responsible person essay

Essays About Responsibility: Top 12 Examples and Prompts

We can’t take on the challenge of life without responsibility; If you are writing essays about responsibility, discover our guide below.

The word responsibility describes the state of being accountable for our actions and is one of the main elements that make us human. We are not born with it; instead, it is something to be exercised and improved on over time.

It has often been said that with power or freedom comes responsibility, which could not be more truthful. Each of us is gifted with the ability to make choices, and we are considered superior to all other living things on this planet. However, we have to make informed choices and be responsible for our actions, whether to ourselves, the people around us, and our environment.

5 Top Essay Examples

1. the value of responsibility by simon baker, 2. freedom is not the lack of constraint, but the exercise of responsibility by beulah west, 3. why responsibility is so important by steve rose.

• 4.  The Beneifts of Being Responsible by Frank Terzo
• 5. ​​What It’s like to Feel Responsible for Everything by Duncan Riach

1. The Importance of Responsibility

2. dealing with false responsibility, 3. freedom and responsibility, 4. what is social responsibility, 5. what are your responsibilities, 6. responsibility as a component of success, 7. a time you acted responsibly.

“It’s easy for us to become blinkered or out-of-touch when we’re constantly working with our heads down. Although meeting our commitments is hugely important we bear another responsibility, that is to invest in ourselves and in each other. When we can free our imagination and refresh our minds, we restore perspective and reduce stress. We find time and space to explore new ways to collaborate, be creative and enjoy ourselves to the benefit of our mission.”

Baker writes about why he thinks responsibility is important and discusses factors related to responsibility, namely trust, personal choice, and freedom. A feeling of trust allows you to be more comfortable accepting responsibility, while responsibility allows us to maximize personal choice and freedom. Most importantly, bearing responsibility means freeing our minds, enjoying life, and coming up with great ideas. 

“A lack of constraint means that you can not do everything that you want. In a perfect world this would be fine, but we don’t live in a perfect world. However everyone’s view of a perfect world is different, if this coincides with the law and you are happy, then you can be free still living under laws and legislations. If you believe that freedom is making your own choices then the only way that we can be “free” is if society does not exist.”

West discusses how just as personal freedom is vital to a healthy society, so is accountability for our actions. Freedom also has a negative side; it can be described as a lack of constraint in our choices. Without constraint, our actions may hurt others or even ourselves. Therefore, it must come with the responsibility to make these choices from a more thoughtful, educated perspective. 

You might also be interested in our list of essays about effective leadership . You can also check out these articles and essays about attitude .

“Taking responsibility creates long term resilience and a sense of purpose. This sense of purpose can be fostered by taking responsibility for one’s self by engaging in self-care. Responsibility can also be developed on a familial and societal level, offering a sense of purpose proportional to your ability to contribute your unique abilities.”

Rose explores the importance of being responsible for one’s health. It gives us a sense of purpose and helps us build resilience; however, we must first be responsible for ourselves by practicing self-care. This includes resting, exercising, taking breaks, and going to the doctor if something is bothering us. This makes us more responsible for the people around us, allowing us to perform different societal roles. You might be inspired by these essays about success and essays about overcoming challenges .

4.   The Beneifts of Being Responsible by Frank Terzo

“If we take care of our commitments, even if it something we might like to ignore, we feel better about ourselves. Each step we take towards being responsible and productive helps to raise our self-esteem and our relationships with friends, family and co-workers improve ten-fold. Being responsible pays big dividends – we have much less stress and chaos in our lives and we gain the respect of others.”

In this short essay, Terzo provides insight into the many benefits responsibility can provide you with. We must always be responsible, even if we might not feel like it, because it can improve our productivity, self-esteem, relationships with others, and overall peace. Though it might not always be easy, responsibility is key to achieving a happy life. 

5. ​​ What It’s like to Feel Responsible for Everything by Duncan Riach

“I hold responsibility when others are not taking responsibility. I was holding all of the responsibility, guilt, and shame that Billy McFarland was disowning. It’s a survival mechanism that I developed when I was a child. I had a step-father who was some form of psychopath or malignant narcissist, a person who was completely out of control and completely irresponsible. The only way that I could feel safe in that environment was to try to hold the responsibility myself.”

Riach reflects on a habit by which he constantly felt responsible for things out of his control, things as minor as events he saw on television. He developed this habit due to his upbringing- his childhood and family life were less than ideal. He is fully aware of his problem but still struggles with it. His case is an excellent example of false responsibility. 

6 Writing Prompts on Essays About Responsibility

Responsibility is, without a doubt, essential, but how important is it really? Reflect on the meaning of responsibility and explain its importance. Discuss this from a practical and personal standpoint; combine personal experience and research as the basis for your points. 

False responsibility is an attitude by which one feels responsible for things they are not. This is a widespread issue that encompasses everyone, from humble workers to some of the most influential people in the world. For your essay, research this phenomenon, then define it and explain why it occurs. Give suggestions on how one can identify false responsibility and work to stop feeling that way. 

The topics of freedom and personal responsibility are deeply intertwined; for freedom to work correctly, there must be a certain level of responsibility instilled in people so society can function correctly. In your essay, discuss these two concepts and their connection. Do proper research on this topic, then conclude this issue: are we responsible enough to be given total freedom? You may also link this to topics such as the law and regulations. You might be inspired by these essays about goals .

Social Responsibility seems straightforward and self-defining, but it is broad, especially with society putting a higher value on awareness, community, and social justice. Research this term and its history and discuss it in your essay; define and explain it, then describe what it means. 

Whether in your studies or at work, as a family member, friend, or even a member of society, we have a unique set of responsibilities that vary depending on the person. Reflect on the different roles you play in life and decide what your responsibilities are. Briefly describe each one and explain how you fulfill these responsibilities. You can also check out these essays about conflict .

This value is important because it is present in all successful individuals. Based on your opinions and research, discuss the relationship between responsibility, success, and some other factors or traits that influence success. Give examples of successful people who have shown responsibility, such as government officials, celebrities, and business leaders. 

When we are responsible, we are pretty proud of ourselves most of the time. Think of an experience you are most proud of in which you acted responsibly. Retell the story, reflect on how you felt, and explain why it is important- be as detailed as possible. Or, you may opt to do the opposite, telling the story of a time you did not show responsibility and thinking of what you would do if given a chance to repeat it. 

Grammarly is one of our top grammar checkers. Find out why in this Grammarly review . Tip: If writing an essay sounds like a lot of work, simplify it. Write a simple 5 paragraph essay instead.

Martin is an avid writer specializing in editing and proofreading. He also enjoys literary analysis and writing about food and travel.

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Are You a Responsible Person?

The factors that play a role in these interpretations and our behavior..

Posted January 6, 2020

Sharon and Nicole were on their way to their cousin’s wedding when they stopped at a red light and saw a driver make an illegal left turn, hitting an oncoming vehicle. It was dark and from what they could tell, Sharon, Nicole, and the two male drivers were the only people in the area. The two other drivers seemed uninjured when they approached each other and engaged in an apparently animated discussion. Sharon wondered whether they should wait for the police to arrive or at least give the drivers their contact information. Nicole said no. She was concerned because they were in a dangerous part of town, she didn’t want to get involved, and she didn’t want to be late for the wedding.

The above scenario can serve as an illustration of whether Sharon and Nicole acted responsibly. Although there is no legal obligation to remain at the scene of a traffic accident and get involved, they could have assisted as witnesses. By not coming forward to those involved in the accident, were they acting irresponsibly?

Individuals who choose to belong to a group acknowledge their dependence on each other. This dependence relies on interconnectedness where the group members accept responsibility in meeting the needs and wants of the others in the group. According to Williams (2008), this form of social responsibility requires “mutual accountability,” wherein an individual not only holds others responsible for what they do, but the individual also understands that he or she will be held accountable for his or her actions and their consequences.

Being responsible is often viewed as a virtue and characterized as a person who is reliable, conscientious , trustworthy, and meets moral obligations. Yet, defining what responsible behavior is may not always be straightforward. There are several factors that can influence an individual’s behavior and thus his or her accountability. These include characteristics of the individual and the group, such as:

• Ability to act
• Individual’s role in the group
• Form of government
• Mores of the group
• Sense of belonging

Living among others is a way in which we can be exposed to acting responsibly. We see how the group interprets irresponsible behavior; however, we may also develop an internal sense of who we are and our values that may differ from that of the group. Consequently, one of the biggest dilemmas regarding “responsible behavior” is in its interpretation. Who determines this—the individual or the group? The ambiguity is intentional so as to force conclusions based on the actor’s reasoning as to what to do as well as that of the group’s assessment. Determining accountability may be biased (such as the actor engaging in self- punishment derived from feeling undue remorse for her actions). Accountability may be assigned to accomplish a certain motive (e.g., the need to find a scapegoat). It may also be affected by characteristics of the evaluator(s); such as being reluctant to cast aspersions or blame or having exceptionally high standards. Moreover, the interpretation of “responsible behavior” can change over time. Therefore, judgments made by the actor or others in the group regarding what to do are fluid, which in turn impacts accountability.

The purpose of determining the accountability of responsibility is to reduce irresponsible behavior. When the group informs the actor of what she or he did that was wrong and why, the intent is to educate and change the actor’s behavior. It can also serve as a lesson to others in the group. The assignment of blame and punishment can have rehabilitative effects; however, this is not universally true. The type of remediation used is critical if it is to be effective for the actor as well as serve as a model to others. The actor’s characteristics may also play a role in effecting change; if the actor does not believe a wrong was committed despite education and punishment, assigning blameworthiness will have little impact. It is also important that the punishment be proportionate to the irresponsible behavior.

The aim of people acknowledging their irresponsible behavior and making changes is that they admit to the act they committed and the effect it had on others. Although it may be understandable for excuses to be made or for one to highlight mitigating factors, doing so is not accepting responsibility for the outcome regardless of one’s intentions (Williams, 2003). Moreover, being a member of a group and its demands regarding the dependence its members have for each other over their own self-interests emphasizes how important it is to act responsibly.

The murder of Kitty Genovese may serve as a case illustration prompting “responsible behavior.” In 1964, Ms. Genovese, 28, was raped and stabbed in New York. The case drew national headlines and a myriad of commentaries. It was reported that more than 30 people were aware of her assault, but no one chose to get involved (e.g., offer her aid, call the police). This led many people to criticize the witnesses as being callous and apathetic. It also spawned a number of psychological experiments that were identified as studying the “ bystander effect ” (i.e., if others are present, the likelihood that one will respond is decreased due to the belief that the others will likely offer aid. Interestingly, however, a meta-analytic review published in 2011 found that “when the bystanders are faced with real emergencies…additional bystanders can lead to more, rather than less, helping.” (Fisher et al., 2011, p. 534).

It is important to note that in 2016, a documentary about the investigation of Ms. Genovese’s death conducted by her brother revealed that some of the witnesses that night did act—calling the police, running out to help her. Whatever judgments the witnesses made about how they should respond was clearly an impetus for society to re-examine “responsible behavior.” It also led to the establishment of the “911 system” (Abate, 2017; Kurson, 2017).

People encountering situations that provoke “responsible behavior” will have to decide whether to act or not and if they decide to act, what should they do? Whatever they decide, they may be held to answer, either by others and/or by their internal moral compass, for the consequences of their decision.

Abate, C. (2017, January 19). History of 911: America’s emergency service, before and after Kitty Genovese. Politics & Government. Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/blog/history-of-911-americas-emergen…

Fischer, P., Krueger, J. I., Greitemeyer, T., Vogrincic, C., Kastenmuller, A., Frey, D., … Kainbacher, M. (2011). The bystander-effect: A meta-analytic review on bystander intervention in dangerous and non-dangerous emergencies. Psychological Bulletin, 13, 517-537. DOI: 10.1037/a0023304

Kurson, H. (2017, January 5). The Kitty Genovese story was the prototype for fake news. New York Observer . Retrieved from https://observer.com/2017/01/the-kitty-genovese-story-was-the-prototype…

Williams, G. (2003). Blame and responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 6, 427–445.

Williams, G. (2008). Responsibility as a virtue. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 11, 455–470. DOI 10.1007/s10677-008-9109-7

Shoba Sreenivasan, Ph.D., and Linda E. Weinberger, Ph.D. , are psychology professors at the Keck School of Medicine at USC.

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100+ Characteristics and Traits of a Responsible Person

The ProWritingAid Team

Table of Contents

Possible causes of being responsible, attitudes related to being responsible, thoughts and struggles linked with being responsible, emotions associated with being responsible, facial expressions linked to being responsible, body language associated with being responsible, behaviors linked to being responsible, growth and evolution of responsible characters, stereotypes of responsible characters to avoid, negatives of being responsible, positives of being responsible, verbal expressions of responsible characters, relationships of responsible characters, examples from books of characters who are responsible, writing exercises for writing responsible characters.

To engage your reader, it's important to always show, not tell, the traits of your characters.

The character trait responsible refers to the ability of a person to be accountable for their actions and decisions, to follow through with their commitments, and to take ownership of their mistakes. A responsible person is reliable, dependable, and trustworthy, and they understand the importance of meeting their obligations and living up to their promises. They are proactive in identifying and addressing problems, and they take steps to ensure that they do not cause harm or inconvenience to others. In short, a responsible character is one who demonstrates a high level of maturity, integrity, and self-discipline.

You might want to weave these into your character's backstory to build a more believable character:

Being assigned early on with important tasks or roles that required reliable behavior

Experiencing negative consequences from not being responsible in the past, leading to a desire to avoid repeating those mistakes

Being praised or rewarded for responsible behavior in the past, reinforcing the belief that being responsible is a desirable trait

Having a natural inclination toward structure, order, and planning, which often goes hand in hand with a responsible attitude

Growing up in an environment where responsibility was highly valued and modeled by parents or caregivers

You may be able to show responsibility through your character's attitudes:

Demonstrating self-discipline and self-control

Being honest and transparent

Taking ownership of one's mistakes and correcting them

Prioritizing obligations and commitments

Being reliable and dependable

Showing respect for rules, laws, and authority

Being proactive and taking initiative

Being accountable for one's actions and decisions

Planning and organizing tasks effectively

Here are some ideas for things your responsible character may think or struggle with:

A need for control and order in their life and surroundings

A fear of letting others down or disappointing them

A tendency to put others' needs before their own, sometimes to the point of self-neglect

A tendency to take on too much responsibility and become overwhelmed

A desire to always do the right thing, even if it's difficult or unpopular

Difficulty delegating tasks to others and trusting them to do a good job

A strong work ethic and dedication to achieving their goals

A sense of duty and obligation toward others

Guilt and self-criticism when they make mistakes or fall short of their own expectations

Here are some ideas for emotions your responsible character may experience:

Trustworthiness

Self-discipline

Follow-through

Organizational skills

Dependability

Conscientiousness

Accountability

Reliability

Time management

Here are some facial expressions your responsible character may exhibit:

A firm and steady gaze

A mature and disciplined countenance

A calm and composed expression

A serious and determined face

A confident and self-assured demeanor

A sincere and focused smile

A thoughtful and attentive look

A reliable and trustworthy appearance

A straight and upright posture

Here is some body language your responsible character may exhibit:

Avoiding fidgeting or nervous habits

Standing up straight with shoulders back

Maintaining eye contact

Taking ownership of mistakes and apologizing when necessary

Keeping a calm and composed demeanor

Speaking clearly and confidently

Using open and expressive hand gestures

Nodding in agreement

Leaning forward to show interest

Here are some behaviors your responsible character may exhibit:

Being proactive in finding solutions to problems

Taking care of one's own needs and responsibilities

Being reliable and punctual

Admitting mistakes and taking ownership of them

Planning ahead and being prepared for potential problems

Prioritizing important tasks and fulfilling obligations

Communicating effectively and honestly with others

Following through on commitments and promises

Being accountable for one's actions and their consequences

Here are some ways that your responsible character may grow and evolve over time:

Develop better communication skills to effectively delegate and collaborate with others

Take initiative to solve problems and make positive changes in their environment

Take ownership of their mistakes and work to rectify them

Take on new responsibilities outside of their comfort zone, pushing themselves to grow

Become a mentor or role model to others, passing on responsible behavior

Learn to delegate tasks and trust others to take on responsibilities

Learn to prioritize responsibilities and make tough decisions when necessary

Learn to overcome the fear of failure and take calculated risks

Develop better time-management skills to balance responsibilities and personal life

Try to avoid writing stereotypical responsible characters like these examples:

Being a pushover or lacking assertiveness

Being overly cautious or hesitant to make decisions

Perfectionism to the point of being unrealistic or unattainable

Boring or dull personalities

Being overly serious or judgmental

Inability to take risks or try new things

Lack of spontaneity or flexibility

Here are some potential negatives of being responsible. Note: These are subjective, and some might also be seen as positives depending on the context.

Feeling overwhelmed by the weight of responsibility

Difficulty delegating tasks and trusting others

Taking on too much responsibility and neglecting self-care

Being viewed as uptight or inflexible

Feeling guilty or anxious when things don't go according to plan

Here are some potential positives of being responsible. Note: These are subjective, and some might also be seen as negatives depending on the context.

It encourages problem-solving and critical thinking skills.

It builds trust and respect in personal and professional relationships.

Responsibility encourages self-discipline and self-reliance.

Responsibility promotes a sense of purpose and accomplishment.

Being responsible means being accountable for your actions and decisions.

Being responsible can improve decision-making abilities.

It leads to better time-management and organization skills.

Responsibility promotes a positive reputation and can lead to future opportunities.

It helps to prioritize tasks and goals effectively.

Here are some potential expressions used by responsible characters:

"I will fulfill my commitments."

"I will own up to my mistakes."

"I will be organized and prepared."

"I am accountable for my actions."

"I will follow through on my promises."

"I will be reliable and trustworthy."

"I will prioritize my duties and responsibilities."

"I will take care of it."

"I will be proactive in addressing issues."

Here are some ways that being responsible could affect your character's relationships:

Responsible people tend to be reliable and dependable, so they often form strong bonds with those who appreciate these qualities.

Responsible people may struggle with delegating tasks or trusting others to handle important responsibilities, which can lead to tension in some relationships.

