by encouraging anthropologists to maintain high ethical standards and open minds.
Franz Boas, an American anthropologist, is acknowledged for redirecting American anthropologists away from cultural evolutionism and toward cultural relativism. Boas first studied physical science at the University of Kiel in Germany. Because he was a trained scientist, he was familiar with using empirical methods as a way to study a subject. Empirical methods are based on evidence that can be tested using observation and experiment.
In 1883, Franz Boas went on a geographical expedition to Baffin Island in the Canadian Arctic. The Central Eskimo (1888) details his time spent on Baffin Island studying the culture and language of the central Eskimo (Inuit) people. He studied every aspect of their culture such as tools, clothing, and shelters. This study was Boas’ first major contribution to the American school of anthropology and convinced him that cultures could only be understood through extensive field research. As he observed on Baffin Island, cultural ideas and practices are shaped through interactions with the natural environment. The cultural traditions of the Inuit were suited for the environment in which they lived. This work led him to promote cultural relativism: the principle that a culture must be understood on its own terms rather than compared to an outsider’s standard. This was an important turning point in correcting the challenge of ethnocentrism in ethnographic fieldwork. [6]
Boas is often considered the originator of American anthropology because he trained the first generation of American anthropologists including Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and Alfred Kroeber. Using a commitment to cultural relativism as a starting point, these students continued to refine the concept of culture. Ruth Benedict, one of Boas’ first female students, used cultural relativism as a starting point for investigating the cultures of the American northwest and southwest. Her best-selling book Patterns of Culture (1934) emphasized that culture gives people coherent patterns for thinking and behaving. She argued that culture affects individuals psychologically, shaping individual personality traits and leading the members of a culture to exhibit similar traits such as tendency toward aggression, or calmness.
Benedict was a professor at Columbia University and in turn greatly influenced her student Margaret Mead, who went on to become one of the most well-known female American cultural anthropologists. Mead was a pioneer in conducting ethnographic research at a time when the discipline was predominately male. Her 1925 research on adolescent girls on the island of Ta‘ū in the Samoan Islands, published as Coming of Age in Samoa (1928), revealed that teenagers in Samoa did not experience the same stress and emotional difficulties as those in the United States. The book was an important contribution to the nature versus nurture debate, providing an argument that learned cultural roles were more important than biology. The book also reinforced the idea that individual emotions and personality traits are products of culture.
Alfred Louis Kroeber, another student of Boas, also shared the commitment to field research and cultural relativism, but Kroeber was particularly interested in how cultures change over time and influence one another. Through publications like T he Nature of Culture (1952), Kroeber examined the historical processes that led cultures to emerge as distinct configurations as well as the way cultures could become more similar through the spread or diffusion of cultural traits. Kroeber was also interested in language and the role it plays in transmitting culture. He devoted much of his career to studying Native American languages in an attempt to document these languages before they disappeared.
Anthropologists in the United States have used cultural relativism to add depth to the concept of culture in several ways. Tylor had defined culture as including knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, capabilities and habits. Boas and his students added to this definition by emphasizing the importance of e nculturation , the process of learning culture, in the lives of individuals. Benedict, Mead, and others established that through enculturation culture shapes individual identity, self-awareness, and emotions in fundamental ways. They also emphasized the need for holism , approaches to research that considered the entire context of a society including its history.
Kroeber and others also established the importance of language as an element of culture and documented the ways in which language was used to communicate complex ideas. By the late twentieth century, new approaches to symbolic anthropology put language at the center of analysis. Later on, Clifford Geertz, the founding member of postmodernist anthropology, noted in his book The Interpretation of Cultures (1973) that culture should not be seen as something that was “locked inside people’s heads.” Instead, culture was publically communicated through speech and other behaviors. Culture , he concluded, is “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes toward life.” [7] This definition, which continues to be influential today, reflects the influence of many earlier efforts to refine the concept of culture in American anthropology.
Ethical Issues in Truth Telling
As anthropologists developed more sophisticated concepts of culture, they also gained a greater understanding of the ethical challenges associated with anthropological research. Because participant-observation fieldwork brings anthropologists into close relationships with the people they study, many complicated issues can arise. Cultural relativism is a perspective that encourages anthropologists to show respect to members of other cultures, but it was not until after World War II that the profession of anthropology recognized a need to develop formal standards of professional conduct.
The Nuremberg trials, which began in 1945 in Nuremberg, Germany and were conducted under the direction of the France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, prosecuted members of the Nazi regime for war crimes. In addition to military and political figures, physicians and scientists were also prosecuted for unethical human experimentation and mass murder. The trials demonstrated that physicians and other scientists could be dangerous if they used their skills for abusive or exploitative goals. The Nuremberg Code that emerged from the trials is considered a landmark document in medical and research ethics. It established principles for the ethical treatment of the human subjects involved in any medical or scientific research.
Many universities adopted principles from the Nuremberg Code to write ethical guidelines for the treatment of human subjects. Anthropologists and students who work in universities where these guidelines exist are obliged to follow these rules. The American Anthropological Association (AAA), along with many anthropology organizations in other countries, developed codes of ethics describing specific expectations for anthropologists engaged in research in a variety of settings. The principles in the AAA code of ethics include: do no harm; be open and honest regarding your work; obtain informed consent and necessary permissions; ensure the vulnerable populations in every study are protected from competing ethical obligations; make your results accessible; protect and preserve your records; and maintain respectful and ethical professional relationships. These principles sound simple, but can be complicated in practice.
Bronislaw Malinowski
The career of Bronislaw Malinowski provides an example of how investigations of culture can lead anthropologists into difficult ethical areas. As discussed above, Malinowski is widely regarded as a leading figure in the history of anthropology. He initiated the practice of participant-observation fieldwork and published several highly regarded books including The Argonauts of the Western Pacific . Following his death, the private diary he kept while conducting fieldwork was discovered and published as A Diary in the Strictest Sense of the Term (1967). The diary described Malinowski’s feelings of loneliness and isolation, but also included a great deal of information about his sexual fantasies as well his some insensitive and contemptuous opinions about the Trobriand Islanders. The diary provided valuable insight into the mind of an important ethnographer, but also raised questions about the extent to which his personal feelings, including bias and racism, were reflected in his official conclusions.
Most anthropologists keep diaries or daily notes as a means of keeping track of the research project, but these records are almost never made public. Because Malinowski’s diary was published after his death, he could not explain why he wrote what he did, or assess the extent to which he was able to separate the personal from the professional. Which of these books best reflects the truth about Malinowski’s interaction with the Trobriand Islanders? This rare insight into the private life of a field researcher demonstrates that even when anthropologists are acting within the boundaries of professional ethics, they still struggle to set aside their own ethnocentric attitudes and prejudices.
Napoleon Chagnon
A more serious and complicated incident concerned research conducted among the Yanomami, an indigenous group living in the Amazon rainforest in Brazil and Venezuela. Starting in the 1960s, the anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon and James Neel, a geneticist, carried out research among the Yanomami. Neel was interested in studying the effects of radiation released by nuclear explosions on people living in remote areas. Chagnon was investigating theories about the role of violence in Yanomami society. In 2000, an American journalist, Patrick Tierney, published a book about Chagnon and Neel’s research: Darkness in El Dorado: How Scientists and Journalists Devastated the Amazon . The book contained numerous stunning allegations, including a claim that the pair had deliberately infected the Yanomami with measles, starting an epidemic that killed thousands of people. The book also claimed that Neel had conducted medical experiments without the consent of the Yanomami and that Chagnon had deliberately created conflicts between Yanomami groups so he could study the resulting violence.
These allegations were brought to the attention of the American Anthropological Association, and a number of inquiries were eventually conducted. James Neel was deceased, but Napoleon Chagnon steadfastly denied the allegations. In 2002, the AAA issued their report; Chagnon was judged to have misrepresented the violent nature of Yanomami culture in ways that caused them harm and to have failed to obtain proper consent for his research. However, Chagnon continued to reject these conclusions and complained that the process used to evaluate the evidence was unfair. In 2005, the AAA rescinded its own conclusion, citing problems with the investigation process. The results of several years of inquiry into the situation satisfied few people. Chagnon was not definitively pronounced guilty, nor was he exonerated. Years later, debate over this episode continues. [8] The controversy demonstrates the extent to which truth can be elusive in anthropological inquiry. Although anthropologists should not be storytellers in the sense that they deliberately create fictions, differences in perspective and theoretical orientation create unavoidable differences in the way anthropologists interpret the same situation. Anthropologists must try to use their toolkit of theory and methods to ensure that the stories they tell are truthful and represent the voice of the people being studied using an ethical approach.
BACK IN THE COFFEE SHOP
This chapter has looked at some historic turning points in the way anthropologists have defined culture. There is not one true, absolute definition of culture. Anthropologists respect traditions such as language; the development of self, especially from infancy to adulthood; kinship; and the structure of the social unit, or the strata of a person within their class structure; marriage, families, and rites of passage; systems of belief; and ritual. However, anthropologists also look at change and the impact it has on those traditions.
With globalization moving at a dramatic pace, and change unfolding daily, how will emerging trends redefine the culture concept? For example, social media and the Internet connect the world and have created new languages, relationships, and an online culture without borders. This leads to the question: is digital, or cyber anthropology the future? Is the study of online cultures, which are encountered largely through reading text, considered armchair or off the veranda research? Is the cyber world a real or virtual culture? In some ways, addressing online cultures takes anthropology back to its roots as anthropologists can explore new worlds without leaving home. At the same time, cyberspaces and new technologies allow people to see, hear, and communicate with others around the world in real time.
Back in the coffee shop, where we spent time with Bob, we discovered that he hoped to keep familiar aspects of his own culture, traditions such as language, social structure, and unique expressions of values, alive. The question, what is culture, caused us to reflect on our own understandings of the cultural self and the cultural Other , and on the importance of self and cultural awareness.
My cultural self has evolved from the first customary traditions of my childhood, yet my life with the Inuit caused me to consider that I have similar values and community traits as my friends in the North. My childhood was focused on caring, acceptance, and working together to achieve the necessities of life. Life on the land with the Inuit was no different, and throughout the years, I have seen how much we are the same, just living in different locations and circumstances. My anthropological training has enriched my life experiences by teaching me to enjoy the world and its peoples. I have also experienced being the cultural Other when working in the field, and this has always reminded me that the cultural self and the cultural Other will always be in conflict with each other on both sides of the experience.
Living with different indigenous tribes in Kenya gave me a chance to learn how communities maintain their traditional culture and ways of living. I come from a Portuguese- Canadian family that has kept strong ties to the culture and religion of our ancestors. Portuguese people believe storytelling is a way to keep one’s traditions, cultural identity, indigenous knowledge, and language alive. When I lived in Nairobi Province, Kenya, I discovered that people there had the same point of view. I found it odd that people still define their identities by their cultural history. What I have learned by conducting cultural fieldwork is that the meanings of culture not only vary from one group to another, but that all human societies define themselves through culture.
Our Final Reflection
Bob took us on a journey to understand what is at the heart of the culture concept. Clearly, the culture concept does not follow a straight line. Scholars, storytellers, and the people one meets in everyday life have something to say about the components of culture. The story that emerges from different voices brings insight into what it is to be human. Defining the culture concept is like putting together a puzzle with many pieces. The puzzle of culture concepts is almost complete, but it is not finished…yet.
Discussion Questions
How did the armchair anthropology and the off the veranda approaches differ as methods to study culture? What can be learned about a culture by experiencing it in person that cannot be learned from reading about it?
Why is the concept of culture difficult to define? What do you think are the most important elements of culture?
Why is it difficult to separate the “social” from the “cultural”? Do you think this is an important distinction?
In the twenty-first century, people have much greater contact with members of other cultures than they did in the past. Which topics or concerns should be priorities for future studies of culture?
Armchair anthropology : an early and discredited method of anthropological research that did not involve direct contact with the people studied.
Cultural determinism : the idea that behavioral differences are a result of cultural, not racial or genetic causes.
C ultural evolutionism: a discredited theory popular in nineteenth century anthropology suggesting that societies evolved through stages from simple to advanced.
Cultural relativism : the idea that we should seek to understand another person’s beliefs and behaviors from the perspective of their own culture and not our own.
Culture : a set of beliefs, practices, and symbols that are learned and shared. Together, they form an all-encompassing, integrated whole that binds people together and shapes their worldview and lifeways.
Enculturation: the process of learning the characteristics and expectations of a culture or group.
Ethnocentrism: the tendency to view one’s own culture as most important and correct and as the stick by which to measure all other cultures.
Functionalism: an approach to anthropology developed in British anthropology that emphasized the way that parts of a society work together to support the functioning of the whole.
Going native : becoming fully integrated into a cultural group through acts such as taking a leadership position, assuming key roles in society, entering into marriage, or other behaviors that incorporate an anthropologist into the society he or she is studying.
Holism: taking a broad view of the historical, environmental, and cultural foundations of behavior.
Kinship: blood ties, common ancestry, and social relationships that form families within human groups.
Participant observation: a type of observation in which the anthropologist observes while participating in the same activities in which her informants are engaged.
Structural-Functionalism: an approach to anthropology that focuses on the ways in which the customs or social institutions in a culture contribute to the organization of society and the maintenance of social order.
The Other: is a term that has been used to describe people whose customs, beliefs, or behaviors are “different” from one’s own
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Benedict, Ruth. Patterns of Culture . Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Company, 1934.
Boas, Franz. Race, Language, and Culture . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940.
Darwin, Charles. On the Origin of Species . London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1859.
Kroeber, Alfred. The Nature of Culture . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952.
Malinowski, Bronislaw. Argonauts of the Western Pacific . London: Routledge and Sons, 1922.
Mead, Margaret. Coming of Age in Samoa: A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization . New York: William Morrow and Company, 1928.
Swift, Jonathan. Gulliver’s Travels into Several Remote Nations of the World . London: Benjamin Motte, 1726.
Tylor, Edward B. Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Customs . London: Cambridge University Press. 1871.
- Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Customs (London: Cambridge University Press, 1871), preface. ↵
- Lewis Henry Morgan was one anthropologist who proposed an evolutionary framework based on these terms in his book Ancient Society (New York: Henry Holt, 1877). ↵
- The film Bronislaw Malinowski: Off the Veranda , (Films Media Group, 1986) further describes Malinowski’s research practices. ↵
- Bronislaw Malinowski. Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1922), 290. ↵
- For more on this topic see Adam Kuper, Anthropology and Anthropologists: The Modern British School (New York: Routledge, 1983) and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (London: Cohen and West, 1952). ↵
- Boas’ attitudes about cultural relativism were influenced by his experiences in the Canadian Arctic as he struggled to survive in a natural environment foreign to his own prior experience. His private diary and letters record the evolution of his thinking about what it means to be “civilized.” In a letter to his fiancé, he wrote: “I often ask myself what advantages our 'good society' possesses over that of the 'savages' and find, the more I see of their customs, that we have no right to look down upon them ... We have no right to blame them for their forms and superstitions which may seem ridiculous to us. We ‘highly educated people’ are much worse, relatively speaking.” The entire letter can be read in George Stocking, ed. Observers Observed: Essays on Ethnographic Fieldwork (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 33. ↵
- Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, Geertz 1973), 89. ↵
- For more information about the controversy, see Thomas Gregor and Daniel Gross, “Guilt by Association: The Culture of Accusation and the American Anthropological Associations Investigation of Darkness in El Dorado.” American Anthropologist 106 no. 4 (2004):687-698 and Robert Borofsky, Yanomami: The Fierce Controversy and What We Can Learn From It (Berkley: University California Press, 2005). Napoleon Chagnon has written his rebuttal in Noble Savages: My Life Among Two Dangerous Tribes—The Yanomamo and the Anthropologists (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013). ↵
A term that has been used to describe people whose customs, beliefs, or behaviors are “different” from one’s own
An early and discredited method of anthropological research that did not involve direct contact with the people studied.
The tendency to view one’s own culture as most important and correct and as the stick by which to measure all other cultures.
A discredited theory popular in nineteenth century anthropology suggesting that societies evolved through stages from simple to advanced.
A type of observation in which the anthropologist observes while participating in the same activities in which her informants are engaged.
Blood ties, common ancestry, and social relationships that form families within human groups.
Becoming fully integrated into a cultural group through acts such as taking a leadership position, assuming key roles in society, entering into marriage, or other behaviors that incorporate an anthropologist into the society he or she is studying.
An approach to anthropology developed in British anthropology that emphasized the way that parts of a society work together to support the functioning of the whole.
An approach to anthropology that focuses on the ways in which the customs or social institutions in a culture contribute to the organization of society and the maintenance of social order.
The idea that we should seek to understand another person’s beliefs and behaviors from the perspective of their own culture and not our own.
The process of learning the characteristics and expectations of a culture or group.
Taking a broad view of the historical, environmental, and cultural foundations of behavior.
Perspectives: An Open Introduction to Cultural Anthropology, 2nd Edition Copyright © 2020 by American Anthropological Association is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.
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2 What is Culture?
Taylor Livingston
Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
- Define culture.
- Compare cultural relativism, moral relativism, and ethnocentrism with examples of each.
- Describe emic vs etic perspective.
- List and explain the six aspects of culture.
Culture Some Definitions:
The first widely accepted notion of what exactly is culture was compiled by Edward B. Tylor. Tylor, a Quaker, school dropout, and British man who kept a fantastic beard throughout his life (see image), is often considered the father of cultural anthropology. He became interested in other cultures because he was encouraged to travel to warm climates for his tuberculosis. While this did nothing for his tuberculosis, it did a great deal for anthropology. Tylor traveled to Mexico and wrote about its peoples ( Lowie, 1917 ). From his experiences in Mexico and studies of other societies as a professor at Oxford (though he had no degrees), he compiled a definition of culture : “A complex whole, which includes knowledge, belief, arts, morals, law, customs and other capabilities and habits acquired by people” (Tylor, 1871, p. 1).
From this first definition, the concept of culture has been expanded to include:
- Learned behaviors and symbols that allow people to live in groups.
- The primary means by which humans adapt to their environments.
- The way of life characteristic of a particular group of humans.
Examples of the first bullet include that official language (a collection of symbols) of the United States is English, which allows us to communicate. We share common symbols, such as a bright, red octagon that we have learned means “stop” that enables us not to crash our cars into each other. While an example of the second bullet is that we do not adapt to winter in Nebraska by increasing our stores of brown fat like other animals do, nor do we develop thicker hair on our bodies, like our cats and dogs do. We adapt by cultural means: we put on a coat, scarf, and mittens for outside and turn on the heat in our homes. The final bullet is a little trickier. What is “a way of life”? It’s all the bullet above, plus the knowledge and beliefs Tylor mentions. If we take football fans of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln as a particular group of people, what might be some of their “ways of life”? Perhaps, it would include: wearing red or black clothing on game days with the word “Nebraska” or the symbol “N” on it, tailgating (consuming alcohol for those over 21 and eating all the things dipped in ranch dressing) in the parking lot of Memorial Stadium, gathering in the Railyard to watch the game, cheering when the players take a diamond-shaped ball across a large field into the opponent’s territory, and hearing a cannon sound when they do.
The Concept:
While definitions and examples of the parts of the definition may be easy to understand, the concept of culture can be difficult to grasp. Most likely because unless you have ever travelled out of the country or to a vastly different area of the country, you have not spent much time thinking about how the way you believe and how you do things are unique to a specific part of the world. This leads some Anthropology textbooks to compare the concept of culture to the water in which a fish swims. Sure, this is an apt analogy as most of us are unaware of the extent culture surrounds us and shapes our lives and we cannot live without it. But, culture has moral and historical underpinning that are not quite captured by the fish in water analogy. As a result, the example of American barbeque to illustrate the concept of culture and its six aspects:
Six Aspects of Culture
- Learned—taught by someone to someone else, usually parent to child. This process is called enculturation.
- Shared—groups share norms—the way things ought to be done—and values—what is true, right, and beautiful
- Symbolic—culture creates meaning; it is the story we tell ourselves about ourselves
- Patterned—practices make sense; culture is an integrated system—changes in one area, cause changes in others
- Adaptive—culture is the way humans adapt to the world; current adaptations may be maladaptive in the long term
- Changes—culture constantly shifts and transforms; it is not static
Barbeque: More American than Apple Pie
When referring to American barbeque, it is not hamburgers and hotdogs cooked on a gas grill, but meat cooked “low (over an indirect flame) and slow” (at least eight hours and as long as 18!). Legend has it the term “barbeque” comes from an Indigenous group, the Tainoused, from the Caribbean who likely cooked fish for an extended time over a wooden pit made with green wood (so as not to catch on fire) called a “barabicu” (or “sacred pit” in the Taino language). Christopher Columbus observed the practice and took stories of it back to Spain where the term became “barbacoa” ( KM, no date ; Suddath, 2009 ). Another Spaniard, De Soto, notes that around 1540 near what is now known as the state of Mississippi, he observes the Chickasaw roasting a pig over a “barbacoa.” Eventually, the practice of cooking meat “low and slow” makes its way to the American colonies and becomes known as “barbeque” ( Geiling 2013 ; Suddath, 2009) . This way of cooking meat lasts longer than British rule, as parties serving barbeque were held for several days, celebrating the conclusion of the Revolutionary War ( KM, no date ).
The practice of barbequing meat becomes most popular in the Southern states. Pork was the first meat used in this cooking practice, as pigs could be left free to roam and feed in the temperate Southeastern forest, while cows needed large amounts of cleared land, enclosures and feed. It is thought that barbeque would have been the preferred method to cook pigs because of the lean, tougher meat forest living and foraging would engender. By barbequing the pigs, the meat would become “fall of the bone” tender ( Gieling, 2013 ).
The South’s immigrants largely influenced the seasoning and dressing flavors of the meat. Early British settlers to the Colonies taste for tart seasoning likely influenced the vinegar-based seasoning of barbeque in Virginia and North Carolina, known as Carolina-style barbeque today (Gieling, 2013). This was likely the type of barbeque eaten at the celebrations following the winning of Revolutionary War and mentioned by George Washington as taking place on his plantation ( KM, no date ). In South Carolina, the large number of German and French immigrants influenced the addition of mustard to the vinegar sauce of barbeque. While in Memphis, access to a large port on the Mississippi River, created the “Memphis style” of barbeque, known for tomato-based barbeque sauce sweetened with molasses, which was imported from the Caribbean. Westward expansion brought the practice of barbequing to Texas, where German immigrants used the practice on their vast supplies of cattle, creating the Texas style of barbeque still around today. The Kansas City style of barbeque, which is the most common style of barbeque (what most people consider barbeque sauce—think about what you would receive at McDonalds, Burger King, or Chick fil A if you asked for barbeque sauce—it’s that style), blends the Texas tradition of using beef with the Memphis style of a sweet and tangy sauce (Gieling, 2013). Kansas City owes its unique blending of styles to Henry Perry, an African American man from Memphis who adapted his home city’s style of barbeque to the large beef meat packing industry in Kansas City when he moved to the area in 1907 ( Gieling, 2013 ).
Indeed, people of African descent have a long connection to the practice of barbequing as the likely cookers of much of the pork-based barbeque consumed in the Southern Colonies and later states were enslaved Africans. Later, many African Americans, like Mr. Perry, took this cooking tradition with them as they migrated out of the rural South to Northern and Midwestern cities during the Great Migration. By the middle of the 20th century, every city in the US had an African American owned and operated barbeque restaurant, cementing the connection between barbeque and African American culture ( Suddath, 2009 ).
Which style of barbeque one prefers is very contentious, especially in the American South, and often a result of what style is most familiar. For example, I am from South Carolina and have been eating mustard-based barbeque for most of my life. When I attended graduate school in North Carolina, I did not understand how people were referring to the almost pure vinegar concoction the shredded meat was in as “sauce.” This was decidedly “wrong” in my opinion. Vinegar is an ingredient to a sauce, not THE sauce. Plus, a sauce is closer to a solid than a liquid! Similarly, when visiting Birmingham, Alabama, I was severed their version of barbeque sauce. While closer to an actual sauce than North Carolina style, it was mayonnaise-based! Surely, one cannot get more wrong than THAT!
The story of barbeque tells the story of America. From its origins in the Caribbean, witnessing in Indigenous cuisines to sauces based on immigrants’ tastes, and finally, it’s popularization through African American-owned restaurants, barbeque symbolizes the melting pot of America and illustrates the concept of culture. The practice is rooted in history, and what style of barbeque one believes to be the best depends on from which region they hail. Further, the story of barbeque illustrates the six aspects of culture:
Barbeque and the Six Aspects of Culture
Barbeque practices are learned :
Like culture, what iteration of barbeque is THE type of barbeque (Carolina, Memphis, Texas, or Kansas City style) is learned by children through the cooking or consumption practices of their parents.
Barbeque is also shared:
Whether you are in Newberry, SC or Charleston, SC, you know that when someone is serving barbeque, it is mustard-based.
Barbeque practices are patterned:
The Texas style of barbeque using beef instead of pork makes sense due to the large number of cattle ranches in the area; what happens in one area (economic) is also found in another (foodways).
Barbeque is symbolic:
For many African Americans during the Great Migration, barbeque was a symbol (a short hand call back) to home and family–way to keep family and regional traditions alive in a new area.
Barbeque is adaptive:
The first Southern Colonists used pigs for barbeque because they were readily available in the area, applying the barbeque technique made this meat edible and a useful resource.
Barbeque practices change:
The addition of mustard to the sauce by South Carolina French and German immigrants changed the barbeque recipe to fit their pallet, based on the cuisine of their countries of origin.
