introduction essay about golden rule

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

The golden rule.

The most familiar version of the Golden Rule says, “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”  Moral philosophy has barely taken notice of the golden rule in its own terms despite the rule’s prominence in commonsense ethics. This article approaches the rule, therefore, through the rubric of building its philosophy, or clearing a path for such construction. The approach reworks common belief rather than elaborating an abstracted conception of the rule’s logic. Working “bottom-up” in this way builds on social experience with the rule and allows us to clear up its long-standing misinterpretations. With those misconceptions go many of the rule’s criticisms.

The article notes the rule’s highly circumscribed social scope in the cultures of its origin and its role in framing psychological outlooks toward others, not directing behavior. This emphasis eases the rule’s “burdens of obligation,” which are already more manageable than expected in the rule’s primary role, socializing children. The rule is distinguished from highly supererogatory rationales commonly confused with it—loving thy neighbor as thyself, turning the other cheek, and aiding the poor, homeless and afflicted. Like agape or unconditional love, these precepts demand much more altruism of us, and are much more liable to utopianism. The golden rule urges more feasible other-directedness and egalitarianism in our outlook.

A raft of additional rationales is offered to challenge the rule’s reputation as overly idealistic and infeasible in daily life. While highlighting the golden rule’s psychological functions, doubt is cast on the rule’s need for empathy and cognitive role-taking. The rule can be followed through adherence to social reciprocity conventions and their approved norms. These may provide a better guide to its practice than the personal exercise of its empathic perspective. This seems true even in novel situations for which these cultural norms can be extrapolated. Here the golden rule also can function as a procedural standard for judging the moral legitimacy of certain conventions.

Philosophy’s two prominent analyses of the golden rule are credited, along with the prospects for assimilating such a rule of thumb, to a universal principle in general theory. The failures of this generalizing approach are detailed, however, in preserving the rule’s distinct contours. The pivotal role of conceptual reductionism is discussed in mainstream ethical theory, noting that other forms of theorizing are possible and are more fit to rules of thumb. Circumscribed, interpersonal rationales like the golden rule need not be viewed philosophically as simply yet-to-be generalized societal principles. Instead, the golden rule and its related rationales-of-scale may need more piecemeal analyses, perhaps know-how models of theory, integrating algorithms and problem-solving procedures that preserve the specialized roles and scope. Neither mainstream explanatory theory, hybrid theory, nor applied ethics currently focuses on such modeling. Consequently, the faults in golden-rule thinking, as represented in general principles, may say less about inherent flaws in the rule’s logic than about shortfalls in theory building.

Finally, a radically different perspective is posed, depicting the golden rule as a description, not prescription, that portrays the symptoms of certain epiphanies and personal transformations observed in spiritual experience.

Table of Contents

• Common Observations and Tradition
• What Achilles Heel?
• Sibling Rules and Associated Principles
• Golden Role-Taking and Empathy
• The Rule of Love: Agape and Unconditionality
• Philosophical Slight
• Sticking Points
• Ethical Reductionism
• Ill-Fitting Theory (Over-Generalizing Rules of Thumb)
• Know-How Theory (And Medium-Sized Rationales)
• Regressive Default (Is Ancient Wisdom Out-Dated?)
• When is a Rule Not a Rule, but a Description?
• References and Further Reading

1. Common Observations and Tradition

“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”  This seems the most familiar version of the golden rule, highlighting its helpful and proactive gold standard. Its corollary, the so-called “silver rule,” focuses on restraint and non-harm: “do nothing to others you would not have done to you.” There is a certain legalism in the way the “do not” corollary follows its proactive “do unto” partner, in both Western and Eastern scriptural traditions. The rule’s benevolent spirit seems protected here from being used to mask unsavory intents and projects that could be hidden beneath. (It is sobering to encounter the same positive-negative distinction, so recently introduced to handle modern moral dilemmas like abortion, thriving in 500 B.C.E.)

The golden rule is closely associated with Christian ethics though its origins go further back and graces Asian culture as well. Normally we interpret the golden rule as telling us how to act. But in practice its greater role may be psychological, alerting us to everyday self-absorption, and the failure to consider our impacts on others. The rule reminds us also that we are peers to others who deserve comparable consideration. It suggests a general orientation toward others, an outlook for seeing our relations with them. At the least, we should not impact others negatively, treating their interests as secondary.

This is a strongly egalitarian message. When first conveyed, in the inegalitarian social settings of ancient Hebrews, it could have been a very radical message. But it likely was not, since it appears in scripture as an obscure bit of advice among scores of rules with greater point and stricture, given far more emphasis. Most likely the rule also assumed existing peer-conventions for interacting with clan-members, neighbors, co-workers, friends and siblings. In context, the rule affirmed a sentiment like “We’re all Jews here,” or “all of sect Y.” Only when this rule was made a centerpiece of social interaction (by Jesus or Yeshua, and fellow John-the-Baptist disciples) did it become a more radical message, crossing class, clan and tribal boundaries within Judaism. Of special note is the rule’s application to outcasts and those below one’s station—the poor, lepers, Samaritans, and certain heathens (goyem). Yeshua apparently made the rule second in importance only to the First Commandment of “the Father” (Hashem). This was to love God committedly, then love thy neighbor as thyself, which raised the rule’s status greatly. It brought social inclusivity to center stage, thus shifting the focus of Jewish ethics generally. Yet the “love thy neighbor” maxim far exceeds the golden rule in its moral expectations. It stresses loving identification with others while the golden rule merely advises equal treatment.

Only when the golden rule was applied across various cultures did it become a truly revolutionary message. Its “good news,” spread by evangelists like Paul (Saul of Tarsus), fermented a consciousness-shift among early Christians, causing them actually to “love all of God’s children” equally, extending to the sharing of all goods and the acceptance of women as equals. Perhaps this was because such love and sharing radically departed from Jewish tradition and was soon replaced with standard patriarchy and private property. The rule’s socialism might have fermented social upheaval in occupied Roman territories had it actually been practiced on a significant scale, which may help explain its persecution in that empire. Most likely the golden rule was not meant for such universalism, however, and cannot feasibly function on broad scales.

The Confucian version of the golden rule faced a more rigid Chinese clan system, outdoing the Hebrews in social-class distinctions and the sense that many lives are worthless. More, Confucius himself made the golden rule an unrivaled centerpiece of his philosophy of life ( The Analects , 1962). The rule, Kung-shu, came full-blown from the very lips and writings of the “morality giver” and in seemingly universal form. It played a role comparable to God’s will, in religious views, to which the concept of “heaven” or “fate” was a distant second. And Confucius explicitly depicted the “shu” component as human-heartedness, akin to compassion. Confucian followers succeeding Mencius into the neo-Confucians, however, emphasized the Kung component or ritual righteousness. They increasingly interpreted the rule within the existing network of Chinese social conventions. It was a source of cultural status quoism—to each social station, its proper portion. Eventually, what came to be called the Rule of the Measuring Square was associated with up to a thousand ritual directives for daily life encompassing etiquette, propriety and politeness within the array of traditional relationships and their strict role-obligations.  The social status quo in Confucian China was anything but compassionate, especially in the broader community and political arenas of life.

In traditional culture, the “others” in “do unto others” was interpreted as “relevant others,” which made the rule much easier to follow, if far less egalitarian or inspiring. One’s true peers were identified only within one’s class, gender, or occupation, as well as one’s extended family members. Generalizing peer relations more broadly was unthinkable, apparently, and was therefore not read into the rule’s intent. Confucius spoke of hopelessly searching in vain, his whole life for one person who could practice Kung-shu for one single day. But clearly he meant one “man,” not person, and one “gentleman” of the highest class. This classism was a source of conflict between Confucianism and Taoism , where the lowest of the low were often depicted as spiritual exemplars.

For the golden rule to have become so pervasive across historical epochs and cultures suggests a growing suspicion of class and ethnic distinctions—challenging ethnocentrism. This trend dovetails nicely with the rule’s challenge to egocentrism at the personal level.  The rule’s strong and explicit egalitarianism has the same limited capture today as it did originally, confined to distinctly religious and closed communities of very limited scope. It is unclear that devout, modern-day Jews or Christians vaunt strong equality of treatment even as an ideal to strive toward. We may speak of social outcasts in our society as comrades, and recognize members of “strange” cultures and unfriendly nations as “fellow children of God.” But we rarely place them on a par with those closer by or close to us, nor treat them especially well. Neither is it clear, to some, that doing so would be best. Instead, the rule’s original small scope and design is preserved, limited to primary groups at most.

Biblical scholars tend to see Yeshua’s message as meant for Jews per se, extending to the treatment of non-Jews yes, but as Jews should treat them. And this does not include treating them as Jews. The golden rule has a very different meaning when it is a circumscribed, in-group prescription. In this form, its application is guided by hosts of assumptions, expectations, traditions, and religious obligations, recognized like-mindedly by “the tribe.” This helps solve the ambiguity problem of how to apply the rule within different roles: parents dealing with children, supervisors with rank-and-file employees, and the like.

2. What Achilles Heel?

When considering a prominent view late in its history, its paths of development also merit analysis. How were its uses broadened or updated over time, to fit modern contexts? Arguably the Paulist extension of the rule to heathens was such a development, as was the rule’s secularization. The rule’s philosophical recasting as a universal principle qualifies most within moral theory. Just as important are ways the rule has been misconstrued and misappropriated, veering from its design function.

We must acknowledge that the golden rule is no longer taken seriously in practice or even aspiration, but merely paid lip service. The same feature that makes the golden rule gleam—its idealism—has dimmed its prospects for influence. The rule is simply too idealistic; that is its established reputation. Note that over-idealism has not discredited Kantian or Utilitarian principles, by contrast, because general theory poses conceptual objects, idealized by nature. They focus on explanation in principle, not application in the concrete. But the golden rule is to be followed, and following the golden rule requires a saintly, unselfish disposition to operate, with a utopian world to operate in. This is common belief. Cloistered monasteries and spiritual communes (Bruderhofs, Koinonia) are its hold-out domains. But even as an ideal in everyday life, the rule is confined to preaching, teaching, and window dressing.  Why then make it the object of serious analysis? The following considerations challenge the rule’s blanket dismissal in practice.

First, the silver component of the golden rule merely bids that we do no harm by mistreating others—treating them the way we would not wish to be treated. There is a general moral consensus in any society on what constitutes harms and mistreatments, wrongs and injustices. So to obey this component of the golden rule is something we typically expect of each other, even without explicitly consulting a hallowed precept. Adhering specifically to the golden rule’s guidelines, then, raises no special difficulty. Its silver role is mostly educative in this context, helping us understand why we expect certain behavior from each other. “See how it feels” when folk violate expectations?

The gold in the rule asks more from us, treating people in fair, beneficial, even helpful ways. As some have it, we are to be loving toward others, even when others do not reciprocate, or in fact mistreat us.  This would be asking much. But despite appearance, the golden rule does not ask it of us. Nothing about love or generosity is mentioned in the rule, nor implied, much less letting oneself be taken advantage of.  Loving thy neighbor as oneself, or turning the other cheek, are distinct precepts—distinct from the golden rule and from each other. These rules are not stated or identified with the golden rationale in biblical or Confucian scripture. Nor are they illustrated together, say in the parables.

We may wish we loved everyone and that everyone loved us, but a wish is not a prescription or command—“Do unto.” And we cannot feasibly love on demand, either in our hearts or actions. (Can we learn to love others as ourselves over a lifetime?) But we can certainly consider how we need or prefer to be treated. And we can treat others that way on almost all occasions, on the spot, without needing to undergo a prior regimen of prayer, meditation, or working with the poor.

As noted, the golden rule may deal more with being other-directed and sensitive rather than proactive. Leading with the word “Do” does not necessarily signal the rule’s demand for action anymore than parents saying to teenagers, “Be good,” when they go on a date. Whether they are (should be ) a certain way isn’t the point. There is no need for them to engage their character and its traits, for example. The focus here is on what they do, actually, and should not do. Likewise with “Do your part” or “Don’t get in the way”: these are general directives of how to orient ourselves on certain occasions. They prime us to take certain sorts of postures, showing a readiness to cooperate or to ask others if we are being a pest, though we may not succeed even if we try. They prime us to apologize if in fact we do get in the way, but maybe not more than that.

No altruism (self-sacrifice) is needed for golden-ruling in this psychological form for adopting a certain “other-orientation” in “the spirit of” greater awareness toward others. Usually one bears no cost to engage empathetic feelings, if that is what is needed. One wonders whether an implicit sense of this merely attitudinal “spirit” of the golden rule helps account for why we do not practice it—no hypocrisy required. If so, it would allow an uplifting turnaround in our moral self-understanding and self-criticism.

Conjuring up certain outlooks or orientations is an especially feasible task when provided a golden recipe for how—by role-taking, for example, or empathy or adherence to reciprocity norms. Once our heart goes out to others, following its spontaneous pull hardly requires going the extra foot, much less a mile in effort for anyone. We simply do what we feel, as much as the pull tugs us to. The truth is that we interact largely in words, and kindly words are free. We’re often not occupied when called upon to respond to others, so that responding lushly is easy—there is no hefty competition for our time or interest. Consider the sort of “do-unto” that can make a person’s week: “I wanted to mention how much I appreciate your support during this transition time for me. It’s noticeable, and it means a lot.”

It pays moral philosophy to think the golden rule through in such actual everyday circumstances before imagining the rule’s costs in principle, or worst-case scenarios. Where school systems routinely include some degree of moral education in their curricula, the case for golden-rule feasibility in a society is even stronger. And, arguably, most children already get some such training in school and at home implicitly.

The same reduced-effort scenario holds when sizing up moral exemplarism, often associated with the golden-rule, and with living its sibling principles. Ministering to the poor and ill often involves the routine work of truckers or dock workers, loading canned food or medical supplies to be hauled away, or hauling it oneself. It may involve primitive nursing or cooking, and point of contact service work routinely taken on as jobs by non-exemplars. These are not seen as careers in saintly heroism. Pursuing such work as a mission, not an occupation, takes significant commitment and gumption. But many exemplars report gradually falling into their roles, without really noticing or thinking clearly (David Fattah of Umoja House) or of being dragged into “the life” by others (Andrie Sakharov and Martin Luther King, for example.) (See Colby and Damon 1984, Oliner and Oliner 1988, The Noetics Institute “Creative Altruist” Profiles).  More, everyday exemplars report doing their work out of an atypical outlook on society and their relation to it. This comes spontaneously to them, as ours comes to us. No additional, much less extraordinary effort is required. This seems the point of Mother Teresa’s refrain to those asking how she could possibly work with lepers and the dying, “Come see.”

If the golden rule is designed for small-group interaction, where face-to face relations dominate, a failure to reciprocate in kind will be noticed. It cannot be hidden as in anonymous, institutionally-mediated cooperation at a distance. Subtle pressures will be felt to conform with this group norm, and subtle sanctions will apply to those who take more than they give. Conforming to norms in this setting will be easier than usual, as well, since in-groups attract the like-minded. And in such contexts requiring extraordinarily helpful motivations and actions from others would be seen as unfair.

By assessing the golden rule outside of such contexts we miss its implicit components, the network of mutual understandings, and established community practices that make its adherence feasible and comprehensible. Such considerations are also crucial in determining the adequacy of the golden rule. The shortfalls that have been identified by the rule’s detractors seemingly arise when the rule is over-generalized and set to tasks beyond its design. If its function is primarily psychological, its conceptual or theoretical faults are not key. If its design is small-scale, fit to primary relations, its danger of allowing adherents to be stepped on is not key. The rule should not be used where those around you let them happen or can’t see it happen. And if the rule’s guidance is judged too vague to follow reliably, we should look to the myriad expectations and implicit assumptions that go with it to see if they supply needed precision and clarity.

The golden rule is not only a distinct rationale within a family of related rationales. It is a general marker, the one explicit component in networks of more implicit rationales and specific prescriptions. Teachings that abstract the rule from its implicit corollaries and situational expectations fail to capture what the rule even says. Theoretical models of the rule that further abstract the rule’s logic from its substance, content or process, likely mutilate it beyond recognition.

“How would you feel if?” puts the golden rule’s peer spirit in a mother’s teaching hands when urging her egocentric, but sensitive child to consider others. As a socializing device, the rule helps us identify our roles within mutually respectful and cooperating community.  How well it accomplishes this socializing task is another crucial mark of its adequacy, perhaps the most crucial. The prospect of first engaging this rule typically captures childhood imaginations, like acquiring many highly useful social skills. (Fowler 1981, Kohlberg 1968, 1982)

Putting these considerations together allows us to identify where the golden rule may be operating unnoticed as a matter of routine—in families, friendships, classrooms and neighborhoods, and in hosts of informal organizations aiming to perform services in the community. Isn’t it in fact typical in these interactions that we treat each other reciprocally, as each other would wish, want, choose, consent or prefer?

3. Sibling Rules and Associated Principles

The foregoing appeals for feasibility are not primarily defenses of the golden rule against criticism. They are clarifications of the rule that expose misconceptions, central to its long-standing reputation. We now question, also, the much admired roles of empathy and role-taking in the golden rule, which can ease adherence to it, but are not necessary. The rule is certainly not a guideline for empathizing or role-taking process, as most believe and welcome. However, empathy can help apply the rule and the rule can provide many “teaching moments” for promoting and practicing empathy, which is advantageous. But distinguishing empathy from the rule’s function also is fortunate for the empathetically challenged among us, and those not able to see the others’ sides. Their numbers seem legion. The golden rule can be adhered to in other ways.

The golden rule is much-reputed for being the most culturally universal ethical tenet in human history. This suggests a golden link to human nature and its inherent aspirations. It recommends the rule as a unique standard for international understanding and cooperation—noble aims, much-lauded by supporters. In support of the link, golden logic and paraphrasing has been cited in tribal and industrialized societies across the globe, from time immemorial to the present. This supposedly renders the rule immune to cultural imperialism when made standard for human rights, international law, and the spreading of western democracy and education—a prospect many welcome, while others fear it. Note that if the golden rule is truly distinct from the related principles such as loving thy neighbor as thyself and feeding the poor, these cherished claims for the rule are basically debunked.

Analysis of this endless stream of sightings shows no more than a family resemblance among distinct rationales (See golden rule website in references below.). Some rationales deal with putting oneself in another’s place, with others viewing everyone as part of one human family, or divine family. Still others promote charity, forgiveness and love for all. Culturally, the golden rule rationale is mostly confined to certain strands of the Judeo-Christian and Chinese traditions, which are broad and lasting, at least until recently, but hardly universal (See Wattles 1966).

The golden-rule’s distinctness, here, is seen relative to its origins. The original statement of the golden rule, in the Hebrew Torah, shows a rule, not an ethical principle, much less the sort of universal principle philosophers make of it. It is one of the simpler and most briefly stated dos and don’ts among long lists of particular rules in Leviticus (XIX: 10-18). These directives concern kosher eating, animal sacrifice procedures, threads that can’t be used together in weaved clothing, and even the cleansing of “impurity” (such as menstruation) by bringing pigeons and doves to a rabbi for ceremonial disposition. If one blinks, or one’s mind wanders, one would miss it, its golden gleam notwithstanding. And even a devout Jew is likely to lose concentration when perusing these outdated, dubious and less than riveting observations.

No fair reading of Levitticus XIX: 18 would term its statement the golden rule, not in our modern sense, first stated in Matthew 7:12. For in Levitticus the commandment is merely not to judge an offender by his offense, and thereby hold a grudge against a fellow Jew for committing it. But love him as yourself. The latter, a crucially different principle, is meant here differently than we now interpret it as well. It perhaps can be rendered as `Remember that you offend fellow Jews also and so you are like the offender on other occasions.’

Seen amid such concrete and mutually understood practices of a small tribe, the golden rule poses no role-taking test. Any community member can comply simply by knowing which reciprocity practices are approved or frowned on. Recollecting what it was like to be on the receiving end of others’ slights or benefits also can help. But that would mean taking one’s own perspective, not another’s, in the past. Doing so is not essential to “golden-ruling” however, nor likely reliable. If a kind of imaginative role-playing is contemplated, one need only conjure up images of community elders frowning or fawning over a variety of choice options and everyday practices.

Neither in eastern nor western traditions did the golden rule shine alone. Thus viewing and analyzing it in isolation misses the point. The golden rule’s relation to sibling principles, associated altered its meaning and purpose in different settings. The most prominent standard bearer for this family of rules seems to have been, “loving thy neighbor as thyself.” This “royal law” is a very different sort of prescription from the golden rule, foreseeing a variety of extraordinarily benevolent practices born of extraordinary identification with others. In Judaism, benevolence usually meant helping family members and neighbors primarily, focusing on one’s kind—one’s particular sect. Generosity meant hospitality to the stranger or alien as well, remembering that the Jews were once strangers in a strange land. Alms were given to the poor; crops were not gleaned from the edges of one’s farm-field so that the poor might find sustenance in the remains. Farmland was to lay fallow each seventh year (like the Sabbath when God rested) so that, in part, the poor then could find rest there, and room to grow (Deuteronomy XV: 7, Leviticus XXIII: 22, XXV: 25, 35).

Turning the other cheek (Luke 6:29), loving even one’s enemy (Matthew 5:44) and not turning away when anyone asks of you (5:42)—these go well beyond normal charity or benevolence, even more than identifying with our neighbor. What neighbor would strike or steal from you (taking our cloak so that you must give him your coat also (Matthew 5:40)? Such practices are not at all required or asked of the Confucian “gentleman” whose Kung-shu practice is more about respect for elders and ancestors, and fulfilling hosts of family and community responsibilities.

With regard to Yeshua’s teachings on feeding the hungry, sheltering the homeless, or praying for those who shamefully use and abuse you, he summarily urged that followers “be perfect, even as your Father in Heaven is Perfect” (5:48). This far exceeds what the golden rule asks—simply that we consider others as comparable to us and consider our comparable impacts on them. These do not represent fair or equal reciprocity in fact. Ask how you would wish to be treated if you were a shameful abuser or even homeless person. There is sufficient testimony revealing that many abusers and homeless do not at all want to be shown charity, for example, but condemnation or punishment, in the first case, and being left alone to fend in a “street community” in the second. They feel this is what they deserve. (To abuse-counselors and homeless shelter workers, this goes without saying.) What the abusive and homeless should want, or calculate as their desert, may be something different. But golden-rule role-taking will not tell.

