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Teleological Argument for the Existence of God

Teleological argument for the existence of god.

The "Teleological Argument for the existence of God" is a member of the classic triad of arguments, which is completed by the Ontological Argument and the Cosmological Argument. Stated most succinctly, it runs:

The world exhibits teleological order (design, adaptation). Therefore, it was produced by an intelligent designer.

To understand this argument, we must first understand what teleological order is.

Teleological Order

Generally speaking, to say that a group of elements is ordered in a certain way is to say that they are interrelated so as to form a definite pattern, but the notion of a definite pattern is vague. Any set of elements is interrelated in one way rather than another, and any complex of interrelations might be construed by someone as a definite pattern. Certain patterns are of special interest for one reason or another, and when one of these is exhibited, the complex would ordinarily be said to be ordered. Thus, when the elements form a pattern in whose perception we take intrinsic delight, we can speak of aesthetic order. When there are discernible regularities in the way, certain elements occur in spatiotemporal proximity, we can speak of causal order. The distinctive thing about teleological (Greek, telos, "end" or "goal") order is that it introduces the notion of processes and structures being fitted to bring about a certain result.

The usual illustrations of teleological order are from living organisms. It is a common observation that the anatomical structures and instinctive activities of animals are often nicely suited to the fulfillment of their needs. For example, the ears of pursuing, carnivorous animals, like the dog and the wolf, face forward so as to focus sounds from their quarry, while the ears of pursued, herbivorous animals, like the rabbit and the deer, face backward so as to focus sounds from their pursuers.

Examples of instinctive behavior are even more striking. The burying beetle deposits its eggs on the carcass of a small animal and then covers the whole "melange" with dirt to protect it until the young hatch out and find an ample supply of (hardly fresh) meat at hand.

If we are going to distinguish teleological order from causal order, we shall have to make explicit the tacit assumption that the result the structure or process in question is fitted to bring about is of value. Otherwise, any cause-effect relationship would be a case of teleological order. It is just as true to say that wind is fitted to produce the result of moving loose dirt into the air as it is to say that the mechanism of the eye is fitted to produce sight. The latter would be counted as an example of "design," whereas the former would not, because we regard sight as something worth having, whereas the movement of dirt through the air is not generally of any value. This has the important implication that insofar as it is impossible to give an objective criterion of value, it will not be an objective matter of fact that teleological order is or is not exhibited in a given state of affairs.

It is important to note that the term design, as used in this argument, does not by definition imply a designer. If it did, there could be no argument from design to the existence of God; we would have to know that the phenomena in question were the work of a designer before we could call them cases of design. We must define design in such a way as to leave open the question of its source. We have design in the required sense when things are so ordered that they tend to perform a valuable function. We might put this by saying that things are ordered as they would be if some conscious being had designed them, but in saying this we are not committing ourselves to the proposition that a mind has designed them. The equivalent terms adaptation and teleological order are not so liable to mislead in this way.

Arguments for the existence of God have been based on kinds of order other than the teleological. Exhortations to move from a consideration of the starry heavens to belief in God constitute an appeal to aesthetic order. It is sometimes claimed that we must postulate an intelligent creator to explain the regularity with which the solar system operates. Here it is causal order that is involved. Arguments like these are often not clearly distinguished from those based on teleological order, to which we shall confine our attention.

Arguments from Particular Cases of Design

The simplest form of the argument is that in which we begin with particular cases of design and argue that they can be adequately explained only by supposing that they were produced by an intelligent being. Thus William Paley , an eighteenth-century philosopher, in a classic formulation of the argument concentrated on the human eye as a case of design, stressing the ways in which various parts of the eye cooperate in a complex way to produce sight. He argued that we can explain this adaptation of means to end only if we postulate a supernatural designer. This is the heart of the teleological argument — the claim that adaptation can be explained only in terms of a designer. It always rests, more or less explicitly, on an analogy with human artifacts. Thus, Paley compared the eye to a watch and argued as follows: If one were to find a watch on a desert island, one would be justified in supposing that it was produced by an intelligent being. By the same token (the adjustment of means to ends) one is entitled, upon examination of the human eye, to conclude that it was produced by an intelligent being.

If it is asked why we should take artifacts as our model, the answer would seem to be this. Artifacts are certainly cases of design. In a watch, for example, the structure is well suited to the performance of a valuable function: showing the time. With artifacts, unlike natural examples of design, we have some insight into what is responsible for the adjustment of means to end. We can understand it because we can see how this adjustment springs from the creative activity of the maker, guided by his deliberate intention to make the object capable of performing this function. Hence, in natural cases of adaptation where the source of the adaptiveness is not obvious, we have no recourse but to employ the only way we know of rendering such phenomena intelligible — supposing them to stem from conscious planning. Since we do not observe any planner at work, we must postulate an invisible planner behind the scenes.

