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Is the Death Penalty Justified or Should It Be Abolished?

• is the death penalty justified or should it be abolished?

*Updated 2022

Throughout history, societies around the world have used the death penalty as a way to punish the most heinous crimes.  while capital punishment is still practiced today,  many countries  have since abolished it.  in fact, in 2019, california’s governor put a  moratorium on the death penalty , stopping it indefinitely. in early 2022, he took further steps and ordered the dismantling of the state’s death row. given the moral complexities and depth of emotions involved, the death penalty remains a controversial debate the world over., the following are three arguments in support of the death penalty and three against it., arguments supporting the death penalty.

Prevents convicted killers from killing again

The death penalty guarantees that convicted murderers will never kill again.  There have been countless cases where convicts sentenced to life in prison have  murdered other inmates  and/or prison guards. Convicts have also been known to successfully arrange murders from within prison, the most famous case being mobster  Whitey Bulger , who apparently was killed by fellow inmates while incarcerated. There are also cases where convicts who have been released for parole after serving only part of their sentences – even life sentences – have  murdered again  after returning to society. A death sentence is the only irrevocable penalty that protects innocent lives.

Maintains justice

For most people, life is sacred, and innocent lives should be valued over the lives of killers. Innocent victims who have been murdered – and in some cases, tortured beforehand – had no choice in their untimely and cruel death or any opportunity to say goodbye to friends and family, prepare wills, or enjoy their last moments of life. Meanwhile, convicted murderers sentenced to life in prison – and even those on death row – are still able to learn, read,  write , paint, find religion, watch TV, listen to music, maintain relationships, and even appeal their sentences.

To many, capital punishment symbolizes justice and is the only way to adequately express society’s revulsion of the murder of innocent lives. According to a 2021 Pew Research Center Poll, the majority of US adults ( 60% ) think that legal executions fit the crime of what convicted killers deserve. The death penalty is a way to restore society’s balance of justice – by showing that the most severe crimes are intolerable and will be punished in kind

Historically recognized

Historians and constitutional lawyers seem to agree that by the time the Founding Fathers wrote and signed the  U.S. Constitution in 1787, and when the Bill of Rights were ratified and added in 1791, the death penalty was an acceptable and permissible form of punishment for premeditated murder. The Constitution’s  8 th  and 14 th  Amendments  recognize the death penalty BUT under due process of the law. This means that certain legal requirements must first be fulfilled before any state executions can be legally carried out – even when pertaining to the  cruelest, most cold-blooded murderer . While interpretations of the amendments pertaining to the death penalty have changed over the years, the Founding Fathers intended to allow for the death penalty from the very beginning and put in place a legal system to ensure due process.

Arguments against the Death Penalty

Not proven to deter crime

There’s  no concrete evidence  showing that the death penalty actually deters crime.  Various studies comparing crime and murder rates in  U.S. states  that have the death penalty versus those that don’t found that the murder rate in non-death-penalty states has actually remained consistently lower over the years than in those states that have the death penalty. These findings suggest that capital punishment may not actually be a deterrent for crime.

The winds may be shifting regarding the public’s opinion about the death penalty. This is evident by the recent decision of a non-unanimous Florida jury to sentence the Parkland High School shooter to life in prison without parole instead of the death penalty . While the verdict shocked many, it also revealed mixed feelings about the death penalty, including among the families of the 17 Parkland victims and families of victims from other mass shootings.

More expensive than imprisonment

Contrary to popular belief, the death penalty is actually  more expensive  than keeping an inmate in prison, even for life. While the cost of the actual execution may be minimal, the overall costs surrounding a capital case (where the death penalty is a potential punishment) are enormously high.  Sources say  that defending a death penalty case can cost around four times higher than defending a case not seeking death. Even in cases where a guilty plea cancels out the need for a trial, seeking the death penalty costs almost twice as much as cases that don’t. And this is before factoring in appeals, which are more time-consuming and therefore cost more than life-sentence appeals, as well as higher prison costs for death-row inmates.

Does not bring closure

It seems logical that punishing a murderer, especially a mass murderer, or terrorist with the most severe punishment would bring closure and relief to victims’ families. However, the opposite may be true.  Studies  show that capital punishment does not bring comfort to those affected by violent and fatal crimes.  In fact, punishing the perpetrator has been shown to  make victims feel worse , as it forces them to think about the offender and the incident even more. Also, as capital cases can drag on for years due to endless court appeals, it can be difficult for victims’ families to heal, thus delaying closure.

The Bottom Line: The death penalty has been used to maintain the balance of justice throughout history, punishing violent criminals in the severest way to ensure they won’t kill again.  On the other hand, with inconclusive evidence as to its deterrence of crime, the higher costs involved in pursuing capital cases, and the lack of relief and closure it brings to victims’ families, the death penalty is not justified. Where do you stand on this controversial issue?

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the death penalty debate

Death penalty: is capital punishment morally justified?

Lecturer in Political Philosophy, University of Essex

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Jeffrey Howard receives funding from the British Academy.

University of Essex provides funding as a member of The Conversation UK.

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The execution, by hanging, of Yakub Memon for his part in the 2003 Mumbai bombings invites us to revisit the vexed issue of capital punishment. Few topics incite such moral passion and controversy.

The world’s religious communities are divided on the death penalty. Despite a seemingly unambiguous commitment to non-violence (or “Ahimsa”) in both Hinduism and Buddhism, scholars within those traditions continue to debate the permissibility of lethal punishment. The Old Testament enjoins us to take an “eye for an eye” – the principle of lex talionis – while the New Testament exhorts us to “turn the other cheek”. And while Islam is generally regarded as compatible with the death penalty, the Qur'an’s emphasis on forgiveness suggests that Muslims should sometimes respond to evil with mercy, not retaliation.

While many European countries urge an ethic of rehabilitation in their criminal justice systems, many jurisdictions in the United States stand firmly in favour of capital punishment for serious crimes. Even a federal jury in Massachusetts, a liberal bastion, recently doled out the death penalty to the sole surviving perpetrator of the Boston marathon bombing. And while the United Kingdom abandoned the death penalty in 1964 – the year of the last executions – nearly half of the British public favours a reintroduction of it (though that figure has been dropping steadily).

We will not make progress in the public debate about the death penalty unless we realise that it is only one element in a much bigger controversy: about the point of punishment itself. As The Conversation invites us to rethink the death penalty over the next few weeks, we must not conduct this discussion in a vacuum. Before you ask yourself whether we should have the death penalty, consider: why hand out any punishments at all? Considering the three main families in the philosophy of punishment can help us organise our conversation.

Retribution

“Bad guys deserve to suffer.” This is a blunt slogan, but it captures the essence of a deeply familiar notion: people who have committed culpable wrongs deserve their lives to go worse as a result. Why do they deserve it? Perhaps because it’s not fair for the lives of wrongdoers to go well when the lives of the innocent have gone poorly – punishment levels the playing field. Whatever the reason, “retributivists” – those who believe in retribution – argue that the punishment of criminals is intrinsically valuable; it is valuable in and of itself, rather than valuable because of its good consequences (for example, preventing future crime).

Even if punishing murderers and thieves had no effect on reducing the overall crime rate, retributivists tend to think it’s still the right thing to do. Retributivists also think that the severity of punishment should match the severity of the crime. So, just as it is wrong to over-punish someone (executing someone for stealing a pair of shoes), it can be wrong to under-punish someone (giving him a community service order for murder).

If you are a retributivist, you might support the death penalty because you think that certain or all murderers (and perhaps other criminals) deserve to suffer death for their crimes. Depending on how you think about death, however, you might oppose the death penalty on the grounds that it is disproportionately harsh – perhaps you think that no matter what someone has done, she does not deserve to die for it.

