japanese earthquake and tsunami 2011 case study

Earthquakes and tsunami – WJEC Case study: Japan tsunami 2011 (HIC)

Earthquakes are caused by the release of built-up pressure at plate boundaries. They can destroy buildings and infrastructure. Tsunami can also occur, with equally devastating and deadly effects.

Part of Geography Tectonic landscapes and hazards

Case study: Japan tsunami 2011 (HIC)

On Friday 11 March 2011 at 14:46:24, an earthquake of magnitude nine on the Richter scale close Richter scale The measure by which the strength of earthquakes is determined. occurred. It was at the point where the Pacific tectonic plate slides beneath the North American plate. The epicentre close epicentre The point on the Earth's surface directly above the focus of an earthquake. was 30 kilometres below the Pacific Ocean seabed and 129 kilometres off the east coast of Honshu, Japan. This triggered a tsunami. High, powerful waves were generated and travelled across the Pacific Ocean. The area worst affected by the tsunami was the east coast of Honshu in Japan.

Main impacts

Infrastructure.

• The waves travelled as far as ten kilometres inland in Sendai.
• Ports and airports in Sendai were damaged and closed.
• The waves destroyed protective tsunami seawalls at several locations.
• The massive surge destroyed three-storey buildings where people had gathered for safety.
• A state of emergency was declared at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, where a cooling system failed and released radioactive materials into the environment.
• In July 2013, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), admitted that about 300 tons of radioactive water continued to leak from the plant every day into the Pacific Ocean.

Social and economic

• Four years after the quake, around 230,000 people who lost their homes were still living in temporary housing.
• The total damages from the earthquake and tsunami are estimated at $300 billion (about 25 trillion yen).
• The number of confirmed deaths as of 10 April 2015 is 15,891. More than 2,500 people are still reported missing.

Responses to build capacity to reduce the risk

• The country unveiled a newly-installed, upgraded tsunami warning system in 2013.
• Earthquake engineers examined the damage, looking for ways to construct buildings that are more resistant to earthquakes and tsunamis. Studies are ongoing.

More guides on this topic

• Plate tectonic theory – WJEC
• Volcanoes – WJEC
• Reducing the impacts of natural hazards – WJEC

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Case Study: How does Japan live with earthquakes?

Japan lies within one of the most tectonically active zones in the world. It experiences over 400 earthquakes every day. The majority of these are not felt by humans and are only detected by instruments. Japan has been hit by a number of high-intensity earthquakes in the past. Since 2000 there are have been 16000 fatalities as the result of tectonic activity.

Japan is located on the Pacific Ring of Fire, where the North American, Pacific, Eurasian and Philippine plates come together. Northern Japan is on top of the western tip of the North American plate. Southern Japan sits mostly above the Eurasian plate. This leads to the formation of volcanoes such as Mount Unzen and Mount Fuji. Movements along these plate boundaries also present the risk of tsunamis to the island nation. The Pacific Coastal zone, on the east coast of Japan, is particularly vulnerable as it is very densely populated.

The 2011 Japan Earthquake: Tōhoku

Japan experienced one of its largest seismic events on March 11 2011. A magnitude 9.0 earthquake occurred 70km off the coast of the northern island of Honshu where the Pacific and North American plate meet. It is the largest recorded earthquake to hit Japan and is in the top five in the world since records began in 1900. The earthquake lasted for six minutes.

A map to show the location of the 2011 Japan Earthquake

The earthquake had a significant impact on the area. The force of the megathrust earthquake caused the island of Honshu to move east 2.4m. Parts of the Japanese coastline dr[[ed by 60cm. The seabed close to the focus of the earthquake rose by 7m and moved westwards between 40-50m. In addition to this, the earthquake shifted the Earth 10-15cm on its axis.

The earthquake triggered a tsunami which reached heights of 40m when it reached the coast. The tsunami wave reached 10km inland in some places.

What were the social impacts of the Japanese earthquake in 2011?

The tsunami in 2011 claimed the lives of 15,853 people and injured 6023. The majority of the victims were over the age of 60 (66%). 90% of the deaths was caused by drowning. The remaining 10% died as the result of being crushed in buildings or being burnt. 3282 people were reported missing, presumed dead.

Disposing of dead bodies proved to be very challenging because of the destruction to crematoriums, morgues and the power infrastructure. As the result of this many bodies were buried in mass graves to reduce the risk of disease spreading.

Many people were displaced as the result of the tsunami. According to Save the Children 100,000 children were separated from their families. The main reason for this was that children were at school when the earthquake struck. In one elementary school, 74 of 108 students and 10 out of 13 staff lost their lives.

More than 333000 people had to live in temporary accommodation. National Police Agency of Japan figures shows almost 300,000 buildings were destroyed and a further one million damaged, either by the quake, tsunami or resulting fires. Almost 4,000 roads, 78 bridges and 29 railways were also affected. Reconstruction is still taking place today. Some communities have had to be relocated from their original settlements.

What were the economic impacts of the Japanese earthquake in 2011?

The estimated cost of the earthquake, including reconstruction, is £181 billion. Japanese authorities estimate 25 million tonnes of debris were generated in the three worst-affected prefectures (counties). This is significantly more than the amount of debris created during the 2010 Haiti earthquake. 47,700 buildings were destroyed and 143,300 were damaged. 230,000 vehicles were destroyed or damaged. Four ports were destroyed and a further 11 were affected in the northeast of Japan.

There was a significant impact on power supplies in Japan. 4.4 million households and businesses lost electricity. 11 nuclear reactors were shut down when the earthquake occurred. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was decommissioned because all six of its reactors were severely damaged. Seawater disabled the plant’s cooling systems which caused the reactor cores to meltdown, leading to the release of radioactivity. Radioactive material continues to be released by the plant and vegetation and soil within the 30km evacuation zone is contaminated. Power cuts continued for several weeks after the earthquake and tsunami. Often, these lasted between 3-4 hours at a time. The earthquake also had a negative impact on the oil industry as two refineries were set on fire during the earthquake.

Transport was also negatively affected by the earthquake. Twenty-three train stations were swept away and others experienced damage. Many road bridges were damaged or destroyed.

Agriculture was affected as salt water contaminated soil and made it impossible to grow crops.

The stock market crashed and had a negative impact on companies such as Sony and Toyota as the cost of the earthquake was realised.  Production was reduced due to power cuts and assembly of goods, such as cars overseas, were affected by the disruption in the supply of parts from Japan.

What were the political impacts of the Japanese earthquake in 2011?

Government debt was increased when it injects billions of yen into the economy. This was at a time when the government were attempting to reduce the national debt.

Several years before the disaster warnings had been made about the poor defences that existed at nuclear power plants in the event of a tsunami. A number of executives at the Fukushima power plant resigned in the aftermath of the disaster. A movement against nuclear power, which Japan heavily relies on, developed following the tsunami.

The disaster at Fukushima added political weight in European countries were anti-nuclear bodies used the event to reinforce their arguments against nuclear power.

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Japan Earthquake 2011

Japan earthquake 2011 case study.

An earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter Scale struck off Japan’s northeast coast, about 250 miles (400km) from Tokyo at a depth of 20 miles.

The magnitude 9.0 earthquake happened at 2:46 pm (local time) on Friday, March 11, 2011.

The earthquake occurred 250 miles off the North East Coast of Japan’s main island Honshu.

Japan 2011 Earthquake map

Japan is located on the eastern edge of the Eurasian Plate. The Eurasian plate, which is continental, is subducted by the Pacific Plate, an oceanic plate forming a subduction zone to the east of Japan. This type of plate margin is known as a destructive plate margin . The process of subduction is not smooth. Friction causes the Pacific Plate to stick. Pressure builds and is released as an earthquake.

Friction has built up over time, and when released, this caused a massive ‘megathrust’ earthquake.

The amount of energy released in this single earthquake was 600 million times the energy of the Hiroshima nuclear bomb.

Scientists drilled into the subduction zone soon after the earthquake and discovered a thin, slippery clay layer lining the fault. The researchers think this clay layer allowed the two plates to slide an incredible distance, some 164 feet (50 metres), facilitating the enormous earthquake and tsunami .

2011 Japan Earthquake Map

The earthquake occurred at a relatively shallow depth of 20 miles below the surface of the Pacific Ocean. This, combined with the high magnitude, caused a tsunami (find out more about how a tsunami is formed on the BBC website).

Areas affected by the 2011 Japanese earthquake.

What were the primary effects of the 2011 Japan earthquake?

Impacts on people

Death and injury – Some 15,894 people died, and 26,152 people were injured. 130,927 people were displaced, and 2,562 remain missing.

Damage – 332,395 buildings, 2,126 roads, 56 bridges and 26 railways were destroyed or damaged. 300 hospitals were damaged, and 11 were destroyed.

Blackouts – Over 4.4 million households were left without electricity in North-East Japan.

Transport – Japan’s transport network suffered huge disruptions.

Impacts on the environment

Landfall – some coastal areas experienced land subsidence as the earthquake dropped the beachfront in some places by more than 50 cm.

Land movement – due to tectonic shift, the quake moved parts of North East Japan 2.4 m closer to North America.

Plate shifts – It has been estimated by geologists that the Pacific plate has slipped westwards by between 20 and 40 m.

Seabed shift – The seabed near the epicentre shifted by 24 m, and the seabed off the coast of the Miyagi province has moved by 3 m.

Earth axis moves – The earthquake moved the earth’s axis between 10 and 25 cm, shortening the day by 1.8 microseconds.

Liquefaction occurred in many of the parts of Tokyo built on reclaimed land. 1,046 buildings were damaged

What were the secondary effects of the 2011 Japan earthquake?

Economy – The earthquake was the most expensive natural disaster in history, with an economic cost of US$235 billion.

Tsunami –  Waves up to 40 m in high devastated entire coastal areas and resulted in the loss of thousands of lives. This caused a lot of damage and pollution up to 6 miles inland. The tsunami warnings in coastal areas were only followed by 58% who headed for higher ground. The wave hit 49% of those not following the warning.

Nuclear power – Seven reactors at the Fukushima nuclear power station experienced a meltdown. Levels of radiation were over eight times the normal levels.

Transport –  Rural areas remained isolated for a long time because the tsunami destroyed major roads and local trains and buses. Sections of the Tohoku Expressway were damaged. Railway lines were damaged, and some trains were derailed. 

Aftermath – The ‘Japan move forward committee’ thought that young adults and teenagers could help rebuild parts of Japan devastated by the earthquake.

Coastal changes – The tsunami was able to travel further inland due to a 250-mile stretch of coastline dropping by 0.6 m.

What were the immediate responses to the Japan 2011 earthquake?

• The Japan Meteorological Agency issued tsunami warnings three minutes after the earthquake.
• Scientists had been able to predict where the tsunami would hit after the earthquake using modelling and forecasting technology so that responses could be directed to the appropriate areas.
• Rescue workers and around 100,000 members of the Japan Self-Defence Force were dispatched to help with search and rescue operations within hours of the tsunami hitting the coast.
• Although many search and rescue teams focused on recovering bodies washing up on shore following the tsunami, some people were rescued from under the rubble with the help of sniffer dogs.
• The government declared a 20 km evacuation zone around the Fukushima nuclear power plant to reduce the threat of radiation exposure to local residents.
• Japan received international help from the US military, and search and rescue teams were sent from New Zealand, India, South Korea, China and Australia.
• Access to the affected areas was restricted because many were covered in debris and mud following the tsunami, so it was difficult to provide immediate support in some areas.
• Hundreds of thousands of people who had lost their homes were evacuated to temporary shelters in schools and other public buildings or relocated to other areas.
• Many evacuees came from the exclusion zone surrounding the Fukushima nuclear power plant. After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown, those in the area had their radiation levels checked, and their health monitored to ensure they did not receive dangerous exposure to radiation. Many evacuated from the area around the nuclear power plant were given iodine tablets to reduce the risk of radiation poisoning.

What were the long-term responses to the Japan 2011 earthquake?

• In April 2011, one month after the event occurred, the central government established the Reconstruction Policy Council to develop a national recovery and reconstruction outlook for tsunami-resilient communities. The Japanese government has approved a budget of 23 trillion yen (approximately £190 billion) to be spent over ten years. Central to the New Growth Strategy is creating a ‘Special Zones for Reconstruction’ system. These aim to provide incentives to attract investment, both in terms of business and reconstruction, into the Tohoku region.
• Also, the central government decided on a coastal protection policy, such as seawalls and breakwaters which would be designed to ensure their performance to a potential tsunami level of up to the approximately 150-year recurrence interval.
• In December 2011, the central government enacted the ‘Act on the Development of Tsunami-resilient Communities’. According to the principle that ‘Human life is most important, this law promotes the development of tsunami-resistant communities based on the concept of multiple defences, which combines infrastructure development and other measures targeting the largest class tsunami.
• Japan’s economic growth after the Second World War was the world’s envy. However, over the last 20 years, the economy has stagnated and been in and out of recession. The 11 March earthquake wiped 5–10% off the value of Japanese stock markets, and there has been global concern over Japan’s ability to recover from the disaster. The priority for Japan’s long-term response is to rebuild the infrastructure in the affected regions and restore and improve the economy’s health as a whole.
• By the 24th of March 2011, 375 km of the Tohoku Expressway (which links the region to Tokyo) was repaired and reopened.
• The runway at Sendai Airport had been badly damaged. However, it was restored and reusable by the 29th of March due to a joint effort by the Japanese Defence Force and the US Army.
• Other important areas of reconstruction include the energy, water supply and telecommunications infrastructure. As of November 2011, 96% of the electricity supply had been restored, 98% of the water supply and 99% of the landline network.

Why do people live in high-risk areas in Japan?

