nike in asia case study

• International Marketing

Decoding Nike’s Global Strategy: A Guide to Market Dominance

• January 16, 2024

Table of Contents

Introduction: decoding nike’s global strategy for market dominance, 1. nike’s international pricing strategy, 2. nike’s global market segmentation and targeting, 3. nike’s global marketing and distribution channels, 4. nike’s global manufacturing and outsourcing strategy, 5. nike’s global human resource management approach, 6. nike’s global social responsibility and sustainability commitments, 7. nike’s global strategy in action: a case study of china, achieving global success with adaptability, cultural sensitivity, and ethical practices, accelingo: your culturally sensitive ally in nike’s footsteps.

Nike, a name synonymous with athletic excellence, has firmly established itself as a global sportswear and apparel giant, boasting a rich history of innovation and success. With a revenue of over $51 billion in 2023, as reported by Statista , Nike’s dominance in the global market is undeniable . This remarkable achievement can be attributed to a combination of strategic approaches, including a well-crafted global pricing strategy, targeted market segmentation, effective marketing and distribution channels, and a commitment to ethical practices.

Nike’s global pricing strategy is a cornerstone of its success. The company employs a premium pricing strategy, positioning its products as high-quality, exclusive items (Hill & McKaig, 2015). This strategy is supported by Nike’s strong brand image, built on years of innovation and association with top athletes (Mahdi et al., 2015).

To cater to a wider audience, Nike employs value-added services, limited edition releases, and tiered pricing (Taylor, 2012). Value-added services such as customization options and personalized shopping experiences further enhance the customer experience and justify the premium pricing (Wang et al., 2016).

Nike’s global market segmentation is another key factor in its success. The company targets major sports markets like North America, China, and Western Europe (Arora & Aggarwal, 2012). This approach allows Nike to tailor its products, marketing campaigns, and distribution channels to the specific needs and preferences of consumers in each market, resulting in a more effective and personalized customer experience (Lund-Thomsen & Coe, 2015).

Nike’s global marketing and distribution channels are extensive and diverse. The company maintains a network of retail stores worldwide, emphasizing its direct-to-consumer approach (Soni, 2014). Additionally, Nike partners with wholesalers and distributors to reach a broader market (Arora & Aggarwal, 2012). The company’s use of digital marketing platforms, such as Nike.com and social media, further expands its reach and engages with consumers on a global scale (Samuels, 2014).

Nike’s commitment to ethical practices is evident in its global manufacturing and outsourcing strategy. The company carefully selects manufacturing locations based on factors such as labor costs, raw material availability, and government policies (Murphy & Mathew, 2012). Nike also maintains a code of conduct for suppliers and factories to ensure fair working conditions and ethical treatment of workers (Kell, 2016).

Nike’s success in the global market is deeply rooted in its well-defined pricing strategy, which effectively balances premium pricing with a touch of versatility to cater to a broad spectrum of consumers. The company’s pricing strategy is characterized by its emphasis on quality, exclusivity, and brand equity , while also incorporating value-added services, limited edition releases, and tiered pricing to attract a wider audience.

Premium Pricing: A Pillar of Brand Image

Nike has established itself as a premium brand, synonymous with innovation, performance, and athletic excellence. This positioning is reflected in its pricing strategy, which consistently places its products at a higher price point compared to competitors . This premium pricing strategy is driven by the company’s strong brand equity, built over decades of delivering high-quality products and associating itself with iconic athletes (Hill & McKaig, 2015).

Cultivating Exclusivity through Limited Edition Releases

To further reinforce its premium positioning and appeal to a discerning clientele, Nike strategically introduces limited edition releases of its products. These exclusive offerings, often collaborations with renowned designers or athletes, create a sense of scarcity and exclusivity, driving demand and justifying the higher prices (Mahdi et al., 2015). Limited edition releases also serve as a marketing tool, generating excitement and buzz around the brand, attracting new customers and enticing existing ones to purchase the coveted items.

Tiered Pricing for Wider Appeal

While maintaining its premium positioning, Nike also incorporates tiered pricing to cater to a broader audience . The company offers a range of products at different price points, from entry-level essentials to high-end performance gear. This tiered pricing strategy allows Nike to reach consumers across various income levels and preferences, expanding its market reach and increasing its overall sales volume.

Value-Added Services for Enhanced Customer Experience

Nike goes beyond traditional pricing strategies by offering value-added services that enhance the overall customer experience and justify the premium pricing. These services include customization options, such as personalized shoe designs, and personalized shopping experiences, providing unique and differentiated offerings to consumers. Customization options allow customers to tailor their products to their specific needs and preferences, increasing their perceived value and willingness to pay the premium price. Personalized shopping experiences, such as exclusive access to limited edition releases or tailored product recommendations based on individual preferences, further enhance the customer experience and create a sense of exclusivity.

Nike’s Pricing Strategy: Achieving Global Success

Nike’s international pricing strategy has played a pivotal role in its global success. The company’s premium pricing, coupled with value-added services, limited edition releases, and tiered pricing, has enabled it to attract a wide range of consumers while maintaining its brand image as a leader in innovation and performance. This strategic approach has allowed Nike to expand its market dominance and become a global icon in the sportswear industry.

Nike’s global success is not solely attributed to its innovative products and premium pricing strategy; it is equally driven by its strategic approach to market segmentation and targeting. The company has effectively identified and targeted major sports markets , such as North America, China, and Western Europe, understanding the specific needs and preferences of consumers in each region.

North America: A Core Market with Diverse Preferences

According to Statista , North America remains Nike’s largest and most established market, accounting for over 44% of its total revenues. This region comprises a diverse population with varying athletic preferences and lifestyles. To cater to this diverse audience, Nike employs localized marketing campaigns that resonate with local trends and cultural nuances . For instance, the company has partnered with prominent NFL and NBA athletes to connect with sports enthusiasts in the United States and Canada.

China: Surging Demand with Cultural Sensitivity

China has emerged as a significant market for Nike, driven by a growing middle class with an increasing interest in fitness and sports (Ko et al., 2012). To penetrate this market, Nike has adapted its products and marketing strategies to align with Chinese cultural preferences . For example, the company has introduced products that incorporate traditional Chinese design elements, such as the use of red and gold colors. Nike has also partnered with Chinese celebrities and influencers to promote its products and connect with local consumers.

Western Europe: A Market of Established Athletics

Western Europe, with its rich sporting heritage and passion for athletic performance, has been a key market for Nike. The company has tailored its products and marketing campaigns to appeal to the region’s discerning consumers. For instance, Nike has partnered with European soccer clubs and athletes to leverage their popularity and enhance brand recognition . The company has also developed products specifically designed for European consumers, considering factors such as weather conditions and athletic preferences.

Localized Marketing for Global Reach

Nike’s success in these diverse markets is attributed to its strategic approach to localization . The company recognizes that simply translating marketing materials and products into different languages is not enough. It actively engages with local communities, understands their cultural nuances, and adapts its messaging and products accordingly. This localized approach enables Nike to connect with consumers on a deeper level and build a strong brand presence in each market.

Product Development Tailored to Local Needs

Nike’s product development process is also guided by market segmentation and targeting. The company recognizes that consumers in different regions have varying needs and preferences. For instance, Nike has developed lightweight and breathable apparel for hot and humid climates, while also offering waterproof and insulated gear for colder regions . This focus on adapting products to local conditions has been instrumental in Nike’s global success.

Nike’s Global Market Segmentation Strategy: Achieving Omnipresence

Nike’s ability to segment and target global markets has been instrumental in its expansion and dominance. By understanding the specific needs and preferences of consumers in each region, the company has tailored its marketing campaigns, products, and distribution strategies accordingly . This localized approach has allowed Nike to connect with consumers on a deeper level, foster brand loyalty, and achieve omnipresence across the globe.

Nike’s global success has been fueled by a sophisticated and multifaceted marketing and distribution strategy that encompasses both physical and digital channels . The company leverages its extensive network of retail stores, strategic partnerships with wholesalers and distributors, and innovative digital marketing tactics to connect with consumers worldwide and drive sales.

Direct-to-Consumer Approach: A Gateway to Customer Connection

Nike’s commitment to a direct-to-consumer (DTC) approach has been instrumental in its global expansion. The company operates over 1,000 retail stores in over 190 countries, as per Statista , providing a direct connection with consumers and allowing for personalized customer experiences . These stores serve as experiential hubs, showcasing Nike’s latest products and engaging with customers through various interactive features.

