essay in russian

Russian Speech Cliches

Good structure is one of the significant pillars of essay writing, and speech cliches are tools to layout your thoughts in the most compelling way. Thus, for your convenience, the expressions are listed according to essay parts: introduction, main body, and conclusion. Beginning with helpful Russian expressions for when you don't know how to start your text:

Russian Essay Phrases for Introduction

Russian essay phrases for main body, russian essay phrases for conclusion, opening words / sentence connectors.

Russian Essay Writing Tips

Do longer eloquent sentences work.

Academic writing, for instance, in English, is all about clarity and brevity. The Russian language also commends the two but favors some more embellishments, even epithets, and metaphors for the diverse scientific topics one can imagine. But what is the limit, and how long is too long? There is no uniform example to give. However, some Russian teachers advise reading the sentence out loud. If you are getting out of breath - time to edit out ruthlessly.

To comma or not to comma?

Typically sentence connectors are separated by commas in the Russian language. But there is a catch: a list of 30+ terms that look like opening words but are, in fact, not. With experience, one develops a gut feeling as to when there is a need for a comma. Before that, use the following test: remove the connector from the sentence. If the meaning does not change, commas are required.

(source: adme )

Handwriting wire

Unless typing is involved, essays in Russian are written in calligraphy. The example above illustrates why it can become an issue, primarily if you are used to writing in block letters. So checking your essay, imagine yourself in the teachers' shoes and question if they can understand not only the arguments but also your handwriting.

Tautology much?

While tautology is a problem that comes up often in writing no matter the tongue, in Russian essays, it is penalized brutally. That is because the language offers several synonyms like no other. One of the most common examples with the verb to go :

It takes time to get used to such a variety. So for safety sake, think twice of any verb or adjective you are choosing, if there is a synonym, go with it.

Do you feel ready now to take the Russian essay writing world by storm? Share with us some of your favorite phrases or common challenges in the comments. 

Olya Amburg

Olya is a globetrotter, a Russian native inspired by people, cultures, and interactions. A love for the Russian language and literature led her to become a journalist. Olya shares her knowledge and passion for language learning, traveling, and communication as a freelance writer. In her spare time, she studies psychology and neuroscience, teaches yoga, and plans international adventures with friends.

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K nowledge of the Russian language opens up a vast, diverse world, stretching from the Carpathian Mountains to the expanses of Siberia.  As well as providing the traveller with the lingua franca of over 15 countries and unrecognised territories, the Russian language is intrinsically connected with a rich culture of world-class literature, art, music, cinema, and architecture.  Russian is an excellent choice for a new language to learn, and here we outline exactly how you should go about achieving this goal.

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How to Use This Guide

For anyone learning a foreign language, nothing is more important than choosing the right learning resources.  However, as with most languages, the amount of available material for learning Russian is overwhelming, and the quality varies enormously.

So what should you buy?

Most resource guides on the internet simply throw together a vast list of virtually everything related to the language in question, leaving you just as bewildered as you were before.

We know from years of experience that the Pareto principle strongly applies to language learning: you really do get 80% of the results from 20% of the materials you buy.  If we had only known at the time how to separate the textbook-wheat from the chaff, we would have saved a considerable amount of money!

And so we have come up with the solution: an all encompassing, fully-updated handbook , advising you on the best books, videos, websites, podcasts and courses to help you on your path to native-level fluency.

We appreciate that you may not have time to read through the whole of the guide, or may just be looking to improve a particular skills.  So, in order to help you find exactly what you need with ease, we’ve grouped our recommended material into the following colour-coordinated categories:

Grammar & Vocabulary

Of course, the material that you use will vastly depend on your current Russian level.  (After all, there's nothing more dispiriting than working through a course that's too easy or too difficult for you!)  That’s why we have divided the guide into three sections: beginners, intermediate, and advanced – showing you exactly what you need for the stage you’re currently at.

Beginners - Grammar & Vocabulary

Grammar and vocabulary are the skeleton around which your language skills develop - you can't do anything until you've got to grips with the basics.  Obviously it's vital to choose the right material for the job.  So let's dive straight in and look at the best textbook on the market for beginners

The New Penguin Russian Course: A Complete Course for Beginners

All-in-all the best course available for beginners. It explains all essential grammar points clearly and thoroughly. Its end-of-chapter exercises and the glossary at the back of the book are useful for building up a good stockpile of basic vocabulary. Should be all you need for grammar to take you up to intermediate level.

Pay no attention to its dreary cover - the Penguin Course is far and away the best Russian textbook on the market for beginners. Every fresh-faced language newcomer has to wade through a sea of trumped-up phrasebooks, masquerading as 'complete courses'. This, however, is the real deal and will get you to a solid B1 level .

Don't expect any cheer or colour though: the style is no-nonsense and could put some people off who need to be eased into a new language. Try to look past this: all of the grammatical points are explained extremely well, with plenty of examples and supplementary exercises . The glossary and grammar tables at the back of the book come in useful if you ever forget any material that you've already covered.

Once you have worked your way through all 26 chapters (starting with the Cyrillic alphabet, and culminating in a short story by Chekhov), you should be able to hold your own in simple conversations and read newspapers (with the help of a dictionary).

The only thing that stops this being the ultimate Russian beginner's resource is the lack of accompanying listening exercises . But as we have that covered below, it really isn't too much of a problem at all.

The New Penguin Russian Course - Our Rating

• Our favourite ones are Russian Lessons and Russian Learn . They are organised in a neat and user-friendly way and are regularly updated.  Although they differ slightly in style and approach, both cover almost exactly the same content as each other, so just choose the one that appeals to you most.
• Another option is Alpha Dictionary .  If you let your eyes adjust to the garish magenta colour-scheme and the hideous 90s interface, you’ll realise that this is a real gem of a website .  What we particularly like about it is that it actually goes slightly beyond the scope of the Penguin Course and provides explanations for some particularly tricky grammatical topics, such as correctly translating ‘for’ and setting up T-K clause constructions.

The Big Silver Book of Russian Verbs

Solid reference book, detailing the full conjugations of 555 common Russian verbs. Numerous example sentences demonstrate how each verb is used in various contexts (including idoms). There is also a sizeable dictionary of 4,000 additional verbs, showing which conjugation pattern each one follows so you know how to form them correctly. A worthwhile purchase for beginners.

The Russian verb is undoubtedly one of the most challenging aspects of the language – crack it and everything else will soon fall into place .

This is easier said than done.  With a confusing array of conjugation patterns, verbs of motion, and countless irregulars , Russian verbs present a serious challenge to new learners. 

Thankfully, you have at your disposal the Big Silver Book of Russian Verbs. It explains how each verb’s conjugation follows one of six approximate paradigms, and shows that once you have memorised these patterns, the process of learning how to use individual verbs becomes infinitely easier.

It then delivers on its promise and sets out the full conjugations of 555 common verbs , as well as listing the infinitives to 4,000 other ones in the back of the back (with their pattern number next to them).

A warning though: the six-paradigm system is not universal – other books may state that there are really only three conjugation groups, with a few minor subgroups that only differ superficially. Be careful not to get mixed up!

The Big Silver Book of Russian Verbs - Our Rating

It’s not as comprehensive as a dictionary or the Big Silver Book, so you shouldn’t completely rely on it. But it does have some nice features that make up for this downside: stress indicators, pronunciation hints, related verb lists, etc.

The site’s owner claims that he frequently adds new words to the database so this should become an even more powerful tool in time.

The Russian Grammar Channel

Concise videos on essential topics in Russian grammar from a doctor of Slavic linguistics. Presented in a clear, friendly manner, these are the best videos on YouTube to help beginners get to grips with the nuts and bolts of the language. An excellent supplement to the Penguin Course.

There are dozens of Russian language channels on YouTube, but none of them are as focused or as useful as Dr Curtis Ford’s Russian Grammar Channel.  

Dr Ford knows the Russian language inside-out.   But what differentiates his channel from the many other excellent alternatives is his ability to break down complex grammatical concepts into manageable chunks.  

The videos are all professionally produced and use plenty of fresh examples to solidify your knowledge.

The Russian Grammar Channel - Our Rating

The Oxford Russian Dictionary

The undisputed king of dictionary series, the Oxford Russian Dictionary contains half a million words, phrases, and translations. Recent stylistic and layout improvements have made it much easier to find the word you need in its correct context. Fully updated to include contemporary business, technical and computing terminology. The best Russian dictionary out there.

Dictionaries are expensive, so you don’t want to keep buying new ones on a regular basis. For this reason, it makes sense to get the best one available straight away.

With half a million words and phrases, you’ll almost certainly find a translation for whatever it is you need.  One of the best features of the Oxford series (that is often lacking in rival dictionaries) is the care they take to provide translations for words in all of their contexts, including idioms, sayings, and figurative usage. Look up a simple word, like ‘hand’, for instance, and you’ll see what we mean: it can be used in dozens of different ways, and doesn’t just refer to the human appendage.

Dictionaries are often criticised for not keeping up to date with modern technology and innovation. The Oxford series, however, are frequently updated, meaning that if you get the most recent edition you can be sure that it will stay relevant for a good few years.

The Oxford Russian Dictionary - Our Rating

Russian Learners' Dictionary: 10,000 Words in Frequency Order

Lists the 10,000 most frequently used Russian words (with English translations), starting from most commonly used downwards. The first 1,500 also come with example sentences. Excellent resource for filling in any important gaps in your vocabulary. Can also be used to provide a rough estimate of your vocabulary size.

When you consider that the average native speaker knows about 20-35,000 words , it’s clear that this book will do wonders for your Russian if you have the stamina to get to the end.

The dictionary allows you to follow a systematic programme of vocabulary learning – master the most common words and then move on to the rarer ones.

Minimum Vocabulary Required for Each CEFR Level

Fire_Irbis/shutterstock.com

One negative, however, is that it only gives limited definitions. You will probably want to cross-check with another dictionary to make sure you know what each word means across different contexts.

Russian Learners' Dictionary - Our Rating

Anki is a spaced repetition flashcard programme. It uses an algorithm that learns which words you find easy to remember and which ones don’t, and adjusts how frequently it tests you on these particular words accordingly. It is completely free and easy to install.

Everyone learns vocabulary in their own way – some people simply suck words in like a sponge and don’t need to make any active effort; for others, nothing seems to stick unless they learn it off by heart.

If you’re the former – great! If not, Anki will prove invaluable.

Essentially, Anki is a flashcard app. But what differentiates it from the hundreds of competitors is the spaced repetition algorithm that it uses. This means that it is able to remember which words you find more difficult to recall than others and to test you on them more frequently.   

While some of the settings can be a little fiddly, and synchronisation between phones and computers can play up, it is generally an extremely reliable app and one that we wished we had used from day one of our language learning.

Even if you only use Anki for half an hour each day, you’ll see marked improvements in your vocabulary. 

Anki - Our Rating

The good thing about Anki is that sometimes you don’t even have to compile vocabulary decks yourself. If you search around on the internet, you can sometimes find pre-made decks that you can import into your folders.

One such deck, created by Neri, displays 5,000 Russian sentences sorted from easiest to hardest. It’s a great way to gradually build up set-phrases and connecting words. You can download the deck from here .

Beginners - Reading

Choosing reading material is not easy when you’ve just started learning a foreign language. The vast majority of books and newspapers available to you will be too challenging at this point, and yet, equally, you can’t stay tethered to the artificially simplistic exercises in your textbooks for too long.

So where is the best place to start once you’re ready to venture out into the world of literature?

Many language guides come out with the same suggestion: start with children’s books. This is TERRIBLE advice. There is nothing easy about children’s literature – especially for learners of Russian! Although the concepts and storylines are simplistic enough to be enjoyed by toddlers, you face a number of surprisingly tricky linguistic challenges, such as a confusing array of diminutives, strange vocabulary, and irregular sentence structure.

A far better option would be to start off with something aimed at older children/teenagers . The vocabulary in these books is still pretty simple, but the grammar is often more regular than those aimed at younger readers.

The Adventures of Tintin

Classic comic book series by Belgian artist, Hergé. Fun and interesting stories with non-complex language and sentence structure. Excellent for beginner readers to build their colloquial comprehension. Entire series can be found here .

If you’ve worked through about half of the Penguin Course, you should find it relatively easy to read one of the Tintin books .

As well as being great stories in themselves, the comic book format means that you’re reading succinct speech bubbles, rather than long sentences. This makes for good, easy practice texts while you’re still mastering trickier grammatical elements, like participles and relative clauses.

New Penguin Parallel Text: Short Stories in Russian

Classic short stories with the Russian original on the left hand page and the English translation on the opposite page. All stories are from the twentieth century and feature writers that readers may not be familiar with, giving a fresh perspective on Russian literature.

When you’ve finished the textbook the best thing to do is to read some Russian texts with parallel translations . Having to go back and forth between the book you’re reading and a dictionary can be incredibly frustrating, and often saps a lot of the fun out of reading.

This is the solution: collections of classic short stories from the Soviet and post-Soviet eras with English translations on the opposite page.

Beginners - Writing

At this stage, most of your writing needs will be taken care of by the Penguin Course, which contains plenty of sentence-formation exercises.  But if you want a little extra practice, you should investigate the Ruslan workbooks

Ruslan Student Workbook

A decent workbook with over 200 written exercises to supplement a beginner’s Russian course. The content is colourful and attractive, and features some interesting cultural insights. It is designed to be used alongside the Ruslan communicative course, but can also be used as a standalone product.

Sadly, it’s a fact that there is a real paucity of material to help beginners improve their written Russian.  This means that the Ruslan series gets on our list by default, and not because we think it is an excellent workbook.

With around 200 written exercises it does what it says on the tin, and the attractive visual content and interesting cultural highlights mean that it is perfectly usable.  However, there is nothing particularly special about Ruslan, and it is as yet unclear how effective it is as a standalone product (there is a coursebook that you buy as well). 

Ruslan Student Workbook - Our Rating

Russian Handwriting

A step-by-step workbook that teaches Russian cursive handwriting. Each letter is broken down into clear steps that show you how to write it cursively. Lots or practice in the form of example letters, words, phrases, and sentences. Three separate volumes in case you get through the first one and want more practice.

Handwriting is a bit like crooked teeth – the earlier you sort it out the easier your life will be in the future . 

The majority of Russian textbooks will only use the print alphabet and omit the cursive version entirely. The reason for this is obvious: cursive can be extremely confusing!  While each letter looks quite distinct in print, in cursive a lot of the letters look almost identical:

This is just something we have to deal with.  And while the Penguin Course – to its credit – does have a chapter dedicated to cursive, it moves on from it pretty quickly, never to return.

Don’t let yourself experience the shock of sticking solely to print while learning, only to go to Russia to find that a huge amount of writing is done in cursive. These workbooks provide plenty of practice.  Although they are priced slightly cheekily, in the long run they are worth the initial investment.

Russian Handwriting - Our Rating

Beginners - speaking.

Get speaking as soon as you can ! It’s the hardest (and most important) language skill, but the one that we most often neglect.

Although you could get a private tutor straight off the bat, it may be cheaper and more constructive to enrol on an evening course in your city.

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The hourly prices of these courses are often twice as cheap as those that a native speaker will charge for one-to-one tuition in your city. On the other hand, a large class will limit the amount of time you get to speak, and sitting patiently while the inevitable class laggard struggles through material that you mastered weeks ago can be incredibly irritating.

Well-reviewed Russian courses in selected cities include:

• New York - ABC Languages
• Los Angeles - Santa Monica Language Academy
• Chicago - Cloudberry Language School
• Houston - Glasscock School of Continuing Studies
• Philadelphia - Bryn Mawr College
• Phoenix - Arizona Language Institute
• San Diego - San Diego Russian School
• Dallas - Russian School of Dallas
• San Jose - San Jose Learning Center
• Toronto - Hansa Language Centre
• Vancouver - International House
• London - Pushkin House Russian Language Centre , School of Slavonic and East European Studies Evening Courses
• Sydney - University of Sydney Centre for Continuing Education

Beginners - Listening

Here we narrow down the best courses, channels, and podcasts for beginners to take their listening skills to the next level

Rocket Russian

The best online Russian course for beginners looking to kickstart their listening skills. Packed full of targeted audio and writing exercises, all organised thematically. Seamless transition from desktop to mobile app, and vice versa. No subscription – a reasonable one-off fee unlocks the entire platform for life.

Incredible online language learning system. Huge number of audio and video podcast lessons, extensive vocabulary lists, personalised learning programmes, PDF worksheets, review quizzes, and many more tools. Dedicated friendly staff and frequently updated content make this an excellent resource to get your listening off the ground.

In compiling this guide we trialled over a dozen of the top online Russian courses.  Rocket Russian stood out as easily the best of the bunch – here’s why:

The content is thematic

We are huge fans of thematic vocabulary learning (Using Russian Vocabulary, for instance, is an essential resource to get) as we have found that structured learning is the best way to keep words in your long-term memory. We were really pleased to see that the team at Rocket Russian share this viewpoint and organise their lessons along thematic lines.

The mobile app is brilliant

Most language apps come across as little more than half-hearted afterthoughts. Some platforms even have the audacity to charge you extra for it. Rocket Russian’s mobile app (free for both iOS and Android) has been designed excellently and was far more intuitive than all of its rivals.

It doesn't smother you with unnecessary features

Rocket Russian only provides you with the tools you need to make real progress with your Russian – interactive audio lessons, detailed writing exercises, and an excellent narrative story which solidifies your situational vocabulary.

Everything is 100% downloadable

This means that you can sit down and get all of the material in one place – no need to keep going in and out of the site itself to use its contents.

Real-life audio from the start

The sooner a student weans themselves off what we call ‘teacher-speak’, the sooner they will understand real conversations. This is what Rocket Russian does from the very beginning, using authentic dialogues to build your listening skills up.

No subscription

Almost all online language courses nowadays charge for monthly/yearly subscriptions, meaning that over time they turn out to be very expensive. With Rocket Russian, however, once you’ve paid the one-off fee you get access to the full platform for life. Although the price may seem a bit steep, you then fully own all of the lessons and downloadable material inside – you’re not ‘renting it’. This means that in the long run Rocket Russian is probably the cheapest course on the market.

Give it a go!

Sign up for Rocket Russian's free trial here:

RussianPod101

We are naturally suspicious of online language courses, as the vast majority do not deliver on their promises – RussianPod101 is one of the few exceptions.

For a very reasonable price you gain access to a veritable treasure trove of Russian learning tools and resources, including:

High quality audio and video podcast lessons

Printable pdf lesson notes, 2000 most common words list, entertaining review quizzes, database of russian grammar constructions, 1-to-1 direct instruction from native russians, interactive pronunciation comparison tool, portable survival phrases centre, a personalised learning programme.