There are several reasons why people live in areas of Japan at risk of tectonic hazards:

• They have lived there all their lives, are close to family and friends and have an attachment to the area.
• The northeast has fertile farmland and rich fishing waters.
• There are good services, schools and hospitals.
• 75% of Japan is mountainous and flat land is mainly found in coastal areas, which puts pressure on living space.
• They are confident about their safety due to the protective measures that have been taken, such as the construction of tsunami walls.

Japan’s worst previous earthquake was of 8.3 magnitude and killed 143,000 people in Kanto in 1923. A magnitude 7.2 quake in Kobe killed 6,400 people in 1995 .

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Learning from Megadisasters: A Decade of Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake

March 11, 2021 Tokyo, Japan

Authors: Shoko Takemoto,  Naho Shibuya, and Keiko Sakoda

Today marks the ten-year anniversary of the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE), a mega-disaster that marked Japan and the world with its unprecedented scale of destruction. This feature story commemorates the disaster by reflecting on what it has taught us over the past decade in regards to infrastructure resilience, risk identification, reduction, and preparedness, and disaster risk finance.  Since GEJE, the World Bank in partnership with the Government of Japan, especially through the Japan-World Bank Program on Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Management in Developing Countries has been working with Japanese and global partners to understand impact, response, and recovery from this megadisaster to identify larger lessons for disaster risk management (DRM).

Among the numerous lessons learned over the past decade of GEJE reconstruction and analysis, we highlight three common themes that have emerged repeatedly through the examples of good practices gathered across various sectors.  First is the importance of planning. Even though disasters will always be unexpected, if not unprecedented, planning for disasters has benefits both before and after they occur. Second is that resilience is strengthened when it is shared .  After a decade since GEJE, to strengthen the resilience of infrastructure, preparedness, and finance for the next disaster, throughout Japan national and local governments, infrastructure developers and operators, businesses and industries, communities and households are building back better systems by prearranging mechanisms for risk reduction, response and continuity through collaboration and mutual support.  Third is that resilience is an iterative process .  Many adaptations were made to the policy and regulatory frameworks after the GEJE. Many past disasters show that resilience is an interactive process that needs to be adjusted and sustained over time, especially before a disaster strikes.

As the world is increasingly tested to respond and rebuild from unexpected impacts of extreme weather events and the COVID-19 pandemic, we highlight some of these efforts that may have relevance for countries around the world seeking to improve their preparedness for disaster events.

Introduction: The Triple Disaster, Response and Recovery

On March 11th, 2011 a Magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the northeast coast of Japan, near the Tohoku region. The force of the earthquake sent a tsunami rushing towards the Tohoku coastline, a black wall of water which wiped away entire towns and villages. Sea walls were overrun. 20,000 lives were lost. The scale of destruction to housing, infrastructure, industry and agriculture was extreme in Fukushima, Iwate, and Miyagi prefectures. In addition to the hundreds of thousands who lost their homes, the earthquake and tsunami contributed to an accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, requiring additional mass evacuations. The impacts not only shook Japan’s society and economy as a whole, but also had ripple effects in global supply chains. In the 21st century, a disaster of this scale is a global phenomenon.

The severity and complexity of the cascading disasters was not anticipated. The events during and following the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) showed just how ruinous and complex a low-probability, high-impact disaster can be. However, although the impacts of the triple-disaster were devastating, Japan’s legacy of DRM likely reduced losses. Japan’s structural investments in warning systems and infrastructure were effective in many cases, and preparedness training helped many act and evacuate quickly. The large spatial impact of the disaster, and the region’s largely rural and elderly population, posed additional challenges for response and recovery.

Ten years after the megadisaster, the region is beginning to return to a sense of normalcy, even if many places look quite different. After years in rapidly-implemented temporary prefabricated housing, most people have moved into permanent homes, including 30,000 new units of public housing . Damaged infrastructure has been also restored or is nearing completion in the region, including rail lines, roads, and seawalls.

In 2014, three years after GEJE, The World Bank published Learning from Megadisasters: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake . Edited by Federica Ranghieri and Mikio Ishiwatari , the volume brought together dozens of experts ranging from seismic engineers to urban planners, who analyzed what happened on March 11, 2011 and the following days, months, and years; compiling lessons for other countries in 36 comprehensive Knowledge Notes . This extensive research effort identified a number of key learnings in multiple sectors, and emphasized the importance of both structural and non-structural measures, as well as identifying effective strategies both pre- and post-disaster. The report highlighted four central lessons after this intensive study of the GEJE disaster, response, and initial recovery:

1) A holistic, rather than single-sector approach to DRM improves preparedness for complex disasters; 2) Investing in prevention is important, but is not a substitute for preparedness; 3) Each disaster is an opportunity to learn and adapt; 4) Effective DRM requires bringing together diverse stakeholders, including various levels of government, community and nonprofit actors, and the private sector.

Although these lessons are learned specifically from the GEJE, the report also focuses on learnings with broader applicability.

Over recent years, the Japan-World Bank Program on Mainstreaming DRM in Developing Countries has furthered the work of the Learning from Megadisasters report, continuing to gather, analyze and share the knowledge and lessons learned from GEJE, together with past disaster experiences, to enhance the resilience of next generation development investments around the world. Ten years on from the GEJE, we take a moment to revisit the lessons gathered, and reflect on how they may continue to be relevant in the next decade, in a world faced with both seismic disasters and other emergent hazards such as pandemics and climate change.

Through synthesizing a decade of research on the GEJE and accumulation of the lessons from the past disaster experience, this story highlights three key strategies which recurred across many of the cases we studied. They are:

1) the importance of planning for disasters before they strike, 2) DRM cannot be addressed by either the public or private sector alone but enabled only when it is shared among many stakeholders , 3) institutionalize the culture of continuous enhancement of the resilience .

For example, business continuity plans, or BCPs, can help both public and private organizations minimize damages and disruptions . BCPs are documents prepared in advance which provide guidance on how to respond to a disruption and resume the delivery of products and services. Additionally, the creation of pre-arranged agreements among independent public and/or private organizations can help share essential responsibilities and information both before and after a disaster . This might include agreements with private firms to repair public infrastructures, among private firms to share the costs of mitigation infrastructure, or among municipalities to share rapid response teams and other resources. These three approaches recur throughout the more specific lessons and strategies identified in the following section, which is organized along the three areas of disaster risk management: resilient infrastructure; risk identification, reduction and preparednes s ; and disaster risk finance and insurance.

Lessons from the Megadisaster

Resilient Infrastructure

The GEJE had severe impacts on critical ‘lifelines’—infrastructures and facilities that provide essential services such as transportation, communication, sanitation, education, and medical care. Impacts of megadisasters include not only damages to assets (direct impacts), but also disruptions of key services, and the resulting social and economic effects (indirect impacts). For example, the GEJE caused a water supply disruption for up to 500,000 people in Sendai city, as well as completely submerging the city’s water treatment plant. [i] Lack of access to water and sanitation had a ripple effect on public health and other emergency services, impacting response and recovery. Smart investment in infrastructure resilience can help minimize both direct and indirect impacts, reducing lifeline disruptions. The 2019 report Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity found through a global study that every dollar invested in the resilience of lifelines had a $4 benefit in the long run.

