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Corruption tolerance as a process of moral, social, and political cognition: evidence from Latin America

Published: 14 October 2021
Volume 77 , pages 381–404, ( 2022 )

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Joseph Pozsgai-Alvarez ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-9338-2583 1

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While corruption is commonly understood in behavioral terms, the dominance of political and economic approaches has hindered the integration of relevant psychological insights into the (anti-)corruption mainstream, causing a rift between the examination of social determinants and their assessment within a process of individual decision-making. The present study offers a model that combines moral, social, and political factors to explore the cognitive processes behind corruption tolerance, operationalized here as attitudinal, intended, and behavioral responses to a bribery event. Using data from 1651 survey respondents across Latin America, it empirically tests the impact of key variables over the formation of individual attitude, intention, and behavior, taking into account the conditions and situations in which it arises. The results show that the decision to engage in petty bribery responds significantly and consistently to the individual’s tendency toward moral disengagement, and the centrality of their moral identity.

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Living with Corruption in Central and Eastern Europe: Social Identity and the Role of Moral Disengagement

Deontological and Consequentialist Ethics and Attitudes Towards Corruption: A Survey Data Analysis

Justifying corrupt exchanges: rational-choice corruptors

For the purpose of this study, corruption is understood as any morally deviant action resulting from the abuse of entrusted power for private gain; the immorality of the act, in turn, need not transgress any formal or informal practices. Therefore, an individual’s moral approval of, or willing participation in, a corrupt event will be considered to represent tolerance of corruption regardless of the extent of corruption and the impunity enjoyed by wrongdoers in a given context.

While an exclusive focus on bribery—to the detriment of information regarding other forms of corruption such as embezzlement, nepotism, abuse of office, and others—limits the scope of applicability of this study, it follows current voices in the field who stress the need to transition away from general discussions of corruption and toward actionable evidence on specific types (Heywood, 2017 ; Ang, 2020 ).

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Acknowledgment

Data collection and earlier drafts of this paper were carried out at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS) of Kyoto University and with the support of the Graduate School of International Development (GSID) of Nagoya University.

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Pozsgai-Alvarez, J. Corruption tolerance as a process of moral, social, and political cognition: evidence from Latin America. Crime Law Soc Change 77 , 381–404 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-021-09995-6

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Accepted : 28 September 2021

Published : 14 October 2021

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-021-09995-6

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Article contents

Political corruption and state crime.

Clayton Peoples Clayton Peoples Department of Social Psychology, University of Nevada, Reno
and James E. Sutton James E. Sutton Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Hobart and William Smith Colleges
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.013.274
Published online: 26 April 2017

The state is responsible for maintaining law and order in society and protecting the people. Sometimes it fails to fulfill these responsibilities; in other cases, it actively harms people. There have been many instances of political corruption and state crime throughout history, with impacts that range from economic damage to physical injury to death—sometimes on a massive scale (e.g., economic recession, pollution/poisoning, genocide). The challenge for criminologists, however, is that defining political corruption and state crime can be thorny, as can identifying their perpetrators—who can often be collectives of individuals such as organizations and governments—and their victims. In turn, pinpointing appropriate avenues of controlling these crimes can be difficult. These challenges are exacerbated by power issues and the associated reality that the state is in a position to write or change laws and, in essence, regulate itself. One possible solution is to define political corruption and state crime—as well as their perpetrators and victims—as broadly as possible to include a variety of scenarios that may or may not exhibit violations of criminal law. Likewise, a resolution to the issue of social control would be to move beyond strictly institutional mechanisms of control. Criminological research should further elucidate these issues; it should also, however, move beyond conceptual dilemmas toward (a) better understanding the processes underlying political corruption/state crime and (b) illustrating the broader ramifications of these crimes.

political corruption
state crime
state-corporate crime
white collar crime
corporate crime
official deviance
organizational deviance

A Criminological Overview of Political Corruption and State Crime

In ideal conceptions of democracy and governance, the state represents and serves the people; it is a protector of people’s rights and freedoms. Unfortunately, the state does not always fulfill this role. Indeed, in some cases the state does the exact opposite and harms the very people it is supposed to protect—sometimes engaging in implicit or even explicit criminal activity in the process (see, e.g., Kramer & Michalowski, 1990 ). Criminal acts by the state tend to both reflect and result from abuses of power when they occur. Political corruption and crimes of the state are therefore often inextricably linked in complicated ways.

Although political corruption receives considerable scholarly attention in political science (see, e.g., Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002 ; Philp, 1997 ; Rose-Ackerman, 1999 ), relatively little attention has been paid to political corruption in criminology. There have, however, been high-profile calls in criminology to examine the broader theme of state crime (see, e.g., Chambliss’s statements during his 1988 presidential address, documented in Criminology , 1989 ), and a sizable literature has emerged around that topic. This literature has primarily focused on conceptual issues related to state crime, but some studies have begun to branch out into other related areas. Overall, while state crime has received more attention than political corruption in criminology, both have received less emphasis than other topics within the white collar crime literature, which itself is small in comparison with the literature on street crime.

This article outlines a framework for a criminological understanding of political corruption and state crime—particularly in the context of the United States. The key conceptual question in the state crime literature is, put simply: What is the definition of state crime? A concomitant conceptual question for this article is: What is political corruption? Hence, this article provides overviews of attempts to address these questions for a criminology audience. Conceptual challenges and debates have often hindered the development of the literatures highlighted here beyond the conceptual stage (Zimring & Johnson, 2005 ). This article therefore focuses on issues pertaining to conceptual clarifications while ultimately foregrounding the interconnections between political corruption and state crime.

When assessing a specific type of crime, there are a number of important substantive considerations that extend beyond the conceptual realm. For instance, aside from defining what a particular crime is, criminologists and others will also want to know more about how it is perpetrated, its victimology, the social control mechanisms that it has elicited, and its broader impact on society. Accordingly, this article also presents sections on each of these substantive themes as they pertain to political corruption and crimes of the state. This article concludes by offering some ideas for future directions in this important and growing area of scholarship.

Literature Review

Criminological work on political corruption and state crime has roots in research on white collar and organized offending (Nelken & Levi, 1996 ). As such, this section begins with an overview of selected key works on white collar crime to provide a starting point for understanding political corruption and crimes of the state. It then addresses the key conceptual issues related to political corruption and state crime, with an emphasis on consensus or oft-cited definitions of key terms, where they exist, as well as influential typologies of these crimes.

Criminaloids and White Collar Crime

The lineage of scholarly attention to the crimes of powerful actors can be traced back to Edward A. Ross’s classic article “The Criminaloid.” Ross ( 1907 , p. 45) warned of pro-social offenders, or criminaloids, that are “guilty in the eyes of the law: but since they are not culpable in the eyes of the public and in their own eye, their spiritual attitude is not that of the criminal.” The examples Ross provided were of powerful offenders from more advantaged social positions who engaged in bribery and other forms of offending that are along the lines of what we focus on in this article.

Approximately 40 years later, Edwin Sutherland coined the term white collar crime , which he defined as “. . . a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation” (Sutherland, 1983 , p. 7). Sutherland’s groundbreaking work provided a systematic study of offending perpetrated by corporate offenders, and it set the stage for subsequent empirical work in this area. In turn, Clinard and Yeager ( 1980 ) conducted a study of corporate crime about 30 years later that updated and expanded upon the scope of Sutherland’s research. For instance, whereas Sutherland examined the offending of 70 corporations, Clinard and Yeager studied 582 corporations. Clinard and Yeager also further distinguished between occupational offenses that are perpetrated for the benefit of individuals and corporate offenses that are perpetrated to further the interests of the corporation, and their work remains the most comprehensive study of corporate offending to date. This article introduces other influential works as well in subsequent sections; it first, however, turns to corruption.

Corruption: Early Emphases

Although corruption—particularly political corruption—is a well-studied area in political science (see, e.g., Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002 ; Philp, 1997 ; Rose-Ackerman, 1999 ), attention to corruption within criminology has been limited (Huisman & Vande Walle, 2010 ). This said, policing is one subfield in which notable works on corruption have been published.