Finally, my last paragraph on mustard-based barbeque sauce being the best and the standard by which other styles should be measured, is related to another aspect of culture— ethnocentrism , the idea that your culture’s way is the best way and every other way is wrong. This concept is what anthropologists try to argue against. Instead, anthropologists argue for us to practice cultural relativism when exposed to new ideas or practices. Cultural relativism is the opposite of ethnocentrism . Cultural relativism argues that the beliefs, values, and practices should be understood based on that culture’s reasoning and history, and not be judged against the criteria of another culture. Using our barbeque example, a cultural relativist would try all the different types of barbeque and attempt to understand the different styles based on the history and practices of the region. They can have a favorite style, but they do not think their favorite style is the best or only way to prepare meat.
Another form of relativism is moral relativism , which argues there is no universal system of right and wrong. What is considered “right” or “wrong” depends on the context (is relative) that that particular culture or historical time period. A moral relativist would argue there is no such things as universal human rights. Using a barbeque example, a moral relativist would argue the best and only way to prepare barbeque is whatever that region thought was the best, even if they murdered people to make the barbeque. If people in that region did not seeing murder and cannibalism as morally or ethically wrong, then it was not wrong. Anthropologists are not moral relativists, as all ascribe to a code of ethics (links to external site) that guide their practice based on the idea of universal human rights (links to external site) as set forth by the United Nations. While anthropologists may study groups, who practice cannibalism or female genital cutting, they do not believe these practices are morally or ethically correct. Instead, they attempt understand the culture’s reasons for such practices and not use their own culture’s standards and values in their evaluation.
The differences in ways of understanding cultural practices, whether from a perspective of someone of that culture or from someone outside of that culture bring us to the concepts of emic and etic perspectives. An emic perspective is the insider’s (how members of the culture) view and understanding of that culture’s practices, while an etic perspective is the outsider (how people who are not members of that culture) view and understand that culture’s practices. Consider these tweets from two different news sources:
Both are about banning the halal and kosher practice of slaughtering animals without stunning, but use different images with different connotations to illustrate this point. Why might that be? First, more information on the differences in animal slaughter is necessary: The halal method of slaughter requires an observant Muslim (someone who practices Islam) to slaughter the animal using a sharp knife to cut the arteries in the animal’s neck to maximize blood loss and swiftly kill the animal. The practitioner must say a blessing before the slaughter. The animal’s head must be facing toward Mecca. The kosher method is similar, also requiring a sharp knife to cut the arteries of the animal’s neck and the stating of a blessing by someone who is Jewish ( Aghwan and Regenstein 2019 ). The stunning method shocks the animal into unconsciousness before slaughter and uses different bleeding and cutting techniques to maximize blood loss. So which of these different methods is considered less harmful to the animal—stunning before slaughter or a swift cut to the main arteries? For many years, animal rights supporters have argued stunning is a more humane method, which led Belgian to pass a law excluding the religious exemptions of halal and kosher slaughter methods. While most halal slaughters do stun the animal before cutting, most slaughters making the meat kosher require that the animal not be stunned. Thus, the issue arises for the minority of halal slaughters not stunning the animal prior and most Jewish slaughters requiring the animal to not be stunned for the meat to be deemed kosher.
The tweets use of different images, one of a meat market and the other of sheep being slaughtered, speak to the different perspectives on this issue. Al Jazeera is a Middle Eastern based news media company, many of their audience practicing Islam, while the BBC is a European-based news media company, with many of their audience not practicing Islam. Al Jazeera may be demonstrating an emic perspective, portraying the court’s ruling of the ban with the image of a meat market to signal the normalcy of halal practices, while the BBC displays a gorier photo of halal slaughter to possibly signal brutality of the non-stunning methods, an etic perspective.
Another example of the etic perspective comes from a tweet by Patrick Gathara, a Kenyan reporter, cartoonist, and satirist:
As Gathara is not American, he reports on the American cultural practice of inauguration from an outsider, etic, perspective, referring to Joe Biden as an “opposition leader” and the ceremony as a “religious oathing ritual” and Washington DC as “home to sacred monuments to revered ancestors.” Nonetheless, Gathara’s description is not technically incorrect: Biden won the Presidency by defeating the incumbent, Donald Trump, making him the opposition; inauguration does have a religious element as US Presidents swear the Oath of Office on a Bible; and the National Mall does contain monuments to ancestors like the Lincoln Memorial, honoring Abraham Lincoln. However, the description does depict the ceremony of inauguration as strange, using terms (“opposition”, “religious”, “revered ancestors”) usually reserved for describing the practices of faraway, remote, Indigenous peoples, not practices of most powerful country in the world. This is not how someone who was American would describe the swearing in of the new President of the United States. This exactly Gathara’s objective as his Twitter account presents US and other Western nations’ news using the etic perspective (which is often derogatory and distancing/othering—see the BBC tweet’s image above to non-Western nations). How one views certain practices, depends on the perspective they are taking, be that emic or etic, ethnocentric, or culturally relative.
An anthropological perspective seeks to combine the emic and etic perspectives. It understands culture practices in a culturally relative way, which views culture as patterned, learned, shared, symbolic, adaptive, and ever-changing.
Key Takeaways
- What anthropologists call “culture”, knowledge, beliefs, and practices of a group of people, is all around us, but it can be difficult to see and understand because it shapes how we see the world.
- Viewing cultural practices from the insider’s perspective with a knowledge of context and history like that of a fish in water, is taking an emic view. Believing that your culture’s way of doing things is the only and best way to do things is called ethnocentrism.
- Culture is learned—taught by someone to someone else, usually parent to child. This process is called enculturation.
- Culture is shared—groups share norms—the way things ought to be done—and values—what is true, right, and beautiful
- Culture is symbolic—culture creates meaning; it is the story we tell ourselves about ourselves.
- Culture is patterned—practices make sense; culture is an integrated system—changes in one area, cause changes in others.
- Culture is adaptive—culture is the way humans adapt to the world; current adaptations may be maladaptive in the long term.
- Culture changes—culture constantly shifts and transforms; it is not static.
- Anthropologists use all these aspects of culture to try to understand the practices of another culture, which is called cultural relativism.
Geiling, N. (2013, July 18). The Evolution of American Barbecue. Retrieved December 18, 2020, from https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/the-evolution-of-american-barbecue-13770775/
KM (no d). The History of Barbecuing. Retrieved December 18, 2020, from https://www.foodnetwork.com/fn-dish/news/2019/6/the-history-of-barbecuing
Lowie, R. (1917). Edward B. Tylor. American Anthropologist, 19 (2), new series, 262-268. Retrieved December 17, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/660758
Suddath, C. (2009, July 03). Barbecue: A Brief History. Retrieved December 18, 2020, from https://time.com/3957444/barbecue/
Aghwan, Z. A., & Regenstein, J. M. (2019). Slaughter practices of different faiths in different countries. Journal of animal science and technology , 61 (3), 111–121. https://doi.org/10.5187/jast.2019.61.3.111
Tylor, E. B. (1871). Primitive culture: Researches into the development of mythology, philosophy, religion, art and custom (Vol. 2). J. Murray.
cumulative deposit of knowledge, experience, beliefs, values, attitudes, meanings, hierarchies, religion, notions of time, roles, spatial relations, concepts of the universe, and material objects and possessions acquired by a group of people
evaluation of other cultures according to preconceptions originating in the standards and customs of one's own culture.
the notion that the beliefs, values, and practices should be understood based on that culture’s reasoning and history, and not be judged against the criteria of another culture
the concept that argues there is no universal system of right and wrong. What is considered “right” or “wrong” depends on the context (is relative) that that particular culture or historical time period
the insider’s (how members of the culture) view and understanding of that culture’s practices
the perspective of the outsider (how people who are not members of that culture) view and understand that culture’s practices
An Introduction to Anthropology: the Biological and Cultural Evolution of Humans Copyright © by Taylor Livingston is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.
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Defining and Understanding Culture
Learning objectives.
- Define culture.
- Identify the differences between armchair anthropology and participant-observer fieldwork.
- Compare and contrast the ideas of ethnocentrism and cultural relativism.
- Define engaged anthropology.
- Identify the key historical figures in the development of cultural anthropology.
- Distinguish between the approaches used by these four schools of anthropological thought: C ultural Evolutionism, European Structural Functionalism, Historical Particularism, and Interpretive Anthropology.
This lesson introduces you to the concept of culture , a system of knowledge, beliefs, behavioral norms, values, traditions, and institutions that are created, learned, and shared by a group of people, often to be challenged and transformed over time. The lesson begins with a discussion of how we can learn about groups of people and their cultures through stories, and how anthropologists themselves are storytellers. It then overviews the history of the field of cultural anthropology, and significant moments, perspectives and people in that history.
Stories as a Reflection of Culture by Emily Cowall and Priscilla Medeiros
Stories are told in every culture and often teach a moral lesson to young children. Fables are similar, but often set an example for people to live by or describe what to do when in a dangerous situation. They can also be a part of traditions, help to preserve ways of life, or explain mysteries. Storytelling takes many different forms such as tall tales and folktales. These are for entertainment or to discuss problems encountered in life. Both are also a form of cultural preservation, a way to communicate morals or values to the next generation. Stories can also be a form of social control over certain activities or customs that are not allowed in a society.
A fable becomes a tradition by being retold and accepted by others in the community. Different cultures have very similar stories sharing common themes. One of the most common themes is the battle between good and evil. Another is the story of the quest. The quest often takes the character to distant lands, filled with real-life situations, opportunities, hardships, and heartaches. In both of these types of stories, the reader is introduced to the anthropological concept known as the Other . What exactly is the Other ? The Other is a term that has been used to describe people whose customs, beliefs, or behaviors are different from one’s own.
Figure 1: Travel writer Lemuel Gulliver is captured and tied down by the Lilliputians.
Can a story explain the concept of the Other? Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels is about four different voyages that Gulliver undertakes. His first adventure is the most well-known; in the story, Lemuel Gulliver is a surgeon who plans a sea voyage when his business fails. During a storm at sea, he is shipwrecked, and he awakens to find himself bound and secured by a group of captors, the Lilliputians, who are six inches tall. Gulliver, having what Europeans consider a normal body height, suddenly becomes a giant. During this adventure, Gulliver is seen as an outsider, a stranger with different features and language. Gulliver becomes the Other.
What lessons about culture can we learn from Gulliver’s Travels ? Swift’s story offers lessons about cultural differences, conflicts occurring in human society, and the balance of power. It also provides an important example of the Other. The Other is a matter of perspective in this story: Gulliver thinks the Lilliputians are strange and unusual. To Gulliver, the Lilliputians are the Other, but the Lilliputians equally see Gulliver as the Other—he is a their captive and is a rare species of man because of his size.
The themes in Gulliver’s Travels describe different cultures and aspects of storytelling. The story uses language, customary behaviors, and the conflict between different groups to explore ideas of the exotic and strange. The story is framed as an adventure, but is really about how similar cultures can be. In the end, Gulliver becomes a member of another cultural group, learning new norms, attitudes, and behaviors. At the same time, he wants to colonize them, a reflection of his former cultural self.
Stories are an important part of culture, and when used to pass on traditions or cultural values, they can connect people to the past. Stories are also a way to validate religious, social, political, and economic practices from one generation to another. Stories are important because they are used in some societies to apply social pressure, to keep people in line, and are part of shaping the way that people think and behave.
WATCH: Ted talk
Anthropologists as storytellers by emily cowall and priscilla medeiros, and melanie a. medeiros.
People throughout recorded history have relied on storytelling as a way to share cultural details. When early anthropologists studied people from other civilizations, they relied on the written accounts and opinions of others; they presented facts and developed their stories, about other cultures based solely on information gathered by others. These scholars did not have any direct contact with the people they were studying. This approach has come to be known as armchair anthropology . Simply put, if a culture is viewed from a distance (as from an armchair), the anthropologist tends to measure that culture from his or her own vantage point and to draw comparisons that place the anthropologist’s culture as superior to the one being studied. This point of view is also called ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism is an attitude based on the idea that one’s own group or culture is better than any other.
Armchair anthropologists were unlikely to be aware of their ethnocentric ideas because they did not visit the cultures they studied. Scottish social anthropologist Sir James Frazer (1854-1941) is well-known for his 1890 work The Golden Bough: A Study of Comparative Religions . Its title was later changed to A Study in Magic and Religion , and it was one of the first books to describe and record magical and religious beliefs of different culture groups around the world. Yet, this book was not the outcome of extensive study in the field. Instead, Frazer relied on the accounts of others who had traveled, such as scholars, missionaries, and government officials, to formulate his study.
Figure 2: Sir James Frazer
Another example of anthropological writing without the use of fieldwork is Sir E. B. Tylor ’s (1832-1917) book Primitive Culture (1871). Tylor, who went on to become the first professor of anthropology at Oxford University in 1896, was an important influence in the development of cultural anthropology as a separate discipline.
Figure 3: Sir E.B. Tylor
Frazer, Tylor and Morgan contributed important and foundational studies even though they never went into the field to gather their information. Armchair anthropologists were important in the development of anthropology as a discipline in the late nineteenth century because although these early scholars were not directly experiencing the cultures they were studying, their work did ask important questions that could ultimately only be answered by going into the field.
At the same time that Frazer, Tyler and Morgan were writing their armchair ethnographies about “the other,” members of otherized societies were writing their own portrayals of life in their communities. Ohíye S’a (1858-1939) was an Indigenous Santee Dakota Sioux, born in what is now the state of Minnesota. He grew up in a semi-nomadic society before moving in with his father who had a European lifestyle. His father baptized him as Charles Eastman and he began learning English and attending colonial schools. Although Ohíye S’a was not trained as an anthropologist, his 1905 book Red Hunters and the Animal People is considered to be the first book about American history written by a Native American author and from the Native American point of view. The book describes Indigenous knowledge and perspectives on non-human animals, with whom who they had a kinship. Ohíye S’a was also an indigenous rights activist. Therefore, Ohíye S’a is one of the first engaged anthropologists , anthropologists who use their research to bring awareness to and address social problems.
Figure 4: Charles Eastman, Ohíye S’a
In the early 20th century, anthropologists continued to be storytellers, however the discipline transformed in such a way that the stories they told were beginning to be informed by in-depth, face-to-face interactions with the people about whom they wrote. While the perspective of the anthropologist always influences the story they tell, later anthropologists attempted to tell stories about groups of people that were informed by their experiences, conversations and perspectives of members of the community themselves.
Anthropologists as Cultural Participants by Emily Cowall and Priscilla Medeiros
The armchair approach as a way to study culture changed when scholars took to the field and studied people by being participants and observers. As they did, fieldwork became the most important tool anthropologists used to understand the “complex whole” of culture.
Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), a Polish anthropologist, was greatly influenced by the work of Frazer . However , unlike the armchair anthropology approach Frazer used in writing The Golden Bough , Malinowski used more innovative ethnographic techniques, and his fieldwork took him off the veranda to study different cultures. The off the veranda approach is different from armchair anthropology because it includes active participant observation : traveling to a location, living among people, and observing their day-to-day lives. Malinowski wrote The Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922), which was considered the first modern ethnography and redefined the approach to fieldwork. This book is part of Malinowski’s trilogy on the Trobriand Islanders. Malinowski lived with them and observed life in their villages. By living among the islanders, Malinowski was able to learn about their social life, food and shelter, sexual behaviors, community economics, patterns of kinship, and family. [1] In The Argonauts of the Western Pacific , Malinowski suggested that other anthropologists should “grasp the native’s point of view, his relations to life, to realize his vision of his world.” [2] However, as we will see in the next lesson on ethnographic field work and ethics , Malinowski’s research presented problems from an ethical point of view.
Figure 5: Bronislaw Malinowski in the Trobriand Islands, 1915–1918
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEORIES OF CULTURE
European structural functionalism.
The discipline of cultural anthropology developed somewhat differently in Europe, North America, and other countries during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many European anthropologists were particularly interested in questions about how societies were structured and how they remained stable over time. In every society, people are linked to one another through social institutions such as families, political organizations, and businesses. Anthropologists across Europe often focused their research on understanding the form and function of these social institutions.
European anthropologists developed theories of structural functionalism to explain how social institutions contribute to the organization of society and the maintenance of social order. Bronislaw Malinowski believed that cultural traditions were developed as a response to specific human needs such as food, comfort, safety, knowledge, reproduction, and economic livelihood. One function of educational institutions like schools, for instance, is to provide knowledge that prepares people to obtain jobs and make contributions to society. The British anthropologist A.R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955) was also interested in the way that social structures functioned to maintain social stability in a society over time. [3] He suggested that in many societies it was the family that served as the most important social structure because family relationships determined much about an individual’s social, political, and economic relationships and these patterns were repeated from one generation to the next. In a family unit in which the father is the breadwinner and the mother stays home to raise the children, the social and economic roles of both the husband and the wife will be largely defined by their specific responsibilities within the family. If their children grow up to follow the same arrangement, these social roles will be continued in the next generation.
Figure 6: A.R. Radcliffe-Brown
European structural functionalism influenced the work of anthropologists outside of Europe as well. Hsiao-t’ung Fei (1910-2005) was a groundbreaking Chinese anthropologist and sociologist who studied under Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown at the London School of Economics. Fei’s 1939 book, Peasant Life in China: A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze Valley presents the findings of his ethnographic study of the economic life of Chinese peasants. Fei’s work was a testament that anthropologists do not need to travel outside of one’s home country to study culture and society.
Figure 7: Hsiao-t’ung Fei
E.E. Evans-Pritchard (1902-1973) was another respected European structural functionalist. His trilogy, The Nuer: A Description of Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People (1940), Kinship and Marriage Among the Nuer (1951), and Nuer Religion (1956) are classic examples of structural functionalism, examining specific social institutions in detail in each book.
Figure 8: E. E. Evans-Pritchard
One of the biggest critiques of structural functionalism is that it views cultures as stable and orderly and ignores or cannot explain social change. Functionalism also struggles to explain why a society develops one particular kind of social institution instead of another. Functionalist perspectives did contribute to the development of more sophisticated concepts of culture by establishing the importance of social institutions in holding societies together. Functionalist theory helped to develop the concept of culture by demonstrating that culture is not just a set of ideas or beliefs, but consists of specific practices and social institutions that give structure to daily life and allow human communities to function.
Although Evans-Pritchard was also one of the first anthropologists to study the religion, and psychological effects of religion in his 1937 Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande , Ibrahim Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) a psychiatrist, philosopher, revolutionary, and writer from Martinique studied and wrote about the cultural and psychological life of Algerians. He also examined the psychological, social, and cultural impact of colonization and decolonization. His most well-known book the Wretched of the Earth was published shortly after his death in 1961 and was a controversial discussion of colonialism and resistance to it.
Figure 9: Frantz Fanon
Anthropology in the Americas: Historical Particularism
The participant-observation method of fieldwork was a revolutionary change to the practice of anthropology, but at the same time it presented problems that needed to be overcome. The challenge was to move away from ethnocentrism, racial stereotypes, and colonial attitudes, and to move forward by encouraging anthropologists to maintain high ethical standards and open minds.
Franz Boas (1858-1942), an American anthropologist, is acknowledged for redirecting American anthropologists away from theories of cultural evolutionism and toward cultural relativism. Boas first studied physical science at the University of Kiel in Germany. Because he was a trained scientist, he was familiar with using empirical methods as a way to study a subject. Empirical methods are based on evidence that can be tested using observation and experiment. In 1883, Franz Boas went on a geographical expedition to Baffin Island in the Canadian Arctic. The Central Eskimo (1888) details his time spent on Baffin Island studying the culture and language of the central Eskimo (Inuit) people. He studied every aspect of their culture such as tools, clothing, and shelters. This study was Boas’ first major contribution to the American school of anthropology and convinced him that cultures could only be understood through extensive field research. As he observed on Baffin Island, cultural ideas and practices are shaped through interactions with the natural environment. The cultural traditions of the Inuit were suited for the environment in which they lived. This work led him to promote cultural relativism : the principle that a culture must be understood on its own terms rather than compared to an outsider’s standard. This was an important turning point in correcting the challenge of ethnocentrism in ethnographic fieldwork. [4]
Figure 10: Franz Boas, One of the founders of American Anthropology, 1915
Although Boas’s contribution of cultural relativism and his challenge of the theory of cultural evolution was critical to the development of the discipline of cultural anthropology, it is important to note that Boas was not only scholar openly challenging the notions of cultural evolution and racial hierarchies that had been popular for decades. In his book, The Equality of Human Races (1885), Anténor Firmin (1850-1911), a Haitian anthropologist, lawyer and journalist, challenged the racist ideas of early anthropologists, arguing that “all men are endowed with the same qualities and the same faults, without distinction of color or anatomical form. The races are equal” (450). Not only did his work predate that of Boas, it was also influential in the Pan-African movement, which advocated for the rights of all people of African descent around the world.
Figure 11: Anténor Firmin
Additionally, although W.E.B DuBois (1868-1963)–an American sociologist, historian, writer, and civil rights activist– was not trained as an anthropologist, his book The Souls of Black Folk (1903) critically examines the effects of “race” on society. DuBois demonstrated the negative and divisive effects of racism on society, and for individual sense of self. He outlined the rights he believed should be afforded to all people irrespective of race, including voting rights, education, and fair treatment. Like Firmin, DuBois’s work was central to the Pan-Africanist movement and later to the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. Du Bois was one of the founders of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1909.
Figure 12 : W.E.B. DuBois in 1918
Franz Boas also influenced American anthropology through his students. Ruth Benedict (1887-1948) was one of Boas’s first female students. Benedict continued to use the approach of cultural relativism as a starting point for investigating the cultures of the American northwest and southwest. Her best-selling book Patterns of Culture (1934) emphasized that culture gives people coherent patterns for thinking and behaving. She argued that culture affects individuals psychologically, shaping individual personality traits and leading the members of a culture to exhibit similar traits such as a tendency toward aggression, or calmness.
Figure 13: Ruth Benedict, 1936
Figure 14: Ella C. Deloria
Figure 15: Margaret Mead in 1950
Katherine Dunham (1909-2006) was another engaged anthropologist, as well as a dancer, choreographer, and activist. She shared the findings of her fieldwork in Jamaica, Martinique, Trinidad and Tabago, and Haiti through her choreography and dance. “ Among her many lasting contributions is the deep concern for the politics of representation that she brought to her work. She recognized early on that not all stories were hers to tell and carefully attended to the responsibilities that came with translating across places, audiences, languages, and genres throughout her acclaimed career.” “Dunham was an innovator in African-American modern dance as well as a leader in the field of dance anthropology, or ethnochoreology.”
Figure 16: Katherine Dunham
Zora Neal Hurston (1891-1960) is another well-respected anthropologist who helped develop the American school of anthropological thought. Hurston embodied the anthropologist as participant observer and story-teller. In 1925, Hurston started studying anthropology as an undergraduate student at Barnard College of Columbia University, where she was the only black student. After graduating with her B.A. in 1928 she began a graduate program in anthropology at Columbia, where she worked with Boas, Benedict and fellow student Mead. Hurston was interested in Southern, African-American and Caribbean folklore, and how these contributed to a community’s identity. She also wrote fiction about contemporary issues in the black community and became a central figure of the Harlem Renaissance. Hurston wrote and published her literary anthropology on African-American folklore in North Florida, Mules and Men (1935). Also published during this time was Tell My Horse: Voodoo and Life in Haiti and Jamaica (1938), documenting her research on rituals in Jamaica and Haiti. Hurston’s works concerned both the African-American experience and her struggles as an African-American woman.
Figure 17: Zora Neale Hurston
In summary, anthropologists in the Americas have used cultural relativism to add depth to the concept of culture in several ways. In the late 19th century British anthropologist Tylor defined culture as including knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, capabilities and habits. Anthropologists in the Americas added to this definition by emphasizing the importance of enculturation , the process of learning culture, in the lives of individuals. They established that through enculturation culture shapes individual identity, self-awareness, and emotions in fundamental ways. They also emphasized the need for holism , approaches to research that considered the entire context of a society including its history.
Late 20th Century Interpretive Anthropology
Clifford Geertz (1926-2006), the founding member of interpretive anthropology, noted in his book The Interpretation of Cultures (1973) that culture should not be seen as something that was “locked inside people’s heads.” Instead, culture was publicly communicated through speech and other behaviors. Culture , he concluded, is “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes toward life.” [5] Geertz’s definition, which continues to be influential today, reflects the influence of many earlier efforts to refine the concept of culture in anthropology.
There are many definitions of culture, all influenced by historical perspectives and figures. For our purposes, we will combine these perspectives into this definition: a system of knowledge, beliefs, behavioral norms, values, traditions, and institutions that are created, learned, and shared by a group of people, often to be challenged and transformed over time.
Complete this 2 Minute Survey after Finishing this Reading Assignment
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
- How do the armchair anthropology and the fieldwork approaches differ as methods to study culture? What can be learned about a culture by experiencing it in person that cannot be learned from reading about it?
- What do you think are the most important elements of culture?
- In the twenty-first century, people have much greater contact with members of other cultures than they did in the past. Which topics or concerns should be priorities for future studies of culture?
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Benedict, Ruth. Patterns of Culture . Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Company, 1934.
Boas, Franz. Race, Language, and Culture . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940.
Darwin, Charles. On the Origin of Species . London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1859.
Kroeber, Alfred. The Nature of Culture . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952.
Malinowski, Bronislaw. Argonauts of the Western Pacific . London: Routledge and Sons, 1922.
Mead, Margaret. Coming of Age in Samoa: A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization . New York: William Morrow and Company, 1928.
Swift, Jonathan. Gulliver’s Travels into Several Remote Nations of the World . London: Benjamin Motte, 1726.
Tylor, Edward B. Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Customs . London: Cambridge University Press. 1871.
