make a creative presentation on virtues and their corresponding vices

Vices and Virtues Explained

Posted by Thomas DeMichele on September 2, 2016 in Reference

How to Understand the Classical Vices and Virtues

Virtue theory, moral philosophy, and chivalry as understood throughout the ages.

We present a list of vices and virtues and look at vices and virtues as understood by philosophers like Aristotle and Aquinas. [1] [2] [3] [4]

That means we will discuss a range of “ virtue theories ” pertaining to both “ moral virtues ” and other types of virtues (such as virtues related to specific “ spheres of life ,” such as statesmanship in the political sphere, health in the physical sphere, friendship in the social sphere, etc).

That also means we will discuss virtue theories like Aristotle’s Theory of “Golden” Means ,  Plato’s Theory of Forms , Smith’s Moral Sentiments , Kant’s metaphysics of Morals, Hume empirical theories on morals, the Greek concept of arete ,  the Christian virtues and vices , the chivalric virtues of the Code of Chivalry , Plato and Aristotle’s ideal city state (and the related “ virtues of the state “), Montesquieu’s “springs” (the virtues as they relate to different types of laws under different types of governments ; the “ virtues of the laws “) from his Spirit of the Laws , and other longstanding virtue theories pertaining to vices and virtues of all sorts.

What are Vice and Virtues?

Although we can, we shouldn’t just understand “ virtue ” as some floating metaphysical form. Instead, virtue should be understood as any positive sentiment that leads to the happiness of ourselves and others (the “good” qualities a person can possess so to speak).

Likewise, “ vice ” is simply the absence of virtue, that which does not lead to happiness (that which we generally consider “bad” qualities).

For Aristotle a virtue was a mean between two vices, for Smith and Hume virtue was just the aspect of our emotion/sentiments/feelings that compelled us to act positively, to Aquinas it was an attribute bestowed upon us by God.

Are virtue and vice physic or metaphysic? Are they natural or divine? That isn’t the question to answer here. Instead we’ll explore what different thinkers have thought (leaving the final call up to you).

There are countless ways to discuss this, but all theories lead back to the same concept. Virtues are those honorable qualities that we respect in ourselves and others, the ones with positive ends (and Vices are the absence of these qualities) .

With that said, by examining different virtue theories and virtue theorists like we do below, we’ll be better understand why past cultures and thinkers considered these somewhat metaphysical aspects of the human condition important enough to include in their major works.

Understanding the Basics of Vices and Virtue

The basics of vices and virtue (like so many things) were perhaps best expressed by Plato and Aristotle.

Here is the anatomy of vice and virtue (which can essentially be gleaned from the Greeks):

• There are different orders of virtues (some higher, some lower) that apply to different areas of life.
• For each virtue, there is generally two vices (one of excess and one of deficiency). We can use this truism to create tables like we do below.
• These aren’t just metaphysical concepts, but are names given to those feelings we all find common that lead to both happiness or a lack there of.
• There is no one perfect list of virtues and vices, but most lists point toward the same basic group.
• Many theorize that the “ends” of all virtue is “happiness.”

“Now goods are of two kinds: there are human and there are divine goods… “For wisdom is chief and leader of the divine class of goods , and next follows temperance ; and from the union of these two with courage springs justice , and fourth in the scale of virtue is courage. All these naturally take precedence of the other goods… …Of the lesser [human] goods the first [the highest] is health , the second beauty , the third strength , including swiftness in running and bodily agility generally, and the fourth is wealth …” – Plato’s Laws Book I

With that quote in mind, here is Plato’s virtues from his Laws in the style of Aristotle’s golden mean chart (which we will discuss in detail below). TIP : This isn’t the only way to express this, this is just an example.

Virtues and Their Relation to Morals and Ethics : Morals and virtues are nearly synonyms. They are the sentiments and values behind our ethical actions and rule-sets (they are the principles behind our codes of conduct). We can understand these as human emotions, and treat them empirically, or we can understand them as something more. Either way they are moral properties that cause us to act ethically, they aren’t themselves ethics and actions. So to be clear, while concepts like Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism relate to a moral theory of vices and virtues, those empirically and logically gleaned “ethical rule-sets” aren’t themselves a comment on vice and virtue directly. Rather, “ethics” is action based on the moral principles we call virtues (ethics are like rule-sets for avoiding vice and ensuring virtues; virtues and morals are the metaphysical concepts underneath the ethics). Ok, think that point has been made. Onto our first list of virtues.

Expressing the Virtues and Vices of Different “Spheres of Life”

Above we offered an example of Aristotle’s Golden mean chart and a few vices and virtues. Below we’ll show you  how to abstract vices from these virtues to find these “golden means”  (consider each “thesis,” each concept, in this case each “virtue,” below has by its nature generally has an “anti-thesis” of deficiency and antithesis of excess; using this sort of logic we can derive vices from virtues and virtues from vices; as you’ll see further down the page).

Before we get to that, let’s discuss another important and fundamental concept, that is how virtues apply to different “ Spheres of life .” Plato tells us there are only two spheres (the human and divine), but in reality he eludes to more (such as the sphere that governs the warrior/timocrat/guardian where honor and duty are high virtues).

Below is an example list of key virtues from different areas (AKA “spheres”) of life. The ends of each type of virtue category is noted. This list is not exhaustive, and it is not a perfect list (in its completeness or order). The is, like most of the lists on this page, just an example that hints at the elusive “ideal list.” See the many other lists below to compare!

TIP : Depending on what we are talking about, if we are talking about “divine” “moral” laws, or if we are talking about something more human like politics or economics, we can consider different virtues. As Plato says and Aquinas agrees, “ Now goods are of two kinds: there are human and there are divine goods… ” Below we can see that physical, social, and political virtues are of the human kind, moral virtues are of the “divine” kind, and practical morals bridge the gap.

TIP : The ends of all virtues are the “health” of that category, a synonym for this is “happiness.” Mill and Smith both see our basic self interest as that of seeking happiness, of course not everything that makes us happy in the short term is “a virtue.” We’ll discuss happiness and vices more below, or see our page on happiness .

NOTE : This example list of virtues above is meant to illustrate different virtues in different “spheres,” which each have different ends (where physical ends are “health” and moral ends are “happiness”). The list it is non-exhaustive to say the least (Truth is for example an important but unnamed virtue), and there is no fully agreed on order or highest good here (there is consensus somewhat, but no official answer). See many more virtue lists below including the most famous ones like the Christian virtues.

TIP : If we synthesize the work of the past virtue theorists (like Plato in his Laws , see the paragraph that starts with “Now goods are of two kinds: there are human and there are divine goods…”  ), we can say some of the “ Highest Moral Virtues ” are Courage ,  Moderation (Temperance) , Wisdom ,  Duty ,  Justice , and Good Will (Aquinas thought the “ cardinal virtues ” were  prudence , temperance , justice , and fortitude ; but there is no one right answer here). Although there are many higher and lower forms of these virtues (at least one for each category of human understanding ), the highest moral forms of each cover most bases. If one has Good Will (good intentions) and understands moral duty and the concept of balance (moderation and justice), i.e. if they have the wisdom to understand these things, and if they have the courage to hold fast to their principles , then charity, sagacity, equality, liberty, tolerance, sensitivity, etc would arise almost as a second nature. This sort of thinking, the idea that holding enlightened virtues can help guide one toward other virtuous action “as if by second nature”, is an extrapolation of the moral philosophies of the Greeks and Enlightenment philosophers. See: Good Faith, Bad Faith, and Duty , arete , and “ what is justice? “ [5]

TIP : Practice makes perfect. Once you understand a virtue and its related vices its all about reinforcement. Act as if, and you become virtuous over time. When the nation inspires virtue in its citizens as part of its laws and civil religion, even better. That is the point of Plato’s Republic and Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws . More-so, to some extent, the concept is the point of all philosophy and most written works of philosophy. Yes the virtues describe a code of ethics of Knights in Shining armor, but there is so much more to it than that.

TIP : There are three general types of “ normative ethics theories “. In simple terms, virtue ethics emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, deontology emphasizes duties or rules, and consequentialism emphasizes the consequences of actions. Although virtue ethics is the theory that specifically emphasizes virtue, more broadly all these normative theories of ethics can be understood in terms of virtue and vice (furthermore,  all these theories were essentially touched on by greats like Aristotle … so with that in mind, lets start by discussing the Virtue Theory of the Greeks). [6] [7]

The Foundation of Virtue Theory: Aristotle’s Theory of Means and Thomas Aquinas’ Vice’s and Virtues

While many philosophers and thinkers clearly defined vices and virtues over the years, Aristotle began the tradition by adding in a nuanced, yet often forgotten, mechanic that I would argue forms the basis of virtue theory.

That mechanic is the idea of deficiency, mean, and excess within a “sphere of action”. It is called Aristotle’s Theory of Means (or “the Golden Mean”) and it is a fundamentally useful little trick that can be applied in a number of ways (including in left-right politics and  Hegel’s Dialectics ). [8]

The Logic Behind Aristotle’s Theory of Means

Aristotle defined vice and virtue as:  vice is an excess or deficiency of virtue , and  virtue is the mean between two accompanying vices that exists within a “sphere” . [9]

For example, in the sphere of “getting and spending”, “charity” is the virtuous mean (the balance) between “greed” and “wasteful extravagance”. If we inherit a fortune, this simple theory tells us that virtue isn’t found in hoarding or wasteful spending, but in a charitable moderation. Thus, if we can define a sphere of action, vice, or virtue we can use this model to fill in the blanks and detect the correct moral behavior. Likewise, we can apply this method to spheres outside of morality (such as governments; see  an essay on the types of governments  for examples).

Meanwhile, another famous virtue theorist, Thomas Aquinas, added in another useful mechanic from his Christian perspective.

Aquinas separated virtue into  cardinal virtues  (natural virtues that can be known through the senses and reason or ethics) and  theological virtues  (divine virtues that can be partially rationalized and intuited but never fully known or roughly morals). Aquinas then stated that complete virtues are virtues that combine the two. [10] [11]

For example, we can combine the virtues of courage (cardinal) and charity (theological) by chasing down a thief who stole a woman’s purse. We courageously chase down the thief, a selfless and charitable action.

Simply, although they may not present prefect lists or theories, Aristotle and Aquinas give us the tools we need to lay a foundation.

Putting the theories together in chart, using the vices and virtues given in the examples above, looks like this (see full charts and lists below):

TIP : Aristotle defines his virtue theory over more than one of his works. In his Rhetoric he says, “The forms of Virtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, wisdom.”

TIP : For Greeks like Aristotle they had a concept called Arete . Arete is the chief good, the aristocracy of virtues. It is a single word that stands as a placeholder for the ends of virtue. Or rather, it is a word that lacks an English equivalent. See an essay on Arete.

TIP : Stepping back from the above theory, but referring to the concept, lets look a little deeper at Plato and Aristotle’s idea of the ideal city state and the ideal soul (and how it shapes the ideal character of a person), because this is directly related to how the Greeks understood virtue. Generally, both individuals and entities (like small groups or even nations) have virtues. To sum up the argument of Plato and Aristotle simply, the greatest virtue is moderation and the greatest ends is justice. Moderation ensures the other virtues, and a balance of virtues assures the greatest happiness for the most, and that is true justice. Meanwhile, vices are generally lower-order pleasure seeking that is immoderate. A vice isn’t bad in moderation, really here, the general warning will be to seek balance and avoid extremes. This being important to all virtues and vices is why moderation is “the chief virtue”. Likewise, money (although neither good or bad alone), being what is needed to obtain most vices, is emblematic of the vices of excess. So a miser who cares only for themselves and seeks animal pleasures is engaging in lower vices, and a sage who cares for truth and justice and seeks moderation is engaging in virtues of the highest order. In the ideal city state both entities thrive, but each plays a different role, each balancing each-other. Therefore, moderation is also “the chief good” of a state. When a state is in balance, there is the greatest happiness, and this is justice.

TIP : Most concepts related to virtue and vice are metaphysical. That doesn’t mean they aren’t practical and don’t have some degree of empirical and rational application. If one has no sense of right and wrong or good and evil , no sense of what causes happiness and unhappiness , then they will struggle to apply many of the theories of moral philosophy, from Plato’s and Aristotle’s to Bentham’s and Mill’s. If we don’t understand happiness as it relates to virtue, how can we have a greater happiness theory ? If we don’t understand unhappiness as it relates to vice, how can we make moral judgements for society? If Titus Livy could not convey the virtues of the Roman state, how could he instill the necessary sense of national pride in Rome? Etc.

How can we learn to be virtuous?  As Aristotle correctly stated [paraphrasing], virtue is learned by experience. One’s character must be cultivated. We learn charity by being charitable, learn honor by being honorable, learn humility by being humble, learn to take joy in healing rather than vice seeking by experiencing the pains and pleasures of life. Etc. One can teach the theory, but one can’t instill virtue in another person.

Defining Vice and Virtue in More Detail

Given the above, we can define vice and virtue like this.

• Virtue : Virtue is that which is moral, ethical, and just. It is the avoiding of vices of deficiency or excess, and adhering to the natural, civil, divine, and enteral law. Virtue may be defined as possessing and utilizing “good” traits in a balanced way with these traits sometimes being understood as the Christian virtues , or as Aquinas’ , or as Aristotle’s , although they aren’t limited to any one interpretation.
• Vice : Vice is simply a deficiency or excess of virtue. Or, generally speaking, a virtue in a corrupting extreme and without the proper restraints.

Thomas Aquinas’ Cardinal Virtues and Theological Virtues

Now for an example of dividing these into cardinal and theological using Aquinas’ model: [12]

• The four cardinal virtues as prudence , temperance , justice , and fortitude . The cardinal virtues are natural and revealed in nature, and they are binding on everyone.
• Three theological virtues : faith , hope , and charity . The theological virtues relate to a more divine morality; they must be intuited and reasoned.

TIP : While I can’t sign off on the idea that we can perfectly define the virtues, the concept of dividing them into empirical and rational categories is either right or on the right track in my opinion.

Complete and Incomplete Virtues

Aquinas also describes the virtues as imperfect (incomplete) and perfect (complete) .

A perfect virtue is any virtue with charity; charity completes a cardinal virtue. Acts that are ethical and have natural goodness are virtuous, but real virtue requires embracing a type of morality which can’t be clearly defined. [13]

Ex. Giving to charity to lower your taxes is ethical, giving a homeless person your last $5 and skipping dinner shows a different aspect of character.

TIP :  Kierkegaard’s Three Stages of Life  is a concept from his masterwork Either/or which separates human experience into the physical (aesthetic), mental (ethical), and religious (moral). Using this theory as a metaphor, the natural cardinal virtues are the ethical limiting of pure aestheticism, and the theological divine virtues are the moral attempt at embracing the unknowable. Perhaps virtue and ethics are not “either/or.” Perhaps, like Aquinas, they elude “both A and B.”

Political Virtues

In this next section we will focus on different ways to understand political virtues. The health of a state (or the happiness of a state) has a direct baring on the happiness and health of its citizens. That is why this subject gets its own section!

Political Virtues Embodied in the Spirit of the Laws: Virtues that Motivate a Citizen’s Behavior According to Montesquieu

Montesquie related certain virtues to certain government types , showing that some virtues were so important that they were “the spring” of that government (the thing that made the government work). [14] [15]

• For democratic republics (and to a somewhat lesser extent for aristocratic republics), this spring is the love of virtue —the willingness to put the interests of the community ahead of private interests. A love of equality for democracy and a love of minor inequality for republics .
• For monarchies, the spring is the love of honor —the desire to attain greater rank and privilege. A love of honor and manners .
• Finally, for despotisms, the spring is the fear of the ruler . A love of the vice of fear .

FACT : Machiavelli favored virtuous leaders and a free-Republic, but he knew it took vice to win at politics. Thus, his Prince is a book that teaches vice to the virtuous .

Political Virtues as a Metaphor Related to the Separations of Powers

Playing on Montesquie’s theory, using my own metaphor pulled from the ideas on this page and classical element theory to illustrate the virtues as understood by western astrology , the  four “elements”  (or “powers”) that form the foundation of government can roughly be expressed as: citizens , executive , legislative , and judicial .

Here we can say each power within the state has a virtuous “spring”. We can roughly define this as:

• FIRE : In the Sphere of Power (the virtues are honor, valor, manners, and courage). Entities in this sphere include: the executive including leaders, the military, and police. Plato’s timoarchy and auxiliaries.
• EARTH : In the Sphere of Economy [of capital and labor] (the virtues are all the physical empirical virtues, including charity): The citizens, politicians, and barons. Plato’s oligarchy and producers.
• AIR : In the Sphere of Reason and Ethics (the virtues are mental, like wisdom): The legislative, scholars, scientists, lawyers, and general intelligence. Plato’s philosophers (in terms of intellect and reason).
• WATER : In the Sphere of Spirituality and Morality (the virtues are ones of spirit and emotion like faith and compassion; the metaphysical): The judicial, judges, and the church. Plato’s philosophers (in terms of morality and wisdom).

Political Left-Right Virtues Table

Another way to look at the virtues of government is in this left-right table in which female is associated with left and male right as a metaphor :

The above table isn’t perfect, but it should help illustrate how certain virtues are at the core of much political debate.

TIP : Conservatism is about authority, tradition, hierarchy, and order, liberalism is about liberty [and equality], socialism about equality, and fascism about nationalism. I will make a full list at some time, but for now our  left-right  page presents most of the underlying virtues i’ve detected. This is essentially the key to all of politics, but why shouldn’t it be that Aristotle and Plato got the theory right back when? We read them for a reason. From there it is just about critical thinking and abstracting concepts.

TIP : Generally we can say, in terms of governments, the left is toward Pure Democracy / Anarchy and the right toward Monarchy / Despotism. The balanced position then being Aristocracy / Oligarchy, or more specifically “ the Republic ” (not “the Republican party”, rather “a mixed-Republic” for which any just party stands). See a theory on the types of governments .

Code of Chivalry as Described by Charlemagne and the Duke of Burgundy

At the end of the eight century Charlemagne’s Code of Chivalry is said to have been presented: [16]

• To fear God and maintain His Church
• To serve the liege lord in valour and faith
• To protect the weak and defenceless
• To give succour to widows and orphans
• To refrain from the wanton giving of offence
• To live by honour and for glory
• To despise pecuniary reward
• To fight for the welfare of all
• To obey those placed in authority
• To guard the honour of fellow knights
• To eschew unfairness, meanness and deceit
• To keep faith
• At all times to speak the truth
• To persevere to the end in any enterprise begun
• To respect the honour of women
• Never to refuse a challenge from an equal
• Never to turn the back upon a foe.

