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Simone de Beauvoir and The Second Sex

By NASRULLAH MAMBROL on May 6, 2016 • ( 5 )

Simone de Beauvoir ‘s The Second Sex (1949) can be said to have inaugurated the second wave of feminism, with its central argument that throughout history, across cultures, woman has always occupied a secondary position in relation to man, being relegated to the position of the “other”, that which is adjectival to the substantial subjectivity and the existential activity of man. Whereas man has been enabled to transcend and control his environment, always furthering the domain of his physical and intellectual conquests, woman has remained imprisoned within ” immanence” remaining a slave within the circle of duties imposed by her maternal and reproductive functions. In highlighting this subordination, the book explains ,1 in characteristic existentialist fashion how the “essence” of woman was in fact created — at economic, social, political, religious levels by historical developments representing the interests of men. This idea resounds in de Beauvoir’s famous statement: “One is not born, but rather becomes a woman.” Influenced by Sartrean existentialism, Marxism, Psychoanaysis and Hegel, she argued that the objectification of woman permeates human history and informs the whole of Western philosophical thought.

In her renowned introduction to The Second Sex , de Beauvoir points out the fundamental asymmetry of the terms “masculine” and “feminine.” Masculinity is considered to be the “absolute human type,” the norm or standard of humanity. A man does not typically preface his opinions with the statement “I am a man,” whereas a woman’s views are often held to be grounded in her femininity rather than in any objective perception of things. A man “thinks of his body as a direct and normal connection with the world, which he believes he apprehends objectively, whereas he regards the body of woman as a hindrance, a prison . . . Woman has ovaries, a uterus; these peculiarities imprison her in her subjectivity, circumscribe her within the limits of her own nature” ( SS , xv). De Beauvoir quotes Aristotle as saying that the “female is a female by virtue of a certain lack of qualities,” and St. Thomas as stating that the female nature is “afflicted with a natural defectiveness” ( SS , xvi). Summarizing these long traditions of thought, de Beauvoir states: “Thus humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being . . . she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute – she is the Other” ( SS , xvi). De Beauvoir’s Hegelian terminology highlights the fact that man’s relegation of woman to the status of “other” violates the principle of mutual recognition, thereby threatening the very status that man has for so long jealously accorded to himself, to his own subjectivity. And yet, as de Beauvoir points out (drawing on both Hegel and Lévi-Strauss), “otherness” is a “fundamental category of human thought,” as primordial as consciousness itself. Consciousness always entails positing a duality of Self and Other: indeed, no group “ever sets itself up as the One without at once setting up the Other over against itself ” ( SS , xvi–xvii). Our very part viii: the twentieth century conception of our identity entails consciousness of what we are not, of what stands beyond us and perhaps opposed to us.

Another contributing factor to women’s subordination is her own reluctance to forego the traditional advantages conferred on them by their protective male superiors: if man supports woman financially and assumes responsibility for defining her existence and purpose, then she can evade both economic risk and the metaphysical “risk” of a freedom in which she must work out her own purposes ( SS , xxi).

Men, of course, have had their own reasons for perpetuating such a duality of Self and Other: “Legislators, priests, philosophers, writers, and scientists have striven to show that the subordinate position of woman is willed in heaven and advantageous on earth” ( SS , xxii). A long line of thinkers, stretching from Plato and Aristotle through Augustine and Aquinas into modern bourgeois philosophers, has insisted on stabilizing woman as an object, on dooming her to immanence, to a life of subjection to given conditions, on barring her from property rights, education, and the professions ( SS , xviii). As well as procuring the obvious economic and political benefits of such subordination, men have reaped enormous psychological reassurance: their hostility toward women conceals a fundamental desire for self-justification, as well as a fundamental insecurity ( SS , xxii). While de Beauvoir acknowledges that by the eighteenth century certain male thinkers such as Diderot and John Stuart Mill began to champion the cause of women, she also notes that, in contradiction of its ostensible disposition toward democracy, the bourgeois class “clung to the old morality that found the guarantee of private property in the solidity of the family.” Woman’s liberation was thwarted all the more harshly as her entry into the industrial workforce furnished an economic basis for her claims to equality ( SS , xxii–xxiii).

From her own perspective of “existentialist ethics,” as informed by Heidegger , Sartre , and Merleau-Ponty , de Beauvoir rejects all attempts to stabilize the condition of women under the pretext that happiness consists in stagnation and stasis. Every human subject, she insists, must engage in exploits or projects that serve as a mode of transcendence, as a means of rising above and controlling the conditions into which one is born ( SS , xxvii). In the first part of her book, de Beauvoir examines the feminist criticism views of women advanced by biology, psychology, and historical materialism, in an endeavor to show how the concept of the feminine has been fashioned and to consider why woman has been defined as the other. Regarding the data afforded by biology, she acknowledges that a physiological burden is imposed on woman by her reproductive function. She points out, however – anticipating the manifold importance subsequently placed on the concept of the “body” by feminists – that the body is not a thing but a situation ( SS , 30–31). Human beings achieve self-definition only as part of a larger, social framework, and the so-called facts of biology must be viewed in the light of economic, social, and moral circumstances: the benefits or disadvantages attaching to these facts are dependent upon the arbitration of social norms. For example, if violence is morally or legally forbidden, man’s superior physical strength is not an intrinsic asset ( SS , 32–33).

In the conclusion to her book, de Beauvoir argues that the age-old conflict between the sexes no longer takes the form of woman attempting to hold back man in her own prison of immanence, but rather in her own effort to emerge into the light of transcendence. Woman’s situation will be transformed primarily by a change in her economic condition; but this change must also generate moral, social, cultural, and psychological transformations. If girls were brought up to expect the same free and assured future as boys, even the meanings of the Oedipus and castration complexes would be modified, and the “child would perceive around her an androgynous world and not a masculine world” (SS, 683). Moreover, if she were brought up to understand, rather than inhibit, her own sexuality, eroticism and love would take on the nature of free transcendence rather than resignation: the notions of dominance and submission, victory and defeat, in sexual relations might give way before the idea of exchange (SS, 685). De Beauvoir is confident that women will arrive at “complete economic and social equality, which will bring about an inner metamorphosis” (SS, 686). And both man and woman will exist both for self and for the other: “mutually recognizing each other as subject, each will yet remain for the other an other.” In this recognition, in this reciprocity, will “the slavery of half of humanity” be abolished (SS, 688).