- The film Bronislaw Malinowski: Off the Veranda , (Films Media Group, 1986) further describes Malinowski’s research practices. ↵
- Bronislaw Malinowski. Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1922), 290. ↵
- For more on this topic see Adam Kuper, Anthropology and Anthropologists: The Modern British School (New York: Routledge, 1983) and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (London: Cohen and West, 1952). ↵
- Boas’ attitudes about cultural relativism were influenced by his experiences in the Canadian Arctic as he struggled to survive in a natural environment foreign to his own prior experience. His private diary and letters record the evolution of his thinking about what it means to be “civilized.” In a letter to his fiancé, he wrote: “I often ask myself what advantages our ‘good society’ possesses over that of the ‘savages’ and find, the more I see of their customs, that we have no right to look down upon them ... We have no right to blame them for their forms and superstitions which may seem ridiculous to us. We ‘highly educated people’ are much worse, relatively speaking.” The entire letter can be read in George Stocking, ed. Observers Observed: Essays on Ethnographic Fieldwork (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 33. ↵
- Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, Geertz 1973), 89. ↵
- Perspectives: An Open Invitation to Cultural Anthropology. Authored by : Edited by Nina Brown, Laura Tubelle de Gonzalez, and Thomas McIlwraith. Provided by : American Anthropological Association. Located at : http://perspectives.americananthro.org/ . License : CC BY-NC: Attribution-NonCommercial
- The Culture Concept. Authored by : Emily Cowall, Priscilla Medeiros. Provided by : McMaster University. Located at : http://perspectives.americananthro.org/Chapters/Culture_Concept.pdf . License : CC BY-NC: Attribution-NonCommercial
- Everyone around you has a story the world needs to know. Authored by : Dave Isay. Provided by : TED talk. Located at : https://www.ted.com/talks/dave_isay_everyone_around_you_has_a_story_the_world_needs_to_hear?language=en . License : CC BY-NC-ND: Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
- Photographs of anthropologists. Provided by : Wikimedia Foundation, Inc.. Located at : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ . Project : Wikipedia. License : Public Domain: No Known Copyright . License Terms : https://foundation.wikimedia.org/wiki/Terms_of_Use/en
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Peter Melville Logan, “On Culture: Edward B. Tylor’s Primitive Culture , 1871″
Edward B. Tylor’s Primitive Culture articulates one of two major theories of culture to emerge around 1870. His theory defines culture in descriptive terms as the “complex whole” that makes up social ideas and institutions, and in this it helped to establish anthropology as a recognized science. Tylor’s ideas were closely related to those published about the same time by Matthew Arnold, who defined culture as a humanist ideal that society should strive for.
Figure 1: Engraving of Edward Burnett Tylor
While a foundational figure in cultural anthropology, Tylor thought about culture in radically different terms than we do today. He accepted the premise that all societies develop in the same way and insisted on the universal progression of human civilization from savage to barbarian to civilized. Nowhere in his writing does the plural “cultures” appear. In his view, culture is synonymous with civilization, rather than something particular to unique societies, and, so, his definition refers to “Culture or civilization.” In part, his universalist view stemmed from his Quaker upbringing, which upheld the value of a universal humanity, and indeed Tylor’s refusal to accept the concept of race as scientifically significant in the study of culture was unusual in Victorian science.
The biology of evolution was explained by Charles Darwin in The Origin of Species (1859), and he expanded his finding to include human evolution in The Descent of Man (1871), which was published the same year as Primitive Culture . While Darwin concentrated on biology, Tylor focused solely on the evolution of human culture. In this, he participated in a lengthy philosophical tradition explaining human development from its beginning to the present day. This speculative practice extends back to classical antiquity. In De Rerum Natura ( The Way Things Are ), recounting the even earlier ideas of the Greek philosopher Epicurus (341-270 BCE), the Roman poet Lucretius (99-55 BCE) told the dramatic story of a turbulent primal earth that generated all forms of life, including giant humans, who would slowly come together to create social groupings. Lucretius was particularly concerned with the development of beliefs about supernatural beings, which he viewed as anthropomorphic attempts to explain the natural world. In medieval Europe, Lucretius’s ideas were largely forgotten in favor of the Christian account of human origins in Genesis. But by the eighteenth century, philosophers proposed new, secular accounts that minimized the story of Genesis. In Scienza nuova (1744; The New Science ), the Italian Giambattista Vico (1688-1744) proposed a theory of human origins that incorporated many of Lucretius’s ideas, including the gigantic stature of early man, and he reiterated the anthropomorphic explanation for the rise in beliefs about gods. Indeed, the first of Vico’s 141 axioms explains the importance of human self-projection as a means of explaining the world around them: “By its nature, the human mind is indeterminate; hence, when man is sunk in ignorance, he makes himself the measure of the universe” (75).
Enlightenment philosophers like Vico typically divided the development of human culture into three distinct stages. While his stages depended on the increasing sophistication of language over time, in De l’esprit des loix (1748; The Spirit of Law s), the French political philosopher Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755) used three static stages defined less by time than by geography and the effects of climate: savagery (hunting), barbarism (herding), and civilization. The French ideologue Marquis de Condorcet (1743-94) used ten stages, but he saw them as more dynamic than did Montesquieu. In Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain (1795; Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind), Condorcet took a developmental view of social progress linked to the development of human reason over time. Condorcet was particularly significant to the thinking of Tylor’s defining predecessor, the French philosopher of science Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Comte’s Cours de philosophie positive (1830-42; Positive Philosophy ) proposed three similarly dynamic stages premised on the growth of reason: the theological stage, dominated by superstition; the metaphysical, where spiritual thinking was replaced by political allegory; and the positivist stage of scientific reason. Comte’s philosophy was popularized in Britain in 1853 by Harriet Martineau’s condensed translation.
While Enlightenment thinkers and Comte referred to the development of “society” or “civilization,” the nineteenth-century German social philosopher Gustav Klemm (1802-67) used a novel term for his discussion of human development. In his Allgemeine Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit (1843-52; The General Cultural History of Mankind ), he substituted the word Kultur for “society” (Williams 91). Nonetheless, Klemm, like his predecessors, considered human culture or civilization as a single condition. The exception was the German Romantic philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), whose unfinished Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784–91; Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man) insisted on cultural relativism, arguing that there was too much variety to view all human societies as part of the same unilinear process.
Tylor’s method did not appear ex nihilo , then. He adopted Klemm’s term, “culture,” as preferable to “civilization.” Most significantly, he used Comte’s three stages wholesale, but he substituted Montesquieu’s terminology of “savage,” “barbarian,” and “civilized” for Comte’s ungainly “theological,” “metaphysical,” and “positivist.” To these, he added a practical method for studying humanity, and this emphasis on scientific objectivity within ethnographic practices differentiated his work from that of his predecessors. “Evolutionary Anthropology,” as Tylor’s Victorian method was called, dominated British ethnography until the end of the nineteenth century. In his most influential work, Primitive Culture , he spelled out two major contributions to anthropology: he defined culture clearly as an object of study for the first time, and he described a systematic method for studying it.
His science of culture had three essential premises: the existence of one culture, its development through one progression, and humanity as united by one mind. Tylor saw culture as universal. In his view, all societies were essentially alike and capable of being ranked by their different levels of cultural advancement. As he explains in a later essay:
the institutions of man are as distinctly stratified as the earth on which he lives. They succeed each other in series substantially uniform over the globe, independent of what seem the comparatively superficial differences of race and language, but shaped by similar human nature acting through successively changed conditions in savage, barbaric, and civilized life. (“On a Method” 269)
The earliest stage of savagery featured largely in Tylor’s study of culture; the term itself derives from the Latin for forest-dweller, and at the time it had both neutral and positive connotations as well as the negative ones that remain today. Societies within each stage have superficial differences masking their fundamental similarity, and the anthropologist’s job is to identify the latter. Determining where the group stood on the hierarchical ladder of cultural development provided the context for interpreting all aspects of the society by comparing it with others on the same rung around the world. One of the most prominent consequences of this logic was the familiar practice in Victorian museums of displaying together all objects of one type from around the world, arranged to illustrate the intrinsic cultural evolution of a musical instrument, bowls, or spears, for example. A cursory glance at most illustrated anthropological books from the time, such as Friedrich Ratzel’s The History of Mankind (1885-86), demonstrates the same principle at work.
The progression from savage to civilized did not occur evenly or at the same pace in every society, but the distinct stages were always the same, much as the growth of the individual from infant to adolescent to adult takes a similar form in different places. The association this analogy created between primitives and children was roundly rejected in anthropology at the turn of the century, but in the meantime it created a sense that Victorians were confronting their infant selves in what they regarded as primitive societies. In this sense, the science of anthropology was not just about the study of other, largely colonized people; it was also about the connection between modern life in Europe and its own earlier stages, and this meant that anthropology had much to teach the British about their own society. Tylor argues that elements of early culture continue on in later stages as “survivals.” Superstitions, nursery rhymes, or familiar expressions (“a pig in a poke”) often are illogical and unintelligible. Such aspects of modern life, he argues, are survivals from mythology or rituals that served a purpose in the past but had lost their meaning over time, even as the practice itself continued. To Tylor, the most apparently insignificant aspects of Victorian life were critical to anthropology. Survivals were “landmarks in the course of culture. . . . On the strength of these survivals, it becomes possible to declare that the civilization of the people they are observed among must have been derived from an earlier state, in which the proper home and meaning of these things are to found; and thus collections of such facts are to be worked as mines of historic knowledge” ( Primitive Culture 1:71). Reuniting survivals with their lost meaning was the key to understanding the true nature of the primitive mind.
Ultimately, understanding the perceptions and working of that primitive mind was the object of anthropology. His central premise was the doctrine of psychic unity: the belief that all humans are governed by the same mental and psychological processes and that, faced with similar circumstances, all will respond similarly. The principal of psychic unity explained the appearance of identical myths and artifacts in widely disparate societies. While acknowledging two other possibilities—that each society could have inherited the trait from a common ancestor, or that each came into contact with one another at some point and learned it from the other—he argued that “independent invention” was the most frequent cause of such coincidences.
The defining trait of the primitive mind was its inability to think abstractly. Because numbers are abstractions, counting was limited to the concrete number of fingers or toes, for example, followed by “a lot.” Language was nonexistent. For the same reason, primitives were unable to group similar objects into abstract categories—all trees, or rocks, or flowers, for example. Instead, the primitive saw only individual trees, without understanding categories like a forest, because of their abstract nature. This was above all a concrete world, one in which each object had a unique identity or personality that could not be replaced by any other. Primitives were thus immersed in a world of singular objects. At the same time they were unable to comprehend events, like thunder, in a logical fashion, because they lacked the power to construct abstract natural laws. Instead, primitives projected their emotions onto the world around them as a means of explaining natural events. In response to the threat posed by thunder, for example, the primitive invents an angry supernatural being to explain it. When a tree ceases to bear fruit, the tree’s spirit must be unhappy. Tylor called the primitive belief in spirits “animism,” a term that continues in use today, and thus he follows a long tradition of imagining early humans as dominated by supernaturalism.
Like Comte, Tylor held that the progress of culture was a slow replacement of this magical thinking with the power of reason. He produced a narrative of human evolution that begins with a global supernaturalism in the savage stage. Supernaturalism coexists with the development of language, laws, and institutions in the barbaric stage. In advanced civilizations, like Tylor’s own, reason and scientific thinking predominate. This is not a rational utopia, by any means. Magical thinking persists in the present; the primitive tendency to imagine objects as having a life of their own exists even within the most civilized gentleman, who might think in a moment of frustration that a broken watch was inhabited by an evil spirit. Tylor did not imagine modern culture in idealist terms, but, ever the Victorian, he did view it as fundamentally better than that of primitive culture.
Evolutionary anthropology remerged in the twentieth century, as early as the 1930s but more influentially later in the century, and it continues today. Unlike its Victorian variant, evolutionary thought now emphasizes multi-causality, the interaction of multiple events to account for the development of societies, as well as the presence of multiple paths in the development of particular cultures. In both of these regards, Tylor’s central concepts of the uniform primitive mind, the single evolutionary path through three stages, and the universality of one human culture remain decidedly Victorian in their outlook, telling us more about the nineteenth century and its own culture, than they do about contemporary anthropological thought.
Peter Melville Logan is Director of the Center for the Humanities at Temple University, where he is a Professor of English. He is the author of Victorian Fetishism: Intellectuals and Primitives (2010), Nerves and Narratives: A Cultural History of Hysteria in Nineteenth-Century British Prose (1997), and Editor of The Encyclopedia of the Novel (2 vols.), 2011.
HOW TO CITE THIS BRANCH ENTRY (MLA format)
published July 2012
Logan, Peter Melville. “On Culture: Edward B. Tylor’s Primitive Culture , 1871.” BRANCH: Britain, Representation and Nineteenth-Century History . Ed. Dino Franco Felluga. Extension of Romanticism and Victorianism on the Net . Web. [Here, add your last date of access to BRANCH].
WORKS CITED
Boas, Franz. “The Limitations of the Comparative Method of Anthroplogy.” Science 4 (1896): 901-08. Print.
Comte, Auguste. The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte . Trans. Harriet Martineau. Vol. 2. 2 vols. London: John Chapman, 1853. Print.
Stocking, George W. “Matthew Arnold, E. B. Tylor, and the Uses of Invention.” Race, Culture and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology . New York: Free Press, 1968. 69-90. Print.
—, ed. The Shaping of American Anthropology, 1883-1911: A Franz Boas Reader . New York: Basic, 1974. Print.
—. Victorian Anthropology . New York: Free Press, 1987. Print.
Tylor, Edward B. “On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions; Applied to Laws of Marriage and Descent.” Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 18 (1889): 245-72. Print.
—. Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Custom . 2nd ed. 2 vols. London: John Murray, 1873. Print.
Vico, Giambattista. New Science: Principles of the New Science Concerning the Common Nature of Nations . Ed. Marsh, David. 3rd ed. London: Penguin, 1999. Print.
Williams, Raymond. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society . New York: Oxford UP, 1983. Print.
RELATED BRANCH ESSAYS
Peter Melville Logan, “On Culture: Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy , 1869″
Bishop's Encyclopedia of Religion, Society and Philosophy
James bishop (phd candidate) – public access to scholarly resources (and a few of my reflections…), e. b. tylor – animistic theory of religion and religion in ‘primitive culture’.
This post offers an analysis of Edward Burnett Tylor’s theory of religion, notably his concept of animism, and some of the value and criticisms of his work Primitive Culture (1871).
A Brief Background
Tylor (1832–1917) was a British anthropologist widely credited for being the father of cultural anthropology . He held academic positions at the prestigious Oxford and embarked on some early travels to the United States, Cuba, and Mexico before returning to England. Many of the societies he discussed and theorized about he did not personally visit. Other than Primitive Culture , Tylor published three works during his career: Anahuac: or, Mexico and the Mexicans Ancient and Modern (1861), Researches into the Early History of Mankind and the Development of Civilization (1865), and Anthropology, an Introduction to the Study of Man and Civilization (1881).
Tylor was raised in a Quaker household and community. The Quakers are known for emphasizing God’s spirit moving a person to speak during worship meetings, meaning that all participants stay in a state of silence until someone feels the spirit prompting them to speak. Tylor also attended a Quaker school until he was the age of sixteen, but his faith did not allow him to enter university, so he became a clerk in the family business. Tylor grew to dislike religion, which he thought was grounded in error. He had a negative attitude toward the church, particularly the Church of England and the Roman Catholics (1).
As part of his scholarly interests, Tylor wanted to discover the earliest religion and/or form of religious belief. He was fully aware that doing so would undermine religion itself, and it is likely that Tylor’s dislike for religion, combined with his Quaker background, influenced the formation of his animistic theory of religion.
Primitive Cultures and Cultural Evolution
In Primitive Culture , Tylor’s goal was to understand so-called “primitive” people and culture. He proposed an evolutionary, developmental chronicle of culture from the primitive and savage to the civilized. It is Tylor’s controversial cultural evolutionary theory, as well as his views on the evolution of religious belief, for which he is mostly known today.
He was also influenced by Charles Darwin’s (1809-1882) biological theory of evolution in On the Origin of Species (1859) and viewed human cultural evolution to have proceeded in a lawful, natural way. One can gauge how developed a culture is by considering their technological and moral accomplishments. The greater these are, the more developed the culture is, at least in Tylor’s mind.
Philosophical Convictions and Definition of Religion
Tylor viewed the universe as inanimate and impersonal and therefore did not find a need to appeal to supernatural forces to explain it. Neither did he need spiritual explanations of religion, especially since religious doctrines and practices belong to “theological systems devised by humans without supernatural aid or revelation.”
If anything, rather than owing their origin or continued existence to a God or supernatural forces, religions are the development of natural religion , which is a feature within human beings that makes them turn to religious ways of thinking. It is in human nature to be religious, and one need not explain the manifestations of it by appealing to the supernatural, God, or gods. Tylor instead wanted to engage in a “systematic study of the religions of the lower races” and found it necessary to provide a rudimentary definition of religion, which he defined as the belief in spiritual beings: “It seems best to fall back at once on this essential source, and simply to claim, as a minimum definition of Religion, the belief in Spiritual Beings” (2).
In what is also reminiscent of the philosopher Rudolf Otto’s numinous , Tylor stated that religion is associated with “intense emotion, with awful reverence, with antagonizing terror, with rapt ecstasy when sense and thought utterly transcend the common evil of daily life” (3). Further, because religion provides an objective account or explanation of the world, it meant that it could be verified or falsified. A religion could fail or succeed in terms of how it squares with reality.
Animism as the Earliest Form of Religion and Two Great Dogmas
Primitive Culture deals with religion and with animism specifically.
Broadly, animism is ascribing personal agency to inanimate objects and using spirits, souls, or gods to explain phenomena in the world. Tylor phrases it as follows: “I propose here, under the name of Animism, to investigate the deep-lying doctrine of Spiritual Beings, which embodies the very essence of Spiritualistic as opposed to Materialistic philosophy” (4).
In Tylor’s terms, animism is spiritualism . This means that a person holds to “extreme spiritualistic views” or “the general belief in spiritual beings,” which can intervene in the lives of human beings and in the natural world. Such a worldview is opposed to materialism , if not its total opposite, which claims that all phenomena in the universe are material or can be reduced to the material. Tylor asserted that animism was historically the earliest form of religion or religious belief.
“Animism characterizes tribes very low in the scale of humanity, and thence ascends, deeply modified in its transmission, but from first to last preserving an unbroken continuity, into the midst of high modern culture” (5).
Employing colonial terminology that would make many modern readers uncomfortable, animism was the religion of the “savages” that continued to evolve up until the age of “civilized men.” Of course, civilized men being Tylor and many of his fellow European countrymen who agreed with his views. Tylor also acknowledged the possibility of there being other forms of belief prior to animism. This could even have been a non-religious condition prior to religion, although Tylor still maintained that on the “immense mass of accessible evidence, we have to admit that the belief in spiritual beings appears among all low races” (6).
Tylor divided animism into two “ great dogmas .” The first concerns the souls of individual creatures that are capable of existing after the death or destruction of the physical body. The second dogma is belief in spirits that exist in a hierarchy “upward to the rank of powerful deities.”
“Spiritual beings are held to affect or control the events of the material world, and man’s life here and hereafter; and it being considered that they hold intercourse with men, and receive pleasure or displeasure from human actions, the belief in their existence leads natural, and it might almost be said inevitably, sooner or later to active reverence and propitiation” (7).
Tylor’s definition of animism includes a belief in souls, controlling deities, and a hierarchy of subordinate spirits. These beliefs are accompanied by doctrines manifesting in some form of active worship. Tylor perceived this worldview in many cultures, including the Algonquins, Arawak, Abipones, Zulus, Basutos, Caribs, Dakotas, Tongans, Fijians, Karens, Khonds, Papuas, Greenlanders, Malays, Java, and the “natives of Nicaragua.” He also includes the Hebrews on this list, as well as Jewish and Arabic philosophy.
Animism and Development: Souls, Phantoms, Dreams
Several ideas were proposed by Tylor to explain the development of animism in the primitive peoples at the “low level of culture.”
He perceived two phenomena of interest to primitive cultures. The first is what makes the difference between a living body and a dead one and what causes waking, sleep, trance, disease, and death. The second stressed human shapes that appeared in dreams and visions.
Tylor states that human beings experience their dreams in that they really do feel like they are moving in a spiritual space where bodies are not needed (8). In a dream, one can observe other things happening—fly, pass through walls, engage in battle—all of which feel very real. According to Tylor, many primitive cultures interpreted dreams as being real experiences of things actually happening, and it is perhaps because of this that the so-called “savage philosopher” inferred that every person has two things belonging to him: a life and a phantom . According to Tylor,
“The notion of a ghost-soul animating man while in the body, and peering in dream and vision out of the body, is found deeply ingrained… the primitive animistic doctrine is thoroughly at home among savages” (9).
The life and the phantom are closely connected with the body. The life enables the body to feel, think, and act, whereas the phantom is the body’s image or second self. Although closely connected, both are also perceived as separable from the body: “the life as able to go away and leave it insensible or dead, the phantom as appearing to people at a distance from it” (10).
Tylor suggested that the next step for these cultures is to combine the life and the phantom. They now both belong to the body and are manifestations of the one and same soul.
“It is a thin unsubstantial human image, in its nature a sort of vapor, film, or shadow; the cause of life and thought in the individual it animates; independently possessing the personal consciousness and volition of its corporeal owner, past or present; capable of leaving the body far behind, to flash swiftly from place to place; mostly impalpable and invisible, yet also manifesting physical power, and especially appearing to men waking or asleep as phantasm separate from the body of which it bears the likeness; continuing to exist and appear to men after the death of that body; able to enter into, possess, and act in the bodies of other men, of animals, and even of things” (11).
Tylor did not claim this ghost-soul concept to be universal, but he nonetheless saw it as being sufficiently general to be taken as a standard for religion. Further, there is an extrapolation that was made to animals and objects who were then also believed to have souls. This, Tylor writes, is a “natural extension from the theory of human souls; the souls of trees and plants follow in some vague partial way; and the souls of inanimate objects expand the general category to its extremest boundary” (12).
A Personal Investment in Animism
As noted earlier, Tylor disliked the church and religion and was well aware that his animistic theory would undermine both.
He reasoned that if all beliefs in and about God had merely evolved from a so-called primitive early form of animism , then no belief, sophisticated or simple, held by anyone in the modern day, including those within the church, could be considered truer or superior to any other.
Every form of monotheistic belief, whether that be of Christianity, Islam , or Judaism, or any other, is an evolution from animism, just as are the polytheistic and henotheistic religions, which supposedly everyone agrees are irrational. All modern religions are therefore no different from the obsolete superstitious ways of seeing the world. One observes this disdain in Tylor’s perception of modern theology, which he believed simply reuses and sophisticates the absurd beliefs of the “savages”: “[T]he conception of the human soul is, as to its most essential nature, continuous from the philosophy of the savage thinker to that of the modern professor of theology” (13).
Superstition in Modern People
Animistic beliefs, Tylor thought, might have been appropriate for the “primitive” and “savage” societies but wondered why modern people, especially religious ones, still held similar beliefs. Why, Tylor asked, if modern people are aware of science, do their beliefs not conform more to this intellectual progress? Instead, most still believed in spirits such as Yahweh, Allah, Vishnu, and so on. Tylor observed how “extremely difficult civilized men have found it [animism] to unmake” (14).
Tylor had, however, noticed some changes in animistic beliefs as human beings became more civilized. For example, the so-called “notion of souls of beasts is to be seen dying out,” while the theological doctrine of the human soul had undergone modification. The human soul is no longer believed by the “civilized” mind to be associated with dreams but is instead just an immaterial entity. It is nonetheless a superstition. The continued presence of animism within modern thought was, in his view, a kind of animistic residue left over from humanity’s historical development,
“The animism of civilized men, while more appropriate to advanced knowledge, is in great measure only explicable as a developed product of the older and ruder system… [it is the] survival of the old in the midst of the new, modification of the old to bring it into conformity with the new” (15).
“Though classic and medieval philosophy modified it much, and modern philosophy has handled it yet more unsparingly, it has so far retained the traces of its original character, that heirlooms of primitive ages may be claimed in the existing psychology of the civilized world. Out of the vast mass of evidence, collected among the most various and distant races of mankind, typical details may now be selected to display the earlier theory of the soul, the relation of the parts of this theory, and the manner in which these parts have been abandoned, modified, or kept up, along the course of culture” (16).
Certain people had, in Tylor’s view, become stuck at a lower stage or level of cognitive, cultural, and religious development than others. He was interested in discoveries of hunter-gatherer societies from the Brixham cave made in 1859, which he used to support his case. Such people made use of simple stone tools and had not developed sophisticated technology, metals, or agriculture, so Tylor considered them as lower in development than the civilized among “men’s intellectual history.”
Appreciation and Criticisms
Tylor’s animistic theory has led some scholars to adopt a “Tylorian theory of religion” because he really captured within religion what is really there, namely a belief in spirit (17). This belief is a feature of many religions, from the likes of Hinduism and Islam to Christianity, Judaism, Neo-paganism, and many others, although it is less clear how this definition would apply to Taoism , Confucianism , or Buddhism .
Although one can find some value in Tylor’s theory, important critiques have been offered. One is that Tylor underestimated the intellectual and artistic complexity of prehistoric cultures. Scholar Ivan Strenski says that the lack of technological sophistication of hunter-gatherer peoples,
“[L]ed thinkers of Tylor’s ilk to regard our ancient prehistoric ancestors as lower in their development than we. They were, to him, “primitive.” But Tylor seemed blind to the sophisticated artistic quality of the wall painting found in the caves. Of the four chapters of his Anthropology entitled “The Arts of Life,” he writes only about utilitarian material culture – technologies, tools, and implements. There is nothing on esthetics or beauty of so-called “primitive” material culture… Tylor had no taste for the cave paintings that so impressed Marrett as fine art. He literally and figuratively never saw sophistication and high culture in the caves. He saw only what he wanted to see — the “primitive”.” (18)
But, as some experts have argued, the artistic talent apparent in hunter-gatherer aesthetic culture suggests an intellectual command not appreciated by later theorists. Contemporary evidence increasingly reveals that prehistoric peoples were much more advanced than they have initially been given credit for (19).
