essay about practical knowledge

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In This Article Expand or collapse the "in this article" section Practical Knowledge

Introduction, general overviews.

The Content of Practical Knowledge
Error and Fallibilism
Intentional Action and Belief
Intention and Belief
Nonobservational Knowledge
Sensation and Bodily Awareness
Inferential Knowledge
Practical Reasoning
The “Cause” of What It Understands

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Practical Knowledge by David Hunter LAST REVIEWED: 15 December 2022 LAST MODIFIED: 30 September 2013 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0010

A person typically knows what she is doing when she does something intentionally, and she usually knows this without having to observe herself. This so-called practical knowledge raises many philosophical questions. Does intentional action require practical knowledge and, if so, what is the strength of this requirement? What is it about intentional action that requires it, since a person can be doing something unintentionally without knowing about it? What is the source or ground of this knowledge? How is it related to observation, bodily sensation, and proprioception? How is a person’s practical knowledge connected to the reasons she has for acting and to practical reasoning more generally? In what sense, if any, is a person’s practical knowledge the “cause” of what it understands, as Anscombe famously claimed? While the notion of practical knowledge was central to the theory of action in the middle decades of the 20th century, it lost this place in the 1960s. But the last ten years has seen a renewed interest in the notion. This article aims to chart both the early debates and the recent discussions of practical knowledge. While it organizes the literature according to certain questions and topics, other ways to organize the literature are possible and nearly all of the texts would fit equally well under several headings.

Because interest in practical knowledge is fairly new, few general overviews are available. Schwenkler 2012 and Roessler 2010 are helpful. They serve as up-to-date introductory surveys of the debate and contain good bibliographies. Haddock 2010 is a helpful discussion of the epistemological significance of practical knowledge. Many of the essays in Ford, et al. 2011 address the views on practical knowledge developed in Anscombe 2000 (cited under History ). Wong 2010 is a helpful introductory discussion of the closely related topic of a person’s awareness of her bodily states and movements. The papers in Roessler and Eilan 2003 all consider from a broadly empirical, psychological point of view the awareness people have when they act. Teichmann 2008 provides a critical introduction to the work of Elizabeth Anscombe, including her views on knowledge of action.

Ford, Anton, Jennifer Hornsby, and Frederick Stoutland, eds. Essays on Anscombe’s Intention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.

DOI: 10.4159/harvard.9780674060913

A collection of essays on various aspects of Anscombe 2000 (cited under History ).

Haddock, A. “Knowledge and Action.” In The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations . Edited by Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar, and Adrian Haddock, 191–260. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.001.0001

A discussion of practical knowledge within the context of contemporary accounts of knowledge and justification.

Roessler, Johannes. “Agents’ Knowledge.” In A Companion to the Philosophy of Action . Edited by Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis, 236–243. Chicester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

DOI: 10.1002/9781444323528

An introductory discussion of practical knowledge in the context of, among other things, recent empirical results and discoveries about pathological actions.

Roessler, Johannes, and Naomi Eilan, eds. Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology . Oxford: Clarendon, 2003.

A collection of essays by philosophers and cognitive scientists on the empirical-psychological aspects of practical knowledge.

Schwenkler, John. “Non-observational Knowledge of Action.” Philosophy Compass 7.10 (2012): 731–740.

DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00513.x

An introductory but critical survey of recent attempts to explain and understand practical knowledge.

Teichmann, Roger. The Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299331.001.0001

An introduction to the general themes in Anscombe’s work, including her views on practical knowledge and the nature of action.

Wong, Hong-Yu. “Bodily Awareness and Bodily Action.” In A Companion to the Philosophy of Action . Edited by Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis, 227–235. Chicester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

An introductory survey of recent work on the connections between a person’s awareness of her bodily movements and states and her actions.

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Essay on Knowledge is Power: Samples in 100, 200, 300 Words

Updated on
Dec 15, 2023

‘ Knowledge is power’ phrase is derived from a Latin term, which is attributed to Sir Francis Bacon, a well-known essayist of all times. Knowledge is power has been accepted widely and timelessly as it underscores the significance of knowledge in empowering people, societies and countries .

Benjamin Franklin once said, ‘An investment in knowledge pays the best interest.’ Knowledge not only improves a person’s understanding of the world but also teaches them life lessons to develop decision-making skills and contribute to the betterment of society. Below we have discussed some essays on knowledge is power in different word limits.

Table of Contents

1 Essay on Knowledge is Power in 100 Words
2 Essay on Knowledge is Power in 200 Words
3 Essay on Knowledge is Power in 300 Words

Also Read: Traditions and Celebrations for Christmas Around the World

Essay on Knowledge is Power in 100 Words

‘Knowledge is power’ is a timeless truth. A person with knowledge can empower himself to make informed decisions, enhance personal growth and contribute to the development of society. Knowledge equips us with effective tools to navigate the challenges of life and achieve our goals in real-time. The pursuit of knowledge is education. A person who is educated and has the right knowledge will find success in life.

The world we live in is driven by knowledge-based education and innovations. From agriculture to healthcare, every activity and field requires you to have proper knowledge and understanding of it. Whether it is at the individual level or global level, people who prioritize education and knowledge enjoy economic prosperity and influence.

Essay on Knowledge is Power in 200 Words

Knowledge is so powerful that it can reshape the entire world or destroy it, depending on the purpose for which it is used. The phrase, ‘Knowledge is Power’ was given by Sir Francis Bacon. With knowledge, one can have a profound impact on their life and the people surrounding it.

Knowledge emperors a person in various ways, from personal growth to changes at the global level. With knowledge, we gain new skills, insights and perspectives about a particular subject. This equips us to excel in our chosen field, pursue all our aspirations and fulfil our dream life.

A person with the right knowledge can make informed decisions. If you are someone who possesses broad knowledge about different subjects, it will be very easy for you to critically analyze any situation, weigh options and make choices that best suit your plans. This not only leads to better personal outcomes but also fosters a sense of autonomy and self-determination. Knowledge is considered as the driving force behind progress. Scientific discoveries, technological innovations, cultural evolution and social developments are all fueled by accumulated knowledge. A very classic example of this is the history of human civilization. We must use knowledge knowledge ethically and ensure its equitable distribution or access.

Also Read – Essay on Unity in Diversity

Essay on Knowledge is Power in 300 Words

Knowledge is deemed as the most powerful tool a human possesses. It is the cornerstone of power in our modern society. The universally acknowledged phrase ‘Knowledge is power’ highlights the profound impact knowledge has on individuals and society, and both.

The first thing to know about knowledge is that it is the key to personal development and empowerment. When a person acquires knowledge, they open doors to personal growth and development. Depending on the person’s expertise and field, this empowerment can come in various forms. I person with the right knowledge often finds himself confident, adaptable, and capable of overcoming obstacles in life.

Moreover, knowledge equips you to make informed decisions. We are living in a world which is driven by information. A person who is well-equipped with knowledge about his or her specific field can critically assess a situation, evaluate the options and make choices that best suit their individual needs and values. This not only enhances their personal lives but also fosters a sense of agency and self-determination.

Knowledge is the driving force behind progress, development and innovation. From the time of industrialization to the invention of the internet, knowledge has been the deciding factor for transformative change, improving the quality of life for countless individuals.

The importance of knowledge is not only limited to individual benefits of scientific discoveries. It also plays a critical role in a country’s governance. It allows you to make informed political decisions, and actively participate in the democratic process. In this way, knowledge serves as a safeguard against tyranny and injustice.

At last, the phrase ‘knowledge is power’ remains a timeless truth that highlights the profound impact of knowledge on a person’s development and societal changes. With this power comes the responsibility to use knowledge ethically and ensure equal access for all, as knowledge remains a vital path to personal and collective empowerment in our ever-changing world.

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Essay on Gaganyaan

The phrase ‘knowledge itself is power’ denotes the meaning that knowing empowers your understanding of the world so that you can make informed decisions for yourself and others. In this way, knowledge is equal to power, as it can help in shaping the future of an individual to an entire country.

Knowledge is considered as an accumulation of information, skills facts and understanding acquired through deep learning, experience and observation. It represents a deep and organised awareness of the world around us, encompassing various fields of knowledge, such as culture, science and technology, history and practical know-how. Knowledge empowers individuals by providing the tools to make informed decisions, solve problems, and navigate life’s complexities. It serves as a foundation for personal growth, innovation, and societal progress, shaping our perceptions and actions.

A person can improve their knowledge by reading informative articles, newspapers and books, enrolling in courses related to their field of study, attending workshops and seminars, engaging in discussions, etc.

For more information on such interesting topics, visit our essay writing page and follow Leverage Edu .

Shiva Tyagi

With an experience of over a year, I've developed a passion for writing blogs on wide range of topics. I am mostly inspired from topics related to social and environmental fields, where you come up with a positive outcome.

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Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays

Kieran Setiya, Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays , Oxford University Press, 2017, 308pp., $74.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780190462925.

Reviewed by Hallvard Lillehammer, Birkbeck, University of London

This book is a collection of twelve essays, originally published between 2004 and 2014, preceded by a substantial and explanatory introduction. The topics are the nature of intentional action; the relationship between the reasons for which agents do and ought to act; and the nature of their first-personal knowledge of the intentions and reasons for which they do act. The scope of the essays is the intersection of action theory and ethics, broadly understood. The content partly overlaps with and partly complements work previously published by the author in his Reasons without Rationalism (2007) and Knowing Right from Wrong (2012). The result is a complex tapestry of interrelated claims about what it is for agents to act intentionally and for (good and bad) reasons, with frequently interesting and occasionally surprising implications for a range of disputed questions in ethics, the philosophy of mind, and what has come to be known as ‘meta-normativity’. Although the book is not an easy read, and the intensely networked and dialectical embedding of its arguments will make it hard for even some educated readers to grasp the full significance of the contrasts drawn between the theses defended and the various alternatives from which they are said to importantly differ, every essay in this collection will repay careful study.

The term ‘practical knowledge’ in the title refers to at least three different things, each of which is treated at some length (I will take them in reverse of Setiya’s order). First, it refers to knowledge of practical reason, or knowledge that is ethical in the broadest sense of the term. This kind of practical knowledge is mainly discussed in the second part of the book, which is partly focused on the nature and foundations of knowledge about what one ought to do; what there is reason to do; or what it is good to do. Second, ‘practical knowledge’ refers to knowledge of how to do the things one does intentionally. This kind of knowledge is mainly discussed in the first part, which is focused on the nature of intentional action and what it is to intend to do something; to do something intentionally; and to do things for reasons. Third, ‘practical knowledge’ refers to knowledge of what one is doing when one is doing it intentionally, and why one is doing it. This kind of knowledge is also discussed in the first part of the book, and is also in a sense the key to the whole enterprise. The main idea here is that the knowledge an agent has of what she is doing when she is doing it intentionally crucially depends on her knowledge of how to do the thing she intentionally does (and so on ‘practical knowledge’ in the second sense). In what follows, I review the main conclusions of the book and say something about why they matter. In doing so, I work ‘backwards’: from questions of about the wider significance of the main conclusions towards the narrower questions about the nature of intentional agency that lie at its core.

The main theses of the second part of the book are broadly as follows. The standards of practical reason are standards of ethical virtue, as applied to practical thought. The best kind of practical thinking is the kind of thinking exemplified by a (real or imaginary) virtuous person, who cares about the right things in the right way. This kind of thinking is not available to everyone. You have to be blessed with the right psychophysical capacities, and have to be properly brought up. It follows that the standards of practical reason and the ‘normative reasons’ they provide are genuinely ‘external’ with respect to the actual motivations of many rational agents. The normative reasons that practical reason provides are identified as premises (not conclusions) of sound practical thinking. It follows that so-called ‘Humean’, ‘internalist’, and various other ‘dispositional’ theories of practical reason are all false.

Moreover, so are all philosophical theories that seek to draw substantially ethical conclusions from a theory of rational agency, including so-called ‘Kantian’, or ‘rationalist’, theories that derive substantially ethical success conditions for human action from standards ‘constitutive’ of rational action. The same goes for teleological theories (including theories with a broadly ‘Aristotelian’ flavour) that seek to draw substantially ethical conclusions from the alleged fact that all rational agents must be interpreted as acting under ‘the guise of the good’. As Setiya argues with some plausibility in an essay entitled ‘Sympathy for the Devil’, they do not. Normative reasons are irreducibly distinct from the ‘explanatory’ or ‘motivating’ reasons to which we appeal in explaining rational action to ourselves and others. In particular, there is no requirement that agents must represent their actions as being (even prima facie ) good things to do, or as having (even prima facie ) anything interesting to be said in their favour. Setiya does not deny the core ‘constitutivist’ insight that there is a valid argument from the metaphysics of agency to some basic norms of practical reason. The problem with any such argument, or so he argues, is that the nature of rational agency as such is too ‘thin’ to provide the premises to support any ethical conclusions. The inherent ‘success conditions’ of ‘basic’ agency (or of ‘planning’ agency, in the sense made famous by Michael Bratman) is just that the agents in question do whatever it is they set themselves (or plan) to do. And although it is arguably true that there are beings (such as birds and bees, and maybe even humans) who will only be truly successful as the kind of things they are if they behave in specific ways in the context of their natural environment or ecological niche, there is no such thing as a ‘natural environment’ or ecological niche of the relevant kind to make certain action profiles (such as ‘ethical’ action profiles) normatively authoritative for rational agents merely as such, at least as a matter of a priori necessity.

There is much more to be said about these issues than Setiya does in this book (and certainly more than can be helpfully said in a short book review). The details of Setiya’s views on ethical knowledge should in any case be sought not in these pages, but in Knowing Right from Wrong. Even so, the message of the essays in the second part of Practical Knowledge is newsworthy enough as things stand. For if Setiya is right, the entire project of grounding a theory of ‘political’, ‘moral’, ‘ethical’, or indeed any kind of substantial practical normativity on a general theory of what it is to act intentionally for reasons is doomed to failure. If substantial ethical thought has any kind of foundation, it is not to be sought in the philosophy of mind or action.

The upshot of all this is a reading of the book according to which the insights of its first and second parts are substantially independent of each other. As Setiya himself puts it, ‘Moral philosophers should think about the metaphysics of agency not because it is the foundation of ethics, but in order to see that it is not’ (33). That is aptly put. For it would clearly be a mistake to think of these two areas of philosophical inquiry as entirely unrelated. One obvious reason is that questions frequently arise in the course of our thinking about reasons and rationality where it is simply not clear from the outset in which pre-conceived ‘domain’ of inquiry the answer is to be sought. One case in point is Setiya’s take on the so-called ‘instrumental principle’, or the claim that one must intend the necessary means to one’s ends. On standard accounts, this principle is one of the core (if not the core) principle of sound ‘practical’ reasoning. On Setiya’s view (and he is not the first philosopher to have made this suggestion), the instrumental principle is an epistemological principle that applies to the beliefs that figure in means-ends reasoning, and so is a principle of ‘theoretical’ reason. (The distinction between the ‘practical’ and the ‘theoretical’ is one of the relatively few to remain unchallenged in this book.)