The comparison to artifacts was attacked by David Hume in his Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, in which he suggested that the production of artifacts by human planning is no more inherently intelligible than the production of organisms by biological generation. Why, asked Hume, should we take the former rather than the latter as the model for the creation of the world? Even if we admit that the world exhibits design, why are we not as justified in supposing that the world was generated from the sexual union of two parent worlds as in supposing that it was created by a mind in accordance with a plan? In answer to Hume it might be argued that creation gives a more satisfactory and a more complete explanation than generation because the generation consists of a reproduction of the same kind of thing and hence introduces another entity that raises exactly the same kind of question. If we are initially puzzled as to why a rabbit has organs that are so well adapted to the satisfaction of its needs, it does not help to be told that it is because the rabbit sprang from other rabbits with just the same adaptive features. If, on the other hand, we could see that the rabbit had been deliberately constructed in this way so that its needs would be satisfied, we would be making progress. To this Hume would reply that the mind of the designer also requires explanation. Why should the designer have a mind that is so well fitted for designing? Thus, this explanation also leaves problems dangling, but at least it is not just the same problem. If we were to reject every explanation that raised fresh problems, we would have to reject all of science.

darwinian theory of evolution

The development of the Darwinian theory of evolution opened up the possibility of a more serious alternative to the theistic explanation. According to this theory, the organic structures of today developed from much simpler organisms by purely natural processes. In this theory (as developed since Charles Darwin) two factors are considered to play the major role: mutations and overpopulation. (A mutation occurs when an offspring differs from its parents in such a way that it will pass this difference along to its offspring, and they will pass it along, and so on. It is a relatively permanent genetic change.)

The way these factors are thought to work can be illustrated by taking one of the cases of adaptation cited above. If we go back far enough in the ancestry of the dog, we will discover ancestors that did not have ears facing forward. Now let us suppose that a mutation occurred that consisted of an ear turned somewhat more forward than had been normal. Granting that organisms tend to reproduce in greater numbers than the environment can support, and hence that there is considerable competition for the available food supply, it follows that any feature of a given organism that gives it any advantage over its fellows in getting food or in avoiding becoming prey will make it more likely to survive and pass along its peculiarity to its offspring. Thus, within a number of generations we can expect the front-turned-ear proto-dogs to replace the others and be left in sole possession of the field. Since mutations do occur from time to time, and since some of them are favorable, we have a set of purely natural factors by whose operation the organic world can be continuously transformed in the direction of greater and greater adaptation.

The Darwinian theory aspires to do no more than explain how more complex organisms develop from less complex organisms. It has nothing to say about the origins of the simplest organisms. However, no matter how simple the organism, its structure must be fitted to the satisfaction of its needs, or it will not survive. Therefore, Darwinian theory is not a complete explanation of the existence of teleological order in the world; it merely tells us how some cases develop from other cases. Hence, it alone is not an alternative to the theistic explanation, but in principle there is no reason why it should not be supplemented by a biochemical theory of the origin of life from lifeless matter. No such theory has yet been completely established, but progress is being made. When and if this is done, there will be an explanation of design in living organisms for which there is empirical support, and it can no longer be claimed that theism represents the only real explanation of such facts.

what follows from the argument

The other major deficiency in Paley's form of the argument is that, even if valid, it does not go very far toward proving the existence of a theistic God. The most we are warranted in concluding is that each case of design in the natural world is due to the activity of an intelligent designer. Nothing is done to show that all cases of design are due to one and the same designer; the argument is quite compatible with polytheism or polydaemonism, in which we would have one supernatural designer for flies, another for fish, and so on. Even if there is one, and only one, designer, nothing is done to show that this being is predominantly good rather than evil; neither is anything done to show that he is infinitely powerful or wise, rather than limited in these qualities. Of course the theist might seek to supplement this argument by others, but by itself it will not bear the weight.

Argument from the Universe as a Whole

No argument that, like the Teleological Argument, is designed to show that facts in nature require a certain explanation, can establish the existence of a deity absolutely unlimited in power, knowledge, or any other respect. By such reasoning we can infer no more in the cause than is required to produce the effect. This deficiency is irremediable. However, there is a simple way of eliminating competing scientific claims — by starting from the universe as a whole rather than from individual instances of design within the universe. There are different ways of doing this. We might think of the whole universe as instrumental to some supreme goal, or we might think of the universe as a unified system of mutually adjusted and mutually supporting adaptive structures.