The twentieth-century British anthropologist Edward Evans-Pritchard ( 1902–1973) was critical of representations like Tylor’s. Having conducted fieldwork with the Nuer people of South Sudan, Evans-Pritchard concedes that to a western mind, “it seems odd, if not absurd, to a European when he is told that a twin is a bird as though it were an obvious fact,” as the Nuer evidently believe (20). Equally, for the Nuer to say that the will-o’-the-wisps (these being mysterious lights that emerge in bushes and in swamps) are spirits or Spirit is strange as “For us the light is [merely] a gas arising from swamp vegetation…” and nothing more than that (21). However, Evans-Pritchard still claims to have uncovered a far greater level of intellectual and artistic elocution than theorists like Tylor and others allowed. Speaking of the Nuer, he says that this ability,
“implies experience on an imaginative level of thought where the mind moves in figures, symbols, metaphors, analogies, and many an elaboration of poetic fancy and language… In all their poems and songs also they play on words and images to such an extent that no European can translate them without commentary from Neur… How Nuer delight in playing with words is also seen in the fun they have in making up tongue-twisters, sentences which are difficult to pronounce without a mistake, and slips of the tongue, usually slips in the presence of mothers-in-law, which turn quite ordinary remarks into obscenities… the imagination of this sensitive people finds its sole expression in ideas, images, and worlds” (22).
Tylor underestimated, if not ignored, this feature of prehistorical peoples. A further critique, which has spawned an entire field of study called post-colonialism and/or decolonialism, is the conspicuous colonial terminology and value judgments of theorists like Tylor, among many others.
As post-colonial theorists have stressed, many of these newly discovered cultures of Tylor’s era were perceived and represented by Europeans as irrational, primitive, savage, and superstitious and placed on a lower rung of evolutionary development than Europeans themselves. The writings of these theorists frequently employ terminology suggestive of a notion of self-superiority over other persons who at the time found themselves subject to the dominion of colonial powers. In the study of religion , many scholars are aware that the origin of their discipline developed out of an intellectual and geopolitical context of conquest, which has led some of them to advocate respect for local knowledge and practices of indigenous men and women.
1. Strenski, Ivan. 2015. Understanding Theories of Religion: An Introduction . New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell.
2. Tylor, E. B. 2002. “Religion in Primitive Culture.” In A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion , edited by Michael Lambek, 23-34. p. 25.
3. Tylor, E. B. 2002. p. 32
4. Tylor, E. B. 2002. p. 25
5. Tylor, E. B. 2002. p. 26
6. Tylor, E. B. 2002. p. 25
7. Tylor, E. B. 2002. p. 26
8. Strenski, Ivan. 2015. Ibid. p. 46.
9. Tylor, E. B. 2002. p. 31
10. Tylor, E. B. 2002. p. 27
11. Tylor, E. B. 2002. p. 27
12. Tylor, E. B. 2002. p. 31
13. Tylor, E. B. 2002. p. 31
14. Tylor, E. B. 2002. p. 27
15. Tylor, E. B. 2002. p. 31
16. Tylor, E. B. 2002. p. 27
17. Strenski, Ivan. 2015. Ibid. p. 47.
18. Strenski, Ivan. 2015. Ibid. p. 48-49.
19. Brooks, Alison., Yellen, John., Potts, Richard., Behrensmeyer, Anna., Deino, Alan., Leslie, David., Ambrose, Stanley., et al. 2018. “Long-distance stone transport and pigment use in the earliest Middle Stone Age.” Science 360(6384):90-94; Scharping, Nathaniel. 2019. Denisovan Research Reveals That Early Humans Were More Complex Than We Thought . Available .
20. Evans-Pritchard, Edward Evans. 1940. The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People . Oxford: Clarendon Press. p. 137.
21. Evans-Pritchard, Edward Evans. 1940. Ibid. p. 137.
22. Evans-Pritchard, Edward Evans. 1940. Ibid. p. 142-143
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[…] (mystè), invisibles (anvizib), angels (zanj), ancestors, and the recently deceased. Voodoo is animistic as a fundamental belief is that everything is spirit; according to Haitian sociologist Laënnec […]
Thank you for a very fine article. Just one minor detail: It is not Evans-Pritchard’s ‘The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People’, you are quoting (20-22), but Evans-Pritchard: 1956: ‘Nuer Religion’. Kind regards, Rune Engelbreth Larsen
Thank you for a fine article. Just one minor detail: It is noge Evans-Pritchard’s ‘The Nuer. A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People’ (1940), you are quoting (20-22), but his ‘Nuer Religion’ (1956). Kind regards, Rune Engelbreth Larsen
Thank you for a fine article. Just one minor detail: It is noge Evans-Pritchard’s ‘The Nuer. A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People’ (1940), you are quoting (20-22), but his ‘Nuer Religion’ (1956). Kind regards, Rune Engelbreth Larsen
[…] Paganism can be polytheistic, pantheistic, duotheistic, panentheistic and/or animistic. [3] Paganism is anti-hierarchical and opposed to any form of external domination. It is likewise […]
[…] incoherent, irrational, or illogical as was held by some other theorists such as James Frazer and E. B. Tylor. To the contrary, primitive thought actually contained an internal rationality even though such […]
[…] the past, Western anthropologists labeled such beliefs as “primitive”. However, the notion of animism was previously misapprehended by […]
[…] E. B. Tylor – Animistic Theory of Religion and Religion in ‘Primitive Culture’ – Bishop’s Encyclopedia of Religion, Society and Philosophy: https://jamesbishopblog.com/2020/03/16/e-b-tylor-animistic-theory-of-religion-and-religion-in-primit… ; […]
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culture , behaviour peculiar to Homo sapiens , together with material objects used as an integral part of this behaviour. Thus, culture includes language , ideas, beliefs, customs, codes, institutions, tools, techniques, works of art, rituals, and ceremonies, among other elements.
The existence and use of culture depends upon an ability possessed by humans alone. This ability has been called variously the capacity for rational or abstract thought, but a good case has been made for rational behaviour among subhuman animals, and the meaning of abstract is not sufficiently explicit or precise. The term symboling has been proposed as a more suitable name for the unique mental ability of humans, consisting of assigning to things and events certain meanings that cannot be grasped with the senses alone. Articulate speech—language—is a good example. The meaning of the word dog is not inherent in the sounds themselves; it is assigned, freely and arbitrarily, to the sounds by human beings. Holy water, “biting one’s thumb” at someone ( Romeo and Juliet , Act I, scene 1), or fetishes are other examples. Symboling is a kind of behaviour objectively definable and should not be confused with symbolizing, which has an entirely different meaning.
The concept of culture
Various definitions of culture.
What has been termed the classic definition of culture was provided by the 19th-century English anthropologist Edward Burnett Tylor in the first paragraph of his Primitive Culture (1871):
Culture . . . is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief , art, morals , law , custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.
In Anthropology (1881) Tylor made it clear that culture, so defined, is possessed by man alone. This conception of culture served anthropologists well for some 50 years. With the increasing maturity of anthropological science, further reflections upon the nature of their subject matter and concepts led to a multiplication and diversification of definitions of culture. In Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (1952), U.S. anthropologists A.L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn cited 164 definitions of culture, ranging from “learned behaviour” to “ideas in the mind,” “a logical construct,” “a statistical fiction,” “a psychic defense mechanism,” and so on. The definition—or the conception—of culture that is preferred by Kroeber and Kluckhohn and also by a great many other anthropologists is that culture is an abstraction or, more specifically, “an abstraction from behaviour.”
These conceptions have defects or shortcomings. The existence of behavioral traditions—that is, patterns of behaviour transmitted by social rather than by biologic hereditary means—has definitely been established for nonhuman animals. “Ideas in the mind” become significant in society only as expressed in language, acts, and objects. “A logical construct” or “a statistical fiction” is not specific enough to be useful. The conception of culture as an abstraction led, first, to a questioning of the reality of culture (inasmuch as abstractions were regarded as imperceptible) and, second, to a denial of its existence; thus, the subject matter of nonbiological anthropology, “culture,” was defined out of existence, and without real, objective things and events in the external world there can be no science.
Kroeber and Kluckhohn were led to their conclusion that culture is an abstraction by reasoning that if culture is behaviour it, ipso facto, becomes the subject matter of psychology; therefore, they concluded that culture “is an abstraction from concrete behavior but is not itself behavior.” But what, one might ask, is an abstraction of a marriage ceremony or a pottery bowl, to use Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s examples? This question poses difficulties that were not adequately met by these authors. A solution was perhaps provided by Leslie A. White in the essay “The Concept of Culture” (1959). The issue is not really whether culture is real or an abstraction, he reasoned; the issue is the context of the scientific interpretation.
When things and events are considered in the context of their relation to the human organism, they constitute behaviour; when they are considered not in terms of their relation to the human organism but in their relationship to one another, they become culture by definition. The mother-in-law taboo is a complex of concepts, attitudes, and acts. When one considers them in their relationship to the human organism—that is, as things that the organism does—they become behaviour by definition. When, however, one considers the mother-in-law taboo in its relationship to the place of residence of a newly married couple, to the customary division of labour between the sexes, to their respective roles in the society’s mode of subsistence and offense and defense, and these in turn to the technology of the society, the mother-in-law taboo becomes, again by definition, culture. This distinction is precisely the one that students of words have made for many years. When words are considered in their relationship to the human organism—that is, as acts—they become behaviour. But when they are considered in terms of their relationship to one another—producing lexicon, grammar, syntax , and so forth—they become language, the subject matter not of psychology but of the science of linguistics. Culture, therefore, is the name given to a class of things and events dependent upon symboling ( i.e., articulate speech) that are considered in a kind of extra-human context.
Universalist approaches to culture and the human mind
Culture, as noted above, is due to an ability possessed by man alone. The question of whether the difference between the mind of man and that of the lower animals is one of kind or of degree has been debated for many years, and even today reputable scientists can be found on both sides of this issue. But no one who holds the view that the difference is one of degree has adduced any evidence to show that nonhuman animals are capable, to any degree whatever, of a kind of behaviour that all human beings exhibit. This kind of behaviour may be illustrated by the following examples: remembering the sabbath to keep it holy, classifying one’s relatives and distinguishing one class from another (such as uncles from cousins), defining and prohibiting incest, and so on. There is no reason or evidence that leads one to believe that any animal other than man can have or be brought to any appreciation or comprehension whatever of such meanings and acts. There is, as Tylor argued long ago, a “mental gulf that divides the lowest savage from the highest ape” ( Anthropology ).
In line with the foregoing distinction, human behaviour is to be defined as behaviour consisting of, or dependent upon, symboling rather than upon anything else that Homo sapiens does; coughing, yawning, stretching, and the like are not human.
Next to nothing is yet known about the neuroanatomy of symboling. Man is characterized by a very large brain, considered both absolutely and relatively, and it is reasonable—and even obligatory—to believe that the central nervous system , especially the forebrain, is the locus of the ability to symbol . But how it does this and with what specific mechanisms remain to be discovered. One is thus led to the conclusion that at some point in the evolution of primates a threshold was reached in some line, or lines, when the ability to symbol was realized and made explicit in overt behaviour. There is no intermediate stage, logical or neurological, between symboling and nonsymboling; an individual or a species is capable of symboling, or he or it is not. The life of Helen Keller makes this clear: when, through the aid of her teacher, Anne Sullivan , Keller was enabled to escape from the isolation to which her blindness and deafness had consigned her and to effect contact with the world of human meanings and values, the transformation was instantaneous.
But even if almost nothing is known about the neuroanatomy of symboling, a great deal is known about the evolution of mind (or “ minding ,” if mind is considered as a process rather than a thing), in which one finds symboling as the characteristic of a particular stage of development. The evolution of minding can be traced in the following sequence of stages. First is the simple reflexive stage, in which behaviour is determined by the intrinsic properties of both the organism and the thing reacted to—for example, the contraction of the pupil of the eye under increased stimulation by light. Second is the conditioned reflex stage, in which the response is elicited not by properties intrinsic in the stimulus but by meanings that the stimulus has acquired for the responding organism through experience—for example, Pavlov’s dog’s salivary glands responding to the sound of a bell. Third is the instrumental stage, as exemplified by a chimpanzee knocking down a banana with a stick. Here the response is determined by the intrinsic properties of the things involved (banana, stick, chimpanzee’s neurosensory-muscular system); but a new element has been introduced into behaviour, namely, the exercise of control by the reacting organism over things in the external world. And, finally, there is the symbol stage, in which the configuration of behaviour involves nonintrinsic meanings, as has already been suggested.
These four stages exhibit a characteristic of the evolution of all living things: a movement in the direction of making life more secure and enduring. In the first stage the organism distinguishes between the beneficial , the injurious, and the neutral, but it must come into direct contact with the object or event in question to do so. In the second stage the organism may react at a distance, as it were—that is, through an intermediate stimulus. The conditioned reflex brings signs into the life process; one thing or event may serve as an indication of something else—food, danger, and so forth. And, since anything can serve as a sign of anything else (a green triangle can mean food, sex, or an electric shock to the laboratory rat), the reactions of the organism are emancipated from the limitations that stage one imposes upon living things, namely, the intrinsic properties of things. The possibility of obtaining life-sustaining things and of avoiding life-destroying things is thus much enhanced , and the security and continuity of life are correspondingly increased. But in stage two the organism still plays a subordinate role to the external world; it does not and cannot determine the significance of the intermediary stimulus: the bark of a distant dog to the rabbit or the sound of the bell to Pavlov’s dog. This meaning is determined by things and events in the external world (or in the laboratory by the experimenter). In stages one and two, therefore, the organism is at the mercy of the external world in this respect.
In the third stage the element of control over environment is introduced. The ape who obtains food by means of a stick (tool) is not subordinate to his situation. He does not merely undergo a situation; he dominates it. His behaviour is not determined by the juxtaposition of things and events; on the contrary, the juxtaposition is determined by the ape. He is confronted with alternatives , and he makes choices. The configuration of behaviour in stage three is constructed within the dynamic organism of the ape and then imposed upon the external world.
The evolution of minding is a cumulative process; the achievements of each stage are carried on into the succeeding one or ones. The fourth stage reintroduces the factor of nonintrinsic meanings to the advances made in stages two and three. Stage four is the stage of symboling, of articulate speech. Thus, one observes two aspects of the evolution of minding, both of which contribute to the security and survivability of life: the emancipation of behaviour from limitations imposed upon it by the external world and increased control over the environment. To be sure, neither emancipation nor control becomes complete, but quantitative increase is significant.
The direction of biologic evolution toward greater expansion and security of life can be seen from another point of view: the advance from instinctive behaviour ( i.e., responses determined by intrinsic properties of the organism) to learned and freely variable behaviour, patterns of which may be acquired and transmitted from one individual and generation to another, and finally to a system of things and events, the essence of which is meanings that cannot be comprehended by the senses alone. This system is, of course, culture, and the species is the human species. Culture is a man-made environment, brought into existence by the ability to symbol.
Once established, culture has a life of its own, so to speak; that is, it is a continuum of things and events in a cause and effect relationship; it flows down through time from one generation to another. Since its inception 1,000,000 or more years ago, this culture—with its language, beliefs, tools, codes, and so on—has had an existence external to each individual born into it. The function of this external, man-made environment is to make life secure and enduring for the society of human beings living within the cultural system. Thus, culture may be seen as the most recent, the most highly developed means of promoting the security and continuity of life, in a series that began with the simple reflex.
Society preceded culture; society, conceived as the interaction of living beings, is coextensive with life itself. Man’s immediate prehuman ancestors had societies, but they did not have culture. Studies of monkeys and apes have greatly enlarged scientific knowledge of their social life—and, by inference , the scientific conception of the earliest human societies. Data derived from paleontological sources and from accumulating studies of living, nonhuman primates are now fairly abundant, and hypotheses derived from these are numerous and varied in detail. A fair summary of them may be made as follows: The growth of the primate brain was stimulated by life in the trees, specifically, by eye-hand coordinations involved in swinging from limb to limb and by manipulating food with the hands (as among the insectivorous lemurs). Descent to the ground, as a consequence of deforestation or increase in body size (which would tend to restrict arboreal locomotion and increase the difficulty of obtaining enough food to supply increased need), and the assumption of erect posture were other significant steps in biologic evolution and the eventual emergence of culture. Some theories reject the arboreal stage in man’s evolutionary past, but this does not seriously affect the overall conception of his development.
The Australopithecines of Africa, extinct manlike higher primates about which reliable knowledge is very considerable today, exemplify the stage of erect posture in primate evolution. Erect posture freed the arms and hands from their earlier function of locomotion and made possible an extensive and versatile use of tools. Again, the eye-hand-object coordinations involved in tool using stimulated the growth of the brain, especially the forebrain. It is not possible to determine on the basis of paleontological evidence the precise point at which the ability to symbol (specifically, articulate speech) was realized, as expressed in overt behaviour. It is believed by some that man’s prehuman ancestors used tools habitually and that habit became custom through the transmission of tool using from one generation to another long before articulate speech came into being. In fact, some theorists hold, the customary use of tools became a powerful stimulus in the development of a brain that was capable of symboling or articulate speech.
The introjection of symboling into primate social life was revolutionary. Everything was transformed, everything acquired new meaning; the symbol added a new dimension to primate—now human—existence. An ax was no longer merely a tool with which to chop; it could become a symbol of authority. Mating became marriage, and all social relationships between parents and children and brothers and sisters became moral obligations, duties, rights, and privileges. The world of nature, from the stones beside the path to the stars in their courses, became alive and conscious spirits. “And all that I beheld respired with inward meaning” (Wordsworth). The anthropoid had at last become a man.
Thus far in this article, culture has been considered in general, as the possession of all mankind. Now it is appropriate to turn to particular cultures , or sociocultural systems. Human beings, like other animal species, live in societies, and each society possesses culture. It has long been customary for ethnologists to speak of Seneca culture, Eskimo culture, North American Plains culture, and so on—that is, the culture of a particular society (Seneca) or an indefinite number of societies (Eskimo) or the cultures found in or characteristic of a topographic area (the North American Plains). There is no objection to this usage as a convenient means of reference: “Seneca culture” is the culture that the Seneca tribe possesses at a particular time. Similarly, Eskimo culture refers to a class of cultures, and Plains culture refers to a type of culture. What is needed is a term that defines culture precisely in its particular manifestations for the purpose of scientific study, and for this the term sociocultural system has been proposed. It is defined as the culture possessed by a distinguishable and autonomous group (society) of human beings, such as a tribe or a modern nation. Cultural elements may pass freely from one system to another (cultural diffusion), but the boundary provided by the distinction between one system and another (Seneca, Cayuga; United States , Japan) makes it possible to study the system at any given time or over a period of time.
Every human society, therefore, has its own sociocultural system: a particular and unique expression of human culture as a whole. Every sociocultural system possesses the components of human culture as a whole—namely, technological, sociological, and ideological elements. But sociocultural systems vary widely in their structure and organization. These variations are attributable to differences among physical habitats and the resources that they offer or withhold for human use; to the range of possibilities inherent in various areas of activity, such as language or the manufacture and use of tools; and to the degree of development. The biologic factor of man may, for purposes of analysis and comparison of sociocultural systems, be considered as a constant. Although the equality or inequality of races, or physical types, of mankind has not been established by science, all evidence and reason lead to the conclusion that, whatever differences of native endowment may exist, they are insignificant as compared with the overriding influence of the external tradition that is culture.
Since the infant of the human species enters the world cultureless, his behaviour—his attitudes, values , ideals, and beliefs, as well as his overt motor activity—is powerfully influenced by the culture that surrounds him on all sides. It is almost impossible to exaggerate the power and influence of culture upon the human animal. It is powerful enough to hold the sex urge in check and achieve premarital chastity and even voluntary vows of celibacy for life. It can cause a person to die of hunger, though nourishment is available, because some foods are branded unclean by the culture. And it can cause a person to disembowel or shoot himself to wipe out a stain of dishonour. Culture is stronger than life and stronger than death. Among subhuman animals, death is merely the cessation of the vital processes of metabolism, respiration, and so on. In the human species, however, death is also a concept; only man knows death. But culture triumphs over death and offers man eternal life. Thus, culture may deny satisfactions on the one hand while it fulfills desires on the other.
The predominant emphasis, perhaps, in studies of culture and personality has been the inquiry into the process by which the individual personality is formed as it develops under the influence of its cultural milieu . But the individual biologic organism is itself a significant determinant in the development of personality. The mature personality is, therefore, a function of both biologic and cultural factors, and it is virtually impossible to distinguish these factors from each other and to evaluate the magnitude of each in particular cases. If the cultural factor were a constant, personality would vary with the variations of the neurosensory-glandular-muscular structure of the individual. But there are no tests that can indicate, for example, precisely how much of the taxicab driver’s ability to make change is due to innate endowment and how much to cultural experience. Therefore, the student of culture and personality is driven to work with “modal personalities,” that is, the personality of the typical Crow Indian or the typical Frenchman insofar as this can be determined. But it is of interest, theoretically at least, to note that even if both factors, the biologic and the cultural, were constant—which they never are in actuality—variations of personality would still be possible. Within the confines of these two constants, individuals might undergo a number of profound experiences in different chronological permutations. For example, two young women might have the same experiences of (1) having a baby, (2) graduating from college, and (3) getting married. But the effect of sequence (1), (2), (3) upon personality development would be quite different than that of sequence (2), (3), (1).
Cultural comparisons
Ethnocentrism is the name given to a tendency to interpret or evaluate other cultures in terms of one’s own. This tendency has been, perhaps, more prevalent in modern nations than among preliterate tribes. The citizens of a large nation, especially in the past, have been less likely to observe people in another nation or culture than have been members of small tribes who are well acquainted with the ways of their culturally diverse neighbours. Thus, the American tourist could report that Londoners drive “on the wrong side of the street” or an Englishman might find some customs on the Continent “queer” or “boorish,” merely because they are different. Members of a Pueblo tribe in the American Southwest, on the other hand, might be well acquainted with cultural differences not only among other Pueblos but also in non-Pueblo tribes such as the Navajo and Apache.
Ethnocentrism became prominent among many Europeans after the discovery of the Americas, the islands of the Pacific, and the Far East. Even anthropologists might characterize all preliterate peoples as being without religion (as did Sir John Lubbock) or as having a “prelogical mentality” (as did Lucien Lévy-Bruhl) merely because their ways of thinking did not correspond with those of the culture of western Europe. Thus, inhabitants of non-Western cultures, particularly those lacking the art of writing, were widely described as being immoral, illogical, queer, or just perverse (“Ye Beastly Devices of ye Heathen”).
Increased knowledge led to or facilitated a deeper understanding and, with it, a finer appreciation of cultures quite different from one’s own. When it was understood that universal needs could be served with culturally diverse means, that worship might assume a variety of forms, that morality consists in conforming to ethical rules of conduct but does not inhere in the rules themselves, a new view emerged that each culture should be understood and appreciated in terms of itself. What is moral in one culture might be immoral or ethically neutral in another. For example, it was not immoral to kill a baby girl at birth or an aged grandparent who was nonproductive when it was impossible to obtain enough food for all; or wife lending among the Eskimo might be practiced as a gesture of hospitality, a way of cementing a friendship and promoting mutual aid in a harsh and dangerous environment, and thus may acquire the status of a high moral value.
The view that elements of a culture are to be understood and judged in terms of their relationship to the culture as a whole—a doctrine known as cultural relativism—led to the conclusion that the cultures themselves could not be evaluated or graded as higher and lower, superior or inferior. If it was unwarranted to say that patriliny (descent through the male line) was superior or inferior to matriliny (descent through the female line), if it was unjustified or meaningless to say that monogamy was better or worse than polygamy, then it was equally unsound or meaningless to say that one culture was higher or superior to another. A large number of anthropologists subscribed to this view; they argued that such judgments were subjective and therefore unscientific.
It is, of course, true that some values are imponderable and some criteria are subjective. Are people in modern Western culture happier than the Aborigines of Australia? Is it better to be a child than an adult, alive than dead? These certainly are not questions for science. But to say that the culture of the ancient Mayas was not superior to or more highly developed than the crude and simple culture of the Tasmanians or to say that the culture of England in 1966 was not higher than England’s culture in 1066 is to fly in the face of science as well as of common sense.
Cultures have ponderable values as well as imponderable, and the imponderable ones can be measured with objective, meaningful yardsticks. A culture is a means to an end: the security and continuity of life. Some kinds of culture are better means of making life secure than others. Agriculture is a better means of providing food than hunting and gathering. The productivity of human labour has been increased by machinery and by the utilization of the energy of nonhuman animals, water and wind power , and fossil fuels. Some cultures have more effective means of coping with disease than others, and this superiority is expressed mathematically in death rates. And there are many other ways in which meaningful differences can be measured and evaluations made. Thus, the proposition that cultures have ponderable values that can be measured meaningfully by objective yardsticks and arranged in a series of stages, higher and lower, is substantiated . But, it should be noted, this is not equivalent to saying that man is happier or that the dignity of the individual (an imponderable) is greater in an industrialized or agricultural sociocultural system than in one supported by human labour alone and sustained wholly by wild foods.
Actually, however, there is no necessary conflict between the doctrine of cultural relativism and the thesis that cultures can be objectively graded in a scientific manner. It is one thing to reject the statement that monogamy is better than polygamy and quite another to deny that one kind of sociocultural system contains a better means of providing food or combating disease than another.