Partnerships with Wholesalers and Distributors: Reaching a Wider Audience

While Nike’s DTC strategy plays a crucial role, the company also collaborates with wholesalers and distributors to reach a broader market. This partnership enables Nike to expand its reach into smaller towns and cities, particularly in emerging markets . Wholesalers and distributors play a vital role in stocking Nike products in various retail outlets, providing consumers with convenient access to the brand’s offerings.

Leveraging Digital Platforms for Global Reach and Engagement

In today’s digital age, Nike has embraced the power of digital marketing to connect with consumers worldwide. The company utilizes a variety of online platforms, including its website, social media channels, and mobile apps, to reach a global audience and promote its products. Nike’s digital marketing efforts are data-driven , allowing the company to tailor its messaging and campaigns to specific demographics and interests.

Nike App: A Multifaceted Platform for Customer Engagement

Nike’s mobile app serves as a central hub for customer engagement. The app allows users to browse products, make purchases, track their workouts, and access personalized recommendations. Additionally, the app provides exclusive content, such as behind-the-scenes access to Nike athletes and events. This comprehensive platform has been instrumental in fostering brand loyalty and driving sales among Nike’s global customer base.

Nike’s Global Marketing and Distribution Strategy: A Winning Formula

Nike’s combination of direct-to-consumer stores, partnerships with wholesalers and distributors, and innovative digital marketing strategies has been a driving force behind its global success. By leveraging these channels effectively, Nike has been able to connect with consumers worldwide, build brand loyalty, and achieve market dominance in the sportswear industry . The company’s commitment to understanding local markets and adapting its messaging and products accordingly has been key to its success. As Nike continues to expand into new markets, its well-defined marketing and distribution strategy will be instrumental in its continued growth and global reach.

Nike’s global manufacturing strategy has been a cornerstone of its success, enabling the company to produce high-quality products at competitive prices . The company’s decision to outsource most of its manufacturing to overseas countries has been driven by several factors, including labor costs, raw material availability, and government policies.

Outsourcing for Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness

Nike’s outsourcing strategy stems from the desire to optimize production processes and reduce costs. By manufacturing its products in countries with lower labor costs, such as China and Southeast Asia, Nike can minimize labor expenses and maintain its competitive edge in the global market (Murphy & Mathew, 2012).

Access to Specialized Materials and Infrastructure

Outsourcing also provides Nike with access to specialized materials and infrastructure that may not be readily available in its home country. Many overseas manufacturing centers possess advanced manufacturing capabilities and expertise in producing high-quality athletic footwear and apparel (Lund-Thomsen & Coe, 2015).

Government Policies and Incentives

Government policies and incentives in various countries have also played a role in Nike’s outsourcing decisions. Many governments offer tax breaks, subsidies, and favorable labor regulations to attract foreign investment in their manufacturing sectors (Arora & Aggarwal, 2012).

Addressing Ethical Labor Concerns

Nike’s outsourcing practices have not been without scrutiny. The company has faced accusations of labor abuses, including low wages, excessive working hours, and unsafe working conditions in its overseas factories (Kell, 2016). In response to these concerns, Nike has implemented various initiatives to improve labor standards and ensure ethical practices in its supply chain.

Code of Conduct and Supplier Monitoring

Nike has established a comprehensive Code of Conduct that outlines its expectations for labor practices among its suppliers. The code prohibits forced labor, child labor, discrimination, and unsafe working conditions. Nike also conducts regular audits of its suppliers to monitor compliance with the code.

Fair Labor Association Partnership

In 1999, Nike joined the Fair Labor Association (FLA), an independent monitoring organization that promotes ethical labor practices in global supply chains . The FLA audits Nike’s suppliers and provides recommendations for improvement.

Community Initiatives and Worker Empowerment

Nike has also implemented community initiatives to improve the lives of workers and their families in its supply chain regions. These initiatives focus on education, healthcare, and economic development . Nike also encourages worker participation and empowerment through training programs and feedback mechanisms.

Nike’s Commitment to Ethical Sourcing

Nike remains committed to ethical labor practices and fair working conditions in its global supply chain. The company recognizes that ethical sourcing is not just a matter of legal compliance but also a strategic imperative for building a sustainable and responsible business . Nike’s efforts to enhance labor standards and empower workers are essential for maintaining its brand reputation and ensuring its long-term success in the global market.

Nike’s success as a global leader in the sportswear industry is not solely attributed to its innovative products and marketing strategies; it is also deeply rooted in its commitment to building a strong and talented workforce around the world . The company recognizes that its employees are its most valuable asset, and it invests heavily in their development and empowerment.

Investment in Local Talent

Nike places a high value on building the skills and capabilities of its local employees. The company recognizes that cultural understanding and local expertise are crucial for success in diverse markets . Nike’s global HR approach focuses on providing training, development opportunities, and mentorship programs to its employees worldwide.

Employee Training and Development

Nike invests heavily in training and development programs to equip its employees with the skills they need to excel in their roles. The company offers a variety of training programs, ranging from technical skills training to leadership development courses. Nike also encourages employee participation in professional development activities and encourages networking opportunities.

Empowering Employees for Success

Beyond training and development, Nike also fosters a culture of empowerment among its employees. The company believes in giving employees the autonomy and authority to make decisions and contribute to the company’s success . Nike encourages open communication, feedback mechanisms, and employee participation in decision-making processes.

Standards for Ethical Treatment of Workers

Nike’s commitment to ethical practices extends beyond its direct employees to its suppliers and factories in the global supply chain. The company adheres to a strict Code of Conduct that outlines its expectations for labor practices among its partners. The code prohibits forced labor, child labor, discrimination, and unsafe working conditions. Nike also conducts regular audits of its suppliers to ensure compliance with the code.

Collaboration with Ethical Organizations

In addition to its own Code of Conduct, Nike collaborates with organizations like the Fair Labor Association (FLA) to promote ethical labor practices in its supply chain. The FLA conducts independent audits of Nike’s suppliers and provides recommendations for improvement.

Nike’s Global HR Approach: A Catalyst for Success

Nike’s global HR strategy is a key pillar of its success. By investing in local talent, providing training and development opportunities, and fostering a culture of empowerment, Nike cultivates a workforce that is well-equipped to drive innovation, adapt to local markets, and contribute to the company’s global growth. Nike’s commitment to ethical labor practices and fair working conditions further reinforces its reputation as a responsible and sustainable corporate citizen . As Nike continues to expand its global footprint, its strong HR practices will remain essential for attracting, retaining, and developing the diverse talent required to achieve sustainable success in the ever-evolving global marketplace.

As a global leader in the sportswear industry, Nike recognizes its responsibility to go beyond profit and contribute to a more sustainable and equitable world. The company has made significant strides in integrating social responsibility and sustainability into its business practices, demonstrating its commitment to making a positive impact on the communities and environments it touches .

Minimizing Environmental Impact: A Sustainable Future

Nike has taken concrete steps to reduce its environmental footprint, aligning with its vision of “ Move to Zero ” by 2040. The company has set ambitious goals to achieve zero carbon emissions from its operations and supply chain, zero waste to landfill, and 100% sustainably sourced materials.

• Energy Efficiency: Nike has implemented energy-efficient practices in its facilities, including installing LED lighting, optimizing HVAC systems, and utilizing renewable energy sources.
• Materials Innovation: The company is constantly exploring innovative materials that reduce environmental impact, such as recycled polyester and organic cotton.
• Waste Reduction: Nike has implemented waste reduction initiatives across its operations, including recycling, composting, and reducing packaging.
• Supply Chain Sustainability: Nike is working with its suppliers to implement sustainable practices, such as reducing water consumption and adopting cleaner production processes.

Supporting Social Causes: Impacting Communities

Nike’s commitment to social responsibility extends beyond environmental sustainability to encompass initiatives that empower communities and address social issues. The company supports a range of causes, including education, economic empowerment, and gender equality .

• Education Initiatives: Nike has partnered with organizations like the Nike Foundation to provide educational opportunities for underserved communities, particularly girls in developing countries.
• Economic Empowerment: The company supports initiatives that promote entrepreneurship and job creation in underserved communities, such as microfinance programs and vocational training.
• Gender Equality: Nike is committed to gender equality and has implemented initiatives to promote women’s leadership and economic participation in sports and beyond.