Taking the whole universe as instrumental to some supreme goal would give us the strongest argument, for here the analogy with consciously designed artifacts is strongest. An artifact like a house, ship, or watch is designed for the realization of goals outside its internal functioning; it is intended to be used for something. Therefore, if the analogy with artifacts is the main support for the notion that the universe was the result of conscious planning, that support would be firmest if grounds were presented for thinking that the universe as a whole was well fitted to be used for something. And if this something were of maximum value, we would then have a basis for attributing supreme goodness to the designer.

However, this alternative is rarely taken, largely because it is difficult to decide on a suitable candidate for, in Alfred, Lord Tennyson's words, the "far-off divine event, toward which the whole creation moves." The most common suggestions are the greater glory of God and the development of moral personality. But in regard to the first, no one can really understand just what it would mean for a God who is eternally perfect to receive greater glory, and in regard to the second, even if we can overcome doubts that moral development is worth the entire cosmic process, it would seem impossible ever to get adequate grounds for the proposition that everything that takes place throughout all space and time contributes to this development.

The second interpretation, that the universe is a unified system of mutually adjusted and mutually supporting adaptive structures — has been tried more often. So conceived, the argument will run as follows.

• The world is a unified system of adaptations.
• We can give an intelligible explanation of this fact only by supposing that the world was created by an intelligent being according to some plan.
• Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that the world was created by an intelligent being.

The famous formulation of the argument in Hume's Dialogues makes explicit the analogy on which, as we have seen, step two depends. Hume's formulation, which is substantially equivalent to the above, runs as follows.

• The world is like a machine.
• Machines are made by human beings, in accordance with plans.
• Like effects have like causes.
• Therefore, the world probably owes its existence to something like a human being, who operates in accordance with a plan.

types of adaptation

If one is to think of the whole universe as a system of connected adaptations, he will consider kinds of adaptation other than that exemplified by the fitness of organisms to the conditions of life; this kind alone will not bear the whole weight. F. R. Tennant, who has developed the weightiest recent presentation of the teleological argument in his Philosophical Theology, discusses six kinds of adaptation:

• The intelligibility of the world. The world and the human mind are so related that we can learn more and more without limit.
• The adaptation of living organisms to their environments. This is the kind on which we have been concentrating.
• The ways in which the inorganic world is conducive to the emergence and maintenance of life. Life is possible only because temperatures do not exceed certain limits, certain kinds of chemical processes go on, and so on.
• The aesthetic value of nature. Nature is not only suited to penetration by the intellect; it is also constituted so as to awaken valuable aesthetic responses in man.
• The ways in which the world ministers to the moral life of men. For example, through being forced to learn something about the uniformities in natural operations, men are forced to develop their intelligence, a prerequisite to moral development. And moral virtues are acquired in the course of having to cope with the hardships of one's natural environment.
• The overall progressiveness of the evolutionary process.

Tennant admits that no one of these forms of adaptiveness is a sufficient ground for the theistic hypothesis, but he maintains that when we consider the ways in which they dovetail, we will see theism to be the most reasonable interpretation. Thus, the adjustment of lower organisms to the environment takes on added significance when it is seen as a stage in an evolutionary process culminating in man, which in turn is seen to be more striking when we realize the ways in which nature makes possible the further development of the moral, intellectual, and aesthetic life of man.

When the argument takes this form, it is no longer subject to competition from scientific explanations of the same facts. If our basic datum is a certain configuration of the universe as a whole, science can, by the nature of the case, offer no explanation. Science tries to find regularities in the association of different parts, stages, or aspects within the physical universe. On questions as to why the universe as a whole exists, or exists in one form rather than another, it is silent. Ultimately this is because science is committed to the consideration of questions that can be investigated empirically. One can use observation to determine whether two conditions within the universe are regularly associated (increase of temperature and boiling), but there is no way to observe connections between the physical universe as a whole and something outside it. Therefore, there is no scientific alternative to the theistic answer to the question "Why is the universe a unified system of adaptations?"

alternative explanations of adaptation

What alternatives to the theistic explanation of adaptation are there? In the literature on the subject one often encounters the suggestion that we have this kind of universe by chance. If we dismiss the animistic notion of chance as a mysterious agent, the suggestion that we have this kind of universe by chance boils down to a refusal to take the question seriously. It may be said that the fact that the universe as a whole exhibits teleological order is not the sort of thing that requires explanation. It is difficult to see what justification could be given for this statement other than an appeal to the principle that sense observation is the only source of knowledge and/or meaning.