Cultural adaptation and change
Every sociocultural system exists in a natural habitat, and, of course, this environment exerts an influence upon the cultural system. The cultures of some Eskimo groups present remarkable instances of adaptation to environmental conditions: tailored fur clothing, snow goggles, boats and harpoons for hunting sea mammals, and, in some instances, hemispherical snow houses, or igloos. Some sedentary, horticultural tribes of the upper Missouri River went out into the Great Plains and became nomadic hunters after the introduction of the horse. The culture of the Navajos underwent profound change after they acquired herds of sheep and a market for their rugs was developed. The older theories of simple environmentalism, some of which maintained that even styles of myths and tales were determined by topography , climate, flora, and other factors, are no longer in vogue. The present view is that the environment permits, at times encourages, and also prohibits the acquisition or use of certain cultural traits but otherwise does not determine culture change. The Fuegians living at the southern tip of South America , as viewed by Charles Darwin on his voyage on the Beagle , lived in a very cold, harsh environment but were virtually without both clothing and dwellings.
“Culture is contagious,” as a prominent anthropologist once remarked, meaning that customs, beliefs, tools, techniques, folktales, ornaments, and so on may diffuse from one people or region to another. To be sure, a culture trait must offer some advantage, some utility or pleasure, to be sought and accepted by a people. (Some anthropologists have assumed that basic features of social structure, such as clan organization, may diffuse, but a sounder view holds that these features involving the organic structure of the society must be developed within societies themselves.) The degree of isolation of a sociocultural system—brought about by physical barriers such as deserts, mountain ranges, and bodies of water—has, of course, an important bearing upon the ease or difficulty of diffusion . Within the limits of desirability on the one hand and the possibility of communication on the other, diffusion of culture has taken place everywhere and in all times. Archaeological evidence shows that amber from the Baltic region diffused to the Mediterranean coast; and, conversely, early coins from the Middle East found their way to northern Europe. In aboriginal North America , copper objects from northern Michigan have been found in mounds in Georgia; macaw feathers from Central America turn up in archaeological sites in northern Arizona. Some Indian tribes in northwestern regions of the United States had possessed horses, originally brought into the Southwest by Spanish explorers, years before they had ever even seen white men. The wide dispersion of tobacco, corn (maize), coffee, the sweet potato , and many other traits are conspicuous examples of cultural diffusion.
Diffusion may take place between tribes or nations that are approximately equal in political and military power and of equivalent stages of cultural development, such as the spread of the sun dance among the Plains tribes of North America. But in other instances, it takes place between sociocultural systems differing widely in this respect. Conspicuous examples of this have been instances of conquest and colonization of various regions by the nations of modern Europe. In these cases it is often said that the culture of the more highly developed nation is “imposed” upon the less developed peoples and cultures, and there is, of course, much truth in this; the acquisition of foreign culture by the subject people is called acculturation and is manifested by the indigenous populations of Latin America as well as of other regions. But even in cases of conquest, traits from the conquered peoples may diffuse to those of the more advanced cultures; examples might include, in addition to the cultivated plants cited above, individual words ( coyote ), musical themes, games, and art motifs.
One of the major problems of ethnology during the latter half of the 19th and the early decades of the 20th centuries was the question “How are cultural similarities in noncontiguous regions to be explained?” Did the concepts of pyramid building, mummification, and sun worship originate independently in ancient Egypt and in the Andean highlands and in Yucatán or did these traits originate in Egypt and diffuse from there to the Americas, as some anthropologists have believed? Some schools of ethnological theory have held to one view, some, to another. The 19th-century classical evolutionists (which included Edward Burnett Tylor and Lewis H. Morgan , among others) held that the mind of man is so constituted or endowed that he will develop cultures everywhere along the same lines. “Diffusionists”—those, such as Fritz Graebner and Elliot Smith , who offered grand theories about the diffusion of traits all over the world—maintained that man was inherently uninventive and that culture, once created, tended to spread everywhere. Each school tended to insist that its view was the correct one, and it would continue to hold that view unless definite proof of the contrary could be adduced.
The tendency nowadays is not to side categorically with one school as against another but to decide each case on its own merits. The consensus with regard to pyramids is that they were developed independently in Egypt and the Americas because they differ markedly in structure and function: the Egyptian pyramids were built of stone blocks and contained tombs within their interiors. The American pyramids were constructed of earth, then faced with stone, and they served as the bases of temples. The verdict with regard to the bow and arrow is that it was invented only once and subsequently diffused to all regions where it has been found. The probable antiquity of the origin of fire making, however, and the various ways of generating it—by percussion, friction, compression (fire pistons)—indicate multiple origins.
Evolution of culture—that is, the development of forms through time—has taken place. No amount of diffusion of picture writing could of itself, for instance, produce the alphabetic system of writing; as Tylor demonstrated so well, the art of writing has developed through a series of stages, which began with picture writing, progressed to hieroglyphic writing , and culminated in alphabetic writing. In the realm of social organization there was a development from territorial groups composed of families to segmented societies (clans and larger groupings). Sociocultural evolution, like biologic evolution, exhibits a progressive differentiation of structure and specialization of function.
A misunderstanding has arisen with regard to the relationship between evolution and diffusion. It has been argued, for example, that the theory of cultural evolution was unsound because some peoples skipped a stage in a supposedly determined sequence; for example, some African tribes, as a consequence of diffusion, went from the Stone Age to the Iron Age without an intermediate age of copper and bronze. But the classical evolutionists did not maintain that peoples, or societies, had to pass through a fixed series of stages in the course of development, but that tools, techniques, institutions—in short, culture—had to pass through the stages. The sequence of stages of writing did not mean that a society could not acquire the alphabet without working its way through hieroglyphic writing; it was obvious that many peoples did skip directly to the alphabet.
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See here for Part I, Tylor's biography etc .
Note Megan Price worked on the Relational Museum project for six months between April and October 2003. During this time she mostly researched Tylor and his collection including contacting many of the Tylor (indirect) descendants. Unfortunately Megan did not leave a full narrative account of the man and his collection when she left the project. This narrative account therefore includes all of Megan’s research, and some research by Alison Petch. Almost everyone who worked on the ESRC-funded ‘Relational Museum’ project did some research on Tylor’s collections and this page is hopefully a summary of all of their contributions (marked as appropriate with the source). Note that where it says ‘pers. comm.’ for Megan Price this refers to information taken from her notes. Most of the information obtained from newspapers etc of Tylor’s day was provided to Megan by Chris Tylor, one of our hero’s descendants and we owe him thanks for providing copies of these. In addition, since this was put on line in 2012 John Young from Wellington in Somerset sent some comments on the text, comments such as this are added in parenthesis.
- Tylor's anthropology
- Tylor's sources
- What was Tylor's collection of objects for?
- Tylorian archival holdings ( probably an incomplete list )
Tylor’s anthropology
According to the 2004 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography entry for Tylor he was described as the ‘father of anthropology’, and nineteenth century anthropology was known as ‘Mr Tylor's science’. Stocking in 1963 suggested that the word ‘culture’ with its ‘modern technical or anthropological meaning was established in English in Tylor in 1871, though it seems not to have penetrated to any general or ‘complete’ British or American dictionary until more than fifty years later’. [Stocking, 1963: 783] However, he does also add:
‘Traditional account would have it that Edward Burnett Tylor created a science by defining its substance—culture. But story recognizes also that Tylor did not invent the word, that it had then and continues to have now a congeries of “humanist” meanings in addition to its “correct” anthropological meaning.’ [Stocking, 1963: 783]
Later Stocking would remark about him and the discipline :
‘Tylor’s conception of anthropology as a liberal “reformer’s science” purging Victorian culture of the unexamined “survivals” of traditional “superstition ...” [Stocking, 1995: xiv]
In his obituary in American Anthropologist 1917 (19: 262-268) Robert Lowie stated:
‘Tylor’s vision embraced, to cite his own definition of culture, ‘that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society’.
Lowie added:
‘The very idea of introducing into a branch of knowledge that is so often the happy hunting-ground of the curiosity-seeking dilettante something of the rigor of the exact sciences is one of wellnigh unparalleled magnificence. Nothing that Tylor ever did serves so decisively to lift him above the throng of his fellow-workers.’
‘Over and above his specific contributions, Tylor had a clear vision of the place of ethnology in modern civilization. The facts of primitive life were to him not mere specimens for a museum of psychological oddities nor was he altogether satisfied with using them as bricks for a theory of cultural development. Beyond its academic aspects he maintained that “such research has its practical side, as a source of power destined to influence the course of modern ideas and actions.”
In 1952 Kroeber and Kluckhohn observed that Tylor was ‘ deliberately establishing a science by defining its subject matter’. [1952, 150-1 quoted in B. Saler ‘E.B. Tylor and the Anthropology of Religion’, American Anthropologist vol 2 no 1 (May 1997) ‘paper prepared for 95th annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association November 21 1996].
Marett remarks that:
‘... Tylor’s interest lay rather in the unity underlying this all too conspicuous difference. The need of his age was to proclaim that mankind is a many in one, with the emphasis on one. ... Natural Science, with no dogma to uphold, no axe to grind, was now prepared to state a case for human unity ... Tylor, in throwing in his lot as a student of Man with the new archaeology and the new biology, supported their demand for an indefinite allowance of time in which to find room for the human life-process to have run its leisurely course. His scientific purpose is the same, namely, to examine origins. His contribution to the question of unity is not show wherein it consists or ought to consist, but rather how it has come about. ... Being chiefly concerned, then, with the cultural and hence mental aspect of human development, Tylor makes language his point of departure. ...’ [Marett, 1936: 48]
Tylor’s defined civilization as:
‘Civilization actually existing among mankind in different grades, we are enabled to estimate and compare it by positive examples. The educated world of Europe and America practically settles a standard by simply placing its own nations at one end of the social series and savage tribes at the other, arranging the rest of mankind between these limits according as they correspond more closely to savage or to cultural life. The principle criteria of classification are the absence or presence, high or low development, of the industrial arts, ... the extent of scientific knowledge, the definiteness of moral principles, the condition of religious belief and ceremony, the degree of social and political organization and so forth. Thus, on the definite basis of compared facts, ethnographers are able to set up at least a rough scale of civilization. Few would dispute that the following races are arranged rightly in order of culture:— Australian, Tahitian, Aztec, Chinese, Italian.’ [Tylor, 1871: I 23-24, quoted in Stocking, 1963: 788] ‘Wherever anthropologists have been able to show definite evidence and inference, for instance, in the developments series of arts in the Pitt-Rivers [sic] Museum, at Oxford, not only specialists but the educated world generally are ready to receive the results and assimilate them into public opinion. Strict method has, however, as yet only been introduced over part of the anthropological field. There is still to be overcome a certain not unkindly hesitancy on the part of men engaged in the precise operations of mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, to admit that the problems of anthropology are amenable to scientific treatment. It is my aim to show that the development of institutions may be investigated on a basis of tabulation and classification.’ [Tylor, 1889 ‘On a method of investigating the development of institutions; applied to laws of marriage and descent’ JAI vol 18 (1889) 245 - 272]
Tylor, like Pitt Rivers believed that ‘the condition of modern savages illustrates the condition of ancient stone age peoples, representatives of a stage of culture at once early in date and low in degree. The Tasmanian specimens and records now place us in full view of the state of a people in the palaeolithic stage, who may have lasted on in their remote and unvisited home from the distant ages when rudely chipped stones grasped in the hand were still the best implements of mankind ... The life of these savages proves to be of undeveloped type alike in arts and institutions, so much so that the distinction of being the lowest of normal tribes may be claimed for them. Still, though the difference between them and even their Australian neighbours is enough to mark lowness of stage, it by no means amounts to an immeasureable interval. Their palaeolithic state does accompany a corresponding lowness of general condition, as compared with that of modern neolithic savages. But the passage from neolithic to palaeolithic only carries us back a stage. The great initial developments of language, arts, religion, society, still remain in the remote background of human development.’ [Tylor, ‘On the Tasmanians as Representatives of Palaeolithic Man’ JAI vol 23 (1894) 141-152, 152]
Even at the end of his life he seems to have held that modern primitive peoples lives and work could be used to illustrate ancient times. A draft for a publication, which was never actually published so far as we are aware, written around 1910 says:
It is now some while since I began to press on anthropologists the importance of this comparison of ancient with modern stone age peoples, as disclosing to us the earliest available evidence of primitive savage conditions. But hitherto I have hesitated to deal fully with the subject, in hopes that more complete evidence might be accessible. As to the historical records of native Tasmanian arts and manners there seems little of consequence to be added to the information in Mr Ling Roth's 'Aborigines of Tasmania'. But of late I have been fortunate in obtaining by the help of Mr E.S. Anthony and Mr Paxton Moir fuller collections of native stone implements than had been known before. These have been taken from the shell-heaps on the coast, left there by natives who resorted there to feed on shellfish, just as in Europe on the Scandinavian coasts. The stone implements of pre-historic men are found in the ... [draft ends here] [Tylor papers, PRM ms collection, page 18]
Stocking describes Tylor as attending ‘to the evolutionary study of culture, with emphasis on language, myth, religion and material culture’ [Stocking, 1995: 3] Stocking describes Tylor as seeming:
‘...to have collected systematic information on [the geographical distribution of “some remarkable customs” including marriage prohibitions, avoidance, and the couvade] and other sociological matters. Twenty-three years later, in what was surely the most important contribution to his later years, he presented the results of an analysis of data on some 350 different peoples, first in a public lecture at Oxford and then to his anthropological confreres in London.’ [Stocking, 1995: 3]
Stocking describes this paper, ‘On a method of investigating the development of institutions..’ [1888], as containing ‘in compressed form all the major methodological and conceptual assumptions of evolutionary anthropology ...’ [Stocking, 1995: 3] Stocking believes that the ‘... concepts of survivals was the linch-pin of Tylor’s reasoning ...’ [Stocking, 1995: 6] Tylor himself summarised this in his concluding remarks:
‘Even the diagrams of this paper may suffice to show that the institutions of man are as distinctly stratified as the earth on which he lives. They succeed each other in series substantially uniform over the globe, independent of what seems the comparatively superficial differences of race and language, but shaped by similar human nature acting through successively changed conditions of savage, barbaric and civilised life.’ [Tylor, 1888, ‘On the method of investigating the development of institutions, applied to laws of marriage and descent’ JAI 21: 248, 269 quoted in Stocking, 1995: 8]
Stocking remarks that this climactic quotation suggests:
‘... Tylor’s paper was in fact a powerfully condensed summary representation of twenty-five years of social evolutionary argument. All of the evolutionary principles were there: the psychic unity of mankind, the uniform stages of development, the doctrine of survivals, and, of course, the comparative method, which was the primary focus of the paper. All the major evolutionary writers were not only referred to but brought together within a single interpretive frame. And throughout there was the characteristic tone of tolerantly patronizing ethnocentrism: savage customs might be farcical, but viewed in evolutionary context, they were rational, and they could be made the subject of systematic scientific investigation. If one were to choose a single paper to exemplify the paradigm of social evolutionary argument, one would be had put to find a better one than this. The difficulty—clear now, though it could not have been to Tylor—was that it was not he prospective exemplar of an ascendant paradigm, but the retrospective exemplar of a paradigm about to enter a period of decline. This is not to say that Tylor’s paper was without influence on later anthropology. Quite the contrary: it was one of the most important single papers in the history of the discipline, widely influential at the turn of the century, and continuing to be widely cited ... into the second half of the twentieth century.’ [Stocking, 1995: 10]
Marett remarks of Tylor’s scientific methods:
‘... the Tylorian method, which in this country has had a host of imitators, of whom Sir James Frazer may be selected for mention honoris causa , is to gather first and sift afterwards.’ [Marett, 1936: 69]
Tylor was the quintessential ‘armchair anthropologist’. Although he travelled a great deal, most of his evidence was gleaned from other authors etc rather than personal experience. Stocking remarks:
‘Despite its self-consciously innovative statistical method, Tylor’s paper of 1888 was a quintessential product of “armchair anthropology”—though perhaps not in a literal sense, since the tabulation of all that data, as well as the correspondence by which a good deal of it was collected, could only have been done at a desk. But the paper still took for granted the division of labour previously assumed by Notes and Queries , between the “travellers and residents in uncivilized lands,” who were “not anthropologists themselves”—and whose observations it sought to improve—and those who carry on “the scientific study of anthropology at home.” ... Tylor had first-hand familiarity with the United States government’s Bureau of Ethnology, which under Powell’s directions had since 1879 been sending investigators to collect information among the Indian tribes of the United States. He knew of the work of Frank Hamilton Cushing ... which was one of the more richly presaging premonitions of the ethnographic style of twentieth century anthropology. Tylor had in fact ended his talk with a call for an international effort to carry on “a prompt and minute observation” among the “hundred or more peoples in the world” on the verge of extinction, in order to save “some fast vanishing memory of their social laws and customs.” But there was no explicit indication that this effort was to be carried out by investigators different from those for whom Notes and Queries had been intended. By 1888, however Tylor was in fact already himself involved in ethnographic enterprises foreshadowing a more modern model. At the Montreal meeting of the British Association, where he had served as first president of the newly formed anthropological section, Tylor played a leading role in the establishment of a committee “for the purpose of investigating and publishing reports on the physical characters, languages, and industrial and social condition of the North-western Tribes of the Dominion of Canada.” ... Furthermore, Tylor was no longer willing to rest satisfied with research by questionnaire. From the beginning of the Northwest Coast project, it was assumed that, on the basis of the results of such an initial inquiry, some of the “more promising districts” would be the subjects of “personal survey... By the time Tylor published his 1888 paper ... the collection of anthropological data by academically trained natural scientists who came to define themselves as “anthropologists”, who were directly involved in the evaluation if not the formulation of anthropological theory, [was beginning] ...” [Stocking, 1995: 84-86.]
One of the ways in which Tylor can be seen as an innovator within anthropology is by his use of statistics in his 1888 paper ‘On a method of investigating the development of institutions...’ when he used rough statistical methods to shore up his theorizing. Köbben states:
‘... he, too, was of Bastian’s opinion “that in statistical investigation the future of anthropology lies” [Tylor, 1889: 269]. Tylor ... did not expect the truth to crystallize automatically from such a process. While claiming that the rules of human conduct are amenable to classification in compact masses so as to show, by strict numerical treatment, their relations to one another, he added: “It is only at this point that speculative explanation must begin ...”’ [Köbben, 1952: 131]
Stocking points out that:
‘During his lifetime, Tylor had several direct experiences with ethnographic “otherness”: his early travels in Mexico and the United States, his subsequent attendance at London seances with a view to their anthropological significance, and a visit to the Zuni pueblo during his American trip of 1884. But for the most part, his anthropology was very much in the “armchair” tradition. He read widely in classical sources, in travel literature, and in accounts of exploration and missionary activity—in most of the published sources, ancient and modern, that might provide information about the variety of human customs and belief. And he read critically. ... As his “adhesions” paper suggests, from an early point Tylor was interested in the improvement of ethnographic data. In 1874 he played the dominant intellectual role in the formation of the British Association’s Notes and Queries on Anthropology ... Although its questions about religion and mythology were clearly structured by the categories of Tylor’s Primitive Culture , the emphasis was on detailed and careful observation ...’ [Stocking, 1995: 15]
Stocking comments:
‘His equation was rather an attempt to define a cultureless being that could serve as base point from which to reconstruct, not the ‘early history of mankind’, but the ‘prehistory’ of human culture. In this context, the problem was no longer to trace history backward , but to reason forward , using what has since been called ‘the comparative method’ and ‘the doctrine of survivals’, to provide a plausible sequence of progressive cultural development—an account of how humans, from being once culturally close to the ape, had risen to the status of civilized gentleman. Although not explicitly so formulated, Tylor’s writing of the later 1860s can be seen as an effort to complement the Darwinian argument, by providing a developmental cultural chain that would take the place of otherwise ‘missing links’ in the evolutionary argument. To do this required not only the rejection of the degenerationist view of savagery ... It required more than the arrangement of archaeological and ethnological artifacts in sequences from simple to complex ... It required the establishment of a plausible naturalistic account of the development of the distinctive features of human spiritual culture ... It was this task ... to which Tylor devoted his magnum opus, Primitive Culture. ’ [Stocking, 1994: xvi-xvii]
Stocking again:
‘By 1871, the basic framework of Tylor’s anthropology had been completed. It was a structure that manifested the moments of its own evolution. The traditional ethnological issues he had treated in the early 1860s were still reflected in his writing of the 1890s. He was never a ‘unilinear’ evolutionist in any stereotypical sense; issues of cultural diffusion—notably the Asian origins of the Aztec game of Patolli—continued to concern him until late in his anthropological career. And although he was in some respects the quintessential ‘armchair anthropologist’, he was from an early point concerned with improving the quality of ethnographic information upon which anthropological comparison was based ...’ [Stocking, 1994: xix-xx] ‘... he may ... be considered an archetypical representative of what has been called ‘classical evolutionism’ in anthropology. The paradigmatic exemplar is an essay he published in 1888 ‘On a method of investigating the development of institutions ...’. ... Based on data on 350 societies he had collected over three decades from a wide variety of sources ... Tylor’s essay sought to establish laws of evolutionary development on a statistical basis that scientists might find convincing. .. From the point of view of ‘scientific revolutions’, however, the difficulty is that the 1888 essay was not the prospective exemplar of an ascendant paradigm, but the retrospective exemplar of a paradigm about to enter a period of decline.’ [Stocking, 1994: xx-xxii]
Hodgen states:
‘Tylor was the author of over two hundred and fifty papers and five books, all of singularly high and even quality. The two treatises for which he is remembered [24] were published in 1865 and 1871, during the first ten years of his working life, a period spent almost entirely in satisfying himself that social development rather than social degradation was the rule. His work was early remarked by his contemporaries for the penetration with which he recognized materials hitherto unknown or neglected, and the originality with which they were employed. ... Although Tylor was alert to all the problems of mid-century ethnology, his judgement of other scholars was often dependent upon their willingness to be equally certain of its applicability. ... Tylor formulated theories with scientific tentativeness, but the reader of his earlier and more vigorous work cannot avoid the conclusion that their structure and merit are derived from the emotional zest with which he entered the lists in favour of the progressionists.’ [Hodgen, 1931: 317] ‘It was Tylor’s conviction, following laborious personal practise, that more profitable work could be done by collecting data than by spinning theories. He objected with particular emphasis to the construction of sweeping generalizations on the foundations of one or two unchecked facts.’ [Hodgen, 1931: 318] ‘Primitive Culture is the mature statement of a seasoned scholar. In it Tylor wisely chose to return for review to his original problem, progression versus degradation, and to the arguments for each side of the controversy. Although he remained convinced that “the main tendency of culture from primeval up to modern times” was from savagery to civilization, he acknowledged other modes of connection such as degeneration, survival and revival. [Hodgen, 1931: 320] ‘The data of archaeology is little used in Primitive Culture, except as a guide to the theory of development illustrated by the serial arrangement of artifacts. Language is discussed as a means of sustaining the right of primitive people to a place in the series, but secondarily, and with repetition from the Researches. Tylor’s most vigorous efforts were given to the search for existing but outworn practices and ideas which could be traced to an early stage of advanced culture and paralleled with similar elements in the cultures of existing savages ...’ [Hodgen, 1931: 322] ‘In appraising Edward Burnett Tylor and his doctrine of survivals, it becomes apparent, that in formulating it he filled the role of a conserving rather than an innovating figure. ... Although he was less ready than many of his intellectual generation to accept all similarities in manners and customs as to equal evidential value in the reconstruction of the early history of man, there were other old methodological ideas to which he loyally adhered. With his contemporaries he accepted the idea of progress or development and employed the comparative method. With them, he utilized clues afforded by excavated artifacts. Like them, his attention was caught by the irrational but tenacious character of some beliefs and practices. This he ascribed to their greater age and their derivation without development from savage ancestors.’ [Hodgen, 1931: 323]
Urry states:
‘Tylor and [ Primitive Culture ] were to dominate British anthropology for the next thirty years. Primitive culture was written, however, on the basis of very little evidence; Tylor had to depend on many scanty and sometimes questionable sources. ... Tylor was very sensitive to the problems involved in using such diverse sources, but in Primitive culture he stated that any theories must be firmly rooted in actual facts.’ [Urry, 1972: 47] ‘Tylor and his contemporaries were indeed trying to raise a science, and they fully realised the importance of accurate information and some of the difficulties involved in collecting it. They openly encouraged the collection of information: ... Tylor by contributing a number of sections of anthropological questions to guide books. Stocking has noted that Tylor’s failure to produce any major work after 1881 has been attributed to his concern with the propagation of anthropology; high among these concerns was the production of such guides.’ [Urry, 1972: 47] [25]
Perhaps a clue as to why Tylor decided to make anthropology the basis of his life’s work can be gleaned from the following passage:
‘In times when subjects of education have multiplied, it may seem at first sight a hardship to lay on the already heavily-pressed student a new science. But it will be found that the real effect of Anthropology is rather to lighten than increase the strain of learning. In the mountains we see the bearers of heavy burdens contentedly shoulder a carrying-frame besides, because they find its weight more than compensated by the convenience of holding together and balancing their load. So it is with the science of Man and Civilization, which connects into a more manageable whole the scattered subjects of an ordinary education. Much of the difficulty of learning and teaching lies in the scholar’s not seeing clearly what each science or art is for, what its place is among the purposes of life. If he knows something of its early history, and how it arose from the simpler wants and circumstances of mankind, he finds himself better able to lay hold of it than when, as to often happens, he is called on to take up an abtruse subject not at the beginning but in the middle. ... It is needless to make a list of fall the branches of education in knowledge and art; there is not one which may not be the easier and better learnt for knowing its history and place in the general science of Man.’ [Tylor, 1930: xi-xii]
Marett’s summary of his work is interesting, as it shows what the next generation of Oxford anthropologists thought of him:
As for scope, his main point was that it must be a universal Science of Man, a synthesis of all that there is to be known about him from experience, that is, in the light of his history ... Tylorian anthropology concerns itself with the unity of mankind more directly envisaged as a continuity. As science it is history and something more, namely, an attempt not only to describe, but likewise in some measure to explain, the historical process. Tylor was an orthodox Darwinian ... Though he occasionally used ... the rather high-sounding phrase “evolution” ... Tylor decidedly prefers to speak simply of the “development” of culture. [Marett, 1936: 17-19]
According to Ackerman, Frazer's biographer, Tylor's was an 'anthropology of origins':
'His self-assigned task was to recover the prehistory of mankind. He starts from the Enlightenment premise that a fundamental unity exists among humankind, and that the similarities among cultures far outweigh the dissimilarities. His work is thus a reflection of the tide of liberal democracy rising all over Europe among the educated middle classes, for comparative evolutionary anthropology may be thought of as a scientific, 'objective' demonstration of the unity of mankind that both the deists on one hand and the romantics on the other had been proclaiming in their different ways since the American and French revolutions. Tylor postulated the existence of an organic law of development and progress operative in the growth of human institutions. This meant that change was gradual and orderly, much the same the world over, and that human institutions, once simple and confused, had become complex and highly coordinated over the passage of time ... [this] was not easy to demonstrate. His problem was one of evidence. Writing before the archaeological data produced by the later excavations in Greece and the eastern Mediterranean became available, how was Tylor to substantiate his statement that human society had evolved, along with everything else in the natural world? ... The solution lay in the comparative method and the doctrine of survivals. Tylor ... simply asserted that, human nature and development being relatively homogeneous, one might legitimately discover, in the behaviour of contemporary primitive peoples, living links in the evolutionary chain. Despite the absence of any evidence that their histories were any less lengthy than those of their European observers, these "savages" were postulated as living fossils, to show man as he was thousands of years ago, before some or all of the great intellectual and cultural advances occurred that had (inevitably) led to the societies of the modern West. Once this giant step was taken, it was not much further to the next: to obtain the needed dynamic view of prehistoric development, one might string together items of culture taken from the most diverse primitive societies if in their totality they illustrated the steady upward movement of human development. The burgeoning ethnography of the time ... was thus levied upon to provide examples of al the various "stages" of human behavioural and social development.' [Ackerman, 1987: 77-8]
What did contemporaries and others think of Tylor?