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Dispatches From the Other

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By Francine Du Plessix Gray

• May 27, 2010

In 1946, when Simone de Beauvoir began to write her landmark study of women, “The Second Sex,” legislation allowing French women to vote was little more than a year old. Birth control would be legally denied them until 1967. Next door, in Switzerland, women would not be enfranchised until 1971. Such repressive circumstances account for both the fierce, often wrathful urgency of Beauvoir’s book and the vehement controversies this founding text of feminism aroused when it was first published in France in 1949 and in the United States in 1953. The Vatican placed it on the Index of Forbidden Books. Albert Camus complained that Beauvoir made Frenchmen look ridiculous. On these shores, the novelist Philip Wylie eulogized it as “one of the few great books of our era,” the psychiatrist Karl Menninger found it “pretentious” and “tiresome,” and a reviewer in The Atlantic Monthly faulted it for being “bespattered with the repulsive lingo of existentialism.”

In her splendid introduction to this new edition , Judith Thurman notes that Blanche Knopf, wife of Beauvoir’s American publisher, heard about the book on a scouting trip to France and was under the impression that it was a highbrow sex manual. Knopf asked for a reader’s report from a retired zoologist, Howard M. Parshley, who was then commissioned to do the translation. Knopf’s husband urged Parshley to condense it significantly, noting that Beauvoir seemed to suffer from “verbal diarrhea.” Parshley complied, providing the necessary Imodium by cutting 15 percent of the original 972 pages. And so it was this truncated text, translated by a scientist with a college undergraduate’s knowledge of French, that ushered two generations of women into the universe of feminist thought, inspiring pivotal later books like Betty Friedan’s “Feminine Mystique” and Kate Millett’s “Sexual Politics.”

Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier’s new translation of “The Second Sex” is the first English-language edition in almost 60 years, and the first to restore the material Parshley excised. In this passionate, awesomely erudite work, Beauvoir examines the reasons women have been forced to accept a place in society secondary to that of men, despite the fact that women constitute half the human race. Supporting her arguments with data from biology, physiology, ethnology, anthropology, mythology, folklore, philosophy and economics, she documents the status of women throughout history, from the age of hunter-gatherers to the mid-20th century. In one of her most interesting chapters, “The Married Woman” (a chapter Parshley particularly savaged), she offers numerous quotations from the novels and diaries of Virginia Woolf, Colette, Edith Wharton, Sophia Tolstoy and others. She also scrutinizes the manner in which various male authors, from Montaigne to Stendhal to D. H. Lawrence, have represented women (and, in many cases, how they treated their wives). Urging women to persevere in their efforts at emancipation, she emphasizes that they must also do so for the sake of men: “It is when the slavery of half of humanity is abolished and with it the whole hypocritical system it implies that the ‘division’ of humanity will reveal its authentic meaning and the human couple will discover its true form.”

How does Beauvoir’s book stand up more than a half-century later? And how does this new translation compare with the previous one? I’m sorry to report that “The Second Sex,” which I read with euphoric enthusiasm in my post-college years, now strikes me as being in many ways dated. Written in an era in which a minority of women were employed, its arguments for female participation in the work force seem particularly outmoded. And Beauvoir’s truly paranoid hostility toward the institutions of marriage and motherhood — another characteristic of early feminism — is so extreme as to be occasionally hilarious. Every aspect of the female reproductive system, from puberty to menopause, is approached with the same ferocious disdain. Females of all living species are “first violated . . . then alienated” by the process of fertilization. Derogatory phrases like “the servitude of maternity,” “woman’s absurd fertility,” the “exhausting servitude” of breast-feeding, abound. (How could they not, since the author sees heterosexual love in general as “a mortal danger?”) According to Beauvoir, a girl’s first menstruation, which many of us welcomed with excitement and pride, is met instead with “disgust and fear. ” It “ inspires horror” and “signifies illness, suffering and death.” Beauvoir doesn’t appear to have spent much time with children or teenagers: a first menses, in her view, leads the girl to be “disgusted by her too-carnal body, by menstrual blood, by adults’ sexual practices, by the male she is destined for.”

If Beauvoir’s ruminations on “the curse” are pessimistic (and pessimism runs through “The Second Sex” like a poisonous river) her reflections on sexual initiation and marriage make them sound like torture. She chooses the most brutal examples of deflorations — mostly rapes — to make her points. Wedding nights “transform the erotic experience into an ordeal” that “often dooms the woman to frigidity forever.” It isn’t surprising, she adds, “that ‘conjugal duties’ are often only a repugnant chore for the wife.” “No one,” she argues, “dreams of denying the tragedies and nastiness of married life.” Conjugal love, in Beauvoir’s view, is “a complex mixture of attachment, resentment, hatred, rules, resignation, laziness and hypocrisy.” Even marriages that “work well” suffer “a curse they rarely escape: boredom.” Already alarmed? Wait until you come to the discussion of motherhood. A woman experiences the fetus as “a parasite.” “Maternity is a strange compromise of narcissism, altruism, dream, sincerity, bad faith, devotion and cynicism.” “There is nothing like an ‘unnatural mother,’ since maternal love has nothing natural about it.” It is significant that the only stage of a woman’s life Beauvoir has good things to say about is widowhood, which, in her view, most bear quite cheerfully. Upon losing their spouses, she tells us, women, “now lucid and wary, . . . often attain a delicious cynicism.” In old age, they maintain “a stoic defiance or skeptical irony.”