Some of the best known books on police corruption were authored by Sherman ( 1974 ) and Goldstein ( 1974 ). Goldstein outlined the challenges associated with defining police corruption and put forth his own definition, in which he states that police corruption includes “. . . acts involving the misuse of authority by a police officer in a manner designed to produce personal gain for himself or for others” (Goldstein, 1974 , p. 3). Although Goldstein’s definition, and most of the examples outlined in his book, emphasized the personal, or occupational, nature of offending, Goldstein also presented examples of coordinated forms of corruption perpetrated by multiple actors within police organizations.

Another classic study of corruption from the 1970s is William Chambliss’s On the Take . Chambliss ( 1978 ) examined the intersections of organized crime and corruption among police and local governmental officials, and his work is especially notable for the ways in which it outlined dynamics of collusion, interplay, and exchange that occur on the local level. Chambliss’s research provides us with a fitting segue into organized crime, which is the primary context within which political corruption has been studied over the years by criminologists (Huisman & Vande Walle, 2010 ).

Corruption has most often been approached as a facilitator of organized crime. Similar to police corruption, there have also been definitional challenges associated with determining what actually constitutes organized crime and corruption (Beare, 1997 ). If we return to Sutherland’s definition of white collar crime, organized crime would differ in that the perpetrators would not be people “. . . of respectability and high social status in the course of [their] occupation” (Sutherland, 1983 , p. 7). With respect to corruption, Beare ( 1997 ) notes that common corruption categories within the context of organized crime include “bribes/kick-backs” and “election/campaign corruption,” which involve illegal payments to gain desired outcomes, as well as garnering influence by offering “protection.”

Political Corruption

Political corruption is certainly not a new phenomenon. The early great thinkers in philosophy (e.g., Aristotle, Plato) addressed the topic, and the Roman Empire—and its fall—serves as an important early case study (MacMullen, 1988 ). Despite this, the term “political corruption” has no agreed-upon definition. Although efforts have been made to advance conceptual frameworks of political corruption (e.g., Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002 ; Philp, 1997 ), a consensus definition does not currently exist—particularly in the criminology literature.

Many definitional challenges—and, hence, debates within the study of crime—come down to issues of inclusivity, parsimony, and analytic precision. One possibility is to cast the net broadly and formulate a broad, inclusive definition. For instance, Sutherland ( 1945 ) thought of crime as going beyond state-defined violations of the criminal law to include acts that were civil law violations as well as those that were “socially injurious.” Scholars who focus on political corruption have made similar calls to go beyond legal definitions.

Passas ( 1998 , pp. 44–45) argues that political corruption comprises “public officials acting in the best interest of private concerns, regardless of, or against, the public interest. Therefore, corruption can be defined as the covert privatization of government functions.” Kaufmann and Vicente ( 2011 ) make a similar case and contend that corruption need not be exclusive to acts that are illegal.

Like Passas ( 1998 ) and Kaufmann and Vicente ( 2011 ), Douglas and Johnson ( 1977 , p. 4) also endorse a more inclusive definition. In fact, they argue that the term political corruption is itself limiting, and they propose that official deviance be used instead for two reasons: first, there is a wide range of officials performing governmental functions, including many who are not necessarily deemed to be “political” by others or themselves; second, corruption tends to connote “material” and monetary exchanges for desired outcomes, yet “most people are more concerned with usurpation of power by officials than with their material corruption.” To capture this sentiment, they therefore prefer the term deviance because it is more general and encompassing.

In contrast to definitions that extend beyond legal categories, Zimring and Johnson ( 2005 , p. 796) argue that embracing the legal component is crucial when conceptualizing political corruption, much as Tappan ( 1947 ) argued many decades ago with crime, more generally. They define corruption as “the illegal use of power for personal gain,” and they maintain that the legal threshold allows for clearer analytical specification. Zimring and Johnson ( 2005 ) further note that laws reflect local norms, which makes them the ideal dimension in which to examine corruption comparatively. Whereas Zimring and Johnson differ sharply from others on whether or not criminologists should focus on legal conceptualizations, they are similar in that most works in this area emphasize the misuse of power for personal gain.

State Crime

Chambliss ( 1989 , p. 184) defines state crime as “acts defined by law as criminal and committed by state officials in the pursuit of their job as representatives of the state,” and he adds that state crime does not include acts “that benefit only individual officeholders.” State crime is therefore something that involves the state or its actors, and it is done to benefit more than just the individuals who are connected to its perpetration.

One possible point of contention concerning the above definition, though, pertains to restricting state crime to only those acts that are defined by law as criminal. Others argue that state crime can also include actions that are “deviant, abusive, harmful . . . [or] wrongful” (Ross, 2015 , p. 499). Put directly, similar to political corruption, one can think of state crime as something that extends beyond legal definitions—particularly given that state actors have the power to define what is legal and illegal (discussed in more detail later). As such, a more inclusive definition might simply specify the prerequisite conditions that ought to be present to consider something a state crime—namely that (a) those committing the crimes are state actors or entities and (b) some kind of harm results from these actors’/entities’ actions (or inaction).

In conceptualizing state crime, one factor to consider is the role of the state in said criminal activity—is it explicitly involved or implicitly involved? Put differently, some state crimes may be state-initiated, while others are state-facilitated (Kramer & Michalowski, 1990 ). Another related factor is the nature of the state. Friedrichs ( 2010 ) identifies four different types of states that may be involved in state crimes: a criminal state, a repressive state, a corrupt state, or a negligent state. There is some overlap between these two typologies in that criminal or repressive states may be more likely to initiate crimes, whereas a negligent state, for instance, may tend to facilitate crimes.

The typology of Friedrichs ( 2010 ) is also useful in thinking about the connection between political corruption and state crime. State crime can be thought of as being connected to distinct from political corruption, depending on the circumstances. As noted above, Friedrichs identifies a corrupt state as one type of state that may be engaged in state crime; the other forms may not necessarily hinge on corruption as an element (e.g., a repressive state). But it is also easy to imagine scenarios in which political corruption can lead to state crime—or crimes that involve collusion between the state and other entities such as corporations.

State-Corporate Crime

Any consideration of state crime would be incomplete without mentioning state-corporate crime. A frequently cited definition asserts that state-corporate crimes are “illegal or socially injurious actions that result from a mutually reinforcing interaction between (1) policies and/or practices in pursuit of the goals of one or more institutions of political governance and (2) policies and/or practices in pursuit of the goals of one or more institutions of economic production and distribution” (Aulette & Michalowski, 1993 , p. 175). Note that here, much like with political corruption and state crime, it is not just legality that is a factor—socially injurious actions are also considered.

The state can play any number of roles in state-corporate crime. An insightful typology developed by Kauzlarich and colleagues ( 2003 ) outlines four possible roles for the state, along with examples of crimes/outcomes: omission-implicit (e.g., inequality), omission-explicit (e.g., regulatory failure), commission-implicit (funding unethical experiments), and commission-explicit (e.g., genocide).

The key element in all of the above roles, however, is the interaction between the state and economic entities, as in Aulette and Michalowski’s ( 1993 ) oft-cited definition. Put directly, things like political corruption and state crime do not exist in a vacuum. Just as political corruption can be linked with state crime, state crime can involve perpetrators within and outside the state, morphing into state-corporate crime.

Perpetrators

One of the key challenges in examining political corruption and state crime is determining who exactly the perpetrators are. With other types of crime (e.g., street crime), it is relatively obvious who the perpetrators are, in part because it is specific individuals who are committing a given crime. With political corruption and state crime, however, determining the perpetrators is not nearly so straightforward. This is due, in part, to the fact that entire organizations/entities can be involved in these crimes rather than just individuals.

Individual Versus Organizational Perpetrators

Although most research in criminology tends to study situations in which individuals are perpetrators, some scholars have argued that “organizations, not just individuals, commit deviant acts” (Ermann & Lundman, 1978 , p. 55). This is a very important insight, as it broadens the net in terms of who can be considered a perpetrator. This becomes especially important when looking at something like state crime.

Although the state is made up of myriad individuals serving in a variety of capacities, state decisions are normally collective in nature, and state actions are typically carried out by agencies with the authority to do so. For instance, policy is made by legislative bodies (e.g., Congress); laws are enforced by agencies (e.g., the DEA). As such, when decisions or actions of the state cross into corrupt and/or criminal territory, it may be collectivities—organizations, agencies, or even the state itself—who are the perpetrators.