This is an intriguing suggestion. The rational failure involved when I keep putting the washing liquid in the fridge rather than by the washing machine as I intended is now to be regarded as either a matter of doing something poor or otherwise inappropriate (by putting the washing liquid in a bad place), or alternatively as a matter of holding an irrational set of beliefs (by failing to draw the obvious conclusions about what placing the washing liquid by the washing machine actually requires by way of means). Thus understood, the rational failure in question has nothing essentially to do with the practical failure of execution implied by not forming and bringing to fruition the relevant auxiliary intentions themselves, however tempting it may be to say so.

The cluster of theses defended in the first part of the book can be summarized roughly as follows. All genuinely intentional action involves knowledge of what one is doing, or of what one is going to do. It is practical knowledge ‘in intention’. On this view, all intentions involve at least some degree of confidence (or ‘partial belief’) that one will successfully do what one intends to do when one sets out to do it. Hence, intentions are at least partly ‘cognitive’. Yet practical knowledge in intention does not depend on either prior inference or sufficient prior evidence that the intentional action in question will be successful. Instead, practical knowledge in intention is genuine knowledge because it combines with requisite capacities or dispositions to actually bring about what the agent intends when the opportunity arises. The presence of these capacities and dispositions make it rational for agents to form the relevant intentions; they justify the agents’ partial beliefs that the actions they intend will be performed successfully; and they ensure that the agents’ confidence that they will successfully execute their intentions is epistemically ‘safe’. In this way, practical knowledge of what one is doing or going to do is said to ‘rest on’, and partly be explained by, a form of ‘knowing how’ (in the sense introduced by Gilbert Ryle in the 1940’s).

The aforementioned package of theses allows Setiya to make plausible sense of some otherwise extremely dubious claims that lie at the heart of his concerns in the first part of the book. One of these is Stuart Hampshire’s contention, in his Thought and Action , that if ‘a man is doing something without knowing that he is doing it, then it must be true that he is not doing it intentionally’. Another is Elizabeth Anscombe’s even more remarkable contention, in her Intention , that the question of ‘why’ someone did something is ‘refused application by the answer: “I was not aware I was doing that”’. The theory of intentional action contained in Anscombe’s ground breaking work, first published in 1957, is currently undergoing something of a revival in mainstream philosophy. The essays republished in the first part of the present volume, from the title essay onwards, make a significant contribution to this revival to the extent that they show how Anscombe’s claim (as well as Hampshire’s) can be interpreted so as to be of more than historical interest.

Perhaps one of the most obvious problems with the claims just quoted from Anscombe and Hampshire (as with many other claims made in contemporary philosophy of action) is that on some natural ways of reading them they seriously over-intellectualize the phenomena they purport to describe. This danger of over-intellectualization provides a useful litmus test for any attempt to make sense of such claims, a test that Setiya’s account should be able to pass. For the fact is that most of us are very far from transparent to ourselves. We frequently do things, and embark on quite sophisticated (and sometimes quite unsavoury) projects without having a very clear sense, from the first-personal perspective, of what we are literally ‘up to’ (our extraordinary capacity for elaborate post hoc rationalizations notwithstanding). The resulting problem for the philosopher of action is not so much that she is describing a kind of acting for reasons that never occurs, but rather that she is describing a kind of acting for reasons that hardly ever does. No doubt there are enough clever philosophers around to come up with a coherent interpretation of the claim that we must know whatever it is we are doing when we do it intentionally. But if very little of what we actually do counts as intentional action thus understood, who cares?

One of the more reassuring aspects of Setiya’s view is that it promises to pass this test, and to do so easily. First, when I do something intentionally my doing so falls under more than one description. On Setiya’s account (slightly reworded), when I do something intentionally, I have some confidence that I am doing it, or else I do it by doing some other things, which I do have some confidence that I am doing . This claim is consistent with the following truths about how we are sometimes not transparent to ourselves. First, my beliefs about what I am up to in making sense of a complex negotiation in a new institutional context allows for both fallibility and a lack of full conviction on my part as to what exactly it is I am up to. Second, there may be truths about what I intentionally do that are neither entailed nor evidentially supported in any obvious way by the contents of the propositions that specify what it is that I consciously think I am doing. Whether through envy, self-deception, delusion, or simple ignorance I can intentionally behave in ways that if more fully described would make me look like a stranger to myself. Third, the nature and extent of the capacities and dispositions that stop me from sinking to the bottom as I dive into the sea and swim to the shore need not be fully transparent to me when I ask myself what it is that I am supposed to know. Moreover, they come in degrees, as does my confidence that I have them. Yet the relevant capacities and dispositions can still support the claim: ‘He knows what he is doing’, as I dive into the sea and successfully demonstrate that I really do know how to do it. If I have understood him correctly, each of these ‘failures’ of transparency is fully compatible with Setiya’s claim that whenever we act intentionally, we know what we are doing. If that is true, then the theory of intentional action espoused in this book has even more to recommend it than is explicitly propounded within its pages.

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Knowledge How

In introductory classes to epistemology, we are taught to distinguish between three different kinds of knowledge. The first kind is acquaintance knowledge : we know our mothers, our friends, our pets, etc., by being acquainted with them. The second kind is knowledge of facts, propositional knowledge, or knowledge-that : this is the sort of knowledge we acquire when we learn that, say, Ithaca is in New York State or that Turin is located in Italy. It is customary to add to the list a third kind of knowledge that is supposed to be distinct both from acquaintance knowledge and from propositional knowledge. One possesses this knowledge when one can be truly described as knowing how to do something: play the piano, make a pie, walk, speak, create, build, and so on.

The distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that was brought to scrutiny in analytic philosophy by Ryle in his seminal The Concept of Mind (1949), where he raised some of the now classical objections to the so-called “intellectualist legend”: the view that knowledge-how amounts to knowledge-that. Ryle instead advocated an “anti-intellectualist” view of knowledge-how according to which knowledge-how and knowledge-that are distinct kinds of knowledge, and manifestations of knowledge-how are not necessarily manifestations of knowledge-that. This anti-intellectualism has been the received view among philosophers for a long time. Even psychologists and neuroscientists have explicitly appealed to Ryle’s classical distinction when discussing their empirical findings (e.g., Cohen & Squire 1980; Anderson 1983). Nevertheless, in the last twenty years, a renewed interest by epistemologists in the nature of knowledge-how has brought new life to the debate, where new versions of intellectualism and anti-intellectualism have been developed and argued for. The debate is partly epistemological: is knowledge-how an altogether distinct kind of knowledge, different from knowledge-that? But it is also about a psychological question: what kind of psychological state is knowledge-how? The goal of this entry is to overview the debate between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists, while highlighting the implications of this debate for related questions concerning intelligence, cognition, language, and skills.

This entry starts by looking at some classical arguments against intellectualism about knowledge-how: the regress argument (section 1), the insufficiency argument (section 2), and the gradability argument (section 3). Then two motivating arguments for intellectualism are considered: the linguistic argument (section 4) and the action theory argument (section 5). Section 6 overviews the recent epistemological debate on whether knowledge-how and propositional knowledge have the same epistemic profile. Section 7 discusses the cognitive science argument against intellectualism. Section 8 surveys what forms anti-intellectualism about knowledge-how has taken in the recent literature. Section 9 looks at the relation between knowledge-how and skills. Section 10 discusses knowledge-how and other related topics.

1.1 The Contemplation Argument

1.2 the employment regress, 1.3 a revival of the regress argument, 1.4 lewis carroll’s regress, 2. the sufficiency argument, 3. the gradability argument, 4.1 the details of the intellectualist proposal, 4.2 first group of objections, 4.3 second group of objections, 4.4 third group of objections, 5. the action theory argument and the question of joint action, 6.1 knowledge-how and belief, 6.2 knowledge-how and gettier, 6.3 knowledge how, defeasibility, and testimony, 7.1 the argument, 7.2 improving the argument, 7.3 articulability, 7.4 knowledge-how in preverbal children and nonhuman animals, 8.1 revisionary intellectualism, 8.2 ability based anti-intellectualism.

8.3 Knowledge-How and Skill

9.1 Skill Across Cultures

9.2 intellectualism and anti-intellectualism about skill, 9.3 skills in epistemology, 9.4 the nature of skilled action, 10. knowledge-how and other related topics, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the regress argument.

Ryle’s most famous objection to intellectualist accounts of skills and knowledge-how is that they lead to a vicious regress:

The consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution of which can be more or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if, for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation had first to be performed and performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to break into the circle. (1949: 19)

Ryle concludes:

“Intelligent” cannot be defined in terms of “intellectual” or “knowing how” in terms of “knowing that”, (1949: 20)

on pain of a vicious regress (see also Ryle 1946: 22). Exactly how to reconstruct Ryle’s argument is a matter of controversy (Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011b; Bengson & Moffett 2011a; Cath 2013; Fantl 2011; Kremer 2020). The next sections discuss different possible ways of understanding the regress challenge and possible responses on behalf of intellectualism.

The contemplation argument assumes for reductio that for any action to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation of “contemplating” has to be performed first :

Contemplation premise (CP): In order to employ one’s knowledge that p , one must contemplate the proposition p .

Assume in addition the following definition of intellectualism:

Strong intellectualism (SI) : For an action Φ, knowing how to Φ consists in knowing some proposition p .

And assume further that in performing an action Φ, one employs one’s knowledge-how to Φ:

Action premise (AP) : For an action Φ, if one Φs, then one employs one’s knowledge-how to Φ.

With these premises the regress goes as follows. Suppose that one performs an action Φ:

By AP, one employs one’s knowledge-how to Φ.
By SI, one employs the knowledge that p , for some p .
So, by CP, one contemplates p .
But contemplating p is an action.
So by AP, if one contemplates p, one employs one’s knowledge-how to contemplate p .
By CP, one ought to contemplate another proposition q , for some q .

The contemplation argument aims at showing the falsity of SI, by showing that its truth, together with the truth of AP and CP, triggers an infinite regress. If SI were true, then performing any action would require contemplating an infinite number of propositions of ever-increasing complexity. On the assumption that this cannot be done in a finite amount of time, the argument goes, accepting SI would lead to the clearly absurd conclusion that no agent could ever perform an action within a finite time (see Fantl 2011: 122).

The question is whether AP and CP are plausible premises. Following Ginet (1975), Stanley & Williamson (2001) argue that AP is plausible only if the relevant Φ is an intentional action. To use one of Ryle’s (1949: 33) own examples, if a clumsy person inadvertently tumbles, it does not follow that in doing so, they employ their knowledge-how to tumble. By contrast, the clown employs their knowledge-how when they tumble on purpose. Nevertheless, if we restrict AP to intentional actions, then the regress can be stopped by observing that contemplating a proposition might happen non-intentionally. For example, when I employ my knowledge that there is a red light ahead by applying the brakes, I need not intentionally contemplate the proposition that there is a red light ahead. Correspondingly, if contemplating a proposition can be done non-intentionally, such contemplation is not the kind of action that requires us to know how to perform it—therefore, it does not trigger the restricted AP and the regress is blocked altogether. Some object that the contemplation in this example might be intentional but unconscious (as suggested by Noë 2005: 282). But it is unclear what reasons there are for thinking that every time one employs one’s knowledge, one intentionally contemplates the relevant proposition (Cath 2013: 365–366).

The Contemplation Argument also assumes CP—i.e., that in order to employ propositional knowledge when acting, one ought to contemplate the relevant proposition. Against CP, Ginet (1975: 7) observes that one might manifest one’s knowledge that one can get the door open by turning the knob and pushing it (as well as my knowledge that there is a door there) by performing that operation quite automatically as one leaves the room; and one may do this without formulating (in one’s mind or out loud) that proposition or any other relevant proposition. Ginet concludes that Ryle’s original argument does not teach us that intellectualism about knowledge-how is false but only that knowledge can be acted upon and manifested without requiring any contemplation on the part of the agent. Indeed, some scholars think that this last weaker claim was the only goal of Ryle’s original argument (Rosefeldt 2004; Sax 2010).

However, CP is not needed in order to trigger a regress. Perhaps the argument can be salvaged by replacing contemplation with a weaker relation. Consider replacing CP with EP:

The Employment Premise (EP): If one employs knowledge that p , one employs knowledge-how to employ one’s knowledge that p (and one’s state of knowledge that p is distinct from one’s state of knowing how to employ one’s knowledge that p ). (Cath 2013: 367–8)

The regress is triggered as before. Suppose one Φs:

By SI, that amounts to employing one’s knowledge that p , for some p .
By EP, one needs to employ one’s knowledge-how to employ one’s knowledge that p .
But employing one’s knowledge-how is an action.
By AP, one employs one’s knowledge-how about employing our knowledge-how to employ one’s knowledge that p .
By SI, that amounts to employing one’s knowledge of q , for some q .

Intellectualists might object to EP in ways similar to how CP was resisted—i.e., that not every action requires for its performance the employment of one’s knowledge-how: only intentional actions do, as the clown example suggests. According to this line of reply, employing one’s propositional knowledge might be more like a reflex in response to stimuli, rather than an action. Further, this version of the regress challenge may be accused of assuming that knowledge-that is “behaviorally inert” and needs to be intentionally selected or employed in order to be manifested. Yet, intellectualists have independent reasons to resist this picture (Stalnaker 2012). On the other hand, if Ryleans insist that employments of knowledge-that are actions of sort, it seems there is no principled reason why employments of knowledge-how would not be subject to the same requirement. Therefore, it looks like any regress generated for the intellectualist is generated for Ryle as well (Stanley 2011b: 14, 26; though see Fantl 2011 for a possible difference between the regress generated for Ryle and the regress generated for intellectualism).

A variety of actions—say, remembering to check the car’s blindspot when reversing—can be intelligent even though they are not intentional. Or one might manifest intelligence through processes —e.g., by coming to understand a difficult proposition, without them even being actions. If one accepts that intelligent performances, whether intentional or not, are necessarily guided by knowledge-how, one might try to recast the regress argument by replacing AP with IPP (Weatherson 2017):

Intelligent performance premise (IPP): For a performance Φ, if one Φs intelligently, one manifests one’s knowledge-how to Φ.

Now it seems plausible that one’s manifestation of propositional knowledge can be intelligent in some cases but not in others. For example, one might manifest one’s knowledge intelligently by bringing to bear one maxim that is appropriate instead of any other that is not to the particular situation which the agent faces. By IPP, if one’s manifestation of knowledge-that in a particular situation is intelligent, it requires one’s manifesting one’s knowledge-how. If intellectualism is true, that would in turn require manifesting one’s knowledge-that. If this manifesting of propositional knowledge is intelligent too, though unintentional, it requires knowledge-how. And so on. We get an infinite regress if one accepts that manifesting propositional knowledge can be an intelligent performance, also when it is not an intentional action. (For similar lines of argument, see also Fridland 2013, 2015; Löwenstein 2016: 276–80; Small 2017: 62–3).