It should be noted that Beauvoir, at least in her personal life, did not hate men. They were, in fact, central to her happiness; she merely loathed the institutions imposed on women by what she considered a patriarchal society. Her lifetime companion, Jean-Paul Sartre, the more conventional of this dazzling couple, proposed to “Castor” and was rejected with the comment that he was being “silly.” (The nickname Castor, French for “Beaver,” was inspired by Beauvoir’s prolific output and her compulsively disciplined work habits; she researched and wrote “The Second Sex” in a mere 14 months, while pursuing several other projects.) A tiny beauty with severely plaited dark hair and a regal manner, always fastidiously attired, she was highly attractive to men. Her complex erotic relationship with Sartre, which occasionally involved the sharing of female partners, and her ardent affair with the American writer Nelson Algren, indicate that she had a pronounced sexual appetite. And though she might have been loath to admit it, both men had a profound impact on the writing of “The Second Sex.” It was Algren who persuaded Beauvoir to expand one of her earlier essays on women into a book-length work. And it was Sartre who provided one of the book’s two basic insights: the existentialist notion of an opposition between a sovereign self (Man) and an objectified Other (Woman), who, limited by her weaker physical strength and the travails of motherhood, must abide by Man’s dictates.

The other pivotal notion at the heart of “The Second Sex” — a more problematic one, which Beauvoir came to on her own — is her belief that, in Parshley’s translation, “one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.” This preposterous assertion, intended to bolster her argument that marriage and motherhood are institutions imposed by men to curb women’s freedom, will be denied by any mother who has seen her toddler son eagerly grab for a toy in the shape of a vehicle or a gun, while at the same time showing a total lack of interest in his sister’s cherished dolls. It has also been disputed by certain feminist scholars, who would argue that many gender differences are innate rather than acquired.

Yet notwithstanding its misconceptions and frequent obsolescence, “The Second Sex” retains an awesome majesty and continues to provide many astute insights into women’s lot. Among the best parts of Beauvoir’s book are those on women artists and intellectuals. Why have women not created art as great as men’s? she asks. Women’s overwhelming desire to please is at fault. The truly original writer is “always scandalous,” and women’s desire to please keeps them from daring to “irritate, explore, explode.”

Should we rejoice that this first unabridged edition of “The Second Sex” appears in a new translation? I, for one, do not. Executed by two American women who have lived in Paris for many years and taught English at the Institut d’Études Politiques, it doesn’t begin to flow as nicely as Parshley’s. A few instances: Writing about the aggressive nature of man’s penetration of woman, Parshley felicitously translates a Beauvoir phrase as “her inwardness is violated.” In contrast, Borde and Malovany-­Chevallier’s rendering states that woman “is like a raped interiority.” And where Parshley has Beauvoir saying of woman, “It is she who defines herself by dealing with nature on her own account in her emotional life,” the new translators substitute, “It is she who defines herself by reclaiming nature for herself in her affectivity.” In yet another example, man’s approach to woman’s “dangerous magic” is seen this way in Parshley: “He sets her up as the essential, it is he who poses her as such and thus he really acts as the essential in this voluntary alienation.” But in Borde and Malovany-Chevallier, “it is he who posits her, and he who realizes himself thereby as the essential in this alienation he grants.” Throughout, there are truly inexcusable passages in which the translators even lack a proper sense of English syntax: “Moments women consider revelations are those where they discover they are in harmony with a reality based on peace with one’s self.”

Never mind. Despite this new edition’s shortcomings, one should be grateful that Beauvoir’s epochal work will be drawn to the attention of another generation. “What a curse to be a woman!” Beauvoir writes, quoting Kier­kegaard. “And yet the very worst curse when one is a woman is, in fact, not to understand that it is one.” No one has done more than Beauvoir to explain the conditions of that curse, and no one has more eloquently, irately challenged us to turn that curse into a blessing.

THE SECOND SEX

By Simone de Beauvoir

Translated by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier

800 pp. Alfred A. Knopf. $40

Francine du Plessix Gray is writing a book about Marie Antoinette’s lover, the Swedish diplomat Axel von Fersen.

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Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

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The Second Sex

Simone de Beauvoir,  The Second Sex , Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (trs.), Random House, 2010, 822pp., $17.95 (pbk), ISBN 9780307277787.

Reviewed by Nancy Bauer, Tufts University

This is a review of the new English-language translation of Simone de Beauvoir's magnum opus,  Le deuxième sexe  (1949), particularly with respect to its value for readers interested in Beauvoir as a philosopher. An important and unqualifiedly positive difference between this translation and the only other one available in English, which came out in 1952, is that the new translation has restored 145 pages of the original 972-page French original that the older English version omits, often willy-nilly and always without annotations or signposts. For the first time, Anglophone readers do not have to wonder whether the particular section of the book they're reading is filled with hidden holes.

We must not undervalue the importance of this restoration. And it is a relief to find that some of most grievous errors in the old translation have been eliminated. But the new translation is on the whole a disappointment, and not just from the point of view of those interested in the book as a work of philosophy, though the sting for us will be especially acute. Some of the problems that plague the old translation reappear in the new, and there are fresh ones as well. Most exasperatingly, the translators of the new version often sacrifice readability and clarity in favor of a highly unidiomatic word-by-word literalism that hampers the flow of Beauvoir's prose and often obfuscates its meaning. There are crucial places in Beauvoir's argument in which the new translation is decidedly superior to the old. On the whole, however, the new version often taxes the reader's patience and obscures Beauvoir's views.

Like Proust in  À la recherche du temps perdu , Beauvoir in  Le deuxième sexe  displays a fondness for unusually long sentences and paragraphs and uncommon punctuation practices -- in her case, a penchant for the semi-colon and, in Proust's, a paucity of commas. In addition to making decisions about the best way to render individual words, phrases, and sentences, translators of highly stylized writings such as these are obliged to adopt a general strategy for achieving two desiderata that are fundamental to good translation and yet often in tension with one another: staying as faithful as possible to the author's way of doing things -- including her or his fondness for various language-specific tropes, such as metaphor, synecdoche, and alliteration -- while making sure that doing things this way makes sense in the target language.

