know thyself essay in english

Our websites may use cookies to personalize and enhance your experience. By continuing without changing your cookie settings, you agree to this collection. For more information, please see our University Websites Privacy Notice .

UConn Today

• School and College News
• Arts & Culture
• Community Impact
• Entrepreneurship
• Health & Well-Being
• Research & Discovery
• UConn Health
• University Life
• UConn Voices
• University News

August 7, 2018 | Kenneth Best - UConn Communications

Know Thyself: The Philosophy of Self-Knowledge

Dating back to an ancient Greek inscription, the injunction to 'know thyself' has encouraged people to engage in a search for self-understanding. Philosophy professor Mitchell Green discusses its history and relevance to the present.

From Socrates to today's undergraduates, philosophy professor Mitchell Green discusses the history and current relevance of the human quest for self-knowledge. (Getty Images)

UConn philosopher Mitchell S. Green leads a Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) titled Know Thyself: The Value and Limits of Self-Knowledge  on the online learning platform Coursera. The course is based on his 2018 book (published by Routledge) of the same name. He recently spoke with Ken Best of UConn Today about the philosophy and understanding of self-knowledge. This is an edited transcript of their discussion.

Q. ‘Know Thyself’ was carved into stone at the entrance to Apollo’s temple at Delphi in Greece, according to legend. Scholars, philosophers, and civilizations have debated this question for a long time. Why have we not been able to find the answer?

A. I’m not sure that every civilization or even most civilizations have taken the goal to achieve self-knowledge as being among the most important ones. It comes and goes. It did have cachet in the Greece of 300-400 BC. Whether it had similar cachet 200 years later or had something like cultural importance in the heyday of Roman civilization is another question. Of course some philosophers would have enjoined people to engage in a search for self-understanding; some not so much. Likewise, think about the Middle Ages. There’s a case in which we don’t get a whole lot of emphasis on knowing the self, instead the focus was on knowing God. It’s only when Descartes comes on the scene centuries later that we begin to get more of a focus on introspection and understanding ourselves by looking within. Also, the injunction to “know thyself” is not a question, and would have to be modified in some way to pose a question. However, suppose the question is, “Is it possible to know oneself, either in part or fully.” In that case, I’d suggest that we’ve made considerable progress in answering this question over the last two millennia, and in the Know Thyself book, and in the MOOC of the same name, I try to guide readers and students through some of what we have learned.

Q. You point out that the shift Descartes brought about is a turning point in Western philosophy.

A. Right. It’s for various reasons cultural, political, economic, and ideological that the norm of self-knowledge has come and gone with the tides through Western history. Even if we had been constantly enjoined to achieve self-knowledge for the 2,300 years since the time Socrates spoke, just as Sigmund Freud said about civilization – that civilization is constantly being created anew and everyone being born has to work their way up to being civilized being – so, too, the project of achieving self-knowledge is a project for every single new member of our species. No one can be given it at birth. It’s not an achievement you get for free like a high IQ or a prominent chin. Continuing to beat that drum, to remind people of the importance of that, is something we’ll always be doing. I’m doubtful we’ll ever reach a point we can all say: Yup, we’re good on that. We’ve got that covered, we’ve got self-knowledge down. That’s a challenge for each of us, every time somebody is born. I would also say, given the ambient, environmental factors as well as the predilections that we’re born with as part of our cognitive and genetic nature, there are probably pressures that push against self-knowledge as well. For instance, in the book I talk about the cognitive immune system that tends to make us spin information in our own favor. When something goes bad, there’s a certain part of us, hopefully within bounds, that tends to see the glass as half full rather than half empty. That’s probably a good way of getting yourself up off the floor after you’ve been knocked down.

Q. Retirement planners tell us you’re supposed to know yourself well enough to know what your needs are going to be – create art or music, or travel – when you have all of your time to use. At what point should that point of getting to know yourself better begin?

A. I wouldn’t encourage a 9-year-old to engage in a whole lot of self-scrutiny, but I would say even when you’re young some of those indirect, especially self-distancing, types of activities, can be of value. Imagine a 9-year-old gets in a fight on the playground and a teacher asks him: Given what you said to the other kid that provoked the fight, if he had said that to you, how would you feel? That might be intended to provoke an inkling of self-knowledge – if not in the form of introspection, in the form of developing empathetic skills, which I think is part of self-knowledge because it allows me to see myself through another’s eyes. Toward the other end of the lifespan, I’d also say in my experience lots of people who are in, or near, retirement have the idea they’re going to stop working and be really happy. But I find in some cases that this expectation is not realistic because so many people find so much fulfillment, and rightly so, in their work. I would urge people to think about what it is that gives them satisfaction? Granted we sometimes find ourselves spitting nails as we think about the challenges our jobs present to us. But in some ways that frequent grumbling, the kind of hair-pulling stress and so forth, these might be part of what makes life fulfilling. More importantly, long-term projects, whether as part of one’s career or post-career, tend I think to provide more intellectual and emotional sustenance than do the more ephemeral activities such as cruises, safaris, and the like.

Q. We’re on a college campus with undergraduates trying to learn more about themselves through what they’re studying. They’re making decisions on what they might want to do with the rest of their life, taking classes like philosophy that encourage them to think about this. Is this an optimal time for this to take place?

A. For many students it’s an optimal time. I consider one component of a liberal arts education to be that of cultivation of the self. Learning a lot of stuff is important, but in some ways that’s just filling, which might be inert unless we give it form, or structure. These things can be achieved through cultivation of the self, and if you want to do that you have to have some idea of how you want it to grow and develop, which requires some inkling of what kind of person you think you are and what you think you can be. Those are achievements that students can only attain by trying things and seeing what happens. I am not suggesting that a freshman should come to college and plan in some rigorous and lockstep way to learn about themselves, cultivate themselves, and bring themselves into fruition as some fully formed adult upon graduation. Rather, there is much more messiness; much more unpredictable try things, it doesn’t work, throw it aside, try something else. In spite of all that messiness and ambient chaos, I would also say in the midst of that there is potential for learning about yourself; taking note of what didn’t go well, what can I learn from that? Or that was really cool, I’d like to build on that experience and do more of it. Those are all good ways of both learning about yourself and constructing yourself. Those two things can go hand-in-hand. Self-knowledge, self-realization, and self-scrutiny can happen, albeit in an often messy and unpredictable way for undergraduates. It’s also illusory for us to think at age 22 we can put on our business clothes and go to work and stop with all that frivolous self-examination. I would urge that acquiring knowledge about yourself, understanding yourself is a lifelong task.

Q. There is the idea that you should learn something new every day. A lot of people who go through college come to understand this, while some think after graduation, I’m done with that. Early in the book, you talk about Socrates’ defense of himself when accused of corrupting students by teaching them in saying: I know what I don’t know, which is why I ask questions.

It seems to me the beginning of wisdom of any kind, including knowledge of ourselves, is acknowledgment of the infirmity of our beliefs and the paucity of our knowledge. — Mitchell S. Green

A. That’s very important insight on his part. That’s something I would be inclined to yell from the rooftops, in the sense that one big barrier to achieving anything in the direction of self-knowledge is hubris, thinking that we do know, often confusing our confidence in our opinions with thinking that confidence is an indication of my degree of correctness. We feel sure, and take that surety itself to be evidence of the truth of what we think. Socrates is right to say that’s a cognitive error, that’s fallacious reasoning. We should ask ourselves: Do I know what I take myself to know? It seems to me the beginning of wisdom of any kind, including knowledge of ourselves, is acknowledgment of the infirmity of our beliefs and the paucity of our knowledge; the fact that opinions we have might just be opinions. It’s always astonishing to me the disparity between the confidence with which people express their opinions, on one hand, and the negligible ability they have to back them up, especially those opinions that go beyond just whether they’re hungry or prefer chocolate over vanilla. Those are things over which you can probably have pretty confident opinions. But when it comes to politics or science, history or human psychology, it’s surprising to me just how gullible people are, not because they believe what other people say, so to speak, but rather they believe what they themselves say. They tend to just say: Here is what I think. It seems obvious to me and I’m not willing to even consider skeptical objections to my position.

Q. You also bring into the fold the theory of adaptive unconscious – that we observe and pick up information but we don’t realize it at the time. How much does that feed into people thinking that they know themselves better than they do and know more than they think they do?

A. It’s huge. There’s a chapter in the book on classical psychoanalysis and Freud. I argue that the Freudian legacy is a broken one, in the sense that while his work is incredibly interesting – he made a lot of provocative and ingenious claims interesting – surprisingly few of them have been borne out with empirical evidence. This is a less controversial view than it was in the past. Experimental psychologists in the 1970s and 80s began to ask how many of those Freudian claims about the unconscious can be established in a rigorous, experimental way? The theory of the adaptive unconscious is an attempt to do that; to find out how much of the unconscious mind that Freud posited is real, and what is it like. One of the main findings is that the unconscious mind is not quite as bound up, obsessed with, sexuality and violence as posited by Freud. It’s still a very powerful system, but not necessarily a thing to be kept at bay in the way psychoanalysis would have said. According to Freud, a great deal with the unconscious poses a constant threat to the well-functioning of civilized society, whereas for people like Tim Wilson, Tanya Chartrand, Daniel Gilbert, Joseph LeDoux, Paul Ekman, and many others, we’ve got a view that says that in many ways having an adaptive unconsciousness is a useful thing, an outsourcing of lots of cognition. It allows us to process information, interpret it, without having to consciously, painstakingly, and deliberately calculate things. It’s really good in many ways that we have adaptive unconscious. On the other hand, it tends to predispose us, for example, to things like prejudice. Today there is a discussion about so-called implicit bias, which has taught us that because we grew up watching Hollywood movies where protagonist heroes were white or male, or both; saw stereotypes in advertising that have been promulgated – that experience, even if I have never had a consciously bigoted, racist, or sexist thought in my life, can still cause me to make choices that are biased. That’s a part of the message on the theory of adaptive unconscious we would want to take very seriously and be worried about, because it can affect our choices in ways that we’re not aware of.

Q. With all of this we’ve discussed, what kind of person would know themselves well?

A. Knowing oneself well would, I suspect, be a multi-faceted affair, only one part of which would have to do with introspection as that notion is commonly understood. One of these facets involves acknowledging your limitations, “owning them” as my Department of Philosophy colleague Heather Battaly would put it. Those limitations can be cognitive – my lousy memory that distorts information, my tendency to sugarcoat any bad news I may happen to receive? Take the example of a professor reading student evaluations. It’s easy to forget the negative ones and remember the positive ones – a case of “confirmation bias,” as that term is used in psychology. Knowing that I tend to do that, if that’s what I tend to do, allows me to take a second look, as painful as it might be. Again, am I overly critical of others? Do I tend to look at the glass as overly half full or overly half empty? Those are all limitations of the emotional kind, or at least have an important affective dimension. I suspect a person who knows herself well knows how to spot the characteristic ways in which she “spins” or otherwise distorts positive or negative information, and can then step back from such reactions, rather than taking them as the last word.

I’d also go back to empathy, knowing how to see things from another person’s point of view. It is not guaranteed to, but is often apt to allow me to see myself more effectively, too. If I can to some extent put myself into your shoes, then I also have the chance to be able to see myself through your eyes and that might get me to realize things difficult to see from the first-person perspective. Empathizing with others who know me might, for instance, help to understand why they sometimes find me overbearing, cloying, or quick to judge.

Q. What would someone gain in self-knowledge by listening to someone appraising them and speaking to them about how well they knew them? How does that dynamic help?

A. It can help, but it also can be shocking. Experiments have suggested other people’s assessments of an individual can often be very out of line with that person’s self-assessment. It’s not clear those other person’s assessments are less accurate – in some cases they’re more accurate – as determined by relatively well-established objective psychological assessments. Third-person assessments can be both difficult to swallow – bitter medicine – and also extremely valuable. Because they’re difficult to swallow, I would suggest taking them in small doses. But they can help us to learn about ourselves such things as that we can be unaccountably solicitous, or petty, or prone to one-up others, or thick-skinned. I’ve sometimes found myself thinking while speaking to someone, “If you could hear yourself talking right now, you might come to realize …” Humblebragging is a case in point, in which someone is ostensibly complaining about a problem, but the subtext of what they’re saying might be self-promoting as well.

All this has implications for those of us who teach. At the end of the semester I encourage my graduate assistants to read course evaluations; not to read them all at once, but instead try to take one suggestion from those evaluations that they can work on going into the next semester. I try to do the same. I would not, however, expect there ever to be a point at which one could say, “Ah! Now I fully know myself.” Instead, this is more likely a process that we can pursue, and continue to benefit from, our entire lives.

Recent Articles

May 23, 2024

Announcing the Provost’s 2024 Alumni Faculty Excellence Awards

Read the article

UConn Law Grad Starts Teaching Fellowship

American Urology Association Honors Dr. Peter Albertsen

• Philosophy and Psychology

The Origin of the Famous Saying "Know Thyself"

The Encyclopedia Of Philosophy

What Is “Know Thyself” By Socrates? A Comprehensive Overview

Have you ever heard the phrase “know thyself”?

It’s a famous quote that has been attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates. But what does it really mean?

Is it just a catchy saying, or is there more to it?

In this article, we’ll explore the concept of “know thyself” and why it’s still relevant today.

We’ll delve into the different interpretations of the phrase and how it can be applied to our modern lives.

So, sit back, relax, and let’s discover what Socrates meant when he said “know thyself.”

What Is Know Thyself By Socrates

Socrates was a philosopher who lived in ancient Greece and is widely regarded as one of the most influential thinkers in Western philosophy. One of his most famous teachings is the phrase “know thyself.”

But what does it mean to know oneself? According to Socrates, it means to have a deep understanding of one’s own beliefs, values, and principles. It means to be aware of one’s own strengths and weaknesses, and to be honest with oneself about them.

Socrates believed that self-knowledge was essential for living a good life. He believed that if we don’t know ourselves, we can’t make good decisions or live in accordance with our true nature.

The Origin Of Know Thyself

The phrase “know thyself” has its roots in ancient Greece and was inscribed on the forecourt of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi, also known as the Oracle of Delphi. Legend has it that the seven sages of ancient Greece, philosophers, statesmen, and law-givers who laid the foundation for Western culture, gathered together in Delphi and encapsulated their wisdom into this command.

The saying was subsequently attributed to a dozen other authors, of which Thales of Miletus most commonly takes the honor. However, it was Socrates and Plato who popularized this phrase and grappled with the mysterious nature of knowledge and identity. Since Greek philosophy laid the foundation for subsequent Western thought, the influence of the Greek command “know thyself” expanded to many other schools of thought, permeating Western philosophical essays and inspirational poetry.

The call to self-knowledge also appears in the East, independently, as far as we can tell, from its Greek emphasis. The Hindu scriptures bring the self into prominence, speaking of its realization as the means to immortality. Along the same vein as Western philosophy, the Hindus claim that man is not naturally born knowing his self and that self-knowledge is a bold and challenging endeavor.

Even farther East, in Imperial China, Confucius draws from the ancient texts of the I-Ching and calls for a system of government based on self-government, which implies self-knowledge. Thus, the call to knowing oneself is universal historically and cannot easily be attributed to a single individual or even a single culture.

Socrates’ Interpretation Of The Phrase

Socrates’ interpretation of the phrase “know thyself” goes beyond just having a general understanding of oneself. He believed that true wisdom comes from recognizing the limits of one’s own knowledge and understanding. In other words, to know oneself means to acknowledge what one does not know.

Socrates argued that people must know themselves before they can claim to know anything else. He believed that ignorance ultimately derived from a lack of self-knowledge, and that by remedying this deficiency, one could gain greater knowledge of oneself and others.

For Socrates, all knowledge must start with the individual and the cultivation of the rational part of their soul. Only then can one acquire knowledge of the world around them, including objects, things, and other people. Socrates believed that knowing oneself was the first step towards wisdom, and that it required courage to persevere, acknowledge failure, and live with the knowledge of one’s own ignorance.

Socrates also believed that knowing oneself meant recognizing one’s true nature as an immortal soul. He argued for the immortality of the soul in his Phaedo dialogue and believed that by knowing oneself as an immortal soul, one could live in accordance with their true nature and make decisions that align with their highest good.

The Importance Of Self-Knowledge

Self-knowledge is important because it allows us to understand our own thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. It provides us with a deeper understanding of our own motivations and desires, which in turn allows us to make better decisions and live more fulfilling lives.

Without self-knowledge, we may be prone to making poor decisions that are not in line with our true nature. We may also struggle to understand why we feel the way we do or why we behave in certain ways. This lack of understanding can lead to feelings of confusion, frustration, and even depression.

Furthermore, self-knowledge is essential for personal growth and self-improvement. By understanding our own strengths and weaknesses, we can work on improving ourselves and becoming the best version of ourselves. We can identify areas where we need to grow and develop new skills or habits that will help us achieve our goals.

In addition, self-knowledge is important for healthy relationships with others. When we know ourselves well, we are better able to communicate our needs and boundaries to others. We are also more empathetic and understanding towards others because we have a greater awareness of our own emotions and experiences.

Applying Know Thyself In Modern Life

In modern life, the concept of “know thyself” is still highly relevant. It means understanding who we are as individuals and what motivates us. It means recognizing our own limitations and knowing when to ask for help.

One way to apply this concept is by practicing self-reflection. This involves taking time to think about our actions, thoughts, and feelings. By doing so, we can gain a deeper understanding of ourselves and our motivations. We can also identify patterns in our behavior that may be holding us back or causing us problems.

Another way to apply “know thyself” is by seeking feedback from others. This can be difficult, as it requires us to be open to criticism and willing to learn from our mistakes. However, it can also be incredibly valuable, as it allows us to see ourselves from a different perspective and identify areas for improvement.

Finally, “know thyself” means being true to ourselves and living in accordance with our values and principles. This may require making difficult decisions or standing up for what we believe in, even if it’s not popular or easy.

Challenges In Achieving Self-Knowledge

Despite the importance of self-knowledge, achieving it is not an easy task. There are several challenges that make it difficult for individuals to truly know themselves.

One challenge is the tendency to deceive ourselves. It’s common for people to have a distorted view of themselves, either by overestimating their abilities or downplaying their flaws. This self-deception can prevent us from seeing ourselves clearly and hinder our ability to make good decisions.

Another challenge is the influence of external factors. Our beliefs and values are often shaped by the society and culture we live in, and it can be difficult to separate our own thoughts and feelings from those that have been imposed on us. This can make it challenging to understand our true selves and what we really want out of life.

Additionally, emotions can cloud our judgment and make it difficult to see ourselves objectively. Fear, anxiety, and other negative emotions can prevent us from confronting our weaknesses and acknowledging our mistakes.

Finally, achieving self-knowledge requires a willingness to be introspective and reflective. It takes effort and courage to examine oneself honestly, and many people may avoid doing so out of fear or discomfort.

Despite these challenges, achieving self-knowledge is possible with practice and dedication. By being honest with ourselves, seeking feedback from others, and engaging in introspection, we can gain a deeper understanding of ourselves and live more fulfilling lives.

Tools And Techniques For Self-Discovery

Knowing oneself is a lifelong journey, and there are many tools and techniques available to help with self-discovery. Here are a few:

1. Self-reflection: Taking the time to reflect on your thoughts, feelings, and actions can help you gain insight into who you are and what you value. Journaling, meditation, and mindfulness practices are all great ways to cultivate self-awareness.

2. Personality assessments: There are many personality assessments available that can help you understand your strengths, weaknesses, and tendencies. These assessments can provide valuable insights into your personality type and how you interact with others.

3. Feedback from others: Sometimes, it can be difficult to see ourselves clearly. Asking for feedback from trusted friends or colleagues can provide a different perspective and help us see ourselves more objectively.

4. Therapy or counseling: Talking to a mental health professional can be a powerful way to gain insight into yourself and your patterns of behavior. A therapist can help you identify areas for growth and provide support as you work through challenges.

5. Mindful self-compassion: Being kind and compassionate toward yourself is an important part of self-discovery. Practicing mindful self-compassion involves treating yourself with the same kindness and care that you would offer to a good friend.

Ultimately, the key to self-discovery is to approach it with curiosity and openness. By being willing to explore our inner selves, we can gain a deeper understanding of who we are and what we want out of life.

Related Posts

Did jesus know about socrates a historical perspective.

Two of the most influential figures in history, one a philosopher and the other a religious leader, have left a lasting impact on the world.…

Read More »

What Did Socrates Discover? A Look Into His Life And Philosophy

In the world of philosophy, few individuals have had as profound an impact as the ancient Greek thinker we know simply as Socrates. Despite never…

How Did Socrates Defend Himself? A Comprehensive Overview

In the world of philosophy, Socrates is a name that is synonymous with wisdom, questioning, and the pursuit of truth. However, he was also a…

Did Socrates Have A Wife? A Look Into The Philosopher’s Personal Life

In ancient Greece, philosophers were revered for their wisdom and intellect. One of the most famous philosophers of all time was Socrates, known for his…

How Did Socrates Think People Should Learn? A Comprehensive Overview

Learning has been a fundamental part of human existence since the beginning of time. From the earliest days of civilization, people have sought to understand…

How To Read Socrates: A Beginner’s Guide

Socrates, the ancient Greek philosopher, is widely regarded as one of the most influential figures in Western philosophy. Despite never having written anything down himself,…

About The Author

Bradley Gray

• Corrections

Michel de Montaigne and Socrates on ‘Know Thyself’

‘Know Thyself’ is a popular philosophical dictum. This article explores how Socrates popularized the saying, and how later thinkers like Montaigne interpreted it.

In ancient Delphi, the phrase ‘Know Thyself’ was one of several philosophical sayings allegedly carved over the entrance to the Temple of Apollo. These phrases came to be known as the ‘Delphic maxims’. Clearly ‘Know Thyself’ was influential enough in ancient Greek society to feature so prominently at one of its most revered holy sites. It would later be referenced over a thousand years later by Montaigne in his celebrated Essays. So where did the maxim actually come from?

Socrates on “Know Thyself”

While many people assume that Socrates invented ‘Know Thyself’ , the phrase has been attributed to a vast number of ancient Greek thinkers, from Heraclitus to Pythagoras. In fact, historians are unsure of where exactly it came from. Even dating the phrase’s appearance at Delphi is tricky. One temple of Apollo at Delphi burnt down in 548 BC, and was replaced with a new building and facade in the latter half of the sixth century. Many academics date the inscription to this time period. Christopher Moore believes that the most likely period of its appearance at the temple is between 525 and 450 BC, since this is when “Delphi would have been asserting itself as a center of wisdom” (Moore, 2015).

The fact that we’ve struggled to establish the origins of ‘Know Thyself’ has two major consequences for Socrates’ use of the phrase. First, we’ll never be able to say with certainty how Socrates was reinterpreting the earlier Delphic maxim (since we have no idea when or why it appeared!). Second, we do know that the maxim was hugely important within ancient Greek philosophical circles. Its prominent location at Delphi, home of the famous oracle , means we have to take it seriously.

What Is Self-Knowledge? Some Views on Socratic Self-Knowledge

Get the latest articles delivered to your inbox

Please check your inbox to activate your subscription.

Nevertheless, scholars have interpreted Socrates’ interest in self-knowledge in very different ways. Some academics are dismissive of its value altogether, believing that the ancients held true self-knowledge to be impossible. The soul is the self, and the self is always changing, so how is it possible to ever really ‘know’ oneself? Others claim that the saying is peripheral to Socrates’ wider philosophy.

Not everyone agrees. Various scholars have sought to illustrate how important self-knowledge is to Socrates’ philosophical project . Academics such as M. M. McCabe have argued that Socratic self-knowledge involves a deep examination of one’s principles and beliefs. We must judge ourselves honestly and openly in order to see where we might be flawed in our views. ‘Know thyself’ requires “the courage to persevere, to acknowledge failure, to live with the knowledge of one’s own ignorance” (McCabe, 2011). This is where we begin to see how self-knowledge, when done correctly, can become a tool for self-improvement.

Self-Knowledge: What Are We Actually “Knowing”?

We’ve already seen the word ‘self’ several times in this article. But what does it actually mean? As Christopher Moore points out, “the severe challenge in ancient philosophy is to identify the “self” of self-knowledge” (Moore, 2015). Is a self something universal that everyone possesses? And is it therefore an entity which can be discovered? Or is it something that doesn’t preexist an effort to know it i.e., does it need to be constructed rather than found?

According to Socrates, self-knowledge was a continuous practice of discovery. In Plato’s dialogues , for example, Socrates is portrayed as being dismissive of people who are interested in trying to rationalize things like mythology: “I am not yet able, as the Delphic inscription has it, to know myself; so it seems to me ridiculous, when I do not yet know that, to investigate irrelevant things”.

The self, according to Socrates , is best thought of as a ‘selfhood’ consisting of beliefs and desires, which in turn drive our actions. And in order to know what we believe, we first have to know what is true. Then we can reassess our preconceptions on a given topic once we have established the truth. Of course, this is much easier to say than to actually do! Hence why self-knowledge is portrayed as a continuous practice.

Self-Knowledge and the Importance of Conversation

Socrates was well-known for his love of conversation . He enjoyed asking questions of other people, whether they were philosophers or senators or merchants. Being able to answer a question, and also offering a coherent explanation for one’s answer, is an important component of self-knowledge. Socrates liked to test people’s beliefs, and in doing so try to establish truth about a particular topic.

Sometimes we confuse how certain we are of our opinions with whether they are actually true or not. Socrates pursued conversation because it helps to question why we believe certain things. If we don’t have a good answer to why we are fighting against climate change, for instance, then how can we continue to hold this as a principle? As Moore writes, “Being properly a self involves meaning what one says, understanding how it differs from the other things one could say, and taking seriously its consequences for oneself and one’s conversations” (Moore, 2015). We have to be able to account for our views on the world without recourse to circular reasoning and other weak forms of argumentation, since these things won’t help us to establish truth.

Michel de Montaigne and ‘Know Thyself’

The French Renaissance thinker Michel de Montaigne was another man who believed in the importance of conversation. He was also a proponent of self-knowledge. His entire purpose in writing the Essays, his literary magnum opus, was to try and commit a portrait of himself to paper: “I am myself the subject of this book.” In doing so, he ended up spending the last decades of his life writing and rewriting over a thousand pages of his observations on every topic imaginable, from child-rearing to suicide.

In many ways, Socrates would have approved of this continuous process of self-examination – particularly Montaigne’s commitment to honest and open assessment of one’s selfhood. Montaigne shares his bowel habits and sicknesses with his readers, alongside his changing tastes in wine. He commits his aging body to paper alongside his evolving preferences for philosophers and historians. For example, Montaigne goes through a phase of fascination with Skepticism, before moving on to Stoicism and thus adding in more quotes and teachings from Stoic philosophers to balance out his older Skeptic preferences. All of this revision and reflection helps to create a moving literary self-portrait .

Indeed, the Essays were constantly revised and annotated right up until Montaigne’s death. In an essay entitled “On Vanity” he describes this process thus: “Anyone can see that I have set out on a road along which I shall travel without toil and without ceasing as long as the world has ink and paper.” This is one of many quotes which reveals Montaigne’s belief that true self-knowledge is indeed impossible. Montaigne frequently complains about the difficulties of attempting to properly ‘pin down’ his own selfhood, since he finds that his beliefs and attitudes towards various topics are always changing. Every time he reads a new book or experiences a particular event, his perspective on something might well change.

These attempts at self-knowledge don’t entirely align with Socrates’ belief that we should attempt to seek out truth in order to know what we ourselves believe. For one thing, Montaigne is not convinced that finding even objective truth in the world is possible, since books and theories are constantly being published that contradict one another. If this is true, then what can we ever truly know?

Well, Montaigne is content to believe that knowing thyself is still the only worthy philosophical pursuit. Even though it’s not a perfect process, which seems to evade him constantly, he uses the Delphic maxim ‘Know Thyself’ to argue that in a world full of distractions, we must hold on to ourselves above all else.

Self-Knowledge and Socrates’ ‘Know Thyself’ in Modern Society: Following Montaigne’s Example

Of course, Socrates and Montaigne are not the only thinkers to ponder this phrase. Everyone from Ibn Arabi to Jean-Jacques Rousseau to Samuel Coleridge has explored the meaning and importance of ‘Know Thyself’. Self-knowledge is also explored in non-Western cultures too, with similar principles found in Indian philosophical traditions and even Sun Tzu’s The Art of War .

So how can we begin to use self-knowledge in our everyday lives ? Thinking about who we are can help us to establish what we want, and what kind of person we would like to be in the future. This can be useful from a practical standpoint when making decisions about what to study at university, or which career path to follow.

We can also use self-knowledge to improve how we communicate with other people. Rather than simply believing what we think, without any further scrutiny, we should try and look more deeply at why we think that and be open to testing our assumptions. Analyzing our own opinions in this way can help us to defend our opinions and beliefs more convincingly, and perhaps even persuade other people to join our cause.

‘Know thyself’ has likely been treated as a valuable maxim within human society for thousands of years. Its inclusion on the walls of Apollo’s temple at Delphi cemented its reputation as a useful philosophical maxim . Socrates explored it in more detail and came up with his own interpretation, while thousands of years later, Montaigne attempted to put the aphorism into practice with his Essays. We can draw on these two influential figures to interpret ‘Know thyself’ for, well, ourselves and our own sense of selfhood.

Bibliography

M.M. McCabe, “It goes deep with me”: Plato’s Charmides on knowledge, self-knowledge and integrity” in Philosophy, Ethics and a Common Humanity, ed. by C. Cordner (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), pp. 161-180

Michel de Montaigne, Les Essais, ed. by Jean Balsamo, Michel Magnien & Catherine Magnien-Simonen (Paris: Gallimard, 2007)

Christopher Moore, Socrates and Self-Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015)

Plato, Phaedrus, trans. by Christopher Rowe (London: Penguin, 2005)

Where Was Ancient Greece Located?

By Rachel Ashcroft MSc Comparative Literature, PhD Renaissance Philosophy Rachel is a contributing writer and journalist with an academic background in European languages, literature and philosophy. She has an MA in French and Italian and an MSc in Comparative Literature from the University of Edinburgh. Rachel completed a PhD in Renaissance conceptions of time at Durham University. Now living back in Edinburgh, she regularly publishes articles and book reviews related to her specialty for a range of publications including The Economist.

Frequently Read Together

5 Quotes by Socrates Explained

Heraclitus of Ephesus: The Philosopher of Change (Bio & Quotes)

Oracle of Delphi: Why Was It So Important To Ancient Greeks?

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

Self-Consciousness

Human beings are conscious not only of the world around them but also of themselves: their activities, their bodies, and their mental lives. They are, that is, self-conscious (or, equivalently, self-aware). Self-consciousness can be understood as an awareness of oneself. But a self-conscious subject is not just aware of something that merely happens to be themselves, as one is if one sees an old photograph without realising that it is of oneself. Rather a self-conscious subject is aware of themselves as themselves ; it is manifest to them that they themselves are the object of awareness. Self-consciousness is a form of consciousness that is paradigmatically expressed in English by the words “I”, “me”, and “my”, terms that each of us uses to refer to ourselves as such .

A central topic throughout the history of philosophy—and increasingly so since the seventeenth century—the phenomena surrounding self-consciousness prompt a variety of fundamental philosophical and scientific questions, including its relation to consciousness; its semantic and epistemic features; its realisation in both conceptual and non-conceptual representation; and its connection to our conception of an objective world populated with others like ourselves.

1.1 Ancient and Medieval Discussions of Self-Consciousness

1.2 early modern discussions of self-consciousness, 1.3 kantian and post-kantian discussions of self-consciousness, 1.4 early twentieth century discussions of self-consciousness.

• Supplement: Scepticism About Essential Indexicality and Agency
• Supplement: Evans on First Person Thought
• Supplement: The Scope of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification

3.1 Consciousness of the Self

3.2 pre-reflective self-consciousness, 3.3 the sense of ownership, 4.1 self-consciousness and personhood, 4.2 self-consciousness and rationality, 4.3 self-consciousness and consciousness, 4.4 self-consciousness and intersubjectivity, 5.1 mirror recognition, 5.2 episodic memory, 5.3 metacognition, other internet resources, related entries, 1. self-consciousness in the history of philosophy.

A familiar feature of ancient Greek philosophy and culture is the Delphic maxim “Know Thyself”. But what is it that one knows if one knows oneself? In Sophocles’ Oedipus , Oedipus knows a number of things about himself, for example that he was prophesied to kill Laius. But although he knew this about himself, it is only later in the play that he comes to know that it is he himself of whom it is true. That is, he moves from thinking that the son of Laius and Jocasta was prophesied to kill Laius, to thinking that he himself was so prophesied. It is only this latter knowledge that we would call an expression of self-consciousness and that, we may presume, is the object of the Delphic maxim. During the course of the drama Oedipus comes to know himself, with tragic consequences. But just what this self-consciousness amounts to, and how it might be connected to other aspects of the mind, most notably consciousness itself, is less clear. It has, perhaps unsurprisingly, been the topic of considerable discussion since the Greeks. During the early modern period self-consciousness became central to a number of philosophical issues and, with Kant and the post-Kantians, came to be seen as one of the most important topics in epistemology and the philosophy of mind.