They may take on leadership roles or responsibilities within their relationships, providing guidance and support to others.

They may have a tendency to be overly critical of themselves and others, which can cause strain in their relationships if not managed properly.

Responsible people often prioritize their commitments and may need to set boundaries to maintain balance in their relationships.

Frodo Baggins from The Lord of the Rings by J.R.R. Tolkien

Elizabeth Bennet from Pride and Prejudice by Jane Austen

Katniss Everdeen from The Hunger Games trilogy by Suzanne Collins

Atticus Finch from To Kill a Mockingbird by Harper Lee

Jane Eyre from Jane Eyre by Charlotte Bront ë

Samwise Gamgee from The Lord of the Rings by J.R.R. Tolkien

Jean Valjean from Les Misérables by Victor Hugo

Mr. Stevens from The Remains of the Day by Kazuo Ishiguro

Hermione Granger from the Harry Potter series by J.K. Rowling

Here are some writing exercises you might try for learning to write responsible characters:

Write a scene where your character takes responsibility for a mistake they made and tries to make amends.

Write a scene where your character takes charge of a situation and makes responsible decisions.

Write a scene where your character helps someone in need, even if it's not their responsibility to do so.

Create a scene where your character is put in a position of authority and handles it with responsibility and grace.

Have your character make a plan or set goals that reflect their responsibility and determination to achieve them.

Create a list of values that your responsible character lives by, and have them reference these values throughout the story.

Create a backstory for your character that explains how they learned to be responsible.

Write a scene where your character is faced with a moral dilemma and chooses the responsible course of action, even if it's difficult.

Write a scene where your character teaches someone else the importance of being responsible.

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Taking Responsibility: 3 Simple Tips to Take Control and be more Responsible

A useful guide to responsibility: What it is, what does it mean to be a responsible person, how does it benefits us, how I can be a more responsible person. Discover the difference between responsibility and guilt, and everything you need to know about social responsibility.

What do we mean by responsibility? If you stop to think, this concept, surely, has been hovering over our heads since we’re kids. Almost from the moment, you get to decide whether to follow the rules and obey or “challenge authority” (mom and dad) we have heard the words “You have to be responsible”.

If you ask a child what it means to be responsible, he or she will say something like “do the right thing”, “do what Mom and Dad say,” or “do my homework”. Adults use the term responsibility to make children understand and assume that they must behave well and do the tasks adults request of them.

Do you think the term responsibility involves more than just obligations? What comes to your mind when you think of responsibility?

What does it mean to be responsible?

If we look at the etymological origin, the meaning of responsibility is not so much related to the tasks performed or the obligations, but rather with commitment involved.

Becoming a responsible person means being able to consciously make decisions, conduct behaviors that seek to improve oneself and/or help others. Most importantly, a responsible person accepts the consequences of his or her own actions and decisions.

The word responsibility comes from the Latin “responsum” (the one who is forced to answer to someone else). The verbs “Respondere and Spondere” are closely related and were widely used in the legal field. The first meant defending or justifying a fact in a trial and the second meant swearing, promising or assuming an obligation.

Therefore, we can define a responsible person as one who accepts the results of the decisions he or she makes. Oxford dictionary defines responsibility as:”The state or fact of being accountable or to blame for something.

This definition of responsibility emphasizes the need for the person to comply with the negative consequences of his or her actions.

From what we can see, it is a term that has different evaluations and can be quite abstract, but we use it regularly in our daily lives.

Why is it important to be responsible?

Being responsible brings us many benefits. It can help you achieve your goals and objectives in any area of your life. Responsibility allows you to create principles, morals and helps you to lead your life. Being a responsible person helps us to:

• Be more honest: When we tend to tell the truth and keep our promises, the people around us will believe us and see us as an honest person.
• Be more independent: Assuming the consequences of our actions will help us make better decisions.
• Be more reliable: By being responsible, we gain other’s trust and we will also gain confidence in ourselves. Doing the right thing will make us feel good. And even if we are wrong, we will be satisfied because we know that we have done our best.

The value of responsibility

Responsibility is taught from childhood. Both in families and in schools , the aim is to educate in values and morals.

It is clear that everyone wants a committed and responsible partner, responsible children who don’t get into trouble, responsible parents and teachers who take care of the children , professionals who do their work responsibly. Why is that?

Because having people like that around us generates confidence, gives us security. We think,”yes, he is a responsible person, he will do it and things will work out. Feeling safe is one of the basic necessities in Maslow’s pyramid .

This is one of the reasons why in our society, responsibility is so positively and highly valued because it gives us security, confidence, and a certain stability.

How can I be more responsible?

There is no magic formula that makes us more responsible. However, responsibility can be trained.

If you want to fulfill your purposes, your obligations, and commitments, what you need is, to a large extent, predisposition and motivation. Now, if you’re still reading this then it’s a sign that you do want to be more responsible so here are some guidelines for you:

• Set goals: It’s important to know what we do things for. Having a sense and direction helps us to be consistent and to continue to do our duty. If you think the goal is too long term, set small goals to achieve it. I advise you to write them down. It sounds silly, but putting it on paper makes them real. Writing your goals can help you be more responsible!
• Objectivity: What is under my control or up to me and what is not? Make a list of the things that depend on you and you can control them. Your attention must be directed to those aspects, for what does not depend on you is not your responsibility.
• Routines: If it takes a lot of effort to “get dressed”, it’s best to get organized. If you have a routine, you’ll know what to do at every moment. But not only that, sometimes, knowing how much time you have to put in the effort also helps. “Come on, it’s only an hour of study before I go to the movies!”
• Rewards: Internal attributions come into play here. If you’ve reached what you set out to do, why not admit it? It’s your moment, give yourself a pat on the back.
• Be honest with yourself: Have you failed, was it something that you could control? Take responsibility, assume the consequences and analyze what you could have done differently, how would you improve for another time?
• Share your plans: I’m not talking about posting on social networks. No, I mean something more intimate. Talk to your partner, your mother or your best friend and tell them what you’re going to do, when and how. This way they will ask and become more involved and there will be no escape, you will have to comply.
• Operationalize: This means that the things you can take responsibility for are actions. For example, picking up your room, delivering a job, preparing food, etc. These are concrete behaviors that you can take on as responsibilities and obligations to fulfill, but you cannot assume responsibility for the consequences. For example, the teacher can give you an A, people might like or not the food you prepared or flatter you but this is not up to you. Therefore, specify activities and tasks that you have the resources and willingness to do and get on with it!

I’m not going to trick you, becoming a responsible person will not come overnight. It requires effort and a commitment. Remember, the key to success is consistency. I encourage you to focus and get it.

You can start by writing your final goals in capital letters and their subtypes or sub-objectives with minuscules. It begins little by little, assuming responsibilities and step by step.

Remember the responsibility for your actions (not the arbitrary consequences). If one day you don’t get the result you were expecting or you haven’t found the clues to using your willpower , don’t punish yourself. Analyze, think that you are on the right track because you are realizing the difficulties and accept the challenge again.

Responsibility & guilt

Guilt is not the same as responsibility. Being responsible for something doesn’t mean guilty. This stuff that seems so basic but how many times have you been surprised saying: “It’s not my fault!”

To understand each other, I’m going to tell you a story, which may even look familiar:

“You found a WhatsApp message just as soon as you got up. You have to finish and deliver the project by 13.00h. In addition, it is essential to be on time to the meeting and to do things perfectly, because it is a very important client. You invest all morning in this assignment, all your effort. When you leave the house, you take the subway, but it’s late. “I should’ve left earlier, I’m gonna get caught.” You’re already five minutes late. You leave the subway and there is a rally that crosses the avenue “I can’t believe it! Did it have to be today?” You’re going to the other sidewalk, you’re 15 minutes late. You get to the office, wait for the elevator. When you get upstairs, you look at the clock before you go in but you are 20 minutes late. The client’s gone, your boss is going to kill you.”

• I told you it was so important that you got here on time! Look at the time! The client’s gone very angry because of your tardiness! It was your responsibility!
• You think I did it on purpose? It’s not my fault that the subway was late and there was a rally cutting down the avenue!

What’s going on here?

Everything you did was with good intentions, effort, and interest. However, different factors have caused you to fail to deliver the project on time.

• What is the real responsibility? Deliver the completed project by 13.00h
• Whose responsibility is it that the client got angry? The client’s own responsibility, because we cannot control the emotions that another person feels .

Guilt carries implicit components that don’t help us at all. For example, it is not the same being responsible for a decision as being guilty of a decision. What does guilt involve?

• Voluntary Action: To make someone feel guilty of something, you need an active search to get that result.
• The result will be negative. If you’re guilty of something, that something is going to be negative.
• It adds up: The fact that we blame someone for an event means that the only way to prevent it from happening would be to eliminate the culprit. However, being responsible means that he or she engaged in certain behaviors that helped produce that outcome.
• Guilt leads us to think about the cause – consequences: Not everything in life happens because of cause and effect. Most things depend on a multitude of factors, as in the story we’ve seen before. Even sometimes, changing one of them doesn’t give us get a different result.

It is important that we bear this in mind because sometimes we take responsibility for things that we cannot control, that we could not change even if we wanted to change it with all our might. Feeling guilty for events, results or situations that do not depend on us affects our mood , frustrates us and often angers us.

The same thing happens when they make us feel guilty. We see it as unfair because what has happened was not in our plans either. Before blaming someone, ask yourself if the negative results obtained have been intentionally sought by the other person or not. Make sure you have done everything in your power to fulfill your responsibility.

Responsibility: Why do I feel bad when I’m not responsible?

In social psychology , Wiener’s theory, the theory of attributions refers to the explanations given by each one of us to the causes, reasons or results of what happens to us. Attributes have a strong influence on the way we feel, how we relate to others and even how we act. And of course, it influences us when we take on responsibilities.

• External attributions: When the explanation or cause of the facts is transferred to something external. We have no responsibility. For example, when we say that “you get on my nerves” as if we were not in control of them and it was inevitable to feel that way. Most people use this type of attribution to evade responsibility, doing so in the wrong way. Another case could be when we say “it was such bad luck” , implying that we have all the skills and abilities necessary to obtain an optimal result, however, chance has negatively influenced the result= zero responsibility.
• Internal attributions: The explanation or cause of the facts is in ourselves. It can be used when you succeed “thanks to me this happened”,”without my effort it wouldn’t have been possible” . Also in a situation where we know that there have been negative consequences for another and we assume that we have been involved. We ask for forgiveness by taking on the responsibility “I’m so sorry”,”Sorry, I didn’t realize” .

Clearly, a person’s attribution style can have a great influence on their self-esteem , their self-concept and, why not, their happiness. For example, someone who does not take responsibility for his or her accomplishments out of excess modesty will have a low self-concept. Giving the impression that his accomplishments never depend on him. On the contrary, a person who always takes credit for his or her merits will give the impression of being a self-righteous, arrogant , and narcissistic person.

What do you think will happen if we use internal attributions for negative and external results for positive ones? Exactly the same.

We must be consistent and objective. It is good to follow our principles and take responsibility for the consequences of the things we do wrong, but for the things we do well. This will give us emotional balance and promote our self-confidence.

3 tips to be more socially responsible

When we speak of social responsibility, we are referring to certain specific guidelines that are set in a given society, with the aim of ensuring that co-existence is correct, peaceful and leads to well-being.

Social responsibility affects relationships with others, but also with oneself:

Tip 1: Commitment

One of the angles of social responsibility is commitment. We commit ourselves continuously. In our work, with family, friends, partners, etc. Commitment means making a promise to someone and keeping it.

It’s funny because on many occasions, we make promises to ourselves and we skip them. “On Monday I will start eating healthy for sure”, ” I’m going to the gym three days a week, no excuses”. I am absolutely sure that one of these promises rings a bell for you, and I am also sure that one of them has not been fulfilled. Don’t you think it’s strange that even though we’re committed to ourselves, we don’t carry out our promises?  Imagine what would happen if you made those promises to someone else:

• “This Monday, yes or no, grandma, I’m going to take care of you”: But you don’t show up.
• “Today I have to work, but tomorrow I will help you to study son”: But you don’t help him.
• “I’m teaching at the gym three days a week.” But you don’t show up.

Why do responsibilities and commitment towards others seem more important than to ourselves?

Tip 2: Obligations

The second angle of social responsibility is obligations. They’re the ones that are taught from childhood. At every age and at every stage of life , it is up to us to learn and incorporate into our repertoire different tasks, in order to adapt ourselves to the society. These are our responsibilities and/or obligations.

Many times, these obligations are not said out loud, they are just assumed. We have certain activities that become a part of our obligations. For example, Mom always puts the washing machine in, Dad always does the shopping, my brother always takes out the dog , I set the table.

What if one day Mommy gets off work late? No clean clothes

What if one day my brother forgets to take the dog out? He pees inside the house

What if dad doesn’t have a car to go shopping that day? No food

They may seem extreme examples, because in general, what happens is that responsibilities rotate. However, sometimes this happens and we find ourselves in situations like “Mom, I don’t have any clothes!” Dad, you haven’t bought me the cookies I like!”,”John is grounded because the dog has peed!”

I invite you to consider examples in which the people around you had implicit obligations and responsibilities, not agreed upon, have failed to fulfill them, and it has become a conflict when it comes to assuming the consequences. Whose responsibility is it? Whose fault is it?

Tip 3: Willpower

Willpower could be defined when we continue to make efforts and sacrifices to achieve a goal or objective, which will bring us great satisfaction in achieving it.

This becomes more relevant when they are short-term goals. It’s easier to maintain willpower. Therefore, it is good to set small goals when the effort has to be very constant over a long period of time.

It also helps to wonder why. Why did I decide to do this? Do I still want that? What do I have to do to get it? Answering these questions will give you strength and make you reaffirm your decision, prompting you to continue forward!

As always, I invite you to comment below, what did you think? What do you do to be responsible? If you have any questions or want to share your opinion, go ahead.

This article is originally in Spanish written by Patricia Sanchez Seisdedos, translated by Alejandra Salazar.

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Individual Perspective on Responsibility Reflective Essay

• To find inspiration for your paper and overcome writer’s block
• As a source of information (ensure proper referencing)
• As a template for you assignment

Introduction

Responsibility: a brief overview, personal view on the meaning of responsibility.

One of the key factors that lead to success in life is being responsible. From childhood, my parents and the whole society at large have been pushing me to show responsibility through my actions, feelings and utterances.

The question that is left begging is: What does responsibility entail? In my opinion, responsibility is making decisions that are mutually beneficial to me and the people that I interact with in everyday activities. This paper shall define this term and evaluate its application in my personal life.

Responsibility refers to one’s ability to perform assigned duties and obligations satisfactorily. This entails taking care, being accountable and accepting the results of one’s actions, feelings and utterances. Throughout my life, I have come to the realization that no matter how smart one is, responsibilities play a pivotal role in the facilitation of success in any endeavor.

In addition, I have come to terms with the fact that as a human being I cannot be responsible for things that are out of my control. For example, you are not responsible for people’s feelings about you or others in society and efforts to change such perceptions may prove to be deleterious.

I believe that responsibility is about seizing opportunities, making the right choices and having control of different situations no matter how challenging they are. It is my ability to respond appropriately by facing the world and actualizing my desires through personal choices.

For example, my parents have always insisted that I exercise patience and discipline in all I do. They argue that these virtues make for a responsible person. As such, I have always applied these virtues in all I do and as a result, people around me consider me as a responsible person.

In the world we live in today, responsibility is measured by the level of efficiency one exhibits as he/she performs a given task. Be it at home or at work, responsibility is hinged on the realization that our actions contribute positively or negatively to the lives of those who rely on us. As such, failure to meet such obligations constitutes to us failing or letting them down.

While man is to error, responsibility demands that we accept our failures because it is through such situations that one becomes more responsible. For a very long time, I associated responsibility with blame.

This is mainly due to the fact that people always demanded to know who was responsible for a particular mishap. However, I have come to understand that responsibility is not only based on successful execution of tasks, but also on one’s ability to accept and own his/her mistakes (accountability).

As a man, there are various duties and obligations that the society expects me to perform. Key among them is to excel in education. Education plays a significant role in character building. For example, a student who plans his/her time effectively, achieves the set goals (grades, discipline and respect) is often viewed as a responsible person. This is because such a student performs successfully in the tasks given at school.

As such, an educated person is responsible in the sense that he/she understands what is expected of him/her in regard to personal behavior, career and social objectives. My parents insisted that excellence in education leads to better responsibilities.

I have witnessed this through my career, whereby I have to delegate duties and manage employees. In essence, I am responsible for them and they rely on me as much as I rely on them for success.

Similarly, responsibility is about balance. A person who takes care of his family is viewed as a responsible man in society. This kind of responsibility is not based on his financial ability, but rather, on his ability to balance his work and family lives effectively. I remember my father telling me that I should not focus on my personal career and forget my duties to those people that I care about.

As an example, he told me how a friend of his concentrated on his job so much that he ended up losing his family. One may argue that he was responsible at work by coming in on time, finishing tasks efficiently and before the deadline or even working overtime. However, he failed his family and people in society viewed him as an irresponsible person.

Personally, I have worked very hard throughout my life to become a responsible person. While I have succeeded in most areas (personal health, hygiene, reputation and finances), there are numerous challenges that shake my confidence.

One of the main challenges is dealing with people who do not care how their actions affect others. I know that through our choices, we determine how our lives turn out. As such, dealing with an irresponsible person gives me grief.

From this paper, it has been established that responsibility is not merely executing the tasks we are assigned, but also being brave enough to admit our mistakes and the consequences that arise from them. If people understand responsibility the way I do, they will make this world a better place even for future generations.