Because striking this balance is an art, not a science, it's always possible for a work to be rendered in markedly different but nonetheless credible ways. Anglophone readers of Proust, for example, disagree about whether the new Penguin version of  À la recherche du temps perdu , with a different translator for each of the six volumes, is superior to the classic C. K. Scott Moncrieff rendering from the 1920s, even though both camps generally acknowledge the integrity of both translations. The difference between the titles of these two works --  In Search of Lost Time  versus  Remembrance of Things Past  -- perhaps epitomizes the difference between the translations as a whole. As his title suggests, Moncrieff chose to take certain liberties with Proust's prose in the service of telling the story in the loveliest English he could craft. Lydia Davis, the translator of the more recent version's first volume ( Du côté de chez Swann ), on the other hand, made preserving the construction and flow of Proust's sentences her highest priority.

We find a similar divergence in translation strategy in the old and new versions of  The Second Sex . The original translator, Howard M. Parshley, was inclined to play fast and loose with word choice and sentence construction. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier, the translators of the new version, were guided by the principle that bringing to light what they call the "logic" of the text required cleaving as closely as possible to Beauvoir's choice of and arrangement of words; thus, for instance,  s'accomplir  is ordinarily translated as "accomplish oneself," rather than the usual "is fulfilled," and some paragraphs go on for almost three pages. [1]

Our choice in this case, however, is not between two viable interpretative strategies. It's between two inadequate renderings, both produced by well-intentioned but inexperienced translators. While Moncrieff and Davis were clearly prepared to take on  À la recherche , each having translated many other literary works from French into English, neither Parshley nor Borde and Malovany-Chevallier had ever taken on the translation of a long piece of French theoretical writing. Nor could they bring to the task experience in the disciplines -- most notably philosophy, but also anthropology, psychoanalysis, social theory, history, and literary criticism -- that Beauvoir adduces and practices in the book.

The story of how  Le deuxième sexe  landed on the desk of Parshley is notorious. Soon after it was published in June of 1949, Blanche Knopf, wife of the publisher Alfred A. Knopf, visited France, saw lots of people carrying volume I of Beauvoir's new book, and urged her husband to buy what she thought might be the next Kinsey Report. Taking his wife's advice, Alfred Knopf engaged as translator a friend of his who happened to be a retired Smith College zoologist specializing in human sexuality. Howard Parshley, who had never professionally translated anything from French into English, soon realized that he was in over his head: not only was  The Second Sex  a dauntingly long piece of writing, but it was also primarily a work of philosophy, albeit one crammed with facts, figures, theories, and examples from many other disciplines and genres. Determined to do the book justice, he spent almost two years on the project and complied, albeit not enthusiastically, with Knopf's demand to make substantial cuts.

The cuts first came to light in 1983, in a landmark essay by the philosopher Margaret A. Simons. Twenty years later, in what is in effect a companion essay to Simons's, the feminist theorist and literary scholar Toril Moi (2002) focused on other problems with the Parshley translation, including its seriously misleading mistranslations of key philosophical terms. Take for example, a key sentence at the end of the long "History" section of  Le deuxième sexe :

Il s'ensuit que la femme se connaît et se choisit non en tant qu'elle  existe pour soi  mais telle que l'homme la définit. (Beauvoir (1949), 233-234; my emphasis here and below)

Parshley renders this sentence thusly:

It follows that woman sees herself and makes her choices not in accordance with  her true nature in itself  but as man defines her. (Beauvoir (1952), 137-138)

Anyone with a little French and a passing familiarity with twentieth-century continental philosophy (not to mention the master-slave dialectic) will recognize  existe pour soi  as a philosophical technical term. To "exist for self" is, roughly speaking, to be the kind of being whose choices play a central role in shaping his or her life. This kind of being is to be contrasted with being- in -itself, which a bearer has by nature or circumstance -- for example, being intersexed or living in fourteenth-century China or standing to inherit the family farm. For human beings, according to the likes of Sartre and Beauvoir (and, with some conceptual tweaking, Heidegger), the meaning or significance of being-in-itself is never a mere given: it's always something that we, sometimes individually and sometimes collectively, allow to matter in our lives in this or that way. So when Parshley translates  existe pour soi  to mean women's "true nature in itself," he is exactly reversing Beauvoir's meaning. And there are dozens more such egregious errors throughout the text.

In 1999, Borde and Malovany-Chevallier attended a conference in Paris celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of  Le deuxième sexe . Expatriate Americans who met in college in the US and moved to France in the 1960s, Borde and Malovany-Chevallier were both teachers of English at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques (popularly known as Sciences Po). In addition to co-writing numerous cookbooks, some in English and some in French, as well as books on the English language for Francophones, the two had done some side-by-side English translations in French publications on various art and architecture exhibitions. [2]  Shocked to hear so many conference speakers bemoan the Parshley translation, they contacted a former student of Malovany-Chevallier's, Anne-Solange Noble, the foreign rights editor of Gallimard, which publishes  Le deuxième sexe , and volunteered to do a new translation.

Noble put Borde and Malovany-Chevallier in touch with an editor at Knopf, who expressed some interest in the proposal but never followed up. At the same time, Knopf was parrying numerous appeals by Beauvoir scholars for a new English translation. In 2004,  The New York Times Book Review  brought the translation problems to the attention of the general public, giving Noble a fresh reason to push for a new version of  The Second Sex . She went to the British publishing house Jonathan Cape, which, like Knopf, is now a Random House company and which owns the British publishing rights. Cape contracted with Borde and Malovany-Chevallier and in November of 2009 debuted the British edition of the new translation. Errors called to the translators' attention before the printing of the Knopf version, in April of 2010, have also been corrected in the paperback version, which appeared under Random House's Vintage imprint in May of 2011.