One cannot perceive by the senses any relation between the physical universe as a whole, or any feature thereof, and something outside it on which it depends. Hence, an extreme form of empiricism would brand the question posed by the Teleological Argument as fruitless or even meaningless. If, on the other hand, the question is taken seriously, any answer will be as metaphysical as the theistic answer, for it is really a question as to what characteristics are to be attributed to the cause (or causes) of the universe. Do the relevant facts about the world most strongly support the theistic position that the cause is a perfectly good personal being who created the universe in the carrying out of a good purpose? Or is there some other view that is equally, or more strongly, supported by the evidence? The Manichaeans held that the physical universe was the work of a malevolent deity and that man must separate himself from the body in order to escape this diabolical power and come into contact with the purely spiritual benevolent deity. It has also been held in many religions that the universe is the joint product of two or more deities who differ markedly in their characteristics. In Zoroastrianism it is held that the world is the battleground of a good deity and an evil deity, the actual state of affairs bearing traces of both. Indian religious philosophy typically regards the universe as resulting from a nonpurposive manifestation of, or emanation from, an absolute unity that is not personal in any strict sense.

extent of adaptiveness in the universe

To evaluate the Teleological Argument in the light of competing explanations, we must ask whether the extent of adaptiveness in the universe is sufficient to warrant the theistic conclusion. As the problem is formulated in Hume's Dialogues, is there a close enough analogy between the universe and a machine? This requires judging the relative proportion of adaptive features to nonadaptive or maladaptive features. In addition to taking account of Tennant's enumeration of the ways in which the shape of things is instrumental to the realization of valuable ends, we must look at the other side of the picture and try to form an adequate impression of (1) the ways in which the shape of things is neutral, providing neither for good nor for evil, and (2) the ways in which the shape of things frustrates the search for value.

As for (1), as far as we can see, the distribution of matter and the variety of chemical elements in the world, to take two examples at random, could have been very different from what they are without reducing the chances of sentient beings leading satisfying lives.

As for (2), we begin to trespass onto the problem of evil, except that here we are interested in suffering and frustration not as possible disproofs of theism but as affecting the cogency of the Teleological Argument for the existence of God. There are many ways in which the organization of the world makes for disvalue rather than value in the lives of men and other sentient creatures. One need only mention the numerous sources of disease, the incidence of malformed offspring, the difficulty of attaining optimum conditions for the development of healthy personalities, and the importance of antisocial tendencies in human nature. It is quite possible, of course, that all the things that seem to be unfortunate features of the world as it exists are necessary elements in the best of all possible worlds. If we already believe that the world is the creation of a perfect deity, that carries with it the belief that these apparent evils are necessary even though we cannot see how they are. However, if we are trying to establish the existence of a perfect deity, we have to proceed on the basis of what we can see. And since, so far as we can see, the world would be better if the features listed above were altered, we cannot argue that the state of adaptiveness in the world requires explanation in terms of a perfectly good, omnipotent deity. But we have already seen, on other grounds, that the Teleological Argument cannot be used to establish the existence of a being unlimited in any respect.

The serious problem that remains is whether the total picture of adaptation and maladaptation, so far as we have it, gives sufficient support to the hypothesis that the world represents the at least partial implementation of a plan that is at least predominantly good. To resolve this problem we must weigh opposite factors and arrive at a final judgment of their relative importance. Unfortunately there are no real guidelines for this task. No one knows how much adaptation, relative to maladaptation, would warrant such a conclusion; and even if he did, he would not know what units to employ to perform the measurement. What is to count as one unit of adaptation? Do we count each individual separately, or is each species one unit? How can we compare the value of human knowledge with the disvalue of disease? It would seem that on this issue different positions will continue to be taken on the basis of factors outside the evidence itself.

See also Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God ; Darwin, Charles Robert ; Darwinism ; Evil, The Problem of ; God/Isvara in Indian Philosophy ; Hume, David ; Mani and Manichaeism ; Ontological Argument for the Existence of God ; Paley, William ; Physicotheology ; Popular Arguments for the Existence of God ; Tennant, Frederick Robert ; Theism, Arguments For and Against ; Zoroastrianism .

Bibliography

In the Middle Ages there was general acceptance of an Aristotelian physics, according to which even purely physical processes were explained in terms of the natural tendency of a body toward an end. (Fire naturally tends to come to rest at the periphery of the universe.) Given this background, it was argued that the consideration of any natural processes led to the postulation of a designer. The argument in this form is found in Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Part I, Question 2, Article 3. Contemporary Thomistic statements try to adjust this line of thought to modern physics. See G. H. Joyce, The Principles of Natural Theology ( New York : AMS Press, 1972); R é ginald Garrigou-Lagrange, God, His Existence and His Nature, 2 vols. (St. Louis: Herder, 1934 – 1936); and D. J. B. Hawkins, The Essentials of Theism ( New York : Sheed and Ward, 1949).