There is one area where the golden rule extends too far, directly into the path of a turning of the other cheek. When we are seriously taken advantage of or mistreated, the rule bids that we treat them well nonetheless. We are to react to unfair treatment as if it were fair treatment, ignoring the moral difference. Critics jump on this problem, as they should, because the golden rule seems designed to highlight such cases. Here is where the rule most contrasts with our typical, pre-moral reaction, while also rising above (Old Testament) justice. In the process, it promotes systematic and egregious self-victimization in the name of self-sacrifice. Yet, is self-sacrifice in the name of unfairness to be admired? Benevolence that suborns injustice, rather than adding ideals to it, seems morally questionable. Moreover, under the golden rule, both victimization and self-victimization seems endless, promoting further abuse in those who have a propensity for it. No matter how much someone takes advantage of us, we are to keep treating them well.   Here the golden rule seems simply unresponsive. Its call to virtuous self-expression is fine, as is its reaction to the equal personhood of the offender. But it neither addresses the wrong being committed, nor that part of the perpetrator to be faulted and held accountable. Interpersonally, the rule calls for a bizarre response, an almost obtuse or incomprehensible one. While a “forgiving” response may be preferable to retribution, why should just desert be completely ignored? It can certainly be integrated into the high-road alternative. In this type of case, the golden rule sides with its infeasible siblings. It bids us to play the exemplar of “new covenant” morality—the morality of love for all people as people, or as children of God. And this asks too much.

These criticisms have merit, but can be mitigated. When dealing with cases of unfairness and abuse, critics assume the golden rule requires us to “take the pain” uncomplainingly. There is no such proviso in the rule. As the Gandhi-King method has shown, it is perfectly legitimate to fault the action—even condemn the action—while not condemning the person, or taking revenge. The practice of abusing or taking advantage of someone does not define its author as a person after all, even when it is habitual. The wrongs anyone commits do not eradicate his good deeds, nor our potential for reform. And the golden rule has us recognize that. But the spirit of silent self-sacrifice is found more in the sibling principles than the golden rule, and should be kept there. In the current case we can readily respond to our oppressor by calling a spade a spade—“You took advantage of me, I noticed.” That would be a first response. “You keep taking advantage of me: that was abusive. I don’t like it; it’s not OK with me.” The abuser responds, “It seems like you like it. Why else would you take it and respond as if it’s OK?” We reply, “Why should I let your abuse drag me down to your level, compounding your offence?”

There are nice and not so nice ways to make this point. If Yeshua is our guide, not so nice approaches are acceptable. To treatment from those known as most righteous in Jerusalem, for example, he responded, “Woe to you Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites all..you are like whited sepulchers, all clean and fair without, and inside filled with dead man’s bones and all corruption…yours is a house of desolation, the home of the lizard and the spider…Serpents, brood of vipers, how can any of you escape damnation?” (Matthew 23:13-50 as insightfully condensed by Zefferelli.) If this be love, then it is certainly hard love, especially when we note that Yeshua faults the person here, not just the act.

We must also see these cases in social context to see how far the golden rule bids us go. If we are sensible, and have friends, it is unlikely we will place ourselves in the vicinity of serious abusers, or remain there. The social convention of avoiding those who hurt us also must figure into the rule’s understanding. The defense our friends will put up for us against abuse must figure into the rule’s feasibility as well.

Most morally important, these abuse cases do not illustrate the golden rule’s standard application—quite the contrary. Fair-dealing with unfairness and abuse, in particular, call  for special principles of rectification, including punishment, recompense or reform. When used in this context, without alteration, the golden rule poses an alternative to the typical ways these practices are performed. But it remains this sort of special principle. Among its aims, the rule certainly seems bent on goals like rectification, recompense and reform, but indirectly.  Arguably the rule has us exemplify the right path—the path the perpetrator might have taken, but did not, thus demonstrating its allure, its superiority. This includes, for observers in the community, the superiority of fairness over retribution (“’Vengeance is mine,’ sayeth the Lord.”)  Teaching this lesson is aimed at raising moral consciousness, especially in the perpetrator. As such, it resembles the practice of “bearing unmerited suffering” in the Gandhi-King approach, aimed at piquing moral conscience in those oppressing us (King 1986).

Ideally, a perpetrator will think better of his practice, apologizing for past wrongs and making up for them. At least it might move him to abandon this sort of practice. And if moral processes are not awakened, then at least placing the offender in a morally disadvantageous position within the group will bring pressures to bear on his behavior. Exemplifying fairness in this way also shows demonstrates putting the person first, holding his status paramount relative to his actions, and our sense of offense.

Exemplifying a moral high road, so as to edify others does not show passivity or weakness. It is normally communicated in a strong, positive pose. Standing above a vengeful or masochist temptation uplifts the supposed victim, not making him further trodden down.  Indeed, its courageous spirit is key in working its effect, an effect achieved by Gandhi, King and legions of followers under the most morally hostile conditions. Aside from giving abusers pause, high-minded responses bring loud  outcries of protest in one’s cause from outside observers, making reform prudent, and practically necessary.

Again, these realities of the rule can only be seen in context, looking into the subtleties of interpersonal relating, communicated emotion, performance before a social audience and the like. The mere logic or golden principle of the thing is silent on them. The same holds for the less feasible sibling rules of the golden rule family, from giving to the poor to turning the other cheek. Trying them out makes a world of difference in understanding what they say. Consider an experiment with trying to “say yes to all who ask,” and substituting “yes” generally, where we routinely say “no” or “maybe.” Doing so may add much less than expected to our load because, first, it makes us more interested in being kinder, which is a rewarding experience, as it turns out. Second, we find that people do not generally ask much, especially when they see you at risk of being taken advantage of for your exceptional good will. Finding simple ways to make the most needy more self-reliant—such as simply encouraging them to be so—also may lighten the helping load. The good it does may be exceptional.

But what of the lingering “doormat problem” for those who are especially dependent and masochistic, all but inviting victimization from abusers? No full mitigation may be possible here. The golden rule, if not exacerbating the problem in practice, at least serves to legitimatize it. Its rationale has been exploited by many, including some Christian churches and clergy who suborn victimization as a lifestyle, especially for wives and mothers. A rule cannot be responsible for those who misuse it, or fail to grasp its purposes. But those sustaining the rule bear a responsibility to clarify its intent. It certainly would be better if the rule itself made its intentions clear or included illustrations of proper use. Currently, it relies on the chance intervention of moral teachers or service organizations—those opposed to, say, domestic violence.  Even Yeshua’s disciples complained that the parables, supposedly illustrating tenets like the golden rule, were perplexing. Confucian writing was definitely not geared to rank and file Chinese, much less children learning their moral lessons. This is an intolerable shortfall for an egalitarian socialization tool.

Consider a second corollary (the “copper” rule?) that might address such difficulties. “When misused by those do unto fairly, do not quietly bear the offense, instead defending and deflecting if with as much understanding as can be summoned.”  Notice that defending does not conflict with praying for those who shamelessly abuse us. (The “summoning understanding” proviso is meant to forestall reversion to a more pragmatic alternative such as “by any means necessary.”)

4. Golden Role-Taking and Empathy

“Putting oneself in the other guy’s place” is yet another distinct principle, as is “walking a mile in the other guy’s moccasins” (the Navaho version). The first involves taking a perspective, the second, gaining similar life experience in an ongoing way. Notice that “loving thy neighbor as thyself” requires neither of these operations presuming that we know how to love ourselves and need only extend that to someone. But of course we may not know how to love ourselves, or how to do so in the right way. The same can be said with identifying, role-taking or learning from another’s type of experience. Given that we may not be loving enough to ourselves, loving our neighbor is best accomplished by referring to prevailing standards. Our own proclivities or values are certainly not the final word. Just as with acting as we’d have others act toward us, loving thy neighbor concerns how we’re supposed to love others, as we should love ourselves. We must consult the community, its ethical conventions or scriptures (including Kantian or Utilitarian scriptures). The last word comes through a critical comparison of these conventions, in experience, with our proclivities and values.

Neither we nor our neighbors likely think it is legitimate, or even kind, to give a thief additional portions of our property. Doing so might well be masochistic, or even egotistical, thinking about our own character development most, thereby exacerbating crime and endangering the community. If we were the thief, we might very well not think that we should be given more of a victim’s property than we stole. Instead, perhaps, we might wish to steal it. Role-taking cannot guide us here.  In fact, it could easily lead us astray in various misguided directions. Some would consider it ideal to be unconcerned with property because it puts spiritual concerns over materialism, or it puts charity before just desert. Others could make a case for better balancing the competing principles involved. What good does role-taking do here? And how can it work in a non-relativistic way, where everyone taking the other’s role would come to a similar realization of what to do correctly? The golden rule is not meant to raise such questions.

Philosophers deal with these problems by standardizing the way roles are taken, the thinking that goes on in the roles, and so forth. This is what the Kantian veil of ignorance or Rawlsian (1972) original position or Habermasian (1990) ideal speech rubric is for. But surely the commonsense role-taking precepts we are talking about here do not even dream of such measures.

Prescriptions for role-taking are likely prominent in many cultures both for the increased psychological perspective they breed and the door they open to better interpersonal interaction. The interpersonal skill involved is perhaps the best explanation of their widespread use and praise, not their power of edification. It is true that if we truly wished to treat others as ourselves, or the way we would want to be treated—if we were them, not ourselves merely placed in their position— role-taking would help. But it is not unusual for primarily psychological or interpersonal tools to aid ethics without being part of ethics itself.

The golden rule’s (emotional) empathy component is as unclear as its role-taking component. To empathize is not really to take another’s perspective. If we truly took that perspective, we would not have to empathize. Being in that perspective would moot an attempt to “feel with” it from another (Noddings 1984, Hoffman 1987). Even if we took the perspective without the associated emotion, our task would then be to conjure up the emotion in the perspective. It would not be to “feel with” anything. We’d be imaginatively in the other’s  head and heart, imaginatively feeling their feelings directly. More, in any relevant context, the golden rule urges to think before we act, then imagine how we would feel, not how the other would. Thus any empathy involved would involve imaginatively “feeling with” myself, at a future time, recipient of another’s similar action. The point here is to supplant the other’s perspective and imagined reaction with our own. This is not how one empathizes. Emotionally, the appropriate orientation toward causing someone possible harm is worry or foreboding. Toward the prospect of doing future good, it’s anticipation of shared joy, perhaps. “Feeling with” or empathizing with others would be prescribed as, “Do unto others in a way that brings them the likely joy you’d happily share.”

Consider more closely what we are supposed to achieve from role-taking and empathy via the golden rule. We get a sense of how others are different from us, and how their situation differs from ours, uniquely tailored to their perspective and feelings on the matter. We then put ourselves in their place with these differences in tact, added on to ours, and subtracting from ours where necessary. So we occupy their perspective as them, not us, just as we’d wish them to do toward us when acting. (We wouldn’t want them to treat us as they’d wish to be treated, but as we’d wish to be treated when they took our perspective.)

But this already is a consequence of applying the rule, not a way of applying it. If depicted as a rule’s rationale it would say, “Treat others the way they’d wish or choose.” Seemingly the best way to do that is to ask them how they’d like to be treated. If we can’t ask, then perhaps we are not so much doing unto them a way as guessing what they’d like. Putting oneself in their place here would not seem a good idea. Neither would empathy, as opposed to prediction. A good prediction would rest on some track record of what they’ve liked in the past, perhaps acquired from a friend of theirs or one’s own experience with them as a friend.

Without involving others, such role-taking is a unilateral affair, whether well-intended or otherwise. It is often paternalistic, choosing someone’s best interest. The whole process is typically done by oneself, within one’s self-perspective or ego, and it can be spun as one wishes, no checks involved. Fairer and more respectful alternatives would involve not only consulting others on their actual outlooks, but including them in our decision making. “Is it OK with you if….” This approach negotiation is based on a different sort of mutuality, democratizing our choices and actions so that they are multilateral.

5. The Rule of Love: Agape and Unconditionality

To some, the gold in the golden rule is love, the silver component, respect. The love connection is likely made in part by confusing the golden rule with its sibling, love thy neighbor as oneself. Traditionally, ethics could have made the connection semantically—it used the term “self-love” where we now say self-interest. This could render like interest in others as other-love. But this is not really in the spirit of unconditional love.

A more likely path to connecting agape with the golden rule is to consider how we’d ideally wish to be treated by others and most wish we could treat them in turn. Wouldn’t we prefer mutual love to mere respect or toleration? This formulation has appeal though it ignores an important reality. Though we might wish to be treated ideally, we might not wish, or feel able to reciprocate in kind. Keeping mutual expectations a bit less onerous—especially when they apply to strangers and possible enemies—may seem more palatable.

But this is to think in interested and conditional terms. Agapeistic love is disinterested or indifferent, if in a lushly loving way. Its bestowal is not based on anything in particular about the person, but only that they are a person. This sufficiently qualifies them as a beloved. And agape does not come out of us as an interest we have, whether toward people, the good, or anything similar.  It comes only out of love, expressing love, or the good luring us with its goodness. Our staking claim or aim toward the good as a personal goal is not involved. The same is true for self-regard. We love ourselves because we are lovable and valuable, like anyone else. The basic or essential self, the soul within us is lovable whether we happen to like and esteem ourselves or not. (Outka 1972).

The most obvious ethical implication of agape is that it is not socially discriminating. We do not love people because they are attractive, or hold compatible views, or work in a profession we respect.  Are they friend, stranger, or opponent? It doesn’t matter. Most surprising, we do not prefer those close to us or in a special relationship, including parent and child. (Children in agapeistic communities are often raised by the adults as a whole, and in separate quarters from parents, primarily inhabited by peers.)

For moral idealists, agape is most alluring. To love in a non-discriminating way has a certain unblemished perfection to it. Pursuing moral values simply for their value or goodness seems clearly more elevated than pursuing them out of personal preference. Loving someone because they happen to be related to us, or a friend, or could do us a favor is shown up as somewhat cheap and discriminatory by comparison. Seeing ourselves as special is revealed for the trap it is—being stuck with ourselves and our self-preference, a burden to aspiration. What is this condition but the ultimate hold of ego over, binding us to all our attachments? (In philosophy, intellectual ego is a chief obstacle between us and truth, causing us to believe ourselves because we are ourselves, despite knowing that there are thinkers just as wise or wiser, with just as well-seasoned beliefs. Why be led around by the nose of our particular beliefs and interests just because they blare most loudly in our heads?)

Agape is worth pondering as a fit purveyor of the golden rule. What could be more golden? The golden rule’s raison d’être is indeed focused on countering egocentrism and self-interest. But promoting other-directedness is its remedy, not unconditionality. And concern for others’ interests is key to establishing equality as the rule directs. A plausible rendering of the golden rule, making its implicit concern for interests more visible would go, `Treat others the way you would be interested in being treated, making adjustments for their differing interests.’ In these terms, unconditional loving is a bad fit. Are we really “interested” in being treated as anyone should be treated regardless of the interests we identify with, as someone with a soul but no interests worth catering to? Likely not. This same lack of interest haunts Kant’s notion of respecting personhood unconditionally. The golden-rule problem is not that we’re failing to notice others’ personhood, but what others desire or prefer. We could indeed be faulted for ignoring others as persons, treating them like potted plants in the room, but that would only result if they craved our notice, attention, or participation. Typically, it would be fine with others if we just went about our business while not getting into theirs.

To be told that we should not be interested, or to be dealt with by people who will not relate to us in interested terms, basically undermines the golden rule’s effectiveness. As with empathy, we cannot be uninterested on demand, or even after practicing to do so long and hard. And if we do not have our self-identified interests taken seriously, we feel that we are not taken seriously, whether we ideally should or not. Ethics is not only about ideals, nor in fact, primarily about ideals. If interest were not key to ours and theirs, the golden rule would be moot. With unconditional love, reciprocity is beside the point, along with its social reciprocity conventions. Taking any perspective is the same as taking any other. In fact, taking one’s own perspective in particular is discriminatory, even when expressing generosity to others.  So is taking the perspective of any particular other. Happening to be ourselves, or a particular other, and taking that as a basis for favoritism, seems a condition—a failure in unconditionality. I could have been anyone, any of them, as they could have been me. So why do I take who I am or who they are so seriously?. Unlike every other ethic, agape provides no basis for according ourselves special first-person discretion or privacy.  The self-other gap is transcended. It’s not even clear how the typical moral division of labor is justified in agapeistic terms. In principle, when we raise our spoon filled with breakfast cereal at the morning table, the matter of whose mouth it goes into is in question.

Some agapeists would not go this far, instead keeping our self-identification intact. But there is good reason to go farther. Gandhi and King have forwarded a view of loving non-violence that doesn’t even allow self-defense because it involves the preference of self over other. Gandhi characterizes personal integrity as “living life as an open book” since one’s life is not one’s own, but merely one example of everyone’s life. And of course there are the turn the other cheek precepts of Yeshua, which push in this direction.

In any event, ethics is not built for such concerns. It is a system designed to handle conflicts of interest, the direction of interests toward values and, perhaps, the upgrading and transformation of interests into aspirations.  Agape would function, within the golden rule, as something more like a song or affirmation for the self-transformations achieved. It is the very admirable diminution or lack of self-interest, in agapeistic love and in social discrimination that puts an agapeistic golden rule out of reach. Its double dose of moral purity and perfection puts it doubly out of reach. We arguably cannot be perfect as our Father in Heaven is perfect (or complete). We also cannot realistically strive toward it, and most likely should not. Religiously, to do so seems a sacrilege—pretending to the level of understanding, wisdom and “lovability” of infinite godhood. Secularly, its beautiful intentions have unwanted consequences.  Aside from the impersonality of childrearing, anyone who has borne the impersonal treatment or unearnable support from someone bent on “treating everyone the same” can testify to its alienating quality. We wish to be loved for us, for our self-identity and the values we identify with. When we are not loved this way, we do not feel loved at all—not loved for whom we are. Ethically, we expect to be unique, or at least special in others’ eyes when we’ve created a special history. We are entitled to it. We build rights around it. And we feel callously disregarded when a loving gaze shows no special glint of recognition as it surveys us among a group of others. This is less egoism than a sense of distinctness and uniqueness within the additional expectations of realized relationship.

Putting the matter more generally, human motivational systems come individually packaged. They are hard-wired to harboring and pursuing interest. And a valid ethics is designed to serve human nature, even as it strives to improve it. If we can transcend human nature, then we need a different system of values, or perhaps nothing like an ethical system. We have risen beyond good and evil, indifferent to harm of death.. We are born, and remain psychologically individualized throughout life, not possessed of a hive mind in which we directly share our choice-making and experiences. We are each unquestionably possessed of this natural, immutable division of moral labors, which gives us direct and reliable control only of our own self. Hence we are held responsible only for our own actions, expected to do for ourselves, provided special standing to plead our own case of mistreatment, and accorded great discretion in our own individual sphere, to do as we like. When agapeistic morality puts our very nature on the spot, bidding us to recast basic motivations to suit—when it sets us in lifetime struggle against ourselves—it fails to acknowledge morality as our tool, not primarily our taskmaster.  These considerations provide the needed boundary line to situate the golden rule this side of a feasibility-idealism divide. The golden rule is indeed designed for human nature as it is and for egos with interests, trying to be better to each other.

Admittedly the question of agape’s realism may not be decidable given the distinctly spiritual nature of their view. Christian agape, like Buddhist indifference and non-attachment is said to be inexpressible in words. It can only be understood correctly through direct insight and experience. Granted, adherents of these ideals place the achievement of spiritual insight out of common hands. Only a few of the most gifted or fortunate adherents achieve it in a lifetime. As such, spiritual love cannot be the currency of the golden rule as we know it, negotiating mutual equality for the vast majority of humanity in everyday life.

What agapeists may be onto is that the golden rule has a dual nature. At a common level, it is a principle of ethical reciprocity. But for those who use its ethic to rise above good and evil in a mundane sense, the golden rule is a wisdom principle. It marks the transcendence of interested and egoistic perspectives. It points toward its sibling of loving thy neighbor as thyself because thy neighbor is us in some deeper sense, accessible by deeper, less egoistic love.

6. Philosophical Slight.

With the foregoing array of “considered judgments” in hand, we are at last positioned to begin distinct philosophizing on the golden rule. That project starts by consulting philosophy’s reconstitution of traditional commonsense ethics—an added context for golden rule interpretation. Philosophical treatments of the golden rule itself come next, with an evaluation of their alternative top-down approach.

One reason philosophers emphasize the juxtaposition of ethics and human nature stems from the moralistic, if not masochistic cast of ethical traditions. Nietzsche’s depiction of “slave morality” in Christianity is a case in point (Nietzsche 1955). Moral suspicion of medieval shira laws in Islam is another. Because the golden rule is prominent in these suspect traditions, philosophy’s concerns are directly relevant. Self-interest has been rehabilitated in philosophical ethics, along with happiness as satisfying interests, not necessarily matching ethereal ideals or god’s will. Ethics in general has also been feminized to encompass self-caring as well, a kind of third-person empathy and supportive aid to oneself (Gilligan 1982). Here, a clarified golden rule notion can fit well.

The role of ethics as our tool and invention has been promoted over traditional views of its partial “imposition” by Nature, Reason or natural law.  As Aristotelians note, the good for anything depends on its type or species: ethics is for “creatures like us,” and because we are not saintly beings we fall short of by nature. Ironically, this a line preached by Yeshua continually in upholding spirituality, or the heart of “the law,” over the legal letter. “The law (Sabbath) was made for man, not man for the law.” (Mark 2:27-28) On this view, ethics should not fate its users to a life of hypocrisy and of not feeling good enough.

For philosophers, however, even a clarified or unbiased depiction of the golden rule cannot overcome its shortfalls in specificity and decisiveness. Ply the rule in the handling of complex and nuanced problems of complex institutions and it is at sea. We cannot imagine how to begin its application. Exercise it within networks of social roles and practices and the rule seems utterly simplistic. (This said, the irony should not be lost here of critics setting the rule up to fail by over-generalizing its intended scope and standards for success.)

Maximum generalization is the dominant philosophical approach to the rule. And in this form there is no question that its shortfalls are many. The rule seems hopeless for dealing with highly layered institutions working through different hierarchies of status and authority. Yet the rule has been posed by philosophers as the ultimate grounding principle of the major moral-philosophic traditions—of a Kantian-like categorical imperative, and a Utilitarian prototype. It has been claimed, in fact, that the rule’s logic was designed for this generalization across cases, situations, and all varieties of societies (Singer (1963) and Hare (1975)).

These interpretations are highly unlikely judging from the rule’s strikingly ethnic origin and design function, as a bottom-up approach makes clear. As noted, this is a tribal or clan rule, cast in highly traditional societies and nurtured there. There is no evidence that it was ever originally intended to define human obligations and problem solving within the human community writ large, or in complex institutional settings in particular. And so shortfalls found in taking it out of its cultural context—ignoring the range of practices and roles that it presumed, placing it in types of social context that didn’t exist when it was born and raised should be no surprise.  The golden rule’s format invites first-person use, addressing interacting with one or two others. Since the rule’s chief role in society seemingly became the instruction of children, alerting them to impacts on others, its shortfalls in complex problem solving seem irrelevant.  Likewise Kant’s categorical imperative falls short in deciding who does the laundry in a marriage, especially once emotions have become too frayed and raw to import formulae into the discussion.