Not surprisingly, there are moments at which the Borde/Malovany-Chevallier (hereafter, BMC) translation is better than Parshley's. Here's a representative example:

A vrai dire, on ne naît pas génie: on le devient; et la condition féminine a rendu jusqu'à présent ce devenir impossible. (Beauvoir (1949), 226-227)

To tell the truth, one is not born a genius: one becomes a genius; and the feminine situation has up to the present rendered this becoming practically impossible. (Beauvoir (1952), 133)

If truth be told, one is not born, but becomes, a genius; and the feminine condition has, until now, rendered this becoming impossible. (Beauvoir (2011), 152)

The opening main clause of the original French sentence has precisely the same structure as the iconic opening line of volume II of  The Second Sex : "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman." [3]  Parshley, who of course could not know how famous this line would become, nonetheless needlessly obscures this rhetorical similarity. Laudably, Borde and Malovany-Chevallier do not.

Substantively, Parshley makes two further -- and characteristically -- bad choices here. First, he uses the word "situation" to render the French word  condition . "Situation" is a key technical term in  The Second Sex , one that Beauvoir chose not to use here. For her, "situation" has to do with the way that an individual as being-for-itself is tempted to take up being-in-itself in accordance with social norms. (Here, Beauvoir differs quite sharply from Sartre, whose voluntarism has him categorizing social norms as just another species of being-in-itself, that is, as one among many circumstances in an individual decision-maker's life, all of which he can choose simply to overlook.) Ordinarily, when Beauvoir uses "condition" instead of "situation," she is referring to the ubiquity of these misogynistic norms, not to the way that women are inclined to respond to them.

Second, Parshley gratuitously has Beauvoir saying that a woman's becoming a genius is "practically" impossible. The practice of qualifying Beauvoir's views is disturbingly typical of him: he is wont to soften or otherwise modify Beauvoir's claims in accordance with his own judgments. As it happens, Beauvoir was not just incidentally committed to the view that there have been no women geniuses. She discusses it in numerous places, and the starkness of this judgment is critical to her view. [4]

BMC's version of the sentence typifies their translation strategy. Except for their making sure that the first clause of the sentence mimics in style the opening line of volume II and handling the fact that "rendered" and "this becoming" can only be separated in English with intolerable awkwardness, they translate pretty much word-for-word. One might imagine that, especially when it comes to as complex a work as  The Second Sex , this strategy is a sound one. But often it produces unidiomatic or otherwise ungainly English.

Let's revisit, for example, the following sentence of Beauvoir's:

Il s'ensuit que la femme se connaît et se choisit non en tant qu'elle  existe pour soi  mais telle que l'homme la définit. (Beauvoir (1949), 233-234; my emphasis here and below)

Again, here's Parshley mucking it up:

BMC is careful to correct this gross mistranslation:

It follows that woman knows and chooses herself not as she  exists for herself  but as man defines her (Beauvoir (2011), 156).

The difficulty posed to the reader by "exists for herself" is a philosophical difficulty, imposed by Beauvoir, not the translators, who were right to translate it literally. But BMC's tendency to choose the evidently closest English cognate for a multivalent term -- even to the point of risking using a  faux ami  -- produces unnecessary diction problems.  Se choisir , though reflexive in structure, does not mean "to choose oneself"; neither is there reason to think that it (or -- see above --  s'accomplir ) is a term in Beauvoir's technical arsenal. [5]   Se choisir  ordinarily means "to choose," but in this instance the indirect object is perhaps semantically appropriate: "to choose  for  oneself." The sentence might read more smoothly, then, if it were rendered thusly:

It follows that woman knows herself and makes choices for herself not as she exists for herself but as man defines her.

Notice, too, that Parshley's version, though it contains a serious error, otherwise conveys Beauvoir's meaning in an elegant way.

One clunky sentence does not a poor translation make. The problem is that we find numerous slightly off (or more than slightly off) sentences on every page of the book, including many in the crucial opening pages of the "Myths" part of volume I, in which Beauvoir appropriates in detail Hegel's master-slave dialectic in her explanation for the persistent imbalance in relations between men and women. I find myself either stopping to puzzle things out or reaching for the original French edition no less frequently than when I read the Parshley. Over the course of page after page of reading, this gives one the brain equivalent of eye strain.

The readability of BMC is diminished further by the translators' decision to preserve Beauvoir's use of very long sentences and paragraphs. Here, from their note at the beginning of the book, is their rationale:

Long paragraphs (sometimes going on for pages) are a stylistic aspect of [Beauvoir's] writing that is essential, integral to the development of her arguments. Cutting her sentences, cutting her paragraphs, and using a more traditional and conventional punctuation do not render Simone de Beauvoir's voice. Beauvoir's style expresses her reasoning. Her prose has its own consistent grammar, and that grammar follows a logic. (Beauvoir (2011), xvii-xviii)

The translators do not elaborate on these claims. In practice, the flow of the prose in BMC takes a back seat to a dogged attempt to pay homage to Beauvoir's French sentence structures. Here is a typical instance of the problem, from a section of the book in which Beauvoir is discussing patriarchal societies in the ancient world:

In Persia, polygamy is customary; woman is bound to absolute obedience to the husband her father chooses for her as soon as she is nubile; but she is more respected than among most Oriental peoples; incest is not forbidden, and marriage takes place frequently among sisters and brothers; she is in charge of educating the children up to the age of seven for boys and until marriage for girls. (Beauvoir (2011), 93)

And here is Parshley's version:

In Persia polygamy was customary; the wife was required to be absolutely obedient to her husband, chosen for her by her father when she was of marriageable age; but she was held in honor more than among most Oriental peoples. Incest was not forbidden, and marriage was frequent between brother and sister. The wife was responsible for the education of children -- boys up the age of seven and girls up to marriage. (Beauvoir (1952), 85-86)

It's hard to see how the BMC version, which omits only a single comma at the end of the sentence, gives us better access to Beauvoir's reasoning than does the Parshley version, which in this case, at least, is mercifully free of disastrous errors. [6]