On the other hand you might oppose the death penalty on the grounds that it is disproportionately light. Many people who opposed the recent death sentence for the Boston bomber did so on the grounds that life in a maximum-security prison would be a worse punishment – and so more fitting – than death.

“Criminals should be punished so that they and others will be less likely to commit crime in the future, making everybody safer.” Many people criticise retributivism on the grounds that it is nothing but a pointless quest for barbaric revenge.

Inflicting suffering on human beings, if it is to be morally justified, must instead have a forward-looking purpose: protecting the innocent from harm. If this sounds sensible to you, you probably believe the point of punishment is not retribution, but rather deterrence.

The idea here is familiar enough: people face temptations to break just laws; the demands of morality and the demands of rational self-interest sometimes seem to diverge. Threats of punishment realign those demands by making it irrational for self-interested individuals to break the law.

If you are a defender of deterrence, you must answer two questions about capital punishment before determining where you stand. The first is empirical: a question about real-world facts. Does the threat of the death penalty actually deter people from committing heinous crimes to a greater extent than the threat of life imprisonment?

The second question is moral. Even if the death penalty deterred crime more successfully than life imprisonment, that doesn’t necessarily mean it would be justified. After all, imagine if we threatened execution for all crimes, including minor traffic violations, theft, and tax fraud.

Doing so would surely slash the crime rate, yet most people would judge it to be wrong. Deterrence theorists tend to defend some upper limit on the harshness of punishment – and it may be that death simply goes beyond what the government is ever permitted to threaten.

“Punishment communicates to criminals that what they have done is wrong, and gives them an opportunity to apologise and reform.” There are many different variants of this view : educative, communicative, rehabilitative – and there are important differences between them. But the basic idea is that punishment should make the wrongdoer understand what he or she has done wrong and inspire her to repent and reform.

Whatever version of this view one supports, its implication for the death penalty is reasonably clear. What is the point of a criminal reforming herself as she prepares for the execution chamber?

To be sure, many people try to mix and match different elements of these three broad views, though such mixed theories tend to be unhelpfully ad hoc and can offer conflicting guidance. Far better, to my mind, to plant one’s flag clearly and answer the question: which view should have priority in our thinking about punishment?

Then, and only then, can we proceed to think about the justice (or lack thereof) of governments who kill their citizens.

This article is part of a series on capital punishment that The Conversation is publishing. Click here to read more.

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Article Contents

Imperatives, acknowledgements.

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A Factful Perspective on Capital Punishment

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David T Johnson, A Factful Perspective on Capital Punishment, Journal of Human Rights Practice , Volume 11, Issue 2, July 2019, Pages 334–345, https://doi.org/10.1093/jhuman/huz018

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Substantial progress has been made towards worldwide abolition of capital punishment, and there are good reasons to believe that more progress is possible. Since 2000, the pace of abolition has slowed, but by several measures the number of executions in the world has continued to decline. Several causes help explain the decline, including political leadership from the front and an increased tendency to regard capital punishment as a human rights issue rather than as a matter of domestic criminal justice policy. There are significant obstacles in the movement to eliminate state killing in the world, but some strategies could contribute to additional decline in the years to come.

People tend to notice the bad more than the good, and this ‘negativity instinct’ is apparent when it comes to capital punishment ( Rosling et al. 2018 : 48). For example, two decades ago, Leon Radzinowicz (1999 : 293), the founder of Cambridge University’s Institute of Criminology, declared that he ‘did not expect any substantial further decrease’ in the use of capital punishment because ‘most of the countries likely to embrace the abolitionist cause’ had already done so. In more recent years, other analysts have claimed that the human rights movement is in crisis, and that ‘nearly every country seems to be backsliding’ ( Moyn 2018 ). If this assessment is accurate, it should be cause for concern for opponents of capital punishment because a heightened regard for human rights is widely regarded as the key cause of abolition since the 1980s ( Hood and Hoyle 2009 ).

To be sure, everything is not fine with respect to capital punishment. Most notably, the pace of abolition has slowed in recent years, and executions have increased in several countries, including Iran and Taiwan (in the 2010s), Pakistan (2014–15), and Japan (2018). But too much negativity will not do. I adopt a factful perspective about the future of capital punishment: I see substantial progress toward worldwide abolition, and this gives me hope that further progress is possible ( Rosling et al. 2018 ).

This article builds on Roger Hood’s seminal study of the movement to abolish capital punishment, which found ‘a remarkable increase in the number of abolitionist countries’ in the 1980s and 1990s ( Hood 2001 : 331). It proceeds in four parts. Section 1 shows that in the two decades or so since 2000 the pace of abolition has slowed but not ceased, and the total number of executions in the world has continued to decline. Section 2 explains how death penalty declines have been achieved in recent years. Section 3 identifies obstacles in the movement toward elimination of state killing in the modern world. And Section 4 suggests some priorities and strategies that could contribute to additional decline in the death penalty in the third decade of the third millennium.

These examples exclude estimates for the People’s Republic of China, which does not disclose reliable death penalty figures, but which probably executes more people each year than the rest of the world combined.

Table 1 displays the number of countries with each of these four death penalty statuses in five years: 1988, 1995, 2000, 2007, and 2017. Overall, the percentage of countries to retain capital punishment has declined by half over that period, from 56 per cent in 1988 to 28 per cent in 2017. But Table 2 shows that the pace of abolition has slowed since the 1990s, when 37 countries abolished. By comparison, only 23 countries abolished in the 2000s, with 11 more countries abolishing in the first eight years of the 2010s. The pace of abolition has declined partly because much of the lowest hanging fruit has already been picked.

Number of abolitionist and retentionist countries, 1988–2017

Note : Figures in parentheses show the percentage of the total number of countries in the world in that year.

Sources : Hood 2001 : 334 (for 1988, 1995, and 2000); Amnesty International annual reports (for 2007 and 2017).

Number of Countries That Abolished the Death Penalty by Decade, 1980s – 2010s

Sources : Death Penalty Information Center; Amnesty International annual reports.

Table 3 uses Hood’s figures for 1980 to 1999 ( Hood 2001 : 335) and figures from Hands Off Cain and Amnesty International to report the estimated number of executions and death sentences worldwide from 1980 to 2017. Because several countries (including China, the world’s leading user of capital punishment) do not disclose reliable death penalty statistics, the figures in Table 3 cannot be considered precise measures of death sentencing and execution trends over time, but the numbers do suggest recent declines. For instance, the average number of death sentences per year in the 2010s (2,220) was less than half the annual average for the 2000s (4,576). Similarly, the average number of executions per year in the 2010s (867) was less than half the annual average for the 2000s (1,762). Moreover, while the average number of countries per year to impose a death sentence remained fairly flat in the four decades covered in Table 3 (58 countries in the 1980s, 68 in the 1990s, 56 in the 2000s, and 58 in the 2010s), the average number of countries per year which carried out an execution declined by about one-third, from averages of 37 countries in the 1980s and 35 countries in the 1990s, to 25 countries in the 2000s and 23 countries in the 2010s. In short, fewer countries are using capital punishment, and fewer people are being condemned to death and executed.

Number of death sentences and executions worldwide, 1980–2017

Notes : (a) The numbers of reported and recorded death sentences and executions are minimum figures, and the true totals are substantially higher. (b) In 2009, Amnesty International stopped publishing estimates of the minimum number of executions per year in China.

Sources : Hood 2001 : 335 (1980–1999); Hands Off Cain (2001); Amnesty International annual reports (2002–2017).