Transparency in Reporting: Accountability and Stewardship

Nike is committed to transparency in reporting its environmental and social performance. The company publishes annual sustainability reports that detail its progress towards its sustainability goals and its efforts to support social causes. Nike also engages with stakeholders, including employees, customers, and investors, to communicate its sustainability commitments and progress.

Nike’s Global Social Responsibility and Sustainability Strategy: A Blueprint for the Future

Nike’s commitment to social responsibility and sustainability is not just a marketing ploy but a fundamental part of its business strategy. The company recognizes that sustainable practices not only benefit the environment but also contribute to long-term profitability, attract talent, and foster a positive brand reputation. As Nike continues to expand its global footprint, its commitment to social responsibility and sustainability will be crucial for maintaining its position as a leader in the sportswear industry and building a more sustainable future for all.

Navigating the Chinese Market: A Success Story of Adaptability

Nike’s expansion into the Chinese market serves as a compelling case study of the company’s ability to adapt its strategy to suit local preferences and cultural nuances. With a population of over 1.4 billion people and a rapidly growing middle class, China represents a significant market opportunity for global brands like Nike . However, entering this complex and diverse market also presents unique challenges and requires a deep understanding of local consumer behavior.

Challenges and Opportunities in the Chinese Market

Nike faced several challenges when entering the Chinese market, including:

• Establishing Brand Recognition: In a market dominated by local brands like Anta and Li-Ning , Nike had to establish its brand identity and gain recognition among Chinese consumers.
• Adapting Products to Local Preferences: Chinese consumers have different tastes and preferences for sportswear than those in Western markets. Nike had to adapt its product offerings to suit local preferences, such as incorporating traditional Chinese design elements.
• Building a Strong Distribution Network: Establishing a robust distribution network in China was crucial to reach a wide audience and provide a seamless shopping experience for Chinese consumers.
• Navigating Cultural Differences: Effective cross-cultural communication was essential for Nike to build relationships with Chinese partners, suppliers, and consumers.

Nike’s Strategies for Successful Market Entry

To overcome these challenges and capture market share in China, Nike implemented a multi-pronged strategy:

• Strategic Partnerships: Nike formed partnerships with local distributors and retailers to gain access to the market and build trust with Chinese consumers.
• Localized Marketing Campaigns: Nike tailored its marketing campaigns to resonate with Chinese consumers, using local celebrities, sporting events, and cultural references.
• Product Innovation: Nike developed products specifically for the Chinese market, incorporating traditional Chinese design elements and catering to local preferences.
• Digital Engagement: Nike embraced digital marketing, leveraging social media platforms and e-commerce channels to reach a wider audience and connect with Chinese consumers.

Nike’s Success in China: A Testament to Adaptability

Nike’s strategy proved to be successful, as the company has become a leading player in the Chinese sportswear market . In 2021, China accounted for over 20% of Nike’s global revenue (Ko & Zhang, 2022). Nike’s success in China highlights the importance of understanding local markets and adapting strategies to suit cultural preferences. The company’s ability to navigate the complexities of the Chinese market and establish a strong brand presence serves as an inspiration for other global brands seeking to expand into emerging markets.

Nike’s journey to becoming a global powerhouse is a testament to the company’s strategic approach to international expansion. By embracing adaptability, cultural sensitivity, and ethical business practices, Nike has successfully navigated the complexities of diverse markets , establishing a strong brand presence and achieving remarkable growth.

Key Takeaways from Nike’s Global Strategy

• Adaptive Pricing Strategy: Nike’s premium pricing strategy has been crucial in maintaining its brand image while also catering to a wider consumer base through tiered pricing and value-added services.
• Targeted Market Segmentation: Nike has effectively segmented global markets, understanding the specific needs and preferences of consumers in each region. This has enabled the company to tailor its marketing campaigns, products, and distribution channels to local tastes.
• Omnichannel Marketing Approach: Nike’s combination of direct-to-consumer stores, partnerships with wholesalers and distributors, and robust digital marketing has ensured a seamless customer experience across various channels.
• Global Manufacturing Strategy with Ethical Sourcing: Nike’s outsourcing approach to manufacturing has allowed for cost-efficiency and access to specialized expertise. However, the company has also prioritized ethical labor practices and fair working conditions, ensuring a sustainable supply chain.
• Commitment to Human Resource Development: Nike invests heavily in developing the skills and capabilities of its local employees, fostering a global talent pool that drives innovation and contributes to the company’s success.
• Global Social Responsibility and Sustainability: Nike’s commitment to environmental sustainability and social responsibility has earned the company a positive reputation and contributed to long-term profitability.
• Effective Cross-Cultural Communication: Nike has demonstrated a deep understanding of cultural differences, building relationships with local partners, suppliers, and consumers through effective cross-cultural communication.

Nike’s remarkable journey to global dominance is a testament to its strategic approach to international expansion , emphasizing adaptability, cultural sensitivity, and ethical business practices. As Nike continues to conquer new markets, Accelingo stands as a trusted partner, providing the professional translation services that are essential for success in diverse cultural landscapes.

Accelingo’s team of experienced linguists understands that effective global marketing goes beyond simply translating words; it’s about understanding the nuances of each culture, adapting your message to resonate authentically, and establishing a genuine connection with local consumers . Our culturally sensitive translation services empower you to replicate Nike’s success, forging deeper connections with global audiences and achieving sustainable growth in the international arena.

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Embrace culturally sensitive translation and unlock the true potential of your global expansion strategy . Let Accelingo be your trusted ally in navigating the complexities of diverse markets , just as Nike has successfully done. Together, we’ll help you translate your brand’s message into a language that resonates with local audiences, fostering trust, loyalty, and enduring success in the global marketplace.

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Case Study | Inside Nike’s Radical Direct-to-Consumer Strategy

• Chantal Fernandez

In October 2020, in the middle of a global pandemic that had infected 188 countries, causing record sales damage across the retail sector, Nike’s share price hit an all-time high.

Like other retailers, Nike had been forced to close most of its network of more than 900 stores across the world, as had its key wholesale partners like Nordstrom and Foot Locker.

But the American sportswear giant’s performance during the pandemic, when its online sales spiked, signalled to many that Nike had the competency to prosper long term, in a future that will be increasingly defined by e-commerce and digital brand connections.

It was a validation of a strategy that Nike prioritised three years ago, dubbing it “Consumer Direct Offense,” but the seeds of the approach go back almost a decade.

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Above all, Nike is a marketing company. It doesn’t just sell sneakers; it sells the brand aspiration that imbues those sneakers with meaning. But to achieve the reach required to scale its business, Nike’s distribution strategy had long-relied on third-party retailers to sell its products, even if the consumer experience offered by those partners diluted its brand.

But in a future increasingly defined by e-commerce, fast-moving trends and, above all, the rising power of branding to drive consumer preference when competitors are just a click away, Nike realised that in order to thrive, it needed to take control of its distribution to better manage its brand and deepen its connection with consumers.

It was definitely architecting a new retail, and a bold, retail vision for Nike.

Such an evolution is easier said than done, especially for a business as large as Nike in a category as competitive as sportswear. But by radically cutting back on its wholesale distribution and raising the bar for brand experience with the third-party partners that remained; expanding its focus on content, community and customisation to keep customers close; investing in its data analytics and logistics capabilities; and rethinking the role of the store as a brand stage, Nike drove a veritable direct-to-consumer revolution.

When the pandemic hit, these shifts went into overdrive.

“It was definitely architecting a new retail, and a bold, retail vision for Nike,” said Heidi O’Neill, Nike’s president of consumer and marketplace, and one of the most prominent executives leading the brand’s new strategy in recent years. “But it started with our consumer, and we knew that consumers wanted a more direct relationship with us today.”

In this case study, BoF breaks down Nike’s pioneering direct-to consumer strategy and how it has worked to the brand’s advantage, propelling its share price to new heights during the global crisis of 2020.

Click below to read the case study now.