The idea that collectivities engage in political corruption and/or state crime fits well with the typologies outlined in the literature review. For instance, in the complicity continuum of Kauzlarich, Mullins, and Matthews ( 2003 ), explicit omission might involve state agencies failing to perform their regulatory functions; explicit commission would involve the state itself engaging in crimes. This overlaps well with the typology of Friedrichs ( 2010 ), which identifies a number of state types that may engage in political corruption (e.g., a corrupt state) or state crime (e.g., a criminal state).

The Role of Networks and Exchange

Social networks and their associated exchanges help move political corruption and crimes of the state from the individual level to the organizational level. Take campaign contributions, for instance. Campaign contributions are typically given in person to a political candidate, which establishes a social tie (Clawson, Neustadtl, & Weller, 1998 ). Something of value—campaign money—has also been given in the process. If the candidate happens to win office, she or he may feel compelled to “return the favor” due to the principle of reciprocity (Cialdini, 2001 ). So, when a contributor requests help (e.g., a “yea” vote) on a future piece of legislation, the politician may feel obligated to do so. Research has shown that this happens with surprising regularity and involves large swaths of politicians, Republicans and Democrats alike (Peoples & Sutton, 2015 ). These exchanges, in aggregate, help shape legislation and tilt laws in favor of moneyed contributors rather than the public as a whole (Gilens & Page, 2014 ).

There are some interesting things to note about the example of campaign contributions influencing votes. First, it is not usually a quid pro quo exchange. Politicians typically do not make explicit promises to do things in exchange for contributions (there are exceptions, of course). Instead, they provide help in the future on a to-be-determined issue or bill. Given that there typically is not a quid pro quo exchange involved, these situations do not fit standard legal definitions of bribery. But in the words of Russell Long, “[t]he distinction between a campaign contribution and a bribe is almost a hairline’s difference” (Kaiser, 2009 , p. 18). More importantly, whether technically a bribe or not, campaign contributions can lead to corruption—both in the public’s perception and in reality.

Opinion polls consistently show that people believe money influences politics (NYT/CBS, 2015 ). These views can erode the public’s confidence in the state. This is evident in the abysmal approval ratings for Congress, which reached record lows of approximately 10% in recent years (Gallup, 2016 ). These views can also lead people to believe that political bodies such as Congress have become corrupt (see, e.g., a CNN poll in 2006 ). But have they become corrupt? Citing the “competing dependencies” that campaign contributions create, Lessig ( 2011 ) argues that institutions such as Congress have, in fact, become corrupt. This leads directly into the final item of note about campaign contributions influencing votes: it is ultimately at the institutional and/or organizational level where this plays out.

In the work of Peoples and Sutton ( 2015 ), it was not merely a handful of individual lawmakers (“a few bad apples”) who were influenced by their contributors—a statistically significant percentage of lawmakers were engaged in this behavior. Additionally, this happened within the context of social networks such that pairs of lawmakers would vote “yea” together on legislation based on their mutual ties to contributors. In other words, there was a culture of collusion and influence-peddling that permeated Congress—it had become a corrupt institution. And again, as noted earlier, the work of Gilens and Page ( 2014 ) suggests that the result of this is policy that favors elites over the rest of society.

The example of campaign contributions nicely demonstrates that offending is not limited to the individual level. Moreover, it also shows how it can be difficult in practice to determine who the perpetrators are when political corruption and crimes of the state occur. These complications ultimately underscore the importance of conceptualization, as an individualistic and purely legalistic view of crime would not apply to this kind of situation. Similar difficulties emerge when trying to identify the victims of these complex offenses.

Victimology

Victims are often afterthoughts in the study of crime, and this is particularly the case when it comes to white collar offending. This is also true of political corruption and crimes of the state, where victims have received scant attention. There are several reasons why.

From a conceptual standpoint, the lack of agreement on what constitutes an offense or perpetrator ultimately results in a lack of consensus on who is victimized. Moreover—and irrespective of how offenses might technically be defined—these acts may feature actors who derive mutual benefits from the arrangement. It is therefore highly unlikely that one of these actors will feel victimized and contact authorities (Zimring & Johnson, 2005 ).

Visibility is another consideration. Ross ( 1907 ) suggested that “criminaloids” take efforts to avoid targeting their own communities when offending. It may also be very difficult in some cases to identify victims or connect victimizations to the situations that caused them. The number of victims (or potential victims) can further complicate matters. It may be quite challenging to determine how many people are adversely impacted by a given policy or action and to what extent they are affected: it could be a relatively small number of people, it could be entire cultures or societies. Likewise, there may be significant lag time between these acts and their effects. Moreover, the complexities associated with organizational forms of offending might make it impossible to either detect harms that have been perpetrated or connect perpetrated harms to the actors that caused them. This is particularly likely when offenses transcend national or other jurisdictional borders. The disconnects between actors, actions, and consequences resulting from political corruption and crimes of the state likely result in these forms of victimization being less visible than the temporal and visceral victimizations that are characteristic of street crime.

An additional consideration for victimology surrounding political corruption and state crime is power. It was previously noted that corrupt exchanges are unlikely to result in the involved actors feeling victimized given that they each benefit from the transaction. However, it may be that more peripheral actors perceive themselves as victims but feel powerless in the situation. For instance, the previous section outlined what appears to be open corruption perpetrated by Congress. Zimring and Johnson ( 2005 , p. 804) argue that conspicuous offending serves as “. . . an advertisement of the corrupt actor’s power.” To the extent that this is the case with political corruption and crimes of the state, victims may feel helpless to seek voice for their experiences—especially when the very entities that are supposed to help them are the ones committing the offenses.

We can and should ask what the victimology of political corruption and state crime looks like. Unfortunately, the broader conceptual challenges that have previously been noted preclude us from coming to a definitive answer, though a few observations are instructive. First, the victimizations that stem from these forms of offending are often qualitatively different from the individual victimizations that commonly occur within the context of street crime. On a related note, the scale of victimization resulting from these acts is potentially far reaching given that these harms are often perpetrated by organizational actors. Lastly, the systematic, organizational, and structural forces that often render victims invisible and disempowered can ultimately prevent us from knowing much about them, furthering their invisibility.

Social Control Mechanisms

With most crimes, there are clear-cut sanctions in place to regulate/control their incidence. With political corruption and state crime, however, things are much blurrier. There are two likely reasons why this is the case: (1) as noted earlier, state crimes are complicated in that neither the perpetrators of these crimes nor their victims are readily identifiable, and (2) it is the state that is normally in a position to regulate/control crime, and, thus, it has a conflict of interest in regulating/controlling itself. Of course, this does not mean that there are no efforts to control state crime—there are (see, e.g., Ross, 2000 ). It does mean, however, that efforts to control state crime face a number of challenges.

Challenges Related to Perpetrators/Victims

The fact that there is gray area with regard to conceptualization, and therefore identification, of the perpetrators and victims of state crimes makes it difficult to control these offenses. This is due to both practical considerations and issues of power.

With regard to practical considerations, there are problems that emerge when it is unclear who the perpetrators or victims are with a given crime. When the perpetrators cannot be concretely identified, questions arise that are difficult to answer: Who should be prosecuted for the crime? What should the sanctions/penalties be? How should the penalties be applied? This is compounded by the fact that, as noted above, those who engage in state crime are often large organizations. How does one go about prosecuting an organization or an entire government? When the victims cannot be identified, again difficult questions come up: Who can make legitimate claims of harm? How should they (or their loved ones) be compensated?

With regard to power, it is well established that powerful entities in society escape prosecution—or receive more lenient sentences if they are prosecuted—than less powerful individuals. This is certainly true of white collar and corporate crime; it is likely true of state crime as well. A less-often-acknowledged reality, though, is that powerful entities can even tilt the laws in their favor (what Lukes, 1974 , refers to as the “second dimension of power”) to allow for activities that in most other contexts would be considered illegal.

This reality of powerful entities tilting the laws in their favor might partly explain why these powerful entities are not prosecuted for their crimes—their activities may not technically be illegal if they have succeeded in getting the laws changed to allow these activities. A great example from the corporate world is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (to be described again shortly), which repealed provisions of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act by allowing banks and investing firms to merge. In so doing, it allowed entities such as Citigroup to legally proceed as merged corporations—the 1999 Act is sometimes referred to in critical circles as “the Citigroup Relief Act”—even though their existence would have been illegal anytime in the 66 years preceding the Act.