One might object that BMC is simply preserving Beauvoir's original sentence structure and that responsibility for any impenetrability ought to be laid at Beauvoir's doorstep. [7] But as Toril Moi (2010), following the linguist Jacqueline Guillemin-Flescher -- a leading expert in French-English translation problems -- notes, "English requires more explicit, precise and concrete connections between clauses and sentences than French," while "French accepts looser syntactical relations." [8]

This is a fact well known to any seasoned English translator of a complex and challenging piece of French writing. In this regard, Lydia Davis, the translator of the new  Swann's Way , leaps to mind: one can only dream about what she might have brought to the Beauvoir project, given her experience with Proust's idiosyncratic style, which is interestingly counterpoised by her own penchant as a writer -- of excellent short stories -- for extreme terseness. In response to Moi's  London Review of Books  essay on the new  Second Sex , and to a letter of mine supporting it, Anne-Solange Noble (the Gallimard editor) accuses me of demanding from her -- at a conference on Beauvoir in Paris in 2008 -- that the translation be supervised and annotated by an advisory board to be headed by "such distinguished professors" as myself . [9]  Never mind that Noble is confusing me with another interlocutor (perhaps because I witnessed this conversation, which she in fact had with another philosopher). My view has always been that the project first and foremost required an expert translator who had demonstrated in earlier work a talent for dealing with the sorts of conceptual and rhetorical challenges  Le deuxième sexe  poses.

In her letter to the  London Review of Books , Noble writes: "Annotated editions and companion books can follow later . . . but let readers first discover this essay in English the way French readers discover it in French -- and people around the world in their own un-annotated editions." Though nothing prevents someone who cares about the text to write a detailed concordance for the book, Random House has a lock on the translation rights for  Le deuxième sexe  until the original copyright expires in the year 2047. So as long as BMC sells, an annotated edition is hardly likely to follow.

BMC as it stands does include a few annotations, but they are routinely unhelpful, or worse. For example, on p. 7, we find Beauvoir's use of the term  Mitsein  footnoted by the translators as follows: " Mitsein  can be translated as 'being with'. The French term  réalité humaine  (human reality) has been problematically used to translate Heidegger's  Dasein ." Note that here we do not learn that  Mitsein  itself is a Heideggerian term. For some readers, this will make the remark about  Dasein  even more baffling. The remark itself gives us to wonder who is "problematically" translating  Dasein , and why. As it happens,  la réalité humaine  is the  conventional  French translation of  Dasein  -- a Heideggerian term of art that in most languages, including English, is conventionally not translated at all. Though non-Francophone readers may not be aware of this fact, there's nothing inherently problematic about the translation practice. What's problematic is that anyone translating  la réalité humaine  into English is likely to render it "human reality" and thereby to obscure the connection with Heidegger. Because BMC's announcement of this connection is linked with Beauvoir's use of the term  Mitsein , the burden is on the reader is unnecessarily heavy.

All things considered, which translation is better? This is like asking whether it's better to burn the cake or undercook it. The issue is moot for anyone who teaches classes in which  The Second Sex  is a mainstay: not surprisingly, Random House has discontinued printing the Parshley version. But what if you want to teach excerpts of the book? My strategy will be to warn my students about the problems with both versions; provide them with the Parshley and a list of howlers; and make BMC and the French available to those who want and are able to make comparisons. I would advise someone who wants to read the whole book but cannot manage the French to try the BMC and hunt down the Parshley if the going gets too tough -- all of this while holding my nose.

Like Parshley, the team of Borde and Malovany-Chevallier took on the gargantuan project of translating Beauvoir's sprawling meditation because they were huge admirers of the book and wanted to bring her work to an Anglophone audience. But good intentions do not a masterpiece make. Committed readers of Beauvoir readily acknowledge this distinction when it comes to the Parshley version, which is universally regarded as inadequate. I have been startled to find that some of these same readers are inclined to overlook the flaws of the new translation, for fear, as one correspondent put it to me, that lamenting them publicly will provide fodder for anti-feminists and those inclined to dismiss Beauvoir as a philosopher. This stance -- which carries a whiff of the "good girl" norm that Beauvoir urged us to question -- not only does contemporary readers of Beauvoir a grave disservice: it also signals to future generations that we were willing to settle for less than we, and Beauvoir herself, deserve.

Bauer, Nancy (2001).  Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy, and Feminism . New York: Columbia University Press.

Bauer, Nancy (forthcoming). "Introduction to 'Femininity: The Trap'."  Beauvoir's Feminist Writings  [working title]. Edited by Margaret A. Simons. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Beauvoir, Simone de (1947). "Femininity: The Trap."  Vogue , March 15, 232-234.

Beauvoir, Simone de (1949).  Le deuxième sexe I . Paris: Gallimard.

Beauvoir, Simone de (1952).  The Second Sex . Translated by Howard M. Parshley. New York: Knopf.

Beauvoir, Simone de (1979). " La femme et la creation ."  Les écrits de Simone de Beauvoir . Edited by Claude Francis and Fernande Gontier: 458-474.

Beauvoir, Simone de (2011).  The Second Sex . Translated by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier. New York: Vintage.

Guillemin-Flescher, Jacqueline (1981),  Syntaxe comparée du français et de l'anglais: Problèmes de traduction . Ophrys.

Moi, Toril (2002). "While We Wait: Notes on the English Translation of  The Second Sex ."  Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society  17:4, 1005-1035. Reprinted in  The Legacy of Simone de Beauvoir , edited by Emily Grosholz (New York: Oxford, 2004).

Moi, Toril (2010). "The Adulteress Wife."   London Review of Books  32:3 (February), accessed July 25, 2011.

Simons, Margaret A. (1983). "The Silencing of Simone de Beauvoir: Guess What's Missing From  The Second Sex ."  Women's Studies International Forum , 6:5, 559-64. Reprinted in Simons,  Beauvoir and The Second Sex: Feminism, Race, and the Origins of Existentialism , (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

Sommers, Christina-Hoff (2011). "Not Lost in Translation."   Claremont Review of Books  (March 28), accessed July 25, 2011.