Intellectualists might respond by distinguishing two senses in which a performance can be intelligent and two corresponding senses of manifestation, only one of which gives rise to the regress. First, an intelligent action might manifest one’s knowledge-how in the case that it is guided by this knowledge-how. On this reading, the regress is triggered. But there is also another—epistemic—sense in which an intelligent action manifests knowledge-how as long as it provides evidence for that knowledge-how. For example, the rings on a tree provide evidence for the tree’s age (hence manifest its age in the epistemic sense) but the rings on a tree are not guided by its age. Crucially, the regress does not arise on the epistemic sense of manifestation. Checking the blindspot might be intelligent in this epistemic sense of manifesting —providing evidence of—knowledge-how. Yet, this epistemic manifestation itself is not something that qualifies as intelligent or unintelligent.

A less discussed regress that can be found in Ryle (1946: 6–7) is an adaptation of Lewis Carroll’s (1895) regress. Suppose a student understands the premises of an argument and also its conclusion but fails to see that the conclusion follows. In order to help him, the teacher teaches him another proposition P —i.e., if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. The student understands this and yet fails to see how from the premises and the additional premise P the conclusion follows. A second hypothetical proposition is added to his store, the proposition that if the premises is true, the conclusion is true too. The student still fails to see. And so on. Ryle concludes:

Knowing a rule of inference is not possessing a bit of extra information but being able to perform an intelligent operation. Knowing a rule is knowing how. It is realized in performances which conform to the rule, not in theoretical citations of it. (1946: 7)

One might respond (cf. Stanley 2011b) to this regress challenge that the student does not really understand the premises of an argument by modus ponens ( p , if p then q ), for that involves grasping the concept of a conditional, and on an inferentialist understanding (Boghossian 1996, 2003), that would dispose one to accept the conclusion of an inference by that rule. Inferentialism about meaning is, however, a controversial doctrine (for several criticisms, see Williamson 2011, 2012). Other replies might be available. Maybe the student does not represent the rule practically (see next section), or she is simply incapable of granting that the rule applies to this case, for that would explain her failure to be appropriately disposed to arrive at the conclusion, given the truth of the premises. (For yet other versions of the regress challenge, see Noë 2005: 285–6 and Hetherington 2006).

The claim that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that encounters an immediate incredulous stare: how could propositional knowledge be sufficient for knowing how to do something? Ryle (1946: 5) himself poses this challenge as a starting point for his argument:

Obviously there is no truth or set of truths of which we could say “If only the stupid player had been informed of them, he would be a clever player”, or “When once he had been apprised of these truths he would play well”.

Certainly, one might know all the propositions that are relevant to how to perform a task, and yet fail to know how to perform it: knowledge-that does not seem sufficient for knowledge-how (see also Ryle 1940: 38–9).

In order to assess this objection, it is helpful to start with a toy intellectualist theory, on which knowledge-how is a matter of knowing, for some way or method to perform a task w , that w is in fact a way to perform it. In section 4 , we will see in more detail a linguistic argument for identifying knowledge-how with this sort of propositional knowledge (Stanley & Williamson 2001; Snowdon 2004). How could, the insufficiency objection goes, one know how to perform a task just in virtue of knowing a proposition about a way to perform it? Consider the following counterexample to intellectualism:

Swimming : Suppose I look at a swimmer’s swimming, and my swimming instructor pointing to the swimmer says to me, “That is a way in which you could swim too”. I believe my instructor and we may suppose that what she said is in fact true. I may thereby come to know a true answer to the question “How could I swim?” However, in the relevant sense, I may not have come to know how to swim. If I took a swimming test, I might still fail it. If thrown in the swimming pool, I might still drown. I do not know how to swim in the relevant sense and yet I do know a true proposition about how to swim.

In response to this sort of counterexample, intellectualists often appeal to “practical modes of presentation”: knowing a proposition observationally or demonstratively is not the same as knowing it practically. Knowledge-how is, at least in part, a matter of representing propositions about tasks and ways of executing tasks in a distinctively practical fashion. For one to know how to swim, in the relevant sense, one must know of a way to swim represented under a distinctive practical mode of presentation, which is essentially different from the observational or demonstrative mode of presentation in Swimming . This kind of practically represented propositional knowledge is what (some) intellectualists call knowledge-how and is what is absent in the example above.

The notion of practical modes of presentation has received several criticisms (Schiffer 2002; Koethe 2002; Noë 2005; Fantl 2011; Glick 2015), on the ground that it seems excessively obscure or even question begging. Koethe (2002: 327) worries that practical modes of presentation smuggle in an antecedent notion of knowledge-how (though see Fantl 2008: 461 for a response). This widespread skepticism about practical modes of presentation has led some intellectualists to explore ways of responding to the insufficiency objection that do not appeal to practical modes of presentation. For example, Stanley (2011b: 126) considers answering the sufficiency challenge in Swimming by appealing to the context-sensitivity of the ability modal “could”. According to Stanley, depending on how the context for the modal is restricted, “That is how you could swim” could mean either that that is how you can swim given your current physical state or that that is how you could swim after training . But coming to know that that is how I could swim after training is clearly not enough for me to come to know how to swim now. Instead, the argument goes, what one needs to know is the former proposition: that that is a way to swim given my current physical state .

Yet, it is unclear that even this response works. Consider a variant of the previous scenario, where Mary is a skilled swimmer who is one day affected by memory loss and so forgets how she is able to swim (Glick 2015). Nothing has changed in Mary’s physical state: she is still able to swim but she just has forgotten how she is able to swim. Suppose she is told, by looking at a recording of her swimming the day before, that that is how she can in fact swim given her current physical state. She might come to know how she is in fact able to swim (just like that!). Yet, she would still fail to know how to swim in the relevant sense and still drown if thrown into the pool.

So, practical modes of representation are hard to escape if intellectualism is to be defended against the sufficiency objection. To assuage concerns about the intelligibility of practical modes of presentation, Pavese (2015b) proposes we think of them along the lines of practical senses, which in turn can be modeled after computer programs. Programs determine an output, just like Fregean senses determine a referent; and they are practical in that they break down a task into the smallest parts that the system can execute (the primitive operations of the system as well as into primitive ways of combining those parts) so they ground the ability to perform a complex task in terms of the ability to perform all of its parts. On this view, if one represents a task practically, one represents all of its parts, and the combination of those parts, through instructions that one has the ability to execute. So representing practically a task entails that one has the ability to perform the corresponding task. (For a critical discussion of practical ways of thinking, see Mosdell 2019. Habgood-Coote 2018c argues that the classical generality problem for reliabilism (Feldman 1985; Conee & Feldman 1998) arises for intellectualism.)

The notion of distinctively practical concepts is motivated by work outside the debate on intellectualism about knowledge-how. Other scholars have discussed concepts that are practical in that they dissociate from semantic and observational concepts and play a central role in explaining behavior. Peacocke (1986: 49–50) talks of “action-based ways of thinking”, Israel, Perry,and Tutiya (1993: 534) of “executable ideas”, and Pacherie (2000, 2006) of “action concepts”. Mylopoulous and Pacherie (2017) suggest that executable action concepts might be needed to overcome the interface problem—the problem of how cognitive representations (intentions) interact with motor representations (Butterfill & Sinigaglia 2014). Pavese (forthcoming-b) advances an empirical-functional case for practical concepts, arguing that they are needed to explain a distinctive sort of productive reasoning. Yet, other intellectualists argue we can dispense with practical modes of presentation altogether and instead appeal to ways of knowing that are distinctively practical or executive (Waights Hickman 2019; Cath 2020).

Levy (2017) argues that a form of intellectualism that only invokes practical ways of thinking and practical concepts might not be able to explain skillful motor behavior, for motor representations of the sort required for skilled action and posited by cognitive psychologists are non-conceptual. Along similar lines, Fridland (2014, 2017) argues motor control and motor representation cannot be countenanced by Stanley & Williamson’s (2001) and Stanley’s (2011b) forms of intellectualism. So, more promising forms of intellectualism might have to invoke, in addition to practical ways of thinking, non-conceptual practical representations (Pavese 2019; Krakauer 2020). Just like perceptual concepts are distinguished from non-conceptual perceptual representations, we might distinguish between practical conceptual representations and practical non-conceptual representations. Motor representations would fall under the latter heading. Nonconceptual motor representations also represent practically, as they break down a task in terms of the most basic operations that a system can perform.

Ryle (1949: 46) formulates the argument from gradability thus:

we never speak of a person having partial knowledge of a fact or truth … it is proper and normal to speak of a person knowing in part how to do something. Learning how or improving in ability is not like learning that or acquiring information. Truths can be imparted, procedures can only be inculcated, and while inculcation is a gradual process, imparting is relatively sudden.

As Kremer (2020: 102) points out, here Ryle is making two distinguishable points: (i) ascriptions of knowledge-how are gradable, whereas ascriptions of know-that are not; (ii) the gradability of these ascriptions is explained by the fact that knowledge-how must come in degrees, because learning-how brings improvement in knowledge-how. There is no parallel phenomenon in learning-that, and so no need for degrees of knowledge-that. Others have followed Ryle in thinking that the gradability argument shows intellectualism wrong. For example, Bengson and Moffett (2011b) argue that because knowledge-how is gradable, knowledge-how is more similar to acquaintance knowledge, which also comes in degrees (see also Ryle 1949: 46; Wiggins 2012; Santorio 2016; Kremer 2020: 102).

Pavese (2017) distinguishes between two kinds of gradability of knowledge-how ascriptions: one might know how to do something in part or entirely (quantitative gradability) or one might know how to do something better than somebody else (qualitative gradability). Crucially, these two kinds of gradability are also present more generally in other knowledge-wh (knowledge-when, who, why, where) ascriptions, which do seem to reduce to propositional knowledge. For instance, one might know in part who came to the party (Lahiri 1991, 2000; Roberts 2009) or know a better answer to that question than somebody else (see also Stanley 2011b: 31–5). If parts of an answer are propositions, then knowing an answer might still amount to knowledge of all of its parts. Knowing in part an answer would then amount to knowing at least one of the propositions that is part of that answer. Similarly, knowing a better answer amounts to knowing a proposition that better answers the relevant question. If this is true of other knowledge-wh ascriptions, it is certainly plausible that it is true for knowledge-how. One might know how to Φ in part by knowing only certain (propositional) parts of the answer to “how does one Φ?” and one might know a better answer to that question than someone else.

This response to the first part of the gradability objection inspires a further response to the second part concerning learning-how. Suppose that knowledge-how is a matter of knowing a practical answer, where a practical answer encompasses a practical representation for a task or a way to Φ ( section 2 ). As we have seen, practically representing requires possessing certain practical capacities and entails certain sorts of abilities. On this picture, one might gradually learn how to perform a task by gradually learning a practical answer to that question, for one requires time and practice to master a practical representation of how to perform the task. Thus, gradual learning may be compatible with the intellectualist picture, if it amounts to gradually coming to learn more parts of a practical answer.

4. The Linguistic Argument

Intellectualism has been motivated on the basis of a linguistic argument concerning knowledge-how ascriptions in English (Vendler 1972; Stanley & Williamson 2001; Snowdon 2004; Stanley 2011b, 2011c). Begin by noticing that (1) is remarkably similar to (2)–(3) (“finite knowledge wh ascriptions” as they embed a complement with a finitival verb) and to (4)–(5) (“infinitive knowledge-wh ascriptions” as they embed a complement with an infinitival verb):

According to the standard syntactic analysis, (2)–(5) have an interrogative as complement—“where is her piano located in the house?”, “who can play the piano?”, “what to do in case of an emergency?” are all interrogatives. Having said this, in broad outline, the linguistic argument for intellectualism has three steps. The first step is to follow the syntactic cues from (1)–(5) and identify the logical form of “ S knows how to Φ” with that of “ S knows + interrogative Q (= “how to Φ”). Call this premise Logical Form . The second step is to accept the orthodox semantics of knowledge-wh ascriptions, according to which in “ S knows + interrogative Q ”, Q denotes a question (C. Baker 1968) and according to which “ S knows + Q ” is true just in case S knows a proposition answering to the question expressed by Q . Call this premise Semantics for Knowledge-Wh (cf., among many others, Hamblin 1958, 1973; Hintikka 1976; Karttunen 1977; Heim 1994; Groenendijk & Stokhof 1982, 1997; and Higginbotham 1996). Finally, the third step is to extend this semantics to knowledge-how ascriptions, such that knowing how to Φ requires knowing a proposition that answers the question “how can one Φ?”

Next section (4.1) looks in some more detail to the intellectualist analysis of the truth conditions for knowledge-how ascriptions. The section after next ( 4.2 ) discusses several objections to the linguistic argument.

The linguistic argument concludes that Intellectualism is true:

Intellectualism about knowing how S knows how to Φ just in case S knows a proposition answering the question “how to Φ”.

But what is the proposition that one knows by knowing how to Φ?

First, note that the subject of the infinitival construction (“How to Φ”), or PRO, can either be interpreted de se ( de se PRO) or generically (generic PRO). According to the first interpretation, that an agent knows how to perform a ski stunt requires their knowing how to perform a ski stunt themselves . According to the latter interpretation, it requires knowing how one (as a generic agent or any other agent) would perform a ski stunt. When it comes to ascriptions of knowledge-how, we care about de se , and not generic, readings of knowing how. If an agent knows how to Φ in the relevant sense, they know how to Φ themselves.

Secondly, infinitival interrogatives such as “how to Φ” and “what to Φ” are ambiguous between a deontic reading ( how to Φ = how one should Φ; what to Φ = what one should do ) and an ability reading ( how to Φ = how one could Φ; what to Φ = what one could do ). The deontic reading does not seem relevant when we ascribe knowledge-how. Hence the relevant reading must be an ability reading. Joining these two disambiguations, the truth conditions of knowledge-how ascriptions are (cf. Schroeder 2012):

( Truth conditions ) “ S knows how to Φ” is true just in case S knows a proposition answering the question “How could they themselves Φ?”

Now, what counts as an answer to the question? Linguists distinguish between different kinds of answers that one might give to a question. An exhaustive answer to “How could S Φ?” would specify all the ways in which S could Φ; a mention-some answer , instead, would specify only one way in which S could Φ. For example, an exhaustive answer to the question “How could S make pasta?” would specify all different recipes for making pasta. A mention-some answer to the same question, instead, would specify (at least) only one recipe. When we ascribe knowledge-how, we don’t expect people to know all the possible ways of performing the relevant task. For example, “Mary knows how to make pasta” can be true, even if Mary only knows one recipe for pasta. This gives us the following truth conditions:

Intellectualism* “ S knows how to Φ” is true just in case S knows, for some way w of Φ -ing , that w is a way he himself could Φ.