When thinking about the state, the ability to shape and tilt laws is even more important. After all, state entities (e.g., legislatures) are literally the very bodies that craft and pass laws. They are therefore in the perfect position to tilt laws in their favor (or exempt themselves from laws that might typically apply to other individuals or entities). This is, however, a clear conflict of interest, as is self-regulation.

Conflicts of Interest in Lawmaking and Self-Regulation

As noted above, the state is responsible for writing and passing laws. It is also tasked with defining, regulating, and controlling criminal behavior. But what if the state or its entities are the ones engaging in crime—can the state be trusted to regulate itself?

Congress presents an interesting case study. Many of the organizations meant to limit congressional deviance are themselves controlled by Congress. For instance, internal ethics committees (e.g., the House Committee on Ethics) are responsible for addressing questionable activities among individual members of Congress. The Federal Election Commission (FEC), which is funded by Congress and whose members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, is responsible for monitoring and enforcing campaign finance laws. Even campaign finance laws—and other laws affecting Congress—are themselves written and enacted by Congress. Simply put, Congress gets to set the very rules by which it is governed and accordingly has significant power over how these rules are enforced.

Congress is just one example; there are many others one could explore. The common thread, however, is that state organizations and agencies often lack truly independent mechanisms of regulation. Granted, some might argue that even auditors and regulators are self-interested individuals who might be susceptible to bias (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1999 ), it is nonetheless true that the lack of external oversight means that these entities are charged with “regulating” themselves. Combined with the fact that some of them get to literally make their own rules (see, again, the example of Congress), this means that things such as corruption, deviance, and crime can go virtually unfettered. These organizations and agencies are above the law; the rules and norms of society do not apply to them. The end result is that they can offend with impunity and potentially harm the very individuals they are supposed to protect: the people.

Broader Societal Consequences

Although there are some who could cite Merton’s ( 1938 ) classic work on anomie to contend that deviance can occasionally carry positive functions for society, there is ample evidence that political corruption and state crimes have a largely adverse impact. As noted above, the number of people affected can vary: in some instances, it is a relatively small percentage of the population; in other cases, it is entire cultures or societies.

The Adverse Impact of Political Corruption

In terms of political corruption, there are a number of adverse impacts on society. As already noted, policy reflects the preferences of elites rather than the general public (Gilens & Page, 2014 ). This results in tax codes that benefit corporations (Clawson et al., 1998 ), sometimes to the detriment of the rest of society (e.g., cutting programs for the poor). Additionally, corporations with connections to politics seek out “government contracts, regulatory waivers, and government subsidies” (Godwin & Seldon, 2002 , p. 205), many of which they succeed in obtaining. For instance, Halliburton profited nicely from its connections to the presidential administration during the Iraq War, securing lucrative “no-bid” contracts (Rothe, 2006 ).

When corporations secure special benefits due to their campaign contributions and connections with politicians, the public can be adversely impacted. This was especially true in the lead-up to the housing crisis and the resultant Great Recession in 2007 . We now know that there were two key pieces of legislation passed in 1999 and 2000 that helped lead to the Great Recession (The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, respectively). They allowed banking and investing firms to merge and ensured a virtually unregulated market for risky investments such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Evidence is beginning to suggest that campaign contributions significantly influenced the passage of both bills (Peoples, 2012 ). Although some businesses and firms initially made handsome profits from the activities allowed by these bills, these same activities introduced so much structural risk that the integrity of the system itself became compromised and the economy collapsed. The result—trillions of dollars in losses, with millions of people losing their jobs and their homes.

The Adverse Impact of State (or State-Corporate) Crime

In terms of state crime, adverse impacts on society are similarly pronounced. Again, as noted at the beginning of this section and above, the number of people impacted can vary. Additionally, as noted in the typologies reviewed above, the involvement of the state (implicit versus explicit) can fluctuate depending on the situation. Nonetheless, the negative effects are significant and sometimes even result in death.

A number of examples can fit around the theme of regulatory failure resulting in harm or death. For instance, the Challenger space shuttle disaster likely stemmed, in part, from a breakdown in proper safety protocol (Kramer, 1992 ). This resulted in the loss of astronauts’ lives and a period of national shock and mourning.

There are other examples of regulatory failure at the nexus between corporations and their (lack of) regulation by the state. For example, stronger regulatory controls could have prevented the fire at the Imperial Foods chicken plant (Aulette & Michalowski, 1993 ) and the ValuJet crash in Florida (Matthews & Kauzlarich, 2000 ). These incidents resulted in 25 and 110 deaths, respectively.

Other examples can fit around the theme of the state itself acting as a criminal agent. These examples would fit under the explicit commission category of the complicity continuum (Kauzlarich et al., 2003 ) and would involve a repressive or criminal state (Friedrichs, 2010 ). The Holocaust stands out as perhaps the quintessential example of the state acting as a criminal agent. In the Holocaust, over 6 million Jews were killed at the hands of the Nazi government. Any situation, though, in which the state sanctions mistreatment and/or murder (e.g., displacement, slavery, mass executions, genocide) would fit here. It is not a stretch to say that in such cases the state has committed “crimes against humanity,” which have been prosecuted in international criminal courts (e.g., during the Nuremberg Trials). Of course, this ultimately takes us full circle and back to the conceptualization challenges introduced at the beginning of this article.

Conclusions and Future Directions

The state is supposed to protect the people. Sadly, it sometimes does just the opposite—it becomes corrupt and/or engages in criminal activity, thereby harming the people instead. Although political corruption and crimes of the state have historically been understudied by criminologists (much like with white collar and corporate crime), this is beginning to change. A distinct literature has more recently begun to coalesce around corruption and state crime, with high-profile calls for more work in this area (e.g., Chambliss, 1989 ).

The key debates and unresolved issues in this growing literature revolve around definitional and conceptual problems and, by extension, questions such as: What is political corruption, What is state crime, Who are the perpetrators, Who are the victims, and What are the implications for social control and broader society? The challenge of resolving these complex questions is further exacerbated by the fundamental nature of political corruption and state crime: not only are those who are committing these crimes powerful individuals or entities, they are also often literally in a position to define whether or not their activities are legal (and, by extension, how to regulate these activities, if at all).

The criminology literature is replete with debates over how crime should be defined. Much of the controversy has been centered on whether or not criminologists should adopt state definitions of crime. As noted earlier, Sutherland ( 1945 ) thought of crime as going beyond state- defined violations of the criminal law. Schwendinger and Schwendinger ( 1970 ) believed that state definitions of crime expressed and reinforced the interests of those with power, and toward this end they called for criminologists to use human rights violations rather than state definitions as the standard for what constitute crimes.

A possible solution to the difficulties of defining the parameters of political corruption and state crime is to follow the above-noted pioneers in thinking beyond the limited scenarios outlined in criminal law. In other words, we can perhaps include acts that are civil law violations, as Sutherland did, as well as those that are, to use his words, “socially injurious.” Future work in this area could continue with this more inclusive approach to what may be defined as political corruption and/or state crime.

A similar solution could be applied to the challenges of determining who perpetrators and victims are with political corruption and state crime: cast the net broadly to be as inclusive as possible. In the case of perpetrators, it is important to remind ourselves that “organizations, not just individuals, commit deviant [or corrupt/criminal] acts” (Ermann & Lundman, 1978 , p. 55). Researchers should therefore expand their parameters accordingly. In thinking about victims, casting the net widely can be very helpful as well. As with white collar and corporate crime, the cost of state crime to society in terms of economics, health, and even life are likely very great.

Lastly, in terms of the control of state crime, it is again the case that broader, more inclusive approaches are potentially warranted. As Ross ( 2015 ) notes, existing approaches include more typical institutional approaches (e.g., internal and external control mechanisms) plus alternative approaches (e.g., resistance by victims, activists, and oppositional groups). Given the unique positon of the state to write its own rules and regulate itself, the most effective approaches may well be those that do not rely on conventional institutional controls. Instead, alternative approaches involving the public may be more effective in the long run.