In 2001, Hood (2001 : 336) reported that 26 countries had executed at least 20 persons in the five-year period 1994–1998. Table 4 compares those figures with figures for the same 26 countries in 2013–2017, and it also presents the annual rate of execution per million population for each country (in parentheses). The main pattern is striking decline. In 2009, Amnesty International stopped publishing estimates of the minimum number of executions per year in the People’s Republic of China, so trend evidence from that source is unavailable, but other sources indicate that executions in China have declined dramatically in the past two decades, from 15,000 or more per year in the late 1990s and early 2000s ( Johnson and Zimring 2009 : 237), to approximately 2,400 in 2013 ( Grant 2014 ) and 2,000 or so in 2016. Of the other 25 countries in Hood’s list of heavy users of capital punishment in the 1990s, 11 saw executions disappear (Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Congo, Sierra Leone, Kyrgyzstan, South Korea, Libya, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe), eight had the execution rate decline by half or more (USA, Nigeria, Singapore, Belarus, Taiwan, Yemen, Jordan, Afghanistan), and two experienced more modest declines (Saudi Arabia and Egypt). Altogether, 22 of the 26 heavy users of capital punishment in the latter half of the 1990s have experienced major declines in executions. Of the remaining four countries, one (Japan) saw its execution rate remain stable until executions surged when 13 former members of Aum Shinrikyo were hanged in July 2018 (for murders and terrorist attacks committed in the mid-1990s), while three (Iran, Pakistan, and Viet Nam) experienced sizeable increases in both executions and execution rates.

Executions and execution rates by country, 1994–1998 and 2013–2017

a The figure of 429 executions for Viet Nam is for the three years from August 2013 to July 2016.

Notes: Countries reported to have executed at least 20 persons in 1994–1998, and execution figures for the same countries in 2013–2017 (with annual rates of execution per million population for both periods in parentheses).

As explained in the text, in addition to the 26 countries that appeared in Table 3 of Hood (2001 : 336), India had at least 24 judicial executions in 1994–1998, Indonesia had four, and Iraq had an unknown number. The comparable figures for these countries in 2013–2017 (with the execution rate per million population in parentheses) are India = 2 (0.0003), Indonesia = 23 (0.09), and Iraq = 469 (2.78).

Sources : Hood 2001 : 336 (1994–1998); Amnesty International (2013–2017); the Death Penalty Database of the Cornell Center on the Death Penalty Worldwide (for India, Indonesia, and Iraq); Johnson and Zimring 2009 : 430 (for India 1994–1998).

The execution rate increases in Table 4 are striking but exceptional. In Iran, the fourfold increase in the execution rate gives it the highest per capita execution rate in the world for 2013–2017, with 6.68 executions per million population per year. This is approximately four times higher than the estimated execution rate for China (1.5) in the same period. The increase in Viet Nam is also fourfold, from 0.38 executions per million population per year to 1.5, while the increase in Pakistan is tenfold, from 0.05 to 0.49. Nonetheless, Viet Nam’s substantially increased execution rate in the 2010s would not have ranked it among the top ten executing nations in the 1990s, while Pakistan’s increased rate in the 2010s would not have ranked it among the top 15 nations in the 1990s. Even among the heaviest users of capital punishment, times have changed.

At least two countries that did not appear on Hood’s heavy user list for the 1990s executed more than 20 people in 2013–2017. The most notable newcomer is Iraq, which executed at least 469 persons in this five-year period, with an execution rate of 2.78 per million population per year. And then there is Indonesia. In the five years from 1994 to 1998, this country (with the world’s largest Muslim population) executed a total of four people, while in 2013–2017 the number increased to 23, giving it an execution rate of 0.09 per year per million population—about the same as the (low) execution rates in Japan and Taiwan.

When Iraq and Indonesia are added to the heavy user list for 2013–2017, only five countries out of 28 have execution rates that exceed one execution per year per million population, giving them death penalty systems that can be deemed ‘operational’ in the sense that ‘judicial executions are a recurrent and important part’ of their criminal justice systems ( Johnson and Zimring 2009 : 22). By contrast, in 1994–1998, 14 of these 28 countries had death penalty systems that were ‘operational’.

India is a country with a large population that does not appear on the frequent executing list for either the 1990s or the 2010s. In 2013–2017, this country of 1.3 billion people executed only two people, giving it what is probably the lowest execution rate (0.0003) among the 56 countries that currently retain capital punishment. India has long used judicial execution infrequently, but its police and security forces continue to kill in large numbers. In the 22 years from 1996 through 2017, India’s legal system hanged only four people, giving it an annual rate of execution that is around 1/25,000th the rate of executions in China. But over the same period, India’s police and security forces have killed thousands illegally and extrajudicially, many in ‘encounters’ that officials try to justify with the lie that the bad guy fired first.

Two fundamental forces have been driving the death penalty down in recent decades ( Johnson and Zimring 2009 : 290–304). First, while prosperity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for abolition, economic development does tend to encourage declines in judicial execution and steps toward the cessation of capital punishment. Second, the general political orientation of government often has a strong influence on death penalty policy, at both ends of the execution spectrum. High-execution rate nations tend to be authoritarian, as in China, Viet Nam, North Korea, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. Conversely, low-execution rate nations tend to be democracies with institutionalized limits on governmental power, as in most of the countries of Europe and in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Korea, and India. Of course, these are tendencies, not natural laws. Exceptions exist, including the USA at the high end of the execution spectrum, and Myanmar and Nepal at the low end.

In addition to economic development and democratization, concerns about wrongful convictions and the execution of innocents have made some governments more cautious about capital punishment. In the USA, for example, the discovery of innocence has led to historic shifts in public opinion and to sharp declines in the use of capital punishment by prosecutors and juries across the country ( Baumgartner et al. 2008 ; Garrett 2017 ). In China, too, wrongful convictions and executions help explain both declines in the use of capital punishment and legal reforms of the institution ( He 2016 ).

The question of capital punishment is fundamentally a matter of human rights, not an isolated issue of criminal justice policy.

Death penalty policy should not be governed by national priorities but by adherence to international human rights standards.

Since capital punishment is never justified, a national government may demand that other nations’ governments end executions. ( Zimring 2003 : 27)

As the third premise of this orthodoxy suggests, political pressure has contributed to the decline of capital punishment. This influence has been especially striking in Europe, where abolition of capital punishment is an explicit and absolute condition for becoming a member of the European Union. In other countries, too, from Singapore and South Korea to Rwanda and Sierra Leone, the missionary zeal of European governments committed to abolition has led to the elimination of capital punishment or to major declines in its usage.

Political leadership has also fostered the death penalty’s decline. There are few iron rules of abolition, but one seems to be that when the death penalty is eliminated, it invariably happens despite the fact of majority public support for the institution at the time of abolition. This—‘leadership from the front’—is such a common pattern, and public resistance to abolition is so stubborn, that some analysts believe ‘the straightest road to abolition involves bypassing public opinion entirely’ ( Hammel 2010 : 236). There appear to be at least two political circumstances in which the likelihood of leadership from the front rises and the use of capital punishment falls ( Zimring 2003 : 22): after the collapse of an authoritarian government, when new leaders aim to distance themselves from the repressive practices of the previous regime (as in West Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Romania, Cambodia, and Timor Leste); and after a left-liberal party gains control of government (as in Austria, Great Britain, France, South Korea, and Taiwan).

Although use of the death penalty continues to decline, there are countervailing forces that continue to present obstacles to abolition, as they have for decades. First and foremost, there is an argument about national sovereignty made by many states, that death penalty policy and practice are not human rights issues but rather matters of criminal justice policy that should be decided domestically, according to the values and traditions of each individual country. There is the role of religion—especially Islamic beliefs, where in some countries and cultures it is held that capital punishment must not be opposed because it has been divinely ordained. There are claims that capital punishment deters criminal behaviour and drug trafficking, though there is little evidence to support this view ( National Research Council 2012 ; Muramatsu et al. 2018 ). And there is the continued use of capital punishment in the USA, which helps to legitimate capital punishment in other countries ( Hood 2001 : 339–44).