In small-group interactions what would normally be tolerated as diversity of opinion and practice can be legitimately identified as problematic instead. Being like-minded, most often group members have expressed commitment to common beliefs, values, and responsibilities. But more important, the rule is vastly more detailed and institutionalized here than it seems because of its guidance by established practices, conventions, and understandings. One’s reputation as a group member depends on holding up one’s end of approved norms, including the golden rule, lest one be considered unreliable and untrustworthy. In such contexts, one can imagine a corollary to the golden rule that would make sense: “Show not consideration to him who receiveth without thought of rendering back.” This seems contrary to the golden rule due to our mis-identification of the rule with sibling rationales of forgiveness and unconditional love—letting others abuse and take advantage of us. Moreover, this corollary may not sanction an actual comeuppance of offenders, in violation of golden-rule spirit, functioning instead as a threat or gentle reminder of joint expectations. Such expectations are a commonly accepted part of “doing unto each other” in a neighborhood or co-worker context where conventions of fairness, just desert and doing one’s share go with the territory.

Marcus Singer, in standard philosophical style, portrays the golden rule as a principle, not a rule. This is because it does not direct a specific type of action that can be morally evaluated in itself. Instead, it offers a rationale for generating such rules. Singer is a kind of “father of generalization” in ethics, holding that the rationale for action of any individual in types of situations holds for any other in like situations  (Singer, 1955)    Singer argues further that the golden rule is a procedural principle, directing us through a process—perspective-taking, either real or imaginary, for example—to generate morally salient action directives.

Singer’s is the “ideal” or top-down theoretical approach, as contrasted with our building from common sense. It starts from an abstracted logical ideal, elaborating a theory around it by tracing its logical implications. The approach is notably uninfluenced by the golden rule’s 2,500 year history. Of course, philosophy need not start from the beginning when addressing a concept, nor be confined by an original intent or design or its cultural development.  The argument must be that the rule’s inner logic is the only active ingredient. The rest is chaff or flourish or unnecessary additives.

In principled form, Singer’s golden “rule” serves also as a standard for judging rules and directives for actions that impact us. The rationale of a contemplated action must  adhere to the rubric of a self-other swap to pass ethical muster in the way that, say, our maxim of intentions must pass the universalization test of the Kant’s categorical imperative.

Singer’s view has merit, especially in emphasizing procedure. Still, the distinction between principles and rules may not be as sharp as claimed. General rules ( rules of legal evidence, for example) also can be used to derive more specific rules based on their logics; principles need not be consulted. For example: Do nice things; do nice things, anonymously for close neighbors in distress; leave breakfast bakery goods at the doorstep of a next door neighbor the morning after they attend a close relative’s funeral; leave donuts and muffins on your next-door neighbor’s welcome map, rewrapped in a white bag with a sedate silvery bow: leave bagels with chive cheese if they are Jewish, sfagliatelle if they are Italian. The most general rule here, “Do nice things,” targets a type of action that can be morally evaluated as right or wrong, but still needs a procedure for determining specific actions that fall in that category, especially at the borders. Consulting community reciprocity standards or conventions might be one. Thus, do nice things by consulting community standards would proceduralize a rule to generate more specific action directives. Again, no consultation with principles are needed.

A great asset of Singer’s view is its accent on the practical within the prescriptive essence of the rule. Most philosophical principles of ethics are explanatory, providing an ultimate ground for understanding prescriptions. These also can be used to justify moral rationales. But they are prescriptive only in the logical sense of distinguishing “shoulds” from “woulds” or “ares,” not the directive sense—do X in way Y. Singer’s take exposes the how-to or know-how of the golden rule. From here, the rule’s interpersonal role in communication and explanation to others is readily derived, especially during socialization. The rule is not portrayed, then as a stationary intellectual object notched on the wall of an inquiring mind. It takes on a life for the moral community living its life.

R. M. Hare basically places the golden rule in the company of the Kantian and Utilitarian theories, or his own “universal prescriptivism.” That is, he interprets it as a universal grounding principle, a fundamental explanatory principle—for reciprocal respect. This conceives ethical theory on the model of scientific theory, especially a physical theory with its laws of nature. A highlighted purpose of Hare’s account is to bring theoretical clarity and rational backing to what he sees as piecemeal intuitionist and situation-based ethics. These latter approaches typically use examples of ethical judgments that the author considers cogent, leaving the reader to agree or disagree on its intuitive appeal. Yet, Hare renders the crucial “as you would have them do” directive of the golden rule as both what we would “wish” them to do to us (before doing it) and what we are “glad” they did toward us (afterwards). He holds that the golden rule’s logic remains constant, despite these word and tense changes. Notably, no grounding is offered for this claim—for the switch from “would have” to “wish” or “glad,” as if these were obviously the same ideas. Hare apparently feels that they are.

But wishes, choices, preferences, and feelings of gladness certainly do not seem the same thing. Choices can come from wishes, though they rarely do, and one feels glad about the results of choices, if not wishes, generally. Wishing typically has higher goals and lower expectations than wanting; it’s bigger on imagination, weaker on real-world motivation. Choosing is usually endorsing and expressing a want, whether or not it expresses a preference among desired objects. None of these may auger a glad feeling, though one would hope they do, hoping also that one’s choices turn out well and that their consequences please us, which they often, sadly, do not.

7. Sticking Points

The greatest help that the golden rule’s common sense might seek from philosophy is a conceptual analysis of the “as you would have” notion (Matthew 7:12).  This is a tricky phrase. Rendering the rule’s meaning in ways that collapses wish and want obscures important differences, as just noted. An alternative rendering is how you prefer they treat you, singling out the want that has highest priority for you in this peculiar context of mutual reciprocity, not necessarily in general. Further alternatives are treatments we would accept, or acquiesce in or consent to as opposed to actively and ideally choose or choose as most feasible. These are four quite different options. Or would we have others do unto us as we believe or expect they should treat us based on our or their value commitments and sense of entitlement ?  Are the expectations of just the two or three people involved to count, or count more than the so-called legitimate expectations of the community? Such interpretations can ride the rule of gold in quite different directions, led by individual tastes, group norms, or transcendent religious or philosophical principles. And we might see some of these as unfair or otherwise illegitimate.

In such contexts, philosophical analysis usually answers questions, clarifying differences in concepts, meanings and their implications. Hare’s account may very likely compound them. I may choose, wish or want that you would treat me with great kindness and generosity, showing me an unselfish plume of altruism. But if I then was legitimately expected to reciprocate out of consistency, I might consent, agree, or acquiesce only in mutual respect or minimal fairness, at most. This is all I’d willingly render to others, certainly, if they did not even render respect and fairness back. From this consent logic we move toward Kantian or social contract versions of mutual respect and a sort of rational expectation that can be widely generalized. But we move very far from the many spirits of the golden rule, wishful and ideal. We move from expanding self-regard other-directedly to hedging our bets, which makes great moral difference.

Similar problems of interpretation rise for the “as” in the related principle, love thy neighbor as thyself (Matthew 20:34).  In ethical philosophy, as noted, “self-love” has been identified traditionally with self-interest or self-preference. In psychology, by contrast, it has been identified with self-esteem and locus of control. These are quite different orientations, setting different generalizable expectations in oneself and in others. It is not clear that generalizing self-love captures appropriate other-love. Common opinion has it that love of others should be more disinterested and charitable than love of self, or self-interest. We feel that it is fine to be hard on ourselves on occasion, but more rarely hard on others. We are our own business, but they are not. They are their own business. It seems morally appropriate to sacrifice our own interests but not those of others even when they are willing. We should not urge or perhaps even ask for such sacrifice, instead taking burdens on ourselves. Joys can be shared, but not burdens quite as much.

We are to be nicer, fairer, and more respectful of others than of ourselves. In fact, ethics is about treating others well, and doing so directly. To treat ourselves ethically is a kind of metaphor since only one person is involved in the exchange, and the exchange can only be indirect. We are not held blameworthy for running our self-esteem down when we think we deserve it, but we are to esteem others even when they have not earned it.

Kant, by contrast, poses equal respect for self and other, with little distinction. We are to treat humanity, whether in ourselves or others, as an end in itself and of infinite value. He also poses second-rung duties to self and other toward the pursuit of happiness—a rational, and so self-expressively autonomous, approach to goods. This might be thought to raise a serious question for altruism—the benefiting of others at our expense. Given duties to self and duties to others, even pertaining to the pursuit of happiness, it is not clear what the grounds would be for preferring others to oneself. Yet one would be honored as generous, the other selfish. And this is so even if we have the perfect right to act autonomously in a generous way, therefore not using ourselves as a mere means to others’ happiness. Throughout his ethical works and essays on religion, however, Kant speaks of philanthropy, kindness, and generosity in praising terms without giving like credit to self-interest.

Some would criticize this penchant for treating others better than ourselves as a Christian bias against self-interest, too often cast as selfishness. But it seems in line with the very purposes of ethics, which is how to interact with others, not oneself. In any case, Yeshua’s conception of love was radically different from the traditional notion of his time as it is from our current common sense.

Most of the population originally introduced to the golden-rule family of rules was uneducated and highly superstitious, even as most may be today. The message greets most of us in childhood. Its Christian trappings growing most, at present, in politically oppressive third-world oligarchies where (sophisticated) education is hard to come by. Likely the rule was designed for such audiences. It was designed to serve them, both as an uplifting inspiration and form of edification, raising their moral consciousness. Yet in these circumstances, the real possibility exists of conceiving the rule as, “if you’re willing to take it (bad treatment) you can blithely dish it out.” Vengeance is also a well-respected principle tied to lex talonis . A related misinterpretation puts us in another’s position with our particular interests in tact, asking ourselves what we in particular would prefer. “If I were you, do you know what I would do in that situation?” Decades of research suggests that these are the interpretations most of us develop spontaneously as we are trying to figure out the golden rule and the place of its rationale in more reasoning over childhood and adolescence (Kohlberg 1982).

We can scoff at the obtuseness of these renderings, but even sophisticates may know less about others’ perspectives than they typically assume. Many have great difficulty imagining strangers’ perspectives from the inside, instead making unwarranted assumptions biased to their own preference. (Selman 1980). Otherwise well-educated and experienced folk can be remarkably unskilled at such perspective-taking tasks. Indeed, feminist psychologists demonstrate this inadequacy empirically in psychological males, especially where it involves empathy or spontaneously “feeling with” others. (Hoffman 1987) (In class, when I’ve fully distinguished empathy from cognitive role-taking, many of my brilliant male students confess, “I don’t think I’ve ever done or experienced that.”) Recent empathy programs designed to stop dangerous bullying in American public schools have acknowledged the absence of empathy in many children. Schools have resorted to bringing babies into the classroom to invoke hopefully deep-seated instincts for emotional identification (or “fellow-feeling”) with other members of our human species (Kohlberg 1969).

How we properly balance empathy with cognitive role-taking is a greater sticking point, plaguing psychological females and feminist authors as much as the rest. (The balance, again, is between feeling with, and imaginatively structuring the person’s conceptual space and point of view.) Such integration problems make it unclear how to follow the golden rules properly in most circumstances. And that is quite a drawback for a moral guideline, if the rule is an action guideline. We might then be advised to seek a different approach such as an interpersonal form of participatory democracy, as was previously noted.

Again, these are precisely the sorts of uncertainties and questions that philosophical analysis and theory is supposed to help answer by moving from common sense to uncommonly good sense. To a certain extent, Kantian and Utilitarian theory does just that, better defining the role of careful thought and estimation (reason), moral personality (the components of “self” and “other” that most count) and how these ground equal consideration. But at some point they move to considerations that serve distinctly theoretical and intellectual purposes, removed from everyday thinking and choice. Kant’s “neumonal self” (composed of reason and free will) and the Bentham-Mill “Util-carrier” (an experience processor for pleasure and pain) are not the selves or others we care about when golden-ruling. Their morally relevant qualities cannot compete in importance with our other personal features. Indeed, we cannot identify with, much less respect these one-sided, disembodied essences enough to overrule the array of motivations and personal qualities that match our sense of moral character and concern.

The theoretical rationality of maximizing good, even with prudence built in, is obviously extremist and over-generalized. Research in more practical-minded economics shows this clearly in coming up with concepts like “satisficing” (seeking enough goods in certain categories of those goods most important to us).  But as philosophers say, the logics of good and reason in Utilitarianism cannot help but extend to maximization—it is simply irrational, all things considered, to pursue less of a good thing when one can acquire more good at little effort. If so, then perhaps all the worse generalization and consistency, which will be avoided by being reasonable and personable. Many of us wish theory to upgrade common sense, not throw it out the window with the golden rationale in tow.

8. Ethical Reductionism

Both present and likely future philosophical accounts may be unhelpful in bringing clarity to the golden rule in its own terms, rather distorting it through overgeneralization. Still, the crafting of general theory in ethics is an important project. It exposes ever deeper and broader logics underlying our common rationales, the golden rule being one. (It is important for some to review these fundamental issues for treating the golden rule philosophically.)

Relative to a commonsense understanding of the golden rule, it is a heady conceptual experience to see this simple rule of thumb universalized–inflated to epic proportions that encompass the entire blueprint for ethical virtue, reasoning, and behavior for humankind. Such is the case with Kantian and Utilitarian super-principles. To increase the complexity of the rule’s implications while retaining its simplicity, transformed to theoretical elegance, is no mean trick. Paul’s revelation that the golden rule is catholic achieved a like headiness in faith. Now to see that faith reinforced by the most rigorous standards of secular reasoning is quite an affirmation. It can also be recruited as a powerful ally in fending off secular criticism.

Often we fail to recognize that extreme reductionism is the centerpiece of the mainstream general theory project. The whole point is to render the seemingly diverse logics of even conflicting moral concepts and phenomena into a single one, or perhaps two. It is very surprising to find how far a rationale can be extended to cover types of cases beyond its seeming ken—to see how much the virtues of golden kindness or respect, for example, can be recast as mere components of a choice process. Character traits, as states of being, appear radically different from processes of deliberation, problem solving, and behavior after all. But the most salient psychological features of virtuous traits fade into the amoral background once the principled source of their moral relevance and legitimacy is redefined. Golden rule compassion becomes virtuous because it allows us to better consider an “other” as a “self,” not necessarily in itself, its expression, or in the good it does.

The project of general theory also exposes how the implications of golden rule’s basic structure fall short when fully extended. Universalization reveals how the basically sound rationale of the golden rule can go unexpectedly awry at full tilt. This shows a hidden chink in its armor. But reducing principles also can overcome the skepticism of those who see the rule as a narrow slogan from the start. The rule can do much more than expected, it turns out, when its far-reaching implications are made explicit. And by exposing the rule’s shortfall and flaws, we can identify the precise sorts of added components or remedies needed to complement it, thus setting back on the right path.

These are the two prime fruits of general theorizing, determining the full extent of a rationale’s reach, before it stretches too thin, and stretching it fully and too thin to expose its failure scenarios. Universalization, in principle, reduces to absurdity in this sense.

Outfitting the golden rule for this project in the standard way, we get “Always act so that you treat any other person, in any context, the way that you would rationally prefer and expressively choose to be treated in that context.” “Never treat someone in a way that would not draw their consent.” (We could say “win” their consent, but that seems a bit “cheerleaderesque.” It invites a process of lobbying that might win or lose due to arbitrary rhetorical skills and which the rule likely does not intend.) Notice that “the standard way” among philosophers is simply to claim that “as you would have” means consent or rational preference without sufficient argument or justification. This is what philosophical research on the matter turns up.

What sorts of faults are revealed by tracing out this principle’s implications? One liability concerns justice. If one puts themselves in the position of someone who has done an injustice, you might reasonably conclude either that the person wishes to be punished, due to their keen sense of justice, or that they wish to be forgiven or to otherwise “get out of” being caught or held accountable. Wishing forgiveness, or at least to be given a second chance, has much to be said for it. And morally, getting one’s just desert also makes sense. A kind of  paradox results, which Christians will recall from the Parable of the Laborers in the vineyard (Matthew 20: 1-16) The rule provides a moral advantage to both punisher and perpetrator in this case. Doing what is fair is good, but using one’s discretion to be forgiving is good also, perhaps better, though not obligatory—a win-win situation. Looking across situations, imagining the social practices and legitimate expectations that result, social members who commit offenses will suffer the luck of the draw. The accountability mechanism of society will not establish a uniform policy of punishment or recompense. (“Luckeee! You got judge X or you mugged a nice guy—wish I had.”)

For moral individualists or libertarians, this is no problem. Who can complain about getting either fair treatment or beneficial treatment? “Should someone be begrudged their generosity,” as the vineyard owner notes, or another their resulting windfall? We accept this discretionary arrangement in many everyday settings. But consider how two children will feel about such unequal treatment, which treats one person as if s/he deserves more, and the other less? Consider how this same sense of being mistreated and perhaps resentful will arise in most small groups of peers. “Why her, not me? Why the favoritism—you value her that much more than me?” The pattern for distributing costs and benefits is unequal to the equal. And that is unjust. Moral liberals will be especially offended by this result. As with many conflicts between moral camps, both sides have a point, which each side seems committed not to acknowledge. And thus far, no way of integrating these rival positions has gained general consensus.

Like any general principle, perhaps, the golden rule also seems incapable of distinguishing general relationships and responsibilities from special ones—responsibilities toward family members, communities of familiars and co-workers, not the wide world of strangers. A proper explanatory principle will allow us to derive such corollaries from its core rationale. But the golden rule falls short: it is truly a rule, not a principle. Compare it with the Utilitarian grounding principle of maximizing good. Maximizing is an ideal logic of reason. Good is an ideal of value of value. We can imagine how a most rational approach to value would promote special situations and relationships, why it would function differently there than in other situations, and why such situations and relationships have special value. Additional good results from family and friendship institutions when members treat each other as special, and especially well. The golden rule, by contrast, bids us to treat people as special when they are not, to treat strangers or enemies as we’d be naturally urged to treat intimates. This is difficult at best, and not clearly a reliable way to maximizing good. It may detract from the good in fact. Also, what is the rationale for treating others as well as those closest to us? Why is showing favoritism toward our favorites a problem? The golden rule itself does not say or explain.

In work situations, are we to ignore who is the boss or supervisor, who is the rank-and-file employee, who is the support staff doing clerical or janitorial work? We’re to be decent to all in some sense, but some we can humanely “order around,” set deadlines for, and some we can’t.

These are serious problems for the golden rule. At a minimum, corollaries would have to be added to the rule explaining how roles and relationships figure in. Treat others as you would choose to be treated in the established social role you each occupy and its legitimate expectations, mother, father, or teacher to children and vice versa, spouses and friends to each other, peer co-workers, supervisor to rank-and-file employees and vice versa, and so forth. Alan Gewirth (1978) has proposed a rule in which we focus on mutual respect for our generic rights alone. This would leave all sorts of other choices to other rationales or to our discretion that the golden rule does not, placing restraints on the rule that it would not currently acknowledge.

Both of these alternatives have horrible consequences for the golden rule however.  Rights simply do not cover enough ethical behavior to rule out forms of psychological cruelty, callousness, and interpersonal exclusion. The reciprocity they guarantee is compatible with most forms of face-to-face interaction that lack it, especially in public peer-relations such as the school or job site, but also in friendships and the family.

Where the ethics or ethos of a society is barbaric, and its hierarchies authoritarian, taking perspectives within roles legitimates these characteristics. How should a slave and her/his master reciprocate? How should a superior race reciprocate with members of a near sub-human race?  This inequality problem is egregious also in adhering to prevailing social reciprocity-conventions applying to roles. Neither ethically skilled role-taking nor empathy can set matters right.

9. Ill-Fitting Theory (Over-Generalizing Rules of Thumb)

Despite its assets, there are further reasons to think that the general theory project is inappropriate for many ethical rationales, the golden rule being perhaps chief among them. Its expose of golden rule faults is more misleading than helpful. General theory assumes that the true and deeper logic of a rationale comes out through generalization, which often is not the case. This should be obvious when theorists note that a rationale cannot avoid certain far-flung implications, no matter how alien or morally outrageous they seem. This “gotcha” view of logical implication speaks badly for logical implication, working alone. Instead of revealing a flaw in the rule’s logic, it may show implicit features of a concept or phenomenon being ignored. In the golden rule’s case this might be a cultural design function being ignored meant purposely to limit the rule’s generalizability and social scope. We must get the rule’s actual “logic” straight, before generalizing it, and this cannot be done in a purely top-down theoretical manner except by creating a different rule.

Rationalist by nature, general theory also assumes that the structure or logic of the rationale is the thing, not its psychological function, emotive effect, or motivational power. The fault here is not emphasizing rational components, but failing to integrate additional components into it adequately. If the golden rule’s logic is procedural, as Singer claims, then it may not serve as a general explanation in “knowing-that” sense, which a Kantian, Utilitarian and “universal prescriptivism” approach like Hare’s ignores. And failing to provide a type of general explanation might not then be a failing.

Besides, the golden rule is unnecessary to the general theoretical project, as Kant (1956)  himself made clear in dismissing it, and in a mere footnote no less ( p. 97, 430:68). We can start with an ideal explanatory principle, ideally structured to capture the explanatory logic of equal consideration or perspective taking. There is no need to generalize from commonsense, distorting a rule designed only for commonsense purposes, in a restricted locale. A reductive account provides an explanation and understanding of one sort, exposing the essential element or active ingredient underlying an ethics’ appearance. It allows us to strip bare what holds the golden rule together beneath surface content that often matters little to its substance. But this account provides neither a good explanation nor understanding of the rule as a whole, or in any element, relative to the rule’s distinct meaning for its users or benefactors, nor its distinctive application in any real-life situation. “I’ve become so focused on getting this project done on time that I’ve lost sight of these people working on it being my colleagues, indeed, my neighbors and friends, of their deserving to be treated that way.”  This is especially true of the implied how-tos or forms of address that make all the difference when showing respect and concern for others. How we do unto our mother or our child or our co-worker, even when their basic personhood is most at stake, requires a remarkably different form of address to convey equal consideration. Patronizing someone (a parent) in showing respect, can convey disrespect. So can failing to “patronize (a child) and thereby coming off cold and remote. These are essential moral matters, golden-rule matters, not just a matter of discretionary style.

Unlike Kant, J. S. Mill (1961) identified the golden rule as “the complete spirit of the ethics of utility” (p. 418). It apparently served as a leading light for the Utilitarian principle, despite the principle’s appearance of not holding high each individual’s sanctity (as a “child of god”).  This may seem outrageous to those who see both the golden rule and Kant’s principle as vaunting this sanctity, whatever their utility to society. For them, Utilitarianism makes an ethic out of the immoral logic of “ends justify the means,” willingly sacrificing the individual to the group—or obligating us to do so. The golden rule, by contrast, asks us to consider another’s equality, not sacrifice her or ourselves for group welfare.