• Mark Parker
• John Donahoe
• direct to consumer
• athletic apparel

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Nike: An Innovation Journey

• First Online: 29 November 2017

Cite this chapter

• Michelle Childs 5 &
• Byoungho Jin 6  

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Practice: Global Fashion Brand Management ((PSP:GFBM))

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Nike is an American multinational company that has evolved to become a global leader in athletic wear with annual sales exceeding $21 billion in 2016, more than half of which is attributed to international markets. Since its inception in 1964, Nike has been an innovation leader in product development, marketing and consumer experience. Due to a dedication to continuous innovation, Nike has been able to sustain a competitive advantage within the athletic apparel and footwear marketplace. This case highlights key points in Nike’s journey of innovation and examines how Nike has successfully emerged as a global champion within the athletic wear industry. Based on these analyzed strategies, this case provides implications that are relevant for practitioners and academics.

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Childs, M., Jin, B. (2018). Nike: An Innovation Journey. In: Jin, B., Cedrola, E. (eds) Product Innovation in the Global Fashion Industry. Palgrave Studies in Practice: Global Fashion Brand Management . Palgrave Pivot, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52349-5_4

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Nike rebounds: How Nike recovered from its supply chain disaster

“I thought we weren’t going to talk about i2,” growls Roland Wolfram, Nike’s vice president of global operations and technology, his eyes flashing at his PR manager with ill-concealed ire.

Wolfram, who was promoted in April to vice president and general manager of the Asia-Pacific division, is all Nike. His complexion is ruddy, his lips cracked from working out or working hard, or both. He’s casually dressed, but with a typical Nike sharpness to his turtleneck and slacks, a sharpness reflected also in his urgent, aggressive defense of his company—a Nike pride that would seem arrogant were not the company so dominant in its industry.

Wolfram calls the i2 problem—a software glitch that cost Nike more than $100 million in lost sales, depressed its stock price by 20 percent, triggered a flurry of class-action lawsuits, and caused its chairman, president and CEO, Phil Knight, to lament famously, “This is what you get for $400 million, huh?”—a “speed bump.” Some speed bump. In the athletic footwear business, only Nike, with a 32 percent worldwide market share (almost double Adidas, its nearest rival) and a $20 billion market cap that’s more than the rest of the manufacturers and retailers in the industry combined, could afford to talk about $100 million like that.

It drives Wolfram crazy that while the rest of the world knows his company for its swooshbuckling marketing and its association with the world’s most famous athletes, the IT world thinks of Nike as the company that screwed up its supply chain—specifically, the i2 demand-planning engine that, in 2000, spat out orders for thousands more Air Garnett sneakers than the market had appetite for and called for thousands fewer Air Jordans than were needed.

“For the people who follow this sort of thing, we became a poster child [for failed implementations],” Wolfram says.

But there was a lesson too for people who do, in fact, follow “this sort of thing,” specifically CIOs. The lesson of Nike’s failure and subsequent rebound lies in the fact that it had a business plan that was widely understood and accepted at every level of the company. Given that, and the resiliency it afforded the company, in the end the i2 failure turned out to be, indeed, just a “speed bump.”

The i2 Failure: Tactical or Strategic?

Nike’s June 2000 problems with its i2 system reflect the double whammy typical of high-profile enterprise computing failures. First, there’s a software problem closely tied to a core business process—in this case, factory orders. Then the glitch sends a ripple through product delivery that grows into a wave crashing on the balance sheet. The wave is big enough that the company must reveal the losses at a quarterly conference call with analysts or risk the wrath of the Securities and Exchange Commission, shareholders or both. And that’s when it hits the pages of The Wall Street Journal, inspiring articles and white papers on the general subject of IT’s hubris, limitations, value and cost.

The idea that something so mundane as a computer glitch could affect the performance of a huge company is still so novel that it makes headlines. But what doesn’t usually enter the analysis is whether the problem was tactical (and fixable) or strategic (meaning the company should never have bought the software in the first place and most likely won’t ever get any value from it). The latter is a goof worthy of a poster; the former is a speed bump.

Nike claims that the problems with its i2 demand-planning software were tactical and therefore fixable. It was too slow, didn’t integrate well, had some bugs, and Nike’s planners were inadequately trained in how to use the system before it went live. Nike says all these problems were fixed by fall 2000. And the company asserts that its business wasn’t affected after that quarter. Indeed, at press time, Nike had just announced that its third-quarter 2003 profit margins were its highest ever.

If there was a strategic failure in Nike’s supply chain project, it was that Nike had bought in to software designed to crystal ball demand. Throwing a bunch of historical sales numbers into a program and waiting for a magic number to emerge from the algorithm—the basic concept behind demand-planning software—doesn’t work well anywhere, and in this case didn’t even support Nike’s business model. Nike depends upon tightly controlling the athletic footwear supply chain and getting retailers to commit to orders far in advance. There’s not much room for a crystal ball in that scenario.

Indeed, Nike confirms that it stopped using i2’s demand planner for its short- and medium-range sneaker planning (it’s still used for Nike’s small but growing apparel business) in the spring of 2001, moving those functions into its SAP ERP system, which is grounded more in orders and invoices than in predictive algorithms. “This allows us to simplify some of our integration requirements,” says Nike CIO Gordon Steele.

Wolfram says Nike’s demand-planning strategy was and continues to be a mixture of art and technology. Nike sells too many products (120,000) in too many cycles (four per year) to do things by intuition alone. “We’ve tuned our system so we do our runs against [historical models], and then people look at it to make sure it makes sense,” he says. The computer models are trusted more when the product is a reliable seller (that is, just about anything with Michael Jordan’s name on it) and the planners’ intuition plays a bigger role in new or more volatile products. In this case, says Wolfram, talking with retailers does more good than consulting the system.

“There’s been a change in the technology for demand planning,” says AMR Research Vice President Bill Swanton, who declined to address the Nike case specifically. “In the late ’90s, companies said all we need is the data and we can plan everything perfectly. Today, companies are trying to do consensus planning rather than demand planning.” That means moving away from the crystal ball and toward sharing information up and down the supply chain with customers, retailers, distributors and manufacturers. “If you can share information faster and more accurately among a lot of people, you will see trends a lot sooner, and that’s where the true value of supply chain projects are,” Swanton says.

If You Have a Game Plan, You Can Snag the Rebound

Another thing that makes Wolfram angry (his already ruddy complexion going completely red) is the widespread assumption that Nike was betting on algorithms and changed course when that didn’t work out. Wolfram says that, on the contrary, i2’s demand-planning software was never intended to be the hero of Nike’s supply chain project—one of the most ambitious ever attempted by a company its size. It was (and still is), he claims, part of a wider strategy to integrate ERP, supply chain planning and CRM software onto a single platform shared by Nike operations in North America, as well as Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA). “Frankly,” he asserts, “we pretty much stayed the course.”

Nike made a bold early bet on the risky and difficult strategy of creating a single, giant, integrated database within its SAP ERP system for every employee in North America and EMEA. (Nike’s Asia-Pacific division will be on a separate instance of the software.) This meant getting everyone to agree on business practices and common data definitions before the software went in—a rarity in ERP project management.

The difficulty of integrating information across a distributed company has brought down many ERP projects, such as drugstore chain FoxMeyer’s SAP ERP system in the late ’90s and Tri-Valley Growers’ 1997 choice of Oracle’s ill-fated ERP package for the consumer packaged-good industry. Neither company ever got its systems working properly and that contributed to both eventually shutting their doors. Other companies gave up on the vision of total information integration and installed many different versions of their ERP systems—as many as 400 different versions, or instances, of a single vendor’s ERP system at some really large companies, according to AMR.

But Nike claims it has never wavered from its single-instance strategy, even when problems with the first piece of that strategy, the i2 system, hit the news on Feb. 26, 2001. The same project leaders who were in place at the time of the i2 problems (CIO Steele and the business lead, Shelley Dewey, Nike’s vice president of supply chain) are still running the project today. The reason Steele and Dewey survived was because when their system failed, they had a lifeline to hang onto: a clear business case for the overall supply chain project. If achieved, they claim it will save the company a lot more than Knight’s $400 million and the $100 million in wayward sneakers.

Nike’s supply chain project is supposed to drive the manufacturing cycle for a sneaker down from nine months to six. Cutting out that three months would match Nike’s manufacturing cycle to its retailers’ ordering schedule—they order 90 percent of their sneakers six months in advance of delivery. This means Nike could begin manufacturing its sneakers to order rather than three months in advance and then hoping they can sell them. Converting the supply chain from make-to-sell to make-to-order is the dream of any company desirous of gaining competitive advantage through its supply chain. Dell has done it, famously, with PCs; Nike wants to do it just as famously with sneakers.

