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• BATNA Examples—and What You Can Learn from Them

BATNA examples in the news offer lessons to business negotiators who are trying to decide when and how to reveal what they will do if they can’t reach a deal with their counterpart.

By Katie Shonk — on May 9th, 2024 / BATNA

What are BATNA examples in negotiation? In their bestseller Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In , Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton (Penguin, 1991) described BATNA, or best alternative to a negotiated agreement , as the path you’ll follow if you don’t reach agreement in your current negotiation.

Awareness of your BATNA will keep you from accepting a worse outcome than you could get elsewhere—and, conversely, from rejecting an agreement that’s better than your BATNA. If you’re excited about a strong job offer, for example, you can bargain hard in negotiations for another job.

Should you reveal your BATNA to your counterpart, and if so, when? BATNA examples in the news shed light on this difficult question. Consider British prime minister Theresa May’s decision back in August 2018 to unveil an initial set of contingency plans for exiting the European Union (E.U.) if the so-called Brexit negotiations ended in impasse.

May’s contingency plans were intended to quell the public’s fears that an impasse would lead to chaos, as well as to convey to E.U. negotiators that the United Kingdom was prepared to walk away from a deal that didn’t meet its interests. Failure to reach agreement “wouldn’t be the end of the world,” May said, according to Sky News.

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The British government’s decision to reveal what will happen if Brexit talks fail raises interesting questions regarding the role of BATNA in business negotiation strategies . The following five do’s and don’ts will help you manage your BATNA with confidence.

• Don’t Reveal a Weak BATNA.

Never share your BATNA with the other party if it is hopelessly weak. A bad BATNA is also known as a WATNA , or worst alternative to a negotiated agreement . Telling a supplier, for example, that you dumped your last partner and are desperate to do a new deal is a surefire way to ensure the supplier will highball you on price and resist compromising. You will also want to be careful to avoid appearing to be in a hurry, seeming stressed, or revealing that you have a wide-open schedule—all potential “tells” that you don’t have much else going on and may be ready to close a deal on your counterpart’s terms.

• Don’t Bluff about Your BATNA.

What if the other side asks you about your BATNA directly? Explain (truthfully) that you are working on various possibilities but want to concentrate on the deal on the table for the time being. Resist the urge to embellish or fabricate a BATNA to try to boost your bargaining power. You’ll sacrifice not only your ethics but perhaps also your reputation if you’re caught in an exaggeration, misrepresentation of facts, or lie.

• Don’t Reveal Your BATNA Too Early.

When you open up about a great BATNA to your counterpart early in the game, the information could come across as a threat: “If you can’t give me an even better deal than the one I just outlined, I’m out of here.” Threats foster a competitive atmosphere when making business deals and hinder your ability to explore tradeoffs that could create value. Even if you’re certain your BATNA is rock solid, hold off on revealing it. It could prove to be a useful bargaining chip during the final stages of a negotiation after you’ve exhausted all other strategies.

• Do Work to Actively Improve Your BATNA.

As BATNA examples such as the Brexit negotiations demonstrate, it’s not enough to simply talk about your BATNA. Rather, you need to do everything you can to try to improve it. For Prime Minister May, that meant asking government agencies and private companies to prepare for an orderly transition in case there is no deal. For a job seeker, that might mean continuing to seek leads in your network or thinking about other paths, such as going back to school.

• Don’t Let Them Talk You out of Your BATNA.

When a counterpart disparages your BATNA, he is obviously hoping to taint it in your eyes. Don’t fall for this tired, old ploy. Of course, it’s smart to investigate any potentially legitimate claims the person makes about your BATNA, but recognize that he has very real incentives to convince you that your outside options are not as good as you’d like to believe.

What BATNA examples can you share that shed light on when to reveal or conceal?

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BATNA Negotiation: A Comprehensive Guide

Dive deep into BATNA Negotiation - a fundamental concept in negotiation strategies. Explore what BATNA means in negotiation, discover how it integrates with various negotiation tactics and learn the art of developing your very own BATNA. With insights, examples, and strategies, this comprehensive blog equips you to enhance your negotiation skills.

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When you are trying to make a deal with someone, you need to know what your best option is if you can’t agree with them. It is called the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement or BATNA Negotiation. It can help you decide what to do and how to act. So, if you are a Negotiator dipping your toes into the world of deal-making, this Negotiation can empower you to navigate the negotiation table with confidence and finesse. 

Want to know how it can benefit you during deal-making? Explore our blog on BATNA Negotiation for a thorough understanding of BATNA and delve into the significance of each step involved. Read this blog to learn more!

Table of Contents  

1) What is BATNA in Negotiation? 

2) Importance of BATNA

3) Challenges of BATNA Negotiation  

4) BATNA and Negotiation tactics  

5) Developing your BATNA   

6) Conclusion   

What is BATNA in Negotiation?  

Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) is a crucial Negotiation Strategy. It refers to the alternative course of action an individual or party can take if a Negotiation fails to reach a satisfactory agreement. It represents the next best option available outside the negotiation and serves as a baseline for assessing the value and acceptability of potential agreements.  

The significance of BATNA lies in its ability to empower Negotiators. Identifying and developing a strong Negotiated agreement allows negotiators to gain leverage and confidence during the Negotiation process. A robust Negotiated agreement provides a viable alternative, enhancing one’s bargaining power and reducing dependence on the other party’s terms.  

It’s important to distinguish between Negotiated agreement and the reservation point. While BATNA represents the alternative, the reservation point is the minimum acceptable outcome within the Negotiation. Understanding this difference allows Negotiators to evaluate proposals and make informed decisions based on objective criteria. 

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Importance of BATNA

The importance of BATNA Negotiation cannot be overstated in various aspects of life, from personal relationships to business transactions. The concept of BATNA plays a pivotal role in ensuring positive outcomes in a wide range of situations. It is a critical concept in Negotiation theory, underlining its importance in achieving successful outcomes in various contexts.

First and foremost, BATNA provides negotiators with a benchmark for assessing the quality of any proposed agreement. By knowing what their best alternative is, they can gauge whether the terms of a Negotiation offer a better outcome. This helps them avoid making suboptimal deals, protecting their interests.

Secondly, BATNA enhances Negotiation advantage. When a negotiator has a strong BATNA, they are in a better position to walk away from a Negotiation if the terms aren't favourable. This can create a sense of urgency for the other party to improve their offer, giving away control of the process.

Moreover, BATNA encourages creativity and flexibility in Negotiations. Knowing about the alternatives empowers negotiators to explore various options and trade-offs, potentially leading to more innovative and mutually beneficial solutions.

In essence, BATNA is important for informed decision-making, leverage, and constructive problem-solving in Negotiations, making it an indispensable tool for individuals and organisations seeking successful agreements and conflict resolution.

Thus, a well-developed Negotiation Agreement increases the likelihood of reaching more favourable agreements. It strengthens your bargaining position and encourages the other party to offer better terms. 

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Challenges of BATNA Negotiation  

While the “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement” is a valuable Negotiation tool, it comes with its own set of challenges and limitations. Here are some common pitfalls and considerations when assessing and utilising the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement:  

Inaccurate evaluation

One of the first challenges is accurately evaluating the alternative options for their feasibility and desirability. Gathering comprehensive information and accurately predicting the outcomes of alternatives can often be challenging. Additionally, overestimating the strength of your BATNA or underestimating the other party’s alternatives can lead to unrealistic expectations and ineffective negotiation strategies.  

Balancing assertiveness with flexibility  

Having a strong BATNA can provide a sense of power, but it’s important to balance assertiveness with flexibility. Being too rigid and uncompromising can harm the Negotiation process and strain relationships. Therefore, maintain open communication and seek mutually beneficial outcomes to build trust and increase the likelihood of reaching an agreement.  

Exploring other Negotiation strategies  

When there are no viable alternatives or when the Negotiation involves complex or unique circumstances. In such cases, exploring other Negotiation strategies, such as integrative Negotiation or focusing on relationship-building, may be necessary to achieve successful outcomes.

BATNA and Negotiation tactics 

Incorporating your BATNA into Negotiation preparation is essential for maximising your chances of success. Here are key  Negotiation Techniques for effectively utilising it as a source of power and leverage:  

Incorporating BATNA during preparation 

Before entering a Negotiation, thoroughly analyse your BATNA and align it with your Negotiation goals. Identify your Negotiation Agreement’s key strengths and advantages and consider how they can be strategically used to influence the Negotiation. Use it as a benchmark to evaluate proposed agreements and determine their value relative to your alternatives.  

Using BATNA to your advantage 

Your BATNA represents your best alternative, giving you leverage and power in the Negotiation. Communicate your awareness of your Negotiated Agreement to the other party. Also, demonstrate your willingness and ability to walk away if the Negotiated Agreement does not meet your needs. This can encourage the other party to make more favourable concessions by creating a sense of urgency. 

Revealing or concealing your BATNA 

The decision of whether to reveal or conceal your BATNA depends on the specific Negotiation context. If it is strong and you believe it will strengthen your position, strategically reveal it to demonstrate your Negotiating power. Also, encourage the other party to improve their offer. However, if it is too weak or uncertain, it may be advantageous to keep it confidential, allowing you to explore potential agreements without revealing your alternatives.

Developing your BATNA  

Developing a strong BATNA requires a systematic approach to identifying and evaluating alternative options outside of Negotiation. Here are key steps to enhance and strengthen your N egotiation Agreement: 

a) Identifying and evaluating alternatives: Begin by brainstorming potential alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement. Consider different courses of action, partnerships, or alternative deals that could meet your interests. Further, assess each option’s advantages, disadvantages, and potential outcomes. Also, conduct research, consult experts, and gather relevant information to make informed decisions.  

b) Assessing feasibility and desirability: Once you have a list of potential alternatives, evaluate their feasibility and desirability. Consider factors such as costs, resources, timeframes, and potential risks involved. Assess how each alternative aligns with your objectives and interests. Lastly, eliminate unattainable or undesirable options and focus on those that offer viable alternatives. 

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Enhancing your BATNA 

To strengthen your Negotiation skills even further, consider strategies such as the following:  

a) Building strategic alliances: Identify potential partners or stakeholders who can offer valuable alternatives or support your position. Collaborating with others can increase your leverage and expand the possibilities for a favourable outcome.  

b) Improving your resources and capabilities: Invest in developing skills, acquiring knowledge, or enhancing your resources to strengthen your BATNA Negotiation. This may involve professional development, expanding networks, or securing additional funding.  

c) Exploring creative solutions: Think outside the box to identify innovative solutions that could surpass the perceived limits of traditional alternatives. This can involve considering non-traditional partnerships, alternative business models, or new technologies. 

Conclusion  

Mastering the art of BATNA Negotiation empowers individuals to make more informed decisions and secure favourable outcomes. Understanding this concept allows them to develop strong negotiation skills and employ effective negotiation tactics. So, harness its power and become a skilled negotiator to navigate complex negotiation scenarios. 

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BLOG CATEGORY   October 23, 2023 A Complete Guide to BATNA, ZOPA & the Reservation Point

Negotiating can be a challenging endeavor, especially when high stakes are on the line. As the negotiation unfolds, you might encounter situations where it seems the other party has the upper hand. In such moments, you're faced with three choices: accepting the deal without further discussion, walking away from the negotiation table, or introducing a better alternative.

While the first two options are self-explanatory, the third is where the magic happens. BATNA and ZOPA, along with your Reservation Point, can tip the scales in your favor during any negotiation.

What is BATNA in Negotiation?

Before delving into the intricacies of negotiation theory, you may be wondering what is BATNA exactly? Simply put, it's the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) that is the most advantageous alternative course of action a party can take if an agreement cannot be reached. Negotiation researchers Roger Fischer and William Ury, of the Harvard Program on Negotiation (PON), are the pioneers of BATNA. They introduced it in their best-selling 1981 book, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In .

BATNA , one of the five principles of negotiation according to Fischer and Ury, focuses on the psychology of negotiators. It does not necessarily guarantee an agreement in your favor, but it prevents the agreement from going against your terms. Having a BATNA before you start negotiating allows you to make greater demands on the other side, as you have a viable alternative available. As a result, you will have an easier time walking away if the negotiations are favoring the other side, making it a valuable tool to have when negotiating for the best deal possible. This guide will help you understand the steps and principles of BATNA.

Why is BATNA Important?

BATNA plays a pivotal role in negotiation and is considered a critical concept for anyone engaged in the negotiation process. Its importance stems from several key reasons:

Risk Mitigation : BATNA serves as a safety net in negotiations. It provides negotiators with a viable alternative in case the current negotiations do not yield a satisfactory agreement. This risk mitigation aspect is crucial because it prevents you from being overly dependent on a single deal and helps you avoid unfavorable outcomes.

Empowerment : Knowing your BATNA empowers you during negotiations. When you are aware of your best alternative, you gain confidence in the negotiation process. This confidence allows you to be more assertive in advocating for your interests and making demands, as you know you have a viable fallback option if the negotiations do not go your way.

Enhanced Decision-Making : BATNA assists in rational decision-making. It allows you to objectively assess whether the proposed agreement is better than your alternative. If the potential agreement doesn't surpass your alternative agreement option, it may be wise to walk away or seek better terms, ensuring that you don't accept a sub-optimal deal.

Reduced Pressure : Negotiations can be stressful, and the fear of reaching no agreement can lead to unfavorable concessions. Having a BATNA alleviates this pressure, as you are less desperate to secure a deal. This reduces the likelihood of making impulsive or unfavorable decisions due to emotional stress.

Negotiation Strategy : Your BATNA informs your negotiation strategy. If your BATNA is strong, you can adopt a more competitive or aggressive stance, knowing that you have an attractive alternative. On the other hand, if it is weak, you may need to be more flexible and accommodating to secure a reasonable deal.

Enhanced Flexibility : BATNA provides flexibility in negotiations. It allows you to explore creative solutions and alternatives without feeling constrained by a single deal. This flexibility can lead to more innovative and mutually beneficial outcomes.

Conflict Resolution : In situations where negotiations break down or become acrimonious, BATNA can serve as a basis for resolving conflicts. Parties can refer back to their alternatives and seek ways to bridge the gap or find common ground by considering each other's BATNAs.

Long-Term Relationship Preservation : Knowing your BATNA can help preserve long-term relationships with negotiation counterparts. When you avoid entering into unfavorable agreements, it reduces the likelihood of resentment or dissatisfaction, potentially preserving a positive working relationship for future interactions.

As you can see, BATNA is critical in any negotiation process because it provides a practical framework for assessing, strategizing, and ultimately achieving more favorable outcomes. It empowers negotiators, reduces risks, and promotes rational decision-making, all of which contribute to more successful and satisfying negotiation outcomes.

The Process of How to Determine Your BATNA

Having a clear picture of your best alternative to a negotiated agreement is a great technique for strengthening your negotiation position. It saves you from accepting unfavorable terms and allows you to push for the best terms possible.

However, finding alternatives to any deal is not a straightforward task. Fisher and Ury gave a simple outline for developing your BATNA:

• Coming up with possible actions as alternatives when no agreement is reached
• Improving the promising options to make them more practical
• Carefully selecting the best option

Using this outline, we have developed the steps below to this process and can help you develop a strong BATNA from scratch.