The chivalric virtues of the Code of Chivalry were also described in the 14th Century by the Duke of Burgundy as: [17]

TIP : These aren’t the only virtue theories laid out over the years, but these examples should make one thing clear, what is considered vice and virtue has fluctuated very little in the west since 300’s BC.

Table of Virtues: Aristotle’s Virtues and the Christian Virtues

Now that we have examined different theories, let’s return to Aristotle’s virtue theory.

TIP : Because moderation is the key to the table, we can say moderation is both a virtue itself (temperance) and an overarching part of moral virtue. Moral virtue (which the Greeks called Arete ) is a term that encapsulates all other virtues (Arete roughly translates to “the aristocracy of virtues”).

TIP : I don’t fully agree with Aristotle’s specifics, but his concept of a virtuous mean is very in line with how things work ( dualities are an abstraction of a single concept ).

Aristotle’s Table of Virtues ( source 1 , source 2 ):

To Aristotle, moral virtues are to be understood as existing as a “mean” in a sphere and falling at the mean between two accompanying vices. His list may be represented by the following table [necessarily translated from Greek]: [18] [19]

Seven Heavenly Virtues and Seven Deadly Sins ( source )

Below is a list of the  seven heavenly virtues and seven deadly sins  for comparison. You’ll note that the concept is the same, but attaches only vices of excess to the virtues. [20]

One of the main principles of liberalism , the philosophy on which all Western society is based, is the concept of freedom of (and from) religion .

Freedom of religion is not freedom from spirituality, and it does not free us from morality, ethics, virtue, or vice. It only ensures our religious liberty and right and frees us from an authoritarian shoving their faith down our throat or using it as a form of control.

In the modern era, we have to come to grips with the fact that science and reason don’t replace our spirituality, they sit beside it. Spirituality is simply not the same as religion, and anyway, vice and virtue aren’t just spiritual, they are very real aspects of the  natural, civil, ethical, and moral law  (even when only considered empirically ).

Vice and virtue are not  either/or choices. They are part of a continuum, a dance of ups and downs, and an end goal. The concept isn’t just limited to ourselves; it is an individual, interpersonal, social, and collective quality. It’s not just a comment on how we treat others here and now, but how we treat all living things, and those beings who come next. It’s a statement on the eternal struggle between light and dark in the human condition . The concept of vice and virtue is  also an interesting segment of metaphysics .

TIP : See also “ happiness as the point of life “, “ classical element theory as a metaphor “, and our “ separation of powers metaphor ” to better understand how to apply virtue theory to other aspects of life.

• VIRTUES &VICES: Countering the Deadly Vices with Godly Virtue
• VIRTUES &VICES: Countering the Deadly Vices with Godly Virtues IV COUNTERING THE “DEADLY” VICES WITH VIRTUES
• The Master List of Virtues
• ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS TABLE OF VIRTUES AND VICES
• Plato’s Laws
• Virtue ethics
• Normative ethics
• Golden mean (philosophy)
• Nicomachean Ethics
• The Summa Theologica
• Thomas Aquinas: Moral Philosophy
• Thomas Aquinas
• Second Part of the Second Part (Secunda Secundæ Partis)
• Book III. Of the Principles of the Three Kinds of Government
• The Spirit of the Laws
• The Origins of Chivalry
• Code of Chivalry
• Nicomachean Ethics: Books I to IV
•   seven heavenly virtues

Thomas DeMichele is the content creator behind ObamaCareFacts.com, FactMyth.com, CryptocurrencyFacts.com, and other DogMediaSolutions.com and Massive Dog properties. He also contributes to MakerDAO and other cryptocurrency-based projects. Tom's focus in all...

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Thank you! helped me put things in perspective and charts are very helpful. For those interested in learning more about the Virtue Theory, Ethics, free markets, China, virtue and vice, morality, etc, I encourage the readers to take a look at the Hillsdale College Free Online Course.

Thomas DeMichele The Author

Aristotle is a great place to start. Looks like they have a whole video series. Cool https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9YaaBgDg57g

Wow, I appreciate this resource. Thank you Thomas for harvesting these different entities into one satisfying read. For me to fully consume and appropriately absorb this posting I will be giving it a second and third read as I do periodically reflect on my behavioural goals. Also, Thomas,  I think you might find of interest and one day possibly participate in a Canadian open mic, ongoing lecture series hosted by Misha Glouberman, “TRAMPOLINE HALL” where brief mind stimulating presentations occur. Nice work…Cheers

Gilbert Hsin

I am presently reading “The Problem of China” – a book by Bertrand Russell written in 1922. I encountered the following passage: “China may be regarded as an artist nation, with the virtues and vices to be expected of the artist: virtues chiefly useful to others, and vices chiefly harmful to oneself….” I am trying to understand what he meant by Virtues and Vices. I researched on the Internet and found your article. It really helps me a lot to appreciate Dr. Russell’s passage. Thank you.

Well you are welcome. I am struggling with that passage as well, maybe more context is needed. But I would assume he means: In respect to Chinese culture from his perspective at the time, it is a virtue (a good thing) to be useful to others, and a vice (a bad thing) to be harmful to one’s self.

Joseph Bunmi

Informative and educative. I am bless.

That is a nice thing to say.

Dobbin.Christ

Being with positive people can make us feel high

What a great high it is. Very little come down, overall a rather positive experience. Vices can be fun, and balance is necessary, but the highs from virtues require very little karmic payment.

Riya Narula

Very well explained . In depth knowledge is given. Appreciated!!

Very well written, thank you for sharing this, ist was very interesting!

You are welcome, I am glad and surprised someone read it. There aren’t a ton of ways to stumble across a page examining the concepts of vice and virtue. 😀

Joshua.jeong

This helped me a lot in studies

« The Caste System Explained

The historical effects of wealth inequality ».

PHIL103: Moral and Political Philosophy

Virtue Ethics

Lists of virtues.

There are several lists of particular virtues. Socrates argued that virtue is knowledge, which suggests that there is really only one virtue. The Stoics concurred, claiming the four cardinal virtues were only aspects of true virtue. John McDowell is a recent defender of this conception. He argues that virtue is a "perceptual capacity" to identify how one ought to act, and that all particular virtues are merely "specialized sensitivities" to a range of reasons for acting.

Aristotle's list

Aristotle identifies approximately eighteen virtues that enable a person to perform their human function well. He distinguished virtues pertaining to emotion and desire from those relating to the mind. The first he calls "moral" virtues, and the second intellectual virtues (though both are "moral" in the modern sense of the word). Each moral virtue was a mean (see golden mean) between two corresponding vices, one of excess and one of deficiency. Each intellectual virtue is a mental skill or habit by which the mind arrives at truth, affirming what is or denying what is not. In the  Nicomachean Ethics  he discusses about 11 moral virtues:

Moral Virtues

1.  Courage  in the face of fear

2.  Temperance  in the face of pleasure and pain

3.  Liberality  with wealth and possessions

4.  Magnificence  with great wealth and possessions

5.  Magnanimity  with great honors

6.  Proper ambition  with normal honors

7.  Truthfulness  with self-expression

8.  Wittiness  in conversation

9.  Friendliness  in social conduct

10.  Modesty  in the face of shame or shamelessness

11.  Righteous indignation  in the face of injury

Intellectual virtues

• Nous (intelligence), which apprehends fundamental truths (such as definitions, self-evident principles)
• Episteme (science), which is skill with inferential reasoning (such as proofs, syllogisms, demonstrations)
• Sophia (theoretical wisdom), which combines fundamental truths with valid, necessary inferences to reason well about unchanging truths.

Aristotle also mentions several other traits:

• Gnome (good sense) – passing judgment, "sympathetic understanding"
• Synesis (understanding) – comprehending what others say, does not issue commands
• Phronesis (practical wisdom) – knowledge of what to do, knowledge of changing truths, issues commands
• Techne (art, craftsmanship)

Aristotle's list is not the only list, however. As Alasdair MacIntyre observed in  After Virtue , thinkers as diverse as: Homer; the authors of the New Testament; Thomas Aquinas; and Benjamin Franklin; have all proposed lists.

Character Strengths and Virtues ( CSV ) is a book by Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman (2004) listing virtues in a modern, empirical, and rigorously scientific manner.

The introduction of CSV suggests that these six virtues are considered good by the vast majority of cultures and throughout history. These traits lead to increased happiness when practiced. CSV identifies 6 classes of virtue (i.e., "core virtues"). These virtues are made up of 28 measurable "character strengths". CSV is intended to provide a theoretical framework to assist in developing practical applications for positive psychology.

The Virtues

Click to print this chapter: the virtues.

Editor’s Note: Aristotle (384-322 BCE) is more interested in how to develop good people rather than merely identifying good actions. The thinking is that good people will naturally act well, just as a good knife cuts well. Here, he outlines a method for determining what sorts of qualities, or virtues, good people should have.Just as a good knife needs to be sharp, balanced, and so on, good people must need to have certain qualities. Virtues are the mean between two corresponding vices, one of excess and one of privation. Using this method to identify a given virtue, we can then verify the virtue by seeing whether or not it leads to a good and complete life (eudaimonia) in ourselves and society.

This selection is from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, which focuses on the nature of virtue, human goodness, and human flourishing.

Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought. And, as ‘life of the rational element’ also has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle, and if we say ‘so-and-so-and ‘a good so-and-so’ have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre, and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of goodness being idded to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case, and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.

But we must add ‘in a complete life.’ For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy…

We must consider it, however, in the light not only of our conclusion and our premisses, but also of what is commonly said about it; for with a true view all the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon clash. Now goods have been divided into three classes, and some are described as external, others as relating to soul or to body; we call those that relate to soul most properly and truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we class as relating to soul. Therefore our account must be sound, at least according to this view, which is an old one and agreed on by philosophers. It is correct also in that we identify the end with certain actions and activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among external goods. Another belief which harmonizes with our account is that the happy man lives well and does well; for we have practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. The characteristics that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have defined happiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity. Now some of these views have been held by many men and men of old, others by a few eminent persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even in most respects.

With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life.

Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their life, therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said, the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes; his judgement is such as we have described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at Delos-

Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health; But pleasantest is it to win what we love.

For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or one- the best- of these, we identify with happiness.

Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death. As we said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition; for which reason some identify happiness with good fortune, though others identify it with virtue…

…When then should we not say that he is happy who is active in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some chance period but throughout a complete life? Or must we add ‘and who is destined to live thus and die as befits his life’? Certainly the future is obscure to us, while happiness, we claim, is an end and something in every way final. If so, we shall call happy those among living men in whom these conditions are, and are to be, fulfilled- but happy men. So much for these questions….

Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.

Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyreplayers by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.

This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.

Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger; some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to the differences between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference…

…First, then, let us consider this, that it is the nature of such things to be destroyed by defect and excess, as we see in the case of strength and of health (for to gain light on things imperceptible we must use the evidence of sensible things); both excessive and defective exercise destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food which is above or below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is proportionate both produces and increases and preserves it. So too is it, then, in the case of temperance and courage and the other virtues. For the man who flies from and fears everything and does not stand his ground against anything becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet every danger becomes rash; and similarly the man who indulges in every pleasure and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, while the man who shuns every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way insensible; temperance and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and preserved by the mean…

…If it is thus, then, that every art does its work well- by looking to the intermediate and judgling its works by this standard (so that we often say of good works of art that it is not possible either to take away or to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art, while the mean preserves it; and good artists, as we say, look to this in their work), and if, further, virtue is more exact and better than any art, as nature also is, then virtue must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate. I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with passions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate.

Again, it is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the class of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the limited), while to succeed is possible only in one way (for which reason also one is easy and the other difficult- to miss the mark easy, to hit it difficult); for these reasons also, then, excess and defect are characteristic of vice, and the mean of virtue;

For men are good in but one way, but bad in many.

Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence in respect of its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue is a mean, with regard to what is best and right an extreme.

But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some have names that already imply badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them. It is not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them; one must always be wrong. Nor does goodness or badness with regard to such things depend on committing adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way, but simply to do any of them is to go wrong. It would be equally absurd, then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly, and voluptuous action there should be a mean, an excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate there would be a mean of excess and of deficiency, an excess of excess, and a deficiency of deficiency. But as there is no excess and deficiency of temperance and courage because what is intermediate is in a sense an extreme, so too of the actions we have mentioned there is no mean nor any excess and deficiency, but however they are done they are wrong; for in general there is neither a mean of excess and deficiency, nor excess and deficiency of a mean.

For Reflection & Discussion

• What is the “golden mean” and why is it important for Aristotle’s ethics?
• What are some virtues that you think are important and why?
• Can someone ever be too rational? Why or why not? What would Aristotle say?

Recommended Resources

• Philosophize This! Episode 005 – Aristotle Part 1 (Click on title above to access a written transcript and/or press play below to listen.)
• Philosophize This! Episode 006 – Aristotle Part 2 (Click on title above to access a written transcript and/or press play below to listen.)

Griffiths, Robert. 2022. “ How to be Really Good .” In Philosophy Now! 151 (Aug/Sept): 31-33. https://philosophynow.org/issues/151/How_To_Be_Really_Good. (Tulsa Community College students can access the reading by clicking the linked title above and entering credentials – T# & password; those without a subscription can access a limited number of articles monthly using the URL provided.

Madigan, Tim and Daria Gorlova. 2018. “ Aristotle on Forming Friendships .” In Philosophy Now! 126 (June/July): 6-9. https://philosophynow.org/issues/126/Aristotle_on_Forming_Friendships.

Citation and Use

Aristotle. (1925). Nicomachean Ethics (W.D. Ross, Trans.). (Original work published circa 350 BCE).

This work is in the Public Domain.

Aristotle, detail of The School of Athens (cropped) by Raphael, c.1509. Public Domain.

This work ( The Virtues by Aristotle) is free of known copyright restrictions.

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Diocese of Westminster Youth Ministry

Virtues and vices.

What are Virtues?

Virtues are good habits, that is, they give us a disposition to perform good actions. Human actions do not arise from a series of disconnected choices. We acquire dispositions that incline us to act in habitual ways. When these habits are good we call them virtues.

What are the principal virtues?

There are four main natural (cardinal) virtues that every good person needs. In addition, there are three supernatural virtues which are unique to the life of grace. The latter are also called theological virtues because they fit us for union with God.

Natural (Cardinal) virtues

Prudence – Deliberating well about what actions we should do Justice – Rendering to each and to all what is due to them Temperance – Curbing the passions that incite us to evil actions Fortitude – Courage in adversity and constancy in difficult actions

Supernatural (Theological) virtues

Faith – Trustful assent of the mind and heart to God’s revealed truth Hope – Expectant desire for attaining eternal life with God Charity – An active will to seek the good of God and others and heavenly friendship with them

How do we achieve the virtues?

To some extent, anyone can acquire natural virtues through the discipline of repeated good actions and a well-ordered life. Nevertheless, we need the help of God’s grace, by means of the sacraments and prayer, both to acquire the supernatural virtues and even to perfect and harmonize the natural virtues.

What are Vices?

Vices are evil habits; that is, they give us a disposition to perform evil actions. We sometimes develop vices which incline us to perform evil actions. These normally involve excess or deficiency in pursuing what is good.

The seven deadly vices

These seven vices are called ‘deadly’ because of their poisonous effects on the human soul, the difficulty that is often experienced in eradicating them, and the ease with which they lead to mortal sin. They are sometimes also called the seven deadly sins or the capital sins. Each of these vices has, as a remedy, a contrary virtue linked to the cardinal virtues.

The vices may promise an easier life but they ensnare and enslave us. By contrast, the virtues may seem difficult, but they lead to our true freedom and happiness as human beings.

The seven deadly vices and their remedies

1. Pride and Humility

Pride (the problem) is a denial of the superiority of the Creator and an inflation of our ego. It leads to excessive ambition, an overestimation of our own strengths and the desire to be idolised by others. Humility (the solution) is a recognition that we are creatures and in need of God. It helps us to form a true opinion of ourselves, to disregard shallow popularity and to free us from self-obsession.

2. Envy and Fraternal charity

Envy (the problem) is an anger or sadness that other people have gifts and possessions that we want for ourselves. Charity (the solution) is gratitude for the gifts and talents of others and a desire that each and every person reaches their potential.

3. Anger and Meekness

Anger (the problem) is a disordered state in which we take revenge on others, or an unfair opposition to a person or thing. Meekness (the solution) is a self-control, not a weakness, which allows us to master our emotions when attacked or wronged.

4. Sloth and Diligence

Sloth (the problem) is a laziness that prevents us from doing what we can achieve and should do. Diligence (the solution) is a readiness to always do what is needed. It makes even difficult tasks achievable.

5. Avarice and Liberality

Avarice (the problem) is an immoderate desire for possessions and gifts. Leads to injustice, stealing and indifference to the poor. Liberality (the solution) is a generosity towards others in sharing God’s gifts. It brings personal contentment with what we possess.

6. Gluttony and Temperance

Gluttony (the problem) is a disordered love for food and drink. It leads us to eat and drink excessively and exclusively for pleasure. Temperance (the solution) is a right use of food and drink for nourishment and pleasure. It leads to self-control in many other areas.

7. Lust and Chastity

Lust (the problem) is a disordered craving for selfish and sensual pleasure (generally sexual). It leads to abuses of the body and the family and many addictions. Chastity (the solution) is a proper use of our sexuality. It leads us to guard our heart and mind from evil influences, gives us freedom and allows us to love purely.

The Six Precepts of the Church

1. You shall attend Mass on Sundays and holy days of obligation. 2. You shall receive the sacrament of Confession (Reconciliation) at least once a year. 3. You shall receive Holy Communion at least once during the Easter season. 4. You shall keep holy the holy days of obligation. 5. You shall fast and observe abstinence on the prescribed days. 6. You shall provide for the material needs of the Church according to your ability.