When Tylor was appointed Professor of Anthropology The Athenaeum of May 25 1895 announced the appointment saying:.
.. The name of Dr Tylor has been associated the world over with stimulating and original research, with lucid and laborious induction, with brilliant and fascinating generalization, with caution and candour as well as with depth of reasoning. His association with the Anthropological Museum of Oxford places within reach of his classes a rare means of experimental study. The other English universities may, perhaps, be expected soon to emulate Oxford. [Athenaeum, 25 May 1895, ‘Anthropological Notes’]
According to Urry [1972: 47] Andrew Lang, writing in 1898 praised Tylor for his careful separation of fact from fantasy in his anthropological writing. James Frazer also had a very positive view of Tylor:
'From the record of the ensuing discussion [following a talk given by Frazer to a meeting of the Anthropological Instiute in London on 10 March 1885, 'On certain burial customs as illustrative of the primitive theory of the Soul'] we learn that Tylor himselff "remarked that Mr Frazer's original and ingenious treatment of the evidence must materially advance the study of animistic funeral customs." On his side Frazer "expressed his deep gratification at the interest which Mr Tylor had expressed in his paper. It was the writings of Mr Tylor which had first interested him in anthropology, and the perusal of them had marked an epoch in his life".' [Ackerman, 1987: 67, quoting from the JAI 48-49]
When Tylor celebrated his seventy-fifth birthday in 1907 The Oxford Magazine of 31 October 1907 stated:
Though October is already some way behind, we desire to add our contribution to the stream of congratulations that has poured in upon Dr Tylor from every quarter of the world of letters on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday. At the same time we wish to congratulate ourselves as a University on being so intimately associated with the man who more than any one else ... deserves to be hailed as “the father of Anthropology” For some twenty-four years Dr Tylor has lectured in Oxford without a break on an endless variety of subjects that cover the whole vast field occupied by the science he has made his own. ... One thing that it is especially interesting to note in Dr Tylor’s case is what compensations there may be for the absence of a University training. He alone, perhaps, of all our doctors and instructors has never been in for an examination in his life. Instead of repairing hither to obtain honours and “Blues’—for a man of his intellectual and physical stature might have made equally sure of both—he travelled about the world, and in particular to Mexico; in which country, as witness his first book ... he received his call—the call of the wild. And we others, academy trained, assiduous practisers of Latin prose, we have not studied the savage at first hand, and we cannot write Tylor’s wonderful English, almost childlike in its simplicity, wholly giant-like in its force. May Dr Tylor long continue to abide amongst us, with health fully restored so as to match the wealth of his great learning.
In 1907 Tylor also received the Huxley medal from the Royal Anthropological Institute. In the Morning Post of November 6 1907 is stated:
‘... Professor D.J. Cunningham, of Edinburgh, remarked that Dr Tylor was the great leader and thinker in those branches of anthropology which he had himself developed, and of which he was acknowledged to be the founder. His work had had a remarkable influence on the progress of the science.
The event was also recorded in the Morning Advertiser, Globe, Daily Telegraph and Pall Mall Gazette .
When Tylor announced his retirement many newspapers published accounts which give their views of Tylor:
‘Dr Tylor’s reputation is one of the longest enjoyed by any living man of science. He published his first book ... in 1859 and at once took his place among original observers and thinkers. ... He received the honorary degree of D.C.L. at the Encaenia of 1875. He was not then an Oxford man, but became so in 1883 on his appointment to succeed Professor Henry Smith as Keeper of the University Museum. Very shortly after he was made Reader in Anthropology, and was in 1895 raised to the status of Professor, and somewhat later because Honorary Fellow of Balliol College. His personal attractiveness, amiability, and generosity have endeared him to numberless friends.’ [ The Times December 10 1909 ‘University Intelligence’] ‘It is announced from Oxford that Dr Tylor is resigning the Chair of Anthropology at the end of the year. The loss to the University is undoubtedly very great, yet not so great in reality as in appearance, since Dr Tylor will be at hand to help and advise as heretofore. After all, when a great thinker and writer has devoted the best of his time for a quarter of a century to academic work such as lecturing and organizing, he well deserves a holiday in the shape of some literary leisure. There is no need to speak here of Dr Tylor’s services to the world at large. It seems a fitting occasion, however, on which to say a word about the debt which Oxford owes him. ... Classification of races, distribution of culture, ethics, games, language, law, magic, marriage, property, religion, survivals, writing—here in alphabetical order is a chance selection of the topics on which he has from time to time discoursed. Again, his work in connexion with the Pitt-Rivers [sic] Museum has been simply invaluable. Lastly he has succeeded, after many years of patient effort, in creating for anthropology not merely a nominal, but a real place in the educational studies of the University. His ‘Memorandum on the Present State and Future Needs of Anthropology in Oxford’ (1902) marks an epoch in the history of the subject, so far at least as Oxford is concerned. Not only is useful research work being done by senior students ... There is likewise a Diploma Course ... and the School can already boast of attracting students of very various aims, such as future “researcher”, explorer, missionary, Colonial administrator and so on. Dr Tylor who has always insisted on the practical no less than the theoretical importance of anthropological science, is known to be extremely gratified at the way in which the subject has been lately gaining ground in the University. ... [ The Athenaeum , December 18 1909 ‘Resignation of Dr E.B. Tylor’] Twenty-five years of lecturing and organizing is a large is a large concession on the part of a thinker, and writer of genius to the [2 Greek words]. ... Thanks to Dr Tylor’s untiring efforts, Anthropology has made steady progress within the University ... It is doubtless because he is satisfied that the ship is through the narrows and has fairly started on its way that Dr Tylor finds it possible to leave the bridge. [ The Oxford Magazine , 20 January 1910]
An undated reference to Tylor:
Harper’s Monthly Magazine for July contains an excellent portrait of Dr E.B. Tylor (of Linden, Wellington) and in the course of an article on “Social Life in Oxford” says: Turning southward again and strolling through the west side of the Parks, one comes to the South Parks Road, where stands the house of Dr E.B. Tylor, the anthropologist. He is one of the most delightful of all the scientific men of the day, and his house, to which he and his wife delight in welcoming their friends, is a peculiarly pleasant one. I once heard a young man exclaim, after a talk with Dr Tylor, “He is the simplest ‘great man’ I have ever talked with,” a remark which only serves to put into words the impression he makes upon all who know him.
When Tylor died there was another opportunity for the newspapers to comment on his career:
‘... Tylor was a tall man of imposing appearance and his friendly, modest courtesy will never be forgotten by those who had the privilege of knowing him. ... On looking through the compendious bibliography of Tylor from 1861 to 1907 compiled by Miss Freire-Marreco .... it is obvious that, apart from his four books, his activity largely manifested itself in lectures, reviews, and addresses. His papers, even when descriptive, were always marked by a breadth of view and an endeavour to drive home the lessons to be garnered from the facts. ... Although Tylor illustrated his theses with a wealth of references, he never permitted himself to be swamped by them. He will always be regarded as the first and foremost exponent of the comparative method in this country, and though, as was natural for a contemporary of Darwin and Huxley, he was imbued with the principle of development, yet he was fully alive to the borrowing of culture and to cultural drifts ... Tylor was always interested in method, and it was mainly by his efforts in this direction that ethnology can now claim to be a science. [A.C. Haddon ‘Sir E.B. Tylor F.R.S.’ Nature , January 11 1917] ‘The death of Sir E.B. Tylor removed a truly grand figure and one of the glories of English Science from us. If the race of mankind in its natural being and tendency was his study, he was himself in his prime a noble specimen of that race in body, heart and head. ... That he wrote a beautiful prose style the many who know his books; especially the famous earlier ones are well aware. But perhaps only a few knew that he was also a poet who could add an excellent stanza to Andrew Lang’s Double Ballade of Primitive Man . He was in truth very witty and ready, as for instance when he said on the spur of the moment of a certain form of Japanese religion in which the ceremonial drinking of tea played the chief part, c’est pur théisme . It was not always possible to tell whether he was serious or in jest, as when he said in one of his lectures on Totems with regard to a certain cult being started by the Cherokee Indians, “That certainly we cannot believe, for we all know the Cherokees.” And he was, with his large nature and splendid frame, as kindly and warm-hearted as he was strong and eager, one whose science Germany might envy and whose spirit they would do well to emulate. [ The Oxford Magazine January 26 1917]
Obituaries appeared in a wide ranging selection of publications including the Scotsman, Glasgow Herald, Irish Times, Western Daily News, Somerset County Gazette, Taunton Mail,, Christian World, Inquirer, Oxford Chronicle, The Wellington Weekly News, The Morning Post, Saturday Review, Birmingham Post, Northern Whig, Daily Telegraph, Globe, Manchester Guardian, The Times, etc.
The essays published for his Festschrift include one from Andrew Lang:
... my acquaintance with Mr Tylor and his great book began thirty-five years ago, when he, beside Sir John Lubbock, already towered above all British anthropologists, like Saul above his people. ... In 1871 he produced his chief work, Primitive Culture , and at once appeared as the foremost of British anthropologists. The extent of his reading, his critical acumen, his accuracy, his power of exposition, his open mind, and his scientific caution makes this book no passing essay, but a possession for ever. He laid the firm foundations of a structure to which, with accruing information, others might make additions; he himself had made and is making additions; but his science passed, thanks to him, out of the pioneering stage, at a single step. ... Not the least of Mr Tylor’s gifts, as the founder of his science, is the happy simplicity and unobtrusive humour of his style. Not stuffed with strange technical words, his language, as in his admirable chapter on ‘Survival in Culture’ ... is so attractive, so pellucid, that any intelligent child could read it with pleasure, and become a folk-lorist unawares. ... On re-perusing the long familiar pages of Primitive Culture one is constantly impressed anew by their readableness. Never sinking to the popular, Mr Tylor never ceases to be interesting, so vast and varied are his stores of learning, so abundant his wealth of apposite and accurate illustration. Ten years was this work in the writing, and it may be said that le temps n’y mord , that though much has been learned in the last thirty years, no book can ever supersede Primitive Culture. It teaches us that, in examining the strangest institutions and beliefs, we are not condemned à chercer raison où il n’y en a pas as Dr Johnson supposed. [Andrew Lang, ‘Edward Burnett Tylor’ in Anthropological Essays presented to Edward Burnett Tylor ...’ p1, 5-7, 12
Myres opens his chapter in Anthropological Essays for Tylor on the occasion of ... on 'The Sigynnae of Herodotus an Ethnological Problem of the Early Iron Age' with a rather obscure reference to him, thus (p.255):
'The time has now gone by when it was safe to jeer at Herodotus as a mere retailer of travellers' stories. For us the Father of History is no less the Father of Anthropology. That he is become so, for some of us, is the outcome of a request made in all diffidence by certain Oxford undergraduates, in the Easter Term of 1892, that the Reader in Anthropology would lecture, if only for once, on the earlier books of Herodotus, or at least on such passages of them as demanded anthropological commentary. No one, I think, of the audience of those lectures on 'Anthropology as related to Ancient and Modern History', has forgotten the wealth of learning, and the truly planetary outlook with which that experiment was made.' (adding that as a result, JLM has never regretted devoting his life to the mass of new material available for the interpretation of the ancient Mediterranean world.) Developing an evolutionary perspective, he began to view culture as a continuum and to search for the origins of culture, and the laws of cultural progress. The latter, he believed, were to be found in the nature of the human mind.
Wilson D. Wallis states:
E.B. Tylor was no doubt the mostly highly honoured by his contemporaries. In the volume of essays in Tylor’s honor presented to him in 1907, on his seventy-fifth birthday, Lang refers to him as “the father of Anthropology in English”. Probably no anthropologist—using the term in its widest sense—would have begrudged him that honor. ... Like Lyell, Darwin, Galton, and a few other pioneers, Tylor had done his principal work outside academic halls. He was a Quaker. Boas told me that he was staying with Tylor the night before the University Convocation was to pass on the matter of Tylor’s Professorship, and it was anticipated that the clergy would attend en masse to voice their strong opposition to it. [Wallis, 1957: 781-2]
How did Tylor acquire information (and objects)?
Tylor obtained ethnographic information from people working in the field:
‘Like several other armchair anthropologists, Tylor established postal contact with various “men on the spot” who seemed particularly well-situated and competent observers, often with an interest in the general issues that were the focus of his theoretical concern. Although communication could take months, some of these people became active participants in the ethnographic process, answering queries, volunteering information, sometimes writing papers which Tylor shepherded into print. A number of the most active and sophisticated were in fact missionaries ...’ [Stocking, 1995: 16]
It is likely that some objects were obtained via the same route.
One report of Tylor obtaining an object, though not for himself or the Pitt Rivers Museum is given here:
‘About 1880 I had chanced to go to the county parish of Holcombe Rogus in Devonshire to pay an afternoon visit to the vicar, Mr. Wills. A remark of mine as to a stone implement on the mantelpiece led to the unexpected remark that there were things upstairs from the Pelew Islands. When I protested that nothing from thence had come to England since the time when Captain Wilson brought over ‘Prince Lee Boo,’ whose sad story is told in the once familiar poem, it was answered that the late Mrs. Wills was of Captain Wilson’s family, and had inherited his curiosities. Before that, two generations of children had played havoc with them, but in the attic there were still the great bird-bowl and the inlaid wooden sword, and the rupak or bone bracelet, that prized ornament of chiefs, with other familiar objects figured in Keate’s book. I represented that they ought to be in the national collection, and not long after, Mr. Wills, on his death-bed, ordered that they should be sent to me. They duly took their deserved places in the ethnographic department of the British Museum, where no doubt they will long outlast the amiable but hopelessly degenerate islanders, the picture of whose social decay has been drawn with such minute faithfulness by Kubary.’ (Tylor, Introduction to Ratzel’s Völkerkunde (‘The History of Mankind’): viii-ix)
Tylor obtained some objects via friends and peers in the international anthropological and archaeological worlds (for example, material from North America via the Smithsonian Institute: John Wesley Powell and James Stevenson).
Obviously gifts of objects were often prompted by conversation with Tylor as the following example suggests:
In the course of a conversation in your Drawing Room a few months ago you mentioned the superstitious habit of some people in carrying the chopped off tip of a tongue as a charm. At the same time you asked me if I ever could obtain one that had actually been carried to let you have it. Quite unexpectedly a few days ago I managed to obtain one that had been carried for some length of time and I now enclose it in this envelope in the hope that you may find it useful in adding to your collection of such things . It is a genuine specimen. I have not carried it about myself in order to qualify it. (Albert Wm. Brown, Tunbridge Wells, to Tylor 13.10.1897. Original emphasis. Tylor Papers, PRM Manuscript Collections).
This was written on college paper, by Brown, a college exhibitioner reading natural sciences at Christ Church College.
In return for the objects he was sent Tylor was not asked for a great deal:
I got the hooks and box from Captain Martin of our Mission Schooner “John Hunt”, and promised him that they should be presented to your Museum in his name. When you write next, please devote a small scrap of paper to an acknowledgement of receipt that I may hand it over to him as a bait to catch more specimens (L. Fison to E.B. Tylor, 17.08.1883. Tylor Papers, PRM Manuscript Collections).
Using a list originally compiled by Sandra Dudley, subsequently amended by Petch to take account of improved information, the following list of people associated with the Tylor collection was prepared. Note that those items which appear to have been retained by Tylor as part of his private collection up to his death are marked by words ‘ [ Private EBT collection ]’:
1. C.C. Abbott - also objects from him donated via Arthur and John Evans, 1 object sent to Tylor by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
2. Miss A. Alger - Sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
3. William George Aston - Also gave directly to PRM. Sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
4. Adolf Bastian - Sent to EBT 1883, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
5. Octavius Bates - Also gave directly to PRM. Sent to EBT in 1885, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
6. Possibly Alexander Montgomerie Bell - Also gave directly to PRM. and via above donor. Tylor might have been a previous owner of the objects
7. Giuseppe Bellucci - Also gave via Walter Leo Hildburgh and Wellcome Institute. Sent to Tylor in 1904 and donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
8. James Theodore Bent - Also gave directly to PRM. Sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
9. A.W. Brown - Sent to EBT in 1885, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
10. Basil Hall Chamberlain - Sent to EBT in 1885, some donated by EBT between 1910 and 1916, others donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Some Private EBT collection]
11. Greville John Chester - One sent to EBT by 1890 rest unknown but all donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
12. Abraham Colles - Sent to EBT by 1911, donated by him 1911
13. C.P. Converse - via R.R. Redding to EBT in 1882 and donated at unknown date
14. John V. Cook - Also gave via other donors, especially Ernest Westlake. Sent to EBT in 1906, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
15. William Crooke - Also gave directly to PRM. Sent to EBT by 1916, donated by him 1916
16. J.E. or S. Dallas - Also gave directly to PRM via Sollas. Sent to EBT by 1916, donated by him 1916
17. Charles Darwin - Given by Robert Swinhoe to Charles Darwin (who was merely an other owner), given by Francis Darwin (Charles’ son) to EBT in 1888. Donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
18. James Leigh Strachan-Davidson - Also gave direct to PRM. Sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
19. Juliet Duff - Sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
20. Mrs Elton - Sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
21. Arthur John Evans - Sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
22. John Gwenogvryn Evans - Sent to EBT by 1886, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
23. Thomas Douglas Forsyth - Also gave directly to PRM (in same year). Sent to EBT by 1886, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
24. Robert Frazer - via Smithsonian Institute sent to EBT November 1884, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
25. William Wyatt Gill - Also gave direct to PRM and via OUMNH. Sent to EBT in 1884, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
26. Major Grant - Sent to EBT in 1889 and donated 1889 after loaned
27. Horatio Hale - Sent to EBT in 1896 and donated 1896
28. Benjamin Harrison - Other objects from Harrison donated via Committee of the British Association. Alfred Schwartz Barnes, Lord Avebury, William G. Wallace and direct. Sent to EBT in 1912 and donated 1912 and donated by Anna Tylor in 1917 [Some Private EBT collection]
29. Dudley Francis Amelius Hervey - One given to EBT and donated by him by 1911, others received by 1917 and donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
30. Miss Heweld - Sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
31. Sydney John Hickson - Many donated directly. Sent to EBT by 1911 and donated 1911
32. J.R. Holland - Other owner only. Collected by Chester Macnaughton in 1890 and donated by EBT in 1916
33. P. Hopkins - Sent to EBT by 1882, donated by Anna Tylor’s executors / Dorothy Tylor in 1921 [Private EBT collection]
33. Eliot Howard - ?Relative [see below] Sent to EBT in 1896, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
35. Elsie Howard - Cousin, sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
36. Alfred William Howitt - Donated directly, also sent to EBT by 1908, some donated 1911, some donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Some Private EBT collection]
37. Frederick Wollaston Hutton - Sent to EBT in 1905 and donated 1913
38. James Johnstone - some donated via Henry Yule, others sent to EBT in 1885, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
39. A. Konoye - Sent to EBT December 1900, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
40. Edward Tyrrell Leith - Sent to EBT in 1889, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
41. Gulielma Lister - Also donated directly. Sent to EBT in 1895, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
42. Alfred Comyn Lyall - Mostly gave directly to PRM. Sent to EBT around 1890, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
43. R.A.S. possibly Robert Alexander Stewart Macalister - Sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
44. Chester Macnaughton - Sent to EBT in 1890 via JR Holland. Donated by Tylor in 1916.
45. Nora Mercer - Sent to EBT in 1892, donated by him in 1911
46. Joseph Paxton Moir - Some given to EBT by 1910 and donated by him in 1910, others sent by 1917 (also associated with Alexander Morton and WL Williamson) and donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
47. James Mooney - Sent to EBT by 1897 and bequeathed by Anna Tylor / Dorothy Tylor 1921 [Private EBT collection]
48. Alexander Morton - Collected with W.L. Williamson and Joseph Paxton Moir, sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
49. John Linton Myres - sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
50. Antonio de Nino - via Janet Ann Duff-Gordon Ross, sent to EBT in 1905, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
51. Mr Parkman - Sent to EBT in 1892 as loan for museum, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
52. Cornelis Marinus Pleyte - Some donated direct to Museum, one also via Balfour, purchased by EBT from Pleyte in 1896, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
John Wesley Powell - donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
53. John Wesley Powell - James Stevenson was collector, Powell was ‘other owner’ (not really, it was Bureau of American Ethnology, he was just associated with it), sent to EBT around 1884, donated by EBT in 1911 or donated by Anna Tylor in 1917 [Private EBT collection]
54. R.R. Redding - other owner only, item collected by C.P. Converse, possibly donated 1882
55. Janet Ann Duff-Gordon Ross - Sent to EBT by 1911 donated by EBT in 1911, some objects collected by Antonio de Nino and given by Janet Ross to EBT in 1905 and donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
56. Johan Diedrich Eduard or Johannes Dietrich Eduard or Johannes Friedrich Eduard Schmeltz - sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
57. Prof Serrurier - sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
58. Jacob esh. Shellaby - via Alfred Harris, sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
59. Erminnie Smith - sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
60. Robert Murdoch Smith - some via OUMNH, one via EBT in 1888, others sent to EBT circa 1858 and bequeathed by Anna Tylor / Dorothy Tylor 1921 [Private EBT collection]
61. William Robertson Smith - sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
62. Frederick Starr - Some directly donated to PRM or via Folklore Society, others sent to EBT by 1917 and donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
63. James Stevenson - via John Wesley Powell sent to EBT around 1884, donated by EBT in 1911 or donated by Anna Tylor in 1917 [Private EBT collection]
64. F.P. Swemburgh - sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
65. Robert Swinhoe - via Charles Darwin and Francis Darwin, sent to EBT in 1888, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
66. Richard Carnac Temple - Sent to EBT by 1916, donated 1916
67. David Thomas - Also donated via Philip John Worsley, sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
68. Everard Im Thurn - Sent to EBT by 1889, donated 1889
69. Francis Fox Tuckett - Relative. Some donated to Museum direct, others sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
70. E.T.C. Werner Tunbridge [NB it does occur to me his name might be Werner and his place of residence Tunbridge!] sent to EBT by 1917, donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
71. John Oliver Wardrop - Sent to EBT in 1895 and donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
72. Chief White - Other owner, Field collector Horatio Hale, purchased by EBT circa 1896 and donated by him same year
73. W.L. Williamson - Sent to EBT by 1917 (also associated with Alexander Morton and Joseph Paxton Moir) and donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
74. Bessie Wilson - Sent to EBT by 1917 and bequeathed by Anna Tylor / Dorothy Tylor 1921 [Private EBT collection]
75. J. Strode Wilson - Sent to EBT by 1917 and donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
76. Bertha Worsley - Item collected by David Thomas, given by Worsley to EBT by 1917 and donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
77. Soldier of the Rifle Brigade - Charles E. Pole Carew gave to Edward Burnett Tylor, June, 1891, and donated by Anna Tylor 1917 [Private EBT collection]
4.4 What was his collection for?
The majority of Tylor's publications do not make specific reference to objects within his collection (or the Museum’s) so it seems that for the most part at least he did not obtain objects as specific examples to support his arguments, as Pitt Rivers did. He may, at least in part, have been a collector per se , collecting for the sheer delight in acquisition. It seems that, as with Balfour, he sometimes obtained objects which ‘duplicated’ other objects which were given direct to the museum. These duplicates were then later given to the Museum after his or his wife’s death. An example of this kind of method of acquisition might be 1917.53.433 etc given in 1917 but obtained by James Stevenson much earlier, similar examples of which were given to the Museum directly. Balfour also obtained objects in this way. Such acquisitions however do suggest that there was more to their collecting than acquiring objects for the Museum, it suggests to me a more personal interest. This is especially so as the objects were often similar, or identical to, objects in the Museum’s collections.