1. Clearly Define your Purpose

You need to understand what you are trying to get from the negotiation. For example, someone trying to sell a business will have a different negotiating purpose than someone trying to find better pricing on products. So before you set out to negotiate, gather all your stakeholders. Negotiating as a team can help clarify what the stakes are. If you are going to negotiate for a higher salary, make sure you know the terms you are demanding. You must know how credible your demands are for this agreement.

2. Brainstorming

You cannot begin without brainstorming all the possible alternatives you can use during the negotiation. Write down all the alternative agreements you would be willing to accept.; you will come up with more than you initially thought. Once you make a list of all the alternatives, identify the top ones. One mistake people make at this step is having assumptions about the other party. Developing a good BATNA does not involve making theories about the other party.

3. Evaluation

Next comes the evaluation of each alternative. This step can help you check possible mistakes you’ve made in identifying the best options. Do some research about the options you have. The more options you have, the better your understanding of the market will be. Assess each of the options very carefully.

4. Setting the Reservation Point

The meaning of a reservation point is it being the breaking point of the negotiation where a deal will no longer be profitable for you. Great negotiators never reveal their reservation point. Having a viable alternative will let you figure out where your limit should be.

What is a Reservation Point in Negotiation?

The Reservation Point in negotiation is crucial for achieving successful outcomes. It serves as a fundamental marker that shapes negotiation strategies, influences decision-making, and determines whether an agreement is reached. In this context, below are three key reasons why the Reservation Point plays such a pivotal role in negotiation dynamics:

Guidance for Negotiation Strategy

The Reservation Point acts as a negotiation compass, providing clear direction on how to navigate the negotiation process. It helps negotiators decide when to hold their ground when to make concessions, and when to walk away. Without this reference point, negotiations can become aimless and less likely to yield favorable results.

Protection Against Poor Deals

Your Reservation Point serves as a safety net, preventing you from agreeing to terms that are harmful to your interests. It ensures that you do not compromise too much or make impulsive decisions that you might regret later. By establishing your bottom line, you protect yourself from unfavorable agreements.

Negotiating with Confidence

Communicating your Reservation Point to the other party signals that you are a serious and informed negotiator. It enhances your bargaining power and encourages the other side to offer terms that align better with your objectives. This confidence can lead to more favorable outcomes and a higher likelihood of achieving your negotiation goals.

BATNA and ZOPA

Now that you know what a BATNA is, you should be aware of another term that is frequently used along with it. The definition of ZOPA is the Zone of Possible Agreement ; the range or area of a negotiation that is satisfactory to both parties. While each party has its alternative agreements ready in a negotiation, it is not very likely that every negotiation has BATNA and ZOPA.

ZOPA occurs when the reservation point of both parties is equal or very close. In simple terms, it's the area where both parties’ reservation points overlap. For example, if an employee’s demand for a pay raise is equal to or almost the same as what the employer has in mind to offer, that is the ZOPA.

What is ZOPA in Negotiation?

Let's dive a bit deeper into the concept of ZOPA and how it acts as your secret weapon in negotiations. It's all about finding that magical overlap where you and the other party can shake hands and say, "Deal!"

Imagine you're negotiating with someone, and you both want different things. You're like puzzle pieces that don't quite fit together. ZOPA is the space where those puzzle pieces can connect, where you can both get something you want without feeling like you're giving up too much.

Here's how it works:

Defining the Range

ZOPA is like drawing a boundary on a map. It marks the area where the negotiators' desires and limits intersect. On one side, you have your "I absolutely won't go lower than this" line, called your "Reservation Point." On the other side, there's your dream outcome, your "Aspiration Point." This zone is what's in between those points, your potential deal-making territory.

Discovering ZOPA

Negotiations often start with both sides stating their initial wishes. Then, through talks, offers, and maybe some friendly back-and-forth, you start narrowing down the difference between your resolution goals. The more you talk, the clearer the ZOPA becomes.

Why ZOPA Matters

ZOPA is like a treasure map for negotiators. It tells you where to dig for gold, and where to focus your efforts. Knowing the zone of possible agreement helps negotiators aim for the sweet spot in their discussions. It saves time because you're not chasing ideas that are way off the mark, and it increases the chances of finding a deal that works for everyone.

So, when you're in a negotiation, remember ZOPA. It's your agreement zone, the place where you and the other party can meet in the middle and make something good happen. It helps you be more efficient as a negotiator, find common ground, and work toward favorable agreements. It's like having a secret map to success in your negotiations.

Knowing When to Walk Away

Recognizing the right moment to walk away from a negotiation is indeed a powerful skill. It can save you from unfavorable deals, preserve your leverage, and sometimes even improve the chances of reaching a more favorable agreement. Here are several situations where it might be prudent to consider walking away:

• Unacceptable Terms : When the terms of the agreement being proposed are far from what you can accept or would harm your interests significantly, it's a clear sign to consider walking away. Trust your instincts and your assessment of whether the deal aligns with your goals and bottom line.
• Lack of Progress : If the negotiation is stagnant or going in circles with no real progress, it may be time to step back. Continuing a negotiation that's not moving forward can be a waste of time and energy.
• Dishonesty or Untrustworthiness : When you have reason to believe that the other party is being dishonest, unethical, or untrustworthy, it's a strong indicator to walk away. A lack of trust can undermine the foundation of any agreement.
• Better Alternatives : If you have a more attractive alternative elsewhere or a better opportunity on the horizon, walking away from the current negotiation may be wise. Having a strong Plan B gives you the confidence to reject a subpar offer.
• One-Sided Concessions : If you find yourself constantly making concessions while the other party is unwilling to reciprocate, it's a sign that the negotiation is not balanced. Walking away can send a message that you won't accept being taken advantage of.
• Dealbreaker Issues : When there are non-negotiable issues or dealbreakers that cannot be resolved, it may be best to end the negotiation. It's important to prioritize your core principles and values.
• Time Sensitivity : If the negotiation is dragging on, and time is of the essence, you might need to walk away to explore other time-sensitive opportunities. Delaying decisions can sometimes cost you more than abandoning the current negotiation.
• Emotional or Hostile Atmosphere : When the negotiation becomes emotionally charged or hostile, it can hinder productive discussions. Walking away temporarily to cool off and return to the table with a clearer perspective may be beneficial.
• Continuous Power Imbalance : If you're negotiating with a party that holds a significant power advantage and is unwilling to level the playing field, walking away may be your best option. It allows you to seek more equitable terms elsewhere.
• Repeated Violations of Agreements : If the other party repeatedly fails to honor agreements or commitments made during the negotiation process, it may be a sign that further negotiations won't be fruitful. Walking away can protect your interests.

In essence, knowing when to walk away is not a sign of weakness but rather a demonstration of your ability to make strategic decisions and protect your interests. It can lead to better outcomes in future negotiations and help you maintain your integrity in the process.

How to Reveal and Use Your BATNA

Sometimes it can be advantageous for you to reveal your BATNA. If the other party understands that you have a better option, they may be forced to match it or do better to win your business. Remember, the initial terms that a party puts forth in a negotiation are rarely the best they can do. In negotiations, everyone is trying to keep as much of the profit margin as possible for themselves. Your BATNA can be the leverage that you use to show the other side that their deal needs to improve.

Here's how to go about revealing it effectively:

#1 Timing is Key

Consider when to disclose. While you may not want to reveal it right at the outset, there are strategic moments when it can be highly effective. For instance, if you sense that the other party is not willing to budge on their initial offer or if negotiations have reached an impasse, that could be the right time to introduce your BATNA.

#2 Use It as Leverage

Letting the other party know that you have a viable alternative can create a sense of urgency. They may realize that they need to improve their offer to compete with your BATNA. This can give you leverage and encourage them to make concessions to secure your business or agreement.

#3 Frame It Positively

When revealing it, frame it in a positive light. Instead of saying, "I have another offer that's much better," you can say, "I have another opportunity that aligns with my goals, but I believe there's room for us to work together if we can adjust some of the terms."

#4 Be Honest and Credible

Honesty is crucial. If you bluff or exaggerate your BATNA, it can damage your credibility and harm the negotiation process. Provide enough information to make it credible without revealing too much detail.

#5 Highlight Mutual Benefits

Emphasize that a better deal benefits both parties. Instead of making it seem like a threat, position it as an opportunity for a more win-win outcome. Say something like, "I think there's potential for a deal that serves both of our interests if we can find common ground."

#6 Stay Flexible

While your BATNA provides leverage, it's important to remain flexible and open to negotiation. Use it as a tool to improve the terms but be willing to adjust and compromise to reach an agreement that works for both sides.

#7 Prepare for Counteroffers

Anticipate that the other party might respond to counter offers or requests for more details. Be ready to engage in constructive discussions and explore how to bridge the gap between your BATNA and their offer.

#8 Evaluate Their Response

Pay attention to how the other party reacts when you reveal your BATNA. If they are unwilling to improve their offer or if they react negatively, it might indicate that they are not genuinely interested in reaching a fair agreement.

#9 Know Your Limits

While using your BATNA as leverage is powerful, it's essential to know your limits. Don't push too hard to the point where you jeopardize the possibility of reaching an agreement. Keep your priorities in mind and be prepared to walk away if the deal remains unfavorable.

Using your BATNA strategically involves timing, honesty, and effective communication. When done thoughtfully, it can help you improve the terms of a negotiation and create a Both-Win situation for all parties involved.

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What is BATNA?

Understanding batna.

• Steps to Identify BATNA
• Application
• Limitations and Criticisms

BATNA: Definition, Steps, Applications & Examples

In the realm of negotiation strategies, one acronym stands out as a crucial element in determining success: BATNA, or “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement.” BATNA refers to the most advantageous alternative course of action a party can take if negotiations fail and an agreement cannot be reached. It serves as a measure of the balance of power in a negotiation and can significantly influence the terms of the deal.

Understanding and accurately determining your BATNA is a critical skill in negotiation, whether you’re haggling in a market, closing a business deal, or involved in diplomatic discussions. It provides a negotiator with the knowledge of when to accept a deal and when to walk away, in order to pursue a potentially better option.

• BATNA stands for “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement” and refers to the alternative course of action a party will take if negotiations fail.
• It helps parties evaluate and compare potential agreements during negotiations.
• It is important to identify and assess your BATNA before entering negotiations to have a clear understanding of your options.

The concept of BATNA was first introduced by negotiation scholars Roger Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard Program on Negotiation in their 1981 book, “Getting to Yes.” They argued that in negotiation, power comes from having good alternatives and knowing them well.

It serves as a contingency plan or backup strategy in case the ongoing negotiation fails to produce a mutually satisfactory agreement. It represents an alternative course of action that aligns with your interests in the event that an agreement cannot be reached with the other party. The identification of your alternative options provides a benchmark against which to assess the proposed agreement.

Let’s say you’re negotiating to buy a car. If you can’t reach a deal with the dealer, your BATNA might be to contact another dealer or perhaps to lease a car instead of buying. In a job negotiation, it might be another job offer you’ve received, or your current job if you’re already employed.

Understanding your BATNA has a twofold significance:

• Walk-Away Point Knowing your BATNA gives you the power to walk away from a negotiation that isn’t meeting your needs. If the dealer isn’t willing to agree to your terms for the car, you have the confidence to walk away because you know you have an acceptable alternative.
• Bargaining Power Its strength partly determines your bargaining power in the negotiation. If you have other options (you’ve got another dealer who has agreed to sell you a similar car at a lower price), you can push harder in your negotiation. Conversely, if your alternatives are weak (there’s only one dealer in town), you might need to be more accommodating.

Understanding this concept is critical for effective negotiation strategy. It provides a safety net, gives you confidence, and boosts your bargaining power. However, it’s not just about knowing your alternatives; it’s also about evaluating and enhancing it to achieve better negotiation outcomes.

Steps to Identify Your BATNA

Identifying your BATNA is a process that requires introspection, research, and sometimes, creativity. Here are the fundamental steps to determine it:

• List Possible Alternatives The first step in identifying your BATNA is brainstorming all possible alternatives to a negotiated agreement. These are the options you could consider if the current negotiation ends in a deadlock. Consider all realistic possibilities, even those that seem less appealing or require additional effort.
• Evaluate These Alternatives Once you have a list of potential alternatives, the next step is to evaluate each one independently. Assess the pros and cons, feasibility, and the value each option can provide. Also, consider the probability of each alternative working out and the resources required to pursue it.
• Select the Best Alternative After evaluating all the options, choose the one that serves your interests best and is reasonably achievable. This becomes your BATNA. It’s important to note that this might not be your ideal outcome. It’s your best possible outcome if the current negotiation fails.

Understanding your BATNA provides a clear perspective on what you stand to gain or lose in a negotiation. Knowing your best alternative to a negotiated agreement can also help you set the reservation point in a negotiation, which is the point at which you’re indifferent between accepting a deal and resorting to your best alternative.

Remember, this could change over time, especially if the negotiation process is extended. Therefore, reevaluating your BATNA periodically can be crucial for successful negotiations.

Application of BATNA

The concept of BATNA is not just theoretical; it is applied in negotiations every day across a range of contexts – from business deals to diplomatic negotiations. Understanding and utilizing it can effectively can significantly affect the negotiation process and its outcome. Here’s how:

• Determines Your Bargaining Range Your BATNA sets the lower limit of what you’re willing to accept in a negotiation. If the deal on the table is worse than your alternative options, you’d be better off rejecting the deal and pursuing your alternative. This understanding allows you to enter negotiations with a clear sense of your bargaining range.
• Improves Your Negotiation Power A strong BATNA provides a higher degree of influence and control in a negotiation. If you have a good alternative waiting for you, you can push for more favorable terms. On the contrary, if your alternatives are weak, you might have to settle for less favorable conditions.
• Aids Decision Making Sometimes, negotiations can become emotionally charged, making it challenging to make rational decisions. Knowing your BATNA can provide an objective standard against which to evaluate the negotiation’s progress. It can help you decide when it’s time to walk away and when to continue the negotiation.
• Boosts Confidence Having a well-defined BATNA provides a safety net, which can give you confidence during the negotiation. You know what to expect if the negotiation fails, which can help you negotiate more assertively.
• Helps in Strategy Planning Having a comprehensive understanding of your own position and the other party’s alternative options can prove advantageous when devising a negotiation strategy. If you are aware that the other party has limited alternative options, you can adopt a more assertive approach during the negotiation process.

Therefore, your BATNA is not just a plan B, but a crucial tool in planning your negotiation strategy and achieving favorable outcomes.