The death penalty also survives in some places because it performs welcome functions for some interests. For instance, following the Arab Spring movements of 2010–2012, Egypt and other Middle Eastern governments employed capital punishment against many anti-government demonstrators and dissenters. In other retentionist countries, capital punishment has little to do with its instrumental value for government and crime control and much to do with the fact that it is ‘productive, performative, and generative—that it makes things happen—even if much of what happens is in the cultural realm of death penalty discourse rather than the biological realm of life and death’ or the penological realms of retribution and deterrence ( Garland 2010 : 285). For elected officials, the death penalty is a political token to be used in electoral contests. For prosecutors and judges, it is a practical instrument that enables them to harness the rhetorical power of death in the pursuit of professional objectives. For the mass media, it is an arena in which dramas can be narrated about the human condition. And for the onlooking public, it is a vehicle for moral outrage and an opportunity for prurient entertainment.

In addition to these long-standing obstacles to abolition, several other impediments have emerged in recent years. Most notably, as populism spreads ( Luce 2017 ) and democracy declines in many parts of the world ( Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018 ), an ‘anti-human rights agenda’ is forcing human rights proponents to rethink their assumptions and re-evaluate their strategies ( Alston 2017 ). Much of the new populist threat to democracy is linked to post-9/11 concerns about terrorism, which have been exploited to justify trade-offs between democracy and security. Of course, we are not actually living in a new age of terrorism. If anything, we have experienced a decline in terrorism from the decades in which it was less of a big deal in our collective consciousness ( Pinker 2011 : 353). But emotionally and rhetorically, terrorism is very much a big deal in the present moment, and the cockeyed ratio of fear to harm that is fostered by its mediated representations has been used to buttress support for capital punishment in many countries, including the USA (the Oklahoma City bombings in 1995), Japan (the sarin gas attacks of 1994 and 1995), China (in Xinjiang and Tibet), India (the Mumbai attacks of 1993 and 2008 and the 2001 attack on the Parliament in New Delhi), and Iraq (where executions surged after the post-9/11 invasion by the USA, and where most persons executed have been convicted of terrorism). More broadly, the present political resonance of terrorism has resulted in some abolitionist states assisting with the use of capital punishment in retentionist nations ( Malkani 2013 ).

Some analysts believe that the ‘abolition of capital punishment in all countries of the world will ensure that the killing of citizens by the state will no longer have any legitimacy and so even more marginalize and stigmatize extra-judicial executions’ ( Hood and Hoyle 2008 : 6). Others claim that the abolition of capital punishment is ‘one of the great, albeit unfinished, triumphs of the post-Second World War human rights movement’ ( Hodgkinson 2004 : 1). But states kill extrajudicially too, and sometimes the scale so far exceeds the number of judicial executions that death penalty reductions and abolitions seem like small potatoes. The most striking example is occurring under President Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines: thousands of extrajudicial executions in a country that abolished capital punishment (for the second time!) in 2006.The case of the Philippines illustrates a pattern that has been seen before and will be seen again in polities with weak law, strong executives, and fearful and frustrated citizens ( Johnson and Fernquest 2018 ). State killing often survives and sometimes thrives after capital punishment is abolished (as in Mexico, Brazil, Nepal, and Cambodia, among other countries). And in countries where capital punishment has not been abolished, extrajudicial executions are frequently carried out even after the number of judicial executions has fallen to near zero (as in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Thailand).

Despite these obstacles to abolition, the decline of capital punishment seems likely to continue in the years to come. The trajectory of this institution is shaped by political and cultural processes over which human rights practices have little influence ( Garland 2010 : Chapter 5), but priorities and strategies do matter. In this section I suggest five imperatives for the future.

First, opponents of capital punishment should recognize the limited importance of public opinion and the generally disappointing results of public education campaigns. There is in fact ‘no real evidence of a public relations campaign ever having had a significant, sustained effect on mass public opinion on capital punishment’ ( Hammel 2010 : 39). Such campaigns are not useless ( Singer 2016 ), but when they make a difference they usually do so by influencing the views of elites. To put the point a little differently, cultural change can stimulate death penalty reform, but the cultural shifts that matter most are those that operate ‘on and through state actors’ ( Garland 2010 : 143). This is where abolitionists should focus their efforts at persuasion.

Second, legal challenges to capital punishment should continue, for they have been effective in Africa, the former British colonies of the Caribbean, the USA, and many other countries (see the Death Penalty Project, https://www.deathpenaltyproject.org ). Moreover, legal challenges tend to be most effective when they come not from individual attorneys but from teams of attorneys and their non-attorney allies—social workers, scholars, mitigation investigators, and the like ( Garrett 2017 : Chapters 5–6). The basic strategy of successful teams is to ‘Make the law do what it promises. Make it be perfect’ ( Von Drehle 2006 : 196). One result is the growing recognition that state killing is incompatible with legal values. Another is a shift in focus from what the death penalty does for people to what it does to them. The evidence of the death penalty’s decline summarized in the first section of this article suggests that country after country has realized that retaining capital punishment breeds disrespect for law by exposing many of its shortcomings ( Sarat 2001 ). In some contexts, this recognition is best cultivated not by invoking ‘human rights’ as a ‘rhetorical ornament’ for anti-death penalty claims ( Dudai 2017 : 18), but simply by concentrating on what domestic law promises—and what it fails to deliver.

Third, research has contributed to the decline of capital punishment, both by undermining claims about its purported deterrent effects and by documenting flaws in its administration. In these ways, a growing empirical literature highlights ‘the lack of benefits associated with capital punishment and the burgeoning list of problems with its use’ ( Donohue 2016 : 53). Unfortunately, much of the available research concentrates on capital punishment in one country—the USA—which provides ‘a rather distorted and partial view of the death penalty’ worldwide ( Hood and Hoyle 2015 : 3). Going forward, scholars should explore questions about capital punishment in the many under-researched retentionist nations of Asia and the Middle East, and they should focus their dissemination efforts on the legal teams and governmental elites that have the capacity to challenge and change death penalty policy and practice, as described above in the first and second imperatives.

Fourth, abolition alone is not enough, in two senses. For one, it is not acceptable to replace capital punishment with a sentence of life without parole which is itself a cruel punishment that represents ‘life without hope’ and disrespect for human rights and human dignity ( Hood 2001 : 346). Moreover, when life without parole sentences are established, far more offenders tend to receive them than the number of offenders actually condemned to death. Overall, the advent of life without parole sometimes results in small to modest reductions in execution, but its main effect on the criminal process is ‘penal inflation’ ( Zimring and Johnson 2012 ). For most human rights practitioners, this is hardly a desirable set of outcomes. In addition, abolition is a hollow victory when extrajudicial executions continue or increase afterwards, yet this occurs often. The nexus between judicial and extrajudicial executions is poorly understood and much in need of further study, but the available evidence from countries such as Mexico and the Philippines suggests that ending judicial executions may do little to diminish state killing. In the light of this legal realism, a single-issue stress on abolishing capital punishment because it is inconsistent with human rights might well be considered more spectacle than substance ( Nagaraj 2017 : 23).

