outline for conspiracy theory research paper

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

• Publications
• Account settings

Preview improvements coming to the PMC website in October 2024. Learn More or Try it out now .

• Advanced Search
• Journal List
• Front Psychol

Contemporary trends in psychological research on conspiracy beliefs. A systematic review

Irena pilch.

1 Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Psychology, University of Silesia in Katowice, Katowice, Poland

Agnieszka Turska-Kawa

2 Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science, University of Silesia in Katowice, Katowice, Poland

Paulina Wardawy

Agata olszanecka-marmola, wiktoria smołkowska-jędo, associated data.

The original contributions presented in this study are included in this article/ Supplementary material , further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.

The number of psychological studies on conspiracy beliefs has been systematically growing for about a dozen years, but in recent years, the trend has intensified. We provided a review covering the psychological literature on conspiracy beliefs from 2018 to 2021. Halfway through this period, the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, accompanied by an explosion of movements based on conspiracy theories, intensifying researchers’ interest in this issue.

Adhering to PRISMA guidelines, the review systematically searched for relevant journal articles published between 2018 and 2021. A search was done on Scopus and Web of Science (only peer-reviewed journals). A study was included if it contained primary empirical data, if specific or general conspiracy belief(s) were measured and if its correlation with at least one other psychological variable was reported. All the studies were grouped for the descriptive analysis according to the methodology used, the participants’ characteristics, the continent of origin, the sample size, and the conspiracy beliefs measurement tools. Due to substantial methodological heterogeneity of the studies, narrative synthesis was performed. The five researchers were assigned specific roles at each stage of the analysis to ensure the highest quality of the research.

Following the proposed methodology, 308 full-text articles were assessed for eligibility and 274 articles (417 studies) meeting the inclusion criteria were identified and included in the review. Almost half of the studies (49.6%) were conducted in European countries. The vast majority of the studies (85.7%) were carried out on samples of adult respondents. The research presents antecedents as well as (potential) consequences of conspiracy beliefs. We grouped the antecedents of conspiracy beliefs into six categories: cognitive (e.g., thinking style) motivational (e.g., uncertainty avoidance), personality (e.g., collective narcissism), psychopathology (e.g., Dark Triad traits), political (e.g., ideological orientation), and sociocultural factors (e.g., collectivism).

Conclusion and limitations

The research presents evidence on the links between conspiracy beliefs and a range of attitudes and behaviors considered unfavorable from the point of view of individuals and of the society at large. It turned out that different constructs of conspiracy thinking interact with each other. The limitations of the study are discussed in the last part of the article.

1. Introduction

The development of research into conspiracy theories has been observed within various disciplines, including psychology. The number of psychological studies on conspiracy beliefs (CBs) has been growing systematically for about a dozen years now, but in recent years the trend has intensified. Due to the large number of such studies, conducted in different theoretical and methodological frameworks and using different measurement tools, it might be difficult to make a synthesis of the relevant literature. This was first attempted by Goreis and Voracek (2019) , who published in the Frontiers in Psychology journal a systematic review of the psychological literature on CBs, covering the period from the beginning of database records until early 2018. It is also worth mentioning the review by van Mulukom et al. (2022) that summarizes 85 studies (available till March 2021) on antecedents and effects of CBs regarding COVID-19.

The current paper was planned as a continuation of the paper by Goreis and Voracek (2019) in the sense that it provides a review covering the psychological literature on CBs from a subsequent period (2018–2021). Halfway through this period, the COVID-19 pandemic broke out and it became a platform for an explosion of movements based on conspiracy theories, which in turn intensified the interest of researchers in this issue. Thus, it becomes extremely important not only to take a quantitative look at the new research, but also to look at new trends or directions of the analyses. The objective of this review was to summarize the evidence regarding antecedents and consequences of CBs. The significance of our review is based on the systematic approach that was used at all stages of the work. We hope that this paper will provide a useful resource for researchers and practitioners seeking a summary of recent psychological research on CBs.

Conspiracy theories can be defined as explanatory narratives about powerful agents collaborating secretly to achieve malevolent goals ( Zonis and Joseph, 1994 ). The government and global corporations continue to be accused most frequently of conspiracies; however, any group perceived as influential could be charged with conspiracy ( Douglas et al., 2019 ). There are also several terms related to conspiracy theories which should be defined. “Conspiracy beliefs” refer to beliefs in some specific conspiracy theories ( Douglas et al., 2019 ). Specific conspiracy theories are focused on particular events or issues, e.g., the death of Princess Diana ( Douglas and Sutton, 2018 ), the assassination of John F. Kennedy ( Calfano, 2020 ) or 9/11 ( Swami et al., 2010 ). Another term is “conspiracy mentality,” also referred to as “conspiracy ideation” or a tendency toward conspiracy thinking ( Douglas et al., 2019 ). Conspiracy mentality describes the general, fundamental tendency to believe in conspiracies, which creates a monological belief system ( Imhoff et al., 2022 ). It predicts beliefs in specific conspiracy theories—even contradictory ( Wood et al., 2012 ) or fictitious ones ( Swami et al., 2011 ).

Conspiracy theories are widespread in society. They constitute a part of human history but can also adapt to the present times, e.g., in terms of the forms of their dissemination ( van Prooijen and Douglas, 2017 ). Whether we examine accounts of ancient Rome, medieval Europe, or contemporary America, conspiracy theories have inspired millions to take action. In the colonial and early Republic period, Americans feared that Catholics, Jews, Freemasons, Native Americans, and African Americans were conspiring against them. Over time, the list of potential conspirators would be extended to include bankers, rich businessmen and Mormons, and even the U.S. government ( Olmstead, 2018 ; Uscinski, 2018 ). In a 2013 survey, four percent of polled Americans (12 million people) were found to believe that “shape-shifting reptilian people control our world by taking on human form and gaining political power to manipulate our societies” ( Brotherton, 2015 ). During the 2016 presidential campaign of Donald Trump, many conspiracy theories were propagated, e.g., “Climate change is a hoax perpetrated by the Chinese” or “The pharmaceutical industry hides evidence that vaccines cause autism” ( van Prooijen, 2018 ). According to the recent Eurobarometer data ( European Commission, 2021 ), 28% of European citizens think that some viruses have been produced in government laboratories to diminish people’s freedom, 26% believe that cure for cancer is being hidden from people, whereas 17–18% are unsure whether these statements are true or false.

Conspiracy explanations tend to emerge especially after large-scale distressing events, such as terrorist attacks, economic crises, or epidemics ( van Prooijen and Douglas, 2017 ). Nowadays, conspiracy theories have a greater potential to spread due to the Internet and social media ( Connolly et al., 2019 ; Bangerter et al., 2020 ). However, not only external circumstances create space for conspiracy theories to spread. Firmly rooted in the literature are also studies presenting specific traits (e.g., cognitive, motivational, psychopathological) of the individual, making the latter more susceptible to conspiracy messages. The primary role of conspiracy theories covers three groups of motives: epistemic (e.g., willingness to understand and need for certainty), existential (e.g., need for security and control), and social (e.g., desire to maintain a positive image of self or in-group; Douglas et al., 2017 ). Conspiracy theories promise to satisfy important psychological needs and help to manage difficult situations. They make it easier to find meaning in ambiguous events and to deal with insecurity and threats ( van Prooijen et al., 2020 ).

In this systematic review, we sought to identify the main directions and results of the latest research on CBs conducted within the framework of psychological science. We aimed to answer questions about the methodological features of the studies and also to provide a comprehensive overview of their results. We decided to prepare a systematic review with narrative synthesis rather than a meta-analysis because we sought to provide a comprehensive outline of the available research. Moreover, studies on CBs differ significantly in terms of the study designs, measures of CBs, and methods of statistical analysis. The authors often used similar construct (e.g., conspiracy mentality, conspiracy ideation). All the above factors make it very difficult to provide a synthesis of the results, even within a narrower scope. Thus, due to the substantial methodological heterogeneity of the studies, a narrative synthesis was performed.

Goreis and Voracek (2019) conducted the first systematic review devoted to psychological literature on CBs, covering the years from the beginning of database records (i.e., Scopus and Web of Science) until March 2018. Our review is intended to extend their work to cover the years 2018–2021. To do so, we adapted the search strategy and inclusion criteria of the systematic review by Goreis and Voracek (2019) in our review. A search was done on Scopus and Web of Science using the search terms “conspir* OR conspira* ideation OR conspira* belief* OR conspira* theory” and it was limited to the years 2018–2021. No limitation on language was imposed. The search was performed on 17 November 2021.

Initially, 3,504 records were extracted (Web of Science = 2,311, Scopus = 1,193). After duplicates removal, we obtained 2,703 records. The screening process covered the titles and abstracts and it was performed by two researchers (IP and PW) evaluating independently and deciding whether a study met the inclusion criteria using a consensus-based screening process. A study was included if it contained primary empirical data, if specific or general conspiracy belief(s) were measured and if its correlation with at least one other psychological variable was reported. Only articles published in peer-reviewed journals were considered to ensure the quality of the studies. The language of the publication was not an exclusion criterion—one article in German ( Baier and Manzoni, 2020 ) and one in Portuguese ( Rezende et al., 2021 ) were included in the review. One of the articles was published both in English and Portuguese ( Rezende et al., 2019a ), another one in English and Spanish ( Guan et al., 2021 ). After that, 308 full-text articles were assessed for eligibility, and 274 articles (417 studies) meeting the inclusion criteria were identified and included in the review (see Figure 1 ). Three reviewers (AOM, PW, and WSJ) extracted data from the studies for further analysis using a form specifically developed for this review. The other two investigators (IP and ATK) verified the data. Any disagreement was resolved by consensus.

PRISMA flow diagram for the current systematic review.

All the studies were grouped for the descriptive analysis according to the methodology used (correlational-cross-sectional, correlational-longitudinal, experimental), participants’ characteristics (adults, school-age students, undergraduates), continent of origin, sample size, and CBs measurement tools. For the substantive analysis, the studies were grouped into two partially overlapping groups according to whether their main focus was on the antecedents or consequences of CBs. A full list of papers included in the review and a summary description of the studies are available as Supplementary material .

The descriptive analysis was conducted first to give a summary of major study characteristics. Of the 417 studies described in the articles analyzed, nearly half (49.6%) were conducted in European countries (see Table 1 ). Other 136 (32.6%) studies were conducted in North America. The vast majority of the studies (85.7%) were carried out on a sample of adult respondents, with only 60 studies concerned undergraduates/students. Some of the studies measured specific groups of respondents, such as individuals who had not been vaccinated against COVID-19 (e.g., Yang et al., 2021 ) or health professionals ( Al-Sanafi and Sallam, 2021 ). The majority of the studies (71.2%) had a cross-sectional design, and the remaining studies had an experimental design (23.3%) or a longitudinal design (5.5%).

Characteristics of the studies included in the current review.

3.1. Measurement of conspiracy beliefs

Beliefs in conspiracy theories are usually measured with self-report questionnaires, referring to conspiracy mentality or specific conspiracy theories ( Swami et al., 2017 ; Imhoff et al., 2022 ; see Table 2 ). Scales referring to specific conspiracy theories usually ask participants if they believe in a conspiratorial explanation of particular issues or events. Some examples of measures referring to specific issues include the Vaccine Conspiracy Belief Scale (VCBS; Shapiro et al., 2016 ) or HIV Conspiracy Theory Scale. Some measures include questions about several specific conspiracy theories which together create a general score of conspiracy ideation ( Swami et al., 2017 ; Douglas et al., 2019 ), such as the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (BCTI; Swami et al., 2010 ).

Questionnaires most used in the studies included in the review.

Another type of scales measure conspiracy mentality without making reference to specific conspiracy theories ( Swami et al., 2017 ). They consist of broader statements about conspiracies and relate to the general tendency to accept conspiracy explanations ( Imhoff et al., 2022 ). Measures of conspiracy mentality are more stable and less skewed in distribution than measures of specific conspiracy theories. They are also more independent from other ideological content. The best-known questionnaires for the general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories are the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS; Brotherton et al., 2013 ) and the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ; Bruder et al., 2013 ). The GCBS was the most frequently used measure of general belief on conspiracy theories. It was used in a total of 62 studies (see Table 2 ). The CMQ and the new one Conspiracy Mentality Scale (CMS; Stojanov and Halberstadt, 2019 ) were used in a bit fewer studies (CMQ—57, CMS—52). In turn, the BCTI, that measures endorsement of a range of conspiracy theories, was used in 17 studies.

The most commonly used scales measuring CBs were scales measuring specific conspiracy theory beliefs. Conspiratorial thinking related to COVID-19 has been studied the most. Due to the specific and new situation, there was no single scale which most researchers would use. The authors of the individual studies opted for either single-item scales (e.g., Chen et al., 2020 ; El-Elimat et al., 2021 ) or multi-item scales (e.g., Cassese et al., 2020 ; Heiss et al., 2021 ; Chayinska et al., 2022 ). The scale items referred most often to the origin of the virus, pointing to a specific “culprit” of the pandemic, e.g., “COVID-19 is a bacteriological weapon used by the Chinese Communist Party to create panic in the West” ( Bertin et al., 2020 ), “Bill Gates caused (or helped cause) the spread of COVID-19 in order to expand his vaccination programs” ( Agley and Xiao, 2021 ) or to some groups not specified in more detail, e.g., “COVID-19 is a biological weapon created by some countries to destabilize the world” ( Baeza-Rivera et al., 2021 ). Studies also used scales related to belief in conspiracy theories about COVID-19 vaccines, creating their own scales (e.g., Cislak et al., 2021 ; de Sousa et al., 2021 ), or relying on the previous validated Vaccine Conspiracy Beliefs Scale (VCBS). In addition, medical conspiracy theories included scales related to HIV ( Patev et al., 2019 ; Jolley et al., 2020a ; Ojikutu et al., 2020 ; Olansky et al., 2020 ) and the Zika virus ( Klofstad et al., 2019 ; Piltch-Loeb et al., 2019 ).

Conspiracy beliefs were also investigated with regard to members of out-groups. The relevant studies focused on specific national or religious groups: Muslims ( van Prooijen et al., 2018b ), Chinese people ( Guan and Yang, 2020 ; van Prooijen and Song, 2021 ), and Americans ( van Prooijen and Song, 2021 ). They were usually based on conspiracy stereotypes, with threatening out-group members being constructed as a collective enemy, aiming to take control of “us” by acting secretly. In studies embedded in political sciences, similar analyses were conducted in relation to party identification (e.g., Enders and Smallpage, 2019a ) and to attitudes toward the establishment ( Wood and Gray, 2019 ; Enders and Uscinski, 2021b ).

The scales used in the studies were often specific to conspiracy theories related to political events occurring the respective country, both currently and in the past, which we illustrate by examples. In Poland, studies concerned beliefs in a conspiracy related to the Smolensk crash (“Polish and Russian authorities jointly conceal the truth about the catastrophe”; Bilewicz et al., 2019 ). In the UK, belief in conspiracy theories regarding Brexit was investigated (“Leave campaigner and Conservative MP Sarah Wollaston announced recently that she has changed her mind and is now backing Remain. The government have planted Remain supporters in Leave to create the appearance that Leave is losing supporters”; Jolley et al., 2022 ). In Pakistan, research concerned conspiracies related to four conspiracy narratives: the death of Osama bin Laden, the identity of Benazir Bhutto’s killers, the siege of the red Mosque in Islamabad, or nuclear weapons ( Siddiqui, 2020 ). In the US, studies included those around 9/11 (“As you know, on September 11, 2001 the United States was attacked. Who do you think was behind the 9/11 attacks?”; Adam-Troian et al., 2021 ) or the Kennedy assassination (an experiment, exposure to media news; Calfano, 2020 ), and in Serbia, conspiracy theories were examined related to the war in former Yugoslavia (“The Hague Tribunal was created with the main idea to only punish the Serbs”; Milošević Đorđević et al., 2021b ).

3.2. Links between the constructs describing conspiracy beliefs

Alongside typically used constructs (conspiracy mentality, conspiracy beliefs), researchers have also been exploring related ones, such as a Manichaean worldview, a belief in unseen forces, fatalism ( Carey, 2019 ), a belief in an unjust world ( Furnham, 2021 ), and dangerous world beliefs ( Hart and Graether, 2018 ). They represent a particular manner of seeing the world and explaining the events taking place there. These general constructs of conspiratorial functioning constitute universal predispositions, not determined by sociopolitical or cultural contexts. CBs were also investigated as a part of a wider category of “unfounded beliefs” ( Teličák and Halama, 2021 ). The generality of belief hypothesis (i.e., the generality of endorsement of various unsubstantiated claims, such as unsubstantiated conspiracy theories, scientific and psychological misconceptions, or paranormal beliefs) received support ( Bensley et al., 2020 ). Researchers have also undertaken an analysis of the relationship between general categories of conspiratorial functioning and belief in specific conspiracy theories ( Radnitz, 2022 ). For example, in the study by Miller (2020) a tendency toward conspiracy thinking turned out statistically significant, positive predictors of three specific CTs: “The virus is a biological weapon intentionally released by China,” “The virus was accidentally released by China,” “The virus was accidentally released by the U.S.” COVID-19 and generics CBs correlated in many studies (e.g., Georgiou et al., 2020 ; Alper et al., 2021 ; Gligorić et al., 2021 ; Jensen et al., 2021 ).

Another commonly discussed predictive factor in the belief in conspiracy theories is the tendency to believe in other conspiracy theories. Researchers also explore the relations between the belief in specific theories, verifying the proposition that one of the predictive factors in the belief of conspiracy theories is the tendency to believe in other conspiracy theories. A study conducted in Venezuela ( Andrade, 2021a ) looked, among other things, at theories about Simon Bolivar’s poisoning by American agents and about Chavez’s death in Havana, theories that US Military personnel brought COVID-19 to Wuhan as a biological weapon, and that COVID-19 was engineered by the Chinese government in a Wuhan lab, as a biological weapon. The study showed the proneness to believe in COVID conspiracy theories to be predicted by belief in other conspiracy theories, but only if they cohered with particular geopolitical sympathies in the context of Venezuelan politics. In the study by Miller (2020) mentioned above, the researcher investigated the correlation between belief in the individual theories indicated. According to the findings, the CTs were highly correlated and a large majority of the participants believed in more than one. Interestingly, even mutually contradictory CTs were positively related to one another.

Although different CBs were correlated in many studies, there is also evidence that the content of CBs matters. For example, general CBs and government-related conspiracies related to COVID-19 differed in their potential causes and consequences, with only the former being positive predictors of xenophobic tendencies and only the latter negatively predicting pandemic protective behavior ( Oleksy et al., 2021b ). Moreover, different CBs were uniquely related to the susceptibility to conjunction fallacy ( Wabnegger et al., 2021 ). On the other hand, in the experiment by Meuer et al. (2021) not the features of conspiracy theories, but only conspiracy mentality predicted credibility judgments of different conspiracy theories.

3.3. Antecedents of conspiracy beliefs

Psychologists are interested in identifying diverse factors that can be viewed as potential antecedents of CBs. In this part of the review, we grouped them into six categories: cognitive, motivational, personality, psychopathology, political, and sociocultural factors. These studies seek to identify the psychological mechanisms underlying the development of CBs and point to the potential reasons of individual differences in CBs level.

3.3.1. Cognitive factors

A cognitive perspective on conspiracy theories assumes that CBs can be understood as the effect of everyday cognitive processes ( Douglas and Sutton, 2018 ). In the analyzed period, more evidence was found about the cognitive roots of CBs in both cross-sectional and experimental studies. Two main themes emerged from these studies, exploring associations between CBs and thinking skills (e.g., rational, intuitive, or critical thinking) and between CBs and cognitive biases (i.e., deviations from rational thinking). Several articles tested the relationship between intuitive and analytical thinking and CBs. Analytical and rational thinking skills measured as analytical thinking style ( Ballova Mikušková, 2021 ; Georgiou et al., 2021a ; Gligorić et al., 2021 ; Čavojová et al., 2022 ), rational thinking style ( Ballová Mikušková, 2018 ), scientific reasoning ( Georgiou et al., 2021a ; Čavojová et al., 2022 ), critical thinking ability ( Lantian et al., 2021 ), or cognitive reflection ( Clifford et al., 2019 ; Rizeq et al., 2021 ; Pisl et al., 2021a ) were negatively related to CBs. The negative association between cognitive ability (intelligence) and conspiracy mentality occurred when rationality priming was used, which suggests that interventions against CBs can be successful when they strengthen people’s motivation to be rational ( Adam-Troian et al., 2019 ). There is also some evidence that analytical thinking is related to lower CBs only in people who value epistemic rationality ( Ståhl and van Prooijen, 2018 ). On the other hand, an intuitive thinking style ( Georgiou et al., 2019 ; Drinkwater et al., 2020 ; Pytlik et al., 2020 ) and faith in intuition ( Alper et al., 2021 ) were positively related to CBs [but no relationship was found in the study by Gligorić et al. (2021) ].

The associations between automatic cognitive processes and cognitive biases and CBs were also investigated. In relation to previous research suggesting that the desire to impose meaning and order was an important motive of CBs, van der Wal et al. (2018) showed that conspiracy thinking occurred when people drew implausible casual connections between co-occurring events unlikely to be directly connected. van Prooijen et al. (2018a) investigated illusory pattern perception and showed that conspiracy thinking was related to causal inferences of chaotic or random stimuli. In turn, Wagner-Egger et al. (2018) found the relationship between CBs and teleological thinking. The endorsement of conspiracy theories was also positively connected with cognitive biases: jumping to conclusion bias ( Pytlik et al., 2020 ; Kuhn et al., 2021 ; Sanchez and Dunning, 2021 ), liberal acceptance bias, bias against disconfirmatory evidence ( Georgiou et al., 2021b ; Kuhn et al., 2021 ), possibility of being mistaken ( Kuhn et al., 2021 ), and negatively associated with data gathering ability ( Bernadyn and Feigenson, 2018 ) and evidence integration ( Georgiou et al., 2021b ). People with high and low conspiracy mentality had different reactions to cues of epistemic authoritativeness ( Imhoff et al., 2018 ). In other studies, a tendency to accept mutually exclusive beliefs predicted specific CBs and conspiracy mentality ( Petrović and Žeželj, 2021 ), and a meta-belief that beliefs should change according to evidence was negatively related to CBs ( Pennycook et al., 2020 ). Interesting results were obtained in a series of experiments by Huang and Whitson (2020) : mind-body dissonance/incongruence led to a compensatory control process which promoted CBs and conspiracy thinking.

3.3.2. Motivational factors

A motivational perspective underlines that CBs can promise to satisfy important psychological needs. As was mentioned in the Introduction, the taxonomy proposed by Douglas et al. (2017) enables classifying these motives into three categories (epistemic, existential, or social motives). Two groups of needs were more extensively investigated: epistemic needs associated with certainty and knowledge and existential needs related to sense of personal control. The studies found positive associations of CBs with uncertainty avoidance or intolerance ( Alper et al., 2021 ; Larsen et al., 2021 ; Marques et al., 2022 ) and need for cognitive closure ( Golec de Zavala and Federico, 2018 ; Gligorić et al., 2021 ; for a different result see Boot et al., 2021 ). In another study, need for cognitive closure predicted a tendency toward conspiratorial explanations for uncertain events when such explanations were situationally accessible ( Marchlewska et al., 2018 ). In a series of experiments, Kovic and Füchslin (2018) showed that conspiratorial thinking in situations when it was used as an explanation for events tended to increase as the probability of the event decreased. It was proposed that conspiratorial thinking could be viewed as a coping mechanism for uncertainty.

Need for control was another motive positively related to CBs ( Gligorić et al., 2021 ). The compensatory control hypothesis (stating that people believe in conspiracy theories seeking compensation for their lack of control) was supported by evidence in relation to COVID-19 CBs; CBs served as a compensatory control mechanism: perceived control (associated with the COVID-19 threat) was inversely related to COVID-19 CBs, but only when other sources of compensatory control were unavailable ( Stojanov et al., 2021 ). A negative correlation between perceived control and CBs was also reported by Mao et al. (2020) , but in an experiment ( Nyhan and Zeitzoff, 2018 ) no support was found for the hypothesis that CBs might be the result of feelings of powerlessness or lack of individual control. Nyhan and Zeitzoff (2018) quoted potential reasons for this unexpected finding (such as social desirability bias, the disproportionately young, male, and educated sample, or sincerity of respondents). In another study, motivational orientations to pursuing goals (promotion focus vs. prevention focus) were found to be related to CBs—experiments showed that promotion focus can reduce CBs because it activates a sense of personal control ( Whitson et al., 2019 ). It is worth noting that the results described in this section do not indicate that CBs are effective in satisfying important needs. In fact, there is evidence that CBs can even strengthen feelings of existential threat ( Liekefett et al., 2021 ). Instead, recent research showed that certain CBs can also satisfy another type of needs—CBs can be perceived by some people as entertaining and exciting, and individuals who perceived them this way were more prone to believe in conspiracy theories ( van Prooijen et al., 2022b ).

3.3.3. Personality factors

As individuals differ in their susceptibility to CBs, some recent studies looked at relationships between CBs and personality traits and other individual-difference features. The investigations would take into account both personality factor models (Big Five, HEXACO), and temperamental traits (impulsivity, sensation seeking), evaluations of self, and trait-like constructs (such as coping styles and attachment styles). Research showed that impulsivity ( Alper et al., 2021 ) and sensation seeking ( van Prooijen et al., 2022b ) were positively associated with CBs. It was also supported that narcissism and self-esteem have the opposite relationships with CBs (a positive one in the case of narcissism, and a negative one for self-esteem) and served as mutual suppressors ( Siem et al., 2021 ). Collective narcissism measured as an individual difference was also positively related to CBs ( Golec de Zavala and Federico, 2018 ; Marchlewska et al., 2019 ; Bertin et al., 2021 ; Stoica and Umbres̨, 2021 ; van Prooijen and Song, 2021 ; Wang et al., 2021 ). Further studies sought to identify relationships between CBs and general personality traits, but the results were inconsistent (in the five-factor model: positive relationships with conscientiousness and openness, Rezende et al., 2021 , and in the six-factor model: negative relationships with agreeableness and conscientiousness, Bowes et al., 2021 ), albeit in line with the results of the meta-analysis ( Goreis and Voracek, 2019 ) that did not find such associations. Among other individual difference features, avoidance coping (dispositional, but also situational) was associated with CBs in cross-sectional and experimental studies ( Marchlewska et al., 2022 ), anxious attachment predicted belief in specific conspiracy theories and a general tendency ( Green and Douglas, 2018 ) and avoidant attachment predicted conspiracy mentality ( Leone et al., 2018 ).

3.3.4. Psychopathology factors

There is extensive evidence that CBs are associated with psychopathology. Among the psychopathology factors investigated in research on CBs, subclinical forms of mental disorders (e.g., depression) and personality disorders (e.g., borderline) or their symptoms, such as paranoia, delusion proneness, dissociative tendencies, or anxiety, can be distinguished. Maladaptive, socially aversive psychological traits (referred to as the Dark Triad or the Dark Tetrad), often treated as subclinical manifestations of disorders, were also investigated. CBs correlated positively with the Dark Triad personality traits, i.e., narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy ( March and Springer, 2019 ; Ahadzadeh et al., 2021 ; Bowes et al., 2021 ; Gligorić et al., 2021 ; Hughes and Machan, 2021 ). In another study, the positive associations between the Dark Tetrad (i.e., Dark Triad traits plus everyday sadism) sub-scales and conspiracist ideation were mediated by a tendency toward odd beliefs, fatalism, and distrust ( Kay, 2021 ).

In the area of psychopathology, CBs were found to be positively related to paranoia ( Furnham and Grover, 2021 ; Kuhn et al., 2021 ; Larsen et al., 2021 ; Freeman et al., 2022 ), schizotypy ( Barron et al., 2018 ; Hart and Graether, 2018 ; Georgiou et al., 2019 ; Denovan et al., 2020 ; Dyrendal et al., 2021 ; Furnham and Grover, 2021 ), delusion proneness ( Georgiou et al., 2019 ; Larsen et al., 2021 ), borderline ( Furnham and Grover, 2021 ); psychoticism ( Bowes et al., 2021 ; Teličák and Halama, 2021 ), and dissociative tendencies ( Pisl et al., 2021a ). The relationship between schizotypy and CBs was mediated by thinking styles ( Barron et al., 2018 ; Denovan et al., 2020 ). A positive relationship of internalizing symptoms (depression, anxiety) with CBs ( Sallam et al., 2020 ; Bowes et al., 2021 ; De Coninck et al., 2021 ) was also observed. In line with this finding, an experimental increase in COVID-19 threat evoked BIS-related emotions (such as fear and anxiety) which in turn increased CBs about the coronavirus ( Jutzi et al., 2020 ). On the other hand, at the level of the personality disorder clusters, CBs were negatively predicted by the “anxious” cluster of personality disorders ( Furnham and Grover, 2021 ). In another study, incidental (experimentally induced) emotions (happiness, anger, or anxiety) had no effect on the endorsement of conspiracy theories ( Yu et al., 2021 ). The above contradictory findings suggest that the relationship between fear or anxiety and CBs can be more complex.

3.3.5. Political factors

Political factors stand out from among the others due to their area of reference, namely the broadly perceived political space. They shape citizens’ activity within the political system (including their interactions with political actors). They comprise both political attitudes (e.g., populism) and the factors shaping them (e.g., political powerlessness), as well as mechanisms of political functioning of individuals (e.g., political ideology). The largest amount of space in this area was dedicated to ideological orientation ( Federico et al., 2018 ; Golec de Zavala and Federico, 2018 ; Hart and Graether, 2018 ; Hollander, 2018 ; Vitriol and Marsh, 2018 ; Enders and Smallpage, 2019b ; Featherstone et al., 2019 ; Calvillo et al., 2020 ; Agley and Xiao, 2021 ; Enders and Uscinski, 2021a ; Furnham, 2021 ; Min, 2021 ; Nera et al., 2021 ; Stecula and Pickup, 2021 ; Stoica and Umbres̨, 2021 ; Tonković et al., 2021 ; Stojanov and Douglas, 2022 ), with extremist ideology distinguished in some studies ( Federico et al., 2018 ; Golec de Zavala and Federico, 2018 ; Baier and Manzoni, 2020 ; Enders and Uscinski, 2021a ; van der Linden et al., 2021 ; Walter and Drochon, 2022 ). Party identification was included in several studies ( Hollander, 2018 ; Vitriol and Marsh, 2018 ; Enders and Smallpage, 2019a , b ; Enders and Uscinski, 2021a ; Stecula and Pickup, 2021 ). The results of the research are not consistent, which may be related, among other things, to the political culture of the specific country. However, a tendency can be observed toward stronger associations of the extreme poles of the identification scales with CBs. Extremist thinking, whether left- or right-wing, as an unambiguous style of defining the world, based on concrete axioms, gives meaning to social and political events more easily. Rottweiler and Gill (2022) found that a stronger conspiracy mentality led to increased violent extremist intentions. However, this relationship is contingent on several individual differences, such as lower self-control, holding a weaker law-relevant morality, and scoring higher in self-efficacy.

A consistent direction of positive relationships is demonstrated by CBs and authoritarianism ( Federico et al., 2018 ; Golec de Zavala and Federico, 2018 ; Enders and Smallpage, 2019b ; Stojanov et al., 2019 ; Wood and Gray, 2019 ; Baier and Manzoni, 2020 ; Goldberg and Richey, 2020 ; Dyrendal et al., 2021 ; Kim and Kim, 2021 ; Krüppel et al., 2021 ; Milošević Đorđević et al., 2021a ; Tonković et al., 2021 ). Right-wing authoritarianism as a political stance characterized by obedience to an authoritarian leader, and a belief in a hierarchical social order may in fact function as a defense system to protect the socio-political status quo .

Research shows positive relations between populist attitudes and CBs ( Cargnino, 2021 ; Eberl et al., 2021 ). This relationship, however, turned out to be more complicated in a Chinese study by Guan and Yang (2020) , who identified two subtypes of populism (right- vs. responsibility-oriented) and two subtypes of conspiracy beliefs (pro-system vs. anti-system). The results demonstrated that while right-oriented populism was positively correlated with anti-system CBs, it had no significant correlations with pro-system CBs. Responsibility-driven populism was positively correlated with pro-system CBs, and negatively correlated with anti-system CBs. Against this background, it is interesting to look at the study by Jolley et al. (2018) , showing that conspiracy theories, often presented as alternatives to the narrative of the establishment, might strengthen rather than undermine support for the social status quo , if the latter’s legitimacy is threatened.

Other political variables investigated in the CBs context include political knowledge ( Golec de Zavala and Federico, 2018 ; Gemenis, 2021 ; Min, 2021 ), political cynicism ( Vitriol and Marsh, 2018 ; Milošević Đorđević et al., 2021a ), political deprivation ( Baier and Manzoni, 2020 ), political powerlessness ( Tonković et al., 2021 ), anomie ( Baier and Manzoni, 2020 ; Majima and Nakamura, 2020 ), ostracism ( Poon et al., 2020 ), corruption perception ( Milošević Đorđević et al., 2021a ), and political interest ( Mondak, 2020 ). The results generally showed that people who feel alienated within the social and political system, do not find the strength to act politically, or perceive the political system as inaccessible for the average citizen present a higher level of CBs. It has also been proven that inclusion partisan stimuli significantly decrease CBs for supporters of one party and increase such beliefs for supporters of the other party ( Enders and Smallpage, 2018 ).

3.3.6. Sociocultural factors

This section presents social and cultural factors that predict susceptibility to conspiracy theories. Relationships between CBs and values are reported first, following by studies exploring predictors of CBs associated with communication process and media use, social trust and religion. This section ends with the description of findings that do not fit within the above categories.