Although the lessons are probably a bit on the easy side for advanced learners, for beginners this is an absolute must-have resource.  The sheer quantity of audio and video lessons alone makes it far and away the most efficient way to improve your Russian listening skills .

RussianPod101 has been expanding steadily for the last few years thanks to its dedicated team.  As it is continuously adding new content to the site you can be sure that you will always have fresh material to practice with.

RussianPod101 - Our Rating

Interested.

If you want to make sure that RussianPod101 is the right product for you, have a look at our detailed review

While the online courses that we’ve reviewed above are excellent, make sure you don’t neglect the thousands of free YouTube channels dedicated to teaching Russian:

Amazing Russian

Weekly Russian

Huliganov's Russian Course

Amazing Russian is hands down the best YouTube channel out there for beginners looking to improve their listening skills.

The reason why we are so enthusiastic is because it is rare to come across such a practical and educational channel on YouTube.   Most ‘learn Russian’ channels rely heavily on gimmicks and flashy appearances without delivering much substance.   But if you want to make real headway with your listening then this is the channel for you.

The videos, mostly dealing with everyday situations, effectively ease students into the listening comprehension with a steady speaking pace, core vocabulary, and optional subtitles.

Weekly Russian is a bit different from other channels. Instead of going over the (admittedly important) mundane practicalities of everyday life, Natalia posts videos covering music, poetry, cartoons, films, all with English subtitles.

Despite the channel’s name, it is updated quite infrequently, but still definitely worth subscribing to.

One of the nicest ways to get into learning Russian is Viktor Dmitrievich Huliganov’s channel.   They start by going over a letter of the alphabet/simple grammatical topic, before telling a classic Russian joke, and finally ending with a Russian song.

Beginners - Bonus

Russian Keyboard Stickers

High-quality transparent stickers for laptop keyboards. Versions for both black and white keyboards available.

Unless by some extraordinary coincidence you bought your computer in the former Soviet Union, your keyboard won’t have the Cyrillic alphabet on it.

In time, this will prove to be a real annoyance , especially as there are so many great resources on the internet that require you to type in Russian.

Fortunately, the solution is both simple and cheap: you can find a range of transparent Cyrillic stickers that sit neatly on your keyboard without obscuring the original Latin symbols.

Beginners | Intermediate | Advanced  

Intermediate - Grammar & Vocabulary

The Penguin Course does a really good job in laying a solid grammatical foundation.   By the end of it you will confident enough to have non-trivial conversations with Russian speakers.   However, you will also realise that you have only scratched the surface, and that there is still a huge amount left to learn. In order to progress past this point, you need a broader resource.

A Comprehensive Russian Grammar

The Russian grammar bible. Period. No serious student of Russian should be without a copy of this authoritative grammar reference book. Covers virtually every topic you can think of, using fresh, interesting vocabulary to illustrate key points. Its structure layout allows students to master Russian grammar systematically.

If the Penguin Course was the tip of the grammar iceberg, this is the massive bulk floating under the water.  

It is difficult to convey how useful this book is for any student of Russian who wants to make real progress beyond the beginner’s level.   This 630-page reference work is encyclopaedic in its breadth and depth : its topics include pronunciation, punctuation, noun formation, verbs of motion, particles, diminutives, participles, gerunds, prepositions, word order, etc. Basically all of the rules – important and obscure – that you need to develop a robust grasp on how the language really works.

The example sentences are all taken from real literary and non-literary Russian sources, and are a breath of fresh air from the typically boring constructions that language books normally rely on.

A highly recommend resource .

A Comprehensive Russian Grammar - Our Rating

Using Russian Vocabulary

Divided into 18 thematic topics, this book provides the reader with over 5,000 Russian words and their translations. Each topic is broken down into three levels, starting with the most basic words and building up to some quite advanced (and obscure) vocabulary. Engaging self-study tasks at the end of each section and etymological insights make this an enjoyable and productive learning resource.

For those of you who have studied other languages, you may be familiar with Cambridge University Press’s excellent ‘ Using X Vocabulary ’ series.   If not, you will have to take our word that this is an invaluable textbook, that will raise all aspects of Russian proficiency.

Learning vocabulary can sometimes feel like a slightly random and chaotic experience – we get to grips with some areas quickly, only to discover (at just the wrong time!) that we have embarrassingly large gaps in our knowledge.

This is the solution. The book is divided into eighteen section (the natural world, industry, leisure & tourism, the physical body, etc.), and each section is divided into three subsections.   The first subsection contains basic vocabulary, whereas the last one will prepare you to authoritatively discuss the topic in question.  

This means that you can pick or choose sections depending on your strengths and interests , or, alternatively, work your way through it systematically.

Combined with Anki , it is the single best way to accumulate a large enough word base to sit the B1-C1 exams.

Intermediate - Reading

At this point you will feel ready to take off the training wheels and start reading some Russian literature in the original.

But there’s one thing you should know: not all classic writers are created equally when it comes to the difficulty of the works .   For example, the intermediate student who begins with one of Gogol’s short stories or Platonov’s novels will have a hard time getting through it.   The style and structure that these authors employ, make their books devilishly difficult to read.

Chekhov - The Collected Short Stories

Collected short stories from one of the masters of Russian literature. Tales in the volume include: ‘The lady with the Dog’, ‘The Princess’, ‘The Post’, and ‘Verochka’.

Collected short stories from one of the masters of Russian literature. Tales in the volume include: ‘The lady with the Dog’, ‘The Princess’, ‘The Post’, and ‘Verochka’. .

bookmonsterzero

Fortunately, there is a good place starting point: we recommend Chekhov .  

The way that Chekhov writes means that he is ideal for the intermediate student: his style is solid and sensible, the realism of his stories prevent confusion, and his choice of words – although firmly rooted in the 19 th century Russian tradition – are never flowery or redundant.

Who keeps the tavern and serves up the drinks? The peasant. Who squanders and drinks up money belonging to the peasant commune, the school, the church? The peasant. Who would steal from his neighbor, commit arson, and falsely denounce another for a bottle of vodka? The peasant. Anton Chekhov in Peasants

What’s more, his best writing was done in the form of short stories .   Even at this point you will rely heavily of a dictionary, and this means it will take you much longer to read one page of Russian than it would something written in your native language.   Reading a 10-page short story is an achievable task; being a hero and slogging through the Brothers Karamazov will not be much fun – yet!  

Chekhov Short Stories - Our Rating

Advanced Russian through History

Serious book covering the entire span of Russian and Soviet history, broken down into 36 concise chapters. Specifically designed for ambitious Russian students that want to gain greater historical awareness and improve their academic vocabulary. Online exercises and mini-lectures included.

If you want a more structured approach to getting your reading up, then Advanced Russian through History is a good option.

As you work through the 36 chronological chapters , taking you from Kievan Rus’ up to the Post-Soviet Era, you will notice that the difficulty of the text gradually becomes more challenging.   However, this progression is so incremental that you never feel too far out of your comfort zone.

Vocabulary keys, high-quality learning tasks, and mini-lectures (found on the publisher’s website ) make this a worthwhile book to buy.

Plus, it’s a fun way to learn more about Russian history!

Advanced Russian through History - Our Rating

It would also be a good idea to start reading the news in Russian. That way you will have a constant stream of new material covering a diverse range of topics.

All of the major Russian newspapers – Vedomosti , Kommersant , Novaya Gazeta – are worth reading, but our favourite website is the BBC’s Russian service .   It follows the rest of the BBC’s policy of using simple, clear diction and produces good, impartial articles on all major stories concerning Russia and the former Soviet Union.

In addition, the majority of the videos that you will find in the multimedia section now come with Russian subtitles – something that you will struggle to find elsewhere.

Intermediate - Writing

Wade’s Grammar is such an intimidating brick of a book that it can be difficult to know where to begin with it.   Because you now have so much information at your disposal you need an effective way to get it in your brain and keep it there.

Russian Grammar Workbook

Excellent workbook to accompany Wade’s grammar textbook. Crammed full of exercises to drill you on virtually everything you need to get your writing and speaking up to an advanced level.

Excellent workbook to accompany Wade’s grammar textbook. Crammed full of exercises to drill you on virtually everything you need to get your writing and speaking up to an advanced level. w

Fortunately, there is also a grammar workbook that can be used independently or in conjunction with the textbook.  

Both books share the same layout and subsection breakdown , so you can synchronise your grammar with written practice.   It features over 230 sets of exercises that involve all sorts of exercises: translation practice, sentence formation, etc.

Although it is only 270 pages, and some reviewers think it is a little on the pricey side for the number of exercises, it is worth pointing out that each of these ‘questions’ has multiple component parts.   This means that, given its size, you are getting a lot more value for money than this may suggest.  

A Russian Grammar Workbook - Our Rating

A Guide to Essay Writing in Russian

Ideal for high school or university students, this book is designed to help readers improve their essay writing skills in Russian. Contains grammar reference, key thematic vocabulary, and practical writing advice, as well as plenty of written exercises. Themes include climate, economics, politics, and organised crime.

All language learners have been set those uninspiring writing tasks from time to time: “write me an essay about what you got up to at the weekend”, “what is your favourite holiday destination”, etc.

What is so irritating about these topics is that, although the content is so simple a child could talk about them confidently, it can be surprisingly tricky to structure them properly.

Essay writing is a skill, and this well-written book will teach you how to excel at it.   Each thematic chapter starts with a grammatical guide, giving useful information on important aspects like conjunctions and word order, before presenting the reader with a series of exercises and essay questions.  

Each essay exercise comes with a template answer to help you develop the right instincts when faced with the real deal in an exam or professional situation.

A Guide to Essay Writing in Russian - Our Rating

Russian for Business Studies

Ideal guide for those that want to use their Russian for business purposes. Follows BCP’s general format of grammar, vocabulary, and written exercises. In particular, it is a nice way to learn those set phrases and pleasantries that pervade every office environment. Topics includes privatisation, entrepreneurship, advertising, and the banking system.

Also in BCP’s textbook series is Russian for Business Studies.   Like the Guide to Essay Writing, this book focuses on the specific grammar and vocabulary that will come in useful in a business context, before cementing this knowledge with a range of written exercises.

It was written in 2000 and doesn’t appear to have been updated since, leaving it vulnerable to the charge of being obsolete.   However, having worked through it, we can confirm that a surprisingly large proportion of the words are still used today, meaning that it’s still worth buying this book.

Of course, you won’t find up-to-date IT and technological terminology, so you will have to look elsewhere for this.   But if you are just interested in a general office-focused business textbook, this will do the job.

Russian for Business Studies - Our Rating

Intermediate - speaking.

In the long run, the only way to improve your Russian speaking is to speak Russian. A lot. For a long time.

If you’re at university and are majoring in Russian, your course should involve a year abroad in a Russian-speaking country.   This is obviously in an incredible opportunity that will give you give you the complete immersion that you need to push yourself out of your Anglophonic comfort zone.

If, however, you are studying independently, it might be difficult to replicate this experience.   You probably won’t be able to take months off from work to study in Russia. There, of course, are a lot of private language schools in all major cities of the former Soviet Union that offer short-term language lesson packages – Liden & Denz , Russianlab , and Language Link are three of the most popular.  

But the high prices that these centres charge might well mean that they are outside your budget.   Taking into account flights and living expenses in pricy cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg, you could easily burn through a few thousand dollars for a couple of weeks’ worth of tuition.

But don’t despair! There is a language school that offers excellent Russian lessons and a welcoming homestay experience with a local family , all for a very affordable price: The London School of Languages and Culture in Bishkek .

Bishkek is the capital of Kyrgyzstan , a Central Asian country that was formerly part of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire before it.   As such, everyone in the country speaks Russian as a first or second language.   This, couple with the fact that the cost of living is more than ten times cheaper than in Russia, makes it the perfect location to learn Russian for those on a budget.

The London School was founded in 1998, and since then has earned a reputation amongst Russian students as an honest and professional institution .   All of the admin involved in organising your stay in Kyrgyzstan (visa, airport pickup, accommodation and meal arrangements) is handled by the school’s competent English-speaking team.

The most important thing to note are the incredible prices: an hour’s worth of one-to-one private tuition with a qualified native speaker will only set you back $5-8 – there is quite simply nowhere else in the world that offers such value for money!

The lessons are top-notch as well.   The school uses its own online teaching system via classroom whiteboard projector screens, meaning that all of your modular lessons will follow the official structure of the course.   All of the teachers that taught us were friendly, knowledgeable, and highly professional .

If you take on the intensive course (20 hours per week), each school day will have a few hours of grammar in the morning followed by conversation and literature practice after lunch.   You will also be expected to complete homework for each class.   So you can expect to be very busy throughout your time in Kyrgyzstan!

Lessons finish at around 3 o’clock, giving you plenty of time to socialise and explore the city.   Bishkek is a pleasant city to live in: it has plenty of bars, restaurants, musical and theatrical performances to keep you entertained.   What is more, levels of English competency are generally very low in Kyrgyzstan, so you won’t have much trouble striking up a conversation with locals in Russian, only for them to switch to fluent English within a few seconds (as often happens in Moscow and St. Petersburg).

  With regards to living arrangements, you have two basic options: either live in the student dormitories that are located in the upper floors of the school itself, or live with a local family as a homestay arrangement (vetted and organised by the London School).   If you do the former you will spend a lot of your free time socialising with other English-speaking students, which is why we recommend that go for the homestay option.  

We guarantee you that you will learn just as much Russian by simply taking part in daily life with your host family as you do from the formal lessons.   Kyrgyz culture highly values hospitality , so you can be sure of a warm welcome and involvement in all of the family’s social life.

The school doesn’t offer any tuition over the weekend, but they do offer lots of extracurricular activities, including: horseback riding, bazaar visits, and mountain treks.

Of course, you can also organise excursions yourself – Kyrgyzstan is a beautiful mountainous country with loads to see and do.   We strongly recommend that you take the time to see Ala Archa National Park , Issuk-Kul Salt Lake , Osh , Karakol , and Arslanbob .  

No matter how long you are able to study at the London School you will come back feeling that your Russian has improved immeasurably.

The London School in Bishkek - Our Rating

But if you’re really not in a position to spend some time in a Russian-speaking country, the next best thing would be to find a language exchange partner in your home country.

If you’re fortunate enough to have a Russian community in your city, then there will be plenty of opportunities to get to know people and practice your Russian with them.   In theory at least…

Although America, Canada, and the UK are some of the most diverse countries in the world, which should  make learning foreign languages a breeze, there’s a major problem for us: most foreign residents speak excellent English.   They have to!   After all, we are extremely demanding when it comes to English proficiency and it is virtually impossible to get a decent job in these countries without fluent English.  

This means that 99% of the Russian speakers you will come across in your city will speak much better English than you speak Russian.   It’s very difficult to get someone to suffer your broken Russian when they know they could accelerate the conversation by switching to English.   Frustrating, but true!

One way you can get around this is by making a semi-formal agreement with your interlocutor that you will speak English for half of the time, and Russian for the other half – that way you both get something out of it.  

You can find people searching for this kind of arrangement on websites like My Language Exchange .

The success of the language exchange will vastly depend on how well your personality and linguistic requirements mesh with your partner’s.   It’s really a case of trial and error .   But if you find the right person you can rack up hours and hours of conversation practice without having to pay anything.

If, though, you live in small town and you can’t find any suitable prospective language partners, we recommend that you skip ahead and take a look at our speaking suggestions for advanced learners.

Intermediate - Listening

Respectable online language courses like RussianPod101 , should still challenge you as you move up to intermediate level Russian.   But now you should begin to spread your wings and start listening to real Russian conversations (i.e. not the watered-down Russian that teachers use).

Mosfilm Catalogue

Film studio behind classic Soviet films like The Irony of Fate , Moscow Does Not Believe In Tears , and Gentlemen of Fortune . Vast catalogue available to watch for free on Youtube and official website. Russian and English subtitles.

A few years ago Mosfilm – one of the oldest and most famous Russian film production companies – released a free catalogue of a huge number of their greatest films on YouTube and their official website .  

These are fantastic ways for improving your listening comprehension, not only because the vast majority of them come with both English and Russian subtitles , but also because these classic Soviet films have made a huge impact on Russian culture.   You’ll find that Russians are always making reference to quotes and characters from these films, so you need to understand what they’re talking about.  

As such, you’ll never be able to claim that you are truly fluent until you can appreciate these cultural nuances, as well as master the linguistic side of the language!

Important Info

Mosfilm catalogue - our rating.

The usefulness of slow news is a controversial topic.   Some people claim that it’s a good way of preparing yourself to listen to real Russian news programmes (in which the presenters speak at an ungodly  pace).   Others say that it’s better just to jump in at the deep end and get used to how people really speak.

We reckon that the latter position is probably closer to the truth.   But if you think listening to slowed-down news would help you at this point then we recommend working through the audio clips found on this website .  

Try to listen to the clip a few times without looking at the accompanying transcription to see if you can understand the general gist.   Once you can understand the main points of the news briefing, it’s time to move on to the real thing.

Intermediate - Bonus

Russian Swear Words

Teaches you the swear words that Russians really use. Takes pains to lay out the grammar and context behind each word so you can use it correctly. Lots of examples given.

Teaches you the swear words that Russians really use. Takes pains to lay out the grammar and context behind each word so you can use it correctly. Lots of examples given. .

Instead, the best thing is to learn those evergreen swear words that people actually use in real life and don’t make you sound stupid.  

The book tells you which words to use and exactly how Russians use (with the correct grammar).  

Even if you have no interest in using the words, it’s still a useful book to read through as you can be sure that you need to understand when people are swearing and what they are saying!

Russian Swear Words - Our Rating

  Beginners | Intermediate | Advanced  

Advanced - Grammar & Vocabulary

Having studied Russian seriously for a few years, you will have picked up a wide range of words and phrases.   Your vocabulary will probably be close to ~10,000 words .   This should allow you to say pretty much whatever you want to say without having to break rhythm and rack your brains for a translation.

However, just because you know lots of words does not mean that you know how to use them correctly and naturally .

Using Russian Synonyms

Designed to expand and deepen the vocabulary of intermediate-advanced students. A guide to finding the right word for the context by illustrating the (often) subtle difference between synonyms. Huge number of words and lexical groups covered, arranged in an orderly fashion with an index.

What do we mean by this?

Well, for example, we all know that when we go to a funeral and we are giving our condolences to the bereaved, that it is polite to talk about the person ‘passing away’, rather than straight ‘dying’ or ‘being killed’.   Although the latter two translations are technically correct, given the situation it would perhaps seem slightly awkward to use them in this context.

The same principle applies to all languages, and Russian isn’t an exception.   If you want to stop being ‘that foreigner that can speak Russian well, but awkwardly and disjointedly’, this book will be invaluable to achieving, not just fluency, but naturalness as well.