THE SEVEN CORPOREAL WORKS OF MERCY

1. Feed the hungry 2. Give drink to the thirsty 3. Clothe the naked 4. Harbour the homeless 5. Visit the sick 6. Visit the imprisoned 7. Bury the dead

THE SEVEN SPIRITUAL WORKS OF MERCY

1. Convert the sinner 2. Instruct the ignorant 3. Counsel the doubtful 4. Comfort the sorrowful 5. Bear wrongs patiently 6. Forgive injustice 7. Pray for the living and dead

This article is originally from ‘CREDO: The Catholic Faith explained’ by CTS .

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9.4 Virtue Ethics

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Identify the central principles of virtue ethics.
• Distinguish the major features of Confucianism.
• Evaluate Aristotle’s moral theory.

Virtue ethics takes a character-centered approach to morality. Whereas Mohists and utilitarians look to consequences to determine the rightness of an action and deontologists maintain that a right action is the one that conforms to moral rules and norms, virtue ethicists argue that right action flows from good character traits or dispositions. We become a good person, then, through the cultivation of character, self-reflection, and self-perfection.

There is often a connection between the virtuous life and the good life in virtue ethics because of its emphasis on character and self-cultivation. Through virtuous development, we realize and perfect ourselves, laying the foundation for a good life. In Justice as a Virtue , for example, Mark LeBar (2020) notes that “on the Greek eudaimonist views (including here Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicurus) our reasons for action arise from our interest in [ eudaimonia , or] a happy life.” The ancient Greeks thought the aim of life was eudaimonia . Though eudaimonia is often translated as “happiness,” it means something closer to “a flourishing life.” Confucianism , with its strong emphasis on repairing the fractured social world, connects the promotion of virtuous development and social order. Confucians believe virtuous action is informed by social roles and relationships, such that promoting virtuous development also promotes social order.

Confucianism

As discussed earlier, the Warring States period in ancient China (ca. 475–221 BCE) was a period marked by warfare, social unrest, and suffering. Warfare during this period was common because China was comprised of small states that were not politically unified. New philosophical approaches were developed to promote social harmony, peace, and a better life. This period in China’s history is also sometimes referred to as the era of the “Hundred Schools of Thought” because the development of new philosophical approaches led to cultural expansion and intellectual development. Mohism, Daoism, and Confucianism developed in ancient China during this period. Daoism and Confucianism would later spread to Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, where they would be adopted and changed in response to local social and cultural circumstances.

Confucius (551–479 BCE) rose from lowly positions to become a minister in the government of a province in eastern China. After a political conflict with the hereditary aristocracy, Confucius resigned his position and began traveling to other kingdoms and teaching. Confucius’s teachings centered on virtue, veering into practical subjects such as social obligations, ritual performance, and governance. During his lifetime, Confucius despaired that his advice to rulers fell on deaf ears: “How can I be like a bitter gourd that hangs from the end of a string and can not be eaten?” (Analects 17:7). He did not foresee that his work and ideas would influence society, politics, and culture in East Asia for over 2000 years.

Confucius is credited with authoring or editing the classical texts that became the curriculum of the imperial exams, which applicants had to pass to obtain positions in government. His words, sayings, and exchanges with rulers and his disciples were written down and recorded in the Lun Yu , or the Analects of Confucius , which has heavily influenced the moral and social practice in China and elsewhere.

Relational Aspect of Virtue

Like Mohism, Confucianism aimed to restore social order and harmony by establishing moral and social norms. Confucius believed the way to achieve this was through an ordered, hierarchical society in which people know their place in relationship to other people. Confucius said, “There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son” (Analects, 7:11). In Confucianism, relationships and social roles shape moral responsibilities and structure moral life.

A cornerstone of Confucian virtue is filial piety . Confucius felt that the role of the father was to care for and educate his son, but the duty of the son must be to respect his father by obediently abiding by his wishes. “While a man's father is alive, look at the bent of his will; when his father is dead, look at his conduct. If for three years he does not alter from the way of his father, he may be called filial” (Analects, 1:11). Indeed, when the Duke of Sheh informed Confucius that his subjects were so truthful that if their father stole a sheep, they would bear witness to it, Confucius replied, “Among us, in our part of the country, those who are upright are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this.” The devotion of the son to the father is more important than what Kant would call the universal moral law of truth telling.

There is therefore an important relational aspect of virtue that a moral person must understand. The virtuous person must not only be aware of and care for others but must understand the “human dance,” or the complex practices and relationships that we participate in and that define social life (Wong 2021). The more we begin to understand the “human dance,” the more we grasp how we relate to one another and how social roles and relationships must be accounted for to act virtuously.

Ritual and Ren

Important to both early and late Confucian ethics is the concept of li (ritual and practice). Li plays an important role in the transformation of character. These rituals are a guide or become a means by which we develop and start to understand our moral responsibilities. Sacrificial offerings to parents and other ancestors after their death, for example, cultivate filial piety. By carrying out rituals, we transform our character and become more sensitive to the complexities of human interaction and social life.

In later Confucian thought, the concept of li takes on a broader role and denotes the customs and practices that are a blueprint for many kinds of respectful behavior (Wong 2021). In this way, it relates to ren , a concept that refers to someone with complete virtue or specific virtues needed to achieve moral excellence. Confucians maintain that it is possible to perfect human nature through personal development and transformation. They believe society will improve if people abide by moral and social norms and focus on perfecting themselves. The aim is to live according to the dao . The word dao means “way” in the sense of a road or path of virtue.

Junzi and Self-Perfection

Confucius used the term junzi to refer to an exemplary figure who lives according to the dao . This figure is an ethical ideal that reminds us that self-perfection can be achieved through practice, self-transformation, and a deep understanding of social relationships and norms. A junzi knows what is right and chooses it, taking into account social roles and norms, while serving as a role model. Whenever we act, our actions are observed by others. If we act morally and strive to embody the ethical ideal, we can become an example for others to follow, someone they can look to and emulate.

The Ethical Ruler

Any person of any status can become a junzi . Yet, it was particularly important that rulers strive toward this ideal because their subjects would then follow this ideal. When the ruler Chi K’ang consulted with Confucius about what to do about the number of thieves in his domain, Confucius responded, “If you, sir, were not covetous, although you should reward them to do it, they would not steal” (Analects, 7:18).

Confucius thought social problems were rooted in the elite’s behavior and, in particular, in their pursuit of their own benefit to the detriment of the people. Hence, government officials must model personal integrity, understand the needs of the communities over which they exercised authority, and place the welfare of the people over and above their own (Koller 2007, 204).

In adherence to the ethical code, a ruler’s subjects must show obedience to honorable people and emulate those higher up in the social hierarchy. Chi K’ang, responding to Confucius’s suggestion regarding thievery, asked Confucius, “What do you say to killing the unprincipled for the good of the principled?” Confucius replied that there was no need to kill at all. “Let your evinced desires be for what is good, and the people will be good.” Confucius believed that the relationship between rulers and their subjects is and should be like that between the wind and the grass. “The grass must bend, when the wind blows across it” (Analects, 7:19).

Japanese Confucianism

Although Confucianism was initially developed in China, it spread to Japan in the mid-sixth century, via Korea, and developed its own unique attributes. Confucianism is one of the dominant philosophical teachings in Japan. As in China, Japanese Confucianism focuses on teaching individual perfection and moral development, fostering harmonious and healthy familial relations, and promoting a functioning and prosperous society. In Japan, Confucianism has been changed and transformed in response to local social and cultural factors. For example, Confucianism and Buddhism were introduced around the same time in Japan. It is therefore not uncommon to find variations of Japanese Confucianism that integrate ideas and beliefs from Buddhism. Some neo-Confucian philosophers like Zhu Xi, for example, developed “Confucian thinking after earlier study and practice of Chan Buddhism” (Tucker 2018).

Aristotelianism

Aristotle (384–322 BCE) was a preeminent ancient Greek philosopher. He studied with Plato (ca. 429–347 BCE) at the Academy , a fraternal organization where participants pursued knowledge and self-development. After Plato’s death, Aristotle traveled, tutored the boy who would later become Alexander the Great, and among other things, established his own place of learning, dedicated to the god Apollo (Shields 2020).

Aristotle spent his life in the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom. His extant works today represent only a portion of his total life’s work, much of which was lost to history. During his life, Aristotle was, for example, principal to the creation of logic, created the first system of classification for animals, and wrote on diverse topics of philosophical interest. Along with his teacher, Plato, Aristotle is considered one of the pillars of Western philosophy.

Human Flourishing as the Goal of Human Action

In the first line of Book I of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , he observes that “[every] art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1094a). If everything we do aims at some good, he argues, then there must be a final or highest good that is the end of all action (life’s telos ), which is eudaimonia , the flourishing life (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1097a34–b25). Everything else we pursue is pursued for the sake of this end.

Connections

See the chapter on epistemology for more on the topic of eudaimonia .

Nicomachean Ethics is a practical exploration of the flourishing life and how to live it. Aristotle, like other ancient Greek and Roman philosophers (e.g., Plato and the Stoics), asserts that virtuous development is central to human flourishing. Virtue (or aretê ) means “excellence. We determine something’s virtue, Aristotle argued, by identifying its peculiar function or purpose because “the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1097b25–1098a15). We might reasonably say, for example, that a knife’s function is to cut. A sharp knife that cuts extremely well is an excellent (or virtuous) knife. The sharp knife realizes its function and embodies excellence (or it is an excellent representation of knife-ness).

Aristotle assumed our rational capacity makes us distinct from other (living) things. He identifies rationality as the unique function of human beings and says that human virtue, or excellence, is therefore realized through the development or perfection of reason. For Aristotle, virtuous development is the transformation and perfection of character in accordance with reason. While most thinkers (like Aristotle and Kant) assign similar significance to reason, it is interesting to note how they arrive at such different theories.

Deliberation, Practical Wisdom, and Character

To exercise or possess virtue is to demonstrate excellent character. For ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, the pursuit of intentional, directed self-development to cultivate virtues is the pursuit of excellence. Someone with a virtuous character is consistent, firm, self-controlled, and well-off. Aristotle characterized the virtuous character state as the mean between two vice states, deficiency and excess. He thought each person naturally tends toward one of the extreme (or vice) states. We cultivate virtue when we bring our character into alignment with the “mean or intermediate state with regard to” feelings and actions, and in doing so we become “well off in relation to our feelings and actions” (Homiak 2019).

Being virtuous requires more than simply developing a habit or character trait. An individual must voluntarily choose the right action, the virtuous state; know why they chose it; and do so from a consistent, firm character. To voluntarily choose virtue requires reflection, self-awareness, and deliberation. Virtuous actions, Aristotle claims, should “accord with the correct reason” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1103b30). The virtuous person chooses what is right after deliberation that is informed by practical wisdom and experience. Through a deliberative process we identify the choice that is consistent with the mean state.

The Role of Habit

Aristotle proposed that humans “are made perfect by habit” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1103a10–33). Habit therefore plays an important role in our virtuous development. When we practice doing what’s right, we get better at choosing the right action in different circumstances. Through habituation we gain practice and familiarity, we bring about dispositions or tendencies, and we gain the requisite practical experience to identify the reasons why a certain action should be chosen in diverse situations. Habit, in short, allows us to gain important practical experience and a certain familiarity with choosing and doing the right thing. The more we reinforce doing the right thing, the more we grow accustomed to recognizing what’s right in different circumstances. Through habit we become more aware of which action is supported by reason and why, and get better at choosing it.

Habit and repetition develop dispositions. In Nicomachean Ethics , for example, Aristotle reminds us of the importance of upbringing. A good upbringing will promote the formation of positive dispositions, making one’s tendencies closer to the mean state. A bad upbringing, in contrast, will promote the formation of negative dispositions, making one’s tendencies farther from the mean state (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1095b5).

Read Like a Philosopher

Artistotle on virtue.

Read this passage from from Book II of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics , considering what Aristotle means when he states that moral virtues come about as a result of habit. How should individuals make use of the two types of virtue to become virtuous?

Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance, the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit. Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyreplayers by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one. Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyreplayers are produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger; some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to the differences between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference.

Social Relationships and Friendship

Aristotle was careful to note in Nicomachean Ethics that virtuous development alone does not make a flourishing life, though it is central to it. In addition to virtuous development, Aristotle thought things like success, friendships, and other external goods contributed to eudaimonia .

In Nicomachean Ethics , Aristotle points out that humans are social (or political) beings (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1097b10). It’s not surprising, then, that, like Confucius, Aristotle thinks social relations are important for our rational and virtuous development.

When we interact with others who have common goals and interests, we are more likely to progress and realize our rational powers. Social relations afford us opportunities to learn, practice, and engage in rational pursuits with other people. The ancient Greek schools (e.g., Plato’s Academy, Aristotle’s Lyceum , and Epicurus’s Gardens) exemplify the ways individuals benefit from social relations. These ancient schools offered a meeting place where those interested in knowledge and the pursuit of wisdom could participate in these activities together.

Through social relations, we also develop an important sense of community and take an interest in the flourishing of others. We see ourselves as connected to others, and through our interactions we develop social virtues like generosity and friendliness (Homiak 2019). Moreover, as we develop social virtues and gain a deeper understanding of the reasons why what is right, is right, we realize that an individual’s ability to flourish and thrive is improved when the community flourishes. Social relations and political friendships are useful for increasing the amount of good we can do for the community (Kraut 2018).

The important role Aristotle assigns to friendship in a flourishing life is evidenced by the fact that he devotes two out of the ten books of Nicomachean Ethics (Books VIII and IX) to a discussion of it. He notes that it would be odd, “when one assigns all good things to the happy man, not to assign friends, who are thought the greatest of external goods” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1169a35–b20). Aristotle distinguishes between incidental friendships and perfect friendships . Incidental friendships are based on and defined by either utility or pleasure. Such friendships are casual relationships where each person participates only because they get something (utility or pleasure) from it. These friendships neither contribute to our happiness nor do they foster virtuous development.

Unlike incidental friendships, perfect friendships are relationships that foster and strengthen our virtuous development. The love that binds a perfect friendship is based on the good or on the goodness of the characters of the individuals involved. Aristotle believed that perfect friends wish each other well simply because they love each other and want each other to do well, not because they expect something (utility or pleasure) from the other. He points out that “those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1156a27–b17). Aristotle argues that the happy man needs (true) friends because such friendships make it possible for them to “contemplate worthy [or virtuous] actions and actions that are [their] own” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1169b20–1170a6). This affords the good individual the opportunity to contemplate worthy actions that are not their own (i.e., they are their friend’s) while still thinking of these actions as in some sense being their own because their friend is another self. On Aristotle’s account, we see a true friend as another self because we are truly invested in our friend’s life and “we ought to wish what is good for his sake” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1155b17–1156a5).

Perfect friendships afford us opportunities to grow and develop, to better ourselves—something we do not get from other relationships. Aristotle therefore argues that a “certain training in virtue arises also from the company of the good” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1170a6–30). Our perfect friend provides perspective that helps us in our development and contributes to our happiness because we get to participate in and experience our friend’s happiness as our own. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that Aristotle considered true friends “the greatest of external goods” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1169a35–b20).

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Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as “Do unto others as you would be done by” and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent.

This is not to say that only virtue ethicists attend to virtues, any more than it is to say that only consequentialists attend to consequences or only deontologists to rules. Each of the above-mentioned approaches can make room for virtues, consequences, and rules. Indeed, any plausible normative ethical theory will have something to say about all three. What distinguishes virtue ethics from consequentialism or deontology is the centrality of virtue within the theory (Watson 1990; Kawall 2009). Whereas consequentialists will define virtues as traits that yield good consequences and deontologists will define them as traits possessed by those who reliably fulfil their duties, virtue ethicists will resist the attempt to define virtues in terms of some other concept that is taken to be more fundamental. Rather, virtues and vices will be foundational for virtue ethical theories and other normative notions will be grounded in them.

We begin by discussing two concepts that are central to all forms of virtue ethics, namely, virtue and practical wisdom. Then we note some of the features that distinguish different virtue ethical theories from one another before turning to objections that have been raised against virtue ethics and responses offered on its behalf. We conclude with a look at some of the directions in which future research might develop.

1.2 Practical Wisdom

2.1 eudaimonist virtue ethics, 2.2 agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, 2.3 target-centered virtue ethics, 2.4 platonistic virtue ethics, 3. objections to virtue ethics, 4. future directions, other internet resources, related entries, 1. preliminaries.

In the West, virtue ethics’ founding fathers are Plato and Aristotle, and in the East it can be traced back to Mencius and Confucius. It persisted as the dominant approach in Western moral philosophy until at least the Enlightenment, suffered a momentary eclipse during the nineteenth century, but re-emerged in Anglo-American philosophy in the late 1950s. It was heralded by Anscombe’s famous article “Modern Moral Philosophy” (Anscombe 1958) which crystallized an increasing dissatisfaction with the forms of deontology and utilitarianism then prevailing. Neither of them, at that time, paid attention to a number of topics that had always figured in the virtue ethics tradition—virtues and vices, motives and moral character, moral education, moral wisdom or discernment, friendship and family relationships, a deep concept of happiness, the role of the emotions in our moral life and the fundamentally important questions of what sorts of persons we should be and how we should live.

Its re-emergence had an invigorating effect on the other two approaches, many of whose proponents then began to address these topics in the terms of their favoured theory. (One consequence of this has been that it is now necessary to distinguish “virtue ethics” (the third approach) from “virtue theory”, a term which includes accounts of virtue within the other approaches.) Interest in Kant’s virtue theory has redirected philosophers’ attention to Kant’s long neglected Doctrine of Virtue , and utilitarians have developed consequentialist virtue theories (Driver 2001; Hurka 2001). It has also generated virtue ethical readings of philosophers other than Plato and Aristotle, such as Martineau, Hume and Nietzsche, and thereby different forms of virtue ethics have developed (Slote 2001; Swanton 2003, 2011a).

Although modern virtue ethics does not have to take a “neo-Aristotelian” or eudaimonist form (see section 2), almost any modern version still shows that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of three concepts derived from it. These are arête (excellence or virtue), phronesis (practical or moral wisdom) and eudaimonia (usually translated as happiness or flourishing). (See Annas 2011 for a short, clear, and authoritative account of all three.) We discuss the first two in the remainder of this section. Eudaimonia is discussed in connection with eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics in the next.