In the case of water infrastructure , the World Bank report Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services: The Case of Japan documents how Sendai City learned from the disaster to improve the resilience of these infrastructures. [ii] Steps included retrofitting existing systems with seismic resilience upgrades, enhancing business continuity planning for sanitation systems, and creating a geographic information system (GIS)-based asset management system that allows for quick identification and repair of damaged pipes and other assets. During the GEJE, damages and disruptions to water delivery services were minimized through existing programs, including mutual aid agreements with other water supply utility operators. Through these agreements, the Sendai City Waterworks Bureau received support from more than 60 water utilities to provide emergency water supplies. Policies which promote structural resilience strategies were also essential to preserving water and sanitation services. After the 1995 Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake (GHAE), Japanese utilities invested in earthquake resistant piping in water supply and sanitation systems. The commonly used earthquake-resistant ductile iron pipe (ERDIP) has not shown any damage from major earthquakes including the 2011 GEJE and the 2016 Kumamoto earthquake. [iii] Changes were also made to internal policies after the GEJE based on the challenges faced, such as decentralizing emergency decision-making and providing training for local communities to set up emergency water supplies without utility workers with the goal of speeding up recovery efforts. [iv]

Redundancy is another structural strategy that contributed to resilience during and after GEJE. In Sendai City, redundancy and seismic reinforcement in water supply infrastructure allowed the utility to continue to operate pipelines that were not physically damaged in the earthquake. [v] The Lifelines report describes how in the context of telecommunications infrastructure , the redundancy created through a diversity of routes in Japan’s submarine internet cable system  limited disruptions to national connectivity during the megadisaster. [vi] However, the report emphasizes that redundancy must be calibrated to the needs and resources of a particular context. For private firms, redundancy and backups for critical infrastructure can be achieved through collaboration; after the GEJE, firms are increasingly collaborating to defray the costs of these investments. [vii]

The GEJE also illustrated the importance of planning for transportation resilience . A Japan Case Study Report on Road Geohazard Risk Management shows the role that both national policy and public-private agreements can play. In response to the GEJE, Japan’s central disaster legislation, the DCBA (Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act) was amended in 2012, with particular focus on the need to reopen roads for emergency response. Quick road repairs were made possible after the GEJE in part due to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)’s emergency action plans, the swift action of the rapid response agency Technical Emergency Control Force (TEC-FORCE), and prearranged agreements with private construction companies for emergency recovery work. [viii] During the GEJE, roads were used as evacuation sites and were shown effective in controlling the spread of floods. After the disaster, public-private partnerships (PPPs) were also made to accommodate the use of expressway embankments as tsunami evacuation sites. As research on Resilient Infrastructure PPPs highlights, clear definitions of roles and responsibilities are essential to effective arrangements between the government and private companies. In Japan, lessons from the GEJE and other earthquakes have led to a refinement of disaster definitions, such as numerical standards for triggering force majeure provisions of infrastructure PPP contracts. In Sendai City, clarifying the post-disaster responsibilities of public and private actors across various sectors sped up the response process. [ix] This experience was built upon after the disaster, when Miyagi prefecture conferred operation of the Sendai International Airport   to a private consortium through a concession scheme which included refined force majeure definitions. In the context of a hazard-prone region, the agreement clearly defines disaster-related roles and responsibilities as well as relevant triggering events. [x]

Partnerships for creating backup systems that have value in non-disaster times have also proved effective in the aftermath of the GEJE. As described in Resilient Industries in Japan , Toyota’s automotive plant in Ohira village, Miyagi Prefecture lost power for two weeks following GEJE. To avoid such losses in the future, companies in the industrial park sought to secure energy during power outages and shortages by building the F-Grid, their own mini-grid system with a comprehensive energy management system. The F-Grid project is a collaboration of 10 companies and organizations in the Ohira Industrial Park. As a system used exclusively for backup energy would be costly, the system is also used to improve energy efficiency in the park during normal times. The project was supported by funding from Japan’s “Smart Communities'' program. [xi] In 2016, F-grid achieved a 24 percent increase in energy efficiency and a 31 percent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions compared to similarly sized parks. [xii]

Schools are also critical infrastructures, for their education and community roles, and also because they are commonly used as evacuation centers. Japan has updated seismic resilience standards for schools over time, integrating measures against different risks and vulnerabilities revealed after each disaster, as documented in the report Making Schools Resilient at Scale . After the 2011 GEJE, there was very little earthquake-related damage; rather, most damage was caused by the tsunami. However, in some cases damages to nonstructural elements like suspending ceilings in school gymnasiums limited the possibility of using these spaces after the disaster. After the disaster, a major update was made to the policies on the safety of nonstructural elements in schools, given the need for higher resilience standards for their function as post-disaster evacuation centers [xiii] .

Similarly, for building regulations , standards and professional training modules were updated taking the lessons learned from GEJE. The Converting Disaster Experience into a Safer Built Environment: The Case of Japan report highlights that, legal framework like, The Building Standard Law/Seismic Retrofitting Promotion Law, was amended further enhance the structural resilience of the built environment, including strengthening structural integrity, improving the efficiency of design review process, as well as mandating seismic diagnosis of large public buildings. Since the establishment of the legal and regulatory framework for building safety in early 1900, Japan continued incremental effort to create enabling environment for owners, designers, builders and building officials to make the built environment safer together.

Cultural heritage also plays an important role in creating healthy communities, and the loss or damage of these items can scar the cohesion and identity of a community. The report Resilient Cultural Heritage: Learning from the Japanese Experience shows how the GEJE highlighted the importance of investing in the resilience of cultural properties, such as through restoration budgets and response teams, which enabled the relocation of at-risk items and restoration of properties during and after the GEJE. After the megadisaster, the volunteer organization Shiryō-Net was formed to help rescue and preserve heritage properties, and this network has now spread across Japan. [xiv] Engaging both volunteer and government organizations in heritage preservation can allow for a more wide-ranging response. Cultural properties can play a role in healing communities wrought by disasters: in Ishinomaki City, the restoration of a historic storehouse served as a symbol of reconstruction [xv] , while elsewhere repair of cultural heritage sites and the celebration of cultural festivals served a stimulant for recovery. [xvi] Cultural heritage also played a preventative role during and after the disaster by embedding the experience of prior disasters in the built environment. Stone monuments which marked the extent of historic tsunamis served as guides for some residents, who fled uphill past the stones and escaped the dangerous waters. [xvii] This suggests a potential role for cultural heritage in instructing future generations about historic hazards.

These examples of lessons from the GEJE highlight how investing in resilient infrastructure is essential, but must also be done smartly, with emphasis on planning, design, and maintenance. Focusing on both minimizing disaster impacts and putting processes in place to facilitate speedy infrastructure restoration can reduce both direct and indirect impacts of megadisasters.  Over the decade since GEJE, many examples and experiences on how to better invest in resilient infrastructure, plan for service continuity and quick response, and catalyze strategic partnerships across diverse groups are emerging from Japan.