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Home — Essay Samples — Life — Emotions & Feelings — Responsibility

Essays on Responsibility

Responsibility is more than a word; it's a virtue that shapes our character and influences our actions. Writing an essay on responsibility isn't just an academic exercise; it's an opportunity to delve into the core of human ethics and the power of accountability. So, why should you write an essay about responsibility? 📜

Responsibility Essay Topics 📝

Choosing the right essay topic is essential for a compelling narrative. Here's how to select one:

Responsibility Argumentative Essay 🤨

Argumentative essays on responsibility require you to defend a viewpoint or argument. Here are ten intriguing topics:

• 1. Argue for or against the idea that individuals should be held legally responsible for their actions, regardless of circumstances.
• 2. Defend your perspective on whether society should prioritize personal responsibility over government intervention in social welfare programs.
• 3. Debate the role of personal responsibility in shaping one's success, happiness, and overall well-being.
• 4. Argue for the importance of personal responsibility in addressing environmental issues and climate change.
• 5. Defend the idea that schools should focus on teaching students about moral and ethical responsibility as part of their curriculum.
• 6. Debate the ethical implications of holding corporations accountable for their environmental and social impact.
• 7. Argue for or against the responsibility of individuals to actively engage in volunteer work and community service.
• 8. Defend your perspective on the role of personal responsibility in addressing global poverty and inequality.
• 9. Debate the influence of personal responsibility on financial decisions, debt management, and savings habits.
• 10. Argue for the responsibility of governments to provide accessible healthcare and education as a fundamental right for all citizens.

Responsibility Cause and Effect Essay 🤯

Cause and effect essays on responsibility explore the reasons behind actions and their consequences. Here are ten topics to consider:

• 1. Analyze the causes and effects of personal responsibility on an individual's sense of self-worth and confidence.
• 2. Examine how taking responsibility for one's actions can lead to personal growth, resilience, and a stronger character.
• 3. Investigate the effects of corporate responsibility on brand reputation and consumer trust.
• 4. Analyze the causes and consequences of holding public figures accountable for their actions and decisions.
• 5. Examine how personal responsibility influences the success and effectiveness of leadership in various fields.
• 6. Investigate the impact of a sense of responsibility on the quality of relationships and trust among individuals and communities.
• 7. Analyze the causes of ethical responsibility in business and its effects on long-term sustainability.
• 8. Examine how personal responsibility for one's health and wellness can lead to improved physical and mental well-being.
• 9. Investigate the effects of government responsibility in providing social safety nets and addressing poverty rates.
• 10. Analyze the causes and consequences of personal responsibility in making environmentally sustainable choices.

Responsibility Opinion Essay 😌

Opinion essays on responsibility allow you to express your subjective viewpoints. Here are ten topics to consider:

• 1. Share your opinion on the importance of teaching children about personal responsibility from an early age.
• 2. Discuss your perspective on whether individuals have a moral obligation to take responsibility for their actions, even when consequences are unintended.
• 3. Express your thoughts on the role of personal responsibility in shaping one's sense of purpose and fulfillment in life.
• 4. Debate the significance of corporate social responsibility in building trust and loyalty among consumers.
• 5. Share your views on the ethical responsibilities of media outlets and social platforms in curating content and information.
• 6. Discuss the impact of personal responsibility in driving positive social change and activism.
• 7. Express your opinion on the responsibility of individuals to actively engage in civic duties, such as voting and community involvement.
• 8. Debate the merits of holding governments responsible for addressing environmental crises and climate change.
• 9. Share your perspective on the importance of personal responsibility in achieving a work-life balance and overall well-being.
• 10. Discuss your favorite book or movie character who embodies the values of responsibility and its impact on your life.

Responsibility Informative Essay 🧐

Informative essays on responsibility aim to educate readers. Here are ten informative topics to explore:

• 1. Provide an in-depth analysis of the historical development of personal responsibility as a cultural and ethical concept.
• 2. Explore the psychological and behavioral aspects of taking personal responsibility for one's actions and decisions.
• 3. Investigate the role of corporate social responsibility in improving business sustainability and ethical practices.
• 4. Analyze the impact of personal responsibility on time management and productivity in personal and professional life.
• 5. Examine the effects of media responsibility in shaping public opinion, values, and societal norms.
• 6. Investigate the responsibilities of individuals in promoting diversity, equity, and inclusion in workplaces and communities.
• 7. Provide insights into the role of government responsibility in addressing social inequalities and providing equal opportunities.
• 8. Analyze the connection between personal responsibility and mental health, stress management, and overall well-being.
• 9. Examine how personal responsibility contributes to the preservation of natural resources and the environment.
• 10. Investigate the therapeutic benefits of accountability and taking responsibility for one's actions in rehabilitation and addiction recovery programs.

Responsibility Essay Example 📄

Responsibility thesis statement examples 📜.

Here are five examples of strong thesis statements for your responsibility essay:

• 1. "In a world where choices define our paths, the essence of responsibility emerges as the guiding force that shapes our character, decisions, and impact on the world."
• 2. "Responsibility is not a burden but a beacon that illuminates our ethical journey, highlighting the power of accountability in personal growth and societal progress."
• 3. "The interconnectedness of personal and collective responsibility underscores our shared obligation to foster a world where accountability is the cornerstone of positive change."
• 4. "Our actions ripple through the fabric of society, and embracing responsibility empowers us to be architects of positive change, leaving a legacy of ethical influence."
• 5. "In exploring the multifaceted dimensions of responsibility, we embark on a quest to unravel the threads of character, ethics, and the profound impact of our choices on ourselves and the world."

Responsibility Essay Introduction Examples 🚀

Here are three captivating introduction paragraphs to kickstart your essay:

• 1. "In a world where choices define our destiny, responsibility emerges as our compass, guiding us through the maze of life's ethical dilemmas. As we embark on this essay journey into the heart of accountability, we unveil the layers of a virtue that shapes individuals and societies alike."
• 2. "Imagine a world where every action has a consequence, and every decision leaves a mark. Responsibility is the thread that weaves this intricate tapestry of cause and effect. Join us as we delve into the fabric of human ethics and unveil the power of taking ownership."
• 3. "Amid the chaos of a fast-paced world, responsibility stands as a lighthouse, offering guidance in the tumultuous seas of choices and consequences. As we venture into this essay's exploration, we are reminded that embracing responsibility is a transformative journey within and beyond ourselves."

Responsibility Conclusion Examples 🌟

Conclude your essay with impact using these examples:

• 1. "As we draw the curtains on this exploration of responsibility, we recognize that our choices are the brushstrokes on the canvas of our lives. The responsibility we embrace is not just an obligation; it is the palette with which we paint a world of integrity, accountability, and positive change."
• 2. "In the closing chapter of our responsibility essay, we stand at the intersection of choice and consequence. The journey continues, and each step we take holds the potential to shape a brighter, more responsible future for ourselves and generations to come."
• 3. "As the echoes of responsibility resonate, we find ourselves at the crossroads of individual and collective ethics. The conclusion of this essay marks the beginning of a commitment—a commitment to a world where accountability is the driving force behind progress and harmony."

My Responsibility to America

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How to write a compelling responsibility essay the right way.

February 6, 2020

I’m sure this is a word you’ve heard since your childhood, responsibility. Your parents, teachers, neighbors, and even the famous high school and college motivational speakers have talked to you about this.

What does responsibility mean to you? I remember my mother telling me, “Son if you are not responsible now, you might never get a wife. And remember, I want grandchildren!” So I have been trying to maintain a sense of responsibility so that I don’t miss out on a wife and deny my mum the golden opportunity of having grandchildren.

That aside, let’s get down to why we are here, writing a responsibility essay.

What is a Responsibility Essay?

The word responsibility in itself is a one-sentence definition. It implies a state of having an obligation to deal with something.

A responsibility essay is, therefore, one that shows a person’s grasp of the outcome, which can be caused by his/her actions. In a broad sense, it means that there is a situation at hand, and how it is going to be handled by the person is critical to the final results.

No one is born with this sense of responsibility. It is a value that is cultivated over time by learning either directly or indirectly from others. A mother has a duty of taking care of the baby until a certain age, so does a president has responsibility for a nation.

Responsibility essay assignments for students hardly miss because this is a practical aspect of life.

Writing Ideas on a Responsibility Essay

Are you there stranded on where to begin your 1000 word essay on responsibility? Well, here are some great ideas that you can borrow from for starters:

• Primary responsibilities: You can write about what you are tasked with daily, and you are getting along with those responsibilities.
• Social responsibility: Talk about society’s rights and how they relate to their duty. Is there a conflict between the two?
• Power and responsibility: Is it true that those in power are the ones mandated with greater responsibilities than the others in society?
• Why is it hard to take it? Here you can delve into the issue of why people do not want to take responsibility for their actions. For instance, a man who impregnates a lady and refuses to own up, thus running away and leaving the lady to fend for herself and the child.

I would not be doing justice if I left this section without quoting the famous Peter Parker’s Principle, “with great power, comes great responsibility.” For those who may not be familiar with that, watch Spider-Man, the movie.

A personal responsibility essay is the cheapest to write. I mean, isn’t there a time you were tasked with watching over your siblings, being the captain of a class, or even tending your flock back in the ranch? All that was responsible, and, in your essay, show whether you were good or bad at it, or sooner if you enjoyed working at it.

You can also show in your essay on why responsibility is essential. If you were looking after your little sister and out of your irresponsibility, she slipped into the kitchen and caused a fire, doesn’t that tell you why you need to be responsible?

If your niche is on leadership, then you can write an essay on responsibility and accountability. Show why the leaders need to be transparent in their undertakings and why it is essential to the citizens at large.

For every successful writer, you need to have an outline . A responsibility paper outline will help you achieve the following:

• Know if your thoughts are well interconnected
• Point out potholes in your essay
• Come up with a clear and precise sequence of ideas
• To determine if the sufficiency of the evidence at hand.

Such will save you the agony of taking a lot of time to write your responsibility. The subsequent speech on responsibility will, therefore, be precise and complete, and perhaps compete for audience with Obama’s speeches.

And if that’s not enough, let us look at some topics you can use for your next essay about responsibility.

Top 10 Winning Topic Ideas for a Responsibility Essay

These topics will act as an icebreaker to stir you up for more great ideas that you can write about from today.

Are you ready for this? Here we go!

• With high power, comes great responsibility (I wouldn’t miss starting with this)
• What is the importance of being responsible?
• At what age can someone be considered responsible enough?
• Leadership and responsibility
• Personal responsibility in college
• Is responsibility an obligation to oneself?
• Personal responsibility and academic success
• Responsibility gun control
• Legal and ethical implications of irresponsibility
• Social responsibility and reduction of crime rate
• Responsible parenting
• Am I good at fulfilling my obligations?
• Rights versus responsibilities
• To be or not to be responsible
• Accountability starts with me!

Crafting Great Responsibility Essay

Well, I guess that is enough to get you started and improve your grades, especially in essay writing. Why don’t you choose one of the topics and craft an essay now?

Do you still have a problem with any of your college assignments or running out of time? Our best writers are just a click of a button away waiting to offer you that professional writing help.

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Responsibility Essay: Topic Ideas & Responsibility Writing Prompts

“You are not only responsible for what you say, but also for what you do not say” Martin Luther

There are a lot of other good quotations that can serve as a good beginning for your essay on responsibility and provide good ideas for writing.

However, responsibility can be viewed from different perspectives, which is why making the final decision for your essay on responsibility can be rather challenging.

If this is your main problem with the responsibility essay, we are glad to help you and offer some brilliant ideas, just check our website .

• 👔 Your Major Responsibilities
• 🔋 Power and Responsibility
• 💻 Social Responsibility Essays
• ❓ Why Is It so Hard to Take It?

✍️ Other Responsibility Essay Topics

1. 👔 your major responsibilities.

If you have absolutely nothing to talk about in the responsibility essay, writing about yourself and your duties can be a good option. So, what are you responsible for? Have your responsibilities changed with time? Do you think you are good at fulfilling them?

2. 🔋 Power and Responsibility

“With great power comes great responsibility” – this can be the main idea of your essay. Do you agree that people who possess power are responsible for many things ? What happens if powerful people act irresponsibly?

3. 💻 Social Responsibility Essays

Do you agree that today people have a lot of rights but do not think much about their responsibilities? Which one of them does a citizen have or a simple person who lives in society along with other people? Answer these questions in your essay on responsibility .

4. ❓ Why Is It so Hard to Take It?

Why are some people afraid to take responsibility for their actions? In your essay on responsibility , introduce several situations like that and tell about the consequences of not taking responsibility.

• Is responsibility a fundamental quality any person must possess?
• Analyze the role of ethics and responsibility at work. 
• How do you understand corporate social responsibility?  
• Explain the role and responsibility of business.  
• The importance of corporate social responsibility in the modern world.  
• Discuss the issues of corporate social responsibility and the ways to overcome them. 
• Describe moral responsibility of each individual for the contribution in global warming.
• Explain why freedom of speech entails a great responsibility to each individual.
• Examine why the sense of responsibility is often considered a driving force of human development.
• Analyze the role of managers in development of corporate social responsibility.
• Explore the complex issue of social responsibility for advertising to children .
• Diverce interpretations interpretations of the term “responcibility” and your personal vision of responsibility .
• Why it is vital to be a responsible person .
• Modern technology, anonymity, and responsibility from a cultural relativism perspective .
• Does Apple show concern for ethical and social responsibility ?
• Discuss the specifics of professional responsibility of lawyers .
• What are you responsible for in your personal life and immediate environment ?
• Describe the peculiarities of ethical responsibility of police administrators.
• Do you feel any responsibility for the things outside of your immediate environment?
• Explain why leadership is a great responsibility.
• Positive and negative impact of globalization on corporate social responsibility in international companies. 
• Analyze the responsibility of citizens for the actions their government take.
• Examine the importance of socially responsible leadership in education .
• What is the student’s responsibility at college?  
• Discuss the connection between social and personal responsibility .
• How to become responsible ?
• Explore the connection between personal responsibility and success.
• The role of parents in formation the sense of responsibility in children.
• The basic aspects of corporate responsibility philosophy. 
• What does personal responsibility towards the society include?
• Discuss the human responsibility for issues outside the immediate environment.
• Are the leaders responsible for social media posts of their team?
• Explore who is responsible for the epidemic of childhood obesity
• Describe the areas of responsibility people have in their personal lives.
• Why do people often shrink from personal responsibility ?
• Benefits of corporate social responsibility. 
• Who is responsible for poverty and violence in developing nations ?
• Explain why you consider yourself a responsible human being .
• Discuss the strong and weak points of the personal responsibility concept.
• People’s responsibility for inhumane acts.
• Describe different points of view on the concept of responsibility.
• Analyze the concept of responsibility from ethical point of view.
• Are parents responsible for children’s crimes?
• What does responsibility mean to you?
• Should celebrities be responsible for being role models?
• Explain why free will is a huge responsibility.
• What are the major traits of a responsible person ?
• Discuss the ethical responsibility in nursing profession.
• Where are the limits of personal responsibility ?
• Describe the connection between responsibility and morality.

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Why Responsibility Is So Important

Written by Steve Rose

Identity, purpose, and belonging, 13 comments(s).

With all of the social distancing measures over the last year, we have been repeatedly told by public health officials that it is our responsibility to stay home and flatten the curve.

You are not responsible for the problem, but you now find yourself responsible for part of the solution.

It can be frustrating, it can be isolating, and it might not seem fair.

Although we may sometimes want to resist the calls to take responsibility, consider the other areas of life where you are not responsible for the problem but still need to be part of the solution.

If you’ve experienced trauma leading to mental health issues, you are not responsible for the problem, but you are responsible for being part of the solution.

The same goes for a heredity illness. You are not responsible for the problem, but you are responsible for being part of the solution.

Falling into a victim mindset only serves to strengthen the problem.

If you or someone you know is struggling with mental health issues, you can check out my  resource page  for suggestions on how to find help.

Table of Contents

What is responsibility?

Responsibility is the ability to respond.

Not paralyzed by fear, plagued by anxiety, or procrastinating, pretending the problem doesn’t exist.

Responsibility means being prepared, but not panicked. It requires planning, but not perfectionistic plots to control the uncontrollable.

Responsibility consists of accepting uncertainty, knowing you will do what you can control, and letting go of the things you cannot.

Responsibility requires a response proportional to the problem, adapting to obstacles as they arise.

The psychologist Jordan Peterson says the physical posture of responsibility is standing up straight with your shoulders back, in 12 Rules for Life :

To stand up straight with your shoulders back is to accept the terrible responsibility of life, with eyes wide open. It means deciding to voluntarily transform the chaos of potential into the realities of habitable order. It means adopting the burden of self-conscious vulnerability, and accepting the end of the unconscious paradise of childhood, where finitude and mortality are only dimly comprehended. It means willingly undertaking the sacrifices necessary to generate a productive and meaningful reality (it means acting to please God, in the ancient language).

Why is responsibility important?

Responsibility is important because it provides a sense of purpose, in addition to building resilience amidst adversity on an individual and societal level.

Like an addiction, sidestepping responsibility may feel good in the short-term, but leads to exponentially worse pain and suffering in the long term.

A tiger metaphor by Steven Hayes seems fitting here.

Imagine you adopted a tiger cub into your home. It is cute, cuddly, and harmless. You notice it begins to purr loudly, and the only way you can make it stop is to feed it red meat. Over the months and years, you keep doing this, but the tiger is now several hundred pounds, requiring whole sides of beef. Rather than a cute purr, the tiger roars ferociously for its meat. You are terrified, so you keep giving him the meat so he will leave you alone. The more you feed it, the larger it gets, and the more trapped you become.

In this metaphor, feeding the tiger symbolizes sidestepping your responsibilities. There is temporary relief, but a long term cost. Each time you avoid responsibility, you are feeding the tiger, making the problem larger, giving up long term freedom and control.

Why do people choose to become trapped in troublesome tiger relations? Jordan Peterson explains one potential reason in 12 Rules for Life :

Sometimes, when people have a low opinion of their own worth or, perhaps, when they refuse responsibility for their lives they choose a new acquaintance, of precisely the type who proved troublesome in the past. Such people don’t believe that they deserve any better so they don’t go looking for it. Or, perhaps, they don’t want the trouble of better.”

Let’s go deeper into how low self-worth prevents responsibility and look at how to build a sense of purpose through responsibility to one’s self, one’s family, and one’s society.

Responsibility provides a sense of purpose

Avoiding responsibility destroys a sense of purpose. Purpose comes from a sense of contribution and connection to something larger than yourself. But first, it is necessary to take responsibility for yourself. By being the best version of yourself, you can then be the most helpful to others.