A series of studies showed relationships between CBs and Hofstede’s cultural values (measured on both the national and individual levels)—positive for collectivism and masculinity, regardless of the measure of CBs used ( Adam-Troian et al., 2021 ). Rezende et al. (2019b) reported correlations between CBs and excitement, suprapersonal, interactive, and promotion values (from the Basic Values Survey). Binding moral foundations (but not individualizing moral foundations) were positively associated with CBs ( Leone et al., 2019 ). There is also evidence from a study conducted in the USA and China that cultural dimension promoting hierarchy in society (i.e., power distance) is related to increased intergroup CBs ( van Prooijen and Song, 2021 ).

De Coninck et al. (2021) obtained associations between main sources of information and the inclination to believe in conspiracies about the coronavirus (traditional media use, health experts—negative associations, digital media use, politicians, personal contacts—positive associations). In another study, the relationships between social media use and different CBs were conditional on the predisposition to conspiracy thinking (stronger for those with higher levels of conspiracy thinking; Enders et al., 2021 ). In turn, social media skepticism was a negative predictor of CBs about COVID-19 ( Ahadzadeh et al., 2021 ). Pro-conspiracy messages increased CBs regardless of the form of such messages (explicit or implicit conspiracy cues), but subsequently receiving corrective information had the opposite effect on CBs ( Bolsen and Druckman, 2018 ; Lyons et al., 2019 ). On the other hand, in an experiment by Nera et al. (2018) the impact of narratives on CBs was not observed. In another study priming resistance to persuasion decreased CBs ( Bonetto et al., 2018 ). Brotherton and Son (2021) discovered that claims regarding conspiracies were situated by participants between facts and opinions, and the extent to which such claims were perceived as facts was associated with the degree to which the individual agreed or disagreed with them.

Another variable introduced in many models during the analyzed period was trust, examined in different subject contexts. One of the more commonly used constructs was institutional trust. It was measured most often by the general trust in institutions ( Jasinskaja-Lahti and Jetten, 2019 ; Baier and Manzoni, 2020 ; Eberl et al., 2021 ; Milošević Đorđević et al., 2021a ; Šrol et al., 2021 ; Stojanov and Douglas, 2022 ), but in some studies the institutions were specifically identified, e.g., the parliament ( Vezzoni et al., 2022 ), the World Health Organization ( Freeman et al., 2022 ), the United Nations, the European Union ( Freeman et al., 2022 ), the government ( Freeman et al., 2022 ; Kim and Kim, 2021 ), heath institutions ( Bruder and Kunert, 2022 ), public officials ( Walter and Drochon, 2022 ), or media ( Stojanov and Douglas, 2022 ). In the pandemic situation, the scientific community undertook immediate research ensuring smooth access to medical and social studies on a huge scale. In the social space, including particularly the virtual space, peer-reviewed scientific research functioned alongside emerging content bearing the hallmarks of misinformation or conspiratorial narratives. Thus, trust in science, scientists and research naturally emerged among the correlates of CBs ( Fasce and Picó, 2019 ; Agley and Xiao, 2021 ; Constantinou et al., 2021b ; Eberl et al., 2021 ; Jensen et al., 2021 ; Stecula and Pickup, 2021 ; Tonković et al., 2021 ; Bruder and Kunert, 2022 ; Freeman et al., 2022 ). The studies also came to include some classic measures: social trust ( Golec de Zavala and Federico, 2018 ; Nestik et al., 2020 ; Kim and Kim, 2021 ), or interpersonal trust ( Hollander, 2018 ; Vitriol and Marsh, 2018 ). In the vast majority of the cases, the results obtained yielded negative relationships between CBs and trust. In a small number of cases, these relationships were statistically insignificant (e.g., Vitriol and Marsh, 2018 ; Kim and Kim, 2021 ).

An important place in the area of social factors is occupied by analyses of the relationship between CBs and religiousness. Researchers see a similarity between an all-powerful being (as described in many religions) and a hidden power organizing events or hiding the truth. This undefinable power is a fundamental feature of conspiracy thinking ( Galliford and Furnham, 2017 ). Although in some studies religious individuals were more likely than non-religious ones to believe in conspiracy theories ( Kim and Kim, 2021 ; Leibovitz et al., 2021 ; Tonković et al., 2021 ; Freeman et al., 2022 ), other studies found no significant relationship (e.g., Agley and Xiao, 2021 ; Andrade, 2021c ; Furnham, 2021 ; Teličák and Halama, 2021 ), or the relationship was different for different CBs scales ( Atari et al., 2019 ). In a study by Jasinskaja-Lahti and Jetten (2019) , no differences were found between endorsement of CBs between believers and non-believers. These discrepancies show how difficult it is to conceptualize and operationalize the construct of religiousness as such. In fact, the analyses presented different approaches, classifying religiousness for instance in terms of religious commitment ( Agley and Xiao, 2021 ), religious belief ( Freeman et al., 2022 ), religion ( Furnham, 2021 ), religiosity ( Hart and Graether, 2018 ; Kim and Kim, 2021 ), the importance of religion ( Tonković et al., 2021 ), or spirituality ( Gligorić et al., 2021 ; Kosarkova et al., 2021 ). The nature of traditionally understood religiosity is institutional, but nowadays more and more people have more popular and unorganized spiritual beliefs ( Baker and Draper, 2010 ; Yilmaz, 2021 ). It is worth pointing out that researchers outline the relations between religiosity and spirituality differently in their studies of CBs. Teličák and Halama (2021) approach the two constructs autonomously, recording weak positive relations between CBs and spirituality and religiosity (slightly stronger for spirituality). Kosarkova et al. (2021) demonstrated an interesting relationship, namely that spirituality without being religiously affiliated was linked to high levels of vaccination refusal and hesitancy, whereas affiliation to a church showed no significant associations. In the study by Gligorić et al. (2021) , spirituality emerged as the most significant predictor of higher conspiracy endorsement. Some researchers treat religion and spirituality jointly without drawing differences between the constructs ( Leibovitz et al., 2021 ; Marques et al., 2022 ), obtaining positive correlations with CBs.

A series of studies showed a tendency to overestimate the CBs of others; perceived CBs of in-groups (but not out-groups) predicted strongly personal CBs, which suggests that challenging misperceived conspiracy belief norms might be the way to reduce CBs ( Cookson et al., 2021 ). There is also evidence that CBs emerging as a response to victimizing social events can destroy social cohesion ( Bilewicz et al., 2019 ) and that chronic social devaluation gives rise to African American endorsement of race-relevant CBs ( Davis et al., 2018 ).

3.4. Consequences of conspiracy beliefs

The endorsement of conspiracy theories may have a range of negative consequences for both individuals and the society at large. Results of studies dedicated to this aspect are presented below, first research focusing on the implications CBs have for individual health and wellbeing, followed by studies describing the implications of CBs important from the point of view of social wellbeing. Further on in this section, the relations between CBs and political and health-related attitudes directly linked to the COVID-19 pandemic will be discussed.

Negative emotions occupy an important position among the potential negative implications of CBs considered from the point of view of an individual endorsing such beliefs. Belief in COVID-19 conspiracies predicted higher fear, distress, and anxiety ( Chen et al., 2020 ; Jolley et al., 2020b ; Jovančević and Milićević, 2020 ; Leibovitz et al., 2021 ), future anxiety ( Duplaga and Grysztar, 2021 ), and also lower wellbeing ( Spasovski and Kenig, 2020 ; van Prooijen et al., 2021 ; Freeman et al., 2022 ) and life satisfaction ( Kohút et al., 2022 ). These implications are also visible in the working environment in the form of a negative impact of CBs on job search behavior ( Gabriel et al., 2021 ) and lower job satisfaction ( Chen et al., 2020 ).

From the point of view of social wellbeing, what seems important are the relations between CBs and various unfavorable attitudes, such as anti-science attitudes ( Marques et al., 2022 ), climate skepticism ( Hornsey et al., 2018a ), lower prosocial orientation ( Hornsey et al., 2021 ), resistance to humanitarian aid ( Mashuri et al., 2022 ), pharmacophobia ( Petelinšek and Lauri Korajlija, 2020 ), negative attitudes toward HIV testing ( Patev et al., 2019 ; Hood et al., 2020 ), and other socially unfavorable attitudes ( Jedinger, 2021 ; Molz and Stiller, 2021 ). The implications of CBs potentially affecting social communication include: endorsement of fake news ( Anthony and Moulding, 2019 ; Halpern et al., 2019 ; Faragó et al., 2020 ; Frischlich et al., 2021 ), rating nonsense as profound ( Čavojová et al., 2019 ), and a willingness to share conspiracy theories online ( Lobato et al., 2020 ). In turn, when it comes to popularization of scientific knowledge, CBs were related to believing in viral and deceptive claims about science ( Landrum and Olshansky, 2019 ), perceiving pseudo-scientific arguments as stronger ( Landrum et al., 2021 ), and a tendency to reject complex scientific messages and to feel rejected and devalued reading such messages ( Schnepf et al., 2021 ).

CBs can be also connected with phenomena constituting manifestations of serious social pathologies, such as social stigma and fear of social exclusion ( Lantian et al., 2018 ), dehumanization of others ( Markowitz et al., 2021 ), criminal intentions and support for violence ( Jolley et al., 2019 ; Jolley and Paterson, 2020 ). The potential negative social implications of CBs are also suggested by the relations between HIV/AIDS CBs and a lower intention to adopt pre-exposure prophylaxis as HIV prevention ( Brooks et al., 2018 ; Jolley et al., 2020a ; Parent et al., 2020 ) and the relationship between CBs and an increase in preferences for alternative therapies over biomedical ones ( Lamberty and Imhoff, 2018 ). It is worth adding that even short-term exposure to conspiracy theories can affect actual behavior ( Bolsen et al., 2020 ; Balafoutas et al., 2021 ; Meuer and Imhoff, 2021 ).

A vast majority of the studies covered by this review were conducted in the period of the COVID-19 pandemic. It was a time when researchers would seek the factors determining conventional and unconventional attitudes and behaviors of citizens with regard to decisions of the authorities (e.g., adherence to guidelines aiming to reduce the spread of COVID-19), as well as the attitudes and behaviors toward political actors (e.g., voting behavior). Similarly, a lot of space in the literature was devoted to the search for predictors of health-promoting behaviors. Both lines of research, partly overlapping, dominated the investigations into the implications of CBs, because political and health-related consequences of CBs seemed especially important in the times of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Several studies investigated the role of CBs in shaping political behavior; in particular, strong connections are visible between CBs and anti-government activity aimed at changing the existing order. Seeing the world as governed by conspiracies increased the intentions to engage in illegal political actions (such as participation in illegal demonstrations or committing a violent attack) but attenuated the willingness to engage in legal forms of political participation (e.g., voting or joining a political party; Imhoff et al., 2021 ). Moreover, belief in conspiracy theories makes it possible to anticipate unconventional (but non-violent) participation ( Ardèvol-Abreu et al., 2020 ), justification of protest actions ( Chayinska and Minescu, 2018 ), support for leaving the EU ( Jolley et al., 2021 ), support for Brexit ( Swami et al., 2018 ), foreign policy views ( Onderco and Stoeckel, 2020 ), and Stealth Democracy beliefs ( Pantazi et al., 2021 ). CBs were also associated with self-reported voting behavior in the 2016 Italian constitutional referendum ( Mancosu et al., 2021 ) and voting behavior with regard to the election of Donald Trump ( Lamberty et al., 2018 ). CBs were positively related to political activities such as talking to people about voting for or against a candidate or a party, or signing a petition on paper about a political or social issue ( Kim, 2022 ).

Social and political consequences of health decisions of individuals seem especially important in the times of the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, it is not unexpected that researchers have most recently been focusing on identifying the antecedents of pandemic-related health behaviors. Conspiracy theory endorsement turned out to be one of the frequently included predictors of such behavior. There is evidence that health-related CBs can lower health-seeking intentions ( Natoli and Marques, 2021 ). In many studies, anti-COVID-19 health protective attitudes and behavior were negatively related to COVID-19 CBs ( Biddlestone et al., 2020 ; Bierwiaczonek et al., 2020 ; Earnshaw et al., 2020 ; Egorova et al., 2020 ; Kowalski et al., 2020 ; Rieger, 2020 ; Romer and Jamieson, 2020 ; Abadi et al., 2021 ; Allington et al., 2021 ; Farias and Pilati, 2021 ; Karić and Međedović, 2021 ; Resnicow et al., 2021 ; Soveri et al., 2021 ; Chayinska et al., 2022 ; Latkin et al., 2022 ; Pavela Banai et al., 2022 ; Garry et al., 2022 ; Hughes et al., 2022 ; Pummerer et al., 2022 ) and conspiracy mentality ( Gualda et al., 2021 ; Oleksy et al., 2021a ; Pellegrini et al., 2021 ; Plohl and Musil, 2021 ; Maftei and Holman, 2022 ). However, sometimes no relationship ( Prichard and Christman, 2020 ; Alper et al., 2021 ; Naveed et al., 2021 ; Schnell et al., 2021 ; Šuriņa et al., 2021 ; Yarosh et al., 2021 ) or even positive relationships ( Alper et al., 2021 ; Corbu et al., 2021 ; Wang and Kim, 2021 ) between these variables were reported. This may be the case because different CBs about COVID-19 can have different and opposite behavioral consequences depending on the content of the conspiracies ( Imhoff and Lamberty, 2020 ; Chan et al., 2021 ; Jia and Luo, 2021 ). Moreover, people with high conspiracy mentality can engage in non-normative pseudoscientific preventive behavior ( Marinthe et al., 2020 ; Teovanović et al., 2021 ). The specificity of preventive behavior can also differentiate the relationship between CBs and behavior ( Bruder and Kunert, 2022 ). In other studies, COVID-19 CBs were used as mediators ( Maglić et al., 2021 ; Swami and Barron, 2021 ) and conspiracy mentality was used as a moderator ( Lazarević et al., 2021 ) of the relationships between other predictors and preventive behavior. In turn, psychological flexibility ( Constantinou et al., 2021a ), institutional trust and self-perceived infections ( van Prooijen et al., 2022a ) served as mediators between CBs and health behavior.

A lot of studies conducted in the reviewed period evaluated the importance of different factors in predicting attitudes and behaviors associated with vaccination. This is understandable considering the importance of vaccination in the context of COVID-19 pandemic. CBs were frequently included as predictors in these studies. The majority of studies concerned COVID-19 vaccines and provided strong evidence for negative relationships between COVID-related CBs and the COVID-19 vaccine attitudes and the intention to be vaccinated ( Bertin et al., 2020 ; Goldberg and Richey, 2020 ; Al-Sanafi and Sallam, 2021 ; Al-Wutayd et al., 2021 ; Andrade, 2021a , b ; Arshad et al., 2021 ; Burke et al., 2021 ; de Sousa et al., 2021 ; Eberhardt and Ling, 2021 ; El-Elimat et al., 2021 ; Jensen et al., 2021 ; Kachurka et al., 2021 ; Lindholt et al., 2021 ; Martinez-Berman et al., 2021 ; Pisl et al., 2021a ; Pivetti et al., 2021a ; Ruiz and Bell, 2021 ; Sallam et al., 2021a , b ; Sowa et al., 2021 ; Wirawan et al., 2021 ; Woolf et al., 2021 ). General CBs were also negative predictors of COVID-19 vaccination attitudes ( Rozbroj et al., 2019 ; Bertin et al., 2020 ; Andrade, 2021a ; Jennings et al., 2021 ; Pisl et al., 2021a , b ; Sallam et al., 2021a ; Bacon and Taylor, 2022 ; Knobel et al., 2022 ; Nazlı et al., 2022 ). However, some studies did not find such a relationship ( Baeza-Rivera et al., 2021 ; Guillon and Kergall, 2021 ; Yang et al., 2021 ). Other studies established the mediational role of COVID-19 CBs ( Maftei and Holman, 2021 , 2022 ; Simione et al., 2021 ), or conspiracy mentality ( Scrima et al., 2022 ) between other predictors and the intention to be vaccinated. Similar relationships were obtained for non-COVID vaccines ( Hornsey et al., 2018b , 2020 , 2021 ; Callaghan et al., 2019 ; Fonseca et al., 2021 ; Milošević Đorđević et al., 2021a ; Pivetti et al., 2021a , b ).

The vast majority of the studies on the relationship between CBs and health attitudes and behavior were correlational. However, the results of several experimental studies are also available. For example, Chen et al. (2021) used the theory of planned behavior to create an experiment. After exposure to HPV vaccine-related conspiracy messages, participants presented more negative attitudes toward the vaccine and weaker intentions to receive the vaccine ( Chen et al., 2021 ). Experimental investigation of the effectiveness of different methods of reducing the acceptance of COVID-related CBs showed that the science- and fact-focusing corrections were effective ( Guan et al., 2021 ). In another study, transparent negative communication about the COVID-19 vaccine decreased acceptance of the vaccine but also increased trust in health authorities, whereas vague, reassuring communication lowered trust and boosted CBs but did not increase vaccine acceptance ( Petersen et al., 2021 ).

4. Discussion

The objective of the current review was to provide an extensive overview of the empirical studies on CBs within psychology. We present a synthesis of the results of 274 articles published between 2018 and 2021 identified in accordance with the guidelines for systematic reviews. It should be underlined that about half of the respective period coincided with the pandemic period, posing an extraordinary challenge for individuals and institutions, and also resulting in a great number of new conspiracy theories. The current paper presents antecedents as well as consequences of CBs. We grouped the potential antecedents of CBs into six categories: cognitive, motivational, personality, psychopathology, political, and sociocultural factors. Within cognitive psychology, researchers have explored basic cognitive processes, such as illusory pattern perception, and different cognitive biases that can lead to CBs. Growing evidence suggests that analytical thinking is associated with a lower tendency to believe in conspiracies. Within the motivational perspective, relationships were demonstrated between conspiracy thinking and important needs and motives, such as uncertainty avoidance, need for cognitive closure, or need for control. Among individual differences, pathological traits and disorders (such as schizotypy, paranoia, and depression) have gained more attention of conspiracy theory researchers than normal personality traits. The Dark Triad personality traits were also often investigated in the context of CBs.

Among the political antecedents of CBs, researchers analyzed political attitudes and mechanisms of political functioning of individuals. Ideological orientation and party identification were included most often in the research models. Although the research results are not consistent, a clear association can be seen between extremist views and CBs. Analyses of other variables such as anomie, political deprivation and political powerlessness show that poorly perceived political subjectivity predisposes one more strongly to CBs. Although in the analyzed period, relations were sought mainly between CBs and right-wing authoritarianism, it should be emphasized that more recent literature reveals certain paths aimed at analyzing the relations between CBs and left-wing authoritarianism features ( Avendaño et al., 2022 ; Costello et al., 2022 ). Left-wing authoritarianism predicts higher endorsement of vaccines and support for compulsory vaccination against COVID-19 and penalties for unvaccinated people ( Peng, 2022 ). Galais and Guinjoan (2022) show that people that value security over freedom are more prone to falling for pandemic misbeliefs. CBs are associated with a belief in a hierarchical social order (right-wing) and with anti-hierarchical attitudes about social order (left-wing). In the sociocultural factors group, the researchers looked for links between CBs and cultural values. Relationships between conspiratorial thinking and social media use and the perception of various media content were also confirmed. Research shows that low trust is more strongly associated with conspiratorial thinking. In turn, the associations between religiousness and CBs did not always yield consistent results.

New trends in research into CBs will be identified by comparing the studies covered by this review to the results of the systematic review by Goreis and Voracek (2019) , covering studies from 1994 until early 2018. This is made possible by applying identical criteria for selecting the studies covered by these reviews. The one by Goreis and Voracek (2019) included seven papers, also included in this review, since the original and final year of their publication differed. These papers were treated (only for the purpose of comparing the two sets of papers) as components of the set of the systematic review by Goreis and Voracek, and at the same time they were excluded from the set of papers covered by this review to avoid their double attribution.

The comparison between the number of papers included in comparable literature reviews (96 vs. 267, after removing duplicates) shows the dramatic increase in the number of studies published in the years 2018–2021. One of the factors that could be responsible for the increase the interest of researchers in the topic of CBs is the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak that resulted in the emergence of a number of conspiracy theories (related to the origin of the virus, the process of its spread, the consequences or composition of vaccines, etc.) spreading rapidly around the world. The pandemic was a difficult situation, generating many doubts, difficult emotions and, above all, a lack of prospects for many individuals. Thus, this period saw a boom in conspiracy theories providing quick answers to difficult questions. Because of their widespread and universal nature (presence in different cultures), as well as of their easy-to-grasp effect on attitudes and behaviors, it has been easier to conduct comparative studies across cultures, including populations hitherto underrepresented in research of this type. Older research on CBs was conducted mainly on WEIRD (White, Educated, Industrialized, Reach, and Democratic) samples, which hinders the generalization of their results. The number of studies included in both reviews, grouped by publication year, is shown in Figure 2 .

Number of studies on conspiracy beliefs per year based on Goreis and Voracek (2019) and the current review.

In the period covered by the present review, an identical share of cross-sectional studies (71.2%) was recorded compared to the previous period ( Goreis and Voracek, 2019 ; 71,1%). However, the pandemic situation in course encouraged the researchers to perform longitudinal studies (5.5%), not present earlier. The territorial scope of the research was expanded. While the majority of studies continue to be performed in Europe and North America, more studies were recorded in Asia (increase from 4.2 to 6.7%), and some first studies appeared in Africa (nine studies, including multiple continents research). An increase in the number of studies involving more numerous samples was recorded. The number of small studies conducted on fewer than 100 people decreased by far (from 16.3 to 1.7%), while the percentage of research on the most numerous samples of over 500 people increased (from 19.9 to 49.6%). A decrease was recorded in the number of studies on students. In the period covered by our review, 2.5 times fewer studies on students (14.3%) were carried out compared to the previous period in total on the group of graduate and undergraduate students (36.8%). This may have been related to the more difficult access to that group at a time when classes had been suspended in most countries, or were being held online.

The pandemic situation became a source for yet another important trend, namely the increase in the number of practically-oriented studies. In the original review by Goreis and Voracek (2019) , few such studies appeared. They concerned, among other things, diagnosing CBs among future teachers with an analysis of the benefits of critical thinking courses as a way of reducing conspiracy beliefs ( Ballová Mikušková, 2018 ) and health-harming behaviors as consequences of CBs ( Jolley and Douglas, 2014 ; Oliver and Wood, 2014 ). The post-2020 situation saw the emergence of a line of research that involved seeking the factors potentially supporting citizens’ behaviors oriented toward containment of virus spread. In that line of research, CBs constitutes, among other things, a predictor of negative attitudes toward vaccines (e.g., Burke et al., 2021 ; de Sousa et al., 2021 ; Eberhardt and Ling, 2021 ) or boycotting the authorities, or unconventional activity such as participating in demonstrations and protests (e.g., Chayinska and Minescu, 2018 ; Ardèvol-Abreu et al., 2020 ).

Goreis and Voracek (2019) pointed out in their systematic review that the majority of research on CBs published until 2018 lacked theoretical background. This conclusion seems to be valid also for the studies included in this review. A similar opinion was expressed by van Prooijen and Douglas (2018, p. 898) in the Introduction to European Journal of Social Psychology Special Issue on conspiracy theories. They stated that “the field is lacking a solid theoretical framework that contextualizes previous findings, that enables novel predictions, and that suggests interventions to reduce the prevalence of conspiracy theories in society.” In the reviewed period, such a theoretical framework, accepted by researchers exploring various themes empirically in the field of research into CBs, does not seem to have appeared. However, over the past few years, a number of papers have been published with the aim of summarizing the current knowledge from the psychological point of view and of outlining the direction of further research ( Douglas et al., 2017 ; Douglas and Sutton, 2018 ; van Prooijen and Douglas, 2018 ; van Prooijen and van Vugt, 2018 ; van Prooijen, 2020 ; Biddlestone et al., 2021 ). For example, van Prooijen and Douglas (2018) defined four basic principles of CBs (i.e., the consequential, universal, emotional, and social character of such beliefs), drawn from empirical studies. van Prooijen and van Vugt (2018) proposed an evolutionary model of CBs. van Prooijen (2020) put forward the existential threat model of CBs, asserting that experiencing existential threat triggers epistemic sense-making processes which in turn can lead to CBs only when antagonistic groups are salient. In turn, Biddlestone et al. (2021) presented a model in which CBs are motivated by the frustration of motives associated with three selves (individual, relational, and collective).

Douglas et al. (2017) articulated the need for research on the consequences of CBs. During the period under examination, a significant increase was observed in the number of studies focusing on this topic. However, it is worth noting that most of the studies on potential consequences of CBs had cross-sectional designs and thus causal relationships remained unclear. In the times of the COVID-19 pandemic, when health-related behaviors had an especially high impact on both individual lives and social security and welfare, most of the research on the effects of CBs focused on this particular issue. These studies provided strong evidence that specific COVID-19 beliefs and conspiracy mentality can predict adherence to pandemic measures and a broad range of pandemic-related attitudes and behaviors, including attitudes toward vaccination. Several studies investigated the role of CBs in shaping political behavior. CBs made it possible to predict activity aimed at changing the existing socio-political order for instance through demonstrations or illegal political actions.

The vast majority of research emphasizes the negative individual and social consequences of endorsing CBs. However, positive effects for individuals (such as satisfying their needs) are also potentially possible. van Prooijen (2022) listed the potential psychological benefits connected with a conspiracy worldview as ego-defensive benefits, help in rationalizing the individual’s behavior, and entertainment. Despite the skepticism often expressed by researchers regarding the possibility of satisfying needs as a result of endorsing conspiracy theories, further research is needed to resolve this problem (see: Liekefett et al., 2021 ).

5. Limitations

The analyses were restricted to studies published between 2018 and 2021, which is a relatively short period of time. However, during that time a rapid increase in the number of studies on CBs was observed, which was the motivation for this review. Only published papers retrieved from two databases (Scopus and Web of Science) were used in the review. These indexing databases seem to be the most appropriate considering the theme of the review, and they are widely regarded as high quality sources of scientific articles, but this decision reduces the number of sources taken into account. Thus, it is likely that not all important, relevant studies were included in our review. The rationale behind this decision was that we strived to maintain compliance with the solutions applied by Goreis and Voracek (2019) in their systematic review (see the Current study section). It is also worth noting that our intention was to present the state of knowledge on CBs as widely as possible at this point in time in order to organize and inspire conspiracy theory researchers rather than formulate answers regarding more specific issues (such as prevalence, evaluation of interventions, or measurement issues).

Although validated and reliable measures of CBs were used in many reviewed studies, some of them used very short (1- to 3-item) scales prepared for the particular research, which makes the comparison of the results very difficult. Study publication and outcome reporting biases can affect the results of systematic reviews, especially when meta-analyses were conducted. However, in this study, due to the broadly formulated purpose of the review and the diversity of the reviewed studies, statistical synthesis was not performed. There is also a risk that some errors were made during data extraction. To avoid this, two independent reviewers (using a consensus-based method) were engaged at every stage of preparing the review.

Data availability statement

Author contributions.

IP and AT-K: conception and design and interpretation of the results. IP and PW: systematic literature search. WS-J, AO-M, PW, AT-K, and IP: analysis of the results. IP, AT-K, PW, AO-M, and WS-J: compilation of the results. All authors approved the submitted version for publication.

Funding Statement

This research was funded by National Science Centre, Poland (grant no 2020/39/I/HS5/00176).

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Publisher’s note

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

Supplementary material

The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1075779/full#supplementary-material

Supplementary Table 1

Summary description of the studies.

Supplementary Appendix 1

Bibliographic data of the papers included in the review.