Although it is occasionally suggested that a concern with self-consciousness is a peculiarly modern phenomenon, originating with Descartes (Brinkmann 2005), it is in fact the topic of lively ancient and medieval debates, many of which prefigure early modern and contemporary concerns (Sorabji 2006). Aristotle, for example, claims that a person must, while perceiving any thing, also perceive their own existence ( De Sensu 7.448a), a claim suggestive of the view that consciousness entails self-consciousness. Furthermore, according to Aristotle, since the intellect takes on the form of that which is thought (Kahn 1992), it “is thinkable just as the thought-objects are” ( De Anima 3.4.430), an assertion that was interpreted by Aristotle’s medieval commentators as the view that self-awareness depends on an awareness of extra-mental things (Cory 2014: ch. 1; Owens 1988).

By contrast, the Platonic tradition, principally through the influence of Augustine, writing in the fourth and fifth centuries, is associated with the view that the mind “gains the knowledge of [itself] through itself” ( On the Trinity 9.3; Matthews 1992; Cary 2000) by being present to itself. Thus, on this view, self-awareness requires no awareness of outer things. In a similar vein, in the eleventh century, Avicenna argues, by way of his Flying Man thought experiment, that a newly created person floating in a void, with all senses disabled, would nevertheless be self-aware. Thus the self that one cognises cannot be a bodily thing of which one is aware through the senses (Kaukua & Kukkonen 2007; Black 2008; Kaukua 2015). On such views, and in contrast to the Aristotelian picture, basic self-awareness is neither sensory in nature nor dependent on the awareness of other things. This latter claim was accepted by Aquinas, writing in the thirteenth century, who can be seen as synthesising aspects of the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions (Cory 2014). For not only does Aquinas claim that there is a form of self-awareness—awareness that one exists—for which, “the mere presence of the mind suffices”, there is another form—awareness of one’s essence—that, as Aristotle had claimed, is dependent on cognising other things and so for which “the mere presence of the mind does not suffice” ( Summa 1, 87, 1; Kenny 1993: ch. 10).

This ancient and medieval debate concerning whether the mere presence of the mind is sufficient for self-awareness is related to another concerning whether self-awareness is itself sensory in character or, put another way, whether the self is or is not perceptible. Aquinas has sometimes been interpreted as offering a positive answer to this question, sometimes a negative answer (see Pasnau 2002: ch. 11, and Cory 2014: ch. 4, for differing views). These issues were also discussed in various Indian (Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist) debates (Albahari 2006; Siderits, Thompson, & Zahavi 2013; Ganeri 2012a,b), with a variety of perspectives represented. For example, in the writing of the eleventh century Jain writer Prabhācandra, there appears an argument very much like Avicenna’s Flying Man argument for the possibility of self-awareness without awareness of the body (Ganeri 2012a: ch. 2), whereas various thinkers of the Advaita Vendānta school argue that there is no self-awareness without embodiment (Ram-Prasad 2013). There were, therefore, wide-ranging debates in the ancient and medieval period not only about the nature of self-consciousness, but also about its relation to other aspects of the mind, most notably sensory perception and awareness of the body.

Central to the early modern discussion of self-consciousness are Descartes’ assertions, in the second of his Meditations , that “ I am , I exist , is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind” (Descartes 1641: 80), and, in both his Discourse and Principles , that “I think, therefore I am”, or “ cogito ergo sum ” (Descartes 1637: 36, and Descartes 1644: 162; see the discussion of Reflection in the entry on seventeenth century theories of consciousness ). The cogito , which was anticipated by Augustine ( On the Trinity 10.10; Pasnau 2002: ch. 11), embodies two elements of self-awareness—awareness that one is thinking and awareness that one exists—that play a foundational role in Descartes’ epistemological project. As such, it is crucial for Descartes that the cogito is something of which we can be absolutely certain. But whilst most commentators are happy to agree that both “I am thinking” and “I exist” are indubitable, there is a great deal of debate over the grounds for such certainty and over the form of the cogito itself (Hintikka 1962; Wilson 1978: ch. 2, §2; B. Williams 1978: ch. 3; Markie 1992). Of particular concern is the question whether these two propositions are known by inference or non-inferentially, e.g., by intuition, an issue that echoes the medieval debates concerning whether one can be said to perceive oneself.

One philosopher who accepts the former, intuition-based, account is Locke, who claims that

we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence , and an internal infallible Perception that we are. In every Act of Sensation, Reasoning, or Thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own Being. (1700: IV.ix.3)

A similar claim can be found in Berkeley’s Three Dialogues (1713: 231–234; Stoneham 2002: §6.4). Further, Locke makes self-consciousness partly definitive of the very concept of a person, a person being “a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places” (1700: II. xxvii.9; Ayers 1991: vol.II, ch.23; Thiel 2011: ch. 4), and self-consciousness also plays an important role in his theory of personal identity (see §4.1 ).

If Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley can be interpreted as accepting the view that there is an inner perception of the self, on this question Hume stands in stark contrast notoriously writing that whilst

there are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self […] For my part when I enter most intimately into what I call myself , I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. (Hume 1739–40: bk.1, ch.4, §6; Pitson 2002: ch. 1; Thiel 2011: ch. 12; cf. Lichtenberg’s famous remark that one should not say “I think” but rather, “it thinks”, discussed in Zöller 1992 and Burge 1998)

Hume’s view that there is no impression, or perception, of oneself is crucial to his case for the understanding of our idea of ourselves as nothing more than a “heap or collection of different perceptions” (1739–40: bk.1, ch.4, §6; Penelhum 2000; G. Strawson 2011a), since lacking an impression of the owner of these perceptions we must, in accordance with his empiricist account of concept acquisition, lack an idea of such. It is clear, then, that in the early modern period issues of self-consciousness play an important role in a variety of philosophical questions regarding persons and their minds.

Hume’s denial that there is an inner perception of the self as the owner of experience is one that is echoed in Kant’s discussion in both the Transcendental Deduction and the Paralogisms, where he writes that there is no intuition of the self “through which it is given as object” (Kant 1781/1787: B408; Brook 1994; Ameriks 1982 [2000]). Kant’s account of self-consciousness and its significance is complex, a central element of the Transcendental Deduction being the claim that a form of self-awareness—transcendental apperception—is required to account for the unity of conscious experience over time. In Kant’s words, “the ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my representations” (Kant 1781/1787: B132; Keller 1998; Kitcher 2011; see the entry on Kant’s view of the mind and consciousness of self ). Thus, while Kant denies that there is an inner awareness of the self as an object that owns its experiences, we must nevertheless be aware of those experiences as things that are, both individually and collectively, our own. The representation of the self in this “I think” is then, according to Kant, purely formal, exhausted by its function in unifying experience.

The Kantian account of self-awareness and its relation to the capacity for objective thought set the agenda for a great deal of post-Kantian philosophy. On the nature of self-awareness, for example, in an unpublished manuscript Schopenhauer concurs with Kant, asserting that, “that the subject should become an object for itself is the most monstrous contradiction ever thought of” (quoted in Janaway 1989: 120). Further, a philosophical tradition stemming from Kant’s work has tried to identify the necessary conditions of the possibility of self-consciousness, with P.F. Strawson (1959, 1966), Evans (1980, 1982), and Cassam (1997), for example, exploring the relation between the capacity for self-conscious thought and the possession of a conception of oneself as an embodied agent located within an objective world (see §4.3 ). Another, related tradition has argued that an awareness of subjects other than oneself is a necessary condition of self-consciousness (see §4.4 ). Historical variations on such a view can be found in Fichte (1794–1795; Wood 2006), Hegel (1807; Pippin 2010), and, from a somewhat different perspective, Mead (1934; Aboulafia 1986).

Fichte offers the most influential account of self-consciousness in the post-Kantian tradition. On the reading of the “Heidelberg School”, Fichte claims that previous accounts of self-consciousness given by Descartes, Locke, and even Kant are “reflective”, regarding the self as taking itself not as subject but as object (Henrich 1967; Tugendhat 1979: ch. 3; Frank 2004; Zahavi 2007). But this reflective form of self-awareness, Fichte argues, presupposes a more primitive form since it is necessary for the reflecting self to be aware that the reflected self is in fact itself . Consequently, according to Fichte, we must possess an immediate acquaintance with ourselves, “the self exists and posits its own existence by virtue of merely existing” (Fichte 1794–1795: 97). Once more, this debate echoes ancient discussions concerning the nature and role of self-consciousness.

In the early twentieth century, Frege suggests a form of self-acquaintance, claiming that “everyone is presented to himself in a special and primitive way” (Frege 1918–1919: 333). In a similar vein, in early work Russell (1910) favours the idea that we are acquainted with ourselves, but by the 1920s (1921: 141) he seems to endorse a view more in line with Hume’s sceptical account. The same can be said of the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus , who famously likens the self to the eye which sees but does not see itself (Wittgenstein 1921: 5.6–5.641; O’Brien 1996; Sullivan 1996). Husserl’s philosophical development seems to have taken the opposite trajectory to that of Russell, with his (1900/1901, Investigation V, §8) denial of the inner awareness of a “pure ego” being subsequently revised into something resembling Kantian transcendental apperception (Husserl 1913: §57; Carr 1999: ch. 3; Zahavi 2005: ch. 2). Continuing with the phenomenological tradition, Sartre (1937; Priest 2000) takes Husserl’s later view to task, arguing against the view that we are continually aware of a transcendent ego, yet in favour of the picture of consciousness as involving a “pre-reflective” awareness of itself reminiscent of the Heidelberg School view (Wider 1997: ch. 3; Miguens, Preyer, & Morando 2016). Questions about the nature of self-consciousness and, in particular, over whether there is an immediate, or intuitive, consciousness of the self, were as lively as ever well into the twentieth century.

2. Self-Consciousness in Thought

One natural way to think of self-consciousness is in terms of a subject’s capacity to entertain conscious thought about herself. Self-conscious thoughts are thoughts about oneself. But it is commonly pointed out that thinking about what merely happens to be oneself is insufficient for self-consciousness, rather one must think of oneself as oneself . If one is capable of self-conscious thought, that is, one must be able to think in such a way that it is manifest to one that it is oneself about whom one is thinking.

It is widely recognised that the paradigmatic linguistic expression of self-consciousness in English is the first-person pronoun “I”; a term with which one might be said to refer to oneself as oneself (Sainsbury 2011). Plausibly, every utterance of a sentence containing “I” is expressive of a self-conscious “I-thought”, that is a thought containing the first-person concept. Thus, discussions of self-consciousness are often closely associated with accounts of the semantics of the indexical term “I” and the nature of its counterpart first-person concept (e.g., Anscombe 1975; Perry 1979; Nozick 1981: ch. 1, §2; Evans 1982: ch. 7; Mellor 1989; O’Brien 1995a; Castañeda 1999; de Gaynesford 2006; Recanati 2007; Rödl 2007: ch. 1; Bermúdez 2016).

As Castañeda (1966; cf. Anscombe 1975) points out, there is an ambiguity in certain ascriptions of belief containing “he” or “she”. I may say “Jane believes that she is F ” without implying that Jane realises that it is herself that she believes to be F . That is, there is a reading of “Jane believes that she is F ” that does not imply self-consciousness on Jane’s part. But, in some cases, we do intend to attribute self-consciousness with that same form of words. To resolve this ambiguity, Castañeda introduces “she*” for self-conscious attributions. I will use the more natural indirect reflexive “she herself”. Thus, “Jane believes that she is F ” does not imply that Jane self-consciously believes that she is F , whilst “Jane believes that she herself is F ” does. Before the dreadful revelation, Oedipus believed that he was prophesied to kill his father, but did not believe that he himself was so prophesied.

2.1 The Essential Indexical

First-personal language and thought is commonly taken to be sui generis , irreducible to language or thought not containing the first-person pronoun or corresponding concept (Castañeda 1966, 1967; Perry 1977, 1979, 2001). Arguments for this view have typically appealed to the essential role seemingly played by the first-person in explanations of action. This point is supported by a number of well-known examples. Consider Perry’s case of the messy shopper,

I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch. (Perry 1979: 33)

As Perry points out, he knew all along that the shopper with the torn sack was making a mess. He may also have believed that the oldest philosopher in the shop (in fact himself) was making a mess, yet failed to check his own cart since he falsely believed that Quine was at the Deli Counter. Indeed, it seems that for any non-indexical term a that denotes Perry, it is possible for Perry to fail to believe anything naturally expressed by the sentence “I am a ”. If so, it is possible for Perry to rationally believe that a is making a mess without believing anything that he would express as “I am making a mess”. It was only when Perry came to believe that he himself was making a mess that he stopped the chase. Indeed, it would seem that only the first-personal content can provide an adequate explanation of Perry’s behaviour when he stops. If Perry had come to believe that John Perry is making a mess then, unless he also believed that he himself was John Perry, he would not have stopped. The first-personal content is “self-locating”, thereby enabling action, whereas the non-first-personal content is not. To use Kaplan’s (1977) example, if I believe that my pants are on fire, pure self-interest will surely motivate me do something about it. If, however, I believe that Smith’s pants are on fire, pure self-interest will only so motivate me if I also believe that I am Smith.

On this widely accepted picture, then, first-personal thought and language is irreducible to non-first-personal thought and language, and is essential to the explanation of action (Kaplan 1977: 533; D. Lewis 1979; McGinn 1983: ch. 6; Recanati 2007: ch. 34; Musholt 2015: ch. 1; Prosser 2015; García-Carpintero & Torre 2016). Importantly, on Perry’s view, what is irreducible is the first-personal way of thinking about ourselves, not the facts or states of affairs that make such thoughts true. So, whilst my belief “I am F ” is not equivalent to any non-first-personal belief, it is true if and only if Smith is F , this being the same fact that makes true the non-first-personal “Smith is F ”. Thus, whilst first-person representations are special, a special class of first-person facts are nowhere to be found (for views that do accept the existence of first-personal facts, see McGinn 1983; Baker 2013; also see Nagel 1986).

Perry (1977, 1979) argues that terms such as “I” which are, as he puts it, “essentially indexical”, pose a problem for the traditional Fregean view of belief as a two-place relation between a subject and a proposition (cf. Spencer 2007). Fregean senses are, according to Perry, descriptive and as Perry has argued no description is equivalent to an essential indexical. Consequently, no Fregean proposition can be the thing believed when one believes first-personally. Essential indexicality, if somehow forced into the Fregean mould, means that we must implausibly accept that there are incommunicable senses that only the speaker (or thinker) is in a position to grasp (see García-Carpintero & Torre 2016); cf.Evans 1981; Longworth 2013). D. Lewis goes further than this, arguing, partly on the basis of his much discussed Two Gods example (1979), in which each God knows all the propositions true at their world yet fails to know which of the two Gods he himself is, that the objects of belief are not propositions at all but rather properties (or centred worlds). That is, since they already know all the true propositions, there is no true proposition the Gods would come to believe when they come to realise which God they are. Essential indexicality forces us away from the model of propositions as the objects of belief. Further, Lewis claims that not just the explicitly indexical cases, but all belief is in this way self-locating or, in his terminology, de se . On this account, every belief involves the self-ascription of a property and so, arguably, is an instance of self-consciousness (for discussion, Gennaro 1996: ch. 8; Stalnaker 2008: ch. 3; Feit 2008; Cappelen & Dever 2013: ch. 5; Magidor 2015).

Arguments such as Perry’s might be challenged on the grounds that it is not possible to rationally doubt that one is the subject of these conscious states , where that formulation involves an “introspective demonstrative” picking out one’s current conscious states. This, it might be claimed, constitutes a reduction of first-person content (cf. Peacocke 1983: ch. 5, although his goal is not reductive). Even if it is true, however, that one cannot doubt that one is the subject of these conscious states, it is not clear that this poses a significant challenge to Perry’s argument for the essential indexicality of the first-person. For one thing, the content itself contains a demonstrative, so indexical, element. Second, it has been argued that our capacity to refer to our own experiences itself depends on our capacity to refer to ourselves as ourselves (P.F. Strawson 1959: 97; Evans 1982: 253). That is, to think of these conscious states is to think of them as these conscious states of mine . If to demonstratively think of one’s conscious state is, necessarily, to think of it as one’s own conscious state, then the purported reduction of first-person thought to thought not containing the first-person will fail.

Cappelen and Dever (2013) present a sustained attack on the constellation of philosophical claims surrounding the “essential indexical”, including its purported relation to action, and both Perry’s and Lewis’s arguments for it (for an alternative objections to Perry and Lewis, see Millikan 1990; Magidor 2015). A central element in their critique is the claim that cases, such as Perry’s shopper, that are often thought to show the special connection between self-consciousness (I-thoughts) and the capacity for action really only show that action explanation contexts do not allow for substitution salva veritate , but rather are opaque (Cappelen & Dever 2013: ch. 3). Just as, if I am at the airport waiting for Jones, I will only signal that man if I believe him to be Jones, so if I am looking for the shopper with the torn sack I will only stop when I believe that I am that shopper. On their view, despite the popularity of the view to the contrary, the capacity for self-consciousness does not possess any philosophically deep relation to the capacity for action. See the supplement: Scepticism About Essential Indexicality and Agency .

2.2 First-Person Reference

Because of its connection with the first-person pronoun, it is often taken as platitudinous to say that self-conscious thought is closely associated with the capacity to refer to oneself as oneself . When I think self-consciously, I cannot fail to refer to myself. More than this, it has often been claimed that for a central class of first-person thoughts, there is no possibility of misidentifying myself: not only can I not fail to pick myself out, I cannot take another person to be me. But first-person reference, and indexicality more generally, has sometimes been thought to pose a challenge to theories of reference, requiring special treatment. Indeed, some have argued that the platitude itself should be rejected.

Terms whose function it is to refer can, on occasion, fail in that function. A use of the term “Vulcan” to refer to the planet orbiting between Mercury and the sun, fails to refer to anything for the reason that there is nothing for it to refer to. If I see the head of one dachshund protruding from behind a tree and the rear end of another protruding from the other side of the tree, and utter “that dog is huge”, my use of “that dog” has arguably failed to refer due to there being too many objects. It would seem that, by contrast, the term “I” cannot fail to refer either by there being too few or too many objects. “I” is guaranteed to refer.

As an indexical, the referent of “I” varies with the context of utterance (see the entry on indexicals ). That is, “I” refers to different people depending on who utters it. Following Kaplan (1977), it is common to think of the meaning of such terms as determining a function from context to referent. In the case of “I”, a natural proposal is the “Self-Reference Rule” (SRR), that the referent of a token of “I” is the person that produces it (Kaplan 1977: 491; Campbell 1994: ch. 3). “I” is thus, unlike “this” or “that”, a pure indexical, seemingly requiring no overt demonstration or manifestation of intention (Kaplan 1977: 489–91). SRR captures the plausible thought that “I” is guaranteed against reference failure. Since every token of “I” has been produced, the fact that “I” refers to its producer means that there is no chance of its failing to pick out some entity. This account of “I”, then, treats it as not only expressive of self-consciousness, but also guaranteed to refer to the utterer.

SRR is Kaplan’s specification of the character of “I”, which is fixed independently of the context of any particular utterance. This character is to be distinguished from the content of a tokening of “I”, which it has only in a context. On Kaplan’s account, the content of an utterance of “I am F ” will be a singular proposition composed of the person that produced it and F ness (Recanati 1993; for an account that attributes to the utterance both singular content, and the “reflexive content” the speaker of this token is F , see Perry 2001; for an alternative “Neo-Fregean” account in terms of object-dependent de re senses, see Evans 1981; cf. McDowell 1977; and Evans 1982: ch. 1).

Intuitively plausible as it is, SRR is open to a number of potential counterexamples. Suppose, for example, that you are away from work due to illness and I leave a note on your door reading “I am not here now”. Plausibly, whilst it was me that produced this token of “I”, it nevertheless refers to you . Or consider a situation in which I walk into a petrol station, point to my car, and say “I’m empty”. In this case, it might be suggested, my use of “I” refers to my car rather than myself (for these and related cases, see Vision 1985; Q. Smith 1989; Sidelle 1991; Nunberg 1993, 1995). If so, SRR cannot specify the character of “I” and so, arguably, some tokens of “I” fail to express the self-conscious thoughts of those that produce them. In light of such cases, a variety of alternatives to SRR have been proposed. Q. Smith (1989) suggests that “I” is lexically ambiguous; Predelli (1998a,b, 2002) offers an intention-based reference rule for “I”; Corazza, Fish, and Gorvett (2002) offer a convention-based account; and Cohen (2013) argues that the cases can be handled by a conservative modification of Kaplan’s original proposal (also see, Romdenh-Romluc 2002, 2008; Corazza 2004: ch. 5; Dodd & Sweeney 2010; Michaelson 2014).

Although she didn’t have Kaplan’s formulation of SRR in mind, an earlier criticism of such a rule can be found in the work of Anscombe (1975) who argues that the rule cannot be complete as an account of the meaning of “I” (for discussion see O’Brien 1994). Anscombe considers a world in which each person has two names, one of which (ranging from “B” to “Z”) is printed on their chest, the other (in every case “A”) is printed on the inside of their wrist. Each person uses “B” to “Z” when attributing actions to others, but “A” when describing their own actions (Anscombe 1975: 49). Anscombe argues that such a situation is compatible with the possibility that the people in question lack self-consciousness. Whilst B uses “A” to refer to B, C uses “A” to refer to C, and so on, there is no guarantee that they are thinking of themselves as themselves , for they may be reporting what are in fact their own actions without thinking of those actions as things that they themselves are performing. They may treat themselves, that is, just as the treat any other. This is despite the fact that, in this scenario, “A” complies with SRR.

Can the Self-Reference Rule be reformulated in such a way as to entail self-consciousness on the part of those who use terms that comply with it? According to Anscombe it can, but any such reformulation will presuppose a prior grasp of self-conscious reference to oneself. For example, if we say, employing the indirect reflexive, that “I” is a term that a person uses to refer to she herself , we have travelled in a tight circle since “she herself” can be understood only in terms of “I” (Anscombe 1975; Castañeda 1966; for discussion, see Bermúdez 1998: ch. 1). This can be seen clearly in the first-person formulation of such a rule: “I” is a term that I use to refer to myself . For here the “myself” must itself be understood as an expression of self-consciousness, i.e., we should really say that “I” is a term that I use to refer to myself as myself .

In response to Anscombe’s argument, it has been argued that SRR is not intended to explain the connection between self-consciousness and the first-person (O’Brien 1994, 1995a; Garrett 1998: ch. 7; cf. Campbell 1994: §4.2; Peacocke 2008: §3.1). On this view, all that the example of “A” users shows is that self-consciousness has not been fully accounted for by SRR, not that SRR fails as an account of the character of “I”. Kaplan himself, however, does appear to be more ambitious than this, claiming that the “particular and primitive way” in which each of us is presented to ourselves is simply that each “is presented to himself under the character of "I"” (Kaplan 1977: 533). This claim, it would seem, is indeed open to Anscombe’s challenge.

Anscombe’s (1975) paper is perhaps most notable for her claim that “I” is not a referring expression at all. Assuming that if “I” refers it must be understood on the model of either a proper name, a demonstrative, or an abbreviation of a definite description, Anscombe argues that each of these kinds of referring expression requires what she calls a “conception” by means of which it reaches its referent. This conception must explain the seemingly guaranteed reference of “I”: the apparent fact that no token of “I” can fail to pick out an object. However, she argues, no satisfactory conception can be specified for “I” since either it fails to deliver up guaranteed reference, or it succeeds but only by delivering an immaterial soul. Since we have independent reason to believe that there are no immaterial souls, it follows that “I” cannot be understood on the model of a proper name, demonstrative or definite description, so is not a referring expression (see Kenny 1979 and Malcolm 1979 for positive appraisals of Anscombe’s position. Criticisms can be found in White 1979; Hamilton 1991; Brandom 1994: 552–561; Glock & Hacker 1996; McDowell 1998; Harcourt 2000).

That “I” does not function as either a name or an abbreviated definite description is widely accepted. The more contentious aspect of Anscombe’s case for the view that there is no appropriate conception for “I” is her claim that “I” does not function like a demonstrative. Her argument for this claim is highly reminiscent of Avicenna’s Flying Man argument (see §1.1 ), with which she was surely familiar. We can, she tells us, imagine a subject in a sensory deprivation tank who has been anaesthetised and is suffering from amnesia. Such a subject would, claims Anscombe, be able to think I-thoughts, perhaps wondering, “How did I get into this mess?”. Since such a subject can think self-consciously in the absence of any presented referent, it follows that “I” cannot mean something like “this person”, since demonstratives require the demonstrated object to be presented to conscious awareness. Treating “I” on a demonstrative model, then, fails (cf. Campbell 1994: §4.2; O’Brien 1995b; see Morgan 2015 for a defence of a demonstrative account).

According to Evans (1982: ch. 7), the problem with Anscombe’s argument is that it fails to appreciate that “I” can be modelled on “here” rather than “this”. According to Evans’ account, the similarity between what he calls “I”-Ideas and “here”-Ideas shows up in their functional role (for an alternative broadly functional account, see Mellor 1989; for an argument that, far from being amenable to a functional analysis, self-consciousness poses a threat to the coherence of functionalism, see Bealer 1997). Once we see how both “I”-Ideas and “here”-Ideas stand at the centre of distinctive networks of inputs (ways of gaining information about ourselves and our locations respectively) and outputs (including the explanation of action), we can see how to model “I” on “here”, thus escaping Anscombe’s argument. For further discussion, see the supplement: Evans on First Person Thought .

2.3 Immunity to Error Through Misidentification

In The Blue and Brown Books , Wittgenstein distinguishes between two uses of the term “I” which he calls the “use as subject” and the “use as object” (1958: 66–70; Garrett 1998: ch. 8; cf. James’ distinction between the I , or pure ego, and the me , or empirical self (1890: vol. 1, ch. X)). As Wittgenstein describes the difference, there is a certain kind of error in thought that is possible when “I” is used as object but not when “I” is used as subject. Wittgenstein notes that if I find myself in a tangle of bodies, I may wrongly take another’s visibly broken arm to be my own, mistakenly judging “I have a broken arm”. Upon seeing a broken arm, then, it can make sense to wonder whether or not it is mine. If, however, I feel a pain in the arm, and on that basis judge “I have a pain”, then it makes no sense at all for me to wonder whether the pain of which I am aware is mine. That is, it is not possible for me to be aware, in the ordinary way, of a pain in an arm but mistakenly judge it to be my own arm that hurts. On this picture, self-ascriptions of pain, at least when based on the usual introspective grounds, involve the use of “I” as subject and so are immune to this sort of error of misidentification.

Immunity to this sort of error should not be conflated with another sort of epistemic security that is often discussed under the heading of self-knowledge (see entry on self-knowledge ). Some philosophers have held that, for a range of mental states, one cannot be mistaken about whether one is in them. Thus, for example, if one sincerely judges that one has a pain, or that one believes that P, then it cannot turn out that one is not in pain, or that one does not so believe. That the kind of immunity to error described by Wittgenstein differs from this sort of epistemic security follows from the fact that one may be sceptical of the latter while accepting the former. That is, one may reject the claim that sincere judgements that one has a pain cannot be mistaken (perhaps it is possible to mistake a sensation of coldness for one of pain), whilst nevertheless maintaining that if one is introspectively aware of a pain, then that pain must be one’s own. Immunity to errors of this sort has been taken, by a number of philosophers, to be importantly connected to self-consciousness.

Under the influence of Shoemaker (1968) this phenomenon has become known as immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun, or IEM. On Shoemaker’s formulation, an error of misidentification occurs when one knows some particular thing, a , to be F and judges that b is F on the grounds that one mistakenly believes that a is identical to b . To this it is important to add that IEM is not a feature that judgements possess in virtue of their content alone but only relative to certain grounds (perception, testimony, introspection , memory , etc.). Thus, the judgement that I am jealous of a might be IEM when grounded in introspection, but not when grounded in the overheard testimony of my analyst. For I may have misinterpreted my analyst’s words, wrongly taking his use of “Smith” in “Smith is Jealous of a ” to refer to me (“Smith” after all is a common name). IEM is always relative, then, to the grounds on which a judgement is based. Which grounds might give rise to first-person judgements that are IEM is a contested matter, see the supplement: The Scope of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification .

On this account, first-person thoughts will be IEM relative to certain grounds just in case errors of misidentification are not possible with respect to them. That is, they will be IEM relative to grounds G if and only if it is not possible that one knows, via G , some particular thing, a , to be F and judges oneself to be F in virtue of mistakenly believing that a is identical to oneself. Whilst precise formulations differ in various ways, this can reasonably be thought of as the standard account of IEM (see, for example, Shoemaker 1968, 1970, 1986, 2012; Brewer 1995; Bermúdez 1998: §1.2; Peacocke 1999: ch. 6; 2008: §3.2; 2014: §5.1; Coliva 2006; Recanati 2007: part 6; Perry 2012; most of the papers in Prosser & Recanati 2012; Musholt 2015: ch. 1).

An alternative way of formulating IEM can be found in the work of variety of philosophers. On this view, a judgement “ a is F ” is IEM if and only if it is not possible to undercut one’s evidence for judging that a is F without thereby undercutting one’s evidence that someone is F (for variations on this idea, see Hamilton 1995; Wright 1998; Pryor 1999; Campbell 1999a; 2002: ch. 5; for discussion see Coliva 2006; Joel Smith 2006a; McGlynn 2016). As Wright puts it, a claim

made on a certain kind of ground involves immunity to error through misidentification just when its defeat is not consistent with retention of grounds for existential generalization. (1998: 19)

The idea is that, for a wide range of judgements it is possible that one knows that something is F but wrongly supposes that a is F . That is, one has misidentified which thing is F. For other judgements, perhaps including the introspection based judgement that one has a headache, this sort of identification error is not possible. After Pryor’s (1999) influential discussion, this is typically known as immunity to which -misidentification, or wh -IEM.

That wh-IEM is a distinct phenomenon from IEM as it is standardly formulated is shown by the fact one may consistently claim that a form of experience, for example memory, does not put one in a position to think, of some a distinct from oneself, that a was F , yet nevertheless does put one in a position to think that someone was F . That is, it might give rise to judgements that are IEM but not wh -IEM. The converse, however, is not possible. For since “ a was F ” entails “ someone was F ”, it will not be possible for a judgement, relative to some grounds, to be wh -IEM without it also being IEM. If a judgement is based on an identification, it will be subject to errors of wh -misidentification. For this reason, wh -IEM might legitimately be considered the more fundamental notion (as it is by Pryor 1999).

What is the philosophical significance of IEM? First, consider what it would take for a form of experience to ground thoughts that are IEM. Suppose that a form of experience, introspection for example, itself has first-personal content. That is, suppose that the content of introspective awareness is not adequately conceptualised as pain but rather requires the first-personal form, my pain . If so, then there would be no need for an identification of some object as oneself, for the identity of the subject of pain is already given as oneself. On this way of thinking, to determine which forms of experience ground judgements that are IEM would be to determine which forms of experience have first-personal content. And that, according to some philosophers, is to determine which forms of experience are themselves forms of self-consciousness (see, for example, Bermúdez 1998: 144). This issue is further discussed in §3 .

Second, Wittgenstein suggests that the phenomenon of IEM is responsible for the (in his view, mistaken) opinion that the use of “I” as subject refers to an immaterial soul (1958: 66). This is for the reason that one may be tempted to suppose that if introspectively based self-ascriptions of psychological predicates do not rely on an identification of a bodily entity, they must rely on the identification of a non-bodily entity (1958: 70; for related discussion, see Peacocke 1999: ch. 6; Coliva 2012). Wittgenstein’s view, of course, is that they rely on no identification at all. As Evans puts it, they are identification-free. Essentially the same point is made by Strawson in his diagnosis of “the fact that lies at the root of the Cartesian illusion”, which is that “criterionless” self-ascription gives rise to the idea of a “purely inner and yet subject-referring use for ‘I’” (P.F. Strawson 1966: 164–166). In short, the fact that a certain class of first-person thoughts depend for their reference on no identification of myself as some publicly presented object (they are identification-free) gives rise to the idea that they pick out a private object, a soul. There is a clear connection between this idea and Anscombe’s (1975) argument for the non-referential character of “I”.

3. Self-Consciousness in Experience

Some philosophers maintain that, in addition to its manifestation in first-personal thinking, self-consciousness is also present in various forms of sensory and non-sensory experience (Bermúdez 1998; Hurley 1998: ch. 4; Zahavi 2005; Peacocke 2014; Musholt 2015). After all, self-consciousness is presumably a form of consciousness (see entry on consciousness ). On the view that experience, like thought, has representational content, this can be understood as the view that experiences, like thoughts, can have content that is first-personal. On the further view that the content of experience is non-conceptual (see the entry on non-conceptual mental content), the claim is that there is non-conceptual first-person content (for a conceptualist response, see Noë 2002). Bermúdez also argues that there is a non-conceptual form of self-conscious thinking that arises from non-conceptual self-conscious experience, which he calls “protobelief” (Bermúdez 1998: ch. 5; cf. Bermúdez 2003).

The claim that there is a form of self-consciousness in experience, one which arguably grounds the capacity to entertain first-personal thought, can be understood in a number of ways. According to one view there is a perceptual, or quasi-perceptual, consciousness of the self as an object of experience. On another, there is a “pre-reflective” form of self-consciousness that does not involve the awareness of the self as an object. A third claims that various forms of experience involve a distinctive “sense of ownership” in which each of us is aware of our own states as our own . In each case, the question is whether the mode of experience in question can, in Peacocke’s (2014: ch. 4) words, act as the “non-conceptual parent” of the first-person concept and associated phenomena, in particular that of immunity to error through misidentification.