Nike hasn’t gotten there yet. And its business case relies on a nearly 30-year-old model that some analysts and retailers grumble is out of touch with the reality of today’s market. But it’s a business case Nike’s leaders believe in. This is how CIOs keep their jobs when a project goes off track and it’s how they keep getting funding to keep it going.

Like many truths, this one is simple yet profound: Projects that survive breakdowns do so because everyone in the business, not just IT, understands what the system is supposed to do for the company—and sees value in it. Indeed, after his infamous conference call outburst in 2001, Knight added that, “I think it will, in the long run, be a competitive advantage.”

“We wish to God Phil [Knight] hadn’t said what he said,” says Steele with a laugh. “But his belief in this project has never wavered. [When the i2 problems emerged], we sat down and talked about what the issues were and he said, OK, I understand, carry on.” (Knight declined to be interviewed by CIO.)

How Nike Built a Robust Business Case

Knight, not normally known for self-control, has shown extraordinary patience with Nike’s supply chain project. And he’s needed it. “Once we got into this, we quickly realized that what we originally thought was going to be a two-to-three-year effort would be more like five to seven,” says Wolfram.

It’s been six years now and counting, with the final stage of the project due to be finished sometime in 2006 at a total cost that has gone from a projected $400 million to $500 million, according to Wolfram.

The theme of Nike’s sneaker supply chain is centralization. All product design, factory contracting and delivery is planned and coordinated from Beaverton, Ore. The supply chain is built around a six-month order cycle, called the “Futures” program, that was developed in 1975 in response to the then-chaotic market for running shoes. In those days, the Far East sneaker supply chain was in its infancy, deliveries were spotty, inflation was high, and runners bought whatever shoes they could find regardless of brand. Nike won that market by guaranteeing delivery and an inflation-proof discount in return for getting its orders six months in advance. Retailers went along happily because runners didn’t much care about style or looks—they wanted technically advanced shoes that fit and were in steady supply. Retailers knew their Nike shoes would sell no matter how far in advance they ordered them.

But as Nike became increasingly global, its supply chain began to fragment. By 1998, Nike had 27 order management systems around the globe, all highly customized and poorly linked to Beaverton. To gain control over its nine-month manufacturing cycle, Nike decided that it needed systems as centralized as its planning processes. ERP software, specifically SAP’s R/3 software, would be the bedrock of Nike’s strategy, with i2 supply, demand and collaboration planner software applications and Siebel’s CRM software also knitted into the overall system using middleware from STC (now SeeBeyond).

Nike’s patience was a virtue here too. It skipped AFS (Apparel and Footwear Solution), the initial version of SAP’s R/3 software developed specifically for the apparel and footwear industry. Archrival Reebok, which partnered with VF (makers of Wrangler Jeans and Vanity Fair bras, among other things) on the beta effort to develop AFS beginning in 1996, struggled for years to implement the buggy, unstable AFS software. (Reebok declined to be interviewed for this story.) And although Nike purchased AFS in 1998, it didn’t attempt to install it until SAP began working on the second, more stable version of the software. “Most of the early adopters were busy installing AFS in 1999,” says Steele with a satisfied smile. “That’s when we began spending a lot of time with SAP, sending our people over to Germany to tell them what we’d like to see in the second version.”

Why I2 Went Wrong

Unfortunately, Nike didn’t apply that same patience to the implementation of the first part of its supply chain strategy: i2’s demand and supply planner software applications. Rather than wait to deploy i2 as part of its SAP ERP project, Nike decided to install i2 beginning in 1999, while it was still using its legacy systems.

According to court documents filed by Nike and i2 shareholders in class-action suits, little went right before June 2000. i2’s predictive demand application and its supply chain planner (which maps out the manufacturing of specific products) used different business rules and stored data in different formats, making it difficult to integrate the two applications. The i2 software needed to be so heavily customized to operate with Nike’s legacy systems that it took as much as a minute for a single entry to be recorded by the software. And, overwhelmed by the tens of millions of product numbers Nike used, the system frequently crashed.

But these problems would have remained only glitches had they not spilled over into factory orders. The system ignored some orders and duplicated others. The demand planner also deleted ordering data six to eight weeks after it was entered, making it impossible for planners to recall what they had asked each factory to produce. Soon, way too many orders for Air Garnetts were going over the wires to Asian factories while calls for Air Jordans were lost or deleted.

When the problems were discovered, Nike had to develop workarounds. Data from i2’s demand predictor had to be downloaded and manually reloaded into the supply chain planner by occupying programmers, quality assurance personnel and businesspeople whenever the applications were required to share data—which was as often as weekly. Consultants were brought in to build databases to bypass portions of the i2 applications, and custom bridges were constructed to enable the i2 demand and supply planner applications to share.

Nike claims the kinks were ironed out by November 2000, but the damage was done, affecting sales and inventory deep into Nike’s next quarter. When the company’s SAP system arrived, short- and medium-range planning moved out of i2 altogether and into SAP. Nike says the $10 million i2 system was a small part of the $500 million overall project cost, although some observers assert that the i2 cost was higher.

Why did things go so wrong? Wolfram says Nike lulled itself into a false sense of security about the i2 installation because, by comparison with the SAP plan, it was a much smaller project. (Nike has about 200 planners who use the demand and supply planning systems.) “This felt like something we could do a little easier since it wasn’t changing everything else [in the business],” he says. “But it turned out it was very complicated.”

“Could we have taken more time with the rollout?” asks Steele. “Probably. Could we have done a better job with software quality? Sure. Could the planners have been better prepared to use the system before it went live? You can never train enough.”

Nike Learns Patience

Nike learned from its mistakes. There would be no rushing the SAP installation. And even though Nike executives occasionally questioned the project’s complexity and expense, Steele never considered abandoning the single-instance strategy. “We said single instance is a decision, not a discussion,” says Steele.

Nike wanted to do a staged, geographically based rollout of SAP, but it also wanted to avoid making each rollout so specific to a region that it would require specialized support. That meant building a design for the U.S. rollout that accommodated some of the peculiarities of the EMEA rollout—such as multiple currency support and different legal restrictions—even though those things were not required for doing business in the United States. This necessitated creating a global template for SAP processes, with all the regions agreeing on the minutiae of doing business. Naturally, this made each rollout longer and more complex.

Canada, a relatively small (roughly $300 million) piece of Nike’s $11 billion business, went first, on Thanksgiving weekend 2000 (the pre-spring rush quiet time), with SAP’s AFS ERP, a bundle of i2 applications and Siebel’s CRM system. Steele and regional Nike executives, dressed in smocks, served Thanksgiving dinner to project employees working around the clock. Other regions—the United States and EMEA—followed on successive Thanksgivings, putting 6,350 users worldwide on the system by the end of 2002. (The last two regions, Asia-Pacific and Latin America, are scheduled for rollout before the end of 2006, according to Nike.) Steele claims he’s never had to serve humble pie along with the turkey, saying to date there have been no disruptions to Nike’s business from the three rollouts.

This may be because of Nike’s newfound respect for training, another weakness of the i2 implementation. Nike’s U.S. customer service representatives received 140 to 180 hours of training from highly trained fellow Nike “super users,” says Andy Russell, Nike’s global transition director. Employees are locked out of the system until they complete the full training course, he says.

What Phil Knight ULTIMATELY Got for His Money

So what have six years and $500 million done for Nike’s business? Wolfram claims that better collaboration with Far East factories has reduced the amount of “pre-building” of shoes from 30 percent of Nike’s total manufacturing units to around 3 percent. The lead time for shoes, he asserts, has gone from nine months to six (in some periods of high demand, seven). But John Shanley, managing director with Wells Fargo, says, “Retailers are saying it’s still closer to nine months than six.” Gross margins have increased slightly since 2001 but not significantly.

Inventory levels have been reduced, says Supply Chain Vice President Dewey, by cutting Nike’s factory order interval time from one month to a week in some cases. But here, too, the effects may not be trickling down to the balance sheet as fast as Nike would like. Inventory levels are still at the mercy of Nike’s fickle audience of teens. Nike’s inventory turns were 4.34 per year in 2003, according to Footwear News, an industry trade magazine, slightly less than the industry average of 4.39 and behind rivals Reebok (5.07) and K-Swiss (4.47).

