this is a series of essays supporting the constitution

Federalist Papers

• Federalist 1-10
• Federalist 11-36
• Federalist 37-61
• Federalist 62-85
• America's Four Republics
• Article The First
• Feds Finally Agree
• Historic.us

Monday, December 17, 2012

Alexander hamilton - john jay - james madison.

The Federalist Papers comprise a series of 85 influential essays penned by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, designed to advocate for the ratification of the United States Constitution. Written under the shared pseudonym "Publius," these essays were initially published serially in New York newspapers between October 1787 and August 1788. The first 77 essays appeared in The Independent Journal and The New York Packet , reaching an audience immersed in the intense debates surrounding the new Constitution’s adoption.

In 1788, publishers John and Andrew M’Lean compiled these works into a two-volume collection titled The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favor of the New Constitution, as Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787 . Printed in New York, this edition was the first to present all 85 essays collectively, solidifying the authors’ arguments and ensuring wider distribution and lasting impact.

The primary objective of The Federalist Papers was to persuade the people of New York to ratify the newly proposed Constitution. Each essay delves into specific facets of the Constitution, defending its structure and addressing concerns of the Anti-Federalists, who feared a too-powerful central government. Among the key topics discussed were:

• The Structure and Powers of the Federal Government : Advocating for a strong yet balanced federal structure, the essays outlined the Constitution’s provisions for a unified national government capable of addressing the collective needs of the states.
• The System of Checks and Balances : The authors argued that dividing government powers among separate branches would prevent any one branch from dominating, thus ensuring liberty and preventing tyranny.
• The Division of Power Between Federal and State Governments : Known as federalism, this distribution of power was presented as a means to balance national authority with states' rights, preserving local autonomy while maintaining national cohesion.
• The Protection of Individual Rights : Although the Constitution as originally proposed did not include a Bill of Rights, the essays suggested that the framework contained implicit protections for individual freedoms, which would later be solidified with the Bill of Rights.

The essays’ authorship was intentionally kept anonymous under the pseudonym "Publius" to focus attention on the arguments rather than the writers' identities. Today, however, the authorship is well-established:

• Alexander Hamilton wrote 51 essays, covering topics such as taxation, military defense, and the judiciary.
• James Madison contributed 29 essays, focusing on the theory of federalism, the need for a strong union, and the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation.
• John Jay authored 5 essays, primarily addressing foreign affairs and the importance of a unified national government in international relations.

The Federalist Papers remain a cornerstone of American political philosophy and constitutional interpretation. They are frequently cited in legal and academic discourse, serving as a primary source for understanding the framers’ intentions and the foundational principles of American governance. These essays continue to be studied widely, providing insight into the original intent behind the Constitution and shaping discussions on its contemporary applications.

Students and Teachers of US History this is a video of  Stanley  and Christopher Klos presenting America's Four United Republics Curriculum at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School. The December 2015 video was an impromptu capture by a member of the audience of Penn students, professors and guests that numbered about 200. -  Click Here  for more information

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The first amendment, historic document, federalist 1 (1787).

Alexander Hamilton | 1787

On October 27, 1787, Alexander Hamilton published the opening essay of The Federalist Papers — Federalist 1 . The Federalist Papers were a series of 85 essays printed in newspapers to persuade the American people (and especially Hamilton’s fellow New Yorkers) to support ratification of the new Constitution. These essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay—with all three authors writing under the pen name “Publius.” On September 17, 1787, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention had signed the new U.S. Constitution. This new Constitution was the Framers’ proposal for a new national government. But it was only that—a proposal. The Framers left the question of ratification—whether to say “yes” or “no” to the new Constitution—to the American people. In the Framers’ view, only the American people themselves had the authority to tear up the previous framework of government—the Articles of Confederation—and establish a new one. The ratification process itself embodied one of the Constitution’s core principles: popular sovereignty, or the idea that all political power is derived from the consent of “We the People.” In Federalist 1, Hamilton captured this vision well, framing the stakes of the battle over ratification. In this opening essay, Hamilton called on the American people to “deliberate on a new Constitution” and prove to the world that they were capable of choosing a government based on “reflection and choice,” not “accident and force.”

Selected by

The National Constitution Center

AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind. This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth. 

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government. 

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable—the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at all times, characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution. 

And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants. . . . 

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole. This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.  

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