It is natural to suppose that self-consciousness is, fundamentally, a conscious awareness of the self. On such a view, one is self-conscious if, when one introspects, one is aware of a thing that is, in some sense, presented as oneself. This is the view, mentioned in §1.2 , that Hume seems to be rejecting with his claim that when he introspects he can never catch himself, but only perceptions (Hume 1739–40: bk. 1, ch. 4, §6). Whilst Hume’s claim has been very influential, it has not found universal acceptance. Those siding with Hume include Shoemaker (1986), Martin (1997), Howell (2010), and Prinz (2012) (for a related, Jamesian perspective, see Flanagan 1992: ch. 9). Those opposing him include Chisholm (1976: ch. 1), Cassam (1995), G. Strawson (2009), Damasio (2010) and Rosenthal (2012).

As with first-person thought, the issue is not whether one is, or can be, conscious of what is in fact oneself. If that were sufficient for self-consciousness then, on the supposition that one is identical to one’s body, seeing oneself in a mirror would be a case of self-consciousness, even if one were unaware that it was oneself that one saw. Rather, the issue is whether one is, or can be, conscious of oneself as oneself , a form of awareness in which it is manifest to one that the object of awareness is oneself. If there is such an awareness then this is philosophically significant, since one might expect it to ground certain cases of self-knowledge, first-person reference, and the immunity to error of certain first-person thoughts (Shoemaker 1986; see the entry on self-knowledge ). The inner consciousness of the self as F , for example, would account for one’s capacity to refer to oneself as oneself , one’s knowledge that one is F , and the fact that such a thought cannot rest on a misidentification of another thing as oneself. On the other hand, the claim that there is no such conscious awareness of the self is philosophically significant, not only because it undermines the possibility of such explanations but also for the reason that it plays an important role in various well known arguments: for example, in Kant’s First Critique (1781/1787), most obviously the Transcendental Deduction, the Refutation of Idealism, and the Paralogisms, and in Wittgenstein’s discussion of the conceptual problem of other minds (Kripke 1982: Postscript).

A simple argument for the claim that we are introspectively aware of ourselves is that in introspection one is perceptually aware of one’s own mental properties, and that when one perceives a property one perceives that which has that property, i.e., oneself. Shoemaker (1984b, 1986) agrees that if there is an introspective awareness of the self as an object, then it should be understood as a form of self -perception . He argues, however, that, on a plausible account of perception, introspection is not a form of perception, so we do not introspectively perceive anything, including the self. As such, we cannot conclude in this way that we are introspectively aware of the self (cf. Martin 1997; Rosenthal 2012).

Shoemaker further argues, in a way reminiscent of the Heidelberg School (Frank 1995; Musholt 2015: ch. 1), that the postulation of an introspective awareness of the self as the self would not be in a position to explain all self-knowledge. According to Shoemaker (1984b: 105), if inner perception revealed an object to be F , then I would only be in a position to judge that I am F if I already took myself to be that object that I perceive. But this both presupposes some (non-perceptual) self-knowledge (i.e., that I am the thing perceived via inner sense), and also implausibly opens up introspection based first-person thought to the possibility of errors of misidentification, since such a view would entail that introspective self-knowledge is based in part on an identification of the self.

A number of philosophers have maintained that, even if Hume is right that introspection does not reveal the self as an object, there is another form of perceptual experience which does: bodily awareness (see entry) . Versions of this claim can be found in P.F. Strawson (1966: 102), Evans (1982: ch. 7), Sutton Morris (1982), Ayers (1991), Brewer (1995), Cassam (1995, 1997), Bermúdez (1998, 2011). On this view, through bodily awareness I am aware of my body “from the inside” as a bodily self, as me . Brewer (1995), for example, argues that since bodily sensations are both manifestly properties of oneself and are perceived as located properties of one’s body, it follows that in bodily awareness one perceives one’s body as oneself.

If one’s body is presented as oneself in bodily awareness then, as mentioned above, we might expect this bodily self-perception to ground first-person thought about one’s bodily states. As pointed out in §2 , it is plausible that first-person thoughts cannot fail to refer to their thinker and further that this is manifest in the thinking of them. Martin (1995, 1997) argues on the basis of these two claims that if bodily awareness is a form of self-awareness, then one’s body as presented in bodily awareness must manifestly be oneself. That is, if a form of awareness is to ground judgements which are manifestly about myself, then that form of awareness must manifestly be an awareness of myself. But this is arguably a condition that it does not meet, since it is perfectly coherent to wonder whether or not one is identical to one’s body, just as Descartes famously did in the Meditations (for a different, imagination-based, argument against bodily awareness as a form of self-awareness, see Joel Smith 2006b; see Bermúdez 2011 for a response; for discussions of the relation between self-consciousness and imagination see B. Williams 1973; Reynolds 1989; Velleman 1996).

Another way in which it can be argued that the self figures in sensory experience is in the self-locating content of perceptual experience, most notably vision. Visual experience is perspectival, containing information not only about perceived objects but also of their spatial relation to the perceiver: I see the wall as in front of me , the bookcase as to my left, and so on. The (bodily) self, it might be argued, is experienced as an object in the world, the point of origin of egocentric perception (Cassam 1997: 52–53; Hurley 1998: ch. 4; Bermúdez 1998: ch. 5, 2002, 2011; Peacocke 1999: ch. 6; Schwenkler 2014). On an alternative view, one consistent with the rejection of any sort of awareness of the self as an object, visual perception does not present the self at its point of origin, but rather represents the locations of perceived objects in monadic terms, as ahead , to the left , and so on, without specifying what it is that they are ahead, or to the left, of (Campbell 1994: §4.1; 2002: §9.3; Perry 1986).

If first-person thought is not grounded in an awareness of the self as an object, then some other account is arguably required to account for the capacity to entertain self-conscious thought (O’Brien 1995a). One suggestion is that subjects possess a form of “pre-reflective self-awareness” as a necessary condition of consciousness (Sartre 1937, 1943: Introduction; Zahavi 2005, 2007; Legrand 2006; cf. Kriegel 2009. For criticism, see Schear 2009; also see the entry on phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness ). On this view, all conscious experience involves an implicit awareness of oneself as its subject without explicitly representing the self as an object of awareness (cf. Musholt’s distinction between “self-representationalist” and “non-self-representationalist” accounts of non-conceptual self-consciousness (2015: chs. 3–4)). Indeed, it might be argued that the necessity of an active agent’s possessing some form of self-awareness follows from the connection between action and self-consciousness that many suppose to have been established by considerations of the essential indexical discussed in §2.1 (cf. Bermúdez 1998).

These views are closely associated with theories that explain consciousness in terms of self-consciousness ( §4.3 ). Pre-reflective self-awareness is “pre-reflective”, according to its proponents, in the sense that it does not require one to explicitly reflect on one’s own mental states, or to otherwise take them as objects of attention. Rather, pre-reflective self-awareness is manifest even in those situations in which one’s attention is directed outwards toward worldly objects and events. Pre-reflective self-awareness, then, is implicit in all consciousness, providing one with a continuous awareness of oneself as the subject of one’s stream of experience.

One way in which such views can be understood is as maintaining that experience involves self-consciousness in the mode, rather than the content, of conscious experience (Recanati 2007: part 5; 2012; O’Brien 2007: ch. 6). This can be fleshed out by analogy with the case of belief: one might claim that the concept of truth figures in the mode, but not the explicit content of every belief. That is, whilst every belief is a holding true, it is not the case that every belief has the content that such and such is true. Similarly, whilst every experience is an experience of one’s own, it is not the case that every experience has the content that such and such is experienced by oneself. Rather, the mode of conscious experience (introspection, bodily awareness, etc.) includes an implicit awareness of the self. A related view is that the self can be considered an “unarticulated constituent” of the experience, just as some claim that “here” is an unarticulated constituent of “It is raining” (Perry 1986; Recanati 2007: parts 9 & 10; for scepticism about unarticulated constituents, see Cappelen & Lepore 2007). So, just as the person who believes “It is raining” is implicitly aware of the fact that it is here that it is raining, so the subject of self-conscious experience is implicitly aware of the fact that it is she herself who is undergoing that experience.

Accounts of self-consciousness as involving unarticulated constituents, or as implicit in the mode of consciousness, will need to explain how the transition is made from such implicit self-awareness to the explicit representation of the self in first-person thought. One option is to appeal to the idea that certain sources of information are self-tracking or, in Perry’s (2012) words, “necessarily self-informative”. A form of experience is self-tracking if it is a way of coming to know of the instantiation of properties of a certain type and, necessarily, a subject can come to know, in that way, of the instantiation of her own states only. For example, if it is true that a subject can only remember conscious episodes from her own past, then episodic memory is self-tracking. If so, then the subject may legitimately think the first-person thought “I was F ”, on the basis of her episodic memory of being F . This account may also be used to explain IEM, since if a form of experience is self-tracking, then it will not be possible for me to know, in that way, that a is F but mistakenly think that it is me that is F on the grounds that I mistakenly believe myself to be identical to a (Perry 2012; Recanati 2012; cf. Campbell 1999a; Martin 1995). Here we have an architectural feature of a given form of experience (that it is necessarily an awareness of oneself) being employed in an explanation of an epistemic feature of self-ascriptions based on such experience (that they are not partly grounded in an identity judgement). If I know, in the relevant way, that a is F , then it must be the case that I am a . On this view, making a first-person judgement grounded in a given form of experience is a matter of articulating the unarticulated self. The experience itself is not explicitly first-personal, representing the self as oneself . Nevertheless, it “concerns” the subject, in that it is necessarily tied to the self (see Musholt 2015: ch. 5 for an alternative account).

Pre-reflective, or implicit, accounts of the place of self-consciousness in experience are often associated with the so-called “sense of ownership”, or “sense of mineness” (Flanagan 1992; Martin 1995; Dokic 2003; Marcel 2003; Zahavi 2005: ch. 5; de Vignemont 2007, 2013; Tsakiris 2011; Zahavi & Kriegel 2015). According to some, a fundamental aspect of conscious experiences is that they seem, in each case, to be mine . In being aware of a thought, action, emotion, perceptual experience, memory, bodily experience (and also my body itself), I am aware of it as being my own . This sense of ownership arguably does some work in explaining why it seems difficult to conceive of what it would be like to experience a thought as located in another’s mind, or a pain as located in another’s body (Martin 1995; Dokic 2003). For such an experience would involve being aware of a thought that seemed to be mine but as located in a mind that did not seem to be my own. The sense of ownership is also a candidate for explaining immunity to error through misidentification since if conscious experiences seem to be one’s own, then there is presumably no need for any identification of the experience’s subject as oneself.

Whilst the sense of ownership would, presumably, be accounted for by an introspective awareness of the self, it can also arguably be explained with the more minimal commitments of the implicit view. The sense of an experience as my own can be understood as nothing over and above the fact that the self is implicitly given in the mode of conscious awareness (Musholt 2015: §4.2). Thus the focus on the sense of ownership might be thought to provide a minimal answer to Humean scepticism about self-perception. As Chisholm points out, for example, although Hume complained that he could find no self in introspection, he reported his findings in first-personal terms. That is, he was aware not only of his mental states, but also aware of them as his own (Chisholm 1976: ch. 1; cf. P.F. Strawson’s 1959: ch. 3, attack on the “no-ownership” view).

Even within the context of an implicit account of self-consciousness in experience, we can further distinguish between reductive and non-reductive construals of the sense of ownership (Bermúdez 2011; Zahavi & Kriegel 2015; Alsmith 2015). For example, Zahavi and Kriegel (2015; cf. Kriegel 2003, 2009; Zahavi 2014) defend a non-reductive understanding of the sense of ownership as a distinct aspect of the phenomenal character of experience. By contrast, a reductive account will explain the sense of ownership in terms of cognitive and/or experiential states whose existence we are independently willing to endorse. For example, Bermúdez (2011: 161–166) argues in favour of a reductive account of the sense of ownership over one’s own body, according to which it consists in nothing more than the phenomenology of the spatial location of bodily sensations alongside our disposition to judge the body in which they occur to be our own (cf. Dainton 2008: §8.2; Prinz 2012). Bermúdez’s argument for the reductive view is, in part, based on the claim that, despite appearances, the non-reductive sense of ownership is not in fact able to explain first-personal judgements of ownership (cf. Schear 2009; for a response see Zahavi & Kriegel 2015).

It is sometimes claimed that the variety of ways in which self-consciousness can break down poses a challenge to the claim that the sense of ownership is a universal characteristic of experience (e.g., Metzinger 2003: §7.2.2). Thought insertion, anarchic hand, alien limb, anonymous memory, and anonymous vision, all seemingly involve subjects who are aware of their own conscious states, actions, or body parts, but without being aware of them as their own (for references, see the supplement: The Scope of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification ). They may disown them or attribute them to others. For example, in cases of thought insertion, a symptom of schizophrenia, subjects report that they are aware of the thoughts of other people or objects entering their own minds (see, for example, Saks 2007: ch. 2; for general discussion of schizophrenia and self-consciousness see Parnas & Sass 2011). On the assumption that such subjects are actually aware of what are, in fact, their own thoughts, this might seem to be a case of a conscious experience that lacks the sense of ownership. Thus, either the sense of ownership is not a necessary feature of experience, or perhaps there is no sense of ownership at all (see, for example, Chadha 2017).

A common response to this line of thought involves, first, distinguishing between the sense of ownership and the sense of agency and, second, claiming that subjects of thought insertion lack the latter whilst retaining the former (Stephens & Graham 2000; Gallagher 2004; Peacocke 2008: §7.8; Proust 2013: ch. 12). The sense of agency is the awareness of being the source or the agent of some action or activity, including mental agency. It is the sense that it is me that is thinking a given thought (Bayne 2008; O’Brien & Soteriou 2009; Proust 2013: ch. 10). According to this standard view, cases of thought insertion or anarchic hand, for example, can be wholly explained by postulating a lack of a sense of agency. The usual sense of being the agent of a thought is lacking, but the sense of ownership remains since the thought seems to the subject be taking place in their own mind.

We might, however, wish to make a three-way distinction between the sense of agency (the sense that one is the author of a mental state), the sense of ownership (the sense that one is the owner of a mental state), and what we might call the sense of location (the sense that a mental state is located within one’s own mind). The sense of location might be understood as being possessed if one is aware of a mental state in the ordinary way, i.e., introspectively. Crucial, it would seem, for evaluating the significance of thought insertion and related cases, and so of the standard view, will be determining which, if any, of the senses of agency, ownership, or location remain intact. For it might be argued that what such subjects retain is in fact the sense of location, rather than the sense of ownership. That is, it may be possible to take their descriptions at face value when they deny, in thought insertion for example, that the thoughts in question are their own (or were thought by them), whilst nevertheless accepting that the inserted thought occurs within the boundary of their own mind (for criticisms of the standard view, see Bortolotti & Broome 2009; Pacherie & Martin 2013; Fernández 2013: ch. 5; Billon 2013).

4. The Conditions of Self-Consciousness

Much of the philosophical work on self-consciousness concerns its relation to a variety of other phenomena. These include the nature of personhood, rationality, consciousness, and the awareness of other minds. In each case we can ask whether self-consciousness is a necessary and/or sufficient condition for the phenomenon in question.

As was mentioned in §1.2 , Locke characterises a person as “a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places” (1700: II.xxvii.9). On such a view, self-consciousness is essential to personhood. In particular, on Locke’s view it is the capacity to reidentify oneself at different times that is important, a claim which is in keeping with the central role of memory in his account of personal identity (see Ayers 1991: vol. II, chs. 22–25; Thiel 2011: ch. 4; Weinberg 2011; G. Strawson 2011b; Snowdon 2014: ch. 3; entry on personal identity ). As such, Locke considers the capacity for self-conscious thinking to be a necessary condition of personhood. What is less clear is whether, on this view, self-consciousness is sufficient for personhood. One reason for doubt on this score is that since it is concerned with self-conscious thought the account provides no reason to suppose that creatures that enjoy non-conceptual self-consciousness are persons. A second is that the requirement of being able to reidentify oneself over time is not one that we need consider met by all self-conscious creatures for, we can suppose, it is possible for a self-conscious subject to lack the conceptual sophistication to understand the past and future tense.

An alternative conception of personhood that also gives a central role to self-consciousness can be found in Frankfurt’s claim that it is essential to persons to have a capacity for reflective self-evaluation manifested in the possession of what he calls “second-order volitions” (Frankfurt 1971: 110). Second-order volitions involve wanting a certain desire to be one’s will, that is wanting it to move one to action. A subject with second-order volitions has the capacity to evaluate their first-order desires and this, it would seem, involves being aware of them as (potentially) their own. Thus persons, thought of as subjects with second-order volitions, are self-conscious (for discussion, see Watson 1975; Dennett 1976; Frankfurt 1987; Bratman 2007: chs. 5 & 11).

An account of persons that would appear to distance that notion from self-consciousness is that offered by P.F. Strawson in chapter 3 of Individuals ,

the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation &c. are equally applicable to a single individual of that type. (1959: 101–102; for discussion, see Ayer 1963; Hacker 2002)

Frankfurt points out that this is inadequate as a definition of personhood since “there are many entities beside persons that have both mental and physical properties” (Frankfurt 1971: 5). It may be, however, that Strawson’s formulation here is somewhat loose, and that his central idea is that persons are those entities that self­ -ascribe both types of predicate, a condition that perhaps rules out at least most non-human animals. After all chapter 3 of Individuals , entitled “Persons”, is primarily concerned with the conditions of such self-ascription, with “the use we make of the word ‘I’” (P.F. Strawson 1959: 94).

Strawson’s primary goal is to argue for the claim that the concept of a person is primitive, a position that he contrasts, on the one hand, with Cartesian dualism and, on the other, with what he calls the “no-ownership view”: a view according to which we don’t really self-ascribe states of consciousness at all, at least not with the use of “I” as subject (cf. Wittgenstein 1953: §244; 1958: 76; Anscombe 1975; it is controversial whether Wittgenstein ever really held this view, for discussion see Hacker 1990: chs. 5 & 11; Jacobsen 1996; Wright 1998). To say that the concept of a person is primitive is, on Strawson’s account, to say that it is “logically prior” to the concepts subject and body ; persons are not to be thought of as compounds of subjects and bodies. Strawson argues that the primitiveness of the concept of a person is a necessary condition of the possibility of self-consciousness (P.F. Strawson 1959: 98–103). His argument is that one can only self-ascribe states of consciousness if one is able to ascribe them to others (for more on this theme see §4.4 ). This rules out Cartesian dualism, since ascribing states of consciousness to others requires that one be able to identify others, and one cannot identify pure subjects of experience or Cartesian egos. The condition that one must be able to ascribe states of consciousness to others also rules out the “no-ownership view” because such a view is inconsistent with the fact that psychological predicates have the very same sense in their first and third person uses.

Closely related to the no-ownership view are a family of claims about persons that Parfit dubs “reductionism” (Parfit 1984: §79). Two prominent members of this familiar are the claim that

[a] person’s existence consists in the existence of a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental event, (1984: 211)

[t]hough persons exist, we could give a complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist. (1984: 212)

Parfit’s reductionism, and it’s relation to Buddhist views of the self, has been widely discussed (see for example, Stone 1988; Korsgaard 1989; Cassam 1989, 1993, 1997: ch. 5; Garrett 1991, 1998: ch. 2; Siderits 1997; McDowell 1997; Blackburn 1997). As is the case with the “no-ownership view” it has sometimes been argued that reductionism is incompatible with self-consciousness so, since we are indisputably self-conscious, reductionism must be false. Against the claim that the (continued) existence of a person consists merely in the (continued) existence of brain, body, and interrelated physical and mental events that do not presuppose anything about persons as such, McDowell (1997) for example, argues from a broadly Evansian position on self-consciousness (see the supplement: Evans on First Person Thought ) that there simply are no such “identity-free relations” (1997: 378) to which a person’s identity could be reducible. That is, there is no way of characterising memory and the other psychological phenomena relevant to personal identity without invoking the identity of the person whose memory it is. As McDowell puts it,

[i]n continuity of “consciousness”, there is what appears to be knowledge of an identity, the persistence of the same subject through time. (1997: 361)

Memory, at least, cannot be employed in a reductive account of persons (for discussion of McDowell’s argument see Buford 2009; Fernández 2014; for related arguments from self-consciousness to the falsity of reductionism, see Cassam 1997: ch. 5).

Is self-consciousness a necessary condition of rationality? A number of philosophers have argued that rationality requires self-knowledge which itself implies self-consciousness (see Shoemaker 1988, 1994; Burge 1996; Moran 2001; Bilgrami 2006; Boyle 2009, 2011; for a general discussion of this approach to self-knowledge, see Gertler 2011: ch. 6). In his case against perceptual theories of self-knowledge, Shoemaker (1994) argues against the possibility of self-blindness; against, that it is, the possibility that a rational creature with all the necessary concepts might be simply unaware of its own sensations, beliefs, and so on. A rational creature that is in pain, Shoemaker argues, will typically desire to be rid of her pain, and this requires that she believe that she is in pain. As Shoemaker puts it, to see rational responses to pain

as pain behavior is to see them as motivated by such states of the creature as the belief that it is in pain, the desire to be rid of the pain, and the belief that such and such a course of behaviour will achieve that result. (Shoemaker 1994: 228)

This belief, that she is in pain, is a self-conscious one; it is a belief that she herself is in pain. This connection between rational behaviour and first-person thought is, of course, the one highlighted by Perry’s (1979) case of the messy shopper in his discussion of the essential indexical (see §2.1 ).

The connection between rationality and self-knowledge (and so self-consciousness), Shoemaker argues, is even more pronounced in the case of our awareness of our own beliefs. Rational subjects should abide by certain strictures on the contents of their beliefs, updating them in line with new evidence, removing inconsistencies, and so on. And this, Shoemaker argues, requires that they not be self-blind with respect to their beliefs. It requires that they are self-conscious. As Shoemaker writes,

in an important class of cases the rational revision or adjustment of the belief-desire system requires that we undertake investigations aimed at determining what revisions or readjustments to make […] What rationalizes the investigation are one’s higher-order beliefs about what one believes and has reason to believe. (Shoemaker 1994: 240; also see Shoemaker’s discussion of Moore’s Paradox in Shoemaker 1988, 1994; for critical discussion of Shoemaker’s arguments in the context of theories of self-knowledge see, for example, Macdonald 1999; Kind 2003; Siewert 2003; Gertler 2011: ch. 5)

The connection that Shoemaker sees between the requirements of rationality, on the one hand, and self-awareness, on the other, is also stressed in so-called “rationalist” accounts of self-knowledge, most prominently in the work of Burge (1996) and Moran (2001; for critical discussion of the rationalist approach as an account of self-knowledge see, for example, Peacocke 1996; O’Brien 2003; Reed 2010; Gertler 2011: ch. 6). Burge focuses on the notion of the critical reasoner . He writes,

[t]o be capable of critical reasoning, and to be subject to certain rational norms necessarily associated with such reasoning, some mental acts and states must be knowledgeably reviewable. (Burge 1996: 97; for a fuller argument for the same conclusion, see Burge 1998)

On Burge’s account, the critical reasoner must be in a position to recognise their reasons as reasons, and that requires “the second order ability to think about thought contents or propositions, and rational relations among them” (1996: 97). This is for the reason that belief involves commitments and such commitments involve meeting certain standards—providing reasons, reevaluating where necessary, and so on.

A similar line of thought can be found in Moran’s account of the role of reflection on one’s own state in practical deliberation about what to do and how to feel (Moran 2001: ch. 2). Here the focus is not so much on critical reasoning but rather practical deliberation as that which requires self-consciousness. This is an idea that is also central to much of Korsgaard’s work (see, in particular, Korsgaard 1996, 2009). A central concern of hers is to distinguish between the sort of action of which all animals are capable and the sort of autonomous agency of which we self-conscious subjects are capable. The difference lies, on her broadly Kantian view, in simply having one’s most powerful desire result in action, on the one hand, and counting that desire as a reason for action, on the other. It is the latter that is constitutive of autonomous, deliberative action understood from the perspective of practical reason. As she writes,

[w]hen you deliberate it is as if there were something over and above all your desires, something which is you , and which chooses which desire to act upon. (Korsgaard 1996: 100)

Self-consciousness, on this view,

is the source of reason. When we become conscious of the workings of an incentive within us, the incentive is experienced not as a force or a necessity but as a proposal, something we need to make a decision about. (Korsgaard 2009: 119; for discussion of Korsgaard’s account of the relation between self-consciousness and the perspective of practical reason, see, for example, Nagel 1996; Fitzpatrick 2005; Soteriou 2013: ch. 12).

Self-awareness, on these views, is a necessary condition of rationality (conceived as the capacity for critical reasoning or practical deliberation). Burge also makes it clear that he regards the capacity for critical reasoning to be a necessary condition of (conceptual) self-consciousness, since to master and self-ascribe psychological concepts such as belief, once must be able to recognise their role in reasoning, and so employ them (Burge 1996: 97, n.3). As he puts it,

[a]cknowledging, with the I concept, that an attitude or act is one’s own is acknowledging that rational evaluations of it which one also acknowledges provide immediate […] reason and rationally immediate motivation to shape the attitude or act in accordance with the evaluation […] The first-person concept fixes the locus of responsibility. (Burge 1998: 253)

The claim that there is a constitutive connection between self-consciousness and rationality has been met with scepticism by Kornblith (2011, 2012: ch. 2; for a related line of thought, see Doris 2015: ch. 2). Regarding the sort of responsiveness to reason involved in updating one’s beliefs in accordance with new evidence—one of the capacities emphasised by both Shoemaker and Burge—Kornblith argues that “[w]hile such responsiveness may be achieved, at times, by way of reflection on one’s beliefs and desires, it does not require any such reflection” (2012: 49). Rationally revising beliefs in the face of evidence, Kornblith is keen to point out, is a capacity enjoyed by non-reflective animals. He further presents the rationalist view with a challenge: if one thinks that (first-order) beliefs are not themselves responsive to reason, how does adding (second-order) beliefs help? One response to this challenge is to point out that the connection between self-awareness and rationality that Shoemaker finds is intended to hold only for “an important class of cases” (Shoemaker 1994: 240), that is it holds for those cases of belief revision that themselves qualify as exercises in rational investigation. On this view, whilst non-reflective creatures may have some degree of rationality, their lack of self-consciousness means that they are not, as we are, capable of fully rational deliberation (for discussion of Kornblith’s scepticism concerning the role of self-consciousness in rationality, see Pust 2014; M. Williams 2015; Smithies 2016).

Central to the history of the self-consciousness sketched in §1 is a concern with the relation between self-consciousness and consciousness. Since self-consciousness is itself a form of consciousness, consciousness is, of course, a necessary condition of it. But is self-consciousness necessary for consciousness? Positive answers to this question come in both reductive and non-reductive varieties.

One way in which consciousness might entail self-consciousness is if the former is reducible to the latter. One such family of views are higher order theories of consciousness which maintain that a psychological state is conscious if and only if it is represented, in the right way, by a higher order state (Gennaro 2004; for a very different account that nevertheless posits a tight connection between consciousness and self-consciousness, see O’Shaughnessy 2002: ch. 3). A natural assumption is that this higher order state is distinct from that which it represents. Higher Order theories that accept this assumption fall into two camps: Higher Order Thought (HOT) theories (Rosenthal 1986, 2005; Carruthers 2000, 2005), which maintain that the higher order state is a thought or belief, and Higher Order Perception (HOP) theories (Armstrong 1968; Lycan 1996, 2004), which by contrast maintain that the higher order state is a perception-like sensory state—an exercise of the sort of inner perception, or “inner sense”, that was extensively debated throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Thiel 2011; see §3.1). Since, however, we can be aware that someone else is in some conscious state, it seems that simply being aware that a thought is occurring is insufficient to render that thought conscious. Arguably, what is required is that one be aware that one is in the relevant first-order state. That is, one represents oneself as being in the state in question. Since this seems to involve a form of self-awareness, the HOT and HOP theories can be understood as holding that consciousness entails self-consciousness (Gennaro 1996). Given this, it is natural to think of the distinction between HOT and HOP theories of consciousness as closely related to that between conceptual and non-conceptual self-consciousness.

An alternative to HOT and HOP theories that still maintains the ambition to reduce consciousness to self-consciousness is the self-representational view (Kriegel & Williford 2006; Kriegel 2009; Caston 2002), according to which a psychological state is conscious if and only if it represents itself. Such accounts are higher-order views that deny that the first and second-order states are distinct. As with both HOT and HOP, self-representationalism can be thought of as supporting the view that a form of self-consciousness is a necessary condition of consciousness. Kriegel (2003) dubs this “intransitive self-consciousness”, the phenomenon purportedly picked out by phrases of the form “I am self-consciously thinking that P”, and distinguishes it from the “transitive self-consciousness” purportedly picked out by phrases of the form “I am self-conscious of my thought that P”. This is a version of the distinction between reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness discussed in §3.2 (and the views of Fichte and Sartre mentioned in §1 ; cf. Kapitan 1999). If conscious states are those that represent themselves then, it might be argued, consciousness entails intransitive self-consciousness, since one’s conscious states do not only represent themselves but also (in some way implicitly) represent oneself as having them (Kriegel 2003: 104).

Aristotle, considering a version of the HOP theory, argued that the view suffered from a regress problem since the higher-order perception must itself be conscious and so be accompanied by a HOP, which would itself be conscious, and so on ( De Anima 3.2; Caston 2002). The standard way to diffuse such a worry is to deny that the higher order state, be it perception or thought, need be conscious. An alternative, of course, is to endorse a self-representational account. There are other objections to higher order views, however, each of which applies to one or more versions of the view. They include worries about the possibility of objectless and non-veridical higher order states (Byrne 1997; Block 2011), about whether it can account for the conscious states of infants and non-humans (Dretske 1995: ch. 4; Tye 1995: ch. 1), the complaint that the postulation of a distinct higher-order state for every conscious state leads to an unnecessarily “cluttered picture of the mind” (Chalmers 1996: 231), and the fundamental worry that no form of higher-order view has the resources to explain consciousness at all (Levine 2006; cf. Kriegel 2012). As such, higher-order and self-representational theories of consciousness, that posit a necessary connection between consciousness and self-consciousness, are far from being established.

If consciousness cannot be reduced to self-consciousness, perhaps the latter is nevertheless a necessary condition of the former. Some non-reductive views, already mentioned, see pre-reflective consciousness (see §3.2 ), or the sense of ownership (see §3.3 ) as necessary conditions of consciousness (see Zahavi 2005). A different non-reductive, and broadly Kantian, argument for the claim that self-consciousness is a necessary condition of consciousness first of all claims that conscious experience is necessarily unified and, second, that this unity of consciousness in turn depends on self-awareness. Of primary interest here is the second step which is articulated by Strawson in his discussion of Kant’s transcendental deduction as the claim that,

if different experiences are to belong to a single consciousness, there must be the possibility of self­ -consciousness on the part of the subject of those experiences. (P.F. Strawson 1966: 93; for discussion of Kant’s views of the matter, see Henrich 1989; Powell 1990; Brook 1994; Keller 1998; Kitcher 2011; Allison 2015; for detailed discussion of whether consciousness is necessarily unified, see Bayne 2010; see also entry on unity of consciousness ).

One reason for supposing that there is a connection between self-consciousness and the unity of consciousness is given by Kant, who writes,

only because I can comprehend their manifold in a consciousness do I call them altogether my representations; for otherwise I would have as multi-coloured diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious. (Kant 1781/1787: B134)

That is, a single self must be able to “comprehend” its own experiences together, otherwise they would not really be its own. Such “comprehension” would seem to involve self-consciousness. As Kant famously puts it,

[t]he I think must be able to accompany all my representations for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me. (Kant 1781/1787: B131–132)

On this view, it is the unity of the self that guarantees that co-conscious experiences are jointly self-ascribable; that unity requires self-consciousness (there is a question as to whether self-consciousness is here supposed to explain the unity of consciousness; cf. Dainton’s strong and weak “I-thesis” (2000: §2.3)). This Kantian picture is associated with the claim that unified self-consciousness requires a conception of the world as objective; as transcending the perspective that one has on it. The idea here is that to self-ascribe an experience one must have some grasp of the distinction between one’s (subjective) experience that the (objective) condition of which it is an experience (these issues are explored in P.F. Strawson 1966; Bennett 1966; Evans 1980; Cassam 1997; Sacks 2000; also see Burge 2010: ch. 6).