[1]  For Borde and Malovany-Chevallier's translation strategy, see their "Translators' Note." For more on their translation of  s'accomplir , see Moi (2010). Moi's review is required reading for anyone interested in a comprehensive overview of the problems with the new translation.

[2]  Collecting the full bibliography for Borde and Malovany-Chevallier is difficult, since many of the books they wrote or translated are now out of print.

[3]  This is Parshley's version; BMC, for reasons that remain murky, despite their attempts to explain them, chose to leave out the indefinite article. In a letter in response to Moi's London Review of Books  review (see note 1), in which Moi discusses the idiosyncrasies of the French indefinite article and shows why leaving out the "a" constitutes a mistake, Borde and Malovany-Chevallier explain their choice this way: "The division of human beings into 'woman' and 'man' is foundational, categories having nothing to do with other nouns."

[4]  See for example, Beauvoir (1947) and Beauvoir (1979, p. 471); see also Bauer (2001) and Bauer (forthcoming) for support for the claim that Beauvoir's view on women and genius is central to her views.

[5]  BMC is also filled with obscure English cognates for non-philosophical technical terms. Here are some examples from Beauvoir (2011; meaning and page numbers in parentheses): "gens" (family, 77); "steatopygous" (a large mass of fat on the buttocks, 79); "agnation" (as Parshley puts it in Beauvoir (1952), "inheritance through the male line"; 87); "pessaries," (plastic devices that fit in women's vaginas to prevent pregnancy).

[6]  Bizarrely, BMC is not consistent about punctuation: sometimes, for instance, the translators use dashes where Beauvoir uses semi-colons and commas. See the first paragraph of the "Myths" section of volume I, for instance (Beauvoir (2011), 159)

[7]  In an astonishingly poorly argued review of the new translation, Christina Hoff Sommers moves with no argument -- and with no quotation of the original French -- from the judgment that there are problems with both translations of  The Second Sex  to the claim that Beauvoir herself was a bad thinker and writer. See Sommers (2011).

[8]  See Guillemin-Flescher (1981).

[9]  The letter is published on the same webpage as Moi (2010).

Watch CBS News

What is Eid al-Fitr? 6 questions about the holiday and how Muslims celebrate it, answered

By Ken Chitwood

Updated on: April 9, 2024 / 8:03 AM EDT / The Conversation

Ken Chitwood  is a senior research fellow, Muslim Philanthropy Initiative at Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis and journalist-fellow at the Dornsife Center for Religion and Civic Culture at the  University of Southern California Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences .

Eid al-Fitr, one of Islam's principal festivals, will be celebrated April 9, 2024, according to the Fiqh Council of North America . At the middle of June, Muslims will celebrate Eid al-Adha. Ken Chitwood, a scholar of global Islam, explains the two Islamic festivals.

1. What is Eid?

Eid literally means a "festival" or "feast" in Arabic. There are two major eids in the Islamic calendar per year – Eid al-Fitr earlier in the year and Eid al-Adha later.

Eid al-Fitr is a three-day-long festival and is known as the "Lesser" or "Smaller Eid" when compared to Eid al-Adha, which is four days long and is known as the "Greater Eid."

2. Why is Eid celebrated twice a year?

The two Eids recognize, celebrate and recall two distinct events that are significant to the story of Islam.

Eid al-Fitr means "the feast of breaking the fast." The fast, in this instance, is Ramadan , which recalls the revealing of the Quran to Prophet Muhammad and requires Muslims to fast from sunrise to sundown for a month.

3. How do Muslims celebrate Eid al-Fitr?

Eid al-Fitr features two to three days of celebrations that include special morning prayers. People greet each other with "Eid Mubarak," meaning "Blessed Eid" and with formal embraces. Sweet dishes are prepared at home and gifts are given to children and to those in need. In addition, Muslims are encouraged to forgive and seek forgiveness. Practices vary from country to country.

In many countries with large Muslim populations, Eid al-Fitr is a national holiday. Schools, offices and businesses are closed so family, friends and neighbors can enjoy the celebrations together. In the U.S. and the U.K., Muslims may request to have the day off from school or work to travel or celebrate with family and friends.

In countries like Egypt and Pakistan, Muslims decorate their homes with lanterns, twinkling lights or flowers. Special food is prepared and friends and family are invited over to celebrate.

In places like Jordan, with its Muslim majority population, the days before Eid al-Fitr can see a rush at local malls and special "Ramadan markets" as people prepare to exchange gifts on Eid al-Fitr.

In Turkey and in places that were once part of the Ottoman-Turkish empire such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Azerbaijan and the Caucasus, it is also known as the, "Lesser Bayram" or "festival" in Turkish.

4. How do Muslims celebrate Eid al-Adha?

The other festival, Eid al-Adha, is the "feast of the sacrifice." It comes at the end of the Hajj , an annual pilgrimage by millions of Muslims to the holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia that is obligatory once in a lifetime, but only for those with means.

Eid al-Adha recalls the story of how God commanded Ibrahim to sacrifice his son Ismail as a test of faith. The story, as narrated in the Quran, describes Satan's attempt to tempt Ibrahim so he would disobey God's command. Ibrahim, however, remains unmoved and informs Ismail, who is willing to be sacrificed.

But, just as Ibrahim attempts to kill his son, God intervenes and a ram is sacrificed in place of Ismail. During Eid al-Adha, Muslims slaughter an animal to remember Ibrahim's sacrifice and remind themselves of the need to submit to the will of God.

5. When are they celebrated?

Eid al-Fitr is celebrated on the first day of the 10th month in the Islamic calendar.

Eid al-Adha is celebrated on the 10th day of the final month in the Islamic calendar.