• Abadi D., Arnaldo I., Fischer A. (2021). Anxious and angry: Emotional responses to the COVID-19 threat. Front. Psychol. 12 : 676116 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.676116 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Adam-Troian J., Caroti D., Arciszewski T., Ståhl T. (2019). Unfounded beliefs among teachers: The interactive role of rationality priming and cognitive ability. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 33 720–727. 10.1002/acp.3547 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Adam-Troian J., Wagner-Egger P., Motyl M., Arciszewski T., Imhoff R., Zimmer F., et al. (2021). Investigating the links between cultural values and belief in conspiracy theories: The key roles of collectivism and masculinity. Polit. Psychol. 42 597–618. 10.1111/pops.12716 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Agley J., Xiao Y. (2021). Misinformation about COVID-19: Evidence for differential latent profiles and a strong association with trust in science. BMC Public Health 21 : 89 . 10.1186/s12889-020-10103-x [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ahadzadeh A. S., Ong F. S., Wu S. L. (2021). Social media skepticism and belief in conspiracy theories about COVID-19: The moderating role of the dark triad. Curr. Psychol . [Epub ahead of print]. 10.1007/s12144-021-02198-1 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Allington D., Duffy B., Wessely S., Dhavan N., Rubin J. (2021). Health-protective behaviour, social media usage and conspiracy belief during the COVID-19 public health emergency. Psychol. Med. 51 1763–1769. 10.1017/S003329172000224X [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Alper S., Bayrak F., Yilmaz O. (2021). Psychological correlates of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and preventive measures: Evidence from Turkey. Curr. Psychol. 40 5708–5717. 10.1007/s12144-020-00903-0 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Al-Sanafi M., Sallam M. (2021). Psychological determinants of COVID-19 vaccine acceptance among healthcare workers in Kuwait: A cross-sectional study using the 5C and vaccine conspiracy beliefs scales. Vaccines 9 : 701 . 10.3390/vaccines9070701 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Al-Wutayd O., Khalil R., Rajar A. B. (2021). Sociodemographic and behavioral predictors of COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy in Pakistan. J. Multidiscip. Healthc. 14 2847–2856. 10.2147/JMDH.S325529 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Andrade G. (2021a). Belief in conspiracy theories about COVID-19 amongst venezuelan students: A pilot study. Rev. Colombiana Psicol. 30 79–88. 10.15446/rcp.v30n1.87357 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Andrade G. (2021b). Covid-19 vaccine hesitancy, conspiracist beliefs, paranoid ideation and perceived ethnic discrimination in a sample of University students in Venezuela. Vaccine 39 6837–6842. 10.1016/j.vaccine.2021.10.037 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Andrade G. (2021c). Vaccine hesitancy and religiosity in a sample of university students in Venezuela. Hum. Vaccin. Immunother. 17 5162–5167. 10.1080/21645515.2021.1981737 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Anthony A., Moulding R. (2019). Breaking the news: Belief in fake news and conspiracist beliefs. Austr. J. Psychol. 71 154–162. 10.1111/ajpy.12233 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ardèvol-Abreu A., Gil de Zúñiga H., Gámez E. (2020). The influence of conspiracy beliefs on conventional and unconventional forms of political participation: The mediating role of political efficacy. Br. J. Soc. Psychol. 59 549–569. 10.1111/bjso.12366 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Arshad M. S., Hussain I., Mahmood T., Hayat K., Majeed A., Imran I., et al. (2021). A national survey to assess the COVID-19 vaccine-related conspiracy beliefs, acceptability, preference, and willingness to pay among the general population of Pakistan. Vaccines 9 : 720 . 10.3390/vaccines9070720 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Atari M., Afhami R., Swami V. (2019). Psychometric assessments of Persian translations of three measures of conspiracist beliefs. PLoS One 14 : e0215202 . 10.1371/journal.pone.0215202 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Avendaño D., Fasce A., Costello T., Adrián-Ventura J. (2022). Spanish adaptation of the left-wing authoritarianism index. J. Pers. Assess. 104 692–699. 10.1080/00223891.2021.1981345 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bacon A. M., Taylor S. (2022). Vaccination hesitancy and conspiracy beliefs in the UK during the SARS-COV-2 (COVID-19) pandemic. Int.J. Behav. Med. 29 , 448–445. 10.1007/s12529-021-10029-7 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Baeza-Rivera M. J., Salazar-Fernández C., Araneda-Leal L., Manríquez-Robles D. (2021). To get vaccinated or not? Social psychological factors associated with vaccination intent for COVID-19. J. Pacif. Rim Psychol. 15 : 18344909211051800 . 10.1177/18344909211051799 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Baier D., Manzoni P. (2020). Verschwörungsmentalität und extremismus – Befunde aus befragungsstudien in der Schweiz (Conspiracy mentality and extremism – Survey findings from Switzerland). Monatsschr. Kriminol. Strafrechtsreform 103 83–96. 10.1515/mks-2020-2044 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Baker J. O., Draper S. (2010). Diverse supernatural portfolios: Certitude, exclusivity, and the curvilinear relationship between religiosity and paranormal beliefs. J. Sci. Study Relig. 49 413–424. 10.1111/j.1468-5906.2010.01519.x [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Balafoutas L., Libman A., Selamis V., Vollan B. (2021). Exposure to conspiracy theories in the lab. Econ.Polit. Stud. 9 90–112. 10.1080/20954816.2020.1818930 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ballová Mikušková E. (2018). Conspiracy beliefs of future teachers. Curr. Psychol. 37 692–701. 10.1007/s12144-017-9561-4 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ballova Mikušková E. (2021). The analytic cognitive style and conspiracy mentality as predictors of conspiracy beliefs. Stud. Psychol. 63 190–203. 10.31577/sp.2021.02.819 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bangerter A., Wagner-Egger P., Delouvée S. (2020). “ How conspiracy theories spread ,” in Routledge handbook of conspiracy theories , eds Butter M., Knight P. (New York, NY: Routledge; ), 206–218. 10.4324/9780429452734-2_5 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Barron D., Furnham A., Weis L., Morgan K. D., Towell T., Swami V. (2018). The relationship between schizotypal facets and conspiracist beliefs via cognitive processes. Psychiatry Res. 259 15–20. 10.1016/j.psychres.2017.10.001 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bensley D. A., Lilienfeld S. O., Rowan K. A., Masciocchi C. M., Grain F. (2020). The generality of belief in unsubstantiated claims. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 34 16–28. 10.1002/acp.3581 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bernadyn T., Feigenson K. A. (2018). Data gathering ability contributes to visual organization and probabilistic reasoning. Heliyon 4 : e00582 . 10.1016/j.heliyon.2018.e00582 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bertin P., Nera K., Delouvée S. (2020). Conspiracy beliefs, rejection of vaccination, and support for hydroxychloroquine: A conceptual replication-extension in the COVID-19 pandemic context. Front. Psychol. 11 : 565128 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.565128 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bertin P., Nera K., Hamer K., Uhl-Haedicke I., Delouvée S. (2021). Stand out of my sunlight: The mediating role of climate change conspiracy beliefs in the relationship between national collective narcissism and acceptance of climate science. Group Process. Intergroup Relat. 24 738–758. 10.1177/1368430221992114 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Biddlestone M., Green R., Douglas K. M. (2020). Cultural orientation, power, belief in conspiracy theories, and intentions to reduce the spread of COVID-19. Br. J. Soc. Psychol. 59 663–673. 10.1111/bjso.12397 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Biddlestone M., Green R., Cichocka A., Sutton R., Douglas K. (2021). Conspiracy beliefs and the individual, relational, and collective selves. Soc. Pers. Psychol. Compass 15 : e12639 . 10.1111/spc3.12639 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bierwiaczonek K., Kunst J. R., Pich O. (2020). Belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories reduces social distancing over time. Appl. Psychol. Health Wellbeing 12 1270–1285. 10.1111/aphw.12223 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bilewicz M., Witkowska M., Pantazi M., Gkinopoulos T., Klein O. (2019). Traumatic rift: How conspiracy beliefs undermine cohesion after societal trauma? Eur. J. Psychol. 15 : 82 . 10.5964/ejop.v15i1.1699 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bogart L. M., Bird S. T. (2003). Exploring the relationship of conspiracy beliefs about HIV/AIDS to sexual behaviors and attitudes among African-American adults. J. Natl Med. Assoc. 95 : 1057 . [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bolsen T., Druckman J. N. (2018). Validating conspiracy beliefs and effectively communicating scientific consensus. Weather Clim. Soc. 10 453–458. 10.1175/WCAS-D-17-0096.1 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bolsen T., Palm R., Kingsland J. T. (2020). Framing the origins of COVID-19. Sci. Commun. 42 562–585. 10.1177/1075547020953603 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bonetto E., Troïan J., Varet F., Lo Monaco G., Girandola F. (2018). Priming resistance to persuasion decreases adherence to conspiracy theories. Soc. Influence 13 125–136. 10.1080/15534510.2018.1471415 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Boot A. B., Eerland A., Jongerling J., Verkoeijen P. P., Zwaan R. A. (2021). Gathering, processing, and interpreting information about COVID-19. Sci. Rep. 11 : 6569 . [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bowes S. M., Costello T. H., Ma W., Lilienfeld S. O. (2021). Looking under the tinfoil hat: Clarifying the personological and psychopathological correlates of conspiracy beliefs. J. Pers. 89 422–436. 10.1111/jopy.12588 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Brooks R. A., Allen V. C., Regan R., Mutchler M. G., Cervantes-Tadeo R., Lee S.-J. (2018). HIV/AIDS conspiracy beliefs and intention to adopt preexposure prophylaxis among black men who have sex with men in Los Angeles. Int J STD AIDS 29 375–381. 10.1177/0956462417727691 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Brotherton R. (2015). Suspicious minds. Why we believe conspiracy theories. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing. [ Google Scholar ]
• Brotherton R., Son L. K. (2021). Metacognitive labeling of contentious claims: Facts, opinions, and conspiracy theories. Front. Psychol. 12 : 644657 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.644657 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Brotherton R., French C., Pickering A. (2013). Measuring belief in conspiracy theories: The generic conspiracist beliefs scale. Front. Psychol. 4 : 279 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00279 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bruder M., Kunert L. (2022). The conspiracy hoax? Testing key hypotheses about the correlates of generic beliefs in conspiracy theories during the COVID-19 pandemic. Int. J. Psychol. 57 43–48. 10.1002/ijop.12769 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bruder M., Haffke P., Neave N., Nouripanah N., Imhoff R. (2013). Measuring individual differences in generic beliefs in conspiracy theories across cultures: Conspiracy mentality questionnaire. Front. Psychol. 4 : 225 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00225 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Burke P. F., Masters D., Massey G. (2021). Enablers and barriers to COVID-19 vaccine uptake: An international study of perceptions and intentions. Vaccine 39 5116–5128. 10.1016/j.vaccine.2021.07.056 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Calfano B. R. (2020). Government-corroborated conspiracies: Motivating response to (and Belief in) a coordinated crime. Polit. Sci. Polit. 53 64–71. [ Google Scholar ]
• Callaghan T., Motta M., Sylvester S., Lunz Trujillo K., Blackburn C. C. (2019). Parent psychology and the decision to delay childhood vaccination. Soc. Sci. Med. 238 : 112407 . 10.1016/j.socscimed.2019.112407 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Calvillo D. P., Ross B. J., Garcia R. J. B., Smelter T. J., Rutchick A. M. (2020). Political ideology predicts perceptions of the threat of COVID-19 (and susceptibility to fake news about it). Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci. 11 1119–1128. 10.1177/1948550620940539 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Carey J. M. (2019). Who believes in conspiracy theories in Venezuela? Latin Am. Res. Rev. 54 444–457. [ Google Scholar ]
• Cargnino M. (2021). The interplay of online network homogeneity, populist attitudes, and conspiratorial beliefs: Empirical evidence from a survey on German Facebook users. Int. J. Public Opinion Res. 33 337–353. 10.1093/ijpor/edaa036 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Cassese E. C., Farhart C. E., Miller J. M. (2020). Gender differences in COVID-19 conspiracy theory beliefs. Polit. Gender 16 1009–1018. 10.1017/S1743923X20000409 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Čavojová V., Secarã E.-C., Jurkovič M., Šrol J. (2019). Reception and willingness to share pseudo-profound bullshit and their relation to other epistemically suspect beliefs and cognitive ability in Slovakia and Romania. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 33 299–311. 10.1002/acp.3486 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Čavojová V., Šrol J., Ballová Mikušková E. (2022). How scientific reasoning correlates with health-related beliefs and behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic? J. Health Psychol. 27 534–547. 10.1177/1359105320962266 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Chan H.-W., Chiu C. P.-Y., Zuo S., Wang X., Liu L., Hong Y. (2021). Not-so-straightforward links between believing in COVID-19-related conspiracy theories and engaging in disease-preventive behaviours. Humanit. Soc. Sci. Commun. 8 : 104 . 10.1057/s41599-021-00781-2 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Chayinska M., Minescu A. (2018). “They’ve conspired against us”: Understanding the role of social identification and conspiracy beliefs in justification of ingroup collective behavior. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 48 990–998. 10.1002/ejsp.2511 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Chayinska M., Uluğ ÖM., Ayanian A. H., Gratzel J. C., Brik T., Kende A., et al. (2022). Coronavirus conspiracy beliefs and distrust of science predict risky public health behaviours through optimistically biased risk perceptions in Ukraine, Turkey, and Germany. Group Process. Intergr. Relat. 25 , 1616–1634. 10.1177/1368430220978278 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Chen L., Zhang Y., Young R., Wu X., Zhu G. (2021). Effects of vaccine-related conspiracy theories on Chinese young adults’ perceptions of the HPV Vaccine: An experimental study. Health Commun. 36 1343–1353. 10.1080/10410236.2020.1751384 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Chen X., Zhang S. X., Jahanshahi A. A., Alvarez-Risco A., Dai H., Li J., et al. (2020). Belief in a COVID-19 conspiracy theory as a predictor of mental health and well-being of health care workers in Ecuador: Cross-sectional survey study. JMIR Public Health Surveillance 6 : e20737 . 10.2196/20737 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Cislak A., Marchlewska M., Wojcik A. D., Śliwiński K., Molenda Z., Szczepańska D., et al. (2021). National narcissism and support for voluntary vaccination policy: The mediating role of vaccination conspiracy beliefs. Group Process. Intergr. Relat. 24 701–719. 10.1177/1368430220959451 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Clifford S., Kim Y., Sullivan B. W. (2019). An improved question format for measuring conspiracy beliefs. Public Opinion Q. 83 690–722. [ Google Scholar ]
• Connolly J. M., Uscinski J. E., Klofstad C. A., West J. P. (2019). Communicating to the public in the Era of conspiracy theory. Public Integr. 21 469–476. 10.1080/10999922.2019.1603045 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Constantinou M., Gloster A. T., Karekla M. (2021a). I won’t comply because it is a hoax: Conspiracy beliefs, lockdown compliance, and the importance of psychological flexibility. J. Context. Behav. Sci. 20 46–51. 10.1016/j.jcbs.2021.03.001 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Constantinou M., Kagialis A., Karekla M. (2021b). COVID-19 scientific facts vs. conspiracy theories: Is science failing to pass its message? Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 18 : 6343 . 10.3390/ijerph18126343 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Cookson D., Jolley D., Dempsey R. C., Povey R. (2021). “If they believe, then so shall I”: Perceived beliefs of the in-group predict conspiracy theory belief. Group Process. Intergr. Relat. 24 759–782. 10.1177/1368430221993907 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Corbu N., Negrea-Busuioc E., Udrea G., Radu L. (2021). Romanians’ willingness to comply with restrictive measures during the COVID-19 pandemic: Evidence from an online survey. J. Appl. Commun. Res. 49 369–386. 10.1080/00909882.2021.1912378 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Costello T. H., Bowes S. M., Stevens S. T., Waldman I. D., Tasimi A., Lilienfeld S. O. (2022). Clarifying the structure and nature of left-wing authoritarianism. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 122 135–170. 10.1037/pspp0000341 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Davis J., Wetherell G., Henry P. J. (2018). Social devaluation of African Americans and race-related conspiracy theories. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 48 999–1010. 10.1002/ejsp.2531 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• De Coninck D., Frissen T., Matthijs K., d’Haenens L., Lits G., Champagne-Poirier O., et al. (2021). Beliefs in conspiracy theories and misinformation about COVID-19: Comparative perspectives on the role of anxiety, depression and exposure to and trust in information sources. Front. Psychol. 12 : 646394 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.646394 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• de Sousa ÁF. L., Teixeira J. R. B., Lua I., de Oliveira Souza F., Ferreira A. J. F., Schneider G., et al. (2021). Determinants of COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy in portuguese-speaking countries: A structural equations modeling approach. Vaccines 9 : 1167 . 10.3390/vaccines9101167 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Denovan A., Dagnall N., Drinkwater K., Parker A., Neave N. (2020). Conspiracist beliefs, intuitive thinking, and schizotypal facets: A further evaluation. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 34 1394–1405. 10.1002/acp.3716 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Douglas K. M., Sutton R. M. (2018). Why conspiracy theories matter: A social psychological analysis. Eur. Rev. Soc. Psychol. 29 256–298. 10.1080/10463283.2018.1537428 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Douglas K. M., Sutton R. M., Cichocka A. (2017). The psychology of conspiracy theories. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 26 538–542. 10.1177/0963721417718261 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Douglas K. M., Uscinski J. E., Sutton R. M., Cichocka A., Nefes T., Ang C. S., et al. (2019). Understanding conspiracy theories. Polit. Psychol. 40 3–35. 10.1111/pops.12568 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Drinkwater K. G., Dagnall N., Denovan A., Neave N. (2020). Psychometric assessment of the generic conspiracist beliefs scale. PLoS One 15 : e0230365 . 10.1371/journal.pone.0230365 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Duplaga M., Grysztar M. (2021). The association between future anxiety, health literacy and the perception of the COVID-19 pandemic: A cross-sectional study. Healthcare 9 : 43 . 10.3390/healthcare9010043 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Dyrendal A., Kennair L. E. O., Bendixen M. (2021). Predictors of belief in conspiracy theory: The role of individual differences in schizotypal traits, paranormal beliefs, social dominance orientation, right wing authoritarianism and conspiracy mentality. Pers. Individ. Differ. 173 : 110645 . 10.1016/j.paid.2021.110645 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Earnshaw V. A., Eaton L. A., Kalichman S. C., Brousseau N. M., Hill E. C., Fox A. B. (2020). COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, health behaviors, and policy support. Transl. Behav. Med. 10 850–856. 10.1093/tbm/ibaa090 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Eberhardt J., Ling J. (2021). Predicting COVID-19 vaccination intention using protection motivation theory and conspiracy beliefs. Vaccine 39 6269–6275. 10.1016/j.vaccine.2021.09.010 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Eberl J.-M., Huber R. A., Greussing E. (2021). From populism to the “plandemic”: Why populists believe in COVID-19 conspiracies. J. Elect. Public Opinion Parties 31 272–284. [ Google Scholar ]
• Egorova M. S., Parshikova O., Chertkova Y., Staroverov V., Mitina O. (2020). COVID-19: Belief in conspiracy theories and the need for quarantine. Psychol. Russia State Art 13 3–25. 10.11621/pir.2020.0401 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• El-Elimat T., AbuAlSamen M. M., Almomani B. A., Al-Sawalha N. A., Alali F. Q. (2021). Acceptance and attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccines: A cross-sectional study from Jordan. PLoS One 16 : e0250555 . 10.1371/journal.pone.0250555 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Enders A. M., Smallpage S. M. (2018). On the measurement of conspiracy beliefs. Res. Polit. 5 : 2053168018763596 . [ Google Scholar ]
• Enders A. M., Smallpage S. M. (2019a). Informational cues, partisan-motivated reasoning, and the manipulation of conspiracy beliefs. Polit. Commun. 36 83–102. [ Google Scholar ]
• Enders A. M., Smallpage S. M. (2019b). Who are conspiracy theorists? A comprehensive approach to explaining conspiracy beliefs. Soc. Sci. Q. 100 2017–2032. [ Google Scholar ]
• Enders A. M., Uscinski J. E. (2021a). Are misinformation, antiscientific claims, and conspiracy theories for political extremists? Group Process. Intergr. Relat. 24 583–605. [ Google Scholar ]
• Enders A. M., Uscinski J. E. (2021b). The role of anti-establishment orientations during the trump presidency. Forum 19 47–76. 10.1515/for-2021-0003 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Enders A. M., Uscinski J. E., Seelig M. I., Klofstad C. A., Wuchty S., Funchion J. R., et al. (2021). The relationship between social media use and beliefs in conspiracy theories and misinformation. Polit. Behav. [Epub ahead of print]. 10.1007/s11109-021-09734-6 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• European Commission. (2021). Special Eurobarometer 516: European citizens’ knowledge and attitudes towards science and technology. Brussels: European Commission. [ Google Scholar ]
• Faragó L., Kende A., Krekó P. (2020). We only believe in news that we doctored ourselves. Soc. Psychol. 51 77–90. 10.1027/1864-9335/a000391 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Farias J., Pilati R. (2021). COVID-19 as an undesirable political issue: Conspiracy beliefs and intolerance of uncertainty predict adhesion to prevention measures. Curr. Psychol. 1–11. [Epub ahead of print]. 10.1007/s12144-021-01416-0 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Fasce A., Picó A. (2019). Science as a vaccine. Sci and Educ 28 109–125. 10.1007/s11191-018-00022-0 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Featherstone J. D., Bell R. A., Ruiz J. B. (2019). Relationship of people’s sources of health information and political ideology with acceptance of conspiratorial beliefs about vaccines. Vaccine 37 2993–2997. 10.1016/j.vaccine.2019.04.063 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Federico C. M., Williams A. L., Vitriol J. A. (2018). The role of system identity threat in conspiracy theory endorsement. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 48 927–938. 10.1002/ejsp.2495 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Fonseca I. C., Pereira A. I., Barros L. (2021). Portuguese parental beliefs and attitudes towards vaccination. Health Psychol. Behav. Med. 9 422–435. 10.1080/21642850.2021.1920948 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Freeman D., Waite F., Rosebrock L., Petit A., Causier C., East A., et al. (2022). Coronavirus conspiracy beliefs, mistrust, and compliance with government guidelines in England. Psychol. Med. 52 251–263. 10.1017/S0033291720001890 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Frischlich L., Hellmann J. H., Brinkschulte F., Becker M., Back M. D. (2021). Right-wing authoritarianism, conspiracy mentality, and susceptibility to distorted alternative news. Soc. Influ. 16 24–64. 10.1080/15534510.2021.1966499 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Furnham A. (2021). Just world beliefs, personal success and beliefs in conspiracy theories. Curr. Psychol. [Epub ahead of print]. 10.1007/s12144-021-01576-z [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Furnham A., Grover S. (2021). Do you have to be mad to believe in conspiracy theories? Personality disorders and conspiracy theories. Int. J. Soc. Psychiatry 68 , 1454–1461. 10.1177/00207640211031614 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gabriel A. S., MacGowan R. L., Ganster M. L., Slaughter J. E. (2021). The influence of COVID-induced job search anxiety and conspiracy beliefs on job search effort: A within-person investigation. J. Appl. Psychol. 106 657–673. 10.1037/apl0000926 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Galais C., Guinjoan M. (2022). The ideological slant of COVID-19-related conspiracies. A new niche for the far-right? Representation . 10.1080/00344893.2022.2034660 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Galliford N., Furnham A. (2017). Individual difference factors and beliefs in medical and political conspiracy theories. Scand. J. Psychol. 58 422–428. 10.1111/sjop.12382 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Garry J., Ford R., Johns R. (2022). Coronavirus conspiracy beliefs, mistrust, and compliance: Taking measurement seriously. Psychol. Med. 52 , 3116–3126. 10.1017/S0033291720005164 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gemenis K. (2021). Explaining conspiracy beliefs and scepticism around the COVID-19 pandemic. Swiss Polit. Sci. Rev. 27 229–242. 10.1111/spsr.12467 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Georgiou N., Delfabbro P., Balzan R. (2019). Conspiracy beliefs in the general population: The importance of psychopathology, cognitive style and educational attainment. Pers. Individ. Differ. 151 : 109521 . 10.1016/j.paid.2019.109521 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Georgiou N., Delfabbro P., Balzan R. (2020). COVID-19-related conspiracy beliefs and their relationship with perceived stress and pre-existing conspiracy beliefs. Pers. Individ. Differ. 166 : 110201 . 10.1016/j.paid.2020.110201 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Georgiou N., Delfabbro P., Balzan R. (2021a). Conspiracy theory beliefs, scientific reasoning and the analytical thinking paradox. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 35 1523–1534. 10.1002/acp.3885 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Georgiou N., Delfabbro P., Balzan R. (2021b). Conspiracy-beliefs and receptivity to disconfirmatory information: A study using the BADE task. SAGE Open 11 : 21582440211006132 . 10.1177/21582440211006131 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gligorić V., da Silva M. M., Eker S., van Hoek N., Nieuwenhuijzen E., Popova U., et al. (2021). The usual suspects: How psychological motives and thinking styles predict the endorsement of well-known and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 35 1171–1181. 10.1002/acp.3844 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Goldberg Z. J., Richey S. (2020). Anti-vaccination beliefs and unrelated conspiracy theories. World Affairs 183 105–124. [ Google Scholar ]
• Golec de Zavala A., Federico C. M. (2018). Collective narcissism and the growth of conspiracy thinking over the course of the 2016 United States presidential election: A longitudinal analysis. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 48 1011–1018. 10.1002/ejsp.2496 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Goreis A., Voracek M. (2019). A systematic review and meta-analysis of psychological research on conspiracy beliefs: Field characteristics, measurement instruments, and associations with personality traits. Front. Psychol. 10 : 205 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00205 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Green R., Douglas K. M. (2018). Anxious attachment and belief in conspiracy theories. Pers. Individ. Differ. 125 30–37. 10.1016/j.paid.2017.12.023 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gualda E., Krouwel A., Palacios-Gálvez M., Morales-Marente E., Rodríguez-Pascual I., García-Navarro E. B. (2021). Social distancing and COVID-19: Factors associated with compliance with social distancing norms in Spain. Front. Psychol. 12 : 727225 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.727225 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Guan T., Yang Y. (2020). Diversifying conspiracy beliefs and populist ideologies in the chinese context. Soc. Sci. Q. 101 459–472. 10.1111/ssqu.12766 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Guan T., Liu T., Yuan R. (2021). Combatiendo la desinformación: Cinco métodos para contrarrestar las teorías de conspiración en la pandemia de Covid-19 (Facing disinformation: Five methods to counter conspiracy theories amid the Covid-19 pandemic). Comunicar 29 71–83. [ Google Scholar ]
• Guillon M., Kergall P. (2021). Factors associated with COVID-19 vaccination intentions and attitudes in France. Public Health 198 200–207. 10.1016/j.puhe.2021.07.035 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Halpern D., Valenzuela S., Katz J., Miranda J. P. (2019). “ From belief in conspiracy theories to trust in others: Which factors influence exposure, believing and sharing fake news ,” in Social computing and social media. design, human behavior and analytics lecture notes in computer science , ed. Meiselwitz G. (Cham: Springer International Publishing; ), 217–232. 10.1007/978-3-030-21902-4_16 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hart J., Graether M. (2018). Something’s going on here. J. Individ. Differ. 39 229–237. 10.1027/1614-0001/a000268 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Heiss R., Gell S., Röthlingshöfer E., Zoller C. (2021). How threat perceptions relate to learning and conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19: Evidence from a panel study. Pers. Individ. Differ. 175 : 110672 . 10.1016/j.paid.2021.110672 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hollander B. A. (2018). Partisanship, individual differences, and news media exposure as predictors of conspiracy beliefs. J. Mass Commun. Q. 95 691–713. [ Google Scholar ]
• Hood K. B., Hall C. J., Owens B. D., Patev A. J., Belgrave F. Z. (2020). HIV testing behaviors among black rural women: The moderating role of conspiracy beliefs and partner status disclosure. Ethn Dis 30 251–260. 10.18865/ed.30.2.251 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hornsey M. J., Chapman C. M., Alvarez B., Bentley S., Salvador Casara B. G., Crimston C. R., et al. (2021). To what extent are conspiracy theorists concerned for self versus others? A COVID-19 test case. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 51 285–293. 10.1002/ejsp.2737 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hornsey M. J., Finlayson M., Chatwood G., Begeny C. T. (2020). Donald trump and vaccination: The effect of political identity, conspiracist ideation and presidential tweets on vaccine hesitancy. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 88 : 103947 . 10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103947 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hornsey M. J., Harris E. A., Fielding K. S. (2018a). Relationships among conspiratorial beliefs, conservatism and climate scepticism across nations. Nat. Clim. Change 8 614–620. 10.1038/s41558-018-0157-2 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hornsey M. J., Harris E. A., Fielding K. S. (2018b). The psychological roots of anti-vaccination attitudes: A 24-nation investigation. Health Psychol. 37 307–315. 10.1037/hea0000586 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Huang L., Whitson J. (2020). Organizational costs of compensating for mind-body dissonance through conspiracies and superstitions. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 156 1–12. 10.1016/j.obhdp.2019.09.006 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hughes J. P., Efstratiou A., Komer S. R., Baxter L. A., Vasiljevic M., Leite A. C. (2022). The impact of risk perceptions and belief in conspiracy theories on COVID-19 pandemic-related behaviours. PLoS One 17 : e0263716 . 10.1371/journal.pone.0263716 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hughes S., Machan L. (2021). It’s a conspiracy: Covid-19 conspiracies link to psychopathy, Machiavellianism and collective narcissism. Pers. Individ. Differ. 171 : 110559 . 10.1016/j.paid.2020.110559 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Imhoff R., Bruder M. (2014). Speaking (Un-)Truth to power: Conspiracy mentality as a generalised political attitude. Eur. J. Pers. 28 25–43. 10.1002/per.1930 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Imhoff R., Lamberty P. (2020). A bioweapon or a hoax? The link between distinct conspiracy beliefs about the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak and pandemic behavior. Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci. 11 1110–1118. 10.1177/1948550620934692 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Imhoff R., Bertlich T., Frenken M. (2022). Tearing apart the “evil” twins: A general conspiracy mentality is not the same as specific conspiracy beliefs. Curr. Opin. Psychol. 46 : 101349 . 10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101349 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Imhoff R., Dieterle L., Lamberty P. (2021). Resolving the puzzle of conspiracy worldview and political activism: Belief in secret plots decreases normative but increases nonnormative political engagement. Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci. 12 71–79. 10.1177/1948550619896491 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Imhoff R., Lamberty P., Klein O. (2018). Using power as a negative cue: How conspiracy mentality affects epistemic trust in sources of historical knowledge. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 44 1364–1379. 10.1177/0146167218768779 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jasinskaja-Lahti I., Jetten J. (2019). Unpacking the relationship between religiosity and conspiracy beliefs in Australia. Br. J. Soc. Psychol. 58 938–954. 10.1111/bjso.12314 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jedinger A. (2021). Conspiracy mentality predicts public opposition to foreign trade. Front. Psychol. 12 : 658919 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.658919 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jennings W., Stoker G., Bunting H., Valgarðsson V. O., Gaskell J., Devine D., et al. (2021). Lack of trust, conspiracy beliefs, and social media use predict COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. Vaccines 9 : 593 . 10.3390/vaccines9060593 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jensen E. A., Pfleger A., Herbig L., Wagoner B., Lorenz L., Watzlawik M. (2021). What drives belief in vaccination conspiracy theories in Germany? Front. Commun. 6 : 678335 . 10.3389/fcomm.2021.678335 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jia H., Luo X. (2021). I wear a mask for my country: Conspiracy theories, nationalism, and intention to adopt Covid-19 prevention behaviors at the later stage of pandemic control in China. Health Commun. 1–9. [Epub ahead of print]. 10.1080/10410236.2021.1958982 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jolley D., Douglas K. M. (2014). The social consequences of conspiracism: Exposure to conspiracy theories decreases intentions to engage in politics and to reduce one’s carbon footprint. Br. J. Psychol. 105 35–56. 10.1111/bjop.12018 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jolley D., Paterson J. L. (2020). Pylons ablaze: Examining the role of 5G COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and support for violence. Br. J. Soc. Psychol. 59 628–640. 10.1111/bjso.12394 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jolley D., Douglas K. M., Sutton R. M. (2018). Blaming a few bad apples to save a threatened barrel: The system-justifying function of conspiracy theories. Polit. Psychol. 39 465–478. 10.1111/pops.12404 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jolley D., Douglas K. M., Leite A. C., Schrader T. (2019). Belief in conspiracy theories and intentions to engage in everyday crime. Br. J. Soc. Psychol. 58 534–549. 10.1111/bjso.12311 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jolley D., Douglas K. M., Marchlewska M., Cichocka A., Sutton R. M. (2022). Examining the links between conspiracy beliefs and the EU “Brexit” referendum vote in the UK: Evidence from a two-wave survey. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 52 30–36. 10.1111/jasp.12829 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jolley D., Douglas K. M., Skipper Y., Thomas E., Cookson D. (2021). Measuring adolescents’ beliefs in conspiracy theories: Development and validation of the adolescent conspiracy beliefs questionnaire (ACBQ). Br. J. Dev. Psychol. 39 499–520. 10.1111/bjdp.12368 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jolley D., Jaspal R., Jolley D., Jaspal R. (2020a). Discrimination, HIV conspiracy theories and pre-exposure prophylaxis acceptability in gay men. Sex. Health 17 525–533. 10.1071/SH20154 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jolley D., Mari S., Douglas K. M. (2020b). “ Consequences of conspiracy theories ,” in Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories , eds Butter M., Knight P. (London: Routledge; ), 231–241. 10.4324/9780429452734-2_7 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jovančević A., Milićević N. (2020). Optimism-pessimism, conspiracy theories and general trust as factors contributing to COVID-19 related behavior – A cross-cultural study. Pers. Individ. Differ. 167 : 110216 . 10.1016/j.paid.2020.110216 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Jutzi C. A., Willardt R., Schmid P. C., Jonas E. (2020). Between conspiracy beliefs, ingroup bias, and system justification: How people use defense strategies to cope with the threat of COVID-19. Front. Psychol. 11 : 578586 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.578586 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kachurka R., Krawczyk M., Rachubik J. (2021). Persuasive messages will not increase COVID-19 vaccine acceptance: Evidence from a nationwide online experiment. Vaccines 9 : 1113 . [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Karić T., Međedović J. (2021). Covid-19 conspiracy beliefs and containment-related behaviour: The role of political trust. Pers. Individ. Differ. 175 : 110697 . 10.1016/j.paid.2021.110697 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kay C. S. (2021). Actors of the most fiendish character: Explaining the associations between the dark tetrad and conspiracist ideation. Pers. Individ. Differ. 171 : 110543 . 10.1016/j.paid.2020.110543 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kim S., Kim S. (2021). Searching for general model of conspiracy theories and its implication for public health policy: Analysis of the impacts of political, psychological, structural factors on conspiracy beliefs about the COVID-19 pandemic. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 18 : 266 . 10.3390/ijerph18010266 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kim Y. (2022). How conspiracy theories can stimulate political engagement. J. Elect. Public Opinion Parties 32 1–21. 10.1080/17457289.2019.1651321 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Klofstad C. A., Uscinski J. E., Connolly J. M., West J. P. (2019). What drives people to believe in Zika conspiracy theories? Palgrave Commun. 5 : 36 . 10.1057/s41599-019-0243-8 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Knobel P., Zhao X., White K. M. (2022). Do conspiracy theory and mistrust undermine people’s intention to receive the COVID-19 vaccine in Austria? J. Commun. Psychol. 50 1269–1281. 10.1002/jcop.22714 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kohút M., Šrol J., Čavojová V. (2022). How are you holding up? Personality, cognitive and social predictors of a perceived shift in subjective well-being during COVID-19 pandemic. Pers. Individ. Differ. 186 : 111349 . 10.1016/j.paid.2021.111349 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kosarkova A., Malinakova K., van Dijk J. P., Tavel P. (2021). Vaccine refusal in the czech republic is associated with being spiritual but not religiously affiliated. Vaccines 9 : 1157 . 10.3390/vaccines9101157 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kovic M., Füchslin T. (2018). Probability and conspiratorial thinking. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 32 390–400. 10.1002/acp.3408 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kowalski J., Marchlewska M., Molenda Z., Górska P., Gawȩda Ł. (2020). Adherence to safety and self-isolation guidelines, conspiracy and paranoia-like beliefs during COVID-19 pandemic in Poland—Associations and moderators. Psychiatry Res. 294 : 113540 . 10.1016/j.psychres.2020.113540 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Krüppel J., Yoon D., Fieg K., Sharma P., Mokros A. (2021). On the relationship between right-wing attitudes, conspiracy beliefs, and intergroup threat: Introducing an indirect measure for intergroup threat. J. Theoret. Soc. Psychol. 5 354–365. 10.1002/jts5.103 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kuhn S. A. K., Lieb R., Freeman D., Andreou C., Zander-Schellenberg T. (2021). Coronavirus conspiracy beliefs in the German-speaking general population: Endorsement rates and links to reasoning biases and paranoia. Psychol Med. [Epub ahead of print]. 10.1017/S0033291721001124 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lamberty P. K., Hellmann J. H., Oeberst A. (2018). The winner knew it all? Conspiracy beliefs and hindsight perspective after the 2016 US general election. Pers. Individ. Differ. 123 236–240. [ Google Scholar ]
• Lamberty P., Imhoff R. (2018). Powerful pharma and its marginalized alternatives? Soc. Psychol. 49 255–270. 10.1027/1864-9335/a000347 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Landrum A. R., Olshansky A. (2019). The role of conspiracy mentality in denial of science and susceptibility to viral deception about science. Polit. Life Sci. 38 193–209. 10.1017/pls.2019.9 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Landrum A. R., Olshansky A., Richards O. (2021). Differential susceptibility to misleading flat earth arguments on youtube. Media Psychol. 24 136–165. 10.1080/15213269.2019.1669461 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lantian A., Bagneux V., Delouvée S., Gauvrit N. (2021). Maybe a free thinker but not a critical one: High conspiracy belief is associated with low critical thinking ability. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 35 674–684. [ Google Scholar ]
• Lantian A., Muller D., Nurra C., Klein O., Berjot S., Pantazi M. (2018). Stigmatized beliefs: Conspiracy theories, anticipated negative evaluation of the self, and fear of social exclusion. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 48 939–954. 10.1002/ejsp.2498 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Larsen E. M., Donaldson K. R., Liew M., Mohanty A. (2021). Conspiratorial thinking during COVID-19: The roles of paranoia, delusion-proneness, and intolerance of uncertainty. Front. Psychiatry 12 : 698147 . 10.3389/fpsyt.2021.698147 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Latkin C. A., Dayton L., Moran M., Strickland J. C., Collins K. (2022). Behavioral and psychosocial factors associated with COVID-19 skepticism in the United States. Curr. Psychol. 41 , 7918–7926. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lazarević L. B., Purić D., Teovanović P., Lukić P., Zupan Z., Knežević G. (2021). What drives us to be (ir)responsible for our health during the COVID-19 pandemic? The role of personality, thinking styles, and conspiracy mentality. Pers. Individ. Differ. 176 : 110771 . 10.1016/j.paid.2021.110771 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Leibovitz T., Shamblaw A. L., Rumas R., Best M. W. (2021). COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs: Relations with anxiety, quality of life, and schemas. Pers. Individ. Differ. 175 : 110704 . 10.1016/j.paid.2021.110704 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Leone L., Giacomantonio M., Lauriola M. (2019). Moral foundations, worldviews, moral absolutism and belief in conspiracy theories. Int. J. Psychol. 54 197–204. 10.1002/ijop.12459 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Leone L., Giacomantonio M., Williams R., Michetti D. (2018). Avoidant attachment style and conspiracy ideation. Pers. Individ. Differ. 134 329–336. 10.1016/j.paid.2018.06.043 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Liekefett L., Christ O., Becker J. C. (2021). Can conspiracy beliefs be beneficial? Longitudinal linkages between conspiracy beliefs, anxiety, uncertainty aversion, and existential threat. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 01461672211060965 . 10.1177/01461672211060965 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lindholt M. F., Jørgensen F., Bor A., Petersen M. B. (2021). Public acceptance of COVID-19 vaccines: Cross-national evidence on levels and individual-level predictors using observational data. BMJ Open 11 : e048172 . 10.1136/bmjopen-2020-048172 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lobato E. J. C., Powell M., Padilla L. M. K., Holbrook C. (2020). Factors predicting willingness to share COVID-19 misinformation. Front. Psychol. 11 : 566108 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.566108 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lyons B., Merola V., Reifler J. (2019). Not just asking questions: Effects of implicit and explicit conspiracy information about vaccines and genetic modification. Health Commun. 34 1741–1750. 10.1080/10410236.2018.1530526 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Maftei A., Holman A. C. (2021). SARS-CoV-2 threat perception and willingness to vaccinate: The mediating role of conspiracy beliefs. Front. Psychol. 12 : 672634 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.672634 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Maftei A., Holman A.-C. (2022). Beliefs in conspiracy theories, intolerance of uncertainty, and moral disengagement during the coronavirus crisis. Ethics Behav. 32 1–11. 10.1080/10508422.2020.1843171 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Maglić M., Pavlović T., Franc R. (2021). Analytic thinking and political orientation in the corona crisis. Front. Psychol. 12 : 631800 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.631800 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Majima Y., Nakamura H. (2020). Development of the Japanese version of the generic conspiracist beliefs scale (GCBS-J). Japanese Psychol. Res. 62 254–267. [ Google Scholar ]
• Mancosu M., Ladini R., Vassallo S. (2021). Political consequences of conspiratorial thinking: Evidence from 2016 Italian constitutional referendum. Acta Polit. 56 69–88. 10.1057/s41269-019-00146-3 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Mao J.-Y., Yang S.-L., Guo Y.-Y. (2020). Are individuals from lower social classes more susceptible to conspiracy theories? An explanation from the compensatory control theory. Asian J. Soc. Psychol. 23 372–383. 10.1111/ajsp.12417 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• March E., Springer J. (2019). Belief in conspiracy theories: The predictive role of schizotypy, machiavellianism, and primary psychopathy. PLoS one 14 : e0225964 . 10.1371/journal.pone.0225964 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Marchlewska M., Cichocka A., Kossowska M. (2018). Addicted to answers: Need for cognitive closure and the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 48 109–117. [ Google Scholar ]
• Marchlewska M., Cichocka A., Lozowski F., Górska P., Winiewski M. (2019). In search of an imaginary enemy: Catholic collective narcissism and the endorsement of gender conspiracy beliefs. J. Soc. Psychol. 159 766–779. 10.1080/00224545.2019.1586637 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Marchlewska M., Green R., Cichocka A., Molenda Z., Douglas K. M. (2022). From bad to worse: Avoidance coping with stress increases conspiracy beliefs. Br. J. Soc. Psychol. 61 532–549. 10.1111/bjso.12494 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Marinthe G., Brown G., Delouvée S., Jolley D. (2020). Looking out for myself: Exploring the relationship between conspiracy mentality, perceived personal risk, and COVID-19 prevention measures. Br. J. Health Psychol. 25 957–980. 10.1111/bjhp.12449 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Markowitz D. M., Shoots-Reinhard B., Peters E., Silverstein M. C., Goodwin R., Bjälkebring P. (2021). Dehumanization during the COVID-19 pandemic. Front. Psychol. 12 : 634543 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.634543 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Marques M. D., Ling M., Williams M. N., Kerr J. R., McLennan J. (2022). Australasian public awareness and belief in conspiracy theories: Motivational correlates. Polit. Psychol. 43 177–198. 10.1111/pops.12746 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Martinez-Berman L., McCutcheon L., Huynh H. P. (2021). Is the worship of celebrities associated with resistance to vaccinations? Relationships between celebrity admiration, anti-vaccination attitudes, and beliefs in conspiracy. Psychol. Health Med. 26 1063–1072. 10.1080/13548506.2020.1778754 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Mashuri A., van Leeuwen E., Zaduqisti E., Sukmawati F., Sakdiah H., Herani I. (2022). The psychological antecedents of resistance to humanitarian aid. Group Process. Intergr. Relat. 25 280–297. 10.1177/1368430220962179 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Meuer M., Imhoff R. (2021). Believing in hidden plots is associated with decreased behavioral trust: Conspiracy belief as greater sensitivity to social threat or insensitivity towards its absence? J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 93 : 104081 . [ Google Scholar ]
• Meuer M., Oeberst A., Imhoff R. (2021). Believe it or not – no support for an effect of providing explanatory or threat-related information on conspiracy theories’ credibility. Int. Rev. Soc. Psychol. 34 : 26 . 10.5334/irsp.587 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Miller J. M. (2020). Do COVID-19 conspiracy theory beliefs form a monological belief system? Can. J. Polit. Sci. 53 319–326. [ Google Scholar ]
• Milošević Đorđević J., Mari S., Vdović M., Milošević A. (2021a). Links between conspiracy beliefs, vaccine knowledge, and trust: Anti-vaccine behavior of Serbian adults. Soc. Sci. Med. 277 : 113930 . 10.1016/j.socscimed.2021.113930 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Milošević Đorđević J., Žeželj I., Đurić Ž. (2021b). Beyond general political attitudes: Conspiracy mentality as a global belief system predicts endorsement of international and local conspiracy theories. J. Soc. Polit. Psychol. 9 144–158. 10.5964/jspp.5609 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Min S. J. (2021). Who believes in conspiracy theories? Network diversity, political discussion, and conservative conspiracy theories on social media. Am. Polit. Res. 49 415–427. 10.1177/1532673X211013526 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Molz G., Stiller M. (2021). Attitudes and opinions about refugees in germany – correlates with conspiracy and political mindsets. Curr. Psychol. 40 2201–2210. 10.1007/s12144-018-0108-0 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Mondak J. J. (2020). Citizen grit: Effects of domain-specificity, perseverance, and consistency on political judgment. Pers. Individ. Differ. 163 : 110059 . [ Google Scholar ]
• Natoli E. E., Marques M. D. (2021). The antidepressant hoax: Conspiracy theories decrease health-seeking intentions. Br. J. Soc. Psychol. 60 902–923. 10.1111/bjso.12426 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Naveed M. A., Malik A., Mahmood K. (2021). Impact of conspiracy beliefs on Covid-19 fear and health protective behavior: A case of university students. Library Hi Tech 39 761–775. 10.1108/LHT-12-2020-0322 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Nazlı s̨B., Yığman F., Sevindik M., Deniz Özturan D. (2022). Psychological factors affecting COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. Ir. J. Med. Sci. 191 71–80. 10.1007/s11845-021-02640-0 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Nera K., Pantazi M., Klein O. (2018). “These are just stories, mulder”: Exposure to conspiracist fiction does not produce narrative persuasion. Front. Psychol. 9 : 684 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00684 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Nera K., Wagner-Egger P., Bertin P., Douglas K. M., Klein O. (2021). A power-challenging theory of society, or a conservative mindset? Upward and downward conspiracy theories as ideologically distinct beliefs. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 51 740–757. 10.1002/ejsp.2769 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Nestik T. A., Deyneka O. S., Maksimenko A. À. (2020). Socio-psychological predictors of belief in conspiracy theories of the origin of COVID-19 and involvement in social media. Soc. Psychol. Soc. 11 87–104. 10.17759/SPS.2020110407 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Nyhan B., Zeitzoff T. (2018). Conspiracy and misperception belief in the Middle East and North Africa. J. Polit. 80 1400–1404. 10.1086/698663 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ojikutu B. O., Amutah-Onukagha N., Mahoney T. F., Tibbitt C., Dale S. D., Mayer K. H., et al. (2020). HIV-related mistrust (or HIV Conspiracy Theories) and willingness to use PrEP among black women in the United States. AIDS Behav. 24 2927–2934. 10.1007/s10461-020-02843-z [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Olansky E., Mansergh G., Pitts N., Mimiaga M. J., Denson D. J., Landers S., et al. (2020). PrEP awareness in the context of HIV/AIDS conspiracy beliefs among black/African American and Hispanic/Latino MSM in three Urban US cities. J. Homosexuality 67 833–843. 10.1080/00918369.2018.1557953 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Oleksy T., Wnuk A., Gambin M., Łyś A. (2021a). Dynamic relationships between different types of conspiracy theories about COVID-19 and protective behaviour: A four-wave panel study in Poland. Soc. Sci. Med. 280 : 114028 . 10.1016/j.socscimed.2021.114028 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Oleksy T., Wnuk A., Maison D., Łyś A. (2021b). Content matters. Different predictors and social consequences of general and government-related conspiracy theories on COVID-19. Pers. Individ. Differ. 168 : 110289 . 10.1016/j.paid.2020.110289 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Oliver J. E., Wood T. (2014). Medical Conspiracy Theories and Health Behaviors in the United States. JAMA Internal Medicine 174 817–818. 10.1001/jamainternmed.2014.190 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Olmstead K. S. (2018). “ Conspiracy theories in U.S. history ,” in Conspiracy theories and the people who believe them , ed. Uscinski J. E. (Oxford: Oxford University Press; ). 10.1093/oso/9780190844073.003.0019 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Onderco M., Stoeckel F. (2020). Conspiratorial thinking and foreign policy views: Evidence from Central Europe. J. Elect. Public Opin. Parties 1–15. 10.1080/17457289.2020.1814309 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pantazi M., Papaioannou K., van Prooijen J.-W. (2021). Power to the people: The hidden link between support for direct democracy and belief in conspiracy theories. Polit. Psychol. 43 529–548. 10.1111/pops.12779 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Parent M. C., Woznicki N., Dillon F. R., Pituch K. A. (2020). Psychosocial barriers to pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) uptake: The roles of heterosexual self-presentation, sexual risk, and perceived peer prep use. Psychol. Men Masculinities 21 699–703. 10.1037/men0000258 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Patev A. J., Hood K. B., Speed K. J., Cartwright P. M., Kinman B. A. (2019). HIV conspiracy theory beliefs mediates the connection between HIV testing attitudes and HIV prevention self-efficacy. J. Am. Coll. Health 67 661–673. 10.1080/07448481.2018.1500472 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pavela Banai I., Banai B., Mikloušić I. (2022). Beliefs in COVID-19 conspiracy theories, compliance with the preventive measures, and trust in government medical officials. Curr. Psychol. 41 , 7448–7458. 10.1007/s12144-021-01898-y [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pellegrini V., Giacomantonio M., De Cristofaro V., Salvati M., Brasini M., Carlo E., et al. (2021). Is Covid-19 a natural event? Covid-19 pandemic and conspiracy beliefs. Pers. Individ. Differ. 181 : 111011 . [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Peng Y. (2022). Politics of COVID-19 vaccine mandates: Left/right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and libertarianism. Pers. Individ. Differ. 194 : 111661 . 10.1016/j.paid.2022.111661 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pennycook G., Cheyne J. A., Koehler D. J., Fugelsang J. A. (2020). On the belief that beliefs should change according to evidence: Implications for conspiratorial, moral, paranormal, political, religious, and science beliefs. Judgment Decis. Making 15 : 476 . [ Google Scholar ]
• Petelinšek A., Lauri Korajlija A. (2020). Predictors of pharmacophobia. Health Psychol. Res. 8 : 8853 . 10.4081/hpr.2020.8853 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Petersen M. B., Bor A., Jørgensen F., Lindholt M. F. (2021). Transparent communication about negative features of COVID-19 vaccines decreases acceptance but increases trust. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 118 : e2024597118 . 10.1073/pnas.2024597118 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Petrović M. B., Žeželj I. (2021). Thinking inconsistently: Development and validation of an instrument for assessing proneness to doublethink. Eur. J. Psychol. Assess. 8 463–475. 10.1027/1015-5759/a000645 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Piltch-Loeb R., Zikmund-Fisher B. J., Shaffer V. A., Scherer L. D., Knaus M., Fagerlin A., et al. (2019). Cross-sectional psychological and demographic associations of zika knowledge and conspiracy beliefs before and after local zika transmission. Risk Anal. 39 2683–2693. 10.1111/risa.13369 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pisl V., Volavka J., Chvojkova E., Cechova K., Kavalirova G., Vevera J. (2021a). Dissociation, cognitive reflection and health literacy have a modest effect on belief in conspiracy theories about COVID-19. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 18 : 5065 . 10.3390/ijerph18105065 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pisl V., Volavka J., Chvojkova E., Cechova K., Kavalirova G., Vevera J. (2021b). Willingness to vaccinate against COVID-19: The role of health locus of control and conspiracy theories. Front. Psychol. 12 : 717960 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.717960 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pivetti M., Di Battista S., Paleari F. G., Hakoköngäs E. (2021a). Conspiracy beliefs and attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccinations: A conceptual replication study in Finland. J. Pacif. Rim Psychol. 15 : 18344909211039892 . 10.1177/18344909211039893 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pivetti M., Melotti G., Bonomo M., Hakoköngäs E. (2021b). Conspiracy beliefs and acceptance of COVID-vaccine: An exploratory study in Italy. Soc. Sci. 10 : 108 . 10.3390/socsci10030108 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Plohl N., Musil B. (2021). Modeling compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines: The critical role of trust in science. Psychol. Health Med. 26 1–12. 10.1080/13548506.2020.1772988 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Poon K.-T., Chen Z., Wong W.-Y. (2020). Beliefs in conspiracy theories following ostracism. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 46 1234–1246. 10.1177/0146167219898944 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Prichard E. C., Christman S. D. (2020). Authoritarianism, conspiracy beliefs, gender and COVID-19: Links between individual differences and concern about COVID-19, mask wearing behaviors, and the tendency to blame China for the virus. Front. Psychol. 11 : 597671 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.597671 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pummerer L., Böhm R., Lilleholt L., Winter K., Zettler I., Sassenberg K. (2022). Conspiracy theories and their societal effects during the COVID-19 pandemic. Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci. 13 49–59. 10.1177/19485506211000217 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pytlik N., Soll D., Mehl S. (2020). Thinking preferences and conspiracy belief: Intuitive thinking and the jumping to conclusions-bias as a basis for the belief in conspiracy theories. Front. Psychiatry 11 : 568942 . 10.3389/fpsyt.2020.568942 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Radnitz S. (2022). Dilemmas of distrust: Conspiracy beliefs, elite rhetoric, and motivated reasoning. Polit. Res. Q. 75 , 1143–1157. 10.1177/10659129211034558 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Resnicow K., Bacon E., Yang P., Hawley S., Horn M. L. V., An L. (2021). Novel predictors of COVID-19 protective behaviors among US adults: Cross-sectional survey. J. Med. Internet Res. 23 : e23488 . 10.2196/23488 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Rezende A. T., Gouveia V. V., do Nascimento A. M., Vilar R., Oliveira K. G. (2019a). Correlatos valorativos de crenças em teorias da conspiração (Values correlates of beliefs in conspiracy theories. in avances en psicología latinoamericana). Avances Psicol. Latinoamericana 37 219–234. 10.12804/revistas.urosario.edu.co/apl/a.7211 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Rezende A. T., Gouveia V. V., Soares A. K. S., Moizéis H. B. C., Gouveia V. V., Soares A. K. S., et al. (2021). Creencias de las teorías de la conspiración en estudiantes universitarios: Una explicación basada en los rasgos de personalidad (Beliefs in conspiracy theories in university students: An explanation based on personality traits. Psicol. Conocimiento Soc. 11 84–98. 10.26864/pcs.v11.n2.6 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Rezende A. T., Silva S. M., Ribeiro M. G. C., Loureto G. D. L., Silva Neta O. F., Gouveia V. V. (2019b). Conspiracy theories: Meanings in the Brazilian context/Teorias da conspiracao: Significados em contexto brasileiro. Estudos Psicol. 36 : e180010 . [ Google Scholar ]
• Rieger M. O. (2020). What makes young people think positively about social distancing during the corona crisis in Germany? Front. Sociol. 5 : 61 . 10.3389/fsoc.2020.00061 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Rizeq J., Flora D. B., Toplak M. E. (2021). An examination of the underlying dimensional structure of three domains of contaminated mindware: Paranormal beliefs, conspiracy beliefs, and anti-science attitudes. Think. Reason. 27 187–211. [ Google Scholar ]
• Romer D., Jamieson K. H. (2020). Conspiracy theories as barriers to controlling the spread of COVID-19 in the U.S. Soc. Sci. Med. 263 : 113356 . 10.1016/j.socscimed.2020.113356 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Rottweiler B., Gill P. (2022). Conspiracy beliefs and violent extremist intentions: The contingent effects of self-efficacy, self-control and law-related morality. Terrorism Polit. Violence. 34 , 1485–1504. 10.1080/09546553.2020.1803288 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Rozbroj T., Lyons A., Lucke J. (2019). Psychosocial and demographic characteristics relating to vaccine attitudes in Australia. Patient Educ. Couns. 102 172–179. 10.1016/j.pec.2018.08.027 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ruiz J. B., Bell R. A. (2021). Predictors of intention to vaccinate against COVID-19: Results of a nationwide survey. Vaccine 39 1080–1086. 10.1016/j.vaccine.2021.01.010 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sallam M., Dababseh D., Eid H., Al-Mahzoum K., Al-Haidar A., Taim D., et al. (2021a). High rates of COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy and its association with conspiracy beliefs: A study in Jordan and Kuwait among other arab countries. Vaccines 9 : 42 . 10.3390/vaccines9010042 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sallam M., Dababseh D., Eid H., Hasan H., Taim D., Al-Mahzoum K., et al. (2021b). Low COVID-19 vaccine acceptance is correlated with conspiracy beliefs among university students in Jordan. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 18 : 2407 . 10.3390/ijerph18052407 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sallam M., Dababseh D., Yaseen A., Al-Haidar A., Ababneh N. A., Bakri F. G., et al. (2020). Conspiracy beliefs are associated with lower knowledge and higher anxiety levels regarding COVID-19 among students at the University of Jordan. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 17 : 4915 . 10.3390/ijerph17144915 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sanchez C., Dunning D. (2021). Jumping to conclusions: Implications for reasoning errors, false belief, knowledge corruption, and impeded learning. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 120 789–815. 10.1037/pspp0000375 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Schnell T., Spitzenstätter D., Krampe H. (2021). Compliance with COVID-19 public health guidelines: An attitude-behaviour gap bridged by personal concern and distance to conspiracy ideation. Psychol. Health. [Epub ahead of print]. 10.1080/08870446.2021.1974861 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Schnepf J., Lux A., Jin Z., Formanowicz M. (2021). Left out—feelings of social exclusion incite individuals with high conspiracy mentality to reject complex scientific messages. J. Lang. Soc. Psychol. 40 627–652. 10.1177/0261927X211044789 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Scrima F., Miceli S., Caci B., Cardaci M. (2022). The relationship between fear of COVID-19 and intention to get vaccinated. The serial mediation roles of existential anxiety and conspiracy beliefs. Pers. Individ. Differ. 184 : 111188 . 10.1016/j.paid.2021.111188 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Shapiro G. K., Holding A., Perez S., Amsel R., Rosberger Z. (2016). Validation of the vaccine conspiracy beliefs scale. Papillomavirus Res. 2 167–172. 10.1016/j.pvr.2016.09.001 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Siddiqui N. (2020). Who do you believe? Political parties and conspiracy theories in Pakistan. Party Polit. 26 107–119. 10.1177/1354068817749777 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Siem B., Kretzmeyer B., Stürmer S. (2021). The role of self-evaluation in predicting attitudes toward supporters of COVID-19-related conspiracy theories: A direct and a conceptual replication of Cichocka et al.(2016). J. Pacif. Rim Psychol. 15 : 18344909211052588 . [ Google Scholar ]
• Simione L., Vagni M., Gnagnarella C., Bersani G., Pajardi D. (2021). Mistrust and beliefs in conspiracy theories differently mediate the effects of psychological factors on propensity for COVID-19 vaccine. Front. Psychol. 12 : 683684 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.683684 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Soveri A., Karlsson L. C., Antfolk J., Lindfelt M., Lewandowsky S. (2021). Unwillingness to engage in behaviors that protect against COVID-19: The role of conspiracy beliefs, trust, and endorsement of complementary and alternative medicine. BMC Public Health 21 : 684 . 10.1186/s12889-021-10643-w [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sowa P., Kiszkiel Ł, Laskowski P. P., Alimowski M., Szczerbiński Ł, Paniczko M., et al. (2021). COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy in Poland—multifactorial impact trajectories. Vaccines 9 : 876 . 10.3390/vaccines9080876 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Spasovski O., Kenig K. (2020). Psychological well-being in students during self-isolation due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Primenjena Psihol. 13 427–477. [ Google Scholar ]
• Šrol J., Ballová Mikušková E., Čavojová V. (2021). When we are worried, what are we thinking? Anxiety, lack of control, and conspiracy beliefs amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 35 720–729. 10.1002/acp.3798 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ståhl T., van Prooijen J.-W. (2018). Epistemic rationality: Skepticism toward unfounded beliefs requires sufficient cognitive ability and motivation to be rational. Pers. Individ. Differ. 122 155–163. 10.1016/j.paid.2017.10.026 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Stecula D. A., Pickup M. (2021). How populism and conservative media fuel conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19 and what it means for COVID-19 behaviors. Res. Polit. 8 : 2053168021993979 . 10.1177/2053168021993979 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Stoica C. A., Umbres̨ R. (2021). Suspicious minds in times of crisis: Determinants of Romanians’ beliefs in COVID-19 conspiracy theories. Eur. Soc. 23 S246–S261. 10.1080/14616696.2020.1823450 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Stojanov A., Douglas K. (2022). Conspiracy beliefs in Britain and North Macedonia: A comparative study. Int. J. Psychol. 57 209–217. 10.1002/ijop.12801 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Stojanov A., Halberstadt J. (2019). The conspiracy mentality scale. Soc. Psychol. 50 215–232. 10.1027/1864-9335/a000381 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Stojanov A., Halberstadt J., Bering J. M., Kenig N. (2021). Examining a domain-specific link between perceived control and conspiracy beliefs: A brief report in the context of COVID-19. Curr. Psychol . [Epub ahead of print]. 10.1007/s12144-021-01977-0 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Stojanov J., Stanisavljavić S., Tatić V., Pantić A. (2019). Conspiracy thinking inventory (Cti)–construction and validation study. Primenjena Psihol. 12 363–383. [ Google Scholar ]
• Šuriņa S., Martinsone K., Perepjolkina V., Kolesnikova J., Vainik U., Ruža A., et al. (2021). Factors related to COVID-19 preventive behaviors: A structural equation model. Front. Psychol. 12 : 676521 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.676521 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Swami V., Barron D. (2021). Rational thinking style, rejection of coronavirus (COVID-19) conspiracy theories/theorists, and compliance with mandated requirements: Direct and indirect relationships in a nationally representative sample of adults from the United Kingdom. J. Pacif. Rim Psychol. 15 : 18344909211037384 . 10.1177/18344909211037385 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Swami V., Barron D., Weis L., Furnham A. (2018). To brexit or not to brexit: The roles of islamophobia, conspiracist beliefs, and integrated threat in voting intentions for the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum. Br. J. Psychol. 109 156–179. 10.1111/bjop.12252 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Swami V., Barron D., Weis L., Voracek M., Stieger S., Furnham A. (2017). An examination of the factorial and convergent validity of four measures of conspiracist ideation, with recommendations for researchers. PLoS One 12 : e0172617 . 10.1371/journal.pone.0172617 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Swami V., Chamorro-Premuzic T., Furnham A. (2010). Unanswered questions: A preliminary investigation of personality and individual difference predictors of 9/11 conspiracist beliefs. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 24 749–761. 10.1002/acp.1583 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Swami V., Coles R., Stieger S., Pietschnig J., Furnham A., Rehim S., et al. (2011). Conspiracist ideation in Britain and Austria: Evidence of a monological belief system and associations between individual psychological differences and real-world and fictitious conspiracy theories. Br. J. Psychol. 102 443–463. 10.1111/j.2044-8295.2010.02004.x [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Teličák P., Halama P. (2021). Maladaptive personality traits, religiosity and spirituality as predictors of epistemically unfounded beliefs. Stud. Psychol. 63 175–189. [ Google Scholar ]
• Teovanović P., Lukić P., Zupan Z., Lazić A., Ninković M., Žeželj I. (2021). Irrational beliefs differentially predict adherence to guidelines and pseudoscientific practices during the COVID-19 pandemic. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 35 486–496. 10.1002/acp.3770 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Tonković M., Dumančić F., Jelić M., Biruški D. Č. (2021). Who believes in COVID-19 conspiracy theories in Croatia? Prevalence and predictors of conspiracy beliefs. Front. Psychol. 12 : 643568 . 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.643568 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Uscinski J. E. (2018). Conspiracy theories and the people who believe them. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• van der Linden S., Panagopoulos C., Azevedo F., Jost J. T. (2021). The paranoid style in American politics revisited: An ideological asymmetry in conspiratorial thinking. Polit. Psychol. 42 23–51. 10.1111/pops.12681 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• van der Wal R. C., Sutton R. M., Lange J., Braga J. P. N. (2018). Suspicious binds: Conspiracy thinking and tenuous perceptions of causal connections between co-occurring and spuriously correlated events. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 48 970–989. 10.1002/ejsp.2507 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• van Mulukom V., Pummerer L. J., Alper S., Bai H., Čavojová V., Farias J., et al. (2022). Antecedents and consequences of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs: A systematic review. Soc. Sci. Med. 301 114912 . 10.1016/j.socscimed.2022.114912 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• van Prooijen J.-W. (2018). The psychology of conspiracy theories. New York, NY: Routledge. [ Google Scholar ]
• van Prooijen J.-W. (2020). An existential threat model of conspiracy theories. Eur. Psychol. 25 16–25. 10.1027/1016-9040/a000381 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• van Prooijen J.-W. (2022). Psychological benefits of believing conspiracy theories. Curr. Opin. Psychol. 47 : 101352 . 10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101352 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• van Prooijen J.-W., Douglas K. M. (2017). Conspiracy theories as part of history: The role of societal crisis situations. Mem. Stud. 10 323–333. 10.1177/1750698017701615 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• van Prooijen J.-W., Douglas K. M. (2018). Belief in conspiracy theories: Basic principles of an emerging research domain. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 48 897–908. 10.1002/ejsp.2530 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• van Prooijen J.-W., Song M. (2021). The cultural dimension of intergroup conspiracy theories. Br. J. Psychol. 112 455–473. 10.1111/bjop.12471 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• van Prooijen J.-W., van Vugt M. (2018). Conspiracy theories: Evolved functions and psychological mechanisms. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 13 770–788. 10.1177/1745691618774270 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• van Prooijen J.-W., Douglas K. M., De Inocencio C. (2018a). Connecting the dots: Illusory pattern perception predicts belief in conspiracies and the supernatural. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 48 320–335. 10.1002/ejsp.2331 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• van Prooijen J.-W., Etienne T. W., Kutiyski Y., Krouwel A. P. (2022a). Just a Flu? Self-perceived infection mediates the link between conspiracy beliefs and Covid-19 health beliefs and behaviors. J. Health Psychol. 27 , 1421–1431. 10.1177/13591053211051816 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• van Prooijen J.-W., Etienne T. W., Kutiyski Y., Krouwel A. P. M. (2021). Conspiracy beliefs prospectively predict health behavior and well-being during a pandemic. Psychol. Med. 1–8. [Epub ahead of print]. 10.1017/S0033291721004438 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• van Prooijen J.-W., Klein O., Milošević Đorđević J. (2020). “ Social-cognitive processes underlying belief in conspiracy theories ,” in Routledge handbook of conspiracy theories , eds Butter M., Knight P. (New York, NY: Routledge; ), 168–180. 10.4324/9780429452734-2_2 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• van Prooijen J.-W., Ligthart J., Rosema S., Xu Y. (2022b). The entertainment value of conspiracy theories. Br. J. Psychol. 113 25–48. 10.1111/bjop.12522 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• van Prooijen J.-W., Staman J., Krouwel A. P. M. (2018b). Increased conspiracy beliefs among ethnic and Muslim minorities. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 32 661–667. 10.1002/acp.3442 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Vezzoni C., Sani G. M. D., Chiesi A. M., Ladini R., Biolcati F., Guglielmi S., et al. (2022). Where does the Coronavirus come from? On the mechanisms underlying the endorsement of conspiracy theories on the origin of SARS-CoV-2. Italian Polit. Sci. Rev. 52 51–65. 10.1017/ipo.2021.19 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Vitriol J. A., Marsh J. K. (2018). The illusion of explanatory depth and endorsement of conspiracy beliefs. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 48 955–969. [ Google Scholar ]
• Wabnegger A., Gremsl A., Schienle A. (2021). The association between the belief in coronavirus conspiracy theories, miracles, and the susceptibility to conjunction fallacy. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 35 1344–1348. 10.1002/acp.3860 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Wagner-Egger P., Delouvée S., Gauvrit N., Dieguez S. (2018). Creationism and conspiracism share a common teleological bias. Curr. Biol. 28 R867–R868. 10.1016/j.cub.2018.06.072 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Walter A. S., Drochon H. (2022). Conspiracy thinking in Europe and America: A comparative study. Polit. Stud. 70 483–501. [ Google Scholar ]
• Wang J., Kim S. (2021). The paradox of conspiracy theory: The positive impact of beliefs in conspiracy theories on preventive actions and vaccination intentions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 18 : 11825 . 10.3390/ijerph182211825 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Wang X., Zuo S.-J., Chan H.-W., Chiu C. P.-Y., Hong Y. (2021). COVID-19-related conspiracy theories in China: The role of secure versus defensive in-group positivity and responsibility attributions. J. Pacif. Rim Psychol. 15 : 18344909211034930 . 10.1177/18344909211034928 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Whitson J. A., Kim J., Wang C. S., Menon T., Webster B. D. (2019). Regulatory focus and conspiratorial perceptions: The importance of personal control. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 45 3–15. 10.1177/0146167218775070 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Wirawan G. B. S., Mahardani P. N. T. Y., Cahyani M. R. K., Laksmi N. L. P. S. P., Januraga P. P. (2021). Conspiracy beliefs and trust as determinants of COVID-19 vaccine acceptance in Bali, Indonesia: Cross-sectional study. Pers. Individ. Dif. 180 : 110995 . 10.1016/j.paid.2021.110995 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Wood M. J., Gray D. (2019). Right-wing authoritarianism as a predictor of pro-establishment versus anti-establishment conspiracy theories. Pers. Individ. Differ. 138 163–166. [ Google Scholar ]
• Wood M. J., Douglas K. M., Sutton R. M. (2012). Dead and alive: Beliefs in contradictory conspiracy theories. Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci. 3 767–773. 10.1177/1948550611434786 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Woolf K., McManus I. C., Martin C. A., Nellums L. B., Guyatt A. L., Melbourne C., et al. (2021). Ethnic differences in SARS-CoV-2 vaccine hesitancy in United Kingdom healthcare workers: Results from the UK-REACH prospective nationwide cohort study. Lancet Reg. Health Eur. 9 : 100180 . 10.1016/j.lanepe.2021.100180 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Yang Z., Luo X., Jia H. (2021). Is it all a conspiracy? Conspiracy theories and people’s attitude to COVID-19 vaccination. Vaccines 9 : 1051 . 10.3390/vaccines9101051 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Yarosh N., Artiukhova V., Zimovin O. (2021). Conspiracy belief and behavior in the COVID-19 pandemic. how belief in conspiracy theory relates to adherence to quarantine restrictions (Wearing protective equipment, isolation, hygiene) and influences antisocial behavior such as aggression and selfishne. Brain Broad Res. Artif. Intellig. Neurosci. 12 202–221. [ Google Scholar ]
• Yilmaz O. (2021). Cognitive styles and religion. Curr. Opin. Psychol. 40 150–154. 10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.09.014 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Yu X., Wojcieszak M., Lee S., Casas A., Azrout R., Gackowski T. (2021). The (Null) effects of happiness on affective polarization, conspiracy endorsement, and deep fake recognition: Evidence from five survey experiments in three countries. Polit Behav 43 1265–1287. 10.1007/s11109-021-09701-1 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Zonis M., Joseph C. M. (1994). Conspiracy thinking in the middle east. Polit. Psychol. 15 443–459. 10.2307/3791566 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]