Nike also is behind its rivals in direct point-of-sale (POS) integration with retailers, says Shanley. Supply chain experts agree that actual data from stores, rather than software algorithms, are the best predictors of demand. But Nike’s SAP system cannot yet accept POS data, though the company says it’s working on it.

So far, the most direct benefits of the system have been typical for ERP: improved financial visibility, cash flow management, revenue forecasting, and an ability to juggle Nike’s cash stockpile in different currencies to take advantage of shifting exchange rates—benefits that are enhanced by the single database that holds all the data.

But Steele maintains that the best is yet to come. “We haven’t changed our processes too much yet,” he says, “because we didn’t want to complicate the rollouts.” Eventually, he believes Nike will get that six-month lead time down to three. But, he cautions, that that would require “significant changes on the part of our retail and supplier partners as well as Nike processes.”

He’d better hurry. Shanley says the sneaker market has changed a lot since Nike created its Futures program in the ’70s. Retailers don’t like having to order products six months in advance when fashions can change in a flash. Rivals are allowing retailers much more leeway in ordering practices, eroding Nike’s market lead in select areas.

But because Nike developed a plan in 1998, and stuck with it, the company claims it can make a coordinated global effort to cut that lead time. The system to make that happen is in place—which, given all that has transpired in the past seven years, is rather remarkable.

More on supply chain:

• What is supply chain management? Mastering logistics end to end
• How data can move the needle on supply chain
• How CIOs can help reduce supply chain anxieties
• Supply chain woes? Analytics may be the answer

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Case Study 16: Nike’s 100 Million Dollar Supply Chain "Speed bump"

“This is what you get for 400 million, huh?” 

Nike President and CEO Phil Knight famously raised the question in a conference call days before announcing the company would miss its third-quarter earnings by at least 28% due to a glitch in the new supply chain management software. The announcement would then send Nike’s stock down 19.8%. In addition, Dallas-based supply-chain vendor i2 Technologies, which Nike assigned blame, would suffer a 22.4% drop in stock price.

The relationship would ultimately cost Nike an estimated $100 million. Each company blamed the other for the failure, but the damage could have been dramatically reduced if realistic expectations had been set early on and a proper software implementation plan had been put in place. Most companies wouldn’t overcome such a disastrous supply chain glitch or “speed bump,” as Knight would call it, but Nike would recover due to its dominant position in the retail footwear and apparel market.

In 1999, two years before Knight’s famous outburst, Nike paid i2 $10 million to centralize its supply, demand, and collaboration planning system with a total estimated implementation cost of $40 million. Initially, i2 was the first phase of The Nike Supply Chain (NSC) project. The plan was to implement i2 to replace the existing system and introduce enterprise resource planning (ERP) software from SAP and customer relationship management (CRM) software from Siebel Systems.  

The goal of the NSC project was to improve Nike’s existing 9-month product cycle and fractured supply chain. As the brand experienced rapid growth and market dominance in the 1990s, it accumulated 27 separate order management systems around the globe. Each is entirely different from the next and poorly linked to Nike’s headquarters in Beaverton, Oregon.

At the time, there wasn’t a model to follow at the scale Nike required. Competitors like Reebok struggled to find a functional supply chain solution specific to the retail footwear and apparel industry. In an effort to solidify its position as the leader in sportswear, Nike decided to move forward quickly with i2’s predictive demand application and its supply chain planner software.

"Once we got into this, we quickly realized that what we originally thought was going to be a two-to-three-year effort would be more like five to seven," - Roland Wolfram, Nike’s vice president of global operations and technology.

The NCS project would be a success, and Nike would eventually accomplish all its supply chain goals. However, the process took much longer than expected, cost the company an additional $100 million, and could have been avoided had the operators or both companies taken a different approach to implementation.

"I think it will, in the long run, be a competitive advantage." – Phil Knight

In the end, Knight was right, but there are many valuable lessons to learn from the Nike i2 failure.

If you want to make sure your business critical project is off to a great start instead of on its way on my list with project failures? Then a New Project Audit is what you are looking for. If you want to know where you are standing with that large, multi-year, strategic project? Or you think one of your key projects is in trouble? Then a Project Review is what you are looking for. If you just want to read more project failure case studies? Then have a look at the overview of all case studies I have written here .

So, before we get into the case study, let’s look at precisely what happened...

Timeline of Events

1996 - 1999

Nike experienced incredible growth during this period but was at a crossroads. Strategic endorsement deals and groundbreaking marketing campaigns gave the company a clear edge over Adidas and Reebok, its two most substantial competitors in the 80s and 90s. However, as Nike became a world-renowned athletics brand, its supply chain became more complex and challenging to manage.

Part of Nike’s strategy that separated itself from competitors was the centralized approach. Product design, factory contracting, and order fulfillment were coordinated from headquarters in Oregon. The process resulted in some of the most iconic designs and athlete partnerships in sports history. However, manufacturing was much more disoriented.

During the 1970s and 80s, Nike battled to develop and control the emerging Asian sneaker supply chain. Eventually, the brand won the market but struggled to expand because of the nine-month manufacturing cycle.

At the time, there wasn’t an established method to outsource manufacturing from Asia, making the ordering process disorganized and inefficient across the industry. In addition, Nike’s fractured order management system contained tens of millions of product numbers with different business rules and data formats. The brand needed a new way to measure consumer demand and manage purchasing orders, but the state of the legacy system would make implementing new software difficult.

At the beginning of 1999, Nike decided to implement the first stage of its NSC project with the existing system. i2 cost the company $10 million but estimated the entire project would cost upwards of $400 million. The project would be one of the most ambitious supply chain overhauls by a company of Nike’s size. 

i2 Technologies is a Dallas, Texas-based software company specializing in designing solutions that simplify supply and demand chain management while maximizing efficiency and minimizing cost. Before the Nike relationship, i2 was an emerging player in logistics software with year-over-year growth. Involvement in the Nike project would position the company as the leading name in supply chain management software.

Nike’s vision for the i2 phase of NSC was “achieving greater flexibility in planning execution and delivery processes…looking for better forecasting and more profitable order fulfillment." When successfully implemented, the manufacturing cycle would be reduced from nine months the six. This would convert the supply chain to make-to-order rather than make-to-sell, an accomplishment not yet achieved in the footwear and apparel industry.

Predicting demand required inputting historical sales numbers into i2’s software. “Crystal balling” the market had substantial support at the time among SCM companies. While the belief that entering numbers into an algorithm and spitting out a magical prediction didn’t age well, the methodology required reliable, uniform data sets to function.

Nike decided to implement the “Big Bang” ERP approach when switching to i2 for the supply chain management. The method consists of going live where the business completely changes without phasing out the old system. Nike also opted for a single instance strategy for implementation. The CIO at the time, Gordon Steele, is quoted saying, “single instance is a decision, not a discussion.” Typically, global corporations choose a multi-instance ERP solution, using separate instances in various regions or for different product categories.

By June of 2000, various problems with the new system had already become apparent. According to documents filed by Nike and i2 shareholders in class-action suits, the system used different business rules and stored data in various formats, making integration difficult. In addition, the software needed customization beyond the 10-15% limit recommended by i2. Heavy customization slowed down the software. For example, entries were reportedly taking over a minute to be recorded. In addition, the SCM system frequently crashed as it struggled to handle Nike’s tens of millions of product numbers.

The issues persisted but were fixable. Unfortunately, the software was linked to core business processes, specifically factory orders, that sent a ripple effect that would result in over and under-purchasing critical products. The demand planner would also delete ordering data six to eight weeks after it was entered. As a result, planners couldn’t access purchasing orders that had been sent to factories.

Problems in the system caused far too many factory orders for the less popular shoes like the Air Garnett IIIs and not enough popular shoes like the Air Jordan to meet the market's demand. Foot Locker was forced to reduce prices for the Air Garnett to $90 instead of the projected retail price of $140 to move the product. Many shoes were also delivered late due to late production. As a result, Nike had to ship the shoes by plane at $4-$8 a pair compared to sending them across the Pacific by boat for $0.75.   