But let us remember that these alleged features of utilitarianism are completely unintended, the result of outfitting its “advance the common good” rationales with universality, then trying to cover all ethical bases, working alone. (Obviously modern democratic constitutions have brought advancing the common good into line with securing individual rights simply by retaining both principles in their own terms and using each to regulate the other.) Even the lush empathy of Utilitarian intent, so key to who sacrifices or willingly serves, was eventually ejected from its general theory. This is an ultimate “golden rule lost” scenario, and reductionism gone wild. Many have noted how “each is to count for one” seems merely inserted into the Utilitarian concept with little utilitarian basis. The golden rule spirit may be one explanation.

The apparent association between the golden rule and the maximizing super-principle came basically from the central role of compassion in early Utilitarian theorizing. When people become experienced with each other, recognizing common needs, hopes and fears, failures and successes, they are moved to act with mutual understanding. This increases their like-mindedness and mutual identification in turn. The resulting sense of connection nurtures increasing indifference toward the narrow desires of those concerned, whether in oneself or others.  Membership in, and contribution to shared community becomes defining. This is how golden rule other-directedness and equality moves toward full mutuality in the pursuit of overall social good. And is there a more “Christian spirit” of charity and service available?

Like most key tenets of ethics, the golden rule shows two major sides: one promoting fairness and individual entitlement, conceived as reciprocity; the other promoting helpfulness and generosity to the end of social welfare. Both the Kantian and Utilitarian traditions focus on only one side, furthering the great distinctions in philosophical ethics—the deontology-teleology and justice-benevolence distinctions. For the general theory project, this one-sidedness is purposeful, a research tool for reductive explanation.

The Utilitarian, Charles Dickens, probably draped most golden-rule content and spirit over the utilitarian side in his Christmas Carol . “Business? Mankind was my business, the common welfare was my business; charity, mercy, forbearance and benevolence were, all, my business. The dealings of my trade were but a drop of water in the comprehensive ocean of my business” (p. 30). In a small way here, Dickens highlighted the direct and visible hand of Utilitarian economics in contrast to the invisible hand of Utilitarian Adam Smith and his capitalist economics—a hand Dickens found quite lacking in compassion or egalitarian benefit. Dickens captured Utilitarianism’s moral hell in even more strikingly golden rule terms, “The air was filled with phantoms, wandering hither and thither in restless haste, moaning as they went…one old ghost cried piteously at being able to assist a wretched woman with an infant, whom it saw below upon a doorstep. The misery with them all was clearly, that they sought to interfere, for good, in human matters, and had lost the power forever” (p. 33). Arguably, the power lost was to treat those in need as one’s potentially needy self should be treated. The each-is-to-count-for-one equality of the golden rule is portrayed as a proven, socially institutionalized means to social good.  “I have always thought of Christmas…as a kind, forgiving charitable and pleasant time when men and women seem, by one consent, to open their shut-up hearts freely and to think of people below them as if they really were fellow-passengers to the grave, not another race of creatures bound on other journeys” (p. 9).What speech more heartily hits the golden tones of the golden rule?

10. Know-How Theory (And Medium-Sized Rationales)

What seems needed to philosophize ably about the golden rule, and its relatives are theoretical models fit for rules of thumb. These would be know-how models, defined by the conceptual work it draped around algorithms, operations, and steps in procedures for putting rules into effect. As noted, these may be psychological rules for taking certain moral points of view, rules of problem solving, negotiation, making contributions to ongoing practices, interactions, and more unilateral actions. These components would be given a context of use and interrelated in crucially different ways, with suggestions for interrelating them further.  Illustrations would be provided of their application and misapplication, at high, medium, and low quality. The resulting combination would be provided overall structure and comprehensibility which would include the rationales needed to explain and justify its components. Rationales for applying the procedures would allow unique and flexible alliances among components fit for particular functions and novel situations. This would encompass the best features of the otherwise inchoate rubric of a conceptual “tool-box.” The illustrations would encompass the best features of philosophically upgraded ethics codes. A range of corollaries would be provided for the rules involved, the golden rule family, for example, capturing the sorts of conventional expectations and practices presumed during the rules’ creation and development. These are of greatest importance to its practicality and success. And, of like importance, background frameworks would be provided for how to practice the rule, indicating the difference in orientation of the novice and expert user. How might we follow a recipe when cooking the way a chef who “knows his way around the kitchen” would?

Relative to mainstream philosophical theory, this project might seem historically regressive, even anti-philosophical.  It resembles a return to the most piecemeal sort of intuitionism, combined with a “hands-on,” applied approach taken to a new clerical extreme. (Applied ethics already boasts hundreds of decision-making step procedures.) For traditional philosophers the small-scale common-sense rationales involved also may seem philosophically uninteresting. “Advancing the good” may be a fine tip for everyday practice but holds little conceptual subtlety compared to “maximizing the ratio of benefits over costs across the domain of sentient beings.” The unseen implications of a maximization principle provided us a new model of practical reason. Resubmitting the range of ethical concepts to it suggests that the aims and consequences of actions, combined with quality of experience, may be all that ethics comes to, personal integrity and inherent rights aside.  Thus the rules of thumb discussed by Mill in his Utilitarianism were quickly deserted by philosophers for rule-utilitarianism. This built newly generalized principles into the very structure of maximization (maximize the regard for rights as inherent and inviolable), turning the pre-existing utilitarian principle (regarding rights and all else as means to social good) into a super-principle, as some term it.

But if one looks back at Mill’s ethical writings as a whole, dropping preconceptions about general theory of utilitarianism itself, one finds ethical rules hat cross categories like deontology and teleology, working insightfully and usefully together, also by rule of thumb, not principle or intuition. There was a time when moral theorist simply dismissed intuitionist and applied theory approaches. Hare does above, Rawls did in his hallowed A Theory of Justice (1972), calling them half-theories. These theories cited piecemeal and ungrounded insights where the completing of conceptual structure was required to provide a full explanatory account. But these forward-looking theorists worked such piecemeal views into pluralist, hybrid, or eclectic theoretical forms. Rawls himself discussed “mixed theories,” with medium-sized principles, which he acknowledged as formidable alternatives to a general theory like his own. (See Rawls’s multiple index references to intuitionism and mixed theories.) The golden rule can find a place here, a merely somewhat generalized, medium-sized or right-sized place, allowing it to function as a lived ethic, readily applicable to everyday life to several ends. There is a certain satisfaction as well to using the most ancient but enduring epigrams of ethics, such as the golden rule, to create the most cutting-edge theoretical forms.

11. Regressive Default (Is Ancient Wisdom Out-Dated?)

Serious innovation in ethics is a long time coming. Arguably, the golden rule has not been seriously updated in its own terms—conceptually, procedurally and culturally since 500 B.C.E., or perhaps 28 C.E., despite quite radical changes in the primary groups of modern societies, and the decrease in tribal societies. Since applied and practical ethics gathered steam, ground-breaking developments like the “ethics of complex organizations” have been few and far between. It is remarkable that moral philosophy is still focused on concepts that were contemporaries of phlogiston and élan and vital, bile and humors. The golden rule long preceded these. Such notions were formulated and plied in an age of rampant superstition, seasoned by deep misconceptions about the nature of reality, human nature (psychology) and social organization. Modern empirical research has had difficulty finding the stable psychological traits that we continue to call virtues. If stable traits exist at all, they may not be organized morally. If they are, their stability and supposed resistance to situational factors of morality appears remarkably weak (Kohlberg 1982a, Myers, chs. 4, 6-9, 12). But philosophers have given hardly a thought to the real prospect that there may be no such things—no real phenomena to cover our grab-bag folk terms. Virtue theorists seem unparsed as they experience a philosophical upswing. Brain research has uncovered forms of mental computation that differ significantly from what we term reasoning or emotion. This should be producing experimental revamping of ethical thinking. Unfortunately, a raft of hasty interpretations of these findings’ significance (by J. Haidt, primarily) have provided grounds for undue skepticism.

The golden rule enjoys the reputation of enduring wisdom, even if its lack of conceptual sophistication leaves philosophers cold. But its ancient origin should make us wonder if it is in fact perennial hot air, misleading even regarding the framework in which moral philosophy is done.

The model of general theory, based on general laws, still enjoys mainstream status in moral philosophy, despite challenges that have diminished its domination. But consider what has happened to its scientific mentor. Important new innovations in physics are questioning the use of general theories marked by laws of nature, gravity, and the like, holding that this centerpiece of physics for centuries was a wrong turn from the beginning that led to the dead end of string theory and an inability to understand quarks and quantum mechanics. Unthinkably regressive anthropomorphic alternatives, such as “biocentric cosmology,” are being taken seriously, or at least stated boldly before a scientific public. (This is the view that reality is determined by our observing it—a giant step beyond the Schrödinger’s Cat Paradox.) In part, this results from challenging the value of sophistication in views like string theory that consider it explanatory to posit non-existent and unknowable scores of reality dimensions for realities we observe. More, these cutting-edge, potentially revolutionary ideas are being proliferated in high-level physics in such popular outlets as Discover Magazine (April 2010 p. 32-44, May p. 52-55) and the Discovery TV Channel, available with “basic cable.”

Where are the parallels in ethics? Where are the steps beyond “subverting the dominant paradigm,” and posing real alternatives for public consumption where ethics meets reality, where the golden rule abides today? Currently, moral philosophy floods its public with an unstoppable stream of “theory and practice” texts championing Kantian deontology and Utilitarian teleology, with the supposedly direct application of their super-principles to concrete cases. (There is nothing like a fundamental explanation to decide an issue and take specific action, is there?) This is especially so when a reader need only follow the philosophical author’s advice to “balance” these two great and conflicting principles in application and practice, as philosophers have been unable to do for centuries. A chapter is always devoted to ancient “virtue ethics” in these volumes despite no one apparently knowing how to apply moral traits or character to anything concrete, in any concrete way.

Before a rule like the golden one is either slighted or acknowledged, moral philosophy should consider innovative approaches to conceiving such rules, their fitness to current practice, and perhaps what we can learn from converting the rule to a programmable algorithm for autonomous agent programming. Perhaps simply “generalization” the rule, as anciently stated is not the most creative theorizing approach. A possible step in a new direction, if originated in more than century-old thinking, is attempted below.

12. When Is a Rule Not a Rule, but a Description?

In classic lectures, compiled as The Varieties of Religious Experience (1901/1985) William James declares the golden rule incompatible with human nature (Lect. 11). It routinely violates the basic structure of human embodiment, the laws of human motivation, and the principles of rational choice of behavior based on them, as depicted above. (James may have confused the rule with sibling principles when making this blanket observation.)

Yet, gathered around this law-like “given,” in James’s remarks are reams of psychological testimony on putative “conversion” and “visitation” experiences wrought by divinities (Lect. 9-12). James identifies certain common features and aftereffects in these putatively supernatural experiences, including ecstatic happiness and sense of liberation, expansive sense of self, and a self-diffusion into those nearby–selflessness of a special, merging sort. He notes, likewise, an overflowing urge to love, give and aid others, nurture and support unlimited others, with unlimited energy, and no sense of sacrifice to oneself. The main attitude observed is “yea-saying” toward everything, reminiscent of Christian calls for “saying yes” to God and “to all who ask of ye” (Lect. 11).This syndrome of experiences and proclivities gives new meaning for its “patients” to what a devoted and dedicated life can be—not devotion to religious duties or divine commands, but the spontaneous embodiment of omnipresent love..

Mystical experience of this sort typically bridges the complete separation between perfect Godhood and sinful devotee, substituting a sense of oneness and “flow” within a cosmic ocean of bliss. James cites ways in which the lasting sensibilities of this experience suborn the asceticism, spiritual purity, and willing material poverty associated with saintliness (Lect. 11).  In a certain way, James goes on to provide a differential diagnosis of this syndrome of symptoms or “golden rule effect.” The cause he infers is some sort of seizure—literally, a seizure—suggesting occult influences, unusual electro-chemical processes within the central nervous system, or both. James notes that when subjected by him to certain “ethers,” known for hallucinogenic effects, those who report these divine visitations also report a strikingly similar experience “under the influence.” All that is missing is a sense of the supernatural. This is not the most morally reassuring depiction of the golden rule as a phenomenon, but so it goes.

Imagine now that there are a third and fourth avenue to these experiences or to the proclivities and golden behaviors that result. One, the third, might involve the secular spiritual transformation that comes from single-mindedness. When someone’s striving for a cherished goal becomes a life-mission, be it mastering a musical instrument or fine art, or putting heart and soul into building a business, or putting a public policy in place (a new drunk-driving ban or universal health care) they often come to embody their goal. “He is his company.” “She has become her music” (“and she writes the songs”).  Certainly in religion this is what is meant by terming someone holy or a living saint. This is also the secular goal of Confucian practice, to make li (behavioral ritual) yi (character). One accomplishes this transformation by complete and intense concentration of thoughts and behavior, and by “letting go” of one’s self-awareness or ego in the task. The work takes over and one becomes “possessed” by it, either in an uplifting way, or as in the need for exorcism, rehab, or at least “intervention” by friends and family. When morality sets the goal and means here, we term their culmination “moral exemplarism.”

This is the indirect pursuit of the golden rule that focuses on ideally good means to ideally good ends. “Love the good with your whole mind, your whole heart and your whole strength,” then you will love your neighbor as yourself, and also treat her as you’d wish to be treated by her. The differential diagnosis here identifies devotion that leads to embodiment as the cause of golden rule effect. And this devotion need not include any following or practicing rules of thumb like the golden rule, purposely fulfilling duties, or practicing those conventional activities associated with being morally upright. It can be as spiritual and abstract an activity as concentrated rational intuition ever-intent on an imagined Platonic form of good, which presumably would direct one’s perception of every reflection of the Form, in every ethical matter one dealt with in life.

Now consider a fourth avenue, much more common to everyday ethics. Here, doing good or being fair is a part-time activity, undertaken alongside hosts of alternatives. It is developed through socialization and reflective practice relative to the normative institutions of society. Social norms are internalized and habituated in action, even to the point of what we call character traits. When dealing with others, and typical moral issues, we gain a sense of proper reciprocity and the need for a certain egalitarianism in how we show respect. In addition, we hear of various rules and principles advising us on how to do this. Among these are members of the golden rule family, perhaps the golden rule itself. One flirts with following those rules of thumb within reach, the way one finds oneself tempted to buy a product one sees advertised. One notices ways that one’s activities already overlap with their biddings. And slowly the rule becomes a partial habit of heart and hand, an implicit directive.

Still, the rule is sometimes consciously referred to as a reminder. Like breathing, that is, the rule has an involuntary and voluntary component in one’s life. Other rules seem reachable somewhere down the road and may slowly become an ideal to work toward, walking a mile in others’ moccasins perhaps,  while an additional class of rules only gets our salute from afar—it is wildly out of reach. “Love your neighbor as yourself” seems in this class, along with, “turn the other cheek” or “give others anything they ask.”

Getting some perspective, the second and third avenues or “ways of embodiment” above are analogous to the two main schools of Zen Buddhism—Rinzai and Soto. In the first, one experiences satori or enlightened awakening in a sudden flash. It is not known how, even a non-devotee may be blessed by this occurrence. One smiles, or laughs as a result, at the contrast in consciousness, then goes back to one’s daily life with no self-awareness of the whole new sense of reality and living it creates. Those around cannot help but notice the whole new range of behaviors that come out, filled with the compassion of a bodhisattva. To the master, it is daily life and interaction: “I eat when I am hungry, I sleep when I am tired.”

The third way is that of gradual enlightenment. One meditates for its own sake, with no special aim in mind—no awaited lightning strike from the blue. “Over time, as one constantly “polishes one’s mirror,” Zen consciousness continually grows until normal consciousness and ego fade out, akin to the Hindu version of enlightenment or moksha. Compassion grows beside it, imperceptibly, until one is bodhisattva. To the recipient, Zen-mind seems ordinary mind.

The fourth way, is more a simulation than a “way.” It is not a form of embodiment at all, and therefore does not generate golden rule effect as a spontaneous offshoot. We learn to act, in some respects, as a master or exemplar would, but without embodying the character being expressed, or being truly self-expressive in our actions. What we call ethics as a whole—the ethics of duties, fulfilling obligations, adhering to responsibilities, and respecting rights can be seen as this sort of partial simulation. We develop moral habits, of course, some of which link together in patterns and proclivities. And we can  “engage” these. But we would not continue to carry around a sense of ethical assembly instructions or recipes needing sometimes to refer to them directly—if we were ethics, if we embodied ethics. We don’t retain rules and instructions when we are friends or parents. (Those who read parenting books are either looking for improvements or fearing that they aren’t true parents yet.) Where else in our daily lives do we look to principles, rules of thumb or formula supplied as advice by a colleague or co-worker to proceed at what we already supposedly can do? When we are a worker, we just work. When we are ethical, we often pause and consult a manual. This is not to deny automaticity or self-reliant reasoning in ethics.

The golden rule displays one algorithm for programming exemplary fair behavior, which can be habituated by repetition and even raised to an art by practice. Virtue ethics (habits) and deliberation ethics (normative ethics) fall here. What we are simulating are side-effects of a moral condition. We are trying to be good, by imitating symptoms of being good.

A behavioral route can be taken instead to these simulations, side-stepping direct reference to the rule. In some ways it is more revealing of our simulation. Here we engage in repetitive behaviors that conform to a reciprocity convention that conforms to the rule. We do not act out of adherence to the rule, but only out or imitation of its applications or illustrations. This again was the Aristotelian approach to learning virtues and also the Confucian approach for starting out. In Japan, this sort of approach extended from the Samurai tea ceremony to the Suzuki method of learning the violin (See Gardner 1993). Such programming is akin to behavioral shaping in behaviorist psychology though it rests primarily on principles of competence motivation, not positive and negative reinforcement.

Social psychology has discovered that the single best way to create or change inner attitudes and motivations is to act as if one already possessed them. Over time, through the psychology of cognitive dissonance reduction, aided by an apparent consistency process in the brain, the mind supplies the motivation needed (Festinger 1957, Van Veen, and others, 2009).  These processes contradict common opinion on how motivations are developed, or at least it does so long as our resolve does. Unless one keeps the behavior going, by whatever means, our psychology will extinguish the behavior for its lack of a motivational correlate.

Here, as elsewhere, the golden rule can act as a conceptual test of whether the group reciprocity conventions of a society are ethically up to snuff. As a means to more morally direct simulation, those interested in the golden rule can try alternative psychological regimens—role-taking is one, empathy might be another. And these can be combined. Those who assume that exemplars must have taken these routes in their socialization may prefer such practices to conventional repetition. However, each is discretionary and but one practical means to it. Each has pros and cons: some routes serve certain personality types or learning styles, others not so well.  In certain cultures, mentoring, mimicking and emulating exemplars will be the way to go.

Deep Thoughts : Perhaps one can also try the way of humor:  “Before you insult a man, walk a mile in his shoes. That way you’ll be a mile away when he gets offended, and you’ll have his shoes.”—John Handy

13. References and Further Reading

• Allen, C. (1996).   “What’s Wrong with the Golden Rule? Conducting Ethical Research in Cyberspace.” The Information Society, v. 1 no.2: 174-188.
• Colby, A. and Damon, W. (1984). Some Do Care . New York, NY: Free Press.
• Colby, A. and Kohlberg, L (1987). The Measurement of Moral Judgment . Vol I, New York: NY: Cambridge University Press.
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Author Information

Bill Puka Email:  [email protected] Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute U. S. A.

An encyclopedia of philosophy articles written by professional philosophers.

Golden Rule

I. definition.

“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” is the idea (also called the law of reciprocity ) that may be the most universally applauded moral principle on Earth—the Golden Rule. Something like it appears in every major religion and ethical philosophy. The wording above is from the King James Bible , Matthew 7:12, however Hindu, Jewish, Buddhist, Confucian, and Zoroastrian versions of it appeared 3,000-500 years earlier.

The Christian version in Matthew says what you should do, rather than what you should not do. Most of the other versions say “don’t do to others what you wouldn’t want done to you.”  This is now known as “the silver rule.” The positive version seems a little more demanding, and more problematic, than the silver rule:

• If you are a parent, should you really treat your young children as you would have them treat you? That would mean expecting your two-year-old to support you, teach you, protect you, and take care of your problems.
• What about if you are a judge dealing with a convicted murder; should you release them immediately, as they would probably prefer you to do?
• If you are a Christian, should you serve a Muslim pork, as you might wish done to you?

Most non-philosophers lump together “love they neighbor,” “turn the other cheek,” and other similar ideas together with the golden rule. All of them revolve around the same themes — empathy, selflessness, reciprocity, and egalitarianism, principles at the foundations of most ethical systems (although certainly not all). So perhaps that is how the golden rule should be taken, as a general ethical stance, not a rule (which is impossible to follow).

Meanwhile, academic philosophers have pretty much left the golden rule alone, commenting on it mainly to point out that although it sounds good, it cannot be applicable to a lot of situations – depending on how you interpret it. We will examine interpretations that eliminate some of these problems cases. The golden rule sounds like a perfect guide to morality but it’s interpretation is rife with difficulties.

II. Types of the Golden Rule

Here we list some relatives of the Golden Rule, which often incorporate it:

a. The Silver Rule

“Do not do unto others as you would not want done to you.”

b. The Platinum Rule

“Treat others the way they want to be treated.”

c. The Rule of Love

Love others as you do yourself (or better).

d. Role-Taking

Put yourself in other’s shoes in order to know how to treat them ethically.

Feel and care about the suffering of others.

f. Kant’s Categorical Imperative

“Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.”  In other words, “Only follow ethical rules that you think should be universal.”  Philosophers consider Kant’s Imperative more philosophically air-tight than the golden rule.  Some present it as supporting the golden rule while others would claim the opposite.

III. The History  and Importance of  the Golden Rule

The oldest golden rule is the Hindu “One should always treat others as they wish to be treated” ( Hitopadehsa , from before 2000 BCE) which seems potentially more demanding than the golden rule. Most people would like to be treated better than they expect to be, or are willing to accept.

People tend to trace the Golden Rule back to Leviticus (19:18), “love thy neighbor as thyself,” which was probably first written down during the second millennium BCE. This is the only version of the rule from a major religion (Judaism) that explicitly mentions “love.” But some philosophers suggest that behind all versions of the golden rule is, or should be, the idea of universal, unconditional love. Along with the silver rule and other similar ideas, the ancient Greek philosophers expressed agape , which also has an underlying principle of love.

However, the Hebrew principle of “love thy neighbor” seems deceptive for its time. The rule was formulated in a tribal society, where it could only apply to other members of one’s tribe, and not necessarily to outsiders. It is quite likely that the “neighbor” in “love thy neighbor” was intended literally: love your neighbor as yourself, but not necessarily people from the next town over! In fact, of the three Abrahamic religions, only Islam has made the golden rule a religious obligation; if you are a guest in a very traditional Muslim home, your hosts will give you everything they can and lay down their lives for you, if necessary.

Similarly, around 500 BCE, Confucius wrote “What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.” In contrast to the statement in Leviticus, which is found in the middle of a long list of rules, the Confucian rule has always been emphasized, as a foundation of Confucian society.