Thank you for visiting nature.com. You are using a browser version with limited support for CSS. To obtain the best experience, we recommend you use a more up to date browser (or turn off compatibility mode in Internet Explorer). In the meantime, to ensure continued support, we are displaying the site without styles and JavaScript.

• View all journals
• My Account Login
• Explore content
• About the journal
• Publish with us
• Sign up for alerts
• Open access
• Published: 15 December 2022

The psychological and political correlates of conspiracy theory beliefs

• Joseph Uscinski 1 ,
• Adam Enders 2 ,
• Amanda Diekman 3 ,
• John Funchion 4 ,
• Casey Klofstad 1 ,
• Sandra Kuebler 5 ,
• Manohar Murthi 6 ,
• Kamal Premaratne 6 ,
• Michelle Seelig 7 ,
• Daniel Verdear 8 &
• Stefan Wuchty 8  

Scientific Reports volume  12 , Article number:  21672 ( 2022 ) Cite this article

17k Accesses

14 Citations

134 Altmetric

Metrics details

• Human behaviour

Understanding the individual-level characteristics associated with conspiracy theory beliefs is vital to addressing and combatting those beliefs. While researchers have identified numerous psychological and political characteristics associated with conspiracy theory beliefs, the generalizability of those findings is uncertain because they are typically drawn from studies of only a few conspiracy theories. Here, we employ a national survey of 2021 U.S. adults that asks about 15 psychological and political characteristics as well as beliefs in 39 different conspiracy theories. Across 585 relationships examined within both bivariate (correlations) and multivariate (regression) frameworks, we find that psychological traits (e.g., dark triad) and non-partisan/ideological political worldviews (e.g., populism, support for violence) are most strongly related to individual conspiracy theory beliefs, regardless of the belief under consideration, while other previously identified correlates (e.g., partisanship, ideological extremity) are inconsistently related. We also find that the correlates of specific conspiracy theory beliefs mirror those of conspiracy thinking (the predisposition), indicating that this predisposition operates like an ‘average’ of individual conspiracy theory beliefs. Overall, our findings detail the psychological and political traits of the individuals most drawn to conspiracy theories and have important implications for scholars and practitioners seeking to prevent or reduce the impact of conspiracy theories.