Being responsible for yourself

This requires taking care of your basic needs. In the recovery community, it is common to use the acronym, HALT. Are you hungry, angry, lonely, or tired? Regularly check in on your current state and address deficiencies where appropriate.

Another way to maintain self-responsibility is to organize the clutter in your physical environment and the chaos in your day-to-day life. Prioritize your sleep, nutrition, and exercise. If all of this sounds overwhelming, start small. As Jordan Peterson says, “Clean your damn room!” But as he also says, “Cleaning up your room involves cleaning up far more than your room.”

Doing something useful for yourself is the first step in reorienting yourself amidst the mental fog of purposelessness. As the fog begins to thin out, you can start to see beyond yourself. This leads to step two:

Being responsible within your family 

Once you’re adequately useful to yourself and can help from a place of genuine giving, you can be useful to others close to you.

I mention genuine giving because many people try to be useful to others without addressing their own needs first. This often results in codependent relationships where you do things for others to fill a lack of self-esteem in yourself. It is an experience of toxic shame where we constantly feel the need to prove ourselves and receive external validation. This may feel like “taking responsibility,” but it is often unhelpful and is just feeding the internal tiger, masking underlying issues with self-worth.

See my article The Need to be Needed for an in-depth description of this interpersonal dynamic.

If you’ve worked through these personal areas and can engage in close interpersonal relationships based on genuine heartfelt giving, the next step is this:

Being responsible within the broader society

Being socially responsible can happen in various ways. Right now, it simply means staying home to prevent community spread of the viral infection.

During regular times, being socially responsible might take place in your work, volunteer roles, or leisure activities.

The key to maximizing your social responsibility is contributing in a way that fits your unique personal strengths. For example, if your strengths are working with people, and you value compassion, developing and applying these strengths allows you to maximally contribute socially.  

A lack of fit between your strengths, values, and interests can hinder your level of usefulness in your work, resulting in a low sense of purpose within the role. Finding alignment between your abilities and your role requires first knowing your strengths and cultivating them. 

Not cultivating and applying your unique strengths doesn’t just rob you of a sense of purpose, but it also robs the broader society of your potential contributions.

Conclusion 

Although you may not be responsible for personal or social issues, you are still responsible for being part of the solution.

Avoiding responsibility comes with a short term gain at a long term cost.

Taking responsibility creates long term resilience and a sense of purpose.

This sense of purpose can be fostered by taking responsibility for one’s self by engaging in self-care. Responsibility can also be developed on a familial and societal level, offering a sense of purpose proportional to your ability to contribute your unique abilities.

Fascinated by ideas? Check out my podcast:

Struggling with an addiction.

If you’re struggling with an addiction, it can be difficult to stop. Gaining short-term relief, at a long-term cost, you may start to wonder if it’s even worth it anymore. If you’re looking to make some changes, feel free to reach out. I offer individual addiction counselling to clients in the US and Canada. If you’re interested in learning more, you can send me a message here .

Other Mental Health Resources

If you are struggling with other mental health issues or are  looking for a specialist near you, use the Psychology Today therapist directory  here to find a practitioner who specializes in your area of concern.

If you require a lower-cost option, you can check out BetterHelp.com . It is one of the most flexible forms of online counseling.  Their main benefit is lower costs, high accessibility through their mobile app, and the ability to switch counselors quickly and easily, until you find the right fit.

*As an affiliate partner with Better Help, I receive a referral fee if you purchase products or services through the links provided.

As always, it is important to be critical when seeking help, since the quality of counselors are not consistent. If you are not feeling supported, it may be helpful to seek out another practitioner. I wrote an article on things to consider here .

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13 Comments

you’ve seen me comment on your posts before, dear Steve, commending you on your writing abilities, but you outdo yourself here, standing amongst philosophers, Marcus Aurelius, for instance, Epictetus, eminent moralists, in bringing heart to your strong and disciplined account of “responsibility” – philosophy is perhaps your true dimension, just saying – all the very best, R ! chard

Great to see you on here again, Richard! I remember you used to enjoy my articles on veterans in transition to civilian life. Thank you for such kind words. Hope you are well! Take care.

I really appreciate the focus on personal responsibility. A well-written message that people need to internalize. We are part of the solution, and it is tempting to think that we can ‘bend the rules’ for some want or need, with unintended consequences the result. I will reblog this on my blog.

Thanks Eric! I believe the ethics of Emanuel Kant apply here. Universalize your individual Maxim. In other words, ask yourself, if everyone did the same thing, is that the type of world you would want to live in?

Crikey …. well this hit me rather hard. I’ve been feeding that tiger so long now that I don’t even know quite where to start. Everything you said there makes total sense. I look forward to reading more of your posts although frankly I’m rather worried. I think I’m going to be making some monumental decisions before too long. I wish I could just bury my head in the sand. Thanks for the post. Katie

It is, a collective responsibility for us, as a whole group of living organisms, to prevent the spread of this current outbreak, and, we must all, abide by the rules of the government, not just for our own sake’s, but for the good, of the, entire, human population on the planet.

I think one thing that’s regularly missed in the conversation about “needing to be needed“ is that people who are “more needy” tend to be socially marginalized. So we find ourselves looking after one another because others w needs are the people available to us. (Others in an AA group, for instance) And then other folks further justify our marginalization by defining us as “codependent helpers.” Of course the second thing that’s overlooked is the reality that people are wired to be connected with other people (belonging) and experience ourselves as valuable through those relationships (meaning, purpose). All of which you have written about extensively.

Thank you for sharing this! I completely agree. My article on the need to be needed covers this. I do want to go deeper into the marginalization vs. individual agency dynamic a bit deeper though. Thank you for highlighting this! I am planning on doing an article on the meaning of the serenity prayer to explore this dynamic further.

Steve, I may quote you on this definition, “responsibility is the ability to respond” … so well said! Thank-you, Carole

No problem! Thank you!

I agree 100%. It can be deadly for high risk people. I like your perspective. We have a responsibility, so that we don’t spread it and make it worse, and contribute to the pandemic.

4 or 6 million people out of 7 billion people. Think about that for just a moment, really. That in my opinion does not represent a pandemic. 6 million out of 7 billion is not even 1% of the population. It would have to be 20% or more of 7 billion before I would even to begin the notion of a true pandemic. Break away from the heard. Use your brain,don’t fall into a sheeple existence. Don’t be a chump. All these people putting this much trust in the CDC and the media leaves me feeling like there is no hope for our future. I have to remind myself that it’s really not their fault or anyone’s fault,they have been brainwashed and pre-programmed, unknowingly. You don’t need a psychologist or at least I don’t,to come to that conclusion.

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Personal Responsibility in Society

Introduction.

Every human being has a role to play in life. Any role played by an individual may contribute to personal or societal growth. Individuals in the society have different levels of responsibility depending on the hierarchy of the social structure and individuals’ dependent on them (Brown 67). The following discussion delineates on my view on responsibility and issues that I feel responsible for in my life .

Meaning of Responsibility

Responsibility is the act of being held accountable for one’s, actions with or without supervision. For one to be a responsible person, one must be disciplined, time conscious, and always be ready to defend his or her cause of action (Brown 107). Different situations call for different levels of responsibilities.

Things I am Responsible for in Life

There are quite a lot of things that I feel that I am responsible for in life, but I will only analyze the main ones; first is self-respect. There is no way the people around me are going to accord or treat me the way I deserve if I do not respect myself. It is my responsibility to work hard in life so that I can improve my living standard. If I am lazy, nobody will help me come out of that situation unless I am willing to be held responsible for my actions.

The company I keep in life too is my responsibility, be it with friends or business associates as they clearly identify with what kind of person I am. No human being can survive on his or her own, in one way or another one will always need help and there is no way one is going to seek it from a bad company not unless one wants to ruin his or her reputation in the society. The image that one carries in the society is what defines an a person and it is an individual responsibility to make it good or bad.

Things I Am Not Responsible For

There are things that I do not feel indebted to or cannot be held accountable for. Births, deaths, weather changes are God’s responsibility and there is no way I can prevent them from happening. The individuals that other people want to be friends or associated with are not my responsibility as they do not impact my life in any way. The decisions they make regarding their lives is all up to them.

Generally it is very hard to choose for other individuals what will make them happy, improve their living standards, or elevate their status in the society

My Responsibility in the Society

My responsibility in the society changes because I have been mandated to play a role in the society that will bring change to the society; these roles may relate to politics, religions, or social acts. All eyes are on me to lead them in the right way and be ready to defend the society by all means possible.

Politically, I am the link that brings the society together and my actions are held in high esteem. I tasked with the responsibility of connecting the society to the outside world, be it in terms of business opportunities, education, and hospitality. Religiously, I am involved in educating the society on the fact that there is a supreme being who should be worshipped. I ensure that they understand there are many religions and different beliefs and everyone should respect each other religion groups.

Things I Take Seriously

I take my family responsibility seriously by ensuring I achieve my expectation. My family roles are crucial to those who depend on me to deliver. I take these roles seriously since I understand the value of a family and the role of a family in an individual development.

Works Cited

Brown, Alexander. Personal Responsibility: Why It Matters . London: Continuum, 2009. Print.

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Responsibility Essay: How To Become The Responsible Person

From the childhood, the parents learn their children to be responsible for their actions. But what is the responsibility? What does it mean for everyone?

The responsibility is the understanding of the consequences, which can be caused by the actions of the person.

Benefits of the responsibility

• We will become more confident in our power and in ourselves.
• It gives us the respect of other people and also self-respect.
• We can control the situation.
• We get the freedom.

The evolution of the responsibility

When children are little, they do not have a lot of responsibility, but when they grow up, they understand, that a lot of things in their life depend on their actions and they are responsible for the consequences. The responsibility helps to develop such qualities as freedom and confidence.

Every year people get a lot of responsibility. For example, parents always are responsible for their children, the head of the organization is always responsible for the workers. If you need to write the personal response essay, you have made the right choice. You can order the essay on this site and we will be glad to help you with it.

4 methods to develop the responsibility

• You should work to improve yourself and the self – control will help you a lot. You should analyze all your words and actions and it will help you become more responsible. You should not give up at once, if you have any difficulties, because this work needs a long period, but you will be surprised with the result.
• It will be helpful, if you write all your tasks on the paper and will set the deadline. You will be more organized and responsible.
• If you work with people and you need to organize their actions, it is the great choice to improve your responsibility.
• If you spend the time with children, you must be responsible for them and to think a lot about the decisions you make.

To be responsible for your future, it is the important quality of the successful person. The meaning is like : “ I said- I did it”. It means that such person will do everything, that he or she promised. Sometimes, teachers ask to write the responsibility essays at school to check the personal qualities of the pupils. It will show them if children are responsible and will help to communicate with the children in the better way.

What does the responsibility mean?

First of all it is setting goals and their reaching. It means to be responsible for all your words, actions and even thoughts. It is the responsibility for your improvement and professional development and of course, it is the responsibility for your health and body.

The possibility to promise something and to do it is one of the fact, that this person is reliable. It is the ground of the leadership and professional growth. If the person does not want to take any responsibility, it means, that this person cannot do a lot in the real life. These people will not be able to reach the success in this life or create the family , because the family is the huge responsibility. But people, that are not afraid of the responsibility and can take it are successful and can control the situation and even the life of other people. They increase their opportunities and they are doing their best to reach the success.

The interesting fact is, that even if the person is wise and have a lot of talents, but do not have the responsibility, he will not reach the success, because he will lose the support of other people, they will not trust him, because he is unreliable.

Check yourself

You need to answer to these 5 questions. The answer is only “Yes” or “No”.

• Do you always do what you promised to other people?
• Do you think, that you are reliable person? Can other people say, that you are the reliable person, that can take the responsibility of the actions? Do you have the examples?
• Do you have long term goals in your life?
• Do you think about your professional development and improvement of your personal qualities?
• Do you like to help other people to solve their problems?

If your answers to all the questions above were “YES”, it means, that you are the reliable person. But if you answered “NO” to any of these questions, it means that you have to work further to be the reliable person.

How to be the responsible person?

• You need to develop yourself. For example, visit some additional courses or seminars, read the books about famous and successful people.
• It is needed to improve your responsibility. You can start from some simple tasks, like to promise something not very difficult to your friends and to do it. You will get the feeling of success, because you did it. To make your life easy, you can write your tasks on the paper and you can be sure, that you will not forget anything. You should be confident, that if you promised something to someone, you need to do it.
• You should constantly work with your life goals.
• You need to control yourself in different situations. It is the factor, which shows if you are the responsible person.

It is very difficult to be the responsible person, but you can be sure, that you will get the respect of other people if you are responsible. It will help you to change your life or to start your business, it will even help you to earn a lot of money .

But the responsibility is different for every person, because all people are different and understand the information in different ways. Because of it, everyone should realize, what exactly is the responsibility in his or her life. If you wish to get more detailed information about the responsibility, our professional writers will be glad to write for you the paragraph about responsibility, which you can order here . You can be sure, that you will be satisfied with the result.

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Moral Responsibility

Making judgments about whether a person is morally responsible for her behavior, and holding others and ourselves responsible for actions and the consequences of actions, is a fundamental and familiar part of our moral practices and our interpersonal relationships.

The judgment that a person is morally responsible for her behavior involves—at least to a first approximation—attributing certain powers and capacities to that person, and viewing her behavior as arising (in the right way) from the fact that the person has, and has exercised, these powers and capacities. Whatever the correct account of the powers and capacities at issue (and canvassing different accounts is the task of this entry), their possession qualifies an agent as morally responsible in a general sense: that is, as one who may be morally responsible for particular exercises of agency. Normal adult human beings may possess the powers and capacities in question, and non-human animals, very young children, and those suffering from severe developmental disabilities or dementia (to give a few examples) are generally taken to lack them.

To hold someone responsible involves—again, to a first approximation—responding to that person in ways that are made appropriate by the judgment that she is morally responsible. These responses often constitute instances of moral praise or moral blame (though there may be reason to allow for morally responsible behavior that is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy: see McKenna 2012: 16–17 and M. Zimmerman 1988: 61–62). Blame is a response that may follow on the judgment that a person is morally responsible for behavior that is wrong or bad, and praise is a response that may follow on the judgment that a person is morally responsible for behavior that is right or good.

It should be noted at the outset that the above schema, while useful, may be misleading in certain respects. For one thing, it suggests a correspondence and symmetry between praise and blame that may not exist. The two are certainly asymmetrical insofar as the attention given to blame far exceeds that given to praise. One reason for this is that blameworthiness, unlike praiseworthiness, is often taken to involve liability to a sanction. Thus, articulating the conditions of blameworthiness may seem to theorists the more pressing matter. Perhaps for related reasons, there is a richer language for expressing blame than praise (Watson 1996 [2004: 283]), and “blame” finds its way into idioms for which there is no ready parallel employing “praise”: compare “ S is to blame for x ” and “ S is to praise for x ”. Note, as well, that “holding responsible” is itself not a neutral expression: it typically arises in blaming contexts (Watson 1996 [2004: 284]). Additionally, there may be asymmetries in the contexts in which praise and blame are appropriate: private blame is a more familiar phenomenon than private praise (Coates & Tognazzini 2013a), and while minor wrongs may reasonably earn blame, minimally decent behavior often seems insufficient for praise (see Eshleman 2014 for this and other differences between praise and blame). Finally, the widespread assumption that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are at least symmetrical in terms of the capacities they require has also been questioned (Nelkin 2008, 2011; Wolf 1980, 1990). Like most work on moral responsibility, this entry will tend to focus on the negative side of the phenomenon; for more, see the entry on blame .

A few other general observations about the concept of moral responsibility are in order before introducing particular conceptions of it. In everyday speech, one often hears references to people’s “moral responsibility” where the point is to indicate that a person has some duty or obligation—some responsibility —to which that person is required, by some standard, to attend. In this sense, we say, for example, that a lawyer has a responsibility (to behave in certain ways, according to certain standards) to his client. This entry, however, is concerned not with accounts that specify people’s responsibilities in the sense of duties and obligations, but rather with accounts of whether a person bears the right relation to her own actions, and their consequences, so as to be properly held accountable for them. (Unfortunately, this entry does not include discussion of some important topics related to moral responsibility, such as responsibility for omissions (see Clarke 2014, Fischer & Ravizza 1998, and Nelkin & Rickless 2017a) or collective responsibility (see the entry on collective responsibility and Volumes 30 and 38 of Midwest Studies in Philosophy ).

Moral responsibility should also be distinguished from causal responsibility. Causation is a complicated topic, but it is often fairly clear that a person is causally responsible for—that is, she is the (or a) salient cause of—some occurrence or outcome. However, the powers and capacities that are required for moral responsibility are not identical with an agent’s causal powers, so we cannot infer moral responsibility from an assignment of causal responsibility. Young children, for example, can cause outcomes while failing to fulfill the requirements for general moral responsibility, in which case it will not be appropriate to judge them morally responsible for, or to hold them morally responsible for, the outcomes for which they may be causally responsible. And even generally morally responsible agents may explain or defend their behavior in ways that call into question their moral responsibility for outcomes for which they are causally responsible. Suppose that S causes an explosion by flipping a switch: the fact that S had no reason to expect such a consequence from flipping the switch might call into question his moral responsibility (or at least his blameworthiness) for the explosion without altering his causal contribution to it. Having distinguished different senses of responsibility, unless otherwise indicated, “responsibility” will refer to “moral responsibility” (in the sense defined here) throughout the rest of this entry.

Until fairly recently, the bulk of philosophical work on moral responsibility was conducted in the context of debates about free will, which largely concerned the various ways that (various sorts of) determinism might threaten free will and moral responsibility. A largely unquestioned assumption was that free will is required for moral responsibility, and the central questions had to do with the ingredients of free will and with whether their possession was compatible with determinism. Recently, however, the literature on moral responsibility has addressed issues that are of interest independently of worries about determinism. Much of this entry will deal with these latter aspects of the moral responsibility debate. However, it will be useful to begin with issues at the intersection of concerns about free will and moral responsibility.