A virtue is an excellent trait of character. It is a disposition, well entrenched in its possessor—something that, as we say, goes all the way down, unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinker—to notice, expect, value, feel, desire, choose, act, and react in certain characteristic ways. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. A significant aspect of this mindset is the wholehearted acceptance of a distinctive range of considerations as reasons for action. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, practices honest dealing and does not cheat. If such actions are done merely because the agent thinks that honesty is the best policy, or because they fear being caught out, rather than through recognising “To do otherwise would be dishonest” as the relevant reason, they are not the actions of an honest person. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, tells the truth because it is the truth, for one can have the virtue of honesty without being tactless or indiscreet. The honest person recognises “That would be a lie” as a strong (though perhaps not overriding) reason for not making certain statements in certain circumstances, and gives due, but not overriding, weight to “That would be the truth” as a reason for making them.

An honest person’s reasons and choices with respect to honest and dishonest actions reflect her views about honesty, truth, and deception—but of course such views manifest themselves with respect to other actions, and to emotional reactions as well. Valuing honesty as she does, she chooses, where possible to work with honest people, to have honest friends, to bring up her children to be honest. She disapproves of, dislikes, deplores dishonesty, is not amused by certain tales of chicanery, despises or pities those who succeed through deception rather than thinking they have been clever, is unsurprised, or pleased (as appropriate) when honesty triumphs, is shocked or distressed when those near and dear to her do what is dishonest and so on. Given that a virtue is such a multi-track disposition, it would obviously be reckless to attribute one to an agent on the basis of a single observed action or even a series of similar actions, especially if you don’t know the agent’s reasons for doing as she did (Sreenivasan 2002).

Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree. To possess such a disposition fully is to possess full or perfect virtue, which is rare, and there are a number of ways of falling short of this ideal (Athanassoulis 2000). Most people who can truly be described as fairly virtuous, and certainly markedly better than those who can truly be described as dishonest, self-centred and greedy, still have their blind spots—little areas where they do not act for the reasons one would expect. So someone honest or kind in most situations, and notably so in demanding ones, may nevertheless be trivially tainted by snobbery, inclined to be disingenuous about their forebears and less than kind to strangers with the wrong accent.

Further, it is not easy to get one’s emotions in harmony with one’s rational recognition of certain reasons for action. I may be honest enough to recognise that I must own up to a mistake because it would be dishonest not to do so without my acceptance being so wholehearted that I can own up easily, with no inner conflict. Following (and adapting) Aristotle, virtue ethicists draw a distinction between full or perfect virtue and “continence”, or strength of will. The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise.

Describing the continent as “falling short” of perfect virtue appears to go against the intuition that there is something particularly admirable about people who manage to act well when it is especially hard for them to do so, but the plausibility of this depends on exactly what “makes it hard” (Foot 1978: 11–14). If it is the circumstances in which the agent acts—say that she is very poor when she sees someone drop a full purse or that she is in deep grief when someone visits seeking help—then indeed it is particularly admirable of her to restore the purse or give the help when it is hard for her to do so. But if what makes it hard is an imperfection in her character—the temptation to keep what is not hers, or a callous indifference to the suffering of others—then it is not.

Another way in which one can easily fall short of full virtue is through lacking phronesis —moral or practical wisdom.

The concept of a virtue is the concept of something that makes its possessor good: a virtuous person is a morally good, excellent or admirable person who acts and feels as she should. These are commonly accepted truisms. But it is equally common, in relation to particular (putative) examples of virtues to give these truisms up. We may say of someone that he is generous or honest “to a fault”. It is commonly asserted that someone’s compassion might lead them to act wrongly, to tell a lie they should not have told, for example, in their desire to prevent someone else’s hurt feelings. It is also said that courage, in a desperado, enables him to do far more wicked things than he would have been able to do if he were timid. So it would appear that generosity, honesty, compassion and courage despite being virtues, are sometimes faults. Someone who is generous, honest, compassionate, and courageous might not be a morally good person—or, if it is still held to be a truism that they are, then morally good people may be led by what makes them morally good to act wrongly! How have we arrived at such an odd conclusion?

The answer lies in too ready an acceptance of ordinary usage, which permits a fairly wide-ranging application of many of the virtue terms, combined, perhaps, with a modern readiness to suppose that the virtuous agent is motivated by emotion or inclination, not by rational choice. If one thinks of generosity or honesty as the disposition to be moved to action by generous or honest impulses such as the desire to give or to speak the truth, if one thinks of compassion as the disposition to be moved by the sufferings of others and to act on that emotion, if one thinks of courage as mere fearlessness or the willingness to face danger, then it will indeed seem obvious that these are all dispositions that can lead to their possessor’s acting wrongly. But it is also obvious, as soon as it is stated, that these are dispositions that can be possessed by children, and although children thus endowed (bar the “courageous” disposition) would undoubtedly be very nice children, we would not say that they were morally virtuous or admirable people. The ordinary usage, or the reliance on motivation by inclination, gives us what Aristotle calls “natural virtue”—a proto version of full virtue awaiting perfection by phronesis or practical wisdom.

Aristotle makes a number of specific remarks about phronesis that are the subject of much scholarly debate, but the (related) modern concept is best understood by thinking of what the virtuous morally mature adult has that nice children, including nice adolescents, lack. Both the virtuous adult and the nice child have good intentions, but the child is much more prone to mess things up because he is ignorant of what he needs to know in order to do what he intends. A virtuous adult is not, of course, infallible and may also, on occasion, fail to do what she intended to do through lack of knowledge, but only on those occasions on which the lack of knowledge is not culpable. So, for example, children and adolescents often harm those they intend to benefit either because they do not know how to set about securing the benefit or because their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is limited and often mistaken. Such ignorance in small children is rarely, if ever culpable. Adults, on the other hand, are culpable if they mess things up by being thoughtless, insensitive, reckless, impulsive, shortsighted, and by assuming that what suits them will suit everyone instead of taking a more objective viewpoint. They are also culpable if their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is mistaken. It is part of practical wisdom to know how to secure real benefits effectively; those who have practical wisdom will not make the mistake of concealing the hurtful truth from the person who really needs to know it in the belief that they are benefiting him.

Quite generally, given that good intentions are intentions to act well or “do the right thing”, we may say that practical wisdom is the knowledge or understanding that enables its possessor, unlike the nice adolescents, to do just that, in any given situation. The detailed specification of what is involved in such knowledge or understanding has not yet appeared in the literature, but some aspects of it are becoming well known. Even many deontologists now stress the point that their action-guiding rules cannot, reliably, be applied without practical wisdom, because correct application requires situational appreciation—the capacity to recognise, in any particular situation, those features of it that are morally salient. This brings out two aspects of practical wisdom.

One is that it characteristically comes only with experience of life. Amongst the morally relevant features of a situation may be the likely consequences, for the people involved, of a certain action, and this is something that adolescents are notoriously clueless about precisely because they are inexperienced. It is part of practical wisdom to be wise about human beings and human life. (It should go without saying that the virtuous are mindful of the consequences of possible actions. How could they fail to be reckless, thoughtless and short-sighted if they were not?)

The second is the practically wise agent’s capacity to recognise some features of a situation as more important than others, or indeed, in that situation, as the only relevant ones. The wise do not see things in the same way as the nice adolescents who, with their under-developed virtues, still tend to see the personally disadvantageous nature of a certain action as competing in importance with its honesty or benevolence or justice.

These aspects coalesce in the description of the practically wise as those who understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important, and thereby truly advantageous in life, who know, in short, how to live well.

2. Forms of Virtue Ethics

While all forms of virtue ethics agree that virtue is central and practical wisdom required, they differ in how they combine these and other concepts to illuminate what we should do in particular contexts and how we should live our lives as a whole. In what follows we sketch four distinct forms taken by contemporary virtue ethics, namely, a) eudaimonist virtue ethics, b) agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, c) target-centered virtue ethics, and d) Platonistic virtue ethics.

The distinctive feature of eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics is that they define virtues in terms of their relationship to eudaimonia . A virtue is a trait that contributes to or is a constituent of eudaimonia and we ought to develop virtues, the eudaimonist claims, precisely because they contribute to eudaimonia .

The concept of eudaimonia , a key term in ancient Greek moral philosophy, is standardly translated as “happiness” or “flourishing” and occasionally as “well-being.” Each translation has its disadvantages. The trouble with “flourishing” is that animals and even plants can flourish but eudaimonia is possible only for rational beings. The trouble with “happiness” is that in ordinary conversation it connotes something subjectively determined. It is for me, not for you, to pronounce on whether I am happy. If I think I am happy then I am—it is not something I can be wrong about (barring advanced cases of self-deception). Contrast my being healthy or flourishing. Here we have no difficulty in recognizing that I might think I was healthy, either physically or psychologically, or think that I was flourishing but be wrong. In this respect, “flourishing” is a better translation than “happiness”. It is all too easy to be mistaken about whether one’s life is eudaimon (the adjective from eudaimonia ) not simply because it is easy to deceive oneself, but because it is easy to have a mistaken conception of eudaimonia , or of what it is to live well as a human being, believing it to consist largely in physical pleasure or luxury for example.

Eudaimonia is, avowedly, a moralized or value-laden concept of happiness, something like “true” or “real” happiness or “the sort of happiness worth seeking or having.” It is thereby the sort of concept about which there can be substantial disagreement between people with different views about human life that cannot be resolved by appeal to some external standard on which, despite their different views, the parties to the disagreement concur (Hursthouse 1999: 188–189).

Most versions of virtue ethics agree that living a life in accordance with virtue is necessary for eudaimonia. This supreme good is not conceived of as an independently defined state (made up of, say, a list of non-moral goods that does not include virtuous activity) which exercise of the virtues might be thought to promote. It is, within virtue ethics, already conceived of as something of which virtuous activity is at least partially constitutive (Kraut 1989). Thereby virtue ethicists claim that a human life devoted to physical pleasure or the acquisition of wealth is not eudaimon , but a wasted life.

But although all standard versions of virtue ethics insist on that conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia , further links are matters of dispute and generate different versions. For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient—what is also needed are external goods which are a matter of luck. For Plato and the Stoics, virtue is both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia (Annas 1993).

According to eudaimonist virtue ethics, the good life is the eudaimon life, and the virtues are what enable a human being to be eudaimon because the virtues just are those character traits that benefit their possessor in that way, barring bad luck. So there is a link between eudaimonia and what confers virtue status on a character trait. (For a discussion of the differences between eudaimonists see Baril 2014. For recent defenses of eudaimonism see Annas 2011; LeBar 2013b; Badhwar 2014; and Bloomfield 2014.)

Rather than deriving the normativity of virtue from the value of eudaimonia , agent-based virtue ethicists argue that other forms of normativity—including the value of eudaimonia —are traced back to and ultimately explained in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents.

It is unclear how many other forms of normativity must be explained in terms of the qualities of agents in order for a theory to count as agent-based. The two best-known agent-based theorists, Michael Slote and Linda Zagzebski, trace a wide range of normative qualities back to the qualities of agents. For example, Slote defines rightness and wrongness in terms of agents’ motivations: “[A]gent-based virtue ethics … understands rightness in terms of good motivations and wrongness in terms of the having of bad (or insufficiently good) motives” (2001: 14). Similarly, he explains the goodness of an action, the value of eudaimonia , the justice of a law or social institution, and the normativity of practical rationality in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents (2001: 99–100, 154, 2000). Zagzebski likewise defines right and wrong actions by reference to the emotions, motives, and dispositions of virtuous and vicious agents. For example, “A wrong act = an act that the phronimos characteristically would not do, and he would feel guilty if he did = an act such that it is not the case that he might do it = an act that expresses a vice = an act that is against a requirement of virtue (the virtuous self)” (Zagzebski 2004: 160). Her definitions of duties, good and bad ends, and good and bad states of affairs are similarly grounded in the motivational and dispositional states of exemplary agents (1998, 2004, 2010).

However, there could also be less ambitious agent-based approaches to virtue ethics (see Slote 1997). At the very least, an agent-based approach must be committed to explaining what one should do by reference to the motivational and dispositional states of agents. But this is not yet a sufficient condition for counting as an agent-based approach, since the same condition will be met by every virtue ethical account. For a theory to count as an agent-based form of virtue ethics it must also be the case that the normative properties of motivations and dispositions cannot be explained in terms of the normative properties of something else (such as eudaimonia or states of affairs) which is taken to be more fundamental.

Beyond this basic commitment, there is room for agent-based theories to be developed in a number of different directions. The most important distinguishing factor has to do with how motivations and dispositions are taken to matter for the purposes of explaining other normative qualities. For Slote what matters are this particular agent’s actual motives and dispositions . The goodness of action A, for example, is derived from the agent’s motives when she performs A. If those motives are good then the action is good, if not then not. On Zagzebski’s account, by contrast, a good or bad, right or wrong action is defined not by this agent’s actual motives but rather by whether this is the sort of action a virtuously motivated agent would perform (Zagzebski 2004: 160). Appeal to the virtuous agent’s hypothetical motives and dispositions enables Zagzebski to distinguish between performing the right action and doing so for the right reasons (a distinction that, as Brady (2004) observes, Slote has trouble drawing).

Another point on which agent-based forms of virtue ethics might differ concerns how one identifies virtuous motivations and dispositions. According to Zagzebski’s exemplarist account, “We do not have criteria for goodness in advance of identifying the exemplars of goodness” (Zagzebski 2004: 41). As we observe the people around us, we find ourselves wanting to be like some of them (in at least some respects) and not wanting to be like others. The former provide us with positive exemplars and the latter with negative ones. Our understanding of better and worse motivations and virtuous and vicious dispositions is grounded in these primitive responses to exemplars (2004: 53). This is not to say that every time we act we stop and ask ourselves what one of our exemplars would do in this situations. Our moral concepts become more refined over time as we encounter a wider variety of exemplars and begin to draw systematic connections between them, noting what they have in common, how they differ, and which of these commonalities and differences matter, morally speaking. Recognizable motivational profiles emerge and come to be labeled as virtues or vices, and these, in turn, shape our understanding of the obligations we have and the ends we should pursue. However, even though the systematising of moral thought can travel a long way from our starting point, according to the exemplarist it never reaches a stage where reference to exemplars is replaced by the recognition of something more fundamental. At the end of the day, according to the exemplarist, our moral system still rests on our basic propensity to take a liking (or disliking) to exemplars. Nevertheless, one could be an agent-based theorist without advancing the exemplarist’s account of the origins or reference conditions for judgments of good and bad, virtuous and vicious.

The touchstone for eudaimonist virtue ethicists is a flourishing human life. For agent-based virtue ethicists it is an exemplary agent’s motivations. The target-centered view developed by Christine Swanton (2003), by contrast, begins with our existing conceptions of the virtues. We already have a passable idea of which traits are virtues and what they involve. Of course, this untutored understanding can be clarified and improved, and it is one of the tasks of the virtue ethicist to help us do precisely that. But rather than stripping things back to something as basic as the motivations we want to imitate or building it up to something as elaborate as an entire flourishing life, the target-centered view begins where most ethics students find themselves, namely, with the idea that generosity, courage, self-discipline, compassion, and the like get a tick of approval. It then examines what these traits involve.

A complete account of virtue will map out 1) its field , 2) its mode of responsiveness, 3) its basis of moral acknowledgment, and 4) its target . Different virtues are concerned with different fields . Courage, for example, is concerned with what might harm us, whereas generosity is concerned with the sharing of time, talent, and property. The basis of acknowledgment of a virtue is the feature within the virtue’s field to which it responds. To continue with our previous examples, generosity is attentive to the benefits that others might enjoy through one’s agency, and courage responds to threats to value, status, or the bonds that exist between oneself and particular others, and the fear such threats might generate. A virtue’s mode has to do with how it responds to the bases of acknowledgment within its field. Generosity promotes a good, namely, another’s benefit, whereas courage defends a value, bond, or status. Finally, a virtue’s target is that at which it is aimed. Courage aims to control fear and handle danger, while generosity aims to share time, talents, or possessions with others in ways that benefit them.

A virtue , on a target-centered account, “is a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough way” (Swanton 2003: 19). A virtuous act is an act that hits the target of a virtue, which is to say that it succeeds in responding to items in its field in the specified way (233). Providing a target-centered definition of a right action requires us to move beyond the analysis of a single virtue and the actions that follow from it. This is because a single action context may involve a number of different, overlapping fields. Determination might lead me to persist in trying to complete a difficult task even if doing so requires a singleness of purpose. But love for my family might make a different use of my time and attention. In order to define right action a target-centered view must explain how we handle different virtues’ conflicting claims on our resources. There are at least three different ways to address this challenge. A perfectionist target-centered account would stipulate, “An act is right if and only if it is overall virtuous, and that entails that it is the, or a, best action possible in the circumstances” (239–240). A more permissive target-centered account would not identify ‘right’ with ‘best’, but would allow an action to count as right provided “it is good enough even if not the (or a) best action” (240). A minimalist target-centered account would not even require an action to be good in order to be right. On such a view, “An act is right if and only if it is not overall vicious” (240). (For further discussion of target-centered virtue ethics see Van Zyl 2014; and Smith 2016).

The fourth form a virtue ethic might adopt takes its inspiration from Plato. The Socrates of Plato’s dialogues devotes a great deal of time to asking his fellow Athenians to explain the nature of virtues like justice, courage, piety, and wisdom. So it is clear that Plato counts as a virtue theorist. But it is a matter of some debate whether he should be read as a virtue ethicist (White 2015). What is not open to debate is whether Plato has had an important influence on the contemporary revival of interest in virtue ethics. A number of those who have contributed to the revival have done so as Plato scholars (e.g., Prior 1991; Kamtekar 1998; Annas 1999; and Reshotko 2006). However, often they have ended up championing a eudaimonist version of virtue ethics (see Prior 2001 and Annas 2011), rather than a version that would warrant a separate classification. Nevertheless, there are two variants that call for distinct treatment.

Timothy Chappell takes the defining feature of Platonistic virtue ethics to be that “Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good” (2014). Chappell follows Iris Murdoch in arguing that “In the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego” (Murdoch 1971: 51). Constantly attending to our needs, our desires, our passions, and our thoughts skews our perspective on what the world is actually like and blinds us to the goods around us. Contemplating the goodness of something we encounter—which is to say, carefully attending to it “for its own sake, in order to understand it” (Chappell 2014: 300)—breaks this natural tendency by drawing our attention away from ourselves. Contemplating such goodness with regularity makes room for new habits of thought that focus more readily and more honestly on things other than the self. It alters the quality of our consciousness. And “anything which alters consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity, and realism is to be connected with virtue” (Murdoch 1971: 82). The virtues get defined, then, in terms of qualities that help one “pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is” (91). And good agency is defined by the possession and exercise of such virtues. Within Chappell’s and Murdoch’s framework, then, not all normative properties get defined in terms of virtue. Goodness, in particular, is not so defined. But the kind of goodness which is possible for creatures like us is defined by virtue, and any answer to the question of what one should do or how one should live will appeal to the virtues.