Finally, while the present moment is in some ways an ‘extraordinarily dangerous time’ for human rights advocates ( Alston 2017 : 14), there is room for optimism that the death penalty may be nearing the ‘end of its rope’ ( Garrett 2017 ). Overall, a factful consideration of contemporary capital punishment suggests that the situation in the world today is both bad and better ( Rothman 2018 ). A factful perspective on capital punishment also makes it reasonable to be a ‘possibilist’ about the future of this form of state killing ( Rosling et al. 2018 : 69). Substantial progress has been made toward worldwide abolition, and there are good reasons to believe that more progress is possible.

Special thanks to Professor Roger Hood for his foundational studies of the death penalty worldwide.

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The Death Penalty Can Ensure ‘Justice Is Being Done’

A top Justice Department official says for many Americans the death penalty is a difficult issue on moral, religious and policy grounds. But as a legal issue, it is straightforward.

By Jeffrey A. Rosen

Mr. Rosen is the deputy attorney general.

This month, for the first time in 17 years , the United States resumed carrying out death sentences for federal crimes.

On July 14, Daniel Lewis Lee was executed for the 1996 murder of a family, including an 8-year-old girl, by suffocating and drowning them in the Illinois Bayou after robbing them to fund a white-supremacist organization. On July 16, Wesley Purkey was executed for the 1998 murder of a teenage girl, whom he kidnapped, raped, killed, dismembered and discarded in a septic pond. The next day, Dustin Honken was executed for five murders committed in 1993, including the execution-style shooting of two young girls, their mother, and two prospective witnesses against him in a federal prosecution for methamphetamine trafficking.

The death penalty is a difficult issue for many Americans on moral, religious and policy grounds. But as a legal issue, it is straightforward. The United States Constitution expressly contemplates “capital” crimes, and Congress has authorized the death penalty for serious federal offenses since President George Washington signed the Crimes Act of 1790. The American people have repeatedly ratified that decision, including through the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 signed by President Bill Clinton, the federal execution of Timothy McVeigh under President George W. Bush and the decision by President Barack Obama’s Justice Department to seek the death penalty against the Boston Marathon bomber and Dylann Roof .

The recent executions reflect that consensus, as the Justice Department has an obligation to carry out the law. The decision to seek the death penalty against Mr. Lee was made by Attorney General Janet Reno (who said she personally opposed the death penalty but was bound by the law) and reaffirmed by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder.

Mr. Purkey was prosecuted during the George W. Bush administration, and his conviction and sentence were vigorously defended throughout the Obama administration. The judge who imposed the death sentence on Mr. Honken, Mark Bennett, said that while he generally opposed the death penalty, he would not lose any sleep over Mr. Honken’s execution.

In a New York Times Op-Ed essay published on July 17 , two of Mr. Lee’s lawyers criticized the execution of their client, which they contend was carried out in a “shameful rush.” That objection overlooks that Mr. Lee was sentenced more than 20 years ago, and his appeals and other permissible challenges failed, up to and including the day of his execution.

Mr. Lee’s lawyers seem to endorse a system of endless delays that prevent a death sentence from ever becoming real. But his execution date was announced almost a year ago, and was initially set for last December. It was delayed when his lawyers obtained six more months of review by unsuccessfully challenging the procedures used to carry out his lethal injection.

After an appellate court rejected their claim as “without merit,” the Justice Department rescheduled Mr. Lee’s execution, providing an additional four weeks of notice. Yet on the day of the rescheduled execution, after family members of his victims had traveled to Terre Haute, Ind., to witness the execution, a District Court granted Mr. Lee’s request for further review. That court entered a last-minute reprieve that the Supreme Court has said should be an “extreme exception.”

Given the long delay that had already occurred, the Justice Department asked the Supreme Court to lift the order so the execution could proceed. Mr. Lee’s lawyers opposed that request, insisting that overturning the order would result in their client’s imminent execution. After reviewing the matter, the court granted the government’s request , rebuked the District Court for creating an unjustified last-minute barrier, and directed that the execution could proceed.

In the final minutes before the execution was to occur, Mr. Lee’s lawyers claimed the execution could not proceed because Mr. Lee still had time to seek further review of an appellate court decision six weeks earlier lifting a prior stay of execution. The Justice Department decided to pause the execution for several hours while the appellate court considered and promptly rejected Mr. Lee’s request. That cautious step, taken to ensure undoubted compliance with court orders, is irreconcilable with the suggestion that the department “rushed” the execution or disregarded any law. Mr. Lee’s final hours awaiting his fate were a result of his own lawyers’ choice to assert a non-meritorious objection at the last moment.

Mr. Lee’s lawyers also disregarded the cost to victims’ families of continued delay. Although they note that some members of Mr. Lee’s victims’ families opposed his execution, others did not. Nor did the family members of Wesley Purkey’s victim, Jennifer Long, who were in Terre Haute on Wednesday afternoon. When the District Court again imposed another last-minute stoppage, granting more time for Mr. Purkey’s lawyers to argue (among other things) that he did not understand the reason for his execution, the Justice Department again sought Supreme Court review.

As the hours wore on, Justice Department officials asked Ms. Long’s father if he would prefer to wait for another day. The answer was unequivocal: He would stay as long as it took. As Ms. Long’s stepmother later said, “We just shouldn’t have had to wait this long.” The Supreme Court ultimately authorized the execution just before 3 a.m. In his final statement, Mr. Purkey apologized to “Jennifer’s family” for the pain he had caused, contradicting the claim of his lawyers that he did not understand the reason for his execution.

The third execution, of Dustin Honken, occurred on schedule, but still too late for some of his victims’ families. John Duncan — the father of the victim Lori Duncan and grandfather of her slain daughters, Kandace (age 10) and Amber (age 6) — had urged Mr. Honken’s execution for years. As John Duncan was dying of cancer in 2018, he asked family members to promise they would witness the execution on his behalf. On July 17, they did. “Finally,” they said in a statement, “justice is being done.”

Mr. Lee’s lawyers and other death penalty opponents are entitled to disagree with that sentiment. But if the United States is going to allow capital punishment, a white-supremacist triple murderer would seem the textbook example of a justified case. And if death sentences are going to be imposed, they cannot just be hypothetical; they eventually have to be carried out, or the punishment will lose its deterrent and retributive effects.

Rather than forthrightly opposing the death penalty and attempting to change the law through democratic means, however, Mr. Lee’s lawyers and others have chosen the legal and public-relations equivalent of guerrilla war. They sought to obstruct by any means the administration of sentences that Congress permitted, juries supported and the Supreme Court approved. And when those tactics failed, they accused the Justice Department of “a grave threat to the rule of law,” even though it operated entirely within the law enacted by Congress and approved by the Supreme Court. The American people can decide for themselves which aspects of that process should be considered “shameful.”

Jeffrey A. Rosen is the deputy attorney general.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

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1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology

Philosophy, One Thousand Words at a Time

The Death Penalty

Author: Benjamin S. Yost Category:  Ethics , Social and Political Philosophy Word Count: 992

The death penalty—executing criminals, usually murderers—is more controversial than imprisonment because it inflicts a more significant injury, perhaps the most serious injury, and its effects are irreversible. [1]

Some advocates of the death penalty, or capital punishment , argue that it is justified because murder is so bad that death is the only appropriate response. Others defend capital punishment on the grounds that it has important benefits for society.

This essay surveys both types of arguments and critical responses.

1. Deontological Justifications

Deontological defenses of capital punishment see execution as a morally “fitting” response to murderers’ horrible deeds. [2] There are two main varieties.