Importance of BATNA

The BATNA concept is a vital component of principled negotiation and plays a crucial role in achieving favorable outcomes in negotiations. Here’s why BATNA is so important:

• Minimizes the Risk of Accepting Unfavorable Deals BATNA serves as a benchmark or standard against which you can measure potential deals. If the terms are less attractive than your BATNA, you can comfortably reject the offer, knowing that you have a better alternative.
• Provides Leverage in Negotiations A strong BATNA gives you an advantage in negotiations. When you have robust alternatives, you are in a better position to press for more favorable terms. If your BATNA is weak, you might have to concede to less attractive terms.
• Increases Bargaining Power The better your BATNA, the more power you have during negotiations. This power isn’t about dominating the other party but having the ability to walk away if the deal isn’t good enough.
• Offers a Plan B Negotiations don’t always result in agreements. Having a BATNA means you have a backup plan, a way forward even if the negotiations fail.
• Enhances Confidence and Reduces Pressure Knowing your BATNA reduces anxiety and stress associated with negotiations. If you know what you’ll do if the negotiation falls through, it gives you the confidence to bargain more effectively.
• Helps in Decision-Making Your BATNA can guide your decisions during negotiations. By comparing the offer on the table with your BATNA, you can make informed decisions about whether to accept, reject, or negotiate further.

Understanding and determining your BATNA before entering a negotiation is a vital strategic step. It equips you to negotiate effectively and reach a deal that aligns with your best interests.

Limitations and Criticisms of BATNA

While the concept of BATNA is widely applied and respected in negotiation theory, it is not without its limitations and criticisms. It’s important to consider these when applying the concept in real-life situations:

• Overconfidence One potential pitfall of having a strong BATNA is that it can lead to overconfidence, which might result in an unwillingness to negotiate effectively or compromise where necessary. This could potentially lead to missed opportunities for mutually beneficial agreements.
• Uncertainty and Fluidity BATNAs are not static; they can change over time due to external circumstances or the emergence of new information. This fluidity can make it challenging to rely on a best alternative throughout a prolonged negotiation process.
• Difficulty in Identifying Identifying your real BATNA can be challenging. It requires a comprehensive understanding of all the possible alternatives and the ability to accurately assess their feasibility and potential impact. There’s always a risk of overlooking a potential alternative or overestimating the value of an alternative.
• Emotional Factors Despite its rational basis, the concept of BATNA can be influenced by emotional factors. For instance, parties may have a strong emotional preference for reaching an agreement, which may lead them to accept terms that are worse than the best alternative.
• Inaccurate Assumption of the Other Party’s BATNA Negotiators may encounter challenges when attempting to estimate the alternative options of the other party. These inaccuracies can result in flawed strategies and potentially less-than-ideal results.
• Use as a Threat Some negotiators might be tempted to use their BATNA as a threat, which can create hostility and hinder the collaborative process of negotiation. The goal of understanding it is to inform your own decisions, not to manipulate or intimidate the other party.

Understanding these limitations can help you use the BATNA concept more effectively and responsibly in your negotiations. It’s a powerful tool, but it needs to be used with care and understanding.

Examples of BATNA

To illustrate the practical application of BATNA, let’s explore some examples across different contexts:

1. Job Negotiation

Suppose you’re offered a position at a company, but the salary is lower than expected. Your BATNA could be a job offer from another company with higher pay, or perhaps staying at your current job if the salary and benefits there are superior. Knowing this, you can negotiate the salary with the first company more confidently.

2. Real Estate

When attempting to purchase a house, you come across one that you adore, but the listed price exceeds your budget. An alternative option to consider could be another house in the same locality that offers similar features at a lower price. Having this alternative enables you to negotiate the price of the first house with the confidence that if an agreement cannot be reached, you still have another viable option available.

3. Business Contract

A business is negotiating a contract with a supplier. Their BATNA might be an offer from an alternative supplier at a lower cost or with better terms. This alternative puts the business in a stronger position to negotiate the contract terms.

4. International Diplomacy

In peace negotiations between countries, alternative options can arise if an agreement is not reached. These options may include seeking assistance from international organizations or allies, or enhancing defensive capabilities. Such alternatives can significantly influence a country’s approach to the negotiation process.

5. Car Purchase

When negotiating the price of a new car at a dealership, your BATNA could be an offer from another dealership for the same car at a lower price. Knowing this, you can negotiate for a better deal at the first dealership.

BATNA stands for “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement.”

BATNA refers to the course of action that a party will take if negotiations fail to reach a satisfactory agreement.

BATNA is important because it provides a baseline for evaluating and comparing potential agreements during negotiations, helping parties determine whether the proposed agreement is better than their alternative options.

To determine your BATNA, you need to identify and assess your alternative options in case the negotiation does not result in a favorable agreement. This could involve considering other potential partners, exploring different strategies, or pursuing alternative opportunities.

Paul Boyce is an economics editor with over 10 years experience in the industry. Currently working as a consultant within the financial services sector, Paul is the CEO and chief editor of BoyceWire. He has written publications for FEE, the Mises Institute, and many others.

Further Reading

• Harvard Business School →
• Faculty & Research →
• Negotiation Journal

BATNAs in Negotiation: Common Errors and Three Kinds of 'No'

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• | Pages: 12
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About The Author

James K. Sebenius

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BUS641: Strategic Negotiations and Conflict Management

BUS641 Study Guide

Unit 3: creating value and positive outcomes, 3a. examine the steps to develop a plan for a negotiation session.

• Why should you have a plan for a negotiation?
• What are a few steps in planning for a negotiation?
• What is BATNA, and how can you use it in a negotiation?

Planning your negotiation is important if you want to examine the process and help determine the outcome. While it will not guarantee the outcome you want, it will help you to be better prepared.

The steps to develop a negotiation plan may vary depending on the situation, the people involved, and the outcome wanted by each side. The steps might include considering options, completing research about the negotiation or the other side, determining the wants and needs of each side, imagining what a win-win scenario would look like, and what your backup plan might be just in case it does not go as planned.

Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) is another way to review the entire negotiation process. BATNA is a strategy you can use to help you plan the negotiation process, and it may help you determine alternative ways to settle a negotiation.

To review, see Why is a Plan Needed? .

3b. Examine how to create value during the negotiation process

• Why would it be important to create value?
• What is an example of how you might create value during a negotiation?
• How might you use integrative bargaining to create value?

It is important to create value in a negotiation, and this may mean finding a creative win-win situation for all parties to agree to. Or if a win-win cannot be accomplished, then perhaps, at a minimum, create a solution that might allow both parties to move forward, even if slightly after the negotiation process. Creating value means that you can show the opposition why a certain path is good for both parties.

In a previous unit, we discussed using integrative bargaining, and this is another strategy to help you create value to get to a win-win resolution. Integrative bargaining looks for the best solution for both sides and by showing the opposition the value, they may be more likely to agree to a resolution. For example, in a real estate negotiation, one side might offer a slightly higher price in exchange for additional features they know the other side wants. By showing that added value and understanding wants and needs, you can work together to accomplish a solution that works well for all sides.

To review, see Build Trust and Find Common Ground .

3c. Examine the stakeholders in the negotiation process

• Why is it important to determine who the stakeholders are in a negotiation?
• Who are the stakeholders in your negotiation?
• How do stakeholders influence the outcome of a negotiation?
• What are the types of stakeholders in a negotiation?

Stakeholders are people with something to win or lose in any negotiation; they are the main decision-makers in a negotiation, and these are the people to ask about wants and needs. There are primary and secondary stakeholders involved in the negotiation process. One thing to keep in mind is that secondary stakeholders are most likely not key decision-makers in a negotiation, and it will be important to determine this as quickly as possible because you need to focus on the people who will make the final decision.

Primary stakeholders are the people that will be directly affected by the negotiation outcome. Sometimes, secondary stakeholders may oversee a negotiation, and sometimes, they may just have a stake in the outcome of the negotiation. Secondary stakeholders might include banks or governmental agencies.

To review, see Stakeholders Wants and Needs .

3d. Evaluate the possible outcomes of a conflict

• Why is it important to try to determine the outcome of a conflict?
• How can you determine the outcome of a conflict?
• Can planning help you to evaluate potential endings to a conflict?

Determining possible outcomes should be part of the planning process when you map out how you would like the negotiation process to go. Gathering as much research as possible is a good way to assist you in understanding the negotiation. You may gather research through conversations with both sides of a negotiation or try to determine how each party may have acted in previous negotiations, asking about needs and wants.

Once you have gathered some information about the negotiation, you may better determine possible outcomes. Thinking through the process and how it could end, or what you will do in response to certain moves, will be useful when reviewing potential outcomes. If one side has more leverage than the other in a negotiation, it is possible to also foresee a win-lose situation, and then you might also think about possible responses to see what needs might be met.

To review, see Gather Information, Clarify Needs, and Bargain .

Unit 3 Vocabulary

This vocabulary list includes terms you will need to know to successfully complete the final exam.

• Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)
• creating value
• possible outcomes
• primary stakeholders
• secondary stakeholders

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Future of Work

Your BATNA in a Dispute Resolution Negotiation

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In this video, Professor George Siedel explains how to use Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) in negotiation.

Excerpt From

Successful negotiation: essential strategies and skills.

0:09 we're not going to continue with our 0:10 analysis 0:11 of a negotiation the analysis that you 0:14 conduct in preparing for a negotiation 0:17 and as you mentioned earlier there are 0:20 three key questions we already talked 0:23 about 0:24 the cluster of questions you should ask 0:26 to complete the analysis 0:28 the second big question is what is my 0:31 bad now 0:32 when i'm involved in a dispute 0:33 resolution negotiation 0:36 the analysis that we did earlier related 0:38 to a deal making 0:40 negotiation so how is a dispute 0:42 resolution 0:43 negotiation different please try to 0:46 think about that 0:47 for a second if you're involved in a 0:50 dispute with somebody 0:52 what is the alternative 0:56 if your negotiation fails why don't you 0:59 write down your answer 1:03 in a dispute resolution negotiation 1:07 the ultimate batna might be litigation 1:11 or an arbitration which is basically 1:14 private litigation 1:16 and as a result to analyze your 1:19 litigation 1:20 badna especially in a global economy you 1:22 should understand some basic differences 1:24 between 1:25 the litigation process in the u.s and 1:28 the litigation process 1:30 in other countries so please 1:33 hit pause for a second and try to think 1:37 of basic differences between 1:40 the u.s and elsewhere and prepare a list 1:45 here are the key differences between 1:47 litigation in the u.s 1:49 and elsewhere six key differences and 1:52 let's go down the list starting with 1:54 contingency fees 1:56 in the united states unlike many other 1:58 countries 2:00 lawyers can be hired on a contingency 2:02 fee 2:03 basis and what that means is that the 2:06 lawyer's fee 2:07 is contingent on the results in the 2:10 litigation 2:12 let's assume for example that you hire a 2:14 lawyer on a 30 percent contingency 2:17 if the lawyer wins 10 million dollars in 2:20 a lawsuit 2:21 the lawyer's fee is 30 percent of the 10 2:24 million 2:25 or 3 million dollars if the lawyer 2:28 loses the lawsuit then the lawyer's fee 2:31 is 30 percent of zero 2:33 the lawyer does not get paid that's the 2:35 contingency 2:36 fee system used in the united states 2:39 adopted in a few other countries perhaps 2:41 spreading 2:42 to to other countries in the world in 2:45 the us 2:45 class actions have long been used in 2:48 certain types of cases 2:51 let's assume that a company cheats me 2:55 by overcharging me one dollar illegally 2:59 i'm probably not going to sue the 3:00 company for that one dollar 3:03 it's not worth it but let's assume that 3:05 the company 3:06 has overcharged 30 million 3:09 customers now 30 million 3:13 customers can join together in a class 3:16 and sue the company 3:17 for the 30 million 3:20 guess who's the big winner in a class 3:22 action 3:23 given the contingency fee system it's 3:26 often the lawyers 3:27 the lawyers might take let's say 3:29 one-third 3:30 of the 30 million 10 million dollars 3:33 the other two thirds might go to the 3:36 customers 3:37 so i would end up with two-thirds of a 3:39 dollar or 3:40 66 cents or perhaps a coupon 3:44 to buy products from the company that 3:46 treated me in the first place 3:49 third feature of the us legal system 3:51 that's quite different from elsewhere 3:53 is discovery there are a number of tools 3:57 that lawyers can use to discover what 4:00 kind of a case 4:01 the other side has and two of these are 4:04 especially important 4:07 one is document discovery where 4:10 lawyers can sweep into your business or 4:13 if it's personal 4:14 litigation they can uncover personal 4:17 documents 4:18 and examine those documents and use them 4:21 in court 4:22 so in other words discovery affects 4:25 everyone on the job 4:28 every day and every minute every time 4:31 you create a document 4:34 every time you use email every time you 4:37 text use voicemail all of those 4:40 are subject to discovery you always have 4:43 to be thinking about 4:45 the potential for litigation as a result 4:47 of the information you create 4:50 that's one form of discovery the other 4:52 very powerful form of discovery is the 4:54 deposition 4:56 where the attorneys will force you 4:59 the opposing attorneys will force you to 5:01 testify 5:02 under oath before a court reporter and 5:05 that's a very effective way for them to 5:07 gain information 5:08 about the litigation if you're 5:11 interested in seeing what a deposition 5:13 looks like 5:14 i have a link here to a youtube 5:16 deposition 5:17 of the president of a health care system 5:21 and he is being questioned about the 5:23 pricing 5:24 used in one of his hospitals 5:27 i highly recommend that you look at this 5:30 deposition for 5:31 a flavor of what goes on and try to put 5:33 yourself into the ceo's position 5:36 how would you deal with the questions 5:38 raised by the 5:39 opposing attorney it only takes about 5:41 five or six minutes 5:42 but highly worthwhile jury trials 5:46 are another distinction between the u.s 5:49 and other countries 5:50 a number of other countries use jury 5:52 trials in criminal cases 5:54 the u.s is one of the very few countries 5:58 that use jury trials in civil cases 6:02 for example business litigation 6:05 punitive damages another unique feature 6:08 of the us system 6:10 in in almost in every country of the 6:12 world 6:13 if you injure me and i sue you 6:18 i can recover what are called 6:20 compensatory damages damages 6:23 to compensate me for my loss 6:26 however in the u.s if your injury was 6:29 caused by conduct that was malicious 6:32 or intentional then the court 6:35 might tack on punitive damages to punish 6:39 you 6:39 for your outrageous conduct this 6:43 is sort of like a criminal fine in other 6:46 countries 6:46 the difference is that the criminal fine 6:49 goes to me 6:50 unless there's a local law that provides 6:53 it should go elsewhere 6:55 and finally in the united states there 6:58 is the so-called 6:59 american rule regarding attorney's fees 7:03 and that rule provides that even if 7:07 i win my case you do not have to pay 7:11 my attorney's fees and this is different 7:14 from the rule used in other countries 7:17 which is sometimes called the everywhere 7:19 but american rule 7:21 sometimes called the loser pays rule 7:24 which 7:24 provides that if you lose your case 7:27 then you have to pay the winner's 7:30 attorney's fees 7:32 so those are the six key features the 7:34 six key distinctions between the u.s 7:36 and other countries when you look at 7:40 combinations 7:40 of these features you can see why 7:43 litigation 7:44 might be more popular in the us than in 7:46 other countries 7:48 for example let's say that 7:51 a sues b they each have their attorneys 7:56 b immediately goes to court and has the 7:59 case dismissed 8:01 so what does a have to pay a the loser 8:05 have to pay his own attorney under the 8:07 contingency fee 8:08 nothing what does plaintiff a 8:12 have to pay to cover attorney b's 8:15 fees under the american rule nothing 8:19 so in other words there's a very low 8:21 barrier to entry 8:22 into the u.s legal system when you look 8:25 at the contingency 8:26 fee system in combination with the 8:28 so-called american rule 8:31 so that lays out the basic distinctions 8:33 between the u.s and elsewhere that you 8:34 need to think about 8:36 in looking at your batna in a dispute 8:40 resolution and let's conclude this 8:42 discussion by looking at an actual case 8:44 so here's the situation we've got a 8:47 grandfather 8:48 driving a dodge caravan with a friend 8:51 sitting in the passenger side 8:53 his daughter's in the back seat with his 8:55 eight-month-old grandson jason 8:57 who's sitting in a car seat a pickup 9:00 truck 9:00 speeding 70 miles an hour in a 35 mile 9:03 an hour zone 9:04 crashes into the rear end of the dodge 9:07 caravan 9:08 the passenger side seat in the front 9:11 collapses back 9:12 on top of baby joshua killing the baby 9:16 so those are the facts and now we have 9:19 litigation 9:20 started by joshua's parents 9:24 we can assume that they probably hired 9:26 an attorney on a contingency fee 9:29 that isn't required but that's typical 9:31 for a case like this 9:33 and in their case they asked for 9:36 punitive damages 9:37 the second feature of the u.s system so 9:40 they sued daimler chrysler 9:42 the manufacturer they claimed that the 9:44 dodge caravan seats were defective 9:46 daimler chrysler failed to warn 9:48 consumers the seats were dangerous 9:51 and therefore the company should be 9:53 liable for compensatory damages 9:56 to compensate for the laws but also for 9:58 punitive damages because the company 10:01 acted in an intentional malicious or 10:04 reckless manner 10:06 so after starting the lawsuit then the 10:09 company has a chance to respond 10:11 and they basically said look our seats 10:14 were designed 10:15 to protect occupants of the front seat 10:18 we couldn't 10:18 avoid the design we used the seat design 10:21 met industry standards which was true 10:23 the seat design exceeded government 10:25 regulations which was also true 10:29 so we've got the filing of the case 10:31 we've got the response 10:33 and now it's time for discovery 10:36 now other countries as well as the u.s 10:39 use 10:40 discovery but the united states 10:43 is more liberal in allowing the parties 10:46 into the records 10:48 of other companies in searching for 10:50 evidence 10:52 so in this case the parents attorneys 10:56 searched the company's records and 10:59 developed this evidence first of all 11:02 they found an expert 11:04 who testified that the current seat 11:05 design was not necessary 11:08 to protect occupants of the front seat 11:10 as the company claimed 11:12 and they found evidence that the company 11:14 knew of their seat design problems for 11:17 20 years 11:18 the company had formed a minivan safety 11:21 leadership team 11:23 with employees from a variety of 11:25 functions 11:26 and the team concluded that the seat 11:28 design was unacceptable 11:30 and inadequate to protect consumers so 11:32 what did the company do 11:34 they ordered the chair of the leadership 11:37 team to destroy the minutes 11:39 and they disbanded the leadership team 11:42 and fired 11:43 the chair so this is the evidence then 11:46 then went to the jury another feature 11:50 of the u.s legal system and the 11:53 questions faced 11:54 by the jury were number one should the 11:57 company be held liable for compensatory 11:59 damages 12:00 did they do something wrong number two 12:03 should they also be held liable for 12:04 punitive damages 12:06 to punish the company for conduct that 12:08 was intentional malicious or reckless 12:10 especially if they knew of the design 12:12 problem and didn't correct it 12:14 and then how much would you award in 12:16 punitive damages 12:18 so let's assume you're sitting on the 12:20 jury you know the facts 12:22 the same facts that the jury had 12:25 please write down your answers to these 12:28 three questions 12:30 do you think the company should be held 12:32 liable at all 12:34 for any damages yes or no do you think 12:38 the company should also be held liable 12:40 for punitive damages 12:42 yes or no and then if you were on the 12:44 jury 12:45 how much would you award in punitive 12:47 damages 12:49 these are the results in the case 12:52 the jury decided that the company and 12:55 the pickup driver 12:56 who rear-ended the dodge caravan 12:59 should be liable for five million 13:01 dollars 13:03 in compensatory damages 50 percent each 13:06 for the wrongful death and in addition 13:09 the company should write a check for 98 13:11 million dollars to the parents 13:13 as punitive damages after the jury 13:16 verdict 13:17 the trial court reduced the punitive 13:20 damages from 98 million to 13 million 13:23 because of the very large discrepancy 13:25 between the actual damages 13:27 and the punitive damages and then the 13:29 case was appealed to the tennessee 13:31 supreme court 13:32 and this court decided in 2008 13:36 that the trial court was correct that 13:39 the parents were entitled to 13:41 compensatory and punitive damages 13:43 because the company covered up evidence 13:46 of the deficiencies of its design 13:48 seat while advertising the caravan as a 13:51 vehicle that put 13:52 children's safety first so this 13:55 illustrates various features 13:56 of the u.s legal system that you need to 13:59 consider 14:01 at least in the united states when 14:04 analyzing your batna 14:05 this particular case also applied the 14:08 american rule although it was not 14:10 discussed in the case 14:11 which means that the winners the parents 14:14 were not 14:15 allowed to recover attorney's fees from 14:18 the losers 14:19 which is daimler chrysler so in 14:21 conclusion 14:24 if you can't negotiate the settlement of 14:25 a dispute either directly 14:28 or with the help of a mediator your 14:30 badness 14:31 might be litigation or arbitration 14:35 and in analyzing your litigation badna 14:38 especially in a global economy 14:40 you should understand the basic elements 14:42 of the litigation process 14:44 and how they differ especially the 14:46 difference between the united states 14:48 and other countries