November 2000

According to Nike, all the problems with i2’s supply chain management system were resolved by the fall. Once the issues were identified, Nike built manual workarounds. For example, programmers had to download data from i2’s demand predictor and reload it into the supply chain planner on a weekly basis. While the software glitches were fixed and orders weren’t being duplicated or disappearing, the damage was done. Sales for the following quarter were dramatically affected by the purchasing order errors resulting in a loss of over $100 million in sales.

Nike made the problem public on February 27, 2001. The company was forced to report quarterly earnings to stakeholders to avoid repercussions from the SEC. As a result, the stock price dove 20%, numerous class-action lawsuits were filed, and Phil Knight famously voiced his opinion on the implementation, "This is what you get for $400 million, huh?"

In the meeting, Nike told shareholders they expected profits from the quarter to decline from around $0.50 a share to about $0.35. In addition, the inventory problems would persist for the next six to nine months as the overproduced products were sold off.

As for the future of NSC, the company, including its CEO and President, expressed optimism. Knight said, "We believe that we have addressed the issues around this implementation and that over the long term, we will achieve significant financial and organizational benefit from our global supply-chain initiative."

A spokeswoman from Nike also assured stakeholders that the problems would be resolved; she said that they were working closely with i2 to solve the problems by creating “some technical and operational workarounds” and that the supply chain software was now stable.

While Nike was positive about the implementation process moving forward, they placed full blame on the SCM software and i2 Technologies.

Nike stopped using i2’s demand-planning software for short-and-medium range sneaker planning; however, it still used the application for short range and its emerging apparel business. By the Spring of 2001, Nike integrated i2 into its more extensive SAP ERP system, focusing more on orders and invoices rather than predictive modeling.

What Went Wrong?

While the failures damaged each company’s reputation in the IT industry, both companies would go on to recover from the poorly executed software implementation. Each side has assigned blame outward, but after reviewing all the events, it's safe to say each had a role in the breakdown of the supply chain management system.

Underestimating Complexity

Implementing software at this scale always has risks. Tom Harwick, Gigi Information Group’s research director for supply chain management, said, “Implementing a supply-chain management solution is like crossing a street, high risk if you don't look both ways, but if you do it right, low risk.”

One of Nike's most significant mistakes was underestimating the complexity of implementing software at such a large scale. According to Roland Wolfram, Nike’s operators had a false sense of security regarding the i2 installation because it was small compared to the larger NSC project. "This felt like something we could do a little easier since it wasn’t changing everything else [in the business]," he says. "But it turned out it was very complicated."

Part of the reason why the project was so complicated was because of Nike’s fractured legacy supply chain system and disoriented data sets. i2’s software wasn’t designed for the footwear and apparel industry, let alone Nike’s unique position in the market.  

Data Quality

Execution by both parties was also to blame. i2 Technologies is on record recommending customization not to exceed 10-15%. Nike and i2 should have recognized early on that this range would be impossible to accommodate the existing SCM system.

Choosing a Big Bang implementation strategy didn’t make sense in this scenario. Nike’s legacy system data was too disorganized to be integrated into the i2 without making dramatic changes before a full-on launch.

Poor Communication

Communication between Nike and i2 from 1999 to the summer of 2000 was poor. i2 claimed not to be aware of problems until Knight issued blame publicly. Greg Brady, the President of i2 Technologies who was directly involved with the project, reacted to the finger-pointing by saying, "If our deployment was creating a business problem for them, why were we never informed?" Brady also claimed, "There is no way that software is responsible for Nike's earnings problem." i2 blamed Nike’s failure to follow the customization limitations, which was caused by the link to Nike’s bake-end.

Rush to Market

At the time, Nike was on the verge of solidifying its position as the leader in footwear and sports apparel for decades to come. Building a solid supply chain that could adapt to market trends and reduce the manufacturing cycle was the last step toward complete market dominance. In addition, the existing supply chain solutions built for the footwear and apparel industry weren’t ready to deploy on a large scale. This gave Nike the opportunity to develop its own SCM system putting the company years ahead of competitors. Implementing functional demand-planning software would be highly valuable for Nike and its retail clients.

i2 also was experiencing market pressure to deploy a major project. Had the implementation gone smoothly, i2 would have a massive competitive advantage. The desire to please Nike likely played a factor in i2’s missteps. Failing to provide clear expectations and communication throughout the process may not have happened with a less prominent client.  

Failure to Train

After the problems became apparent in the summer of 2000, Nike had to hire consultants to create workarounds to make the SCM system operational. This clearly indicates that Nike’s internal team wasn’t trained adequately to handle the complexity of the new ERP software.

Nike’s CIO at the time reflected on the situation. "Could we have taken more time with the rollout?" he asked. "Probably. Could we have done a better job with software quality? Sure. Could the planners have been better prepared to use the system before it went live? You can never train enough."

How Nike Could Have Done Things Differently

While Nike and i2 attempted to implement software that had never been successfully deployed in the global footwear and apparel industry, many problems could have been avoided. We can learn from the mistakes and how Nike overcame their challenges with i2 to build a functioning ERP system.

Understanding and Managing Complexity

Nike’s failure to assess the complexity of the problem is at the root of the situation. Regardless if the i2 implementation was just the beginning of a larger project, it featured a significant transition from the legacy system. Nike’s leadership should have realized the scale of the project and the importance of starting NSC off on the right foot.  

i2 also is to blame for not providing its client with realistic expectations. As a software vendor, i2 is responsible for providing its client with clear limitations and the potential risks of failing to deploy successfully.

See " Understanding and Managing Your Project’s Complexity " for more insights on this topic.

Collaborate with i2 Technologies

Both companies should have realized that Nike required more than 10-15% customization. Working together during the implementation process could have prevented the ordering issues that were the reason for the lost revenue.

Collaboration before deployment and at the early stages of implementation is critical when integrating a new system with fractured data. Nike and i2 should have coordinated throughout the process to ensure a smooth rollout; instead, both parties executed poor project management resulting in significant financial and reputational blows.  

See " Solving Your Between Problems " for more insights on this topic.

Hire a 3rd Party Integration Company

Nike’s lack of understanding of the complexity of SCM implementation is difficult to understand. If i2 had been truthful in that they did not know about problems with their software, Nike could have made a coordinated decision not to involve the software company during the process.

Assuming that is the case, Nike should have hired a 3rd party to help with the integration process. Unfortunately, Nike’s internal team was not ready for the project. Outside integrators could have prevented the problems before the damage was done.

Not seeking outside help may be the most significant aspect of Nike’s failure to implement a new SCM system.   

See " Be a Responsible Buyer of Technology " for more insights on this topic.

Deploy in Stages

A “Big Bang” implementation strategy was a massive mistake by Nike. While i2 should have made it clear this was not the logical path considering the capabilities of their software and Nike’s legacy system, this was Nike’s decision.

Ego, rush to market, or failure to understand the complexities of the project could all have been a factor in the decision. Lee Geishecker, a Gartner analyst, stated that Nike chose to go live a little over a year after starting the project, while projects of this scale should take two years before deployment. In addition, the system should be rolled out in stages, not all at once.

Brent Thrill, an analyst at Credit Suisse First Boston, is on record saying he would have kept the old system running for three years while testing i2’s software. In another analysis, Larry Lapide commented on the i2 project by saying, "Whenever you put software in, you don't go big bang, and you don't go into production right away. Usually, you get these bugs worked out . . . before it goes live across the whole business."

At the time, Nike’s planners weren’t prepared for the project. While we will never know what would have happened if the team had been adequately trained, proper preparation would have put Nike in a much better position to handle the glitches and required customizations.

See " User Enablement is Critical for Project Success " for more insights on this topic.

Practice Patience in Software Implementation

At the time, a software glitch causing a ripple effect that would impact the entire supply chain was a novel idea. Nike likely made their decisions to risk the “Big Bang” strategy, deploy in a year without phases and proper testing, and not seek outside help because they assumed the repercussions of a glitch wouldn’t be as catastrophic.

Impatience resulted in avoidable errors. A more conservative implementation strategy with adequate testing would have likely caught the mistakes.

See " Going Live Too Early Can Be Worse as Going Late " for more insights on this topic.

Closing Thoughts

One of the most incredible aspects of Nike’s implementation failure is how quickly the company bounced back. While Nike undoubtedly made numerous mistakes during the process, NSC was 80% operational in 2004.