Risk Identification, Reduction, and Preparedness

Ten years after the GEJE, a number of lessons have emerged as important in identifying, reducing, and preparing for disaster risks. Given the unprecedented nature of the GEJE, it is important to be prepared for both known and uncertain risks. Information and communication technology (ICT) can play a role in improving risk identification and making evidence-based decisions for disaster risk reduction and preparedness. Communicating these risks to communities, in a way people can take appropriate mitigation action, is a key . These processes also need to be inclusive , involving diverse stakeholders--including women, elders , and the private sector--that need to be engaged and empowered to understand, reduce, and prepare for disasters. Finally, resilience is never complete . Rather, as the adaptations made by Japan after the GEJE and many past disasters show, resilience is a continuous process that needs to be adjusted and sustained over time, especially in times before a disaster strikes.

Although DRM is central in Japan, the scale of the 2011 triple disaster dramatically exceeded expectations. After the GEJE, as Chapter 32 of Learning From Megadisasters highlights, the potential of low-probability, high-impact events led Japan to focus on both structural and nonstructural disaster risk management measures. [xviii] Mitigation and preparedness strategies can be designed to be effective for both predicted and uncertain risks. Planning for a multihazard context, rather than only individual hazards, can help countries act quickly even when the unimaginable occurs. Identifying, preparing for, and reducing disaster risks all play a role in this process.

The GEJE highlighted the important role ICT can play in both understanding risk and making evidence-based decisions for risk identification, reduction, and preparedness. As documented in the World Bank report Information and Communication Technology for Disaster Risk Management in Japan , at the time of the GEJE, Japan had implemented various ICT systems for disaster response and recovery, and the disaster tested the effectiveness of these systems. During the GEJE, Japan’s “Earthquake Early Warning System” (EEWS) issued a series of warnings. Through the detection of initial seismic waves, EEWS can provide a warning of a few seconds or minutes, allowing quick action by individuals and organizations. Japan Railways’ “Urgent Earthquake Detection and Alarm System” (UrEDAS) automatically activated emergency brakes of 27 Shinkansen train lines , successfully bringing all trains to a safe stop. After the disaster, Japan expanded emergency alert delivery systems. [xix]

The World Bank’s study on Preparedness Maps shows how seismic preparedness maps are used in Japan to communicate location specific primary and secondary hazards from earthquakes, promoting preparedness at the community and household level. Preparedness maps are regularly updated after disaster events, and since 2011 Japan has promoted risk reduction activities to prepare for the projected maximum likely tsunami [xx] .

Effective engagement of various stakeholders is also important to preparedness mapping and other disaster preparedness activities. This means engaging and empowering diverse groups including women, the elderly, children, and the private sector. Elders are a particularly important demographic in the context of the GEJE, as the report Elders Leading the Way to Resilience illustrates. Tohoku is an aging region, and two-thirds of lives lost from the GEJE were over 60 years old. Research shows that building trust and social ties can reduce disaster impacts- after GEJE, a study found that communities with high social capital lost fewer residents to the tsunami. [xxi] Following the megadisaster, elders in Ofunato formed the Ibasho Cafe, a community space for strengthening social capital among older people. The World Bank has explored the potential of the Ibasho model for other contexts , highlighting how fueling social capital and engaging elders in strengthening their community can have benefits for both normal times and improve resilience when a disaster does strike.

Conducting simulation drills regularly provide another way of engaging stakeholders in preparedness. As described in Learning from Disaster Simulation Drills in Japan , [xxii] after the 1995 GHAE the first Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework was developed as a guide for the execution of a comprehensive system of disaster response drills and establishing links between various disaster management agencies. The Comprehensive Disaster Management Drill Framework is updated annually by the Central Disaster Management Council. The GEJE led to new and improved drill protocols in the impacted region and in Japan as a whole. For example, the 35th Joint Disaster simulation Drill was held in the Tokyo metropolitan region in 2015 to respond to issues identified during the GEJE, such as improving mutual support systems among residents, governments, and organizations; verifying disaster management plans; and improving disaster response capabilities of government agencies. In addition to regularly scheduled disaster simulation drills, GEJE memorial events are held in Japan annually to memorialize victims and keep disaster preparedness in the public consciousness.

Business continuity planning (BCP) is another key strategy that shows how ongoing attention to resilience is also essential for both public and private sector organizations. As Resilient Industries in Japan demonstrates, after the GEJE, BCPs helped firms reduce disaster losses and recover quickly, benefiting employees, supply chains, and the economy at large. BCP is supported by many national policies in Japan, and after the GEJE, firms that had BCPs in place had reduced impacts on their financial soundness compared to firms that did not. [xxiii] The GEJE also led to the update and refinement of BCPs across Japan. Akemi industrial park in Aichi prefecture, began business continuity planning at the scale of the industrial park three years before the GEJE. After the GEJE, the park revised their plan, expanding focus on the safety of workers. National policies in Japan promote the development of BCPs, including the 2013 Basic Act for National Resilience, which was developed after the GEJE and emphasizes resilience as a shared goal across multiple sectors. [xxiv] Japan also supports BCP development for public sector organizations including subnational governments and infrastructure operators. By 2019, all of Japan’s prefectural governments, and nearly 90% of municipal governments had developed BCPs. [xxv] The role of financial institutions in incentivizing BCPs is further addressed in the following section.

The ongoing nature of these preparedness actions highlights that resilience is a continuous process. Risk management strategies must be adapted and sustained over time, especially during times without disasters. This principle is central to Japan’s disaster resilience policies. In late 2011, based on a report documenting the GEJE from the Expert Committee on Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster Management, Japan amended the DCBA (Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act) to enhance its multi-hazard countermeasures, adding a chapter on tsunami countermeasures. [xxvi]

Disaster Risk Finance and Insurance

Disasters can have a large financial impact, not only in the areas where they strike, but also at the large scale of supply chains and national economy. For example, the GEJE led to the shutdown of nuclear power plants across Japan, resulting in a 50% decrease in energy production and causing national supply disruptions. The GEJE has illustrated the importance of disaster risk finance and insurance (DRFI) such as understanding and clarifying contingent liabilities and allocating contingency budgets, putting in place financial protection measures for critical lifeline infrastructure assets and services, and developing mechanisms for vulnerable businesses and households to quickly access financial support. DRFI mechanisms can help people, firms, and critical infrastructure avoid or minimize disruptions, continue operations, and recover quickly after a disaster.

Pre-arranged agreements, including public-private partnerships, are key strategies for the financial protection of critical infrastructure. The report Financial Protection of Critical Infrastructure Services (forthcoming) [xxvii] shows how pre-arranged agreements between the public sector and private sector for post-disaster response can facilitate rapid infrastructure recovery after disasters, reducing the direct and indirect impacts of infrastructure disruptions, including economic impacts. GEJE caused devastating impacts to the transportation network across Japan. Approximately 2,300 km of expressways were closed, representing 65 percent of expressways managed by NEXCO East Japan , resulting in major supply chain disruptions [xxviii] .  However, with the activation of pre-arranged agreements between governments and local construction companies for road clearance and recovery work, allowing damaged major motorways to be repaired within one week of the earthquake. This quick response allowed critical access for other emergency services to further relief and recovery operations.