All the synonyms are collected as groups.   So ‘to die’, ‘to perish’, ‘to pass away’, etc. are all one group, with ‘to die’ – the most common and neutral synonym – being presented as the group leader. The group leaders are all arranged alphabetically, meaning that finding the group you need is exceedingly simple.

Within each group the author provides the necessary grammatical information to use the words correctly, but also explains in what context the word should be used, states the register of the word (i.e. is it slang, neutral, formal, etc.), and provides plenty of usage examples.

While this book isn’t the end of the road when it comes to vocabulary, if you can work your way through it and absorb as many of the lexical nuances that are presented to you, you will be knocking on the door to genuine native-level fluency.

An absolute essential for advanced Russian learners.

Advanced - Reading

At this level, you should be able to read virtually anything!   The entire world of Russian literature is now open for you to explore, and no writing in the contemporary media will be prohibitively challenging.

The main thing to do is to read widely – try to absorb as much vocabulary from as many genres, topics, and registers as you you’re able to bear.

Below we have listed some online newspapers and magazines that are worth bookmarking:

  Vedomosti

  Kommersant

  Forbes (Ru)

  Novaya Gazeta

  Radio Svoboda

  Nezavisimaya Gazeta

  Argumenty i Fakty

  Sovetsky Sport

  Autoreview

  Tekhnika Molodezhi

  Literaturnaya Gazeta

  Vokrug Sveta

Advanced - Writing

While reading proficiency will have taken off for most advanced speakers, many will find that their writing skills are seriously lagging behind.

Time to take action!

Using Russian

Focuses on areas of written Russian that English speakers in particular find challenging. Learn how contemporary Russian is actually used in the real world. An excellent choice for students that would like to use Russian for business purposes and want to improve the professionalism of their Russian.

Using Russian is a guide to advanced Russian usage, focusing on areas of grammar, vocabulary, style, and register that are particularly difficult for English speakers.

It assumes that you have a solid grammatical and lexical foundation, so is able to skip past standard grammatical topics and instead focus on a huge range of miscellaneous problems : neologisms, fillers, idioms, measurement, currency, faux amis, translation issues, jokes, puns, verbal etiquette, etc.

We really can’t rate this book highly enough: even if you learnt Wade’s Grammar off by heart, you would still come across thousands of annoying difficulties in trying to write perfect Russian.   While we obviously can’t claim that this book contains the answer to every single one of those problems, just one look at its contents pages should convince you that it’s a vital tool for advanced learners who want to take their Russian to the next level.

Using Russian - Our Rating

Perhaps you’ve already signed up to Vkontakte – if you haven’t you should now!

Vkontakte is the largest social media network in the Russian-speaking world .   You make a profile just as you would on Facebook (in fact, much of the interface is virtually identical), and you’re good to go.

Apart from staying in contact with people you’ve met on your travels, it’s clearly a fantastic resource for keeping up-to-date with modern Russian culture, news, and topics of conversation.

Why is it in our writing section? Well, obviously, once you’ve connected with some Russian friends you can use it to practise your Russian writing with them all of the time!

But let’s assume for a second that your friends have lives and don’t want to spending every waking minute of the day correcting your past perfective participles – who can you go to for writing practice?

It really is that simple!

Of course, like all of these mutual-assistance websites, the more you help others, the more you’ll receive corrections for the material you input.   Even if you’re not a particularly altruistic person, the benefits of having your writing corrected by a native more than outweigh the time costs of returning the favour.

The Russian section of the WordReference forum is a great alternative if you can’t be bothered with Lang-8’s reciprocal set-up.

You can ask virtually any question related to Russian and expect to get a detailed knowledgeable answer back within a few hours.   As with any forum, make sure you read up on the site’s rules and etiquette before posting.

Advanced - Speaking

If you’re not living in Russia, keeping your speaking up for an advanced learner can be surprisingly difficult.   Language classes in institutes aren’t really worth their high costs at this point because you just need to talk, not have grammar explained to you.

If you haven’t got a burgeoning Russian-orientated social life, then you need to create one artificially!

Online language learning website which connects language learners and teachers through video chat. Over 5,000 teachers to choose from, ranging from qualified professionals to community tutors. Prices per hour can be as low as $5 for Russian. Best way to keep up your speaking skills from home.

Italki is essentially an online marketplace that links up language students and tutors for affordable Skype lessons.

Teachers are divided into two categories: professional teachers and community tutors .

Professional teachers are in possession of teaching qualifications and tend to follow a structured lesson plan.   They may charge quite a bit, depending on the language being taught.   Community tutors on the other hand are just enthusiastic native speakers that can provide informal conversational lessons.   Their prices vary, but for some languages (including Russian!) you can get hour-long lessons for as low as $5 !

If you are an advanced Russian speaker, we recommend that you arrange lessons solely with community tutors – all you need at this point is conversation practice, and a lot of it!

Of course, you need to find a tutor that you like with and whose teaching style suits you well.   Luckily, there is the ‘trial lesson’ feature that allows you to try out tutors in half-hour lessons at heavily discounted rates .   So you can sample a number of tutors that you think look promising and then arrange further lessons with the ones that you get on best with.

On top of all this, Italki also features a messaging tool, language specific blogs, Q&A forums, and feedback notebooks for any writing tasks that tutors set you.

Italki really is a fantastic tool that all language learners should know about.   There is now no excuse not to take your speaking proficiency to the next level!

Italki - Our Rating

Advanced - listening.

Listening will remain a major hurdle for advanced learners, long after they have mastered other skills.   No matter how proficient you become in Russian you will always have to pay attention when a native starts talking to make sure you catch every word.

To feel truly confident with your listening you will need to watch many hours of Russian television and films.

Russian TV streaming service that allows you to watch popular Russian programmes in your home country. Hundreds of channels and thousands of films available mean that you will always have fresh listening material. Reasonably priced and no contracts.

If you are no longer living in Russia, we recommend that you purchase a subscription with Kartina .

Kartina is a streaming service (you will need to buy a Dune media streamer first) that distributes Russian television channels , targeting the Russian diaspora in most Western countries.

You link it up to your television and for a small monthly fee (around $10, no contract) you get access to a 150+ channels and 2000+ on-demand films from across the former Soviet Union.   All the programming is archived for two weeks, so you have complete control over when you watch your programmes.Once you have a Kartina account, as well as watching it through Dune on your television, you can also login via a laptop or with the official app (iPhone and Android) on your phone at no extra cost.

It’s a reliable, fast service that we have had no problems with over the years, and an excellent way to get some Russian listening practice in if you have a spare 15-30 minutes.

Kartina TV - Our Rating

The only criticism we have of Kartina is that none of the channels come with Russian subtitles.   This would be useful for learners who are not quite good enough yet to understand everything spoken on Russian television.   But considering that Kartina is primarily aimed at Russian expatriates, and not foreign language learners, it’s not surprising that this feature has been omitted.

Unfortunately, there doesn’t seem to be anything to fill this gap in the market – you will just have to struggle on with unsubtitled Russian television until you get used to the speed and complexity of the speech.

Otherwise, Youtube and Rutube are your friends.   You can actually find most of the programmes that you get through Kartina on these sites.   So if you’re on a budget, these can be a good alternative to the subscription service.

Advanced - Bonus

The Russian Word's Worth

Cultural study and colloquial dictionary rolled into one book. The collected articles of a long-time Moscow expat, covering a smorgasbord of interesting and quirky topics. Great fun and a good insight into how Russians really speak.

Cultural study and colloquial dictionary rolled into one book. The collected articles of a long-time Moscow expat, covering a smorgasbord of interesting and quirky topics. Great fun and a good insight into how Russians really speak. .

Translator and Moscow Times columnist, Michele Berdy has been living in Moscow for decades – since before the collapse of the Soviet Union, in fact.   In that time, she has built up an enormous wealth of knowledge about Russia, its culture, and its language.

The Russian Word’s Worth is a collection of her humorous articles on a variety of topics – politics, the workplace, holidays, etymology – all of them focused on translation and the struggle that expats have in expressing themselves correctly.  

You will pick up a lot of practical Russian vocabulary: how to: express your condolences, how to deal with plumbers, how to excuse yourself to go to the bathroom, among other things.

The articles are refreshingly apolitical – a rarity when it comes to Russia!   And the fact that the author doesn’t take herself too seriously makes them a pleasure to read.

All-in-all, It’s an excellent book for advanced learners who want to expand their colloquial grasp of the language and gain a deeper appreciation for Russian culture.

The Russian Word's Worth - Our Rating

Russian - English Dictionary of Idioms

Colossal collection of Russian idioms, old and new. Over 14,000 entries with explanations and examples. The only resource that any Russian learner would ever need to enrich their vocabulary with colourful idioms. A must-have for (in particular, literary) translators.

You can actually find hundreds of Russian idioms on Wiktionary (with their literal translations and English equivalents).  

But if you that’s not enough and you feel you want to delve deeper, then this dictionary is perfect for you.

With close to 14,000 fully-translated items from the nineteenth century to the present day, it can rightfully claim to be the ‘most innovative, comprehensive, and scholarly bilingual dictionary of Russian idioms available today’.

Like all good language books, it packed full of examples, grammatical explanations, and stylistic and usage information.

Russian - English Dictionary of Idioms - Our Rating

Introduction to Russian - English Translation

Very practical, hands-on guide for Russian-English translators. The main aim of the book is to identify problematic aspects of Russian and English that might cause translations to sound clunky or awkward. Provides numerous examples for each point made and supplementary exercises to test your knowledge.

Perhaps you want to do more than speak excellent Russian.   Perhaps you have ambitions of working as a professional Russian translator.

If that’s the case, it’s important that you realise that being a good linguist and being a good translator are two COMPLETELY different things.   They require different skills, and different competencies.   In fact, many people claim that to succeed as a translator depends more on how well you write in your native tongue than how well you speak the foreign language you’re translating from.

That’s why books like Introduction to Russian-English Translation are so important: they teach you the vital translation skills that you won’t get from general Russian textbooks.  

The book is focused solely on the specific language pair of Russian-English, covering topics such as:

• Key words vs props
• Identifiers
• Intensifiers
• Diminutives and augmentatives
• Loaded words and implication
• Delays and interruptions
• Rhetorical and pragmatic factors

If you don’t know what a lot of these terms mean, then … all the more reason you should buy this book!

Introduction to Russian - English Translation - Our Rating

  Beginners | Intermediate | Advanced

Language Level Guide

• A1-A2 on the CEFR scale
• Has been learning for 0-1 years
• Is able to understand and contribute to basic conversations 
• B1-B2 on the CEFR scale
• Has been learning for 1-3 years
• Can satisfy majority of communicative needs in a wide range of situations
• C1-C2 on the CEFR scale
• Has been learning for 3+ years
• Has a high level of command in all communicative contexts

Russian Writing Examples

The following shows writing examples at various proficiency levels. These were produced by real language learners and may contain errors. See Writing Section Tips at the bottom of this page.

Russian Proficiency Tests and Resources

Writing Section Tips

Additional resources can be found in the Power-Up Guide and on our Video Tutorials page.

• Be a ‘show-off’ – this is the time to show what you can do!
• Be organized in your writing.
• Challenge yourself to go above and beyond what you normally write.
• Be creative and don’t stress out over possible errors. Perfection is not the goal!

Simply do your best and enjoy creating and communicating in the language that you are learning.

How do I type in this language?

Read our Writing Input Guide to learn how to type in this language on Windows , Mac , or ChromeOS .

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Russian Texts for Beginners

Would you like to learn Russian or improve your understanding of the language? If your answer is yes, you're in the right place. Lingua.com has Russian texts with audio and exercises so that you can practice and improve your reading comprehension of this language.

Our Russian texts were written by teachers of the language, and are divided into different levels of difficulty and topics. Choose the one that best suits your needs or interests.

The texts are accompanied by audio files so that you can listen to the correct pronunciation of the words and sentences. If you wish, you can also download our Russian readings in PDF format.

Essay in Russian

Argumentative Essays

Narrative Essays

Comparative Essays

Student Partnership

Hello everyone,

Welcome to our class blog for Essay in Russian !

Here you will find examples of some of the essays written by UCL SSEES undergraduate students studying Russian as part of their degree.

The Essay in Russian module is an elective module of the Russian degree programme and aims to develop general transferable writing skills as well as essay writing in Russian. The content of the course is developed using both Process and Result oriented approaches to teaching writing. The module sets out to allow students to become independent and competent writers and give them the skills needed to produce coherent and cohesive written content in Russian.

Over the course of the 2018/19 academic year we covered four different types of essays: argumentative, narrative, reasoning, and comparative, plus a “review writing” – to all of which you can find sample essays in this blog.

Within the framework of the module, students were asked to create an individual online writer’s blog using the WordPress blogging platform where they published some of their work (essays or other posts). This was done as part of formative assessment and on an entirely voluntary basis.

Four different types of digital technologies were used to deliver this module and blogs were one part of them. The use of blogs was suggested to students in order to facilitate the idea of writing for audiences and to build their skills and confidence when writing. Using blogs also aimed to teach students to be accountable for the content they upload publicly and to serve as a tool of reflection on students’ writing process and progress. It also functioned as a motivational booster letting students see how they have improved over the course of the year. Moreover, in the future students can also use the blogs as Language Portfolios as evidence of their language proficiency to others, such as potential employers or other academic institutions.

I am very grateful to all my students who have contributed essay samples for this blog and who have provided continual valuable feedback on how to improve the module for future students. As a result of this successful pilot module and the feedback given by students this module has been refined, amended and improved and next academic year will run under the title Writing, Editing and Blogging in Russian. Thank you to all who helped to shape this module. Your responsive and positive attitude and collaboration is very much appreciated.

I hope you will enjoy the samples you read and will celebrate the achievements of our students!

With fondest regards,

Maria Sibiryakova ([email protected])

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Context sentences

English russian contextual examples of "essay" in russian.

These sentences come from external sources and may not be accurate. bab.la is not responsible for their content.

Synonyms (English) for "essay":

Pronunciation.

• espresso coffee
• espresso cup
• espresso drinks
• espresso machine
• espresso maker
• espresso powder
• esprit de corps
• essay address
• essay assignment
• essay competition
• essay contest
• essay describe
• essay discuss
• essay mills
• essay portion
• essay publish
• essay topic

Search for more words in the German-English dictionary .

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A Guide to Essay Writing in Russian

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Designed for student of Russians at A Level and beyond, this book first provides guidance on the basics of writing Russian and then goes on to give practical assistance in writing essays and projects in Russian on a range of topics - ranging from climate to organized crime - included in area studies courses on post-Soviet Russia. Each topic is divided into sections on vocabulary, phraseology and useful background information adaptable for self-teaching and for oral conversation classes. Exercises are included on specific grammar points and related vocabulary, all Russian texts included as information source and as models for adaptation are translated, and an English-Russian vocabulary is provided.

• ISBN-10 1853994936
• ISBN-13 978-1853994937
• Publisher Bristol Classical Press
• Publication date January 1, 1998
• Language English
• Dimensions 6 x 0.48 x 9 inches
• Print length 228 pages
• See all details

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• Publisher ‏ : ‎ Bristol Classical Press (January 1, 1998)
• Language ‏ : ‎ English
• Paperback ‏ : ‎ 228 pages
• ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 1853994936
• ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-1853994937
• Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 11 ounces
• Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 6 x 0.48 x 9 inches
• #10,371 in Foreign Language Instruction (Books)
• #223,032 in Unknown

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Contextualizing putin's "on the historical unity of russians and ukrainians".

Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent essay, "On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians," which was published on the Kremlin's website in Russian , English and Ukrainian , elaborates on his frequently stated assertion that Ukrainians and Russians are "one people." In what Anne Applebaum called “ essentially a call to arms ," Putin posits that Ukraine can only be sovereign in partnership with Russia, doesn't need the Donbas and nullified its claims on Crimea with its declaration of independence from the Soviet Union, and has been weakened by the West's efforts to undermine the unity of the Slavs.

Responses to the 5000-word article have ranged from deep concern to near dismissal , with some likening its statements to a justification for war and others pointing to its lack of novelty and suggesting that the primary audience is President Volodymyr Zelensky as he met with leaders in the West. (Zelensky, for his part, offered the tongue-in-cheek response that Putin must have a lot of extra time on his hands.) The discussions inspired by the essay have explored questions such as: Why is Russia so obsessed with Ukraine ? Where do the facts diverge from myth? What is Putin's motivation for writing this document? 

In August 2017, we published an interview with Serhii Plokhii (Plokhy) about his book  Lost Kingdom: The Quest for Empire and the Making of the Russian Nation , which addresses many of the themes emerging in discussions in the wake of Putin's statements. We are reposting the interview below for those who are interested in learning more about Russian nationalism and the intersection of history and myth, past and present.

In the coming weeks, we will also publish excerpts from Plokhii's forthcoming book The Frontline  in open access on our HURI Books website. 

August 2017 Interview

Covering the late 15th century through the present, this book focuses specifically on the Russian nationalism, exploring how leaders from Ivan the Terrible to Vladimir Putin instrumentalized identity to achieve their imperial and great-power aims. Along the way, Plokhy reveals the central role Ukraine plays in Russia’s identity, both as an “other” to distinguish Russia, and as part of a pan-Slavic conceptualization used to legitimize territorial expansion and political control. 

HURI:  Did you come across anything in your research that surprised you?

Plokhy:  A monument to St Volodymyr/ St Vladimir was recently constructed in the most coveted, the most prestigious, the most visible place in the Russian capital, right across from the Kremlin. To me, this was striking enough that I made it the opening of my book.

St. Volodymyr, the Prince who ruled in Kyiv, is more prominent in the Russian capital in terms of the size and location of the statue than the alleged founder of Moscow, Yuriy Dologorukii. Some pundits say that St. Volodymyr is a namesake of Vladimir Putin, so this is really a celebration of Putin, but excepting all of that, there has to be a very particular understanding of Kyivan history to allow one to place in the very center of Moscow a statue of a ruler who ruled in a city that is the now the capital of a neighboring country. 

That means the things I've discussed in the book are not just of academic interest for historians; the history of the idea of what historian Alexei Miller called the “big Russian nation,” is important for understanding Russian behavior today, both at home and abroad. 

HURI:  Do you have any sense of the attitude of Russian people toward the monument?

Plokhy:  Muscovites protested against the plan to place the monument at Voroviev Hills, overseeing the city, but I do not think anyone said that it honored the wrong person or anything like that.

HURI:  In a book that covers 500 years of history, some interesting common threads must appear. What are some of these constants?