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BATNA and ZOPA Negotiation

Batna in negotiation with example.

BATNA Refers to the Alternatives each Party has in a Negotiation Process that would avoid moving their Acceptance limit beyond a certain point .

• These alternatives are outside the Negotiation and particular to each Party.

It is the Limit , each Party has, due to their Access to a Real and Viable Alternative .

• An Alternative to the Product or Price that is being Negotiated.

Its name is an acronym for B est A lternative T o a N egotiated A greement.

BATNA Example

Imagine that you want to buy a New Car .

Your friend has offered you his, for $5,000 .

However, you want to see what is in the Market.

One day, you find a Dealer that offers a nice car for $6,000.

• A car of Quality and Age similar to that of your friend.

You then Start Negotiating with the Dealer about the Price.

As you may imagine, the Maximum Price you will be willing to Pay is $5,000 .

• That is your BATNA .

ZOPA in Negotiation with Example

The ZOPA is the Range of Prices where Two Parties can Reach an Agreement .

• What Positions can result in an Agreement.

The ZOPA is located between the BATNAs of both Parties .

Its name is an acronym for Z one O f P ossible A greement.

ZOPA Example

Following with the Previous example:

The Dealer has another Client that is willing to pay $4,000 for that car .

That is his BATNA .

• A Price he can immediately obtain and is acceptable for him.

The ZOPA of this Negotiation is between $5,000 (your BATNA) and those $4,000 .

• The two of you can come to an Agreement in this Price Range.

BATNA and ZOPA Model

Before looking at more examples, we want to give you some Tips on How to identify BATNAs .

• Since they are the References that best define a Negotiation Process.

How do you identify a BATNA?

Study the Alternatives that each Party has .

• Real Alternatives that can be adopted without any problem.

Try to find Substitute Solutions for each Party and How much they Cost .

• Different types of Solutions, ordered by Cost and Feasibility.

Define what you (or the other Party) would do if the Negotiation failed .

• What would each Party do? How much would it cost?
• Request the other Party for Proof of its Alternative Solutions .
• This will push it to uncover its BATNA (if it is Real).

The best way to understand what BATNA and ZOPA are, and Why they are useful, is by sharing some examples with you:

BATNA and ZOPA Examples

There are hundreds of different Business Situations in which BATNA and ZOPA can be used.

• That is why we have chosen 2 day to day examples .

Because, perhaps , you have experience one of these two Situations .

Let’s begin:

Negotiating a Salary Increase - BATNA and ZOPA example

Imagine that you want to Negotiate a Salary Increase (we all do).

The First thing you should do is to find your BATNA.

• As well as the BATNA of your Employer.

Your BATNA would be:

The Salary that other Company offers you

• Which is higher than your current one.

You wouldn’t accept a Salary lower than your BATNA.

• Otherwise, you would move to the other Company.

Your Employer BATNA is:

The Salary that a New Employee with your same Experience would accept .

Once you find them out, you will be able to identify your ZOPA.

• The Range of Salaries that you two would accept.

Let’s see it graphically:

BATNA and ZOPA of a Salary Increase Negotiation.

Negotiating the Rent - BATNA and ZOPA example

Now, we’ll imagine that you are thinking about moving to a bigger house .

• You are about to have your second child, and you want a bigger house.

However, your current house is fine, and you have a lease for an additional year.

This is your BATNA :

Staying in your current home for one additional year .

One day, you find an interesting House that meets all your Requirements .

• It is bigger, it is well located, it is close to a nice school, etc.

The New Landlord whose house you are interested in, has more Clients interested.

That is the BATNA of the New Landlord :

The Rent other Interested tenants are willing to pay .

BATNA and ZOPA of a Rent Negotiation.

Summarizing

BATNA Refers to the Alternatives each Party has in a Negotiation Process that would avoid moving their Acceptance limit beyond a certain point.

• It is the Limit, each Party has, due to their Access to a Real and Viable Alternative.

The ZOPA is the Range of Prices where Two Parties can Reach an Agreement.

• The ZOPA is located between the BATNAs of both Parties.

How to identify a BATNA:

• Study the Alternatives that each Party has.
• Try to find Substitute Solutions for each Party and How much they Cost.
• Define what you (or other Party) would do if the Negotiation failed .
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The Cyprus Bailout: A BATNA Case Study in the Making

by Marty Latz | Blog | 0 comments

Over the weekend, a bailout was announced for Cyprus in which the euro zone and the International Monetary Fund agreed to give €10 billion to the Mediterranean island and, in exchange, Cyprus would raise €5.8 billion by imposing a tax on depositors in Cypriot banks. Accounts with €100,000 or less would be taxed 6.75% and those with more 9.9%.  Banks in Cyprus were temporarily closed pending the approval of the deal by the Cypriot government.

On Tuesday, in response to intensely negative public outcry, the Cypriot parliament voted against the plan, which failed to receive a single favorable vote.

Banks remain closed as the parties involved returned to the bargaining table.

Hugo Dixon at  The New York Times   identifies  Cyprus’ best alternatives to a negotiated agreement (BATNAs or “Plan Bs” as we like to call them) as follows:

…sell its soul to Russia  [many Russians have significant deposits in Cyprus banks, and it is rumored Russia might offer a bailout in exchange for an interest in Cypriot oil and gas reserves] , default and possibly quit the euro or patch together a new deal with the euro zone.

Why did the Cypriot parliament decline the deal? Because they determined that at least one of their Plan Bs was better than approving the deal and facing the wrath of their constituents (and possibly the wrath of the Russian mafia who reportedly make up a substantial number of the Russian depositors).

Here is our general advice:

If your Plan B is better than the deal on the table, don’t do the deal. If the deal on the table is better than your best Plan B, take it. If you can’t reach an agreement, work hard to improve your best Plan B (and possibly also work to undermine your counterpart’s).

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BATNA: The negotiation technique for successful agreements

The BATNA method

Before entering into sales talks, use the BATNA template to prepare yourselves as a team to face whatever may come up and conclude a successful negotiation. This is a ready-to-use template for a team due to hold a sales meeting with a client or lead. During negotiations, you only have a few seconds to think before finalizing an agreement that may last for years. Don’t let yourself get dragged into an unfavorable agreement anymore! Take the time out with your team to agree on the settlement range that you are willing to accept when reaching an agreement with your client.

Find out everything about BATNA in just 3 questions

What does batna mean.

No, BATNA is definitely not Batman and Krishna’s secret love child. In fact, it stands for “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement” . The BATNA method was popularized in the early 80s by its inventors, Roger Fisher and William Ury, who taught the art of negotiating at Harvard University. It helps anticipate a reasonable last resort fallback solution, in case negotiations don’t go as planned. The fallback should allow you to reach a favorable agreement. So BATNA is the last position that the seller is willing to accept to conclude a satisfactory agreement.

How to prepare your BATNA?

To understand how to prepare your best fallback solution, look at the following image.

• Both buyer and seller have a reserve price . This can be either minimum or maximum, depending on their position in the negotiation, beyond which, one of the parties will withdraw to avoid signing an unsatisfactory agreement.
• There is a bargaining range for both buyer and seller. It consists of all of the prices that fall within the reserve price and the ideal price. For each of the parties, the negotiation must take place within these two limits. 
• Between the two windows lies the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) , where each party puts forward its arguments, terms and concessions. This is what you must aim for before playing out your BATNA, the alternative that includes the solutions that you are ready to consider to finalize a purchase without being at a disadvantage.

To prepare your BATNA, follow these easy steps:

• Determine your ideal price and your reserve price;
• Estimate your client or lead’s ideal price and reserve price;
• Anticipate each party’s terms and concessions by taking into consideration all possible scenarios.

In short, it’s vital to draw up your BATNA before a negotiation, so you optimize your chances of success.

Who is the BATNA meant for?

The only way to conduct successful sales talks is to have a solid base to fall back on when it comes to the critical point in a business agreement. That means having multiple business proposals ready before the meeting, along with the approval of your team! The BATNA is meant for any team dealing with a client or sales lead.

Good reasons why you should use the BATNA template as a team

An awareness and confidence builder

The aim of the BATNA is to help realize when the business agreement stops being beneficial for the seller. When drawing up your BATNA, examine all the gray areas relating to this particular client as a team, so you will avoid getting caught off guard during the sales talks. This prior preparation will offer you reference points during the negotiation , and knowing where you stand during the meeting will facilitate your decision-making process.  

Planning out your BATNA as a team will increase your confidence. You will come across as more assertive during the sales negotiation, and will spare yourself two setbacks:

• An inconclusive meeting due to lack of confidence;
• Wrong decisions taken on the spur of the moment during the agreement. 

Remember: it’s always better not to sign an agreement than to sign one that is unsatisfactory, and may even turn out to be a disaster in the long run!

Make use of the power of visual management and collective intelligence

With Klaxoon’s Board , the digital interactive whiteboard, enjoy a communication space that can be easily accessed by all your team members, wherever they may be. Even when working remotely, the integrated video conferencing feature allows you to engage in real-time exchanges. And with Board’s specially designed BATNA template, all the conditions are met to effectively set up your future negotiations!

The template allows you to discuss the best solution, i.e. your best price and your reserve price, as a team. With Question , Klaxoon’s tool for feedback and efficient decision making, you can easily receive immediate comments from your team, and choose the best options.

By feeding in your ideas, terms and possible concessions, you can see your BATNA being charted out right before your eyes in a few clicks. This way, you can second guess the arguments that your client is going to use and plan yours so you are ready for whatever comes up.