As we have seen in section 2 , in addition to knowing that a way to Φ is a way to Φ, one needs to think of that way under a practical mode of presentation. Let Pr be a practical way of thinking of a way and let way of Φ -ing be a way of thinking of the property of being a way of Φ-ing; finally let ⦼ be a way of composing ways of thinking into a proposition. Then <Pr ⦼ way of Φ -ing > is the practical proposition that one comes to know when coming to know how to Φ. On how to implement Fregean senses in the compositional semantics, see Yalcin (2015).

Several philosophers have objected that intellectualists are giving undue weight to linguistic considerations and that other considerations, coming from the cognitive sciences, should be taken into account too, when thinking about the nature of knowledge-how (Noë 2005, 2011; Devitt 2011; Brown 2013; Johnson 2006; Glick 2011; Roth & Cummins 2011). It does not follow from this worry that the linguistic argument ought to be dismissed as lacking any evidential value. Consider an analogy. Arguably, the best theory of beliefs and desires is one on which these are propositional attitudes. This theory is compatible with how we ascribe beliefs and desires (i.e., ascriptions of beliefs are of the form “ S believes that p ”, where “ p ” is standardly taken to stand for proposition). But it is also compatible with folk psychology, according to which thinking of beliefs and desires as propositional attitudes helps explain behavior. By parity of reasoning, ideally, the best theory of knowledge-how should presumably be compatible both with our best psychological theory and our best linguistic theory of knowledge-how ascriptions (cf. Stanley 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Cath 2015a for a defense of the linguistic methodology).

Among those engaging with the linguistic argument, many have objected that it fails to adequately capture the truth conditions of knowledge-how ascriptions (Roberts 2009; Brogaard 2009, 2011; Michaelis 2011; Bengson & Moffett 2011a; Ginzburg 2011; Abbott 2013; Santorio 2016; Hornsby 2016). Some have argued against the claim that knowledge-wh is a matter of knowing a proposition that answers a question ( Semantics for knowledge-wh) . For example, Carr (1979, 1981) argues that when you know how to do something, you have an attitude that essentially takes an act as its object. But when you know that something is the case, you have an attitude that essentially takes a proposition as its object. Yet, intellectualists might reply that knowledge-how might be an attitude towards an act in virtue of being an attitude towards a proposition about that act.

Others have questioned whether the complement “which team is winning” in “ S knows which team is winning” is, semantically, just like an interrogative (Brogaard 2009, 2011; Ginzburg 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 2011; Ginzburg & Sag 2000). One argument against this assumption is that, if, e.g., “which team is winning” denoted a question, we would expect it to co-refer with “the question of which team is winning”. Yet we cannot substitute such expression-pairs salva veritate . Suppose Jenny knows/discovered/revealed an interesting question and suppose the interesting question discovered by Jenny is “who left yesterday?”. Even so, it does not follow that Jenny knows/discovered/revealed who left yesterday. A response to this objection might be that these examples exploit a subtle equivocation (Stanley 2011b: ch. 2, following King 2002). Consider “Jamaal discovered a new element”. In it, “discovered” denotes a relation between Jamaal and an object, a chemical element. On the other hand, in the sentence “Jamaal discovered who left yesterday”, “discovered” denotes a different relation, one that holds between Jamaal and something of a different sort, namely, the proposition answering the question expressed by “who left yesterday”. It is this second relation which is relevant for the intellectualist. This is supported by the fact that the “[t]he former relation would be expressed in German by ‘ kennen ’, and the latter by ‘ wissen ’” (Stanley 2011b: 66). (For more relevant discussion, see Parent 2014.)

Others have questioned Logical form —the claim that in knowledge-how ascriptions, the embedded complement is an interrogative. Objectualists claim that the complement of knowledge-how ascriptions (“how to Φ”) is not an interrogative but an “objectual” complement—one denoting ways to Φ instead of propositions representing these ways (Bengson & Moffett 2011a). Objectualism is motivated by the consideration that “knowing how to Φ” seems to be equivalent to “knowing a way to Φ” in pretty much every context and by the apparent gradability of “knows-how” ascriptions (cf. section 3 ). An objectual semantics is in a good place to explain the gradability of knowledge-how ascriptions, since objectual knowledge ascriptions also permit degree modifiers—one can have partial knowledge of Paris, or know Paris better than someone else. Along similar lines, Bach (2012) and Abbott (2013) argue that in knowledge-how ascriptions “how to Φ” might work as a free relative . A free relative is a wh-phrase that denotes an individual. So for example, “what I was given for dinner” can be used as an interrogative in “I asked what I was given for dinner” but also as a free relative in “I ate what I was given for dinner”. In the latter ascription, it denotes some food that was given to me for dinner. In that sense, “how to Φ” according to this proposal, in “ S knows how to Φ” should be interpreted as a free relative denoting a way to Φ, rather than an answer to the question “how to Φ?”

To this proposal, some respond that knowledge-how ascriptions do not pass the standard tests for detecting free relative complements (Schaffer 2009: 486–91; Habgood-Coote 2018a). Take the coordinated use of knowledge-how and other knowledge-wh ascriptions in “ S has always known how to swim and never has wondered how”. This coordination suggests that both kinds of ascriptions have an interrogative as a complement (Bresnan & Grimshaw 1978: 332; M. Baker 1996: 204–7). Further, knowledge-how ascriptions can be extended to embed a multiple interrogative, as in “Mark knows how to do what?” , whereas free relative complements do not tolerate multiple wh-phrases (C. Baker 1968; Bresnan & Grimshaw 1978: 335). Moreover, infinitival wh phrases, such as “what to do”, “how to do”, “who to ask” never allow for free relative reading (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 1070–3). Finally, a standard test for telling apart free relatives and interrogatives is to see if they embed under “believe”, for “believe” does not take interrogatives as complements but it does tolerate free relatives. (For example, “Mark believed who was charged guilty” cannot mean “Mark believed the answer to the question “Who was charged guilty?””. Rather, it means that Mark believed the person who was charged guilty.) However, interestingly, “believe” can never embed infinitival constructions such as “what to do”, “how to do”, or “who to ask”.

Finally, some have questioned whether Semantics for knowledge-wh applies to ascriptions embedding infinitival complements, like knowledge-how ascriptions. Roberts (2009) argues that, as opposed to other wh complements, the meaning of “how” denotes a property rather than a proposition when embedded in infinitival clauses. Santorio (2016) defends a Gibbardian semantics for knowledge ascriptions embedding infinitive interrogatives, on which these ascriptions ascribe maximal performance plans compatible with an agent’s plans (for more objections to Semantics for knowledge-wh , see also Sgaravatti & Zardini 2008 and George 2013).

The perhaps most serious objection to the linguistic argument is that it ignores cross-linguistic evidence about how knowledge-how is ascribed in languages other than English (Rumfitt 2003; Roberts 2009; Glick 2012; Wiggins 2012; Abbott 2013; Douskos 2013; Ditter 2016). Rumfitt (2003) argues that the linguistic facts on behalf of intellectualism are overstated. Many languages—e.g., French, Italian, Spanish, and Russian—ascribe knowledge-how not just through ascriptions embedding interrogatives (“ S knows how to Φ”) but also through ascriptions embedding bare infinitivals (“ S knows + (bare infinitive) to Φ” (= “ S knows to Φ”)) as in “ Marie sait nager ” and “ Maria sa nuotare ”. Stanley (2011b, 2011c) responds that these ascriptions are to be analyzed as embedding an implicit interrogative—one where the question word “how” is not explicitly articulated. However, Abbott (2013), Hornsby (2016), and Ditter (2016) have observed that this response does not help with yet other languages, such as Russian, in which knowledge-how ascriptions—of the form “ S (attitude verb) V s + (infinitive) to Φ”—feature an embedding verb V (“ umetj ”) that never licenses an interrogative complement nor a declarative complement (i.e., a that -clause).

In order to assess what this cross-linguistic evidence really establishes, consider a new version of the linguistic argument. Let “ S V s Φ” be an ascription of knowledge-how in an arbitrary language L that is correctly translated in English by “ S knows + (interrogative) how ( de se ) to Φ”. Assuming that translation preserves at least truth conditions, “ S V s Φ” will be true in L just in case “ S knows + (interrogative) how ( de se ) to Φ” is true in English. Call this the Interpretation Premise. By the Disquotational Schema, “ S knows how to Φ” is true in English just in case S knows how to Φ; so, we have that “ S V s Φ” is true in L just in case S knows how to Φ. This conclusion, together with the Semantics for knowledge wh , the Logical Form , and the Interpretation Premise , yields that “ S V s Φ” is true in L just in case S bears a knowledge relation towards an answer to the question “How he himself could Φ”. Through this argument, the truth conditions of any knowledge-how ascription, whether in English or in any other language, are reduced to propositional knowledge, whether the relevant knowledge-how ascription has or not the interrogative form.

Proponents of the cross-linguistic argument might challenge Logical Form : the different ways of ascribing knowledge-how (through the infinitival form and through the interrogative form) in these languages indicate that knowledge-how ascriptions in English are ambiguous between two not truth-conditionally equivalent logical forms: an interrogative form and a bare infinitival form ( Ambiguity Hypothesis ) (Rumfitt 2003; Wiggins 2012; Setiya 2012; Glick 2012; Ditter 2016; Hornsby 2016). The main piece of evidence for the Ambiguity Hypothesis is that in languages employing both the interrogative form and the infinitival form, those different ascriptions can come apart in their truth conditions. For example, it is claimed that the Italian sentence “ Mario sa come nuotare ” (interrogative form = “Mario knows how to swim”) may be usedly true, while the sentence “ Mario sa nuotare ” (infinitival form = Mario knows to swim) is false. This would be the case, for example, if Mario lacks (in some sense) the ability to swim (so too for its French and Spanish translations). Similarly, Ditter argues that in Russian, the interrogative construction must ascribe a different state from the “ umetj ” ascription (+ infinitival), on the ground that one can coherently use in Russian sentences of the following form:

John znaet kak igrat’ na pianino, no on ne umeyet igrat.

John knows + (interrogative) how to play the piano, but he does not know (“ umetj ”) + (infinitival) to play the piano.

“John knows how to play the piano, but he doesn’t know how to do it”.

According to these authors, this difference between interrogative embedding constructions and infinitival embedding construction shows up also in English locally for the verb learn : “ S learnt to swim” differs from “ S learnt how to swim” in that the former, but not the latter, is ability-entailing (Rumfitt 2003; Glick 2012).

This argument for the Ambiguity Hypothesis might be in certain ways too quick. The only way to make (6) intelligible in English is to translate it as (7), where the generic interpretation of the first knowledge-how ascription and the de se interpretation of the second ascription are made explicit:

However, (6) cannot be interpreted as (8) on pain of contradiction:

If so, the fact that (6) is acceptable in Russian does not establish that the interrogative form in Russian cannot also have an interpretation (the de se interpretation) on which it is truth conditionally equivalent to the Russian’s infinitival form. Here is a competitive explanation of the available cross-linguistic evidence that does not commit us to the Ambiguity Hypothesis . Just like English’s ascriptions, the interrogative form in Russian is ambiguous between a de se interpretation, on which it is truth conditionally equivalent to the infinitival form, and a generic interpretation of the subject of the infinitival embedded verb, on which it comes apart from the infinitival form. This explains why (6) is felicitous and why it can be translated as (7) but not as (8). On this explanation, this evidence might be compatible with English knowledge-how ascriptions univocally having the same logical form (the interrogative form), even though the embedded interrogative can receive either the generic or the de se interpretation, depending on the subject of the infinitival embedded verb.

Ryle is often interpreted as claiming that knowledge-how ascriptions are nothing more than ascriptions of an ability or a complex of dispositions to act in a skilled or intelligent manner (though see Hornsby 2011: 82 and Waights Hickman 2019 for dissent). This interpretation is based on passages in the Concept of Mind , such as the following:

When a person is described by one or other of the intelligence epithets such as “shrewd” or “silly”, “prudent” or “imprudent”, the description imputes to him not the knowledge or ignorance of this or that truth, but the ability, or inability, to do certain sorts of things. (Ryle 1949: 27)

Early intellectualists argued that knowledge-how does not entail ability (Ginet 1975; Stanley & Williamson 2001; Snowdon 2004). For example, a pianist who lost their arms in a car accident may have lost her ability to play but still preserve her knowledge-how to play the piano (cf. Snowdon’s 2004: 8 expert omelette maker); or a ski instructor might know how to do a ski stunt and, according to Stanley & Williamson (2001), still fail to have the ability to do it. By contrast, anti-intellectualists argue that it is important to distinguish between knowing how to perform a task, which corresponds to a general ability, and being (actually and circumstantially) able to perform it (Noë 2005; Glick 2012; Setiya 2012). So the pianist might have both general ability as well as knowledge-how, though they lack circumstantial ability. By contrast, the ski instructor does not clearly have knowledge-how to perform the ski stunt themselves, while they know how one , in general, can do it. Recent intellectualist views also take knowledge-how to go together with abilities (understood along Hawley’s 2003 notion of counterfactual success) and argue that rightly construed intellectualism can vindicate this connection (Pavese 2015b; Cath 2020).

Yet, everybody agrees that while knowledge-how might entail ability, ability is not sufficient for knowledge-how, as demonstrated by an example from Hawley (2003):

Annoyance. Susie is attempting to annoy Joe; she thinks smoking will do the trick. Whenever she smokes, she unconsciously and inadvertently taps on her cigarette pack. Unbeknownst to Susie, Joe does not mind cigarette smoke, but finds her tapping obnoxious.

Susie has the ability to annoy Joe, since she has the disposition to annoy Joe whenever she attempts to do so. But, intuitively, she does not know how to annoy him. A natural explanation of this is that she cannot annoy him intentionally (for structurally similar cases, see Carr 1979, 1981 and Bengson, Moffett, & Wright 2009). Pretty much all sides of the dispute agree on the following claim (Ryle 1949; Stanley & Williamson 2001; Hawley 2003; Hornsby 2004, 2011; Stanley 2011b; Setiya 2012):

( Knowledge-how/Intentionality ): If S intentionally Φs, S knows how to Φ.

Many also endorse the biconditional ( Knowledge-how/Ability Intentional ) (Hawley 2003; Setiya 2012):

( Knowledge-how/Ability Intentional ): S has the ability to intentionally Φ if and only if S knows how to Φ.

Now, suppose that knowing how to Φ does require the ability to intentionally perform Φ. If so, whether knowledge-how requires a propositional attitude depends on whether or not one can intentionally Φ without having a propositional attitude about how to Φ. But according to many influential views of intentional action, intentionally Φ-ing does require a propositional attitude, namely a belief about how to Φ. In particular, intentionally Φ-ing requires having an action plan, which is characterizable in terms of a belief about how to perform Φ. For example, on Goldman’s (1970) view, one intentionally Φs when one has a plan to Φ, where a plan to Φ is a belief that specifies the means to Φ (see, also, e.g., Harman 1976; Audi 1986; Bratman 1987; Velleman 1989; Ginet 1990; Mele & Moser 1994; Gibbons 2001). From this, we get:

( Intentionality/Belief ): If S intentionally Φs, then there are some means $m_1$, …, $m_n$ to Φ such that S truly believes that $m_1$, …, $m_n$ are means for oneself to Φ.