Another Platonistic variant of virtue ethics is exemplified by Robert Merrihew Adams. Unlike Murdoch and Chappell, his starting point is not a set of claims about our consciousness of goodness. Rather, he begins with an account of the metaphysics of goodness. Like Murdoch and others influenced by Platonism, Adams’s account of goodness is built around a conception of a supremely perfect good. And like Augustine, Adams takes that perfect good to be God. God is both the exemplification and the source of all goodness. Other things are good, he suggests, to the extent that they resemble God (Adams 1999).

The resemblance requirement identifies a necessary condition for being good, but it does not yet give us a sufficient condition. This is because there are ways in which finite creatures might resemble God that would not be suitable to the type of creature they are. For example, if God were all-knowing, then the belief, “I am all-knowing,” would be a suitable belief for God to have. In God, such a belief—because true—would be part of God’s perfection. However, as neither you nor I are all-knowing, the belief, “I am all-knowing,” in one of us would not be good. To rule out such cases we need to introduce another factor. That factor is the fitting response to goodness, which Adams suggests is love. Adams uses love to weed out problematic resemblances: “being excellent in the way that a finite thing can be consists in resembling God in a way that could serve God as a reason for loving the thing” (Adams 1999: 36).

Virtues come into the account as one of the ways in which some things (namely, persons) could resemble God. “[M]ost of the excellences that are most important to us, and of whose value we are most confident, are excellences of persons or of qualities or actions or works or lives or stories of persons” (1999: 42). This is one of the reasons Adams offers for conceiving of the ideal of perfection as a personal God, rather than an impersonal form of the Good. Many of the excellences of persons of which we are most confident are virtues such as love, wisdom, justice, patience, and generosity. And within many theistic traditions, including Adams’s own Christian tradition, such virtues are commonly attributed to divine agents.

A Platonistic account like the one Adams puts forward in Finite and Infinite Goods clearly does not derive all other normative properties from the virtues (for a discussion of the relationship between this view and the one he puts forward in A Theory of Virtue (2006) see Pettigrove 2014). Goodness provides the normative foundation. Virtues are not built on that foundation; rather, as one of the varieties of goodness of whose value we are most confident, virtues form part of the foundation. Obligations, by contrast, come into the account at a different level. Moral obligations, Adams argues, are determined by the expectations and demands that “arise in a relationship or system of relationships that is good or valuable” (1999: 244). Other things being equal, the more virtuous the parties to the relationship, the more binding the obligation. Thus, within Adams’s account, the good (which includes virtue) is prior to the right. However, once good relationships have given rise to obligations, those obligations take on a life of their own. Their bindingness is not traced directly to considerations of goodness. Rather, they are determined by the expectations of the parties and the demands of the relationship.

A number of objections have been raised against virtue ethics, some of which bear more directly on one form of virtue ethics than on others. In this section we consider eight objections, namely, the a) application, b) adequacy, c) relativism, d) conflict, e) self-effacement, f) justification, g) egoism, and h) situationist problems.

a) In the early days of virtue ethics’ revival, the approach was associated with an “anti-codifiability” thesis about ethics, directed against the prevailing pretensions of normative theory. At the time, utilitarians and deontologists commonly (though not universally) held that the task of ethical theory was to come up with a code consisting of universal rules or principles (possibly only one, as in the case of act-utilitarianism) which would have two significant features: i) the rule(s) would amount to a decision procedure for determining what the right action was in any particular case; ii) the rule(s) would be stated in such terms that any non-virtuous person could understand and apply it (them) correctly.

Virtue ethicists maintained, contrary to these two claims, that it was quite unrealistic to imagine that there could be such a code (see, in particular, McDowell 1979). The results of attempts to produce and employ such a code, in the heady days of the 1960s and 1970s, when medical and then bioethics boomed and bloomed, tended to support the virtue ethicists’ claim. More and more utilitarians and deontologists found themselves agreed on their general rules but on opposite sides of the controversial moral issues in contemporary discussion. It came to be recognised that moral sensitivity, perception, imagination, and judgement informed by experience— phronesis in short—is needed to apply rules or principles correctly. Hence many (though by no means all) utilitarians and deontologists have explicitly abandoned (ii) and much less emphasis is placed on (i).

Nevertheless, the complaint that virtue ethics does not produce codifiable principles is still a commonly voiced criticism of the approach, expressed as the objection that it is, in principle, unable to provide action-guidance.

Initially, the objection was based on a misunderstanding. Blinkered by slogans that described virtue ethics as “concerned with Being rather than Doing,” as addressing “What sort of person should I be?” but not “What should I do?” as being “agent-centered rather than act-centered,” its critics maintained that it was unable to provide action-guidance. Hence, rather than being a normative rival to utilitarian and deontological ethics, it could claim to be no more than a valuable supplement to them. The rather odd idea was that all virtue ethics could offer was, “Identify a moral exemplar and do what he would do,” as though the university student trying to decide whether to study music (her preference) or engineering (her parents’ preference) was supposed to ask herself, “What would Socrates study if he were in my circumstances?”

But the objection failed to take note of Anscombe’s hint that a great deal of specific action guidance could be found in rules employing the virtue and vice terms (“v-rules”) such as “Do what is honest/charitable; do not do what is dishonest/uncharitable” (Hursthouse 1999). (It is a noteworthy feature of our virtue and vice vocabulary that, although our list of generally recognised virtue terms is comparatively short, our list of vice terms is remarkably, and usefully, long, far exceeding anything that anyone who thinks in terms of standard deontological rules has ever come up with. Much invaluable action guidance comes from avoiding courses of action that would be irresponsible, feckless, lazy, inconsiderate, uncooperative, harsh, intolerant, selfish, mercenary, indiscreet, tactless, arrogant, unsympathetic, cold, incautious, unenterprising, pusillanimous, feeble, presumptuous, rude, hypocritical, self-indulgent, materialistic, grasping, short-sighted, vindictive, calculating, ungrateful, grudging, brutal, profligate, disloyal, and on and on.)

(b) A closely related objection has to do with whether virtue ethics can provide an adequate account of right action. This worry can take two forms. (i) One might think a virtue ethical account of right action is extensionally inadequate. It is possible to perform a right action without being virtuous and a virtuous person can occasionally perform the wrong action without that calling her virtue into question. If virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for right action, one might wonder whether the relationship between rightness/wrongness and virtue/vice is close enough for the former to be identified in terms of the latter. (ii) Alternatively, even if one thought it possible to produce a virtue ethical account that picked out all (and only) right actions, one might still think that at least in some cases virtue is not what explains rightness (Adams 2006:6–8).

Some virtue ethicists respond to the adequacy objection by rejecting the assumption that virtue ethics ought to be in the business of providing an account of right action in the first place. Following in the footsteps of Anscombe (1958) and MacIntyre (1985), Talbot Brewer (2009) argues that to work with the categories of rightness and wrongness is already to get off on the wrong foot. Contemporary conceptions of right and wrong action, built as they are around a notion of moral duty that presupposes a framework of divine (or moral) law or around a conception of obligation that is defined in contrast to self-interest, carry baggage the virtue ethicist is better off without. Virtue ethics can address the questions of how one should live, what kind of person one should become, and even what one should do without that committing it to providing an account of ‘right action’. One might choose, instead, to work with aretaic concepts (defined in terms of virtues and vices) and axiological concepts (defined in terms of good and bad, better and worse) and leave out deontic notions (like right/wrong action, duty, and obligation) altogether.

Other virtue ethicists wish to retain the concept of right action but note that in the current philosophical discussion a number of distinct qualities march under that banner. In some contexts, ‘right action’ identifies the best action an agent might perform in the circumstances. In others, it designates an action that is commendable (even if not the best possible). In still others, it picks out actions that are not blameworthy (even if not commendable). A virtue ethicist might choose to define one of these—for example, the best action—in terms of virtues and vices, but appeal to other normative concepts—such as legitimate expectations—when defining other conceptions of right action.

As we observed in section 2, a virtue ethical account need not attempt to reduce all other normative concepts to virtues and vices. What is required is simply (i) that virtue is not reduced to some other normative concept that is taken to be more fundamental and (ii) that some other normative concepts are explained in terms of virtue and vice. This takes the sting out of the adequacy objection, which is most compelling against versions of virtue ethics that attempt to define all of the senses of ‘right action’ in terms of virtues. Appealing to virtues and vices makes it much easier to achieve extensional adequacy. Making room for normative concepts that are not taken to be reducible to virtue and vice concepts makes it even easier to generate a theory that is both extensionally and explanatorily adequate. Whether one needs other concepts and, if so, how many, is still a matter of debate among virtue ethicists, as is the question of whether virtue ethics even ought to be offering an account of right action. Either way virtue ethicists have resources available to them to address the adequacy objection.

Insofar as the different versions of virtue ethics all retain an emphasis on the virtues, they are open to the familiar problem of (c) the charge of cultural relativity. Is it not the case that different cultures embody different virtues, (MacIntyre 1985) and hence that the v-rules will pick out actions as right or wrong only relative to a particular culture? Different replies have been made to this charge. One—the tu quoque , or “partners in crime” response—exhibits a quite familiar pattern in virtue ethicists’ defensive strategy (Solomon 1988). They admit that, for them, cultural relativism is a challenge, but point out that it is just as much a problem for the other two approaches. The (putative) cultural variation in character traits regarded as virtues is no greater—indeed markedly less—than the cultural variation in rules of conduct, and different cultures have different ideas about what constitutes happiness or welfare. That cultural relativity should be a problem common to all three approaches is hardly surprising. It is related, after all, to the “justification problem” ( see below ) the quite general metaethical problem of justifying one’s moral beliefs to those who disagree, whether they be moral sceptics, pluralists or from another culture.

A bolder strategy involves claiming that virtue ethics has less difficulty with cultural relativity than the other two approaches. Much cultural disagreement arises, it may be claimed, from local understandings of the virtues, but the virtues themselves are not relative to culture (Nussbaum 1993).

Another objection to which the tu quoque response is partially appropriate is (d) “the conflict problem.” What does virtue ethics have to say about dilemmas—cases in which, apparently, the requirements of different virtues conflict because they point in opposed directions? Charity prompts me to kill the person who would be better off dead, but justice forbids it. Honesty points to telling the hurtful truth, kindness and compassion to remaining silent or even lying. What shall I do? Of course, the same sorts of dilemmas are generated by conflicts between deontological rules. Deontology and virtue ethics share the conflict problem (and are happy to take it on board rather than follow some of the utilitarians in their consequentialist resolutions of such dilemmas) and in fact their strategies for responding to it are parallel. Both aim to resolve a number of dilemmas by arguing that the conflict is merely apparent; a discriminating understanding of the virtues or rules in question, possessed only by those with practical wisdom, will perceive that, in this particular case, the virtues do not make opposing demands or that one rule outranks another, or has a certain exception clause built into it. Whether this is all there is to it depends on whether there are any irresolvable dilemmas. If there are, proponents of either normative approach may point out reasonably that it could only be a mistake to offer a resolution of what is, ex hypothesi , irresolvable.

Another problem arguably shared by all three approaches is (e), that of being self-effacing. An ethical theory is self-effacing if, roughly, whatever it claims justifies a particular action, or makes it right, had better not be the agent’s motive for doing it. Michael Stocker (1976) originally introduced it as a problem for deontology and consequentialism. He pointed out that the agent who, rightly, visits a friend in hospital will rather lessen the impact of his visit on her if he tells her either that he is doing it because it is his duty or because he thought it would maximize the general happiness. But as Simon Keller observes, she won’t be any better pleased if he tells her that he is visiting her because it is what a virtuous agent would do, so virtue ethics would appear to have the problem too (Keller 2007). However, virtue ethics’ defenders have argued that not all forms of virtue ethics are subject to this objection (Pettigrove 2011) and those that are are not seriously undermined by the problem (Martinez 2011).

Another problem for virtue ethics, which is shared by both utilitarianism and deontology, is (f) “the justification problem.” Abstractly conceived, this is the problem of how we justify or ground our ethical beliefs, an issue that is hotly debated at the level of metaethics. In its particular versions, for deontology there is the question of how to justify its claims that certain moral rules are the correct ones, and for utilitarianism of how to justify its claim that all that really matters morally are consequences for happiness or well-being. For virtue ethics, the problem concerns the question of which character traits are the virtues.

In the metaethical debate, there is widespread disagreement about the possibility of providing an external foundation for ethics—“external” in the sense of being external to ethical beliefs—and the same disagreement is found amongst deontologists and utilitarians. Some believe that their normative ethics can be placed on a secure basis, resistant to any form of scepticism, such as what anyone rationally desires, or would accept or agree on, regardless of their ethical outlook; others that it cannot.

Virtue ethicists have eschewed any attempt to ground virtue ethics in an external foundation while continuing to maintain that their claims can be validated. Some follow a form of Rawls’s coherentist approach (Slote 2001; Swanton 2003); neo-Aristotelians a form of ethical naturalism.

A misunderstanding of eudaimonia as an unmoralized concept leads some critics to suppose that the neo-Aristotelians are attempting to ground their claims in a scientific account of human nature and what counts, for a human being, as flourishing. Others assume that, if this is not what they are doing, they cannot be validating their claims that, for example, justice, charity, courage, and generosity are virtues. Either they are illegitimately helping themselves to Aristotle’s discredited natural teleology (Williams 1985) or producing mere rationalizations of their own personal or culturally inculcated values. But McDowell, Foot, MacIntyre and Hursthouse have all outlined versions of a third way between these two extremes. Eudaimonia in virtue ethics, is indeed a moralized concept, but it is not only that. Claims about what constitutes flourishing for human beings no more float free of scientific facts about what human beings are like than ethological claims about what constitutes flourishing for elephants. In both cases, the truth of the claims depends in part on what kind of animal they are and what capacities, desires and interests the humans or elephants have.

The best available science today (including evolutionary theory and psychology) supports rather than undermines the ancient Greek assumption that we are social animals, like elephants and wolves and unlike polar bears. No rationalizing explanation in terms of anything like a social contract is needed to explain why we choose to live together, subjugating our egoistic desires in order to secure the advantages of co-operation. Like other social animals, our natural impulses are not solely directed towards our own pleasures and preservation, but include altruistic and cooperative ones.

This basic fact about us should make more comprehensible the claim that the virtues are at least partially constitutive of human flourishing and also undercut the objection that virtue ethics is, in some sense, egoistic.

(g) The egoism objection has a number of sources. One is a simple confusion. Once it is understood that the fully virtuous agent characteristically does what she should without inner conflict, it is triumphantly asserted that “she is only doing what she wants to do and hence is being selfish.” So when the generous person gives gladly, as the generous are wont to do, it turns out she is not generous and unselfish after all, or at least not as generous as the one who greedily wants to hang on to everything she has but forces herself to give because she thinks she should! A related version ascribes bizarre reasons to the virtuous agent, unjustifiably assuming that she acts as she does because she believes that acting thus on this occasion will help her to achieve eudaimonia. But “the virtuous agent” is just “the agent with the virtues” and it is part of our ordinary understanding of the virtue terms that each carries with it its own typical range of reasons for acting. The virtuous agent acts as she does because she believes that someone’s suffering will be averted, or someone benefited, or the truth established, or a debt repaid, or … thereby.

It is the exercise of the virtues during one’s life that is held to be at least partially constitutive of eudaimonia , and this is consistent with recognising that bad luck may land the virtuous agent in circumstances that require her to give up her life. Given the sorts of considerations that courageous, honest, loyal, charitable people wholeheartedly recognise as reasons for action, they may find themselves compelled to face danger for a worthwhile end, to speak out in someone’s defence, or refuse to reveal the names of their comrades, even when they know that this will inevitably lead to their execution, to share their last crust and face starvation. On the view that the exercise of the virtues is necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia , such cases are described as those in which the virtuous agent sees that, as things have unfortunately turned out, eudaimonia is not possible for them (Foot 2001, 95). On the Stoical view that it is both necessary and sufficient, a eudaimon life is a life that has been successfully lived (where “success” of course is not to be understood in a materialistic way) and such people die knowing not only that they have made a success of their lives but that they have also brought their lives to a markedly successful completion. Either way, such heroic acts can hardly be regarded as egoistic.

A lingering suggestion of egoism may be found in the misconceived distinction between so-called “self-regarding” and “other-regarding” virtues. Those who have been insulated from the ancient tradition tend to regard justice and benevolence as real virtues, which benefit others but not their possessor, and prudence, fortitude and providence (the virtue whose opposite is “improvidence” or being a spendthrift) as not real virtues at all because they benefit only their possessor. This is a mistake on two counts. Firstly, justice and benevolence do, in general, benefit their possessors, since without them eudaimonia is not possible. Secondly, given that we live together, as social animals, the “self-regarding” virtues do benefit others—those who lack them are a great drain on, and sometimes grief to, those who are close to them (as parents with improvident or imprudent adult offspring know only too well).

The most recent objection (h) to virtue ethics claims that work in “situationist” social psychology shows that there are no such things as character traits and thereby no such things as virtues for virtue ethics to be about (Doris 1998; Harman 1999). In reply, some virtue ethicists have argued that the social psychologists’ studies are irrelevant to the multi-track disposition (see above) that a virtue is supposed to be (Sreenivasan 2002; Kamtekar 2004). Mindful of just how multi-track it is, they agree that it would be reckless in the extreme to ascribe a demanding virtue such as charity to people of whom they know no more than that they have exhibited conventional decency; this would indeed be “a fundamental attribution error.” Others have worked to develop alternative, empirically grounded conceptions of character traits (Snow 2010; Miller 2013 and 2014; however see Upton 2016 for objections to Miller). There have been other responses as well (summarized helpfully in Prinz 2009 and Miller 2014). Notable among these is a response by Adams (2006, echoing Merritt 2000) who steers a middle road between “no character traits at all” and the exacting standard of the Aristotelian conception of virtue which, because of its emphasis on phronesis, requires a high level of character integration. On his conception, character traits may be “frail and fragmentary” but still virtues, and not uncommon. But giving up the idea that practical wisdom is the heart of all the virtues, as Adams has to do, is a substantial sacrifice, as Russell (2009) and Kamtekar (2010) argue.