How do you use the BATNA template?

1. Determine your selling price settlement range

Using your collective intelligence , define the best selling price to be achieved during the negotiation. First, each person individually suggests the price that they consider ideal and explains their point of view to the rest of the group. Then, the members of the group “like” the most convincing proposal, using the “like” button. In the case of a drawing, launch a Question so the decision can be taken during a vote.

Do the same to determine your minimum acceptable selling price or reserve price.

2. Guess your client’s or lead’s purchasing price settlement range

Put yourself in the buyer’s shoes and proceed as before to estimate:

• Their ideal purchasing price;
• Their maximum acceptable price.

In addition to this process, you can use the SONCASE method to identify as a team your sales lead or client’s buying motives . This prior preparation will help you estimate as accurately as possible the purchasing price settlement range and anticipate their arguments.

3. Second guess your client or lead’s negotiating arguments and prepare your counterarguments

By determining your minimum acceptable selling price and the client’s or lead’s maximum acceptable purchasing price, you have identified the limits of the Zone Of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) or “bargaining range”.

Within this range, imagine all the solutions where both negotiating parties might find a common ground. First, think of the demands that your client or lead is likely to put forward. Every member of the team can add their ideas to the dedicated space.

Once all the ideas are set out, everyone “likes” the suggestion that they consider most relevant. Then, do the same with the concessions that you might find acceptable and highlight the best ones, again using the “like” button. This will help increase your negotiating power!

Finally, list the terms that you might want to put forward. And think of the concessions your client or prospect could make.

4. Prepare an outcome for negotiation in case no agreement can be reached

Once outside the ZOPA, the seller and buyer come into conflict and cannot find a common ground. Despite a well-prepared negotiation, a meeting may not always result in an agreement. So think of an amicable outcome, in view of possible future cooperation .

Decide on the best option as a team, using the multiple-choice Poll Question.  

Now you have all the cards up your sleeve for a successful negotiation, from your ideal price to your best fallback solution!

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Open Negotiation Education for Academic Libraries (ONEAL)

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Learning Objectives

Learners will be able to: 

• Analyze their library's position within negotiations.
• Apply best practices in principled negotiation when planning and conducting complex negotiations with library vendors.
• Optimize available options during negotiations by forming strategies to be used during negotiation and building coalitions of support.
• Evaluate license clauses to understand their potential impact on the library and its user communities
• Identify clauses that are in or out of alignment with the library's interests and be able to explain why to vendors and other stakeholders.
• Explain license clauses (including alternatives to standard vendor language) that protect and advance library interests.
• Describe current issues facing academic libraries and how they relate to negotiating with third party vendors to provide guidance and leadership within their organizations.

Outline of the Curriculum

FOUNDATIONS MODULE - Available April 2024

Introduction to the Course

• Overview of the course
• Historical context
• Resource talks: a cademic library workers discuss their favorite negotiation resource

Contracts & Licensing

• Introduction
• Anatomy of a license
• Overview of contract terms

Introductions to Negotiations

• Asking for what you need
• It's a business relationship!
• Principled negotiations
• The structure of negotiations

Negotiation Planning Part 1 - Negotiation Strategy

• Importance of planning
• Negotiation vocabulary (BATNA, ZOPA, Concessions, Reservation Price)
• Best practices in negotiation planning including
• Framing, anchors, first mover advantage, planning concessions
• Preparing for no
• Negotiating via email, phone, virtual meeting
• Managing unacceptable behavior
• Best practices
• Improving your BATNA over time
• Strategies for when you have little power

Negotiation Planning Part 2 - Internal Analysis

• Determining interests
• What is price sensitivity, why is it important, and how can you determine it?
• Useful analysis, tools, and resources
• Understanding your power position in the negotiation

Negotiation Panning Part 3 - Researching Vendors

• Doing an external review: finding vendor financial information, competitive product information, and available pricing
• Finding vendor financial information
• Understanding vendor financial information

Issues: Accessibility

• Assessing the accessibility of a resource
• Finding vendor accessibility documentation
• Negotiating for accessibility in the licensing

Strategies Module - In development

Setting priorities.

• Values-driven strategies
• Managing when you can't negotiate every deal
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• Morale concerns
• Solo vs team efforts
• Engaging with other librarians, administrators, institutional faculty, students, procurement, and general counsel
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• Power mapping

Managing Vendor Relationships

• Facilitating good relationships with vendors
• Informing vendors of academic library and institutional context
• Managing behavior

Contracts & Licensing Strategy

• Developing preferred terms or deal breakers for licensed content
• Reading for asymmetry in terms
• Financial exigency
• Resource sharing
• Indemnification
• Author rights 
• Goal setting
• Version control
• Preparation matrix
• Starting license checklists
• Examples of campus governance resolutions

Issues Module - In development

Accessibility - available april 2024 (publishing with foundations module).

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Text Data Mining (TDM)

Privacy & surveillance, authentication, acquisitions models.

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Curriculum Design Considerations

• The best delivery method of learning content (video, text, etc.)
• Existing resources that can be integrated into the curriculum
• Active learning assignments that participants can prepare, gather, and refer to when planning and executing future negotiations with library vendors.
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Asynchronous learning modules.

Asynchronous Learning Modules will be centered around three primary learning components designed to teach negotiations concepts and strategy, basics in licensing, and dive more deeply into issues affecting academic libraries. The exact content included will be influenced by  community discussion forums, which will guide the curriculum planning process and ensure that these modules are centered on the academic library experience. The project team will collaborate with identified experts in creating the content of these modules which include best practices in planning and executing negotiations, negotiating vendor licensing agreements, and current issues affecting academic libraries during negotiations for resources.

Synchronous Teaching Support

With the assistance of expert content creators, the project team will develop a set of synchronous teaching materials that can be used in concert with the asynchronous learning modules to aid in the learning of the material from the three modules. This includes lesson plans, discussion guides, and in-class exercises. These materials will enable groups such as consortia, professional organizations, and individual libraries to facilitate learning and practice within their organizations.

Case Studies

ONEAL will develop a set of fictionalized case studies centered around negotiations within academic libraries based on the experiences of 25 interviewed academic librarians. Qualitative analysis will be used to identify key themes in order to draft scenarios that enable engagement with the material taught through the asynchronous (and optional synchronous) materials. Each case study will have three parts: 1) library point of view, 2) vendor point of view, and 3) teaching note. These case studies will allow learners to practice preparing for and executing negotiations by working with a partner. (Note this preparation and practice could happen between two individuals or two small groups.) The library and vendor point of view are written with differing information to replicate the missing information that must be uncovered mid-negotiation when seeking agreement. The teaching note can be used by a group facilitator or by a pair of individual learners after the negotiation. It will provide discussion/reflection questions and will summarize key themes within the case study facilitating a debrief of the experience.

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Article Contents

Trust and calculation in international relations, a granular theory of trust and calculation in international negotiations, the brexit negotiations as a case-study.

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Trust and calculation in international negotiations: how trust was lost after Brexit

We would like to thank the editor of International Affairs and three anonymous reviewers for their guidance and constructive comments. Earlier drafts were presented to the International Relations Research Group at the University of Edinburgh, the ConTrust Research Colloquium and the RiesiKo Colloquium at Goethe University Frankfurt as well as at the German Political Science Association's International Relations Conference 2023 in Friedrichshafen and the European Workshops in International Studies 2023 in Amsterdam. Thanks in particular are due to Perri 6, Salvatore Barilla, Andrea Birdsall, Florian Böller, Julia Calvert, Nicola Chelotti, Christopher Daase, Marc Geddes, Manolis Kalaitzake, İrem Karamık Kaya, Nele Kortendiek, Max Lesch, Andrew Neal, Hanna Pfeifer, Lauren Rogers, Hendrik Simon and Lisbeth Zimmermann for helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful to Frederik Hermle for his superb research assistance and to Alexander Mesarovich and Luke Stephens for their support in conducting the interviews. The research presented in this article was funded in part by the Hessian Ministry of Higher Education, Research and the Arts through the research initiative ‘ConTrust: Trust in Conflict’ and by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 962533 (‘ENGAGE’—Envisioning a New Governance Architecture for a Global Europe”). Both authors contributed equally to the article.

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Tobias Wille, Benjamin Martill, Trust and calculation in international negotiations: how trust was lost after Brexit, International Affairs , Volume 99, Issue 6, November 2023, Pages 2405–2422, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad243

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How does a loss of trust affect international negotiations? We know that trust enables cooperation and comes with the risk of betrayal. Yet the effects of lost trust are not well understood, with most research in International Relations (IR) focusing on how trust is initially built in adversarial relations. In this article, we conceptualize trust as the eclipsing of possible futures in which others do not behave cooperatively. When trust is lost, actors include further possibilities of non-cooperative behavior in their calculations and adjust their negotiating demands accordingly. We use this framework to explain the European Commission's response to Boris Johnson's government breaking its trust during the Brexit negotiations by deviating from the Political Declaration, introducing the Internal Market Bill, and not conducting border checks in the Irish Sea. Drawing on elite interviews, we trace how the Commission altered its expectations and consequently sought negotiated outcomes with tighter contracting, reduced discretion and retaliatory mechanisms. Analysing the interplay of trust and calculation on a granular level, we show that breaches of trust do not preclude future cooperation per se, but shape its form and extent in important ways.

In international negotiations, states and their leaders must come to terms with the ever-present possibility that their trust will be betrayed. Trust is needed to reduce the uncertainty that characterizes negotiations, allowing the parties to make the sizable concessions required for eventual agreement. But trust is also risky because it can be betrayed, leaving states and their leaders open to costly and potentially embarrassing outcomes. This creates a dilemma: too much trust and they become vulnerable to costly defection; too little and the gains from cooperation disappear. States have often responded to this dilemma with a combined approach of trust and control—such as the Reagan-era ‘trust but verify’ 1 —with incremental moves to gradually build trust, 2 or with grand gestures that signal sincerity and benign intent. 3 Leaders also have always understood that the ‘human factor’ matters and trust is best nurtured in personal interactions. 4 Through such strategies of trust-building, states try to obtain the benefits of cooperation under conditions of considerable uncertainty and to start creating shared institutions to structure their interactions.

But what happens when existing trust is lost? This is not an uncommon occurrence in international politics. The souring relations between Russia and NATO since the mid-1990s, 5 the United States' abandonment of the Iran nuclear deal, 6 Australia's decision to renege on an agreement with France in favour of the AUKUS deal 7 —these are all examples of how trust can be lost in cooperative and often densely institutionalized relationships. Meanwhile, the retreat of the liberal international order, the ‘return’ of geopolitics and the rise of populism globally all set the stage for more frequent disruptions to existing relationships of trust. Yet International Relations (IR) research on trust has strongly focused on initial trust-building in adversarial relations, as in the paradigmatic case of US–Soviet relations at the end of the Cold War, which has been the subject of much path-breaking work. 8 As a result, trust research in IR has not yet developed the conceptual tools to account for the consequences of declining trust in dense cooperative relationships.

This article fills this gap by articulating a distinct account of trust which is granular and rooted in social understandings of the phenomenon. We argue that trust is best conceived of as a specific, non-calculative way of anticipating the future behaviour of others. To trust means to act as if certain objectively possible futures, in which others behave uncooperatively, were impossible. Trust, from this perspective, is a means of reducing uncertainty: by excluding possible futures from their calculations, states and their leaders can reduce complexity and stabilize expectations so that cooperation becomes possible. Trust and calculation are distinct phenomena that co-exist in specific constellations, with actors choosing to trust in some areas while calculating possible futures in others. When trust is lost in regard to a specific issue, actors will adjust their expectations and include further possibilities in their calculations about the future. Actors then become more wary of the risks of cooperation and seek recourse to non-trust-based means of reducing uncertainty, placing greater emphasis on monitoring, oversight and retaliatory mechanisms in their negotiating demands. Our account is granular in that it is able to analyse trust in regard to specific expectations about the future instead of assuming that actors have general levels of trust.

We demonstrate our argument through a case-study of the European Commission's approach to the negotiations around the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union, drawing on elite interviews with Commission officials and EU policy-makers. The Brexit talks offer an instructive example of how declining trust comes to shape international negotiations. We show how the Commission initially trusted the UK not to undertake objectively possible actions—deviating from its stated intentions, abrogating legal commitments, refusing to abide by the agreement—because otherwise no cooperation would have been possible. The Commission excluded these possibilities from its calculations, even as it assessed the risk of non-cooperative actions in a host of other areas (such as hard bargaining and competitive deregulation) and built these into its negotiating strategy. When British prime minister Boris Johnson's government betrayed the Commission's trust by unexpectedly deviating from the Political Declaration (PD), introducing the Internal Market Bill (IMB) in contravention of the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and refusing to implement required checks in the Irish Sea, the Commission responded by adjusting its expectations and adapting its negotiating strategy to incorporate non-trust-based means of reducing uncertainty.

Our findings advance IR's theoretical debates on trust. First, we offer a conceptual framework for understanding the impact of declining trust within cooperative relationships. Contributing to research on institutional design, we show at a granular level how declining trust contributes to a reliance on alternative forms of managing uncertainty and thus to specific institutional outcomes involving greater levels of monitoring and control. Second, our account contributes to trust research more generally by clearly demarcating the line between trust and calculation, allowing us to maintain the efficacy of trust as a social phenomenon, while simultaneously acknowledging the complex calculations undertaken by actors in negotiating settings. Since complex constellations of trust and calculation abound in international politics, our theoretical framework has considerable purchase across a wide range of cases. Third, our account directs the researcher towards trust as a genuinely social phenomenon, namely the collective eclipsing of objectively possible futures from planning, thus affording a more direct observation of trust than can be achieved through commonly used proxies, such as left/right partisanship or cooperative behaviour.

Our argument has important implications for policy-makers involved in international negotiations. In establishing a clear line between genuine trust and calculation, it can help them take a more reflective stance when negotiating, and to appreciate the distinct value of trust as opposed to approaches based on calculation alone. Far from encouraging naive trust, however, our approach can also help policy-makers identify means of hedging against uncooperative behaviours, including the cautious balancing of trust and calculation and the making of incremental adjustments to their expectations in response to the actions of the other side. Our findings can also help policy-makers to identify the most appropriate alternatives in situations where trust has been lost, including institutional arrangements which allow for greater oversight, lower levels of discretion and retaliatory measures. Finally, our empirical findings highlight the follies of negotiating strategies that seek to take advantage of unexpected breaches of trust—like Johnson's so-called ‘Madman’ strategy 9 —since these may lead the other parties to resort to less advantageous arrangements, making unattainable cooperative outcomes previously within reach.

Because states in the international system are not subject to any central authority that could enforce rules and monopolize the legitimate use of violence, there is profound uncertainty about the future behaviour of others. 10 In consequence, the history of the academic discipline of IR can be told as a history of the engagement with the question of how and when, under the structural conditions of anarchy, sufficient trust can be built to allow for peaceful coexistence, mutually beneficial cooperation and adequate handling of global challenges. Yet in spite of the centrality of trust for the question of how states interact under conditions of anarchy, it has not been an explicit focus of theorizing through much of the discipline's history. 11 Only in the past two decades have we witnessed the emergence of a literature that explicitly theorizes and empirically examines trust.