In reality, though, research on political corruption and state crime needs to move beyond definitional and conceptual issues and focus on the broader processes and ramifications of these crimes. In terms of processes, political corruption and crimes of the state are ultimately linked through exchange and relationships among actors. Social network analysis may therefore provide a methodological tool through which scholars can better trace the trajectories of these crimes and connect the individual to the organizational level (Peoples & Sutton, 2015 ).

In terms of ramifications, visibility is critical. With political corruption and state crime, the complexities and powerful actors associated with these acts can result in these offenses going unnoticed or being deliberately hidden. This is why it is critical to follow the call of Chambliss ( 1989 ) and conduct more criminological research on crimes of the state (and associated themes). More research on these topics—through both quantitative studies and, importantly, qualitative case studies (Kramer, Michalowski, & Kauzlarich, 2002 )—would further increase the visibility of these offenses and give voice to their many, sometimes invisible, victims.

Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Political corruption'

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Faller, Julie Kathleen. "Essays on Political Corruption." Thesis, Harvard University, 2015. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17467300.

Yiu, Yee-ling. "Corruption in the public sector in Hong Kong and the Philippines." [Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong], 1993. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B13641360.

Qizilbash, M. "Corruption, political systems and economic theory." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.358574.

Ang, Amanda. "The Political Economy of Corruption Indexes." Thesis, Department of Political Economy, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/8262.

Wong, Kam-bill. "Corruption in Japan." Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 1998. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B3197871X.

黃錦標 and Kam-bill Wong. "Corruption in Japan." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1998. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B3197871X.

Shang, Ying. "Curbing corruption a comparative analysis of corruption control in Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan : a thesis /." online access from Digital dissertation consortium access full-text, 2002. http://libweb.cityu.edu.hk/cgi-bin/er/db/ddcdiss.pl?3076914.

Hunter, Jason. "Taiwan domestic politics political corruption, cross strait relations, and national identity /." online access from Digital Dissertation Consortium, 2007. http://digital.library.okstate.edu/etd/umi-okstate-2271.pdf.

Cover, Oliver. "Political corruption, public opinion and citizens' behaviour." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2008. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:e2c48400-e400-46b2-814a-a68b998179a6.

David-Barrett, Elizabeth. "Theorising political corruption in transition Eastern Europe." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.550500.

Xu, Gang. "Essays on the Political Economy of Corruption and Anti-corruption : Evidence from China." Kyoto University, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/244507.

Turer, Ahmet. "Combating Corruption: A Comparison of National Anti-Corruption Efforts." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2003. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4247/.

Ceresola, Ryan Guy. "POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL ENGAGMENT: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS INVESTIGATING THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION PROSECUTIONS ON VOTING AND GOVERNMENT TRUST IN THE UNITED STATES." OpenSIUC, 2016. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/1266.

Sun, Yunbo. "A chronic political illness, an analysis of corruption and anti-corruption in contemporary China." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp04/mq23520.pdf.

Li, Yinan. "Institutions, Political Cycles and Corruption : Essays on Dynamic Political Economy of Government." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-83374.

Costas-Pérez, Elena. "Essays on the Political Economy of Local Corruption." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/287837.

Tangsupvattana, Ake. "Political De-development, Corruption and Governance in Thailand." Gadjah Mada University Press, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2237/15873.

Strimbu, Octavian. "Three essays on political corruption and common agency." Thesis, Université Laval, 2013. http://www.theses.ulaval.ca/2013/29824/29824.pdf.

Alhumami, Amich. "Political power, corruption, and witchcraft in modern Indonesia." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2012. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/39273/.

ALBUQUERQUE, Emmanuel Felipe Patriota de. "Corruption and political marketing: a game theoretical approach." Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, 2016. https://repositorio.ufpe.br/handle/123456789/24424.

Strîmbu, Octavian. "Three essays on political corruption and common agency." Doctoral thesis, Université Laval, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/24274.

Maguchu, Prosper Simbarashe. "Analysis of political corruption trends in transitional states." University of the Western Cape, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/5397.

Donnelly, Robert Christian. "Postwar vice crime and political corruption in Portland." PDXScholar, 1997. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/3554.

Hou, Xiaoyang. "The value of political connections : evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign /." View abstract or full-text, 2007. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?FINA%202007%20HOU.

Cordis, Adriana S. "Judicial checks on corruption." Connect to this title online, 2008. http://etd.lib.clemson.edu/documents/1211388402/.

Breitenstein, Gomis Sofia Helen. "Attitudes towards corruption and their consequences on political behavior." Doctoral thesis, TDX (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa), 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/670414.

Gobewole, Stephen H. "Public Corruption in Liberian Government." ScholarWorks, 2015. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/355.

Tsai, Jung-Hsiang. "Constitution and corruption semi-presidentialism in Taiwan and South Korea /." online access from Digital Dissertation Consortium access full-text, 2005. http://libweb.cityu.edu.hk/cgi-bin/er/db/ddcdiss.pl?3193072.

Freille, Sebastian. "Essays on corruption and economic development." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2007. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/10302/.

Wilson, Andrew Jonathon. "Comparative Political Corruption in the United States: The Florida Perspective." Scholar Commons, 2013. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4613.

Han, Jia. "Institutional approach to political corruption : statistical evidence from east Asia /." View abstract or full-text, 2007. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?SOSC%202007%20HAN.

Lu, Xi. "Essays in China's Anti-corruption Campaign." Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2017. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10280422.

China's unique system of hiring and promoting talented people within the state, under the supervision of the Communist Party, has been held up as an important institutional factor supporting its remarkably rapid and sustained economic growth. Jointly with Professor Peter L. Lorentzen, we explore this meritocracy argument in the context of Chinese leader Xi Jinping's ongoing anti-corruption campaign. Some question the sincerity of the campaign, arguing that it is nothing but a cover for intra-elite struggle and a purge of Xi's opponents. In the first chapter of my thesis, we use a dataset I have created to identify accused officials and map their connections. Our evidence supports the Party's claim that the crackdown is primarily a sincere effort to cut down on the widespread corruption that was undermining its efforts to develop an effective meritocratic governing system. First, we visualize the "patron-client'' network of all probed officials announced by the central government and identify the core targets of the anti-corruption campaign. Second, we use a recursive selection model to analyze who the campaign has targeted, providing evidence that even personal ties to top leaders have provided little protection. Finally, we show that, in the years leading up to the crackdown, the provinces later targeted had departed from the growth-oriented meritocratic selection procedures evident in other provinces.

In addition to its motivation, I also discuss the campaign's effects on economic efficiency. The second chapter of my thesis tests the "greasing-the-wheels'' hypothesis in the context of China's residential land market. We show that China's anti-corruption campaign, aimed at removing corruption in China's monopoly land market, caused a decrease in land transaction volumes. Furthermore, not removing any form of corruption would also lead to a similar decrease. It is only necessary to remove corruption that enables real estate developers to circumvent red tape and reduce trading costs. Our findings support the "greasing-the-wheels'' hypothesis hypothesis: when an economy has a low outcome owing to some preexisting distortions, corruption could be a positive factor in that it offers a "second-best world.''

Stairs, William J. "Political corruption and public opinion : the evolution of political ethics in Canada, 1840-1896." Doctoral thesis, Université Laval, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/17640.

Meeusen, A. "Esprit de corps : corruption in a transforming police service." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/12560.

Tunali, Çiğdem Börke. "Essays on political economy." Thesis, Strasbourg, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018STRAB013/document.

Dabla, Era. "Essays in corruption, income inequality, and growth /." Digital version accessible at:, 1998. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.

Morris, Stephen David. "The causes, consequences and dynamics of political corruption in Mexico." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/184518.

Yiu, Yee-ling, and 姚綺玲. "Corruption in the public sector in Hong Kong and the Philippines." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1993. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31950504.

Broucher, L. V. "The role of the Romanian press in reporting political corruption." Thesis, Nottingham Trent University, 2016. http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/29137/.

Biddle, Lauren Huber Evelyne. "Corruption in Latin America political, economic, structural, and institutional causes /." Chapel Hill, N.C. : University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2006. http://dc.lib.unc.edu/u?/etd,484.

Popa, Mircea. "Essays on the Political Economy of Corruption and Rent-Seeking." Thesis, Harvard University, 2013. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10935.