Plokhy:  One common thread is the centrality of Ukraine in defining what Russia is and is not. The historical mythology of Kyivan Rus' is contested by Russians and Ukrainians. But no matter how strong or weak the argument on the Ukrainian side of the debate, Russians today have a difficult time imagining Kyiv being not part of Russia or Russia-dominated space and Kyivan Rus' not being an integral part of Russian history.

Ukraine and Ukrainians are important for Russian identity at later stages, as well. For example, the first published textbook of “Russian history” was written and published in Kyiv in the 1670s. This Kyivan book became the basic text of Russian history for more than 150 years.

In the 20th century and today, we see the continuing importance of Ukraine in the ways the concept of the Russian world is formulated, the idea of Holy Rus', church history and church narrative, and so on.

That is one of the reasons why post-Soviet Russia is not only engaged in the economic warfare, or ideological warfare with Kyiv, but is fighting a real physical war in Ukraine. On the one hand, it's counter-intuitive, given that Putin says Ukrainians and Russians are one and the same people, but, given the importance of Ukrainian history for Russia, it's a big issue for which they are prepared to fight.

HURI:  Can you talk about a few important actions or moments when Ukraine saw itself as a distinct group from the projected pan-Russian nation, and maybe when it saw itself as part of it?

The development of a separate Ukrainian identity, literature, and language was met in the 19th century with attempts to arrest that development. HURI recently published an important collection of articles,  Battle for Ukrainian , which (among other things) shows how important language is for the national formation and identity. The Russian Empire also treated language as a matter of security. That's why in 1863 it was the Minister of Interior who issued the decree limiting use of the Ukrainian language, not the Minister of Education, not the President of the Academy of Sciences, but the Minister of Interior. It was a matter of security.

The battles start then and focus on history and language, but for a long time the goal of Ukrainian activists was autonomy, not independence per se. The idea of Ukrainian independence in earnest was put on the political agenda in the 20th century and since then it's refused to leave. In the 20th century, we had five attempts to declare an independent Ukrainian state. The fifth succeeded in 1991, and then the question was, “Okay, you have a state, but what kind of nation does or will Ukraine have? Is it ethnic? Is it political? What separates Russia from Ukraine?” These are the questions that found themselves in the center of public debate. There’s probably no other country where the president would publish a book like  Ukraine Is Not Russia  (President Kuchma). You can't imagine President Macron writing France Is Not Germany or anything like that.

HURI:  Anne Applebaum said  during a lecture  at the Holodomor Research and Education Consortium, “If Stalin feared that Ukrainian nationalism could bring down the Soviet regime, Putin fears that Ukraine’s example could bring down his own regime, a modern autocratic kleptocracy.” Putin emphasizes the “sameness” of the nations, which would seem to increase the power of Ukraine’s example to undermine his regime. Do you think the the drive to call Ukrainians the same as Russians is informed not only by foreign policy, but also by domestic considerations? 

Plokhy:  I think so. Historically the two groups have a lot in common, especially since eastern and central Ukraine were part of the Russian Empire for a long period of time, starting in the mid-17th century. Therefore, common history is certainly there, and the structure of society, the level of education, the level of urbanization, and other things are similar.

Because of these connections, if Ukraine could do certain things, it would be much more difficult to say it can’t be done in Russia, that Russia has a special destiny, that democracy would never work in Russia, and so on and so forth. That would be not just a geopolitical setback for Russia, but would undermine the legitimizing myth Russia needs in order to have an authoritarian regime. 

HURI:  Are there any important differences between the behavior of Putin and previous leaders?

The policies introduced in the occupied territories in eastern Ukraine or in Crimea offer very little space for Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture. That's a big difference in thinking from what we had in most of the 20th century, when there were all sorts of atrocities but at least on the theoretical level the Ukrainian nation’s right to exist was never questioned. Now it is. The recent attempt to declare “Little Russia” in Donbas and under this banner to take over the rest of Ukraine, promoted by Mr. Surkov, has failed, but it shows that the Russian elites prefer to think about Ukraine in pre-revolutionary terms, pretending as though the revolution that helped to create an independent Ukrainian state and the Soviet period with its nation-building initiatives had never taken place.

HURI:  How about the mentality of Russian citizens toward Ukrainians?

Plokhy:  When the conflict started, Putin was voicing the opinion of the majority of Russians that there is no real difference between Russians and Ukrainians, but the war is changing that. We see a much bigger spike of hostility toward Ukraine on the side of Russian population as compared to the spike of anti-Russian feelings in Ukraine, which also reveals a lot about the two societies and how state propaganda works.

HURI:  Speaking of Russian nation-building and nationalism, what about the non-Slavic peoples, particularly those living to the east of the Urals? Has their inclusion and sense of belonging in the Russian state (or empire) changed over time?

Plokhy:  I leave this subject largely outside the frame of this book, which focuses mainly on relations between Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarusians, and how the sense of Russian identity evolved over time. But non-Slavs are extremely important part of Russian imperial history as a whole.

Russia today, compared to imperial Russia or the Soviet Union, has lost a lot of its non-Russian territories, including Ukraine and Belarus, but still a good number of non-Slavs live in the Russian Federation. On the one hand, the government understands that and tries not to rock the boat, but exclusive Russian ethnic nationalism is generally on the rise in Russia. The Russians who came to Crimea, the people who came to Donbas, like Igor Girkin (Strelkov), they came to Ukraine with a pan-Russian ideology. It's not just anti-Western, it puts primacy on the ethnically, linguistically, culturally understood Russian people, which certainly threatens relations with non-Russians within the Russian Federation.

What we see is the ethnicization of Russian identity in today's Russia. It has a lot of ugly manifestations, but overall it's a common process for many imperial nations to separate themselves from their subjects and possessions. Russians redefine what Russians are by putting emphasis on ethnicity. We witnessed such processes in Germany, and in France, and in both countries there were a lot of unpleasant things, to put it mildly.

Plokhy:  For a long time, Russian ethnic nationalism, particularly in the Soviet Union, was basically under attack. Russian as lingua franca was of course supported and promoted, the dominance of Russian cadres in general was supported, but the emphasis on ethnicity, on Russian ethnicity in particular, was not welcome because that could mobilize non-Russian nationalism as a reaction, and that was a threat to the multi-ethnic character of the state.

Today, Russia is much less multi-ethnic than it was during Soviet times, and the regime is much more prepared to use ethnic Russian nationalism for self-legitimization or mobilization for war, like the war in Ukraine. All of that contributes to the rise of ethnic nationalism. The government relies more on its support and it provides less of a threat to the state, given that the state is less multi-ethnic.

HURI:  With the belief that Russia's borders should come in line with the ethnic Russian population, doesn't that create a danger with Chechnya and other autonomous republics in the Caucasus having a reason to leave?

Plokhy:  It does. One group of ethnicity-focused and culture-focused Russian nationalists are saying that Russia should actually separate from the Caucasus. If you bring ethnonationalist thinking to its logical conclusion, that's what you get, and that's what some people in Russia argue. They're not an influential group, but they argue that.

HURI:  And what about, say, eastern Russia?

Plokhy:  Yes, in terms of geography, it is easier to imagine Chechnya and Dagestan leaving than Tatarstan. That is why extreme Russian nationalism is an export product for the Russian government, rather than the remedy the doctor himself is using at home. It is used to either annex or destabilize other countries, but within the country itself there is an emphasis on the multi-ethnicity of the Russian political nation. Putin has to keep the peace between the Orthodox and Muslim parts of the population.

The goal is to keep the post-Soviet space within the Russian sphere of influence. In the case of Georgia and Ukraine, the goal is also to preclude a drift over to the West; in the Baltic States, to question the underlying principle of NATO, that countries like the US or Germany would be prepared to risk a war over a small country like Estonia. Large NATO countries don't have the answer to that dilemma yet, and Putin is trying to create a situation where the answer will be “no.” So it's great power politics, it's sphere-of-influence politics.

Putin and the people around him are not ideologically driven doctrinaires. They use ideology to the degree that it can support great power ambitions and their vision of Russia’s role in the world. They jumped on the bandwagon of rising Russian nationalism, seeing in it an important tool to strengthen the regime both at home and abroad.

Ukraine became a polygon where the strength of Russian nationalism as a foreign policy was tested for the first time. The Baltic states have a big Russian-speaking minority where the "New Russia" card can be played if the circumstances are right.

HURI:  Was there a point after the fall of the Soviet Union when Russia turned back to an imperial model of Russian identity? Or was it never going to become a modern nation state?

Plokhy:  The shift started in the second half of the 1990s, but it really began to solidify when Putin came to power in 2000.

The 1990s for Russia were a very difficult period as a whole. Expectations were extremely high, but there was a major economic downturn, the loss of the status of a super power. This discredited the liberal project as a whole, in terms of foreign policy, in the organization of a political system, in the idea of democracy itself. The only thing from the West that Russia adopted to a different degree of success was a market economy. The market per se and private property, despite the high level of state influence, is still there, but the democracy did not survive. The Yeltsin-era attempt to shift from “Russkii” to more inclusive “Rossiyanin” as the political definition of Russianness also found itself under attack. The rise of ethnic Russian nationalism undermines the liberal model of the political Russian nation.

Society’s disappointment in the 1990s led to a search for alternatives, which were found in the idea of strengthening the power of the state and led to the rise of authoritarian tendencies. At the same time came Russia’s attempt to reclaim its great power status, despite an extreme gap between its geopolitical ambitions and economic potential. Today, Russia isn't even part of the ten largest world economies, so its GDP is smaller than Italy’s and Canada’s and is on par with South Korea’s. Think about Italy or Canada conducting that kind of aggressive foreign policy. You see the discrepancy right away.

This aggressive policy is a terrible thing for Ukraine and other countries, but it's also not good at all for Russia’s society, for the Russian economy, for the future of Russia as a state.

HURI:  What do you think of the term "managed democracy"? Do you think that's an accurate term?

Plokhy:  That's certainly the term that you can use to destroy democracy and get away with it.

Post-imperial countries - and that applies to the new nations in the post-Soviet space - face special difficulties in that regard. The majority of countries that were subjects of empires probably go through a period of authoritarian rule, and that's because they have to organize themselves, they have to build institutions. Think about Poland or Romania during the interwar period. You see the same situation in Belarus and Kazakhstan. Russia fell in that category as well. It was running an empire and had a long tradition of institutions, but none of those institutions were democratic.

Ukraine is an outlier in that sense. It's maintained its democratic institutions. It's paying a price for that, but the society is quite committed to keep going as a democratic country. There were two attempts -- one under President Kuchma, which resulted in one Maidan, and one under President Yanukovych, which resulted in another Maidan -- attempts to strengthen the presidential branch and join the post-Soviet authoritarian sphere. Both attempts were rejected by the Ukrainian society.

Foreign factors paid their role as well. But one should not overestimate those. On a certain level, the US was trying to help strengthen the democratic society and Russia was trying to strengthen the authoritarian tendencies in Yanukovych's regime, but in the end, it wasn’t up to outside players. The Ukrainian society made the decision, and in the last 25 years both attempts at authoritarianism failed.

They're issued by different publishers that view their readership differently. The title is the part of the book where the publisher has as much influence as the author, or maybe even more, and marketing people are also involved. The titles reflect the different ways publishers understand what is most important and can be conveyed in the most direct way to the readership.

HURI:  And I would guess it’s the same with the different cover art? What’s the significance of the images?

The same thing with the images. With the American one, there was a number of possibilities, and the publisher listened to my preference. The European one just produced something, and I accepted it.

So it's directly related to the story told in the book, but I also liked it as an image because it's extremely detailed, with a lot of things happening at the same time. It is easy to get lost in these details of battle. It fits the main title of the book,  Lost Kingdom , pretty well. The idea is that with all these wars and interventions, Russia lost its way to modern nationhood.

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Russia’s war in Ukraine, explained

Putin’s invasion in February began Europe’s first major war in decades.

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Russia is bombarding major cities in Ukraine, more than a week into a war where Moscow has faced setbacks on the battlefield — yet seems undeterred from its campaign to take Ukraine.

Get in-depth coverage about Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Why Ukraine? 

Learn the history behind the conflict and what Russian President Vladimir Putin has said about his war aims .

The stakes of Putin’s war

Russia’s invasion has the potential to set up a clash of nuclear world powers . It’s destabilizing the region and terrorizing Ukrainian citizens . It could also impact inflation , gas prices , and the global economy. 

How other countries are responding

The US and its European allies have responded to Putin’s aggression with unprecedented sanctions , but have no plans to send troops to Ukraine , for good reason . 

How to help

Where to donate if you want to assist refugees and people in Ukraine.

On March 4, Russia seized Zaporizhzhia , one of Europe’s largest nuclear power plants. Russian shelling of the southeastern Ukraine facility set off a fire , which Ukrainian officials warned could set off a nuclear disaster. It took hours, but the fire was extinguished, and international monitors said that they do not detect elevated radiation levels and that the fire did not damage “essential” equipment. US officials have said Russia now appears to be in control of the plant.

But the incident was a reminder of how dangerous this war in Ukraine is becoming, and how uncertain and confusing things still are on the ground. Russian troops were advancing toward Kyiv, and thousands and thousands are fleeing in advance of a possible siege on the city.

The Russian military has made advances in the south, and are gaining in the area of Kherson, a port city on the Black Sea whose control is reportedly contested , and Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov. Russian bombardment of these cities has resulted in humanitarian issues , with bridges and roads damaged by the fighting and dwindling access to food, clean water, medicine, and electricity in certain areas. Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, experienced heavy Russian fire this week, and strikes have heavily damaged residential areas .

Ukrainian and Russian officials met in early March, and tentatively agreed on the need to humanitarian corridors — basically, safe zones for civilians to flee and supplies to pass through — but did not reach agreements on a larger ceasefire. As of March 6, multiple attempts to evacuate Ukrainian civilians have been halted because of Russian shelling.

Putin’s attempt to redraw the map of Europe risks becoming the most devastating conflict on the continent since World War II. Already, it is causing an astounding humanitarian crisis: Hundreds, perhaps thousands , of civilians have died, and more than 1.5 million people have fled the violence so far, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, making it the fastest-growing refugee crisis in Europe since World War II.

The battle for Ukraine began in the early morning hours, local time, on February 24, when Russian President Vladimir Putin launched what he called a “special military operation” into the country of about 40 million. He claimed the Russian military seeks “demilitarization and denazification” but not occupation; attacks shortly followed from multiple fronts and targeted toward multiple cities.

Ukraine’s resistance has complicated Russia’s efforts to seize the country. Russian forces have not made the progress they likely thought they would at the start of the campaign. The Russian military’s early strategy has perplexed some experts and observers . But the more protracted this war becomes, the more catastrophic it will be.

The United States and its allies in Europe and the United Kingdom imposed the toughest financial sanctions ever on Russia after the first incursion, and have only built on these penalties since. On February 26, the United States and European countries agreed to block some Russian banks from SWIFT, a global messaging system, which will essentially prevent those institutions from doing any global transactions, a punishment that allies had previously hesitated to pursue . Already, Russia’s economy is reeling from the impact of these penalties .

This sustained international pressure, and Ukraine’s resistance, may still not be enough to force Russia to end its military campaign. That leaves Ukraine — and the world — in a perilous and unpredictable moment.

Ukraine is under siege

After months of Putin building up tens of thousands of troops near the Ukrainian border and a series of failed diplomatic talks, Russia is now waging a full-out war on Ukraine.

Tensions escalated quickly when, on February 21, Putin delivered an hour-long combative speech that essentially denied Ukrainian statehood . He recognized the independence of two breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine where Moscow has backed a separatist rebellion since 2014 and sent so-called peacekeeping forces into the region. As experts said , that was likely just the beginning, setting the stage for a much larger conflict.

Days later, that larger conflict materialized. On February 24, Putin announced he was launching an assault “to defend people who for eight years are suffering persecution and genocide by the Kyiv regime,” a reference to a false claim about the government in Ukraine. He demanded Ukraine lay down its weapons or be “ responsible for bloodshed .”

Soon after Putin’s speech, reports emerged of explosions around cities, including Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine and the capital Kyiv . The Ukrainian foreign minister called it “a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.” By the afternoon in Ukraine, Russian troops and tanks had entered the country on three fronts : from Belarus in the north, from the east of Ukraine, and from the south.

The Russian military has targeted critical infrastructure, like airports, with airstrikes and has launched more than 400 missiles , as of March 1. As a senior US defense official said on February 26, “There’s no doubt in our mind that civilian infrastructure and civilian areas are being hit as a result of these barrages.”

The main battlefronts are in Kyiv’s outskirts; in southern Ukraine, including the major city of Mariupol; and in eastern Ukraine around Kharkiv, the country’s second-largest city.

NEW #Ukraine Conflict Update; Click the link to read the latest assessment from @TheStudyofWar and @criticalthreats https://t.co/0Hb0nLSebU pic.twitter.com/RINKbJsJIM — ISW (@TheStudyofWar) March 4, 2022

“They had maximal war aims,” Michael Kofman, research director in the Russia studies program at CNA, said in an interview posted on Twitter on February 25. “They had a military operation that’s now in progress, first to try to achieve regime change, encircle the capital, and try to overthrow the Ukrainian government, and then a much larger set of pincer movements to encircle and envelope Ukrainian forces. Try to do this quickly and force surrender of isolated pockets.”

But the Russian army has not been able to completely roll over Ukrainian forces, and some analysts have suggested Moscow may have been surprised at Ukraine’s resistance. Pentagon officials said that, as of March 4, Russia has committed about 92 percent of its combat power so far. Ukraine’s airspace remains contested.

Samuel Charap, a senior political scientist at RAND Corporation, told a panel of reporters on February 28 that Russia’s military performance has been odd. “In other words, some of the things that I would have expected — like the air force taking a major role — have not happened.”

“Seems to me there was a lot of war optimism and a sense that the [Ukrainian] government would fall with just a little push,” Charap continued. “And that didn’t happen. I wouldn’t read too much into that about the ultimate course of the war, though. This is still a situation where the deck unfortunately is stacked against the Ukrainians, despite their bravery.”

Putin himself has called on the Ukrainian army to “take power into their own hands and overthrow” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a sign that Putin remains focused on regime change. “According to the available intelligence, the enemy marked me as a target No. 1 and my family as the target No. 2,” said Zelenskyy, speaking on the night of February 24.

Efforts to stop the fighting have so far failed. On February 28, high-level officials from Russia and Ukraine met at the Ukraine-Belarus border, and again on March 3. Russia has continued to insist that a ceasefire requires “demilitarization” and neutrality for Ukraine, but Ukraine has only continued to push for more military aid and ascension into Western bodies like the EU, even signing an EU membership application amid the fighting .

Both Ukraine and Russia have suggested they will hold another round of talks in coming days. Across conflicts, there is usually a severe escalation in fighting before ceasefires, as everyone attempts to maximize their leverage. “I think that they want to inflict maximum damage to pressure the Ukrainian government to seek some sort of ceasefire that is effectively a surrender,” said Margarita Konaev, associate director of analysis and research fellow at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology.