Early contributions to this literature drew on rationalist approaches in trust research to articulate an account of international politics in which trust is understood as the subjective expectation of state A that state B is willing to reciprocate cooperative behaviour out of self-interest. 12 This expectation that state B is willing to cooperate is formed through a rational and often iterative learning process; by observing B's actions and analysing underlying incentive structures, state A can ascertain the likelihood of state B engaging in cooperative behaviour. From this perspective, states can actively build trust, for example, by mutually assuring each other of their cooperative intentions through costly signals 13 or creating institutions that reduce the risk of defection. 14 Social psychological work in IR has extended this model by positing that excessive distrust, as well as naive trust, are the result of cognitive mechanisms by which rational processing of information is distorted, accounting for ‘missed opportunities’ of cooperation that cannot be rationally explained. 15

While these accounts are granular in that they model trust as expectations about specific behaviour, they miss an important nuance of what it means to trust. 16 Trust is always a reaction to uncertainty. After all, if actor A knows with certainty what actor B will do, then A does not have to trust B. It only makes sense to speak of trust when a ‘risky investment’ 17 is made and vulnerability is accepted. 18 To be sure, most rationalists would agree with this; 19 however, they assume that this uncertainty takes the form of risk that is at least in principle calculable. A theoretically more sophisticated perspective recognizes that trust is required precisely in situations when the future cannot be calculated as risk and the actors thus face a more profound uncertainty. 20 Trust, then, is a genuine leap into the unknown 21 or, more technically, a non-calculative attitude. 22

A range of contributions to the literature has emphasized the non-calculative nature of trust. Constructivist research on cultures of anarchy, 23 security communities 24 and the democratic peace 25 has linked trust to shared identities, an argument that more recently was articulated explicitly in the vocabulary of trust research. 26 Such trust can be labelled ‘particularized’, because it is given only to members of one's social group. 27 The opposite concept of ‘generalized’ trust, which an actor displays as a disposition in principle towards all other actors, has been deployed to explain the variation in leaders' propensity to cooperate under similar structural conditions. 28 Highlighting the relational nature of trust, recent research has emphasized the importance of ‘bonding trust’ that develops in the direct interactions between leaders, transforms their identities and interests, and enables them to cooperate even under unfavourable conditions. 29 This framework has also been extended to include other ‘boundary spanners’, such as ambassadors, in order to grasp how trust between states is constituted by a web of interpersonal relations. 30 Due to their focus on identities, which tend to be fairly homogenous, these accounts however have difficulties explaining issue-specific variations in trust and thus are limited to relating general levels of trust to generic cooperative behaviour.

So far, IR has focused heavily on how trust can initially be built in adversarial relations. 31 As a result, its theories and methods are not well suited to explaining how trust declines in dense cooperative relationships and how this affects the prospects of cooperation. Building on a small literature on trust in multilateral settings 32 and recent attempts to theorize trust dynamics when international norms such as pacta sunt servanda or diplomatic consideration are violated, 33 we propose an approach that operates at a granular level and is capable of analysing shifts in complex constellations of trust and calculation.

To explain how declining trust shapes international negotiations, we propose a theory that relates certain constellations of trust and calculation to specific actor behaviour and negotiation outcomes. We conceive of trust as a particular kind of anticipation that can be performed by single human individuals but also collectively in organizations. 34 On our account, trust inheres in anticipating the future actions of others without a corresponding weighing of risks and opportunities. 35 To trust does not mean to fully abstain from anticipating and planning for the future, but rather to disregard certain objectively possible futures in which the other does not behave cooperatively. As Luhmann writes, ‘by introducing trust, certain possibilities of development can be excluded from consideration’. 36 Understood this way, trust can occur alongside calculation, but will exclude certain possibilities from the latter.

Conceptualized as such, trust can be clearly distinguished from calculative ways of dealing with uncertainty. 37 Actors in international politics are confronted with a problem of excessive complexity because the behaviour of other actors is uncertain. To be able to coordinate their action nevertheless, they must find ways to reduce this complexity. The prevalent response to this problem in institutionalist theories is control, i.e., the reduction of uncertainty through such mechanisms as interdependence, reputation, deterrence or information. 38 Complexity is reduced by objectively limiting what other actors can do. Yet another way actors can reduce complexity—one that institutionalists have largely ignored—is to trust: ‘to behave as though the future were certain’, 39 even though objectively it is not. The problem of uncertainty is solved subjectively by acting as if it did not exist . This does not preclude the possibility that trust may later turn out to be misplaced, but it sufficiently solves the problem of complexity to enable coordinated action.

We therefore expect that actors will behave differently depending on whether they either trust another actor or rather seek to actively calculate their future behaviour. When actor A trusts actor B to abstain from action C, A does not anticipate that B could do C and therefore does not include C in their planning for the future. A thus deals with the problem that B's actions are uncertain by simply assuming that B will not do C. If A loses trust in B in regard to C, A will start to include the possibility of C in their planning. A will then rely on alternative strategies to reduce the uncertainty of B's actions, for instance by collecting information, reducing B's leeway and preparing to mitigate the consequences if B still does C. Specifically in the context of international negotiations, we expect that without trust in regard to a certain issue, parties will seek greater oversight, tighter contracting, less discretion and mechanisms for retaliatory measures. 40 Since trust in our conceptualization is issue-specific, we can model that actors trust each other in regard to certain issues, i.e., that they exclude certain possibilities from their calculations, while remaining suspicious in regard to others, in order to explain the resulting complex outcomes.

Most non-calculative conceptualizations of trust assume that the suspension of risk calculation takes place in the minds of the respective decision-makers. Such an understanding requires that the gap between mental states and collective action be bridged somehow, and makes trust correspondingly difficult to assess. After all, in most cases, foreign policy decisions are not made by isolated individuals, but are produced collectively in political and bureaucratic organizations. While acknowledging that trust is also a mental state, we shift the focus to its social dimension, since expectations about the future are ‘shaped by collective beliefs formed through communicative practices’. 41 Trust can be held as a shared attitude by the members of organizations, 42 including governments and foreign policy bureaucracies, where it can be ‘established in discourse and become part of a common sense’. 43 The resulting conceptualization of trust as an inherently social activity of anticipating, rather than a mental state, resonates with the ‘practice turn’ in IR 44 and recent accounts of trust expressed in practice-theoretical terms. 45

Methodologically, this approach allows us to observe trust more directly than alternative conceptualizations. Mental states are difficult to access, particularly in such settings as international negotiations when the participants are not available to fill out surveys or participate in laboratory experiments. Researchers studying trust in IR therefore have to rely on proxy variables for trust such as left/right partisanship, 46 cooperative behaviour 47 or the absence of extensive control. 48 In contrast, when people collectively anticipate the future, this activity leaves traces in documents and discourse that are easily accessible with conventional social science methods. Furthermore, actors themselves can give an account of the futures they anticipated at a specific point in time (even though the usual caveats in regard to both truthfulness and the reliability of memory apply). Our approach moreover allows us to clearly distinguish trust, i.e., the collective anticipation of the future, from actions taken because this future is anticipated (e.g. making concessions or holding firm in negotiations). It is thus uniquely suited to study the complex constellations of trust and calculation in international negotiations, as well as their consequences.

To demonstrate our argument empirically, we trace the European Commission's loss of trust in the UK during the Brexit negotiations, focusing on its response to three key actions by Boris Johnson's government: 1) setting aside the PD, 2) introducing the IMB, and 3) unilaterally extending the grace period for border checks in the Irish Sea. The Brexit negotiations, in which a dense network of cooperative relations was increasingly strained by conflict and uncertainty following the referendum in 2016, offer a good example of how declining trust can shape the prospects of international cooperation. 49 Our evidence comes from elite interviews with Commission officials and EU policy-makers conducted between 2017 and 2023. We focus on insider accounts because these are more comprehensive than available public statements and less likely to be crafted with strategic intentions. Our aim is to reconstruct which possible futures were anticipated by the Commission at crucial points in the negotiations. Since trust is a shared attitude towards the future, it leaves traces in documents and contemporary discourse, which can be studied by applying conventional social science methods. Furthermore, its effects can be traced through specific bargaining positions and strategies, and ultimately to policy outcomes. 50 Based on our theory, we expect that actors will respond to breaches in trust by re-assessing what futures are possible and altering their negotiating position accordingly. Our findings, presented below, demonstrate that the Commission responded to Britain's unanticipated actions by seeking more oversight, control and retaliatory mechanisms in the negotiated agreement.

Disregarding the Political Declaration

Boris Johnson took over from Theresa May as British Prime Minister in July 2019 on the back of his predecessor's failure to pass the WA and PD she had negotiated with the EU. Johnson had capitalized on May's inability to negotiate an agreement that satisfied the warring ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ factions within the Conservative Party, which brought about the defeat of her agreement in Parliament in early 2019 and contributed to her political downfall. 51 Upon taking office, Johnson pressed the Commission to re-open elements of May's deal, renegotiating—albeit not radically—elements of the PD, and replacing the Northern Ireland ‘backstop’ arrangements with the Protocol, which would see the territory remain de facto in the single market for goods, with a regulatory border down the Irish Sea. The passage of the revised WA and PD on 30 December 2019 was facilitated by the 80-seat majority obtained by the government in the 12 December general election, which Johnson fought on his promise to ‘get Brexit done’. 52 This set the stage for the talks on the future relationship, to be codified in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which was to be concluded prior to the UK exiting the transition period on 1 January 2021. Unlike his predecessor, Johnson sought a ‘Canada-style’ free trade agreement with the EU, for the future relationship, allowing the UK greater autonomy.

The Commission's expectations about UK actions had always represented a combination of trust and calculation. While it had anticipated that the UK would attempt to divide and rule between the member states, 53 seek opportunities for competitive deregulation, 54 and attempt to leverage budgetary commitments to obtain a more favourable agreement, 55 it also trusted that the UK would negotiate in good faith and commit to any legal obligations entered into. 56 When Johnson took office, the Commission expected that he would up the ante on the ‘hard bargaining’ of his predecessor, predicting the UK might ‘try to get their way with surprises, unpredictability and threats’. 57 But this did not upend the Commission's continuing trust in the government's commitment to the agreements it was signing, to the legal principles at stake, nor to implementing the agreements in good faith.

The Commission understood that the PD embodied very different kinds of commitments than a legally binding agreement—in the words of Michel Barnier, the chief Brexit negotiator for the European Union, ‘the general contours, not the precise relationship’. 58 But this did not render the PD meaningless in the eyes of the Commission: rather, it set expectations of what would be included in the future agreement and would thus serve as a baseline for the second stage of negotiations. Yet the UK stated at the outset of the TCA negotiations in February 2020 that it no longer considered itself to be bound by the terms of the PD. 59 The UK Chief Negotiator, David Frost, asserted Britain would accept some aspects of the text, but singled out the level playing field (LPF) commitment and the mooted security agreement as areas where London would seek to diverge. Many, including Barnier, regarded the announcement as a strategic ploy to put the Commission on the back foot 60 and establish a first-mover advantage for the UK. 61

The announcement contributed to loss of trust, since the Commission had regarded the PD as a serious statement of intent, rather than ‘the irrelevance that Johnson was treating it as’. 62 Barnier described the announcement as a ‘bombshell’ and could not understand why the UK would diverge from something it had just negotiated. 63 Stefaan De Rynck, a senior advisor to Michel Barnier, claimed that by ‘ripping up its intentions expressed in the agreed declaration the UK brought the talks back to square one’. 64 The Johnson government's actions, in the eyes of the Commission, revealed the UK's lack of integrity, since its stated aims now appeared non-credible. This in turn affected the tone of the negotiations, which became more difficult when the UK placed back onto the table issues the Commission felt had been settled in principle. 65

The decision not to seek a specific security agreement was met with ‘disbelief’ by the member states 66 and undermined the UK's reputation as a trustworthy actor, 67 but did not significantly affect the outcome of the negotiations on the TCA. Commission officials lamented the decision and Barnier announced that a security partnership would remain ‘on the table’ should the UK change its mind, 68 but a lack of UK interest prompted a recourse to bilateral security agreements instead. 69 The LPF, however, was seen by the Commission as an integral component of the TCA. Following the UK's announcement, in the first meeting of the negotiating teams, Barnier impressed on the UK that the provision was a non-negotiable condition of an agreement. 70 The Commission re-tabled a full legal text that reflected the language of the PD in order to ‘keep a first-mover advantage and set the agenda’ and also to help maintain unity among the EU27. 71 Over the following months, Barnier sought to hold the UK to its commitments, noting in his diary on 5 June 2020 that: ‘On all points, and on the level playing field in particular, the British negotiators continue to ignore the Political Declaration, negotiated and approved by Boris Johnson and then voted for by the British Parliament just six months ago.’ 72

In a public statement issued the same day, Barnier asserted that the EU ‘cannot and will not accept this backtracking on the political declaration’. 73 On 15 June 2020—at the occasion of the political progress report—David Sassoli, the President of the European Parliament, chastized Johnson, telling him: ‘ Pacta sunt servanda , Boris! We need you to honour your commitments on the level playing field.’ 74 By late summer both sides reached agreement on a complex set of arrangements for maintaining a LPF which—while they did not encompass all the Commission's demands—succeeded through ‘incremental adjustments’ in balancing UK concerns with the EU's insistence on non-regression. 75 In the assessment of the Commission, by tearing up the PD at the start of the talks the UK had succeeded only in antagonizing the member states and squandering an opportunity to ‘put the talks on a more constructive track’, and increasing the Commission's insistence on strong LPF provisions. 76

In sum, the Commission anticipated Johnson would up the ante on hard bargaining, but it also trusted that the UK would negotiate in good faith, so that British statements of its objectives and its position could be treated as sincere. Without this trust, cooperation would prove difficult, which indeed became the case when the UK decided to move away from the contents of the PD, thereby leading the Commission to actively calculate possible futures in which UK commitments were insincere and to seek tighter control mechanisms in the resulting TCA.