MACEDO, JOANA DA COSTA. "POLITICAL REFORM: OLD QUESTIONS NEW MEANING – FROM GOVERNABILITY TO CORRUPTION." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2010. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=16489@1.

Cherotich, Lillian Anne. "Political corruption and democratization in Kenya : the case of Goldenberg." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.669869.

Akcetin, Elif. "Corruption at the frontier : the Gansu fraud scandal /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/10488.

Abaalkhail, Nassar Ahmad. "The effectiveness of internal control in tackling corruption." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2016. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/65942/.

Lauw, Erven. "Essays on corruption and development issues." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/7784.

Haigh, Jane Galblum. "Political Power, Patronage, and Protection Rackets: Con Men and Political Corruption in Denver 1889-1894." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/195958.

Stenberg, Lotta. "Non-institutionalized Political Participation in South Korea : The Effects of Perceived Corruption and Political Trust." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-384565.

Eisler, Jacob Morse. "Personhood and the Law of Corruption in Federal Courts." Thesis, Harvard University, 2016. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33493326.

Leung, Pang Sau-fong Alice. "An evaluation of anti-corruption legislation in Hong Kong." [Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong], 1986. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B12323317.

How anti-corruption efforts strengthen global democracy and security

Subscribe to governance weekly, norman eisen and norman eisen senior fellow - the brookings institution, governance studies @normeisen fred dews fred dews senior multimedia project manager - office of communications @publichistory.

December 6, 2023

14 min read

Corrupt regimes around the world threaten global democracy and security. On this episode of The Current, Norman Eisen, senior fellow in Governance Studies and chair of the newly launched global Anti-Corruption, Democracy, and Security (ACDS) project at Brookings, talks about the project and explains why fighting corruption and promoting good governance are key to strengthen democracy and security.

Dissertation: Corruption Tolerance in Latin American Democracies

Corruption is conduct – or practice – that deviates from standard expectations in the performance of the functions of entrusted power. What is or is not perceived as corruption varies among individuals, in space and time. There will always be a certain degree of permissiveness towards corruption in society, with some of them being more likely to justify corrupt practices than others. This dissertation focuses on understanding the elements that condition tolerance to corruption, at the individual level, in Latin American democracies. To do so, an ordered probit model was calculated, using data from the 2020 Latinobarometer.

The results indicate that men, on average, are more likely to have lower tolerance for corruption than women; that individuals with lower educational attainment are more likely to be more tolerant of corruption; and that higher levels of religious practice tend to be associated with tougher attitudes toward corruption. The results also show that employees in private companies are more likely to be more tolerant than those in public companies. With regard to the perception of the extent of corruption, individuals who believe that corruption has increased or greatly increased in the year 2020 tend to be less tolerant of corruption and those who are more satisfied with democracy show a lower tendency to tolerate corruption. Trusting many government institutions – national and international – is also associated with a lower tolerance for corruption, a similar result for individuals who prefer a freer society.

It can be seen that, when comparing with the year 2016, the conditionals of tolerance to corruption remained the same, except for the result by gender. This study provides relevant evidence on the individual determinants of corruption tolerance in Latin American democracies and thus helps us understand why corruption is more resilient in some societies than in others.

NOTE: The work was developed in partnership with the EPOCA group: corruption and economic crisis – ICS-Lisbon

Publication Year: 2022

Student: Thaysa Viana Almeida de Lieberenz

Advisor: Prof. Dr. Viviani Silva Lírio

Co-Supervisor: Felippe Clemente

Program: Master in Applied Economics

University: Federal University of Viçosa (Brazil)

More information: https://www.poseconomiaaplicada.ufv.br/?informativo=estudante-do-programa-de-pos-graduacao-em-economia-aplicada-defende-dissertacao-intitulada-tolerancia-a-corrupcao-em-democracias-latino-americanas

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Jon Stewart to Robert Menendez: ‘You don’t need to break the law so cartoonishly when the legal corruption in the Senate is so fucking lucrative.’

Jon Stewart on Senator Robert Menendez’s corruption charges: ‘How dumb is you?’

Late-night hosts discuss America’s other major political corruption trial, Michael Cohen’s witness testimony and Trump’s praise of Hannibal Lecter

Late-night hosts talk Senator Robert Menendez’s old-school corruption scandal, the northern lights in Florida and Donald Trump’s speech praising Hannibal Lecter.

The Daily Show

While most eyes have been trained on Donald Trump’s criminal hush-money trial in New York, Jon Stewart looked at America’s other major political corruption trial : that of the New Jersey senator Robert Menendez.

The 70-year-old senator faces 16 counts of federal bribery charges for allegedly conspiring with his wife, Nadine, to accept bribes from wealthy businessmen in exchange for political favors to help the governments of Qatar and Egypt. The prosecution’s evidence recovered from Menendez’s house includes boots stuffed with cash, gold bars, a Mercedes-Benz convertible, furniture, exercise equipment and cash found in the lining of the senator’s embroidered congressional jacket.

Upon returning from a trip to Egypt, Menendez also Googled “how much is one kilo of gold worth?” “Damn you, metric system!” Stewart joked.

Menendez has proclaimed innocence. According to the New York Times, he said his cash habit was the result of “traumatic” family history. “These are simply my emotional support gold bars,” Stewart joked as the senator. “Whenever I’m not with them, I get anxious. We respond to trauma in different ways.”

“But perhaps the dumbest thing about this entire, not-quite-believable Real Housewives episode is how unnecessary it all is,” said Stewart. “You, sir, are an elected official in America’s most respected legislative body. It’s like a license to print money. You don’t need to break the law so cartoonishly when the legal corruption in the Senate is so fucking lucrative.” The trial occasioned a new Daily Show segment: “Senator Robert Menendez, how dumb is you?”

As Stewart explained: “Promising favors to foreign entities for a little chump change on the side? It’s bush league when as a US senator you can enrich yourself in so many different, let’s call them ‘legal’, ways.” The host let Menendez in on the workings of insider trading, writing laws that benefit a side business, “like the way Senator Chuck Grassley netted $370,000 in farm subsidies” and leadership PACs that essentially operate as lobbyist slush funds. “A pharma lobbyist cannot buy a senator a panini and some NyQuil,” he said, “but through the Pac, they can pay for five-star hotels for Senator Kristen Gillibrand, luxury resorts for Ted Cruz and even golf lessons for Rand Paul.

“At every turn, our Congress and our courts have been given a choice: be less corrupt, or redefine what constitutes corruption and get on with your bad selves,” Stewart added. “Robert Menendez’s gold bars in exchange for favorable legislation is obviously cartoonishly corrupt, but for anyone out there who thinks the status quo of government patronage and influence is of an entirely different species than Menendez … how dumb is you?”

Stephen Colbert

Stephen Colbert hosted The Late Show on his 60th birthday, which coincided with extra-vivid instances of the aurora borealis, caused by a massive solar storm in which large explosive bursts of energy from the sun started slamming into Earth. “Or to put that in layman’s terms: God was on shrooms and was hankering for a little laser Zeppelin,” Colbert joked.

The lights could be seen as far south as Florida, “where Governor DeSantis immediately banned the sky for displaying a Pride flag”, he quipped.

The host then checked in on week four of Trump’s “faking business records to cover up banging a porn star trial”. This week features star witness Michael Cohen , Trump’s former lawyer and fixer, who served as the middleman in the alleged $130,000 hush-money payment to Stormy Daniels. “You never want to be the middleman between your boss and a porn star,” Colbert joked. “Sure, it sounds titillating when they ask, but eventually it’s a tangle of limbs and you’re just kinda watching.”

According to Cohen, Trump was not concerned that the revelation he paid hush money to Stormy Daniels would threaten his marriage to Melania, telling him: “Don’t worry … how long do you think I’ll be on the market for? Not long.”

“Coincidentally, ‘not long’ is how Stormy described it,” Colbert joked. “But it’s true: he would be off the market soon. I mean, he’s clearly past his expiration date.”

Seth Meyers

And on Late Night, Seth Meyers recapped a Trump rally in New Jersey in which the former president denigrated Bruce Springsteen (“we have a much bigger crowd”) and praised “the late, great Hannibal Lecter, he’s a wonderful man”.