The toll of this young conflict is growing. The UN has said that, as of March 6, more than 350 civilians have been confirmed killed and hundreds more have been wounded; Ukraine’s emergency services puts the civilian death toll at 2,000 people as of March 2 . Ukrainian officials have said about 11,000 Russian troops have been killed in the fighting, as of March 6, but American and European estimates of Russian casualties have been substantially lower . The Russian government has reported nearly 500 soldier deaths . Experts said all these statistics should be treated with a great deal of caution because of the fog of war and the incentives both Russia and Ukraine have to push a particular narrative.

Ukrainian officials have also accused Russia of war crimes after reports of a shelling of an orphanage and kindergarten outside of Kyiv . Across Ukraine, thousands of civilians of all ages are enlisting to fight . Ukrainian officials called on residents to “make Molotov cocktails” to defend against the invasion. More than 1.5 million Ukrainians have fled to neighboring countries like Poland since the conflict began, according to a United Nations estimate .

The roots of the current crisis grew from the breakup of the Soviet Union

Russia’s invasion contravenes security agreements the Soviet Union made upon its breakup in the early ’90s. At the time, Ukraine, a former Soviet republic, had the third-largest atomic arsenal in the world. The US and Russia worked with Ukraine to denuclearize the country, and in a series of diplomatic agreements , Kyiv gave its hundreds of nuclear warheads back to Russia in exchange for security assurances that protected it from a potential Russian attack.

But the very premise of a post-Soviet Europe is helping to fuel today’s conflict. Putin has been fixated on reclaiming some semblance of empire, lost with the fall of the Soviet Union. Ukraine is central to this vision. Putin has said Ukrainians and Russians “ were one people — a single whole ,” or at least would be if not for the meddling from outside forces (as in, the West) that has created a “wall” between the two.

Last year, Russia presented the US with a list of demands , some of which were nonstarters for the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Putin demanded that NATO stop its eastward expansion and deny membership to Ukraine, and also made other demands for “security guarantees” around NATO.

The prospect of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO has antagonized Putin at least since President George W. Bush expressed support for the idea in 2008. “That was a real mistake,” Steven Pifer, who from 1998 to 2000 was ambassador to Ukraine under President Bill Clinton, told Vox in January. “It drove the Russians nuts. It created expectations in Ukraine and Georgia, which then were never met. And so that just made that whole issue of enlargement a complicated one.”

Ukraine is the fourth-largest recipient of military funding from the US, and the intelligence cooperation between the two countries has deepened in response to threats from Russia. But Ukraine isn’t joining NATO in the near future, and President Joe Biden has said as much. Still, Moscow’s demand was largely seen as a nonstarter by the West, as NATO’s open-door policy says sovereign countries can choose their own security alliances.

Though Putin has continued to tout the threat of NATO, his speech on February 21 showed that his obsession with Ukraine goes far beyond that. He does not see the government in Ukraine as legitimate.

“Ukraine is not just a neighboring country for us. It is an inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space,” he said, per the Kremlin’s official translation . “Since time immemorial, the people living in the south-west of what has historically been Russian land have called themselves Russians.”

The two countries do have historical and cultural ties, but as Vox’s Zack Beauchamp explained , Putin’s “basic claim — that there is no historical Ukrainian nation worthy of present-day sovereignty — is demonstrably false .”

As experts noted, it is difficult to square Putin’s speech — plus a 2021 essay he penned and other statements he’s made — with any realistic diplomatic outcome to avert conflict. It was, essentially, a confession that this wasn’t really about NATO, said Dan Baer, the acting director of the Europe program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. “It was about that he doesn’t think Ukraine has a right to exist as a free country,” he said before Putin’s escalation on the night of February 23.

This is the culmination of eight years of tensions

This isn’t the first time Russia has attacked Ukraine. In 2014, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula, invaded eastern Ukraine, and backed Russian separatists in the eastern Donbas region. That conflict has killed more than 14,000 people to date .

Russia’s assault grew out of mass protests in Ukraine that toppled the country’s pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, which began over his abandonment of a trade agreement with the European Union. US diplomats visited the demonstrations, in symbolic gestures that further agitated Putin.

President Barack Obama, hesitant to escalate tensions with Russia any further, was slow to mobilize a diplomatic response in Europe and did not immediately provide Ukrainians with offensive weapons.

“A lot of us were really appalled that not more was done for the violation of that [post-Soviet] agreement,” said Ian Kelly, a career diplomat who served as ambassador to Georgia from 2015 to 2018. “It just basically showed that if you have nuclear weapons” — as Russia does — “you’re inoculated against strong measures by the international community.”

Since then, corruption has persisted in the Ukrainian government, and the country ranks in the bottom third of the watchdog group Transparency International ’s index.

Ukraine’s far-right presence has grown and become somewhat normalized, and there are government-aligned fascist militias in the country. But Moscow has drawn out those issues to advance false claims about genocide and other attacks on civilians as a way to legitimize the separatist movement in eastern Ukraine and to create a pretext for invasion. In his prerecorded speech shared on the eve of the bombardment of Ukraine, Putin said he sought the “ denazification ” of Ukraine.

To be clear: The Ukrainian government is not a Nazi regime and has not been co-opted by the far right. Zelenskyy is Jewish; he speaks proudly of how his Jewish grandfather fought against Hitler’s army .

Yet, days earlier, Putin used these sorts of claims as part of his explanation for recognizing as independent the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic, the two territories in eastern Ukraine where he has backed separatists since 2014. “Announcing the decisions taken today, I am confident in the support of the citizens of Russia. Of all the patriotic forces of the country,” Putin said before moving troops into the regions for “peacekeeping” purposes.

At the time, most experts Vox spoke to said that looked like the beginning, not the end, of Russia’s incursion into Ukraine.

“In Russia, [it] provides the political-legal basis for the formal introduction of Russian forces, which they’ve already decided to do,” Kofman, of CNA, told Vox on February 21 . “Secondarily, it provides the legal local basis for Russian use of force in defense of these independent republics’ Russian citizens there. It’s basically political theater.”

It set “the stage for the next steps,” he added. Those next steps are now clear.

How the rest of the world is responding

The United States and its allies around the world have condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and have since announced increasingly tough sanctions, intended to completely isolate Russia from the international community and inflict real economic costs.

Biden announced on the afternoon of February 24 that the United States would impose sanctions on Russian financial institutions, including cutting off Russia’s largest banks from the US financial system, and on Russian elites in Putin’s inner circle. America will also implement export controls on certain technologies . The United Kingdom and Europe added their own sanctions, imposing the “ massive ” penalties the West had been warning Putin about.

The US and its allies have only amped up the pressure since then. On February 25, the EU and US imposed sanctions on Putin himself . On February 26, the US and European countries announced an agreement to cut some (but not all) Russian banks off from SWIFT, the global messaging system that enables most international transactions, which will make it very difficult for Russia to make transactions beyond its borders. (Japan also signed on to SWIFT actions on February 27.) The US and its allies have said they will target Russia’s central bank , specifically its foreign reserves that Moscow needs to help support its currency. The US has continued to add penalties, including joining other countries in closing US airspace to Russian aircraft , and sanctioning more than a dozen oligarchs.

The United States has said it will not involve troops in any Ukrainian conflict, though more US military aid to Ukraine is on its way and the US has shored up its presence on NATO’s eastern flank. On February 24, the Pentagon said it would send 7,000 additional troops to Germany , and Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on February 26 that he was authorizing “up to $350 million” in additional military aid to Ukraine, including “further lethal defensive assistance to help Ukraine address the armored, airborne, and other threats it is now facing.”

Such aid, according to a February 26 tweet by State Department spokesperson Ned Price, will be provided “immediately” and include “anti-tank and air defense capabilities.” Other European and NATO countries are also stepping up their assistance, including Germany , which reversed a long-standing policy of not sending lethal aid to conflict zones.

Russia knows that the US and its partners do not want to commit themselves militarily, and, as Putin launched his invasion, he offered an ominous warning as he touted Russia’s nuclear arsenal : “There should be no doubt that any potential aggressor will face defeat and ominous consequences should it directly attack our country.” On February 27, Putin escalated that threat by putting the country’s nuclear deterrent forces on high alert .

NATO has vowed to protect its members from any Russian aggression. On February 25, NATO announced that it was activating part of its NATO Response Force — a 40,000-troop unit modernized after the 2014 Crimea invasion — to protect allies on NATO’s eastern flank. “We are now deploying the NATO Response Force for the first time in a collective defense context. We speak about thousands of troops. We speak about air and maritime capabilities,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said .

Yet these are largely defensive measures, which means most of the punishment against Russia will come in the form of economic sanctions. Still, the West is starting to shift from an original hesitancy to impose the most severe costs on Russia over fears of what it might mean for Europe, the US, and the rest of the global economy — and what Russia might do to retaliate.

They’re not all the way there, however. For example, even the SWIFT action is expected to leave some carve-outs so Russia can still export gas to Europe . The tougher the sanctions on Russia, the harder it will hit the US and especially European economies, so leaders are still trying to soften the impact. But the fallout from these punishments — along with other measures, like the EU and United States barring Russia from their airspace — is being felt in Russia, as the ruble crashes and analysts warn of a deep recession .

A way out of this war is difficult to contemplate as bombs are falling on Ukraine, but the US and its allies are going to have to do careful diplomacy to isolate and put pressure on Russia in the long term — and create incentives for Moscow to stop its assault on Ukraine . The US and its allies are also likely going to have to decide how much they want, or can, support Ukraine as it battles Russia.

“The real question, I think, is going to come down to what extent the West can and will try to support and supply a long-term insurgency against Russia,” said Paul D’Anieri, an expert on Eastern European and post-Soviet politics at the University of California Riverside. “And what level of success does Russia have in fighting back against? Unfortunately, it seems like the best strategy for peace right now is when enough Russians die, that the Russians decide it’s not worth it anymore.”

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75 Russian Phrases Every Language Learner Should Know

• English as a Second Language
• M.F.A., Creative Writing, Manchester Metropolitan University
• Diploma in Translation (IoLet Level 7, Russian), Chartered Institute of Linguists

Consider the following 75 Russian phrases a survival guide for your time in Russia. Our lists include everything you need to know to greet people, ask for directions, order at a restaurant, shop, and get around.

At a Restaurant or Café

Getting around, when you don't quite understand.

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Geopolitics — the key to understanding Russia foreign policy

• January 19, 2022

Gabriel Gorodetsky

• Themes: Russia

From Tsar Alexander II to Putin, Russia's leading ideology and relationship to Europe has swung between extremes. One constant, however, has remained throughout history: an overriding concern for the geopolitical.

This essay originally appeared under the title  ‘Geopolitical factors in Russian foreign policy and strategy’  in  ‘ The Return of Geopolitics ’,  Bokförlaget Stolpe , in collaboration with the  Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation , 2019.

It is most telling that less than ten years ago, with Vladimir  Putin  already well settled in the saddle, prominent Russian liberals dismissed the legend of ‘the Phoenix rising out of the ashes’ as a possible trajectory of the future. It was misleading, as  Dimitri Trenin  argued, because of the ‘discontinuities in Russia’s structure and behaviour that militate against the repetition of the familiar cycle, i.e passing from imperial break-up to  imperial restoration .’ In other words, there was no longer ‘a fundamental value gap between Russia and much of the rest of the world…  borders  as barriers are being replaced by borders as frontiers, interfaces, lines of communication.’

The perennial issue concerns the definition of the nature of Russian foreign policy and revolves around the relationship between ideology, realism and national interests. My contention is that the l egacy of the past still weighs heavily on the execution of contemporary Russian foreign policy . Any attempt in the  West  to make projections for the future, therefore, requires an ability to recognise the past and the enduring geopolitical factors of Russian foreign policy.

The concept of geopolitics often relates to the physical realm, and yet it is also inherently mental. Perceptions, preconceived ideas, emotions and individuals remain major factors in the conduct of international relations, though naturally this is rarely conceded by politicians and, strangely enough, tends to be ignored, if not dismissed, by both historians and political scientists. In the 1930s, for instance, vindictiveness and resentment rekindled preconceptions and mutual suspicion, which in turn shaped policies, and were the single most important contributor to the calamitous events leading to the  Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact  that precipitated the outbreak of the  Second World War.

The following subtle minor episode illustrates the  power  of such convictions. In May 1940, when Britain embarked on crucial negotiations with the Soviet Union in an attempt to sway it away from Nazi Germany,  General Hastings Ismay , head of the Cabinet Secretariat and later  Winston Churchill’s  military adviser, sent his friend,  Orme Sargent,  the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Rudyard Kipling’s famous poem, ‘ The Truce of the Bear ’, which was inspired by the 19th-century Anglo-Russian imperial rivalry in Central Asia – the so called ‘Great Game’. In the poem, from which the following verses are selected, an old blind beggar who had been mauled by a bear removes his bandages to reveal his wounds and speaks:

Eyeless, noseless, and lipless – toothless, broken of speech, Seeking a dole at the doorway he mumbles his tale to each Over and over the story, ending as he began: ‘Make ye no truce with Adam-zad – the Bear that walks like a man.

‘Horrible, hairy, human, with paws like hands in prayer, Making his supplication rose Adam-zad the Bear! I looked at the swaying shoulders, at the paunch’s swag and swing, And my heart was touched with pity for the monstrous, pleading thing.

Touched with pity and wonder, I did not fire then… I have looked no more on women – I have walked no more with men. Nearer he tottered and nearer, with paws like hands that pray – From brow to jaw that steel-shod paw, it ripped my face away!

‘When he shows as seeking quarter, with paws like hands in prayer, That is the time of peril – the time of the Truce of the Bear!’ Over and over the story, ending as he began: ‘There is no truce with Adam-zad, the Bear that looks like a Man.’

Ever since Russia’s emergence as a major power in the 18th century,  the Western world has been reluctant to accept it as an integral part of Europe . This rebuff, embedded in a deep-rooted Russophobic tradition, was heightened by the  Bolshevik Revolution . In 1839, the  Marquis de Custine , whose entire family had been sent to the guillotine, sought refuge in Russia, the bastion of monarchical rule in Europe. He came back appalled, warning his readers that the Russians were ‘Chinese masquerading as Europeans’. Almost a century later we find the famous British diplomat, author and politician,  Harold Nicolson , describing in his diary a lunch at the grand London residency of Ambassador  Ivan Maisky , a ‘grim Victorian mansion’ in Nicolson’s words. ‘I was ushered into a room of unexampled horror… we were given corked sherry, during which time the man with a yellow moustache and a  moujik’s  unappetising daughter carried tableware and bananas into the room beyond,’ he wrote. ‘We then went into luncheon, which was held in a winter-garden, more wintry than gardeny… We began with caviar which was all to the good. We then had a little wet dead trout. We then had what in nursing homes is called “fruit jelly”…During the whole meal, I felt that there was something terribly familiar about it all… And then suddenly I realised it was the East. They were playing at being Europeans…They have gone oriental.’

Earlier, during the civil war in the wake of the Russian Revolution,  Churchill  applied far more unflattering metaphors, comparing the Russians to ‘crocodiles’ and a ‘bubonic plague’. Continuity in the Western perception of Russia was likewise conspicuous in its choice of the ‘Iron Curtain’ metaphor as an opening salvo in the  Cold War , a mere para- phrase of the ‘ cordon sanitaire ’, with which  Lord Curzon  had hoped to isolate Western civilisation from the Bolshevik ‘epidemic’ following the Russian Revolution.

Nor have the Russians been immune to xenophobia, or clear about their own  identity and destiny.  From the early 1830s the Russian intelligentsia pursued a fierce debate between the  Westerners and the Slavophiles  over the road which Russia should follow to surmount its political, social and economic backwardness. It may well be argued that the search by the  double-headed eagle  for physical and national identity had been the gist of Russian history all along. The debate, in various shapes and forms, has since followed each swivel in the Russian story, culminating in the demonising of the Western bourgeoisie following the Bolshevik revolution. Stalin’s chronic misreading of British intentions and behaviour, for instance, was undoubtedly a major factor in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy.

This diehard tradition accounts very much for Western attempts to impose values as the indispensable common denominator and precondition for any community of interests with Russia – a criterion which is hardly observed by the West in its relations with allies such as  Turkey , Saudi Arabia or Egypt. This adherence to ‘moral’ criteria in forging foreign policy stands in contrast to lessons learnt from the past. There is no way of overcoming lingering mutual suspicion and preconceived ideas without a resort to history and dialogue, if a bridge is to be established. The idea that values are the indispensable common denominator and precondition for any community of interests is not borne out by historical experience. After all, paradoxically, the West forged the most sound alliances with Russia on solidly geopolitical grounds when its regime was much at odds with Western values: be that during the Napoleonic Wars, the  First World War , or the Grand Alliance with Stalin.

Notions of space and geopolitics, applied to conflicts concerning overlapping interests or regional ethnic issues and manipulated through the instruments of balance of power, were and remain central to the formulation and execution of Russian foreign policy. My extended research into Stalin’s foreign policy, for instance, has shown that he was little affected by ideological predilections or sentiments in that regard. His statesmanship was to a large extent entrenched in the legacy of  Tsarist Russia , and responded to challenges which had deep historical roots. This is in no way to question the view that Stalin’s system of government (or for that matter Putin’s as well) was also characterised by idiosyncratic and despotic methods in the pursuit of state goals. Who would dispute the disastrous impact of  Stalin’s savage purges of the military , his disastrous meddling in the workings of the high command and the highly professional Soviet foreign ministry?

And yet, on the whole, Stalin’s foreign policy appears to have followed an unscrupulous realpolitik, serving well-defined traditional Russian geopolitical interests. Ironically, Marx’s battle cry for the international proletariat in 1848 – that they had ‘ little to lose but their chains ’ – evoked far less resonance in Stalin than the famous dictum of the then British Foreign Secretary,  Lord Palmerston , in the same year: ‘We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.’

I have devoted the core of my academic career to exploring the interrelations between ideology, realpolitik and geopolitics.  My earlier books  focused on the formulation of Soviet foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s. They revealed how the first decade of the Russian Revolution was characterised by a dynamic process of re-evaluation of foreign policy. The Bolsheviks faced a formidable trial in their futile attempts to reconcile two contradictory factors: the axiomatic need to spread the revolution beyond Russia’s borders and the prosaic need to guarantee survival within recognised borders. From its inception, Soviet foreign policy was characterised by a gradual but consistent retreat from unyielding hostility to capitalist regimes, preferring peaceful coexistence based on mutual expediency. Crude, cold calculations had always been and remained the backbone of Stalin’s policies, and they echoed forcefully in the corridors of the Kremlin until the  appearance of Mikhail Gorbachev  and the sub-sequent demise of the Soviet Union.