Similar content being viewed by others

Conspiracy mentality and political orientation across 26 countries

Individual, intergroup and nation-level influences on belief in conspiracy theories

On modeling the correlates of conspiracy thinking

Introduction.

Conspiracy theory beliefs are associated with numerous societal harms, including vaccine refusal, prejudice against vulnerable groups, and political violence 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 . To lay the groundwork for the development of effective and practical tools to minimize such harms, broad, interdisciplinary research programs have developed over the past decade 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 . The growing literature has collectively identified dozens of individual-level psychological and political factors that are correlated with conspiracy theory beliefs 11 . However, the literature has developed in a piecemeal fashion, with singular studies oftentimes considering only a small number of conspiracy theories or potential correlates at a time 12 . This brings into question the generalizability of these previous findings.

Our central concern is the extent to which the previously identified psychological and political correlates of conspiracy theory beliefs vary—in strength, direction, and statistical significance—depending on the specific conspiracy theory belief being examined. For example, Republicanism and conservatism are typically associated with the belief that Barack Obama faked his birth certificate 13 . Such a finding reveals important details about the basic nature of “birther” beliefs and could even be used to develop strategies to correct such beliefs 14 . But should we also expect that the factors related to birtherism are also related to beliefs in other conspiracy theories, such as the assertion that the moon landing was faked? Are the characteristics related to birtherism similar to those of the average conspiracy theory believer, or specific to believers in birtherism or a few other conspiracy theories? Similar questions may be asked of the political and psychological characteristics associated with believers of other conspiracy theories. Going further, should we expect because, for example, narcissism is associated with Holocaust denial and support for violence with QAnon beliefs that, on average, those exhibiting a tendency toward generalized conspiracy thinking are also likely to be narcissistic or supportive of violence? In each case the literature only offers speculation because generalizability is rarely considered.

Our research question asks: to what extent do the major psychological and political correlates of conspiracy theory beliefs fluctuate depending on the specific conspiracy theory belief under consideration? To answer, we aim to construct empirical distributions of the effects of various political and psychological characteristics on a wide variety of conspiracy theory beliefs. The distribution of these effects provides clues as to how common (or uncommon) a relationship between a given conspiracy theory belief and political/psychological characteristic is, thereby shedding light on the characteristics of the average conspiracy believer and potentially qualifying past inferences made using beliefs in only a single or small number of conspiracy theories. In short, our analysis is calibrated to decipher how generalizable and representative previously identified characteristics of conspiracy believers really are.

To this end, we employ a national survey of 2021 U.S. adults from May 2021, estimating previously identified relationships across many conspiracy theory beliefs within both bivariate (correlation) and multivariate (regression with controls) frameworks. In particular, we focus on 15 different individual-level psychological and political characteristics identified by past work and beliefs in 39 conspiracy theories that vary by topic, the supposed villains, the age of the theory, and its popularity—585 pairwise relationships in total. We also consider the relationships between the 15 individual-level characteristics and conspiracy thinking , the predisposition toward viewing events and circumstances in conspiratorial terms 15 , 16 , 17 , which allows for a comparison of these relationships with those we observe with beliefs in specific conspiracy theories. Of course, we should hope that patterns match, but this is ultimately an empirical question that remains unanswered by the literature. Should the relationships between the various correlates we consider and the specific conspiracy theory beliefs we employ closely match the relationships between those correlates and the conspiracy thinking predisposition, there would be good empirical reason for researchers—in many research designs—to avoid the trappings of specific conspiracy theories in favor of analyzing the general predisposition.

The vast majority of research on the political correlates of conspiracy theory beliefs focuses on partisanship and ideology 16 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 . Some studies distinguish between partisanship and ideology and the strength of those attachments, finding that—regardless of partisan/ideological “direction”—the extremity of one’s political attachments are associated with conspiracy beliefs 21 , 22 . After Donald Trump was elected, more research considered the role of orientations toward Trump 23 , specifically, as well as other orientations that have been associated with Trump, such as populism and Manicheanism 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 . Finally, support for political violence has become relevant in the wake of the January 6, 2021 riot 33 , the burning of 5G cell tower 3 , and other acts of violence during the COVID pandemic and 2020 election 34 . Altogether, we believe that we have broad coverage of the political correlates of conspiracy beliefs identified in past literature.

Our examination of psychological correlates is primarily confined to personality traits, such as Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism—each of which are related to conspiracy theory beliefs 35 , 36 , 37 . We also consider potential downstream products of these antisocial personality traits that have also been found to correlate with conspiracy theory beliefs, such as the tendency to knowingly share false information online, support the use of violence, and distrust government and other people 35 , 38 , 39 , 40 . We focus on personality traits because they—perhaps unlike other psychological factors such as cognitive biases (e.g., conjunction fallacy, intentionality bias) or existential motives (e.g., feelings of powerlessness)—appear to actually structure conspiratorial belief systems 38 . This is not to say that cognitive biases and existential motives of various sorts are not fundamental or important, but they appear to be less predictive of conspiracism than personality traits and other political orientations 41 . Although the list of correlates we consider is necessarily incomplete, it does broadly cover the political and social-psychological correlates identified by past literature as being strongly predictive of a wide variety of beliefs in specific conspiracy theories.

The answer to our primary research question—to what extent do the major psychological and political correlates of conspiracy theory beliefs fluctuate depending on the specific conspiracy theory belief under consideration—has important implications for the study of conspiracy theories. First, it may call into question the generalizability of inferences made using a small number of conspiracy theory beliefs (which is the strategy employed by most studies), especially when the conspiracy theories examined in singular studies exhibit similar characteristics (e.g., who the accused conspirators are). Second, our findings may help with the development of strategies designed to curtail conspiracy theory beliefs and their associated harms. The development of effective interventions requires an accurate understanding of the correlates of conspiracy theory beliefs, as these can shed light on believers’ motivations and tendencies.

Materials and methods

We surveyed U.S. adults in partnership with Qualtrics between April 30–May 19, 2021. The University of Miami Human Subjects Research Office approved this survey on April 8, 2021 (#20210244). Survey respondents provided informed consent via computer screen and could exit at any time. This research was conducted in accordance with all relevant guidelines and regulations, including the Declaration of Helsinki. All materials necessary for replication are available in the Open Science Framework. The quota-based sampling procedure produced a sample representative of the American adult population in terms of gender, age, race and ethnicity, household income, and educational attainment based on 2019 American Community Survey estimates; see the supplementary information for details about the precise sociodemographic composition of the sample.

We took several steps to ensure response quality. Following best practices 42 , our survey included four attention checks (two standalone and two embedded in grids of Likert response-type questions). Respondents who did not successfully complete all four attention checks were excluded from the sample. We also excluded “speeders”: respondents who took less than half the median time to complete the survey upon “soft launch” of the survey on a limited sample. The final sample size was 2021 U.S. adults.

Dependent variables

We employ two sets of dependent variables: the first capturing beliefs in 39 specific conspiracy theories and the second measuring conspiracy thinking (the predisposition towards believing conspiracy theories, sometimes called “conspiracy mentality" or “conspiracy ideation") 43 . Regarding our specific conspiracy theories, we note that researchers cannot examine every conspiracy theory because the universe of conspiracy theories is constantly expanding and seemingly infinite 44 . Consequently, an investigation of beliefs in all or even most conspiracy theories is impossible. Moreover, researchers have yet to identify the “right” set of conspiracy theories for the purpose of making generalizable inferences, prompting the need for the research at hand 45 .

We therefore examine a large number of conspiracy beliefs—39 in total—that capture the five types of conspiracy theories identified by Brotherton, French, and Pickering 46 : government malfeasance (e.g., government officials engaged in sex trafficking), extraterrestrial cover-up (e.g., government hiding alien contact), malevolent global conspiracies (e.g., The Rothschilds control the world), personal well-being (e.g., 5G cell towers spread coronavirus), and control of information (e.g., FDA hiding cures). As many partisan conspiracy theories are popular in the U.S., we also include conspiracy theories involving partisan actors and issues (e.g., Hillary Clinton gave Russia nuclear materials).

The supplementary information  lists the 39 items, as well as the percentage of Americans who express belief in each. These conspiracy theories vary considerably in their popularity, ranging from a low of 5% (Osama bin Laden is still alive) to a high of 56% (more than one person was behind the assassination of President Kennedy).

We measure the predisposition to interpret events and circumstances as the product of real-world conspiracies— conspiracy thinking —using the American Conspiracy Thinking Scale (ACTS). The ACTS is an index of four questions—each measured on a five-point, “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5) scales—developed by Uscinski and Parent 47 and based on items employed by McClosky and Chong 48 :

Much of our lives are being controlled by plots hatched in secret places.

Even though we live in a democracy, a few people will always run things anyway.

The people who really “run” the country are not known to the voters.

Big events like wars, the current recession, and the outcomes of elections are controlled by small groups of people who are working in secret against the rest of us.

This scale (range = 1–5, M  = 3.11, SD  = 1.00, α = 0.86) has been validated in previous work 15 , 16 , 17 , 30 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 , which reveals correlations with a variety of conspiracy theory beliefs, as well as its reliable and unidimensional nature.

Independent variables

We employ three substantive groups of independent variables—psychological and personality characteristics, non-partisan/ideological political attitudes, and partisan/ideological political attitudes and identities—comprised of 15 distinct variables in total. As for psychological and personality characteristics, we examine the relationship between conspiracy theory beliefs and the dark triad 53 , which includes narcissism (range = 1–5, M  = 2.42, SD  = 0.98, α = 0.87; e.g., “I tend to want others to pay attention to me”), Machiavellianism (range = 1–5, M  = 2.09, SD  = 0.91, α = 0.84; e.g., “I tend to manipulate others to get my way”), and psychopathy (range = 1–5, M  = 2.12, SD  = 0.87, α = 0.81; e.g., “I tend to be callous or insensitive”). Previous research has found that the dark triad is related to conspiracy theory beliefs that revolve around the Holocaust 38 , false flag events 38 , election fraud 54 , and QAnon 55 . We also consider the tendency to share false information online (range = 1–5, M  = 1.81, SD  = 1.09; e.g., “I share information on social media about politics even though I believe it may be false”), which is related to conspiracy theory beliefs regarding AIDS, school shootings, and COVID-19, for example 38 .

As for non-partisan/ideological political attitudes, we consider Manicheanism (range = 1–5, M  = 3.25, SD  = 1.17; e.g., “Politics is a battle between good and evil”), populism (range = 1–5, M  = 3.80, SD  = 0.81, α = 0.82; e.g., “The established elite and politicians have often betrayed the people”), support for political violence (range = 1–5, M  = 2.16, SD  = 1.24; e.g., “Violence is sometimes an acceptable way for Americans to express their disagreement with the government”), and (dis)trust in government (range = 1–5, M  = 2.62, SD  = 1.14; e.g., “The federal government in Washington can be trusted to do what is right”). Previous studies find that Manichean attitudes are related to several conspiracy theory beliefs 56 , as are populist attitudes and support for violence 26 , 33 , 55 . A long line of literature also theorizes and observes correlations between distrust and conspiracy theory beliefs 11 .

Finally, partisan/ideological attitudes include partisan (range 1–7, M  = 3.73, SD  = 2.20; 7 = “strong Republican”; e.g., “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?”) and ideological (range = 1–7, M  = 4.04, SD  = 1.80; 7 = “extremely conservative”; e.g., “Where would you place yourself on a scale that goes from ‘very liberal’ to ‘very conservative’?”) identities, as well as the extremity of partisan (range = 1–4, M  = 1.91, SD  = 1.11; 4 = “strong partisan”) and ideological (range = 1–4, M  = 1.37, SD  = 1.17; 4 = “extreme identifier”) identities. Both strength of identity measures are “folded” versions of the seven-point partisan and ideological identity measures—the direction of attachment is removed and only strength/extremity of attachment remains. Previous studies show that partisan and ideological identities are inconsistently associated with conspiracy theory beliefs 20 , 57 : some conspiracy theories are believed more by those on the political right 19 , 58 , and others find more support among those on the left 56 . Furthermore, some studies find that conspiracy theory beliefs are related to partisan strength and ideological extremity 22 , while others find that conspiracy theory beliefs are unrelated to partisanship, ideology or to the strength/extremity thereof 17 .

We also employ feelings toward salient partisan figures in the U.S. such as current President Joe Biden (range = 0–100, M  = 50.51, SD  = 38.12; this is assessed vis-à-vis a “feeling thermometer” where 100 = very positive feelings) and former President Donald Trump (range = 0–100, M  = 39.70, SD  = 39.15; this is assessed vis-à-vis a “feeling thermometer” where 100 = very positive feelings). Support for Donald Trump is correlated with beliefs in conspiracy theories regarding COVID-19 23 , election fraud 59 , and QAnon 55 , for example.

Our analysis unfolds in two steps. First, we estimate the correlation between each of the 15 characteristics described above and each of the 39 conspiracy theory beliefs, for a total of 585 correlations (product-moment correlations for conspiracy theory questions that utilize ordinal response options and point-biserial correlations for those that employ dichotomous response options; see supplementary information for details). We examine distributions of these correlations by characteristic, paying particular attention to the mean and standard deviation, as well as the proportion of instances in which the correlations are statistically distinguishable from 0 at p  < 0.05 (using Benjamini–Hochberg to estimate the false discovery rate across many tests). By examining distributions of correlations across a wide variety of conspiracy theory beliefs, we can better understand the extent to which such correlations fluctuate in magnitude, direction, and statistical significance as the details of the specific conspiracy theories in question vary. We also bolster this analysis by examining the distribution of coefficients from regressions of each conspiracy belief on the full set of individual-level characteristics.

Second, we examine correlations between each of the 15 identified correlates and our measure of generalized conspiracy thinking, the ACTS. We pay particular attention to the extent to which these patterns reflect those in our first analysis: do the correlations with the general predisposition tend to mimic the average correlations across a wide range of specific beliefs?

Survey protocol was approved by the University of Miami Institutional Review Board (Protocol ##20210244). Survey respondents provided informed consent and could leave the survey at any time. All relevant regulations were followed in performing this research.

Figure  1 displays the distribution of correlations between each of the 15 characteristics and the 39 conspiracy theory beliefs we employ. In each panel, we include the mean and standard deviation of the distribution, as well as the percentage of the 39 cases where the correlation is statistically distinguishable from 0 at p  < 0.05. Several patterns emerge.

Distribution of correlation coefficients, by psychological and political correlates, across all conspiracy theory beliefs. Mean, standard deviation, and percentage of cases where correlation was statistically significant ( p  < 0.05) appears in text. p -values corrected for multiple comparisons via the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure.

First, the average correlation with our measure of conspiracy thinking (the ACTS), 0.44, is nearly double that of the next largest average correlation, 0.27, which is associated with spreading false information online (though this correlation is significant across 95% of conspiracy theory beliefs, compared to 100% for the ACTS). This makes theoretical sense and showcases the validity and practical utility of measures of conspiracy thinking such as the ACTS. For the dark triad traits, we observe distributions of mostly positive correlations with small standard deviations; Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy, are statistically significant correlates of 92%, 87%, and 92% of our conspiracy theory beliefs, respectively.

Results are similar for non-partisan/ideological political attitudes, particularly populism, Manicheanism, and support for political violence. These attitudes are significant in 97–100% of cases with relatively strong mean correlations ranging from 0.24 to 0.25. The exception is trust in government, which we expect to be negatively correlated with conspiracy theory beliefs. While the distribution is skewed such that there are more negative correlations than positive ones, it is also centered near 0, with a mean correlation of − 0.07 and standard deviation larger than the other correlates we have discussed so far (0.13). Moreover, trust in government has a lower significance rate of 77%.

Finally, we consider partisan/ideological attitudes and identities. We observe very similar patterns when it comes to partisanship and ideology: relatively weak average correlations of 0.08–0.09, large standard deviations of 0.17–0.18 relative to the other correlates, and a mixture of positive and negative correlations. Both identities are significantly correlated with 69% of the conspiracy theory beliefs we consider (i.e., 26–27 beliefs). This comports with recent work showing inconsistent correlations between partisan and ideological identities depending on the details of the conspiracy theory in question, namely the centrality of partisan/ideological figures and groups 20 , 56 . A similar inference can be made about support for Joe Biden and Donald Trump, though feelings about these salient leaders are more strongly and consistently related than partisan and ideological identities. Both show average correlations greater than 0 in absolute value (0.20 for Trump, − 0.13 for Biden), with relatively large standard deviations, a mixture of positive and negative correlations across beliefs, and significance rates of 74% (Biden) and 85% (Trump).

We find the weakest evidence for a consistent effect of partisan and ideological extremity. Both have distributions with very small standard deviations and correlations clustered around 0; the average correlation is − 0.01 for partisan extremity, 0.04 for ideological extremity. Moreover, neither characteristic is significantly correlated in a majority (> 50%) of cases.

In the supplementary information , we replicate Fig.  1 separately for conspiracy theory questions that utilize ordinal response options and dichotomous response options (not including “don’t know” responses) in order to decipher whether the patterns observed above are impacted by question format. Although the point-biserial correlations utilized with the dichotomous items are weaker than the product-moment correlations (as to be expected), patterns are very similar. We also observe slightly greater average correlations for partisan/ideological political predispositions when it comes to the ordinal response items, though this appears to be an artifact of the fact that more of these items involve partisan or ideological groups, figures, and topics.

Next, we replicate Fig.  1 in a regression framework whereby each conspiracy belief is regressed (via OLS or logistic regression) on all 15 predictors in order to examine controlled relationships. Results appear in Figs.  2 and 3 . The ACTS is the strongest and most consistently significant predictor. Partisanship, ideology, and the strength thereof tend to be weak and non-significant on balance, though Trump support exhibits a more consistently moderate-strong relationship. We also find that many of the psychological and non-partisan/ideological (e.g., populism, support for political violence) predictors tend to exhibit weaker relationships than the correlational analysis in Fig.  1 revealed—this is likely because many of these variables are quite highly correlated with each other, and with ACTS (see supplementary information for these correlations). In other words, not only are inferences tethered to which conspiracy theories one utilizes, they are also contingent on which factors (if any) are controlled for in analyses.

Distribution of standardized OLS coefficients for ordinal conspiracy belief questions, by psychological and political correlates. Mean, standard deviation, and percentage of cases where coefficient was statistically significant ( p  < 0.05) appears in text. p -values corrected for multiple comparisons via Benjamini–Hochberg procedure.

Distribution of odd ratios (based on logit coefficients) for dichotomous conspiracy belief questions, by psychological and political correlates. Mean, standard deviation, and percentage of cases where coefficient was statistically significant ( p  < 0.05) appears in text. p -values corrected for multiple comparisons via Benjamini–Hochberg procedure.

Figure  4 displays each of the 585 correlations involved in the main analysis. While we refrain from probing these quantities individually, a brief examination of the partisan/ideological attitudes and identities can reveal instances where correlations differ directionally. For example, we observe very weak or statistically non-significant correlations for partisanship, ideology, and support for Biden and Trump when it comes to conspiracy theory beliefs that do not involve partisan/ideological considerations (those with gray labels), such as those regarding the moon landing, UFOs, assassinations (e.g., MLK, JFK, RFK), cellphones, 5G service, or the pharmaceutical industry.

Pearson correlations between each psychological and political characteristic and each of 39 conspiracy theory beliefs. Partisan/ideological conspiracy theories have white labels, non-partisan/ideological conspiracy theories have gray labels. Horizontal black bars are 95% confidence intervals.

We do, however, observe systematic patterns with relatively strong, statistically significant correlations when it comes to conspiracy theories involving partisan and ideological considerations (those with white labels), including those addressing Barack Obama’s birth certificate, Hillary Clinton’s supposed dealings with Russia, Republicans stealing elections, Jeffrey Epstein (a one-time Trump associate), liberal donor George Soros, and, in many cases, COVID-19 (an issue about which Donald Trump publicly proffered many conspiracy theories). These findings suggest that beliefs in conspiracy theories that accuse a contemporary partisan or ideological actor, or that are parroted by partisan or ideological media and elites, will be correlated with partisanship and ideology. Beliefs in conspiracy theories that do not accuse a partisan or ideological actor, and are not parroted by partisan or ideological elites, are unlikely to be strongly correlated with partisanship or ideology.

In our final analysis, we examine the correlation between each of the 15 psychological and political characteristics and the ACTS, our measure of generalized conspiracy thinking. Figure  5 displays these correlations in order of magnitude. We also overlay the average correlation between the political and psychological characteristics and all 39 specific conspiracy theories (the distribution means displayed in Fig.  1 ). We find that the correlations between the characteristics and the ACTS tend to mirror the average correlations across all 39 specific conspiracy theory beliefs. Indeed, the strongest, most consistent correlates of specific conspiracy theory beliefs tend to be the strongest correlates of the ACTS. In a sense, the ACTS behaves empirically like an average across many specific conspiracy theory beliefs—precisely what we should expect of (a measure of) a predisposition 60 , even though previous studies have only assumed, rather than empirically tested, this.

Pearson correlations between conspiracy thinking (ACTS) and each psychological and political correlated, with 95% confidence intervals. Also depicts average correlation for each correlate across all 39 conspiracy theory beliefs.

More specifically, we observe relatively strong, significant correlations with psychological and non-partisan/ideological political characteristics: the dark triad, sharing false information online, populism, Manicheanism, and support for political violence. There are, however, some minor discrepancies from the analysis presented in Fig.  1 (e.g., trust in government, support for political candidates). In each case where we observe a difference, the correlation with the ACTS is larger in absolute value than the average correlation across specific beliefs.

We investigated variability in the magnitude, direction, and statistical significance of correlations between 15 different psychological and political characteristics identified by the conspiracy theory belief literature and beliefs in 39 specific conspiracy theories, capturing a total of 585 relationships. We also interrogated the robustness of these findings across question types and utilizing a multivariate framework. Finally, we compared the correlations across specific conspiracy beliefs to those between the psychological and political characteristics we considered and conspiracy thinking, as operationalized by the ACTS.

We found that the psychological (dark triad, propensity to share false information online) and non-partisan/ideological political (populism, Manicheanism, support for political violence) traits tend to exhibit the strongest and most consistent correlations across a wide variety of beliefs in conspiracy theories. The ACTS was the strongest correlate of specific beliefs—it is reassuring, though not surprising, that it is a significant predictor of every conspiracy theory belief we examined. We also found that partisan/ideological attitudes and identities were less strongly correlated with specific conspiracy theory beliefs, on average, and exhibited a great deal of variability across beliefs. Indeed, left–right orientations such as these were most strongly correlated with beliefs in conspiracy theories that involved partisan actors and groups (e.g., Clinton, Trump, Republicans) or had ideological implications (e.g., global warming hoax beliefs). Finally, patterns in the correlations between individual characteristics we considered and conspiracy thinking (ACTS) were quite similar to patterns in the correlations with specific conspiracy theory beliefs. Where such correlations diverged, relationships with conspiracy thinking were stronger in absolute magnitude compared to the average correlations across specific conspiracy theory beliefs.

These findings have several implications for the study of conspiracy theory beliefs. First, researchers should be circumspect about generalizing from one or a small number of conspiracy theories. Not all conspiracy theories are created equal! Such an observation is reinforced when examining the partisan and ideological correlates of conspiracy theory beliefs. In particular, the basic nature of these relationships is heavily contingent on the specific conspiracy theories probed because conspiracy theories are differentially attractive depending on one’s social and political identities 61 , 62 . Further, the factors associated with belief in one conspiracy theory may not speak to the general tendency to believe in conspiracy theories 60 . Nonetheless, the extant literature has focused heavily on some conspiracy theories, such as those regarding climate change 63 , 64 , 65 , Barack Obama’s birth certificate 12 , 13 , 66 , and the terror attacks of 9/11/2001 67 , 68 , 69 , oftentimes attempting to draw generalizable inferences about the broader tendency toward conspiracy theorizing 70 . While these conspiracy theories are, of course, important and worthy of study, our findings show that they are not representative of all conspiracy theories. Thus, generalizations based on analyses involving these conspiracy theories can be misleading if not properly qualified and contextualized.

One practical solution for those seeking to study conspiracy theories generally—as opposed to intentionally focusing on one or a few—involves utilizing a variety of conspiracy theory beliefs, ideally spanning various characteristics or dimensions, such as those identified by Brotherton et al. 46 . Another practical solution involves studying conspiracy thinking, the predisposition to believe in conspiracy theories, rather than the beliefs in specific conspiracy theories 46 , 71 , 72 , 73 , 74 . Given that patterns in the average correlation between the psychological and political characteristics and the 39 conspiracy theory beliefs we considered tend to mirror patterns in those characteristics’ correlation with conspiracy thinking, researchers might consider employing measures of conspiracy thinking in many cases, rather than measures of beliefs in specific conspiracy theories. The ACTS and similar operationalizations (e.g., the CMQ 75 and GCBS 46 ) have the advantage of being demonstrably reliable, valid, and measurement invariant across countries and contexts. Furthermore, they are typically composed of a small number of survey items, thereby making them a robust and thrifty alternative to specific conspiracy theory beliefs. Even in instances where researchers are interested in specific beliefs, perhaps because of their potential consequences (e.g., those about vaccines, election fraud, minority groups), they might also examine conspiracy thinking as a window into how a specific belief might deviate from the average. Overall, the robust relationship between conspiracy thinking and beliefs in specific conspiracy theories demonstrated here suggests that there is still enormous potential for theory development and empirical testing when it comes to understanding the characteristics, experiences, processes, and situational factors that promote or inhibit conspiracy thinking.

Finally, our findings have implications for social and political debates and policies regarding the spread of conspiracy theories. Whereas conspiracy theories certainly pose a political problem, they may not always be a left–right partisan or ideological problem. We found positive and negative correlations with partisan and ideological identities, as well as support for Biden and Trump, signaling that those on the political left and right both believe in conspiracy theories when it is psychologically, politically, or socially expedient to do so (e.g., to reduce cognitive dissonance, bolster one’s group-image, denigrate an out-group). In such cases, measures involving correctives from co-partisans can be successful 14 , 76 . However, some of the strongest and most consistent correlates of conspiracy theory beliefs involve psychological and political characteristics that are markers of anti-social, conflictual tendencies (e.g., dark triad traits, support for violence, Manicheanism). Efforts to correct or pre-bunk conspiracy theory beliefs are less likely to be successful among individuals exhibiting such traits.

We encourage researchers who are actively developing interventions aimed at dissuading people from adopting conspiracy theory beliefs to examine the effectiveness of their strategies across a large range of conspiracy theories that vary in numerous ways and to specifically consider strategies for reaching the most cantankerous—and perhaps the most dangerous—conspiracy theory believers. For example, treatments designed to “correct” conspiracy beliefs might not only include high-quality information from epistemic authority figures, which the most conspiratorial individuals are likely to ignore, but also acknowledge that even scientists and other experts occasionally get things wrong and that the process of scientific discovery is dynamic and non-linear. Such a strategy may disarm narcissists and the most distrustful members of society by acknowledging that their beliefs and worldviews have some merit, thereby making them more receptive to authoritative information. In general, more research examining the impact of debunking, prebunking, and the like—conditional on high levels of distrust, populism, Manicheanism, and dark triad personality traits—must be conducted.

Limitations and future directions

Despite the relatively large number of correlates we employ, many other correlates that have been identified by the rapidly growing literature (e.g., criminal activity, anomie, paranoid ideation, depression) are not included in this study due to the space limitations of our survey 3 , 4 , 77 . We encourage future studies to replicate and expand our analyses, using additional psychological and political traits across a broad range of specific conspiracy theory beliefs to understand the robustness of the relationships observed in past work. Since they are based on cross-sectional, observational data we must also acknowledge that our analyses are incapable of shedding light on causal pathways between the psychological and political characteristics we identified and conspiracy theory beliefs. The conspiracy belief literature would benefit greatly from more studies that employ different research designs, especially those involving panel data and experimental manipulations.

We also recognize that our analysis was conducted on a U.S. sample and during a tumultuous political time when one political party was continuing to contest the outcome of a recent election. While we do not expect our focus on the U.S. to impact inferences about psychological characteristics, political dynamics do vary across sociopolitical contexts, as does the relative salience of specific conspiracy theories 21 . In other words, it could be that case that the dynamics of partisan and ideological predispositions are contingent not only on the specific conspiracy theory beliefs assessed, but also on the broader political climate (as is certainly the case for feelings toward political candidates, who differ from election to election). For example, the “conspiracy theories are for losers” hypothesis holds that those who identify with the party that loses an election or is perceived to lack power are more likely to exhibit conspiracy theory beliefs, especially about the out-party 21 , 47 , 78 . For these reasons, we also encourage future studies to replicate and expand our study in different countries and other time points to account for the potential impact of situational factors.

Data availability

All data and replication code is available on the Open Science Framework:  https://osf.io/c6f2y/ .

Jolley, D., Mari, S. & Douglas, K. M. In Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories (eds Butter, M. & Knight, P.) 231–241 (Routledge, 2020).

Chapter   Google Scholar  

Jolley, D., Meleady, R. & Douglas, K. M. Exposure to intergroup conspiracy theories promotes prejudice which spreads across groups. Br. J. Psychol. 111 , 17–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12385 (2020).

Article   Google Scholar  

Jolley, D. & Paterson, J. L. Pylons ablaze: Examining the role of 5G COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs and support for violence. Br. J. Soc. Psychol. 59 , 628–640. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12394 (2020).

Jolley, D., Douglas, K. M., Leite, A. C. & Schrader, T. Belief in conspiracy theories and intentions to engage in everyday crime. Br. J. Soc. Psychol. 58 , 534–549. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12311 (2019).

Jolley, D. & Douglas, K. The social consequences of conspiracism: Exposure to conspiracy theories decreases intentions to engage in politics and to reduce one’s carbon footprint. Br. J. Psychol. 105 , 35–56 (2014).

Jolley, D. & Douglas, K. The effects of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories on vaccination intentions. PLoS One 9 , e89177. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0089177 (2014).

Article   ADS   CAS   Google Scholar  

Butter, M. & Knight, P. In Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them, Ch. 2 (ed. Uscinski, J. E.) 33–46 (Oxford University, Paris, 2018).

Butter, M., & Knight, P. (Eds.). Routledge Handbook of Conspriacy Theories. (Routledge, London, 2020).

Uscinski, J. (Ed.) Conspiracy Theories & the People Who Believe Them. (Oxford University Press, New York, 2018).

Dyrendal, A., Robertson, D. G. & Asprem, E. Handbook of Conspiracy Theory and Contemporary Religion (Brill, 2018).

Book   Google Scholar  

Douglas, K. et al. Understanding conspiracy theories. Adv. Political Psychol. 40 , 3–35. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12568 (2019).

Enders, A., Smallpage, S. M. & Lupton, R. N. Are all ‘Birthers’ conspiracy theorists? On the relationship between conspiratorial thinking and political orientations. Br. J. Political Sci. 50 , 849–866. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000837 (2020).

Pasek, J., Stark, T. H., Krosnick, J. A. & Tompson, T. What motivates a conspiracy theory? Birther beliefs, partisanship, liberal-conservative ideology, and anti-black attitudes. Elect. Stud. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2014.09.009 (2014).

Berinsky, A. Rumors and health care reform: Experiments in political misinformation. Br. J. Political Sci. 47 , 241–262. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123415000186 (2015).

Cassese, E. C., Farhart, C. E. & Miller, J. M. Gender differences in COVID-19 conspiracy theory beliefs. Political Gend. 16 , 1009–1018. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X20000409 (2020).

Miller, J. M. Psychological, political, and situational factors combine to boost COVID-19 conspiracy theory beliefs. Can. J. Political Sci. 53 , 327–334. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000842392000058X (2020).

Article   ADS   Google Scholar  

Klofstad, C. A., Uscinski, J. E., Connolly, J. M. & West, J. P. What drives people to believe in Zika conspiracy theories?. Palgrave Commun. 5 , 36. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0243-8 (2019).

Enders, A. et al. Are republicans and conservatives more likely to believe conspiracy theories?. Political Behav. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-022-09812-3 (2022).

van der Linden, S., Panagopoulos, C., Azevedo, F. & Jost, J. T. The paranoid style in American politics revisited: An ideological asymmetry in conspiratorial thinking. Political Psychol. 42 , 23–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12681 (2021).

Miller, J. M., Saunders, K. L. & Farhart, C. E. Conspiracy endorsement as motivated reasoning: The moderating roles of political knowledge and trust. Am. J. Political Sci. 60 , 824–844. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12234 (2016).

Imhoff, R. et al. Conspiracy mentality and political orientation across 26 countries. Nat. Hum. Behav. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01258-7 (2022).

van Prooijen, J.-W., Krouwel, A. & Pollet, T. Political extremism predicts belief in conspiracy theories. Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci. 6 , 570–578. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550614567356 (2015).

Uscinski, J. et al. Why do people believe COVID-19 conspiracy theories?. Harv. Kennedy Sch. (HKS) Misinf Rev. 1 , 1–12. https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-015 (2020).

Oliver, E. & Rahn, W. M. Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 election. Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. Soc. Sci. 667 , 189–206 (2016).

van Prooijen, J.-W., Rutjens, B. & Brandt, M. Populism as political mentality underlying conspiracy theories. Belief Systems and the Perception of Reality , 79–96 (2018).

Stecula, D. & Pickup, M. How populism and conservative media fuel conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19 and what it means for COVID-19 behaviors. Res. Politics 8 , 2053168021993979. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168021993979 (2021).