Some intellectualists have argued on these bases that knowledge-how to Φ requires at least a propositional attitude about the means to Φ (Cath 2015b).

But is propositional knowledge of means to ends required for intentional action, over and above true belief? Gibbons (2001) provides several examples to buttress the necessity of knowledge for intentional action. For example, one cannot plausibly intentionally win a fair lottery , nor can one intentionally defuse a bomb if one unintentionally and fortuitously chooses the correct wire; in both cases, a plausible explanation for the lack of intentionality is that the subjects does not have the relevant propositional knowledge about how to accomplish those tasks. These cases buttress the claim that intentional action requires knowledge of the means to execute it:

( Intentionality/Knowledge ): If S intentionally Φs, then there are some means $m_1$, …, $m_n$ to Φ such that s knows that $m_1$, …, $m_n$ are means for oneself to Φ.

With these assumptions in the background, here is a non-linguistic argument for intellectualism. Start from ( Knowledge-how/Intentionality ): if S intentionally Φs, S knows how to Φ. Furthermore, suppose that ( Intentionality/Knowledge ) is true so that the intentionality of an action is to be explained at least in part in terms of propositional knowledge. Then, by these two premises, we get that if one intentionally Φs, one both knows how to Φ and one has propositional knowledge of the means to Φ:

( Knowledge-how, Intentionality, Knowledge ): If S intentionally Φs, S both knows how to Φ and for some means $m_1$, …, $m_n$, S knows that means $m_1$ , …, $m_n$ are means for oneself to Φ.

Now, according to standard formulations of intellectualism, one knows how to Φ only if, for some means m to Φ, one knows that m is a means for one to Φ:

( Intellectualism about Knowledge-How ): S knows how to Φ is at least in part of a matter of knowing, for some means m to Φ, S knows that m is a means for oneself to Φ.

So, the argument from intentional action for intellectualism maintains that the intellectualist picture provides the best explanation for why ( Knowledge-How, Intentionality, Knowledge ) should hold. According to this explanation, ( Knowledge-How, Intentionality, Knowledge ) is true not just because of a coincidental alignment of propositional knowledge and knowledge-how in intentional action. Rather, its truth is grounded on the very nature of knowledge-how: one knows how to Φ in virtue of knowing, for some means m to Φ, that m is a means for oneself to Φ.

The view that intentional action requires belief has been challenged for the particular case of basic actions . Setiya (2012) observes that one can perform a basic action of clenching one’s fist without even having the belief that one can succeed at doing it. For example, someone might have had a paralyzing injury, fail to believe they have healed, and still form the intention to clench their fist. Intellectualists might reply that, although that subject does not believe that one will succeed, they might have a sufficiently high credence and that credence can amount to knowledge too (Pavese 2020). (For other possible responses to the idea that intentional action requires knowledge or belief, see Elzinga forthcoming).

A further related question is how to think of knowledge-how in the case of joint actions. When two agents act jointly towards a goal, as when they row a boat together, they responsively coordinate and monitor each other’s movements in ways that produce a joint action. What kind of knowledge-how is manifested by successful joint action? It must be possible for the agents to coordinate without each having to know the different ways in which each must act to achieve their common goals: you and I can jointly make risotto even if I do not know how to season it and you do. Correspondingly, Birch (2019) suggests that joint knowledge-how must be accounted for distributively . If this is correct, then the agents can jointly know how to do something without each having a belief about how they jointly do it, but only in virtue of having a collective, or group, belief about how to do it. (For more discussion on group knowledge-how, see Palermos & Tollefsen 2018 and Strachan, Knoblich & Sebanz 2020)

6. The Epistemology of Knowledge-How

Some have observed that knowledge-how may differ from propositional knowledge in that, whereas the latter plausibly entails belief, knowledge-how does not (Dreyfus 1991, 2005; Wallis 2008; Brownstein & Michaelson 2016). For example, consider Brownstein & Michaelson (2016)’s example. When catching a ball, ball players make anticipatory saccades to shift their gaze ahead of the ball one or more times during the course of its flight towards them. These players know how to catch a ball, and their way of catching a ball requires making anticipatory saccades when watching the ball as it falls. Yet, the players do not believe that making anticipatory saccades is part of how they catch the ball. Rather they believe that they are tracking the ball the whole time. However, from the fact that the subject has false beliefs about how she catches the ball, it does not follow that the subject does not also have correct beliefs about it. So, a natural response is that there is some sense in which the player correctly believes that his manner of tracking the ball has a chance of resulting in success.

Whether this response is compelling might depend on what one takes beliefs to be. On this topic, philosophers widely disagree. On an “intellectualist” account of belief, on which believing that p requires the subject to acknowledge that p , it is implausible that the athletes have the relevant belief. But intellectualists about knowledge-how might advocate replacing this intellectual notion of belief with a less demanding one. According to a prominent functional characterization of belief, to believe that p entails being disposed to act in ways that would tend to satisfy one’s desires, whatever they are, in a world in which p (together with one’s other beliefs) are true” (cf. Stalnaker 1984: 15; Stalnaker 2012). Now, suppose that in game after game, Athena catches the ball using a certain method m , and that whenever she does so, her behavior is intentional. From this it seems to follow that Athena is disposed to perform the actions specified by m . Since, ex hypothesi , m is a way of catching the ball, it follows that in all the worlds where she performs these actions, she satisfies her desire of catching the ball (or at least is sufficiently likely to do so). By the previous functional characterization of belief, it follows that Athena believes that m is a way for her to catch the ball. The lesson of this debate might be, following Stalnaker (2012), that intellectualism about knowledge-how is best construed as a form of anti-intellectualism about knowledge, belief, and the mental.

Another way of challenging the intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that is to question whether knowledge-how can be Gettiered. If knowledge-how survives Gettierization, that would be evidence that knowledge-how is not a species of knowledge-that, on the assumption that Gettiered justified true belief cannot constitute propositional knowledge (Gettier 1963). Stanley & Williamson (2001) argue that knowledge-how cannot be Gettiered. However, Cath (2011) responds by proposing the Lucky Light Bulb case, where Charlie wants to learn how to change a lightbulb, but he knows almost nothing about light fixtures or bulbs. Charlie consults The Idiot’s Guide to Everyday Jobs . Inside, he finds an accurate set of instructions describing the shape of a light fixture and bulb, and the way to change a bulb. Charlie grasps these instructions perfectly. And so there is a way such that Charlie now believes truly that that way is a way for him to change a light bulb, namely, the way described in the book. However, unbeknownst to Charlie, he is extremely lucky to have read these instructions, for the disgruntled author of The Idiot’s Guide filled her book with otherwise misleading instructions. Cath (2011) argues that intuitively Charlie still knows how to fix the light bulb, despite his belief being Gettiered (cf. also Poston 2009: 744).

Stanley replies that knowledge-wh in general seems to be Gettierable and that might be explained in terms of features having to do with knowing the answer . For example, consider Hawthorne’s (2000) example of a teacher giving each child in their class a note with the name of a city. “Vienna” is written only on one of the notes. In this context, it seems true that one child knows the correct answer to the question “what is the capital of Austria”, even though the child’s belief is true by luck. (Though see Carter & Pritchard 2015c for a reply that while knowledge-how is similar to knowledge-that and knowledge-wh in that it is incompatible with intervening luck, it differs with these kinds of knowledge in being compatible with environmental luck.) Others still have responded that intuitions are subtle and not all of them favor anti-intellectualism (Marley-Payne 2016; Pavese forthcoming-a). For a recent experimental study with mixed results, see Carter, Pritchard, and Shepherd (2019). Hawley (2003: 28) argues that knowledge-how, like propositional knowledge, requires “warrant” on the ground that success on the basis of a lucky guess does not seem to manifest one’s knowledge-how. A similar theoretical argument for thinking that lucky belief cannot suffice for knowledge-how starts from the thesis that knowledge-how enters in explanations of success and that satisfactory explanations must be “modally robust”. From this, the argument concludes that the sort of belief that robustly explains intentional success must be knowledge, for knowledge has the relevant modal profile (Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000; D. Greco 2016). Another line of argument starts from the observations that knowledge-how to Φ explains the ability to intentionally Φ (see section 4 ) and that only knowledge can explain intentional action (Gibbons 2001: 589–590). On these bases, some argue that knowledge-how cannot fall short of non-getteriable knowledge (Cath 2015b for objections to this line of argument).

Some object that while knowledge-that can be defeated by misleading evidence, not so knowledge-how (see Carter & Navarro 2017 for this line of argument and Pavese 2021 for a reply). Finally, some object that knowledge-how cannot be knowledge-that because the latter is acquirable by testimony and the former is not. While the following argument (A–C) is valid, the following (i–iii) is not (Poston 2016):

Mark knows that Turin is in Northern Italy.
Mark tells that to John, who believes him.
John comes to know that Turin is in Northern Italy.
Mark knows how John could swim.
Mark tells John.
John comes to know how to swim.

Following Stanley’s (2011b: 126) modal restriction proposal (cf. section 3 ), Cath (2017, 2019) responds that depending on how the context for the modal is restricted, (i) could mean either that Mark knows how John could swim given his current physical state or how John could swim after training . If only the latter, that is not the sort of proposition that John needs to know in order for (iii) to be true: for that, John ought to know that that is how he could swim under his current physical state. (Though see section 2 for qualms about this intellectualist strategy.) Another avenue for reply to the challenge from testimony may be to insist that not every propositional knowledge is transferable through testimony. A comparison: visual knowledge that Mark murdered Tina differs in content and mode of presentation from the knowledge that of the murder obtained by being told by his prosecutor. The former observational knowledge is not transferable through mere testimony but (exactly because of that!) it is more helpful for the purpose of convicting Mark than second-hand knowledge. That does not mean that observational knowledge is not propositional. Like in the case of perceptual knowledge, the proposition that one knows by knowing how to do something involves distinct modes of presentation of ways of doing things ( section 2 , section 3 ). We should not expect propositions under this mode of presentation to be transferable through testimony. (For a response to Poston 2016, see also Peet 2019).

7. The Argument from Cognitive Science

The argument from cognitive science against intellectualism starts by pointing out that cognitive scientists distinguish between different kinds of cognitive systems: It is often held that the declarative system is responsible for encoding propositional knowledge, whereas knowledge-how is encoded in the procedural system . Given empirical evidence that the declarative and procedural systems are separate (about which more below), it would seem to follow that knowledge-how is not reducible to propositional knowledge (Wallis 2008; Devitt 2011; Roth & Cummins 2011):

The Cognitive Science Argument

The usual evidence marshaled in favor of C1 relies on amnesiac case studies (Milner 1962; see Cohen & Squire 1980 for discussion). A typical example is HM. After bilateral removal of the hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, entorhinal cortex, and most of the amygdala to relieve debilitating symptoms of epilepsy, HM was unable to form new memories of facts or events and he could no longer access memories he acquired in the few years leading up to his surgery. Nevertheless, it was found that over 10 trials, HM tuned his motor skill to trace the outline of a five-pointed star based only on looking at reflection in a mirror. Since he could not store new memories, HM’s declarative knowledge of the means of performing the task did not change from one trial to the next. But his performance improved. So, the reasoning goes, the improvement of motor skills is governed by a distinct cognitive system from that which governs the retention of declarative facts.

Many embrace C2 (e.g., Lewicki, Czyzewska, & Hoffman 1987: 523; Devitt 2011; Wallis 2008). But some object that a closer look at the details of HM’s case (as reported in Milner 1962) supports a different diagnosis, on which knowledge-how is realized by a combination of the procedural and the declarative system (Pavese 2013; Stanley & Krakauer 2013). At the beginning of each trial, prior to being given verbal instructions on how to perform the motor task, HM lacked the ability to intentionally perform it: HM was able to perform the motor task only after being reminded of what the task consisted in . This suggests, against C2, that there was an important declarative component to HM’s ability to perform the motor task (for the role of declarative knowledge in skillful action, see also Christensen, Sutton, & Bicknell 2019).

Here is a possible way to patch up the Argument from Cognitive Science (Fridland 2014, 2017; Levy 2017). Replace C2 with:

With C2*, the argument goes on as before. Stanley & Krakauer (2013) seems to accept this conclusion (for more discussion and critiques, see Krakauer 2019; Springle 2019; De Brigard 2019; Schwartz & Drayson 2019). Other intellectualists reply that this argument misses the intellectualist target. Cath (2020) argues that procedural representation might be a prerequisite for knowledge-how rather than a constituent. Pavese (2019) develops an account on which procedural representations, of the sort studied by motor scientists when giving an account of the procedural aspect of skill (Wolpert 1997; Jeannerod 1997), can be understood as practical, albeit nonconceptual, representations—the sort of representations that intellectualism independently requires for knowledge-how ( section 2 ).

According to C3, propositional knowledge corresponds to “declarative” knowledge—to a sort of knowledge that is, at least in principle, verbalizable. Opponents of intellectualism often uses C3 in a novel argument against intellectualism: if propositional knowledge has to be verbalizable, then knowledge-how cannot be propositional knowledge, for often subjects know how to perform tasks even though they cannot explain how they do it (Schiffer 2002; Devitt 2011; Adams 2009; Wallis 2008). On behalf of intellectualism, there do seem to be cases in which you come to know how to do something precisely by consulting a manual and learning some propositions (see, e.g., Snowdon 2004: 12; Bengson and Moffett 2011a: 8; and Katzoff 1984: 65ff). Moreover, it is not clear that the anti-intellectualist demand that propositional knowledge be always verbalizable is motivated. In fact, it seems to conflate knowing how to perform a task with knowing how to explain how the task is performed (cf. Fodor 1968: 634; Stalnaker 2012). Stanley (2011b: 161) points out that there is a sense in which knowledge-how is always verbalizable. A punch-drunk boxer who can at best demonstratively refer to his re-enactment of the way of boxing against southpaws, and says, “This is the way I fight against a southpaw” intuitively knows that this is the way he fights against southpaws. This knowledge has an essential demonstrative or indexical component. But the same goes for much other propositional knowledge like, for example, the knowledge we express by saying, “This is the tool for the job”, or “That is going to be trouble”. This reply assumes that ways to execute tasks are ostensible and as such can be picked up by a demonstrative. This does not need to be so: on any single occasion, one may only act on parts of a way. So, one will not thereby be able to pick up the general way one’s knowledge-how is about. Another reply on behalf of intellectualism is to point out that practical concepts for tasks differ from “semantic” concepts for the same tasks precisely in that, even if propositional, they are not necessarily verbalizable.