When it comes to the Second World War,  neither the fanciful idea that throughout 1939–41 Stalin had been meticulously preparing a revolutionary war against Germany  but was pre-empted by Hitler’s own invasion of Russia, nor the notion that he expected Germany and Britain to bleed white, paving the way for the communist revolution to be carried into the heart of Europe on the bayonets of the Red Army, is borne out by the archival sources. Shortly after the outbreak of war, Stalin personally warned  Georgi Dimitrov,  the Bulgarian leader of the Comintern, not to cherish revolutionary dreams. ‘In the First Imperialist War’, Dimitrov was warned, ‘the Bolsheviks overestimated the situation. We all rushed ahead and made mistakes! This can be explained, but not excused, by the conditions prevailing then. Today we must not repeat the mistakes made by the Bolsheviks then.’

Surprisingly, Stalin’s mind was not set on war, but rather on the agenda for a peace conference which he expected to convene by 1942. He hoped the conference, attended by a debilitated British Empire, would topple the Treaty of Versailles, and acknowledge the new Soviet security arrangements in Central and Northern Europe. However, far more striking is that, embracing the traditional Russian geopolitical outlook, Stalin saw in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact an opportunity to redress the grievances which he felt had been inflicted on Russia throughout the 19th century, during the struggle for mastery in Europe – and specifically in the  Paris  and Berlin Peace conferences following the Crimean War of 1856 and the  Russo-Turkish wars in 1877–78 . The forgotten story of the scramble for the Balkans in 1939–41, and indeed the reopening of the 19th-century ‘Eastern Question’, best illustrate the geopolitical continuum in Stalin’s approach to foreign policy. The  annexation of Bessarabia in June 1940  has been commonly perceived by historians as yet another example of pure Bolshevik expansionism. But the move was motivated by the need to improve the strategic position of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis both Britain and Germany by securing the littoral of the  Black Sea  and control of the mouth of the Danube. His conduct is almost a replica of Alexander II’s conduct during the 1877–78 war with Turkey, which ended with the  Treaty of San Stefano , establishing a Russian presence at the opening of the Bosphorus strait.

The common vivid presentation of  Molotov’s negotiations with Hitler  in Berlin in November 1940 as proof that Stalin had conspired with Hitler to divide the world, is contested by the directive for the talks, dictated to Molotov in Stalin’s dacha and in his long hand, which I unearthed, and which is confined to the intrinsic Soviet interests in the Balkans and the Turkish Straits, determined by considerations of security. Stalin later explained to Dimitrov, who became the first communist leader of Bulgaria, that the approach to Hitler was induced by the threats posed to Russia in the Black Sea. ‘Historically the danger has always come from there,’ Stalin noted, revealing his frame of mind, ‘The Crimean War – the capture of Sebastopol – the  intervention of Wrangel  [the commanding general of the anti-Bolshevik White Army in southern Russia] in 1919 etc.’

Stalin’s stance over the Balkans reflected similar arrangements obtained by force from Finland after the conclusion of the  Winter War in March 1940,  and which protected the maritime approaches to Leningrad. The triangular ‘urge to the Sea’ (at the Pacific, the Baltic and the North Seas, and the Black Sea) had been, and remains, as brilliantly suggested a long time ago by Max Kerner, a cardinal principle in Russian geopolitically-oriented foreign policy. It was Stalin’s a priori premise, when war broke out, that Russia was ‘content being confined to its own small  lebensraum ’. Accused at one point by the Western press of conducting in southeast Europe a ‘platonic relationship with the Slavonic people’, Stalin responded: ‘I have read Plato carefully but I do not really see the relevance. We simply pursue a realistic policy rather than sentimental. We save our sentiments for small children and little animals, but in practice we do not conduct a sentimental policy in relation to any country, be that Slav or not, be that small or big.’ In a tête-à-tête conversation with  Anthony Eden , Britain’s Foreign Secretary for most of the Second World War, Maisky, the veteran Soviet ambassador to London, complained that British statesmen and politicians had always been divided into two groups. One embodied primarily the state interests of Great Britain and the second embodied primarily the ‘class feelings and prejudices of the ruling top circles’. When Eden suggested that the same could be said of Russia, Maisky interjected: ‘But the difference is that the S[oviet] G[overnment] has never pursued and does not pursue  Gefülspolitik.  The S[oviet] G[overnment] is utterly realistic in its foreign policy. When state interests and ideas collide, state interests always emerge with the upper hand.’

It may come as a surprise to learn that Churchill, the cross-bearer in the crusade against communism in the Russian civil war and the 1920s, and the architect of the Iron Curtain, held similar views. Churchill’s witty quip, describing Russia as  ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’ , has often been evoked by historians and politicians alike to demonstrate the sinister nature of Stalin’s foreign policy. However, few historians have actually bothered to study the radio speech delivered by Churchill in October 1939 (merely three months after the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact), seeking reconciliation and rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Churchill actually went on to solve the mystery: ‘ But perhaps, there is a key. The key is Russian national interest. It cannot be in accordance with the interest of the safety of Russia that Germany should plant herself upon the shores of the Black Sea, or that she should overrun the Balkan States and subjugate the Slavonic peoples of south-eastern Europe. That would be contrary to the historic life-interests of Russia. ’

In conclusion, my argument is that to attribute Russian imperial policy, Stalin’s conduct of foreign affairs or indeed Putin’s actions in contemporary world affairs to the whims of tyranny, or to an ideological drive towards relentless expansionism, is entirely misleading and ahistorical. It overlooks Russia’s tenacious adherence to imperatives deeply rooted within its history and national mentality.

Geopolitics, in the Russian/Soviet process of nation building, has been a major factor in the interrelationship of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. It leaves one wondering whether, in the sphere of foreign policy, universal ideologies have not been at best instrumental in manipulating and moulding public opinion, or in sustaining legitimacy in the age of democracy and the masses.

In order to understand the 20th century, as well as today’s Russia, it might be necessary to resort to the icons of  Halford Mackinder ,  Machiavelli ,  Richelieu  and  Bismarck , rather than  Woodrow Wilson ,  Marx ,  Lenin  or  Milton Friedman.

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The New Propaganda War

Autocrats in China, Russia, and elsewhere are now making common cause with MAGA Republicans to discredit liberalism and freedom around the world.

This article was featured in the One Story to Read Today newsletter. Sign up for it here .

On June 4 , 1989 , the Polish Communist Party held partially free elections, setting in motion a series of events that ultimately removed the Communists from power. Not long afterward, street protests calling for free speech, due process, accountability, and democracy brought about the end of the Communist regimes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Within a few years, the Soviet Union itself would no longer exist.

Also on June 4, 1989, the Chinese Communist Party ordered the military to remove thousands of students from Tiananmen Square. The students were calling for free speech, due process, accountability, and democracy. Soldiers arrested and killed demonstrators in Beijing and around the country. Later, they systematically tracked down the leaders of the protest movement and forced them to confess and recant. Some spent years in jail. Others managed to elude their pursuers and flee the country forever.

Explore the June 2024 Issue

Check out more from this issue and find your next story to read.

In the aftermath of these events, the Chinese concluded that the physical elimination of dissenters was insufficient. To prevent the democratic wave then sweeping across Central Europe from reaching East Asia, the Chinese Communist Party eventually set out to eliminate not just the people but the ideas that had motivated the protests. In the years to come, this would require policing what the Chinese people could see online.

Nobody believed that this would work. In 2000, President Bill Clinton told an audience at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies that it was impossible. “In the knowledge economy,” he said, “economic innovation and political empowerment, whether anyone likes it or not, will inevitably go hand in hand.” The transcript records the audience reactions:

“Now, there’s no question China has been trying to crack down on the internet.” ( Chuckles. ) “Good luck!” ( Laughter. ) “That’s sort of like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall.” ( Laughter. )

While we were still rhapsodizing about the many ways in which the internet could spread democracy, the Chinese were designing what’s become known as the Great Firewall of China . That method of internet management—which is in effect conversation management—contains many different elements, beginning with an elaborate system of blocks and filters that prevent internet users from seeing particular words and phrases. Among them, famously, are Tiananmen , 1989 , and June 4 , but there are many more. In 2000, a directive called “ Measures for Managing Internet Information Services ” prohibited an extraordinarily wide range of content, including anything that “endangers national security, divulges state secrets, subverts the government, undermines national unification,” and “is detrimental to the honor and interests of the state”—anything, in other words, that the authorities didn’t like.

From the May 2022 issue: There is no liberal world order

The Chinese regime also combined online tracking methods with other tools of repression, including security cameras, police inspections, and arrests. In Xinjiang province, where China’s Uyghur Muslim population is concentrated, the state has forced people to install “nanny apps” that can scan phones for forbidden phrases and pick up unusual behavior: Anyone who downloads a virtual private network, anyone who stays offline altogether, and anyone whose home uses too much electricity (which could be evidence of a secret houseguest) can arouse suspicion. Voice-recognition technology and even DNA swabs are used to monitor where Uyghurs walk, drive, and shop. With every new breakthrough, with every AI advance, China has gotten closer to its holy grail: a system that can eliminate not just the words democracy and Tiananmen from the internet, but the thinking that leads people to become democracy activists or attend public protests in real life.

But along the way, the Chinese regime discovered a deeper problem: Surveillance, regardless of sophistication, provides no guarantees. During the coronavirus pandemic, the Chinese government imposed controls more severe than most of its citizens had ever experienced. Millions of people were locked into their homes. Untold numbers entered government quarantine camps. Yet the lockdown also produced the angriest and most energetic Chinese protests in many years. Young people who had never attended a demonstration and had no memory of Tiananmen gathered in the streets of Beijing and Shanghai in the autumn of 2022 to talk about freedom. In Xinjiang, where lockdowns were the longest and harshest, and where repression is most complete, people came out in public and sang the Chinese national anthem , emphasizing one line: “Rise up, those who refuse to be slaves!” Clips of their performance circulated widely, presumably because the spyware and filters didn’t identify the national anthem as dissent.

Even in a state where surveillance is almost total, the experience of tyranny and injustice can radicalize people. Anger at arbitrary power will always lead someone to start thinking about another system, a better way to run society. The strength of these demonstrations, and the broader anger they reflected, was enough to spook the Chinese Communist Party into lifting the quarantine and allowing the virus to spread. The deaths that resulted were preferable to public anger and protest.

Like the demonstrations against President Vladimir Putin in Russia that began in 2011, the 2014 street protests in Venezuela , and the 2019 Hong Kong protests , the 2022 protests in China help explain something else: why autocratic regimes have slowly turned their repressive mechanisms outward, into the democratic world. If people are naturally drawn to the image of human rights, to the language of democracy, to the dream of freedom, then those concepts have to be poisoned. That requires more than surveillance, more than close observation of the population, more than a political system that defends against liberal ideas. It also requires an offensive plan: a narrative that damages both the idea of democracy everywhere in the world and the tools to deliver it.

On February 24, 2022, as Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, fantastical tales of biological warfare began surging across the internet. Russian officials solemnly declared that secret U.S.-funded biolabs in Ukraine had been conducting experiments with bat viruses and claimed that U.S. officials had confessed to manipulating “dangerous pathogens.” The story was unfounded, not to say ridiculous, and was repeatedly debunked .

Nevertheless, an American Twitter account with links to the QAnon conspiracy network—@WarClandestine—began tweeting about the nonexistent biolabs , racking up thousands of retweets and views. The hashtag #biolab started trending on Twitter and reached more than 9 million views. Even after the account—later revealed to belong to a veteran of the Army National Guard—was suspended, people continued to post screenshots. A version of the story appeared on the Infowars website created by Alex Jones, best known for promoting conspiracy theories about the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School and harassing families of the victims. Tucker Carlson, then still hosting a show on Fox News, played clips of a Russian general and a Chinese spokesperson repeating the biolab fantasy and demanded that the Biden administration “stop lying and [tell] us what’s going on here.”

Chinese state media also leaned hard into the story. A foreign-ministry spokesperson declared that the U.S. controlled 26 biolabs in Ukraine: “Russia has found during its military operations that the U.S. uses these facilities to conduct bio-military plans.” Xinhua, a Chinese state news agency, ran multiple headlines: “U.S.-Led Biolabs Pose Potential Threats to People of Ukraine and Beyond,” “Russia Urges U.S. to Explain Purpose of Biological Labs in Ukraine,” and so on. U.S. diplomats publicly refuted these fabrications. Nevertheless, the Chinese continued to spread them. So did the scores of Asian, African, and Latin American media outlets that have content-sharing agreements with Chinese state media. So did Telesur, the Venezuelan network; Press TV, the Iranian network; and Russia Today, in Spanish and Arabic, as well as on many Russia Today–linked websites around the world.

This joint propaganda effort worked. Globally, it helped undermine the U.S.-led effort to create solidarity with Ukraine and enforce sanctions against Russia. Inside the U.S., it helped undermine the Biden administration’s effort to consolidate American public opinion in support of providing aid to Ukraine. According to one poll, a quarter of Americans believed the biolabs conspiracy theory to be true. After the invasion, Russia and China—with, again, help from Venezuela, Iran, and far-right Europeans and Americans—successfully created an international echo chamber. Anyone inside this echo chamber heard the biolab conspiracy theory many times, from different sources, each one repeating and building on the others to create the impression of veracity. They also heard false descriptions of Ukrainians as Nazis, along with claims that Ukraine is a puppet state run by the CIA, and that NATO started the war.

Outside this echo chamber, few even know it exists. At a dinner in Munich in February 2023, I found myself seated across from a European diplomat who had just returned from Africa. He had met with some students there and had been shocked to discover how little they knew about the war in Ukraine, and how much of what they did know was wrong. They had repeated the Russian claims that the Ukrainians are Nazis, blamed NATO for the invasion, and generally used the same kind of language that can be heard every night on the Russian evening news. The diplomat was mystified. He grasped for explanations: Maybe the legacy of colonialism explained the spread of these conspiracy theories, or Western neglect of the global South, or the long shadow of the Cold War.

But the story of how Africans—as well as Latin Americans, Asians, and indeed many Europeans and Americans—have come to spout Russian propaganda about Ukraine is not primarily a story of European colonial history, Western policy, or the Cold War. Rather, it involves China’s systematic efforts to buy or influence both popular and elite audiences around the world; carefully curated Russian propaganda campaigns, some open, some clandestine, some amplified by the American and European far right; and other autocracies using their own networks to promote the same language.

To be fair to the European diplomat, the convergence of what had been disparate authoritarian influence projects is still new. Russian information-laundering and Chinese propaganda have long had different goals. Chinese propagandists mostly stayed out of the democratic world’s politics, except to promote Chinese achievements, Chinese economic success, and Chinese narratives about Tibet or Hong Kong. Their efforts in Africa and Latin America tended to feature dull, unwatchable announcements of investments and state visits. Russian efforts were more aggressive—sometimes in conjunction with the far right or the far left in the democratic world—and aimed to distort debates and elections in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and elsewhere. Still, they often seemed unfocused, as if computer hackers were throwing spaghetti at the wall, just to see which crazy story might stick. Venezuela and Iran were fringe players, not real sources of influence.

Slowly, though, these autocracies have come together, not around particular stories, but around a set of ideas, or rather in opposition to a set of ideas. Transparency, for example. And rule of law. And democracy. They have heard language about those ideas—which originate in the democratic world—coming from their own dissidents, and have concluded that they are dangerous to their regimes. Their own rhetoric makes this clear. In 2013, as Chinese President Xi Jinping was beginning his rise to power, an internal Chinese memo, known enigmatically as Document No. 9 —or, more formally, as the Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere—listed “seven perils” faced by the Chinese Communist Party. “Western constitutional democracy” led the list, followed by “universal human rights,” “media independence,” “judicial independence,” and “civic participation.” The document concluded that “Western forces hostile to China,” together with dissidents inside the country, “are still constantly infiltrating the ideological sphere,” and instructed party leaders to push back against these ideas wherever they found them, especially online, inside China and around the world.

From the December 2021 issue: The bad guys are winning

Since at least 2004, the Russians have been focused on the same convergence of internal and external ideological threats. That was the year Ukrainians staged a popular revolt, known as the Orange Revolution —the name came from the orange T-shirts and flags of the protesters—against a clumsy attempt to steal a presidential election. The angry intervention of the Ukrainian public into what was meant to have been a carefully orchestrated victory for Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian candidate directly supported by Putin himself, profoundly unnerved the Russians. This was especially the case because a similarly unruly protest movement in Georgia had brought a pro-European politician, Mikheil Saakashvili, to power the year before.

Shaken by those two events, Putin put the bogeyman of “color revolution” at the center of Russian propaganda. Civic protest movements are now always described as color revolutions in Russia, and as the work of outsiders. Popular opposition leaders are always said to be puppets of foreign governments. Anti-corruption and prodemocracy slogans are linked to chaos and instability wherever they are used, whether in Tunisia, Syria, or the United States. In 2011, a year of mass protest against a manipulated election in Russia itself, Putin bitterly described the Orange Revolution as a “well-tested scheme for destabilizing society,” and he accused the Russian opposition of “transferring this practice to Russian soil,” where he feared a similar popular uprising intended to remove him from power.

Putin was wrong—no “scheme” had been “transferred.” Public discontent in Russia simply had no way to express itself except through street protest, and Putin’s opponents had no legal means to remove him from power. Like so many other people around the world, they talked about democracy and human rights because they recognized that these concepts represented their best hope for achieving justice, and freedom from autocratic power. The protests that led to democratic transitions in the Philippines, Taiwan, South Africa, South Korea, and Mexico; the “people’s revolutions” that washed across Central and Eastern Europe in 1989; the Arab Spring in 2011; and, yes, the color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia—all were begun by those who had suffered injustice at the hands of the state, and who seized on the language of freedom and democracy to propose an alternative.

This is the core problem for autocracies: The Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians, and others all know that the language of transparency, accountability, justice, and democracy appeals to some of their citizens, as it does to many people who live in dictatorships. Even the most sophisticated surveillance can’t wholly suppress it. The very ideas of democracy and freedom must be discredited—especially in the places where they have historically flourished.

In the 20th century, Communist Party propaganda was overwhelming and inspiring, or at least it was meant to be. The future it portrayed was shiny and idealized, a vision of clean factories, abundant produce, and healthy tractor drivers with large muscles and square jaws. The architecture was designed to overpower, the music to intimidate, the public spectacles to awe. In theory, citizens were meant to feel enthusiasm, inspiration, and hope. In practice, this kind of propaganda backfired, because people could compare what they saw on posters and in movies with a far more impoverished reality.