1.1. Retributivist Justifications

The idea that punishments should be equal in severity to their crimes underlies retributivist defenses of capital punishment. Retributivists argue that execution is justified because it matches the badness or wrongness of murder—i.e., it is a proportionate punishment for murder. [3]

How is proportionality established? “Eye for an eye” principles suggest that execution is proportional to murder because it involves the same kind of act (killing). [4] More sophisticated approaches begin with the idea that life is uniquely valuable: it is the precondition of everything else good for someone. Because being murdered prevents the victim from having any valuable experiences, murderers are punished too lightly if they can enjoy even the limited goods life in prison allows. [5]

1.2. Purgative Justifications

Some argue for a duty to purge exceptionally evil offenders from society by executing them. [6] On this view, the continued existence of such offenders morally stains society: by expending resources on them, society takes on responsibility for their violation of human dignity. Execution dissolves that responsibility. [7]

2. Consequentialist Justifications

Many defend the death penalty not as a response to criminals for their past evil deeds, but by arguing that executing murderers produces better overall social consequences than not doing so. [8] Two consequences are frequently discussed.

2.1. Deterrence

Common sense suggests that the fear of being executed prevents, or deters , potential murderers from killing. For deterrent justifications of capital punishment, the beneficial consequences of executions—innocent lives saved—outweigh the costs to the legal system and the executed person. [9]

2.2. Incapacitation

Deterrence is about reducing murder rates overall. Incapacitation aims at preventing specific offenders from reoffending: some murderers might be so dangerous, only death ensures they won’t kill again. [10]

3. Criticisms of Deontological  Justifications

Let’s consider some objections to the above arguments.

“Eye for an eye” retributivism seems to mandate immoral punishments like raping rapists or torturing torturers.

Proportionality-based retributivism also faces challenges. Capital punishment is sometimes judged to be disproportionately harsh because murderers suffer from prison time, from knowing their execution date, and from losing their lives, whereas murder victims only lose their lives. [11] More often, critics argue that life in prison, the longest sentence possible, is just as proportionate as execution and less morally controversial. [12]

4. Criticisms of Consequentialist Justifications

Deterrence theorists presume that execution is more “persuasive” than imprisonment. But researchers have found no evidence of execution’s marginal deterrent effect—i.e., a deterrent impact on murder rates exceeding that of imprisonment . [13] It is not enough for proponents to show that execution deters murder. Execution must deter murder better than imprisonment for its costs to be justified. [14]

An objection to both theories is that they permit punishing people for actions they didn’t perform. [15] Most believe that only those guilty of criminal acts should be punished. But deterrence theories could allow executing the innocent: if executing an innocent person would prevent future murders and authorities could keep her innocence secret, the benefits would plausibly outweigh the costs and deterrence theories would support killing her. [16] And incapacitation theories punish offenders for what they might do in the future, rather than any wrongs actually committed. [17]

5. General Objections to Capital Punishment

Death penalty abolitionists raise a number of general objections to capital punishment. 

5.1. The Right to Life

Abolitionists argue that execution violates murderers’ inviolable right to life.

Advocates respond that offenders forfeit their right to life by committing murder. And assertions of an absolute right to life have the implausible consequence of prohibiting killing in justified self-defense.

5.2. Dignity

Dignity arguments against capital punishment focus on whatever basic human capacity (e.g., rationality) imparts dignity , that in virtue of which persons are owed respect. Actions that violate dignity, like torture, are widely condemned. Abolitionists argue that because execution destroys the capacity for dignity, it violates dignity and is thus immoral.

Advocates question whether eliminating the condition of some valuable feature actually offends against that feature: e.g., killing people annihilates their ability to practice religion, yet it’s odd to characterize execution as violating religious freedom.

5.3. Procedural Problems

Capital punishment is often rejected on account of flaws in the legal procedures leading to death sentences. Some reject the death penalty in practice for these procedural reasons, even though they believe it is justified in theory .

5.3.1. Arbitrariness

In the U.S., capital juries may sentence a convicted murderer to life in prison, instead of execution, for almost any reason whatsoever. There is little consistency in who is sentenced to death and who is sent to prison, and so the death penalty is condemned as being intolerably arbitrary. [18]

5.3.2. Discrimination

One pattern in capital sentencing is that those who murder white people are more likely to be sentenced to death than those who murder black people (blacks who murder whites are the most likely to face execution). [19] It can seem deeply unfair, if not racist, for the likelihood of a death sentence to depend on racial factors. [20]

Death penalty advocates respond by insisting that what an individual murderer deserves is unaffected by how other murderers are treated. They add that arbitrariness and discrimination are reasons to reform , not abolish, sentencing procedures.

5.3.3. Irrevocability

If someone is wrongly executed—either because she is innocent, or subject to procedural injustice at trial—there is no way to right the wrong. Some abolitionists argue that because a just state is obliged to undo its serious mistakes, it mustn’t impose irrevocable punishments like the death penalty. [21], [22]  

6. Conclusion

Retributivist justifications dominate contemporary politics, but have recently suffered some legislative defeats to proceduralist arguments. [23] Determining whether practical worries about capital punishment trump concerns about potentially treating murders too leniently is thus of great legal and moral significance.

[1] For a general introduction to the debates about what justifies punishments in general and what makes particular punishments appropriate, see Theories of Punishment by Travis Joseph Rodgers.

In the U.S., twenty-nine states, the federal government, and the military allow for the death penalty. State and federal death rows are populated solely by murderers and accomplices to murder. Some states and the federal government permit execution for treason and other crimes, but these laws have never been tested in court.

Fifty-five other countries permit capital punishment, while more than one hundred nations have abolished it or no longer use it. In countries with an active death penalty, death-eligible crimes include kidnapping, drug trafficking, treason, and sexual immorality. For detailed information on capital punishment by U.S. state and country , see the Death Penalty Information Center .

[2] Deontologists see murder as the only crime for which capital punishment is appropriate, because murder is uniquely bad, and so only murderers deserve death.

[3] Proportionality is sometimes called commensurability . Some retributivists claim that proportionate punishments are justified because they give wrongdoers what they deserve.

[4] The “eye for an eye” principle is called the lex talionis. The most famous lex talionis defense of the death penalty can be found in Immanuel Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, vi: 332–333. For more on Kant’s view, see Yost (2010). For an introduction to Kant’s ethics see Deontology: Kantian Ethics by Andrew Chapman.

[5] Sorell (1993).

[6] The purgative rationale applies only to extraordinarily evil offenders, not to garden-variety first-degree murderers (Kramer 2011). That is, it applies only to people like Adam Lanza, the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooter, who in 2012 shot to death twenty six- and seven-year old students and six school staff.

[7] These purgative theorists regard executing evil offenders as morally obligatory , whereas retributivists typically consider it merely permissible .

[8] See Shane Gronholz’s Consequentialism for discussion of the ethical theory known as “consequentialism” that these arguments often depend on.

[9] John Stuart Mill defends capital punishment in these terms (1868).

[10] This rationale best applies to countries other than the U.S., which has invested in technologically advanced maximum-security prison divisions, where inmates are (inhumanely) restricted to solitary confinement and under constant supervision.

[11] Camus (1963).

[12] Bedau (2002); Finkelstein (2002). Critics of retributivism as a general theory of punishment often raise a related objection: it is hard to know how much punishment to assign to a given offense. Does armed robbery merit a year in jail? A year and a month? A year and one hundred days? 

[13] State of the art research neither establishes nor disproves a marginal deterrent effect; see Nagin and Pepper (2012).

[14] Although the cost varies from state to state, the price for executing a murderer in the U.S. is always higher than keeping him in prison for life.

[15] Pure deterrence theories can be contrasted with two-level theories. Two-level theories of punishment endorse deterrence as the general justifying aim of punishment, but maintain that the determination of who and how much to punish is governed by retributive principles (see, e.g., Hart 1968). These views sidestep the innocence objection, but inherit the problems of deontological approaches.