The Internal Market Bill

The Commission expected the UK to engage in ‘disruptive tactics’ during the TCA negotiations, such as running down the clock, threatening to walk away from the table and other variants of ‘hard bargaining’, 77 but also to honour the commitments enshrined in the legally binding WA, including the Northern Ireland Protocol. As then Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker sought to impress on Johnson, the UK would have to manage a de facto border in the Irish Sea and, unlike the PD, the Protocol amounted to a legally binding international treaty. 78 While the UK reneging on the Protocol was always objectively possible, the Commission's trust meant the outcome was not included in its calculation of possible futures. Indeed, the Commission's entire approach to Brexit was premised on the assumption that the UK was a law-abiding actor, an impression reinforced by May's insistence in conversation with Juncker that, as recalled by one observer, ‘Britain has always been a country that has abided by the rules of public international law; this is part of our constitution, part of our way to behave in a civilized way in the world.’ 79

From February 2020, however, the Johnson government had been mulling over ways to escape its obligations under the Protocol, which many Conservatives came to believe—incorrectly—had been foisted on the UK under duress. 80 On 23 February 2020 The Times reported that Johnson's Brexit team had been ‘ordered to draw up plans to “get around” the Northern Ireland protocol … so the prime minister can play hardball with Brussels over trade’. 81 Reportedly, Frost's team was tasked with finding ways to avoid the checks on the border and to ‘claw back’ funds from the financial settlement. The news ‘raised alarm bells in Brussels [and] undermined EU confidence that the UK would implement the protocol, and related EU law, as agreed’. 82 Observers expected that the move would provoke ‘a more hard-line approach to compliance with EU law’ since a flexible implementation of the Protocol would ‘only be available if the EU trusts the UK to manage the border’. 83 Despite this news, Barnier accepted Frost's assurances that the UK would not seek to undermine the WA. 84

On 7 September 2020 the media reported that ministers were working on legislation—the IMB—that would override key parts of the WA, allowing the UK to unilaterally change aspects of the Protocol outside of the joint ministerial committee established for this purpose. 85 Brandon Lewis, the Minister for Northern Ireland, conceded that the IMB would ‘break international law in a very specific and limited way’. 86 The move came as a shock to the Commission, which obtained a copy of the legislation the following day and confirmed the IMB would amount to a breach of international law. 87 It was interpreted as a strategic move—‘a weapon that the British were putting on the table so that we were forced to negotiate in a certain way’. 88 The IMB, De Rynck claimed, served no practical purpose within Northern Ireland, but simply ‘came out of the blue to disrupt talks on the future’. 89

The unveiling of the IMB betrayed the Commission's trust that the UK would stand by the legal obligations established in the WA. According to one official, ‘trust collapsed very seriously during the negotiations when they proposed the [IMB]. There, we realized Johnson doesn't care so much about the legal obligations he would have and the international commitments he could take’. 90 Another official asserted the Commission had been far too trusting of Britain's intentions and that the announcement led to a steep learning curve on the EU side. 91 Barnier himself noted in his diaries:

I feel that the threat is a betrayal of their word. It seems they will stop at nothing. Perhaps most seriously for me personally, I do not feel that the team currently in 10 Downing Street is equal to the challenges of Brexit and what is at stake in it … I simply don't trust them anymore. And we need trust to make a deal on our future relationship. 92

The UK's actions induced a new reticence on the Commission's part to make concessions. When the UK sought to re-open talks on the status of geographical indicators, Barnier refused, noting:

Now we are forewarned, and therefore very cautious. I ask our team to take a firm line. We will tell the British people that the way in which their government has provoked the European Union and attacked the Withdrawal Agreement makes us reluctant to open any discussion on its contents. 93

It was also at this time that the Commission began preparing for a broader range of outcomes, including a ‘no deal’ Brexit, which now appeared as a real possibility. 94

The IMB announcement also increased the EU's resolve to build sufficiently strong governance mechanisms into the TCA, Barnier noting this ‘requirement is obviously only reinforced by the threats of the Internal Market Bill’. 95 This desire for greater robustness is also reflected in the TCA governance provisions. Outside of law enforcement, taxation and competition policy, the TCA provides for a dispute mechanism process through the UK–EU Partnership Council and its sub-committees, with consultation followed by arbitration and enforcement mechanisms, including suspension of the agreement. 96 Special dispute resolution mechanisms apply to chapters dealing with the level playing field and a rebalancing mechanism allows either side to take countermeasures should divergence arise in social or environmental standards, including the temporary suspension of the agreement. 97 Rebalancing was included to appease member states favouring an evolutionary mechanism, which the UK had rejected. 98 However, a high barrier for establishing harm and cautiously calibrated retaliatory measures suggest the mechanism was designed to be seldom used, 99 and the level playing field itself is compatible with significant future divergence. 100

Yet, the Commission regards the mechanism as a proportionate response and a good outcome from the negotiations. One member state official working on implementation claimed the numerous provisions and mechanisms give the Commission access to a whole set of possible measures should the UK breach its obligations. 101 De Rynck suggests the only price the Commission paid was increased complexity, 102 noting that the agreement ‘reinforce[s] the capacity of each party to react unilaterally with so-called punitive measures’. 103 Even in retrospect, to the Commission the provisions appear adequate to manage the risk of UK defection:

[We] wanted to be sure that such a deep and broad relationship would have an adequate level of governance attached to it … in hindsight, everybody's 20/20 [vision], but I think that the governance of the Withdrawal Agreement and the governance of TCA are as good as they could get. 104

A senior Commission official stated that, in any case, they ‘don't expect the UK to diverge so much from the EU standards, even if they think they're going to’, adding: ‘The TCA I'm not worried about, we have arbitration, we will have procedures.’ 105 Ultimately, the governance mechanisms enshrined in the final agreement reflected both the Commission's revised position, shaped in light of the IMB by doubts as to whether the UK would act in ‘good faith’, 106 as well as its recognition of the UK's legitimate desire to diverge from EU rules and institutions. 107

In summary, the Commission trusted that the UK would stick by its legal commitments, even though it was always objectively possible that it would not. Otherwise, there would have been no point in even negotiating a treaty. When the UK introduced the IMB and broke the Commission's trust, the latter responded by reappraising its expectations and insisting upon tighter contracting in the LPF provisions, including opportunities for retaliatory action should the UK diverge.

Implementing the Northern Ireland Protocol

With the TCA coming into force provisionally and the UK exiting the transition period on 1 January 2021, the UK–EU relationship was now determined by the WA and the Protocol, as well as by the TCA. Under the terms of the Protocol, the UK committed to introducing checks on the EU's regulatory border in the Irish Sea. While the Commission had earlier noted with some concern Johnson's tendency to misrepresent the need for checks emanating from the Protocol, 108 they saw this as redolent of the domestic discourse surrounding Brexit itself, rather than any lack of commitment to follow through. Implementing the agreement required a considerable amount of trust, since it was ‘quite a concession to make, to say that a part of its external economic border would now run through the territory of what was going to become a third country, and rely on that country, trust that country to conduct the checks that are necessary on its behalf’. 109 Yet, on 4 March 2021, following the UK's exit from the transition period and on the date the ‘grace period’ for checks was set to end, the UK opted to unilaterally extend the grace period, effectively abrogating the terms of the agreement.

The reaction from Brussels was one of surprise and disappointment. A senior EU diplomat noted they ‘had hoped to maintain a trustful partnership … now it looks like it is going to be quite a tough and rough relationship for the foreseeable future’. 110 A Commission official claimed:

Now, we are seeing in the Protocol, in the Withdrawal Agreement, that they don't want to comply with the thing they just signed. They simply don't want to apply the Protocol … So, I have to say that the trust in the British government is not very high. We are convinced that he [Johnson] will do whatever he thinks is good for him, for his political agenda. 111

One member state official argued that the non-application of the provisions of the Protocol was simply not understandable and that there was no way to justify or explain the decision, noting: ‘We probably have learned that we need to judge now the UK government by deeds and not by words’. 112 Another Commission official claimed that ‘a lot of trust was breached. The EU has learned not to trust the UK anymore in their announcements [on] this, so member states have lost a lot of goodwill toward the UK’. 113

The Commission's response was initially cautious and held off initiating infringement proceedings. The Union's representative on the Partnership Committee, Maroš Šefčovič, noted the EU's readiness ‘to seek creative solutions, within the framework of the Protocol, in the interest of all communities in Northern Ireland’ but emphasized it ‘will not agree to a renegotiation of the Protocol.’ 114 On 6 September 2021, Frost confirmed that there would be no checks in the foreseeable future, prompting the EU to seek further talks and an exploration of proposals. 115 On 10 November Frost publicly hinted that the UK might trigger Article 16, suspending the agreement if no solution could be found. The EU responded by threatening infringement proceedings and retaliatory tariffs. 116 On 13 June the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill was published, providing for the removal of the role of the Court of Justice of the EU in the Protocol, prompting the Commission to initiate infringement proceedings. In parallel, the EU proposed a solution which purported to reduce by 50 per cent the paperwork incurred by the cross-border checks and obviate the need for 80 per cent of the checks themselves. The proposal was rejected by the UK. 117

Alongside the slow ramping up of legal proceedings, the Commission sought to exclude the UK from policies and agreements outside the TCA, among them accession to the Lugano Convention regulating cross-border civil disputes, 118 access to funding under the EU's Horizon2020 initiative, 119 and equivalence in financial services. 120 As a former senior official put it:

It is good that on our side, we have not brought financial services or data into the agreement, but can unilaterally decide to work with that, always depending on the behaviour of the UK in the overall context of our under-developed partnership … Normally, these things are prolonged automatically with all our partners, but with the UK, we have kept this under close scrutiny to see whether this is really then in line with the relationship that we will have with the UK in two, three or four years. 121

For the member states the UK's actions contributed to ‘a toxic relationship and the level of trust was quite low’. 122 Member states which originally had sought a bilateral security agreement with the UK were reportedly less keen after the issues with the Protocol arose. 123 Some member state officials reported that the issue had driven a wedge between their bilateral relations with the UK and their overall support for the EU line, noting that their first loyalty lay with the Union. 124 While the UK made a concerted effort to bilateralize its security relationships after Brexit, 125 both the member states and the European External Action Service were careful to ensure these ties did not undercut the EU's overall foreign policy position. 126 One diplomat even reported that the bilateralization of security policy was actively hampered by the Protocol implementation issues. 127

Ironically for the UK, the loss of trust resulting from its aggressive negotiation tactics made it harder to agree a solution, since it made the Commission less amenable to affording the UK any flexibility in overseeing the EU's external border. 128 Member state officials accused London of negotiating in bad faith and doubted whether trust could be rebuilt in the relationship. 129 Moreover, the non-implementation of the Protocol also contributed to difficulties implementing the TCA. As one senior Commission official put it,

the TCA is inevitably … flavoured by the very difficult situation on the Northern Ireland Protocol. So, I think if the situation on the Protocol would have been one hundred per cent stable and harmonious … we probably would be in a bit [of an] easier context for the implementation of the TCA. 130

In summary, the Commission trusted the UK to abide by the terms of the agreement reached, even though non-compliance was always objectively possible, in order to achieve the kind of deep cooperation required on the border issue. When the UK broke this trust and extended the grace period, the Commission sought retaliatory measures across a host of areas excluded from the TCA and reduced the level of discretion it was willing to show the UK in implementing the Protocol.

The Commission's conduct of the Brexit negotiations exemplifies with particular clarity the dilemma international actors face when trusting other actors despite the objective possibility of betrayal. Without trust, no agreement could be reached at all, as the Commission was acutely aware. While anticipating that the talks would be tough, the Commission did not initially consider the possibility that the UK would engage in certain obstructive or even hostile behaviours. Rather than calculating the risks of these objectively possible futures, the Commission instead trusted Britain. As the negotiations unfolded, however, these expectations were disappointed repeatedly, as when the UK declared it did not consider itself to be bound by the PD, introduced via the IMB clauses which abrogated commitments in the WA, and refused to implement the agreed checks in the Irish Sea. These actions were experienced as a breach of trust by the Commission, which set about re-assessing the UK's expected future behaviour, calculating the risks of uncooperative actions it had previously disregarded, and updating its strategy accordingly. The result was a greater emphasis on oversight, monitoring and retaliatory mechanisms in the Commission's strategy as alternative means of reducing uncertainty.

Our argument contributes to debates on trust in IR by demonstrating how a loss of trust in dense cooperative relationships can affect the extent and form of future cooperation. We show how breaches of trust lead actors to include in their calculations previously unanticipated actions and re-assess their negotiating strategies, motivating in turn recourse to alternative means of reducing uncertainty based on monitoring, oversight and retaliatory mechanisms. Yet our findings also show that trust dies hard, since actors' expectations usually pertain to specific issues and deviations thus bring about a loss of trust in a specific context and not tout court . Thus, lost trust will often alter the quality of cooperation, rather than precluding it as such. By providing a granular account of trust, our approach can advance our understanding of the complex and dynamic constellations of trust and calculation that characterize international negotiations. Unlike rationalist theories of trust, our framework maintains the essence of trust as a social concept that is non-calculative, while simultaneously accounting for variation at the level of specific actions for which existing identity-based accounts are insufficiently granular. Methodologically, our theory provides for a more direct observation of trust than other approaches and allows us to clearly differentiate trust from cooperation, which in turn enables us to better study the impact of trust on cooperation itself.

Our findings also speak to policy-makers, showing that the question is often not whether to trust, but rather which forms of trust are reasonable in order to make cooperation possible without drastically increasing the risks involved. Moreover, they demonstrate that trust is different from calculation and cannot be reduced to it. We furthermore identify several strategies that can be adopted on a granular level to mitigate the effects of broken trust for cooperation, including incremental adjustments in negotiating strategy and a reliance on alternative means of reducing uncertainty. Finally, our empirical findings highlight the folly of bargaining strategies that seek to gain advantage through unexpected breaches of trust, since these lead other actors to consider a wider range of possible outcomes and to respond with proposals containing alternative means of reducing uncertainty which offer less discretion and thus are often less advantageous.

Martin Klimke, Reinhild Kreis and Christian F. Ostermann, ‘Introduction’, in Martin Klimke, Reinhild Kreis and Christian F. Ostermann, eds, Trust, but verify: the politics of uncertainty and the transformation of the Cold War order, 1969–1991 (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), pp. 1–13 at p. 4.

Charles E. Osgood, An alternative to war or surrender (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

Andrew H. Kydd, Trust and mistrust in international relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), ch. 7.

Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Investigating diplomatic transformations’, International Affairs 89: 2, 2013, pp. 477–96, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12028 .

M. E. Sarotte, Not one inch: America, Russia, and the making of post-Cold War stalemate (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2021); Tracey German, ‘NATO and the enlargement debate: enhancing Euro-Atlantic security or inciting confrontation?’, International Affairs 93: 2, 2017, pp. 291–308, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix017 .

Daniel W. Drezner, ‘Immature leadership: Donald Trump and the American presidency’, International Affairs 96: 2, 2020, pp. 383–400 at p. 394, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa009 .

Jamal Barnes and Samuel M. Makinda, ‘Testing the limits of international society? Trust, AUKUS and Indo-Pacific security’, International Affairs 98: 4, 2022, pp. 1307–25, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac111 .

E.g. Kydd, Trust and mistrust ; Wheeler, ‘Investigating diplomatic transformations’.

It is often held that outwardly conveying the unpredictability of one's actions can incur bargaining advantages by rendering credible threats a perceptibly rational actor could not make. Johnson's approach leaned into this assumption, leading observers to label his a ‘Madman’ strategy.

Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The security dilemma: fear, cooperation and trust in world politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), ch. 1.

See Brian C. Rathbun, ‘Trust in international relations’, in Eric M. Uslaner, ed., The Oxford handbook of social and political trust (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 687–705.

Kydd, Trust and mistrust , p. 6; similarly Aaron M. Hoffman, Building trust: overcoming suspicion in international conflict (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006), p. 14.

Kydd, Trust and mistrust , pp. 183–213.

Hoffman, Building trust , pp. 43–8; Andrew H. Kydd, ‘Trust building, trust breaking: the dilemma of NATO enlargement’, International Organization 55: 4, 2001, pp. 801–28, https://doi.org/10.1162/002081801317193600 .