1. Freedom, Responsibility, and Determinism

2.1 forward-looking accounts, 2.2.1 “freedom and resentment”, 2.2.2 criticisms of strawson’s approach, 2.3 reasons-responsiveness views, 3.1.1 attributability versus accountability, 3.1.2 attributionism, 3.1.3 answerability, 3.2.1 the moral competence condition on responsibility, 3.2.2 conversational approaches to responsibility, 3.2.3 psychopathy, 3.3.1 moral luck, 3.3.2 ultimate responsibility, 3.3.3 personal history and manipulation, 3.3.4 the epistemic condition on responsibility, other internet resources, related entries.

How is the responsible agent related to her actions; what power does she exercise over them? One (partial) answer is that the relevant power is a form of control, and, in particular, a form of control such that the agent could have done otherwise than to perform the action in question. This captures one commonsense notion of free will, and one of the central issues in debates about free will has been about whether possession of it (free will, in the ability-to-do-otherwise sense) is compatible with causal determinism (or with, for example, divine foreknowledge—see the entry on foreknowledge and free will ).

If causal determinism is true, then the occurrence of any event (including events involving human deliberation, choice, and action) that does in fact occur was made inevitable by—because it was causally necessitated by—the facts about the past (and the laws of nature) prior to the occurrence of the event. Under these conditions, the facts about the present, and about the future, are uniquely fixed by the facts about the past (and about the laws of nature): given these earlier facts, the present and the future can unfold in only one way. For more, see the entry on causal determinism .

If possession of free will requires an ability to act otherwise than one in fact does, then it is fairly easy to see why free will has often been regarded as incompatible with causal determinism. One way of getting at this incompatibilist worry is to focus on the way in which performance of a given action should be up to an agent if he has the sort of free will required for moral responsibility. As the influential Consequence Argument has it (Ginet 1966; van Inwagen 1983: 55–105; Wiggins 1973), the truth of determinism seems to entail that an agent’s actions are not up to him since they are the unavoidable consequences of things over which the agent lacks control. Here is an informal summary of this argument from Peter van Inwagen’s important book, An Essay on Free Will (1983):

If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us. (1983: 16)

For an important argument that suggests that the Consequence Argument conflates different senses in which the laws of nature are not up to us, see David Lewis (1981). For more on incompatibilism and incompatibilist arguments, see the entries on free will , arguments for incompatibilism , and incompatibilist (nondeterministic) theories of free will , as well as Randolph Clarke (2003).

Compatibilists maintain that free will (and/or moral responsibility) is possible even in a deterministic universe. Versions of compatibilism have been defended since ancient times. For example, the Stoics—Chryssipus, in particular—argued that the truth of determinism does not entail that human actions are entirely explained by factors external to agents; thus, human actions are not necessarily explained in a way that is incompatible with praise and blame (see Bobzien 1998 and Salles 2005 for Stoic views on freedom and determinism). Similarly, philosophers in the Modern period (such as Hobbes and Hume) distinguished the general way in which our actions are necessitated if determinism is true from the specific instances of necessity sometimes imposed on us by everyday constraints on our behavior (e.g., physical impediments that make it impossible to act as we choose). The difference is that the necessity involved in determinism is compatible with agents acting as they choose to act: even if S ’s behavior is causally determined, it may be behavior that she chooses to perform. And perhaps the ability that matters for free will (and responsibility) is just the ability to act as one chooses, which seems to require only the absence of external constraints (and not the absence of determinism).

This compatibilist tradition was carried into the twentieth century by logical positivists such A. J. Ayer (1954) and Moritz Schlick (1930 [1966]). Here is how Schlick expressed the central compatibilist insight in 1930 (drawing, in particular, on Hume):

Freedom means the opposite of compulsion; a man is free if he does not act under compulsion , and he is compelled or unfree when he is hindered from without…when he is locked up, or chained, or when someone forces him at the point of a gun to do what otherwise he would not do. (1930 [1966: 59])

Since deterministic causal pressures do not always force one to “do what otherwise he would not do”, freedom—at least of the sort specified by Schlick—is compatible with determinism.

A closely related compatibilist strategy, influential in the early and mid-twentieth century, was to offer a conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise (Ayer 1954, Hobart 1934, Moore 1912; for earlier expressions, see Hobbes 1654 and Hume 1748). As just noted, even if determinism is true, agents may often act as they choose, and it is equally compatible with determinism that an agent who performed act A (on the basis of his choice to do so) might have performed a different action on the condition that (contrary to what actually happened) she had chosen to perform the other action. Even if a person’s actual behavior is causally determined by the actual past, it may be that if the past had been suitably different (e.g., if the person’s desires, intentions, choices, etc. had been different), then she would have acted differently. And perhaps this is all that the ability to do otherwise comes to: one can do otherwise if it is true that if one had chosen to do otherwise, then one would have done otherwise.

However, this compatibilist picture is open to serious objections. First, it might be granted that an ability to act as one sees fit is valuable, and perhaps related to the type of freedom at issue in the free will debate, but it does not follow that this is all that possession of free will comes to. A person who has certain desires as a result of indoctrination, brainwashing, or psychopathology may act as he chooses, but his free will and moral responsibility may still be called into question. (For more on the relevance of such factors, see §3.2 and §3.3.3 .) More specifically, the conditional analysis is open to the following sort of counterexample. It might be true that an agent who performs act A would have omitted A if she had so chosen, but it might also be true that the agent in question suffers from an overwhelming compulsion to perform act A . The conditional analysis suggests that the agent in question retains the ability to do otherwise than A , but, given her compulsion, it seems clear that she lacks this ability (Broad 1934, Chisholm 1964, Lehrer 1968, van Inwagen 1983). More generally, incompatibilists are likely to be dissatisfied with the conditional analysis since it fails to give an account of an ability that agents can have, right here and right now, to either perform or omit an action while holding everything about the here and now, and about the past, fixed.

Despite the above objections, the compatibilist project described so far has had significant lasting influence. As will be seen below, the fact that determined agents can act as they see fit is still an important inspiration for compatibilists, as is the fact that determined agents may have acted differently in counterfactual circumstances. For more, see the entry on compatibilism . For recent accounts related to (and improving upon) early compatibilist approaches, see Michael Fara (2008), Michael Smith (2003), and Kadri Vihvelin (2004), and for criticism of these accounts, see Randolph Clarke (2009).

Another influential trend in compatibilism has been to argue that moral responsibility does not require an ability to do otherwise. If this is right, then determinism would not threaten responsibility by ruling out access to behavioral alternatives (though determinism might threaten responsibility in other ways: see van Inwagen 1983: 182–88 and Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 151–168). In a very influential 1969 paper, Harry Frankfurt offers examples meant to show that an agent can be morally responsible for an action even if he could not have done otherwise. Versions of these examples are often called Frankfurt cases or Frankfurt examples . In the basic form of the example, an agent, Jones, considers a certain action. Another agent, Black, would like to see Jones perform this action and, if necessary, Black can make Jones perform it through some type of intervention in Jones’s deliberative process. However, as things transpire, Black does not intervene in Jones’s decision making since he can see that Jones will perform the action on his own and for his own reasons. Black does not intervene to ensure Jones’s action, but he could have, and he would have, had Jones showed some sign that he would not perform the action on his own. Therefore, Jones could not have done otherwise , yet he seems responsible for his behavior. After all, given Black’s non-intervention, Jones’s action is a perfectly ordinary bit of voluntary behavior.

There are questions about whether Frankfurt’s example really shows that Jones is morally responsible even though he couldn’t have done otherwise. For one thing, it may not be clear that Jones really couldn’t have done otherwise: while he performed the action on his own, there was the alternative that he perform the action due to some intervention on Black’s part, and not on his own. Furthermore, though he did not do so, Jones might have given Black some indication that he would not perform the action in question. Alternatively, an objection might be framed by asking how Black could be certain that Jones would or would not perform the action on his own. There seems to be a dilemma here. Perhaps determinism obtains in the universe of the example, and Black sees some sign that indicates the presence of factors that causally ensure that Jones will behave in a particular way. But in this case, incompatibilists are unlikely to grant that Jones is morally responsible if they think that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism. On the other hand, perhaps determinism is not true in the universe of the example, but then it is not clear that the example excludes alternatives for Jones: if Jones’s behavior isn’t causally determined, then perhaps he can do otherwise. For objections to Frankfurt’s original example along these lines, see Carl Ginet (1996) and David Widerker (1995); for defenses of Frankfurt, see John M. Fischer (1994: 131–159; 2002; 2010); and for refined versions of Frankfurt’s example, meant to clearly deny Jones access to alternatives, see Alfred Mele and David Robb (1998), David Hunt (2000), and Derk Pereboom (2000; 2001: 18–28).

In response to criticisms such as the above, Frankfurt has said that his example was intended mainly to draw attention to the fact “that making an action unavoidable is not the same thing as bringing it about that the action is performed” (2006: 340; emphasis in original). In particular, while determinism may make an agent’s action unavoidable, it does not follow that the agent acts as he does only because determinism is true: it may also be true that he acts as he does because he wants to and because he sees reasons in favor of so acting. The point of his original example, Frankfurt suggests, was to draw attention to the significance that the actual causes of an agent’s behavior (such as her reasons and desires) can have independently of whether the agent might have done something else. Frankfurt concludes that “[w]hen a person acts for reasons of his own…the question of whether he could have done something else instead is quite irrelevant” for the purposes of assessing responsibility (2006: 340). A focus on the actual causes that lead to behavior, as well as investigation into when an agent can be said to act on her own reasons, has characterized a great deal of work on responsibility since Frankfurt’s essay (see §2.3 and §3.3.3 ).

2. Some Approaches to Moral Responsibility

This section discusses three important approaches to responsibility. Additional perspectives (attributionism, conversational theories, mesh or structural accounts, skeptical accounts, etc.) are introduced in more or less detail in the discussions of contemporary debates below.

Forward-looking approaches to moral responsibility justify responsibility practices by focusing on the beneficial consequences that can be obtained by engaging in these practices. This approach was influential in the earlier parts of the twentieth century (as well as before), had fallen out of favor by the closing decades of that century, and has recently been the subject of renewed interest.

Forward-looking perspectives tend to emphasize one of the central points discussed in the previous section: an agent’s being subject to determinism does not entail that he is subject to constraints that force him to act independently of his choices. If this is true, then, regardless of the truth of determinism, it may be useful to offer certain incentives to agents—to praise and blame them and generally to treat them as responsible—in order to encourage them to make certain choices and thus to secure positive behavioral outcomes.

According to some articulations of the forward-looking approach, to be a responsible agent is simply to be an agent whose motives, choices, and behavior can be shaped in this way. Thus, Moritz Schlick argued that

The question of who is responsible is the question concerning the correct point of application of the motive …. in this its meaning is completely exhausted; behind it lurks no mysterious connection between transgression and requital…. It is a matter only of knowing who is to be punished or rewarded, in order that punishment and reward function as such—be able to achieve their goal. (1930 [1966: 61]; emphasis in original)

And, according to Schlick, the goals of punishment and reward have nothing to do with the past: the idea that punishment “is a natural retaliation for past wrong, ought no longer to be defended in cultivated society” (1930 [1966: 60]; emphasis in original). Instead, punishment ought to be

concerned only with the institution of causes, of motives of conduct…. Analogously, in the case of reward we are concerned with an incentive. (1930 [1966: 60]; emphasis in original)

J. J. C. Smart (1961) also defended a well-known, forward-looking approach to moral responsibility in the mid-twentieth century. Smart claimed that to blame someone for a piece of behavior is simply to assess the behavior negatively (to “dispraise” it, in Smart’s terminology) while simultaneously ascribing responsibility for the behavior to the agent. And, for Smart, an ascription of responsibility merely involves taking an agent to be such that he would have omitted the behavior if he had been provided with a motive to do so. Whatever sanctions may follow on an ascription of responsibility are administered with eye to giving an agent motives to refrain from such behavior in the future.

Smart’s general approach has its contemporary defenders (Arneson 2003), but many have found it lacking in important ways. For one thing, as R. Jay Wallace notes, an approach like Smart’s “leaves out the underlying attitudinal aspect of moral blame” (Wallace 1996: 56, emphasis in original; see the next subsection for more on blaming attitudes). According to Wallace, the attitudes involved in blame are “backward-looking and focused on the individual agent who has done something morally wrong” (Wallace 1996: 56). But a forward-looking approach, with its focus on bringing about desirable outcomes

is not directed exclusively toward the individual agent who has done something morally wrong, but takes account of anyone else who is susceptible to being influenced by our responses. (Wallace 1996: 56; emphasis added)

In exceptional cases, a focus on beneficial outcomes may provide grounds for treating as blameworthy those who are known to be innocent (Smart 1973). This last feature of (some) forward-looking approaches has led to particularly strong criticism.

Recent efforts have been made to develop partially forward-looking accounts of responsibility that evade some of the criticisms mentioned above. These (somewhat revisionary) accounts justify our responsibility practices by appeal to their suitability for fostering moral agency and the acquisition of capacities required for such agency. Most notable in this regard is Manuel Vargas’s “agency cultivation model” of responsibility (2013; also see Jefferson 2019 and McGeer 2015). Recent conversational accounts of responsibility ( §3.2.2 ) also have an important forward-looking component insofar as they regard those with whom one might have fruitful moral interactions as candidates for responsibility. Some responsibility skeptics have also emphasized the forward-looking benefits of certain responsibility practices. For example, Derk Pereboom—who rejects desert-based blame—has argued that some conventional blaming practices can be maintained (even after ordinary notions of blameworthiness have been left behind) insofar as these practices are grounded in “non-desert invoking moral desiderata” such as “protection of potential victims, reconciliation to relationships both personal and with the moral community more generally, and moral formation” (2014: 134; also see Caruso 2016, Levy 2012, and Milam 2016). In contrast to some of the forward-looking approaches described above, Pereboom (2017) proposes that only those agents who have in fact acted immorally should be open to forward-aiming blaming practices. (For more on skepticism about responsibility, see §3.3 and the entry on skepticism about moral responsibility .)

2.2 The Reactive Attitudes Approach

P. F. Strawson’s 1962 paper, “Freedom and Resentment”, is a touchstone for much of the work on moral responsibility that followed it, especially the work of compatibilists. Strawson’s aim was to chart a course between incompatibilist accounts committed to a free will requirement on responsibility, and forward-looking compatibilist accounts that did not, in Strawson’s view, appropriately acknowledge and account for the interpersonal significance of the affective component of our responsibility practices. In contrast with forward-looking accounts such as J. J. C. Smart’s and Moritz Schlick’s ( §2.1 ), Strawson focuses directly on the emotions—the reactive attitudes—that play a fundamental role in our practices of holding one another responsible. Strawson’s suggestion is that attending to the logic of these emotional responses yields an account of what it is to be open to praise and blame that need not invoke the incompatibilist’s conception of free will. Indeed, Strawson’s view has been interpreted as suggesting that no metaphysical facts beyond our praising and blaming practices are needed to ground these practices.

Part of the novelty of Strawson’s approach is its emphasis on the “importance that we attach to the attitudes and intentions towards us of other human beings” (1962 [1993: 48]) and on

how much it matters to us, whether the actions of other people…reflect attitudes towards us of goodwill, affection, or esteem on the one hand or contempt, indifference, or malevolence on the other. (1962 [1993: 49])

For Strawson, our practices of holding others responsible are largely responses to these things: that is, “to the quality of others’ wills towards us” (1962 [1993: 56]).

To get a sense of the importance of quality of will for our interpersonal relations, note the difference in your response to one who injures you accidentally as compared to how you respond to one who does you the same injury out of “contemptuous disregard” or “a malevolent wish to injure [you]” (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 49]). The second case is likely to arouse a type and intensity of resentment that would not be (appropriately) felt in the first case. Corresponding points may be made about positive responses such as gratitude: you would likely not have the same feelings of gratitude toward a person who benefits you accidentally as you would toward one who does so out of concern for your welfare. The focus here is on personal reactive attitudes directed toward another on one’s own behalf, but Strawson also discusses “sympathetic or vicarious” attitudes felt on behalf of others, and “self-reactive attitudes” that an agent may direct toward herself (1962 [1993: 56–7]).

On Strawson’s view, the tendency to respond with relevant reactive attitudes to displays of good or ill will implicates a demand for moral respect and due regard. Indeed, for Strawson, “[t]he making of the demand is the proneness to such attitudes”, and the attitudes themselves are the “correlates of the moral demand in the case where the demand is felt to be disregarded” (1962 [1993: 63]; emphasis in original). Thus, among the circumstances that mollify a person’s (negative) reactive attitudes, are those which show that—despite initial appearances—the demand for due regard has not been ignored or flouted. When someone explains that the injury she caused you was entirely unforeseen and accidental, she indicates that her regard for your welfare was not insufficient and that she is therefore not an appropriate target for the negative attitudes involved in moral blame.

Note that the agent who excuses herself from blame in the above way is not calling into question her status as a generally responsible agent: she is still open to the demand for due regard and liable, in principle, to reactive responses. Other agents, however, may be inapt targets for blame and the reactive emotions precisely because they are not legitimate targets of a demand for regard. In these cases, an agent is not excused from blame, he is exempted from it: it is not that his behavior is discovered to have been non-malicious, but rather that he is seen to be one of whom better behavior cannot reasonably be demanded. (The widely-used terminology in which the above contrast is drawn—“excuses” versus “exemptions”—is due to Watson 1987 [2004]).

For Strawson, the most important group of exempt agents includes those who are, at least for a time, significantly impaired for normal interpersonal relationships. These agents may be children, or psychologically impaired like the “schizophrenic”; they may exhibit “purely compulsive behaviour”, or their minds may have “been systematically perverted” (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 51]). Alternatively, exempt agents may simply be “wholly lacking…in moral sense” (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 58]), perhaps because they suffered from “peculiarly unfortunate…formative circumstances” (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 52]). These agents are not candidates for the range of emotional responses involved in our personal relationships because they do not participate in these relationships in the right way for such responses to be sensibly applied to them. Rather than taking up interpersonally-engaged attitudes (that presuppose a demand for respect) toward exempt agents, we instead take an objective attitude toward them. The exempt agent is not regarded “as a morally responsible agent…as a member of the moral community” (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 59]); though he may be regarded as “an object of social policy” and as something “to be managed or handled or cured or trained” (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 52]).