The GEJE illustrated the importance of clearly defining post-disaster financial roles and responsibilities among public and private actors in order to restore critical infrastructure rapidly . World Bank research on Catastrophe Insurance Programs for Public Assets highlights how the Japan Railway Construction, Transport and Technology Agency  (JRTT) uses insurance to reduce the contingent liabilities of critical infrastructure to ease impacts to government budgets in the event of a megadisaster. Advance agreements between the government, infrastructure owners and operators, and insurance companies clearly outline how financial responsibilities will be shared in the event of a disaster. In the event of a megadisaster like GEJE, the government pays a large share of recovery costs, which enables the Shinkansen bullet train service to be restored more rapidly. [xxix]

The Resilient Industries in Japan   report highlights how diverse and comprehensive disaster risk financing methods are also important to promoting a resilient industry sector . After the GEJE, 90% of bankruptcies linked to the disaster were due to indirect impacts such as supply chain disruptions. This means that industries located elsewhere are also vulnerable: a study found that six years after GEJE, a greater proportion of bankruptcy declarations were located in Tokyo than Tohoku. [xxx] Further, firms without disaster risk financing in place had much higher increases in debt levels than firms with preexisting risk financing mechanisms in place. [xxxi] Disaster risk financing can play a role pre-disaster, through mechanisms such as low-interest loans, guarantees, insurance, or grants which incentivize the creation of BCPs and other mitigation and preparedness measures.  When a disaster strikes, financial mechanisms that support impacted businesses, especially small or medium enterprises and women-owned businesses, can help promote equitable recovery and help businesses survive. For financial institutions, simply keeping banks open after a major disaster can support response and recovery. After the GEJE, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) and local banks leveraged pre-arranged agreements to maintain liquidity, opening the first weekend after the disaster to help minimize economic disruptions. [xxxii] These strategies highlight the important role of finance in considering economic needs before a disaster strikes, and having systems in place to act quickly to limit both economic and infrastructure service impacts of disasters.

Looking to the Future

Ten years after the GEJE, these lessons in the realms of resilient infrastructure, risk identification, reduction and preparedness, and DRFI are significant not only for parts of the world preparing for tsunamis and other seismic hazards, but also for many of the other types of hazards faced around the globe in 2021. In Japan, many of the lessons of the GEJE are being applied to the projected Nankai Trough and Tokyo Inland earthquakes, for example through modelling risks and mapping evacuation routes, implementing scenario planning exercises and evacuation drills , or even prearranging a post-disaster reconstruction vision and plans. These resilience measures are taken not only individually but also through innovative partnerships for collaboration across regions, sectors, and organizations including public-private agreements to share resources and expertise in the event of a major disaster.

The ten-year anniversary of the GEJE finds the world in the midst of the multiple emergencies of the global COVID-19 pandemic, environmental and technological hazards, and climate change. Beyond seismic hazards, the global pandemic has highlighted, for example, the risks of supply chain disruption due to biological emergencies. Climate change is also increasing hazard exposure in Japan and around the globe. Climate change is a growing concern for its potential to contribute to hydrometeorological hazards such as flooding and hurricanes, and for its potential to play a role in secondary or cascading hazards such as fire. In the era of climate change, disasters will increasingly be ‘unprecedented’, and so GEJE offers important lessons on preparing for low-probability high-impact disasters and planning under uncertain conditions in general.

Over the last decade, the World Bank has drawn upon the GEJE megadisaster experience to learn how to better prepare for and recover from low-probability high-impact disasters. While we have identified a number of diverse strategies here, ranging from technological and structural innovations to improving the engagement of diverse stakeholders, three themes recur throughout infrastructure resilience, risk preparedness, and disaster finance. First, planning in advance for how organizations will prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters is essential, i.e. through the creation of BCPs by both public and private organizations. Second, pre-arranged agreements amongst organizations for sharing resources, knowledge, and financing in order to mitigate, prepare, respond and recover together from disasters and other unforeseen events are highly beneficial. Third, only with continuous reflection, learning and update on what worked and what didn’t work after each disasters can develop the adaptive capacities needed to manage ever increasing and unexpected risks. Preparedness is an incremental and interactive process.

These lessons from the GEJE on the importance of BCPs and pre-arranged agreements both emphasize larger principles that can be brought to bear in the context of emergent climate and public health crises. Both involve planning for the potential of disaster before it strikes. BCPs and pre-arranged agreements are both made under blue-sky conditions, which allow frameworks to be put in place for advanced mitigation and preparedness, and rapid post-disaster response and recovery. While it is impossible to know exactly what future crises a locale will face, these processes often have benefits that make places and organizations better able to act in the face of unlikely or unpredicted events. The lessons above regarding BCPs and pre-arranged agreements also highlight that neither the government nor the private sector alone have all the tools to prepare for and respond to disasters. Rather, the GEJE shows the importance of both public and private organizations adopting BCPs, and the value of creating pre-arranged agreements among and across public and private groups. By making disaster preparedness a key consideration for all organizations, and bringing diverse stakeholders together to make plans for when a crisis strikes, these strengthened networks and planning capacities have the potential to bear benefits not only in an emergency but in the everyday operations of organizations and countries.

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Additional Resources

Program Overview

• Japan-World Bank Program on Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Management in Developing Countries

Reports and Case Studies Featuring Lessons from GEJE

• Learning from Megadisasters: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake  (PDF)
• Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity  (PDF)
• Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services: The Case of Japan  (PDF)
• Japan Case Study Report on Road Geohazard Risk Management  (PDF)
• Resilient Infrastructure PPPs  (PDF)
• Making Schools Resilient at Scale  (PDF)
• Converting Disaster Experience into a Safer Built Environment: The Case of Japan  (PDF)
• Resilient Cultural Heritage: Learning from the Japanese Experience  (PDF)
• Information and Communication Technology for Disaster Risk Management in Japan
• Resilient Industries in Japan : Lessons Learned in Japan on Enhancing Competitiveness in the Face of Disasters by Natural Hazards (PDF)
• Preparedness Maps for Community Resilience: Earthquakes. Experience from Japan  (PDF)
• Elders Leading the Way to Resilience  (PDF)
• Ibasho: Strengthening community-driven preparedness and resilience in Philippines and Nepal by leveraging Japanese expertise and experience  (PDF)
• Learning from Disaster Simulation Drills in Japan  (PDF)
• Catastrophe Insurance Programs for Public Assets  (PDF)
• PPP contract clauses unveiled: the World Bank’s 2017 Guidance on PPP Contractual Provisions
• Learning from Japan: PPPs for infrastructure resilience

Audiovisual Resources on GEJE and its Reconstruction Processes in English

• NHK documentary: 3/11-The Tsunami: The First 3 Days
• NHK: 342 Stories of Resilience and Remembrance
• Densho Road 3.11: Journey to Experience the Lessons from the Disaster - Tohoku, Japan
• Sendai City: Disaster-Resilient and Environmentally-Friendly City
• Sendai City: Eastern Coastal Area Today, 2019 Fall

[i]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.63

[ii]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.63

[iii]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.8

[iv]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.71

[v]   Resilient Water Supply and Sanitation Services  report, p.63

[vi]   Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity  report, p.115

[vii] Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity  report, p.133

[viii]   Japan Case Study Report on Road Geohazard Risk Management  report, p.30

[ix]   Resilient Infrastructure PPPs  report, p.8-9

[x]   Resilient Infrastructure PPPs  report, p.39-40

[xi]   Resilient Industries in Japan  report, p.153.