A few autocracies still portray themselves to their citizens as model states. The North Koreans continue to hold colossal military parades with elaborate gymnastics displays and huge portraits of their leader, very much in the Stalinist style. But most modern authoritarians have learned from the mistakes of the previous century. Freedom House, a nonprofit that advocates for democracy around the world, lists 56 countries as “not free.” Most don’t offer their fellow citizens a vision of utopia, and don’t inspire them to build a better world. Instead, they teach people to be cynical and passive, apathetic and afraid, because there is no better world to build. Their goal is to persuade their own people to stay out of politics, and above all to convince them that there is no democratic alternative: Our state may be corrupt, but everyone else is corrupt too. You may not like our leader, but the others are worse. You may not like our society, but at least we are strong. The democratic world is weak, degenerate, divided, dying.

Instead of portraying China as the perfect society, modern Chinese propaganda seeks to inculcate nationalist pride, based on China’s real experience of economic development, and to promote a Beijing model of progress through dictatorship and “order” that’s superior to the chaos and violence of democracy . Chinese media mocked the laxity of the American response to the pandemic with an animated film that ended with the Statue of Liberty on an intravenous drip . China’s Global Times wrote that Chinese people were mocking the January 6 insurrection as “karma” and “retribution”: “Seeing such scenarios,” the publication’s then-editor wrote in an op-ed , “many Chinese will naturally recall that Nancy Pelosi once praised the violence of Hong Kong protesters as ‘a beautiful sight to behold.’ ” (Pelosi, of course, had praised peaceful demonstrators , not violence.) The Chinese are told that these forces of chaos are out to disrupt their own lives, and they are encouraged to fight against them in a “people’s war” against foreign influence.

Read: I watched Russian TV so you don’t have to

Russians, although they hear very little about what happens in their own towns and cities, receive similar messages about the decline of places they don’t know and have mostly never visited: America, France, Britain, Sweden, Poland—countries apparently filled with degeneracy, hypocrisy, and Russophobia . A study of Russian television from 2014 to 2017 found that negative news about Europe appeared on the three main Russian channels, all state-controlled, an average of 18 times a day. Some of the stories were obviously invented ( European governments are stealing children from straight families and giving them to gay couples!  ), but even the true ones were cherry-picked to support the idea that daily life in Europe is frightening and chaotic, that Europeans are weak and immoral, and that the European Union is aggressive and interventionist. If anything, the portrayal of America has been more dramatic. Putin himself has displayed a surprisingly intimate acquaintance with American culture wars about transgender rights, and mockingly sympathized with people who he says have been “canceled.”

The goal is clear: to prevent Russians from identifying with Europe the way they once did, and to build alliances between Putin’s domestic audience and his supporters in Europe and North America, where some naive conservatives (or perhaps cynical, well-paid conservatives) seek to convince their followers that Russia is a “white Christian state.” In reality, Russia has very low church attendance, legal abortion, and a multiethnic population containing millions of Muslim citizens and migrants. The autonomous region of Chechnya, which is part of the Russian Federation, is governed, in practice, by elements of Sharia law . The Russian state harasses and represses many forms of religion outside the state-sanctioned Russian Orthodox Church, including evangelical Protestantism. Nevertheless, among the slogans shouted by white nationalists marching in the infamous Charlottesville, Virginia, demonstration in 2017 was “ Russia is our friend .” Putin sends periodic messages to this constituency: “I uphold the traditional approach that a woman is a woman, a man is a man, a mother is a mother, and a father is a father,” he told a press conference in December 2021, almost as if this “traditional approach” would be justification for invading Ukraine.

Michael Carpenter: Russia is co-opting angry young men

This manipulation of the strong emotions around gay rights and feminism has been widely copied throughout the autocratic world, often as a means of defending against criticism of the regime. Yoweri Museveni, who has been the president of Uganda for more than three decades, passed an “anti-homosexuality” bill in 2014, instituting a life sentence for gay people who have sex or marry and criminalizing the “promotion” of a homosexual lifestyle. By picking a fight over gay rights, he was able to consolidate his supporters at home while neutralizing foreign criticisms of his regime, describing them as “social imperialism”: “Outsiders cannot dictate to us; this is our country,” he declared. Viktor Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary, also ducks discussion of Hungarian corruption by hiding behind a culture war. He pretends that ongoing tension between his government and the U.S. ambassador to Hungary concerns religion and gender: During Tucker Carlson’s recent visit to Hungary , Carlson declared that the Biden administration “hates” Hungary because “it’s a Christian country,” when in fact it is Orbán’s deep financial and political ties to Russia and China that have badly damaged American-Hungarian relations.

The new authoritarians also have a different attitude toward reality. When Soviet leaders lied, they tried to make their falsehoods seem real. They became angry when anyone accused them of lying. But in Putin’s Russia, Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, and Nicolás Maduro’s Venezuela, politicians and television personalities play a different game. They lie constantly, blatantly, obviously. But they don’t bother to offer counterarguments when their lies are exposed. After Russian-controlled forces shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over Ukraine in 2014, the Russian government reacted not only with a denial, but with multiple stories, plausible and implausible: It blamed the Ukrainian army, and the CIA, and a nefarious plot in which dead people were placed on a plane in order to fake a crash and discredit Russia. This tactic—the so-called fire hose of falsehoods—ultimately produces not outrage but nihilism. Given so many explanations, how can you know what actually happened? What if you just can’t know? If you don’t know what happened, you’re not likely to join a great movement for democracy, or to listen when anyone speaks about positive political change. Instead, you are not going to participate in any politics at all.

Anne Applebaum: The American face of authoritarian propaganda

Fear, cynicism, nihilism, and apathy, coupled with disgust and disdain for democracy: This is the formula that modern autocrats, with some variations, sell to their citizens and to foreigners, all with the aim of destroying what they call “American hegemony.” In service of this idea, Russia, a colonial power, paints itself as a leader of the non-Western civilizations in what the analyst Ivan Klyszcz calls their struggle for “ messianic multipolarity ,” a battle against “the West’s imposition of ‘decadent,’ ‘globalist’ values.” In September 2022, when Putin held a ceremony to mark his illegal annexation of southern and eastern Ukraine, he claimed that he was protecting Russia from the “satanic” West and “perversions that lead to degradation and extinction.” He did not speak of the people he had tortured or the Ukrainian children he had kidnapped. A year later, Putin told a gathering in Sochi: “We are now fighting not just for Russia’s freedom but for the freedom of the whole world. We can frankly say that the dictatorship of one hegemon is becoming decrepit. We see it, and everyone sees it now. It is getting out of control and is simply dangerous for others.” The language of “hegemony” and “multipolarity” is now part of Chinese, Iranian, and Venezuelan narratives too.

In truth, Russia is a genuine danger to its neighbors, which is why most of them are re-arming and preparing to fight against a new colonial occupation. The irony is even greater in African countries like Mali, where Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group have helped keep a military dictatorship in power, reportedly by conducting summary executions, committing atrocities against civilians, and looting property. In Mali, as in Ukraine, the battle against Western decadence means that white Russian thugs brutally terrorize people with impunity.

And yet Mali Actu, a pro-Russian website in Mali, solemnly explains to its readers that “in a world that is more and more multipolar, Africa will play a more and more important role.” Mali Actu is not alone; it’s just a small part of a propaganda network, created by the autocracies, that is now visible all over the world.

The infrastructure of antidemocratic propaganda takes many forms, some overt and some covert, some aimed at the public and some aimed at elites. The United Front, the fulcrum of the Chinese Communist Party’s most important influence strategy, seeks to shape perceptions of China around the world by creating educational and exchange programs, controlling Chinese exile communities, building Chinese chambers of commerce, and courting anyone willing to be a de facto spokesperson for China. The Confucius Institutes are probably the best-known elite Chinese influence project. Originally perceived as benign cultural bodies not unlike the Goethe-Institut, run by the German government, and the Alliance Française, they were welcomed by many universities because they provided cheap or even free Chinese-language classes and professors. Over time, the institutes aroused suspicion, policing Chinese students at American universities by restricting open discussions of Tibet and Taiwan, and in some cases altering the teaching of Chinese history and politics to suit Chinese narratives. They have now been mostly disbanded in the United States. But they are flourishing in many other places, including Africa, where there are several dozen.

These subtler operations are augmented by China’s enormous investment in international media. The Xinhua wire service, the China Global Television Network, China Radio International, and China Daily all receive significant state financing , have social-media accounts in multiple languages and regions, and sell, share, or otherwise promote their content. These Chinese outlets cover the entire world, and provide feeds of slickly produced news and video segments to their partners at low prices, sometimes for free, which makes them more than competitive with reputable Western newswires, such as Reuters and the Associated Press. Scores of news organizations in Europe and Asia use Chinese content, as do many in Africa, from Kenya and Nigeria to Egypt and Zambia. Chinese media maintain a regional hub in Nairobi, where they hire prominent local journalists and produce content in African languages. Building this media empire has been estimated to cost billions of dollars a year.

For the moment, viewership of many of these Chinese-owned channels remains low; their output can be predictable, even boring. But more popular forms of Chinese television are gradually becoming available. StarTimes, a satellite-television company that is tightly linked to the Chinese government, launched in Africa in 2008 and now has 13 million television subscribers in more than 30 African countries. StarTimes is cheap for consumers, costing just a few dollars a month. It prioritizes Chinese content—not just news but kung-fu movies, soap operas, and Chinese Super League football, with the dialogue and commentary all translated into Hausa, Swahili, and other African languages. In this way, even entertainment can carry China-positive messages.

This subtler shift is the real goal: to have the Chinese point of view appear in the local press, with local bylines. Chinese propagandists call this strategy “borrowing boats to reach the sea,” and it can be achieved in many ways. Unlike Western governments, China doesn’t think of propaganda, censorship, diplomacy, and media as separate activities. Legal pressure on news organizations, online trolling operations aimed at journalists, cyberattacks—all of these can be deployed as part of a single operation designed to promulgate or undermine a given narrative. China also offers training courses or stipends for local journalists across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, sometimes providing phones and laptops in exchange for what the regime hopes will be favorable coverage.

The Chinese also cooperate, both openly and discreetly, with the media outlets of other autocracies. Telesur, a Hugo Chávez project launched in 2005, is headquartered in Caracas and led by Venezuela in partnership with Cuba and Nicaragua. Selectively culled bits of foreign news make it onto Telesur from its partners, including headlines that presumably have limited appeal in Latin America: “US-Armenia Joint Military Drills Undermine Regional Stability,” for example, and “Russia Has No Expansionist Plans in Europe.” Both of these stories, from 2023, were lifted directly from the Xinhua wire.

Iran, for its part, offers HispanTV, the Spanish-language version of Press TV, the Iranian international service. HispanTV leans heavily into open anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial: One March 2020 headline declared that the “New Coronavirus Is the Result of a Zionist Plot.” Spain banned HispanTV and Google blocked it from its YouTube and Gmail accounts, but the service is easily available across Latin America, just as Al-Alam, the Arabic version of Press TV, is widely available in the Middle East. After the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, an international group dedicated to fighting disinformation, found that Iran was creating additional hacking groups to target digital, physical, and electoral infrastructure in Israel (where it went after electoral rolls) and the United States. In the future, these hacking operations may be combined with propaganda campaigns.

RT—Russia Today—has a bigger profile than either Telesur or Press TV; in Africa, it has close links to China . Following the invasion of Ukraine, some satellite networks dropped RT. But China’s StarTimes satellite picked it up, and RT immediately began building offices and relationships across Africa, especially in countries run by autocrats who echo its anti-Western, anti-LGBTQ messages, and who appreciate its lack of critical or investigative reporting.

RT—like Press TV, Telesur, and even CGTN—also functions as a production facility, a source of video clips that can be spread online, repurposed and reused in targeted campaigns. Americans got a firsthand view of how the clandestine versions work in 2016, when the Internet Research Agency—now disbanded but based then in St. Petersburg and led by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, more famous as the mercenary boss of the Wagner Group who staged an aborted march on Moscow—pumped out fake material via fake Facebook and Twitter accounts, designed to confuse American voters. Examples ranged from virulently anti-immigration accounts aimed at benefiting Donald Trump to fake Black Lives Matter accounts that attacked Hillary Clinton from the left.

Since 2016, these tactics have been applied across the globe. The Xinhua and RT offices in Africa and around the world—along with Telesur and HispanTV—create stories, slogans, memes, and narratives promoting the worldview of the autocracies; these, in turn, are repeated and amplified in many countries, translated into many languages, and reshaped for many local markets. The material produced is mostly unsophisticated, but it is inexpensive and can change quickly, according to the needs of the moment. After the October 7 Hamas attack, for example, official and unofficial Russian sources immediately began putting out both anti-Israel and anti-Semitic material, and messages calling American and Western support for Ukraine hypocritical in light of the Gaza conflict. The data-analytics company Alto Intelligence found posts smearing both Ukrainians and Israelis as “Nazis,” part of what appears to be a campaign to bring far-left and far-right communities closer together in opposition to U.S.-allied democracies. Anti-Semitic and pro-Hamas messages also increased inside China, as well as on Chinese-linked accounts around the world. Joshua Eisenman, a professor at Notre Dame and the author of a new book on China’s relations with Africa, told me that during a recent trip to Beijing, he was astonished by how quickly the previous Chinese line on the Middle East—“China-Israel relations are stronger than ever”—changed. “It was a complete 180 in just a few days.”

Not that everyone hearing these messages will necessarily know where they come from, because they often appear in forums that conceal their origins. Most people probably did not hear the American-biolabs conspiracy theory on a television news program, for example. Instead, they heard it thanks to organizations like Pressenza and Yala News. Pressenza, a website founded in Milan and relocated to Ecuador in 2014, publishes in eight languages, describes itself as “an international news agency dedicated to news about peace and nonviolence,” and featured an article on biolabs in Ukraine. According to the U.S. State Department, Pressenza is part of a project, run by three Russian companies, that planned to create articles in Moscow and then translate them for these “native” sites, following Chinese practice, to make them seem “local.” Pressenza denied the allegations; one of its journalists, Oleg Yasinsky, who says he is of Ukrainian origin, responded by denouncing America’s “planetary propaganda machine” and quoting Che Guevara.

Like Pressenza, Yala News also markets itself as independent. This U.K.-registered, Arabic-language news operation provides slickly produced videos, including celebrity interviews, to its 3 million followers every day. In March 2022, as the biolabs allegation was being promoted by other outlets, the site posted a video that echoed one of the most sensational versions: Ukraine was planning to use migratory birds as a delivery vehicle for bioweapons, infecting the birds and then sending them into Russia to spread disease.

Yala did not invent this ludicrous tale: Russian state media, such as the Sputnik news agency, published it in Russian first, followed by Sputnik’s Arabic website and RT Arabic. Russia’s United Nations ambassador addressed the UN Security Council about the biobird scandal, warning of the “real biological danger to the people in European countries, which can result from an uncontrolled spread of bioagents from Ukraine.” In an April 2022 interview in Kyiv , Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told The Atlantic ’s editor in chief, Jeffrey Goldberg, and me that the biobirds story reminded him of a Monty Python sketch. If Yala were truly an “independent” publication, as it describes itself, it would have fact-checked this story, which, like the other biolab conspiracies, was widely debunked.

Read: Anne Applebaum and Jeffrey Goldberg interview Volodymyr Zelensky

But Yala News is not a news organization at all. As the BBC has reported , it’s an information laundromat, a site that exists to spread and propagate material produced by RT and other Russian facilities. Yala News has posted claims that the Russian massacre of Ukrainian civilians at Bucha was staged, that Zelensky appeared drunk on television, and that Ukrainian soldiers were running away from the front lines. Although the company is registered to an address in London—a mail drop shared by 65,000 other companies—its “news team” is based in a suburb of Damascus. The company’s CEO is a Syrian businessman based in Dubai who, when asked by the BBC, insisted on the organization’s “impartiality.”

Another strange actor in this field is RRN—the company’s name is an acronym, originally for Reliable Russian News, later changed to Reliable Recent News. Created in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, RRN, part of a bigger information-laundering operation known to investigators as Doppelganger, is primarily a “typosquatter”: a company that registers domain names that look similar to real media domain names—Reuters.cfd instead of Reuters.com, for example—as well as websites with names that sound authentic (like Notre Pays , or “Our Country”) but are created to deceive. RRN is prolific. During its short existence, it has created more than 300 sites targeting Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America. Links to these sites are then used to make Facebook, Twitter, and other social-media posts appear credible. When someone is quickly scrolling, they might not notice that a headline links to a fake Spiegel.pro website, say, rather than to the authentic German-magazine website Spiegel.de.

Doppelganger’s efforts, run by a clutch of companies in Russia, have varied widely, and seem to have included fake NATO press releases , with the same fonts and design as the genuine releases, “revealing” that NATO leaders were planning to deploy Ukrainian paramilitary troops to France to quell pension protests. In November, operatives who the French government believes are linked to Doppelganger spray-painted Stars of David around Paris and posted them on social media, hoping to amplify French divisions over the Gaza war. Russian operatives built a social-media network to spread the false stories and the photographs of anti-Semitic graffiti. The goal is to make sure that the people encountering this content have little clue as to who created it, or where or why.

Russia and China are not the only parties in this space. Both real and automated social-media accounts geolocated to Venezuela played a small role in the 2018 Mexican presidential election, for example, boosting the campaign of Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Notable were two kinds of messages: those that promoted images of Mexican violence and chaos—images that might make people feel they need an autocrat to restore order—and those that were angrily opposed to NAFTA and the U.S. more broadly. This tiny social-media investment must have been deemed successful. After he became president, López Obrador engaged in the same kinds of smear campaigns as unelected politicians in autocracies, empowered and corrupted the military, undermined the independence of the judiciary, and otherwise degraded Mexican democracy. In office, he has promoted Russian narratives about the war in Ukraine along with Chinese narratives about the repression of the Uyghurs. Mexico’s relationship with the United States has become more difficult—and that, surely, was part of the point.

None of these efforts would succeed without local actors who share the autocratic world’s goals. Russia, China, and Venezuela did not invent anti-Americanism in Mexico. They did not invent Catalan separatism, to name another movement that both Russian and Venezuelan social-media accounts supported, or the German far right, or France’s Marine Le Pen. All they do is amplify existing people and movements—whether anti-LGBTQ, anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant, anti-Ukrainian, or, above all, antidemocratic. Sometimes they provide a social-media echo. Sometimes they employ reporters and spokespeople. Sometimes they use the media networks they built for this purpose. And sometimes, they just rely on Americans to do it for them.