Hameleers, M. They are selling themselves out to the enemy! The content and effects of populist conspiracy theories. Int. J. Public Opin. Res. 33 , 38–56. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edaa004 (2020).

Müller, J.-W. What, if anything, do populism and conspiracy theories have to do with each other?. Soc. Res. Int. Q. 89 , 607–625 (2022).

Papaioannou, K., Pantazi, M. & van Prooijen, J.-W. Unravelling the relationship between populism and belief in conspiracy theories: The role of cynicism, powerlessness and zero-sum thinking. Br. J. Psychol. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12602 (2022).

Uscinski, J. et al. American politics in two dimensions: Partisan and ideological identities versus anti-establishment orientations. Am. J. Political Sci. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12616 (2021).

Enders, A. & Uscinski, J. The role of anti-establishment orientations during the Trump presidency. The Forum 19 , 47–76. https://doi.org/10.1515/for-2021-0003 (2021).

Erisen, C. et al. Psychological correlates of populist attitudes. Political Psychol. 42 , 149–171. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12768 (2021).

Armaly, M. T., Buckley, D. T. & Enders, A. M. Christian nationalism and political violence: Victimhood, racial identity, conspiracy, and support for the capitol attacks. Political Behav. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-021-09758-y (2022).

van Mulukom, V. et al. Antecedents and consequences of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs: A systematic review. Soc. Sci. Med. 301 , 114912. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2022.114912 (2022).

Kay, C. S. Actors of the most fiendish character: Explaining the associations between the Dark Tetrad and conspiracist ideation. Pers. Individ. Differ. 171 , 110543. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110543 (2021).

Hughes, S. & Machan, L. It’s a conspiracy: Covid-19 conspiracies link to psychopathy, Machiavellianism and collective narcissism. Pers. Individ. Differ. 171 , 110559. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110559 (2021).

March, E. & Springer, J. Belief in conspiracy theories: The predictive role of schizotypy, Machiavellianism, and primary psychopathy. PLoS One 14 , e0225964. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0225964 (2019).

Article   CAS   Google Scholar  

Enders, A. et al. Do conspiracy beliefs form a belief system? Examining the structure and organization of conspiracy beliefs. J. Soc. Political Psychol. 9 , 255–271. https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.5649 (2021).

Goertzel, T. Belief in conspiracy theories. Political Psychol. 15 , 733–744. https://doi.org/10.2307/3791630 (1994).

Ren, Z. B., Dimant, E. & Schweitzer, M. E. Beyond belief: How social engagement motives influence the spread of conspiracy theories. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 104 , 104421. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2022.104421 (2023).

Enders, A. & Smallpage, S. M. Who are conspiracy theorists? A comprehensive approach to explaining conspiracy beliefs. Soc. Sci. Q. 100 , 2017–2032. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12711 (2019).

Berinsky, A., Margolis, M. F., Sances, M. W. & Warshaw, C. Using screeners to measure respondent attention on self-administered surveys: Which items and how many?. Political Sci. Res. Methods 9 , 430–437. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2019.53 (2021).

Uscinski, J., Klofstad, C. & Atkinson, M. Why do people believe in conspiracy theories? The role of informational cues and predispositions. Political Res. Q. 69 , 57–71. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912915621621 (2016).

Uscinski, J. Conspiracy Theories: A Primer (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2020).

Google Scholar  

Sutton, R. M. & Douglas, K. M. In Power, Politics, and Paranoia: Why People are Suspicious of Their Leaders (eds van Prooijen, J.-W. & van Lange, P. A. M.) 254–272 (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

Brotherton, R., French, C. C. & Pickering, A. D. Measuring belief in conspiracy theories: The generic conspiracist beliefs scale. Front. Psychol. 4 , 1–15. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00279 (2013).

Uscinski, J. & Parent, J. M. American Conspiracy Theories (Oxford University Press, 2014).

McClosky, H. & Chong, D. Similarities and differences between left-wing and right-wing radicals. Br. J. Political Sci. 15 , 329–363. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400004221 (1985).

Miller, J. M. Do COVID-19 conspiracy theory beliefs form a monological belief system?. Can. J. Political Sci. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423920000517 (2020).

Marietta, M. & Barker, D. C. In Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them, Ch. 14 (ed. Uscinski, J. E.) 214–225 (Oxford University Press, 2018).

Enders, A. et al. The relationship between social media use and beliefs in conspiracy theories and misinformation. Political Behav. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-021-09734-6 (2021).

Han, H. et al. Validity testing of the conspiratorial thinking and anti-expert sentiment scales during the COVID-19 pandemic across 24 languages from a large-scale global dataset. Epidemiol. Infect. 150 , e167. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0950268822001443 (2022).

Furnham, A., Richards, S. C. & Paulhus, D. L. The dark triad of personality: A 10 year review. Soc. Pers. Psychol. Compass 7 , 199–216. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12018 (2013).

Enders, A. et al. The 2020 presidential election and beliefs about fraud: Continuity or change?. Elect. Stud. 72 , 102366. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102366 (2021).

Enders, A. et al. Who supports QAnon? A case study in political extremism. J. Politics 84 (3), 1844–1849 (2022).

Oliver, E. & Wood, T. Conspiracy theories and the paranoid style (s) of mass opinion. Am. J. Political Sci. 58 , 952–966. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12084 (2014).

Smallpage, S. M., Enders, A. M. & Uscinski, J. The partisan contours of conspiracy theory beliefs. Res. Politics 4 , 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168017746554 (2017).

Romer, D. & Jamieson, K. H. Conspiracy theories as barriers to controlling the spread of COVID-19 in the US. Soc. Sci. Med. 263 , 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2020.113356 (2020).

Arceneaux, K. & Truex, R. Donald Trump and the lie. Perspect. Politics. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592722000901 (2022).

Imhoff, R., Bertlich, T. & Frenken, M. Tearing apart the “evil” twins: A general conspiracy mentality is not the same as specific conspiracy beliefs. Curr. Opin. Psychol. 46 , 101349 (2022).

Robertson, C. E., Pretus, C., Rathje, S., Harris, E. A. & Van Bavel, J. J. How social identity shapes conspiratorial belief. Curr. Opin. Psychol. 47 , 101423. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101423 (2022).

Sternisko, A., Cichocka, A. & Van Bavel, J. J. The dark side of social movements: Social identity, non-conformity, and the lure of conspiracy theories. Curr. Opin. Psychol. 35 , 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.02.007 (2020).

Bolsen, T., Palm, R. & Kingsland, J. T. Effects of conspiracy rhetoric on views about the consequences of climate change and support for direct carbon capture. Environ. Commun. 16 , 209–224. https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2021.1991967 (2022).

Saunders, K. L. The impact of elite frames and motivated reasoning on beliefs in a global warming conspiracy: The promise and limits of trust. Res. Politics 4 , 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168017717602 (2017).

van der Linden, S. The conspiracy-effect: Exposure to conspiracy theories (about global warming) decreases pro-social behavior and science acceptance. Pers. Individ. Differ. 87 , 171–173. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2015.07.045 (2015).

Jardina, A. & Traugott, M. The genesis of the birther rumor: Partisanship, racial attitudes, and political knowledge. J. Race Ethn. Politics 4 , 60–80. https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2018.25 (2019).

Richey, S. A birther and a truther: The influence of the authoritarian personality on conspiracy beliefs. Politics Policy 45 , 465–485. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12206 (2017).

Wood, M. & Douglas, K. “What about Building 7?” A social psychological study of online discussion of 9/11 conspiracy theories. Front. Psychol. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00409 (2013).

Stempel, C., Hargrove, T. & Stempel, G. H. Media use, social structure, and belief in 9/11 conspiracy theories. J. Mass Commun. Q. 84 , 353–372. https://doi.org/10.1177/107769900708400210 (2007).

Min, S. J. Who believes in conspiracy theories? Network diversity, political discussion, and conservative conspiracy theories on social media. Am. Politics Res. 49 , 415–427. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x211013526 (2021).

Imhoff, R. & Bruder, M. Speaking (un-)truth to power: Conspiracy mentality as a generalised political attitude. Eur. J. Pers. 28 , 25–43. https://doi.org/10.1002/per.1930 (2014).

Drinkwater, K. G., Dagnall, N., Denovan, A. & Neave, N. Psychometric assessment of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale. PLoS One 15 , e0230365. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230365 (2020).

Stojanov, A. & Halberstadt, J. The conspiracy mentality scale. Soc. Psychol. 50 , 215–232. https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000381 (2019).

Han, H. et al. Validity Testing of the Conspiratorial Thinking and Anti-Expert Sentiment Scales during the COVID-19 Pandemic Across 24 Languages from a Large-Scale Global Dataset (PsyArXiv, 2021).

Bruder, M., Haffke, P., Neave, N., Nouripanah, N. & Imhoff, R. Measuring individual differences in generic beliefs in conspiracy theories across cultures: The Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ). Front. Psychol. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00225 (2013).

Benegal, S. D. & Scruggs, L. A. Correcting misinformation about climate change: The impact of partisanship in an experimental setting. Clim. Change 148 , 61–80 (2018).

Baum, M., Druckman, J., Simonson, M., Lin, J. & Perlis, R. The Political Consequences of Depression: How Conspiracy Beliefs, Self-Efficacy, and Depression Affect Support for Political Violence (Northwestern, 2022).

Edelson, J., Alduncin, A., Krewson, C., Sieja, J. A. & Uscinski, J. E. The effect of conspiratorial thinking and motivated reasoning on belief in election fraud. Political Res. Q. 70 , 933–946 (2017).

Download references

Acknowledgements

The efforts of JU, CK, MM, KP, MS, DV, and SW were funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation, SaTC Award #2123635. The efforts of AD and SK were funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation, SaTC Award #2123618. Data collection was funded by the University of Miami U-Link initiative.

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Department of Political Science, University of Miami, 1300 Campo Sano Blvd., Coral Gables, FL, 33146, USA

Joseph Uscinski & Casey Klofstad

Department of Political Science, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, 40292, USA

Adam Enders

Department of Psychology, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, 47405, USA

• Amanda Diekman

Department of English, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, 33146, USA

John Funchion

Department of Linguistics, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, 47405, USA

Sandra Kuebler

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, 33146, USA

Manohar Murthi & Kamal Premaratne

Department of Cinema and Interactive Media, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, 33146, USA

Michelle Seelig

Department of Computer Science, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, 33146, USA

Daniel Verdear & Stefan Wuchty

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Contributions

A.E., J.U., C.K., M.S. designed and performed the research; A.E., J.U., C.K. prepared the analysis; A.E. prepared the figures; J.U., A.E., A.D., C.K., S.K., M.M., K.P., M.S., J.F., D.V., and S.W. wrote the paper; All authors reviewed the manuscript.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Joseph Uscinski .

Ethics declarations

Competing interests.

The authors declare no competing interests.

Additional information

Publisher's note.

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Supplementary Information

Supplementary information., rights and permissions.

Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ .

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article.

Uscinski, J., Enders, A., Diekman, A. et al. The psychological and political correlates of conspiracy theory beliefs. Sci Rep 12 , 21672 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-25617-0

Download citation

Received : 07 September 2022

Accepted : 01 December 2022

Published : 15 December 2022

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-25617-0

Share this article

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

This article is cited by

People do change their beliefs about conspiracy theories—but not often.

• Matt N. Williams
• Mathew Ling
• Edward J. R. Clarke

Scientific Reports (2024)

Automatic detection of fake tweets about the COVID-19 Vaccine in Portuguese

• Rafael Geurgas
• Leandro R. Tessler

Social Network Analysis and Mining (2024)

Dark Triad and COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy: the role of conspiracy beliefs and risk perception

• Marco Giancola
• Massimiliano Palmiero
• Simonetta D’Amico

Current Psychology (2024)

• Adam M. Enders
• Joseph Uscinski

Scientific Reports (2023)

Correlation between coronavirus conspiracism and antisemitism: a cross-sectional study in the United Kingdom

• Daniel Allington
• David Hirsh
• Louise Katz

By submitting a comment you agree to abide by our Terms and Community Guidelines . If you find something abusive or that does not comply with our terms or guidelines please flag it as inappropriate.

Quick links

• Explore articles by subject
• Guide to authors
• Editorial policies

Sign up for the Nature Briefing newsletter — what matters in science, free to your inbox daily.

• Search Menu
• Browse content in Arts and Humanities
• Browse content in Archaeology
• Anglo-Saxon and Medieval Archaeology
• Archaeological Methodology and Techniques
• Archaeology by Region
• Archaeology of Religion
• Archaeology of Trade and Exchange
• Biblical Archaeology
• Contemporary and Public Archaeology
• Environmental Archaeology
• Historical Archaeology
• History and Theory of Archaeology
• Industrial Archaeology
• Landscape Archaeology
• Mortuary Archaeology
• Prehistoric Archaeology
• Underwater Archaeology
• Urban Archaeology
• Zooarchaeology
• Browse content in Architecture
• Architectural Structure and Design
• History of Architecture
• Residential and Domestic Buildings
• Theory of Architecture
• Browse content in Art
• Art Subjects and Themes
• History of Art
• Industrial and Commercial Art
• Theory of Art
• Biographical Studies
• Byzantine Studies
• Browse content in Classical Studies
• Classical History
• Classical Philosophy
• Classical Mythology
• Classical Literature
• Classical Reception
• Classical Art and Architecture
• Classical Oratory and Rhetoric
• Greek and Roman Papyrology
• Greek and Roman Epigraphy
• Greek and Roman Law
• Greek and Roman Archaeology
• Late Antiquity
• Religion in the Ancient World
• Digital Humanities
• Browse content in History
• Colonialism and Imperialism
• Diplomatic History
• Environmental History
• Genealogy, Heraldry, Names, and Honours
• Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing
• Historical Geography
• History by Period
• History of Emotions
• History of Agriculture
• History of Education
• History of Gender and Sexuality
• Industrial History
• Intellectual History
• International History
• Labour History
• Legal and Constitutional History
• Local and Family History
• Maritime History
• Military History
• National Liberation and Post-Colonialism
• Oral History
• Political History
• Public History
• Regional and National History
• Revolutions and Rebellions
• Slavery and Abolition of Slavery
• Social and Cultural History
• Theory, Methods, and Historiography
• Urban History
• World History
• Browse content in Language Teaching and Learning
• Language Learning (Specific Skills)
• Language Teaching Theory and Methods
• Browse content in Linguistics
• Applied Linguistics
• Cognitive Linguistics
• Computational Linguistics
• Forensic Linguistics
• Grammar, Syntax and Morphology
• Historical and Diachronic Linguistics
• History of English
• Language Evolution
• Language Reference
• Language Acquisition
• Language Variation
• Language Families
• Lexicography
• Linguistic Anthropology
• Linguistic Theories
• Linguistic Typology
• Phonetics and Phonology
• Psycholinguistics
• Sociolinguistics
• Translation and Interpretation
• Writing Systems
• Browse content in Literature
• Bibliography
• Children's Literature Studies
• Literary Studies (Romanticism)
• Literary Studies (American)
• Literary Studies (Asian)
• Literary Studies (European)
• Literary Studies (Eco-criticism)
• Literary Studies (Modernism)
• Literary Studies - World
• Literary Studies (1500 to 1800)
• Literary Studies (19th Century)
• Literary Studies (20th Century onwards)
• Literary Studies (African American Literature)
• Literary Studies (British and Irish)
• Literary Studies (Early and Medieval)
• Literary Studies (Fiction, Novelists, and Prose Writers)
• Literary Studies (Gender Studies)
• Literary Studies (Graphic Novels)
• Literary Studies (History of the Book)
• Literary Studies (Plays and Playwrights)
• Literary Studies (Poetry and Poets)
• Literary Studies (Postcolonial Literature)
• Literary Studies (Queer Studies)
• Literary Studies (Science Fiction)
• Literary Studies (Travel Literature)
• Literary Studies (War Literature)
• Literary Studies (Women's Writing)
• Literary Theory and Cultural Studies
• Mythology and Folklore
• Shakespeare Studies and Criticism
• Browse content in Media Studies
• Browse content in Music
• Applied Music
• Dance and Music
• Ethics in Music
• Ethnomusicology
• Gender and Sexuality in Music
• Medicine and Music
• Music Cultures
• Music and Media
• Music and Religion
• Music and Culture
• Music Education and Pedagogy
• Music Theory and Analysis
• Musical Scores, Lyrics, and Libretti
• Musical Structures, Styles, and Techniques
• Musicology and Music History
• Performance Practice and Studies
• Race and Ethnicity in Music
• Sound Studies
• Browse content in Performing Arts
• Browse content in Philosophy
• Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
• Epistemology
• Feminist Philosophy
• History of Western Philosophy
• Metaphysics
• Moral Philosophy
• Non-Western Philosophy
• Philosophy of Language
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Perception
• Philosophy of Science
• Philosophy of Action
• Philosophy of Law
• Philosophy of Religion
• Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
• Practical Ethics
• Social and Political Philosophy
• Browse content in Religion
• Biblical Studies
• Christianity
• East Asian Religions
• History of Religion
• Judaism and Jewish Studies
• Qumran Studies
• Religion and Education
• Religion and Health
• Religion and Politics
• Religion and Science
• Religion and Law
• Religion and Art, Literature, and Music
• Religious Studies
• Browse content in Society and Culture
• Cookery, Food, and Drink
• Cultural Studies
• Customs and Traditions
• Ethical Issues and Debates
• Hobbies, Games, Arts and Crafts
• Lifestyle, Home, and Garden
• Natural world, Country Life, and Pets
• Popular Beliefs and Controversial Knowledge
• Sports and Outdoor Recreation
• Technology and Society
• Travel and Holiday
• Visual Culture
• Browse content in Law
• Arbitration
• Browse content in Company and Commercial Law
• Commercial Law
• Company Law
• Browse content in Comparative Law
• Systems of Law
• Competition Law
• Browse content in Constitutional and Administrative Law
• Government Powers
• Judicial Review
• Local Government Law
• Military and Defence Law
• Parliamentary and Legislative Practice
• Construction Law
• Contract Law
• Browse content in Criminal Law
• Criminal Procedure
• Criminal Evidence Law
• Sentencing and Punishment
• Employment and Labour Law
• Environment and Energy Law
• Browse content in Financial Law
• Banking Law
• Insolvency Law
• History of Law
• Human Rights and Immigration
• Intellectual Property Law
• Browse content in International Law
• Private International Law and Conflict of Laws
• Public International Law
• IT and Communications Law
• Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
• Law and Politics
• Law and Society
• Browse content in Legal System and Practice
• Courts and Procedure
• Legal Skills and Practice
• Primary Sources of Law
• Regulation of Legal Profession
• Medical and Healthcare Law
• Browse content in Policing
• Criminal Investigation and Detection
• Police and Security Services
• Police Procedure and Law
• Police Regional Planning
• Browse content in Property Law
• Personal Property Law
• Study and Revision
• Terrorism and National Security Law
• Browse content in Trusts Law
• Wills and Probate or Succession
• Browse content in Medicine and Health
• Browse content in Allied Health Professions
• Arts Therapies
• Clinical Science
• Dietetics and Nutrition
• Occupational Therapy
• Operating Department Practice
• Physiotherapy
• Radiography
• Speech and Language Therapy
• Browse content in Anaesthetics
• General Anaesthesia
• Neuroanaesthesia
• Clinical Neuroscience
• Browse content in Clinical Medicine
• Acute Medicine
• Cardiovascular Medicine
• Clinical Genetics
• Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics
• Dermatology
• Endocrinology and Diabetes
• Gastroenterology
• Genito-urinary Medicine
• Geriatric Medicine
• Infectious Diseases
• Medical Toxicology
• Medical Oncology
• Pain Medicine
• Palliative Medicine
• Rehabilitation Medicine
• Respiratory Medicine and Pulmonology
• Rheumatology
• Sleep Medicine
• Sports and Exercise Medicine
• Community Medical Services
• Critical Care
• Emergency Medicine
• Forensic Medicine
• Haematology
• History of Medicine
• Browse content in Medical Skills
• Clinical Skills
• Communication Skills
• Nursing Skills
• Surgical Skills
• Browse content in Medical Dentistry
• Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery
• Paediatric Dentistry
• Restorative Dentistry and Orthodontics
• Surgical Dentistry
• Medical Ethics
• Medical Statistics and Methodology
• Browse content in Neurology
• Clinical Neurophysiology
• Neuropathology
• Nursing Studies
• Browse content in Obstetrics and Gynaecology
• Gynaecology
• Occupational Medicine
• Ophthalmology
• Otolaryngology (ENT)
• Browse content in Paediatrics
• Neonatology
• Browse content in Pathology
• Chemical Pathology
• Clinical Cytogenetics and Molecular Genetics
• Histopathology
• Medical Microbiology and Virology
• Patient Education and Information
• Browse content in Pharmacology
• Psychopharmacology
• Browse content in Popular Health
• Caring for Others
• Complementary and Alternative Medicine
• Self-help and Personal Development
• Browse content in Preclinical Medicine
• Cell Biology
• Molecular Biology and Genetics
• Reproduction, Growth and Development
• Primary Care
• Professional Development in Medicine
• Browse content in Psychiatry
• Addiction Medicine
• Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
• Forensic Psychiatry
• Learning Disabilities
• Old Age Psychiatry
• Psychotherapy
• Browse content in Public Health and Epidemiology
• Epidemiology
• Public Health
• Browse content in Radiology
• Clinical Radiology
• Interventional Radiology
• Nuclear Medicine
• Radiation Oncology
• Reproductive Medicine
• Browse content in Surgery
• Cardiothoracic Surgery
• Gastro-intestinal and Colorectal Surgery
• General Surgery
• Neurosurgery
• Paediatric Surgery
• Peri-operative Care
• Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
• Surgical Oncology
• Transplant Surgery
• Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgery
• Vascular Surgery
• Browse content in Science and Mathematics
• Browse content in Biological Sciences
• Aquatic Biology
• Biochemistry
• Bioinformatics and Computational Biology
• Developmental Biology
• Ecology and Conservation
• Evolutionary Biology
• Genetics and Genomics
• Microbiology
• Molecular and Cell Biology
• Natural History
• Plant Sciences and Forestry
• Research Methods in Life Sciences
• Structural Biology
• Systems Biology
• Zoology and Animal Sciences
• Browse content in Chemistry
• Analytical Chemistry
• Computational Chemistry
• Crystallography
• Environmental Chemistry
• Industrial Chemistry
• Inorganic Chemistry
• Materials Chemistry
• Medicinal Chemistry
• Mineralogy and Gems
• Organic Chemistry
• Physical Chemistry
• Polymer Chemistry
• Study and Communication Skills in Chemistry
• Theoretical Chemistry
• Browse content in Computer Science
• Artificial Intelligence
• Computer Architecture and Logic Design
• Game Studies
• Human-Computer Interaction
• Mathematical Theory of Computation
• Programming Languages
• Software Engineering
• Systems Analysis and Design
• Virtual Reality
• Browse content in Computing
• Business Applications
• Computer Security
• Computer Games
• Computer Networking and Communications
• Digital Lifestyle
• Graphical and Digital Media Applications
• Operating Systems
• Browse content in Earth Sciences and Geography
• Atmospheric Sciences
• Environmental Geography
• Geology and the Lithosphere
• Maps and Map-making
• Meteorology and Climatology
• Oceanography and Hydrology
• Palaeontology
• Physical Geography and Topography
• Regional Geography
• Soil Science
• Urban Geography
• Browse content in Engineering and Technology
• Agriculture and Farming
• Biological Engineering
• Civil Engineering, Surveying, and Building
• Electronics and Communications Engineering
• Energy Technology
• Engineering (General)
• Environmental Science, Engineering, and Technology
• History of Engineering and Technology
• Mechanical Engineering and Materials
• Technology of Industrial Chemistry
• Transport Technology and Trades
• Browse content in Environmental Science
• Applied Ecology (Environmental Science)
• Conservation of the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Environmental Sustainability
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Environmental Science)
• Management of Land and Natural Resources (Environmental Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environmental Science)
• Nuclear Issues (Environmental Science)
• Pollution and Threats to the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Environmental Science)
• History of Science and Technology
• Browse content in Materials Science
• Ceramics and Glasses
• Composite Materials
• Metals, Alloying, and Corrosion
• Nanotechnology
• Browse content in Mathematics
• Applied Mathematics
• Biomathematics and Statistics
• History of Mathematics
• Mathematical Education
• Mathematical Finance
• Mathematical Analysis
• Numerical and Computational Mathematics
• Probability and Statistics
• Pure Mathematics
• Browse content in Neuroscience
• Cognition and Behavioural Neuroscience
• Development of the Nervous System
• Disorders of the Nervous System
• History of Neuroscience
• Invertebrate Neurobiology
• Molecular and Cellular Systems
• Neuroendocrinology and Autonomic Nervous System
• Neuroscientific Techniques
• Sensory and Motor Systems
• Browse content in Physics
• Astronomy and Astrophysics
• Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
• Biological and Medical Physics
• Classical Mechanics
• Computational Physics
• Condensed Matter Physics
• Electromagnetism, Optics, and Acoustics
• History of Physics
• Mathematical and Statistical Physics
• Measurement Science
• Nuclear Physics
• Particles and Fields
• Plasma Physics
• Quantum Physics
• Relativity and Gravitation
• Semiconductor and Mesoscopic Physics
• Browse content in Psychology
• Affective Sciences
• Clinical Psychology
• Cognitive Psychology
• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Criminal and Forensic Psychology
• Developmental Psychology
• Educational Psychology
• Evolutionary Psychology
• Health Psychology
• History and Systems in Psychology
• Music Psychology
• Neuropsychology
• Organizational Psychology
• Psychological Assessment and Testing
• Psychology of Human-Technology Interaction
• Psychology Professional Development and Training
• Research Methods in Psychology
• Social Psychology
• Browse content in Social Sciences
• Browse content in Anthropology
• Anthropology of Religion
• Human Evolution
• Medical Anthropology
• Physical Anthropology
• Regional Anthropology
• Social and Cultural Anthropology
• Theory and Practice of Anthropology
• Browse content in Business and Management
• Business Ethics
• Business Strategy
• Business History
• Business and Technology
• Business and Government
• Business and the Environment
• Comparative Management
• Corporate Governance
• Corporate Social Responsibility
• Entrepreneurship
• Health Management
• Human Resource Management
• Industrial and Employment Relations
• Industry Studies
• Information and Communication Technologies
• International Business
• Knowledge Management
• Management and Management Techniques
• Operations Management
• Organizational Theory and Behaviour
• Pensions and Pension Management
• Public and Nonprofit Management
• Strategic Management
• Supply Chain Management
• Browse content in Criminology and Criminal Justice
• Criminal Justice
• Criminology
• Forms of Crime
• International and Comparative Criminology
• Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice
• Development Studies
• Browse content in Economics
• Agricultural, Environmental, and Natural Resource Economics
• Asian Economics
• Behavioural Finance
• Behavioural Economics and Neuroeconomics
• Econometrics and Mathematical Economics
• Economic History
• Economic Systems
• Economic Methodology
• Economic Development and Growth
• Financial Markets
• Financial Institutions and Services
• General Economics and Teaching
• Health, Education, and Welfare
• History of Economic Thought
• International Economics
• Labour and Demographic Economics
• Law and Economics
• Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
• Microeconomics
• Public Economics
• Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
• Welfare Economics
• Browse content in Education
• Adult Education and Continuous Learning
• Care and Counselling of Students
• Early Childhood and Elementary Education
• Educational Equipment and Technology
• Educational Strategies and Policy
• Higher and Further Education
• Organization and Management of Education
• Philosophy and Theory of Education
• Schools Studies
• Secondary Education
• Teaching of a Specific Subject
• Teaching of Specific Groups and Special Educational Needs
• Teaching Skills and Techniques
• Browse content in Environment
• Applied Ecology (Social Science)
• Climate Change
• Conservation of the Environment (Social Science)
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Social Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environment)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Social Science)
• Browse content in Human Geography
• Cultural Geography
• Economic Geography
• Political Geography
• Browse content in Interdisciplinary Studies
• Communication Studies
• Museums, Libraries, and Information Sciences
• Browse content in Politics
• African Politics
• Asian Politics
• Chinese Politics
• Comparative Politics
• Conflict Politics
• Elections and Electoral Studies
• Environmental Politics
• European Union
• Foreign Policy
• Gender and Politics
• Human Rights and Politics
• Indian Politics
• International Relations
• International Organization (Politics)
• International Political Economy
• Irish Politics
• Latin American Politics
• Middle Eastern Politics
• Political Behaviour
• Political Economy
• Political Institutions
• Political Methodology
• Political Communication
• Political Philosophy
• Political Sociology
• Political Theory
• Politics and Law
• Public Policy
• Public Administration
• Quantitative Political Methodology
• Regional Political Studies
• Russian Politics
• Security Studies
• State and Local Government
• UK Politics
• US Politics
• Browse content in Regional and Area Studies
• African Studies
• Asian Studies
• East Asian Studies
• Japanese Studies
• Latin American Studies
• Middle Eastern Studies
• Native American Studies
• Scottish Studies
• Browse content in Research and Information
• Research Methods
• Browse content in Social Work
• Addictions and Substance Misuse
• Adoption and Fostering
• Care of the Elderly
• Child and Adolescent Social Work
• Couple and Family Social Work
• Developmental and Physical Disabilities Social Work
• Direct Practice and Clinical Social Work
• Emergency Services
• Human Behaviour and the Social Environment
• International and Global Issues in Social Work
• Mental and Behavioural Health
• Social Justice and Human Rights
• Social Policy and Advocacy
• Social Work and Crime and Justice
• Social Work Macro Practice
• Social Work Practice Settings
• Social Work Research and Evidence-based Practice
• Welfare and Benefit Systems
• Browse content in Sociology
• Childhood Studies
• Community Development
• Comparative and Historical Sociology
• Economic Sociology
• Gender and Sexuality
• Gerontology and Ageing
• Health, Illness, and Medicine
• Marriage and the Family
• Migration Studies
• Occupations, Professions, and Work
• Organizations
• Population and Demography
• Race and Ethnicity
• Social Theory
• Social Movements and Social Change
• Social Research and Statistics
• Social Stratification, Inequality, and Mobility
• Sociology of Religion
• Sociology of Education
• Sport and Leisure
• Urban and Rural Studies
• Browse content in Warfare and Defence
• Defence Strategy, Planning, and Research
• Land Forces and Warfare
• Military Administration
• Military Life and Institutions
• Naval Forces and Warfare
• Other Warfare and Defence Issues
• Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
• Weapons and Equipment

• < Previous chapter

2 The History of Conspiracy Theory Research: A Review and Commentary

• Published: December 2018
• Cite Icon Cite
• Permissions Icon Permissions

How has academic research into conspiracy theories developed over time? This chapter demonstrates that scholarly interest only emerged in the 1930s as part of psychohistorical explorations into the origins of totalitarianism. This line of research continued into the 1950s and influenced public opinion on the subject matter, as it received a lot of media attention. The common denominator of these earliest studies is that they pathologize conspiracy theories and those who believe in them. This tendency is to a certain degree still palpable in the most recent research in social psychology and political science which employs sophisticated quantitative methodologies.

Signed in as

Institutional accounts.

• Google Scholar Indexing
• GoogleCrawler [DO NOT DELETE]

Personal account

• Sign in with email/username & password
• Get email alerts
• Save searches
• Purchase content
• Activate your purchase/trial code
• Add your ORCID iD

Institutional access

Sign in with a library card.

• Sign in with username/password
• Recommend to your librarian
• Institutional account management
• Get help with access

Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:

IP based access

Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.

Sign in through your institution

Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.

• Click Sign in through your institution.
• Select your institution from the list provided, which will take you to your institution's website to sign in.
• When on the institution site, please use the credentials provided by your institution. Do not use an Oxford Academic personal account.
• Following successful sign in, you will be returned to Oxford Academic.

If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.

Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.

Society Members

Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:

Sign in through society site

Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:

• Click Sign in through society site.
• When on the society site, please use the credentials provided by that society. Do not use an Oxford Academic personal account.

If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.

Sign in using a personal account

Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.

A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.

Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.

Viewing your signed in accounts

Click the account icon in the top right to:

• View your signed in personal account and access account management features.
• View the institutional accounts that are providing access.

Signed in but can't access content

Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.

For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.

Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.

• About Oxford Academic
• Publish journals with us
• University press partners
• What we publish
• New features  
• Open access
• Rights and permissions
• Accessibility
• Advertising
• Media enquiries
• Oxford University Press
• Oxford Languages
• University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

• Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
• Cookie settings
• Cookie policy
• Privacy policy
• Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.

To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to  upgrade your browser .

Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

• We're Hiring!
• Help Center

The History of Conspiracy Theory Research: A Review and Commentary

Related Papers

Michael Butter

M R. X. Dentith

Belief in conspiracy theories is typically considered irrational, and as a consequence of this, conspiracy theorists – those who dare believe some conspiracy theory – have been charged with a variety of epistemic or psychological failings. Yet recent philosophical work has challenged the view that belief in conspiracy theories should be considered as typically irrational. By performing an intra-group analysis of those people we call 'conspiracy theorists', we find that the problematic traits commonly ascribed to the general group of conspiracy theorists turn out to be merely a set of stereotypical behaviours and thought patterns associated with a purported subset of that group. If we understand that the supposed problem of belief in conspiracy theories is centred on the beliefs of this purported subset – the conspiracists – then we can reconcile the recent philosophical contributions to the wider academic debate on the rationality of belief in conspiracy theories.

Peter Knight

Handbook of Conspiracy Theory and Contemporary Religion

Asbjørn Dyrendal

Religion and conspiracy theory are both contested concepts, used in highly specialized academic discourses that stress different sides of, or questions pertaining to, the complexes of behaviour that the concepts may refer to. Both terms are also rich with vernacular meanings that infuse public and academic discourse alike; politics and analytics intertwine. The challenge is to clarify both ‘religion’ and ‘conspiracy theory’ under such conditions. This opening chapter will draw a road map to the different approaches, while providing an overview of previous research and highlighting areas of further interest.