A final objection is that intellectualism overintellectualizes knowledge-how in a way that is incompatible with what we know about animals’ cognition (Noë 2005; Hornsby 2007; Dreyfus 2007; Elzinga forthcoming). According to this objection, unsophisticated and non- (or pre-) linguistic agents such as babies and non-human animals can know how to perform certain tasks, while lacking the concepts that are required for propositional knowledge. Some intellectualists respond that ordinary speakers routinely also ascribe propositional knowledge to animals and babies, as we say that Fido knows that its owner is arriving or that a baby knows that their mother is present (Stanley & Williamson 2001). Thus, while propositional knowledge may require concept possession, our ordinary knowledge ascriptions suggest that we regard relatively unsophisticated agents as possessing the relevant concepts. Comparative psychologists do routinely credit many non-human and non-linguistic animals with the possession of concepts. (See Allen & Bekoff 1999 for a comprehensive overview).

This response might be less plausible, though, when it comes to lower animals, or insects. Here too, we might describe ants as knowing how to carry food back to their nest. And yet, there is less evidence from cognitive science that insects are capable of concepts too (though see Gallistel & King 2009). In response, a different line of argument might be more promising (cf. McDowell 2007): it does not follow from the fact that we are disposed to ascribe knowledge-how to lower animals that what explains their goal-directed behavior is the same sort of psychological state that underlies human knowledge-how and human action. For from the fact that their behavior resembles humans’ in some respects (for example, in its goal-directedness) does not entail that it resembles humans’ skilled behavior in all respects that matter (for example, in the susceptibility of the relevant behavior to rational revision).

8. Varieties of Anti-Intellectualism

According to orthodox intellectualism, knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Revisionary intellectualism, instead, contends that although knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that, the relevant knowledge is sui generis and differs from standard propositional knowledge in some important ways. For example, Brogaard (2009, 2011) argues that, in general, knowledge can have cognitive abilities or practical abilities as its justificatory grounds. In the latter case, agents know in virtue of ability states that are not subject to the usual epistemic constraints that characterize belief states generated by cognitive abilities. Correspondingly, knowledge-how fits the bill for this practically grounded knowledge. Cath (2015b) argues that we should distinguish between theoretical knowledge-that and practical knowledge-that. The former is subject to the usual epistemic constraints, like being sensitive to Gettierization (cf. also Zardini 2013). The latter, instead, is not sensitive to the usual epistemic constraints of theoretical knowledge-that—and can therefore constitute knowledge-that even if Gettierized. Waights Hickman (2019) suggests that knowledge-how is a distinct kind of knowledge-that relation, characterized by knowing something in “the executive way”, which requires

possession of (a) dispositions to attend to features of an action-context on which one’s knowledge (how) bears; and (b) dispositions to adjust one’s use of that knowledge accordingly. (2019: 333).

As we have seen ( section 4 ), Bengson & Moffett (2007, 2011b) defend Non-propositional (or Objectualist) Intellectualism . On this view, knowing how to Φ necessarily involves having objectual knowledge of a way of Φ-ing but having objectual knowledge of a way of Φ-ing is not sufficient to know how to Φ. For example, a tropical swimmer may be acquainted with a way of escaping an avalanche, namely making swimming motions. Yet, if this swimmer had no conception whatsoever of an avalanche or of snow, he would not know how to escape an avalanche. This suggests that there must be some propositional/representational aspect of knowing how to Φ. Hence, according to this view for one to know how to Φ, (i) one must have objectual knowledge of a way of Φ-ing and (ii) one must grasp a correct and complete conception of this way.

As we have seen, Ryle is often interpreted as claiming that knowledge-how ascriptions are nothing more than ascriptions of an ability or a complex of dispositions to act in a skilled or intelligent manner (Hornsby 2011). (For a recent defense of knowledge-how as an ability, see Markie 2015.) Anti-intellectualism of this sort has been voiced by Lewis (1990) and has been thought to undercut the so-called “knowledge-argument” in the philosophy of mind (see Jackson 1986 for a classic formulation. For further discussion, see Nemirow 1990 and Alter 2001). However, Cath (2009) argues that similar worries about the argument survive even on some prominent intellectualist views. For a survey of other consequences thought to follow from the various positions in the knowledge-how debate, see Bengson and Moffett (2011b: 44–54).

However, few theorists nowadays identify knowledge-how with bare abilities. Setiya (2012) holds that to have knowledge-how is to have the disposition to act guided by one’s intention; Constantin (2018) argues that knowing how to Φ is to have the disposition to have the ability to Φ. Neo-Rylean views are also developed by Craig (1990), Wiggins (2012), and Löwenstein (2016). Craig suggests that knowledge-how to Φ amounts to the ability to teach others how to Φ. Wiggins argues that genuine knowledge-how stems from a bundle of practical abilities that constitute the ethos of a practice and, while interrelated with propositional knowledge, cannot be reduced to it. In turn, Löwenstein argues that knowledge-how to Φ is the ability to Φ intelligently guided by the understanding of the activity of Φ-ing.

Carter and Pritchard (2015a,b,c) develop an alternative view which does not equate knowledge-how with an ability, but it still gives ability a central theoretical role. In their view, knowing how to Φ is a cognitive achievement, given our abilities to Φ: if one successfully Φs because of one’s ability, then one knows how to Φ. And if one knows how to Φ, then one is positioned to successfully Φ because of one’s ability. Therefore, for them, knowledge-how does not reduce to the mere possession of abilities but it essentially involves the successful enactment of these abilities. Habgood-Coote (2019) defends the view that knowing how to Φ just is the ability to generate the right answers to the question of how to Φ. Although on this view, knowledge-how is a relation an agent bears to a proposition—one that answers the relevant practical question—this relation to a proposition is not understood in epistemic terms but in terms of dispositions (see also Audi 2017 and Farkas 2017).

8.3 Radical Anti-Intellectualism: Practicalism

While the intellectualist holds that knowledge-how must be understood in terms of knowledge-that, radical anti-intellectualism holds that knowledge-that must be understood in terms of knowledge-how or skill. As Hetherington puts it:

Your knowing that p is your having the ability to manifest various accurate representations of p . The knowledge as such is the ability as such. (2011: 42, original emphasis)

An agent knows that, for instance, she is in France whenever she is able to produce the corresponding true belief, to assert that she is indeed in France, provide justification, answer related questions, etc. (see Hartland-Swann 1956; Roland 1958 for classic formulation and Hetherington’s 2006, 2011, 2020 “practicalism” for a more recent form of radical anti-intellectualism).

9. Knowledge-How and Skill

The most recent debate on knowledge-how has intertwined with a debate on the nature of skills. While there is no consensus on what counts as a skill, by and large people take skills to manifest in purposeful and goal-directed activities and to be learnable and improvable through practice (Fitts & Posner 1967; Stanley & Krakauer 2013; Willingham 1998; Yarrow, Brown, & Krakauer 2009). Skills are usually contrasted with knacks (or mere talents). Some contrast them with habits (Pear 1926; Ryle 1949) in that these are performed automatically, whereas the exercise of intelligent capacities involves self-control, attention to the conditions, and awareness of the task. Others, instead, argue that understanding skill requires a better understanding of what habits amount to (Gallagher 2017; Hutto & Robertson 2020).

The topic of skill and expertise is central since ancient philosophy through the notion of technē . Although both Plato and Aristotle took technē to be a kind of knowledge, there is significant controversy about their conceptions regarding the nature of this kind of knowledge and its relation to experience ( empeiria ) on one hand, and scientific knowledge ( epistēmē ) on the other (Johansen 2017; Lorenz & Morison 2019; Coope 2020). Annas (1995, 2001, 2011) develops an interpretation on which skill and virtue (or phronēsis ) are closer in Aristotle’s action theory than usually thought and they are both conceived along a broadly intellectualist model.

In contemporary times, the notion of skill is central to the philosophy of the twentieth-century French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty (1945 [1962]) distinguishes between motor intentionality —the sort of intentionality relevant for motor skills—and cognitive intentionality . While the latter is conceptual and representational, Merleau-Ponty thought that motor intentionality is non-representational and non-conceptual. Central to Merleau-Ponty is the role of motor skills in shaping perceptual experience: in paradigmatic cases of perception, the flow of information taken in by perceivers is inseparable from the way they move through a scene. On this view, even superficially static perceptions engage motor skills, such as seeing the color of a table as uniform when different parts of it are differently illuminated (see Siegel 2020 for an helpful introduction).

This phenomenological tradition inspires Dreyfus’ (1991, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2007) critique of standard action theory. According to Dreyfus, theories on which an action is intentional only if the agent is in a mental state that represents the goal of her action (cf. Searle 1980, 2001) or on which actions are permeated by conceptual rationality (cf. McDowell 2007) are not supported by the phenomenology of purposive activity. Paradigmatic examples of these purposive activities are, for Dreyfus, skillful activities like playing tennis or habitual activity like rolling over in bed or making gestures while speaking. In this sort of skillful coping, Dreyfus thought that the mind does not represent the world as detached from it. Rather, it is fundamentally embedded, absorbed, and embodied (see Gehrman & Schwenkler 2020 for an helpful introduction to Dreyfus on skills).

The notion of skill is central also in Eastern philosophy. Garfield and Priest (2020) examine the various roles that the notion of skill plays in the Indian school of Mahayana Buddhism, in Daoism, and in Chan/Zen thought. In Daoism as well as in Chan/Zen Buddhism, the emphasis on skill is also connected, fundamentally, to concerns about living a good and ethical life. Sarkissan (2020) argues that two prominent types of expertise often encountered in ancient Chinese thought from the sixth to third centuries BCE: The first is expertise at a particular craft, occupation, or dao , as is most famously presented in the Daoist anthology Zhuangzi . The second is ethical expertise in the Ruist (Confucian) and Mohist schools (cf. for more on skill in Buddhism, see also MacKenzie 2020).

What is the relation between knowledge-how and skill? For many tasks at least, it is intuitive that one cannot be skilled at it without knowing how to perform it. At first, it also seems as if knowledge-how entails skill: one does not really know how to swim if one does not have the skill to swim; and one cannot know how to tell apart birds without the skills of a bird watcher. One might object to the sufficiency of knowledge-how for skill on the grounds that it is natural to say things such as “John may know how to make risotto, but I would not say he is skilled at it”. However, knowing how to make risotto sufficiently well (relative to contextually determined standards) might entail being skilled at it (relative to the same standards) (Cath 2020).

Ryle (1946, 1949) used “skill” and “knowledge-how” interchangeably in his criticism of the “Intellectualist legend” (for discussion, see Kremer 2020). In fact, Ryle’s view of knowledge-how is stated, literally, as the view that “skill” is a complex of dispositions (Ryle 1949: 33; see also Ryle 1967, 1974, 1976 for his views on how skill as a form of knowledge is distinguished by the forms on how it is taught and learned through training). This discussion brings us to whether intellectualism about knowledge-how and intellectualism about skill stand or fall together. Should intellectualists about knowledge-how identify skill too with propositional knowledge? While Stanley and Williamson (2001) embrace the view that knowledge-how is propositional knowledge, in a recent paper (Stanley & Williamson 2017), they refuse to think of skill as a standing propositional knowledge state. Rather, they argue that skills are dispositions to know. One motivation for this view is that this addresses the novelty challenge raised by Dreyfus (1991, 2005). According to this challenge, propositional knowledge cannot explain the ability to respond intelligently to situations that have not been encountered by the agent before. If skills are dispositions to know, it is no mystery how novel situations can be handled by skillful agents. Stanley & Williamson (2017) claim that the resulting view is still broadly intellectualist in a sense, because on it, skillful action manifests propositional knowledge (for a criticism of this response to the novelty objection, see Pavese 2016 in Other Internet Resources ).

Some authors argue that while skills may be related to propositional knowledge, they do not reduce to it. Dickie (2012) suggests that an agent is skilled at Φ whenever her intentions to Φ are non-lucky selectors of non-lucky means to Φ; while, in turn, these means might manifest propositional knowledge. Some argue that control is necessary for skills, and control cannot fully be understood in terms of propositional knowledge (Fridland 2014, 2017a, 2017b). In order to provide a theory of skill that makes room for control, Fridland (2020) develops a “functional” account of skills. In this view, a skill is a function from intentions to action, implemented through certain “control structures”, which include attention and strategic control. Among these control structures, there is also propositional knowledge, which is required for strategic control. In contrast, intellectualists about skills argue that being in control is not intelligible unless it is understood in terms of knowing what one is doing in virtue of knowing how to perform that action. Therefore, they argue that agentive control itself is best understood in terms of the capacity for propositional knowledge.

Understanding the nature of skill and its relation with knowledge is of crucial importance for virtue epistemology—the view that knowledge is to be defined in terms of the success of our cognitive skills (Zagzebski 2003, 2008; Sosa 2007, 2009; J. Greco 2003, 2010; Pritchard 2012; Turri 2013, 2016; Beddor & Pavese 2020; Pritchard 2020). Nevertheless, if it turns out that skill must be explained in terms of knowledge, virtue epistemology would be trying to account for knowledge in terms of knowledge and so would be viciously circular (see Millar 2009; Stanley & Williamson 2017 for an argument in this spirit). Some virtue epistemologists have responded by offering an anti-intellectualist account of knowledge-yielding cognitive skills. Sosa and Callahan (2020) describe the relevant skills as dispositions to succeed when one tries—such that knowledge is obtained when agents in the right shape and in the right situation enact these skills appropriately.

Recent discussions on skill include a renewed debate on the nature of skilled action—i.e., on the sort of processes that are involved in the manifestation of skills. The most recent discussion on skilled action concerns the extent to which they are automatic or under conscious control. A long tradition has taken skilled action to be paradigmatically a matter of “absorbed coping” (Heidegger 1927; Merleau-Ponty 1945 [1962]; Dreyfus 1991)—characterized as immersion in the situation and intuitive response to its demands, with little awareness of the body, tools or even possibly the activity itself. Following Dreyfus and the phenomenological tradition, some enactivists (e.g., Noë 2004) highlight the analogies between skillful behavior and perception; other enactivists (e.g., Gallagher 2017; Hutto & Robertson 2020) argue that in order to understand the automaticity and unreflectiveness of skilled action, we ought to better understand habitual behavior. Even outside the phenomenological tradition, people have emphasized the unreflective aspect of skilled action. For example, Papineau (2013) argues that skilled actions are typically too fast for conscious control. One important argument for the unreflectiveness of skilled action starts from the phenomenon of choking under pressure, where an individual performs significantly worse than would be expected in a high-pressure situation. This phenomenon has been taken to be evidence that skillful action proceeds without conscious attention, because choking episodes are thought to arise from the fact that anxiety leads one to focus and direct one’s mind on the performance, which would proceed smoothly if mindless (Baumeister 1984; Masters 1992; Beilock & Carr 2001; Ford, Hodges, & Williams 2005; Jackson, Ashford, & Norsworthy 2006; Gucciardi & Dimmock 2008). Some argue that unreflectiveness also characterizes skillful joint action (Høffding 2014; Gallagher and Ilundáin-Agurruza 2020).