Here is a difficult truth: A part of the American political spectrum is not merely a passive recipient of the combined authoritarian narratives that come from Russia, China, and their ilk, but an active participant in creating and spreading them. Like the leaders of those countries, the American MAGA right also wants Americans to believe that their democracy is degenerate, their elections illegitimate, their civilization dying. The MAGA movement’s leaders also have an interest in pumping nihilism and cynicism into the brains of their fellow citizens, and in convincing them that nothing they see is true. Their goals are so similar that it is hard to distinguish between the online American alt-right and its foreign amplifiers, who have multiplied since the days when this was solely a Russian project. Tucker Carlson has even promoted the fear of a color revolution in America, lifting the phrase directly from Russian propaganda. The Chinese have joined in too: Earlier this year, a group of Chinese accounts that had previously been posting pro-Chinese material in Mandarin began posting in English, using MAGA symbols and attacking President Joe Biden. They showed fake images of Biden in prison garb, made fun of his age, and called him a satanist pedophile. One Chinese-linked account reposted an RT video repeating the lie that Biden had sent a neo-Nazi criminal to fight in Ukraine. Alex Jones’s reposting of the lie on social media reached some 400,000 people.

Given that both Russian and Chinese actors now blend in so easily with the MAGA messaging operation, it is hardly surprising that the American government has difficulty responding to the newly interlinked autocratic propaganda network. American-government-backed foreign broadcasters—Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Farda, Radio Martí—still exist, but neither their mandate nor their funding has changed much in recent years. The intelligence agencies continue to observe what happens—there is a Foreign Malign Influence Center under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence—but they are by definition not part of the public debate. The only relatively new government institution fighting antidemocratic propaganda is the Global Engagement Center, but it is in the State Department, and its mandate is to focus on authoritarian propaganda outside the United States. Established in 2016, it replaced the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, which sought to foil the Islamic State and other jihadist groups that were recruiting young people online. In 2014–15, as the scale of Russian disinformation campaigns in Europe were becoming better known, Congress designated the GEC to deal with Russian as well as Chinese, Iranian, and other propaganda campaigns around the world—although not, again, inside the United States. Throughout the Trump administration, the organization languished under the direction of a president who himself repeated Russian propaganda lines during the 2016 campaign—“Obama founded ISIS,” for example, and “Hillary will start World War III.”

Today the GEC is run by James Rubin, a former State Department spokesperson from the Bill Clinton era. It employs 125 people and has a budget of $61 million—hardly a match for the many billions that China and Russia spend building their media networks. But it is beginning to find its footing, handing out small grants to international groups that track and reveal foreign disinformation operations. It’s now specializing in identifying covert propaganda campaigns before they begin, with the help of U.S. intelligence agencies. Rubin calls this “prebunking” and describes it as a kind of “inoculation”: “If journalists and governments know that this is coming, then when it comes, they will recognize it.”

The revelation in November of the Russian ties to seemingly native left-wing websites in Latin America, including Pressenza, was one such effort. More recently, the GEC published a report on the African Initiative, an agency that had planned a huge campaign to discredit Western health philanthropy, starting with rumors about a new virus supposedly spread by mosquitoes. The idea was to smear Western doctors, clinics, and philanthropists, and to build a climate of distrust around Western medicine, much as Russian efforts helped build a climate of distrust around Western vaccines during the pandemic. The GEC identified the Russian leader of the project, Artem Sergeyevich Kureyev; noted that several employees had come to the African Initiative from the Wagner Group; and located two of its offices, in Mali and Burkina Faso. Rubin and others subsequently spent a lot of time talking with regional reporters about the African Initiative’s plans so that “people will recognize them” when they launch. Dozens of articles in English, Spanish, and other languages have described these operations, as have thousands of social-media posts. Eventually, the goal is to create an alliance of other nations who also want to share information about planned and ongoing information operations so that everyone knows they are coming.

It’s a great idea, but no equivalent agency functions inside the United States. Some social-media companies have made purely voluntary efforts to remove foreign-government propaganda, sometimes after being tipped off by the U.S. government but mostly on their own. In the U.S., Facebook created a security-policy unit that still regularly announces when it discovers “coordinated inauthentic behavior”—meaning accounts that are automated and/or evidently part of a planned operation from (usually) Russian, Iranian, or Chinese sources—and then takes down the posts. It is difficult for outsiders to monitor this activity, because the company restricts access to its data, and even controls the tools that can be used to examine the data. In March, Meta announced that by August, it would phase out CrowdTangle, a tool used to analyze Facebook data, and replace it with a tool that analysts fear will be harder to use.

X (formerly Twitter) also used to look for foreign propaganda activity, but under the ownership of Elon Musk, that voluntary effort has been badly weakened. The new blue-check “verification” process allows users—including anonymous, pro-Russian users—to pay to have their posts amplified; the old “safety team” no longer exists. The result: After the collapse of the Kakhovka dam in Ukraine last summer, a major environmental and humanitarian disaster caused by Russian bombing over many weeks, the false narrative that Ukraine had destroyed it appeared hundreds of thousands of times on X. After the ISIS terrorist attack on a concert hall in Moscow in March, David Sacks, the former PayPal entrepreneur and a close associate of Musk’s, posted on X, with no evidence, that “if the Ukrainian government was behind the terrorist attack, as looks increasingly likely, the U.S. must renounce it.” His completely unfounded post was viewed 2.5 million times. This spring, some Republican congressional leaders finally began speaking about the Russian propaganda that had “infected” their base and their colleagues. Most of that “Russian propaganda” is not coming from inside Russia.

Over the past several years, universities and think tanks have used their own data analytics to try to identify inauthentic networks on the largest websites—but they are also now meeting resistance from MAGA-affiliated Republican politicians. In 2020, teams at Stanford University and the University of Washington, together with the Digital Forensic Research Lab at the Atlantic Council and Graphika, a company that specializes in social-media analytics, decided to join forces to monitor false election information. Renée DiResta, one of the leaders of what became the Election Integrity Partnership, told me that an early concern was Russian and Chinese campaigns. DiResta assumed that these foreign interventions wouldn’t matter much, but she thought it would be useful and academically interesting to understand their scope. “Lo and behold,” she said, “the entity that becomes the most persistent in alleging that American elections are fraudulent, fake, rigged, and everything else turns out to be the president of the United States.” The Election Integrity Partnership tracked election rumors coming from across the political spectrum, but observed that the MAGA right was far more prolific and significant than any other source.

The Election Integrity Partnership was not organized or directed by the U.S. government. It occasionally reached out to platforms, but had no power to compel them to act, DiResta told me. Nevertheless, the project became the focus of a complicated MAGA-world conspiracy theory about alleged government suppression of free speech, and it led to legal and personal attacks on many of those involved. The project has been smeared and mischaracterized by some of the journalists attached to Musk’s “Twitter Files” investigation , and by Representative Jim Jordan’s Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government. A series of lawsuits alleging that the U.S. government sought to suppress conservative speech, including one launched by Missouri and Louisiana that has now reached the Supreme Court, has effectively tried to silence organizations that investigate both domestic and foreign disinformation campaigns, overt and covert. To state baldly what is happening: The Republican Party’s right wing is actively harassing legitimate, good-faith efforts to track the production and dissemination of autocratic disinformation here in the United States.

Over time, the attack on the Election Integrity Partnership has itself acquired some of the characteristics of a classic information-laundering operation. The most notorious example concerns a reference, on page 183 of the project’s final post-2020-election report, to the 21,897,364 tweets gathered after the election, in an effort to catalog the most viral false rumors. That simple statement of the size of the database has been twisted into another false and yet constantly repeated rumor: the spurious claim that the Department of Homeland Security somehow conspired with the Election Integrity Partnership to censor 22 million tweets. This never happened, and yet DiResta said that “this nonsense about the 22 million tweets pops up constantly as evidence of the sheer volume of our duplicity”; it has even appeared in the Congressional Record .

The same tactics have been used against the Global Engagement Center. In 2021, the GEC gave a grant to another organization, the Global Disinformation Index, which helped develop a technical tool to track online campaigns in East Asia and Europe. For a completely unrelated, separately funded project, the Global Disinformation Index also conducted a study, aimed at advertisers, that identified websites at risk for publishing false stories. Two conservative organizations, finding their names on that latter list, sued the GEC, although it had nothing to do with creating the list. Musk posted, again without any evidence, “The worst offender in US government censorship & media manipulation is an obscure agency called GEC,” and that organization also became caught up in the endless whirlwind of conspiracy and congressional investigations.

As it happens, I was caught up in it too, because I was listed online as an “adviser” to the Global Disinformation Index, even though I had not spoken with anyone at the organization for several years and was not aware that it even had a website. A predictable, and wearisome, pattern followed: false accusations (no, I was not advising anyone to censor anyone) and the obligatory death threats. Of course, my experience was mild compared with the experience of DiResta, who has been accused of being, as she put it, “the head of a censorship-industrial complex that does not exist.”

These stories are symptomatic of a larger problem: Because the American extreme right and (more rarely) the extreme left benefit from the spread of antidemocratic narratives, they have an interest in silencing or hobbling any group that wants to stop, or even identify, foreign campaigns. Senator Mark Warner, the chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, told me that “we are actually less prepared today than we were four years ago” for foreign attempts to influence the 2024 election. This is not only because authoritarian propaganda campaigns have become more sophisticated as they begin to use AI, or because “you obviously have a political environment here where there’s a lot more Americans who are more distrustful of all institutions.” It’s also because the lawsuits, threats, and smear tactics have chilled government, academic, and tech-company responses.

One could call this a secret authoritarian “plot” to preserve the ability to spread antidemocratic conspiracy theories, except that it’s not a secret. It’s all visible, right on the surface. Russia, China, and sometimes other state actors—Venezuela, Iran, Hungary—work with Americans to discredit democracy, to undermine the credibility of democratic leaders, to mock the rule of law. They do so with the goal of electing Trump, whose second presidency would damage the image of democracy around the world, as well as the stability of democracy in America, even further.

This article appears in the June 2024 print edition with the headline “Democracy Is Losing the Propaganda War.” Anne Applebaum’s new book, Autocracy, Inc.: The Dictators Who Want to Run the World , will be published in July.

​When you buy a book using a link on this page, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.

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Are E.V.s Too Quiet and ‘Boring’?

More from our inbox:, living with roommates in college, tech in the classroom, ‘unpleasant truths’ about russia, water and politics.

To the Editor:

Re “ Electric Cars Are Boring ,” by Ezra Dyer (Opinion guest essay, April 13):

If E.V.s are boring, I guess I am OK with being bored. As an E.V. owner, I no longer have to stop at the gas station to fill up in all kinds of (Chicago) weather. No more oil changes, no more antifreeze concerns, no muffler or fuel pump problems. Boring is good.

No key or fob to carry, and I can preheat or precool my E.V. in various types of inclement weather.

Now for full disclosure. I bought my first E.V. 10 years ago when I was 73. I am now at the age where simpler (boring) is better. I still drive my grandson’s stick shift from time to time, but find it requires too much effort.

I was wondering if Mr. Dyer would like to go back to the horse and buggy. Just think of the road noise and the sound of real horses.

Ron Thomas Glencoe, Ill.

The slowdown in E.V. sales is not because they are boring. It’s because they are 1) too expensive; 2) take too long to charge; 3) don’t go far enough on a single charge.

I will happily buy a medium-size S.U.V. E.V. when it goes 500 miles on a five-minute charge and costs about the same as the hybrid version. Until then I will settle for the Toyota RAV4 hybrid.

John Aitken Salt Lake City

Sitting on the back deck of my house, I can hear the faint roar of traffic from the town center, about a mile away. I console myself that when more people are driving E.V.s, quiet and the sweet cacophony of bird song will prevail.

Now, Ezra Dyer tells us that E.V. manufacturers are designing speaker systems that will mimic the sound of “loud exhaust” because E.V.s are too boring.

What’s next, E.V.s equipped to spew the nostalgia-inducing “not entirely unpleasant” smell of gas, oil and diesel?

The genius of human invention never fails to amaze and horrify.

Janet Buchwald Sudbury, Mass.

What an unexpected and incredibly refreshing surprise to see the essay on electric cars by Ezra Dyer, a Car and Driver columnist. As a longtime Car and Driver subscriber and past and present owner of three Alfa Romeos, I agree wholeheartedly with his observations.

And given the fact that the Porsche 911 GT3 is one of the most coveted cars by my 25-year-old son, there is hope for the next generation. We just need the car manufacturers to listen to the roar.

Allan M. Tepper Philadelphia

Re “ Living With a Stranger Is Hard. College Students Should Try It ,” by Pamela Paul (column, April 23):

I had the unique privilege of having roommates for my first two years of college who were radically different from me. I learned an awful lot because of the experience. But there was plenty I wish I hadn’t too.

The move to college is hard enough — academically, socially, mentally — that sharing that with another person places a needless burden on new students.

Ms. Paul is quite right that students benefit from learning from those around them, and schools should emphasize this in the classroom. But if there’s one place that ought to be sacred and free from the trials of starting college, it should be one’s room.

James J. Bernstein New York

When I arrived at the University of Alaska Fairbanks as a freshman in 1972 as a Jewish New Yorker in a distant land, I met my new roommate, a Muslim from the Philippines. Two people could not have been more different. And it worked out magically.

While we have lost touch over the years, I still remember his glowing smile and warmth and am glad we were selected as roommates. It helped me to grow and appreciate people from vastly different backgrounds.

Randomness in roommate selection can generate growth and learning, which is what I always thought college is supposed to do.

Paul Neuman New York

Re “ Tech in Schools Needs ‘a Hard Reset,’ ” by Jessica Grose (Opinion, April 28):

Over the past 15 years of having school-age kids, I have been deeply frustrated by how our schools have adopted technology without enough scrutiny. It is depressing to realize how many hours my kids are required to spend in front of the computer screen daily — and all without any body of evidence pointing to its positive effect on learning.

How I dreamed about running the iPad over with my van after four years of my high schooler reading everything — even novels! — on his device.

Though I’ve heard noble rationales for tech in the classrooms — “It will save the trees!” — I agree with Ms. Grose that schools need to re-evaluate what tech companies decide the schools need.

Not only are standardized tests at every level revealing faltering learning outcomes, but the human-to-human interaction is also clearly suffering the most. Out with Google Slides; in with teaching!

Amanda Bonagura Floral Park, N.Y.

Re “ How Do I Talk to My Son About a War I Don’t Understand? ,” by Sasha Vasilyuk (Opinion guest essay, April 28):

The war in Ukraine is not “Russia’s betrayal,” as Ms. Vasilyuk writes, but Russia’s business as usual. For generations, Moscow has violently suppressed the freedoms of surrounding nations.

Rather than withhold unpleasant truths, Russian parents must teach their children what Ukrainian, Polish or Latvian children learn from theirs: Historically Russia is an aggressor.

Russia’s imperialism relies on the unquestioned belief among countless ordinary Russians that their state has a virtuous right to dominate its neighbors. Without much hard work by parents and teachers, Russia’s noxious record will continue unchallenged.

John Connelly Kensington, Calif. The writer is a professor of history at the University of California, Berkeley.

Re “ Democrats See Water as Issue to Win Over Rural Arizona Voters ” (news article, April 24):

This article points out the difficulty that Democrats face in winning over conservative voters. For these desert communities, water is a life and death issue. But even though they admit that Republican policies hurt them and Democratic policies help them, these people will vote for Donald Trump.

And it’s not as if they don’t realize which side is which. They may agree that on this crucial issue the Democrats are right and are helping them, and the Republicans are wrong and are hurting them, but it doesn’t matter. They will still vote for Mr. Trump. There could be no clearer example of people voting directly against their own interests.

If nothing else, this discouraging story shows how much stronger is the fear of migrants, of change, of big government — all abstract fears really — than the drastic reality staring these people in the face.

Tim Shaw Cambridge, Mass.

Ukraine says it foiled a Russian spy agency plot to assassinate President Zelensky

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Ukrainian counterintelligence investigators have foiled a Russian plot to assassinate President Volodymyr Zelensky and other top military and political figures, Ukraine ’s state security service said Tuesday.

Two colonels in the State Guard of Ukraine, which protects top officials, were detained on suspicion of enacting the plan drawn up by Russia’s Federal Security Service, a statement said. The colonels were recruited before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 , according to the statement.

It quoted the head of the State Security Service, Vasyl Maliuk, as saying the plot foresaw an attack before Russian President Vladimir Putin ’s inauguration for a fifth term on Tuesday. Maliuk said that he personally oversaw the top-secret operation to track the plot.

Ukrainian allegations of Russian efforts to kill Zelensky aren’t new. Zelensky said in 2022 there has been at least 10 attempts to assassinate him, and now the war with Russia has stretched into its third year.

World & Nation

News analysis: Why Putin is raising the specter of nuclear weapons again

Russia announces plans to hold drills near Ukraine simulating the use of battlefield nuclear weapons.

May 6, 2024

Also, prosecutors in Poland said last month that a Polish man had been arrested on allegations of being ready to spy on behalf of Russia’s military intelligence in an alleged plot to assassinate Zelensky.

Zelensky’s movements are kept secret for security reasons, and his visits around the country are publicly announced only after he has left. News of events he holds in Kyiv is usually embargoed until they are over.

Pummeled by airstrikes, Ukrainians in Kharkiv live in defiance of Russia

Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, is facing intense Russian airstrikes, but its residents are defiant. “We can stand up, no matter what they do,” one said.

April 26, 2024

Zelensky has proved to be a valuable asset for his country as the war against Ukraine’s bigger neighbor grinds on, and as Kyiv’s depleted forces wait for more troops and weapons. He has urged his people to keep fighting and instilled a belief that Ukraine can prevail.

The Ukrainian statement said the Russian intelligence agents targeting Zelensky sought out members of the Ukrainian military close to the president’s security detail who could take the head of state hostage and later kill him. The operation was run from Moscow, it said, providing the names of three alleged Russian spies behind the conspiracy.

In Ukraine, relief over U.S. aid vote — and fear over what an angry Russia will do next

Amid worsening Ukraine war outlook, an infusion of American military aid is seen as crucial in the fight against Russian invaders. Will it be enough?

April 21, 2024

The broader plan was to identify the location of senior Ukrainian officials and target them with a rocket attack, followed by drones and missiles.

The two Ukrainian colonels were arrested on suspicion of treason, which carries a life sentence, the statement said.

Novikov writes for the Associated Press.

In Ukraine’s old imperial city, pastel palaces are in jeopardy, but black humor survives

Ukraine’s port of Odesa is a key Russian target, endangering the city’s UNESCO-designated historic center and challenging citizens to keep their sense of humor.

More to Read

Russia puts Ukrainian President Zelensky on its wanted list

May 4, 2024

Poland arrests man suspected of spying for Russia to aid Zelensky assassination plot

April 18, 2024

Zelensky fires more aides in a reshuffle as Russia launches drones and missiles across Ukraine

March 30, 2024

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