The claim that the unity of consciousness requires self-consciousness can be criticised in a number of different ways. How one evaluates the claim will depend on whether one has conceptual or non-conceptual self-consciousness in mind. As Bayne (2004) points out, the claim that the unity of consciousness requires that one possess the concept of oneself seems, implausibly, to imply that conceptually unsophisticated infants and non-human animals could not possess a unified stream of consciousness (of course, this worry applies quite generally to views that connect consciousness with self-consciousness). The view that non-conceptual self-consciousness is a necessary condition of the unity of consciousness would appear to be vulnerable to the objection that it implausibly rules out the possibility of cases such as Anscombe’s (1975) subject in a sensory deprivation tank, a case in which the forms of experience typically classed as forms of non-conceptual self-consciousness are lacking (for related cases see Bayne 2004; also see G. Strawson 1999). A different worry about the connection between self-consciousness and the unity of consciousness is the “just more content” objection (B. Williams 1978: ch. 3; Hurley 1994; and 1998 Part I). The concern is addressed to the view that self-consciousness is not merely a necessary condition of the unity of consciousness but is that in virtue of which it is unified. For if the self-ascription of experiences is taken to be that which is responsible for the unity of consciousness, how can we account for the fact that the self-conscious thoughts are themselves unified with the first-order experiences that they supposedly unify? As Hurley puts it,

self-conscious or first-person contents […] are just more contents , to which the problem of co-consciousness [i.e., the unity of consciousness] also applies (1998: 61)

To appeal to the third-order self-ascription of the self-conscious thought would appear to invite a regress.

What is the connection between self-consciousness and the awareness of others? On some views self-consciousness requires awareness of others, on another view the awareness of others requires self-consciousness. In each case we can distinguish between those accounts according to which such awareness is merely an empirical condition from those according to which it is a strictly necessary/sufficient condition. There is also a distinction to be made regarding the sense of “awareness of others” that is in play: whilst some philosophers are concerned with knowledge of other minds, others are content with the representation of others, veridical or not.

A familiar account of our knowledge of others takes the form of an argument from analogy (Slote 1970: ch. 4; Avramides 2001: part I). The argument from analogy presents an account of our justification for moving from judgements about others’ observable behaviour to judgements about their unobservable mental states. I am aware from my own case that, say, wincing is the result of pain so, on seeing another’s wincing, I am justified in judging them to be in pain. On this picture, self-awareness, as manifest in the judgement about my own case, is a necessary condition of knowledge of other minds. In this respect the view is related to contemporary simulation theory, standard versions of which see our capacity to attribute mental states to others as dependent on our capacity to attribute them to ourselves (Heal 1986; Goldman 2006: ch. 9; for a simulationist theory that differs in this respect, see Gordon 1996). Associated with the argument from analogy is a view according to which our grasp of mental state concepts is an essentially first-personal affair. That is, we understand what, for example, pain is first from our own case (Nagel 1986: §2.3; Peacocke 2008: ch. 5–6; it has sometimes been claimed that this view gives rise to the conceptual problem of other minds, see Wittgenstein 1958: §302; McGinn 1984; Avramides 2001: part II).

In opposition to this package stand views on which our grasp and application of mental state concepts is neutral between the first and third-person cases. Theory theorists, for example, claim that we attribute mental states to both ourselves and others by means of a (tacitly held) psychological theory. They may also hold that possession of such a theory constitutes our grasp of mental state concepts (Carruthers 1996, 2011: ch. 8; Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997; for an account that combines elements of theory with elements of simulation, see Nichols & Stich 2003). While such views accord no priority to the first-person case, they may see a tight connection between self-consciousness and our capacity to think about others: these are simply two aspects of the more general capacity to think about the mind. A distinct, though related, family of views see both self-consciousness and awareness of others as emerging from a primitive “adualist” state in which self and other are not distinguished (Piaget 1937; Merleau-Ponty 1960; Barresi & Moore 1996; Hurley 2005; Gallese 2005; also see D. Stern 1985: part II). Against such “adualist” views, it is often claimed the phenomena of neonate imitation, joint attention, and emotion regulation show that infants display an awareness of others as others from the very beginning of life (Meltzoff & Moore 1977; Trevarthen 1979; Hurley & Chater 2005; Eilan et al. 2005; Legerstee 2005; Reddy 2008). One empirical proposal is that it is from this early form of social interaction and capacity to understand others that self-consciousness emerges as a self-directed form of mindreading (Carruthers 2011; Carruthers, Fletcher, & Ritchie 2012; for an early such account, see Mead 1934). On such a view the first-person case is treated as secondary, reversing the traditional picture associated with the argument from analogy.

A more ambitious version of this approach to the relationship between self-consciousness and awareness of others, prioritizing the awareness of others, is to argue that knowledge of other minds is a necessary condition of the possibility of self-consciousness. Well known examples of such arguments can be found in the work of P.F. Strawson (1959: ch. 3) and Davidson (1991; for the related Hegelian view that various forms of self-consciousness depend on intersubjective recognition, see Honneth 1995). Since knowledge of other minds is typically considered to be open to sceptical doubt, and self-consciousness is not, such lines of reasoning are transcendental arguments and so potentially open to general criticisms of that form of argument (Stroud 1968; R. Stern 1999, 2000). Strawson’s argument hinges on his claim that

the idea of a predicate is correlative with that of a range of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be significantly, though not necessarily truly, affirmed. (P.F. Strawson 1959: 99; cf. Evans’ generality constraint, 1982: §4.3)

This means, Strawson claims, that one can only ascribe mental states to oneself if one is capable of ascribing them to others which, in turn, means that I cannot have gained the capacity to think of others’ mental states by means of an analogical reasoning from my own case. This, Strawson argues, shows that others’ observable behaviour is not a “sign” of their mentality, but is a “criterion” of it. In short, we must have knowledge of others’ minds if we are self-conscious (for the full argument, see P.F. Strawson 1959: 105ff; for critical discussion, see R. Stern 2000: ch. 6; Sacks 2005; Joel Smith 2011).

Davidson’s transcendental argument—the triangulation argument—connects self-consciousness, knowledge of other minds, and knowledge of the external world. At its heart is the claim that for my thoughts to have determinate content there must exist another subject who is able to interpret me. As Davidson puts it,

it takes two points of view to give a location to the cause of a thought, and thus to define its content […] Until a base line has been established by communication with someone else, there is no point in saying one’s own thoughts or words have a propositional content. (Davidson 1991: 212–213)

Since self-conscious subjects are aware of the contents of their thoughts, they must know that there are other minds, since the sort of intersubjective externalism that Davidson endorses guarantees it. Self-knowledge, on this view, entails knowledge of others (for discussion, see R. Stern 2000: ch. 6; Sosa 2003; Ludwig 2011).

5. Self-Consciousness in Infants and Non-Human Animals

At what age can human infants be credited with self-consciousness? Is self-consciousness present beyond homo sapiens ? Some theorists, for example Bermúdez (1998), claim that various forms of perceptual experience constitute a non-conceptual form of self-consciousness (see §3 ). Others, for example Rosenthal (2005), claim that phenomenal consciousness entails self-consciousness. If either view is correct then self-consciousness, of some kind, can plausibly be attributed to creatures other than adult humans. But when it comes to more sophisticated forms of self-awareness, matters are less clear. What is required is some empirical criterion for judging a creature self-conscious even if, as with infants and non-human animals, they are unable to provide evidence via their use of the first-person pronoun. Such evidence, if available, may reasonably be thought to shed light on both the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of self-consciousness (Ferrari & Sternberg 1998; Terrace & Metcalfe 2005; see the entries on animal consciousness and animal cognition ).

It has sometimes been claimed, most forcefully by Gallup and colleagues, that the capacity to recognise oneself in the mirror is a marker of self-consciousness (Gallup 1970; Gallup, Anderson, & Platek 2011; Gallup, Platek, & Spaulding 2014). It is easy to see why this might seem to be so since, if first-person thought involves thinking about oneself as oneself , then it is natural to suppose that a capacity to recognise that a subject seen in a mirror is oneself involves such a thought. In Evans’s (1982) terminology such thoughts involve an “identification component”.

Gallup (1970) devised a test for mirror self-recognition: surreptitiously placing a red mark on a subject’s forehead before exposure to a mirror, then observing whether they touch the relevant spot. It is well established that chimpanzees pass the mirror test while other primate species fail (Anderson & Gallup 2011). It has also been claimed that dolphins and some elephants pass the test (Reiss & Marino 2001; Plotnik et. al. 2006). With respect to human infants, the consensus is that success in the mirror test begins at around 15 to 18 months of age, and that by 24 months most children pass (Amsterdam 1972; M. Lewis & Brooks-Gunn 1979; Nielsen, Suddendorf, & Slaughter 2006).

It is not universally accepted, however, that success in the mirror test is an indication of self-consciousness. For example, Heyes (1994) presents an influential critique of the claim that it is a marker of self-awareness, arguing that all that is required for success is that subjects be able to distinguish between novel ways of receiving bodily feedback in order to guide behaviour, on the one hand, and other forms of incoming sensory data, on the other. Such a view, however, needs to explain why it is that passing the mirror test seems to be connected with the phenomena arguably associated with self-consciousness, such as experiencing shame and embarrassment (M. Lewis 2011). There remains, then, significant controversy concerning what success in the mirror test really shows, and so whether it can shed light on the development of self-awareness (see, for example, Mitchell 1993; Suddendorf & Butler 2013; Gallup, Platek, & Spaulding 2014. For related philosophical discussion, see Rochat & Zahavi 2011; Peacocke 2014: ch.8).

Another potential marker of self-consciousness is episodic memory, the capacity that we have to recollect particular episodes from our own past experience (see Tulving 1983; Michaelian 2016; entry on memory ). As Tulving describes it, episodic memory involves “autonoesis” or “mental time-travel”, the experience of transporting oneself in time (which also has a future oriented dimension in expectation, planning, and so on; see Michaelian, Klein, & Szpunar 2016). The connection between memory and self-consciousness is one that is often made (see §2.3 , §3 , and §4.1 ). If it is correct that episodic memory essentially involves a form of self-consciousness, and we are able to test for the presence of episodic memory in non-linguistic infants and animals, then we have a way of detecting the presence of self-conscious abilities. Since, however, episodic memory is not the only form of self-consciousness, the lack of it does not indicate that a creature is not self-aware. Indeed, the much discussed case of K.C. seems to be one in which, due to an accident, someone has lost episodic memory but appears to remain otherwise self-conscious (see Rosenbaum et. al. 2005).

Tulving himself argues that only humans possess episodic memory, and only when they reach the age of around 4 years (2005; also see Suddendorf & Corballis 2007). Whilst human infants and non-human animals possess non-episodic forms of memory such as semantic memory (remembering that such and such is the case), they lack the “autonoetic” consciousness of themselves projected either back or forwards in time. For example whilst most 3 year old infants can remember presented information, most are unreliable when it comes to the question of how they know—did they see it, hear it, etc. (Gopnik & Graf 1988). The suggestion here is that the development of the reliable capacity to report how they know some fact reflects the development of the capacity to episodically remember the learning event.

In the case of animals perhaps the most suggestive evidence of episodic memory derives from work on scrub-jays, who can retain information about what food has been stored, where it was stored, and when (Clayton, Bussey, & Dickinson 2003). This evidence coheres with the “what, where, when” criterion of episodic memory originally proposed by Tulving (1972). It is, however, widely accepted that this content-based account of episodic memory—episodic memory is memory that contains information about what happened, where it happened, and when—is inadequate, since non-episodic, semantic memory often involves the retention of “what, where, when” information. Due to the difficulties in finding a behavioural test for “autonoetic” consciousness, it is often, though not universally, claimed that there is no compelling evidence for episodic memory, and thus this particular form of self-consciousness, in non-human animals (Tulving 2005; Suddendorf & Corballis 2007; Michaelian 2016: ch. 2; for discussion relating to apes, see Menzel 2005; Schwartz 2005; for an alternative perspective suggesting that episodic memory abilities come in degree, see Breeden et. al. 2016).

Another body of research pertaining to the question of self-consciousness in infants and non-human animals is the work on metacognition (and metamemory). The term “metacognition” typically refers to the capacity to monitor and control one’s own cognitive states, and is manifest in one’s judgements (or feelings) concerning one’s own learning and consequent level of certainty or confidence (J.D. Smith 2009; Beran et al. 2012; Proust 2013; Fleming & Frith 2014). The suggestion is that if a creature is able to monitor their own level of confidence, they are to that extent self-conscious. One common paradigm for testing metacognitive abilities involves presenting subjects with a stimulus that they must categorise in one of two ways. Crucially, they are also given the opportunity to opt out of the test, with correct categorisation resulting in the highest reward, opting out resulting in a lower reward, and incorrect categorisation resulting in no reward. The assumption is that the opt-out response reflects a meta-cognitive judgement of uncertainty. Evidence gathered from such a paradigm has been taken to show metacognitive abilities in some birds (Fujita et. al. 2012), dolphins (J.D. Smith et. al. 1995), primates (Shields et. al. 1997), and children from the age of around 4 years (Sodian et. al. 2012).

The view that success on metacognitive opt-out tests is indicative of self-consciousness is not uncontroversial, however. For example, it has been suggested that the uncertainty response is indicative not of metacognitive uncertainty monitoring but rather of first-order, environmental judgements concerning a third category between the intended two (Kornell, Son, & Terrace 2007; Hampton 2009; also see Carruthers 2008; Kornell 2014; Musholt 2015: ch. 7). On such an interpretation, the research on metacognition does not provide compelling evidence regarding self-consciousness in infants and non-human animals (but for critical discussion see J.D. Smith 2005; J.D. Smith, Couchman, & Beran 2014; also relevant is the distinction between “evaluativist” and “attributivist” accounts of metacognition outlined by Proust (2013)). The question of the significance of opt-out tests for attributions of self-consciousness remains controversial.

Where applicable, page references are to reprinted versions.