Joe Uscinski

The study of conspiracy theories has undergone a drastic transformation in the last decade. While early scholarly treatments relied on historical cases and cultural analyses, more recent works focus on the individuals who subscribe either to specific conspiracy beliefs or to more generalized conspiratorial thinking. This shift in focus presents scholars with an opportunity to learn more about how and why conspiracy theories gain followers. But also, this new focus presents dangers which have yet to be fully considered by the psychologists, social-psychologists, and political scientists spearheading the research. In this essay, I highlight the potential benefits and pitfalls of the current scholarly agenda.

Richard Hershey

The purpose of this discussion is to draw attention to some of the common assumptions currently found in the study of conspiracy theory, arguing that assumption may often belie precision. To accomplish this, this discussion addresses the assumption of connotation in academic terminology, showing that attributive adjectives are often conflated and assumed to be used in the connotative sense, though arguing that this is not strictly erroneous. The assumptions of pathology and malevolence are also problematized, arguing that “paranoid” is wrongly assumed to be equivalent to clinical pathology, and that conspiracies are nearly always assumed to be malevolent. These assumptions are countered by presenting evidence that “paranoid” is often used in its connotative, non-clinical sense and demonstrating that not all conspiracies are malevolent.

Alfred Moore

While conspiracies have always been with us, conspiracy theories are more recent arrivals. The framing of conspiracy theories as rooted in erroneous or delusional belief in conspiracies is characteristic of “positive” approaches to the topic, which focus on identifying the causes and cures of conspiracy theories. “Criti- cal” approaches, by contrast, focus on the historical and cultural construction of the concept of conspiracy theory itself. This issue presents a range of essays that cut across these two broad approaches, and reflect on the problematic relationship between con- spiracy theory and democratic politics.

Idući između dve paradigme – Sociokulturalni pristup izučavanju teorija zavere

Petar Lukic

Social sciences and humanistic disciplines that showed an interest in conspiracy theories are dominantly relying on either a cultural perspective (e.g. history, anthropology, ethnology, sociology, cultural studies, literature, etc.) or a positivist perspective (psychology and political science). Between these two perspectives lays a gap in the way the nature of the phenomenon is understood, as well as its manifestation, the methodology used and how they interpret results and their implications. In this paper we are aiming to show that this topic is in its core a sociocultural question and that the perspective of sociocultural theory represents a way to bridge the aforementioned gap by using features of both approaches. If the cultural approach sees conspiracy theories as a product of a culture, and the positivist approach as a question of the individual, then through a sociocultural perspective we are looking at how an individual actively acts in a society which developed the discourse of conspiracy theories through time. By adopting this view, we can study how individuals purposefully participate in contextually situated (co)construction and transformation of meanings, discourse and conspiratorial narratives, as well as how they utilize conspiracy theories and other artefacts.

Popular Inquiry: The Journal of Kitsch, Camp and Mass Culture [Special Issue on "Storytelling and Its Narrative Modes: Conspiracy Theories, Fake News, Post-Truths, New World Orders, Negationist Theories and Infodemics"]

Siim Sorokin

uncorrected pre-print/view proof. please cite the published essay: https://www.popularinquiry.com/s/Popular-inquiry_Vol8_2021_4_Sorokin_up1.pdf -- Arguably, our (post)modern age engenders suspicion and (explanatory) uncertainty, prompting epistemic instability, eroding veracity conditions and causing rational skepticism and distrust. This throws into sharp relief the leading pathologizing or stigmatizing scholarly evaluation of the practice of conspiracy theorizing. Especially insofar as the proliferation and stratification of competing (and power-differentiated) stories and knowledge representations are concerned. In challenging the validity of such conventional wisdom, this multidisciplinary essay broadly follows the critical "particularist" philosophical perspective. I will highlight the doubly collaborative activity underscoring digital conspiracism: The Latin etymology of "to conspire" ("to breathe together") and the storytelling dimension of "to plot" ("plotting a story"). Two notions will be introduced: contra-plotting and plotters of suspicion. Both elaborate on the ubiquitous role of narrative, for plotting necessitates an indefinitely expanding "middle" communally self-reproduced through "continual interpretation" --precluding the final acceptability of any resolution (sections 1-2). The third section offers an illustrative qualitative analysis of 'natural' discursive data. The sample of forum posts on the MS Estonia's catastrophic shipwreck is taken from the bilingual (Estonian-English) conspiracy forum Para-Web and broader (motif and theme-oriented) plotting tendencies are identified. The essay concludes with some summarizing thoughts and suggestions for further research (section 4).

James Rankin , James Rankin

Those challenging the official accounts of significant events are often labeled conspiracy theorists and the alternative explanations they propose are often referred to as conspiracy theories. These labels are frequently intended to dismiss the beliefs of those questioning potential hegemonic control of what people believe. The conspiracy theory concept functions as an impediment to legitimate discursive examination of conspiracy suspicions. The effect of the label appears to constrain even the most respected thinkers. This impediment is particularly problematic in academia, where thorough, objective analysis of information is critical to uncovering truth, and where members of the academy are typically considered among the most important of epistemic authorities. This paper follows the development and use of such terms as pejoratives used to shut down critical thinking, analysis, and challenges to authority. Evidence exists suggesting government agents were instrumental in creating the pejorative meme conspiracy theorist and the use of this pejorative continues in contemporary media. How has the phrase conspiracy theorist developed as a powerful hegemonic tool against those who challenge authority and claims made by powerful people and institutions? Keywords: conspiracy theory, conspiracy theorist, hegemony, propaganda, critical discourse analysis

RELATED PAPERS

James Rankin

David Robertson

Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne

Franciszek Czech

Jaron Harambam , Stef Aupers

Julien GIRY , Emmanuel Kreis

Interstudia (25, (2019))

Sociology Compass

Niccolò Bertuzzi

Ginna Husting , Martin Orr

Symbolic Interaction

Martin Orr , Ginna Husting

Jack Bratich

Journal of Social Philosophy

Tim Hayward

European journal of American studies

British Journal of Psychology

Jakob Pietschnig , Adrian Furnham

Rationality and Society

Turkay Nefes

Security Dialogue

Roland Bleiker

Han-yu Huang

Andreas Ventsel

Conspiracy Theories in Eastern Europe: Tropes and Trends

Tamás Scheibner

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations

Dr. Alexander Dunst

Correspondences: Journal for the Study of Esotericism, VOLUME 6, NO. 2

Aaron French

Chara Van Horn

Czas Kultury / EN

Czas Kultury , Wojciech Hamerski

Insight Turkey

Hossein Turner

Mari-Liis Madisson

Mark Fenster

International Journal for the Study of New Religions

Leif Edward Ottesen Kennair

Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly

Carl Stempel

psychosozial 43. Jg.

Florian Hessel , Mischa Luy , Pradeep Chakkarath

RELATED TOPICS

•   We're Hiring!
•   Help Center
• Find new research papers in:
• Health Sciences
• Earth Sciences
• Cognitive Science
• Mathematics
• Computer Science
• Academia ©2024

Guide for researching conspiracy theories and mystery topics

Example search or keywords, keywords and concepts for this topic:.

(This is not an exhaustive list, but it will help you get started.)

mystery conspiracy misinformation or disinformation conspiracy theor* [ the * tells the database to search different word endings like theory, theories, theorize, etc.] conspiracy theories or beliefs fears trust government conspiracy truth reality alternative reality fake news social media causes or reasons or factors impact or influence or effect perception true crime unsolved crime unsolved

Find articles - for background and framing the issues

• Criminal Justice Database Criminal Justice Database supports research on crime, its causes and impacts, legal and social implications, as well as litigation and crime trends. It includes U.S. and international scholarly journals, and correctional and law enforcement trade publications, dissertations, crime reports, crime blogs and other material relevant for researchers or those preparing for careers in criminal justice, law enforcement and related fields.
• Communication and Mass Media Complete Search for journal articles on topics such as communication, mass media, film, television, marketing, business communication, health communication, and more.
• Academic Search Premier A great place to start your research on any topic, search multidisciplinary, scholarly research articles. This database provides access to scholarly and peer reviewed journals, popular magazines and other resources. View this tutorial to learn how to go from a general idea to a very precise set of results of journal articles and scholarly materials.
• Sociological Abstracts This core database for the field of sociology contains information on sociology and social policy worldwide. Sociological Abstracts includes citations from the 1952-present. It provides abstracting and indexing of articles and book reviews drawn from thousands of journal publications, plus books, book chapters, dissertations, conference papers, and working papers.
• AnthroSource Search or browse major journals from the American Anthropological Association (AAA) including American Anthropologist, American Ethnologist, Anthropology and Education Quarterly, and Medical Anthropology Quarterly.
• Anthropology Plus Anthropology Plus provides extensive worldwide indexing of journal articles, reports, commentaries, edited works, and obituaries in the fields of social, cultural, physical, biological, and linguistic anthropology, ethnology, archaeology, folklore, material culture, and interdisciplinary studies.. Coverage is from the late 19th century to the present.
• APA PsycInfo Find articles in thousands of psychology journals, from 1806 to current. View this tutorial to learn how to go from a general idea to a very precise set of results of journal articles and scholarly materials.

Find articles about an "event"

• U.S. Newsstream This link opens in a new window Search the most recent premium U.S. news content, as well as archives which stretch back into the 1980s featuring newspapers, newswires, blogs, and news sites in active full-text format.
• MasterFile Complete Search magazines, with a small number of journals and newspapers, covering a broad range of disciplines and topics. Includes photos and multimedia.
• America: History and Life America: history and life provides historical coverage of the United States and Canada from prehistory to the present with over 2,000 journals including all key English-language historical journals. Limited to 6 simultaneous users.
• Historical Abstracts Find journal articles covering world history from 1450 to the present. Limited to 6 simultaneous users.

Guide for reading magazines, current news, commentary, and opinion

Sample of online books.

• The Stigmatization of Conspiracy Theory since The 1950s by Katharina Thalmann ISBN: 9780429020353 Publication Date: 2019-03-06 Are conspiracy theories everywhere and is everyone a conspiracy theorist? This ground-breaking study challenges some of the widely shared assessments in the scholarship about a perceived mainstreaming of conspiracy theory. It claims that conspiracy theory underwent a significant shift in status in the mid-20th century and has since then become highly visible as an object of concern in public debates. Providing an in-depth analysis of academic and media discourses, Katharina Thalmann is the first scholar to systematically trace the history and process of the delegitimization of conspiracy theory. By reading a wide range of conspiracist accounts about three central events in American history from the 1950s to 1970s - the Great Red Scare, the Kennedy assassination, and the Watergate scandal - Thalmann shows that a veritable conspiracist subculture emerged in the 1970s as conspiracy theories were pushed out of the legitimate marketplace of ideas and conspiracy theory became a commodity not unlike pornography: alluring in its illegitimacy, commonsensical, and highly profitable. This will be of interest to scholars and researchers interested in American history, culture and subcultures, as well, of course, to those fascinated by conspiracies.  

• Spartanburg Community College Library
• SCC Research Guides

ENG 100 - Conspiracy Theory Summary

• 1. Getting Started

First Things First - Assignment Requirements

Before you begin work on any research paper, examine the assignment closely for any requirements. 

Q. How long is the paper? 

Your summary should be about 1/3 of the length of the original article.

Q. How many sources?

For this assignment, you only need one source (your article). You will write a summary of the article in your own words. Be sure to highlight the main points of the article in your summary.

Q. How do you cite sources?

You will use  MLA format for your citations. You may want to remind yourself what information you need to create the MLA Works Cited page and in-text citations .

Do not directly quote any information from the article. You must put all ideas in your own words.

Q. What is due?

Is this just a summary? Are there other pieces like a rough draft, outline, reading response, a tutorial, etc.  Make note of all the parts of the assignment and create a checklist to make sure you don't leave anything out.

Q. When is it due?

How long do you have to work on this summary? Is there one due date for everything or are there multiple due dates for different parts of the assignment?  Plan out your time, so you don't get stuck doing all the work at the last minute. Plan extra time in case you have problems or get stuck.

Q. What other requirements should you make note of? 

Are there requirements to include a certain number of quotes or paraphrases? Do you need to have a certain number of paragraphs?  Make note of any other requirements on the assignment sheet, and ask your instructor for clarification on any parts you're not sure about.

• << Previous: Home
• Next: 2. Selecting a Conspiracy Theory >>
• 2. Selecting a Conspiracy Theory
• 3. Choose Your Article
• Where to Find Citation Information
• 4. Evaluate Your Sources
• 5. Write Your Summary

Questions? Ask a Librarian

• Last Updated: May 8, 2024 9:31 AM
• URL: https://libguides.sccsc.edu/eng100-conspiracytheory

Giles Campus | 864.592.4764 | Toll Free 866.542.2779 | Contact Us

Copyright © 2024 Spartanburg Community College. All rights reserved.

Info for Library Staff | Guide Search

Return to SCC Website

Do Your Own Research: Conspiracy Theories and the Internet

• English Language & Literature
• Manchester University

Research output : Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

• Conspiracy theories
• social media

Access to Document

• Birchall and Knight, Do Your Own Research, AAM version Accepted author manuscript, 253 KB Licence: CC BY

Fingerprint

• Fear Psychology 100%
• Trust Psychology 100%
• Narrative Psychology 100%

Projects per year

Everything Is Connected: Conspiracy Theories in the Age of the Internet

Birchall, C.

AHRC Arts and Humanities Research Council

1/09/2021 → 31/08/2024

Project : Research

• Conspiracy theory 100%
• Vernacular 100%
• Hermeneutics 100%

T1 - Do Your Own Research: Conspiracy Theories and the Internet

AU - Birchall, Clare

AU - Knight, Peter

PY - 2022/11/1

Y1 - 2022/11/1

N2 - What difference has the internet made to conspiracy theories? In the wake of recent episodes in the United States—from birtherism to the “big lie,” from QAnon to the COVID-19 “infodemic,” and from the “great replacement” to the “great reset”—the default assumption is that the internet has created an unprecedented spread of conspiracy theories. It seems commonsense that the internet in general, and social media in particular, has increased the volume and virality of conspiracy theories, leading to fears that polarized conspiracism threatens to undermine trust in impartial media, objective science, and even democracy itself. But is that actually the case? If some commentators have raised the alarm that the internet has changed everything in the realm of conspiracism, others have adopted the contrarian position that the internet has changed nothing. Neither claim is ultimately convincing. What this essay will make clear is the necessity of asking different kinds of research questions to understand how the internet has shaped the form and function, the production and consumption, and the causes and consequences of conspiracy narratives.

AB - What difference has the internet made to conspiracy theories? In the wake of recent episodes in the United States—from birtherism to the “big lie,” from QAnon to the COVID-19 “infodemic,” and from the “great replacement” to the “great reset”—the default assumption is that the internet has created an unprecedented spread of conspiracy theories. It seems commonsense that the internet in general, and social media in particular, has increased the volume and virality of conspiracy theories, leading to fears that polarized conspiracism threatens to undermine trust in impartial media, objective science, and even democracy itself. But is that actually the case? If some commentators have raised the alarm that the internet has changed everything in the realm of conspiracism, others have adopted the contrarian position that the internet has changed nothing. Neither claim is ultimately convincing. What this essay will make clear is the necessity of asking different kinds of research questions to understand how the internet has shaped the form and function, the production and consumption, and the causes and consequences of conspiracy narratives.

KW - Conspiracy theories

KW - internet

KW - social media

M3 - Article

SN - 0037-783X

JO - SOCIAL RESEARCH

JF - SOCIAL RESEARCH

Click through the PLOS taxonomy to find articles in your field.

For more information about PLOS Subject Areas, click here .

Loading metrics

Open Access

Peer-reviewed

Research Article

On the Viability of Conspiratorial Beliefs

* E-mail: [email protected]

Affiliation University of Oxford, Old Road Campus Research Building, Off Roosevelt Drive, Oxford OX3 7DQ, United Kingdom

• David Robert Grimes

• Published: January 26, 2016
• https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147905
• Reader Comments

1 Mar 2016: Grimes DR (2016) Correction: On the Viability of Conspiratorial Beliefs. PLOS ONE 11(3): e0151003. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0151003 View correction

Conspiratorial ideation is the tendency of individuals to believe that events and power relations are secretly manipulated by certain clandestine groups and organisations. Many of these ostensibly explanatory conjectures are non-falsifiable, lacking in evidence or demonstrably false, yet public acceptance remains high. Efforts to convince the general public of the validity of medical and scientific findings can be hampered by such narratives, which can create the impression of doubt or disagreement in areas where the science is well established. Conversely, historical examples of exposed conspiracies do exist and it may be difficult for people to differentiate between reasonable and dubious assertions. In this work, we establish a simple mathematical model for conspiracies involving multiple actors with time, which yields failure probability for any given conspiracy. Parameters for the model are estimated from literature examples of known scandals, and the factors influencing conspiracy success and failure are explored. The model is also used to estimate the likelihood of claims from some commonly-held conspiratorial beliefs; these are namely that the moon-landings were faked, climate-change is a hoax, vaccination is dangerous and that a cure for cancer is being suppressed by vested interests. Simulations of these claims predict that intrinsic failure would be imminent even with the most generous estimates for the secret-keeping ability of active participants—the results of this model suggest that large conspiracies (≥1000 agents) quickly become untenable and prone to failure. The theory presented here might be useful in counteracting the potentially deleterious consequences of bogus and anti-science narratives, and examining the hypothetical conditions under which sustainable conspiracy might be possible.

Citation: Grimes DR (2016) On the Viability of Conspiratorial Beliefs. PLoS ONE 11(1): e0147905. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147905

Editor: Chris T. Bauch, University of Waterloo, CANADA

Received: September 23, 2015; Accepted: January 6, 2016; Published: January 26, 2016

Copyright: © 2016 David Robert Grimes. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Data Availability: In this modelling paper, all data used comes from previously published sources and is available in the paper itself.

Funding: The author has no support or funding to report.

Competing interests: The author has declared that no competing interests exist.

Introduction

Conspiratorial beliefs, which attribute events to secret manipulative actions by powerful individuals, are widely held [ 1 ] by a broad-cross section of society. Belief in one conspiracy theory is often correlated with belief in others, and some stripe of conspiratorial belief is ubiquitous across diverse social and racial groups [ 2 ]. These concepts run the gauntlet from the political to the supernatural, and a single working definition is not easy to obtain. We shall clarify the working definition of conspiracy theory here as being in line the characterisation of Sunstein et al [ 1 ] as “ an effort to explain some event or practice by reference to the machinations of powerful people, who attempt to conceal their role (at least until their aims are accomplished) ”.While the modern usage of conspiracy theory is often derogatory (pertaining to an exceptionally paranoid and ill-founded world-view) the definition we will use does not a priori dismiss all such theories as inherently false.

However, even with this disclaimer, there are a disconcerting number of conspiracy theories which enjoy popular support and yet are demonstrably nonsensical. This is particularly true of conspiracies over scientific and medical issues where conspiratorial ideation can lead to outright opposition to and rejection of the scientific method [ 3 ]. This can be exceptionally detrimental, not only to believers but to society in general; conspiratorial beliefs over medical interventions such as vaccination, for example, can have potentially lethal consequence [ 4 ]. Conspiratorial thinking is endemic in anti-vaccination groups, with those advocating the scientific and medical consensus often regarded as agents of some ominous interest group bent on concealing “the truth”. This becomes a defence mechanism to protect beliefs that are incompatible with the evidence, and unsurprisingly perhaps proponents of such views display not only conspiratorial traits but a litany of reasoning flaws, a reliance on anecdote over data and low cognitive complexity in thinking patterns [ 5 ].

Similarly, the framing of climate-change as a hoax creates needless uncertainty in public discourse, and increases the risk of damaging inertia instead of corrective action. The dismissal of scientific findings as a hoax also has a political element; a 2011 study found conservative white males in the US were far more likely than other Americans to deny climate change [ 6 ]. Similarly, a UK study found that climate-change denialism was more common among politically conservative individuals with traditional values [ 7 ]. The public acceptance of climate-change conspiracy transcends the typical wide-ranging domain of conspiratorial belief; a 2013 investigation by Lewandowsky et al [ 8 ] found that while subjects who subscribed to conspiracist thought tended to reject all scientific propositions they encountered, those with strong traits of conservatism or pronounced free-market world views only tended towards rejecting scientific findings with regulatory implications at odds with their ideological position.

Challenging dubious anti-science assertions is an important element for constructive social debate, and there is some evidence that challenging such narratives can be successful. Belief in the moon-landing hoax is highly associated with acceptance of other conspiracy theories, but there is some evidence that when presented with scientific evidence critical of this narrative that a significant decrease in support for that theory ensues [ 9 ]. Previous investigation has also shown that improved communication of knowledge of the scientific consensus can also overcome some conspiratorial thinking on issues as diverse as the link between HIV and AIDs to acceptance of climate-change [ 10 ].

Of course, it is worthwhile to take a considered Devil’s advocate approach—there are numerous historical examples of exposed conspiracies and scandals, from Watergate to the recent revelations on the sheer scale of spying on the online activity of citizens by their own governments. It would be unfair then to simply dismiss all allegation of conspiracy as paranoid where in some instances it is demonstrably not so. There is also merit to charges that vested interests can distort and confuse public perception—in the case of climate-change, for example, conservative demagogues have succeeded in casting a perception of doubt on robust science in public discussion [ 8 , 11 – 14 ]. Evidently an approach which dismisses these very real concerns out of hand and without due consideration is not good enough, and there must be a clear rationale for clarifying the outlandish from the reasonable.

Something currently lacking that might be useful is a method for ascertaining the likelihood that a conspiracy is viable, and the factors that influence this. The benefits of this would be two-fold; firstly, it would allow one to gauge whether a particular narrative was likely and what scale it would have to operate at. Secondly, and perhaps more usefully, it would help counteract potentially damaging anti-science beliefs by giving an estimate of viability for a conspiracy over time. The parameters for this model are taken from literature accounts of exposed conspiracies and scandals, and used to analyse several commonly held conspiracy theories, and examine the theoretical bounds for the magnitude and time-frame of any posited conspiracy theory.

0.1 Anti-Science conspiracy narratives—A brief overview

• NASA Moon-landing conspiracy —The successful 1969 Apollo 11 mission first put men on the moon, a seminal achievement in human history. Yet even since that historic day, there has been a persistent fringe belief group that strongly believe the moon-landings were faked, mocked up for propaganda purposes. In 2013 it was estimated that 7% of Americans subscribe to this view [ 15 ]. Those advocating this conspiracy claim there are inconsistencies in pictures taken on the moon’s surface, despite these claims being comprehensively debunked [ 16 ].
• Climate change conspiracy —Climate-change denial has a deep political dimension [ 7 , 8 ]. Despite the overwhelming strength of evidence supporting the scientific consensus of anthropogenic global warming [ 17 ], there are many who reject this consensus. Of these, many claim that climate-change is a hoax staged by scientists and environmentalists [ 18 – 20 ], ostensibly to yield research income. Such beliefs are utterly negated by the sheer wealth of evidence against such a proposition, but remain popular due to an often-skewed false balance present in partisan media [ 20 , 21 ], resulting in public confusion and inertia.
• Vaccination conspiracy —Conspiratorial beliefs about vaccination are endemic in the anti-vaccination movement [ 18 , 22 ]. It is estimated that roughly 20% of Americans hold the long de-bunked notion that there is a link between autism and the MMR vaccine [ 15 ], a belief which has reduced uptake of important vaccinations [ 22 ] in several countries. Anti-vaccination beliefs and scare-mongering are also endemic in the internet age, with vaccine critical websites asserting dubious information [ 23 , 24 ]. Ill-founded beliefs over vaccination have been darkly successful in stirring panic and reducing vaccine uptake, which has led to damaging resurgence in diseases such as measles [ 4 ].
• Cancer cure conspiracy —The belief that a cure for cancer is being withheld by vested interests is a long-standing one [ 25 ]. It is often used as a universal deus ex machina for those pushing an alternative alleged cure, and assertion of the conspiracy theory functions as an explanatory device to explain the complete paucity of clinical evidence for such claims [ 26 ]. Such claims can be detrimental to patients, some of whom abandon conventional treatment for the lofty but ill-founded promises of alternative medicine [ 27 ].

1.1 Model derivation

• PPT PowerPoint slide
• PNG larger image
• TIFF original image

The blue sold line depicts L over time with a constant level of conspirators being maintained. The red dotted line shows a single event with Gompertzian decay of the conspiring population, assuming an average initial age of 40 years old and the dashed orange line shows an exponential decay with number of conspirators being halved every 10 years. In the first case, the likelihood of conspiracy failure always increases with time. In the Gompertzian case, the chances of failure initially increase towards a maximum (L = 0.38 after 29 years in this example), but the death of conspirators with time acts to decrease probability of failure after this. Finally, if conspirators are removed extrinsically, then the curve hits a maximum (L = 0.12 after 14 years) before decaying to lower likelihoods as less conspirators exist to betray confidence.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147905.g001

1.2 Parameter estimation

• The National Security Agency (NSA) PRISM affair—The staggering extent of spying by the NSA and its allies on civilian internet users [ 29 ] was exposed by contractor Edward Snowden in 2013. The extent of the eavesdropping was unprecedented, including the tapping of fiber-optic cables, phone calls from allied heads of state and a huge amount of meta-data [ 30 ].
• The Tuskegee syphilis experiment—In 1932 the US Public Health Service began an observational study on African-American men who had contracted syphilis in Alabama. The study became unethical in the mid 1940s, when penicillin was shown to effectively cure the ailment and yet was not given to the infected men. Ethical questions about the research were raised in the mid 1960s, and finally exposed by researcher Dr. Peter Buxtun in 1972 [ 31 – 33 ].
• The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) forensic scandal—Dr. Frederic Whitehurst wrote hundreds of letters to his superiors detailing the pseudoscientific nature of many of the FBI forensics tests. The dubious nature of these protocols resulted in a large number of innocent men being detained for decades, several of whom were executed for these crimes or died in prison, before Whitehurst exposed the debacle in 1998. A subsequent report by the FBI and Department of justice found that at least 26 of the 28 dedicated hair analysts gave misleading testimony, prompting an on-going massive re-evaluation of unsafe convictions [ 34 , 35 ].

There is considerable and unavoidable ambiguity on some of these estimates, especially on the number of people with full knowledge of the event. In the PRISM case, the figure of 30,000 comes from total NSA staff. In reality, the proportion of those employed would would have knowledge of this program would likely be a lot less but we take the upper bound figure to minimize the estimate of p . Given the short time-frame involved, we further assume the number of conspirators stayed approximately constant over the duration before the event was exposed. The situation is even more complicated regarding the Tuskegee experiment. This originally fell under the remit of the venereal diseases division of the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) in the early 1930s, before this department was restructured in later years. Historical employment levels for the USPHS are not readily available, so the estimation of 6700 is taken from data for current officer staff levels of the entire USPHS. This likely over-estimates the number involved substantially, which historically would have chiefly concerned only the much smaller venereal disease division. The FBI forensics scandal is also difficult to quantify; while 28 agents were specifically involved with the microscopic hair analysis debacle [ 39 ], Dr Whitehurst’s whistle-blowing exposed much wider scale problems affecting the entire forensics department. Accordingly, we have used the modern estimate of FBI forensic staff both scientific and agency. Taking a larger value for N tends to over-estimate the ability of a mass of conspirators to retain a secret, yet it allows us to set an extreme lower bound for p , the failure odds per unit time per conspirator. This essentially yields a “best-case” scenario for the conspirators.

In addition to this, the life-time of the conspiracy is not always clear—in the NSA case, estimates span only a narrow range, between 5 and 6 years [ 29 ]. The Tuskegee experiment is more ambigious; the original experiment commenced in the 1930s but did not become unethical until the late 1940s, when the decision was made to deny penicilin to the afflicted individuals. There were also ethical questions raised by others before Dr. Peter Buxten, but we use 1972 as our upper-limit as it was his whistle-blowing that focused attention on the long-running abuses. Finally, the FBI forensics time-frame is rather opaque—the FBI forensics laboratory was established in 1932, and naively we could take the conspiracy life-time as 66 years before exposure in 1998, in which case this would push the estimate of p down by roughly an order of magnitude to p > 2.11 × 10 −5 . Yet this is unrealistic, as the problems with certain aspects of nascent criminology were unlikely to have been known. However, between 1992 and 1997 Dr. Whitehurst penned several hundred letters to this superiors about gaping problems with aspects of the analysis, which were roundly ignored. It follows that the FBI were aware from at least 1992 that their forensic methods were untenable, giving a life-time until exposure of only 6 years. In all cases, we take the largest realistic value of t as this pertains to the best-case scenario for a conspiracy.

1.3 Experimental method

The model established allows estimation of how certain parameters influence the success or failure chance for any conspiracy. From Table 1 , assuming the derived best-case scenario value for the conspirators ( p = 4.09 × 10 −6 ), we can apply the model outlined to several popular and enduring conspiracy theories and ascertain their viability with time. As discussed in the previous section, this estimate is intentionally optimistic for conspirators, and corresponds to a case where the average expected number of fatal leaks for a conspiracy is as low as roughly 4 in a million. In keeping with “best case scenario” estimates for conspiracies, we also neglect the upper figure of p = 2.45 × 10 −4 , which is roughly 60 times greater than the minimum projected probability of failure per conspirator per year as outlined in Table 1 .

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147905.t001

Table 2 lists non-exhaustive estimations of the number of conspirators required for the anti-science belief outlined. Critically, the estimates for N ( t ) shown here assume all scientists involved would have be aware of an active cover-up, and that a small group of odious actors would be unable to deceive the scientific community for long timescales; the rationale for this assumption is expanded further in the discussion section. In most of these cases, constant up-keep would be required to maintain secrecy, so N ( t ) = N o . In the case of the NASA hoax conjecture, it could be argued that the conspiracy was a single-event fiction, and thus the Gompertzian population form in Eq 5 could apply. This is not a very realistic assumption, but is considered here too. The climate-change conspiracy narrative requires some clarification too; those sceptical of the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change may take either a “hard” position that climate-change is not occurring or a “soft” position that it may be occurring but isn’t anthropogenic. For this investigation, we’ll define climate change conspiracy as those taking a hard position for simplicity. Results are shown in Fig 2 . From this, we can also determine the maximum time-scales before imminent failure under best-possible conditions for these conspiracies, taken as L > 0.95. These estimates are given in Table 3 .

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147905.t002

Failure curves for (a) NASA moon-landing hoax—results for both constant population and Gompertzian function are so close as to be non-resolvable visually (b) Climate change hoax—The blue solid line depicts failure probability with time if all scientific bodies endorsing the scientific consensus are involved, the red-dotted line presents the curve if solely active climate researchers were involved (c) Vaccination conspiracy—blue solid line showing failure probability with time for a combination of public health bodies and major drug manufacturers and the red-dotted line depicting case if only public health bodies were conspiring (d) Failure with time for a suppressed cancer cure conspiracy.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147905.g002

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147905.t003

The analysis here predicts that even with parameter estimates favourable to conspiratorial leanings that the conspiracies analysed tend rapidly towards collapse. Even if there was a concerted effort, the sheer number of people required for the sheer scale of hypothetical scientific deceptions would inextricably undermine these nascent conspiracies. For a conspiracy of even only a few thousand actors, intrinsic failure would arise within decades. For hundreds of thousands, such failure would be assured within less than half a decade. It’s also important to note that this analysis deals solely with intrinsic failure, or the odds of a conspiracy being exposed intentionally or accidentally by actors involved—extrinsic analysis by non-participants would also increase the odds of detection, rendering such Byzantine cover-ups far more likely to fail. Moreover, the number of actors in this analysis as outlined in Table 2 represent an incredibly conservative estimate. A more comprehensive quantification would undoubtedly drive failure rate up for all considered conspiracy narratives.

This problem appears insurmountable for any large conspiracy; if it requires constant upkeep ( N ( t ) ≈ N o ) then odds of failure approach unity with time. If we assign a detection threshold under which a conspiracy should remain ( μ = 0.05) in a time-frame, then Table 4 enumerates the maximum number of conspirators possible. Even for a relatively short time of 5 years, the limit is hit with only 2521 agents. To sustain it for more than 10 years, less than 1000 people can be involved even with the generous estimate of p = 4.09 × 10 −6 derived in this work. Even for single-events with Gompertzian population decay, the problem of large conspiracy failure is not adequately circumvented—for such an event, the odds of failure exceed 5% at around 650 participants even with the ideal value of p and an average age of participants of 40 years. In this situation however, failure probability eventually falls as the population involved decrease, meaning that the threshold can be considered a maximum probability of detection in this scenario. This probability also rapidly increases with number of conspirators involved, rendering large sustained conspiracies unlikely. Under ideal circumstances, it would only be possible to keep a single conspiratorial event below detection thereshold if the number of actors involved was very small (≪ 1000).