But this raises a different kind of problem for the golden rule:

Confucian society was far from egalitarian, and not supposed to be. In the context of Confucian China, as is still true today, morality consisted of treating people as appropriate to their stations in life—treating a gentleman as a gentleman, a soldier as a soldier, and a slave as a slave; the hierarchy of superior and inferior relationships was (perhaps still is) is a central principle of Chinese relationships.

Confucius may have meant, “Treat people appropriately for their status, as you would wish them to do to you.”  Or “Treat other people of a similar status, as you expect to be treated.” For people of different social status to treat each other similarly is traditionally considered both rude and immoral in China; it threatens to upset social harmony, which depends on each person fulfilling their proper role in the Confucian hierarchy.

IV. Famous Quotes about the Golden Rule

“I have something that I call my Golden Rule. It goes something like this: ‘Do unto others twenty-five percent better than you expect them to do unto you.’ … The twenty-five percent is for error.” ― Linus Pauling

Linus Pauling, an American chemist and the only scientist to win two non-shared Nobel prizes, gives us a rationally improved golden rule. Although it’s a bit tongue in cheek, alluding to the high standard of proof in science, Pauling’s modification is an astute rule-of-thumb repair for one of the golden rule’s most serious flaws – that it expects us to decide how well other people wish to be treated.

“Jonathan Swift made a soul for the gentlemen of this city by hating his neighbor as himself.” ― W.B. Yeats, Selected Poems and Four Plays

A humorous and cynical twist on the Torah’s “love thy neighbor as thyself,” Yeats, the great Irish poet, expressed much in this quote. Jonathan Swift, another Irishman and the author of Gulliver’s Travels, also wrote the satirical “A Modest Proposal,” in which he parodied the cruelty of upper-class attitudes towards the poor in his city of Dublin. So, he truly did give the “gentlemen” of his city a “soul” – that is, he tried to awaken their consciences by pointing out the opposite of love.

V.  The Golden Rule in Popular Culture

Example 1 : “deep thoughts” by jack handy on saturday night live.

This was a running joke on SNL for years in which the viewer was periodically presented with various “deep thoughts” – sort of an early predecessor of the fake-profound memes so many people post on Facebook. The following one is based on the Navajo version of the golden rule, “Before you insult someone, walk a mile in their moccasins”:

Deep Thoughts : “Before you insult a man, walk a mile in his shoes. That way you’ll be a mile away when he gets offended, and you’ll have his shoes.”—John Handy

Example 2: Hamlet by William Shakespeare

This may be stretching the definition of “pop culture” a bit, but we had to find a place for this quote, in which Prince Hamlet and the councilor Polonius discuss how Polonius will treat the traveling theatrical troupe which has come to their castle (“desert” in this quote means what someone deserves):

POLONIUS: My lord, I will use them according to their desert. HAMLET: God’s bodykins, man, much better. Use every man after his desert, and who should ’scape whipping? Use them after your own honor and dignity. The less they deserve, the more merit is in your bounty. Take them in. ( Hamlet , Act II, Scene 2)

Here, Shakespeare seems to argue for how one should treat people who might not “deserve” high-class treatment. His answer is, the better you treat them, and the less they deserve it, the more honorable you’ll look. At the same time that this seems like a highly ethical policy, it is meant somewhat cynically, since Hamlet is appealing to Polonius’ ego in order to motivate him to treat people well.

VI. The Golden Rule versus Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism , associated with philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill provides universal ethical guidance through its policy of “maximizing utility,” where “utility” usually means human well-being. In other words, “always do whatever will bring the greatest amount of well-being to the greatest number of people.” This can be seen as another attempt, like Kant’s, to come up with a more reliable version of the golden rule. Most critics of the golden rule agree that its greatest flaw is the phrase “as you would have them do to you” because it references our subjective desires and preferences. Utilitarianism remedies this flaw.

VII. Controversies

Philosophers disagree about whether the golden rule is problematic or inappropriate, and why.

Some point out that it cannot be followed literally in all kinds of relationships, such as between employer and employee, parent and child, or teacher and student. Others say that it can be, because it could be interpreted to mean “treat others as you would wish to be treated if you were them, in their social role, relative to you”; i.e. if you are a boss, treat your employees as you would wish to be treated if you were in their position .

Thus, perhaps the Hindu version, “treat others as they wish to be treated” is better worded. But, it doesn’t save the day. Some people wish to be treated badly. Others wish to be treated like gods.  Few people know what is best for themselves. And the way a child wishes to be treated by a parent or a teacher is probably not the best thing for them!

Other philosophers say that the answer to these conundrums is that the golden rule is not a “rule” of action, but of psychology; in other words, it says, “be empathic” or “treat people as if you cared for their welfare as much as your own.”

But, even if this solves some of the earlier mentioned difficulties, it’s a recipe for disaster in relationships between people from different cultures. For example, if you go to China, people will usually serve you hot water at meals. Chinese people believe that cold water is bad for one’s health. Chinese also may feel offended if you tip them, because it implies that they need your charity. So, following the golden rule is much complicated by cultural relativity.

a. Buddhism

c. Christianity

d. Hinduism

a. It mentions love

b. It is worded negatively rather than positively

c. It only applies to Jews

d. It was singled out as more important than other rules

a. Different people prefer to be treated differently

b. It requires too much self-sacrifice

c. People are not wise enough to apply it correctly

d. It was created by people who may not have been egalitarian

a. Treat people as they wish to be treated

b. Treat people in whatever way is best for everybody’s well-being

c. Treat people as they deserve to be treated

d. Don’t treat others as you wish not to be treated

Effectiviology

The Golden Rule: Treat Others the Way You Want to Be Treated

The golden rule is a moral principle which denotes that you should treat others the way you want to be treated yourself. For example, the golden rule means that if you want people to treat you with respect, then you should treat them with respect too.

The golden rule is an important philosophical principle, which has been formulated in various ways by many different groups throughout history, and which can be used to guide your actions in a variety of situations. As such, in the following article you will learn more about the golden rule, see how it can be refined, and understand how you can implement it in practice.

Main forms of the golden rule

The golden rule can be formulated in three main ways:

• Positive/directive form. The positive formulation of the golden rule states that you should treat others the same way you would want to be treated yourself. This suggests, for example, that if you want people to treat you with respect, then you should treat them with respect.
• Negative/prohibitive form. The negative formulation of the golden rule states that you should  not treat others in ways you would not want to be treated yourself. This suggests, for example, that if you don’t want people to say mean things to you, then you shouldn’t say mean things to them.
• Empathic/responsive form.  The empathic formulation of the golden rule states that when you wish something upon others, you also wish it upon yourself. This suggests, for example, that if wish ill toward someone else, then you are also wishing ill toward yourself.

Different people tend to be exposed to different forms of the golden rule to a different degree, based on factors such as the predominant religion in their society.

However, all these forms of the golden rule revolve around the same underlying concept and around the same underlying intention. Namely, all forms of the golden rule aim to help you treat others better, by using the way you yourself would want to be treated as a guide of how to behave.

Note: the negative form of the golden rule is sometimes referred to as the silver rule . In addition, the general concept of the golden rule is sometimes also referred to as the ethic of reciprocity. Finally, in some contexts, the term ‘golden rule’ is used to refer to an important rule or principle in a certain field (for example “the golden rule of engineering”), rather than to the golden rule in the context of morality.

Examples of the golden rule

There are many examples of ways in which the golden rule can be implemented, in its various forms. For example:

• If you want people to be polite to you, then you should be polite to them. (positive form)
• If you don’t want people to be rude to you, then you shouldn’t be rude to them. (negative form)
• If you want people to help you in a selfless manner, then you should also help them in a selfless manner. (positive form)
• If you don’t want people to selfishly deny you help that they can give, then you shouldn’t selfishly deny them the help that you can give. (negative form)
• If you wish positive things to someone else, then you also wish positive things to yourself. (empathic form)

Variants of the golden rule

The underlying principle behind the golden rule has been proposed in many different formulations throughout history, by various individuals and groups.

For instance, many philosophers proposed variations of this concept , as you can see in the following examples:

“That character is best that doesn’t do to another what isn’t good for itself.” — Zoroaster, Persia (circa 500 BC) “What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.” — Confucius, China (circa 500 BC) “We should conduct ourselves toward others as we would have them act toward us.” — Aristotle, Greece (circa 350 BC) “What you shun enduring yourself, attempt not to impose on others.”  — Epicetus, Greece (circa 150 AD) “To do as one would be done by, and to love one’s neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.” — John Stuart Mill, England (1861)

Similarly, the golden rule has also been featured in various formulations by many different religions :

“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” (Christianity) “That which is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow. That is the entire Law; all the rest is commentary.” (Judaism) “No one of you is a believer until he desires for his brother that which he desires for himself.” (Islam) “Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful.” (Buddhism) “This is the sum of duty: do naught unto others which would cause you pain if done to you.” (Hinduism)

Keep in mind that many of these variants of the golden rule are translations from versions of it in other languages, such as the Latin “quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri ne feceris”, which can be translated as “do not do to another what you do not want to be done to you”.

In addition, keep in mind that the exact origins and phrasing of some of these quotes remain unclear. Nevertheless, the main takeaway from these varied examples is the fact that the underlying concept behind the golden rule was prevalent among a diverse range of groups throughout history.

Related concepts

When it comes to morality and ethics, there are various concepts that are closely associated with the golden rule.

The most notable of these concepts is Kant’s categorical imperative , which states that you should “act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law”, meaning that you should act a certain way only if you’re willing to have everyone else act the same way too.

Another such concept is referred to as Clarke’s Rule of Equity , and states that “Whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable that another should do for me, that by the same judgment I declare reasonable or unreasonable that I should in the like case do for him”.

Criticism of the golden rule and potential solutions

Accounting for the wishes of others.

The main criticism that people mention when it comes to the golden rule, and particularly when it comes to its implementation in practice, is the fact that the golden rule suggests that others would like to be treated the same way you would like to be treated, which is not necessarily true .

This can lead to problematic situations, where one person might mistreat someone else under the guidance of the golden rule. For example, this problem could lead someone to make an overt romantic gesture toward someone that isn’t interested in it, simply because the person making the gesture wishes that someone would do the same for them.

This issue has been described by writer George Bernard Shaw, who famously said :

“Do not do unto others as you would that they should do unto you. Their tastes may be not be the same.”

To address this issue, a variant of the golden rule has been developed, which is called the platinum rule , and which denotes that you should treat others the way they want to be treated.

However, this principle has also been criticized , for example because it can lead to issues in cases where it prompts you to act toward someone in a way that contradicts your own values. Furthermore, there are cases where it’s not possible to use the platinum rule, for example when you have no way of knowing what the other person wants, or where the golden rule leads to better outcomes, for example when it prompts someone to display more empathy in practice. As such, the platinum rule is not inherently better than the golden rule, and there are cases where it’s preferable to use the two rules together, or to use the golden rule by itself.

Note : the platinum rule is sometimes referred to by other names, such as the   copper rule or the inversion of the golden rule .

Conflict with other principles

Another notable criticism of the golden rule is the fact that, in certain situations, its application can lead to undesirable outcomes, when it conflicts with other guiding principles, including both moral principles as well as other types of principles, such as social or legal ones.

For example, if someone is convicted of a crime and sentenced to prison, the golden rule would suggest that we should let them go, because we would not want to be imprisoned ourselves. This remains the case even if we use the platinum rule, since the prisoner would likely also prefer to avoid going to prison.

However, this issue with the golden rule can be dealt with in a general manner, by viewing this principle as one of several principles that we use to guide our behavior as individuals and as a society.

Specifically, in the example described above, the golden rule would not be enough to prevent that person from going to prison, because most individuals and societies choose to place other laws and ethical principles above the golden rule, while still taking the golden rule into account. This means that they strive to implement the golden rule whenever possible, as long as it doesn’t clash with the implementation of a more important concept.

This notion is described, for example, in the writing of philosopher Henry More, who said that:

“The Evil you would not have done to your self, you must abstain from doing the same to another, as far as may be done without prejudice to a Third.” — In Enchiridion Ethicum (1667), Chap. 4, Noema XV

How to implement the golden rule

The basic way to implement the golden rule is to treat other people the way that you would want to be treated yourself. To help yourself do this, when considering a certain action toward someone, ask yourself “how would I like to be treated in this situation?”, or “how would I feel if someone treated me the way I’m planning to treat this person right now?”.

Furthermore, when doing this, you can use additional techniques, which will help you implement this rule effectively:

• Use cognitive techniques to help yourself assess the situation. For example, you can use self-distancing language by asking yourself “how would  you feel if someone treated you that way?”, to help yourself assess the situation more rationally. Similarly, you can ask yourself how you would feel if someone else treated someone that you care about the same way you’re thinking of treating a person right now.
• Consider the different variants of the golden rule. Specifically, this includes the positive formulation of the rule (treat others the same way you would want to be treated yourself), the negative formulation (don’t treat others in ways you wouldn’t want to be treated yourself), and the empathic formulation (when you wish something upon others, you also wish it upon yourself). This can be helpful since different people in different situations may connect better with different formulations of the golden rule.
• Consider using the platinum rule, either instead of or in addition to the golden rule. This involves considering not only how  you want to be treated, but also how the other person wants to be treated. To do this effectively, you can do things such as talk to the other person directly, to figure out how they would like to be treated. Alternatively, you can do things such as to talk to someone who knows them, or look at other relevant information, such as how they’d indicated they’d like to be treated in the past. Finally, it can also be helpful to use various debiasing techniques to help yourself assess the situation properly, for example by slowing down your reasoning process to reduce any egocentric biases that you might have, which could help you see things from their perspective.
• Take additional considerations into account. For example, if following the golden rule would lead you to cause someone harm, you can avoid following the rule if you believe that avoiding harm is more important in that situation.
• Keep the limitations of the golden rule in mind. These include the potential discrepancy between how you want to be treated and how others want to be treated, as well as the potential conflicts that may arise between the golden rule and other considerations. Essentially, this rule can be a useful rule of thumb to consider and apply in various situations, but that doesn’t mean that it should be the only guiding factor that you use in every situation.

Finally, note that these techniques can also be useful when it comes to getting people other than yourself to consider and use the golden rule.

Summary and conclusions

• The golden rule is a moral principle which denotes that you should treat others the way you want to be treated yourself.
• For example, the golden rule means that if you want people to treat you with respect, then you should treat them with respect too.
• The underlying concept behind the golden rule has been formulated by various individuals and groups throughout history, and it’s often seen as one of the key principles which are used to guide how people should behave toward each other.
• A notable limitation of the golden rule is the fact that others might not want to be treated the same way you want to be treated; this issue can be addressed by refining the golden rule into a variant called the platinum rule , which suggests that we should treat others the way they themself wish to be treated.
• When implementing the golden rule, it’s important to keep in mind that it’s meant to serve as a general rule of thumb rather than an absolute law, and there are situations where other guiding principles overrule it.

Other articles you may find interesting:

• The Platinum Rule: Treat Others the Way They Want to Be Treated
• Kant's Categorical Imperative: Act the Way You Want Others to Act
• It's Better to Be Smart than to Be Right

Understanding the Golden Rule/Rigorous Introduction to the Golden Rule

Rigorous introduction to the golden rule [ edit | edit source ].

• 1.1.1 Literal GR
• 1.1.2 Same-situation clause
• 1.1.3 The GR question
• 1.1.4 GR requires consistency
• 1.1.5 Gold, not garbage
• 1.2 Applying GR wisely: Kita
• 1.3 Further GRs and relatives
• 1.4 GR fallacies
• 2 Religions and philosophies
• 3 Technical appendix (This difficult material is optional)
• 4 Assignment
• 5 References

The golden rule (GR) says “Treat others as you want to be treated.” Other phrasings include “Do unto others as you’d have them do unto you,” “Do as you’d be done by,” and “Don’t do to others what you want not done to yourself.” GR calls for a harmony between my act toward another and my desire about how I’d be treated in the same situation.

This course is a fairly comprehensive treatment of the golden rule. We’ll defend GR philosophically, connect it with world religions and history, and apply it to practical areas like moral education and business. If you are more interested in living the golden rule than studying it, you may prefer to take the companion course Living the Golden Rule or you may benefit from taking both courses.

This section is about GR reasoning. We’ll first note that GR is wildly influential across the globe (and considered gold) but largely ignored in academic circles (and considered garbage). Then we’ll look at problem areas.

Gold or garbage? [ edit | edit source ]

The golden rule for centuries has been important all over the world, in different cultures and religions, and in professions and families.

All major religions accept GR. Confucius, Hillel, Jesus, and many others used it to sum up how to live. The Parliament of the World’s Religions in 1993 overwhelmingly supported GR as the basis for global ethics and the “irrevocable, unconditional norm for all areas of life” [1] .

Conscientious professionals often appeal to GR. A business person might say, “I try to treat customers as I desire that I’d be treated.” A nurse might say, “I care for patients as I hope that I’d be cared for if I were sick.” A teacher might say, “I teach students as I wish that I’d have been taught.”

GR is popular among politicians. President Barack Obama used it in over twenty speeches; here are two examples: [2]

The only time I ever saw my mother really angry is when she saw cruelty, when she saw somebody being bullied or somebody being treated differently because of who they were. And, if she saw me doing that, she would be furious. And she would say to me: “Imagine standing in that person’s shoes. How would that make you feel?” If there is one law that we can be most certain of, it is the law that binds people of all faiths and no faith together. It’s no coincidence that it exists in Christianity and Judaism; in Islam and Hinduism; in Buddhism and humanism. It is, of course, the golden rule – the call to treat one another as we wish to be treated. [3]

His Republican predecessor, George W. Bush, in at least eighteen speeches used some variation of this GR phrasing: “Love your neighbor just like you’d like to be loved yourself.” [4] GR is non-partisan.

A British TV station created a new “ten commandments” [5] , surveying 44,000 people about the most important norms for living. GR was by far the most popular norm: “Treat others as you want to be treated.”

Searching the Web for “golden rule” reveals many Web pages, including Harry Gensler’s page . GR is growing in popularity.

GR is less popular in academic circles. Courses in moral philosophy or moral theology typically ignore GR or mention it only briefly. Marcus Singer began an article about GR by saying: [6]

The golden rule has received remarkably little philosophical discussion….Considering its obvious importance and its almost universal acceptance, this… is unfortunate, and also somewhat surprising.

The only philosophy dissertations on GR up to now were Alton 1966 [7] and Gensler 1977. [8] [9] Jeff Wattles 1996: 6, in a groundbreaking first scholarly book in English on GR since the 17th century, noted that:

Many scholars today regard the rule as an acceptable principle for popular use but as embarrassing if taken with philosophic seriousness. Most professional ethicists rely instead on other principles, since the rule seems vulnerable to counterexamples, such as the current favorite, “What if a sadomasochist goes forth to treat others as he wants to be treated?”

When Harry Gensler was writing the book this course is based on [10] , his fellow academics often asked about it. Imagine this conversation. Professor asks, “What is your book about?” He says, “The golden rule.” Professor then snickers inside, thinking, “You mean that silly kindergarten saying that doesn’t apply to the complex problems of the real world?” Now Professor is too polite to say this out loud. His mother long ago used GR to instruct him against rudeness, and this is still with him. But his behavior suggests what’s in the back of his mind: “The golden rule – what a silly principle for a grownup philosopher to write a book on!”

Not all academics think so little of the golden rule. But most do. Most think that GR is unclear and full of problems. If we take the vague GR and try to formulate it clearly, it quickly leads to absurdities. So GR is dismissed as a folksy proverb that self-destructs when analyzed carefully.

So is GR gold (as the world thinks) or garbage (as many academics think)?

Literal GR [ edit | edit source ]

What does “Treat others as you want to be treated” mean? Let’s try taking it as the literal golden rule (or Pyrite 1, where pyrite is fool’s gold): [11]

Pyrite 1: the literal GR   Objection 1: different circumstances If you want X to do A to you, then do A to X   If you’re in different circumstances from the other person (for example, you have different likes and dislikes), GR can command bad actions.

To derive an instance, substitute a person for X and an act for do -A, and rephrase to keep it grammatical. So Pyrite 1 logically entails “If you want Jones to be polite to you, then be polite to Jones ” – and “If you want Jones not to hit you, then do not hit Jones .” Pyrite 1 works well if you and X are in similar circumstances and you have good desires about how you’re to be treated. If either condition fails, Pyrite 1 can tell you to do crazy or evil things.

Consider this different circumstances objection. Suppose you have a bad appendix and want Dr. Davis to remove it. Then Pyrite 1 absurdly tells you: “ If you want Davis to remove your appendix, then remove her appendix. ” Pyrite 1 assumes that how you want to be treated in your situation is how you should treat others in their situation – even if their situation is very different.

Here’s another example. I’m a waiter, and I hate broccoli . Becky orders broccoli (which she likes). Should I serve her broccoli? Not by the literal GR, which says: “If you want Becky not to serve you broccoli, then don’t serve her broccoli.” Becky would be upset, and I’d likely be fired. Pyrite 1 seems to assume that the other person’s tastes are the same as mine.

Or suppose I visit my sister Carol at her house. In the morning, I wake energized and like to chat. But Carol absolutely hates early chatting, since she needs to wake up before she can deal with others. Should I chat with Carol? The literal GR says yes: “If I want Carol to chat with me, then I’m to chat with her.” But this is inconsiderate, since her needs differ from mine.

Or you’re a little boy who loves fighting, and you’d love to have your little sister fight with you. She’s peaceful and hates fighting. Should you fight with her? Pyrite 1 says yes: “If I want my little sister to fight with me, then I’m to fight with her.” Pyrite 1 here is violent and inconsiderate.

Here’s another objection to GR (don’t worry about why it’s 3):

Objection 3: your flawed desires If you have flawed desires about how you’re to be treated, GR can command bad actions.

Suppose you eat bad broccoli and catch the dreaded broccoli-itis disease, which makes you want everyone to hurt you. Pyrite 1 tells you: “ If you want your friend to hurt you, then hurt her .” But you do want your friend (and everyone else) to hurt you; thus by Pyrite 1 you’re to hurt her (and everyone else). So Pyrite 1 can tell a person with flawed desires to do bad things.

Pyrite 1 assumes that our desires about how we’re to be treated are fine and guide us well on how to treat others. But our desires may be flawed. Maybe we have mental problems and want everyone to hurt us. Or maybe we have immoral desires and want Rob to help us to rob banks; then Pyrite 1 tells us to help him to rob banks. Or maybe we’re misinformed and want others to give us severe electrical shocks (which we think are pleasurable); then Pyrite 1 tells us to give others such shocks. Since our desires about how we’re to be treated may be flawed, they aren’t a reliable guide on how to treat others.

Since Pyrite 1 can tell us to do crazy things, it’s only fool’s gold. It also fails the Wattles [12] GR test for GR interpretations: “Would you want to be treated according to a rule construed in this way?”