“Is that a fucking bit we did?” Meyers exclaimed. “Who the hell goes to New Jersey and attacks Bruce Springsteen? What’s next on your cross-country insult tour? Are you going to go to Boston and attack Ben Affleck while you drink Starbucks in a Yankees hat?”

The curious references led reporters to ask Trump outside his trial: why defend the serial killer character?

“‘Why Hannibal Lecter?’ is such an amazing question to yell at a presidential candidate,” Meyers laughed. “By the way, that question was nestled between two other questions about his criminal trial for defrauding voters by paying hush money to a porn star. For any other presidential candidate, getting asked the question ‘why Hannibal Lecter?’ would mean you’re in a five-alarm shit storm, but for Trump? Just a normal Monday.”

Late-night TV roundup
Jon Stewart

Sen. Bob Menendez’s corruption trial begins, his second in the last decade

For the second time in a decade, Sen. Bob Menendez is finding his political career and freedom on the line in a federal criminal case that has already forced him out of one of the Senate’s most powerful posts. The New Jersey Democrat goes to trial Monday.

Sen. Bob Menedez, D-NJ, arrives at a federal courthouse in Manhattan for the start of jury selection in his corruption trial. Menendez is charged with accepting bribes of gold and cash to use his influence to deliver favors.

Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J., leaves the Manhattan federal court, after the first day of his corruption trial, Monday, May, 13, 2024, in New York. (AP Photo/Stefan Jeremiah)

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Sen. Bob Menendez, center, sits with his defense team during jury selection, Monday, May 13, 2024, at Manhattan federal court in New York. Menendez, a Democrat, is accused of accepting bribes of gold and cash to use his influence to deliver favors that would help three New Jersey businessmen. (Candace E. Eaton via AP)

Wael Hana, left, Sen. Bob Menendez, center, and Fred Daibes, sit in Manhattan federal court with Judge Sidney H. Stein presiding during jury selection, Monday, May 13, 2024, in New York. Menendez, a Democrat, went on trial in Manhattan federal court Monday, accused of accepting bribes of gold and cash to use his influence to deliver favors that would help three New Jersey businessmen. (Candace E. Eaton via AP)

Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J., arrives for the first day of his trial at the Manhattan federal court, Monday, May 13, 2024, in New York. (AP Photo/Stefan Jeremiah)

FILE - Wael Hana, right, leaves the federal courthouse in New York, Tuesday, Sept. 26, 2023. For the second time in a decade, Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J., faces a corruption trial Monday, May 13, 2024, with his political career and freedom on the line. Hana is accused of paying off Menendez for helping him get a lucrative deal with the Egyptian government to certify that imported meat met Islamic dietary requirements. (AP Photo/Seth Wenig, File)

FILE - Fred Daibes, one of three businessmen named as co-defendants with Sen. Bob Menendez, arrives at federal court, Sept. 27, 2023, in New York. For the second time in a decade, Menendez faces a corruption trial Monday, May 13, 2024, with his political career and freedom on the line. Daibes is accused of delivering gold bars and cash to Menendez and his wife to get the senator to use his clout to help him secure a multimillion-dollar deal with a Qatari investment fund, including by taking actions favorable to Qatar’s government. (AP Photo/Seth Wenig, File)

FILE - Jose Uribe leaves federal court, Wednesday, Sept. 27, 2023, in New York. For the second time in a decade, Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J., faces a corruption trial Monday, May 13, 2024, with his political career and freedom on the line. Uribe was accused of buying a Mercedes-Benz for Nadine Menendez after her previous car was destroyed when she struck and killed a man crossing the street. Prosecutors said Menendez twice tried to help Uribe by trying to influence criminal investigations involving his business associates. Uribe pleaded guilty and is expected to testify. (AP Photo/Seth Wenig, File)

NEW YORK (AP) — Sen. Bob Menendez went on trial in Manhattan federal court Monday, accused of accepting bribes of gold and cash to use his influence to deliver favors that would help three New Jersey businessmen.

The Democratic senator sat with his lawyers and listened as Judge Sidney H. Stein told over 150 prospective jurors throughout the day about the charges against Menendez and two of the businessmen.

The judge told them the “sitting U.S. senator from the state of New Jersey” had been charged in a conspiracy in which he allegedly “agreed to accept bribes and accepted bribes.”

FILE - Democratic U.S. Sen. Bob Menendez of New Jersey and his wife Nadine Menendez arrive at the federal courthouse in New York, Sept. 27, 2023. A federal judge has ruled that Sen. Menendez and his wife will be tried separately on allegations that they participated in a bribery scheme. Judge Sidney H. Stein agreed Thursday , April 11, 2024, to sever and delay Nadine Menedez’s trial after her lawyers said she required treatment for a serious medical condition. (AP Photo/Jeenah Moon, File)

After he warned them that the trial was expected to last up to seven weeks, Stein let would-be jurors, identified only by numbers, raise their hands if they believed they could not serve for that length of time. Then, he took them one at a time into a separate room to ask them why.

Menendez, 70, is on trial with two of the businessmen who allegedly paid him bribes — real estate developer Fred Daibes and Wael Hana. All three have pleaded not guilty. A third businessman has pleaded guilty and agreed to testify against the other defendants. The senator’s wife is also charged, but her trial is delayed until at least July.

Stein had not finished questioning prospective jurors who said they could not serve when he finished for the day without yet beginning the process of asking general questions of all jurors, such as whether they know any of the parties to the case, including lawyers, the defendants and possible witnesses.

The judge gave no indication whether he thought it was likely that openings would occur Tuesday.

Among dozens of prospective jurors who asked to be removed from the jury pool, there were numerous individuals who had nonrefundable travel plans in coming weeks or disabled family members they cared for or jobs that would leave them virtually irreplaceable.

But there were several who said they worried they could not be fair given everything they’d heard about the case. Many were dismissed by the judge.

“I would side with the prosecutor,” one told the judge flatly.

AP AUDIO: Corruption trial for Sen. Bob Menendez underway with jury selection

AP correspondent Jennifer King reports on developments in the bribery trial of an influential New Jersey senator.

“All lawyers are liars. And like I said, regardless of what evidence is put in front of me, I’m just not going to have a good thought process about the process,” another said.

One man said he worked as a graphic artist on multiple late night comedy television shows and had “certainly worked on things critical of the senator.”

After the man then expressed concern about the safety of jurors on the trial, Stein said: “I’ve never heard any issue like that here.”

Finally, seemingly exasperated after the man expressed fears of foreign governments, the judge said: “Now I think you’re simply trying to get out of jury duty.”

When Menendez left the courthouse at the end of the day, he gave a friendly wave toward reporters who asked him to speak as he walked quickly to a waiting car, but he left any meaningful comment for another day.

In the morning, Menendez, in a suit with a red tie, was dropped off in front of the courthouse at 8:15 a.m., 40 minutes before former President Donald Trump’s motorcade passed by on its way across the street to state court, where he is on trial for allegedly falsifying business records to hide hush money payments to a porn actor before the 2016 election.

The trial, the second in seven years for Menendez, has already sent the senator’s political stature tumbling. After charges were announced in September, he was forced out of his powerful post as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The three-term senator has announced he will not be seeking reelection on the Democratic ticket this fall, although he has not ruled out running as an independent.

The previous corruption prosecution of Menendez on unrelated charges ended with a deadlocked jury in 2017.

In the new case, prosecutors say the senator’s efforts on behalf of the businessmen led him to take actions benefitting the governments of Egypt and Qatar. Menendez has vigorously denied doing anything unusual in his dealings with foreign officials.

Besides charges including bribery, extortion, fraud and obstruction of justice, Menendez also is charged with acting as a foreign agent of Egypt.

Among evidence his lawyers will have to explain are gold bars worth over $100,000 and more than $486,000 in cash found in a raid two years ago on his New Jersey home, including money stuffed in the pockets of clothing in closets.

The Democrat’s wife, Nadine Menendez, was also charged in the case, but her trial has been postponed for health reasons. She is still expected to be a major figure. Prosecutors say Nadine Menendez often served as a conduit between the men paying the bribes and Bob Menendez.

The senator’s lawyers in court papers have said they plan to explain that Menendez had no knowledge of some of what occurred because she kept him in the dark.