[xii]   Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity  report, p. 132

[xiii]   Making Schools Resilient at Scale  report, p.24

[xiv]   Resilient Cultural Heritage  report, p.62

[xv]   Learning from Megadisasters  report, p.326

[xvi]   Resilient Cultural Heritage  report, p.69

[xvii]   Learning from Megadisasters  report, p.100

[xviii] Learning from Megadisasters  report, p.297.

[xix]  J-ALERT, Japan’s nationwide early warning system, had 46% implementation at GEJE, and in communities where it was implemented earthquake early warnings were successfully received. Following GEJE, GOJ invested heavily in J-ALERT adoption (JPY 14B), bearing 50% of implementation costs. In 2013 GOJ spent JPY 773M to implement J-ALERT in municipalities that could not afford the expense. In 2014 MIC heavily promoted the L-ALERT system (formerly “Public Information Commons”), achieving 100% adoption across municipalities. Since GEJE, Japan has updated the EEWS to include a hybrid method of earthquake prediction, improving the accuracy of predictions and warnings.

[xx]  Related resources: NHK, “#1 TSUNAMI BOSAI: Science that Can Save Your Life”  https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/ondemand/video/3004665/  ; NHK “BOSAI: Be Prepared - Hazard Maps”  https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/ondemand/video/2084002/

[xxi]  Aldrich, Daniel P., and Yasuyuki Sawada. "The physical and social determinants of mortality in the 3.11 tsunami." Social Science & Medicine 124 (2015): 66-75.

[xxii]   Learning from Disaster Simulation Drills in Japan  Report, p. 14

[xxiii]  Matsushita and Hideshima. 2014. “Influence over Financial Statement of Listed Manufacturing Companies by the GEJE, the Effect of BCP and Risk Financing.” [In Japanese.] Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineering 70 (1): 33–43.  https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jscejsp/70/1/70_33/_pdf/-char/ja .

[xxiv]   Resilient Industries in Japan  report, p. 56

[xxv]  MIC (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications). 2019. “Survey Results of Business Continuity Plan Development Status in Local Governments.” [In Japanese.] Press release, MIC, Tokyo.  https://www.fdma.go.jp/pressrelease/houdou/items/011226bcphoudou.pdf .

[xxvi]   Japan Case Study Report on Road Geohazard Risk Management  report, p.17.

[xxvii]  The World Bank. 2021. “Financial Protection of Critical Infrastructure Services.” Technical Report – Contribution to 2020 APEC Finance Ministers Meeting.

[xxviii]   Resilient Industries in Japan  report, p. 119

[xxix]  Tokio Marine Holdings, Inc. 2019. “The Role of Insurance Industry to Strengthen Resilience of Infrastructure—Experience in Japan.” APEC seminar on Disaster Risk Finance.

[xxx]  TDB (Teikoku DataBank). 2018. “Trends in Bankruptcies 6 Years after the Great East Japan Earthquake.” [In Japanese.] TDB, Tokyo.  https://www.tdb.co.jp/report/watching/press/pdf/p170301.pdf .

[xxxi]  Matsushita and Hideshima. 2014. “Influence over Financial Statement of Listed Manufacturing Companies by the GEJE, the Effect of BCP and Risk Financing.” [In Japanese.] Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineering 70 (1): 33–43.  https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jscejsp/70/1/70_33/_pdf/-char/ja .

[xxxii]   Resilient Industries in Japan  report, p. 145

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Japan earthquake and tsunami: what happened and why

What caused the tsunami.

The most powerful earthquake recorded in Japanese history, magnitude 8.9. The tremors were the result of a violent uplift of the sea floor 80 miles off the coast of Sendai, where the Pacific tectonic plate slides beneath the plate Japan sits on. Tens of miles of crust ruptured along the trench where the tectonic plates meet. The earthquake occurred at the relatively shallow depth of 15 miles, meaning much of its energy was released at the seafloor.

How does the earthquake compare with others?

This was the sixth largest earthquake in the world since 1900, when seismological records began. The most devastating earthquake to strike Japan was in 1923, when a magnitude 7.9 tremor devastated Tokyo and Yokohama and killed an estimated 142,800 people. The Kobe earthquake in 1995 was a magnitude 6.9 and caused more than 5,000 deaths and injured 36,000 others. The earthquake that wrecked Christchurch in New Zealand last month was a magnitude 6.3 event. Around 30 times more energy is released as the magnitude of an earthquake increases one unit, for example from magnitude 8 to 9.

Why is the area so prone to earthquakes?

The Pacific plate moves fast in tectonic terms, at a rate of 9cm (3.5 inches) a year. This leads to the rapid buildup of huge amounts of energy. As the Pacific plate moves down, it sticks to the overhead plate and pulls it down too. Eventually, the join breaks, causing the seafloor to spring upwards several metres. The plate tectonics of the region are complex, and geologists are not sure which plate Japan sits on. Candidates include the Eurasian plate, the North American plate, the Okhotsk plate, and the Honshu microplate.

How big were the waves?

The largest waves measured by instruments in the water were 7 metres (nearly 23ft) high in the north-east of Japan, according to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre (PTWC) in Hawaii. Other estimates put the wave height at 10 metres. Waves reached 4 metres around the coast of Japan. As the tsunami spread across the Pacific, the wave height dropped to around 40cm in Guam and the nearby Marianas. The most powerful waves appeared to be moving south-west from Japan. Some countries may experience waves up to 2 metres, according to PTWC forecasts.

How much damage has been caused?

Japan has invested heavily in coastal protection and buildings that can withstand tremors. Nevertheless, ports were pounded by the tsunami and the airport in Sendai was inundated. Nuclear power plants were shut down across the country and a state of emergency declared at the Fukushima nuclear power plant, where a cooling system failed. Modern buildings in Japan are designed to absorb the violent sideways shaking that can devastate cities. High-rise buildings can still be damaged, but are more likely to remain standing. There are concerns for low-lying islands in the Pacific.

How long will the waves take to reach other countries?

The tsunami moves across the Pacific at a speed of 500mph, with waves expected to reach the island of Fiji and Cairns in Australia at 3.28pm GMT. From then, waves are due to reach Acapulco in Mexico at 7.59pm, Chile at 10.55pm, Ecuador at 11.31pm, Colombia at 11.47 and Peru at 12.33am.