The Islamic calendar is a lunar calendar, and dates are calculated based on lunar phases. Since the Islamic calendar year is shorter than the solar Gregorian calendar year by 10 to 12 days, the dates for Ramadan and Eid on the Gregorian calendar can vary year by year.

6. What is the spiritual meaning of Eid al-Fitr?

Eid al-Fitr, as it follows the fasting of Ramadan, is also seen as a spiritual celebration of Allah's provision of strength and endurance.

Amid the reflection and rejoicing, Eid al-Fitr is a time for charity, known as Zakat al-Fitr. Eid is meant to be a time of joy and blessing for the entire Muslim community and a time for distributing one's wealth.

Charity to the poor is a highly emphasized value in Islam. The Quran says ,

"Believe in Allah and his messenger, and give charity out of the (substance) that Allah has made you heirs of. For those of you who believe and give charity – for them is a great reward."

This piece incorporates materials from an article first published on Aug. 28, 2017. The dates have been updated. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.

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The Second Sex Questions and Answers

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What should be the key points of this article what is the central theme to deliver could you answer in point wise, the second sex introduction, what type of text is "the second sex", one is not born but rather becomes one, the beginning of the second sex in short, why did richards mother make him go to the store even though she knew he might get beaten again, why does beauvoir described married woman as parasites , wanna a help with understanding title.

Don’t Be Fooled By Trump’s Failure to Endorse a Nationwide Abortion Ban

F ormer President Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that he favors state control over abortion law and policy and declined to endorse a nationwide ban. He also claimed that the Supreme Court’s overturning of  Roe v. Wade  in  Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization  was favored by “all legal scholars” on “both sides.” Abortion is “where everybody wanted it, from a legal standpoint,” according to Trump.

All of this is patently false, of course. Decades of legal scholarship and advocacy support the federal constitutional right to abortion that Dobbs eliminated. Some scholars who support legal abortion as a matter of policy have criticized the result the Court reached in  Roe , but they are in the minority. Others have critiqued the  reasoning  of  Roe v. Wade . Some, like Ruth Bader Ginsburg , prefer the equality rationale of  Planned Parenthood v. Casey   (1992), where the Court noted the central importance of reproductive freedom to women’s ability to participate fully and equally in the social, political, and economic life of the nation. But the notion that all or most legal scholars wanted the Court to obliterate the right to choose abortion is ludicrous.

No one should be fooled by Trump’s failure to endorse any of the proposed nationwide abortion bans, a move designed to appear “moderate” and lull voters into a false sense of complacency. Make no mistake: a second Trump administration will empower an anti-abortion movement determined to make abortion illegal everywhere. Even if Republicans do not take over Congress, there are plans in place to make medication abortion unavailable and to resurrect the 1873 Comstock Act, an archaic anti-vice law, to ban abortion nationwide. Proponents of fetal personhood, which defines an embryo as a legal person from the moment of fertilization, will be closer to realizing their goal, threatening not only abortion and miscarriage care but also IVF and common forms of contraception. Trump promotes the grotesque lie that Democrats want to “execute babies” to distract from his own party’s extremism.

Trump peddles these false and misleading claims because he understands that the truth about abortion endangers his candidacy and Republicans generally. Far from ending the controversy, returning abortion to the states already has led to outcomes wildly out of step with public opinion. Doctors and hospitals routinely deny patients basic medical care, including miscarriage treatment, because they are not close enough to death to have their rights outweigh those of an embryo or fetus. State laws with no or ineffective exceptions force children, survivors of rape and incest, and people with nonviable fetuses to carry pregnancies regardless of the consequences to their health and future fertility. Maternal health deserts multiply because doctors fear criminal and civil liability. Abortion bans exacerbate a maternal and infant mortality crisis that makes pregnancy a mortal danger to American women— especially Black women , who are almost three times more likely to die from pregnancy and childbirth than their white counterparts.

Read More: How Louisiana Has Become a Microcosm of the Abortion Access Fight

Even people with qualms about abortion in theory don’t favor these horrific results in fact. Recent polling from Gallup and Axios respectively reveals supermajority popular opposition to total and near-total bans on abortion, and majority support , even among Republicans, for keeping the government out of reproductive health care decisions altogether. Every ballot initiative since Dobbs has been resolved in favor of abortion rights and access. In fact, abortion motivates Americans to turn out and vote for candidates who support reproductive freedom.

Perhaps the most pernicious of Trump’s lies is that returning abortion to the states is a victory for democracy. Depriving people of the right to make the most basic decisions about their bodies and lives is deeply undemocratic and a hallmark of authoritarian regimes worldwide. Extreme abortion bans and fetal personhood laws pass  despite  popular opposition because of unchecked partisan gerrymandering that gives Republicans supermajorities. Even the most conservative lawmakers live in fear of a primary challenge from the right if they support any exceptions, however minor and ineffective, to total abortion bans. Trump says abortion law after Dobbs is “all about the will of the people.” But in fact, Republicans are scrambling to take decisions about abortion out of the people’s hands by preventing referenda from reaching the ballot, protecting state courts that defy public opinion from accountability for their decisions, and disenfranchising voters.

The GOP has long used abortion to secure the support of voters to promote a much broader right-wing agenda. Trump, as promised, packed the federal judiciary with jurists who would destroy the government’s ability to regulate corporations, combat climate change and political corruption, enact sensible gun-safety laws, provide for affordable health care, expand opportunities for women and people of color, fight discrimination, protect the rights of workers and immigrants, ask the wealthy to pay their fair share in taxes, and so on. The problem is that a majority of Americans actually support each of the policies the Right is determined to undo. To remain in power, Republicans must undermine democratic institutions and practices. Partisan and racial gerrymandering, voter suppression, and the evisceration of campaign finance regulation and voting rights laws are longstanding strategies; more recently, election denialism, insurrection, political violence, and white supremacist resurgence—all fomented by Trump—place democracy and the rule of law in mortal danger. All of this is at stake in Trump’s ultimate lie: his claim to be a champion of democracy rather than the architect of its demise.

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