According to an indictment, Daibes delivered gold bars and cash to Menendez and his wife to get the senator’s help with a multimillion-dollar deal with a Qatari investment fund, prompting Menendez to act in ways favorable to Qatar’s government.

The indictment also said Menendez did things benefitting Egyptian officials in exchange for bribes from Hana as the businessman secured a valuable deal with the Egyptian government to certify that imported meat met Islamic dietary requirements.

In pleading guilty several weeks ago, businessman Jose Uribe admitted buying Menendez’s wife a Mercedes-Benz to get the senator’s help to influence criminal investigations involving his business associates.

US Senator Robert Menendez goes on trial for corruption, no jurors chosen

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U.S. Senator Robert Menendez arrives at Federal Court for the start of his bribery trial in New York

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Four from MIT named 2024 Knight-Hennessy Scholars

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Two by two grid of Top row: Vittorio Colicci, Owen Dugan, Carina Letong Hong, and Carine You, all with the same reddish roofttops and trees in the background

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MIT senior Owen Dugan, graduate student Vittorio Colicci ’22, predoctoral research fellow Carine You ’22, and recent alumna Carina Letong Hong ’22 are recipients of this year’s Knight-Hennessy Scholarships. The competitive fellowship, now in its seventh year, funds up to three years of graduate studies in any field at Stanford University. To date, 22 MIT students and alumni have been awarded Knight-Hennessy Scholarships.

“We are excited for these students to continue their education at Stanford with the generous support of the Knight Hennessy Scholarship,” says Kim Benard, associate dean of distinguished fellowships in Career Advising and Professional Development. “They have all demonstrated extraordinary dedication, intellect, and leadership, and this opportunity will allow them to further hone their skills to make real-world change.”

Vittorio Colicci ’22

Vittorio Colicci, from Trumbull, Connecticut, graduated from MIT in May 2022 with a BS in aerospace engineering and physics. He will receive his master’s degree in planetary sciences this spring. At Stanford, Colicci will pursue a PhD in earth and planetary sciences at the Stanford Doerr School of Sustainability. He hopes to investigate how surface processes on Earth and Mars have evolved through time alongside changes in habitability. Colicci has worked largely on spacecraft engineering projects, developing a monodisperse silica ceramic for electrospray thrusters and fabricating high-energy diffraction gratings for space telescopes. As a Presidential Graduate Fellow at MIT, he examined the influence of root geometry on soil cohesion for early terrestrial plants using 3D-printed reconstructions. Outside of research, Colicci served as co-director of TEDxMIT and propulsion lead for the MIT Rocket Team. He is also passionate about STEM engagement and outreach, having taught educational workshops in Zambia and India.

Owen Dugan, from Sleepy Hollow, New York, is a senior majoring in physics. As a Knight-Hennessy Scholar, he will pursue a PhD in computer science at the Stanford School of Engineering. Dugan aspires to combine artificial intelligence and physics, developing AI that enables breakthroughs in physics and using physics techniques to design more capable and safe AI systems. He has collaborated with researchers from Harvard University, the University of Chicago, and DeepMind, and has presented his first-author research at venues including the International Conference on Machine Learning, the MIT Mechanistic Interpretability Conference, and the American Physical Society March Meeting. Among other awards, Dugan is a Hertz Finalist, a U.S. Presidential Scholar, an MIT Outstanding Undergraduate Research Awardee, a Research Science Institute Scholar, and a Neo Scholar. He is also a co-founder of VeriLens, a funded startup enabling trust on the internet by cryptographically verifying digital media.

Carina Letong Hong ’22

Carina Letong Hong, from Canton, China, is currently pursuing a JD/PhD in mathematics at Stanford. A first-generation college student, Hong graduated from MIT in May 2022 with a double major in mathematics and physics and was inducted into Sigma Pi Sigma, the physics honor society. She then earned a neuroscience master’s degree with dissertation distinctions from the University of Oxford, where she conducted artificial intelligence and machine learning research at Sainsbury Wellcome Center’s Gatsby Unit. At Stanford Law School, Hong provides legal aid to low-income workers and uses economic analysis to push for law enforcement reform. She has published numerous papers in peer-reviewed journals, served as an expert referee for journals and conferences, and spoken at summits in the United States, Germany, France, the U.K., and China. She was the recipient of the AMS-MAA-SIAM Morgan Prize for Outstanding Research, the highest honor for an undergraduate in mathematics in North America; the AWM Alice T. Schafer Prize for Mathematical Excellence, given annually to an undergraduate woman in the United States; the Maryam Mirzakhani Fellowship; and a Rhodes Scholarship.

Carine You ’22

Carine You, from San Diego, California, graduated from MIT in May 2022 with bachelor’s degrees in electrical engineering and computer science and in mathematics. Since graduating, You has worked as a predoctoral research assistant with Professor Amy Finkelstein in the MIT Department of Economics, where she has studied the quality of Medicare nursing home care and the targeting of medical screening technologies. This fall, You will embark on a PhD in economic analysis and policy at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. She wishes to address pressing issues in environmental and health-care markets, with a particular focus on economic efficiency and equity. You previously developed audio signal processing algorithms at Bose, refined mechanistic models to inform respiratory monitoring at the MIT Research Laboratory of Electronics, and analyzed corruption in developmental projects in India at the World Bank. Through Middle East Entrepreneurs of Tomorrow, she taught computer science to Israeli and Palestinian students in Jerusalem and spearheaded an online pilot expansion for the organization. At MIT, she was named a Burchard Scholar.

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Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College. I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.
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Focusing on the influence of political institutions on corruption, the thesis then provides evidence that a high level of political interest helps to reduce corruption within a society, while the effect of democracy upon corruption depends on property rights protection and income distribution.
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Abstract. This dissertation presents three essays offering explanations for the persistence of corruption despite electoral competition. The first essay, co-authored with Adam Glynn and Nahomi Ichino, asks what the effect of electoral systems is on corruption. Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) proposed that plurality electoral systems should ...
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This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an ... levels of political interference and corruption undermine the effectiveness of public sector leaders of the Tigray ...
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Doctoral Dissertation: DETAILS Author Name: Anas Lamin, PhD Year: 2020 Title: Corruption in Developing Countries: Case Study of Libya Document type: Doctoral dissertation ... 4.14.3 Regression Analysis of Political Goodwill Factor on Corruption.....173 4.14.4 Regression ...
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2.5 Link or Nexus between Political Corruption and Democratic Governance 20 2.6 Examples of Political Corruption Cases in Nigeria 21 2.6.1 Grass-Cutting Scandal - Babachir Lawal 22 2.6.2 Abdulrasheed Maina 22 2.6.3 The Dasukigate - Col. Sambo Dasuki 23 2.6.4 Alison Madueke's Loot 23 3 THEORETICAL CONCEPT 24 3.1 The Two Publics 24
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The criminal corruption trial of the Democratic US senator Bob Menendez of New Jersey is scheduled to get under way in a Manhattan federal court on Monday, with prosecutors preparing a colorful ...
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NEW YORK (AP) — For the second time in a decade, U.S. Sen. Bob Menendez faces a corruption trial Monday with his political career and freedom on the line in a criminal case that already has forced him out of one of the most powerful posts in Congress.. The 70-year-old New Jersey Democrat and his wife are accused of accepting bribes from three wealthy businessmen in his home state and ...
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FILE - Fred Daibes, one of three businessmen named as co-defendants with Sen. Bob Menendez, arrives at federal court, Sept. 27, 2023, in New York. For the second time in a decade, Menendez faces a corruption trial Monday, May 13, 2024, with his political career and freedom on the line.
US Senator Robert Menendez goes on trial for corruption, no jurors
Jury selection began in the corruption trial of U.S. Senator Robert Menendez on Monday, with a judge excusing dozens of prospective jurors in a case that could affect the Democrat's political ...
Four from MIT named 2024 Knight-Hennessy Scholars
Caption. Clockwise from top left: Vittorio Colicci, Owen Dugan, Carine You, and Carina Letong Hong. Credits. Photos courtesy of the Knight-Hennessy Scholars. MIT senior Owen Dugan, graduate student Vittorio Colicci '22, predoctoral research fellow Carine You '22, and recent alumna Carina Letong Hong '22 are recipients of this year's ...