[16] A related worry is that deterrence theories condone execution for crimes far less serious than murder: if executing one or two burglars would eliminate property crimes, deterrence rationales might allow such a punishment.

[17] See, e.g., Nadelhoffer, et al . (2012).

[18] See Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Callins v. Collins . For a more philosophical approach, see Nathanson (2001).

[19] Poor people are more likely to be executed than well-off people, though the research on this comparison is scant. But when we consider that litigating capital cases is difficult and time-consuming, and poor defendants must rely on overworked public defenders, many of whom have no experience with capital trials, the consequences seem clear. For harrowing stories of how bad lawyering leads to death sentences, see Bright (1994).

[20] Cholbi (2006).

[21] Yost (2019).

[22] The irrevocability of execution is, however, philosophically controversial. Davis argues that authorities can compensate a wrongly executed person by advancing her interests or values (1984). For example, the state could send her son to college or donate five million dollars to her favorite charity. Davis concludes that compensation of this sort counts as revoking the wrongful execution.

[23] For example, in 2018 the Washington Supreme Court struck down the death penalty , citing its arbitrary and discriminatory nature.

Callins v . Collins . 510 U.S. 1141. U.S. Supreme Court, 1994.

Bedau, Hugo (2002). “The Minimal Invasion Argument against the Death Penalty.” Criminal Justice Ethics 21 (2): 3-8.

Bright, Steven (1994). “Council for the Poor: the Death Penalty Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer.” Yale Law Journal 103 (7): 1835-83.

Camus, Albert (1963). “Reflections on the Guillotine.” Resistance, Rebellion, and Death. New York: Modern Library.

Cholbi, Michael (2006). “Race, Capital Punishment, and the Cost of Murder.” Philosophical Studies 127: 255-282.

Davis, Michael (1984). “Is the Death Penalty Irrevocable?” Social Theory and Practice 10 (2): 143-156.

Finkelstein, Claire (2002). “Death and Retribution.” Criminal Justice Ethics 21 (2): 12-21.

Hart, H.L.A. (1968). Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kramer, Matthew (2011). The Ethics of Capital Punishment: A Philosophical Investigation of Evil and Its Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mill, John Stuart (1868). “Speech in Favor of Capital Punishment.”

Nagin, Daniel, and John Pepper (2012). “Deterrence and the Death Penalty.” National Research Council. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.

Nadelhoffer, Thomas, et al. (2012). “Neuroprediction, Violence, and the Law: Setting the Stage.” Neuroethics 5 (1): 67-99.

Nathanson, Stephen (2001). An Eye for an Eye : The Immorality of Punishing by Death. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Sorell, Tom (1993). “Aggravated Murder and Capital Punishment.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 10 (2): 201-213.

Yost, Benjamin S. (2010). “Kant’s Justification of the Death Penalty Reconsidered.” Kantian Review 15 (2): 1-27.

Yost, Benjamin S. (2019). Against Capital Punishment. New York: Oxford University Press.

For Further Reading

Hoag, Robert. “Capital Punishment.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .

Related Essays

Theories of Punishment by Travis Joseph Rodgers

Is Death Bad? Epicurus and Lucretius on the Fear of Death by Frederik Kaufman

Deontology: Kantian Ethics by Andrew Chapman

Consequentialism by Shane Gronholz

Philosophy and Race: An Introduction to Philosophy of Race  by Thomas Metcalf

Philosophy of Law: An Overview  by Mark Satta

Moral Luck  by Jonathan Spelman

Hell and Universalism  by A.G. Holdier 

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About the Author

Benjamin S. Yost is Professor of Philosophy at Providence College and Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University. His specializations include the philosophy of punishment and Kant’s practical philosophy. His book Against Capital Punishment was published by Oxford University Press (2019), and he has a co-edited volume titled The Movement for Black Lives: Philosophical Perspectives forthcoming from Oxford. His papers appear in journals such as Utilitas, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Kantian Review, and Continental Philosophy Review . www.benjaminsyost.net

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Death Penalty Abolition, the Right to Life, and Necessity

• Published: 27 December 2022
• Volume 24 , pages 77–95, ( 2023 )

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• Ben Jones   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-2134-8631 1  

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One prominent argument in international law and religious thought for abolishing capital punishment is that it violates individuals’ right to life. Notably, this right-to-life argument emerged from normative and legal frameworks that recognize deadly force against aggressors as justified when necessary to stop their unjust threat of grave harm. Can capital punishment be necessary in this sense—and thus justified defensive killing? If so, the right-to-life argument would have to admit certain exceptions where executions are justified. Drawing on work by Hugo Bedau, I identify a thought experiment where executions are justified defensive killing but explain why they cannot be in our world. A state’s obligations to its prisoners include the obligation to use nonlethal incapacitation (ONI), which applies as long as prisoners pose no imminent threat. ONI precludes executions for reasons of future dangerousness. By subjecting the right-to-life argument to closer scrutiny, this article ultimately places it on firmer ground.

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The Justice of Capital Punishment

ASEAN and the Death Penalty: Theoretical and Legal Views and a Pathway to Abolition

De jure abolition of the death penalty: cambodia and the philippines.

Some may suggest gladiator contests, where the condemned could defend themselves, as a counterexample. Being sentenced to such combat was not a true death sentence, though. There were distinctions in ancient Rome between gladii poena (certain death by sword), summum supplicium (certain death by more cruel methods like being thrown to the beasts), and ludi damnatio (condemnation to gladiatorial games). The last penalty forced individuals into combat where death was possible but not assured (see Bauman 1996 : 14, 122). Furthermore, my description of capital punishment remains apt for present practices since gladiator combat is rightly seen as morally repugnant and not a realistic sentencing option today.

Bedau does not explicitly say that executing murderers is the only way to revive their victims, but context implies it. He writes: “taking life deliberately is not justified so long as there is any feasible alternative” (Bedau 1993 : 179).

Before Bedau, Justice Richard Maughan of the Utah Supreme Court expressed a similar idea: “Were there some way to restore the bereaved and wounded survivors, and the victims, to what was once theirs; there could then be justification for the capital sanction. Sadly, such is not available to us” (State v. Pierre 1977 : 1359). This remark is mentioned by Barry ( 2017 : 540).

That claim is questionable in the US, where most death sentences are overturned (Baumgartner and Dietrich 2015 ) and executions that do occur usually take place close to two decades after conviction (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2021 : 2). I grant this claim, though, for the sake of argument.

E.g., Thomas Creech who killed a fellow inmate after receiving life sentences for murder in Idaho (Boone 2020 ).

E.g., Clarence Ray Allen who while serving a life sentence for murder in California conspired with a recently released inmate to murder witnesses from his previous case (Egelko and Finz  2006 ).

E.g., Jeffrey Landrigan who escaped from an Oklahoma prison where he was serving a sentence for murder and went on to commit another murder in Arizona (Schwartz 2010 ).

E.g., Kenneth McDuff who was sentenced to death, had his sentences commuted to life following Furman v. Georgia ( 1972 ), and was eventually paroled, after which he murdered multiple people in Texas (Cartwright 1992 ). I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the examples in footnotes 5–8.

These critics include those who grant retribution as a valid rationale for punishment but still reject it as a justification for the death penalty (see Brooks 2004 ).

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I am grateful for helpful feedback on this article from Désirée Lim, Kevin Barry, and Erin Hanses.

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Jones, B. Death Penalty Abolition, the Right to Life, and Necessity. Hum Rights Rev 24 , 77–95 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-022-00677-x

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Published : 27 December 2022

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-022-00677-x

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Capital Punishment:Our Duty or Our Doom?