Nike turned the project around by making adjustments and learning patience. Few companies can suffer a $100 million “speed bump” without filing bankruptcy, but Nike is in that position because of its resilience. The SAP installation wasn’t rushed and resumed many aspects of its original strategy. In addition, a training culture was established due to the i2 failures. Customer service representatives receive 140 to 180 hours of training from highly skilled “super users,” All employees are locked out of the system until they complete their required training courses.

Aside from the $100 million loss, the NSC project was successful. Lead times were reduced from nine months to six (the initial goal), and Nike’s factory inventory levels were reduced from a month to a week in some cases. Implementing a new SCM system also created an integration between departments, better visibility of customer orders, and increased gross margins.

While Nike could have executed far more efficiently, Phil Knight’s early assessment of the i2 failure turned out to be true. In the long run, the process gave Nike a competitive advantage and was instrumental in building an effective SCM system. 

In a nutshell: A failure to demonstrate patience, seek outside help, and rush software implementation can have drastic consequences.  

> Nike says i2 hurt its profits

> I2 Technologies, Inc.

> How Not to Spend $400 Million

> i2-Nike fallout a cautionary tale

> Nike rebounds: How Nike recovered from its supply chain disaster

> Scm and Erp Software Implementation at Nike – from Failure to Success 

> I2 Says: "You Too, Nike"

Nike and child labour – how it went from laggard to leader

29 February 2016

For well over a decade, Nike became defined by the term ‘sweatshop labour’. It was simply one of the principal things for which it became famous. Consequently, a good many people saw it as the epitome of uncaring capitalism. It was one of the demons of the anti-capitalist campaigners.

In reality, there was no truth to the idea that the company was wicked or uncaring. It was simply one of the first that had pioneered a new business model, and it was learning the hard way that it’s hugely successful formula had unintended consequences that would have to be dealt with.

Nike was originally founded in 1964 as Blue Ribbon Sports, changing to Nike in 1971. One of the two founders, Phil Knight, came up with the idea while he was at Stanford Business School. At the time, the vast majority of US footwear was manufactured in America. Nike was able to grow quickly using the model of outsourcing production to a network of suppliers in parts of the world where costs were lower.

Nike didn’t own the factories. In a very real sense, Nike has never manufactured a single shoe in its entire history. And because it didn’t own the factories, the assumption was that running them was business of the owners, not Nike. In its early decades of existence, there was apparently no evidence of any problem that challenged that assumption.

But by the 1990s, the world was changing. Economic deregulation was leading to a huge increase in the globalisation of the economy, and as the scale of global corporate activity was ramping up, the negative consequences were becoming highly visible. Consequently, the US and European home markets began to hear more about working conditions in foreign factories. Nike was neither better nor worse than any of its peers at this point. The whole outsourced industry was based on the premise of “ignorance is bliss”. But ignorance was proving more and more difficult to maintain.

The company began to make changes. It revised its factory code of conduct, and hired auditing firms to carry out safety checks. But by and large, it was still left to the factory owners to sort themselves out while Nike negotiated for the lowest possible prices.

Everything changed in 1996. Life magazine published a story that included a photograph of a child stitching footballs that carried the Nike logo. There is some evidence that the photo was staged, since it showed inflated footballs while in reality the balls were shipped uninflated. It didn’t matter. The picture was a powerful visual for a situation that was shown to genuinely exist. The company’s reputation suffered and the first of many protests began to take place.

By 1998, the company accepted it needed to take responsibility. Phil Knight admitted “the Nike product has become synonymous with slave wages, forced overtime and arbitrary abuse.” It was going to be a longer journey than they might have imagined. Nike and child labour had become indelibly linked in the public consciousness.

Nike began to take the first steps. It released the names and locations of its factories. It changed elements of its shoe manufacture to reduce hazards to the workers who make them. It began producing reports to talk about its progress. And it put more focus on audits of factories to identify problems.

Still, the popular view of the company as a villain refused to go away. In 2001, one particular incident summed up the problem. The company had offered customers the ability to have a word of their choice stitched onto their new Nike trainers. One enterprising critic requested that the word ‘sweatshop’ should be used for his shoes. The company’s refusal was one of the first examples of a viral internet phenomenon as the email exchange got shared widely across the world.

Organisations such as ‘NikeWatch’ and the Clean Clothes Campaign expressed skepticism about Nike’s efforts, taking a cynical view of its seriousness and sincerity.

But by 2005, the company’s steady progress began to gain grudging respect from some of the campaign groups, and it seemed like the mood music might begin to change. Then just at that point, there came a crisis that threatened to take it right back to the beginning.

In the run-up to the 2006 World Cup, photos were presented to the company of pictures of Pakistani children stitching Nike footballs – a direct repeat of what had happened ten years earlier. It turned out that the supplier, Saga Sports, having become overwhelmed with orders linked to the approaching World Cup, had gone against the rules by sending balls out to be made at local homes.

There was a significant cost to dealing with this problem. To recall the balls would cost $100m short term, and it would delay future production considerably. The company decided to pull the product anyway and to cancel its contract with Saga, moving instead to Silver Star where all work would be done on factory premises.

It was a short-term financial blow, but it sent a strong signal to the company’s suppliers and its customers at the same time, that it was serious about tackling the problem.

The impact on former supplier Saga was enormous, essentially driving it to bankruptcy. Other suppliers based in Sialkot, Pakistan took careful note.

Nike has shown itself to be willing to take other tough decisions, for instance pulling support from a major low cost supplier in Bangladesh because it was impossible to provide working conditions that met decent standards. This was a move that gave it a competitive disadvantage when others were exploiting Bangladesh as the lowest possible cost base. But it left the company less exposed when the Rana Plaza building disaster took place and hard questions began to be asked about who was doing what.

Now, Nike finds itself more often at the top of lists for sustainable companies, particularly within its sector. It appears in the top ten of the Fortune Most Admired Companies list. Its commitment to improving its environmental impact, providing transparency about its processes, and ensuring decent working conditions in its supply chain, have turned the tide of public perception.

Now the company is more often to be found on the front foot when it comes to matters of integrity. For instance, when boxer Manny Pacquiao recently made anti-gay comments during a media interview, Nike dissolved its partnership with him the very next day, labelling his comments “abhorrent.”

The company’s turnaround has become one of the success stories of corporate integrity in the last two decades.

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Nike lists abuses at Asian factories

Nike, long the subject of sweatshop allegations, yesterday produced the most comprehensive picture yet of the 700 factories that produce its footwear and clothing, detailing admissions of abuses, including forced overtime and restricted access to water.

The company has published a 108-page report, available on its website, the first since it paid $1.5m to settle allegations that it had made false claims about how well its workers were treated.

For years activists have been pressing Nike and other companies to reveal where their factories are in order to allow independent monitoring.

Nike lists 124 plants in China contracted to make its products, 73 in Thailand, 35 in South Korea, 34 in Vietnam and others in Asia.

It also produces goods in South America, Australia, Canada, Italy, Mexico, Turkey and the US. It employs 650,000 contract workers worldwide.

The report admits to widespread problems, particularly in Nike's Asian factories. The company said it audited hundreds of factories in 2003 and 2004 and found cases of "abusive treatment", physical and verbal, in more than a quarter of its south Asian plants.

Between 25% and 50% of the factories in the region restrict access to toilets and drinking water during the workday.

The same percentage deny workers at least one day off in seven.

In more than half of Nike's factories, the report said, employees worked more than 60 hours a week. In up to 25%, workers refusing to do overtime were punished.

Wages were also below the legal minimum at up to 25% of factories.

Michael Posner, the executive director of the organisation Human Rights First, described the report as "an important step forward" and praised Nike for its transparency.

But he added: "The facts on the ground suggest there are still enormous problems with these supply chains and facto ries ... what is Nike doing to change the picture and give workers more rights?"

Nike has joined the Fair Labour Association, a group that includes other footwear and clothing makers, as well as NGOs and universities, which conducts independent audits designed to improve standards across the industry.

The company said it needed further cooperation with other members of the industry.

"We do not believe Nike has the power to single-handedly solve the issues at stake," the company said in the report.

Mr Posner said retailers such as Wal-Mart bore huge responsibility for keeping prices low and consequently compounding poor working conditions in factories overseas.

He said that the likes of Nike and Adidas needed to work together to gain some kind of counterweight.

Debora Spar, the author of a case study on Nike, said the report "shows the company has turned a corner, although I am not sure that I would describe it as a very sharp corner."

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