Strawson’s perspective has an important compatibilist upshot. We may be able, in limited circumstances, to take up a detached, objective perspective on the behavior of normal (that is, non-exempt) agents. But Strawson argues that we cannot take up with this perspective permanently, and certainly not on the basis of discovering that determinism is true:

The human commitment to participation in ordinary interpersonal relationships is, I think, too thoroughgoing and deeply rooted for us to take seriously the thought that a general theoretical conviction [e.g., about the truth of determinism] might so change our world that, in it, there were no longer any such things as interpersonal relationships as we normally understand them; and being involved in inter-personal relationships…precisely is being exposed to the range of reactive attitudes and feelings that is in question. (1962 [1993: 54])

More specifically, the truth of determinism would not show that human beings generally occupy excusing or exempting conditions that would make the attitudes involved in holding one another responsible inappropriate. It would not follow from the truth of determinism, for example, “that anyone who caused an injury either was quite simply ignorant of causing it or had acceptably overriding reasons for” doing so (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 53]; emphasis in original); nor would it follow (from the truth of determinism)

that nobody knows what he’s doing or that everybody’s behaviour is unintelligible in terms of conscious purposes or that everybody lives in a world of delusion or that nobody has a moral sense. (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 59])

Various objections have been raised regarding P. F. Strawson’s general theoretical approach to moral responsibility, his assumptions about human psychology and sociality, and his arguments for the compatibility of determinism and responsibility.

As noted in the previous subsection, Strawson argues that learning that determinism is true would not raise general concerns about our responsibility practices. This is because the truth of determinism would not show that human beings are generally abnormal in a way that would call into question their openness to the reactive attitudes: “it cannot be a consequence of any thesis which is not itself self-contradictory that abnormality is the universal condition” (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 54]). In reply, it has been noted that while the truth of determinism might not suggest universal abnormality, it might well show that normal human beings are morally incapacitated in a way that is relevant to our responsibility practices (Russell 1992: 298–301). Strawson’s assumptions that we are too deeply and naturally committed to our reactive-attitude-involving practices to give them up, and that doing so would irreparably distort our moral lives, have also been criticized (Nelkin 2011: 42–45; G. Strawson 1986: 84–120; Watson 1987 [2004: 255–258]).

A different sort of objection emphasizes the response-dependence of Strawson’s account: that is, the way it explains an agent’s responsibility in terms of the moral responses that characterize a given community’s responsibility practices, rather than in terms of independent facts about whether the agent is responsible. This feature of Strawson’s approach invites a reading that may seem paradoxical:

In Strawson’s view, there is no such independent notion of responsibility that explains the propriety of the reactive attitudes. The explanatory priority is the other way around: It is not that we hold people responsible because they are responsible; rather, the idea ( our idea) that we are responsible is to be understood by the practice, which itself is not a matter of holding some propositions to be true, but of expressing our concerns and demands about our treatment of one another. (Watson 1987 [2004: 222]; emphasis in original; see Bennett 1980 for a related, non-cognitivist interpretation of Strawson’s approach)

Strawson’s approach would be particularly problematic if, as the above reading might suggest, it entails that a group’s responsibility practices are—as they stand and however they stand—beyond criticism simply because they are that group’s practices (Fischer & Ravizza 1993a: 18).

But there is something to be said from the other side of the debate. It may seem obvious that people are appropriately held responsible only if there are independent facts about their responsibility. But on reflection—and following R. Jay Wallace’s (1996) influential Strawsonian approach—it may be difficult “to make sense of the idea of a prior and thoroughly independent realm of moral responsibility facts” that is separate from our practices and yet to which our practices must answer (1996: 88). For Wallace, giving up on practice-independent responsibility facts doesn’t mean giving up on facts about responsibility; rather, “we must interpret the relevant facts [about responsibility] as somehow dependent on our practices of holding people responsible” (1996: 89). Such an interpretation requires an investigation into our practices, and what emerges most conspicuously, for Wallace, from this investigation is the degree to which our responsibility practices are organized around a fundamental commitment to fairness (1996: 101). Wallace develops this commitment to fairness, and to norms of fairness, into an account of the conditions under which people are appropriately held morally responsible for their behavior (1996: 103–109). (For a more recent defense of the response-dependent approach to responsibility, see Shoemaker 2017b; for criticism of such approaches, see Todd 2016.)

As noted in §1 , one of the lasting influences of Harry Frankfurt’s defense of compatibilism was to draw attention to the actual causes of agents’ behavior, and particularly to whether an agent—even a causally determined agent—acted for her own reasons. Reasons-responsiveness approaches to responsibility have been particularly attentive to these issues. These approaches ground responsibility by reference to agents’ capacities for being appropriately sensitive to the rational considerations that bear on their actions. Interpreted broadly, reasons-responsiveness approaches include a diverse collection of views, such as David Brink and Dana Nelkin (2013), John M. Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998), Ishtiyaque Haji (1998), Michael McKenna (2013), Dana Nelkin (2011), Carolina Sartorio (2016), R. Jay Wallace (1996), and Susan Wolf (1990). Fischer and Ravizza’s Responsibility and Control (1998), which builds on Fischer (1994), offers the most influential articulation of the reasons-responsiveness approach.

Fischer and Ravizza begin with a distinction between regulative control and guidance control. Regulative control involves the possession of a dual power: “the power freely to do some act A , and the power freely to do something else instead” (1998: 31). Guidance control, on the other hand, does not require access to alternatives: it is manifested when an agent guides her behavior in a particular direction (and regardless of whether it was open to her to guide her behavior in a different direction). Since Fischer and Ravizza take Frankfurt cases ( §1 ) to show that access to behavioral alternatives is not necessary for moral responsibility, they conclude that “the sort of control necessarily associated with moral responsibility for action is guidance control ” and not regulative control (1998: 33; emphasis in original).

A number of factors can undermine guidance control. If a person’s behavior is brought about by hypnosis, brainwashing, or genuinely irresistible urges, then that person may not be morally responsible for her behavior since she does not reflectively guide it in the way required for responsibility (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 35). More specifically, an agent in the above circumstances is not likely to be responsible because he “is not responsive to reasons—his behavior would be the same, no matter what reasons there were” (1998: 37). Thus, Fischer and Ravizza characterize possession of guidance control as (partially) dependent on responsiveness to reasons. In particular, guidance control depends on whether the psychological mechanism that issues in an agent’s behavior is responsive to reasons. (Guidance control also requires that an agent owns the mechanism on which she acts. According to Fischer and Ravizza, this requires placing historical conditions on responsibility; see §3.3.3 .)

Fischer and Ravizza’s focus on mechanisms is motivated by the following reasoning. In a Frankfurt case, an agent is responsible for an action even though his so acting is ensured by external factors. But the presence of these external factors means that the agent in a Frankfurt case would have acted the same no matter what reasons he was confronted with, which suggests that the responsible agent in a Frankfurt scenario is not responsive to reasons. This is a problem for Fischer and Ravizza’s claim that guidance control, and thus reasons-responsiveness, is necessary for responsibility. Fischer and Ravizza’s solution is to argue that while the agent in a Frankfurt case may not be responsive to reasons, the agent’s mechanism—“the process that leads to the relevant upshot [i.e., the agent’s action]”—may well be responsive to reasons (1998: 38). In other words, the agent’s generally-specified psychological mechanism might have responded (under counterfactual conditions) to considerations in favor of omitting the action that the agent actually performed (and that he was guaranteed to perform, regardless of reasons, since he was in a Frankfurt-type scenario).

Fischer and Ravizza thus arrive at the following provisional conclusion: “relatively clear cases of moral responsibility”—that is, those in which an agent is not hypnotized, etc.—are distinguished by the fact that “an agent exhibits guidance control of an action insofar as the mechanism that actually issues in the action is his own, reasons-responsive mechanism” (1998: 39). But how responsive to reasons does an agent’s mechanism need to be for that agent to have the type of control over his behavior associated with moral responsibility? A strongly reasons-responsive mechanism would both recognize and respond to any sufficient reason to act otherwise (1998: 41). (In Fischer and Ravizza’s terminology, such a mechanism is strongly “receptive” and “reactive” to reasons). But strong reasons-responsiveness cannot be required for guidance control since many intuitively responsible agents—i.e., many garden variety wrongdoers—fail to attend to sufficient reasons to do otherwise. On the other hand, weak reasons-responsiveness is not enough for guidance control. An agent with a weakly reasons-responsive mechanism will respond appropriately to some sufficient reason to do otherwise, but the pattern of responsiveness revealed in the agent’s behavior might be too arbitrary for the agent to be credited with the kind of control required for responsibility. A person’s pattern of responsiveness to reasons would likely seem erratic in the relevant way if, for example, she would forego purchasing a ticket to a basketball game if it cost one thousand dollars, but not if it cost two thousand dollars (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 66).

Fischer and Ravizza settle on moderate reasons responsiveness as the sort that is most germane to guidance control (1998: 69–85). A psychological mechanism that is moderately responsive to reasons exhibits regularity with respect to its receptivity to reasons: that is, it exhibits “an understandable pattern of (actual and hypothetical) reasons-receptivity” (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 71; emphasis in original). Such a pattern will indicate that an agent understands “how reasons fit together” and that, for example, “acceptance of one reason as sufficient implies that a stronger reason must also be sufficient” (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 71). (In addition, a pattern of regular receptivity to reasons will include receptivity to a range of moral considerations (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 77). This will rule out attributing moral responsibility to non-moral agents; see Todd and Tognazzini 2008 for criticism of Fischer and Ravizza’s articulation of this condition.) However, a moderately responsive mechanism may be only weakly reactive to reasons since, as Fischer and Ravizza put it (somewhat mysteriously), “reactivity is all of piece” such

that if an agent’s mechanism reacts to some incentive to…[do otherwise], this shows that the mechanism can react to any incentive to do otherwise. (1998: 73; emphasis in original)

Fischer and Ravizza’s account has generated a great deal of attention and criticism. Some critics focus on the contrast (just noted) between the conditions they impose on receptivity to reasons and those they impose on reactivity to reasons (McKenna 2005, Mele 2006a, Watson 2001). Additionally, many are dissatisfied with Fischer and Ravizza’s presentation of their account in terms of the powers of mechanisms as opposed to agents. This has led some authors to develop agent-based reasons-responsiveness accounts that address the concerns that led Fischer and Ravizza to their mechanism-based approach (Brink & Nelkin 2013, McKenna 2013, Sartorio 2016).

3. Contemporary Debates

3.1 the “faces” of responsibility.

Do our responsibility practices accommodate distinct forms of moral responsibility? Are there different senses in which people may be morally responsible for their behavior? Contemporary interest in these possibilities has its roots in a debate between Susan Wolf and Gary Watson. Among other things, Wolf’s important 1990 book, Freedom Within Reason , offers a critical discussion of “Real Self” theories of responsibility. According to these views, a person is responsible for behavior that is attributable to her real self, and

an agent’s behavior is attributable to the agent’s real self…if she is at liberty (or able) both to govern her behavior on the basis of her will and to govern her will on the basis of her valuational system. (Wolf 1990: 33)

The basic idea is that a responsible agent is not simply moved by her strongest desires, but also, in some way, approves of, or stands behind, the desires that move her because they are governed by her values or because they are endorsed by higher-order desires. Wolf’s central example of a Real Self view is Watson’s (1975). In an important and closely related earlier paper, Wolf (1987) characterizes Watson (1975), Harry Frankfurt (1971), and Charles Taylor (1976) as offering “deep self views”. For more on real-self/deep-self views, see §3.3.3 ; for a recent presentation of a real-self view, see Chandra Sripada (2016).

According to Wolf, one point in favor of Real Self views is that they explain why people acting under the influence of hypnosis or compulsive desires are often not responsible (1990: 33). Since these agents are typically unable, under these conditions, to govern their behavior on the basis of their valuational systems, they are alienated from their actions in a way that undermines responsibility. But, for Wolf, it is a mark against Real Self views that they tend to be silent on the topic of how agents come to have the selves that they do. An agent’s real self might, for example, be the product of a traumatic upbringing, and Wolf argues that this would give us reason to question the “agent’s responsibility for her real self” and thus her responsibility for the present behavior that issues from that self (1990: 37; emphasis in original). For an important account of an agent with such an upbringing, see Wolf’s (1987) fictional example of JoJo (and see Watson 1987 [2004] for a related discussion of the convicted murderer Robert Alton Harris). For discussion of JoJo in this entry, see §3.2.1 , and for general discussion of the relevance of personal history for present responsibility see §3.3.3 .

Wolf suggests that when a person’s real self is the product of serious childhood trauma (or related factors), then that person is potentially responsible for her behavior only in a superficial sense that merely attributes bad actions to the agent’s real self (1990: 37–40). However, Wolf argues that ascriptions of moral responsibility go deeper than such attributions can reach:

When…we consider an individual worthy of blame or of praise, we are not merely judging the moral quality of the event with which the individual is so intimately associated; we are judging the moral quality of the individual herself in some more focused, noninstrumental, and seemingly more serious way. (1990: 41)

This deeper form of assessment—assessment in terms of “deep responsibility” (Wolf 1990: 41)—requires more than that an agent is “able to form her actions on the basis of her values”, it also requires that “she is able to form her values on the basis of what is True and Good” (Wolf 1990: 75). This latter ability will be impaired or absent in an agent whose real self is the product of pressures (such as a traumatic childhood) that have distorted her moral vision. (For the relevance of moral vision, or “moral competence”, for responsibility, see §3.2 .)

In “Two Faces of Responsibility” (1996 [2004]), Gary Watson responds to Wolf. Watson agrees with Wolf that some approaches to responsibility—i.e., self-disclosure views (a phrase Watson borrows from Benson 1987)—focus narrowly on whether behavior is attributable to an agent. But Watson denies that these attributions constitute a merely superficial form of responsibility assessment. After all, behavior that is attributable to an agent—in the sense, for example, of issuing from her valuational system—often discloses something interpersonally and morally significant about the agent’s “fundamental evaluative orientation” (Watson 1996 [2004: 271]). Thus, ascriptions of responsibility in this responsibility-as-attributability sense are “central to ethical life and ethical appraisal” (Watson 1996 [2004: 263]).

However, Watson agrees with Wolf that the above story of responsibility is incomplete: there is more to responsibility than attributing actions to agents. In addition, we hold agents responsible for their behavior, which “is not just a matter of the relation of an individual to her behavior” (Watson 1996 [2004: 262]). When we hold responsible, we also “demand (require) certain conduct from one another and respond adversely to one another’s failures to comply with these demands” (Watson 1996 [2004: 262]). The moral demands, and potential for adverse treatment, associated with holding others responsible are part of our accountability (as opposed to attributability) practices, and these features of accountability raise issues of fairness that do not arise in the context of determining whether behavior is attributable to an agent (Watson 1996 [2004: 273]). Therefore, conditions may apply to accountability that do not apply to attributability: for example, perhaps “accountability blame” should be—as Wolf suggested—moderated in the case of an agent whose “squalid circumstances made it overwhelmingly difficult to develop a respect for the standards to which we would hold him accountable” (Watson 1996 [2004: 281]).

There are, then, two forms, or “faces”, of responsibility on Watson’s account. There is responsibility-as-attributability, and when an agent satisfies the conditions on this form of responsibility, behavior is properly attributed to her as reflecting morally important features of her self—her virtues and vices, for example. But there is also responsibility-as-accountability, and when an agent satisfies the conditions on this form of responsibility, which requires more than the correct attribution of behavior, she is open to being held accountable for that behavior in the ways that predominantly characterize moral blame.

It has become common for the views of several authors to be described (with varying degrees of accuracy) as instances of “attributionism”; see Neil Levy (2005) for the first use of this term. These authors include Robert Adams (1985), Nomy Arpaly (2003), Pamela Hieronymi (2004), T. M. Scanlon (1998, 2008), George Sher (2006a, 2006b, 2009), Angela Smith (2005, 2008), and Matthew Talbert (2012, 2013). Attributionists take moral responsibility assessments to be mainly concerned with whether an action (or omission, character trait, or belief) is attributable to an agent for the purposes of moral assessment, where this usually means that the action (or omission, etc.) reflects the agent’s “judgment sensitive attitudes” (Scanlon 1998), “evaluative judgments” (A. Smith 2005), or, more generally, her “moral personality” (Hieronymi 2008).

Attributionism resembles the self-disclosure views mentioned by Watson (see the previous subsection) insofar as both focus on the way that a responsible agent’s behavior discloses interpersonally and morally significant features of the agent’s self. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that contemporary attributionist views are interested only in specifying the conditions for what Watson calls responsibility-as-attributability. In fact, attributionists typically take themselves to be giving conditions for holding agents responsible in Watson’s accountability sense. (See the previous subsection for the distinction between accountability and attributability.)

According to attributionism, fulfillment of attributability conditions is sufficient for holding agents accountable for their behavior. This means that attributionism rejects conditions on moral responsibility that would excuse agents if their characters were shaped under adverse conditions (Scanlon 1998: 278–85), or if the thing for which the agent is blamed was not under her control (Sher 2006b and 2009, A. Smith 2005), or if the agent can’t be expected to recognize the moral status of her behavior (Scanlon 1998: 287–290; Talbert 2012). Attributionists reject these conditions on responsibility because morally and interpersonally significant behavior is attributable to agents that do not fulfill them, and such attributions are taken to be sufficient for an agent to be open to the responses involved in holding agents accountable for their behavior. Attributionists have also argued that blame may profitably be understood as a form of moral protest (Hieronymi 2001, A. Smith 2013, Talbert 2012); part of the appeal of this move is that moral protests may be legitimate in cases in which the above conditions are not met.

Several objections have been posed to attributionism. Some argue that attributionists are wrong to reject the conditions on responsibility mentioned in the last paragraph (Levy 2005, 2011; Shoemaker 2011, 2015a; Watson 2011). It has also been argued that the attributionist account of blame is too close to mere negative appraisal (Levy 2005; Wallace 1996: 80–1; Watson 2002). In addition, Scanlon (2008) has been criticized for failing to take negative emotions such as resentment to be central to the phenomenon of blame (Wallace 2011, Wolf 2011; a similar criticism would apply to Sher 2006a).