Will there be aftershocks?

Regular aftershocks have already hit Japan as the Earth's crust continues to rupture along the Japan trench. Those tremors are expected to be weaker and are less likely to produce another tsunami. The release of energy along the subduction zone between the Pacific and North Atlantic plates will transfer stress to other parts of the faultline, which could easily generate more earthquakes in the region in coming months.

• Natural disasters and extreme weather
• Asia Pacific
• Earthquakes

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For the Instructor

• Case Study 2: 2011 Japanese Earthquake

Just a few years after the 2004 event, another large-scale tsunami hit one of the most prepared and most technologically advanced countries in the world. The event occurred in March of 2011 when a large 9.0 magnitude earthquake off the eastern coast of Japan produced a tsunami wave that came ashore on the Japanese coastline less than an hour after the earthquake. In this case, the tsunami wave was detected about 25 minutes after the earthquake by a DART buoy. The geologic context was nearly identical to the 2004 event in Sumatra. An eastward directed mega-thrust earthquake disturbed the seafloor, this time in a much more restricted region but with similar energy release, and generated a substantial tsunami that raced across the Pacific Ocean. This model produced by NOAA's Tsunami Research Center (NCTR) in Seattle, Washington shows the predicted path of the March 11, 2011 Honshu tsunami as it propagated around the Pacific.

Check out more information about NCTR. Also on the site is a maximum wave amplitude model produced by the MOST tsunami model and a new narrated animation of the tsunami propagation and maximum amplitude model. Even more exciting is the fact that NCTR now has a Google Earth interface that provides users with access to datasets (tide data, DART buoy data, etc.) that record water levels in shallow water regions as well as out at sea in deep water where they present water column height (in meters above the seafloor), more on this later.

In any regard, as the length of the fault rupture was relatively small compared to the 2004 Sumatran event, wave propagation was more spherical, and although tsunami beaming occurred, seamounts and other submerged obstructions in the direction of the most prominent beaming direction (i.e., toward the southeast) helped to bend and refract the direct wave so that it lost some of its amplitude as it traveled toward Hawaii and South America. Data measured by tsunami buoys showed that the initial wave close to the fault observed a nearly 2m amplitude wave. As the wave moved toward the southeast, the amplitude subsided to less than a meter, likely as a result of interference as mentioned here. However, the beaming that focused toward the northwest meant that the full-force of the direct wave was squarely onto the island of Honshu.Given the orientation of the shoreline with numerous river valleys opening to the east and southeast (see below), the tsunami waves were funneled full force into shallow waters and up the progressively narrower valleys located up and down the coast of Honshu.

So, although much had been learned from the 2004 event, and although the tsunami warning system is more advanced and sophisticated and although it had helped to detect and measure the tsunami wave, unfortunately the tsunami produced an incredible trail of destruction across northern Japan. Not only did the earthquake result in uplift and subsidence of portions of the sea floor and the islands of northern Japan, in fact, Honshu, Japan's main island was detected to move eastward by over two meters while some of the shoreline on the same island subsided by about a half meter. In addition to these tectonic movements, the event produced 10 meter waves that led to wave run-up heights of almost 40 meters (over 120 feet) in some areas, and traveled inland through low lying river systems at least 10 kilometers and caused over 500 square kilometers to be flooded. For a zoomable map showing some of the specific numbers for wave heights and run-up, check out this map at Extreme Planet .

Most coastal defenses were insufficient in preventing the destruction as tsunami seawalls were overtopped or destroyed in many communities. Perhaps the tsunami warning system didn't function as intended and notice didn't reach the population. Perhaps the wave was generated so close to shore there was so little time. Perhaps a false sense of security was afforded by the coastal infrastructure built to protect the shoreline. Nevertheless, as a result of the 2011 tsunami, more than 15,000 people died when entire communities were wiped from their seaside locations. The vast majority died as a result of drowning. When you search the Internet, you will easily find tens of videos showing people desperately trying to move to high ground as the wall of water surges inland behind them. There are even videos of residents on the tops of taller buildings who thought they were safe, but who were also washed away. In addition to these frightening occurrences, the tsunami triggered a series of events that led to the failure of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. When the plant failed, the nuclear meltdown led to the release of radioactive materials that ended up in the atmosphere and the Pacific Ocean. In addition to radioactive materials, the Japanese government suggested that more than five million tons of debris was washed out to sea as the surge waters retreated back to the sea. As a result of these and other damages, estimates for damage topped $300 billion dollars in Japan alone, but real costs were far greater and continue to mount as a result of clean-up efforts and as a result of the environmental impact on fisheries and agricultural areas that supply food to the population. The Extreme Planet website has some absolutely mesmerizing photos from the event that are incredible to look at and fundamentally demonstrate how destructive these events can be.

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Please note you do not have access to teaching notes, forensic investigation of the 2011 great east japan earthquake and tsunami disaster: a case study of rikuzentakata.

Disaster Prevention and Management

ISSN : 0965-3562

Article publication date: 5 June 2017

Using the forensic investigation (FORIN) approach, the purpose of this paper is to identify the factors that exacerbated the loss of human life in one of the most devastated local municipalities on the coast by 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET) disaster.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper begins by reviewing the extent of damage to the local municipalities along the Sanriku ria coast, which has a long history of tsunami disasters. Second, the paper compares previous major tsunami events by using a human vulnerability index, and applies this index to detect the city of Rikuzentakata. Third, the paper identifies the root causes of the GEJET disaster in the city. Interview records with disaster victims were used to elucidate the main factors that exacerbated the number of deaths.

The study indicates that the FORIN approach can be effectively applied to identify the target city for this case study and to point to those factors the most exacerbated human sufferings, and also provides many lessons based on research findings and methodologies to support building resilient societies in the future.

Originality/value

This paper indicates FORIN approach as an effective research template by investigating the GEJET disaster.

• FORIN approach
• Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
• Historical comparison
• Rikuzentakata
• Root causes

Acknowledgements

The International Center for Water Hazard and Risk Management-Public Works Research Institute (ICHARM-PWRI) provided the authors with the opportunity to research the GEJET disaster. The authors were able to develop the FORIN approach through many discussions with different expert researchers and practitioners. The Rachadapisek Sompote Fund for Postdoctoral Fellowship, Chulalongkorn University supported the completion process of this research paper. The authors would like to thank Mr Katsuhito Miyake, Ms Yoko Hagiwara, and Ms Mari Sawai for their insightful advice and discussions during the field survey and also thank Professor Kuniyoshi Takeuchi, the Former Director of ICHARM, and Dr Raya Muttarak from IIASA, for their continuous advice and encouragement. The authors are grateful to the mayor of Rikuzentakata City, and city officers for their support. The authors also extend gratitude to many people who provided assistance in the surveys.

Nakasu, T. , Ono, Y. and Pothisiri, W. (2017), "Forensic investigation of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami disaster: A case study of Rikuzentakata", Disaster Prevention and Management , Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 298-313. https://doi.org/10.1108/DPM-10-2016-0213

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