Even though the “situationist challenge” has left traditional virtue ethicists unmoved, it has generated a healthy engagement with empirical psychological literature, which has also been fuelled by the growing literature on Foot’s Natural Goodness and, quite independently, an upsurge of interest in character education (see below).

Over the past thirty-five years most of those contributing to the revival of virtue ethics have worked within a neo-Aristotelian, eudaimonist framework. However, as noted in section 2, other forms of virtue ethics have begun to emerge. Theorists have begun to turn to philosophers like Hutcheson, Hume, Nietzsche, Martineau, and Heidegger for resources they might use to develop alternatives (see Russell 2006; Swanton 2013 and 2015; Taylor 2015; and Harcourt 2015). Others have turned their attention eastward, exploring Confucian, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions (Yu 2007; Slingerland 2011; Finnigan and Tanaka 2011; McRae 2012; Angle and Slote 2013; Davis 2014; Flanagan 2015; Perrett and Pettigrove 2015; and Sim 2015). These explorations promise to open up new avenues for the development of virtue ethics.

Although virtue ethics has grown remarkably in the last thirty-five years, it is still very much in the minority, particularly in the area of applied ethics. Many editors of big textbook collections on “moral problems” or “applied ethics” now try to include articles representative of each of the three normative approaches but are often unable to find a virtue ethics article addressing a particular issue. This is sometimes, no doubt, because “the” issue has been set up as a deontologicial/utilitarian debate, but it is often simply because no virtue ethicist has yet written on the topic. However, the last decade has seen an increase in the amount of attention applied virtue ethics has received (Walker and Ivanhoe 2007; Hartman 2013; Austin 2014; Van Hooft 2014; and Annas 2015). This area can certainly be expected to grow in the future, and it looks as though applying virtue ethics in the field of environmental ethics may prove particularly fruitful (Sandler 2007; Hursthouse 2007, 2011; Zwolinski and Schmidtz 2013; Cafaro 2015).

Whether virtue ethics can be expected to grow into “virtue politics”—i.e. to extend from moral philosophy into political philosophy—is not so clear. Gisela Striker (2006) has argued that Aristotle’s ethics cannot be understood adequately without attending to its place in his politics. That suggests that at least those virtue ethicists who take their inspiration from Aristotle should have resources to offer for the development of virtue politics. But, while Plato and Aristotle can be great inspirations as far as virtue ethics is concerned, neither, on the face of it, are attractive sources of insight where politics is concerned. However, recent work suggests that Aristotelian ideas can, after all, generate a satisfyingly liberal political philosophy (Nussbaum 2006; LeBar 2013a). Moreover, as noted above, virtue ethics does not have to be neo-Aristotelian. It may be that the virtue ethics of Hutcheson and Hume can be naturally extended into a modern political philosophy (Hursthouse 1990–91; Slote 1993).

Following Plato and Aristotle, modern virtue ethics has always emphasised the importance of moral education, not as the inculcation of rules but as the training of character. There is now a growing movement towards virtues education, amongst both academics (Carr 1999; Athanassoulis 2014; Curren 2015) and teachers in the classroom. One exciting thing about research in this area is its engagement with other academic disciplines, including psychology, educational theory, and theology (see Cline 2015; and Snow 2015).

Finally, one of the more productive developments of virtue ethics has come through the study of particular virtues and vices. There are now a number of careful studies of the cardinal virtues and capital vices (Pieper 1966; Taylor 2006; Curzer 2012; Timpe and Boyd 2014). Others have explored less widely discussed virtues or vices, such as civility, decency, truthfulness, ambition, and meekness (Calhoun 2000; Kekes 2002; Williams 2002; and Pettigrove 2007 and 2012). One of the questions these studies raise is “How many virtues are there?” A second is, “How are these virtues related to one another?” Some virtue ethicists have been happy to work on the assumption that there is no principled reason for limiting the number of virtues and plenty of reason for positing a plurality of them (Swanton 2003; Battaly 2015). Others have been concerned that such an open-handed approach to the virtues will make it difficult for virtue ethicists to come up with an adequate account of right action or deal with the conflict problem discussed above. Dan Russell has proposed cardinality and a version of the unity thesis as a solution to what he calls “the enumeration problem” (the problem of too many virtues). The apparent proliferation of virtues can be significantly reduced if we group virtues together with some being cardinal and others subordinate extensions of those cardinal virtues. Possible conflicts between the remaining virtues can then be managed if they are tied together in some way as part of a unified whole (Russell 2009). This highlights two important avenues for future research, one of which explores individual virtues and the other of which analyses how they might be related to one another.

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• Yu, Jiyuan, 2007, The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle: Mirrors of Virtue , New York: Routledge.
• Zagzebski, Linda, 1996, Virtues of the Mind , New York: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1998, “The Virtues of God and the Foundations of Ethics,” Faith and Philosophy , 15 (4): 538–553.
• –––, 2004, Divine Motivation Theory , New York: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2017, Exemplarist Moral Theory , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Zwolinski, Matt and David Schmidtz, 2013, “Environmental Virtue Ethics,” in Russell (2013), pp. 221–239.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Bibliography on Virtue Ethics (in PDF, listed alphabetically), and Bibliography on Virtue Ethics (in PDF, listed chronologically), by Jörg Schroth.

Aristotle | character, moral | character, moral: empirical approaches | consequentialism | ethics: deontological | moral dilemmas

Acknowledgments

Parts of the introductory material above repeat what was said in the Introduction and first chapter of On Virtue Ethics (Hursthouse 1999).

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Virtues and Their Vices

Kevin Timpe and Craig A. Boyd (eds.),  Virtues and Their Vices , Oxford University Press, 2014, 528pp., $120.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780199645541.

Reviewed by Bradford Cokelet, University of Miami

Kevin Timpe and Craig A. Boyd offer us twenty-two chapters that discuss a host of specific virtues and vices (sections 1-4) and reflect on the role of virtue in various disciplines (section 5). The papers on the specific virtues and vices are organized into four traditional categories -- cardinal virtues, capital vices and corrective virtues, intellectual virtues, and theological virtues -- and these seventeen articles make up the heart of the collection. As this categorical scheme might suggest, most of the authors discuss and defend Christian accounts of the virtues and vices, and the collection effectively draws one (theist or not) into thinking about how Aquinas-inspired virtue theory can speak to people today.

Before getting into the details, I should say that several articles could be fruitfully used in a contemporary moral problems or introduction to philosophy class, and that the articles in sections 1-3, perhaps coupled with some of the recent work on Kant's account of virtue, could deeply enrich discussion in an upper-level or graduate course on virtue theory or virtue ethics. These chapters allow non-theistic philosophers to glimpse the concrete ways in which theistically understood virtues promise to aptly structure and orient the psychologies, practices, and activities of people and communities who are oriented by a religious conception of the good. By extension, they provide a useful framework to ask questions about the specific virtues that those with very different conceptions of the good will need to embody or reflectively cultivate in order to embody their ideals or values.

I cannot discuss all twenty-two articles or even summarize critical reactions to the core group of seventeen. Instead, I am going to highlight some of the aspects of the collection as a whole that will make it especially valuable for teachers and scholars. I am going to leave aside the last five chapters, which explore interesting questions about virtue in different disciplines but which are not tightly integrated with the larger whole. These chapters are, however, well done. Philosophers interested in virtue in theology, civic virtue in political liberalism, virtue in positive psychology, neuroscience and virtue, and virtue and a feminist ethics of care are encouraged to take a look at them. Helpful overviews of these papers can be found in the editors' introduction (29-32).

Turning to what I think is the core of the collection, I want to begin by re-iterating that many of these papers will be of interest to philosophy teachers, theist and non-theist alike. Representative options here include the chapters "Lust and Chastity", "Gluttony and Abstinence" and "Sloth". They introduce various historical conceptions of the virtues, compare their relative strengths and weaknesses, and invite readers to either adopt a revised historical conception or think about what alternative virtue and vice concepts they can develop in their place. For example, Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung's entry on sloth explains that on one traditional understanding of sloth, restless multi-taskers, and not just slackers, count as slothful. On this view, sloth involves a failure to mindfully and zealously embody devotion to the good in one's activities, and it therefore need not be associated with a lack of worldly ambition or be contrasted with the view that work is more important than leisure or family. This historical discussion helpfully reminds us that our ordinary assumptions about specific virtues and vices may be the result of historical contingencies, but it also pushes us to think about how our psychologies must be shaped if we are to be zealously and energetically oriented toward the good (however we conceive of it).

Colleen McCluskey's chapter on lust and chastity and Robert B. Kruschwitz's on gluttony and abstinence have arguments that get a bit more contentious, but this just adds to their appeal. McCluskey nicely discusses what Aquinas might say in response to Simon Blackburn's argument that lust can be a virtue and, while rejecting Blackburn's approach, she argues for an Aquinas-inspired position that is revised to fit contemporary thinking or common sense. Like DeYong's essay on sloth this one illustrates that the virtues enable us to embody love for (or appreciation of) the good in our activities and relationships and that they therefore enable us to live well. But McCluskey sounds another theme that runs through the collection: that to live intelligently or prudently we need to be oriented towards the right kinds of goods and be oriented towards them in a structured way that reflects their comparative value.

In the discussion of lust and charity, for example, we are invited to reflect on the goods of sexual pleasure in and out of various kinds of relationship, to reflect on our conceptions of better and worse relationships, and to then think about how we would need to be psychologically constituted in order to be aptly oriented towards the good of sexual pleasure and its relation to other goods. In Kruschwitz's discussion of gluttony and abstinence, we are invited to reflect on analogous questions regarding the pleasures of eating and drinking. In each case we are also asked to think about how the pleasures we take in one kind of thing (e.g., food) can give energy and enjoyment to activities that embody or nurture even greater goods (e.g., family meals that nurture good family relations). Taken together, these chapters encourage us to think about how we can best temper and cultivate our desires for various creature comforts, so that they will become integrated with our more distinctively human desires to embody our ideals or values and live a good life. These chapters invite us to develop, in other words, a concrete conception of temperance, as that virtue is insightfully discussed by Robert C. Roberts in section one.

Most of the essays in sections one and two have something instructive to say about how the virtues enable us to be energetically and aptly oriented by a hierarchically structured and integrated conception of the good, but they also discuss how vices or shortcomings in virtue can lead to disordered, or just plain bad, lives. This theme comes to the fore, but does not dominate, in the chapters that discuss the vices of avarice, anger, envy, and pride. Taken together, these chapters remind us that our characteristically human concerns for long term safety, control, power, social standing, and self-esteem can distort our thinking about and relationships with others, as well our ability to pursue our own good. Given the religious framework of many of the authors it is unsurprising that they get us to think about how these vices can distort one's proper relationship with God. But they also make many insightful points about how our disordered or inapt emotions, deliberations, and volitions can corrupt our relations to friends, family members, communities, etc. and inhibit our ability to successfully and prudently pursue worthwhile life-projects. Moreover, these reflections are coupled with ones about the virtuous (well-ordered and apt) emotions, deliberations, and volitions and the way they contribute to good relationships and successful, excellent projects. These chapters are all interesting in their own right, but also link to varying degrees with the insightful earlier chapters on prudence, fortitude, and justice, and the later ones on the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity.

As a non-theist, I found the later set of overlaps particularly interesting because they allowed me to start to see what theists might have in mind when they claim that the theistic virtues in some way infuse and improve the shared "pagan" ones that non-theists recognize. For example, in "Charity: How Friendship with God Unfolds in Love for Others" Paul J. Wadell invites the reader to think about how friendship with God could not only justify and motivate love for enemies and strangers, or buttress our hope when we are in dire straights, but how it could also, "deepen and perfect," our more central attachments to family, friends, and community (384-85). More specifically, he says that the relation to God calls on us to be "more attentive, focused, and faithful in love" to our near and dear (384).

To a non-theist such claims can remain opaque and apparently ungrounded, and this collection provides some real help in this regard. When trying to make sense of the view that the theological virtues transform or infuse the moral ones, you can revisit the earlier chapters on the specific virtues and vices that enable or inhibit our abilities to be attentive, focused, and faithful in love and to be energetic and devoted in our pursuit of worthwhile projects. You can look in these chapters for clues about how a loving relationship with God could be thought to deepen and perfect the moral virtues that are recognizable as virtues in a non-theistic framework. At least in my case, this provoked an initially plausible, if somewhat obvious, suggestion: that various ordinary vices and short-comings in virtue are grounded in our inflated, unduly negative, or fragile sense of self-worth or self-esteem, and that by entering into a loving relationship with God you can at least in principle (and perhaps with graceful intervention or co-operation) adopt a warranted and resilient sense of your worth. Now this is only one possibility. Non-theists might accept the claim about the common cause of vice and then offer an alternative story about how agents can develop a warranted and resilient sense of self worth -- drawing on the responses to this problem that we find in Kant, Aristotle, or the Buddhists, for example. But I hope this example illustrates the way that this collection allows one to think critically both about how to develop a theistic account of the virtues and their role in the good life, and the way that the account helps non-theists see how they can benefit by engaging with more traditional theistic conceptions.

My comments up to now have focused on the sections that discuss the moral and theological virtues, and I want to end with some brief comments about the section on the epistemic virtues. This section has three excellent essays by philosophers working in the virtue epistemology tradition -- Linda Zagzebski on trust, John Greco on knowledge and understanding, and Jason Baehr on theoretical wisdom/ sophia . Taken together these essays provide a lucid and inviting overview of the epistemic virtues and the ways that virtue epistemology enriches our thinking about epistemic assessments, strategies, and goals. Given the larger theme of the collection (virtues and their vices), however, I was left wanting a substantive discussion of various epistemic vices. For example, it would have been very nice to see what virtue epistemologists, especially theologically informed ones, can add to our thinking about epistemic injustice of the sort discussed by Miranda Fricker or to hear more about the epistemic issues that come up in thinking about moral education. More generally, the collection naturally provokes questions about how epistemic, moral, and theological virtues and vices might be inter-twined, and it would have been nice to have some essays on this topic -- for example one discussing the ethics of belief, Kant's worries about religious enthusiasm, or epistemic issues that crop up when we think about moral education and autonomy.

Finally, I found it a bit odd that a book so resolutely focused on showing that history can help us think more deeply and creatively about the virtues has little to no discussion of Kant's conception of virtue and all of the good work that has recently been done on that topic. Of course no collection can do it all, and I suppose these desires for more entries in a book that already runs 528 pages just reflect the value that the volume has. This is a large collection, and it could be better unified around a guiding purpose, but I nonetheless think it is surprisingly successful as a whole and that the individual essays should prove useful for both scholars and teachers.

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4: Intellectual Virtues and Vices

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Michael Fitzpatrick contributed quite a bit to this chapter, so Chapter 4 should be seen as a collaboration between Lavin and Fitzpatrick.

Note for Instructors

Starting in edition 4, Chapter 4 on fallacies has been renamed and somewhat rewritten into a chapter on "Intellectual Virtues and Vices," incorporating material from the conclusion and the previous version of the chapter. Thinking about the traditional fallacies under a model of virtue epistemology seemed more in line with the values of this textbook, but they can still be taught as traditional fallacies if that is your preference.

The most significant change is that the "Fallacies of Induction," which was 4.3, have all been moved to the new 8.5, forming part of the chapter on inductive reasoning. This allows those fallacies to be taught in the context in which they are mistakes in reasoning, as teaching fallacies in the context of their positive counterparts seems more pedagogically useful.

Also, the fallacy of equivocation has been moved to 2.2 "Fallacy of Equivocation" , since it is most naturally taught alongside the discussion of the role of language in critical thinking.

All the other fallacies (Relevance and Presumption) remain here, described as intellectual vices.

• 4.1: What are Virtues and Vices?
• 4.2: Some Intellectual Virtues
• 4.3: Some Intellectual Vices
• 4.E: Chapter Four (Exercises)

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4.9 Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics approaches focus on describing virtues (and vices) and explaining how to develop a virtuous character and live a good life. While acting in the right way and bringing about good consequences matter, developing a virtuous character is the central concern. The idea is that if one has the right kind of character, then one will, as a result of this, do the right things and good consequences will follow.

As with consequentialism and deontology, we can find versions of this approach in many different cultural traditions. Arguably, whenever someone tells a story about an exemplary human being with the clear implication that others ought to behave like this exemplar, they are engaged in a kind of virtue ethics. Although philosophers have different ways of identifying virtues and characterizing the good life, virtue approaches tend to have a set of things in common. They all recognize that developing a good character takes training and practice. The disposition to be good is, in effect, a habit of behaving well. Good habits are acquired by repetition, whether we repeat these actions mindfully or simply by inclination, just as bad habits are acquired by repeatedly behaving badly. Thus, many virtue ethicists emphasize the importance of education and having a social environment that supports the acquisition of virtue as well as discussing how those of us who want to be better people can shape our own characters.

The Good Life, According to Aristotle

The most famous virtue ethicist in the European tradition is Aristotle (384–322 BCE). His book, The Nicomachean Ethics , begins by identifying the good as that which people pursue for its own sake.  While we can see that many people pursue things like pleasure and wealth, these are not the kinds of ultimate ends that Aristotle has in mind. After all, wealth is only an instrumental good as it merely provides a means for obtaining things that we hope will make us happy but does not provide happiness directly (or particularly reliably). Similarly, pleasure is often a sign of the good—particularly for virtuous people who take pleasure in acting virtuously—but it is not itself good. Aristotle believed that what we pursue is happiness and a happy life is the ultimate good that humans seek. Although we have used the term “happiness,” this isn’t a perfect translation. The Greek term Aristotle used is “ eudaemonia ,” which is variously translated as happiness, flourishing, and well-being. (The BBC has a nice little video about eudaemonia and Aristotle’s ethics, which you can view here .)

It is important to understand that Aristotle is not just saying that if you follow the virtues, then you will experience happiness. (This is one of the reasons why many translators prefer the term “flourishing” as a translation of eudaemonia .) Eudaemonia is nothing other than living virtuously, functioning well as a human being over a continuous period of time by consistently doing the right thing. From eudaemonia positive and appropriate emotions flow. Emotional responses, like virtuous character traits, are acquired through habit and though they should not override reasons, Aristotle believed they had an important role in our moral lives.