Building on the distinction between attributability and accountability ( §3.1.1 ), David Shoemaker (2011 and 2015a) has introduced a third form of responsibility: answerability. On Shoemaker’s view, attributability-responsibility assessments respond to facts about an agent’s character, accountability-responsibility responds to an agent’s degree of regard for others, and answerability-responsibility responds to an agent’s evaluative judgments. However, A. Smith (2015) and Hieronymi (2008 and 2014) use “answerability” to refer to a view more like the attributionist perspective described in the previous subsection, and Pereboom (2014) has used the term to indicate a form of responsibility more congenial to responsibility skeptics.

3.2 Moral Competence

The possibility that moral competence—the ability to recognize and respond to moral considerations—is a condition on moral responsibility has been suggested at several points above ( §2.2.1 , §2.2.2 , §2.3 , §3.1.1 , §3.1.2 ). Susan Wolf’s (1987) fictional story of “JoJo” is one of the best-known illustrations of this proposal. JoJo was raised by an evil dictator, and as a result he became the same sort of sadistic tyrant that his father was. As an adult, JoJo is happy to be the sort of person that he is, and he is moved by precisely the desires (e.g., to imprison, torture, and execute his subjects) that he wants to be moved by. Thus, JoJo fulfills important conditions on responsibility ( §3.1.1 , §3.3.3 ), however, Wolf argues that it may be unfair to hold him responsible for his bad behavior.

JoJo’s upbringing plays an important role in Wolf’s argument, but only because it left JoJo unable to fully appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior. Thus, it is JoJo’s impaired moral competence that does the real excusing work, and similar conclusions of non-responsibility should be drawn about all those whom we think “could not help but be mistaken about their [bad] values”, if possession of these values impairs their ability to tell right from wrong (Wolf 1987: 57).

Many others join Wolf in arguing that impaired moral competence (perhaps on account of one’s upbringing or other environmental factors) undermines one’s moral responsibility (Benson 2001, Doris & Murphy 2007, Fischer & Ravizza 1998, Fricker 2010, Levy 2003, Russell 1995 and 2004, Wallace 1996, Watson 1987 [2004]). Part of what motivates this conclusion is the thought that it can be unreasonable to expect morally-impaired agents to avoid wrongful behavior, and that it is therefore unfair to expose these agents to the harm of moral blame on account of their wrongdoing. For detailed development of the moral competence requirement on responsibility in terms of considerations of fairness, see R. Jay Wallace (1996); also see Erin Kelly (2013), Neil Levy (2009), and Gary Watson (1987 [2004]). For rejection of the claim that blame is unfair in the case of the morally-impaired agent, see several of the defenders of attributionism mentioned in §3.1.2 (particularly Hieronymi 2004, Scanlon 1998, and Talbert 2012)

The moral competence condition on responsibility can also be motivated by the suggestion that impaired agents are not able to commit wrongs that have the sort of moral significance to which blame would be an appropriate response. The basic idea here is that, while morally-impaired agents can fail to show appropriate respect for others, these failures do not necessarily constitute the kind of flouting of moral norms that grounds blame (Watson 1987 [2004: 234]). In other words, a failure to respect others, is not always an instance of blame-grounding disrespect for others, since the latter (but not the former) requires the ability to comprehend the norms that one violates (Levy 2007, Shoemaker 2011).

Considerations about moral competence play an important role in the recent trend of conversational theories of responsibility, which construe elements of our responsibility practices as morally-expressive moves in an ongoing moral conversation. The thought here is that to fruitfully (and fully) participate in such a conversation, one must have some degree of competence in the (moral) language of that conversation.

Several prominent versions of the conversational approach develop P. F. Strawson’s suggestion ( §2.2.1 ) that the negative reactive attitudes involved in blame are expressions of a demand for moral regard from other agents. Gary Watson argues that a demand “presumes”, as a condition on the intelligibility of expressing it, “understanding on the part of the object of the demand” (1987 [2004: 230]). Therefore, since, “[t]he reactive attitudes are incipiently forms of communication”, they are intelligibly expressed “only on the assumption that the other can comprehend the message”, and since the message is a moral one, “blaming and praising those with diminished moral understanding loses its ‘point,’” at least in a certain sense (Watson 1987 [2004: 230]; see Watson 2011 for a modification of this proposal). R. Jay Wallace argues, similarly, that since responsibility practices are internal to moral relationships that are

defined by the successful exchange of moral criticism and justification…. it will be reasonable to hold accountable only someone who is at least a candidate for this kind of exchange of criticism and justification. (1996: 164)

Michael McKenna’s Conversation and Responsibility (2012) offers the most developed conversational analysis of responsibility. For McKenna, the “moral responsibility exchange” occurs in stages: an initial “moral contribution” of morally salient behavior; the “moral address” of, e.g., blame that responds to the moral contribution; the “moral account” in which the first contributor responds to moral address with, e.g., apology; and so on (2012: 89). Like Wallace and Watson, McKenna notes the way in which a morally impaired agent will find it difficult “to appreciate the challenges put to her by those who hold [her] morally responsible”, but he also argues that a suitably impaired agent cannot even make the first move in a moral conversation (2012: 78). Thus, the morally impaired agent’s responsibility is called into question not only because she is unable to respond appropriately to moral demands, but also because “she is incapable of acting from a will with a moral quality that could be a candidate for assessment from the standpoint of holding responsible” (McKenna 2012: 78). This point is related to Neil Levy’s and David Shoemaker’s contention, noted in the previous subsection, that impairments of moral competence can leave an agent unable to harbor and express the type of ill will or lack of regard to which blame responds. By contrast, Watson (2011), seems to allow that significant moral impairment is compatible with the ability to perform blame-relevant wrongdoing, even if such impairment undermines the wrongdoer’s moral accountability for her actions.

For another important account of responsibility in broadly conversational terms, see Shoemaker’s discussion of the sort of moral anger involved in holding others accountable for their behavior (2015a: 87–117). For additional defenses and articulations of the conversational approach to responsibility, see Stephen Darwall (2006), Miranda Fricker (2016), and Colleen Macnamara (2015).

Impairments of moral competence come in degrees. Susan Wolf’s JoJo ( §3.2.1 ) has localized impairments of the capacity to recognize and respond to moral considerations, but it is not clear that he is entirely immune to moral considerations. However, at the far end of the spectrum, we encounter more globally and thoroughly impaired figures such as the psychopath. In philosophical treatments, the psychopath is typically presented as an agent who, while retaining other psychological capacities, is entirely—or as nearly so as possible—incapable of responding appropriately to moral considerations. (This is something of a philosophical construct since real-life psychopathy admits of varying degrees of impairment, corresponding to higher or lower scores on diagnostic measures.)

One interesting question is whether the psychopath’s inability—or at least consistent failure—to respond appropriately to moral incentives is primarily the result of a motivational rather than cognitive failure: does the psychopath in some way know what morality requires and simply not care? If a positive answer is given to this last question (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 76–81; Nichols 2002), then it seems likely that the psychopath could be responsible for at least some of his bad behavior. And some have argued that even if psychopathy is primarily a cognitive impairment, it may still be the case that psychopaths possess a sufficient capacity for distinguishing right and wrong—or that they possess sufficient related capacities—to be held responsible, at least to some extent and in certain ways (Glannon 1997, Greenspan 2003, Maibom 2008, Shoemaker 2014, Vargas & Nichols 2007). On the other hand, many believe that the psychopath’s capacity for grasping moral considerations is too superficial to sustain responsibility (Kennett 2019; Levy 2007; Nelkin 2015; Wallace 1996: 177–78; Watson 2011; see Mason 2017 for the claim that the relevant deficiency is one of moral knowledge rather than moral capacity). And still others have argued that even those who are fully impaired for moral understanding are open to blame as long as they possess broader rational competencies (Scanlon 1998: 287–290; Talbert 2014). However, the psychopath’s possession of these broader competencies has been called into question (Fine & Kennett 2004, Greenspan 2003, Litton 2010).

3.3 Skepticism and Related Topics

This section introduces contemporary skepticism about moral responsibility by way of discussions of several topics that have broad relevance for thinking about responsibility.

If moral responsibility requires free will, and free will involves access to alternatives in a way that is not compatible with determinism, then it would follow from the truth of determinism that no one is ever morally responsible. The above reasoning, and the skeptical conclusion it reaches, is endorsed by the hard determinist perspective on free will and responsibility, which was defended historically by Spinoza and d’Holbach (among others) and, more recently, by Ted Honderich (2002). But given that determinism may well be false, contemporary skeptics about moral responsibility more often pursue a hard incompatibilist line of argument according to which the kind of free will required for desert-based (as opposed to forward-looking, see §2.1 ) moral responsibility is incompatible with the truth or falsity of determinism (Pereboom 2001, 2014). The skeptical positions discussed below are generally of this sort: the skeptical conclusions they advocate do not depend on the truth of determinism.

According to Thomas Nagel, a person is subject to moral luck if factors that are not under that person’s control affect the moral assessments to which he is open (Nagel 1976 [1979]; also see Williams 1976 [1981] and the entry on moral luck .)

Is there such a thing as moral luck? More specifically, can luck affect a person’s moral responsibility? Consider a would-be assassin who shoots at her target, aiming to kill, but fails to do so only because her bullet is deflected by a passing bird. It seems that such a would-be assassin has good moral outcome luck (that is, good moral luck in the outcome of her behavior). Because of factors beyond her control, the would-be assassin’s moral record is better than it would have been: in particular, she is not a killer and is not morally responsible for causing anyone’s death. One might think, in addition, that the would-be assassin is less blameworthy than a successful assassin with whom she is otherwise identical, and that the reason for this is just that the successful assassin intentionally killed someone while the unsuccessful assassin (as a result of good moral luck) did not. (For important recent defenses of moral luck, see Hanna 2014 and Hartman 2017.)

On the other hand, one might think that if the two assassins just mentioned are identical in terms of their values, goals, intentions, and motivations, then the addition of a bit of luck to the unsuccessful assassin’s story cannot ground a deep contrast between these two agents in terms of their moral responsibility. One way to sustain this position is to argue that moral responsibility is a function solely of internal features of agents, such as their motives and intentions (Khoury 2018; also see Enoch & Marmor 2007 for some of the main arguments against moral luck). Of course, the successful assassin is responsible for something (killing a person) for which the unsuccessful assassin is not, but it might be possible to argue that both are morally responsible—and presumably blameworthy— to the same degree insofar as it was true of both of them that they aimed to kill, and that they did so for the same reasons and with the same degree of commitment toward bringing about that outcome (see M. Zimmerman 2002 and 2015 for this influential perspective).

But now consider a different would-be assassin who does not even try to kill anyone, but only because his circumstances did not favor this option. This would-be assassin is willing to kill under favorable circumstances (and so he may seem to have had good circumstantial moral luck since he was not in those circumstances). Perhaps the degree of responsibility attributed to the successful and unsuccessful assassins described above depends not so much on the fact that they both tried to kill as on the fact that they were both willing to kill; in this case, the would-be assassin just introduced may share their degree of responsibility since he shares their willingness to kill. But an account that focuses on how agents would be willing to act under counterfactual circumstances is likely to generate unintuitive conclusions about responsibility since many agents who are typically judged blameless might willingly perform terrible actions under the right circumstances. (M. Zimmerman 2002 and 2015 does not shy away from this consequence, but criticisms of his efforts to reject moral luck—Hanna 2014, Hartman 2017—have made much of it; see Peels 2015 for a position that is related to Zimmerman’s but that may avoid the unintuitive consequence just mentioned.)

Another approach to luck holds that it is inimical to moral responsibility in a way that generally undermines responsibility ascriptions. To see the motivation for this skeptical position, consider constitutive moral luck: that is, luck in how one is constituted in terms of the “inclinations, capacities, and temperament” one finds within oneself (Nagel 1976 [1979: 28]). Facts about a person’s inclinations, capacities, and temperament explain much—if not all—of that person’s behavior, and if the facts that explain why a person acts as she does are a result of good or bad luck, then perhaps it is unfair to hold her responsible for that behavior. As Nagel notes, once the full sweep of the various kinds of luck comes into view, “[t]he area of genuine agency” may seem to shrink to nothing since our actions and their consequences “result from the combined influence of factors, antecedent and posterior to action, that are not within the agent’s control” (1976 [1979: 35]). If this is right, then perhaps,

nothing remains which can be ascribed to the responsible self, and we are left with nothing but a…sequence of events, which can be deplored or celebrated, but not blamed or praised. (Nagel 1976 [1979: 37])

The above quotations notwithstanding, Nagel himself doesn’t fully embrace a skeptical conclusion about responsibility on grounds of moral luck, but others have done so, most notably, Neil Levy (2011). According to Levy’s “hard luck view”, the encompassing nature of moral luck means “that there are no desert-entailing differences between moral agents” (2011: 10). Of course, there are differences between agents in terms of their characters and the good or bad actions and outcomes that they produce, but Levy’s point is that, given the influence of luck in generating these differences, they don’t provide a sound basis for differential treatment of people in terms of moral praise and blame. (See Russell 2017 for a compatibilist account that is led to a variety of pessimism, though not skepticism, on the basis of the concerns about moral luck just described.)

Another important skeptical argument—related to the observations about constitutive moral luck in the previous subsection—is Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument, which concludes that “we cannot be truly or ultimately morally responsible for our actions” (1994: 5). (Since the argument targets “ultimate” moral responsibility, it does not necessarily exclude other forms, such as forward-looking responsibility ( §2.1 ) and, on some understandings, responsibility-as-attributability ( §3.1.1 ).) The argument begins by noting that an agent makes the choices she does because of certain facts about the way she is: for example, the facts about what seems choiceworthy to her. But if this is true, then, in order to be responsible for her subsequent choices, perhaps an agent also needs to be responsible for the facts about what seems choiceworthy to her. But how can one be responsible for these prior facts about herself? Wouldn’t this require a prior choice on the part of the agent, one that resulted in her present dispositions to see certain ends and means as choiceworthy? But this prior choice would itself be something for which the agent is responsible only if the agent is also responsible for the fact that that prior choice seemed choiceworthy to her. And now we must explain how the agent can be responsible for this additional prior fact about herself, which will require positing another choice by the agent, and the responsibility for that choice will also have to be secured, which will require explaining why it seemed choiceworthy to her, and so on. A regress looms here, and Strawson claims that it cannot be stopped except by positing an initial act of self-creation on the responsible agent’s part (1994: 5, 15). Only self-creating agents could be fully responsible for their own tendencies to exercise their powers of choice as they do, but self-creation is impossible, so no one is every truly or ultimately morally responsible for their behavior.

A number of replies to this argument (and the argument from constitutive moral luck) are possible. One might simply deny that how a person came to be the way she is matters for present responsibility: perhaps all we need to know in order to judge a person’s present responsibility are facts about her present constitution and about how that constitution is related to the person’s present behavior. (For views like this, see the discussion of attributionism ( §3.1.2 ) and the discussion of non-historical accounts of responsibility in the next subsection). Alternatively, one might think that while personal history matters for moral responsibility, Strawson’s argument sets the bar too high, requiring too much historical control over one’s constitution (see Fischer 2006; for a reply, see Levy 2011: 5). Perhaps what is needed is not literal self-creation, but simply an ability to enact changes in oneself so as to acquire responsibility for the self that results from these changes (Clarke 2005). A picture along these lines can be found in Aristotle’s suggestion that one can be responsible for being a careless person if one’s present state of carelessness is the result of earlier choices that one made (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics ; see also Michele Moody-Adams 1990).

Roughly in this Aristotelian vein, Robert Kane offers a detailed incompatibilist account of how we can secure ultimate responsibility for our actions (1996 and 2007). On Kane’s view, for an agent

to be ultimately responsible for [a] choice, the agent must be at least in part responsible by virtue of choices or actions voluntarily performed in the past for having the character and motives he or she now has. (2007: 14; emphasis in original)

This position may appear to be open to the regress concerns presented in Galen Strawson’s argument above. But Kane thinks a regress is avoided in cases in which a person’s character-forming choices are undetermined. Since these undetermined choices will have no sufficient causes, there is no relevant prior cause for which the agent must be responsible, so there is no regress problem (Kane 2007: 15–16; see Pereboom 2001: 47–50 for criticism of Kane on this point.)

Of particular interest to Kane are potential character-forming choices that occur “when we are torn between competing visions of what we should do or become” (2007: 26). In such cases, if a person sees reasons in favor of either choice that he might make, and the choice that he makes is undetermined, then whichever choice he makes will have been chosen for his own reasons. According to Kane, when an agent makes this kind of choice, he shapes his character, and since his choice is not determined by prior causal factors, he is responsible for it and for the character it shapes and for the character-determined choices that he makes in the future.

Kane’s approach is an important instance of those incompatibilist theories that attempt to explain how free will, while requiring indeterminism, could clearly be at home in the natural world as we know it (also see Balaguer 2010, Ekstrom 2000, and Franklin 2018). (This is as opposed to agent-causal accounts of free will—Chisholm 1964, O’Connor 2000—that invoke a type of causal power that is less easily naturalized). However, many have argued that any account like Kane’s, which inserts an indeterministic link in the causal chain leading to action, actually reduces an agent’s control over an action or at least leaves it unclear why such an insertion would increase agential control over actions as compared to a deterministic story of action (Hobart 1934; Levy 2011: 41–83; Pereboom 2014: 31–49; van Inwagen 1983: 126–52; Watson 1999).

Accounts such as Neil Levy’s (2011) and Galen Strawson’s (1994), described in the two preceding subsections, assume that the facts about the way a person came to be the way she is are relevant for determining her present responsibility. But non-historical views, such as attributionism ( §3.1.2 ) and the views that Susan Wolf calls “Real Self” theories ( §3.1.1 ), reject this contention. Real Self accounts are sometimes referred to as “structural” or “hierarchical” theories, and John M. Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998: 184–187) have called them “mesh” theories. By whatever name, the basic idea is that an agent is morally responsible insofar as her will has the right sort of structure: in particular, there needs to be a mesh or fit between the desires that actually move the agent and her values, or between the desires that move her and her higher-order desires, the latter of which are the agent’s reflective preferences about which desires should move her. (For approaches along these lines, see Dworkin 1970; Frankfurt 1971, 1987; Neely 1974; and Watson 1975.)