Some who use GR in their lives are impatient with GR objections and say they know how to avoid the problems. They may be right. But still it’s important to study the objections, because (1) many reject GR on this basis; (2) GR should lead us to take seriously the views and objections of others; (3) a clear GR formula that avoids the objections may help others to use GR; and (4) without understanding the objections, we’ll never really understand GR.

Same-situation clause [ edit | edit source ]

GR urgently needs a same-situation clause. [13]

Here’s a fable about the literal GR. There once was a flood involving a monkey and a fish. The monkey climbed a tree to escape the rising flood waters. He looked down and saw a poor fish struggling against the current. Because he cared about the fish, he reached down and grabbed him from the water, lifting him to safety on a high branch. But the fish died after being taken from the water. The foolish monkey applied GR too literally; he wanted to be taken from the water himself, so he took the fish from the water. [14]

Now there was also a wise GR monkey, named Kita, who knew that fish can’t survive out of water. Kita saw a fish, imagined herself in its place, and asked “Am I now willing that if I were in the same situation as the fish, then I be taken from the water?” She answered, “Gosh no: this would kill me!” So Kita left the fish alone.

In applying GR, we need to know the other’s situation, which may differ from ours: the other may have different likes, dislikes, and needs. We need to imagine ourselves in the other’s situation. And we need to ask, “How do I desire that I be treated if I were in that situation? ”

The same-situation clause helps with the other cases:

• I want Dr. Davis to remove my appendix. Should I thus remove hers? No, since I desire that if I were in her situation (with a healthy appendix) then my appendix not be removed by a patient ignorant of medicine.
• I’m a broccoli-hating waiter, and Becky who likes broccoli orders it. Does GR prevent me from serving her broccoli? No, since I’m willing that if I were in her situation (loving the stuff) then I be served it.
• I want people to chat with me in the morning, but my sister Carol hates this. Should I chat with her? No, since I desire that if I were in her situation (hating early chatting) then people not chat with me.
• I’m a violent little boy who loves to have others fight with me. Should I fight with my peaceful little sister who hates fighting? No, since I desire that if I were in her situation (hating violence) then people not fight with me.

Adding a same-situation clause improves GR greatly. [15]

How should we go about reformulating GR? Should we just tinker with the wording until we get it right? It’s better to apply a deeper understanding. GR, Gensler contends, is a child of two parents: IMPARTIALITY and CONSCIENTIOUSNESS. GR inherits its same-situation clause from IMPARTIALITY.

Impartiality , as we use the term throughout the course, requires that we make similar evaluations about similar acts, regardless of the individuals involved . [16] If we’re impartial, then we’ll evaluate an act based on what it’s like – and not based on who plays what role in the situation; so we’ll apply the same standards to ourselves that we apply to others. I violate impartiality if I make conflicting evaluations about acts that I regard as exactly similar or relevantly similar .

Here’s a Good Samaritan example. Suppose that, while jogging, I see a man who’s been beaten, robbed, and left to die. Should I help him, perhaps by making a phone call? I think of excuses why I shouldn’t. I’m busy and don’t want to get involved. I say, “It would be all right for me not to help him.” But then I consider an exactly similar reversed situation, where our properties are switched. [17] I imagine myself in his exact place; so I’m the one who’s been beaten, robbed, and left to die. And I imagine him in my exact place; so he’s jogging and sees me in my sad state. I ask myself, “Would it be all right for this man not to help me in this reversed situation? Surely not!” But then I’m inconsistent. What’s all right for me to do to another must be all right for the other to do to me in an imagined exactly similar reversed situation.

In the actual world, no two acts are exactly similar. But I can always imagine an exactly similar act. If I’m about to do something to another, to test my impartiality I can imagine what it would be like for this to be done to me in an exactly similar situation. Impartiality forbids the combination on the left:

Impartiality forbids combining these:   GR forbids combining these: • I believe: “It’s right for me to do A to another.” • I believe: “It’s wrong for A to be done to me in the same situation.”   • I do A to another. • I’m unwilling that A be done to me in the same situation.

The left box is about impartiality : making similar evaluations about similar acts. The GR analogue, by contrast, forbids combining an act toward another with a desire about how I’d be treated in the same situation. Both are good principles. And both take “(exact) same situation” the same way; we are to imagine the two acts having all the same properties in common.

This example uses an imagined second case. But we can use an actual second case, if there’s one handy. Suppose I cut X off in traffic and I think this is OK. Later, Y cuts me off and I think this is wrong. But I ask, “Why would cutting-someone-off be right for me to do but wrong for another to do?” Since I find no rationally defensible reason, I conclude that the two acts are relevantly similar. But then I violate impartiality, which forbids the combination on the left:

Impartiality forbids combining these:   GR forbids combining these: • I believe: “It’s right for me to cut X off.” • I believe: “It’s wrong for Y to cut me off.” • I believe: “These two acts are relevantly similar.”   • I cut X off. • I’m unwilling that Y cut me off. • I believe: “These two acts are relevantly similar.”

I violate impartiality, since my three beliefs don’t fit together. I must reject at least one belief. I could hold that both actions are wrong, or that both are right, or that one act was right, but not the other, because of such and such differences. So, while impartiality doesn’t say specifically what to believe, it guides me on how to work out my beliefs in a consistent way.

The GR analogue involves an act toward another and a desire about how I’d be treated in a similar situation. We can express this GR as “Don’t act to do A to another while you’re unwilling that A be done to you in a situation that you regard as relevantly similar.” Both boxes take “relevantly similar” the same way: two acts are relevantly similar if the reasons why one fits in a given moral category (good, bad, right, wrong, or whatever) also apply to the other.

In deciding whether two actions are relevantly similar , we appeal to antecedent moral beliefs about which factors give reasons for a given moral appraisal. Impartiality and GR push us to apply these reasons in the same way to our actions and to another’s actions. But since the appeal to relevantly similar cases can get slippery, it’s often cleaner to appeal to imagined exactly similar cases – and so this course will emphasize these more.

Thus we can apply impartiality and GR to imagined cases or to actual cases. Poetic justice occurs when you later have the same thing actually done to you. So the Good Samaritan may later be helped in a similar way.

Impartiality requires a same-situation clause. It doesn’t violate impartiality to say “It’s right for me to drive but wrong for my sister to drive” – since there may be important differences between the cases (maybe I’m sober but she isn’t). Impartiality needs a clause about the acts being relevantly or exactly similar. GR needs this too, which is why Pyrite 1 is pyrite. [18]

The GR question [ edit | edit source ]

We need to be careful about something else. GR is about my present desire about a hypothetical case. It isn’t about what I’d desire if I were in the hypothetical case. Ask the first question, not the second:

Am I now willing that if I were in the same situation then this be done to me?   If I were in the same situation, would I then be willing that this be done to me?

The difference is subtle. Let’s try to clarify it.

Suppose I have a two-year-old son Willy, who puts his fingers into electrical outlets. I try to discourage him from this, but nothing works. I see that I need to stop him when he does it. But can I stop him without violating GR? In deciding this, I should ask the first question, not the second:

Am I now willing that if I were in Willy’s place in the same situation then I be stopped?   If I were in Willy’s place in the reversed situation, would I then be willing to be stopped? This has “ willing that if. ” It’s about my present adult desire about a hypothetical case.   This has “if” before “willing.” It’s about the desire I’d have as a small child.

With the first question, I imagine this case: I’m a two-year-old child who knows nothing about electricity; I want to put my fingers into electrical outlets and I want not to be stopped from doing this . As an adult, I say “I now desire that if I were in this situation then I be stopped from putting fingers into an outlet.” Thus I can stop Willy without breaking GR, since I’m willing that I would have been treated the same way in the same situation. I might even tell my parents: “Thanks for stopping me in this situation!”

On the other hand, if I were in Willy’s place, and thus judged things from a two-year-old mentality, then I’d desire not to be stopped. That’s what the crossed-out question is about. If we express GR using this, then I’d break GR if I stopped Willy. But this is absurd and leads to fried children. The GR question needs to deal with my present desire about a hypothetical case . I satisfy GR because I’m now willing that I would have been stopped in this situation.

Many people ask the GR same-situation question wrongly. The distinction is crucial when we deal with one who is less rational (e.g., drunk, senile, or in a coma). Suppose a friend at your party wants to drive home despite being drunk and confused. You tell her no; and you’re willing that if the situation were reversed (and you were drunk and confused) then you be told the same thing.

You might even say: “If I ever insist on driving home drunk, please stop me!” In applying GR here, ask the first question, not the second:

Am I now willing that if I were drunk in this situation then I be told that I can’t drive home?   If I were drunk in this situation, would I then be willing to be told that I can’t drive home?

With the second question, drunk and confused desires give the norm of how to treat your friend. To use GR correctly, say “ I’m willing that if. ” Ask this: “ Am I now willing that if I were in the same situation then this be done to me? ”

Here’s another example. You’re a judge, about to sentence a dangerous criminal to jail. The criminal protests and appeals (incorrectly) to GR: “If you were in my place, you’d want not to be sent to jail; so by GR you can’t send me to jail.” You should respond: “I can send you to jail, because I’m now willing that if I were in your place (as a dangerous criminal) then I be sent to jail.” You could add, “If I do such things, then please send me to jail too!” [19]

Pyrite 2 goes with the bad crossed-out question and suffers from Objection 2:

Pyrite 2: a faulty same-situation GR   Objection 2: X’s flawed desires Given that if you were in X’s exact place (in the reversed situation) then you’d want A done to you, then do A to X.   If X has flawed desires (about how he wants to be treated), GR can command bad actions.

Suppose X has flawed desires. For example, X is little Willy (who wants to be allowed to put his fingers into electrical outlets), or a drunk (who wants to be allowed to drive home), or a dangerous criminal (who wants to be set free so he can harm others). If you were in X’s exact place, then you’d have the same flawed desires. Then by Pyrite 2, you should act according to these desires (and let Willy put his fingers into electrical outlets, or let the drunk drive home, or let the criminal go free). But these actions are wrong. Sometimes we need to act against what others want. GR lets us do this, as long as we’re now willing that if we were in the same situation then we be treated similarly. We might say: “If I ever insist on driving home drunk, please stop me!” [20]

GR inherits its present desire about a hypothetical case question from its CONSCIENTIOUSNESS parent.

Conscientiousness , as the term is used in this course, requires that we keep our life (including actions, intentions, etc.) in harmony with our moral beliefs . When we are conscientious, we act consistently with what we believe. Suppose I believe that one ought never to kill a human being for any reason. If I’m conscientious, then I’ll never intentionally kill a human being, I’ll resolve not to kill for any reason (even to protect myself or my family), and I won’t want others to kill for any reason. Similar requirements cover beliefs about what is “all right” (“permissible”). If I’m conscientious, then I won’t do something without believing that it would be all right for me to do it. And I won’t believe that something is all right without consenting to the idea of it being done.

The conscientiousness norm says “Avoid inconsistencies between your moral beliefs and how you live.” It forbids inconsistent combinations like these:

• I believe I ought to do A. • I don’t act to do A.   • I believe act A is wrong. • I act to do A.   • I believe everyone ought to do A. • I don’t act to do A.

Conscientiousness gives a consistency tool to criticize moral principles. Let’s call “All short people ought to be beat up, just because they’re short” shortism . Now shortism commits us to these two conditionals:

(1) If I were short, then I ought to be beat up. (2) If I were short, then beat me up.

If I accept shortism, then, to be consistent, I must accept these. Accepting (1) is believing that if I were short then I ought to be beat up. Accepting (2) is desiring that if I were short then I be beat up; this is a present desire about a hypothetical case , like GR uses.

GR requires consistency [ edit | edit source ]

Pyrite 3 adds a present desire about a hypothetical case: [21]

Pyrite 3: an almost correct GR   Objection 3: your flawed desires If you want it to be that if you were in X’s exact place (in the reversed situation) then A would be done to you, then do A to X.   If you have flawed desires about how you’re to be treated, GR can command bad actions.

Pyrite 3 still suffers from Objection 3. Suppose you’re a masochist and want everyone to hurt you. You desire that, if you were in Xavier’s place in the reversed situation, then you be hurt. Then Pyrite 3 tells you to hurt Xavier. Think of an evil action that you could do to another. Imagine that you’re so deranged that you desire that, if you were in the other’s place, then this action be done to you. Then Pyrite 3 would tell you to do this evil action. [22]

Gensler's solution is to rephrase GR so it forbids an inconsistent combination but doesn’t say specifically what to do :

• I do something to another. • I’m unwilling that this be done to me in the same situation.   ← Don't combine these.

This consistency GR won’t tell you to hurt Xavier (a specific action), even if you have flawed desires. A more complete solution would also say how to criticize flawed desires See the section on Applying GR wisely: Kita . But for now it’s enough to formulate GR so it won’t tell you to do bad things, even if you have bad desires. This prose version is Gensler’s central GR formula, with three key features:

Gold 1: Gensler’s GR Treat others only as you consent to being treated in the same situation.

• a same-situation clause,
• a present desire about a hypothetical case, and
• a consistency form that forbids an action–desire combination.

We need these features to avoid absurd implications and ensure that GR follows from impartiality and conscientiousness.

Two examples show how Gold 1 works with flawed desires. (1) There once was a woman named Electra who got her facts wrong. Electra thought severe electrical shocks were pleasant. So she shocked others and, yes, she was willing that she be shocked in their place. She followed GR but acted wrongly. While Electra satisfied GR consistency, she can be faulted for getting her facts wrong. Applying GR wisely requires more than just sitting down in ignorance and asking how we want to be treated. To lead reliably to right action, GR needs to build on knowledge and imagination. But even if we’re misinformed, GR doesn’t command specific wrong acts – because it doesn’t command specific acts. Instead, GR forbids inconsistent combinations.

(2) There once was a coal-mine owner named Rich. Rich was very rich but paid his workers only a miserly $1 a day. He was asked if he’d be willing to be paid only $1 a day in their place. He said yes, and so was consistent. But he said yes only because he thought (wrongly) that his workers could live tolerably on this much. If he knew how little $1 buys, he wouldn’t answer that way. Rich needed to get his facts straight; he might have tried going to the store to buy food for his family with only $1 in his pocket. Here Rich satisfied GR consistency but acted wrongly, because he was misinformed. GR consistency needs to combine with other elements, like knowledge and imagination.

Let’s consider three consistency examples, to see better how consistency principles work. Then we’ll get back to GR. Perhaps you sometimes meet people who say things like “All bearded people are crazy.” It can be fun to challenge their consistency. You might ask, “Did Jesus Christ and Abraham Lincoln have beards?” They say yes. Then ask, “Were they crazy?” They say no. Then say, “You contradicted yourself.” You can’t reasonably combine these three beliefs:

• I believe: “All bearded people are crazy.” • I believe: “Jesus and Lincoln are bearded people.” • I believe: “Jesus and Lincoln aren’t crazy.”   ← Don't combine these.

If you hold all three, you must give up one. A consistency challenge doesn’t say exactly what to believe. It just says, “The things you accept don’t fit together – so you must change something.”

Or suppose that Donna wants to become a doctor. She realizes that, to do this, she needs to study hard and get good grades. But she doesn’t act accordingly. Donna violates this ends–means consistency imperative:

• I have the goal of becoming a doctor. • I believe that achieving this goal requires that I study hard. • I don’t study hard.   ← Don't combine these.

Since her goals, beliefs, and actions don’t fit together, she must change something. Maybe her doctor-goal is unrealistic and should be rejected; or maybe she just needs to carry out the means. Consistency doesn’t say what to change.

Here’s a simple imperative about consistent willing:

• I resolve to eat nothing. • I eat this granola bar.   ← Don't combine these.

This forbids a combination but doesn’t say exactly what to do. If my medical exam requires that I not eat, then I should do the resolving and avoid the eating. If my resolving is an unhealthy way to diet, then maybe I should do the eating and avoid the resolving.

Gold 1, on the left, likewise forbids a combination but doesn’t say exactly what to do (and so doesn’t tell us to do bad actions if we have flawed desires):

Gold 1 forbids an inconsistent combination:   Deductive model of GR reasoning (the desire wording can vary): • I do something to another. • I’m unwilling that this be done to me in the same situation.       If you have this desire about A being done to you, then do A to X.     You have this desire about A being done to you. ∴ Do A to X. [23]

Gold 1 has a consistency model of GR reasoning. If we violate GR consistency, it needn’t be that our action is wrong. It could be that our action is right and we should be willing that this thing be done to us in the same situation.

Pyrite 1–3 use a deductive model , on the right. This can prescribe bad actions if we have flawed desires. Flawed desires might, for example, be immoral (like wanting others to cooperate with you in doing evil), come from an unhealthy psychological condition (like wanting everyone to hurt you), or come from wrong information (like thinking that severe electrical shocks are pleasurable). And this model can lead to contradictions in multi-party cases, where you desire conflicting things depending on which place you consider yourself in (§14.3e). We fix these problems if we see GR as a consistency norm that forbids a combination but doesn’t prescribe or forbid specific actions. [24]

So how is Gold 1 derivable from IMPARTIALITY and CONSCIENTIOUSNESS? Suppose you want to steal Detra’s bicycle. And suppose you’re impartial (make similar evaluations about similar acts) and conscientious (have your moral beliefs and how you live in harmony). Then you won’t steal her bicycle unless you’re also willing that your bicycle be stolen in the same situation. Here’s a chart showing the steps involved:

Here’s a less graphical version. If we’re impartial and conscientious, then:

So if we’re impartial and conscientious, then we’ll follow GR: we won’t do A to X unless we’re willing that A be done to us in the same situation. If we assume that we ought to be impartial and conscientious, then it follows that we ought to follow GR. So GR is a theorem, provable from the impartiality and conscientiousness requirements.

As a consistency norm, GR isn’t a direct criterion of right and wrong, and isn’t a rival to moral norms like “We ought not to steal.” GR works at a different level. GR is more like “Don’t contradict yourself” or “Don’t accept a premise without accepting what logically follows from it.” GR’s role isn’t to replace other ethical theories but to supplement them – by giving a consistency tool that’s often useful. Most ethical theories recognize the role of consistency and so should be able to accept GR on this basis.

Gold, not garbage [ edit | edit source ]

So is GR gold or garbage? As opposed to what many academics think, we can explain GR in a clear way that avoids the absurdities: [25]

Understood correctly, GR is pure gold; we’ll appreciate this more as we move through this course. GR is gold (valuable) because it captures so much of the spirit behind morality. It counters self-centeredness and helps us to see the point of moral rules. It’s psychologically sound and personally motivating, engages our reasoning instead of imposing answers from the outside. It promotes cooperation and mutual understanding. It criticizes culturally taught racist or sexist moral intuitions. It concretely applies ideals like fairness and concern. And the core idea is a global wisdom, common to most religions and cultures. So GR makes a good one-sentence summary of morality.

GR also can be gold if we live and apply it wisely , even if we word it poorly. Many people live GR more subtlety than how they say it. [26]

Applying GR wisely: Kita [ edit | edit source ]

Kita (Know-Imagine-Test-Act) gives four main elements for using GR wisely: [27]

K. Know: “How would my action affect others?” I. Imagine: “What would it be like to have this done to me in the same situation?” T. Test for consistency: “Am I now willing that if I were in the same situation then this be done to me?” A. Act toward others only as you’re willing to be treated in the same situation.

Suppose that Rich, who pays his workers a miserly $1 a day (See the section on GR requires consistency ), decides to run his coal mine by the golden rule. How could he apply GR wisely?

(K) Rich would gain knowledge. He’d ask, “How are my company policies affecting others – workers, neighbors, customers, and so on? What problems do my policies create for people?” To know such things, Rich would need to spend time talking with workers and others.

As we form our moral beliefs, we need to be informed. As far as reasonably possible, we need to know circumstances, alternatives, and consequences. To the extent that we’re misinformed or ignorant, our thinking is flawed. We also need to know alternative moral views and arguments for or against them; our thinking is less rational if we’re unaware of opposing views. We also need self-knowledge. We can to some degree neutralize our biases by understanding how they originated. For example, some are hostile toward a group because they were brought up this way; their attitudes might change if they understood their hostility’s source and broadened their experience.

We can never know all the facts. And we often must act quickly and can’t take time to research a problem. But we can act out of greater or lesser knowledge. Other things equal, a more informed judgment is a more rational one.

(I) Rich would apply imagination. He’d ask, “What would it be like to be in the place of those affected by my company’s policies?” He’d imagine himself as a worker (laboring under bad conditions for a poor salary), or a neighbor (with black smoke coming into his house). Or he’d imagine his children being brought up under the same conditions as his workers’ children.

As we form moral beliefs, we need to exercise imagination. As far as reasonably possible, we need to be vividly and accurately aware of what it would be like to be in the place of those affected by our actions. This differs from just knowing facts. So besides knowing facts about poor people, we also need to appreciate and envision what these facts mean to their lives. Movies, literature, and personal experience can help us visualize another’s life.

Imagining another’s place is a common human experience [28] . A child pretends to be a mother or a soldier. A chess player asks, “If I were in my opponent’s place, how would I respond to this move?” A writer dialogues with an imagined reader who misunderstands and raises objections. A teacher asks, “How would I respond to this assignment if I were a student?” Imagining another’s place is especially important for applying GR.

Our imagination can be more or less accurate. The mine owner will never perfectly understand what it’s like to be in the place of his workers and their families. But, with effort, he can grow in this area and become better at it. The fact that we’ll never do something (like moral decision making) perfectly doesn’t excuse us from trying to do it as well as we reasonably can.

Theists can see this Kita procedure as an attempt to imitate God’s wisdom. Only God can know perfectly how an action affects another and understand perfectly what it would be like to be in another’s place. We struggle in these areas, knowing that our wisdom will always be incomplete. Kita reflects our attempt to know what a perfectly knowing and loving God would want.

(T) Rich would test his consistency using the GR question: “Am I now willing that if I were in the same situation (as that of my workers, neighbors, or customers) then these company actions be done to me?” If the answer is no, then his actions toward others clash with his desire about how he’d be treated in a similar situation – and so he must change something.

If Rich changes company policies, he’ll need creativity to find alternatives. He might listen to ideas from others, after first helping them to feel free to share ideas. He might learn what other companies and cultures do. He might imagine what policies make sense from a worker’s perspective, explain current policies to a child, write an essay listing options, take a long walk, or pray about it. Any acceptable policy must satisfy GR; he must be able to approve of it regardless of where he imagines himself in the situation: as owner, worker, neighbor, or customer. The final solution, while maybe not satisfying everyone fully, needs to be at least minimally acceptable from everyone’s perspective.

(A) Rich would act on GR: he’d act toward others only as he’s willing to be treated in the same situation. Yes, it’s a simple formula. But it may require difficult preparatory work on knowledge, imagination, and creativity.

Flawed desires (about how we’d be treated in a similar situation) can stall GR. And so sometimes we need to make our desires more rational. Many think desires can’t be appraised as rational or irrational. Richard Brandt [29] rightly disagrees. He proposes that a rational desire is one that would survive cognitive therapy : a maximal criticism in terms of logic and vivid exposure to facts.