Aristotle had a very particular account of the virtues, each one of which he thought was situated between two vices—one of excess and the other of deficiency. So, for instance, Aristotle thought that the virtue of courage is a middle way, between the vices of cowardice and recklessness. He has a long list of virtues with their attendant vices, and even with its length, there is little reason to think his list is exhaustive.

Although we may wonder if this account of virtue accurately captures the character of all virtues and vices, careful consideration of some cases shows its usefulness. One of the virtues Aristotle considers is proper pride , what we might think of as appropriate self-regard. Someone with proper pride thinks themselves worthy and is worthy; they make claims to appropriate treatment by others in accord with their merits. Thus, Aristotle notes, pride is a kind of “crown of the virtues” [1] as one must have already achieved great things to properly feel it. This virtue sits between the excess of vanity , where one believes that they deserve more than they truly merit, and a vice of false modesty or inappropriate humility. Both of these vices reflect a failure to accurately appreciate one’s own merits. Such failures may lead one to act badly because one has over-estimated one’s capacities, in the case of the vanity, or fail to act at all, as in the case of the inappropriate humility.

Similarly, anger can be virtuous or vicious. Aristotle identifies the good-tempered person as someone “who is angry at the right things and with the right people, and further, as [they] ought, when [they] ought, and as long as [they] ought.” [2] This rests between the vices of being hot-tempered—where one easily angers, directs one’s anger at the wrong targets, or is sulky or vengeful—and a deficiency where one doesn’t care about anything at all or is willing to accept abuse of oneself or others.

The thing to notice in these examples is that there isn’t a rule that will tell you how to be courageous, how to have proper pride, or how to feel and express appropriate anger. Nor is there an ordering of virtues and vices that tells you which virtues are more important than others. Indeed, the appropriate action in any given situation is often particular to that situation. What we can say is that the virtuous person will act well no matter the situation and will, by so doing, flourish and live a successful, happy life.

The Good Life, According to Buddhism

A number of contemporary thinkers read Buddhist ethics as a type of virtue ethics. One of the complications here is that even if we concede that much of Buddhist ethics addresses the acquisition of virtuous ways of thinking and acting, it starts with a big dose of consequentialism. Like Aristotle’s ethics, Buddhist ethics begins with an observation about human lives. Indeed, this insight about the nature of life is Buddhism’s first noble truth: Suffering is an inescapable part of life. The Buddha is thought to have said:

…[B]irth is suffering; aging is suffering; sickness is suffering; death is suffering; sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair are suffering; association with the unpleasant is suffering; dissociation from the pleasant is suffering; not to get what one wants is suffering…” [3]

Having recognized this, the aim of Buddhism is really about figuring out how to live so as to minimize suffering—clearly a consequentialist goal.

However, the guidance that Buddhism gives for achieving this goal focuses on the cultivation of ways of thinking and behaving that fit the model of virtue ethics. For instance, the second noble truth identifies the source of suffering as what are, in effect, vices. The central vice identified here is attachment . Attachment includes things like greed and lust but more generally refers to craving or desire for things. Along with attachment, ignorance and hatred constitute the ‘three poisons’ that tend to give rise to suffering. So, dispositions to dismiss or be indifferent to the truth, despise and harm others, or constantly acquire or desire more things are serious character flaws.

The third noble truth just makes the obvious point that you can decrease suffering by renouncing or rejecting what gives rise to it. In terms of the three poisons, instead of ignorance one should pursue wisdom, instead of hatred one should cultivate loving kindness, and instead of attachment, one should practice a selflessness and generosity.

The fourth noble truth further specifies the practices that the virtuous person should pursue to reduce suffering—the eightfold path. These are, in effect, a basic guide to living in a way that reduces suffering, both for yourself and everyone else. Two parts focus on wisdom. The first is right view, which is the effort to gain the correct view of reality. The next is right intention or thought, which, for Buddhists, means cultivating compassion for all sentient beings. The next four focus on conduct. Right speech favors telling the truth over lying and slander and speaking kindly and usefully rather than using abusive language or engaging in gossip. Right action and right livelihood basically require one to find ways of living that don’t promote suffering, and right effort recognizes that this kind of virtuous conduct requires self-discipline. The final two parts of the eightfold path concern mental discipline. Right mindfulness requires cultivating an awareness of all one’s activities and thoughts, while right concentration is the reflection on and internal investigation of one’s thoughts, which is associated with meditation. [4]

Again, the BBC has rather a nice little video encapsulating the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism and you can find it here .

The Exemplar of a Virtuous Person

Often virtue ethics approaches offer an ideal or exemplary person as a kind of role model to emulate. Similarly, we tell stories about vicious people to understand how their lives can go awry so that we do not make the same poor choices that they did.

STOP & THINK

Who to you exemplifies a good person who is living well?

What are their virtues?

Can you recount a story about them that reveals their virtuous character?

Such exemplars redirect ethics from the individual actions and moral dilemmas that are, typically, the focus of consequentialism and deontology to a more holistic way of thinking about a moral life.

Note on Attribution

Chapter 4.9 Virtue Ethics was adapted from “Chapter 9, Virtue Ethics – Applied Ethics Primer” by Letitia Meynell and Clarisse Paron, AtlanticOER, licensed under CC BY-NC 4.0 .

• Aristotle, Ethics, trans. J.A.K. Thomson (London: Penguin Classics, 1976), 1124a, 1. ↵
• Aristotle, 1125b, 32-3. ↵
• John M. Koller, Asian Philosophies, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 2002), 53. ↵
• Koller, 59-61. ↵

Leading the Way: A Path Towards Ethical Leadership Copyright © by Thomas Edison State University and Kelly Alverson is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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• Relationships

The First Step Toward Better Character

Moving away from vice and toward virtue..

Posted March 10, 2022 | Reviewed by Michelle Quirk

• Virtues make deep, secure, lasting relationships possible—a central aspect of human flourishing.
• Vices corrupt, corrode, and undermine both our character and our relationships.
• By identifying our vices, we'll be better positioned to grow in the corresponding virtues.

To flee vice is the beginning of virtue. –Horace

In my experience, most people are concerned about character. They want to be morally decent, and they want the same for others. The words of Horace can be helpful here. If we want to cultivate virtue in ourselves, it is important to flee vice.

Defining Virtue and Vice

First, a couple of quick definitions. A virtue is an excellent human character trait that helps us to live well. Virtues make deep, secure, lasting relationships possible—a central aspect of human flourishing. They also enable us to live well, to act well, and to be good human beings. A vice is a bad human character trait that undermines our ability to live well. Vices corrupt, corrode, and undermine both our character and our relationships. They prevent us from truly flourishing.

How to Cultivate Virtue

There are many answers to this, and a variety of strategies that different wisdom traditions offer. But one step that we may too quickly ignore is to flee the vices that we possess. If I am greedy, I can't just will myself to all of a sudden become generous, for example. I don't believe there is some fixed, step-by-step process to character development, but I am confident that one fruitful thing we can do is work at identifying our vices. With this self-knowledge, we'll be better positioned to grow in the corresponding virtues.

If I come to see that I am, in fact, a greedy person, there are several things I can do to begin to flee this vice. I could spend some time alone, in silence, and explore why I am greedy. What am I relying on my possessions for that is better sought elsewhere? What unmet needs or desires for good things are feeding my greed? What false messages from my culture have I internalized about money and possessions and their role in a good and happy life? What truths might I focus on instead?

But mere reflection is not enough. Action is important. The internal work helps me to flee the vice, and begin to change the parts of me that are feeding it. But to flee vice fully, to begin to take steps toward good character in this area of life, I need to do something. I might simply put myself on a spending freeze, for instance, and only buy what is truly necessary for a week or two, maybe longer. Then I could donate the money saved to a charity or buy something for a friend or family member, as a simple act of generosity .

There is much more to cultivating good character than fleeing our vices. But it's a good start.

Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Glittering Vices, 2nd edition (Brazos Press, 2020).

Michael W. Austin, Ph.D. , is a professor of philosophy at Eastern Kentucky University.

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1.5: Theory-Building Activities - Virtue Ethics

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• William Frey and Jose a Cruz-Cruz
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Module Introduction

This module uses materials being prepared for Good Computing: A Virtue Approach to Computer Ethics, to set up an exercise in which you will identify and spell out virtues relevant to your professional discipline. After identifying these virtues, you will work to contextualize them in everyday practice. Emphasis will be placed on the Aristotelian approach to virtues which describes a virtue as the disposition toward the mean located between the extremes of excess and defect. You will also be asked to identify common obstacles that prevent professionals from realizing a given virtue and moral exemplars who demonstrate consistent success in realizing these virtues and responding to obstacles that stand in the way of their realization. In a variation on this module, you could be asked to compare the virtues you have identified for your profession with virtues that belong to other moral ecologies such as those of the Homeric warrior.

Three Versions of Virtue Ethics: Virtue 1, Virtue 2, and Virtue 3

Virtue ethics has gone through three historical versions. The first, Virtue 1, was set forth by Aristotle in ancient Greece. While tied closely to practices in ancient Greece that no longer exist today, Aristotle's version still has a lot to say to us in this day and age. In the second half of the twentieth century, British philosophical ethicists put forth a related but different theory of virtue ethics (virtue 2) as an alternative to the dominant ethical theories of utilitarianism and deontology. Virtue 2 promised a new foundation of ethics consistent with work going on at that time in the philosophy of mind. Proponents felt that turning from the action to the agent promised to free ethical theory from the intractable debate between utilitarianism and deontology and offered a way to expand scope and relevance of ethics. Virtue 3 reconnects with Aristotle and virtue 1 even though it drops the doctrine of the mean and Aristotle's emphasis on character. Using recent advances in moral psychology and moral pedagogy, it seeks to rework key Aristotelian concepts in modern terms. In the following, we will provide short characterizations of each of these three versions of virtue ethics.

Virtue 1: Aristotle's Virtue Ethics

• Eudaimonia. Happiness, for Aristotle, consists of a life spent fulfilling the intellectual and moral virtues. These modes of action are auto-telic, that is, they are self-justifying and contain their own ends. By carrying out the moral and intellectual virtues for a lifetime, we realize ourselves fully as humans. Because we are doing what we were meant to do, we are happy in this special sense of eudaimonia.
• Arete. Arete is the Greek word we usually translate as "virtue". But arete is more faithfully translated as excellence. For Aristotle, the moral and intellectual virtues represent excellences. So the moral life is more than just staying out of trouble. Under Aristotle, it is centered in pursuing and achieving excellence for a lifetime.
• Virtue as the Mean. Aristotle also characterizes virtue as a settled disposition to choose the mean between the extremes of excess and defect, all relative to person and situation. Courage (the virtue) is the mean between the extremes of excess (too much courage or recklessness) and defect (too little courage or cowardice). Aristotle's claim that most or all of the virtues can be specified as the mean between extremes is controversial. While the doctrine of the mean is dropped in Virtue 2 and Virtue 3, we will still use it in developing virtue tables. (See exercise 1 below.) You may not find both extremes for the virtues you have been assigned but make the effort nonetheless.
• Ethos. "Ethos" translates as character which, for Aristotle, composes the seat of the virtues. Virtues are well settled dispositions or habits that have been incorporated into our characters. Because our characters are manifested in our actions, the patterns formed by these over time reveal who we are. This can be formulated as a decision-making test, the public identification test. Because we reveal who we are through our actions we can ask, when considering an action, whether we would care to be publicly identified with this action. "Would I want to be publicly known as the kind of person who would perform that kind of action? Would I, through my cowardly action, want to be publicly identified as a coward? Would I, through my responsible action, want to be publicly identified as a responsible person? Because actions provide others with a window into our characters, we must make sure be sure that they portray us as we want to be portrayed.
• Aisthesis of the Phronimos. This Greek phrase, roughly translated as the perception of the morally experienced agent, reveals how important practice and experience are to Aristotle in his conception of moral development. One major difference between Aristotle and other ethicists (utilitarians and deontologists) is the emphasis that Aristotle places on developing into or becoming a moral person. For Aristotle, one becomes good by first repeatedly performing good actions. So morality is more like an acquired skill than a mechanical process. Through practice we develop sensitivities to what is morally relevant in a situation, we learn how to structure our situations to see moral problems and possibilities, and we develop the skill of "hitting" consistently on the mean between the extremes. All of these are skills that are cultivated in much the same way as a basketball player develops through practice the skill of shooting the ball through the hoop.
• Bouleusis. This word translates as "deliberation." For Aristotle, moral skill is not the product of extensive deliberation (careful, exhaustive thinking about reasons, actions, principles, concepts, etc.) but of practice. Those who have developed the skill to find the mean can do so with very little thought and effort. Virtuous individuals, for Aristotle, are surprisingly unreflective. They act virtuously without thought because it has become second nature to them.
• Akrasia. Ross translates this word as "incontinence" which is outmoded. A better translation is weakness of will. For Aristotle, knowing where virtue lies is not the same as doing what virtue demands. There are those who are unable to translate knowledge into resolution and then into action. Because akrasis (weakness of will) is very real for Aristotle, he also places emphasis in his theory of moral development on the cultivation of proper emotions to help motivate virtuous action. Later ethicists seek to oppose emotion and right action; Aristotle sees properly trained and cultivated emotions as strong motives to doing what virtue requires.
• Logos Aristotle's full definition of virtue is "a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which [a person] of practical wisdom would determine it." (Ross's translation in Nichomachean Ethics, 1106b, 36.) We have talked about character, the mean, and the person of practical wisdom. The last key term is "logos" which in this definition is translated by reason. This is a good translation if we take reason in its fullest sense so that it is not just the capacity to construct valid arguments but also includes the practical wisdom to assess the truth of the premises used in constructing these arguments. In this way, Aristotle expands reason beyond logic to include a fuller set of intellectual, practical, emotional, and perceptual skills that together form a practical kind of wisdom.
• The following summary of Virtue 2 is taken largely from Rosalind Hursthouse. While she extensively qualifies each of these theses in her own version of virtue ethics, these points comprise an excellent summary of Virtue 2 which starts with G.E.M. Anscombe's article, "Modern Moral Philosophy," and continues on into the present. Hursthouse presents this characterization of Virtue 2 in her book, On Virtue Ethics (2001) U.K.: Oxford University Press: 17.
• Virtue 2 is agent-centered. Contrary to deontology and utilitarianism which focus on whether actions are good or right, V2 is agent-centered in that it sees the action as an expression of the goodness or badness of the agent. Utilitarianism focuses on actions which bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number; deontology seeks those actions that respect the autonomy of individuals and carry out moral obligations, especially duties. These theories emphasize doing what is good or right. Virtue 2, on the other hand, focuses on the agent's becoming or being good.
• Can Virtue 2 tell us how to act? Because V2 is agent-centered, critics claim that it cannot provide insight into how to act in a given situation. All it can say is, "Act the way a moral exemplar would act." But what moral standards do moral exemplars use or embody in their actions? And what moral standards do we use to pick out the moral exemplars themselves? Hursthouse acknowledges that this criticism hits home. However, she points out that the moral standards come from the moral concepts that we apply to moral exemplars; they are individuals who act courageously, exercise justice, and realize honesty. The moral concepts "courage," "justice," and "honesty" all have independent content that helps guide us. She also calls this criticism unfair: while virtue 2 may not provide any more guidance than deontology or utilitarianism, it doesn't provide any less. Virtue 2 may not provide perfect guidance, but what it does provide is favorably comparable to what utilitarianism and deontology provide.
• Virtue 2 replaces Deontic concepts (right, duty, obligation) with Aretaic concepts (good, virtue). This greatly changes the scope of ethics. Deontic concepts serve to establish our minimum obligations. On the other hand, aretaic concepts bring the pursuit of excellence within the purview of ethics. Virtue ethics produces a change in our moral language that makes the pursuit of excellence an essential part of moral inquiry.
• Finally, there is a somewhat different account of virtue 2 (call it virtue 2a) that can be attributed to Alisdair MacIntyre. This version "historicizes" the virtues, that is, looks at how our concepts of key virtues have changed over time. (MacIntyre argues that the concept of justice, for example, varies greatly depending on whether one views justice in Homeric Greece, Aristotle's Greece, or Medieval Europe.) Because he argues that skills and actions are considered virtuous only in relation to a particular historical and community context, he redefines virtues as those skill sets necessary to realize the goods or values around which social practices are built and maintained. This notion fits in well with professional ethics because virtues can be derived from the habits, attitudes, and skills needed to maintain the cardinal ideals of the profession.

Virtue 3 can best be outlined by showing how the basic concepts of Virtue 1 can be reformulated to reflect current research in moral psychology.

• Reformulating Happiness (Eudaimonia). Mihaly Csikcszentmihalyi has described flow experiences (see text box below) in which autotelic activities play a central role. For Aristotle, the virtues also are autotelic. They represent faculties whose exercise is key to realizing our fullest potentialities as human beings. Thus, virtues are self-validating activities carried out for themselves as well as for the ends they bring about. Flow experiences are also important in helping us to conceptualize the virtues in a professional context because they represent a well practiced integration of skill, knowledge, and moral sensitivity.
• Reformulating Values (Into Arete or Excellence). To carry out the full project set forth by virtue 3, it is necessary to reinterpret as excellence key moral values such as honesty, justice, responsibility, reasonableness, and integrity. For example, moral responsibility has often been described as carrying out basic, minimal moral obligations. As an excellence, responsibility becomes refocused on extending knowledge and power to expand our range of effective, moral action. Responsibility reformulated as an excellence also implies a high level of care that goes well beyond what is minimally required.
• De-emphasizing Character. The notion of character drops out to be replaced by more or less enduring and integrated skills sets such as moral imagination, moral creativity, reasonableness, and perseverance. Character emerges from the activities of integrating personality traits, acquired skills, and deepening knowledge around situational demands. The unity character represents is always complex and changing.
• Practical Skill Replaces Deliberation. Moral exemplars develop skills which, through practice, become second nature. These skills obviate the need for extensive moral deliberation. Moral exemplars resemble more skillful athletes who quickly develop responses to dynamic situations than Hamlets stepping back from action for prolonged and agonizing deliberation.
• Greater Role for Emotions. Nancy Sherman discusses how, for Aristotle, emotion is not treated as an irrational force but as an effective tool for moral action once it has been shaped and cultivated through proper moral education. To step beyond the controversy of what Aristotle did and did not say about the emotions (and where he said it) we place this enhanced role for emotions within virtue 3. Emotions carry out four essential functions: (a) they serve as modes of attention; (b) they also serve as modes of responding to or signaling value; (c) they fulfill a revelatory function; and (d) they provide strong motives to moral action. Nancy Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue (1997), U.K.: Cambridge University Press: 39-50.