Harry Frankfurt’s comparison between a willing drug addict and an unwilling addict illustrates important features of his version of the structural approach to responsibility. Both of Frankfurt’s addicts have desires to take the drug to which they are addicted, and the nature of their addictions is such that both addicts will ultimately act to fulfill their first-order addictive desire. But suppose that both addicts are capable of taking higher-order perspectives on their first-order desires, and suppose that they take different higher-order perspectives. The willing addict endorses and identifies with his addictive desire. The unwilling addict, on the other hand, repudiates his addictive desire to such an extent that, when it ends up being effective, Frankfurt says that this addict is “helplessly violated by his own desires” (1971: 12). The willing addict has a kind of freedom that the unwilling addict lacks: they may both be bound to take the drug to which they are addicted, but insofar as the willing addict is moved by a desire that he endorses, he acts freely in a way that the unwilling addict does not (Frankfurt 1971: 19). A related conclusion about responsibility may be drawn: perhaps the unwilling addict’s desire is alien to him in such a way that his responsibility for acting on it is called into question (for a recent defense of this conclusion, see Sripada 2017).

One objection to Frankfurt’s view goes like this. His account seems to assume that the addicts’ higher-order desires have the authority to speak for them—they reveal (or constitute) the agent’s “real self”, to use Wolf’s language (1990). But if higher-order desires are invoked out of a concern that an agent’s first-order desires may not stem from his real self, why won’t the same worry recur with respect to higher-order desires as well? In other words, when ascending through the orders of desires, why stop at any particular point, why not think that appeal to a still higher order is always necessary to reveal where an agent stands? (See Watson (1975) for an objection along these lines, which partly motivates Watson—in his articulation of a structural approach—to focus on whether an agent’s desires conform with her values , rather than with her higher-order desires).

And even if one agrees with Frankfurt (or Watson) about the structural elements required for responsibility, one might wonder how an agent’s will came to have its particular structure. Thus, an important type of objection to Frankfurt’s view notes that the relevant structure might have been put in place by factors that intuitively undermine responsibility, in which case the presence of the relevant structure is not itself sufficient for responsibility (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 196–201; Locke 1975; Slote 1980). Fischer and Ravizza argue that

[i]f the mesh [between higher- and lower-order desires] were produced by…brainwashing or subliminal advertising…we would not hold the agent morally responsible for his behavior

because the psychological mechanism that produced the behavior would not be, “in an important intuitive sense, the agent’s own ” (1998: 197; emphasis in original). In response to this type of worry, Fischer and Ravizza argue that responsibility has an important historical component, which they attempt to capture with their account of how agents can “take responsibility” for the psychological mechanisms that produces their behavior (1998: 207–239). (For criticism of Fischer and Ravizza’s account of taking responsibility, see Levy 2011: 103–106 and Pereboom 2001: 120–22; for quite different accounts of taking responsibility, see Enoch 2012; Mason 2019: 179–207; and Wolf 2001. For work on the general significance of personal histories for responsibility, see Christman 1991, Vargas 2006, and D. Zimmerman 2003.)

Part of Fischer and Ravizza’s motivation for developing their account of “taking responsibility” was to ensure that agents who have been manipulated in certain ways do not turn out to be responsible on their view. Several examples and arguments featuring the sort of manipulation that worried Fischer and Ravizza have played important roles in the recent literature on responsibility. One of these is Alfred Mele’s Beth/Ann example (1995, 2006b), which emphasizes the difficulties faced by accounts of responsibility that eschew historical conditions. In the example, Ann has acquired her preferences and values in the normal way, but Beth is manipulated by a team of neuroscientists so that she now has preferences and values that are identical to Ann’s. After the manipulation, Beth is capable of reflecting on her new values, and when she does so, she endorses them enthusiastically. But whereas we might normally take such an endorsement to be a sign of the sort of self-governance associated with responsibility, Mele suggests that Beth, unlike Ann, exhibits merely “ersatz self-government” since Beth’s new values where imposed on her (1995: 155). And if certain kinds of personal histories similarly undermine an agent’s ability to genuinely or authentically govern her behavior, then agents with these histories will not be morally responsible. (For replies to Mele and general insights into manipulation cases, see Arpaly 2003, King 2013, McKenna 2004, and Todd 2011; for discussion of issues about personal identity that arise in manipulation cases, see Khoury 2013, Matheson 2014, Shoemaker 2012)

Now one can take a hard line in Beth’s case (McKenna 2004). Such a stance might involve noting that while Beth acquired her new values in a strange way (and in a way that involved moral wrongs done to her), everyone acquires their values in ways that are not fully under their control. Indeed, following Galen Strawson’s line of argument (1994), described in §3.3.2 , it might be noted that no one has ultimate control over their values, and even if normal agents have some capacity to address and alter their values, the dispositional factors that govern how this capacity is used are ultimately the result of factors beyond agents’ control. So perhaps it is not as clear as it might first appear that Beth is distinguished from normal agents in terms of her powers of self-governance and her moral responsibility for her behavior. But this reasoning can cut both ways: instead of showing that Beth is assimilated into the class of normal, responsible agents, it might show that normal agents are assimilated into the class of non-responsible agents like Beth. Derk Pereboom’s four-case argument employs a maneuver along these lines (1995, 2001, 2007, 2014).

Pereboom’s argument presents Professor Plum in four different scenarios. In each scenario, Plum kills Ms. White while satisfying the conditions on desert-involving moral responsibility most often proposed by compatibilists (and described in earlier sections of this entry): Plum kills White because he wants to, and while this desire is in keeping with Plum’s character, it is not irresistible; Plum also endorses his desire to kill White from a higher-order volitional perspective; finally, Plum is generally morally competent, and the process of deliberation that leads to his decision to kill White is appropriately responsive to reasons.

In Case 1, Plum is “created by neuroscientists, who…manipulate him directly through the use of radio-like technology” (Pereboom 2001: 112). These scientists cause Plum’s reasoning to take a certain (reasons-responsive) path that culminates in Plum concluding that the self-serving reasons in favor of killing White outweigh the reasons in favor of not doing so. Pereboom believes that in such a case Plum is clearly not responsible for killing White since his behavior was determined by the actions of the neuroscientists. In Cases 2 and 3, Plum is causally determined to undertake the same reasoning process as in Case 1, but in Case 2 Plum is merely programmed to do so by neuroscientists (rather than having been created by them), and in Case 3 Plum’s reasoning is the result of socio-cultural influences that determine his character. In Case 4, Plum is just a normal human being in a causally deterministic universe, and he decides to kill White in the same way as in the previous cases.

Pereboom claims that there is no relevant difference between Cases 1, 2, and 3 such that our judgments about Plum’s responsibility should be different in these three cases. Furthermore, the reason that Plum is not responsible in these cases seems to be that, in each case, his behavior is causally determined by forces beyond his control (Pereboom 2001: 116). But then we should conclude that Plum is not responsible in Case 4 (since causal determinism is the defining feature of that case). And since, in Case 4, Plum is just a normal human being in a causally deterministic universe, the conclusion we draw about him should extend to all other normal persons in causally deterministic universes. (For an important, related manipulation argument, see Mele’s “zygote argument” in Mele 1995, 2006b, and 2008.)

Pereboom’s argument has inspired a number of objections. For example, it could be argued that in Case 1, the manipulation to which Plum is subject undermines his responsibility for some reason besides the fact that the manipulation causally determines his behavior, which would stop the generalization from Case 1 to the subsequent cases (Fischer 2004, Mele 2005, Demetriou 2010; for a response to this line of argument, see Matheson 2016; Pereboom addresses this concern in his 2014 presentation of the argument; also see Shabo 2010). Alternatively, it might be argued, on compatibilist grounds, that Plum is responsible in Case 4, and this conclusion might be extended to the earlier cases since Plum fulfills the same compatibilist-friendly conditions on responsibility in those cases (McKenna 2008).

The four-case argument attempts to show that if determinism is true, then we cannot be the sources of our actions in the way required for moral responsibility. It is, therefore, an argument for incompatibilism rather than for skepticism about moral responsibility. But, in combination with Pereboom’s argument that we lack the sort of free will required for responsibility even if determinism is false (2001: 38–88; 2014: 30–70), the four-case argument has emerged as an important part of a detailed and influential skeptical perspective. For other skeptical accounts, see Caruso (2016), Smilansky (2000), Waller (2011); also see the entry on skepticism about moral responsibility .

There has been a recent surge in interest in the epistemic, or knowledge, condition on responsibility (as opposed to the freedom or control condition that is at the center of the free will debate). In this context, the following epistemic argument for skepticism about responsibility has been developed. (In certain structural respects, the argument resembles Galen Strawson’s skeptical argument discussed in §3.3.2 .)

Sometimes agents act in ignorance of the likely bad consequences of their actions, and sometimes their ignorance excuses them from blame for so acting. But in other cases, an agent’s ignorance might not excuse him. How can we distinguish the cases where ignorance excuses from those in which it does not? One proposal is that ignorance fails to excuse when the ignorance is itself something for which an agent might be blamed. And one proposal for when ignorance is blameworthy is that it issues from a blameworthy benighting act in which an agent culpably impairs, or fails to improve, his own epistemic position (H. Smith 1983). In such a case, the agent’s ignorance seems to be his own fault, so it cannot be appealed to in order to excuse the agent.

But when is a benighting act blameworthy? Several philosophers have suggested that we are culpable for benighting acts only when we engage in them knowing that we are doing so and knowing that we should not do so (Levy 2011, Rosen 2004, M. Zimmerman 1997). Ultimately, the suggestion is that ignorance for which one is blameworthy, and that leads to blameworthy unwitting wrongdoing, has its source in knowing wrongful behavior. Thus, if someone unwittingly does something wrong, then that person will be blameworthy only if we can explain his lack of knowledge (his “unwittingness”) by reference to something else that he knowingly did wrong.

Consider an example from Gideon Rosen (2004) in which a surgeon orders her patient to be transfused with the wrong type of blood, and suppose that the surgeon was unaware that she was making this mistake. According to Rosen, the surgeon will be blameworthy for harming her patient only if she is blameworthy for being ignorant about the patient’s blood type when she requests the transfusion, and she will be blameworthy for this only if her ignorance stems from some instance in which the surgeon knowingly failed to do something that she ought to have done to avoid her later ignorance. It won’t, for example, be enough that the surgeon’s ignorance is explained by her failure to doublecheck the patient’s medical records. In order to ground blame, this omission on the surgeon’s part must itself have been culpable, which requires that the surgeon knew that this omission was wrong. And if the surgeon wasn’t aware that she was committing a wrongful omission (when she failed to doublecheck her patient’s medical records), then this failure of knowledge on the surgeon’s part must be explained by some prior culpable—that is, knowing—act or omission. In the end, for Rosen,

the only possible locus of original responsibility [for a later unwitting act] is an akratic act …. a knowing sin. (2004: 307; emphasis in original)

Similarly, Michael Zimmerman argues that

all culpability can be traced to culpability that involves lack of ignorance, that is, that involves a belief on the agent’s part that he or she is doing something morally wrong. (1997: 418)

The above reasoning may apply not just to cases in which a person is unaware of the consequences of her action, but also to cases in which a person is unaware of the moral status of her behavior. A slaveowner, for example, might think that slaveholding is permissible, and so, on the account considered here, he will be blameworthy only if he is culpable for his ignorance about the moral status of slavery, which will require, for example, that he ignored evidence about its moral status while knowing that this is something he should not do (Rosen 2003 and 2004).

These reflections can give rise to a couple forms of skepticism about moral responsibility (and particularly about blameworthiness). First, we might come to endorse a form of epistemic skepticism on the grounds that we rarely have insight into whether a wrongdoer was akratic—that is, was a knowing wrongdoer—at some suitable point in the etiology of a given action (Rosen 2004). Alternatively, or in addition, one might endorse a more substantive form of skepticism on the grounds that a great many normal wrongdoers don’t exhibit the sort of knowing wrongdoing supposedly required for responsibility. In other words, perhaps very many wrongdoers don’t know that they are wrongdoers and their ignorance on this score is not their fault since it doesn’t arise from an appropriate earlier instance of knowing wrongdoing. In this case, very many ordinary wrongdoers may fail to be morally responsible for their behavior. (For skeptical suggestions along these lines, see M. Zimmerman 1997 and Levy 2011.)

There is more to the epistemic dimension of responsibility than what is contained in the above skeptical argument, but the argument does bring out a lot of what is of interest in this domain. For one thing, it prominently relies on a tracing strategy. This strategy is used, for example, in accounts that feature a person who does not, at the time of action, fulfill control or knowledge conditions on responsibility, but who nonetheless seems morally responsible for her behavior. In such a case, the agent’s responsibility may be grounded in the fact that her failure to fulfill certain conditions on responsibility is traceable to earlier actions undertaken by the agent when she did fulfill these conditions. For example, a person may be so intoxicated that she lacks control over, or awareness of, her behavior, and yet it may still be appropriate to hold her responsible for her intoxicated behavior insofar as she freely took steps to intoxicate herself. The tracing strategy plays an important role in many accounts of responsibility (see, e.g., Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 49–51), but it has also been subjected to important criticisms (see Vargas 2005; for a reply see Fischer and Tognazzini 2009; for more on tracing, see Khoury 2012, King 2014, Shabo 2015, and Timpe 2011).

Various strategies for rejecting the above skeptical argument also illustrate stances one can take on the relevance of knowledge for responsibility. These strategies typically involve rejecting the claim that knowing wrongdoing is fundamental to blameworthiness. For example, it might be argued that it is often morally reckless to perform actions when one is merely uncertain whether they are wrong, and that this recklessness is sufficient for blameworthiness (see Guerrero 2007; also see Nelkin & Rickless 2017b and Robichaud 2014). Another strategy would be to argue that blameworthiness can be grounded in cases of morally ignorant wrongdoing if it is reasonable to expect the wrongdoer to have avoided her moral ignorance, and particularly if her ignorance is itself caused by the agent’s own epistemic and moral vices (FitzPatrick 2008 and 2017). Relatedly, it might be argued that one who is unaware that he does wrong is blameworthy if he possessed relevant capacities for avoiding his failure of awareness; this approach may be particularly promising in cases in which an agent’s lack of moral awareness stems from a failure to remember her moral duties (Clarke 2014, 2017 and Sher 2006b, 2009; also see Rudy-Hiller 2017). Finally, it might simply be claimed that morally ignorant wrongdoers can harbor, and express through their behavior, objectionable attitudes or qualities of will that suffice for blameworthiness (Arpaly 2003, Björnsson 2017, Harman 2011, Mason 2015, Talbert 2013). This approach may be most promising in cases in which a wrongdoer is aware of the material outcomes of her conduct but unaware of the fact that she does wrong in bringing about those outcomes.

For more, see the entry on the epistemic condition for moral responsibility .

The special issues of Midwest Studies in Philosophy cited in the Introduction are Volume 30 (2006) and Volume 38 (2014), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

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• The Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website , edited by Ted Honderich, University College London.
• Flickers of Freedom (multiple contributors, coordinated by Thomas Nadelhoffer, closed 9 February 2017, archive version)
• Eshleman, Andrew, “Moral Responsibility”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/moral-responsibility/ >. [This was the previous entry on this topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — see the version history .]

blame | compatibilism | determinism: causal | free will | free will: divine foreknowledge and | incompatibilism: (nondeterministic) theories of free will | incompatibilism: arguments for | luck: moral | moral responsibility: the epistemic condition | responsibility: collective | skepticism: about moral responsibility

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Derk Pereboom for his helpful comments on drafts of this entry.

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Essay on Social Responsibility

Social responsibility is a term that has been used in different contexts, including the economy, education, politics , and religion. Social responsibility is challenging because it encompasses so many aspects, and there is no single definition of social responsibility. In simple words, social responsibility is the responsibility of an individual to act in a way that promotes social well-being. This means that a person has a sense of obligation to society and sacrifices for the good of others. BYJU’S essay on social responsibility explains the importance of being a socially responsible citizen.

A society’s responsibility to the individuals in that society can be seen through the various social programmes and laws. Governments try to create a better world for their citizens, so they implement various social programmes like welfare, tax assistance, and unemployment benefits. Laws are also crucial to a society because they enforce practical actions by its citizens and punish harmful actions. Now, let us understand the significance of social responsibility by reading a short essay on social responsibility.

Importance of Social Responsibility

BYJU’S essay on social responsibility highlights the importance of doing good deeds for society. The short essay lists different ways people can contribute to social responsibility, such as donating time and money to charities and giving back by visiting places like hospitals or schools. This essay discusses how companies can support specific causes and how people can be actively involved in volunteering and organisations to help humanitarian efforts.

Social responsibility is essential in many aspects of life. It helps to bring people together and also promotes respect for others. Social responsibility can be seen in how you treat other people, behave outside of work, and contribute to the world around you. In addition, there are many ways to be responsible for the protection of the environment, and recycling is one way. It is crucial to recycle materials to conserve resources, create less pollution, and protect the natural environment.

Society is constantly changing, and the way people live their lives may also vary. It is crucial to keep up with new technology so that it doesn’t negatively impact everyone else. Social responsibility is key to making sure that society is prosperous. For example, social media has created a platform for people to share their experiences and insights with other people. If a company were going to develop a new product or service, it would be beneficial for them to survey people about what they think about the idea before implementing it because prior knowledge can positively impact future decisions.

Social responsibility is essential because it creates a sense of responsibility to the environment . It can lead to greater trust among members of society. Another reason is that companies could find themselves at a competitive disadvantage if they do not ensure their practices are socially responsible. Moreover, companies help people in need through money, time, and clothing, which is a great way to showcase social responsibility.

Being socially responsible is a great responsibility of every human being, and we have briefly explained this in the short essay on social responsibility. Moreover, being socially responsible helps people upgrade the environment and society. For more essays, click on BYJU’S kids learning activities.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does being socially responsible help in protecting the environment.

Yes. Being socially responsible helps in protecting the environment.

Why should we be socially responsible?

We should be socially responsible because it is the right thing to upgrade society and the environment. Another reason is to help those in need because when more people have jobs, the economy can thrive, and people will have more opportunities.

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