But human rights advocates and civil libertarians continue to decry the immorality of state-sanctioned killing in the U.S. Is capital punishment moral?

About 2000 men, women, and teenagers currently wait on America's "death row." Their time grows shorter as federal and state courts increasingly ratify death penalty laws, allowing executions to proceed at an accelerated rate. It's unlikely that any of these executions will make the front page, having become more or less a matter of routine in the last decade. Indeed, recent public opinion polls show a wide margin of support for the death penalty. But human rights advocates and civil libertarians continue to decry the immorality of state-sanctioned killing in the U.S., the only western industrialized country that continues to use the death penalty. Is capital punishment moral?

Capital punishment is often defended on the grounds that society has a moral obligation to protect the safety and welfare of its citizens. Murderers threaten this safety and welfare. Only by putting murderers to death can society ensure that convicted killers do not kill again.

Second, those favoring capital punishment contend that society should support those practices that will bring about the greatest balance of good over evil, and capital punishment is one such practice. Capital punishment benefits society because it may deter violent crime. While it is difficult to produce direct evidence to support this claim since, by definition, those who are deterred by the death penalty do not commit murders, common sense tells us that if people know that they will die if they perform a certain act, they will be unwilling to perform that act.

If the threat of death has, in fact, stayed the hand of many a would be murderer, and we abolish the death penalty, we will sacrifice the lives of many innocent victims whose murders could have been deterred. But if, in fact, the death penalty does not deter, and we continue to impose it, we have only sacrificed the lives of convicted murderers. Surely it's better for society to take a gamble that the death penalty deters in order to protect the lives of innocent people than to take a gamble that it doesn't deter and thereby protect the lives of murderers, while risking the lives of innocents. If grave risks are to be run, it's better that they be run by the guilty, not the innocent.

Finally, defenders of capital punishment argue that justice demands that those convicted of heinous crimes of murder be sentenced to death. Justice is essentially a matter of ensuring that everyone is treated equally. It is unjust when a criminal deliberately and wrongly inflicts greater losses on others than he or she has to bear. If the losses society imposes on criminals are less than those the criminals imposed on their innocent victims, society would be favoring criminals, allowing them to get away with bearing fewer costs than their victims had to bear. Justice requires that society impose on criminals losses equal to those they imposed on innocent persons. By inflicting death on those who deliberately inflict death on others, the death penalty ensures justice for all.

This requirement that justice be served is not weakened by charges that only the black and the poor receive the death penalty. Any unfair application of the death penalty is the basis for extending its application, not abolishing it. If an employer discriminates in hiring workers, do we demand that jobs be taken from the deserving who were hired or that jobs be abolished altogether? Likewise, if our criminal justice system discriminates in applying the death penalty so that some do not get their deserved punishment, it's no reason to give Iesser punishments to murderers who deserved the death penalty and got it. Some justice, however unequal, is better than no justice, however equal. To ensure justice and equality, we must work to improve our system so that everyone who deserves the death penalty gets it.

The case against capital punishment is often made on the basis that society has a moral obligation to protect human life, not take it. The taking of human life is permissible only if it is a necessary condition to achieving the greatest balance of good over evil for everyone involved. Given the value we place on life and our obligation to minimize suffering and pain whenever possible, if a less severe alternative to the death penalty exists which would accomplish the same goal, we are duty-bound to reject the death penalty in favor of the less severe alternative.

There is no evidence to support the claim that the death penalty is a more effective deterrent of violent crime than, say, life imprisonment. In fact, statistical studies that have compared the murder rates of jurisdictions with and without the death penalty have shown that the rate of murder is not related to whether the death penalty is in force: There are as many murders committed in jurisdictions with the death penalty as in those without. Unless it can be demonstrated that the death penalty, and the death penalty alone, does in fact deter crimes of murder, we are obligated to refrain from imposing it when other alternatives exist.

Further, the death penalty is not necessary to achieve the benefit of protecting the public from murderers who may strike again. Locking murderers away for life achieves the same goal without requiring us to take yet another life. Nor is the death penalty necessary to ensure that criminals "get what they deserve." Justice does not require us to punish murder by death. It only requires that the gravest crimes receive the severest punishment that our moral principles would allow us to impose.

While it is clear that the death penalty is by no means necessary to achieve certain social benefits, it does, without a doubt, impose grave costs on society. First, the death penalty wastes lives. Many of those sentenced to death could be rehabilitated to live socially productive lives. Carrying out the death penalty destroys any good such persons might have done for society if they had been allowed to live. Furthermore, juries have been known to make mistakes, inflicting the death penalty on innocent people. Had such innocent parties been allowed to live, the wrong done to them might have been corrected and their lives not wasted.

In addition to wasting lives, the death penalty also wastes money. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it's much more costly to execute a person than to imprison them for life. The finality of punishment by death rightly requires that great procedural precautions be taken throughout all stages of death penalty cases to ensure that the chance of error is minimized. As a result, executing a single capital case costs about three times as much as it costs to keep a person in prison for their remaining life expectancy, which is about 40 years.

Finally, the death penalty harms society by cheapening the value of life. Allowing the state to inflict death on certain of its citizens legitimizes the taking of life. The death of anyone, even a convicted killer, diminishes us all. Society has a duty to end this practice which causes such harm, yet produces little in the way of benefits.

Opponents of capital punishment also argue that the death penalty should be abolished because it is unjust. Justice, they claim, requires that all persons be treated equally. And the requirement that justice bc served is all the more rigorous when life and death are at stake. Of 19,000 people who committed willful homicides in the U.S. in 1987, only 293 were sentenced to death. Who are these few being selected to die? They are nearly always poor and disproportionately black. It is not the nature of the crime that determines who goes to death row and who doesn't. People go to death row simply because they have no money to appeal their case, or they have a poor defense, or they lack the funds to being witnesses to courts, or they are members of a political or racial minority.

The death penalty is also unjust because it is sometimes inflicted on innocent people. Since 1900, 350 people have been wrongly convicted of homicide or capital rape. The death penalty makes it impossible to remedy any such mistakes. If, on the other hand, the death penalty is not in force, convicted persons later found to be innocent can be released and compensated for the time they wrongly served in prison.

The case for and the case against the death penalty appeal, in different ways, to the value we place on life and to the value we place on bringing about the greatest balance of good over evil. Each also appeals to our commitment to"justice": Is justice to be served at all costs? Or is our commitment to justice to be one tempered by our commitment to equality and our reverence for life? Indeed, is capital punishment our duty or our doom?

(Capital punishment) is . . . the most premeditated of murders, to which no criminal's deed, however calculated . . can be compared . . . For there to be an equivalence, the death penalty would have to punish a criminal who had warned his victim of the date at which he would inflict a horrible death on him and who, from that moment onward, had confined him at mercy for months. Such a monster is not encountered in private life. --Albert Camus

If . . . he has committed a murder, he must die. In this case, there is no substitute that will satisfy the requirements of legal justice. There is no sameness of kind between death and remaining alive even under the most miserable conditions, and consequently there is no equality between the crime and the retribution unless the criminal is judicially condemned and put to death. --Immanuel Kant

For further reading:

Hugo Adam Bedau, Death Is Different: Studies in the Morality, Law, and Politics of Capital Punishment (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1987).

Walter Berns, For Capital Punishment (New York: Basic Books, 1979.)

David Bruch, "The Death Penalty: An Exchange," The New Republic , Volume 192 (May 20, 1985), pp. 20-21.

Edward I. Koch, "Death and Justice: How Capital Punishment Affirms Life," The New Republic, Volume 192 (April 15,1985), pp. 13-15.

Ernest van den Haag and John P. Conrad , The Death Penalty: A Debate (New York: Plenum Press, 1983).

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