• Aboulafia, Mitchell, 1986, “Mead, Sartre: Self, Object, and Reflection”, Philosophy and Social Criticism , 11(2): 63–86.
• Albahari, Miri, 2006, Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self , Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Allison, Henry E., 2015, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical-Historical Commentary , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Alsmith, Adrian, 2015, “Mental Activity & the Sense of Ownership”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology , 6(4): 881–896.
• Alter, Torin, 2010, “A Defense of the Necessary Unity of Phenomenal Consciousness”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 91(1): 19–37.
• Ameriks, Karl, 1982 [2000], Kant’s Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason , Oxford: Clarendon Press; second edition 2000. doi:10.1093/0198238975.001.0001
• Amsterdam, Beulah, 1972, “Mirror Self-Image Reactions Before Age Two”, Developmental Psychobiology , 4(5): 297–305.
• Anderson, James R. and Gordon G. Gallup, 2011, “Which Primates Recognize Themselves in Mirrors?”, PLoS Biology , 9(3): e1001024. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001024
• Anscombe, G.E.M., 1975, “The First Person”, in Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Mind & Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974 , Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 45–65.
• Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologica , translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, New York: Benziger Bros, 1948.
• Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul) , translated by Hugh Lawson-Tancreed, London: Penguin, 1986.
• –––, De Sensu and De Memoria , translated by G.R.T. Ross, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1906.
• Armstrong, David, 1968, A Materialist Theory of Mind , London: Routledge.
• Augustine, On the Trinity: Books 8–15 , edited by Gareth B. Matthews, translated by Stephen McKenna, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
• Avramides, Anita, 2001, Other Minds , London: Routledge.
• Ayer, A.J., 1963, “The Concept of a Person”, in A.J. Ayer, The Concept of a Person and Other Essays , London: Macmillan, pp. 82–128.
• Ayers, Michael, 1991, Locke , 2 vols., London: Routledge.
• Babb, Matthew, 2016, “The Essential Indexicality of Intentional Action”, The Philosophical Quarterly , 66(264): 439–457. doi:10.1093/pq/pqw023
• Baker, Lynne Rudder, 2013, Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Barresi, John and Chris Moore, 1996, “Intentional Relations and Social Understanding”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences , 19(1): 107–122. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00041790
• Bayne, Tim, 2004, “Self-Consciousness and the Unity of Consciousness”, The Monist , 87(2): 219–236.
• –––, 2008, “The Phenomenology of Agency”, Philosophy Compass , 3(1): 182–202.
• –––, 2010, The Unity of Consciousness , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Bealer, George, 1997, “Self-Consciousness”, Philosophical Review , 106(1): 69–117.
• Bennett, Jonathan, 1966, Kant’s Analytic , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Beran, Michael J., Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner, and Joëlle Proust (eds.), 2012, Foundations of Metacognition , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Berkeley, George, 1713, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonus , edited by Jonathan Dancy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
• Bermúdez, José Luis, 1998, The Paradox of Self-Consciousness , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• –––, 2002, “The Sources of Self-Consciousness”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 102: 87–107.
• –––, 2003, Thinking Without Words , New York: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2011, “Bodily Awareness and Self-Consciousness”, in Gallagher 2011: 157–179.
• –––, 2012, “Memory Judgments and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification”, Grazer Philosophische Studien , 84(1): 123–142.
• –––, 2013, “Immunity to Error through Misidentification and Past-Tense Memory Judgements”, Analysis , 73(2): 211–220. doi:10.1093/analys/ant002
• –––, 2016, Understanding “I”: Language and Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198796213.001.0001
• –––, 2017, “Yes, Essential Indexicals Really Are Essential*”, Analysis , 77(4): 690–694. doi:10.1093/analys/anx137
• Bermúdez, José Luis, Anthony Marcel, and Naomi Eilan (eds.), 1995, The Body and the Self , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Bilgrami, Akeel, 2006, Self-Knowledge and Resentment , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Billon, Alexandre, 2013, “Does Consciousness Entail Subjectivity? The Puzzle of Thought Insertion”, Philosophical Psychology , 26(2): 291–314.
• Black, Deborah L., 2008, “Avicenna on Self-Awareness and Knowing that One Knows”, in Shahid Rahman, Tony Street, and Hassan Tahiri, 2008, The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition: Science, Logic, Epistemology and their Interactions , Dordrecht: Springer Science, pp. 63–87.
• Blackburn, Simon, 1997, “Has Kant Refuted Parfit?” in Dancy 1997: 180–201.
• Block, Ned, 2011, “The Higher Order Approach to Consciousness Is Defunct”, Analysis , 71(3): 419–431. doi:10.1093/analys/anr037
• Bortolotti, Lisa, and Matthew Broome, 2009, “A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences , 8(2): 205–224.
• Boyle, Matthew, 2009, “Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 78(1): 133–164.
• –––, 2011, “Transparent Self-Knowledge”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume , 85: 223–241.
• Brandom, Robert B., 1994, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Bratman, Michael E., 2007, Structures of Agency: Essays , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Breeden, Prescott, Dorothea Dere, Armin Zlomuzica, and Ekrem Dere, 2016, “The Mental Time Travel Continuum: On the Architecture, Capacity, Versatility and Extension of the Mental Bridge into the Past and Future”, Reviews in the Neurosciences , 27(4): 421–434.
• Brewer, Bill, 1995, “Bodily Awareness and the Self”, in Bermúdez, Marcel, & Eilan 1995: 291–309.
• Brinkmann, Klaus, 2005, “Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and the Modern Self”, History of the Modern Sciences , 18(4): 27–48.
• Brook, Andrew, 1994, Kant and the Mind , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Buford, Christopher, 2009, “Memory, Quasi-memory, and Pseudo-quasi-memory”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 87(3): 465–478.
• Burge, Tyler, 1996, “Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 96: 91–116.
• –––, 1998, “Reason and the First-Person”, in Wright, Smith, & Macdonald 1998: 243–270.
• –––, 2010, Origins of Objectivity , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Byrne, Alex, 1997, “Some Like it HOT: Consciousness and Higher Order Thoughts”, Philosophical Studies , 86(2): 103–129.
• Campbell, John, 1994, Past, Space, and Self , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• –––, 1999a, “Immunity to Error through Misidentification and the Meaning of a Referring Term”, Philosophical Topics , 26(1&2): 89–104.
• –––, 1999b, “Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons, and Thinking as a Motor Process”, The Monist , 82(4): 609–625.
• –––, 2002, Reference and Consciousness , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Cappelen, Herman and Ernie Lepore, 2007, “The Myth of Unarticulated Constituents”, in O’Rourke & Washington 2007: 199–214.
• Cappelen, Herman and Josh Dever, 2013, The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686742.001.0001
• Carr, David, 1999, The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Carruthers, Peter, 1996, “Simulation and Self-Knowledge: A Defence of Theory Theory”, in Carruthers & Smith 1996: 22–38.
• –––, 2000, Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2005, Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2008, “Metacognition in Animals: A Skeptical Look”, Mind & Language , 23(1): 58–89.
• –––, 2011, The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Carruthers, Peter, Logan Fletcher, and J. Brendan Ritchie, 2012, “The Evolution of Self-Knowledge”, Philosophical Topics , 40(2): 13–37.
• Carruthers, Peter and Peter K. Smith (eds.), 1996, Theories of Theories of Mind , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Cary, Phillip, 2000, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Cassam, Quassim, 1989, “Kant and Reductionism”, Review of Metaphysics , 43(1): 72–106.
• –––, 1993, “Parfit on Persons”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 93: 17–37.
• –––, 1995, “Introspection and Bodily Self-Ascription”, in Bermúdez, Marcel, & Eilan 1995: 311–336.
• –––, 1997, Self and World , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Castañeda, Hector Neri, 1966, “’He’: A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness”, Ratio , 8: 130–157; reprinted in Castañeda 1999: 35–60.
• –––, 1967, “Indicators and Quasi-Indicators”, American Philosophical Quarterly , 4(2): 85–100; reprinted in Castañeda 1999: 61–88.
• –––, 1999, The Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness , edited by James G. Hart and Tomis Kapitan, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
• Caston, Victor, 2002, “Aristotle on Consciousness”, Mind , 111(444): 751–815.
• Chadha, Monima, 2017, “No-Self and the Phenomenology of Agency”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences , 16(2): 187–205.
• Chalmers, David, 1996, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Chen, Cheryl K., 2011, “Bodily Awareness and Immunity to Error through Misidentification”, European Journal of Philosophy , 19(1): 21–38.
• Chisholm, Roderick M., 1976, Person and Object , Chicago: Open Court.
• Clayton, Nicola S., Timothy J. Bussey, and Anthony Dickinson, 2003, “Can Animals Recall the Past and Plan for the Future?” Nature Reviews Neuroscience , 4(8): 685–691.
• Cohen, Jonathan, 2013, “Indexicality and the Puzzle of the Answering Machine”, The Journal of Philosophy , 110(1): 5–32.
• Coliva, Annalisa, 2002, “Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error through Misidentification”, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology , 9(1): 27–34.
• –––, 2006, “Error Through Misidentification: Some Varieties”, Journal of Philosophy , 103(8): 407–425.
• –––, 2012, “Which ‘Key to all Mythologies’ About the Self? A Note on Where the Illusions of Transcendence Come From and How to Resist Them”, in Prosser & Recanati 2012: 22–45.
• Corazza, Eros, 2004, Reflecting the Mind: Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Corazza, Eros, William Fish, and Jonathan Gorvett, 2002, “Who is I?” Philosophical Studies , 107(1): 1–21.
• Cory, Therese Scarpelli, 2014, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Dainton, Barry, 2000, Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience , London: Routledge.
• –––, 2008, The Phenomenal Self , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Daly, Chris John, 2007, “Acquaintance and De Re thought”, Synthese , 156(1): 79–96.
• Damasio, Antonio, 2010, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain , New York: Pantheon Books.
• Dancy, Jonathan (ed.), 1997, Reading Parfit , Oxford: Blackwell.
• Davidson, Donald, 1991, “Three Varieties of Knowledge”, in A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), A.J. Ayer: Memorial Essays , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 153–166; reprinted in Donald Davidson, 2001, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 205–220.
• de Gaynesford, Maximilian, 2003, “Is ‘I’ Guaranteed to Refer?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 84(2): 109–126.
• –––, 2006, I: The Meaning of the First-Person Term , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• de Vignemont, Frédérique, 2007, “Habeas Corpus: The Sense of Ownership of One’s Own Body”, Mind and Language , 22(4): 427–449.
• –––, 2012, “Bodily Immunity to Error”, in Prosser & Recanati 2012: 224–246.
• –––, 2013, “The Mark of Bodily Ownership”, Analysis , 73(4): 643–651. doi:10.1093/analys/ant080
• Dennett, Daniel, 1976, “Conditions of Personhood”, in Amélie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons , Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 175–196; reprinted in Daniel Dennett, Brainstorms , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981, pp. 267–285.
• Descartes, René, 1637, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences , translated in Descartes 1998: 20–56.
• –––, 1641, Meditations on First Philosophy , translated in Descartes 1998: 73–159.
• –––, 1644, Principles of Philosophy , translated in Descartes 1998: 160–212.
• –––, 1998, Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings , translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Diamond, Cora and Jenny Teichman (eds.), 1979, Intention & Intentionality: Essays in Honour of G.E.M. Anscombe , Brighton: The Harvester Press.
• Dodd, Dylan and Paula Sweeney, 2010, “Indexicals and Utterance Production”, Philosophical Studies , 150(3):331–348.
• Dokic, Jérôme, 2003, “The Sense of Ownership: An Analogy Between Sensation and Action”, in Roessler & Eilan 2003: 321–344.
• Doris, John, 2015, Talking to Ourselves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Dretske, Fred, 1995, Naturalizing the Mind , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Eilan, Naomi, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack, and Johannes Roessler (eds.), 2005, Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Evans, Gareth, 1980, “Things Without the Mind—A Commentary upon Chapter Two of Strawson’s Individuals ”, in Zak Van Straaten (ed.) , Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson , Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 76–116; reprinted in Evans 1985: 249–290.
• –––, 1981, “Understanding Demonstratives”, in Herman Parret and Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and Understanding , Berlin: W. de Gruyter, pp. 280–304; reprinted in Evans 1985: 291–321.
• –––, 1982, The Varieties of Reference , edited by John McDowell, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 1985, Collected Papers , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Feit, Neil, 2008, Belief about the Self: A Defence of the Property Theory of Content , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Fernández, Jordi, 2013, Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2014, “Memory and Immunity to Error through Misidentification”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology , 5(3): 373–390.
• Ferrari, Michel and Robert J. Sternberg, 1998, Self-Awareness: Its Nature and Development , New York: The Guilford Press.
• Fichte, Johann Gottleib, 1794–1795, Science of Knowledge , 2nd edition, edited and translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
• Fitzpatrick, William J. 2005, “The Practical Turn in Ethical Theory: Korsgaard’s Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity”, Ethics , 115(4): 651–691.
• Flanagan, Owen, 1992, Consciousness Reconsidered , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Fleming, Stephen M. and Christopher D. Frith (eds.), 2014, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Metacognition , Heidelberg: Springer.
• Frank, Manfred, 1995, “Is Subjectivity a Non-Thing, an Absurdity [ Unding ]? On Some Difficulties in Naturalistic Reductions of Self-Consciousness”, in Karl Ameriks and Dieter Sturma (eds.), The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy , Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 177–197.
• –––, 2004, “Fragments of a History of the Theory of Self-Consciousness from Descartes to Kierkegaard”, Critical Horizons , 5(1): 53–136.
• Frankfurt, Harry, 1971, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, The Journal of Philosophy , 68(1): 5–20.
• –––, 1987, “Identification and Wholeheartedness”, in Ferdinand Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 27–45.
• Frege, Gottlob, 1918–1919, “Thought”, translated by Peter Geach and R.H. Stoothoff, in Michael Beaney (ed.), The Frege Reader , Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 325–345.
• Fujita, Kazuo, Noriyuki Nakamura, Sumie Iwasaki and Sota Watanabe, 2012, “Are Birds Metacognitive?” in Beran et al. 2012: 50–61.
• Gallese, Vittorio, 2005, “’Being Like Me’: Self-Other Identity, Mirror Neurons, and Empathy”, in Hurley & Chater 2005: vol. 1, 101–118.
• Gallagher, Shaun, 2000, “Self Reference and Schizophrenia”, in Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience , Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 203–239.
• –––, 2004, “Neurocognitive Models of Schizophrenia: a Neurophenomenological Critique”, Psychopathology , 37(1): 8–19.
• ––– (ed.), 2011, The Oxford Handbook of the Self , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548019.001.0001
• –––, 2012, Phenomenology , Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Gallup, Gordon G., 1970, “Chimpanzees: Self-Recognition”, Science , 167(3914): 86–87.
• Gallup, Gordon G., James R. Anderson, and Steven M. Platek, 2011, “Self-Recognition”, in Gallagher 2011: 80–110.
• Gallup, Gordon G., Steven M. Platek, and Kristina N. Spaulding, 2014, “The Nature of Visual Self-Recognition Revisited”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 18(2): 57–58.
• Ganeri, Jonardon, 2012a, The Self: Consciousness, Naturalism, and the First-Person Stance , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2012b, The Concealed Art of the Soul: Theories of Self and Practices of Truth in Indian Ethics and Epistemology , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• García-Carpintero, Manuel, 2017, “The Philosophical Significance of the De Se ”, Inquiry , 60(3): 253–276. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2017.1262003
• García-Carpintero, Manuel and Stephan Torre (eds.), 2016, About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.001.0001
• Garrett, Brian, 1991, “Personal Identity and Reductionism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 51(2): 361–373.
• –––, 1998, Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness , London: Routledge.
• Gennaro, Rocco, 1996, Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness , Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
• ––– (ed.), 2004, Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness , Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
• Gertler, Brie, 2011, Self-Knowledge , London: Routledge.
• Gjelsvik, Olav, 2017, “Indexicals: What They Are Essential For”, Inquiry , 60(3): 295–314.
• Glock, Hans Johann and P.M.S. Hacker, 1996, “Reference and the First Person Pronoun”, Language and Communication , 16(2): 95–105.
• Goldman, Alvin I., 2006, Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Gopnik, Alison and Andrew N. Meltzoff, 1997, Words, Thoughts, and Theories , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Gopnik, Alison and Peter Graf, 1988, “Knowing How You Know: Young Children’s Ability to Identify and Remember the Sources of Their Beliefs”, Child Development , 59(5): 1366–1371. doi:10.2307/1130499
• Gordon, Robert, M., 1996, “’Radical’ Simulationism”, in Carruthers & Smith 1996: 11–21.
• Hacker, P.M.S., 1990, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, vol. III, Part I: Essays , Oxford: Blackwell.
• Hacker, Peter, 2002, “Strawson’s Concept of a Person”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 102(1): 21–40. doi:10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00041.x
• Hamilton, Andy, 1991, “Anscombian and Cartesian Scepticism”, The Philosophical Quarterly , 41(162), Oxford Academic: 39–54.
• –––, 1995, “A New Look at Personal Identity”, The Philosophical Quarterly , 45(180): 332–349. doi:10.2307/2219654
• –––, 2009, “Memory and Self-Consciousness: Immunity to Error Through Misidentification”, Synthese , 171(3): 409–417.
• –––, 2013, The Self in Question , Basingstoke: Palgrage Macmillan.
• Hampton, Robert, R., 2009, “Multiple Demonstrations of Metacognition in Nonhumans: Converging Evidence or Multiple Mechanisms”, Comparative Cognition and Behaviour Reviews , 4: 17–28.
• Harcourt, Edward, 2000, “The First-Person: Problems of Sense and Reference”, in Roger Teichmann (ed.), Logic, Cause and Action: Essays in Honour of Elizabeth Anscombe , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 25–46.
• Heal, Jane, 1986, “Replication and Functionalism”, in Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind and Logic , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 135–150.
• Hegel, G.W.F., 1807, Phenomenology of Spirit , translated by A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
• Heinämaa, Sara, Vili Lähteenmäki, and Pauliina Remes (eds.), 2007, Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy , Dordrecht: Springer.
• Henrich, Dieter, 1967, “Fichte’s Original Insight”, translated by David R. Lachterman, in Kristin Gjesdal (ed.), Debates in Nineteenth Century European Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses , New York: Routledge, pp. 35–44.
• –––, 1989, “The Identity of the Subject in the Transcendental Deduction”, in Eva Schaper and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl (eds.), Reading Kant: New Perspectives on Transcendental Arguments and Critical Philosophy , Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 250–280.
• Heyes, Cecilia M., 1994, “Reflections on Self-Recognition in Primates”, Animal Behaviour , 47(4): 909–919.
• Hintikka, Jaakko, 1962, “Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance”, The Philosophical Review , 71(1): 3–32.
• Honneth, Axel, 1995, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Howell, Robert J., 2010, “Subjectivity and the Elusiveness of the Self”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 40(3): 459–483.
• Hume, David, 1739–40, A Treatise of Human Nature , edited by L.S. Selby-Bigge, Second Edition, revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon, 1978.
• Hunter, David, 2017, “Practical Reasoning and the First Person: (Why ‘You’ and ‘I’ Are Not Needed in Practical Reasoning)”, Philosophia , 45(2): 677–700. doi:10.1007/s11406-016-9793-9
• Hurley, Susan, 1994, “Unity and Objectivity”, in Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 49–77.
• –––, 1998, Consciousness in Action , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• –––, 2005, “The Shared Circuits Hypothesis: A Unified Functional Architecture for Control, Imitation, and Simulation”, in Hurley & Chater 2005: vol. 1, 177–193.
• Hurley, Susan, and Nick Chater (eds.), 2005, Perspectives on Imitation: From Neuroscience to Social Science, 2 Volumes , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Husserl, Edmund, 1900/1901, Logical Investigations , translated by J.N. Findlay, edited by Dermot Moran, London: Routledge, 2001.
• –––, 1913, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book , translated by F. Kersten, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998.
• Jacobsen, Rockney, 1996, “Wittgenstein on Self-Knowledge and Self-Expression”, The Philosophical Quarterly , 46(182): 12–30. doi:10.2307/2956302
• James, William, 1890, The Principles of Psychology , 2 Vols, New York: Dover, 1950.
• Janaway, Christopher, 1989, Self and World in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Jeshion, Robin (ed.), 2010, New Essays on Singular Thought , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Kahn, Charles H., 1992, “Aristotle on Thinking”, in Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima , Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 359–380.
• Kant, Immanuel, 1781/1787, Critique of Pure Reason , edited by Paul Guyer and Alan Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
• Kapitan, Tomis, 1999, “The Ubiquity of Self-Awareness”, Grazer Philosophische Studien , 57(1): 17–44.
• Kaplan, David, 1977, “Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals”, in Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein (eds.), 1989, Themes From Kaplan , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 481–563.
• Kaukua, Jari, 2015, Self-Awareness in Islamic Philosophy: Avicenna and Beyond , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Kaukua, Jari and Taneli Kukkonen, 2007, “Sense Perception and Self-Awareness: Before and After Avicenna”, in Heinämaa, Lähteenmäki, & Remes 2007: 95–119.
• Keller, Pierre, 1998, Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Kenny, Anthony, 1979, “The First Person”, in Diamond & Teichman 1979: 3–13.
• –––, 1993, Aquinas on Mind , London: Routledge.
• Kind, Amy, 2003, “Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore’s Paradox”, The Philosophical Quarterly , 53(210): 39–48. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00294
• Kitcher, Patricia, 2011, Kant’s Thinker , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Klein, Stanley B. and Shaun Nichols, 2012, “Memory and the Sense of Personal Identity”, Mind , 121(483): 677–702.
• Kornblith, Hilary, 2011, “Reasons, Naturalism, and Transcendental Philosophy”, in Smith & Sullivan 2011: 96–119.
• –––, 2012, On Reflection , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Kornell, Nate, 2014, “Where is the ‘Meta’ in Animal Metacognition?” Journal of Comparative Psychology , 128(2): 143–149.
• Kornell, Nate, Lisa K. Son, and Herbert S. Terrace, 2007, “Transfer of Metacognitive Skills and Hint Seeking in Monkeys”, Psychological Science , 18(1): 64–71.
• Korsgaard, Christine, 1989, “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit”, Philosophy and Public Affairs , 18(2): 101–132.
• –––, 1996, The Sources of Normativity , Onora O’Neill (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2009, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Kriegel, Uriah, 2003, “Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 33(1): 103–132.
• –––, 2009, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2012, “Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap”, in Lui & Perry 2012: 51–75.
• Kriegel, Uriah and Kenneth Williford (eds.), 2006, Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Kripke, Saul A., 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language , Oxford: Blackwell.
• Lane, Timothy and Caleb Liang, 2011, “Self-Consciousness and Immunity”, Journal of Philosophy , 108(2): 78–99.
• Langland-Hassan, Peter, 2015, “Introspective Misidentification”, Philosophical Studies , 172(7): 1737–1758.
• Legerstee, Maria, 2005, Infants’ Sense of People: Precursors to a Theory of Mind , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Legrand, Dorothée, 2006, “The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences , 5(1): 89–118.
• Levine, Joseph, 2006, “Conscious Awareness and (Self-)Representation”, in Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 173–197.
• Lewis, David, 1979, “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se ”, The Philosophical Review , 88(4): 513–543; reprinted with Postscripts in David Lewis, 1983, Philosophical Papers: Volume 1 , New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 133–159.
• Lewis, Michael, 2011, “The Origins and Uses of Self-Awareness or the Mental Representation of Me”, Consciousness and Cognition , 20(1): 120–129.
• Lewis, Michael and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, 1979, Social Cognition and the Acquisition of Self , New York: Plenum Press.
• Locke, John, 1700, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , 4th Edition, edited by Peter H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
• Longworth, Guy, 2013, “Sharing Thoughts About Oneself”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 113: 57–81.
• Ludwig, Kirk, 2011, “Triangulation Triangulated”, in Cristina Amoretti and Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Triangulation: From an Epistemological Point of View , Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, pp. 69–95.
• Lui, JeeLoo and John Perry (eds.), 2012, Consciousness and the Self: New Essays , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Lycan, William, 1996, Consciousness and Experience , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• –––, 2004, “The Superiority of HOP to HOT”, in Gennaro 2004: 93–114.
• Macdonald, Cynthia, 1999, “Shoemaker on Self-Knowledge and Inner Sense”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 59(3): 711–738.
• Magidor, Ofra, 2015, “The Myth of the De Se”, Philosophical Perspectives , 29(1): 249–283. doi:10.1111/phpe.12065
• Malcolm, Norman, 1979, “Whether ‘I’ is a Referring Expression”, in Diamond & Teichman 1979: 15–24.
• Marcel, Anthony J., 2003, “The Sense of Agency: Awareness and Ownership of Action”, in Roessler & Eilan 2003: 48–93.
• Marchetti, Clelia and Sergio Della Sala, 1998, “Disentangling the Alien and Anarchic Hand”, Cognitive Neuropsychiatry , 3(3): 191–207.
• Markie, Peter, 1992, “The Cogito and its Importance”, in John Cottingham (ed.), Cambridge Companion to Descartes , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 140–173.
• Martin, M.G.F., 1995, “Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership”, in Bermúdez, Marcel, & Eilan 1995: 267–289.
• –––, 1997, “Self-Observation”, European Journal of Philosophy , 5(2): 119–40.
• Matthews, Gareth B., 1992, Thought’s Ego in Augustine and Descartes , Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
• McDowell, John, 1977, “On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name”, Mind , 86(342): 159–85.
• –––, 1997, “Reductionism and the First Person”, in Dancy 1997: 230–250; reprinted in John McDowell, 1998, Mind, Value, & Reality , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 359–382.
• –––, 1998, “Referring to Oneself”, in Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson , Chicago: Open Court, pp. 129–145.
• McGinn, Colin, 1983, The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 1984, “What is the Problem of Other Minds?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume , 58: 119–137.
• McGlynn, Aidan, 2016. “Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Epistemology of De Se Thought”, in García-Carpintero & Torre 2016: 25–55. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0002
• Mead, George Herbert, 1934, Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviourist , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
• Mellor, D.H., 1989, “I and Now”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 89: 79–94.
• Meltzoff, Andrew N. and M. Kieth Moore, 1977, “Imitation of Facial and Manual Gestures by Human Neonates”, Science , 198(4312): 75–78.
• Menzel, Charles, 2005, “Progress in the Study of Chimpanzee Recall and Episodic Memory”, in Terrace & Metcalfe 2005: 188–224.
• Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1960, “The Child’s Relations With Others”, Translated by William Cobb in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 1960, The Primacy of Perception , edited by Edie, J. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, pp. 96–155.
• Metzinger, Thomas, 2003, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Michael, Michaelis, 2010, “Belief De Re, Knowing Who, and Singular Thought”, Journal of Philosophy , 107(6): 293–310.
• Michaelian, Kourken, 2016, Mental Time Travel , Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
• Michaelian, Kourken, Stanley B. Klein, and Karl K. Szpunar (eds.), 2016, Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future Oriented Mental Time Travel , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Michaelson, Eliot, 2014, “Shifty Characters”, Philosophical Studies , 167(3): 519–540.
• Miguens, Sofia, Gerhard Preyer, and Clara Bravo Morando (eds.), 2016, Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind , Abingdon: Routledge.
• Millikan, Ruth Garrett, 1990, “The Myth of the Essential Indexical”, Noûs , 24(5): 723–734. doi:10.2307/2215811
• Mitchell, Robert W., 1993, “Mental Models of Mirror-Self-Recognition: Two Theories”, New Ideas in Psychology , 11(3): 295–325.
• Moran, Richard, 2001, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Morgan, Daniel, 2015, “The Demonstrative Model of First-Person Thought”, Philosophical Studies , 172(7): 1795–1811.
• –––, 2018, “Impersonal Intentions”, The Philosophical Quarterly , 68(271): 376–384. doi:10.1093/pq/pqx053
• –––, 2019, “ Temporal Indexicals Are Essential”, Analysis , 79(3): 452–461. doi:10.1093/analys/any053
• Moro, Valentina, Massimiliano Zampini, and Salvatore M. Aglioti, 2004, “Changes in Spatial Position of Hands Modify Tactile Extinction but Not Disownership of Contralesional Hand in Two Right Brain-Damaged Patients”, Neurocase , 10(6): 437–443.
• Mullins, Simon, and Sean A. Spence, 2003, “Re-examining Thought Insertion: Semi-Structured Literature Review and Conceptual Analysis”, The British Journal of Psychiatry , 182(4): 293–298.
• Musholt, Kristina, 2015, Thinking about Oneself: From Nonconceptual Content to the Concept of a Self , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Nagel, Thomas, 1986, The View From Nowhere , New York: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 1996, “Universality and the Reflective Self”, in Korsgaard 1996: 200–209.
• Nichols, Shaun and Stephen P. Stich, 2003, Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Nielsen, Mark, Thomas Suddendorf, and Virginia Slaughter, 2006, “Mirror Self-Recognition Beyond the Face”, Child Development , 77(1): 176–185. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00863.x
• Ninan, Dilip, 2016, “What is the Problem of De Se Attitudes?” in García-Carpintero & Torre 2016: 86–120. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0004
• Noë, Alva, 2002, “Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual?”, The Philosophical Quarterly , 52(207): 185–194. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00261
• Nozick, Robert, 1981, Philosophical Explanations , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Nunberg, Geoffrey, 1993, “Indexicality and Deixis”, Linguistics and Philosophy , 16(1): 1–43.
• –––, 1995, “Transfers of Meaning”, Journal of Semantics , 12(2): 109–132.
• O’Brien, Lucy F., 1994, “Anscombe and the Self-Reference Rule”, Analysis , 54(4): 277–281. doi:10.1093/analys/54.4.277
• –––, 1995a, “The Problem of Self-Identification”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 95: 235–251.
• –––, 1995, “Evans on Self-Identification”, Noûs , 29(2): 232–247. doi:10.2307/2215660
• –––, 1996, “Solipsism and Self-Reference”, European Journal of Philosophy , 4(2): 175–194.
• –––, 2003, “Moran on Agency and Self-Knowledge”, European Journal of Philosophy , 11(3): 375–390.
• –––, 2007, Self-Knowing Agents , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2012, “Action and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification”, in Prosser & Recanati 2012: 124–143.
• O’Brien, Lucy and Matthew Soteriou (eds.), 2009, Mental Actions , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• O’Rourke, Michael and Cory Washington (eds.), 2007, Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• O’Shaughnessy, Brian, 2002, Consciousness and the World , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Owens, Joseph, 1988, “The Self in Aristotle”, The Review of Metaphysics , 41(4): 707–722.
• Pacherie, Elisabeth and Jean-Remy Martin, 2013, “Out of Nowhere: Thought Insertion, Ownership and Context-Integration”, Consciousness and Cognition , 22(1): 111–122.
• Parfit, Derek, 1984, Reasons and Persons , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Parnas, Josef and Louis A. Sass, 2011, “The Structure of Self-Consciousness in Schizophrenia”, in Gallagher 2011: 521–546.
• Pasnau, Robert, 2002, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologaie 1a 75–89 , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Peacocke, Christopher, 1983, Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and their Relations , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 1996, “Entitlement, Self-Knowledge, and Conceptual Redeployment”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 96: 117–158.
• –––, 1999, Being Known , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 2003, “Action: Awareness, Ownership, and Knowledge”, in Roessler & Eilan 2003: 94–110.
• –––, 2008, Truly Understood , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2014, The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, & Self-Consciousness , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Penelhum, Terence, 2000, Themes in Hume . Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Perry, John, 1977, “Frege on Demonstratives”, The Philosophical Review , 86(4): 474–97; reprinted with Postscript in Perry 1993: 3–32.
• –––, 1979, “The Problem of the Essential Indexical”, Noûs , 13(1): 3–21; reprinted with Postscript in Perry 1993: 33–52. doi:10.2307/2214792
• –––, 1986, “Thought Without Representation”, Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 60: 137–152; reprinted with Postscript in Perry 1993: 205–255.
• –––, 1993, The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays , New York: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2001, Reference and Reflexivity , Stanford: CSLI Publications.
• –––, 2012, “Thinking About the Self”, in Lui & Perry 2012: 76–100.
• Piaget, Jean, 1937, The Construction of Reality in the Child , translated by Margaret Cook, New York: Basic Books, 1954.
• Pippin, Robert, B., 2010, Hegel on Self-Consciousness: Desire and Death in the Phenomenology of Spirit , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Pitson, A.E., 2002, Hume’s Philosophy of the Self , London: Routledge.
• Plotnik, Joshua M., Richard Lair, Wirot Suphachoksahakun, and Frans B.M. de Waal, 2006, “Self-Recognition in an Asian Elephant”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America , 103(12): 17053–17057.
• Powell, C. Thomas, 1990, Kant’s Theory of Self-Consciousness , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Predelli, Stefano, 1998a, “‘I Am Not Here Now’”, Analysis , 58(2): 107–115. doi:10.1093/analys/58.2.107
• –––, 1998b, “Utterance, Interpretation and the Logic of Indexicals”, Mind and Language , 13(3): 400–414.
• –––, 2002, “Intentions, Indexicals and Communication”, Analysis , 62(4): 310–316. doi:10.1093/analys/62.4.310
• Priest, Stephen, 2000, The Subject in Question: Sartre’s Critique of Husserl in The Transcendence of the Ego , London: Routledge.
• Prinz, Jesse, 2012, “Waiting for the Self”, in Lui & Perry 2012: 123–149.
• Prosser, Simon, 2015, “Why are Indexicals Essential?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 115(3): 211–233. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00392.x
• Prosser, Simon and François Recanati (eds.), 2012, Immunity to Error Through Misidentification , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Proust, Joëlle, 2013, The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Pryor, James, 1999, “Immunity to Error Through Misidentification”, Philosophical Topics , 26(1&2): 271–304.
• Pust, Joel, 2014, “Critical Notice of Hilary Kornblith’s On Reflection ”, Episteme , 11(1): 53–61.
• Ram-Prasad, Chakravarthi, 2013, “Situating the Elusive Self of Advaita Vedānta”, in Siderits, Thompson, & Zahavi 2013: 217–238.
• Recanati, François, 1993, Direct Reference: From Language to Thought , Oxford: Blackwell.
• –––, 2007, Perspectival Thought: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2012, “Immunity to Error Through Misidentification”, in Prosser & Recanati 2012: 180–201.
• Reddy, Vasudevi, 2008, How Infants Know Minds , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Reed, Baron, 2010, “Self-Knowledge and Rationality”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 80(1): 164–181.
• Reiss, Diana and Lori Marino, 2001, “Mirror Self-Recognition in the Bottlenose Dolphin: A Case of Cognitive Convergence”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America , 98(10): 5937–5942.
• Reynolds, Steven L., 1989, “Imagining Oneself To Be Another”, Noûs , 23(5): 615–633. doi:10.2307/2216004
• Rochat, Philippe and Dan Zahavi, 2011, “The Uncanny Mirror: A Re-Framing of Mirror Self-Experience”, Consciousness and Cognition , 20(2): 204–213. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.06.007
• Rödl, Sebastian, 2007, Self-Consciousness , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Roessler, Johannes, and Naomi Eilan (eds.), 2003, Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Romdenh-Romluc, Komarine, 2002, “Now the French are Invading England!” Analysis , 62(1): 34–41. doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00326
• –––, 2008, “First-Person Thought and the Use of ‘I’”, Synthese , 163(2): 145–156.
• Rosenbaum, R. Shayna, Stefan Köhler, Daniel L. Schacter, Morris Moscovitch, Robyn Westmacott, Sandra E. Black, Fuqiang Gao, and Endel Tulving, 2005, “The Case of KC: Contributions of a Memory-Impaired Person to Memory Theory”, Neuropsychologia , 43(7): 989–1021.
• Rosenthal, David, 1986, “Two Concepts of Consciousness”, Philosophical Studies , 49(3): 329–359.
• –––, 2005, Consciousness and Mind , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2012, “Awareness and Identification of Self”, in Lui & Perry 2012: 22–50.
• Russell, Bertrand, 1910, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 11: 108–128.
• –––, 1921, The Analysis of Mind , London: George Allen, & Unwin.
• Sainsbury, Mark, 2011, “English Speakers Should Use ”I“ to Refer to Themselves”, in Anthony Hatzimoysis, 2011, Self-Knowledge , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 246–260.
• Sacks, Mark, 2000, Objectivity and Insight , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 2005, “Sartre, Strawson and Others”, Inquiry , 48(3): 275–299. doi:10.1080/00201750510022826
• Saks, Elyn R., 2007, The Centre Cannot Hold: A Memoir of My Schizophrenia , London: Virago.
• Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1937, The Transcendence of the Ego , translated by Andrew Brown, London: Routledge, 2004.
• –––, 1943, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology , translated by Hazel E. Barnes, London: Routledge, 1998.
• Schear, Joseph K., 2009, “Experience and Self-Consciousness”, Philosophical Studies , 144(1): 95–105.
• Schwartz, Bennett L., 2005, “Do Nonhuman Primates have Episodic Memory?” in Terrace & Metcalfe 2005: 225–241.
• Schwenkler, John, 2014, “Vision, Self-Location, and the Phenomenology of the ‘Point of View’”, Noûs , 48(1): 137–155. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00871.x
• Seeger, Max, 2015, “Immunity and Self-Awareness”, Philosophers’ Imprint , 15(17): 1–19.
• Shields, Wendy E., J. David Smith, and David A. Washburn, 1997, “Uncertain Responses by Humans and Rhesus Monkeys ( Macaca Mulatta ) in a psychophysical same-different task”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General , 126(2): 147–164.
• Shoemaker, Sydney, 1968, “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness”, The Journal of Philosophy , 65(19): 555–567; reprinted in Shoemaker 1984a: 6–18.
• –––, 1970, “Persons and their Pasts”, American Philosophical Quarterly , 7(4): 269–285; reprinted in Shoemaker 1984a: 19–48.
• –––, 1984a, Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1984b, “Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account”, in Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne, Personal Identity , Oxford: Blackwell.
• –––, 1986, “Introspection and the Self”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy , 10: 101–120; reprinted in Shoemaker 1996: 3–24.
• –––, 1988, “On Knowing One’s Own Mind”, in James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 2, Epistemology , Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing, pp. 183–209; reprinted in Shoemaker 1996: 25–49.
• –––, 1994, “Self-Knowledge and ‘Inner-Sense’”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 68(2): 249–314; reprinted in Shoemaker 1996: 201–268.
• –––, 1996, The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2012, “Personhood and Consciousness”, in Lui & Perry 2012: 198–213.
• Sidelle, Alan, 1991, “The Answering Machine Paradox”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 21(4): 525–539.
• Siderits, Mark, 1997, “Buddhist Reductionism”, Philosophy East and West , 47(4): 455–478.
• Siderits, Mark, Evan Thompson, and Dan Zahavi (eds.), 2013, Self or No-Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Siewert, Charles, 2003, “Self-Knowledge and Rationality: Shoemaker on Self-Blindness”, in Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge , Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 131–145.
• Slote, Michael A., 1970, Reason and Scepticism , London: Routledge.
• Smith, J. David, 2005, “Studies of Uncertainty Monitoring and Metacognition in Animals and Humans”, in Terrace & Metcalfe 2005: 242–271.
• –––, 2009, “The Study of Animal Metacognition”, Trends in Cognitive Science , 13(9): 389–396.
• Smith, J. David, Justin J. Couchman and Michael J. Beran, 2014, “The Highs and Lows of Theoretical Interpretation in Animal-Metacognition Research”, in Fleming & Frith 2014: 87–111.
• Smith, J. David, Jonathan Schull, Jared Strote, Kelli McGee, Roian Egnor, and Linda Erb, 1995, “The Uncertain Response in the Bottlenosed Dolphin ( Terciops Truncatus )”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General , 124(4): 391–408.
• Smith, Joel, 2006a, “Which Immunity to Error?” Philosophical Studies , 130(2): 273–83.
• –––, 2006b, “Bodily Awareness, Imagination, and the Self”, European Journal of Philosophy , 14(1): 49–68.
• –––, 2011, “Strawson on Other Minds”, in Smith & Sullivan 2011: 184–208.
• Smith, Joel and Peter Sullivan (eds.), 2011, Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Smith, Quentin, 1989, “The Multiple Uses of Indexicals”, Synthese , 78(2): 167–191.
• Smithies, Declan, 2016, “ Reflection On : On Reflection”, Analysis , 76(1): 55–69. doi:10.1093/analys/anv032
• Snowdon, Paul F., 2014, Persons, Animals, Ourselves , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Sodian, Beate, Claudia Thoermer, Susanne Kristen and Hannah Perst, 2012, “Metacognition in Infants and Young Children”, in Beran et al. 2012: 119–133.
• Sorabji, Richard, 2006, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Sosa, Ernest, 2003, “Knowledge of Self, Others, and World”, in Kirk Ludwig (ed.), Donald Davidson , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Soteriou, Matthew, 2013, The Mind’s Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Spencer, Cara, 2007, “Is There a Problem of the Essential Indexical?” in O’Rourke & Washington 2007: 179–197.
• Stalnaker, Robert C., 2008, Our Knowledge of the Internal World , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Stephens, G. Lynn and George Graham, 2000, When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Stern, Daniel, 1985, The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology , New York: Basic Books.
• Stern, Robert (ed.), 1999, Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 2000, Transcendental Arguments and Scepticism: Answering the Question of Justification , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Stone, Jim, 1988, “Parfit and the Buddha: Why There Are No People”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 48(3): 519–532.
• Stoneham, Tom, 2002, Berkeley’s World: An Examination of the Three Dialogues , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Strawson, Galen, 1999, “Self, Body, and Experience”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume , 73: 307–332.
• –––, 2009, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 2011a, The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2011b, Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Strawson, P.F., 1959, Individuals , London: Methuen.
• –––, 1966, The Bounds of Sense , London: Methuen.
• Stroud, Barry, 1968, “Transcendental Arguments”, Journal of Philosophy , 65(9): 241–256.
• Suddendorf, Thomas and David L. Butler, 2013, “The Nature of Visual Self-Recognition”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 17(3): 121–127.
• Suddendorf, Thomas and Steven C. Corballis, 2007, “The Evolution of Foresight: What is Mental Time Travel and is it Unique to Humans?” Behavioural and Brain Sciences , 30: 299–351.
• Sullivan, Peter, 1996, “The ‘Truth’ in Solipsism, and Wittgenstein’s Rejection of the A Priori”, European Journal of Philosophy , 4(2): 195–219.
• Sutton Morris, Phyllis, 1982, “Some Patterns of Identification and Otherness, ” Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology , 13(3): 216–225.
• Terrace, Herbert S. and Janet Metcalfe (eds.), 2005, The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Thiel, Udo, 2011, The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Torre, Stephan, 2018, “In Defense of De Se Content”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 97(1): 172–189. doi:10.1111/phpr.12364
• Trevarthen, Colwyn, 1979, “Communication and Cooperation in Early Infancy: A Description of Primary Intersubjectivity”, in Margaret Bullowa (ed.), Before Speech: The Beginning of Interpersonal Communication , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 321–347.
• Tsakiris, Manos, 2011, “The Sense of Body Ownership”, in Gallagher 2011: 180–203.
• Tugendhat, Ernst, 1979, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination , translated by Paul Stern, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986.
• Tulving, Endel, 1972, “Episodic and Semantic Memory”, in Endel Tulving and Wayne Donaldson (eds.), Organization of Memory , New York: Academic Press, pp. 382–403.
• –––, 1983, Elements of Episodic Memory , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 2005, “Episodic Memory and Autonoesis: Uniquely Human?” in Terrace & Metcalfe 2005: 3–56.
• Tye, Michael, 1995, Ten Problems of Consciousness , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Valente, Matheus, 2018, “What Is Special about Indexical Attitudes?”, Inquiry , 61(7): 692–712. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2017.1402701
• Velleman, J. David, 1996, “Self to Self”, The Philosophical Review , 105(1): 39–76.
• Verdejo, Víctor M., 2020, “Explaining Public Action”, Topoi , 39: 475–485.
• Vision, Gerald, 1985, “‘I Am Here Now’”, Analysis , 45(4): 198–199. doi:10.1093/analys/45.4.198
• Watson, Gary, 1975, “Free Agency”, The Journal of Philosophy , 73(8): 205–220.
• Weinberg, Shelley, 2011, “Locke on Personal Identity”, Philosophy Compass , 6(6): 398–407.
• White, Michael J., 1979, “The First Person Pronoun: A Reply to Anscombe and Clarke”, Analysis , 39(3): 120–123. doi:10.1093/analys/39.3.120
• Wider, Kathleen, 1997, The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind , Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
• Williams, Bernard, 1978, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry , London: Penguin.
• –––, 1973, “Imagination and the Self”, in Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 26–45.
• Williams, Michael, 2015, “What’s So Special About Human Knowledge?” Episteme , 12(2): 249–268.
• Wilson, Margaret Dualer, 1978, Descartes , London: Routledge.
• Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1921, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.
• –––, 1953, Philosophical Investigations , translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell.
• –––, 1958, The Blue and Brown Books , Oxford: Blackwell.
• Wood, Allen W., 2006, “Fichte’s Intersubjective I”, Inquiry , 49(1): 62–79. doi:10.1080/00201740500497431
• Wright, Crispin, 1998, “Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy”, in Wright, Smith, & MacDonald 1998: 13–45.
• Wright, Crispin, Barry Smith, and Cynthia MacDonald (eds.), 1998, Knowing Our Own Minds , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Zahavi, Dan, 2005, Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• –––, 2007, “The Heidelberg School and the Limits of Reflection”, in Heinämaa, Lähteenmäki, & Remes 2007: 267–285.
• –––, 2014, Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Zahavi, Dan and Uriah Kriegel, 2015, “For-Me-Ness: What It Is and What It Is Not”, in Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou, and Walter Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology , Oxford: Routledge, pp. 36–53.
• Zahn, Roland, Jochen Talazko, and Dieter Ebert, 2008, “Loss of the Sense of Self-Ownership for Perceptions of Objects in a Case of Right Inferior Temporal, Parieto-Occipital and Precentral Hypometabolism”, Psychopathology , 41(6): 397–402.
• Zöller, Günther, 1992, “Lichtenberg and Kant on the Subject of Thinking”, Journal of the History of Philosophy , 30(3): 417–441.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Self-Consciousness , bibliography at PhilPapers.org.
• Self-Consciousness , entry at Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .

animal: cognition | animal: consciousness | bodily awareness | consciousness | consciousness: higher-order theories | consciousness: seventeenth-century theories of | consciousness: unity of | indexicals | introspection | Kant, Immanuel: view of mind and consciousness of self | memory | mental content: nonconceptual | personal identity | self-consciousness: phenomenological approaches to | self-knowledge

Copyright © 2020 by Joel Smith < joel . smith @ manchester . ac . uk >

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2023 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