However, an unpublished ms of Tylor's in the PRM manuscript collections suggests that later in his career Tylor was specifically interested in addressing partticular objects, both within his own personal collection and within the Museum's. This manuscript is located in Box 5 'Notes'' of the Tylor ms collection and appears to be rough drafts, lists of reading and references, and notes for a publication, putatively titled, ' Origin and Spread of Cultures' , and divided into 8 main chapters:
Chapter 1 - History and Prehistory
Chapter 2 - Eolithic and Palaeolithic Ages
Chapter 3 - Magic
Chapter 4 - Astrology
Chapter 5 - Deluge
Chapter 6 - Rosaries and Prayer Wheels
Chapter 7 - Games
Chapter 8 - Languages
It is chapter 4 which gives us a date for this work, as happening in 1910 or later. This is because in Tylor's notes he records that in this chapter he will look at several events forecast in various almanacks and comment upon them and he specifically mentions that he has chosen events in 1910.
It is clear that this publication, though no section appears to be finalised in this version at least, was going to deal with material culture much more directly than other publications. Here are some relevant extracts:
I possess one or two drawers-full [of stone tools] collected by Mr Benjamin Harrison of Ightham (Kent) or by myself under his guidance. [PRM Tylor ms collections, Box 5: page 15]
This clearly suggests that at some point Tylor actually undertook some practical archaeological work, if only field walking.
It is especially interesting to see what position astrology occupies in our times. It has fallen to publications price a few pence and sold in shops in villages and outskirts of towns. I have before me the 6d almanacks of Ladkiel [and several named others] ... from each of which take here or there a prophetic remark or two from each ... [PRM Tylor ms collections, Box 5: page 25]
This is somewhat incoherent passage, and it ends more or less as I give it, but it does give clear evidence that Tylor was purchasing objects (in this case, almanacks) in order to use them in his work.
There are also those [shell beads] of Cosinopara globularis from Les Boves near Amiens, now in the Pitt Rivers Museum. These plainly show that ornaments of strung beads and shells gave pleasure to mankind in remote ages, as they have continued to do since. In the same Museum may be seen in the necklaces of Elenchus shells stripped of theirr outer coating, which within our lifetime decorated the savage of Tasmania. [PRM Tylor ms collections, Box 5: page 65]
'The first home of the string of beads for counting the repitition of prayers and other sacred formulas, appears likely to have been India, where a vast population belonging to several religions still use it as they did ages ago. My own fairly complete collection of Indian rosaries was mostly made for me [draft ends here] [PRM Tylor ms collections, Box 5: page 66]
On page 67-8 there is an alternative draft of the above paragrap:
My own fairly complete collection of Indian rosaries was mostly made for me by my friend Mr Crooke, Collector of Mirzapur, and in 1893, at a meeting of the Ninth Congress of Orientalists in London ...' [PRM Tylor ms collections, Box 5: page 67-8]
Both of these paragraph drafts give a clear indication that Tylor intended to use his collection of Indian rosaries directly in the chapter, but also that he had an aim when collecting and believed that he had obtained 'a fairly complete collection', i.e. somewhat on the lines of Pitt Rivers attitude to complete-able typological series. Quite how Tylor knew, other than Crooke informing him that his set was fairly complete it is unclear from this ms.
This draft ms, if it had been published, would have been much more directly associated with material culture than his other books. He gives real and direct evidence of his connection to them:
I have on my table a pretty silver one [prayer wheel]... [PRM Tylor ms collections, Box 5: page 75]
I hold in my hand a silver prayer wheel from Tibet. On it is inscribed the familiar format Om Mani Padme Hum ... [PRM Tylor ms collections, Box 5: page 114v][Clare Harris is attempting to match this prayer wheel with the definite PRM object, there are two candidates, she also intends publishing about this]
NB there is also a long list of rosaries heading Tylor's collection of rosaries that can presumably be matched to specific objects, Tylor himself estimated he had a collection of almost 100 [PRM Tylor ms collections, Box 5: page 114v]
The use of objects whilst he was lecturing can be illustrated with the following reports:
‘The Reader in Anthropology commenced his course of lectures on Monday last. He naturally commenced by discoursing on flint implements and their uses; but perhaps the most interesting feature in the lecture was his practical illustration of their manufacture. To see the learned Doctor working, and with some skill too, with the actual tools of a palaeolithic man was an interesting and instructive example of the proverb about extremes meeting.’ [ The Oxford Magazine: Volume II no. 2, Wednesday January 30, 1884, p.20]
‘How are we to account for the difference which exists between the agricultural Pueblo Indians and wild hunting tribes, such as the Colorado Indians? It would seem from several pieces of evidence that this difference cannot be satisfactorily accounted for by the hypothesis that the former has reached a higher stage of development than the latter: more probably the wild Indian is the descendant of tribes who had reached a higher state of life, but have, owing to the pressure of war or poverty, sunk in the scale of civilization.
‘At the outset of his lecture or before proceeding to the evidence for this view, Dr. Tylor gave a practical warning to the unwary anthropologist who deals too hastily with wild races in contact with civilized white men; the professor produced a typical tomahawk with which a tobacco-pipe was combined, the whole being apparently of Indian make, but a little consideration shows that, as the Indian has no iron, he could not have made the iron head, and also his genuine pipe or calumet is made either of stone or of terracotta, so that the idea of adding a bowl to a war hatchet is due solely to the inventive genius of the white trader. Again, strings of shell beads are bartered to the Indian, which can be distinguished from those of native manufacture by the evenness of the holes, which have been bored through the shells with a turning-lathe and fine drill.’[ The Oxford Magazine: Volume II, no.22, Wednesday November 19, 1884, p. 410]
Documentary Sources for E.B. Tylor [List compiled by Chris Wingfield in 2002 and added to by AP]
Pitt Rivers ms collections
3 boxes of notebooks dated from c1862-1890. Contain notes taken from EBT’s wide-ranging reading. Most of the notes are direct quotes from each book or article. He does not provide annotations to them. Include excerpts from travel/exploration literature, latest anthropological writing, philosophy and physiology etc. Some notes in Greek, French, German and Spanish. Some illustrations, especially of Mexican pottery and codices. Some of these notes were drawn upon for EBT’s publications, e.g. Notebook I has numerous historical references to children raised by animals, which were clearly used in his 1863 article, ‘Wild men and beast-children’, Anthropological Review 1: 21-32. Also, contain several sets of notes taken at various museum visits, including Hunterian, Smithsonian, British Museum etc. Some rough notes of conversations held with A.W. Franks and Henry Christy, but very sketchy.
Correspondence - extensive correspondence from colleagues and supporters of the PRM worldwide. Includes letters from Boas, Fison, Hale, Dawson, Howitt etc. Many letters contain details of objects the writers are seeking on EBT’s behalf. Also, donations to the PRM. Many contain quite detailed ethnological information (especially those of Fison and Hale). Others are more clearly written by “amateur” anthropologists, colonial officials, etc. Very few letters from EBT have been copied, though there are some rough drafts of letters, e.g. concerning the purchase and transportation of the totem poles from Masset, QCI.
Photographs - large collection of photographs donated to PRM in 1917 following Tylor’s death. These were subsequently split up. Some were purchased by EBT as late as 1913. Lizzie plans using these in forthcoming project.
Charts - lifesize drawings and paintings for EBT’s lectures, c. 1885-1890. Include cave paintings, driving out devils, ideas of death after life, animism, Mexican patolli players.
- Pitt Rivers Museum
820 objects donated by Lady Tylor following EBT’s death in 1917.
Numerous objects donated by EBT from 1886-1916. Some are referred to in correspondence in EBT Papers and are listed as donations from EBT, also giving collector’s name. Others are just listed as from EBT and do not give collector’s details, though they can still be identified in correspondence, allowing for the information in the correspondence to be included in catalogue records.
Correspondence within accession books and related documents files concerning artefacts donated throughout EBT’s Keepership.
1884 - 1898 Letter to EB Poulton
Myres Papers - Memories of the Pitt Rivers Museum (MS Myres 93 (192-197)).
Natural History Museum
Archives - L MSS TYL: Notebook relating to EBT’s life by Lady Tylor. The entries are brief, stating where EBT was and when, and sometimes for what purpose. Illnesses and deaths of people close to the Tylors are also noted. Most of the entries refer to the places that the Tylors travelled to each year, and how long they stayed there.
British Library
Add MS 5024 - correspondence 1859-1906 (97 items)
Galton Papers - NRA 19968 Galton. Letters to Sir Francis Galton
MS ADD 88 - NRA 14256. Correspondence with G. C. Robertson
Salisbury and South Wiltshire Museum
Letters to Augustus Henry Lane Fox Pitt Rivers
American Philosophical Society
Correspondence with Franz Boas in Boas-Rukeyser Collection, 1869-1940. B/B61.ru
National Anthropological Archives - Smithsonian
BAAS papers
Cambridge University Library - Charles Darwin papers
Trinity College, Cambridge - Frazer papers
British Museum Archives - probably will contain references in Christy and Franks papers.
Royal Anthropological Institute - RAI, Ethnological Society of London, Anthropological Society of London
Records of former anthropology students in Oxford. Syllabus. Exam papers etc.
U niversity of California Tylor archive
[24] Hodgen sites ‘Researches into the Early History of Mankind..’ and ‘Primitive Culture..’
[25] Later in the same paper Urry says that Tylor contributed to the Admiralty Handbook as well as to Hints for travellers [Urry, 1972: 48]
[26] Later in the same paper Urry says that Tylor contributed to the Admiralty Handbook as well as to Hints for travellers [Urry, 1972: 48]
AP added to site September 2012, slightly amended March 2013
- Events Index
- Key Players
- People Database
- Article Index
- Ashmolean Museum
- Bodleian Library
- University Archives
- Other Archives and Resources
- Primary Docs Index
- Bibliography
- Museum Annual Reports
Supported by the John Fell OUP Research Fund
( c ) 2012 Pitt Rivers Museum, University of Oxford
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Culture: A contemporary definition
This chapter was written for a book published in 1988. It was conceptualised and published as a response to the concepts of culture that was being put forward by the then Apartheid government of South Africa, and was intended to counter these conceptions. The central concept of the paper is that culture is a human resource, not the possession of a ‘people’, or of government, and that we need to distinguish between the anthropological (and humanist) notion of culture as a human resource and heritage, one that can and must be shared, and the idea that cultures are bounded, static ‘wholes’. It has had wide currency and influence since its publication in 1988.
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Wilhelm H. I. Bleek first came to Natal in 1854 with Bishop J. W. Colenso's party to assist with translation of the English bible into Zulu. A young Prussian linguist, he was the founder of southern African linguistics. Bleek's doctoral dissertation at the University Bonn, submitted in 1851 as De Nominum Generibus Linguarum Africae Australis, Copticae, Semiticarum Aliarumque Sexualium was written in Latin, and based on a few texts that he had been able to obtain from missionaries in the Cape and from European libraries. This dissertation dealt with the problem of how the more abstract grammatical 'gender' classes of the African languages might be related to ‘sexual’ gender categories (masculine and feminine) in European languages. Although broadly comparative, it also attempted to provide the first grammars of Nama and Xhosa. Bleek’s earliest work was the first philosophical and comparative approach to African languages in relation to cultural categories: what we would today call a socio-linguistics. Indeed, his work on gender as both a grammatical and cultural category anticipated by at least a century similar work by linguists and feminists. This work formed the basis for his later Grammar of South African Languages published in 1863, a work which formed the basis for all subsequent grammars of Bantu languages and still forms the basis on which all of these languages are described and taught today. By coining the term ‘Bantu’ as the universal label for a large family related languages and cultures, he paved the way for ideas of pan-African identities and histories, comparative studies in ethnology and linguistics, and helped to make later ethnographic studies possible
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2 The Culture Concept
This is an adaptation of:
Perspectives: An Open Introduction to Cultural Anthropology (Second Edition)
by Nina Brown, Thomas McIlwraith, Laura Tubelle de González
Chapter Authors :
Priscilla Medeiros, Women’s College Hospital
Emily Cowall, McMaster University
Presentation Slides by James Sera
Discovering Cultural Anthropology shares and adapts this work under the CC BY-NC 4.0 copyright license
Learning Objectives
- Compare and contrast the ideas of ethnocentrism and cultural relativism.
- Describe the role that early anthropologists Sir James Frazer and Sir E. B. Tylor played in defining the concept of culture in anthropology.
- Identify the differences between armchair anthropology and participant-observer fieldwork and explain how Bronislaw Malinowski contributed to the development of anthropological fieldwork techniques.
Identify the contributions Franz Boas and his students made to the development of new theories about culture.
- Assess some of the ethical issues that can arise from anthropological research.
THOUGHTS ON CULTURE OVER A CUP OF COFFEE
Do you think culture can be studied in a coffee shop? Have you ever gone to a coffee shop, sat down with a book or laptop, and listened to conversations around you? If you just answered yes, in a way, you were acting as an anthropologist. Anthropologists like to become a part of their surroundings, observing and participating with people doing day-to-day things. As two anthropologists writing a chapter about the culture concept, we wanted to know what other people thought about culture. What better place to meet than at our community coffee shop?
Our small coffee shop was filled with the aroma of coffee beans, and the voices of people competed with the sound of the coffee grinder. At the counter a chalkboard listed the daily specials of sandwiches and desserts. (Coffee shops have their own language, with vocabulary such as macchiato and latte . It can feel like entering a foreign culture.) We found a quiet corner that would allow us to observe other people (and hopefully identify a few to engage with) without disturbing them too much with our conversation. We understand the way that anthropologists think about culture, but we were also wondering what the people sitting around us might have to say. Would having a definition of culture really mean something to the average coffee-shop patron? Is a definition important? Do people care? We were very lucky that morning because sitting next to us was a man working on his laptop, a service dog lying at his feet.
Meeting Bob at the Coffee Shop
Having an animal in a food-service business is not usually allowed, but in our community people can have their service dogs with them. This young golden retriever wore a harness that displayed a sign stating the owner was diabetic. This dog was very friendly; in fact, she wanted to be touched and would not leave us alone, wagging her tail and pushing her nose against our hands. This is very unusual because many service dogs, like seeing eye dogs, are not to be touched. Her owner, Bob, let us know that his dog must be friendly and not afraid to approach people: if Bob needs help in an emergency, such as a diabetic coma, the dog must go to someone else for help. We enjoyed meeting Bob and his dog, and we asked if he would like to answer our question: what is culture? Bob was happy to share his thoughts and ideas.
Bob feels that language is very important to cultural identity. He believes that if one loses language, one also loses important information about wildlife, indigenous plants, and ways of being. As a member of a First Nations tribe, Bob believes that words have deep cultural meaning. Most importantly, he views English as the language of commerce. Bob is concerned with the influence of Western consumerism and how it changes cultural identity.
Bob is not an anthropologist. He was just a person willing to share his ideas. Without knowing it, though, Bob had described some of the elements of anthropology. He had focused on the importance of language and the loss of tradition when it is no longer spoken, and he had recognized that language is a part of cultural identity. He was worried about globalization and consumerism changing cultural values. With Bob’s opinions in mind, we started thinking about how we, two cultural anthropologists, would answer the same question about culture. Our training shapes our understandings of the question, yet we know there is more to culture concepts than a simple definition. Why is asking the culture concept question important to anthropologists? Does it matter? Is culture something that we can understand without studying it formally?
In this chapter, we will illustrate how anthropology developed the culture concept. Our journey will include the importance of storytelling and the way that anthropology became a social science. Along the way, we will learn about some important scholars and be introduced to anthropology in North America. Let’s begin with our discussion of storytelling by taking a look at Gulliver’s Travels .
STORIES AS A REFLECTION ON CULTURE
Stories are told in every culture and often teach a moral lesson to young children. Fables are similar, but often set an example for people to live by or describe what to do when in a dangerous situation. They can also be a part of traditions, help to preserve ways of life, or explain mysteries. Storytelling takes many different forms such as tall tales and folktales. These are for entertainment or to discuss problems encountered in life. Both are also a form of cultural preservation, a way to communicate morals or values to the next generation. Stories can also be a form of social control over certain activities or customs that are not allowed in a society.
A fable becomes a tradition by being retold and accepted by others in the community. Different cultures have very similar stories sharing common themes. One of the most common themes is the battle between good and evil. Another is the story of the quest. The quest often takes the character to distant lands, filled with real-life situations, opportunities, hardships, and heartaches. In both of these types of stories, the reader is introduced to the anthropological concept known as the Other . What exactly is the Other ? The Other is a term that has been used to describe people whose customs, beliefs, or behaviors are “different” from one’s own.
Can a story explain the concept of the Other? Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels is about four different voyages that Gulliver undertakes. His first adventure is the most well-known; in the story, Lemuel Gulliver is a surgeon who plans a sea voyage when his business fails. During a storm at sea, he is shipwrecked, and he awakens to find himself bound and secured by a group of captors—the Lilliputians—who are six inches tall. Gulliver, having what Europeans consider a normal body height, suddenly becomes a giant. During this adventure, Gulliver is seen as an outsider, a stranger with different features and language. Gulliver becomes the Other.
What lessons about culture can we learn from Gulliver’s Travels ? Swift’s story offers lessons about cultural differences, conflicts occurring in human society, and the balance of power. It also provides an important example of the Other. The Other is a matter of perspective in this story: Gulliver thinks the Lilliputians are strange and unusual. To Gulliver, the Lilliputians are the Other, but the Lilliputians equally see Gulliver as the Other—he is their captive and is a rare species of man because of his size.
The themes in Gulliver’s Travels describe different cultures and aspects of storytelling. The story uses language, customary behaviors, and the conflict between different groups to explore ideas of the exotic and strange. The story is framed as an adventure, but is really about how similar cultures can be. In the end, Gulliver becomes a member of another cultural group, learning new norms, attitudes, and behaviors. At the same time, he wants to colonize them, a reflection of his former cultural self.
Stories are an important part of culture, and when used to pass on traditions or cultural values, they can connect people to the past. Stories are also a way to validate religious, social, political, and economic practices from one generation to another. Stories are important because they are used in some societies to apply social pressure, to keep people in line, and are part of shaping the way that people think and behave.
Anthropologists as Storytellers
People throughout recorded history have relied on storytelling as a way to share cultural details. When early anthropologists studied people from other civilizations, they relied on the written accounts and opinions of others; they presented facts and developed their “stories,” about other cultures based solely on information gathered by others. These scholars did not have any direct contact with the people they were studying. This approach has come to be known as armchair anthropology . Simply put, if a culture is viewed from a distance (as from an armchair), the anthropologist tends to measure that culture from his or her own vantage point and to draw comparisons that place the anthropologist’s culture as superior to the one being studied. This point of view is also called ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism is an attitude based on the idea that one’s own group or culture is better than any other.
Early anthropological studies often presented a biased ethnocentric interpretation of the human condition. For example, ideas about racial superiority emerged as a result of studying the cultures that were encountered during the colonial era. During the colonial era from the sixteenth century to the mid–twentieth century, European countries (Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Dutch Republic, Spain, Portugal) asserted control over land (Asia, Africa, the Americas) and people. European ideas of wrong and right were used as a measuring stick to judge the way that people in different cultures lived. These other cultures were considered primitive, which was an ethnocentric term for people who were non-European. It is also a negative term suggesting that indigenous cultures had a lack of technological advancement. Colonizers thought that they were superior to the Other in every way.
Sir James Frazer is among the founders of modern anthropology.
Armchair anthropologists were unlikely to be aware of their ethnocentric ideas because they did not visit the cultures they studied. Scottish social anthropologist Sir James Frazer is well-known for his 1890 work The Golden Bough: A Study of Comparative Religion s . Its title was later changed to A Study in Magic and Religion , and it was one of the first books to describe and record magical and religious beliefs of different culture groups around the world. Yet, this book was not the outcome of extensive study in the field. Instead, Frazer relied on the accounts of others who had traveled, such as scholars, missionaries, and government officials, to formulate his study.
Another example of anthropological writing without the use of fieldwork is Sir E. B. Tylor’s 1871 work Primitive Culture. Tylor, who went on to become the first professor of anthropology at Oxford University in 1896, was an important influence in the development of sociocultural anthropology as a separate discipline. Tylor defined culture as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” His definition of culture is still used frequently today and remains the foundation to the culture concept in anthropology.
Tylor’s definition of culture was influenced by the popular theories and philosophies of his time, including the work of Charles Darwin. Darwin formulated the theory of evolution by natural selection in his 1859 book On the Origin of Species . Scholars of the time period, including Tylor, believed that cultures were subject to evolution just like plants and animals and thought that cultures developed over time from simple to complex. Many nineteenth century anthropologists believed that cultures evolved through distinct stages. They labeled these stages with terms such as savagery, barbarism, and civilization. These theories of cultural evolutionism would later be successfully refuted, but conflicting views about cultural evolutionism in the nineteenth century highlight an ongoing nature versus nurture debate about whether biology shapes behavior more than culture.
Both Frazer and Tylor contributed important and foundational studies even though they never went into the field to gather their information. Armchair anthropologists were important in the development of anthropology as a discipline in the late nineteenth century because although these early scholars were not directly experiencing the cultures they were studying, their work did ask important questions—questions that could ultimately only be answered by going into the field.
Anthropologists as Cultural Participants
The armchair approach as a way to study culture changed when scholars such as Bronislaw Malinowski, Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, Franz Boas, and Margaret Mead took to the field and studied by being participants and observers. As they did, fieldwork became the most important tool anthropologists used to understand the “complex whole” of culture.
Bronislaw Malinowski, a Polish anthropologist, was greatly influenced by the work of Frazer . How- ever , unlike the armchair anthropology approach Frazer used in writing The Golden Bough , Malinowski used more innovative ethnographic techniques, and his fieldwork took him off the veranda to study different cultures. The off the veranda approach is different from armchair anthropology because it includes active participant-observation : traveling to a location, living among people, and observing their day-to-day lives.
Bronislaw Malinowski in the Trobriand Islands, 1915–1918
What happened when Malinowski came off the veranda? The Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922) was considered the first modern ethnography and redefined the approach to fieldwork. This book is part of Malinowski’s trilogy on the Trobriand Islanders. Malinowski lived with them and observed life in their villages. By living among the islanders, Malinowski was able to learn about their social life, food and shelter, sexual behaviors, community economics, patterns of kinship , and family.
Malinowski went “native” to some extent during his fieldwork with the Trobriand Islanders. Going native means to become fully integrated into a cultural group: taking leadership positions and assuming key roles in society; entering into a marriage or spousal contract; exploring sexuality or fully participating in rituals. When an anthropologist goes native, the anthropologist is personally involved with locals. In The Argonauts of the Western Pacific , Malinowski suggested that other anthropologists should “grasp the native’s point of view, his relations to life, to realize his vision of his world.” However, as we will see later in this chapter, Malinowski’s practice of going native presented problems from an ethical point of view. Participant-observation is a method to gather ethnographic data, but going native places both the anthropologist and the culture group at risk by blurring the lines on both sides of the relationship.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEORIES OF CULTURE
Anthropology in europe.
The discipline of cultural anthropology developed somewhat differently in Europe and North Amer- ica, in particular in the United States, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with each region contributing new dimensions to the concept of culture. Many European anthropologists were particularly interested in questions about how societies were structured and how they remained stable over time. This highlighted emerging recognition that culture and society are not the same. Culture had been defined by Tylor as knowledge, beliefs, and customs, but a society is more than just shared ideas or habits. In every society, people are linked to one another through social institutions such as families, political organizations, and businesses. Anthropologists across Europe often focused their research on understanding the form and function of these social institutions.
European anthropologists developed theories of functionalism to explain how social institutions contribute to the organization of society and the maintenance of social order. Bronislaw Malinowski believed that cultural traditions were developed as a response to specific human needs such as food, comfort, safety, knowledge, reproduction, and economic livelihood. One function of educational institutions like schools, for instance, is to provide knowledge that prepares people to obtain jobs and make contributions to society. Although he preferred the term structural-functionalism , the British anthropologist A.R. Radcliffe-Brown was also interested in the way that social structures functioned to maintain social stability in a society over time. He suggested that in many societies it was the family that served as the most important social structure because family relationships determined much about an individual’s social, political, and economic relationships and these patterns were repeated from one generation to the next. In a family unit in which the father is the breadwinner and the mother stays home to raise the children, the social and economic roles of both the husband and the wife will be largely defined by their specific responsibilities within the family. If their children grow up to follow the same arrangement, these social roles will be continued in the next generation.
In the twentieth century, functionalist approaches also became popular in North American anthropology, but eventually fell out of favor. One of the biggest critiques of functionalism is that it views cultures as stable and orderly and ignores or cannot explain social change. Functionalism also struggles to explain why a society develops one particular kind of social institution instead of another. Functionalist perspectives did contribute to the development of more sophisticated concepts of culture by establishing the importance of social institutions in holding societies together. While defining the division between what is cultural and what is social continues to be complex, functionalist theory helped to develop the concept of culture by demonstrating that culture is not just set of ideas or beliefs, but consists of specific practices and social institutions that give structure to daily life and allow human communities to function.
Anthropology in the United States
During the development of anthropology in North America (Canada, United States, and Mexico), the significant contribution made by the American School of Anthropology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was the concept of cultural relativism , which is the idea that cultures cannot be objectively understood since all humans see the world through the lens of their own culture. Cultural relativism is different than ethnocentrism because it emphasizes understanding culture from an insider’s view. The focus on culture, along with the idea of cultural relativism, distinguished cultural anthropology in the United States from social anthropology in Europe.