Suppose you hate the very idea of eating yogurt. Maybe you never tried it; but you were falsely taught that it has bad germs, tastes awful, and is eaten only by weird people. Then your aversion would likely diminish if you understood its origin, learned more about yogurt, and actually tried it.

Or suppose you dislike Xs because your family hated Xs, called them names, taught false stereotypes about them, and had you meet only a few atypically nasty Xs. Your aversion to Xs would likely diminish if you understood its origin and broadened your experience and knowledge. Such cognitive therapy can be useful to help us conquer prejudices and apply GR more wisely. We’ll appeal to it later, in discussing racism and masochism (§§8.2 & 14.3g).

Gensler’s favorite historical GR example is a civil rights speech by President John Kennedy (1963) during the first black enrollment at the University of Alabama. His speech exemplifies Kita: Know-Imagine-Test-Act. Here’s part of it:

If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat lunch in a restaurant open to the public, if he cannot send his children to the best public school available, if he cannot vote for the public officials who represent him, if, in short, he cannot enjoy the full and free life which all of us want, then who among us would be content to have the color of his skin changed and stand in his place? Who among us would then be content with the counsels of patience and delay? … The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights and equal opportunities, whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be treated. [30]

Kennedy also stressed the inconsistency between American ideals (“All men are created equal”) and practice (black soldiers are denied basic rights but fight and die for freedom). His Civil Rights Act passed in 1964, after his death.

Further GRs and relatives [ edit | edit source ]

Many GR formulas (not just Gold 1) are good principles and derivable from IMPARTIALITY and CONSCIENTIOUSNESS. [31] The golden rule is a family of related formulas. No one formula exhausts GR.

The section above on the Same-situation clause gave a GR variation about relevantly similar actual cases. This variation gives a duty instead of an imperative:

Gold 2: a duty GR You ought to treat others only as you consent to being treated in the same situation.

This one deals with desires instead of actions:

Gold 3: a GR about desires Don’t combine desiring something to be done to another with being unwilling that this be done to you in the same situation.

These give consistency conditions for using moral terms:

Gold 4: a GR about consistently using “all right” Don’t believe that it would be all right for you to do A to X unless you’re willing that A be done to you in the same situation.

Gold 5: a GR about consistently using “ought” Don’t believe that you ought to do A to X unless you want A to be done to you in the same situation.

Or we could imagine someone else we care about (for example, our daughter) on the action’s receiving end. [32] Since these and other variations can combine, there are at least 6,460 correct GRs [33] [34] . So “the” golden rule is a family of principles rather than a single principle.

Related principles can help us recognize duties to ourselves. Suppose you have so much concern for your children that you never think of your own needs; you’re inconsistent if you aren’t willing that your children live that way when they grow up. Or you go through college putting little effort into it; you’re inconsistent if you don’t consent to the idea of a daughter of yours doing this. Or, because you lack courage and a sense of self-worth, you refuse to seek treatment for a drug habit that’s ruining your life; you’re inconsistent if you aren’t willing that your younger brother do this in a similar situation. The self-regard principle says: “Treat yourself only as you’re willing to have others (especially those you most care about) treat themselves in the same situation.”

Many people have too little concern for themselves. Various factors (like laziness, fear, habit, and lack of self-appreciation or discipline) can drive us into actions that benefit neither ourselves nor others; consider how we hurt ourselves by overeating, selfishness, laziness, or overwork. Our consistency norms recognize the importance of concern both for others and for ourselves.

GR and self-regard switch persons . We also can switch times and imagine that we now experience future consequences. Future-regard says: “Treat your-future-self only as you’re willing to have been treated by your-past-self in the same situation.” More crudely: “Don’t do what you’ll later regret.” For example, maybe you cause yourself a future hangover by drinking; but, when you imagine yourself experiencing the hangover now, you don’t consent to the idea of your having treated yourself this way. Or you cause yourself a future jail sentence by stealing; but when you picture yourself suffering these consequences now because of your past actions, you don’t consent to these actions. In both cases, you’re inconsistent and violate future-regard.

This carbon rule switches both persons and times: “Keep the earth livable for future generations, as we want past generations to have done for us.”

How does GR apply to actions that affect several parties? Suppose I own a store and need to hire just one worker. Alice and Betty apply, and I must choose between them. Here I must satisfy GR toward each party. So if I pick Alice (who’s more qualified) instead of Betty, then I must be willing that I not be picked if I were in Betty’s situation. Combining two Gold 1s, we get:

Gold 6: a Three-party GR Don’t act in a given way toward X and Y without Being willing that this act be done when you imagine Yourself in X’s place and being willing that this act Be done when you imagine yourself in Y’s place

The generalized GR goes further:

Gold 7: a generalized GR Act only as you’re willing for anyone to act in the same situation, regardless of where or when you imagine yourself or others.

This includes GR (you’re in the place of someone affected by your action), self-regard (someone you care about is in your place), and future-regard (you’re at a future time experiencing your action’s consequences).

Reasonable moral beliefs need to be consistent, informed, imaginative, and maybe more things. Consistency requires GR, impartiality, conscientiousness, logical consistency in beliefs, ends–means consistency, self-regard, and future-regard. Consistency forbids combinations (of beliefs, actions, resolutions, or whatever) instead of saying exactly what to believe or do. Consistency norms specify a broader norm: “Be consistent in thought and action.”

GR fallacies [ edit | edit source ]

At least six fallacies can corrode golden-rule thinking. [35] [36]

(1) The literal GR fallacy assumes that everyone has the same likes, dislikes, and needs that we have. So we treat others in their situation exactly how we want them to treat us in our situation. But on the contrary, we often need to grasp another’s uniqueness, imagine being in their shoes (which includes their likes and dislikes), and ask: “Am I now willing that if I were in the same situation then this be done to me?” Many problems come from neglecting the same-situation clause. ( Literal GR Fallacy , Literal GR & 14.1–2)

(2) The soft GR fallacy assumes that we should never act against what others want. So we always yield to the desires of others. But on the contrary, we sometimes need to stop a two-year-old who wants to put fingers into electrical outlets, refuse a salesperson who wants to sell us overpriced products, fail a student who doesn’t work, forcibly defend ourselves against an attacker, and jail a dangerous criminal. And yes, we’re now willing that if we were in their situation then we be treated that way too. ( Soft GR Fallacy , & The GR question )

(3) The doormat GR fallacy assumes that we should ignore our own interests. So we let others take advantage of us. But on the contrary, we need to consider everyone’s interests, including our own. GR lets us say no to others, as long as we’re willing that others say no to us in similar circumstances. GR tries to harmonize self-love and other-love, without destroying either; it builds on self-love and extends this to others. (See Doormat GR Fallacy , Further GRs and relatives & 14.3g)

(4) The third-parties GR fallacy assumes that we should consider only ourselves and the other person. But on the contrary, we also need to consider third parties. So a judge should consider that freeing a dangerous criminal may bring harm to future victims. We need to satisfy GR toward everyone affected by our action – acting only in ways that we find acceptable, regardless of where or when we imagine ourselves or others in the situation. (See Third Parties GR Fallacy & Further GRs and relatives )

(5) The easy GR fallacy assumes that GR gives an infallible test of right and wrong that takes only seconds to apply. We just ask ourselves how we desire that we be treated in the same situation. Sorry, life is more complicated than that. To lead reliably to right action, GR consistency needs to build on things like knowledge, imagination, creativity, rationalized desires, and a healthy self-love; these can take much time and effort. (See Easy GR Fallacy & Applying GR wisely: Kita )

(6) The too-simple-or-too-complex GR fallacy assumes that GR is either so simple that our kindergarten GR is enough for adult decisions or so complex that only a philosopher can understand it. But on the contrary, GR is scalable (which is computer talk for “expandable”). You can teach GR to little children (“Don’t hit your little sister – you don’t want us to hit you, do you?”), but adults can use it in complex decisions (like how to run a coal mine in a way that respects everyone’s rights and interests).

Robert Fulghum [37] wrote an essay called “All I really need to know I learned in kindergarten.” Here’s an excerpt (Gensler’s italics):

Share everything. Play fair. Don’t hit people. Put things back where you found them. Clean up your own mess…. The golden rule and love and basic sanitation…. Take any of those items and extrapolate it into sophisticated adult terms and apply it to your family life or your work or your government or your world and it holds true and clear and firm.

In kindergarten, you learned many things, including 2+2=4 and the literal GR. What you learned is a great beginning. But you must extrapolate the math further into sophisticated adult terms to do the company budget, and you must develop GR further to apply it to complex adult problems, like how to run a company in a way that respects everyone’s rights and interests. Your kindergarten GR has major flaws if you import it unchanged into the adult world:

• Any smart philosopher can demolish your GR in thirty seconds.
• Your GR thinking may be of low level and suffer from fallacies.
• You may get so confused and frustrated applying your GR to adult problems that you reject it as unworkable and unrealistic.
• Your world will be deprived of benefits that mature GR thinking can bring.

Our GR needs to grow as we mature, or else we may trash it as a “silly kindergarten saying that doesn’t apply to the complex problems of the real world.”

Religions and philosophies [ edit | edit source ]

So far, the course has presented how to phrase GR to avoid absurdities and how to apply it wisely. The course has not yet addressed about why we should follow GR and what larger worldviews can explain GR. We need these, and they will be addressed later in the course.

GR can be part of diverse frameworks. When a Buddhist talks about GR, you may hear about karma, peace of mind, reincarnation, the no-self view, and nirvana. From a Christian, you may hear about God as Love and Father, how we’re brothers and sisters of one family, Christ’s example, and how gratitude to God impels us to love our neighbor.

At a meeting on GR in world religions [38] , a speaker used an airplane example: if you’re assigned a seat that splits a family, you might use GR to conclude that you should offer to switch seats, so the family can sit together. After that, others were inspired to use airplane examples. Gensler’s was this. Motivated by GR, I offer to switch my seat to let a family sit together. A Buddhist does the same thing. And suppose we both formulate GR the same way. Then is our GR thinking the same? Not necessarily. If we push it further, there may be differences: the Buddhist may talk about karma and reincarnation, while Gensler talks about Christian things. Suppose the plane has many people of diverse religions and philosophies who, motivated by GR, offer to switch their seats. Is their GR thinking the same? The formula and Kita procedure may be the same, while GR’s context may be very different.

Just as GR is part of diverse religions, so too it can be part of diverse philosophies. What do you think ethics is based on? Self-evident principles? Then you can see GR (or the consistency axioms from which it follows) as self-evident. A rational procedure? GR uses facts, imagination, and consistency. God’s will? Almost every religion teaches GR. Cultural conventions? Almost every society endorses GR. A social contract for mutual advantages? GR promotes cooperation and helps resolve conflicts. Social usefulness? GR has this. Personal feelings? Many have feelings that support GR. Self-interest? Many find that living GR brings self-respect and better treatment from others, and helps us avoid painful inconsistency and self-condemnation. It’s important that GR can be part of diverse frameworks. We live in an increasingly diverse world. How can we get along, when people have such different ways of looking at things, reflecting different religions, philosophies, and cultures? GR offers a global moral framework that diverse groups can share, but for different reasons. GR is a point of unity in a diverse world.

Technical appendix (This difficult material is optional) [ edit | edit source ]

Gold 1 rests on the idea that we ought to be consistent in thought and action. This section mentions related technical points. If you’re overloaded, skip this section. Or if you want more than what’s here, see Gensler 1996 [39] (more philosophical) or Gensler 2010 [40] (more logical).

We begin with three points about consistency. (1) Our duty to be consistent is subject to certain implicit qualifications (Gensler 1996: 19–23), since there may be cases when we’re unable to be consistent in certain ways (perhaps because of emotional turmoil or the inability to grasp complex logical relationships) or cases when being inconsistent in a minor way will have very bad consequences (maybe migraine headaches or Dr. Evil destroying the world). In practice, these qualifications aren’t very important.

(2) This section of the course leaves open why we ought to be consistent. While most thinkers accept a consistency duty, they justify it differently – for example, as a self-evident truth, a social convention, or a pragmatic norm to avoid confusion.

(3) When we call impartiality and conscientiousness “consistency norms,” we mean that they forbid certain combinations that are somehow objectionable – whether logically (based on the meaning and logical implications of words), ethically, religiously, or pragmatically. This section leaves this open too, since various thinkers may understand these matters differently (ch. 12–13).

Recall our explanation of conscientiousness (See The GR question ):

Conscientiousness, as we use the term, requires that we keep our life (including actions, intentions, etc.) in harmony with our moral beliefs. Suppose I believe that one ought never to kill a human being for any reason. If I’m conscientious, then I’ll never intentionally kill a human being, I’ll resolve not to kill for any reason (even to protect myself or my family), and I won’t want others to kill for any reason. Similar requirements cover beliefs about what is “all right” (“permissible”). If I’m conscientious, then I won’t do something without believing that it would be all right for me to do it. And I won’t believe that something is all right without consenting to the idea of it being done.

This explanation requires that key terms be taken in certain ways.

“Believing that I ought now to do A commits me to acting now to do A.” Here “ought” must be used in an evaluative, all-things-considered sense. When I say “I ought to wear a tie at work,” I may be just describing company policy instead of giving my own evaluation; if so, my statement doesn’t commit me to acting accordingly. And a prima facie duty (a duty that may be overridden by other duties) doesn’t commit me to action. Suppose I say: “Insofar as I promised to take you to the movies, I ought to do this (prima facie duty); but insofar as my wife needs me to drive her to the hospital, I ought to do this instead (prima facie duty). Since my duty to my wife is more urgent, my all-things-considered duty is to drive my wife to the hospital.” Here the prima facie duties don’t commit me to action, but the all-things-considered duty does. The action I’m committed to is intentional action (acting with the intention of doing the thing).

“Believing that A ought to be done commits me to wanting A to be done.” Here “want” (or “desire,” which we use equivalently) must be used in a volitional, all-things-considered sense. Suppose that, while I hate going to the dentist, I make an appointment to go. Do I want to go to the dentist? I don’t want it in an emotional sense (I don’t feel like going), but I do want it in a volitional sense (my will directs me to go). Our consistency norms require the volitional sense. Or suppose I have some desire (a prima facie desire) not to do A, even though my all-things-considered desire is to do A. Our consistency norms require that the all-things-considered desire go with the all-things-considered ought.

“All right” (or “permissible”) in our consistency norms is also to be taken in an evaluative, all-things-considered sense.

“Believing that act A is all right (permissible) commits me to consenting to act A being done.” Now what does this “consenting” (or “willingness” that the action be done, which I use equivalently) involve? I see it as a kind of legislating in our minds about which actions we permit (allow, consent to, are willing to have done). Such permitting has these features:

• For any specific act A that I’ve made up my mind about, I might permit doing A, or permit omitting A, or permit both.
• If I do A or want A to be done, then I must in consistency permit A.
• If I both permit doing A and permit omitting A, then I can consistently decide either way about what to do or want.
• Permitting is volitional and all-things-considered. I may permit act A in an all-things-considered way, even though I object to some aspects of A.
• Instead of permit, consent, or be willing, we can say approve, allow, agree to, condone, or tolerate – in some senses of these terms. The opposite is to inwardly condemn, object to, disapprove, forbid, protest, prohibit, or repudiate.

Recall our bicycle example. Stealing Detra’s bicycle (intentional action) commits you to believing that this act is all right (in an evaluative, all-things-considered way), which commits you to believing that the reversed-situation act is all right (in this same way), which commits you to be willing (in a volitional, all-things-considered way) that this reversed-situation act be done. [41]

Gensler sometimes speaks of GR as calling for a harmony between my act (toward another) and my desire about how I’d be treated in a similar situation. Here “desire” is used in a broad sense to cover consenting (as just described) as well as desiring in a narrow sense (as described a few paragraphs back).

This consistency theory’s more rigorous form uses three axioms, the first two adapted from R.M. Hare (§13.1). Axiom 1 is universalizabilit y, which says that whatever is permissible (obligatory, wrong, etc.) in one case would also be permissible (obligatory, wrong, etc.) in any exactly or relevantly similar case, regardless of the individuals involved. [42] Axiom 2 is prescriptivity , which links judgments about what is obligatory/permissible to imperatives (“Do this”) and permissives (“You may do this”). Axiom 3 is rationality , which says that we ought to think and live consistently with logic plus universalizability and prescriptivity. Here we take universalizability and rationality to be self-evident truths and prescriptivity to express a self-evident logical entailment; but other views are possible (ch. 12–13).

This is a rough outline. For details, see Gensler 1996 & 2010: 290–335. The latter puts the consistency theory into symbolic logic, as a formal system. Gold 1 in symbols is “~( u :A u x • ~ u :(ƎF)(F * A u x • ▉ (FA x u ⊃ MA x u)))” and its 35-step proof is a thing of great beauty.

Assignment [ edit | edit source ]

Please select answers to each of the following questions: Press the "Submit" button after you have made your selections.

1 GR tells us to put ourselves in the place of the other person. But this is logically impossible, since if I were the other person then I wouldn't be me.

2 The golden rule is an invention of modern western culture.

3 The literal form of the golden rule says: "If you want X to do A to you, then do A to X." To this one might object that then

4 Ima Robber has a friend X who asks for help in robbing Y. Ima desires that if he were in the place of (fellow robber) X then he be helped to rob Y. But Ima also desires that if he were in the place of (victim) Y then people not collaborate to rob him. What does GR tell Ima to do?

5 Correct variations on the golden rule require that we treat others only in ways that we're willing to be treated.

Please continue. Select answers to each of the following questions: Press the "Submit" button after you have made your selections.

1 The literal form of the golden rule says: "If you want X to do A to you, then do A to X." This literal GR

2 Correct variations on the golden rule require that we treat others only in ways that we're willing in like circumstances

3 The golden rule gives

4 The duty to follow the golden rule holds without exception.

5 Suppose that I want to steal Pat's computer. To apply the golden rule, I'd imagine myself in Pat's exact place. I'd ask myself, "Do I consent to the idea of someone stealing my computer in such a case?" If the answer is NO, then it follows that I ought not to steal Pat's computer.

1 Suppose that you want to discipline your child. GR would have you ask:

2 While we've formulated the golden rule as an imperative or an ought judgment, we could also formulate it in terms of

3 Ima Masochist desires that if she were in the place of X (a nonmasochist) then she be tortured.

4 The golden rule applies to how we act toward

5 The literal golden rule says: "If you want X to do A to you, then do A to X." A good objection to this is that it implies

1 The practical value of the golden rule is that

2 Suppose that you're thinking about robbing a person who is asleep. GR would have you ask:

3 One could satisfy GR and still act wrongly.

4 Suppose that you act to do A to another but are unwilling to have A done to you in the same situation; you violate GR and your action-desire combination is inconsistent. Which should you change -- your action or your desire?

5 Correct formulations of the golden rule involve

1 In applying the golden rule to someone who is confused, senile, or in a coma, we should ask

2 The golden rule tells you to treat others

3 The golden rule presumes religious beliefs -- especially the belief in a loving God who is the Creator and Father of us all.

4 It's difficult to satisfy the golden rule.

5 The defenders of the golden rule include

1 The three-party version of GR says "Don't act in a given way toward X and Y without consenting to the idea of this act being done when you imagine yourself in the place of X and also consenting to the idea of this act being done when you imagine yourself in the place of Y."

2 The positive GR says "If you want X to do A to you, then do A to X" -- while the negative GR says "If you want X not to do A to you, then don't do A to X." How do the two compare?

3 About how many correctly formulated variations on the golden rule are there?

4 "If you don't consent to the idea of someone doing A to you in the reversed situation, then you ought not to do A to another"

1 "Suppose that you're a parent who has so much concern for your children that you never think of your own needs. But you think that it would be wrong for your children to live in a similar way when they grow up. Are you consistent?"

2 "President Kennedy appealed to the golden rule in arguing that "

3 "The golden rule applies to our actions toward "

4 "The literal golden rule (LR) says: "If you want X to do something to you, then do this same thing to X." To this one might object that LR tells "

5 "We follow GR because it accords with our feelings "

1 "GR is a self-evident truth "

2 "We follow GR because it's God's law "

3 "What is the best match? We follow GR because then people will treat us better, we'll avoid social penalties, and we'll feel better about ourselves "

4 "What is the best match? We follow GR because because society demands this "

5 "What is your answer? Suppose that you explain the golden rule to your child, and then ask, 'If someone hits you, what would the golden rule say to do?' Your child answers, 'Hit him back. Treat others as they treat you.'Does your child have a correct understanding of the golden rule? "

1 "Defenders of the golden rule include "

2 "The literal golden rule says: 'If you want X to do something to you, then do this same thing to X.' This literal GR "

3 "'Love your neighbor' and our golden rule "

4 The literal golden rule tells Ima Masochist, who wants X to torture him, to torture X. The book deals with the masochist problem by

5 I do something to another. To test whether I satisfy our GR, I should ask:

1 The golden rule theorem says:

2 Suppose that your present drinking will cause yourself a future hangover. When you imagine yourself experiencing the hangover now, you don't consent to the idea of your having treated yourself that way. Are you consistent?

3 Correct formulations of the golden rule involve

4 Suppose that you want to punish your child. Our GR would have you ask:

5 The golden rule, understood properly, is

1 In applying GR to someone who is senile, we should ask:

2 The practical value of the golden rule is that

3 One could follow GR but still act wrongly.

4 The golden rule can be derived from the requirements to

5 The golden rule is an invention of modern western culture.

1 Our GR ("We ought to treat others only as we consent to being treated in the same situation") is stronger than the GR of prescriptivism in that:

2 Suppose that you write a poor essay and your teacher gives you a low grade. You tell your teacher, "If you were in my place, you wouldn't want to be given a low grade; so, by the golden rule, you ought not to give me a low grade." What is wrong with this reasoning?

3 Our GR can tell a masochist who wants to be tortured to torture another.

4 What is the best match? Keep your means in harmony with your ends

5 What is the best match? Make similar evaluations about similar actions, regardless of the individuals involved

1 What is the best match? Our GR (Treat others only as you consent to being treated in the same situation

2 What is the best match? Act only in ways that you find acceptable, regardless of where or when you imagine yourself in the situation

3 What is the best match? Treat yourself only as you're willing to have others treat themselves in the same situation

4 What is the best match? Act only as you're willing for anyone to act in the same situation -- regardless of imagined variations of time or person

5 What is the best match? Keep your actions, resolutions, and desires in harmony with your moral beliefs

1 What is the best match? Avoid inconsistent beliefs

2 What is the best match? Treat yourself (in the future) only as you're willing to have been treated by yourself (in the past)

3 What is your answer? The formula of universal law theorem says:

4 What is your answer? If you're conscientious and impartial, then:

5 What is your answer? To apply the golden rule adequately, we need

1 What is your answer? The formula of universal law says that we are to act only as we're willing for anyone to act in similar circumstances -- regardless of imagined variations of time or person. This formula includes the insights of

2 What is your answer? Our GR is the same as "Treat others as they want to be treated" (the platinum rule).

Please continue the course with the topic on Religious and Cultural Origins of the Golden Rule .