In recent years, however, some have emphasized the role of attention and consciousness in skillful performance (Montero 2016, 2020; Wu 2016, 2020). Montero argues against the Dreyfusian idea of skillful and mindless coping, by noting that online conscious thought about what one is doing is compatible with expertise and by surveying empirical evidence that suggests revisiting the choking argument. Christensen, Sutton and McIlwain (2016) and Christensen, Sutton, and Bicknell’s (2019) argue for the centrality of cognition in explaining the flexibility of skilled action in complex situations and advance a “mesh theory” of skilled action, according to which skilled action results for a mesh of both automatic and cognitively controlled processes (for a survey of some of these issues, Christensen 2019. See also Sutton 2007 and Fridland 2017b).

Knowledge-how is related to but distinct from practical knowledge (Anscombe 1957). Practical knowledge is occurrent during intentional action: when one intentionally acts, one knows what one is doing while knowing it. While being capable of practical knowledge might require knowledge-how, knowing how to perform an action does not entail performing that action, and so does not entail practical knowledge (Setiya 2008; Schwenkler 2019; Small 2020). Some have argued knowledge-how is the norm of intention (Habgood-Coote 2018b), so that one can properly intend to perform an act only if one knows how to perform it.

An important question is whether knowledge-how is connected to distinctive kinds of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007; Dotson 2011; Collins 1990, 1998; Medina 2011). Hawley (2011) discusses the phenomena whereby people ascribe less knowledge-how and ability to female musicians (Goldin & Rouse 2000) and whereby standards for judgments of success due to ability rather than luck or “instinct” tend to be higher for women and non-white men (Biernat & Kobrynowicz 1997). In these cases, agents may be transmitting knowledge by being direct sources of information, rather than by testifying to the truth of a proposition. If so, the harms that they suffer might call for a different account than standard cases of epistemic injustices like Fricker’s (2007), which focus on testimonial transmission of knowledge-that.

A final topic of interest is the relation between knowledge-how and faith. While most views on faith focus on its doxastic aspect, Sliwa (2018) argues that faith essentially involves agents acting in the right way with respect to the object of their faith. Having faith in a person, for instance, requires knowing how to interact with them so as to trust them, help them, and ensure their autonomy in general. Religious faith, similarly, requires faithful agents to know how to enact the relevant practices like going to mass, declaring one’s faith, and praying.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Weatherson, Brian, 2006, “Ryle on Knowing How ’, blog post at Thoughts Arguments and Rants.
Links in Phil Papers to recent work on knowledge-how , edited by John Bengson.
“ Know-how ,’ by Charles Wallis in Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind .
“ Knowledge ,” by Stephen Hetherington in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
Pavese, Carlotta, 2016, “Comments on “ Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions ” by Joshua Habgood-Coote”, Minds Online (blog), 5 September 2016.
Fantl, Jeremy, “Knowledge How”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/knowledge-how/ >. [This was the previous entry on this topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — see the version history .]

Acknowledgments

The author would like to acknowledge the contributions of Alejandro Vesga to this entry. He brought to my attention recently published papers on knowledge-how; brainstormed with me about the structure of the entry and the order of the topics to be discussed; provided substantial criticisms of, and suggestions for, drafts of the content; contributed the idea of adding a final section that related knowledge-how to other related topics; and compiled the bibliography once the bulk of the entry was finished.

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Aristotle on Practical vs. Theoretical Knowledge Essay

Introduction, examining aristotle’s arguments, works cited.

There is a constant need to consider various arguments and facts to resolve challenges appearing in life. Moral judgments can be associated with practical or theoretical knowledge in the area of interest. This paper aims to explore the difference between the mentioned concepts. Happiness or good comes from a contemplative life that was defined by Aristotle as the one caused by divine inspiration, ensures the selection of the best decision, and allows achieving the highest virtue of pleasure.

Aristotle stated that the pivotal goal of a man is to recess from his or her mind and become more conscious. Henry and Nielsen claim that this was regarded by the philosopher as the highest form of human activity and one of the components of divine inspiration, which is the first argument (50). It seems that the latter should be understood as the prerequisite of happiness since those who balanced their consciousness and environment are able to speculate. In this connection, practical knowledge refers to social life and specific actions, while theoretical knowledge guides them based on intellectual virtues.

The second argument that should be discussed in Aristotle’s view of the idea of pleasure as the way to meet the key function of a person. There are two types of pleasure: good pleasure is beneficial to people, while bad pleasure cannot be sufficient to them since it requires always fulfilling it (Henry and Nielsen 77). According to the mentioned philosopher, practical knowledge in the form of action but not contemplation is the object of practical knowledge. Due to the fact that a person is not capable of being continuously active without any rest, practical knowledge does not provide true happiness (Prior 175). Therefore, theoretical wisdom, which is expressed in the contemplative nature of life in this case, provides virtue that, in combination with activity, is a more viable way to accomplish happiness.

Reasoning is the greatest virtue of a conscious person, as it can be suggested from Aristotle’s statements. Prior assumes that the greatest pleasure, in its turn, is fulfilling the function of a human being, and it is closely related to happiness (182). Since action offers only timely joy, the contemplation may provide longer pondering over one’s life. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that contemplation is not the highest virtue, yet it a reliable means of sustainable self-sufficiency and consciousness.

On the contrary to the discussed arguments, one can claim that practical knowledge is characteristic of the issues learned from the very childhood, while theoretical knowledge is realized sooner in one’s adolescence or adult periods. It seems that Aristotle perceived virtues as the ones granted by nature and developed by the family (Henry and Nielsen 77). In case a child was not taught to contemplate, it may be quite difficult to do apply theoretical wisdom in his or her adulthood. It is possible to suggest that practical knowledge is often the only way to experience happiness. In particular, such people would presumably have problems with the highest pleasure and consciousness, trying to achieve it from actions. Answering this objection, one may state that any person can improve and learn even though it was not developed in childhood.

In conclusion, Aristotle distinguished between theoretical and practical knowledge with regard to pleasure and happiness. Due to its ability to offer the greatest virtue, fulfill the function of a person, and consciousness based on divine inspiration, one should agree that theoretical knowledge is the key to achieve genuine happiness. Leading the contemplative life allows for choosing the best solution possible from a range of options.

Henry, Devin, and Karen Margrethe Nielsen. Bridging the Gap Between Aristotle’s Science and Ethics . Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Prior, William J. Virtue and Knowledge: An Introduction to Ancient Greek Ethics . Routledge, 2016.

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Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Aristotle on Practical vs. Theoretical Knowledge." September 14, 2021. https://ivypanda.com/essays/aristotle-on-practical-vs-theoretical-knowledge/.

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Practical Knowledge Versus Knowledge as Practice

István Danka

The main thesis of this essay is that practice is superior to a "theoretical vs. practical" distinction. In this sense, every sort of knowledge is essentially "practical"; so-called "theoretical" knowledge is an historically overemphasised borderline example of the practical. Based mostly on Wittgenstein's view, I shall gradually refine an opposition between theoretical and practical knowledge by analysing some related dualisms on an active, processual, communicative and applicative concept of knowledge. Then I will provide some arguments as to why knowledge as a practical matter in this sense should be seen as, both logically and temporally, prior to the distinction.

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Practical Knowledge And Theoretical Knowledge According To Aristotle Essay

Type of paper: Essay

Topic: Education , Life , Ethics , Morality , Skills , Knowledge , Actions , Aristotle

Published: 02/10/2020

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Introduction

This essay will cover Aristotle’s distinction between practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge. By knowing the distinction of practical and theoretical knowledge, this will help understand the behavior of a person who is aware of harmful actions, but still continue doing it.

Aristotle, together with other Greek thinkers, considered that the appropriateness of any specific form of knowledge relies on the purpose it serves. Practical knowledge includes the virtues and is the capability to see the right thing to do in the situations present. It was originally linked with political and ethical life. It involves judgment -making and human relationship. Ethical relativism was not indicated on Aristotle's theory since there are suitable expectations of the significance of actions and moral virtues. Thus, it is well guided by a moral temperament to respond truly and appropriately; a matter of having a good life and personal well-being. Theoretical knowledge according to Aristotle was the highest type of human task. It was the greatest intellectual quality, a life of unbroken consideration being divine. This impression can think about images of sacred people reflecting or meditating. The entire thing has somewhat unworldly experience. Sound reasoning or comprehensive reflections are used as basis of actions.

Understanding Person’s Harmful Behavior Based on Practical and Theoretical Knowledge

It is not so simple doing the right thing, even if several people intentionally choose to acquire vicious behaviors. Moral conducts’ enemy according to Aristotle is specifically the inability to act well even on those situations when one's thought has led to distinct knowledge of what was appropriate. This may seem to be an intelligence failure.

Individuals have a natural ability for good personality, and this ability is formulated through practice. Habits are formulated through acting. An individual's character is the framework of habits and is produced by what the individual does.

Smith, M. K. (1999). Aristotle on knowledge. Retrieved July 13, 2013, from http://infed.org/mobi/aristotle-on-knowledge/

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It is far more important to have practical skills than theoretical knowledge...(Band 9 Sample Essay)

You should spend about 40 minutes on this task.

Write about the following topic:

In today's job market it is far more important to have practical skills than theoretical knowledge. In the future, job applicants may not need any formal qualifications.

To what extent do you agree or disagree?

Give reasons for your answer and include any relevant examples from your own knowledge and experiences.

You should write at least 250 words.

IELTS Band 9 Sample Essay - In today's job market it is far more important to have practical skills than theoretical knowledge. In the future, job applicants may not need any formal qualifications.

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Sample Essay 1

In job markets, it is considered that practical skills are much more important than theoretical knowledge, and the future might even disregard workers’ any formal qualifications except the required skills. I strongly agree with this statement because, with the pace of global production race, manufacturing mechanism demands more practical hands than that of administrative or managerial positions.

A company needs more people to produce something than that of generating a concept. That means, a business idea or a product concept could be developed by only a handful number of individuals, but it requires many skilled hands to convert the thought into production. Ideas might be developed by a few people who are rich in theoretical knowledge, but the implementation demands a number of people who shine in their practical skills. As a result, businesses look for more hands-on learned people, regardless of their theoretical background, rather than the merely theoretically knowledgeable ones.

In addition, labour intensive industries are swarming as the overall global population is rising exponentially, and these is lowering the labour cost which is exploited by manufacturing businesses. Farms in this type of industry produce in economy of scale and they always look for expanding their volume of production to minimize the marginal production cost. These phenomena push them to hire only the workers who have specific skills that the company needs in the specific production field, these employers do not necessarily need to see where the worker studied or what is his/her education level. As the time passes by, the trend “bring skills first, others are optional” is becoming more of an employment norm, and the future will definitely see it more as the global businesses are constantly setting the goal of more and more production.

To conclude, in comparison to policy making or concept development, a business needs more people in production process. As the companies are always running to produce in higher volume, they are and always will be looking for skilled people for the specific manufacturing field, regardless of their theoretical background or knowledge level.

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Sample Essay 2

In the contemporary job market, the debate between the value of practical skills versus theoretical knowledge has never been more pronounced. As we venture into the future, there is a growing speculation that formal qualifications may become obsolete, overshadowed by the paramount importance of hands-on abilities. This essay contends that while practical skills are increasingly vital, theoretical knowledge remains indispensable, arguing for a harmonious blend of both for career success.

The ascendancy of practical skills is evident in numerous sectors where the ability to apply knowledge effectively trumps theoretical understanding. In industries such as technology and healthcare, hands-on experience facilitates innovation and improves problem-solving capabilities. For instance, a software developer's ability to code proficiently is more crucial than their knowledge of computer science theories. Similarly, a nurse's competency in clinical procedures directly impacts patient care quality. These examples underscore the criticality of practical skills in executing job responsibilities effectively and adapting to the dynamic demands of the workplace.

Conversely, theoretical knowledge serves as the foundation upon which practical skills are built. It provides a comprehensive understanding of underlying principles and concepts, enabling professionals to make informed decisions. In engineering, for example, theoretical knowledge of physics and mathematics is essential for designing structures that stand the test of time and nature. Furthermore, in fields like law and education, a deep understanding of theory is crucial for interpreting legislation and developing curricula, respectively. Thus, dismissing the importance of formal qualifications undermines the role of theory in informing practice and fostering innovation.

In conclusion, the perceived divide between practical skills and theoretical knowledge is misleading. Both are essential and mutually reinforcing for professional success. The future should not see formal qualifications sidelined by practical skills but should embrace an integrated approach that values both. This ensures professionals are not only competent in their current roles but also primed for future innovation and leadership.

Sample Essay 3

In an era marked by rapid technological advancements and evolving job markets, the debate surrounding the relative importance of practical skills versus theoretical knowledge has intensified. This discourse posits that while hands-on abilities are undeniably crucial, the foundation of theoretical understanding cannot be sidelined. This essay will articulate the symbiotic relationship between these competencies, advocating for a holistic approach to professional development that marries practical experience with deep-seated knowledge.

At the heart of the modern workplace lies the undeniable value of practical skills, essential tools that empower individuals to navigate the complexities of their roles with unmatched adeptness and precision. For instance, in the dynamic realm of digital marketing, the ability to adeptly analyze data trends and apply them in real-time campaign adjustments is not just valuable but indispensable. These competencies, born from direct, hands-on experience, are pivotal in ensuring operational efficacy and driving innovation forward. This underscores the critical role that practical skills play in adapting to and thriving within the constantly evolving contours of contemporary professions.

However, to view practical skills in isolation from theoretical knowledge is to overlook a significant portion of the full spectrum of professional expertise. Theoretical frameworks offer a comprehensive lens through which the world can be understood more fully, providing a robust backdrop against which practical skills are finely honed. For example, an architect relies not only on creativity but draws upon deep theoretical principles of design and engineering to create structures that are both aesthetically pleasing and structurally sound. Without a solid grounding in theory, the practical application of skills may be misguided or inefficient, underscoring the indispensable synergy between practical skills and theoretical understanding in professional excellence.

In conclusion, true professional competence emerges at the intersection of practical skills and theoretical knowledge. Achieving peak career success requires blending hands-on experience with foundational understanding. As we look ahead, fostering an environment that equally values these aspects is crucial for cultivating careers that are not just successful, but also deeply fulfilling and influential.

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Essay: We need more Practical Knowledge in our Education System

Essay: We need more Practical…

There was a time when a notebook and a pencil were sufficient tools for study in a classroom. In today’s world, students need much more to prepare themselves for the job market. The thing that has not changed is the impact a teacher can have on the life and learning of a student.

The present education system is not sufficient. It is mainly based on theoretical knowledge rather than practical knowledge.

The students play no active role in the attainment of knowledge. Things are loaded on his mind which he cannot digest; he only crams and therefore they never become his own. Our educational system according to Dr. Annie Basant is just “Filling students’ heads with a lot of disjointed facts poured into the heads as into a basket; to be emptied out again in the examination hall and empty basket carried out again into the world.” This is the reason why a student who succeeds well in his college examination fails miserably in the examination of life.

The existing system of our education is predominantly academic and theoretical. The student is taught lessons by books, but not lessons from life. In other words, he is provided with knowledge but not with wisdom. He is obliged to know the history of Greece 200 years ago, but he knows nothing of what’s happening in his own country.