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147905.t004

As outlined in the section on parameter estimation, estimates used here were deliberately selected to be maximally conducive to conspirators; the lowest values for p obtained were used for estimates, but the highest value was roughly two orders of magnitude above this. If this estimate is instead used, it would have a very stark effect, hugely decreasing time-frame to detection as depicted in Fig 3 . Given the lack of clarity in getting precise numbers and time-frames, there is inherent uncertainty in this work on the estimated parameters and better estimates would allow better quantification of p . There is also an open question of whether using exposed conspiracies to estimate parameters might itself introduce bias and produce overly high estimates of p —this may be the case, but given the highly conservative estimates employed for other parameters, it is more likely that p for most conspiracies will be much higher than our estimate, as even relatively small conspiracies (such as Watergate, for example) have historically been rapidly exposed. It is also important to note that p will likely vary markedly for different conspiracies, depending on how deeply invested agents are invested in a given conspiracy and the figures here are at best a conservative approximation of typical values. However, even if agents are highly invested in a conspiracy, p also includes the odds of an accidental intrinsic exposure. While conspiracies do undoubtedly happen, their continued secrecy is probably more due to keeping the number of agents low than having an intrinsically small per agent per time leak probability.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147905.g003

The number of conspirators N o is also an important uncertainty that needs to be carefully interpreted; the estimates made in this paper (shown in Table 2 ) are at best order of magnitude estimates. These have deliberately been picked to be relatively conservative in one many respects; for example, the number involved in a hypothetical vaccine conspiracy is likely a massive underestimate due to the ubiquity of vaccination. The estimates also make the assumption that all agents in the estimate are considered to have knowledge of the conspiracy at hand; if this wasn’t the case, then only those with adequate knowledge of the deception would count towards the number N o . This might potentially be the case for some political or social conspiracies, yet for a hypothetical scientific conspiracy it is probably fair to assume that all agents working with the data would have to be aware of any deception. Were this not the case, fraudulent claims or suspect data would be extrinsically exposed by other scientists upon examination of the data in much the same way that instances of scientific fraud are typically exposed by other members of the scientific community. Thus even if a small devious cohort of rouge scientists falsified data for climate change or attempted to cover-up vaccine information, examination by other scientists would fatally undermine the nascent conspiracy. To circumvent this, the vast majority of scientists in a field would have to mutually conspire—a circumstance the model predicts is exceptionally unlikely to be viable.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147905.g004

The theory outlined is useful in predicting the broad patterns expected from a conspiracy event, but does not consider the dynamics, motivations and interactions of individual agents. This interplay might be an avenue for future work, perhaps employing agent based models to account for the various internal frictions and pressures affecting the gross failure rate. The approach outlined here might give some insight into the gross behaviour of conspiracies, but agent based modelling focused on individual actors interacting with certain probabilities might better capture the intricacies of conspiracy and whistle-blowing. Such models could also readily be informed by psychological data, ascribing simulated actors a spectrum of traits, with specific interaction rules to see whether the emergent dynamics affect the success or failure of any secretive event.

While challenging anti-science is important, it is important to note the limitations of this approach. Explaining misconceptions and analysis such as this one might be useful to a reasonable core [ 9 ], but this might not be the case if a person is sufficiently convinced of a narrative. Recent work has illustrated that conspiracy theories can spread rapidly online in polarized echo-chambers, which may be deeply invested in a particular narrative and closed off to other sources of information [ 61 ]. In a recent Californian study on parents, it was found that countering anti-vaccination misconceptions related to autism was possible with clear explanation, but that for parents resolutely opposed to vaccination attempts to use rational approach further entrenched them in their ill-founded views [ 62 ]. The grim reality is that there appears to be a cohort so ideologically invested in a belief that for whom no reasoning will shift, their convictions impervious to the intrusions of reality. In these cases, it is highly unlikely that a simple mathematical demonstration of the untenability of their belief will change their view-point. However, for the less invested such an intervention might indeed prove useful.

Acknowledgments

Many thanks to Dr. Frederic Whitehurst for this helpful first-hand insight into the FBI forensics scandal. As the author is a physicist rather than a psychologist, I am indebted to Profs. Stephan Lewandowsky and Ted Goertzel and Ms. Mathilde Hernu for their valuable input on conspiratorial thinking. Thanks also to Drs. Ben Goertzel and David Basanta for their comments and suggestions, and to the reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank my University of Oxford colleagues for their continued support, in particular Dr. Mike Partridge. This work did not require specific funding, from nebulous clandestine cabals or otherwise.

Author Contributions

Conceived and designed the experiments: DRG. Performed the experiments: DRG. Analyzed the data: DRG. Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: DRG. Wrote the paper: DRG.

• View Article
• Google Scholar
• PubMed/NCBI
• 8. Lewandowsky S, Oberauer K, Gignac GE. NASA Faked the Moon Landing therefore (Climate) Science Is a Hoax: An Anatomy of the Motivated Rejection of Science. Psychological Science. 2013;Available from: http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/03/25/0956797612457686.abstract .
• 15. Public Policy Polling. Democrats and Republicans differ on conspiracy theory beliefs. 2013. Available from: http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/2011/PPP_Release_National_ConspiracyTheories_040213.pdf .
• 17. Pachauri RK, Allen M, Barros V, Broome J, Cramer W, Christ R, et al. Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2014;.
• 28. Levy G, Levin B. The Biostatistics of Aging: From Gompertzian Mortality to an Index of Aging-relatedness. John Wiley & Sons; 2014.
• 29. Director of National Intelligence. Facts on the Collection of Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 2013;.
• 34. Edwards H, Gotsonis C. Strengthening forensic science in the United States: A path forward. Statement before the United State Senate Committee on the Judiciary.2009;.
• 35. Office of the Inspector General. An Assessment of the 1996 Department of Justice Task Force Review of the FBI Laboratory; 2014.
• 36. National Security Agency. 60 Years of Defending Our Nation. 2012;.
• 37. USPHS—Career and Benefits;. Available from: http://www.usphs.gov/profession/ .
• 38. FBI—Laboratory services;. Available from: https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab .
• 39. FBI Testimony on Microscopic Hair Analysis Contained Errors in at Least 90 Percent of Cases in Ongoing Review;. Available from: https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-testimony-on-microscopic-hair-analysis-contained-errors-in-at-least-90-percent-of-cases-in-ongoing-review .
• 40. Nimmen JV, Bruno LC, Rosholt RL. NASA Historical Databook, 1958–1968, Volume I (SP-4012). Washington, D.C,: NASA Resources; 1976.
• 41. American Geophysical Union—Our History;. Available from: http://about.agu.org/our-history/ .
• 42. NASA Workforce;. Available from: http://nasapeople.nasa.gov/workforce/default.htm .
• 43. AAAS Membership;. Available from: http://membercentral.aaas.org/membership .
• 44. Royal Society Fellowships;. Available from: https://royalsociety.org/about-us/fellowship/ .
• 45. European Physical Society membership;. Available from: http://www.eps.org/?page = membership_ms .
• 47. Centre for Disease Control Factsheet;. Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/about/resources/facts.htm .
• 48. World Health Organization—people and offices;. Available from: http://www.who.int/about/structure/en/ .
• 61. Del Vicario M, Bessi A, Zollo F, Petroni F, Scala A, Caldarelli G, Stanley HE, Quattrociocchi W.. The spreading of misinformation online. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2016: p.201517441.
• 62. Nyhan B, Reifler J, Richey S, Freed GL. Effective Messages in Vaccine Promotion: A Randomized Trial. Pediatrics. 2014;Available from: http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/early/2014/02/25/peds.2013-2365.abstract .

9 Conspiracies and Theories: Questions to Ask

Image:  Masks worn during experiments with plague. Manila, Philippines (1912). Original image from National Museum of Health and Medicine. Digitally enhanced by  rawpixel , Public Domain ( CC0 ).

This page reproduces two articles that were originally published by  ProPublica , a Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative newsroom, and are provided here under  Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND  3.0) .

Please read both articles by Marshall Allen below .

If you end up quoting or paraphrasing from either of these sources in your assignments for this class, please cite the original articles:

Allen, Marshall. “I’m an Investigative Journalist. These Are the Questions I Asked about the Viral ‘Plandemic’ Video.”  ProPublica , 9 May 2020,  https://www.propublica.org/article/im-an-investigative-journalist-these-are-the-questions-i-asked-about-the-viral-plandemic-video .

Allen, Marshall. “Immune to Evidence: How Dangerous Coronavirus Conspiracies Spread.”  ProPublica , 17 May 2020,  https://www.propublica.org/article/immune-to-evidence-how-dangerous-coronavirus-conspiracies-spread .

I’m an Investigative Journalist. These Are the Questions I Asked about the Viral ‘Plandemic’ Video.

Marshall Allen,  ProPublica , 9 May 2020

The links to the viral video “Plandemic” started showing up in my Facebook feed Wednesday. “Very interesting,” one of my friends wrote about it. I saw several subsequent posts about it, and then my brother texted me, “Got a sec?”

My brother is a pastor in Colorado and had someone he respects urge him to watch “Plandemic,” a 26-minute video that promises to reveal the “hidden agenda” behind the COVID-19 pandemic. I called him and he shared his concern: People seem to be taking the conspiracy theories presented in “Plandemic” seriously. He wondered if I could write something up that he could pass along to them, to help people distinguish between sound reporting and conspiracy thinking or propaganda.

So I watched “Plandemic.” I did not find it credible, as I will explain below. YouTube, Facebook and Vimeo have since  removed it from their platforms  for violating their guidelines. Now it’s available on its own site.

Sensational videos, memes, rants and more about COVID-19 are likely to keep coming. With society polarized and deep distrust of the media, the government and other institutions, such content is a way for bad actors to sow discord, mostly via social media. We saw it  with Russia in the 2016 election  and we should expect it to continue.

But what surprised me is how easily “Plandemic” sank its hooks into some of my friends. My brother also felt alarmed that his own church members and leaders in other churches might be tempted to buy into it.

The purpose of this column is not to skewer “Plandemic.” My goal is to offer some criteria for sifting through all the content we see every day, so we can tell the difference between fair reporting and something so biased it should not be taken seriously.

Here’s a checklist, some of which I shared with my friends on Facebook, to help interrogate any content — and that includes what we publish at ProPublica.

Is the Presentation One-Sided?

There’s never just one side to a story. I mentioned this point in 2018 when  I wrote about my faith  and the biblical basis for investigative reporting. One of my favorite Proverbs says, “The first to state his case seems right until another comes and cross-examines him.” So a fair presentation should at least acknowledge opposing points of view.

I didn’t see this in “Plandemic,” so I called the filmmaker, Mikki Willis, who is also the film’s narrator, to ask him whether I had somehow missed the other side of the argument. I had not. “The other side of the argument plays 24/7 on every screen in every airport and on every phone and in every home,” Willis said. “The people are only seeing one side of the story all the time. This is the other side of the story. This is not a piece that’s intended to be perfectly balanced.”

I asked Willis if it was fair to call his film “propaganda,” which  the Oxford dictionary defines as  “information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote or publicize a particular political cause or point of view.”

He said he doesn’t feel there’s anything misleading in his film, but otherwise the definition fits. And based on that definition he feels 100% of news reporting is propaganda. “What isn’t propaganda these days?” he asked. “In that sense, what we’re doing is fighting fire with fire.”

Is There an Independent Pursuit of the Truth?

The star of “Plandemic,” medical researcher Judy Mikovits, is controversial. The magazine  Science reports that it published and then retracted  one of her papers in 2011. A  search warrant provided to ProPublica  by one of her former attorneys shows she was fired from her position at Whittemore Peterson Institute, a research center in Nevada, in September 2011. Then she allegedly stole notebooks and a laptop computer from the Institute, the search warrant said, leading to an arrest warrant for alleged possession of stolen property and unlawful taking of computer data. She was arrested on Nov. 18, 2011, but denied wrongdoing. The charges were dropped.

But “Plandemic” ignores or brushes past these facts and portrays her as an embattled whistleblower. “So you made a discovery that conflicted with the agreed-upon narrative?” Willis says to Mikovits, introducing her as a victim. “And for that, they did everything in their powers to destroy your life.”

A typical viewer is not going to know the details about Mikovits’ background. But as the primary source of controversial information being presented as fact, it’s worth an online search. The fact-checking site PolitiFact  details her arrest and criminal charges . Clearly, there’s more to her story than what’s presented in “Plandemic.” That should give us pause when we assess its credibility.

Is There a Careful Adherence to the Facts?

In “Plandemic,” Willis asks Mikovits about her arrest: “What did they charge you with?”

“Nothing,” she replies. “I was held in jail, with no charges.”

Being charged with a crime is one of those concrete facts that we can check out.  Science magazine  reported Mikovits’ arrest and felony charge. I also found a civil lawsuit she filed against the Whittemore Peterson Institute in 2014 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. “Mikovits was arrested on criminal charges…”  her complaint says  in the case, which was eventually dismissed.

I asked Willis about the apparent discrepancy, where she said in his film that she wasn’t charged, when court documents show that she was charged. After my inquiry, he said he spoke to Mikovits and now feels it is clear that she meant that the charges were dropped.

I tracked down Mikovits and she said what she meant in the film is that there were no charges of any type of wrongdoing that would have led to her being charged with being a fugitive from justice. She admitted that all the controversy has been hard for her to sort out. “I’ve been confused for a decade,” she told me. She said she would try to be more clear in the future when she talks about the criminal charge: “I’ll try to learn to say it differently,” she said.

This underscores the importance of careful verification, and it distinguishes the craft of journalism from other forms of information sharing. People often speak imprecisely when they’re telling their stories. It’s our duty to nail down precisely what they do and do not mean, and verify it independently. If we don’t, we risk undermining their credibility and ours. That’s in part why we at ProPublica and many other journalists often link directly to our underlying source documents, so you can verify the information yourself.

Are Those Accused Allowed to Respond?

Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, is one of the nation’s leaders in the response to the coronavirus. In “Plandemic,” Mikovits accuses Fauci of a cover-up and of paying off people who perpetrate fraud, among other things.  PolitiFact  found no evidence to support the allegations against Fauci.

Every time I write a story that accuses someone of wrongdoing I call them and urge them to explain the situation from their perspective. This is standard in mainstream journalism. Sometimes I’ve gone to extreme lengths to get comments from someone who will be portrayed unfavorably in my story — traveling to another state and showing up at their office and their home and leaving a note if they are not there to meet me. “Plandemic” doesn’t indicate whether the filmmakers reached out to Fauci for his version of the story. So I asked Willis about it. “We did not,” he told me.

Are All Sources Named and Cited, and if Not, Is the Reason Explained?

All sources should be identified, with their credentials, so viewers can verify their expertise or possible biases. If they can’t be for some reason, then that should be explained. “Plandemic” features unnamed people in medical scrubs, presented as doctors, saying they’re being wrongly pressured to add COVID-19 on people’s death certificates or are not being allowed to use the drug hydroxychloroquine to treat patients. But the speakers are not named, so we can’t really tell who they are, or even if they are doctors at all. That makes it impossible to tell if they are credible.

I asked Willis why he didn’t name those people. He told me he was in a hurry to release the 26-minute version of “Plandemic,” but the doctors will be named in the final version. “We should have done that,” he said.

Does the Work Claim Some Secret Knowledge?

“Plandemic” calls itself a documentary that reveals “the hidden agenda behind COVID-19.” We are in the midst of a global pandemic where few people in the world can figure out what is happening or the right way to respond, let alone agendas. We have almost every journalist in the country writing about this. And if the truth about a conspiracy is out there, many people have an incentive to share it. But “Plandemic” would like us to think it’s presenting some exclusive bit of secret knowledge that is going to get at the real story. That’s not likely.

Plus, to be honest, there were so many conspiratorial details stacked on top of each other in the film I couldn’t keep them straight. When I spoke to Willis I told him I was having a hard time understanding his point. Then I took a stab at what I thought was the main thrust of his argument. “Are you saying that powerful people planned the pandemic and made it happen so they could get rich by making everyone get vaccines?” I asked.

It turns out Willis isn’t sure either. “We’re in the exploratory phase,” he told me. “I don’t know, to be clear, if it’s an intentional or naturally occurring situation. I have no idea.”

Then he went on to say that the pandemic is being politicized and used to take away our civil liberties and leverage other political policies. “Certain forces” have latched onto the situation, he said. “It’s too fishy.”

He had me at, “I have no idea.” That sums it up. This is a vast pandemic and massive catastrophe. Our country wasn’t prepared for it, and the response by our top leaders has been disjointed. We’re restricted to our homes. Many people have lost their jobs and some are afraid or sick or dying. That makes us vulnerable to exploitation by people who will present inaccurate or intellectually dishonest information that promises to tell us the truth.

Perhaps “Plandemic” is guilty of sloppy storytelling, or maybe people really do believe the things they’re saying in the video. Or perhaps they’re being intentionally dishonest, or it’s a biased connecting of the dots rooted in personal and professional grievances. I don’t know because I can’t get inside their heads to judge their motives.

Ultimately, we’re all going to need to be more savvy consumers when it comes to information, no matter how slickly it’s presented. This may be but a signal of what’s to come in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election, when memes and ads of unknown origin come across our social media feeds. There are standards for judging the credibility of the media we take in every day, so let’s apply them.

“Immune to Evidence”: How Dangerous Coronavirus Conspiracies Spread

Marshall Allen,  ProPublica , 17 May 2020

Stephan Lewandowsky studies the way people think, and in particular, why they engage in conspiracy theories. So when the  cognitive scientist from England’s University of Bristol  observes wild speculation related to the COVID-19 pandemic, he sees how it fits into the historical pattern of misinformation and fake news.

I recently wrote about  the viral video “Plandemic”  as an investigative reporter assessing the range of unsubstantiated COVID-19 allegations put forth by a controversial researcher. Lewandowsky comes at the video and others like it from a science-based perspective. He is one of the authors of “ The Conspiracy Theory Handbook ,” which explains the traits of conspiratorial thinking.

Conspiracy theories related to the COVID-19 pandemic seem to be proliferating, and some may even be taking root. So I asked Lewandowsky to share how he identifies and understands them, and what we can do to sort through the confusion. The interview has been condensed for clarity and length.

What’s the difference between a real conspiracy and a conspiracy theory?

A real conspiracy actually exists, and it is usually uncovered by journalists, whistleblowers, document dumps from a corporation or government, or it’s discovered by a government agency. The Volkswagen emissions scandal, for example, was discovered by conventional ways when some engineers discovered an anomaly in a report. It was all mundane — normal people having normal observations based on data. They said, “Hang on, something’s funny here,” and then it unraveled. The same is true for the Iran-contra scandal. That broke via a newspaper in Lebanon. True conspiracies are often uncovered through the media. In Watergate, it was journalists not taking “no” for an answer.

A conspiracy theory, on the other hand, is discussed at length on the internet by people who are not bona fide journalists or government officials or whistleblowers in an organization or investigative committees of regulators. They’re completely independent sources, individuals who self-nominate and put themselves forward as being in possession of the truth. In principle, that could be true. But then if you look at the way these people think and talk and communicate, you discover their cognition is different from what I would call conventional cognition.

What are some differences between conventional and conspiratorial thinking?

You can start with healthy skepticism vs. overriding suspicion. As a scientist, I’m obviously skeptical. I’m questioning anything people say. I look at my own data and other people’s data with a skeptical eye. But after skeptics have been skeptical, they are quite capable of accepting evidence. Once something has withstood scrutiny, you accept it. Otherwise you’re in a state of complete nihilism and you can’t believe anything.

That crucial second step of acceptance is absent in conspiracy theorists. That is where conspiracy theorists are different. Their skepticism is a bottomless, never-ending pit of skepticism about anything related to the official account. And that skepticism is accompanied by extreme gullibility to anything related to the conspiracy. It’s an imbalance between skepticism for anything an official may say and complete gullibility for something some random dude on the internet will tweet out. It’s that imbalance that differentiates conspiracy thinking from standard cognition.

Conspiracy thinking is immune to evidence. In the “Plandemic” video, the absence of evidence is twisted to be seen to be as evidence for the theory. They say the cover-up is so perfect that you will never find out about it. That’s the opposite of rational thinking. Usually when you think of a hypothesis, you think of the evidence. And if there’s zero evidence, you give it up or say there is no evidence for it.

Conspiracy theorists may also simultaneously believe things that are contradictory. In the “Plandemic” video, for example, they say COVID-19 both came from a Wuhan lab and that we’re all infected with the disease from vaccinations. They’re making both claims, and they don’t hang together.

More generally, conspiracy theorists show this contradictory thinking by presenting themselves as both victims and heroes. They see themselves as these heroes in possession of the truth. But they also see themselves as victims. They feel they are being persecuted by this evil establishment or the deep state or whatever it is.

Why do you think some conspiracy theories are so popular?

Some people find comfort in resorting to a conspiracy theory whenever they have a sense of a loss of control or they’re confronted with a major adverse event that no one has control over. So every time there’s a mass shooting in the U.S., I can guarantee you ahead of time that there will be a conspiracy theory about it.

So you would expect conspiracy theories related to the pandemic. That doesn’t make them any less harmful. Here in the United Kingdom, people are  burning 5G cell towers  because of this extreme idea that 5G has something to do with causing COVID-19. More than 70 cell towers have gone up in flames because of this conspiracy theory.

Is conspiracy thinking at an all time high?

Historical records show that there were rampant conspiracy theories going on in the Middle Ages when the plague hit Europe. It was anti-Semitism at the time. That tends to be part and parcel of pandemics. People engage in conspiracies that involve some sort of “othering” of people. During previous pandemics, people chased doctors down the street because they thought they were responsible for the pandemic. In Europe, now a lot of antagonism is directed at Asians, because the pandemic started in China. The internet is helping the spread of conspiracy theories. It’s much easier now than it was 30 years ago. But it’s difficult to say we have more now.

Are conservatives or liberals any more likely to engage in conspiracy thinking?

There is a lot of research on this and political conspiracy theories tend to be most associated with extreme political views, on the right or the left. But if you quantify it, you frequently find more on the right than the left.

How do we talk to the conspiracy theorists in our lives?

It’s extremely difficult. In terms of strategy, the best people to talk to are people who are not conspiracy theorists. The vast majority of people are grateful for the debunking and responsive to it. That should be your target of communication if you have a choice. The hardcore conspiracy theorists are unlikely to change their minds. They will take what you say and display considerable ingenuity in twisting it and using it against you. On Twitter, I block them immediately because I’m concerned about my ability to have a rational conversation and I don’t want others to violate that right.

How do we prevent the spread of conspiracy theories?

By trying to inoculate the public against them. Telling the public ahead of time: Look, there are people who believe these conspiracy theories. They invent this stuff. When they invent it they exhibit these characteristics of misguided cognition. You can go through the traits we mention in our handbook, like incoherence, immunity to evidence, overriding suspicion and connecting random dots into a pattern. The best thing to do is tell the public how they can spot conspiracy theories and how they can protect themselves.

Are you aware of any cases where the conspiracy theorists turned out to be right?

There are tens of thousands of conspiracy theories out there, so I haven’t checked them all. But if you look at actual conspiracies, Volkswagen, Iran-contra, Watergate — the real conspiracies — they were uncovered by conventional cognition. There weren’t people there who took the absence of evidence to be evidence for the theory, or who reinterpreted contrary evidence to somehow support their theory. I’m not aware of any conspiracy theorists discovering something where they turn out to be correct.

Conspiracies and Theories: Questions to Ask Copyright © 2021 by Matthew Bloom; Christine Jones; Cameron MacElvee; Jeffrey Sanger; and Lori Walk is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

Share This Book

Blackboard Calendar Locations Student Email Moodle my.WakeTech WebAdvisor

• Research Guides
• Course Guides

ENG 111- Essay 3, Cults and Conspiracy Theories

• Your Assignment
• Approved Database Resources
• Credible Internet Sources
• Tutorials and Help
• Writing and Citation Help
• Ask a Librarian

Unit 3 Essay: Researched Argument

Assignment overview.

The Researched Argument, your third major writing assignment in ENG 111 worth 25% of your overall course grade, requires that you analyze either a cult or a conspiracy theory.. This assignment requires three submissions: a topic proposal, a preliminary draft, and a final draft. During this unit, you will gain experience demonstrating critical thought about a current topic, organizing information about that topic, utilizing evidence to build claims, and ensuring that your voice is the guiding and predominant force behind a substantive argument that cites the words of others.

Assigned Topic Choices:

Choose only one of the following three essay prompts:

• What is a cult and why do people join them? Research one specific cult to explain how cults work and why people not only join but remain loyal to them.  Possible choices include the following cults: NXIM, Children of God (AKA Family International), Twelve Tribes, God’s Salvation Church, Congregation for the Light, the Brethren, Heaven’s Gate, Kashi Ashram, Superior Universal Alignment, Raëlism, The People’s Temple.
• What is a conspiracy theory and why do people believe them? Research one specific conspiracy theory to explain how these theories work and why people believe them. Possible choices include the following conspiracy theories: Area 51, Illuminati, Chemtrails, Black Helicopter Theory, MK Ultra, Chappaquiddick, the FDA holds the cure to cancer, lizard people control politics, the CIA developed crack, the existence of cryptids, the government allowed 9/11.

Assignment Requirements

• Compose an essay no less than five, double-spaced pages in length. This total does not include your Works Cited page, which must begin on a new page.
• Include as support for your argument at least one quote (or paraphrased idea) from each of the required five sources .
• Develop a thesis that conveys your argumentative purpose and/or your answer to your chosen essay prompt.
• Develop your arguments within the essay body by way of explanation and exemplification — concrete, detailed, and coherent reasons and examples that demonstrate the logic and significance behind your argument.
• Identify and apply the conventions of 9 th edition MLA format and accurate MLA documentation, including attribution (signal phrasing), in-text citation, and a Works Cited page. I also require use of 12-point, Times New Roman font.
• Avoid use of 1st or 2nd person (“I,” “we,” “us,” and “you”). This assignment asks for a response based on research found in the source material, and you should strive to write in an academic voice that uses third person only.
• Avoid personal narrative and opinion-based development (i.e. “I believe,” “I think,” “In my opinion,” etc.). All ideas must be well-supported with logical explanation, details, connections, and evidence from the required source material.
• Use all stages of the writing process to develop a final draft that demonstrates your ability to incorporate standard, academic, writing conventions (see rubric)

Source Requirements

You must find a total of five sources that meet the following requirements.

• One credible video or podcast source
• Two library database sources
• Two credible internet sources (which could include a second video or podcast)
• Because we cover the assigned topics (cults and conspiracy theories) in weekly course material, you may not use any of the sources that we have provided throughout this Unit. All sources referenced in your essay must be found (by way of research)

The Research Process

1. Identify your topic 2. Develop search terms 3. Conduct a search 4. Evaluate information ​5. Cite your sources

• Last Updated: Apr 18, 2024 4:23 PM
• URL: https://researchguides.waketech.edu/ENG111Cults

English: Intro to College Writing: Conspiracy Theories

• PROWL Tutorial
• Creating Good Research Questions
• Find a Book
• Find Articles
• Cite Sources
• Annotated Bibliographies
• E Books for Writing Help
• Renee - Websites and Bias
• Matthew - Website Examples
• Conspiracy Theories
• REQUEST an Information Literacy Session!
• Digital Citizenship

Conspiracy?

Websites to Reference

• Time's Magazine: Contemporary Conspiracies
• Huffington Post - Conspiracy Theories
• New York Magazine - Conspiracy Theories
• How Conspiracy Theories Work
• Jesse Ventura - Conspiracy Theories
• Psychology of Conspiracy

Recent Conspiracy Theories

• Some local GOP leaders fire up the base with conspiracies, lies
• Stop the Steal denied inciting violence: Now its leader wants to "bring hell" to his enemies
• Why So Many Believe Trump Won the Election
• Far-right extremists move from stop the steal to stop the vaccine
• Trump Spread Multiple Conspiracy Theories on Monday. Here Are Their Roots
• The Future of QAnon Explained

Frequent Conspiracies

• Area 51 & Aliens
• Obama Birther
• CIA and AIDS
• New World Order
• Moon Landing
• Holocaust Revisionists
• JFK Facts - Memory/Truth
• Citizens for Truth - Kennedy Assassination
• Mary Ferrell Foundation
• 9/11 Cover-up - Want to Know
• 9/11 Review
• Educating Humanity
• Dark Government - Area 51
• Galactic Connection
• Top Facts About Area 51 - Open Mind
• Birther Report
• Obama Was Born in Kenya.com
• Obama 'Communist"
• Infowars - Alex Jones
• AIDS Timeline - Killtown
• AIDS, CIA and Biowarfare
• Illuminati Agenda
• Endtime Ministries - New World Order
• Bible Believers - New World Order
• Now the End Begins
• Denver Airport - Conspiracy Theories
• How Kubrick Faked Landing
• Apollo Zero
• Faked Landings
• BBC Page on Moon Landings Conspiracy
• Auschwitz: 'Myths and Facts'
• Bible Believers: Holohoax
• Inconvenient History
• Holocaust Hoax Museum

Articles of Relevance from Google Scholar & Library Databases

• Distrust of Government, the Vigilante Tradition, and Support for Capital Punishment
• Why can't we just get along? Interpersonal biases and interracial distrust
• The Skeptical American: Revisiting the Meanings of Trust in Government and Confidence in Institution
• Political paranoia v. political realism: on distinguishing between bogus conspiracy theories and genuine conspiratorial politics
• The truth is out there
• Conspiracy Beliefs about the Origin of HIV/AIDS in Four Racial/Ethnic Groups
• The power of unreason: conspiracy theories, extremism and counter-terrorism
• They Call Me Crazy: Factors to Conspiratorial Participation
• The Effects of Anti-Vaccine Conspiracy Theories on Vaccination Intentions
• Nova: Vaccinations: Calling the Shots

Relevant News Articles

• Witnesses to the JFK Assassination - LA Times
• Saudi Involvement in 9/11
• How Area 51 Works
• Scientific American on Moon Landings
• Popular Mechanics: Mythbusters - Moon Landing

Urban Legends - Resources

• Snopes Best places for quick checks of internet rumors and urban legends.
• TruthorFiction.com - Snopes is a 'tool' of the Democratic Party Conspiracy theory on the urban legend checker!
• NPR on Snopes
• Urban Legends @ About.com
• How Urban Legends Work - HowStuffWorks
• << Previous: Matthew - Website Examples
• Next: REQUEST an Information Literacy Session! >>
• Last Updated: Apr 24, 2024 10:29 AM
• URL: https://libguides.madisoncollege.edu/EnglishICW

1701 Wright Street | Madison, Wisconsin 53704 | Libraries: 608.246.6640 | Student Achievement Centers: 608.246.6125 | College Info: 608.246.6100

• Circulation
• Start Your Research
• Subject & Course Research Guides
• Computers, Printing & Additional Services
• Success Centers
• Faculty Circulation
• eRes & Online Storage
• Schedule a Library Orientation
• Research Skills & Information Literacy
• Find Books & eBooks
• Find Articles
• Find Credible Websites
• Citing Your Sources
• Hours & Holidays
• Library Map
• Library Staff
• Mission, Policies & Outcomes

Conspiracy Theories and Misinformation: Citing Your Sources

• Find Websites
• MLA Citations
• APA Citations
• Chicago Style

Works Cited Generators on the Web

• CiteThis Ad-Free Citation generator.
• KniteCite Service

Why is it Important to Cite Your Sources for Your Research Papers?

Citing sources and creating a Bibliography/Works Cited List:

• ​​​​ Gives credit to the author(s)
• Illustrates your ability to locate & evaluate appropriate sources
• Provides evidence for the arguments and conclusions in your paper
• Prevents plagarism and copyright infringement

What Is Plagiarism?

pla·gia·rism (noun)

The practice of taking someone else's work or ideas and passing them off as one's own. Synonyms - copying, infringement of copyright, piracy, theft, stealing. Informal - cribbing "accusations of plagiarism." Source: Google Definition

Plagiarism can be intentional or unintentional.

Citation Styles

• MLA Citation Style
• APA Citation Style
• Chicago Citation Style

What is MLA Style?  

MLA (Modern Language Association) style specifies guidelines for formatting papers. MLA style also provides a system for referencing sources through parenthetical citations in essays and Works Cited pages.

• MLA Handbook Plus This link opens in a new window The go-to resource for writers of research papers and anyone citing sources in MLA format. Watch the How to use MLA Handbook video and guide more... less... MLA Handbook Plus includes the full text of the ninth edition of the handbook, the second edition of the MLA Guide to Digital Literacy, and the MLA Guide to Undergraduate Research in Literature, as well as a video course that teaches the principles of MLA documentation style through a series of short videos paired with quizzes, plus a final assessment.

• Success Centers-Chaffey College Need more help? Contact the Success Centers for tutors and workshops on citing your sources.
• MLA Formatting and Style Guide From Owl Purdue University Writing Lab Helps you better understand how to cite sources using MLA Style, including the list of works cited and in-text citations.

What is APA Style?  

APA format is the official style of the  American Psychological Association  (APA) and is commonly used to cite sources in psychology, education, and the social sciences.  Most importantly, the use of APA style can protect writers from accusations of plagiarism, which is the purposeful or accidental uncredited use of material by other authors .

• APA 7th Edition References/In-Text Citations
• APA 7th Edition Sample Paper
• Chaffey College Success Centers Need more help? Contact the Success Centers for tutors and workshops on citing sources.
• OWL at Purdue University Writing Lab - APA Formatting and Style Guide Overview of APA (American Psychological Association) style and where to find information with different APA resources.

What is Chicago Style?

The Chicago Manual of Style  sets the standard for scholarly publishing in the Humanities.  Chicago  offers two citation formats, the author-date reference format and the standard bibliographic format, each of which provides conventions for organizing footnotes or endnotes, as well as bibliographic citations.  Most importantly, the use of the Chicago style can protect writers from accusations of plagiarism, which is the purposeful or accidental uncredited use of material by other authors .

• OWL at Purdue University Writing Lab - Chicago Formatting and Style Guide Information on The Chicago Manual of Style method of document formatting and citation.

Avoid Plagiarism by Citing Sources

Bainbridge State College. "Plagiarism: How to Avoid It."  YouTube . YouTube, 5 Jan. 2010. Web. 19 Oct. 2014.

A transcript is in process for this video. If you need assistance, please contact the Reference Librarian at  [email protected].

Citations Galore!

https://blog.writersdomain.net/2014/06/17/this-aint-your-high-school-english-class-why-plagiarism-is-a-big-deal/

Consequences of Plagiarism Here at Chaffey

• verbal warning or written reprimand
• failing grade for an assignment
• failing grade in the course
• removal from class
• restitution
• Chaffey College Standards of Student Conduct
• Chaffey College Student Handbook
• << Previous: Find Websites
• Next: MLA Citations >>
• Last Updated: Jan 17, 2024 2:52 PM
• URL: https://libguides.chaffey.edu/conspiracy-theories