Deborah Welch Larson, ‘Trust and missed opportunities in International Relations’, Political Psychology 18: 3, 1997, pp. 701–34, https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00075 .

See Torsten Michel, ‘Time to get emotional: phronetic reflections on the concept of trust in International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations 19: 4, 2012, pp. 869–90, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066111428972 ; Guido Möllering, ‘Nature of trust: from Georg Simmel to a theory of expectation, interpretation and suspension’, Sociology 35: 2, 2001, pp. 403–20, https://doi.org/10.1177/S0038038501000190 .

Niklas Luhmann, Trust and power (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1979), p. 24.

Denise M. Rousseau, Sim B. Sitkin, Ronald S. Burt and Colin Camerer, ‘Not so different after all: a cross-discipline view of trust’, Academy of Management Review 23: 3, 1998, pp. 393–404 at p. 395, https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1998.926617 .

See e.g. Hoffman, Building trust , pp. 17–19; Kydd, Trust and mistrust , p. 10.

See Peter J. Katzenstein and Lucia A. Seybert, ‘Protean power and uncertainty: exploring the unexpected in world politics’, International Studies Quarterly 62: 1, 2018, pp. 80–93, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx092 . T

Möllering, ‘The nature of trust’, pp. 414–15; see also Luhmann, Trust and power , pp. 24–31.

See Oliver E. Williamson, ‘Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization’, Journal of Law and Economics 36: 1, 1993, pp. 453–86, https://doi.org/10.1086/467284 .

Alexander Wendt, Social theory of international politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds, Security communities (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Democratic peace—warlike democracies? A social constructivist interpretation of the liberal argument’, European Journal of International Relations 1: 4, 1995, pp. 491–517, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066195001004005 .

Jonathan Mercer, ‘Rationality and psychology in international politics’, International Organization 59: 1, 2005, pp. 77–106, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050058 ; Clara Weinhardt, ‘Relational trust in international cooperation: the case of North–South trade negotiations’, Journal of Trust Research 5: 1, 2015, pp. 27–54, https://doi.org/10.1080/21515581.2015.1007460 .

Eric M. Uslaner, The moral foundations of trust (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Brian C. Rathbun, Trust in international cooperation: international security institutions, domestic politics, and American multilateralism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

Marcus Holmes and Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘Social bonding in diplomacy’, International Theory 12: 2, 2020, pp. 133–61, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971919000162 ; Nicholas J. Wheeler, Trusting enemies: interpersonal relationships in international conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

Sian Troath, ‘Trusted intermediaries: Macmillan, Kennedy and their ambassadors’, International Relations 36: 2, 2021, pp. 262–84, https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178211052819 ; David J. Wilcox, ‘A very personal breakthrough: interpersonal trust and the Oslo Channel’, Israel Studies Review 38: 2, 2023, pp 12–29, https://doi.org/10.3167/isr.2023.380203 .

E.g. Kydd, Trust and mistrust ; Rathbun, Trust in international cooperation ; Wheeler, Trusting enemies .

E.g. Larissa Versloot, ‘The vitality of trusting relations in multilateral diplomacy: an account of the European Union’, International Affairs 98: 2, 2022, pp. 509–28, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab260 ; Hayley Walker and Katja Biedenkopf, ‘Why do only some chairs act as successful mediators? Trust in chairs of global climate negotiations’, International Studies Quarterly 64: 2, 2020, pp. 440–52, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa018 .

Barnes and Makinda, ‘Testing the limits’; Vincent C. Keating and Lucy M. Abbott, ‘Entrusted norms: security, trust, and betrayal in the Gulf Cooperation Council crisis’, European Journal of International Relations 27: 4, 2021, pp. 1090–113, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066121104419 7.

For us, trust is always oriented towards the uncertain future behaviour of specific others. For a more existential understanding of trust as confidence in the stability of the international order, see Minseon Ku and Jennifer Mitzen, ‘The dark matter of world politics: system trust, summits, and state personhood’, International Organization 76: 4, 2022, pp. 799–829, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818322000169 .

Möllering, ‘The nature of trust’.

Luhmann, Trust and power , p. 25.

Cf. Guido Möllering, ‘The trust/control duality: an integrative perspective on positive expectations of others’, International Sociology 20: 3, 2005, pp. 283–305, https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580905055478 ; Philipp Brugger, Andreas Hasenclever and Lukas Kasten, ‘Theorizing the impact of trust on post-agreement negotiations: the case of the Franco-German security relations’, International Negotiation 18: 3, 2013, pp. 441–69, https://doi.org/10.1163/15718069-12341265 .

Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and institutions’, World Politics 38: 1, 1985, pp. 226–54, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010357 .

Luhmann, Trust and power , p. 10.

In this we provide an alternative to rationalist and historical institutionalist accounts of variation in institutional design, e.g. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, ‘The rational design of international institutions’, International Organization 55: 4, 2001, pp. 761–99, https://doi.org/10.1162/002081801317193592 ; Stephanie C. Hofmann and Andrew Yeo, ‘Historical institutionalism and institutional design: divergent pathways to regime complexes in Asia and Europe’, European Journal of International Relations , publ. online 11 May 2023, https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661231170717 .

Jens Beckert, Imagined futures: fictional expectations and capitalist dynamics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), p. 13.

Martyna K. Janowicz-Panjaitan and Niels G. Noorderhaven, ‘Levels of inter-organizational trust: conceptualization and measurement’, in Reinhard Bachmann and Zaheer Akbar, eds, Handbook of trust research (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), pp. 264–79 at p. 270; similarly Oliver Schilke and Karen S. Cook, ‘A cross-level process theory of trust development in interorganizational relationships’, Strategic Organization 11: 3, 2013, pp. 281–303 at pp. 289–92, https://doi.org/10.1177/1476127012472096 .

Philipp Brugger, ‘Trust as a discourse: concept and measurement strategy—first results from a study on German trust in the USA’, Journal of Trust Research 5: 1, 2015, pp. 78–100 at p. 83, https://doi.org/10.1080/21515581.2015.1011164 .

Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, ‘International practices’, International Theory 3: 1, 2011, pp. 1–36, https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297191000031X ; Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger, ‘The play of international practice’, International Studies Quarterly 59: 3, 2015, pp. 449–60, https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12202 ; Sebastian Schindler and Tobias Wille, ‘How can we criticize international practices?’, International Studies Quarterly 63: 4, 2019, pp. 1014–24, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz057 .

Kristin Anabel Eggeling and Larissa Versloot, ‘Taking trust online: digitalisation and the practice of information sharing in diplomatic negotiations’, Review of International Studies , publ. online 6 Dec. 2022, pp. 1–20, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210522000559 ; Versloot, ‘The vitality of trusting relations’.

Rathbun, Trust in international cooperation , pp. 45–53.

Vincent C. Keating and Jan Ruzicka, ‘Trusting relationships in international politics: no need to hedge’, Review of International Studies 40: 4, 2014, pp. 753–70, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210514000059 .

Hoffman, Building trust , pp. 26–34.

Benjamin Farrand and Helena Carrapico, ‘“People like that cannot be trusted”: populist and technocratic political styles, legitimacy, and distrust in the context of Brexit negotiations’, Journal of Contemporary European Research 17: 2, 2021, pp. 147–65, https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v17i2.1186 .

Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).

Benjamin Martill, ‘Deal or no deal: Theresa May's withdrawal agreement and the politics of (non-) ratification’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 59: 6, 2021, pp. 1607–22, at p. 1616, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13205 ; Meg Russell, ‘Brexit and Parliament: the anatomy of a perfect storm’, Parliamentary Affairs 74: 2, 2021, pp. 443–63, https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsaa011 .

Russell, ‘Brexit and Parliament’, p. 458.

Filipa Figueira and Benjamin Martill, ‘Bounded rationality and the Brexit negotiations: why Britain failed to understand the EU’, Journal of European Public Policy 28: 12, 2021, pp. 1871–89, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1810103 ; Brigit Laffan and Stefan Telle, The EU's response to Brexit: united and effective (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023); Leonard August Schuette, ‘Forging unity: European Commission leadership in the Brexit negotiations’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 59: 5, 2021, pp. 1142–59, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13171 .

Interview B04, Commission official, 1 July 2021.

Stefaan De Rynck, Inside the deal: how the EU got Brexit done (Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda, 2023), p. 32.

Interview B07, senior Commission official, 6 July 2021.

Michel Barnier, My secret Brexit diary: a glorious illusion (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2021), p. 332; Interview B06, former Labour MEP, 5 July 2021.

Barnier, My secret Brexit diary , p. 46.

Barnier, My s ecret Brexit diary , p. 316.

Barnier, My secret Brexit diary , p. 316.

De Rynck, Inside the deal , p. 228.

Christopher Grey, Brexit unfolded: how no one got what they wanted (and why they were never going to) (London: Biteback, 2021), p. 210.

De Rynck, Inside the deal , p. 192.

Interview C14, think tank official, 20 Oct. 2022.

Barnier, My secret Brexit diary , p. 324.

Nicolai von Ondarza, ‘Foreign and security policy: the consequences of bilateralisation for EU–UK relations’, UK in a Changing Europe, 25 March 2022, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/foreign-and-security-policy-bilateralisation-uk-eu/ . (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 29 August 2023.)

Barnier, My secret Brexit diary , p. 335.

‘Brexit: trade deal still possible with EU, says UK minister’, BBC News, 5 June 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-52934128 .

Barnier, My secret Brexit diary , p. 337 (italics in original).

De Rynck, Inside the deal , p. 223.

De Rynck, Inside the deal , p. 244.

De Rynck, Inside the deal , p. 227.

Grey, Brexit unfolded , pp. 230–233.

Tim Shipman, ‘Brexit team seeks to evade Irish Sea checks on goods’, The Times , 23 Feb. 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/brexit-team-seeks-to-evade-irish-sea-checks-on-goods-mv3pqjkcm .

Jess Sargeant, Alex Stojanovic, Haydon Etherington and James Kane, Implementing Brexit: the Northern Ireland protocol (London: Institute for Government, May 2020), p. 33.

Sargeant et al., Implementing Brexit , p. 33.

Grey, Brexit unfolded , p. 233.

Lisa O'Carroll, ‘Government admits new Brexit bill “will break international law”’, Guardian , 8 Sept. 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/sep/08/government-admits-new-brexit-bill-will-break-international-law .

Barnier, My secret Brexit diary , p. 348.

Interview B08, senior Commission official, 6 July 2021.

De Rynck, Inside the deal , pp. 182, 231.

Interview C11, Commission official, 18 Oct. 2022.

Barnier, My secret Brexit diary , pp. 348–9.

Barnier, My secret Brexit diary , p. 355.

Simon Usherwood, ‘“Our European friends and partners”? Negotiating the Trade and Cooperation Agreement’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 59: S1, 2021, pp. 115–23 at p. 120, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13238 .

Barnier, My secret Brexit diary , p. 360.

Maddy Thimont Jack, Joe Marshall, James Kane and Dan Goss, ‘Disputes under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement’, Institute for Government Explainer, 1 Nov. 2021, https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainer/disputes-trade-and-cooperation-agreement .

Elena Ares et al., ‘The UK–EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement: level playing field’, Research Briefing, House of Commons Library, 20 May 2021, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9190 .

António Gaucho Soares, ‘The EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement: the level playing field issue’, Interdisciplinary Political Studies 8: 1, 2022, pp. 207–21 at p. 218.

David Collins, ‘Standing the test of time: the level playing field and rebalancing mechanism in the UK–EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA)’, Journal of International Dispute Settlement 12: 4, 2021, pp. 617–36 at p. 636, https://doi.org/10.1093/jnlids/idab023 .

Collins, ‘Standing the test of time’, p. 617.

Interview C20, member state official, 3 Nov. 2022.

Stefaan De Rynck, Transcript of interview with the Brexit Witness Archive, UK in a Changing Europe, 1 and 15 March 2021, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-witness-archive/stefaan-de-rynck/ .

Usherwood, ‘“Our European friends and partners”’, pp. 119–20.

Interview B12, senior Commission official, 16 July 2021.

De Rynck, Inside the deal , p. 181.

Interview B06, former Labour MEP, 5 July 2021.

Jim Brunsden, Sam Fleming and George Parker, ‘EU capitals weigh tougher response to UK's Brexit “provocations”’, Financial Times , 12 March 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/d19633e3-5f6c-4924-a06d-3553c0f2fee3 .

House of Lords European Affairs Committee, Report from the Sub-Committee on the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: follow-up report , 2nd Report Session 2022–23 (London: House of Lords, 2022), pp. 7–8.

House of Lords, Report from the Sub-Committee , p. 10.

BBC News, ‘Brexit: suspension of NI-EU trade deal’, BBC News, 10 Nov. 2021, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-59231057 .

Fieldfisher, ‘Brexit and Lugano—where are we now?’, 17 Feb. 2022, https://www.fieldfisher.com/en/insights/brexit-and-lugano---where-are-we-now .

Cristina Gallardo, ‘EU unity faces fresh test in Northern Ireland Brexit row’, Politico , 10 Oct. 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-northern-ireland-brexit-unity-protocol .

Brunsden, Fleming and Parker, ‘EU capitals weigh tougher response’.

Interview D01, European diplomat in London, 3 Aug. 2023.

Interview C02, senior EEAS official, 7 Oct. 2022; interview C17A, senior EU diplomat, 26 Oct. 2022.

Interview C21, member state official, 14 Dec. 2022; Interview C23, member state MFA official, 9 Feb. 2023.

von Ondarza, ‘Foreign and security policy’.

Interview C24, EU official, 3 May 2023.

Interview C17A, Senior EU diplomat, 26 Oct. 2022.

House of Lords, Report from the Sub-Committee , p. 6.

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Research: Negotiating Is Unlikely to Jeopardize Your Job Offer

• Einav Hart,
• Julia Bear,
• Zhiying (Bella) Ren

A series of seven studies found that candidates have more power than they assume.

Job seekers worry about negotiating an offer for many reasons, including the worst-case scenario that the offer will be rescinded. Across a series of seven studies, researchers found that these fears are consistently exaggerated: Candidates think they are much more likely to jeopardize a deal than managers report they are. This fear can lead candidates to avoid negotiating altogether. The authors explore two reasons driving this fear and offer research-backed advice on how anxious candidates can approach job negotiations.

Imagine that you just received a job offer for a position you are excited about. Now what? You might consider negotiating for a higher salary, job flexibility, or other benefits , but you’re apprehensive. You can’t help thinking: What if I don’t get what I ask for? Or, in the worst-case scenario, what if the hiring manager decides to withdraw the offer?

• Einav Hart is an assistant professor of management at George Mason University’s Costello College of Business, and a visiting scholar at the Wharton School. Her research interests include conflict management, negotiations, and organizational behavior.
• Julia Bear is a professor of organizational behavior at the College of Business at Stony Brook University (SUNY). Her research interests include the influence of gender on negotiation, as well as understanding gender gaps in organizations more broadly.
• Zhiying (Bella) Ren is a doctoral student at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Her research focuses on conversational dynamics in organizations and negotiations.

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