In a way, our education has become a sort of pastime luxury, a form of amusement like many other modern things of entertainment. Students go to school and colleges more for the sake of amusement than learning.

Our classroom has an appearance of almost a cinema hall; well furnished with chairs and electric fans and blackboard which can be compared to a screen on the background of which the teacher stands more or less like an actor trying to please his audience by his saucy remarks, pleasant stories, etc.

He is on the stage and has to play his allotted part very sincerely. Such as actors appear before the huge audience of the students one after the other and if any actor fails in his dramatic performance, the audience gets out of control and raises strange catcalls of all kinds, just as happens in theatre.

In view of the foregoing defects and shortcomings, our system of education calls for a radical change. Practical knowledge, self-reading, information gathering, work experience in school life should be given more importance to bring about a complete and harmonious development of all factors of human personality.

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‘Students go to school and colleges more for the sake of amusement than learning.’ – Students go to school/colleges for the sake of being able to find a job later. Although that doesn’t take away from the fact that the pursuit of knowledge in itself is not enough to draw them to school, to compare schools with theaters and teachers with actors is perhaps dramatizing the reality of it.

“This is the reason why a student who succeeds well in his college examination fails miserable in the examination of life.”

I would say it’s more common for an uneducated person to fail in life…

4 Knowledge of Intention

Published: October 2016
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This chapter argues that it is not by inference from intention that I know what I am doing intentionally. Instead, the reverse is true: groundless knowledge of intention rests on the will as a capacity for non-perceptual, non-inferential knowledge of action. Knowledge of intention is ‘transparent to the world’ in much the same way as knowledge of one’s own beliefs: the capacity to know what one believes adapts and repurposes the capacity for belief itself, as the capacity to know what one intends adapts and repurposes the capacity for practical knowledge that constitutes the will. The upshot is a new defence of the connection between knowledge and intentional action assumed by Anscombe and others.

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Guest Essay

There’s No Such Thing as an American Bible

A photo of an LED sign against a vivid sunset, displaying the word “GOD” atop an American flag background.

By Esau McCaulley

Contributing Opinion Writer

The presumptive Republican nominee for president of the United States, who weeks ago started selling shoes , is now peddling Bibles. During Holy Week.

What’s special about this Bible? So many things. For example, according to a promotional website, it’s the only Bible endorsed by Donald Trump. It’s also the only one endorsed by the country singer Lee Greenwood. Admittedly, the translation isn’t distinctive — it’s your standard King James Version — but the features are unique. This Bible includes the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, the Pledge of Allegiance and part of the lyrics of Mr. Greenwood’s song “God Bless the USA.” Perhaps most striking, the cover of the Bible does not include a cross or any symbol of the Christian tradition; instead, it is emblazoned with the American flag.

While part of me wants to laugh at the absurdity of it — and marvel at the sheer audacity — I find the messaging unsettling and deeply wrong. This God Bless the USA Bible, as it’s officially named, focuses on God’s blessing of one particular people. That is both its danger and, no doubt for some, its appeal.

Whether this Bible is an example of Christian nationalism I will leave to others. It is at least an example of Christian syncretism, a linking of certain myths about American exceptionalism and the Christian faith. This is the American church’s consistent folly: thinking that we are the protagonists in a story that began long before us and whose main character is in fact the Almighty.

Holy Week is the most sacred portion of the Christian calendar, a time when the church recounts the central events of our faith’s narrative, climaxing in the death and resurrection of Jesus. That story, unlike the parochial God Bless the USA Bible, does not belong to any culture.

Holy Week is celebrated on every continent and in too many languages to number. Some of the immigrants Mr. Trump declared were “ poisoning the blood” of America will probably shout “Christ is risen!” this Easter. Many of them come from the largely Christian regions of Latin America and the Caribbean. They may have entered the country with Bibles in their native tongues nestled securely among their other belongings.

One of the beauties of the Christian faith is that it leaps over the lines dividing countries, leading the faithful to call fellow believers from very different cultures brothers and sisters. Most of the members of this international community consist of the poor living in Africa, Asia and Latin America. There are more Spanish-speaking Christians than English- speaking ones .

If there are central messages that emerge from the variety of services that take place during Holy Week, for many Christians they are the setting aside of power to serve, the supremacy of love, the offer of divine forgiveness and the vulnerability of a crucified God.

This is not the stuff of moneymaking schemes or American presidential campaigns.

It was Pontius Pilate , standing in as the representative of the Roman Empire, who sentenced Jesus to death. The Easter story reminds believers that empires are more than willing to sacrifice the innocent if it allows rulers to stay in power. The church sees Christ’s resurrection as liberating the believer from the power of sin. The story challenges imperial modes of thinking, supplanting the endless pursuit of power with the primacy of love and service.

Easter, using the language of St. Augustine, represents the victory of the City of God over the City of Man. It declares the limits of the moral reasoning of nation-states and has fortified Christians who’ve resisted evil regimes such as fascists in South America, Nazis in Germany, apartheid in South Africa and segregation in the United States.

For any politician to suppose that a nation’s founding documents and a country music song can stand side by side with biblical texts fails at a theological and a moral level. I can’t imagine people in other countries going for anything like it. It is hard to picture a modern “God Bless England” Bible with elements of British common law appended to Christianity’s most sacred texts.

I am glad for the freedoms that we share as Americans. But the idea of a Bible explicitly made for one nation displays a misunderstanding of the story the Bible attempts to tell. The Christian narrative culminates in the creation of the Kingdom (and family) of God, a transnational community united by faith and mutual love.

Roman Catholics , Anglicans and Orthodox Christians, who together claim around 1.5 billion members, describe the Bible as a final authority in matters of faith. Evangelicals, who have overwhelmingly supported Mr. Trump over the course of three election cycles, are known for their focus on Scripture, too. None of these traditions cite or refer to any American political documents in their doctrinal statements — and for good reason.

This Bible may be unique in its form, but the agenda it pursues has recurred throughout history. Christianity is often either co-opted or suppressed; it is rarely given the space to be itself. African American Christians have long struggled to disentangle biblical texts from their misuse in the United States. There is a reason that the abolitionist Frederick Douglass said that between the Christianity of this land (America) and the Christianity of Christ, he recognized the “widest possible difference.”

And while Christianity was used to give theological cover to North American race-based chattel slavery, it was violently attacked in places like El Salvador and Uganda, when leaders including the archbishops Oscar Romero and Janani Luwum spoke out against political corruption.

The work of the church is to remain constantly vigilant to maintain its independence and the credibility of its witness. In the case of this particular Bible, discerning what is happening is not difficult. Christians are being played. Rather than being an appropriate time to debut a patriotic Bible, Easter season is an opportune moment for the church to recover the testimony of the supremacy of the cross over any flag, especially one on the cover of a Bible.

Esau McCaulley ( @esaumccaulley ) is a contributing Opinion writer, the author of “ How Far to the Promised Land: One Black Family’s Story of Hope and Survival in the American South ” and an associate professor of New Testament at Wheaton College.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook , Instagram , TikTok , WhatsApp , X and Threads .

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Practical Knowledge
Theoretical knowledge generally serves to focus on giving complete knowledge that builds the context and helps you set a strategy for dealing with the practical application. Theoretical knowledge can often lead to a deeper understanding of a concept through seeing it in context of a greater whole and understanding the why behind it, but still ...
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Many of the essays in Ford, et al. 2011 address the views on practical knowledge developed in Anscombe 2000 (cited under History). Wong 2010 is a helpful introductory discussion of the closely related topic of a person's awareness of her bodily states and movements.
Essay on Knowledge is Power: Samples in 100, 200, 300 Words
Essay on Knowledge is Power in 300 Words. Knowledge is deemed as the most powerful tool a human possesses. It is the cornerstone of power in our modern society. ... encompassing various fields of knowledge, such as culture, science and technology, history and practical know-how. Knowledge empowers individuals by providing the tools to make ...
PDF Practical and Theoretical Knowledge in Contrast: Teacher Educators
The empirical material consists of group conversations with teacher educators. The findings reveal that the practical and theoretical appear to be in contrast, which in turn seem to affect education quality. Finally, implications of the findings are discussed, where a future diagonal diverse discourse, combining theoretical and practical ...
Full article: Perceptions of practical knowledge of learning and
This depends on their available practical knowledge on learning and feedback (Borko et al. 1997; Meirink 2007; Thurlings et al. 2013 ). Teachers' practical knowledge of learning and feedback influences teachers' perceptions, sense-making, and what they learn from experiences. Therefore, academic teachers' practical knowledge likely ...
Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays
The phrase 'practical knowledge' could mean two different things: the spontaneous 'knowledge without observation' that, according to Elizabeth Anscombe and Stuart Hampshire, we have of what we are doing intentionally and, at least sometimes, of what we are going to do; or knowledge how to perform a certain task. 1 This essay attempts to restore a commonsense idea: that this is not a ...
Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays
Kieran Setiya, Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays, Oxford University Press, 2017, 308pp., $74.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780190462925. Reviewed by . Hallvard Lillehammer, Birkbeck, University of London. 2017.01.05. This book is a collection of twelve essays, originally published between 2004 and 2014, preceded by a substantial and explanatory ...
(PDF) What is Practical Knowledge?
Abstract. Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to explain the key dimensions of practical knowledge. It is argued that practical knowledge and practice are two sides of the same phenomenon and ...
PDF Theory and Practice: Dichotomies of Knowledge?
theoretical knowledge (as in the discovery of new pathologies by the medical profession and its influence on the biological sciences), the relationship has remained largely one way. This little essay argues that, while the distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge retains some of its conventional utility, it needs to be re-
Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays
For rationalists or constitutivists, the standards of practical reason derive from the nature of agency as a functional or teleological kind. They are no more mysterious than the standards for being a good clock or a good heart, given the function of clocks and hearts. In this collection of new and previously published essays, Kieran Setiya ...
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Knowledge-how is related to but distinct from practical knowledge (Anscombe 1957). Practical knowledge is occurrent during intentional action: when one intentionally acts, one knows what one is doing while knowing it. ... Craig, Edward, 1990, Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Devitt ...
Aristotle on Practical vs. Theoretical Knowledge Essay
In this connection, practical knowledge refers to social life and specific actions, while theoretical knowledge guides them based on intellectual virtues. The second argument that should be discussed in Aristotle's view of the idea of pleasure as the way to meet the key function of a person. There are two types of pleasure: good pleasure is ...
Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays
In what follows, I argue for two principal claims. First, that knowing how to φ, as it relates to intentional action, is not propositional knowledge: 'intellectualism' about knowing how is false.My strategy here extends the argument of an earlier paper, 'Practical Knowledge' (Setiya 2008a [this volume: Ch. 1]), to which a prominent intellectualist, Jason Stanley, has replied (2011: ...
From Practical Knowledge To Practical Theory Education Essay
Practical knowledge is the knowledge that teachers generate as a result of their experiences as teachers and their reflections on these experiences. This knowledge is anchored in classroom situations; it includes all the practical dilemmas that teachers encounter in carrying out purposeful actions (Munby, Russell & Martin 2001).
PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE VERSUS KNOWLEDGE AS PRACTICE
Abstract: The main thesis of this essay is that practice is superior to a "theoretical vs. practical" distinction. In this sense, every sort of knowledge is essentially "practical"; so-called "theoretical" knowledge ... radically different from practical knowledge, but that it is only a set of tools for more complex tasks. Therefore ...
Practical Knowledge Versus Knowledge as Practice
Practical Knowledge Versus Knowledge as Practice The main thesis of this essay is that practice is superior to a "theoretical vs. practical" distinction. In this sense, every sort of knowledge is essentially "practical"; so-called "theoretical" knowledge is an historically overemphasised borderline example of the practical. Based mostly on Wittgenstein's view, I shall gradually refine an ...
Theoretical Knowledge Vs Practical Knowledge Essay
Theoretical Knowledge Vs Practical Knowledge Essay. 1331 Words6 Pages. A major criteria that separates practical knowledge from that of theoretical, is the former's vast use in the everyday walks of life. Practical knowledge also ensures an accurate application of the learned skills and techniques unlike that in theoretical knowledge.
Practical Expertise
Practical expertise may seem like routine activity in being direct and effortless, but this is misleading. In both the way it is developed and the way it is exercised, practical expertise requires many differences from routine, which are detailed. Keywords: practical expertise, knowledge how, skill, enjoyment, flow.
IELTS Essay: Learning Facts & Practical Skills at School
1. However, it is more important for students to learn skills with practical import. 2. This can include but does not have to be limited to learning skills like cooking and woodworking, which are not traditional academic subjects. 3. The curriculum could also be broadened to critical thinking skills.
Free Essay On Practical Knowledge And Theoretical Knowledge According
Introduction. This essay will cover Aristotle's distinction between practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge. By knowing the distinction of practical and theoretical knowledge, this will help understand the behavior of a person who is aware of harmful actions, but still continue doing it. Aristotle, together with other Greek thinkers ...
It is far more important to have practical skills...(Band 9 Essay)
Sample Essay 1. In job markets, it is considered that practical skills are much more important than theoretical knowledge, and the future might even disregard workers' any formal qualifications except the required skills. I strongly agree with this statement because, with the pace of global production race, manufacturing mechanism demands ...
Essay: We need more Practical Knowledge in our Education System
In view of the foregoing defects and shortcomings, our system of education calls for a radical change. Practical knowledge, self-reading, information gathering, work experience in school life should be given more importance to bring about a complete and harmonious development of all factors of human personality. Tutor and Freelance Writer.
Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays
Setiya, Kieran, 'Knowledge of Intention', Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays, Oxford Moral Theory (New York, 2016; online edn, ... as the capacity to know what one intends adapts and repurposes the capacity for practical knowledge that constitutes the will. The upshot is a new defence of the connection between knowledge and intentional action ...
Trump's Bible Misunderstands Christianity
Here are some tips. And here's our email: [email protected]. Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, WhatsApp, X and Threads. 602. 602. Trump's God Bless ...

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Practical Knowledge by David Hunter LAST REVIEWED: 15 December 2022 LAST MODIFIED: 30 September 2013 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0010

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Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays

Bibliography

Knowledge How

1.1 The Contemplation Argument

9.1 Skill Across Cultures

4. The Linguistic Argument

6. The Epistemology of Knowledge-How

7. The Argument from Cognitive Science

8. Varieties of Anti-Intellectualism

8.3 Radical Anti-Intellectualism: Practicalism

9. Knowledge-How and Skill

Acknowledgments

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Aristotle on Practical vs. Theoretical Knowledge Essay

Practical Knowledge Versus Knowledge as Practice

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Practical Knowledge And Theoretical Knowledge According To Aristotle Essay

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Understanding Person’s Harmful Behavior Based on Practical and Theoretical Knowledge

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It is far more important to have practical skills than theoretical knowledge...(Band 9 Sample Essay)

In today's job market it is far more important to have practical skills than theoretical knowledge. In the future, job applicants may not need any formal qualifications.

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There’s No Such Thing as an American Bible

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