• Search Menu
• Sign in through your institution
• Browse content in Arts and Humanities
• Browse content in Archaeology
• Anglo-Saxon and Medieval Archaeology
• Archaeological Methodology and Techniques
• Archaeology by Region
• Archaeology of Religion
• Archaeology of Trade and Exchange
• Biblical Archaeology
• Contemporary and Public Archaeology
• Environmental Archaeology
• Historical Archaeology
• History and Theory of Archaeology
• Industrial Archaeology
• Landscape Archaeology
• Mortuary Archaeology
• Prehistoric Archaeology
• Underwater Archaeology
• Urban Archaeology
• Zooarchaeology
• Browse content in Architecture
• Architectural Structure and Design
• History of Architecture
• Residential and Domestic Buildings
• Theory of Architecture
• Browse content in Art
• Art Subjects and Themes
• History of Art
• Industrial and Commercial Art
• Theory of Art
• Biographical Studies
• Byzantine Studies
• Browse content in Classical Studies
• Classical History
• Classical Philosophy
• Classical Mythology
• Classical Literature
• Classical Reception
• Classical Art and Architecture
• Classical Oratory and Rhetoric
• Greek and Roman Epigraphy
• Greek and Roman Law
• Greek and Roman Papyrology
• Greek and Roman Archaeology
• Late Antiquity
• Religion in the Ancient World
• Digital Humanities
• Browse content in History
• Colonialism and Imperialism
• Diplomatic History
• Environmental History
• Genealogy, Heraldry, Names, and Honours
• Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing
• Historical Geography
• History by Period
• History of Emotions
• History of Agriculture
• History of Education
• History of Gender and Sexuality
• Industrial History
• Intellectual History
• International History
• Labour History
• Legal and Constitutional History
• Local and Family History
• Maritime History
• Military History
• National Liberation and Post-Colonialism
• Oral History
• Political History
• Public History
• Regional and National History
• Revolutions and Rebellions
• Slavery and Abolition of Slavery
• Social and Cultural History
• Theory, Methods, and Historiography
• Urban History
• World History
• Browse content in Language Teaching and Learning
• Language Learning (Specific Skills)
• Language Teaching Theory and Methods
• Browse content in Linguistics
• Applied Linguistics
• Cognitive Linguistics
• Computational Linguistics
• Forensic Linguistics
• Grammar, Syntax and Morphology
• Historical and Diachronic Linguistics
• History of English
• Language Acquisition
• Language Evolution
• Language Reference
• Language Variation
• Language Families
• Lexicography
• Linguistic Anthropology
• Linguistic Theories
• Linguistic Typology
• Phonetics and Phonology
• Psycholinguistics
• Sociolinguistics
• Translation and Interpretation
• Writing Systems
• Browse content in Literature
• Bibliography
• Children's Literature Studies
• Literary Studies (Asian)
• Literary Studies (European)
• Literary Studies (Eco-criticism)
• Literary Studies (Romanticism)
• Literary Studies (American)
• Literary Studies (Modernism)
• Literary Studies - World
• Literary Studies (1500 to 1800)
• Literary Studies (19th Century)
• Literary Studies (20th Century onwards)
• Literary Studies (African American Literature)
• Literary Studies (British and Irish)
• Literary Studies (Early and Medieval)
• Literary Studies (Fiction, Novelists, and Prose Writers)
• Literary Studies (Gender Studies)
• Literary Studies (Graphic Novels)
• Literary Studies (History of the Book)
• Literary Studies (Plays and Playwrights)
• Literary Studies (Poetry and Poets)
• Literary Studies (Postcolonial Literature)
• Literary Studies (Queer Studies)
• Literary Studies (Science Fiction)
• Literary Studies (Travel Literature)
• Literary Studies (War Literature)
• Literary Studies (Women's Writing)
• Literary Theory and Cultural Studies
• Mythology and Folklore
• Shakespeare Studies and Criticism
• Browse content in Media Studies
• Browse content in Music
• Applied Music
• Dance and Music
• Ethics in Music
• Ethnomusicology
• Gender and Sexuality in Music
• Medicine and Music
• Music Cultures
• Music and Religion
• Music and Media
• Music and Culture
• Music Education and Pedagogy
• Music Theory and Analysis
• Musical Scores, Lyrics, and Libretti
• Musical Structures, Styles, and Techniques
• Musicology and Music History
• Performance Practice and Studies
• Race and Ethnicity in Music
• Sound Studies
• Browse content in Performing Arts
• Browse content in Philosophy
• Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
• Epistemology
• Feminist Philosophy
• History of Western Philosophy
• Metaphysics
• Moral Philosophy
• Non-Western Philosophy
• Philosophy of Science
• Philosophy of Language
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Perception
• Philosophy of Action
• Philosophy of Law
• Philosophy of Religion
• Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
• Practical Ethics
• Social and Political Philosophy
• Browse content in Religion
• Biblical Studies
• Christianity
• East Asian Religions
• History of Religion
• Judaism and Jewish Studies
• Qumran Studies
• Religion and Education
• Religion and Health
• Religion and Politics
• Religion and Science
• Religion and Law
• Religion and Art, Literature, and Music
• Religious Studies
• Browse content in Society and Culture
• Cookery, Food, and Drink
• Cultural Studies
• Customs and Traditions
• Ethical Issues and Debates
• Hobbies, Games, Arts and Crafts
• Lifestyle, Home, and Garden
• Natural world, Country Life, and Pets
• Popular Beliefs and Controversial Knowledge
• Sports and Outdoor Recreation
• Technology and Society
• Travel and Holiday
• Visual Culture
• Browse content in Law
• Arbitration
• Browse content in Company and Commercial Law
• Commercial Law
• Company Law
• Browse content in Comparative Law
• Systems of Law
• Competition Law
• Browse content in Constitutional and Administrative Law
• Government Powers
• Judicial Review
• Local Government Law
• Military and Defence Law
• Parliamentary and Legislative Practice
• Construction Law
• Contract Law
• Browse content in Criminal Law
• Criminal Procedure
• Criminal Evidence Law
• Sentencing and Punishment
• Employment and Labour Law
• Environment and Energy Law
• Browse content in Financial Law
• Banking Law
• Insolvency Law
• History of Law
• Human Rights and Immigration
• Intellectual Property Law
• Browse content in International Law
• Private International Law and Conflict of Laws
• Public International Law
• IT and Communications Law
• Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
• Law and Politics
• Law and Society
• Browse content in Legal System and Practice
• Courts and Procedure
• Legal Skills and Practice
• Primary Sources of Law
• Regulation of Legal Profession
• Medical and Healthcare Law
• Browse content in Policing
• Criminal Investigation and Detection
• Police and Security Services
• Police Procedure and Law
• Police Regional Planning
• Browse content in Property Law
• Personal Property Law
• Study and Revision
• Terrorism and National Security Law
• Browse content in Trusts Law
• Wills and Probate or Succession
• Browse content in Medicine and Health
• Browse content in Allied Health Professions
• Arts Therapies
• Clinical Science
• Dietetics and Nutrition
• Occupational Therapy
• Operating Department Practice
• Physiotherapy
• Radiography
• Speech and Language Therapy
• Browse content in Anaesthetics
• General Anaesthesia
• Neuroanaesthesia
• Browse content in Clinical Medicine
• Acute Medicine
• Cardiovascular Medicine
• Clinical Genetics
• Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics
• Dermatology
• Endocrinology and Diabetes
• Gastroenterology
• Genito-urinary Medicine
• Geriatric Medicine
• Infectious Diseases
• Medical Toxicology
• Medical Oncology
• Pain Medicine
• Palliative Medicine
• Rehabilitation Medicine
• Respiratory Medicine and Pulmonology
• Rheumatology
• Sleep Medicine
• Sports and Exercise Medicine
• Clinical Neuroscience
• Community Medical Services
• Critical Care
• Emergency Medicine
• Forensic Medicine
• Haematology
• History of Medicine
• Browse content in Medical Dentistry
• Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery
• Paediatric Dentistry
• Restorative Dentistry and Orthodontics
• Surgical Dentistry
• Browse content in Medical Skills
• Clinical Skills
• Communication Skills
• Nursing Skills
• Surgical Skills
• Medical Ethics
• Medical Statistics and Methodology
• Browse content in Neurology
• Clinical Neurophysiology
• Neuropathology
• Nursing Studies
• Browse content in Obstetrics and Gynaecology
• Gynaecology
• Occupational Medicine
• Ophthalmology
• Otolaryngology (ENT)
• Browse content in Paediatrics
• Neonatology
• Browse content in Pathology
• Chemical Pathology
• Clinical Cytogenetics and Molecular Genetics
• Histopathology
• Medical Microbiology and Virology
• Patient Education and Information
• Browse content in Pharmacology
• Psychopharmacology
• Browse content in Popular Health
• Caring for Others
• Complementary and Alternative Medicine
• Self-help and Personal Development
• Browse content in Preclinical Medicine
• Cell Biology
• Molecular Biology and Genetics
• Reproduction, Growth and Development
• Primary Care
• Professional Development in Medicine
• Browse content in Psychiatry
• Addiction Medicine
• Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
• Forensic Psychiatry
• Learning Disabilities
• Old Age Psychiatry
• Psychotherapy
• Browse content in Public Health and Epidemiology
• Epidemiology
• Public Health
• Browse content in Radiology
• Clinical Radiology
• Interventional Radiology
• Nuclear Medicine
• Radiation Oncology
• Reproductive Medicine
• Browse content in Surgery
• Cardiothoracic Surgery
• Gastro-intestinal and Colorectal Surgery
• General Surgery
• Neurosurgery
• Paediatric Surgery
• Peri-operative Care
• Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
• Surgical Oncology
• Transplant Surgery
• Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgery
• Vascular Surgery
• Browse content in Science and Mathematics
• Browse content in Biological Sciences
• Aquatic Biology
• Biochemistry
• Bioinformatics and Computational Biology
• Developmental Biology
• Ecology and Conservation
• Evolutionary Biology
• Genetics and Genomics
• Microbiology
• Molecular and Cell Biology
• Natural History
• Plant Sciences and Forestry
• Research Methods in Life Sciences
• Structural Biology
• Systems Biology
• Zoology and Animal Sciences
• Browse content in Chemistry
• Analytical Chemistry
• Computational Chemistry
• Crystallography
• Environmental Chemistry
• Industrial Chemistry
• Inorganic Chemistry
• Materials Chemistry
• Medicinal Chemistry
• Mineralogy and Gems
• Organic Chemistry
• Physical Chemistry
• Polymer Chemistry
• Study and Communication Skills in Chemistry
• Theoretical Chemistry
• Browse content in Computer Science
• Artificial Intelligence
• Computer Architecture and Logic Design
• Game Studies
• Human-Computer Interaction
• Mathematical Theory of Computation
• Programming Languages
• Software Engineering
• Systems Analysis and Design
• Virtual Reality
• Browse content in Computing
• Business Applications
• Computer Security
• Computer Games
• Computer Networking and Communications
• Digital Lifestyle
• Graphical and Digital Media Applications
• Operating Systems
• Browse content in Earth Sciences and Geography
• Atmospheric Sciences
• Environmental Geography
• Geology and the Lithosphere
• Maps and Map-making
• Meteorology and Climatology
• Oceanography and Hydrology
• Palaeontology
• Physical Geography and Topography
• Regional Geography
• Soil Science
• Urban Geography
• Browse content in Engineering and Technology
• Agriculture and Farming
• Biological Engineering
• Civil Engineering, Surveying, and Building
• Electronics and Communications Engineering
• Energy Technology
• Engineering (General)
• Environmental Science, Engineering, and Technology
• History of Engineering and Technology
• Mechanical Engineering and Materials
• Technology of Industrial Chemistry
• Transport Technology and Trades
• Browse content in Environmental Science
• Applied Ecology (Environmental Science)
• Conservation of the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Environmental Sustainability
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Environmental Science)
• Management of Land and Natural Resources (Environmental Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environmental Science)
• Nuclear Issues (Environmental Science)
• Pollution and Threats to the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Environmental Science)
• History of Science and Technology
• Browse content in Materials Science
• Ceramics and Glasses
• Composite Materials
• Metals, Alloying, and Corrosion
• Nanotechnology
• Browse content in Mathematics
• Applied Mathematics
• Biomathematics and Statistics
• History of Mathematics
• Mathematical Education
• Mathematical Finance
• Mathematical Analysis
• Numerical and Computational Mathematics
• Probability and Statistics
• Pure Mathematics
• Browse content in Neuroscience
• Cognition and Behavioural Neuroscience
• Development of the Nervous System
• Disorders of the Nervous System
• History of Neuroscience
• Invertebrate Neurobiology
• Molecular and Cellular Systems
• Neuroendocrinology and Autonomic Nervous System
• Neuroscientific Techniques
• Sensory and Motor Systems
• Browse content in Physics
• Astronomy and Astrophysics
• Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
• Biological and Medical Physics
• Classical Mechanics
• Computational Physics
• Condensed Matter Physics
• Electromagnetism, Optics, and Acoustics
• History of Physics
• Mathematical and Statistical Physics
• Measurement Science
• Nuclear Physics
• Particles and Fields
• Plasma Physics
• Quantum Physics
• Relativity and Gravitation
• Semiconductor and Mesoscopic Physics
• Browse content in Psychology
• Affective Sciences
• Clinical Psychology
• Cognitive Psychology
• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Criminal and Forensic Psychology
• Developmental Psychology
• Educational Psychology
• Evolutionary Psychology
• Health Psychology
• History and Systems in Psychology
• Music Psychology
• Neuropsychology
• Organizational Psychology
• Psychological Assessment and Testing
• Psychology of Human-Technology Interaction
• Psychology Professional Development and Training
• Research Methods in Psychology
• Social Psychology
• Browse content in Social Sciences
• Browse content in Anthropology
• Anthropology of Religion
• Human Evolution
• Medical Anthropology
• Physical Anthropology
• Regional Anthropology
• Social and Cultural Anthropology
• Theory and Practice of Anthropology
• Browse content in Business and Management
• Business Strategy
• Business Ethics
• Business History
• Business and Government
• Business and Technology
• Business and the Environment
• Comparative Management
• Corporate Governance
• Corporate Social Responsibility
• Entrepreneurship
• Health Management
• Human Resource Management
• Industrial and Employment Relations
• Industry Studies
• Information and Communication Technologies
• International Business
• Knowledge Management
• Management and Management Techniques
• Operations Management
• Organizational Theory and Behaviour
• Pensions and Pension Management
• Public and Nonprofit Management
• Strategic Management
• Supply Chain Management
• Browse content in Criminology and Criminal Justice
• Criminal Justice
• Criminology
• Forms of Crime
• International and Comparative Criminology
• Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice
• Development Studies
• Browse content in Economics
• Agricultural, Environmental, and Natural Resource Economics
• Asian Economics
• Behavioural Finance
• Behavioural Economics and Neuroeconomics
• Econometrics and Mathematical Economics
• Economic Systems
• Economic History
• Economic Methodology
• Economic Development and Growth
• Financial Markets
• Financial Institutions and Services
• General Economics and Teaching
• Health, Education, and Welfare
• History of Economic Thought
• International Economics
• Labour and Demographic Economics
• Law and Economics
• Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
• Microeconomics
• Public Economics
• Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
• Welfare Economics
• Browse content in Education
• Adult Education and Continuous Learning
• Care and Counselling of Students
• Early Childhood and Elementary Education
• Educational Equipment and Technology
• Educational Strategies and Policy
• Higher and Further Education
• Organization and Management of Education
• Philosophy and Theory of Education
• Schools Studies
• Secondary Education
• Teaching of a Specific Subject
• Teaching of Specific Groups and Special Educational Needs
• Teaching Skills and Techniques
• Browse content in Environment
• Applied Ecology (Social Science)
• Climate Change
• Conservation of the Environment (Social Science)
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Social Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environment)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Social Science)
• Browse content in Human Geography
• Cultural Geography
• Economic Geography
• Political Geography
• Browse content in Interdisciplinary Studies
• Communication Studies
• Museums, Libraries, and Information Sciences
• Browse content in Politics
• African Politics
• Asian Politics
• Chinese Politics
• Comparative Politics
• Conflict Politics
• Elections and Electoral Studies
• Environmental Politics
• European Union
• Foreign Policy
• Gender and Politics
• Human Rights and Politics
• Indian Politics
• International Relations
• International Organization (Politics)
• International Political Economy
• Irish Politics
• Latin American Politics
• Middle Eastern Politics
• Political Methodology
• Political Communication
• Political Philosophy
• Political Sociology
• Political Behaviour
• Political Economy
• Political Institutions
• Political Theory
• Politics and Law
• Politics of Development
• Public Administration
• Public Policy
• Quantitative Political Methodology
• Regional Political Studies
• Russian Politics
• Security Studies
• State and Local Government
• UK Politics
• US Politics
• Browse content in Regional and Area Studies
• African Studies
• Asian Studies
• East Asian Studies
• Japanese Studies
• Latin American Studies
• Middle Eastern Studies
• Native American Studies
• Scottish Studies
• Browse content in Research and Information
• Research Methods
• Browse content in Social Work
• Addictions and Substance Misuse
• Adoption and Fostering
• Care of the Elderly
• Child and Adolescent Social Work
• Couple and Family Social Work
• Direct Practice and Clinical Social Work
• Emergency Services
• Human Behaviour and the Social Environment
• International and Global Issues in Social Work
• Mental and Behavioural Health
• Social Justice and Human Rights
• Social Policy and Advocacy
• Social Work and Crime and Justice
• Social Work Macro Practice
• Social Work Practice Settings
• Social Work Research and Evidence-based Practice
• Welfare and Benefit Systems
• Browse content in Sociology
• Childhood Studies
• Community Development
• Comparative and Historical Sociology
• Economic Sociology
• Gender and Sexuality
• Gerontology and Ageing
• Health, Illness, and Medicine
• Marriage and the Family
• Migration Studies
• Occupations, Professions, and Work
• Organizations
• Population and Demography
• Race and Ethnicity
• Social Theory
• Social Movements and Social Change
• Social Research and Statistics
• Social Stratification, Inequality, and Mobility
• Sociology of Religion
• Sociology of Education
• Sport and Leisure
• Urban and Rural Studies
• Browse content in Warfare and Defence
• Defence Strategy, Planning, and Research
• Land Forces and Warfare
• Military Administration
• Military Life and Institutions
• Naval Forces and Warfare
• Other Warfare and Defence Issues
• Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
• Weapons and Equipment

• < Previous
• Next chapter >

1 Introduction: Know Thyself

Dr. Richard Gipps is a clinical psychologist in private psychotherapy practice in Oxford, UK, and an associate of the Philosophy Faculty at the University of Oxford. He convenes the Philosophy Special Interest Group of the Institute of Psychoanalysis, the Oxford Interdisciplinary Seminars in Psychoanalysis, and the Making the Unconscious Conscious seminar series. His research interests lie in psychoanalysis, psychosis, existential phenomenology, and Wittgenstein.

Dr Michael Lacewing is a former Vice-Principal Academic and Reader in Philosophy at Heythrop College, London, an Honorary Reader in Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology at University College, London, and a teacher of philosophy and theology at Christ's Hospital School, Sussex. He has published widely in philosophy of psychoanalysis, metaethics and moral psychology, alongside writing textbooks for A level philosophy and training in Philosophy for Children (P4C).

• Published: 07 November 2018
• Cite Icon Cite
• Permissions Icon Permissions

This Handbook examines the contributions of philosophy to psychoanalysis and vice versa. It explores the most central concept of psychoanalysis—the unconscious—in relation to its defences, transference, conflict, free association, wish fulfilment, and symbolism. It also considers psychoanalysis in relation to its philosophical prehistory, the recognition and misrecognition afforded it within twentieth-century philosophy, its scientific strengths and weaknesses, its applications in aesthetics and politics, and its value and limitations with respect to ethics, religion, and social life. The book explains how psychoanalysis draws our attention to the reality of central aspects of the inner life and how philosophy assists psychoanalysis in knowing itself. This introduction elaborates on the phrase ‘know thyself’, the words inscribed at the Temple of Delphi, and illustrates the connection between matters philosophical and psychoanalytic in relation to the Delphic command by highlighting their mutual concern with truth and truthfulness.

A Delphic Command

The words inscribed at the Temple of Delphi—‘know thyself’—have been a guiding light for both philosophy and psychoanalysis.

Thus it is often said that an important aim of psychoanalysis is self-knowledge. 1 An explicit connection to Delphi, however, was made by Freud himself just once, in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life , where he says ‘The road whose goal it is to observe the precept γνῶθι σεαυτόν [ gnothi seauton : know thyself] runs via the study of one’s own apparently accidental actions and omissions’ (Freud 1901 : 210). The claim that this was not only an aim of psychoanalysis, but the guiding principle of Freud’s life and work, was left to Ernest Jones to make in his obituary of Freud (in the kind of hagiographic language which could only be justified, if at all, in such a context): ‘Future generations of psychologists will assuredly wish to know what manner of man it was who, after two thousand years of vain endeavour had gone by, succeeded in fulfilling the Delphic injunction: know thyself’ (Jones 1940 : 4). Jones rehearsed the claim again in his influential biography of Freud (Jones 1955 : 470), and the connection between psychoanalysis and the inscription at Delphi became widespread, endorsed by such luminaries as Sterba ( 1969 : 439), Eissler ( 1963 : 461), Menninger ( 1956 : 623), Kohut ( 1973 : 25), and Bettelheim ( 1982 : ch. 4 ), who elaborates the aim by connecting it with practical effects: ‘The guiding principle of psychoanalysis is that knowing oneself requires knowing also one’s unconscious and dealing with it, so that its unrecognized pressures will not lead one to act in a way detrimental to oneself and others’ (1982: 24).

While the Delphic command is mentioned in several of Plato’s dialogues, Socrates, like Freud, takes it up in discussion just once, in the Phaedrus , where he claims that it is ‘ridiculous’ to pursue knowledge of other things before one knows oneself, a claim which places self-knowledge at the heart of the human epistemological endeavour. What Socrates himself meant by inviting us to pursue self-knowledge is something about which scholars disagree (Hadot 1995 : 90), yet there are at least four senses in which the endeavour has been considered central to philosophy.

First we have the practical endeavour of the individual philosopher, through her philosophical reflection on her predicaments in their particularity, better to come to know herself . This goal, clearly apparent in the approach of Socrates, the Stoics, and Epicureans, has been suggested as the intelligibility-conferring setting against which various ancient philosophical texts must be read (Hadot 2002 ). An explicit personal, therapeutic, existential engagement in doing philosophy is only occasionally to be found in more recent philosophers (e.g. Nehamas 1998 ), yet may play an implicit motivating role for philosophers more widely.

Next we have that project which could be called ‘knowing ourselves ’—namely the philosophical project of clearly articulating the human condition in its generality. This is the Socratic task taken up in theoretical mode. This project of philosophical anthropology may appear merely descriptive yet, to the extent that humanity is to be understood by reference to ideals, aspirations, and excellences (such as truth and truthfulness, love and goodness, reason and rationality), it is not intelligibly separable from fundamental evaluative questions of how to live (i.e. from what we here call ‘ethics’, which we understand more broadly than questions of ‘morality’ traditionally conceived).

Thirdly we meet with the philosophical valuation of knowing ourselves as an intrinsically valuable way of life. This was most famously encapsulated in Socrates’ famous retort when invited at his trial to abandon reflection on the Delphic oracle’s pronouncements (i.e. to abandon his search for wisdom): ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’. Here philosophical reflection becomes not merely a reflective means to a non-reflective end but an end in itself, one which constitutes a significant form of the good life.

Finally we may bring these together, as when my philosophical reflection on how I am to live is informed by my best understanding of how one may live best given what it is to be human , or when my understanding of how one may live best is informed by deep reflection on my own (or others’) personal experience. While different philosophers have understood the connection between self-knowledge and the ethical life in various ways, it is notable that living an examined life, one enabled by philosophical enquiry, has been seen as the crowning purpose and achievement of philosophy by many, from Plato and Aristotle, through Descartes, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, and Dewey to Martha Nussbaum and Bernard Williams. And here we meet with values that find expression not only in philosophy but also in the goals and methods of psychoanalysis. In what follows we explore the character and congruence of such endeavours at self-knowledge.

As Bernard Williams expresses our second, theoretical, version of the Delphic command, philosophy can be understood as ‘part of a more general attempt to make the best sense of our life, and so of our intellectual activities, in the situation in which we find ourselves’ (2000: 479). As such, he argues, philosophy is a ‘humanistic discipline’. It is humanistic not only in the sense that the central object of study is ourselves, but also that its understanding develops within and expresses a ‘human perspective’. Definitive of such a perspective is that it is irreducible to that of the natural sciences in its style, method, and aims. The scientific ambition that particularly concerns Williams is that of working towards a description of the world ‘as it is in itself, independent of perspective’ (2000: 481). The contrastive aim of philosophy, as he understands it, is to do proper justice to matters of meaning, intelligibility, and significance—matters which, he argues, involve reason reflecting on itself from within, drawing inescapably on such perspectival modes of understanding as are inevitably historically and culturally situated and conditioned.

Williams’s thought may here helpfully be brought into relation with that of Charles Taylor ( 1985 ) who takes us closer to matters psychoanalytic with his focus on that project of self-understanding which involves our articulating—both in the sense of ‘giving voice to’ and in the sense of ‘developing and refining’—our emotional experience. Thus according to Taylor we are essentially ‘self-interpreting animals’ whose ‘interpretation of ourselves and our experience is constitutive of what we are, and therefore cannot be considered as merely a view on reality, separable from reality, nor as an epiphenomenon, which can be by-passed’ (1985: 47). What Taylor means here by ‘self-interpretation’ is not an essentially intellectual or reflective act, but nevertheless pertains to a kind of self-understanding not met with in animal life. We highlight two aspects of Taylor’s discussion.

First, Taylor argues that ‘experiencing a given emotion involves experiencing our situation as bearing a certain import’ (1985: 49). An import is a way in which a situation or object can be relevant and important to us, given our desires and purposes. Taylor’s claim is now very widely accepted in the philosophy and psychology of emotion as the claim that emotions constitutively involve our making appraisals of situations, which appraisals form ‘the grounds or basis for the feeling’ (49). Thus, we can define emotions ‘by the imports they relate to: fear is the affective response to the menacing, anger to the provoking, indignation to the flagrantly wrongful, and so on’ (49). As a consequence, our emotions are not intelligible for what they are merely in objective—i.e. experience-independent, physiological, or physical-causal—terms since they essentially ‘characterize things in their relevance to our desires and purposes’ (51).

Second, Taylor highlights the relationship between our self-understanding, our social and moral emotions, and what it is to lead a human life. Shame, for example, is only intelligibly experienced by those who understand, experience, and value their lives as having a certain kind of import—i.e. only intelligibly experienced by subjects with an aspiration to dignity (1985: 53). The subject who feels shame cares about how she handles herself and how she is seen by others. She is someone who understands herself, in her shame, to be failing to meet standards that matter to her. In such ways are self-conscious social subjects partly constituted, in their emotional lives, by their self-interpretations.

None of this is to say that there is no space for our self-interpretations to go awry, nor to suggest that we may not fail to interpret ourselves in apt ways (see Moran 2001 : ch. 2 ; Carman 2003 ). What it suggests, however, is that from the point of view of philosophical anthropology, aspirations to grasp what it is to lead a human life in merely objective terms (i.e. in terms not referring to a subject’s self-understanding) will be doomed to failure; from the point of view of psychopathology, that the relationship between self-interpretation and selfhood must be taken into account in understanding the distinctive sufferings of human selves; and from the point of view of therapy, that we can begin to understand how a merely talking cure could be thought curative of such disturbances as reach down into our selfhood—since reinterpreting the meaning of one’s behaviour will be at the same time a refashioning of oneself.

Recovering the Inner Life

Williams and Taylor pursue philosophy as, in part, a project of retrieving, sustaining, and exploring a conception of what it is to live a human life. The living of a distinctly human life involves, at its paradigmatic best, the experience of a rich inner subjectivity which informs our relationships, work, and creative projects. Aspects of this inner life may, and frequently do, remain stunted or atrophy through lack of nurture, become covered over by emotional defences against the pains of living, be inhibited by ideological narrowness, or be degraded through corrupt forms of relationship. Against such natural tendencies, many of the arts and humanities, including literature, poetry, history, and philosophy, engage in a continuing project of developing and retrieving our subjectivity. The project may be valuable for individuals yet also, more broadly, for cultures.

What makes this ongoing endeavour intelligible to its participants is the possible disjunction of our implicit, lived understanding of what it is to live a distinctly human life and those more explicit self-understandings which may do better or worse justice to what is implicitly grasped and lived. What makes it necessary is the way in which our implicit, lived understandings may have been muted or thwarted by various factors including our explicit self-conception that may tacitly or explicitly trash much of what makes for our humanity. (Imagine how impoverishing it would be to actually live as if that philosophy or psychology of mind you consider most implausibly reductive, or which simply leaves out of account or sees as merely epiphenomenal that which in your inner and existential life most matters to you, were true.) And what makes it valuable is the recovery of that within us which has become muted, our emancipation from such falsifying self-understandings as impoverish our self-becoming, and the intrinsic dignity of the examined life.

Nothing in such a humanistic approach is opposed to the natural scientific study of human life, but it challenges the scientistic thought that such a life may itself be adequately articulated in the terms offered by the natural sciences. The humanity that Williams and Taylor retrieve for us is one run through with a constitutive normativity, subjectivity, affectivity, rationality, and agency, and the methods they retrieve for us are ineliminably hermeneutic and aspire to no interpretation-transcending objectivity. What matters for them is not that the humanities and social sciences demonstrate the validity and reliability of their methods by adopting natural scientific methods ill-fitted to self-interpreting animals, but rather that they self-critically deploy such meaning-apprehending methods as are apt to the study of human life.

Such a focus is also central to the vision of psychoanalysis which pursues its own exploration and development of our humanity on two fronts.

First, at the level of theory, and by contrast with behaviourist, cognitivist, and physiological psychology, it emphasizes the inner subjective life. This is the life of our preoccupations—with erotic desire and social recognition, with our shame, guilt and contrition, power and humiliation, with our hopes and our histories, lovableness and loneliness, lovesickness and consuming hatreds, shyness and courage, envy, resentment and gratitude, intense secret passions, idealizing delights, the peculiarly vaunted or denigrated status for us of our significant attachment figures, our sexual adequacy and inadequacy, fateful repetitions, with our expressions and deeds which threaten to betray us, and all of our inner conflicts, moodiness, anxieties, excitements, self-punishments, self-defeating behaviours, irrational impulses, and bodge-job forms of self-management. This caboodle is what we may call our ‘subjective life’ or ‘internal world’, and many a student of psychology has been disappointed to find that what they naturally hoped would be centre stage on their syllabus—namely why our emotional life is so often baffling and tumultuous—barely gets a look-in beside the studies of cognition, behaviour, perception, and neuropsychology. It is, of course, the life of the neurotic subject—but also of all of us, since ‘psychoanalytic research finds no fundamental, but only quantitative, distinctions between normal and neurotic life’ and ‘the psychical mechanism employed by neuroses is not created by the impact of a pathological disturbance upon the mind but is already present in the normal structure of the mental apparatus’ (Freud 1900 : 373, 607).

Second, at the level of practice, psychoanalysis aims to attain or recover for us the very subjective sense of what otherwise appears not as meaningful, humanly intelligible moments of emotionally charged behaviour, but instead merely as behavioural signs and symptoms of an unknown condition. It aims, that is, to restore or develop in us our subjectivity, to help us recover or grow our agency or self-possession, to retrieve or awaken our inner lives, to ‘make the unconscious conscious’ and thereby to ‘know ourselves’.

It is safe to say that, compared to any other psychological school, psychoanalysis has in both its theory and practice most keenly kept its pulse on the distinctive qualities of the inner life. That philosophy may borrow from it to considerably enrich its own sense of what it really means to live a distinctly human life should not be surprising (e.g. Wollheim 1984 ; 1993 ). One of the most valuable contributions made by psychoanalysis to the project of making sense of ourselves is its drawing our attention to both the clinical data and the everyday observations upon which it constructs its theories. It offers up, if not an entirely new, then a considerably under-examined, set of human experiences. Such experiences are relevant not only for psychoanalysis’ own explanatory and therapeutic projects, they also deserve a place in the understanding of what it is to be human at play in many other disciplines—including, of course, philosophy. Many chapters in this Handbook consider the significance of psychoanalysis as a contribution to the meaning and meaningfulness of human activity, to the nature of human experience, to a philosophical anthropology and the phenomenology of human consciousness and relating, and thus to questions in ethics, religion, aesthetics, and, of course, self-knowledge.

Thus, psychoanalysis draws our attention to the reality of central aspects of the inner life which we know implicitly to be essential to human life as lived yet which for various reasons often escape our reflective grasp. As Nietzsche remarked, philosophy is littered with claims and ideas, e.g. about human psychology and ethics, that are insufficiently tied to human reality. For example, the important Aristotelian conception of man as a ‘rational animal’ might, if we’re not careful, illegitimately displace from our self-understanding the essential contribution made by our emotional sensibilities, sensibilities which make possible not only irrationality and human impoverishment but which put us in contact with reality and enable our flourishing. Or an equation of mentality with consciousness may squeeze out of view the essential contribution to our psychological lives of dynamically and descriptively unconscious mental processes. At the time of writing, many areas of philosophy are undergoing transformation in response to developments in the social, cognitive, and neuropsychological understanding of unconscious processes and the possible challenges these provide to the autonomy and integrity of conscious rational deliberation. The issue is at the heart of philosophy’s project, as the place and nature of reason and conscious deliberation have been of central concern to philosophy since its inception.

A second reason why philosophy should attend to the understandings of human life offered by psychoanalysis, and may be enhanced by psychoanalytic reflection, is that the unconscious may be understood to consist of optional and idiosyncratic aspects of our lives which go unexamined and constrain our sense of what is possible (see Fuchs, this volume, and Lear, this volume). This point can be better understood in light of a more familiar argument concerning why philosophy should attend to history, deriving from the self-interpreting nature of human life. If what it is to live a human life or have a human mind were immutable facts, they could be interrogated by means of a familiarity with any human culture at any point in history (one’s own culture and times, for example). Since, however, what it is to be a human being itself changes (within limits) over time and place, philosophers attempting to grasp what it is to live a human life or to be minded in human ways will do well to attend to more than their present time. This will be important not only for the understanding of other modes of human life but, perhaps even more importantly, for the understanding of our own. For it is only when set against the backdrop of other ways of being human that we can understand the distinctive shape, and acknowledge the contingency, of our own life. This lesson from history, we say, has a psychoanalytic analogue given above. Thus, a historical, sociological, and psychoanalytic method may help philosophy come to know itself, to make its unconscious conscious, by unearthing the contingent character of the forms of life which it takes for granted, including the form of its own enquiries.

Psychoanalysis: Know Thyself

But in what ways may philosophy return the favour? Various chapters of this Handbook provide their own diverse answers. But, following here the theme of ‘know thyself’, we propose that one of philosophy’s distinctive contributions is to assist psychoanalysis in knowing itself . Psychoanalysis as a discipline involves an ongoing dialectic of psychological theory and therapeutic practice informing each other, over time generating diverse self-understandings that are in tension with one another. Perhaps the debate over natural science and hermeneutics provides the most striking example of this. Philosophy can make more explicit conceptual implications, uncover misunderstandings, unearth problematic structuring assumptions, and enable new and productive self-understandings.

As an illustration: it is today fairly well understood that the kind of self-knowledge sought both by psychoanalysis and by anyone hoping to do genuine emotional work on herself, is not simply reflective. It may be interesting for us to develop beliefs about our minds’ functioning, and such beliefs may even be true, but, from a therapeutic point of view, the risk is significant that such an intellectual self-acquaintance may defensively stand in the way of, and disguise the ongoing need for, an emotionally deeper and mutative form of self-knowledge. Relatedly, Jonathan Lear ( 2005 : section 4) notes that even ‘raising “the question of how to live” can be a way of avoiding the question of how to live’. Getting clear on what is and isn’t involved in that deeper and intrinsically transformative project of knowing thyself is something with which philosophy has been concerned for centuries before psychoanalysis, and without philosophical aid it is inevitable that psychoanalysis will sometimes embed those self-misunderstandings about what it is to know thyself with which philosophy has had to grapple. 2

Consider for example Hadot’s ( 1995 : 90) explication of that first sense of ‘know thyself’ offered in our first section:

[In] the Socratic dialogue … the interlocutors are invited to participate in such inner spiritual exercises as examination of conscience and attention to oneself; in other words, they are urged to comply with the famous dictum, ‘Know thyself’. Although it is difficult to be sure of the original meaning of this formula, this much is clear: it invites us to establish a relationship of the self to the self, which constitutes the foundation of every spiritual exercise.

But is ‘this much’ clear? Sometimes this is the relationship taken in knowing oneself, but others have taken the Delphic command otherwise. Augustine, for example, ( c .417/2002: 10.8.11) urged that when the mind ‘is ordered to know itself, let it not seek itself as though withdrawn from itself, but let it withdraw what it has added to itself’. That is to say that some central forms of knowing oneself involve not the gleaning of new information about oneself—not an addition but a subtraction, not so much the establishment of a helpful self-relation but the undoing of an unhelpful self-relation. In addition we also meet with those other forms which take us closer to self-becoming, i.e. to growing into one’s own character, to articulating and making more determinate what is as yet undeveloped, than to any increased store of knowledge about oneself.

Philosophical reflection on the way that the term ‘self’ works in a variety of locutions—including ‘know thyself’—bears this out and helps us guard against assuming that it inevitably signifies the object of a reflexive relationship, and instead helps us see how it functions to signal the absence of relationship. Consider, for example, ‘self-respect’, ‘self-possession’, ‘self-motivation’, ‘self-consciousness’, ‘to thine own self be true’, ‘selfishness’. Someone who ‘selfishly’ ‘keeps something for himself’ is not well understood as keeping something for someone who happens to be himself, but rather as simply keeping something without thought of later giving it to anyone. The same may be said of someone who ‘keeps something to himself’: he just doesn’t share it with others. Someone who is ‘self-possessed’ doesn’t stand in a positive relation of possession to himself (whatever that would mean), but is rather free from the psychological influence of others past and present. He now acts in a straightforward and decisive manner that is free from responsibility-avoiding dither. Someone who becomes ‘self-conscious’ is, to be sure, thrown into an anxious state of wondering how she is coming across to others, and in this sense it is she and they, these flesh and blood people (but not some additional ‘self’ that she has), who are the objects of her attention. Yet what is also essential to our self-conscious subject is that she has been thrown out of relationship with these others, at least in any trusting connected form. Someone who is ‘true to herself’ is not so much simply representing herself accurately or simply happening to act on the basis of whatever she desires. Rather, she is not in the business of dissimulation but now chooses and acts according to her own values. The ‘self-motivated’ person is simply a person whose motivation to achieve her goals is not dependent on external influences . And, we suggest, one important understanding of the person who follows the Delphic command focuses not on the subject enjoying a reflexive relationship with his own mind but on his enjoying the absence of unhelpful defence mechanisms . For just as ‘being true to oneself’ is not perspicuously taken to cover, say, unremarkable cases of wanting to go for a walk and then, by gosh, going for a walk, so too ‘knowing thyself’ is not perspicuously taken to cover, say, ordinary cases of being able to verbally express one’s thoughts and feelings about, say, going for that walk. Instead ‘knowing thyself’ is, in such cases, not a matter of having, but rather of emancipating oneself from , a certain relation with oneself—a relation of self-deception or the inability to tolerate and own one’s thoughts and feelings. In such contexts, at least, the injunction to ‘know thyself’ refers not to the cultivation of a truthful reflexive presentation of the mind to itself but to a non-dissimulative, non-reflexive engagement with one’s life. 3

Or—by way of understanding the value of philosophical reflection on ‘knowing thyself’ to psychoanalysis—consider the idea that such self-knowledge is by itself but a morally neutral affair. Here we are offered the notion of a psychopathic patient who, despite her depravity, and perhaps even because of a successful psychoanalysis, knows herself perfectly well—not just in the sense of having a factually correct understanding of her own psychology, but also in the sense of having dismantled her defences. Without philosophical reflection such an idea can seem rather too clearly intelligible, as if there were no meaningful alternative. Yet, while the claim remains controversial, it certainly has been doubted whether what we understand by the Delphic command, or for that matter by the work of psychoanalysis, can quite so readily meet with an amoral interpretation. For, the suggestion goes, just as it is only in and through our joy, anger, and sadness that we really understand what it is to know reward, be wronged, and lose what matters to us, so too it is only really in and through relationships conditioned by love that we can comprehend others’ true reality, and only in and through our honest commitment, integrity, and humility that we can know what it is to lead a truly human life. On this view we do not grasp what it is to be a human living a distinctly human life by becoming knowledgeable about the behavioural habits of Homo sapiens . Rather we grasp it by engaging in forms of relationship with others which are essentially characterized in moral terms—in terms of what is humane, in terms of what is revealing of our and their humanity. 4 Truly understanding what it is to wrong someone, for example, may be thought to consist not simply in being able to track a range of abstract propositional entailments, but instead in feeling guilt and wanting to put it right. There are certainly senses in which a clever and uninhibited psychopath may ‘know herself’, but if she can’t feel the guilt she has nevertheless accrued by her evil acts then, the suggestion goes, there is yet an important form of self-knowledge which she lacks.