Flow Experiences

• The psychologist, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, has carried out fascinating research on what he terms "flow experiences." Mike Martin in Meaningful Work (2000) U.K.: Oxford,: 24, summarizes these in the following bullets:
• "clear goals as one proceeds"
• "immediate feedback about progress"
• "a balance between challenges and our skills to respond to them"
• "immersion of awareness in the activity without disruptive distractions"
• "lack of worry about failure"
• loss of anxious self-consciousness"
• time distortions (either time flying or timeslowing pleasurably)"
• the activity becomes autotelic: an end in itself, enjoyed as such"

Virtue Tables

The table just below provides a format for spelling out individual virtues through (1) a general description, (2) the correlative vices of excess and defect, (3) the skills and mental states that accompany and support it, and (4) real and fictional individuals who embody it. Following the table are hints on how to identify and characterize virtues. We start with the virtue of integrity:

Exercise 1: Construct Virtue Tables for Professional Virtues

• Discuss in your group why the virtue you have been assigned is important for the practice of your profession. What goods or values does the consistent employment of this virtue produce?
• Use the discussion in #1 to develop a general description of your virtue. Think along the following lines: people who have virtue X tend to exhibit certain characteristics (or do certain things) in certain kinds of situations. Try to think of these situations in terms of what is common and important to your profession or practice.
• Identify the corresponding vices. What characterizes the points of excess and defect between which your virtue as the mean lies?
• What obstacles arise that prevent professionals from practicing your virtue? Do well-meaning professionals lack power or technical skill? Can virtues interfere with the realization of non-moral values like financial values? See if you can think of a supporting scenario or case here.
• Identify a moral exemplar for your virtue. Make use of the exemplars described in the Moral Exemplars in Business and Professional Ethics module.
• Go back to task #2. Redefine your description of your virtue in light of the subsequent tasks, especially the moral exemplar you identified. Check for coherence.
• Finally, does your virtue stand alone or does it need support from other virtues or skills? For example, integrity might also require moral courage.

Exercise 2: Reflect on these Concluding Issues

• Did you have trouble identifying a moral exemplar? Many turn to popular figures for their moral exemplars. Movies and fiction also offer powerful models. Why do you think that it is hard to find moral exemplars in your profession? Is it because your profession is a den of corruption? (Probably not.) Do we focus more on villains than on heroes? Why or why not?
• What did you think about the moral leaders portrayed in the Moral Exemplars in Business and Professional Ethics module?
• Did you have trouble identifying both vices, i.e., vices of excess and defect? If so, do you think this because some virtues may not have vices of excess and defect? What do you think about Aristotle's doctrine of the mean?
• Did you notice that the virtue profiles given by your group and the other groups in the class overlapped? Is this a problem for virtue theory? Why do our conceptions of the key moral values and virtues overlap?
• Did you find the virtues difficult to apply? What do you think about the utilitarian and deontological criticism of virtue ethics, namely, that it cannot provide us with guidelines on how to act in difficult situations? Should ethical theories emphasize the act or the person? Or both?
• The most tenacious obstacle to working with virtue ethics is to change focus from the morally minimal to the morally exemplary. “Virtue” is the translation of the Greek word, arête. But “excellence” is, perhaps, a better word. Understanding virtue ethics requires seeing that virtue is concerned with the exemplary, not the barely passable. (Again, looking at moral exemplars helps.) Arête transforms our understanding of common moral values like justice and responsibility by moving from minimally acceptable to exemplary models.

Moral Leaders The profiles of several moral leaders in practical and professional ethics. Computer Ethics Cases This link provides several computer ethics cases and also has a description of decision making and socio-technical systems frameworks. Moral Exemplars in Business and Professional Ethics Profiles of several moral leaders in practical and professional ethics.

Presentation on Virtue Ethics

I. why study virtue ethics.

• It provides new insights into moral education
• Involves the whole self: attitudes, knowledge, skill, emotion
• It reorients moral theory toward excellence

II. Three Definitions

• “Las virtudes son disposiciones y rasgos del carácter del agente moral a la hora de ejecutar las acciones inherentes al ser persona.
• se trata de un punto intermedio entre dos extremos, ninguno de los cuales representa un valor moral, sino que más bien puede constituir un vicio o al menos carecer de excelencia
• no son meros rasgos del carácter que se operan automáticamente, sino respuestas deliberadas ante las situaciones concretas
• Lugo,E. (2002) Relación Medico / paciente: encuentro interpersonal ética y espiritualidad. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Puerto Rico: 88

Rosalind Hursthouse

• “A virtue such as honesty or generosity is not just a tendency to do what is honest or generous, nor is it to be helpfully specified as a “desirable” or “morally valuable” character trait.
• It is, indeed a character trait—that is, a disposition which is well entrenched in its possessor, something that, as we say “goes all the way down”, unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinker—but the disposition in question…is multi-track.
• It is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests expectations and sensibilities.
• To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset.”
• Hursthouse, R. (2007) “Virtue Ethics” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/
• MacIntyre, a modern theorist, brings out the communitarianism in Aristotle
• “A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tend to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.

III. Virtues and Practices

Virtues are dispositions that bring about the internal and external goods around which a social or professional practice is built.

Constituents of a Practice

• Participants: Formed of individuals whose activities, attitudes, and goals are integrated, shared, or overlap in significant ways
• Rules and Procedures: Participants occupy roles which outline tasks and procedures. Roles in a practice are coordinated so that they combine to bring about complex ends beyond the capabilities of isolated individuals
• Boundaries: Boundaries such as disciplinary and theoretical principles surround practices and serve to distinguish one from the other
• External Goals: Engineering serves public wellbeing. Medicine health. Law justice. Business commerce.
• Internal Goals: Engineering has the internal goals of faithful agency (to client), collegiality (to peers), and loyalty (to the profession or practice itself)

IV. Developing Virtues for Practices

• Choose a virtue that is important for your occupation or profession. What goods or values does the consistent employment of this virtue produce?
• Develop a general description of your virtue. (Think along the following lines: people who have virtue X tend to exhibit certain characteristics (or do certain things) in certain kinds of situations. Try to think of these situations in terms of what is common and important to your profession or practice.)
• Identify the corresponding vices of excess and defect.
• Identify the obstacles arise that prevent professionals from practicing your virtue? Do well-meaning professionals lack power or technical skill?
• Does your virtue stand alone or does it need support from other virtues or skills? For example, integrity might also require moral courage.
• Murdoch, I. (1970). The Sovereignty of Good. UK: London, Routledge.
• Sherman, N. (1989). The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue. UK: Oxford, Oxford University Press.
• Hursthouse, R. (1999). On Virtue Ethics. UK: Oxford, Oxford University Press.
• Virtue Ethics. (2003). Edited by Stephen Darwall. UK: Oxford: Blackwell.
• Blum, L. (1994). Moral Perception and Particularity. UK: Cambridge University Press.
• Pincoffs, E.L. (1986). Quandaries and Virtues: Against Reductivism in Ethics. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
• Virtue Ethics (1997). Edited by Crisp, R. and Slote, M. UK: Oxford, Oxford University Press.
• Environmental Virtue Ethics. (2005). Edited by Sandler, R. and Cafaro, P. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Frey, W. (2008). “Engineering Ethics in Puerto Rico: Issues and Narratives. Science and Engineering Ethics, 14: 417-431.
• Frey, W. (2010). “Teaching Virtue: Pedagogical Implications of Moral Psychology. Science and Engineering Ethics, 16: 611-628.
• Huff, C., Barnard, L. and Frey, W. (2008) “Good computing: a pedagogically focused model of virtue in the practice of computing (parts 1 and 2)." Information, Communication and Ethics in Society, 6(3), 246-278.
• Huff, C., Barnard, L. and Frey, W. (2008) “Good computing: a pedagogically focused model of virtue in the practice of computing (parts 1 and 2). Information, Communication and Ethics in Society, 6(4), 284-316.

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Research in positive psychology has focused on either (1) positive emotions, (2) happiness or subjective well-being, or (3) character strengths or virtues. This chapter emphasizes viewing it more in terms of eudaimonic virtue (for self and other). Positive psychology and the psychology of religion and spirituality are joined by studying virtue, morality, subjective well-being, and positive emotion. We find the psychology of religion and spirituality and positive psychology to be potentially kindred spirits similarly aimed at studying virtue, and thus we expect that the future will hold a growing positive relationship characterized by two-sided dialogue. Psychologists in both positive psychology and the psychology of religion and spirituality have different perspectives, and the overlap and differences in their views of concepts and measurements should contribute to that dialogue.

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The Varieties of Moral Vice: An Aristotelian Approach

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On a standard Aristotelian account, the moral virtues and vices stand in an asymmetric relationship to one another. To help explain this asymmetry, I argue that the vices share significantly less common structure than many think. That there are many ways for agents to get it wrong gives us prima facie reason to think that the vices lack a robust common structure. Further, the most promising candidates for a common structure (or important property) of the vices fall short. These are that (a) the vices have the common structure of being excesses and deficiencies (this is not the right kind of common structure), (b) the vices result from agents’ unreflectively taking their inclinations as their ends (not all vicious agents do), and, relatedly, (c) the vices result from rational corruption (this structure does not apply in all cases of vice). Argument (b), which Terence Irwin and others endorse, is the most promising one, so I focus on it. But it, too, faces weighty objections. I conclude that none of these important arguments establishes the existence of a robust common structure of the moral vices. The great variety of moral vices is a puzzling phenomenon that continues to stand in need of explanation.

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I lack scope to discuss other forms of virtue ethics that take inspiration from, say, Stoicism, Thomism, Nietzscheanism, or hybrid accounts.

But see Grönroos ( 2015 ) and Müller ( 2015 ). As Reeve ( 2018 ) says, these authors accept that there is no cause of all evils and no bad in the category of substance itself.

See also Grönroos ( 2015 : 151), citing Plato ( 1997 : Republic I, 351e10-2a9). I follow Grönroos in this paragraph.

I discuss Irwin ( 2001 ), Kontos ( 2018b ) and Barney ( 2020 ) below.

“Seem to” is not meant here to imply “clearly do,” which would be far too ambitious.

There are also hybrid views (e.g., Barney 2020 ) on which vices and virtues are in different respects both symmetrical and asymmetrical.

Initial quotation from Roochnik ( 2007 : 211). See also Rorty ( 1980 : 272), Brickhouse ( 2003 : 4), and Nielsen ( 2017 ).

Müller ( 2015 : 460–461) names the two views and, focusing on EN IX.4, argues that the second view is correct.

Grönroos ( 2015 : 147–148, 161, et passim ) argues that the vicious person faces two sets of desires. Satisfying bad desires both precludes satisfying good ones and leads to a sense of degradation.

“Generally” because, as Aristotle notes ( EN I 5, 106b 19–22), some people do seek to imitate powerful leaders (e.g., Sardanapallus) who lead lives of pleasure and gratification fit for grazing animals. Whether people admire the vicious-but-powerful may depend on the particular vices in question. It’s easier to admire a wealthy king who is avaricious than a murderous one.

Barney ( 2020 ) provides textual and linguistic analysis of Aristotle that challenges some accounts of a robust common structure. As noted later, I agree in part with her account, including for independent reasons (see §II-V). I also critically address her account of a common structure of the vices (toward the end of §V).

A related account might consider the importance of my thesis for consequentialists and deontologists who argue in the register of virtue and vice.

Some argue that missing the mark is not enough to constitute vice. See, e.g., Drefcinski ( 1996 ), Cuzner (2005). I will use “missing the mark” broadly to mean deliberating poorly in choosing an end or ineffectively pursuing a well-chosen end.

One might wish to read the following analysis with regard only to vice in the strict sense soon discussed. Fine by me.

See Kontos ( 2014 ) on intellectual failings that cause agents in states of vice, beastliness, incontinence, and continence to miss the mark.

Aristotle also distinguishes incontinence and vice temporally: the former is episodic, the latter continual (Müller, 2015 : 470).

See Russell ( 2018 : 242; cf. Kontos 2018 : 75 et passim , Müller 2015 : 462–463) on controversy over whether Aristotle treats vicious activities as things people pursue who see it as for their good or as activity they (the “incontinent”) know is bad but pursue for temporary pleasure.

Korsgaard ( 1986 : 267) observes:

The fact that reason itself admits of corruption or a kind of error that is undetectable (vice is unconscious of itself) implies that determining the mean by reason cannot be a straightforward matter. At least we cannot find the mean merely by engaging in some characteristic procedures of reason, for these can be misleading. For instance, we cannot determine the mean by referring to our rational wishes, for if we have vices, these too will be wrong.

On this classificatory scheme, see Irwin ( 2001 ) and Curzer ( 2018 ). Curzer ( 2018 ; see also 2012 ), for instance, compares virtuous, continent, incontinent, vicious, and brutish ( thêriotês ) agents. His multifaceted account of vice pursues an intra-group pairwise ranking of agents by their moral status. He notes (2018: 102), for instance, Aristotle’s underappreciated distinction between ( a ) continent agents who strive to overcome vicious desires for pleasure and ( b ) agents with “endurance,” who aim to overcome such desires to avoid pain . My argument that the vices have fairly minimal common structure is compatible with this helpful categorization.

But see Aristotle EN VII (2000); Kontos ( 2014 : esp. 224–227; 2018b); and Pearson ( 2018 ).

Emotions can be critically virtue-supporting. For instance, anger at being harmed can be good for one’s development (see, e.g., Taylor 2006 : 14).

For example, exercising charity will often require sympathy, but one can fail to sympathize, be insufficiently sympathetic, or sympathize for the wrong reasons or with the wrong people.

Korsgaard ( 1986 : 266) observes that the vicious might yet have harmonious souls due to their “corrupted reason.” A vicious person can reason in unconflicted ways to achieve defective ends, such that “the bad person’s rational wishes and rational judgments are harmonious with her evil passions” (266).

Neo-Aristotelian views of excess and deficiency address reason and non-rational desire as well as their roles and weights in deliberation and action. It is unsurprising, then, that UET and the excess-and-deficiency account are not wholly distinct (see Irwin 1988 : 374–376; 2007 : 155–157).

On the nature and development of practical skill, see Fridland ( 2014 ).

For example, the suburbanite teenager with no income does not incorporate the virtue of generosity by giving great sums to charity. Instead she becomes generous by, say, helping her friends with their homework or volunteering at a local soup kitchen. I believe I first heard this example from Julia Annas.

Annas’s account is not intended to suggest a perfect analogy between virtue and skill. Human action differs from skillful production in notable ways, and virtue requires certain motivations, unlike skill. See Aristotle ( 2000 : EN VI).

Irwin too discusses the excess and deficiency view (2001: 74).

On the doctrine of the mean, see Gottlieb ( 2009 : Chap.1, esp. 32–35). Gottlieb argues (22–32), inter alia , that it is a doctrine of equilibrium or correct balancing rather than moderation, and that virtue is a mean relative to persons and their particular contexts. By implication, when it comes to determining the mean, “the relevant factors in one situation may not be the relevant factors in another” (Meilaender, 2010 ). I accordingly suggest that the degree of common structure of the vices will depend on how the vices link to their particular corresponding virtues and how and how far particular vices are agent- and context-relative.

Here “very vicious” allows that viciousness is scalar rather than binary.

The vicious person may well pursue the fine ( kalon ) but does so to meet his ends and not because it is fine (see Irwin 2001 : 86).

On miscalibration as a vicious extreme, see Gottlieb ( 2009 : 23).

Social environments may also be full of temptations to, or accommodations for, vice, which can even make the virtuous maladapted to succeed within them.

People who act upon their inclinations will not necessarily become worse off. In certain settings, relying on inclinations that are caused or guided by one’s emotional instincts can be adaptively valuable (see, e.g., Railton 2014 ).

Irwin does say that “[p]erhaps all that the different vices have in common is their failure to be virtues” (Irwin, 2001 : 74). He does not develop this idea, however, but proceeds to argue in detail that the vices have one key common structure: viz., the vicious uncritically accept their inclinations as ends.

See also Gaus ( 2008 : 56–65) on framing effects, prospect theory, and other sources of psychological bias. For instance, if Jane falsely believes that charitably helping others precludes them from eventually helping themselves, this can push her toward extreme selfishness.

This theory arose as a challenge to the traditional rational actor model in economics.

Repeatedly facing such situations could give one a vicious disposition to steal that is not due to an unjustified lack of reflection.

This seems true insofar as reflecting seriously requires doing so in a way that is sensitive to resource trade-offs one faces qua deliberator.

This allows that rationality is scalar rather than binary.

Irwin’s account has also been criticized for underappreciating the conflict between wish and appetite in the vicious person. On this line of argument, the rational part of the soul, which “harbours wish,” fails to control the non-rational part, which “harbours appetite” (Grönroos, 2015 : 150, 154, et passim ). Korsgaard ( 1986 : 261) notes that wish ( boulesis ) “is a rational desire, a desire for something conceived as a good.” Such a fact pattern is sufficient, but not necessary, however, to establish the presence of vice. Vicious agents can also, for instance, conceive (Reeve, 2018 : 22–23) or pursue (Brickhouse, 2003 : 12–19) the good in rationally inadequate ways.

Other possible structures of the vices seem true of either some but not all vices (e.g., steady weakness in the face of temptation) or many things beyond the vices (e.g., a disposition to support value-undermining processes or outcomes). See Barney ( 2020 : 293 − 94).

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Acknowledgements

For generous feedback and discussion, I thank Neera Badhwar, Ben Bryan, Jason Byas, Mark LeBar, Christian Miller, James Otteson, Karina Robson, Tristan Rogers, Daniel Russell, and Wes Siscoe. I especially thank Julia Annas, a mentor who never ceases to inspire a desire for virtue.

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Robson, G. The Varieties of Moral Vice: An Aristotelian Approach. Erkenn (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00614-x

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