The participant-observation method of fieldwork was a revolutionary change to the practice of anthropology, but at the same time it presented problems that needed to be overcome. The challenge was to move away from ethnocentrism, race stereotypes, and colonial attitudes, and to move forward by encouraging anthropologists to maintain high ethical standards and open minds.
Franz Boas, an American anthropologist, is acknowledged for redirecting American anthropologists away from cultural evolutionism and toward cultural relativism. Boas first studied physical science at the University of Kiel in Germany. Because he was a trained scientist, he was familiar with using empirical methods as a way to study a subject. Empirical methods are based on evidence that can be tested using observation and experiment.
Franz Boas, One of the Founders of American Anthropology, 1915
In 1883, Franz Boas went on a geographical expedition to Baffin Island in the Canadian Arctic. The Central Eskimo (1888) details his time spent on Baffin Island studying the culture and language of the central Eskimo (Inuit) people. He studied every aspect of their culture such as tools, clothing, and shelters. This study was Boas’ first major contribution to the American school of anthropology and convinced him that cultures could only be understood through extensive field research. As he observed on Baffin Island, cultural ideas and practices are shaped through interactions with the natural environment. The cultural traditions of the Inuit were suited for the environment in which they lived. This work led him to promote cultural relativism: the principle that a culture must be understood on its own terms rather than compared to an outsider’s standard. This was an important turning point in correcting the challenge of ethnocentrism in ethnographic fieldwork.
Boas is often considered the originator of American anthropology because he trained the first generation of American anthropologists including Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and Alfred Kroeber. Using a commitment to cultural relativism as a starting point, these students continued to refine the concept of culture. Ruth Benedict, one of Boas’ first female students, used cultural relativism as a starting point for investigating the cultures of the American northwest and southwest. Her best-selling book Patterns of Culture (1934) emphasized that culture gives people coherent patterns for thinking and behaving. She argued that culture affects individuals psychologically, shaping individual personality traits and leading the members of a culture to exhibit similar traits such as tendency toward aggression, or calmness.
Benedict was a professor at Columbia University and in turn greatly influenced her student Margaret Mead, who went on to become one of the most well-known female American cultural anthropologists. Mead was a pioneer in conducting ethnographic research at a time when the discipline was predominately male. Her 1925 research on adolescent girls on the island of Ta‘ū in the Samoan Islands, published as Coming of Age in Samoa (1928), revealed that teenagers in Samoa did not experience the same stress and emotional difficulties as those in the United States. The book was an important contribution to the nature versus nurture debate, providing an argument that learned cultural roles were more important than biology. The book also reinforced the idea that individual emotions and personality traits are products of culture.
Ruth Benedict, 1936
Alfred Louis Kroeber, another student of Boas, also shared the commitment to field research and cultural relativism, but Kroeber was particularly interested in how cultures change over time and influence one another. Through publications like The Nature of Culture (1952), Kroeber examined the historical processes that led cultures to emerge as distinct configurations as well as the way cultures could become more similar through the spread or diffusion of cultural traits. Kroeber was also interested in language and the role it plays in transmitting culture. He devoted much of his career to studying Native American languages in an attempt to document these languages before they disappeared.
Anthropologists in the United States have used cultural relativism to add depth to the concept of culture in several ways. Tylor had defined culture as including knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, capabilities and habits. Boas and his students added to this definition by emphasizing the importance of enculturation , the process of learning cul- ture, in the lives of individuals. Benedict, Mead, and others Ruth Benedict, 1936 established that through enculturation culture shapes individual identity, self-awareness, and emotions in fundamental ways. They also emphasized the need for holism, approaches to research that considered the entire context of a society including its history
Kroeber and others also established the importance of language as an element of culture and documented the ways in which language was used to communicate complex ideas. By the late twentieth century, new approaches to symbolic anthropology put language at the center of analysis. Later on, Clifford Geertz, the founding member of postmodernist anthropology, noted in his book The Interpretation of Cultures (1973) that culture should not be seen as something that was “locked inside people’s heads.” Instead, culture was publicly communicated through speech and other behaviors. Culture , he concluded, is “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes toward life.” This definition, which continues to be influential today, reflects the influence of many earlier efforts to refine the concept of culture in American anthropology.
Ethical Issues in Truth Telling
As anthropologists developed more sophisticated concepts of culture, they also gained a greater understanding of the ethical challenges associated with anthropological research. Because participant- observation fieldwork brings anthropologists into close relationships with the people they study, many complicated issues can arise. Cultural relativism is a perspective that encourages anthropologists to show respect to members of other cultures, but it was not until after World War II that the profession of anthropology recognized a need to develop formal standards of professional conduct.
The Nuremberg trials, which began in 1945 in Nuremberg, Germany and were conducted under the direction of the France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, prosecuted members of the Nazi regime for war crimes. In addition to military and political figures, physicians and scientists were also prosecuted for unethical human experimentation and mass murder. The trials demonstrated that physicians and other scientists could be dangerous if they used their skills for abusive or exploitative goals. The Nuremberg Code that emerged from the trials is considered a land- mark document in medical and research ethics. It established principles for the ethical treatment of the human subjects involved in any medical or scientific research.
Many universities adopted principles from the Nuremberg Code to write ethical guidelines for the treatment of human subjects. Anthropologists and students who work in universities where these guidelines exist are obliged to follow these rules. The American Anthropological Association (AAA), along with many anthropology organizations in other countries, developed codes of ethics describing specific expectations for anthropologists engaged in research in a variety of settings. The principles in the AAA code of ethics include: do no harm; be open and honest regarding your work; obtain informed consent and necessary permissions; ensure the vulnerable populations in every study are protected from competing ethical obligations; make your results accessible; protect and preserve your records; and maintain respectful and ethical professional relationships. These principles sound simple, but can be complicated in practice.
Bronislaw Malinowski
The career of Bronislaw Malinowski provides an example of how investigations of culture can lead anthropologists into difficult ethical areas. As discussed above, Malinowski is widely regarded as a leading figure in the history of anthropology. He initiated the practice of participant-observation fieldwork and published several highly regarded books including The Argonauts of the Western Pacific . Following his death, the private diary he kept while conducting fieldwork was discovered and published as A Diary in the Strictest Sense of the Term (1967). The diary described Malinowski’s feelings of loneliness and isolation, but also included a great deal of information about his sexual fantasies as well his some insensitive and contemptuous opinions about the Trobriand Islanders. The diary provided valuable insight into the mind of an important ethnographer, but also raised questions about the extent to which his personal feelings, including bias and racism, were reflected in his official conclusions.
Most anthropologists keep diaries or daily notes as a means of keeping track of the research project, but these records are almost never made public. Because Malinowski’s diary was published after his death, he could not explain why he wrote what he did, or assess the extent to which he was able to separate the personal from the professional. Which of these books best reflects the truth about Malinowski’s interaction with the Trobriand Islanders? This rare insight into the private life of a field researcher demonstrates that even when anthropologists are acting within the boundaries of professional ethics, they still struggle to set aside their own ethnocentric attitudes and prejudices.
Napoleon Chagnon
A more serious and complicated incident concerned research conducted among the Yanomami, an indigenous group living in the Amazon rainforest in Brazil and Venezuela. Starting in the 1960s, the anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon and James Neel, a geneticist, carried out research among the Yanomami. Neel was interested in studying the effects of radiation released by nuclear explosions on people living in remote areas. Chagnon was investigating theories about the role of violence in Yanomami society. In 2000, an American journalist, Patrick Tierney, published a book about Chagnon and Neel’s research: Darkness in El Dorado: How Scientists and Journalists Devastated the Amazo n . The book contained numerous stunning allegations, including a claim that the pair had deliberately infected the Yanomami with measles, starting an epidemic that killed thousands of people. The book also claimed that Neel had conducted medical experiments without the consent of the Yanomami and that Chagnon had deliberately created conflicts between Yanomami groups so he could study the resulting violence.
These allegations were brought to the attention of the American Anthropological Association, and a number of inquiries were eventually conducted. James Neel was deceased, but Napoleon Chagnon steadfastly denied the allegations. In 2002, the AAA issued their report; Chagnon was judged to have misrepresented the violent nature of Yanomami culture in ways that caused them harm and to have failed to obtain proper consent for his research. However, Chagnon continued to reject these conclusions and complained that the process used to evaluate the evidence was unfair. In 2005, the AAA rescinded its own conclusion, citing problems with the investigation process. The results of several years of inquiry into the situation satisfied few people. Chagnon was not definitively pronounced guilty, nor was he exonerated. Years later, debate over this episode continues. The controversy demonstrates the extent to which truth can be elusive in anthropological inquiry. Although anthropologists should not be storytellers in the sense that they deliberately create fictions, differences in perspective and theoretical orientation create unavoidable differences in the way anthropologists interpret the same situation. Anthropologists must try to use their toolkit of theory and methods to ensure that the stories they tell are truthful and represent the voice of the people being studied using an ethical approach.
BACK IN THE COFFEE SHOP
This chapter has looked at some historic turning points in the way anthropologists have defined culture. There is not one true, absolute definition of culture. Anthropologists respect traditions such as language; the development of self, especially from infancy to adulthood; kinship; and the structure of the social unit, or the strata of a person within their class structure; marriage, families, and rites of passage; systems of belief; and ritual. However, anthropologists also look at change and the impact it has on those traditions.
With globalization moving at a dramatic pace, and change unfolding daily, how will emerging trends redefine the culture concept? For example, social media and the Internet connect the world and have created new languages, relationships, and an online culture without borders. This leads to the question: is digital, or cyber anthropology the future? Is the study of online cultures, which are encountered largely through reading text, considered armchair or off the veranda research? Is the cyber world a real or virtual culture? In some ways, addressing online cultures takes anthropology back to its roots as anthropologists can explore new worlds without leaving home. At the same time, cyberspaces and new technologies allow people to see, hear, and communicate with others around the world in real time.
Back in the coffee shop, where we spent time with Bob, we discovered that he hoped to keep familiar aspects of his own culture, traditions such as language, social structure, and unique expressions of values, alive. The question, what is culture, caused us to reflect on our own understandings of the cultural self and the cultural Other , and on the importance of self and cultural awareness.
My cultural self has evolved from the first customary traditions of my childhood, yet my life with the Inuit caused me to consider that I have similar values and community traits as my friends in the North. My childhood was focused on caring, acceptance, and working together to achieve the necessities of life. Life on the land with the Inuit was no different, and throughout the years, I have seen how much we are the same, just living in different locations and circumstances. My anthropological training has enriched my life experiences by teaching me to enjoy the world and its peoples. I have also experienced being the cultural Other when working in the field, and this has always reminded me that the cultural self and the cultural Other will always be in conflict with each other on both sides of the experience.
Living with different indigenous tribes in Kenya gave me a chance to learn how communities main- tain their traditional culture and ways of living. I come from a Portuguese- Canadian family that has kept strong ties to the culture and religion of our ancestors. Portuguese people believe storytelling is a way to keep one’s traditions, cultural identity, indigenous knowledge, and language alive. When I lived in Nairobi Province, Kenya, I discovered that people there had the same point of view. I found it odd that people still define their identities by their cultural history. What I have learned by conducting cul- tural fieldwork is that the meanings of culture not only vary from one group to another, but that all human societies define themselves through culture.
Our Final Reflection
Bob took us on a journey to understand what is at the heart of the culture concept. Clearly, the culture concept does not follow a straight line. Scholars, storytellers, and the people one meets in everyday life have something to say about the components of culture. The story that emerges from different voices brings insight into what it is to be human. Defining the culture concept is like putting together a puzzle with many pieces. The puzzle of culture concepts is almost complete, but it is not finished…yet.
Armchair anthropology : an early and discredited method of anthropological research that did not involve direct contact with the people studied.
Cultural determinism : the idea that behavioral differences are a result of cultural, not racial or genetic causes.
Cultural evolutionism: a discredited theory popular in nineteenth century anthropology suggesting that societies evolved through stages from simple to advanced.
Cultural relativism : the idea that we should seek to understand another person’s beliefs and behaviors from the perspective of their own culture and not our own.
Culture : a set of beliefs, practices, and symbols that are learned and shared. Together, they form an all- encompassing, integrated whole that binds people together and shapes their worldview and lifeways.
Enculturation: the process of learning the characteristics and expectations of a culture or group.
Ethnocentrism: the tendency to view one’s own culture as most important and correct and as the stick by which to measure all other cultures.
Functionalism: an approach to anthropology developed in British anthropology that emphasized the way that parts of a society work together to support the functioning of the whole.
Going native : becoming fully integrated into a cultural group through acts such as taking a leadership position, assuming key roles in society, entering into marriage, or other behaviors that incorporate an anthropologist into the society he or she is studying.
Holism: taking a broad view of the historical, environmental, and cultural foundations of behavior.
Kinship: blood ties, common ancestry, and social relationships that form families within human groups.
Participant observation: a type of observation in which the anthropologist observes while participat- ing in the same activities in which her informants are engaged.
Structural-Functionalism: an approach to anthropology that focuses on the ways in which the cus- toms or social institutions in a culture contribute to the organization of society and the maintenance of social order.
The Other: is a term that has been used to describe people whose customs, beliefs, or behaviors are “dif- ferent” from one’s own
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Benedict, Ruth. Patterns of Culture . Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Company, 1934. Boas, Franz. Race, Language, and Culture . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940. Darwin, Charles. On the Origin of Species . London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1859. Kroeber, Alfred. The Nature of Culture . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952.
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- Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Customs (London: Cambridge University Press, 1871), preface.
- Lewis Henry Morgan was one anthropologist who proposed an evolutionary framework based on these terms in his book Ancient Society (New York: Henry Holt, 1877).
- The film Bronislaw Malinowski: Off the Veranda , (Films Media Group, 1986) further describes Malinowski’s research practices.
- Bronislaw Malinowski. Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1922), 290.
- For more on this topic see Adam Kuper, Anthropology and Anthropologists: The Modern British School (New York: Routledge, 1983) and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (London: Cohen and West, 1952).
- Boas’ attitudes about cultural relativism were influenced by his experiences in the Canadian Arctic as he strug- gled to survive in a natural environment foreign to his own prior experience. His private diary and letters record the evolution of his thinking about what it means to be “civilized.” In a letter to his fiancé, he wrote: “I often ask myself what advantages our ‘good society’ possesses over that of the ‘savages’ and find, the more I see of their customs, that we have no right to look down upon them … We have no right to blame them for their forms and superstitions which may seem ridiculous to us. We ‘highly educated people’ are much worse, relatively speaking.” The entire letter can be read in George Stocking, ed. Observers Observed: Essays on Ethnographic Fieldwork (Madi- son, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 33.
- Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, Geertz 1973), 89.
- For more information about the controversy, see Thomas Gregor and Daniel Gross, “Guilt by Association: The Culture of Accusation and the American Anthropological Associations Investigation of Darkness in El Dorado.” American Anthropologist 106 no. 4 (2004):687-698 and Robert Borofsky, Yanomami: The Fierce Controversy and
What We Can Learn From It (Berkley: University California Press, 2005). Napoleon Chagnon has written his rebuttal in Noble Savages: My Life Among Two Dangerous Tribes—The Yanomamo and the Anthropologists (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013).
Discovering Cultural Anthropology Copyright © by Antonia M. Santangelo is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.
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Satisfaction with Life as an Entrepreneur: From Early Volition to Eudaimonia
- Original Paper
- Published: 15 October 2024
Cite this article
- Nadav Shir ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-7697-2322 1 ,
- Johan Wiklund 2 &
- Srikant Manchiraju 3
This study explores how being satisfied with one’s life as an entrepreneur is a crucial ethical and psychological outcome of early volition and, subsequently, a vital resource in the development of a richer eudaimonic experience from entrepreneurship. We develop and test our predictions based on two independent datasets: American and Swedish business owners and early stage entrepreneurs. We argue and demonstrate that satisfaction with life as an entrepreneur conveys a distinct state of entrepreneurial well-being and constitutes a crucial self-evaluation which mediates the effects of early volition in entrepreneurship on long-term eudaimonia. We contribute to the emerging conversations on entrepreneurship, business ethics, and well-being.
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The reader should note the difference between MacIntyre’s classification of internal and external goods and the popular psychological classification of life goals and motivation as intrinsic or extrinsic. Whereas the latter pertains to whether a goal or motive contributes directly to the satisfaction of basic psychological needs (Deci and Ryan 2000 ), the former classification considers whether goods are unique to a practice. Striving for and attaining internal goods is connected to human flourishing, as individuals exercise their virtues and complete their lives (see MacIntyre 2013 for an extended argument).
From this perspective, entrepreneurial engagement might likened to participating in a public goods game, in which individual entrepreneurs assume not only financial risks and uncertainties, but also uncertainties related to personal well-being. Thus, understanding entrepreneurs’ motivational foundations and well-being is also essential for broader promotion of societal well-being. We owe this insightful observation to one of our anonymous reviewers.
Men, it should be noted, are consistently found to value self-direction, risk-taking, and independence more than women (Schwartz et al., 2005) and to experience a greater normative fit with the entrepreneurial role (Lewis, 2006 ). We will return to this issue in the final sub-section below.
While the original scale by Diener et al. ( 1985 ) measures a person’s general evaluation of their lives, the ELS scale asks for a more context-specific evaluation of life as an entrepreneur . which we view as a core meaning experience (Wittgenstein 2019 ) in entrepreneurship. As entrepreneurship constitutes a major domain in the lives of entrepreneurs, ELS represents an important component of their psychological well-being and mental health. It has historically been ignored by economists, entrepreneurship scholars, and organisational psychologists, who have traditionally looked to work satisfaction as a measure of well-being in work domains.
Although χ2 was significant, several fit indexes have been developed to remedy the problems associated with χ2 statistics. Rather than relying on a single measure, researchers generally recommend examining several indices when evaluating model fit (e.g., Kline 2005 ; Nye and Drasgow, 2011 ). Therefore, other indices should be considered, including the Tucker–Lewis index (TLI), the comparative fit index (CFI), and the standardised root mean square residual (SRMR). For maximum likelihood (ML) CFA, a cutoff value close to .95 for TLI and CFI, and a cutoff value less than .08 for SRMR are both needed before we can conclude that there is a relatively good fit between the hypothesised model and the observed data (Hu and Bentler 1999).
One purpose of measurement invariance establishment is to assess construct equivalence across groups (e.g., gender). For instance, per Putnick and Bornstein ( 2016 ), a study might measure the same cognition or behaviour (form) across groups, but the focal construct (i.e., cognition or behaviour) might have different meanings (function) for each group, contingent upon the meaning conventionalised, and might therefore differ in meaning for cognition and behaviour across groups. Thus, for appropriate comparison of constructs between groups, the equivalence of meaning must be ensured (Putnick and Bornstein 2016 ). Furthermore, no modification indices were employed to enhance the model fit indices.
One-way ANOVA was conducted, which compared the ELS scale total mean score across genders to calculate ELS difference. The results were insignificant; F (1, 284) = 0.315, p = .575; eta-squared (point estimate = 0.001; CI 95% = [0.00–0.022]), which confirms that ELS mean scores do not differ across genders in this study.
It should be further noted that the crude necessity/opportunity distinction may fail to capture the quality of freedom, as some entrepreneurs may report “having no better choice for work” not because of some urgent, material need for such engagement but rather, as Shir and Ryff ( 2022 ) put it, “because they feel they must as part of their sense of self and personal vision”. We abstract from this problem of interpretation here and hope to address this in a future study.
However, other limitations of such a measure should be noted. In particular, it is known that Likert-type scale measures fail to capture the complexity of responses in general (Lim et al., 2023 ). Different individuals may interpret and respond to Likert scale items differently based on their unique perspectives, which could lead to potential response bias and variability (Sanz-Velasco, 2006 ). At the same time, as Bavetta and Navarra discuss, there is a strong and consistent logic to the use of such a subjective measure in appraising of autonomy freedom (for the full argument, see Bavetta and Navarra, 2012 , ch.4 p. 58–98).
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The following items, which are included in PWB-42 (Ryff, 1989 ), were excluded from PWB-34 to establish unidimensionality before parcelling.
Autonomy (A)
A5. I often change my mind about decisions if my friends and family disagree.
A6. Being happy with myself is more important than having others approve of me.
Environmental Mastery (EM)
EM5. I am good at juggling my time so that I can fit everything in that needs to be done.
EM6. I have difficulty arranging my life in a way that is satisfying to me.
Personal Growth (PG)
PG2. I don’t want to try new ways of doing things—my life is fine the way it is.
PG5. I feel that I have developed a lot as a person over time
Positive Relations (PR)
PR5. It seems to me that most other people have more friends than I do.
PR7. I know that I can trust my friends, and they know that they can trust me.
Note : Reverse-coded items in italics.
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Shir, N., Wiklund, J. & Manchiraju, S. Satisfaction with Life as an Entrepreneur: From Early Volition to Eudaimonia. J Bus Ethics (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-024-05832-7
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Received : 16 January 2024
Accepted : 04 October 2024
Published : 15 October 2024
DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-024-05832-7
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Definition of Culture By Different Authors. According to E. B. Tylor (1871), "Culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, moral, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." Ralph Linton (1940) defines, "The sum total of knowledge, attitudes and habitual behavior patterns shared and transmitted by the members of a ...
2 The Culture Concept. 2. Compare and contrast the ideas of ethnocentrism and cultural relativism. Describe the role that early anthropologists Sir James Frazer and Sir E. B. Tylor played in defining the concept of culture in anthropology. Identify the differences between armchair anthropology and participant-observer fieldwork and explain how ...
Symbolic—culture creates meaning; it is the story we tell ourselves about ourselves. Patterned—practices make sense; culture is an integrated system—changes in one area, cause changes in others. Adaptive—culture is the way humans adapt to the world; current adaptations may be maladaptive in the long term.
Tylor's definition of culture was influenced by the popular theories and philosophies of his time, including the work of Charles Darwin. Darwin formulated the theory of evolution by natural selection in his 1859 book On the Origin of Species. Scholars of the time period, including Tylor, believed that cultures were subject to evolution just ...
decades. In 1920, Robert H. Lowie began Primitive Society by quoting "Tylor's famous definition." In recent years, however, conceptions and definitions of culture have multiplied and varied to a great degree. One of the most highly favored of these is that culture is an abstraction. This is the conclusion reached
Public Domain. Sir Edward B. Tylor's definition of culture (1871) "Culture… is that complex whole which includes. knowledge, beliefs, arts, morals, law, customs, and any. other capabilities and habits acquired by [a human] as. a member of society.". What does this definition include or imply about the concept of.
Ask the Chatbot a Question Ask the Chatbot a Question Sir Edward Burnett Tylor (born Oct. 2, 1832, London—died Jan. 2, 1917, Wellington, Somerset, Eng.) was an English anthropologist regarded as the founder of cultural anthropology.His most important work, Primitive Culture (1871), influenced in part by Darwin's theory of biological evolution, developed the theory of an evolutionary ...
Edward B. Tylor's Primitive Culture articulates one of two major theories of culture to emerge around 1870. His theory defines culture in descriptive terms as the "complex whole" that makes up social ideas and institutions, and in this it helped to establish anthropology as a recognized science. Tylor's ideas were closely related to ...
7. Culture is a human product: culture is not a force, operating by itself and independent of the human actors. There is an unconscious tendency of defy culture-to endow it with life and treat it as a thing. Culture is a creation of society in interaction and depends for its existence upon the continuance of the society.
This post offers an analysis of Edward Burnett Tylor's theory of religion, notably his concept of animism, and some of the value and criticisms of his work Primitive Culture (1871). A Brief Background Tylor (1832-1917) was a British anthropologist widely credited for being the father of cultural anthropology. He held academic positions at the prestigious…
culture, behaviour peculiar to Homo sapiens, together with material objects used as an integral part of this behaviour. Thus, culture includes language, ideas, beliefs, customs, codes, institutions, tools, techniques, works of art, rituals, and ceremonies, among other elements. The existence and use of culture depends upon an ability possessed ...
According to the 2004 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography entry for Tylor he was described as the 'father of anthropology', and nineteenth century anthropology was known as 'Mr Tylor's science'. Stocking in 1963 suggested that the word 'culture' with its 'modern technical or anthropological meaning was established in English ...
Culture (1872), Tylor designs a comprehensive concept of culture-civilization as a "complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." 2. Tylor's holistic definition of civilization-culture has created an amount of confusion that
Tylor, Edward Bunnet 1871 Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosphy, Religion, Language, Art and Custom. 2 vols. London: J. Murray. Tylor's book is a watershed in the conceptual development of Anthropology, but this definition of culture should be appreciated for its historical value, rather than accepted today.
In Tylor's Primitive Culture, Tylor described culture as a complex whole that includes the likes of morals, customs, beliefs, knowledge, habits, and other capabilities that is available to an individual part of a society. From Tylor's definition of 'culture', it is evident that culture holds mental capabilities such as thoughts ...
It can be seen as a pattern of behaviour, a way of perceiving and acting, a set of values and beliefs, or a system of meaning that is shared and transmitted by a group of people. Culture in uences ...
Tylor defined culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.". His definition of culture is still used frequently today and remains the foundation to the culture concept in anthropology.
Sir Edward B. Tylor's definition of culture (1871) "Culture... is that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, arts, morals, law, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by [a human] as a member of society.". What does this definition include or imply about the concept of culture? Culture includes mental ...
If you ask any of those people what the definition of culture is-you will probably get a million different answers. A British anthropologist, Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917) is often credited with giving the first definition of culture in anthropology. Tylor said that culture "is that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, art ...
This study explores how being satisfied with one's life as an entrepreneur is a crucial ethical and psychological outcome of early volition and, subsequently, a vital resource in the development of a richer eudaimonic experience from entrepreneurship. We develop and test our predictions based on two independent datasets: American and Swedish business owners and early stage entrepreneurs. We ...