References [ edit | edit source ]

• ↑ Küng, H. (1993) Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic, New York: Continuum. 23f
• ↑ See also Obama, B. (2006) The Audacity of Hope, New York: Crown, p. 265.
• ↑ In researching his book, Harry Gensler searched whitehouse.gov for “golden rule” and for “do unto others” in August 2012. The quotes are from archives.cnn.com/transcripts (beginning) and presidentialrhetoric.com .
• ↑ Search georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov for “like to be loved.” A general Web search for Bush’s GR gives references mainly to him.
• ↑ Spier, R. (2005) “The British public speaks,” Science and Engineering Ethics 11: 163–5.
• ↑ Singer, M. (1963) “The golden rule,” Philosophy 38: 293–314
• ↑ Alton, B. (1966) An Examination of the Golden Rule, philosophy dissertation at Stanford, http://disexpress.umi.com
• ↑ Gensler, H. The Golden Rule, philosophy dissertation at Michigan, http://disexpress.umi.com
• ↑ Most Gensler items in the Bibliography of Gensler, Harry J. (March 21, 2013). Ethics and the Golden Rule . Routledge. pp. 256. ISBN  978-0415806879 .   discuss GR, including a technical book on formal ethics (1996, ch. 5), a logic textbook (2010, ch. 11), and an ethics textbook (2011a, ch. 8).
• ↑ Gensler, Harry J. (March 21, 2013). Ethics and the Golden Rule . Routledge. pp. 256. ISBN  978-0415806879 .  
• ↑ See Gensler, Harry J. (March 21, 2013). Ethics and the Golden Rule . Routledge. pp. 256. ISBN  978-0415806879 .   Section 2.1a
• ↑ Wattles, J. (1996) The Golden Rule , New York: Oxford University Press.
• ↑ Gensler, Harry J. (March 21, 2013). Ethics and the Golden Rule . Routledge. pp. 256. ISBN  978-0415806879 .   Section 2.1b
• ↑ This story may have originated as a traditional Tanzanian folktale and was adapted by Gensler for use in teaching the golden rule. See: http://www.afriprov.org/index.php/african-stories-by-season/14-animal-stories/67-how-the-monkeys-saved-the-fish.html
• ↑ Francis of Assisi (c. 1220: 134) was the first Harry Gensler found to use a same-situation clause: “Blessed is the person who supports his neighbor in his weakness as he would want to be supported were he in a similar situation.” Robert Golobish, a Franciscan, sent Gensler this quote. Benjamin Camfield, who published a GR book in 1671, wrote (p. 61): “We must suppose other men in our condition, rank, and place, and ourselves in theirs”; Boraston 1684, Goodman 1688, and Clarke 1706 used similar clauses. Wattles 1996: 35 says: “When we say, ‘Do not treat others as you do not want others to treat you,’ there is the unspoken assumption ‘in (essentially) the same situation.’” Wattles and Gensler differ in strategy. He keeps the GR wording as it is but applies GR in subtle ways to avoid objections; Gensler rephrases GR. They have the same goal, to understand GR.
• ↑ For more on the basis of impartiality, see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/impartiality/#2.1
• ↑ Instead of switching every property in my mind, I could switch just those relevant to evaluating the act. If I’m unsure whether a property is relevant, I could switch it anyway – just to be safe. This has me imagine a relevantly similar action. In this section, it would be more technically precise to speak of switching universal properties instead of just switching properties – so being injured and having blue eyes would be switched, but not being me or being Harry Gensler; The Technical Appendix has more details.
• ↑ We can mix the elements in each pair of boxes. So this is inconsistent: “I do A to another but I believe it’s wrong for A to be done to me in the same situation.” And so is this: “I believe it’s right for me to do A to another but I’m unwilling that A be done to me in the same situation.”
• ↑ Immanuel Kant (1785: 97) used this criminal objection against GR; others followed, including defenders of slavery who wanted to discredit GR (§§8.5 & 14.3c). R.M. Hare was perhaps the first to apply the distinction between our two questions to GR (Hare, R. (1963) Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Clarendon. 108). He noted that “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” obscures the issue (Hare, R.(1972b) Essays on Philosophical Method , Berkeley: University of California.44). See also Hare 1981 Moral Thinking , Oxford: Clarendon.: 95f, Hoche, H. (1982) “The golden rule: New aspects of an old principle,” Contemporary German Philosophy, ed. D. Christensen, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 69– 90. First published in 1978, as “Die Goldene Regel: Neue Aspekte eines alten Moralprinzips,” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 32: 355–75.: 76–9, and Carson 2010: Lying and Deception , Oxford: Oxford University Press, ch. 6–10.139f.
• ↑ Shifting to Pyrite 2a won’t help: “Given that if you were in X’s exact place except that you’re rational then you’d want X to do A to you, then do A to X.” People often need to be treated in certain ways because they’re irrational. For example, I may need to confront X about being irrational. If I were in X’s place but rational then I wouldn’t want to be confronted about being irrational; so, by Pyrite 2a, I shouldn’t confront X. So the solution in the text is better.
• ↑ Gensler, Harry J. (March 21, 2013). Ethics and the Golden Rule . Routledge. pp. 256. ISBN  978-0415806879 .   Section 2.1d
• ↑ Shifting to Pyrite 3a won’t help: “If you believe that if you were in X’s place then A ought to be done to you, then do A to X.” Pyrite 3a commands you to do evil action E to X if your moral beliefs are deranged (you believe that if you were in X’s place then E ought to be done to you).
• ↑ The three dots at the beginning of this statement represent “ therefore .” These three statements are an example of the logic construct called modus ponens .
• ↑ We could rescue the deductive model by rewording GR to say: “If you have this desire about A being done to you and your desire isn’t flawed, then do A to X.” Then we’d add this premise: “Your desire about A being done to you isn’t flawed” – so it isn’t immoral, based on an unhealthy psychological condition, or based on false information. While this works, the added premise makes GR harder to apply, since we must check whether our desire is morally proper (which requires antecedent moral norms and makes GR a less important addition to these norms), based on an unhealthy psychological condition (and that idea needs clarification), or based on false information (and even a morally and psychologically mature person can have false information). So GR gets messy. The consistency model is cleaner; it doesn’t try to build everything into GR but rather sees GR as a consistency component that needs to be combined with other components (like knowledge and imagination).
• ↑ Gensler, Harry J. (March 21, 2013). Ethics and the Golden Rule . Routledge. pp. 256. ISBN  978-0415806879 .   Section 2.1e
• ↑ For more on living the golden rule, see the companion course Living the Golden Rule .
• ↑ These elements can be based on GR. Since we want others to use knowledge and imagination when deciding how to act toward us, we need to use these too. The question tests whether we’re following GR. And the act element is just GR itself. Dialogue , while not mentioned by Kita, is needed to get the facts, imagine another’s situation, and uncover inconsistencies (see Habermas 1983). While Kita covers some key elements of responsible decision making, there are other elements too (Gensler 1996: 149–57).
• ↑ Katz, R. (1963) Empathy , London: Collier-Macmillan. (psychology)
• ↑ Brandt, R. (1970) “Rational desires,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 43: 43–64.
• ↑ President John F. Kennedy, Civil Rights Message , June 11, 1963
• ↑ Gensler, Harry J. (March 21, 2013). Ethics and the Golden Rule . Routledge. pp. 256. ISBN  978-0415806879 .   Section 2.3
• ↑ Don’t believe that you ought to do A to X unless you are willing A to be done to Y (where Y represents someone you especially care about, such as your daughter) in the same situation.
• ↑ Gensler, . (1996) Formal Ethics , New York: Routledge. 101-4
• ↑ Terry, Q. (2012) Golden Rules and Silver Rules of Humanity , 5th ed., Concord, Mass.: Infinity.
• ↑ Gensler, Harry J. (March 21, 2013). Ethics and the Golden Rule . Routledge. pp. 256. ISBN  978-0415806879 .   Section 2.4
• ↑ Other fallacies confuse GR with “Treat others as they treat you” (repayment and retaliation), “Treat others well so they’ll treat you well” (self-interest), or “People will treat you as you treat them” (empirical claim); see also §11.2 Q2.
• ↑ Fulghum, R. (1990) All I Really Need To Know I Learned In Kindergarten , New York: Villard, pp. 6f.
• ↑ Neusner, J., and B. Chilton (eds) (2008) The Golden Rule: The Ethics of Reciprocity in World Religions , New York: Continuum.
• ↑ Formal Ethics , New York: Routledge.
• ↑ Introduction to Logic , 2nd ed., New York: Routledge, pp. 290–335.
• ↑ See also Boonin 2003 (who criticizes consenting), Carson 2010: 129–56 (who emphasizes not objecting), Wallace 2007 (who emphasizes resenting), and our §14.3a. All right and consenting need to be qualified the same way; so if I judge A to be all right relative to the total facts (or to the agent’s data), then I must also consent to A being done relative to the total facts (or to the agent’s data).
• ↑ The more precise wording for “permissible” (similar forms work for other terms) goes: “If act A is permissible, then there’s some universal property (or conjunction of such properties) F, such that: act A is F, and in any actual or hypothetical case any act that’s F is permissible.” Here a universal property is a non-evaluative property describable without proper names (like “Gensler” or “Boston”) or pointer terms (like “I” or “this”). An exactly reversed situation switches all the universal properties. See Gensler 1996: 69–92 & 2010: 324f.

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Essay On The Golden Rule

Type of paper: Essay

Topic: Law , History , Religion , Thinking , Treatment , Utilitarianism , Rule , Golden Rule

Published: 01/19/2020

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Throughout all the centuries of war and violence, one law has persevered through the undercurrent of the history of mankind. The Golden Rule: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” This rule, in its two forms (the positive and the negative), is found in every major world religion and many minor, lesser known ones. I want to briefly explore The Golden Rule through several of these religions and hopefully discover what it means to me. When most people think of The Golden Rule, they automatically think of Jesus when he said, “In everything, do to others as you would have them do to you; for this is the law and the prophets.” (Matthew 7:12) The Golden Rule can be found elsewhere in the Bible in another form. “And you shall love thy neighbor as yourself.” (Mark 12:31) The Golden Rule can be found in the other Western religions as well. In Judaism, "What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor. This is the whole Torah; the rest is just commentary." (Hillel, Talmud, Shabbat 31a) Also in Islam, which has been under some scrutiny due to some recent events, the Prophet Muhammed is attributed to saying, 'Not one of you truly believes until you wish for others what you wish for yourself." (Hadith) The Golden Rule has a long history, but we don't live in the Bronze Age anymore, and it seems, in this era, that The Golden Rule has become a broken law, something of a suggestion like speed limits and drinking ages. To me, The Golden Rule is very simple. If I want people to treat me well, I must treat others well. There are so many cliche sayings regarding this. "What goes around, comes around." "You reap what you sow." "You get what you give." The Golden Rule just comes down to common sense, pure and simple. Treat others as you would want to be treated. Unfortunately, other human traits interfere with this sense of reciprocity. Jealously, lust, and desire all lead to senseless acts of atrocity.

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Article – Golden Rule

I was taught the Golden Rule before I knew it by that name. Whenever I used to do mischievous things to my older sister as a young boy, my mother would pull me aside and ask me, “Would you like it if she did those things to you? No? Then don’t do them to her.” I found that logic to be very persuasive, even as a child, and in retrospect it’s very impressive how effective my mother was at modifying my behavior with such a simple concept. I was also taught to extend that principle to others, as my mother explained that God appears in different masks, even as beggars and other destitute people, to test you to see whether you were kind to every person you met or not, whether you treated them as you wish to be treated.

For us as adults, the Golden Rule remains just as simple and powerful. Be kind to others. Think about how much joy you get in life when you are the subject of someone else’s kindness—imagine how great others would feel if you did the same for them. There is hardly any culture or religion that suggests otherwise. This Golden Rule is the conscious decision to always put yourself in the shoes of another before conducting yourself in a way that will have a direct effect upon that other. The amazing similarities of the quotes below show how eight completely different religions are saying virtually the same thing.

Christianity

“So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets.” (Matthew 7:12, NIV) —The New Testament, Christian text

“The Prophet Muhammad said, ‘None of you [truly] believes until he loves for his brother that which he loves for himself.’” —[Al-Bukhari], Hadith 13

“That which is despicable to you, do not do to your fellow, this is the whole Torah, and the rest is commentary, go and learn it.’” —Hillel the Elder in The Babylonian Talmud

“Choose thou for thy neighbor that which thou choosest for thyself.” —Baha’u’llah, Baha’i prophet

“One should not behave toward others in a way which is disagreeable to oneself.” —Mahabharata (Anusasana Parva 113.8), Hindu text

“Hurt not others with that which pains yourself.” —Udanavarga (5:18), Buddhist text

“Regard your neighbor’s gain as your own gain, and your neighbor’s loss as your own loss.” — T’ai Shang Kan Ying P’ien, Daoist text

Confucianism

“Tzu-kung asked, ‘Is there a single word which can be a guide to conduct throughout one’s life?’ The Master said, ‘It is perhaps the word “shu.” Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire.’” —The Analects (15:24), Confucian text

Science, Philosophy, Psychology

“The good which every man who pursues virtue aims at for himself he will also desire for the rest of mankind, and all the more as he acquires a greater knowledge of God.” —Baruch Spinoza, Enlightenment philosopher

“If it’s really true that all religions have this ethical principle, across continents and across centuries, then it is more likely to have a hardwired scientific basis than if it was just a neighborhood custom.” — Donald W. Pfaff, Ph.D., neuroscientist

One of the great things about the Golden Rule is its sheer simplicity and pithiness. It can capture an entire moral infrastructure in a short phrase There’s nothing complicated about this. It is only logical that when we all treat each other the way we would want to be treated, we all flourish. The Golden Rule works in the spirit of enlightened self-interest. So, if you throw garbage out on the street, the resulting filth will generate disease which will impact all equally, for bacteria does not recognize class or color. Climate change effects all, so it makes sense to mind one’s carbon footprint. Think how wonderful the world would be if we could all finally put this one simple Golden Rule into action on a day-to-day basis!

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Examining “The Golden Rule” and Virtue Ethics Essay (Critical Writing)

Introduction, ethical issue, case study facts, analysis utilizing the golden rule, analysis using virtue ethics, recommendation, works cited.

As described by Harless (2004), human behavior is often thought of as erratic, unpredictable and as a result prone to sudden inexplicable changes that at times defy conventional thought (Harless, 143-147). Despite such behavioral nuances people still continue to conform to societal rules and conventions in what can be described as “norms of behavior” dictated by an individual’s inherent ethical and moral standards which ascribe to a behavioral standpoint of harmonious interaction with other members of a community.

As noted by Leach and Oakland (2010), these ethical and moral standards dictate how individual members of society perceive what can be considered adverse or positive aspects of certain behaviors and methods of decision making and as such are utilized as a means of determining how they should proceed with a particular action (Leach and Oakland, 197 – 201).

The culmination of such methods of decision making are what are known as ethical theories which help individuals come to terms with all aspects of a problem and how best to proceed with what can be considered an ethical compromise to resolving them. It is based on this that this paper will explore the concepts of “The Golden Rule” and virtue ethics in order to resolve the ethical case study that was given for consideration.

The ethical issue in this particular case is whether or not Alice should report the apparent mistake in Mark’s nutritional report to the company or whether she should tell Mark that she looked through the report despite it being marked confidential and explain to him the mistake she saw.

As noted by Jing-Ping (2011) ethical decisions are often made based on either conformity to a generally preconceived societal notion (i.e. crimes are bad hence the fact you should report a crime in progress) or based on inherent ethical or moral code (i.e. treat people as you want to be treated) (Jing-Ping, 21 – 31). In this particular case it can be seen that Alice has to decide whether to report the case or admit to Mark that she looked through the files, in either instance such as decision will definitely impact her friendship with Mark in some way.

The following is a brief outline of the various facts in the case presented which should shed some light in what ethical course action should be followed. First and foremost it must be noted that Mark and Alice have been best friends for quite some time and they even graduated from the same university.

This establishes the fact that they have a close personal relationship which should be taken into account when Alice will make a decision regarding whether to inform the company or not. It was also noted that in the case study Mark has a family to take care of and was barely making enough to support them as is, a fact well known by Alice.

Furthermore, the scenario in the case example clearly states that Mark is a good worker and has actually performed exceptionally well during his 3 years at the company. If Mark were to be fired from his job due to the error in the report not only would this have marred his 3 exceptional years working for the company but NC would lose a great worker.

What must be understood is that NC actually little tolerance for mistakes and as such should the mistake be discovered it would more than likely result in Mark being fired. Underpinning all of this is the fact that Alice violated Mark’s trust by looking at the sealed files, yet if she didn’t the mistake wouldn’t have been found out until it was too late.

As stated by James Want (1999), the Golden Rule can be summarized into two distinct principles: that a person should treat others in the way that they themselves would like to be treated and a person should not treat others in a way that they themselves would not like to be treated (James Wang, 415). Basically the Golden rule is a concept with reciprocal action as its basis wherein people treat others in a positive manner due to the assumption that they themselves will also be treated similarly.

When utilizing this particular theory as means of analyzing the ethicality of a particular set of actions it is always the case that an individual takes into account how they would like to be treated should they be placed in a similar situation where they will feel the ramifications of a particular decision. In this particular there are two viewpoints to take into consideration: the viewpoint of Alice putting herself in Mark’s situation or in her placing herself in the situation of the company.

Viewpoint where Alice Places Herself in the Situation of Mark

From this viewpoint if Alice were to report the mistake to the company it would most likely result in Mark getting fired. It must be pointed out though that the Golden Rule only leads an individual towards making the best decision only if they fulfill the requirement of being highly ethical. Furthermore, it also makes the assumption that those who are affected by decisions are also highly ethical individuals.

While it must also be taken into consideration that Mark has a family to support, has performed admirably over the past several years and that he is Alice’s best friend the fact remains that under the Gold Rule of decision a highly ethical person wouldn’t ask nor expect a friend to lie for them thus if Mark and Alice are highly ethical individuals Alice would report Mark and Mark would accept the consequences of his actions if he was a loyal employee of the company.

Viewpoint where Alice Places Herself in the Situation of the Company

It must be noted though that from the perspective of the company Alice has a responsibility in ensuring the best interests of the company are followed through. If through inaction Alice allowed the actions of Mark to continue then this would result in possibly adverse consequences for the company in the future.

Taking the Golden Rule into consideration, if the roles were reversed Alice herself would want her employees to ensure the continued survival of the company by making sure that problems are prevented from occurring rather than knowingly allowing them to happen. As such if Alice didn’t report Mark to the company she would be complicit in allowing the company to experience a moment of failure.

It is based on these two perspectives that is likely that under the “Golden Rule” Alice would report Mark to the company.

Under the concept of virtue ethics decisions are made based on an individual’s inherent character or virtues wherein personal integrity and moral character are taken into consideration before making a decision. What must be understood is that from the perspective of a virtue ethicist the decision to tell a lie or not actually depends on how that decision reflects upon an individual’s moral behavior or inherent character.

When looking at the situation of Alice and Mark what must be taken into consideration is how would telling the company reflect on Alice’s moral character when she could still tell Mark about the mistake and have him fix it? In the case provided it was not stated that the mistake could not be corrected, the only thing standing in between the mistake being corrected is Alice admitting to Mark that she looked through the report marked “confidential”.

In this situation there are two possible outcomes: Alice would tell Mark that she looked through the documents, which would call her moral integrity into question since she should not have looked at them, or Alice would not tell Mark and report him to the company despite there being the opportunity to still correct the mistake.

Based on the fact that the virtue ethics perspective considers primarily the actor’s character, motivations, and intentions it can be seen that the best course of action would be to tell Mark about the mistake and have him correct it.

When Alice looked through the documents she was not driven by any malicious intentions or self-serving motivations, she was just curious, if she were to report Mark to the company despite there being an alternative means of resolving the problem this would call into questions her own moral character. Thus, taking the virtue ethics perspective into consideration, Alice would tell Mark about the problem and have him fix it.

Based on my analysis of the “Golden Rule” Alice should report Mark to the company however based on virtue ethics Alice should give Mark a chance to correct the mistake in the report. If Alice were to merely report Mark without giving him a chance to fix the mistake this would violate the principles of virtue ethics since she would knowingly cause an action (Mark getting fired) despite there being an alternative (having Mark fix the mistake).

On the other hand, if Alice were to inform Mark about the mistake yet he still doesn’t fix it under the “Golden Rule” Alice has the ethical responsibility to the company to report Mark for his mistake.

Halwani, Raja. “Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics.” Hypatia 18.3 (2003): 161. Literary Reference Center . EBSCO. Web.

Harless, William. “Who’s Afraid of A Brave New World? An argument for the genetic manipulation of human behavior.” Boulevard 20.1 (2004): 143-150.

Literary Reference Center . EBSCO. Web.

James Wang, Qingjie. “The Golden Rule and Interpersonal Care–From A Confucian Perspective.” Philosophy East & West 49.4 (1999): 415.

Jing-Ping, Sun. “Ethical decision-making and ethical responding: an analysis and critique of various approaches through case study.” International Journal of Leadership in Education 14.1 (2011): 21-45. Academic Search Premier . EBSCO. Web.

Leach, Mark M., and Thomas Oakland. “Displaying Ethical Behaviors by Psychologists When Standards Are Unclear.” Ethics & Behavior 20.3/4 (2010): 197-206.

Academic Search Premier . EBSCO. Web.

• Chicago (A-D)
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IvyPanda. (2024, March 26). Examining "The Golden Rule" and Virtue Ethics. https://ivypanda.com/essays/business-ethics-case-study/

"Examining "The Golden Rule" and Virtue Ethics." IvyPanda , 26 Mar. 2024, ivypanda.com/essays/business-ethics-case-study/.

IvyPanda . (2024) 'Examining "The Golden Rule" and Virtue Ethics'. 26 March.

IvyPanda . 2024. "Examining "The Golden Rule" and Virtue Ethics." March 26, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/business-ethics-case-study/.

1. IvyPanda . "Examining "The Golden Rule" and Virtue Ethics." March 26, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/business-ethics-case-study/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Examining "The Golden Rule" and Virtue Ethics." March 26, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/business-ethics-case-study/.

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The Golden Rule

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Wattles offers a comprehensive survey of the history of the golden rule, ‘‘Do unto others as you want others to do unto you’’. He traces the rule’s history in contexts as diverse as the writings of Confucius and the Greek philosophers, the Bible, modern theology and philosophy, and the American ‘‘self-help’’ context. He concludes by offering his own synthesis of these varied understandings.

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Golden Rule of Interpretation Introduction: Initially Golden Rule of Interpretation was called 'Logical Interpretation or Logical Rule of Interpretation

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