This excursus into two important, psychoanalytically pertinent meanings of ‘knowing thyself’ is of course but one of the ways in which philosophy may repay psychoanalysis for its enriched reflective conception of our inner life. Stepping back to survey the interdisciplinary field we may distinguish advocative, critical, and synoptic applications of philosophy to psychoanalytic theory.

On the advocative side we find philosophy helping to defend and clarify psychoanalytic theory from misunderstandings. Here we might think, for example, of how best to understand the physicalistic and energetic metaphors within psychoanalysis, how best to understand the notions of psychological ‘structures’ and defence ‘mechanisms’, and which methods of investigation, epistemic standards, and forms of understanding and explanation are best suited to knowledge of inner life.

On the critical side we find philosophy helping to sort out the wheat from the chaff within psychoanalytic theory. What has mattered here is not so much the scientific evidence for the truth or falsity of psychoanalytic theories, which is not a direct matter for philosophy. Instead what matters here is the cogency of the forms of reasoning used within psychoanalysis to support its claims, and the critical unearthing of optional, perhaps even worrisome, moral and political values tacitly embedded in the theory and practice. Here, connecting the critical with the advocative application, the question of whether psychoanalysis can qualify as a science, and if so, what kind of science, has been of considerable importance. In such ways psychoanalysis comes to better know itself—to know and work through its habitual irrationalities in the service of achieving a more honest, perhaps a more modest, less hubristic, and more integrated enterprise.

The synoptic contribution of philosophical reason to psychoanalysis takes us into a broader discussion of interdisciplinarity in psychoanalytic thought.

Psychoanalysis Situated

The earlier discussion of the Delphic command stressed the importance of not misunderstanding ‘knowing thyself’ as always and inevitably involving the cultivation of a positively informative relation of the self to itself. Instead it urged the significance of a form of ‘knowing’ marked principally, not by the presence of a particular epistemic attitude but rather, by the absence of self-deception. Another way to misunderstand ‘knowing thyself’ merely as a self-relation would be to assume that it did not essentially implicate others—i.e. to overlook the essentially interpersonal nature of self-knowledge. This idea that we come to know ourselves in and through one another forms the heart of Hegel’s ( 1807/1977 ) conception of identity as ‘negation’: we become who we are in so far as we distinguish ourselves from others and in so far as we achieve mutual recognition with them. 5 Such negation determines not only our sensorimotor selfhood—as we differentiate from, while at the same moment we perceptually and motorically relate to, our proximate environments—but also our personalities—as we come to relinquish our childhood egocentricity. In that process we come to appreciate both that we and others have genuinely different tastes, desires, and values and that, all being well, for all that we may still offer one another humane recognition. Or, at least, that we may—if we so wish—work to achieve that mutual recognition and mutual accountability, work to manage our relationships, and overcome our and others’ misrecognitions, such unending work being—in the ‘tragic vision’ of psychoanalysis—an aspect of any worthwhile relating at all.

That self-knowledge may be won through essentially relational means marks a significant theme of recent psychoanalysis which has come to place our object relations and our intersubjectivity at the heart of both its clinical theory and its clinical practice. Yet negation and relation also provide another means for philosophy to repay its debt for the richer picture of the inner world offered to it by psychoanalysis: by helping psychoanalysis ‘know itself’ through grasping its relations to, identities with, distinctions from, debts to, and dependencies on other disciplines. Here philosophy plays its long-established role of coordinating and synthesizing synoptician.

Psychoanalysis itself originated in interdisciplinary reflection. It is both well known and frequently forgotten within psychoanalysis that Freud drew upon extensive non-clinical sources in constructing psychoanalytic theory. Patricia Kitcher ( 1992 ) lays out the full extent of Freud’s borrowings from theories and discoveries of his time in neurophysiology (neurons, psychic energy, the reflex model of the mind), psychology (associationism, functional analysis), psychiatry (unconscious ideas, the sexual origin of neurosis, the separation of ideas and language), sexology (infantile sexuality, stages of sexual development, component instincts), anthropology and evolutionary biology (recapitulationism), with further ideas taken from philology and sociology. To the extent to which psychoanalysis draws on non-clinical findings and models directly it will need to revisit such ideas as have been superseded within their source disciplines. The same may be said of the use by more recent incarnations of psychoanalysis of theories and concepts from structural linguistics, attachment theory, existential phenomenology, Marxism and critical theory, anthropology, postmodernism, developmental psychology, and neurobiology. Philosophy in synoptic, grand-theoretic, mode may take up the task of urging and facilitating such updatings, and of drawing critical attention to failures to do so.

Philosophy’s job here, however, is not only the uncomfortable one of interdisciplinary police officer, but also that of diplomat. For sometimes, when psychoanalysis borrows from other disciplines, it does not so much directly import their concepts, as tacitly reappropriate or metaphorically extrapolate them for its own ends. While this may, in many cases, relieve psychoanalysis of the obligation to keep track of changes in scientific knowledge and understanding within the source domains, it may result in unclarity about the imported concepts, e.g. whether they are best understood as carrying literal or metaphorical senses (an example here may be Freud’s use of energetic and biological concepts). Here the task of philosophy is to clarify this indeterminacy and to assess whether inferences are being made within the psychoanalytic theory which illegitimately switch the senses of terms mid-argument.

Perhaps the most significant diplomatic role for philosophy concerns the questions of whether and how the findings and the methods of non-psychoanalytic disciplines are to be brought to bear on psychoanalytic theory and vice versa. Looking back a few decades one thinks especially of attempts to use the quantitative methods of experimental psychology to test hypotheses derived from psychoanalytic theory, or to test the adequacy of psychoanalytic therapy. The distinctly philosophical questions here were whether and when and how such hypotheses are pertinent to the theory, whether the theory is genuinely testable, whether it’s too bad for the theory or too bad for the experimental methods if it isn’t, and whether and when such methods truly are apt to investigation of the internal world. 6 In the background of such debates lies the central question of whether psychoanalysis is a science. If so, of what sort, and are our existing conceptions of science adequate when it comes to the idea of a ‘science of subjectivity’? If not, is this because psychoanalysis is unscientific (i.e. a failed science) or non-scientific (e.g. a Weltanschauung )? More recently one thinks of the theory and findings of experimental psychology concerning the non-dynamic unconscious and their significance for psychoanalytic theory. In defending the claim that apparently meaningless human phenomena may have a sense, Freud ( 1916 : 251) argued that merely physical (e.g. genetic or neurological) explanations frequently fail to tell us all we want to know, and that psychological explanation remains called for—but he failed to adequately consider the different psychological ways in which we may make sense of such phenomena (e.g. via such heuristics and biases in information processing as form part of an ‘adaptive’ unconscious). Recent work on both sides explores the complementarity of such explanations, and offers us the understanding that cognitive processing is motivated in psychodynamic ways and that the psychodynamic unconscious may be comprised of structures first delineated outside psychoanalytic theory (Eagle 2013 ; Chen and Chaiken 1999 ). Here the philosopher’s role is both synoptic (surveying the points of overlap and contact in the objects and the theories) and diplomatic (working to ensure that different schools, with their different approaches to the life of the mind, do not talk past one another).

A certain kind of good psychoanalysis might go something like this (but without the linear form): build enough trust between a vulnerable patient and a respectful analyst; examine and carefully deconstruct the patient’s defensive character formations; try to tolerate, truthfully acknowledge, and integrate such latent unintegrated and undeveloped feelings and expectations that induce shame and distrust in the patient; facilitate thereby the development of these feelings and the patient’s increased realistic self-confidence. Along the way such grandiose ambitions and self-deceiving illusions as serve defensive ends may be dismantled in the pursuit of a more workable inner life, an increased ability to remain inwardly and outwardly truthful, and the forming of deeper relationships. A good philosophical analysis of psychoanalysis may proceed along parallel lines. Having one’s precious psychoanalytic understandings subjected to philosophical critique may be galling, parts of what was cherished may have to be foregone, ambitions may sometimes need to be scaled back, collaborations more willingly entered into—with the rewards being greater clarity and the opportunity for what is truly valuable within the theory to shine and grow. The result is a discipline with its finger even more keenly on the pulse of our baffling inner lives and yet more serviceable to those seeking to follow the Delphic command.

Truth and Truthfulness

We close with an illustration of the closeness of matters philosophical and psychoanalytic in relation to the Delphic command by an examination of their mutual concern with truth and truthfulness.

Freud commented that ‘Psychoanalytic treatment is founded on truthfulness’ (1915: 164) and—perhaps less truthfully!—that, regarding his own development of psychoanalysis, ‘My single motive was the love of truth’ (quoted in Sterba 1982 : 115). It is a motivation he urges on the patient too, in the ‘fundamental rule’ of psychoanalysis (Thompson 2004 ). ‘The only exception’ to the rule that the patient be encouraged to speak of whatever he or she wants is ‘in regard to the fundamental rule of psycho-analytic technique which the patient has to observe’. What is the rule? Freud ( 1913 : 134–5) tells his patient that:

You will notice that as you relate things various thoughts will occur to you which you would like to put aside on the ground of certain criticisms and objections. You will be tempted to say to yourself that this or that is irrelevant here or that it’s quite unimportant or nonsensical so that there’s no need to say it. You must never give in to these criticisms, but must say it in spite of them—indeed, you must say it precisely because you feel an aversion to doing so. Later on you will find out and learn to understand the reason for this injunction, which is really the only one you have to follow. So say whatever goes through your mind … [N]ever forget that you have promised to be absolutely honest and never leave anything out because for some reason or other it is unpleasant to tell it.

This valuation of truth-telling is also central to that most psychoanalytical of pre-Freudian philosophers, Friederich Nietzsche, who, in his last work The Antichrist , wrote: ‘Truth has had to be fought for every step of the way, almost everything else dear to our hearts … has had to be sacrificed for it. Greatness of soul is needed for it, the service of truth is the hardest service’ (Nietzsche 1895/1968 : 50). In The Gay Science , he explains that the ‘ “will to truth” does not mean “I do not want to let myself be deceived” but—there is no alternative—“I will not deceive, not even myself”; and with that we stand on moral ground ’ (Nietzsche 1882/2001 : 344).

Earlier we considered the notion of knowing thyself, and tried to do more justice to the idea of such a gain in knowledge than could be done by reading it in terms of increasing one’s stock of information about oneself. In particular we stressed self-knowledge as overcoming self-deception and self-alienation and as relating realistically with others. Later we will also go on to discuss ‘knowing one’s own mind’ in the sense of arriving at non-vacillating resolve and determinacy of thought and will. So too, in considering truth, we do well to attend to uses of the concept which take us beyond notions of mere correctness. Thus not only a judgement expressed in a proposition, but also plumb lines, hearts, desires, and lovers, may all be true. And if we are true to someone (including ourselves—recall ‘to thine own self be true’), then correct judgement also does not seem to come into it. We may here recall Martin Heidegger’s ( 1927/1962 : §44) recovery of truth as alethia from otherwise hegemonic conceptions of truth as adequatio —the former to do with something’s self-revelation or unimpeded unconcealment, the latter to do with one thing’s correct representation of something else (see Gipps, this volume). We may think, too, of Gilbert Ryle’s ( 1949 : 183–4) discussion of what he called ‘avowals’—utterances such as:

‘I want’, ‘I hope’, ‘I intend’, ‘I dislike’, ‘I am depressed’, ‘I wonder’ etc— and of how we may be tempted by their form to misconstrue all the sentences in which they occur as self-descriptions. But in its primary employment ‘I want … ’ is not used to convey information, but to make a request or demand. It is no more meant as a contribution to general knowledge than ‘please’…. Nor, in their primary employment, are ‘I hate … ’ and ‘I intend … ’ used for the purpose of telling the hearer facts about the speaker … They are things said in detestation and resolution and not things said to advance biographical knowledge about detestations and resolutions.

The truth of such avowals is not a function of their expressing correct judgements that one hates or intends, but rather of their being expressions of the hate and intention in question. When we express ourselves truly, or again truthfully, we typically speak ‘from’, not ‘about’, our thoughts and feelings, and do so without perverting their articulation.

What none of these philosophers considers, in their talk of truth as the auto-revelation of Being to us (Heidegger) or as the auto-revelation of the human heart and mind to itself and others (Nietzsche, Ryle), is the significance, including the ethical significance, of an interpersonal commitment to truthfulness for the very constitution of what is there to be revealed. To put it otherwise: we do well to avoid considering the value of truthfulness only in relation to the expression of what already has determinate psychological shape , and instead to acknowledge its even more fundamental role in our minds becoming made up , in various senses of that idiom. Such a focus is provided by Williams’s ( 2002 ) discussion of the virtues of truth and truthfulness, the psychoanalytic resonances of which should shortly become clear.

Williams begins with the observation that many of our thoughts do not already clearly take the form of a belief as opposed to a desire or, say, a wish (2002: 82). For sure, sometimes we do have:

very determinate dispositions to assert certain things. But in many other cases, it is not merely the case that we do not know what we believe (though this is of course often true), but that a given content has not come to be a belief at all. What makes it into a belief may be that we are asked about the matter or about the belief and then have to decide whether we are prepared to assert it or not. How can that be, if assertions are expressions of belief? The answer is that assertions … often give others a reason to rely on what we say, either as a statement of how things are, or as an expression of how they seem to us. So … I have to consider what I am prepared, sincerely and responsibly, to assert. I ask myself what I believe, and that is, in such a context, the same question. The question should not be understood, however, as simply one of what I already believe; in trying to answer it I do not simply review my dispositions but consider my reasons for taking a given content to be true, and this is a question of what I am to believe.

A subject may be sincere in that he may come out with what is on his mind at any moment, but unless there is some consistency between what he says from occasion to occasion it will be hard to treat what he says as expressive of anything that dignifies the description of ‘belief’ (Williams suggests the phrase ‘propositional mood’ as a more fitting alternative). He may at first be ‘awash with many images, many excitements, merging fears and fantasies that dissolve into one another’ (2002: 195).

What will help a subject firm up his thoughts into distinct beliefs, desires, and wishes that no longer bleed into one another, will be in part the conversations he has with others. In conversation you may ask me what I think or feel about something, and if I am to respect the relationship we have, to be of use to you, and to be someone whose word counts for something, it will be important that I give thought to the matter at hand and actually form determinate thoughts or feelings. At a level more basic than the enjoyment of any transparent self-understanding of determinate beliefs and desires ‘we are all together in our social activity of mutually stabilizing our declarations and moods and impulses into becoming such things as beliefs and relatively steady attitudes’ (Williams 2002 : 193).

Williams identifies a second way in which conversations clarify what we believe. Some of our thoughts are wishes, and through wishful thinking, turn into beliefs. Or again, some of our indeterminate thoughts may become either wishes or beliefs, and which they become may depend on other wishes and desires we have. Wishful thinking, says Williams, ‘is very basic and not a great mystery: the steps from its being pleasant to think of P, to its being pleasant to think that P, to thinking that P, cover no great psychological distance’ (2002: 83). As a result, ‘there is no mystery about the fact that … an agent may easily find himself committed to [the] content [of his wishes and beliefs] in the wrong mode’ (2002: 198). However, this does not happen transparently. When beliefs arise in these ways, when they ‘become hostage to desires and wishes, they do so only as the result of hidden and indirect processes, against which the disciplines of the virtues of truth are directed’ (2002: 83). And this is something that conversations with others can help prevent.

This applies not only to questions of what to believe, but also when thinking about what to do. Since:

individual deliberation … is inherently open to wishful thinking … it needs the virtues of truth as much as purely factual inquiries need them. [So] thinking about what one individual should do can usefully involve more than one person: we can think about what I should do. This is not just because you may have experience and knowledge which I lack, but because your wishes are not mine—possibly not in their content, certainly not in their effects. [We] help to sustain each other’s sense of reality, both in stopping wishes’ becoming beliefs when they should not, and also in helping some wishes rather than others to become desires. 7 (Williams 2002 : 198)

The same may also be said of a third question, self-interpretation: we may equally helpfully think together about who I am.

The implications of Williams’s philosophical argument for both psychoanalytic theory and practice are clear. Yet, arguably, they are equally relevant to philosophical practice itself. Nietzsche and Wittgenstein both identify a similar role for the will and its influence on philosophical thought as Williams identifies for the wish here, and with it the significance of an ethic of truthfulness in philosophy. Wittgenstein’s remarks return us to the very first sense of ‘know thyself’ we identified in relation to philosophy, the practical endeavour of the philosopher to come to know herself:

What makes a subject difficult to understand—if it is significant, important—is not that some special instruction about abstruse things is necessary to understand it. Rather it is the contrast between the understanding of the subject and what most people want to see…. What has to be overcome is not a difficulty of the intellect, but of the will…. Work on philosophy is … actually more of a kind of work on oneself. (Wittgenstein 2005 : 86)

The edifice of your pride has to be dismantled. And that means frightful work…. One cannot speak the truth, if one has not yet conquered oneself. One cannot speak it—but not because one is still not clever enough. (Wittgenstein 1980 : 30–5)

A Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoanalysis

Wittgenstein’s reflections on philosophical practice carry both explicit and implicit psychoanalytic overtones (Baker 2003 ), but he famously had an ambivalent relationship to psychoanalysis itself (Levy, this volume), while Freud in turn famously had an ambivalent relationship with philosophy. In 1886 Freud avowed to Fliess that he secretly nourished ‘the hope of arriving … at my initial goal of philosophy’ after ‘the detour of medical practice’ (Freud 1985 : 159). Furthermore he supplemented his medical lectures by enrolling in six of the philosopher Brentano’s lecture courses, and also met with him outside the class (Tauber 2010 : 29). He conceived of psychoanalysis as standing in a ‘middle position between medicine and philosophy’; he also added that he had ‘never really been a doctor in the proper sense’ (cited by Rieff 1959 : 301). Later though he confessed to a ‘constitutional incapacity’ for philosophy (Freud 1925 : 60) and became famously dismissive of ‘the philosophers’—whom he equated with those who dogmatically insisted that ‘ “consciousness” and “mental” were identical’ and so would not accept what he variously described as the ‘postulate’ or ‘hypothesis’ of unconscious mental life (1925: 31).

By happy contrast with Freud’s ‘philosophers’, those contributing to this Handbook show a sympathetic interest in psychoanalysis’ most central concept, the unconscious, in relation to its closest conceptual allies: defences, transference, conflict, free association, wish-fulfilment, and symbolism. Several of their chapters work to help psychoanalysis know itself by elucidating, retheorizing, and rescuing ‘the unconscious’ from objections and misrepresentations—including its self-misrepresentations. Other contributions explore psychoanalysis in relation to its philosophical prehistory, the recognition and misrecognition afforded it within twentieth-century philosophers, its scientific strengths and weaknesses, its applications in aesthetics and politics, and its value and limitations when brought to bear on ethics, religion, and social life.

Further introduction we save for the openings of each of the sections which follow. Within each section, we have endeavoured to provide an evaluative overview of current thinking at the interface between philosophy and psychoanalysis through original contributions that will shape the future of the debate. Some chapters lean more towards the overview, others towards developing a line of argument that defends a particular position, but taken as a whole, each section forms the ground for future research.

We close by acknowledging three points. First, we have not sought to provide an introduction to psychoanalytic theory, for which we refer the reader to Bateman and Holmes ( 1995 ), Rusbridger and Budd ( 2005 ), Eagle ( 2011 ), Lear ( 2011 ), or Milton, Polmear, and Fabricius ( 2011 ). Second, there are some limitations in coverage. The reader will notice, for example, that Jungian, Lacanian, and feminist traditions feature far less prominently than Freudian and object-relations approaches. Sometimes this wasn’t for lack of trying to solicit contributions but, especially in relation to the paucity of coverage of post-Lacanian developments, we must also own a lack of editorial expertise in assessing their cogency. The third relates to this being a Handbook of philosophy and , not philosophy of , psychoanalysis. It may be remarked that we have included some, but not extensive, coverage of the ‘Freud Wars’ which constituted a once-prominent strand within the philosophy of psychoanalysis of the last forty years. Some of the important issues that arose in those debates, in particular the scientific evidence for and conceptual validity of psychoanalytic theory, have naturally found their place in this Handbook, but on the whole, we have encouraged different modes of engagement of the kind discussed and illustrated in this introductory chapter. 8

Baker, G. ( 2003 ). ‘Wittgenstein’s method and psychoanalysis’. In K. W. M. Fulford , K. Morris , J. Sadler , and G. Stanghellini (eds), Nature and Narrative (pp. 57–73). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Google Scholar

Google Preview

Bateman, A. and Holmes, J. ( 1995 ). Introduction to Psychoanalysis . London: Routledge.

Bettelheim, B. ( 1982 ). Freud and Man’s Soul . New York: Knopf.

Carman, T. ( 2003 ). ‘First persons: on Richard Moran’s Authority and Estrangement ’. Inquiry 46: 395–408.

Chen, S. and Chaiken, S. ( 1999 ). ‘The heuristic-systematic model in its broader context’. In S. Chaiken and Y. Trope (eds), Dual Process Theories in Social Psychology (pp. 73–96). New York: Guilford.

Eagle, M. ( 2011 ). From Classical to Contemporary Psychoanalysis . London: Routledge.

Eagle, M. ( 2013 ). ‘ The implications of conceptual critiques and empirical research on unconscious processes for psychoanalytic theory ’. Psychoanalytic Review 100(6): 881–917.

Eissler, K. R. ( 1963 ). ‘ Notes on the psychoanalytic concept of cure ’. Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 18: 424–463.

Freud, S. ( 1900 ). The Interpretation of Dreams . In J. Strachey (ed. and trans.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud , Vol. 5. London: Hogarth Press.

Freud, S. ( 1901 ). The Psychopathology of Everyday Life . In J. Strachey (ed. and trans.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud , Vol. 6. London: Hogarth Press.

Freud, S. ( 1913 ). ‘On beginning the treatment’. In J. Strachey (ed. and trans.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud , Vol. 12 (pp. 121–144). London: Hogarth Press.

Freud, S. ( 1915 ). ‘Observations on transference love. Further recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis. III’. In J. Strachey (ed. and trans.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud , Vol. 12 (pp. 159–173). London: Hogarth Press.

Freud, S. ( 1916 ). Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis . In J. Strachey (ed. and trans.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud , Vols 15 and 16. London: Hogarth Press.

Freud, S. ( 1925 ). An Autobiographical Study . In J. Strachey (ed. and trans.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud , Vol. 20. London: Hogarth Press.

Freud, S. ( 1985 ). The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhem Fliess 1887–1904 , trans. J. M. Masson . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gaita, R. ( 2004 ). Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception , 2nd edn. Abingdon: Routledge.

Gomez, L. ( 2005 ). The Freud Wars: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis . Hove: Routledge.

Hadot, P. ( 1995 ). Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault . Oxford: Blackwell.

Hadot, P. ( 2002 ). What is Ancient Philosophy? Cambridge, MA: Belknap Harvard.

Hegel, G. W. F. ( 1807 /1977). Phenomenology of Spirit , trans. A. V. Miller . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heidegger, M. ( 1927 /1962). Being and Time , trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson . Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Jones, E. ( 1940 ). ‘ Sigmund Freud 1856–1939 ’. International Journal of Psychoanalysis 21 : 2–26.

Jones, E. ( 1955 ). Sigmund Freud Life and Work, Volume Two: Years of Maturity 1901–1919 . London: Hogarth Press.

Kitcher, P. ( 1992 ). Freud’s Dream: A Complete Interdisciplinary Science of Mind . Cambridge, MA: MIT.

Kohut, H. ( 1973 ). ‘ Psychoanalysis in a troubled world ’. Annual Psychoanalysis 1: 3–25.

Lacewing, M. ( 2014 ). ‘ Psychodynamic psychotherapy, insight and therapeutic action ’. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice 21: 156–173.

Lear, J. ( 2005 ). ‘The Socratic method and psychoanalysis’. In S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar (eds), A Companion to Socrates (ch. 27). Oxford: Blackwell.

Lear, J. ( 2011 ). Freud . London: Routledge.

Lear J. ( 2014 ). ‘ Integrating the non-rational soul ’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114: 75–101.

Malcolm, N. ( 1958 ). Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir . London: Oxford University Press.

McDonald, M. ( 2014 ). Hegel and Psychoanalysis: A New Interpretation of ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’ . New York: Routledge.

Menninger, K. A. ( 1956 ). ‘ Freud and American psychiatry ’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 4: 614–625.

Milton, J. , Polmear, C. , and Fabricius, J. ( 2011 ). A Short Introduction to Psychoanalysis . London: Sage Publications.

Moran. R. ( 2001 ). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Nehamas, A. ( 1998 ). The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault . Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Nietzsche, F. ( 1882 /2001). The Gay Science , ed. Bernard Williams , trans. Josefine Nauckhoff . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nietzsche, F. (1887/ 1967 ). On the Genealogy of Morals , ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann . New York: Vintage Books.

Nietzsche, F. ( 1895 /1968). The Antichrist , ed. and trans. R. J. Hollingdale . New York: Viking Penguin.

Rieff, P. ( 1959 ). Freud: The Mind of the Moralist . New York: Viking Press.

Rusbridger, R. and Budd, S. ( 2005 ). Introducing Psychoanalysis: Essential Themes and Topics . London: Routledge.

Ryle, G. ( 1949 ). The Concept of Mind . London: Hutchinson.

Saussure, F. de ( 1915 /1961). Course in General Linguistics , trans. W. Baskin . New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.

Smith, David Livingstone ( 2003 ). Psychoanalysis in Focus . London: Sage Publications.

Sterba, R. F. ( 1969 ). ‘ The Psychoanalyst in a world of change ’. Psychoanalytic Quarterly 38: 432–454.

Sterba, R. F. ( 1982 ). Reminiscences of a Viennese Psychoanalyst . Detroit, IL: Wayne State University Press.

Tauber, A. I. ( 2010 ). Freud, the Reluctant Philosopher . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Taylor, C. ( 1985 ). ‘Self-interpreting animals’. In C. Taylor , Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers , Vol. 1 (pp. 45–76). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thompson, M. G. ( 2004 ). The Ethic of Honesty . Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi.

Williams, B. ( 2000 ). ‘ Philosophy as a humanistic discipline’. Philosophy 75 (4): 477–496.

Williams, B. ( 2002 ). Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Wittgenstein, L. ( 1980 ). Culture and Value , trans. P. Winch . Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L. ( 2005 ). Big Transcript . Oxford: Blackwell.

Wollheim, R. ( 1984 ). The Thread of Life . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Wollheim, R. ( 1993 ). The Mind and Its Depths . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Other important aims include self-becoming (i.e. developing what is as yet but latent within) and improved self–other relating. As will be evident from our discussion we take these to be interdependent with self-knowing. For elaborations see Eagle ( 2011 ) and Lacewing ( 2014 ).

The fantasy that one could avoid such philosophical troubles through avoiding philosophizing—and the correlative defensive equation of intellectual activity with intellectualizing defence—is akin to the fantasy that one may better go through life by simply avoiding troublesome emotional experience. The psychoanalyst, one might say, no more has the option of opting out of intellectual self-understanding than the philosopher has the option of opting out of the self-(mis)understandings that constitute our emotional lives. For self-(mis)understanding, in both emotional and intellectual registers, is an inexorable part of the human condition. One might say that one cannot not philosophize—only do so worse or better, i.e. only be less or more aware of the assumptions embedded in one’s thinking.

In this way we can grasp why, say, a Woody Allen character who is preoccupied by psychoanalytically understanding himself is still neurotic: he is caught up in endless self-relationship rather than being emancipated from self-preoccupation.

It is important to note that more comes under the general concept of knowing thyself than the absence of unhelpful self-relations. Thus another important aspect of the concept refers to the cultivation of a straightforward determinacy of action. Such an agent takes responsibility for himself (he ‘owns’ his thought and his actions) and does not vacillate; he ‘knows his own mind’. We return to this in the final section of this introduction.

A perspective most forcefully developed by Raimond Gaita ( 2004 ), and iterated by Backström (this volume).

This is but one of several ways in which Hegel prefigures psychoanalytic theory (McDonald 2014 ). We may think here too of Wittgenstein’s plan to use either the Earl of Kent’s ‘I will teach you differences’, or Joseph Butler’s ‘everything is what it is and not another thing’, as the motto for his Philosophical Investigations . The thought is also familiar to us through Saussure’s ( 1915 : 120) consideration that ‘in language there are only differences without positive terms’: our concepts enjoy their determinacy in virtue of their exclusionary relations with other concepts, and we reflectively grasp what phenomena are by appreciating how they differ from other phenomena.

For summaries see Smith ( 2003 ) and Gomez ( 2005 ).

As Williams ( 2002 : 198) notes, however, there can yet ‘be a negative side to this same process: in helping you to decide, I may reinforce your fantasy, and we may conspire in projecting wishes into a deceptive social hologram’.

We are very grateful to Katy Abramson and Adam Leite for their comments on an earlier draft of this introduction.

• About Oxford Academic
• Publish journals with us
• University press partners
• What we publish
• New features  
• Open access
• Institutional account management
• Rights and permissions
• Get help with access
• Accessibility
• Advertising
• Media enquiries
• Oxford University Press
• Oxford Languages
• University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

• Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
• Cookie settings
• Cookie policy
• Privacy policy
• Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

History of Greece and Rome

1001 anecdotes and curiosities of the ancient world

“Know thyself ( Know yourself)”, γνῶθι σεαυτόν (gnóthi seautón), Nosce te ipsum, Conócete a ti mismo, Connais-toi toi-même, Conosci te stesso, Erkenne dich selbst.

This ancient Greek phrase, “know yourself” is the simplest invitation to reflect on oneself

This phrase, which has a high ethical value and a religious value for some people, is a forceful and disturbing order, because it makes the men, curious beings, face the fact that we need to know, to understand and to accept ourselves; it also makes us face with the evidence of the lack of that self-knowledge and awareness of oneself.

Once again are the ancient Greeks, who developed the rational knowledge of nature, who also focused their reflection in man and therefore in themselves.

Pausanias , the famous tourist of the II century A.D., in his " Description of Greece ", in Book X dedicated to Phocis, in chapter 24, paragraphs 1-2 , tells us that in the courtyard of the temple of Apollo at Delphi there were registered (Pliny says that in gold letters) useful phrases for the life of men, which are in the mouth of all Greeks (Εν δέ τώ προνάω τά έν Δελφοίς γεγραμμένα, έστιν ώφελήματα άνθρώποις εἰς βίον = En de to pronao ta en Delfois gegrammena estín ofelémata anthropois eis bion ), such as:

          " know thyself "  (Γνῶθι σαυτόν, gnóthi sautón ),

          “ nothing too much ” (Μηδέν άγαν, medén ágan ).

According to the same Pausanias, these phrases, receiving those who consulted the oracle, were attributed to the Seven Sages (Cleobulus of Lindos, Solon of Athens, Sparta Quilon, Bias of Priene, Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, Periander of Corinth ).

Already Plato had said in his dialogue Protagoras (343 b ), that the Seven Sages showed his admiration for the Lacedaemonian know " when meeting in Delphi, they wanted to offer to Apollo, in his temple Delfico, the first fruits of their wisdom, and consecrated inscriptions  that everyone repeats: Know thyself and nothing in excess ".

Many of these statements have not ceased to be used and to encourage reflection of men from then until today.

Probably the most successful of them is " know thyself ", especially since Socrates himself used it many times, especially as stated in the Platonic dialogue " Alcibiades " when facing the ambitious young Athenian politician with his own ignorance. This is the reason why the phrase is wrongly attributed to Socrates.

Naturally, the Romans, rulers of Greece but captured by their culture, immediately adopted the maxim in the form " nosce te ipsum " or less used “ temet nosce ”.

If there are infinite thinkers and philosophers who take as their own " nosce te ipsum " or one of its variants, there are also infinite ways in which it was used.

The phrase continues to be an enigma from the beginning. Does it mean just remember the men their vulnerability and deadly?, perhaps the meaning is to tell us that we need to know well ourselves, that we must know our intellectual and rational soul to guide our life right?, or maybe that the phrase owns itself the treasure of treasures, and who knows himself knows the universe and the gods?, as Hermes Trismegistus intended.

The same idea is expressed by Saint Augustine , directing the judgment in the Christian sense, when he says " do not want to pour out; fall within yourself, because inside of man lies the truth " (From True Religion 39,72 ), thus inaugurating the so called " Socratic Christian " spoken by Gilson.

In any case " knowing oneself " is a difficult task, the most difficult, as Thales of Miletus said, according to Diogenes Laertius ( Lives and opinions of eminent philosophers, Book I, 12,15 ) or according to the dialogue of Plato Alcibiades, 130 ,:

 " I often thought, Socrates, that it was available to everyone, but in other times I also found it very difficult. "

For other authors the task is impossible and the man is doomed not to know " who he is, where he comes from and where it goes " or at least to have a meager knowledge of himself and a slight self-consciousness.

Actually this " Delphic order " constitutes one of the pillars of philosophical reflection of all time, ethics and mysticism; infinite authors since antiquity, as we saw, through the Middle Ages of Peter Abelard (1079-1142 ), who used it as the title for his treatise " Ethica seu liber dictus: scito te ipsum ", or Petrarch.

Among others, our Spanish moralist Gracián (1601-1658) said in his book Faultfinder , part one, chap. IX entitled " Moral anatomy of man ": " He who begins ignoring oneself, badly can learn other things. But what is the good in knowing everything while not knowing oneself? ".

Closer to our time, the same idea is repeated by many:

Hegel:" self-consciousness is the fount of truth ".

Fichte: " Look at yourself, shift your gaze from everything around you and direct it to your interior. This is the first request that philosophy makes to his apprentice. You are not going to talk about anything outside of you, but only of yourself ".

Cassirer: " the autognosis is the supreme purpose of philosophical inquiry ".

Montaigne: " every man contains within himself the entire form of the human condition ".

There is no philosopher who is inspired by the inscription of the temple of Delphi.

Even today in our hyperactive culture, little given to reflection and peace of mind, the highest Greek inspired numerous self-help books looking for the north in self acceptance or self-identity.

Necessary books that are not always valuable. Also here the consumer society and the bestsellers found a good opportunity for business.

I hope this short article is used for guide the reader, in the sense that he considers most appropriate, of course.

• ← I hate and I love (odi et amo)
• The Roman state helps the starving citizens with the “annona” →

This website uses cookies so that you have the best user experience. If you continue browsing you are giving your consent for the acceptance of the aforementioned cookies and the acceptance of our cookie policy , click the link for more information.

Know Thyself: Sophocles’ “Oedipus the King”

The famous saying “Know Thyself,” which is written on the temple at Delphi, is one of the main messages of the Sophocles’ play “Oedipus the King.” Taking into account the historical context, it is easy to explain the problem that appeared at the end of the fifth century. “Know Thyself” becomes not a trivial motto, but real folk wisdom of that time. The whole life and activity of Oedipus are aimed at knowing himself.

The main character does not care about the challenges, tribulations, and other problems the acknowledgment may bring, he is ready to accept any truth and follow the destiny. “And yet I know this much – no disease no any other suffering can kill me…But whether my fate leads, just let it go” (Sophocles “Oedipus the King,” 1700). The first desire of the protagonist is not only to learn whose son, husband, or father you are, but to learn your abilities and willingness to follow your purpose.

On the other hand, Oedipus’ desire to know himself also leads to despair. He realizes the vanity of human efforts, limited knowledge we have, and inability to shape the future: “O generations of mortal men…What man is there, what human being, who attains greater happiness than mere appearances, a joy which seems to fade away to nothing?” (Sophocles “Oedipus the King,” 1423). The theme of knowing yourself and following your destiny is revealed from different points in the play. However, the conclusion remains the same: perfect knowledge leads to great suffering.

Cite this paper

• Chicago (N-B)
• Chicago (A-D)

StudyCorgi. (2021, July 4). Know Thyself: Sophocles’ “Oedipus the King”. https://studycorgi.com/know-thyself-sophocles-oedipus-the-king/

"Know Thyself: Sophocles’ “Oedipus the King”." StudyCorgi , 4 July 2021, studycorgi.com/know-thyself-sophocles-oedipus-the-king/.

StudyCorgi . (2021) 'Know Thyself: Sophocles’ “Oedipus the King”'. 4 July.

1. StudyCorgi . "Know Thyself: Sophocles’ “Oedipus the King”." July 4, 2021. https://studycorgi.com/know-thyself-sophocles-oedipus-the-king/.

Bibliography

StudyCorgi . "Know Thyself: Sophocles’ “Oedipus the King”." July 4, 2021. https://studycorgi.com/know-thyself-sophocles-oedipus-the-king/.

StudyCorgi . 2021. "Know Thyself: Sophocles’ “Oedipus the King”." July 4, 2021. https://studycorgi.com/know-thyself-sophocles-oedipus-the-king/.

This paper, “Know Thyself: Sophocles’ “Oedipus the King””, was written and voluntary submitted to our free essay database by a straight-A student. Please ensure you properly reference the paper if you're using it to write your assignment.

Before publication, the StudyCorgi editorial team proofread and checked the paper to make sure it meets the highest standards in terms of grammar, punctuation, style, fact accuracy, copyright issues, and inclusive language. Last updated: July 4, 2021 .

If you are the author of this paper and no longer wish to have it published on StudyCorgi, request the removal . Please use the “ Donate your paper ” form to submit an essay.

How it works

Transform your enterprise with the scalable mindsets, skills, & behavior change that drive performance.

Explore how BetterUp connects to your core business systems.

We pair AI with the latest in human-centered coaching to drive powerful, lasting learning and behavior change.

Build leaders that accelerate team performance and engagement.

Unlock performance potential at scale with AI-powered curated growth journeys.

Build resilience, well-being and agility to drive performance across your entire enterprise.

Transform your business, starting with your sales leaders.

Unlock business impact from the top with executive coaching.

Foster a culture of inclusion and belonging.

Accelerate the performance and potential of your agencies and employees.

See how innovative organizations use BetterUp to build a thriving workforce.

Discover how BetterUp measurably impacts key business outcomes for organizations like yours.

A demo is the first step to transforming your business. Meet with us to develop a plan for attaining your goals.

• What is coaching?

Learn how 1:1 coaching works, who its for, and if it's right for you.

Accelerate your personal and professional growth with the expert guidance of a BetterUp Coach.

Types of Coaching

Navigate career transitions, accelerate your professional growth, and achieve your career goals with expert coaching.

Enhance your communication skills for better personal and professional relationships, with tailored coaching that focuses on your needs.

Find balance, resilience, and well-being in all areas of your life with holistic coaching designed to empower you.

Discover your perfect match : Take our 5-minute assessment and let us pair you with one of our top Coaches tailored just for you.

Research, expert insights, and resources to develop courageous leaders within your organization.

Best practices, research, and tools to fuel individual and business growth.

View on-demand BetterUp events and learn about upcoming live discussions.

The latest insights and ideas for building a high-performing workplace.

• BetterUp Briefing

The online magazine that helps you understand tomorrow's workforce trends, today.

Innovative research featured in peer-reviewed journals, press, and more.

Founded in 2022 to deepen the understanding of the intersection of well-being, purpose, and performance

We're on a mission to help everyone live with clarity, purpose, and passion.

Join us and create impactful change.

Read the buzz about BetterUp.

Meet the leadership that's passionate about empowering your workforce.

For Business

For Individuals

The importance of knowing yourself: your key to fulfillment

Jump to section

What does it mean to know yourself?

The importance and benefits of knowing one's self, how to know yourself better, how to improve your self-knowledge, how coaching can help.

Think of the most eccentric person in your life. You know the one. 

The one who either shows up in a disheveled leather jacket or an all-black outfit and a beret. They’re somewhat aloof but always energetic. Unapologetically flamboyant, but always kind and understanding. This person chooses to be themselves, not who they’re expected to be. 

They don’t care about the world’s expectations. This sometimes gets them into trouble or attracts judging glares from nearby strangers. But, you have to admit, it would be nice to have that kind of self-confidence . And you can!

In a world rife with expectations, living authentically can feel impossible. It feels easier to have your path planned for you. But, in the long run, this will only hold you back from living a fulfilling life.

The great philosopher Socrates said it himself: “To know thyself is the beginning of wisdom.” 

So if you’re wondering whether authenticity is worth pursuing, the short answer is “yes.” And, for the detail-oriented among you, here’s everything you need to know about the importance of knowing yourself — so you too can find your true self.

Knowing yourself is about discovering what makes you tick. Among other things, it means:

• Learning your likes and dislikes
• Unearthing your beliefs and values
• Knowing your personal boundaries
• Accepting your personality traits
• Being a better team player
• Having a clearer path in your professional life
• Understanding how you interact with others
• Recognizing your core personal values
• Increasing your capacity for self-compassion
• Having a clearer idea of your life’s purpose
• Knowing what it takes to be self-motivated
• Being more adaptable  

Ultimately, all of these things will increase your self-awareness . Being more self-aware lends to enhanced self-development, acceptance, and proactivity while benefiting our overall mental health .

We’ll be more confident, make better decisions, have stronger relationships, and be more honest .

Knowing yourself is about knowing what makes you tick. It means identifying what matters to you, your strengths and weaknesses, your behaviors, tendencies, and thought patterns. This list describes the importance and benefits of knowing one's self:

1. Despite your quirks, flaws, and insecurities, you learn self-love and acceptance. Once you do, you can walk through the world with more confidence and care less about what people think. 

2. You can change your personality flaws and improve on your weaknesses. You are empowered to become who you want to be. This will help you become a better, more well-rounded person.

3. You’ll have more emotional intelligence , which is key to knowing others. You’ll be more conscious of your own emotions and feelings, making it easier to understand another person's point of view.

4. You'll be more confident. Self-doubt disappears when you know and accept yourself, and others won't influence you as easily. It'll be easier to stand your ground .

5. You’ll forge better relationships. It’s easier to share yourself when you know yourself. You’ll also know what kind of people you get along with, so you can find your community .

6. You’ll be less stressed. Self-awareness will help you make decisions that are better for you. And when this happens, you become less stressed about what people think or whether you made the right choice. 

7. You’ll break patterns of disappointment. Y ou'll find repetitive behaviors that lead to poor outcomes when you look inward. Once you name them, you can break them.

8. You’ll be happier. Expressing who you are, loud and proud, will help you improve your well-being.

10. You'll have more self-worth. Why is self-worth important? Because it helps you avoid compromising your core values and beliefs. Valuing yourself also teaches others to respect you.

11. You'll understand your values. We can’t understate the importance of knowing your values. They will help you make decisions aligned with who you are and what you care about.

12. You'll find purpose in life. Knowing purpose in life will give you a clear idea of where you should go and what you should do. 

Getting to know yourself is hard. It involves deep self-reflection, honesty, and confronting parts of yourself you might be afraid of. But it’s a fundamental part of self-improvement .

If you need help, try working with a professional. BetterUp can help you navigate your inner world.

Now that we’re clear on the importance of knowing yourself, you might not know where to get started. Let’s get into it.

Check your VITALS

Author Meg Selig coined the term VITALS as a guide for developing self-knowledge. Its letters spell out the six core pillars of self-understanding:

These are your guides for decision-making and setting your goals. Understanding them will help you make decisions aligned with your authentic self. Here are some example values:

• Being helpful
• Trust 
• Wealth 

You can see how each of these might lead to different life choices. For example, if you value honesty, you might quit a job where you have to lie to others.

2. I nterests

Your interests are what you do without being asked, like your hobbies, passions, and causes you care about. You can then try to align your work with these interests. Here are some examples:

• Climate change. If you’re passionate about this issue, you might choose to work directly on the problem. Or you can make choices that allow for a more sustainable lifestyle, like owning an electric car.
• Audio editing. Perhaps you’re an amateur musician, and you spend your time recording and editing audio. You can start working as a freelance editor or find a job that uses these skills.
• Fitness. If you love working out and value helping others, you might consider becoming a trainer at your local gym or leading a running group.

Not all of your interests need to be a side-hustle . But being aware of them can help you make decisions that better suit your desired life. It is really about knowing your priorities.

3. T emperament

Your temperament describes where your energy comes from. You might be an introvert and value being alone. Or, as an extrovert, you find energy being around others.

Knowing your temperament will help you communicate your needs to others. 

If you’re a meticulous planner going on a trip, you should communicate this to your more spontaneous travel buddy. They might feel suffocated by your planning, leading to arguments down the road. Bringing it up before your trip will help talk it out to avoid conflict later.

4. A round-the-clock activities

This refers to when you like to do things. If you’re a writer and you’re more creative at night, carve out time in the evening to work. If you prefer working out in the morning, make it happen. Aligning your schedule with your internal clock will make you a happier human being.

5. L ife-mission and goals

Knowing your life mission is about knowing what gives your life meaning. It gives you purpose, a vocation , and something to strive for.

To find your life mission, think about what events were most meaningful to you so far. For example:

• Leading a successful project at the office
• Influencing positive change through your work
• Helping someone else succeed

There are many ways to fulfill a life mission. You can fulfill your goals with the skills and resources you have. For example, “helping someone succeed” could mean becoming a teacher or mentoring a young professional.

6. S trengths and weaknesses

These include both “hard skills” (like industry-specific knowledge and talents) and “soft skills” (like communication or emotional intelligence ).

When you do what you’re good at, you’re more likely to succeed, which will improve your morale and mental health.

Knowing your weaknesses and toxic traits will help you improve on them or minimize their influence on your life.

Are you ready to get started? There are many ways to understand your inner self:

• Write in a journal
• Step out of your comfort zone
• Track your progress
• Choose smart habits

A professional coach will encourage you to reflect on and reframe your inner thoughts and patterns. They understand that, in many cases, impulsivity holds you back from attaining your full potential.

The amygdala — an almond-sized region of the brain partially responsible for emotions — releases dopamine to reinforce impulsive behavior . This happens every time you open Facebook instead of working, eat chocolate while on a diet, or get angry at your colleagues instead of helping solve the problem.

Self-awareness can help you overcome your impulsivity. Armed with the right tools, you can break unhealthy or unwanted behaviors. 

A coach can help you meet these ends. They can teach you:

• Mindfulness: the acceptance that nothing is inherently good or bad 
• Metacognition: the awareness that your mind is the root of your actions
• Reframing: the power to react differently to an event or circumstance

These three elements can help you strengthen your self-control . You'll keep a cool head in stressful situations, communicate more effectively with others, and become a better leader overall.

In other words: by checking in with yourself, you avoid wrecking yourself.

At BetterUp , our coaches are trained in Inner Work® and understand the importance of knowing yourself. This is a lifetime journey. But together, we can make your life better.

Discover your authentic self

Kickstart your path to self-discovery and self-awareness. Our coaches can guide you to better understand yourself and your potential.

Allaya Cooks-Campbell

With over 15 years of content experience, Allaya Cooks Campbell has written for outlets such as ScaryMommy, HRzone, and HuffPost. She holds a B.A. in Psychology and is a certified yoga instructor as well as a certified Integrative Wellness & Life Coach. Allaya is passionate about whole-person wellness, yoga, and mental health.

The benefits of knowing yourself: Why you should become your own best friend

Self-knowledge examples that will help you upgrade to you 2.0, how to reset your life in 10 ways, tune in to the self discovery channel with 10 tips for finding yourself, reinventing yourself: 10 ways to realize your full potential, 10 self-discovery techniques to help you find yourself, life purpose: the inspiration you need to find your drive, 15 questions to discover your life purpose and drive meaning, use the wheel of life® tool to achieve better balance, similar articles, the subtle, but important, difference between confidence and arrogance, how self-compassion and motivation will help achieve your goals, how to walk the freeing path of believing in yourself, what is self-awareness and how to develop it, self-awareness in leadership: how it will make you a better boss, 17 self-awareness activities for exploring yourself, what are metacognitive skills examples in everyday life, stay connected with betterup, get our newsletter, event invites, plus product insights and research..

3100 E 5th Street, Suite 350 Austin, TX 78702

• Platform Overview
• Integrations
• Powered by AI
• BetterUp Lead™
• BetterUp Manage™
• BetterUp Care®
• Sales Performance
• Diversity & Inclusion
• Case Studies
• Why BetterUp?
• About Coaching
• Find your Coach
• Career Coaching
• Communication Coaching
• Life Coaching
• News and Press
• Leadership Team
• Become a BetterUp Coach
• BetterUp Labs
• Center for Purpose & Performance
• Leadership Training
• Business Coaching
• Contact Support
• Contact Sales
• Privacy Policy
• Acceptable Use Policy
• Trust & Security
• Cookie Preferences

Know Then Thyself By Alexander Pope Summary and Questions and Answers

Table of Contents

Alexander Pope (1688-1744)

Alexander Pope (1688-1744) is considered to be the most outstanding literary figure of the 18th century (neo-classical age). He was born to catholic parents in London. On account of his religion, he was an outsider in the protestant dominated society and was barred from seeking admission to public schools and universities. He was largely self-educated as he said ‘he had dipped into a great number of English, French, Italian, Latin and Greek poets’. He was largely influenced by Roman poets.

As a poet, he was an intellectual personality. He wrote in the chaste and flawless language. He aimed to achieve absolute correctness. He brought the heroic couplet to perfection dealing with social and intellectual themes; his poetry exposed the social hypocrisies and vanities of his contemporaries. His important works are Pastorates, The Rape of the Lock, An Essay on Man, Imitation of Horace etc.

Please enable JavaScript

The poem ‘Know Then Thyself’ is an extract taken from An Essay on Man: Epistle II. This long poem ‘An Essay on Man’ has four Epistles. It is considered to be a sublime work of poetry. This extract ‘Know Then Thyself’ argues that human beings should learn to look at themselves and try to learn about their own nature, power, limitations, and weakness. It is a plea to look inward to gather knowledge about oneself. It is in fact a scientific inquiry propagated by enlightenment.

• Thyself –Yourself

• Deem -Consider in a specific way

• Alike –Similar

Presume – to be arrogant to examine closely; Scan – to examine closely; Isthmus – a narrow strip of land with water on either side; Darkly wis e – foolishly wise; Rudely great – great and yet mean; Stoic – a person who is not disturbed by pain or not excited by joy; Hangs between – neither a god nor a beast; in doubt – not sure; Doubt …. prefer – pulled apart by rival forces of the body and the mind; Born … die – once he is born, he can not escape death; Reasoning – able to think logically; alike – same (remaining equally ignorant); Chaos – completely confused; Abused – deceived, misled; Disabused – self enlightened; Half to rise – to succeed partially; Great Lord – the crown of creation; Sole – man is the only being gifted with powers to know the truth from untruth; Glory – crown; Jest – laughing stock; Riddle – puzzle.

Summary of the Poem

‘Know Then Thyself’ is a poem written by Alexander Pope, the famous poet of the eighteenth century. He was a famous satirist of his time. He wrote a number of philosophical poems also. The present selection is an extract from the Second Epistle of Pope’s long argumentative poem, ‘An Essay on Man’. It is commonly believed to have derived its underlying idea from Lord Boling broke, to whom it is dedicated. Written in four Epistles, The Essay tries to ‘vindicate the ways of God to man’, based on the doctrine that whatever is, is right.

Explain with Reference to the Context:

Known then thyself …………………………. The stoic’s prid e

Reference to Context:-

These lines quoted above have been taken from the well-known poem ‘Know Then Thyself’ written by Alexander Pope. In this poem, the poet says that man is a strange combination of opposite qualities. He advises man to study himself. Man’s disability prevents him from taking any single direction: one aspect of his nature cancels out another

Explanation:-

In these lines, the poet advises man that he should not try to study God. He advises man to limit himself only to the study of his own nature and existence and not try to investigate the power of judging the schemes of universe propounded by God. If he wants to study mankind, he should study himself. Man is a very complex creature and occupies a paradoxical position in this world. Man is a link between God and animal. Pope relates man on the muddled ‘middle state’, which on the one hand endows him with godlike qualities and on the other, levels him down with the animals. Man is a mixture of contrary qualities. He is ignorant as well as wise. He is rude and great he has so much knowledge that he cannot be a sceptic. He has so much weakness that he cannot be indifferent to pain and sufferings. Man is like a ‘Trishanku,’ dangling between heavenly aspirations and earthly existence. Thus these lines sum up the living contradiction of man’s nature.

He hangs between ………………….. or too much

These lines have been taken from Pope’s poem ‘Know Then Thyself’. The poet says that man is a very complex creature and is a paradox of the world. He is a combination of opposite qualities. He occupies the middle position between God and animal.

Explanation :-

In this stanza, the poet says that man is a strange creature full of contrary qualities and feelings of wisdom and folly, greatness and pettiness, reason and passion, love and hate. He always remains in doubt. He cannot decide whether to work hard in life or to be satisfied with his present position. Man is forever caught in the conflicting claims of body and soul. He fails to decide whether he should prefer the physical pleasure of the intellectual things of life. He is born to die. Man has the gift of reason, even then the commits mistakes. Either a man thinks too little or too much, he cannot overcomes his ignorance. In other words, Pope sums up the paradoxical nature of man by pointing out that his birth is nothing but the beginning of his end and reasoning nothing but an instrument of erring.

Chasos of thought ……………………….riddle of the worlds.

These lines have been taken from Alexander Pope’s well-known poem ‘Know Then Thyself’. The poet tells us about the middle position of man in the world. Man is a combination of contrary qualities. He often remains confused and fails to decide between different courses of action. Man’s disability prevents him from taking any single direction: one aspect of his nature cancels out another

In this stanza, the Pope says that man is a complex mixture of thoughts and feelings. The poet further expands the idea of man shuttled and torn between opposites. He is always being self-deceived or undeceived. In simple words, he can realise what is good or bad for him. He is the master of the universe because he is blessed with the power of reason by God. But even then he becomes a victim of all things around him. He is the only judge of truth, yet he makes countless mistakes. He is the glory of the world because God has given him the gift of knowledge and wisdom. But at the same time, he is also a jest of the world as he commits many mistakes in his life. He is a riddle also as he does not know whether he belongs to the category of angels or to the animals.

Important devices

• Use of rhyming couplets (2 lines rhyming together)

• The poet is particularly skilled at pulling his ideas into epigrams

‘the glory, jest and riddle of the world’

• Use of repetition/ alliteration

Endless – errors

Sceptic- side

• Use of paradox darkly wise and rudely great

• All these devices helped the poet reiterate his point of view.

Questions -Answer (Essay Type)

Q.1. Sum up in your own words Pope’s conception of man.

Ans.: In this poem ‘Know Then Thyself’, Alexander Pope sums up man’s position in this world. Man is the supreme creature in the world. God has made him such a way that he can rise and be equal to the gods. But this seldom happens. There are number of limitations on man’s knowledge and capabilities. According to pope man has placed himself in the middle state, which on the one hand endows him with godlike qualities and on the other levels him down with the animals. He wants to develop a stoic attitude to pain and suffering but then there are so many weaknesses in him that he fails to be a stoic. He always remains in doubt and cannot decide what to choose. In his doubts, he can not decide whether to do work or take some rest. He fails to understand his position in this world. He cannot decide whether he is a god or is a beast. He thinks that he is the master of this universe but falls victim to everything. Thus there are a number of limitations on man.

Q.2. Where, according to Pope, does the root of man’s confusion lie?

Ans.: Pope says that man is a strange creature full of contrary qualities and feelings of wisdom and folly, greatness and pettiness, reason and passion, love and hate. He is a bundle of contradictions. His life is paradoxical. He is wise as well an ignorant. He is great as well as rude. He is too wise to be a sceptic. He is at the some time so weak that he cannot be a stoic. He stands halfway between being a God and being an animal. He fails to decide whether he should consider himself a God or a beast. Man is forever caught in the conflicting claims of body and soul. He cannot decide whether he should prefer his body or his mind. He is always found in his doubts. In his doubts, he fails to make proper decision whether he should lead a life of rest or a life of action. He considers himself the only judge of truth. But he commits countless errors. He thinks that he is the master of everything. Pope says that his birth is nothing but the beginning of his end and his reasoning nothing but on instrument of earning. His reasoning power also leads him to error. In this way man is like a ‘Trishanku’, dangling between heavenly aspirations and earthly existence. Man always suffers from a number of contradictions.

Questions -Answer (Short Type)

Q.1. Explain the meaning of the first two lines of the poem ‘Know Then Thyself’.

Ans.: In the first two lines, the poet advises man to study himself. He says that man should be limited only to the study of his own nature and existence and should forget about the power of judging the scheme of universe propounded by God. Man should not try to investigate the ways of God. That is beyond his powers. It is proper for man to study himself and know himself because man himself is too difficult to understand.

Q.2. What does paradox mean? Give examples from the poem.

Ans.: A paradox is a self-contradictory statement, which seems on its face to be absurd, yet turns out to have a valid meaning. Pope in this poem ‘Know Then Thyself’ uses a number of paradoxes for examples he calls man “darkly wise”. Secondly, he says that man is “lord of all things, yet a prey to all”.

Q.3. What do you think pope means by the following phrases:-

a) ‘hangs between’

b) ‘chaos of thought and Passion’

c) ‘ a prey to all’

Ans. a) ‘hangs between ‘:- Pope says that man is a confused being. He is always found in the state of doubt whether to lead a life of rest or a life or action. So he hangs between.

b) ‘Chaos of thought and Passion’: – In man’s mind there is a complex mixture of thoughts and feelings. He fails to decide whether of follow mind or heart.

c) ‘a prey to all’:- Man is a victim of everything in this world.

Q.4. Find out Pope’s use of proverbial expression in the poem.

Ans.: Pope is considered the master of proverbial use of language. He has given many famous proverbs or sayings such as

“ A little learning is a dangerous thing” “For Foals rush in where angels fear to tread? “To err human, to forgive divine” .

In this poem also, Pope uses a number of proverbial expressions. ‘Know Then Thyself’ is a proverb which advises man to recognize his true self. Then the poet says, ‘The proper study of mankind is man”. The last line of the poem is also proverbial. The poet says that man is “The glory, jest and riddle of the world”.

Extra Questions

Answer the following questions in a word/ phrase/ sentence

Q. What should man not presume to scan? A. The ways of God.

Q. Who is the glory, jest and riddle of the world? A. Man

Q. What according to the poet is the proper study of mankind? A. The study of man

Q. What doubt does man hang between? A. Whether to act or rest

Answer the following question in 20-30 words

Q. Explain ‘the glory, jest and the riddle of the world’? A. Man is the sole judge of truth on this earth. Yet, his own life is a history of endless errors. Sometimes he performs deeds worthy of pride. Thus man is a glory, a jest and riddle of the world.

Q. How is man a confused being? A. Man is a confused being because he does not know what or who is he. He has knowledge but is ignorant of many things. Thus he remains a confused being

Q. What is a paradox? Find the two instances of paradox? A. A paradox is a statement that contains two opposite ideas. For example, Pope calls man darkly wise and rudely great. Thus man, according to him, is a paradox.

1 thought on “Know Then Thyself By Alexander Pope Summary and Questions and Answers”

• Pingback: Know Then thyself By Alexander Pope - Summary and Paraphrase - Smart eNotes

Have something to say Cancel reply

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed .

Discover more from Smart English Notes

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Type your email…

Continue reading

• Privacy Policy
• Terms and Conditions

Know Then thyself By Alexander Pope – Summary and Paraphrase

Published by sirafzal72 on december 14, 2020 december 14, 2020, about the poet.

Alexander Pope (1688-1744) was born to prosperous London linen-merchant.

Since Pope’s father converted to Roman Catholicism, Pope was not allowed to be taught by Catholic priests.

Being a voracious, avid reader, Pope studied the works of Latin, English, French and Italian poets.

Pope was a versatile genius. He tried his hand at pastorals, didactic & elegiac poetry and satire.

About The Poem

The poem is an extract from – An Essay on Man.

An Essay on Man is the second epistle, a long argumentative poem.

The first epistle deals with man in relation to the universe and the second epistle shows a man with respect to himself as an individual, the third man in relation to society and the fourth man in relation to God.

The poet argues and justifies the ways of God to man. He maintains that man must not indulge in finding faults with God or his schemes. He advises man to limit himself to a study of his own nature.

“ Know then ……….. The stoic’s pride”

The poet advises man not to indulge in the vain pursuit of examining and judging God’s ways. He says that a study of man’s own self is the proper study for man. Man according to the poet stands on the isthmus of divinity and bestiality.

Man is a strange mixture of wisdom and folly, greatness and pettiness. Though he has the wisdom to be truly great he seldom exhibits that.

“He hangs ……….… too much”

He oscillates between a state of doubt to act or a state of staying at rest, thus he always remains caught in a conflict.

Due to his paradoxical nature, man fails to understand whether he should think himself a god or a beast.

Man’s birth is nothing but the beginning of his end.

He reasons only to stand deceived.

“Chaos …………….. World.”

Pulled in opposite directions by his intellect and heart, man remains confused.

He becomes his own friend and his own enemy depending on whether he acts wisely or unwisely.

It is a man who attains victory and it is he only who fails.

He is a great Lord of things as he has mastered material things, yet he is vulnerable to fall prey to these things.

Being the sole judge of truth, he tends to commit errors.

The conflicting pulls of man’s powers and frailties make him a laughing stock and he remains a riddle of the world.

Summary and Questions

Leave a reply cancel reply.

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.

Related Posts

Examining the chilling invitation of dickinson’s “because i could not stop for death”.

Examining the Chilling Invitation of Dickinson’s “Because I Could Not Stop for Death” Introduction to a Thought-Provoking PoemEmily Dickinson’s celebrated poem “Because I Could Not Stop for Death” uses the metaphor of a carriage ride Read more…

Bob Dylan’s 30 Most Beautiful Songs of All Time

Bob Dylan’s 30 Most Beautiful Songs of All Time Introduction: Bob Dylan, a musical icon and legendary singer-songwriter, has left an indelible mark on the music industry. With his poetic lyricism and soul-stirring melodies, Dylan Read more…

To the Cuckoo by William Wordsworth – Summary and Questions and Answers

To the Cuckoo by William Wordsworth William Wordsworth’s poem “To the Cuckoo” is a eulogy for the bird. The poet is resting on the grass, immersed in nature when he hears the Cuckoo’s song. Wordsworth Read more…

Sanjeev Niraula

• [email protected]

Know Thyself Class 12 English Unit 1

Here is the solution of the exercises of Know Thyself, class 12 English, unit 1 with the complete explanation.

Exercise 

Working with words .

A. Find the words from the text that match with the following meanings. 

Different Thinkings

B. Consult your teacher and define the following thinking skills. 

a. Convergent thinking

Convergent thinking is the process of finding the single best solution to a problem. In convergent thinking, we analyze the multiple solutions to the problem but finally pick only one solution based on logical reasoning as one answer can be 100% correct. Convergent thinking examples include multiple-choice tests, spelling tests, math quizzes, and standardized tests,

b. Divergent thinking 

Divergent thinking is the process of finding many possible solutions to a problem Unlike convergent thinking, we don’t stick to a solution in divergent thinking but consider many options. Whenever we use divergent thinking, we search for options instead of just choosing among predetermined options. Convergent thinking relies heavily on logic and less on creativity, while divergent thinking emphasizes creativity. Divergent thinking works best in problems that are open-ended and allow for creativity.

c. Critical thinking 

Critical thinking is the process in which knowledge based on observation, experience, contemplation, reasoning, or communication is actively and skilfully conceptualized, applied, analyzed, summarized, or evaluated. Critical thinking refers to the ability to analyze information and make reasoned judgments. It involves the evaluation of sources, such as data, facts, observable phenomena, and research findings.

d. Creative thinking 

Creative thinking is the process of looking at things in a new way and from various perspectives. Creative thinking means thinking outside the box; Creative thinking is the ability to consider something in a new way. It is an innovative style of thinking that leads to unexpected findings and fresh ways of doing things.

Comprehension: Know Thyself 

Answer the following questions. 

a. Who was Jack? How did he make children laugh? 

Jack was the classmate of the narrator. He was friendly and funny. He made children laugh by cracking jokes.

b. Why are “Sharks” important to Reid? 

Sharks are important to Reid because they help to keep the ocean clean by eating dead things in the ocean.

c. What does Mr. Browne think about the most important thing? 

Mr. Browne thinks that the most important thing is to know who we are.

d. What is that has not been noticed by the student? 

The plaque with the writing ‘Know Thyself’ outside the classroom on the wall is the thing that has not been noticed by the students

e. How did Jack make fun of the English class? 

When the teacher said that the students were in the English class to know who they were, Jack remarked that he was in the class to learn English which made the students laugh. In this way, he made fun of the English class.

f. What were the students going to do at the end of the month? 

Students were going to submit the essay at the end of the month on the precepts as discussed by the teacher at the beginning of the month.

g. What particular act of students surprised a girl student? 

Students’ act of writing precepts on postcards and mailing them to the teacher during the summer surprised a girl student.

Suggested Reading

Question Tag, Grammar, Unit 1, English Class 12

YouTube Video