The influential presentation by the eighteenth-century thinker William Paley is to be found in his Natural Theology: Or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, Collected from the Appearances of Nature (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963). Important more recent formulations include F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, 2 vols. (New York, 1928 – 1930), Vol. II, Ch. 4, and A. E. Taylor, Does God Exist? (New York: Macmillan, 1947).

Acute criticisms of the argument are to be found in David Hume , Dialogues concerning Natural Religion ; Immanuel Kant , Critique of Pure Reason, Book II. Ch. 3; C. D. Broad, Religion, Philosophy, and Psychical Research (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1953); John Laird, Theism and Cosmology (New York, 1942); and J. J. C. Smart, "The Existence of God," in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, edited by Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (London: SCM Press, 1955).

William P. Alston (1967)

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1.5: The Teleological Argument

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State of the Argument

              In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer, that for any thing I knew to the contrary it had lain there for ever ; nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But sup- pose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that for any thing I knew the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone ; why is it not as admissible in the second case as in the first ? For this reason, and for no other, namely, that when we come to inspect the watch we perceive — what we could not discover in the stone — that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e. g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day ; that if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, or placed after any other manner or m any other order than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now served by it. To reckon up a few of the plainest of these parts and of their offices, all tending to one result: We see a cylindrical box containing a coiled elastic spring, which, by its endeavor to relax itself, turns round the box. "We next observe a flexible chain — artificially wrought for the sake of flexure — communicating the action of the spring from the box to the fusee. We then find a series of wheels, the teeth of which catch in and apply to each other, conducting the motion from the fusee to the balance and from the balance to the pointer, and at the same time, by the size and shape of those wheels, so regulating that motion as to terminate in causing an index, by an equable and measured progression, to pass over a given space in a given time. We take notice that the wheels are made of brass, in order to keep them from rust ; the springs of steel, no other metal being so elastic ; that over the face of the watch there is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part of the work, but in the room of which, if there had been any other than a transparent substance, the hour could not be seen without opening the case. This mechanism being observed — it requires indeed an examination of the - instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it ; but being once, as we have said, observed and understood, the inference we think is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker — that there must have existed, at some time and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer, who comprehended its -construction and designed its use.

I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion, that we had never seen a watch made — that we had never known an artist capable of making one — that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was per- formed ; all this being no more than what is true of soma exquisite remains of ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned ? Ignorance of this kind exalt our opinion of the unseen and unknown artist's skill, if he be unseen and unknown, but raises no doubt in our minds of the existence and agency of such an artist, at some former time and in some place or other. Nor can I perceive that it varies at all the inference, whether the question arise concerning a human agent or concerning an agent of a different species, or an agent possessing in some respects a different nature.

II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right. The purpose of the machinery, the design, and the designer might be evident, and in the case supposed, would be evident, in whatever way we accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could account for it or not- It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with what design it was made : still less necessary, where the only question is whether it were made with any design at all.

III. Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of the watch, concerning which we could not discover or had not yet discovered in what manner they conduced to the general effect ; or even some parts, concerning which we could not ascertain whether they conduced to that effect in any manner whatever. For, as to the first branch of the case, if by the loss, or disorder, or decay of the parts in question, the movement of the watch were found in fact to be stopped, or disturbed, or retarded, no doubt would remain in our minds as to the utility or intention of these parts, although we should be unable to investigate the manner according to which, or the connection by which, the ultimate effect depended upon their action or assistance ; and the more complex the machine, the more likely is this obscurity to arise. Then, as to the second thing supposed, namely, that there were parts which might be spared without prejudice to the movement of the watch, and that we had proved this by experiment, these superfluous parts, even if we were completely assured that they were such, would not vacate the reasoning which we had instituted concerning other parts. The indication of contrivance remained, with respect to them, nearly as it was before.

IV. Nor, fourthly, would any man in his senses think the existence of the watch with its various machinery account- ed for, by being told that it was one out of possible combinations of material forms ; that whatever he had found in the place where he found the watch, must have contained some internal configuration or other ; and that this configuration might be the structure now exhibited, namely, of the works of a watch, as well as a different structure.

V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his inquiry more satisfaction, to be answered that there existed in things a principle of order, which had disposed the parts of the watch into their present form and situation. He never knew a watch made by the principle of order ; nor can he even form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct from the intelligence of the watchmaker.

VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so :

VII. And not less surprised to be informed, that the watch in his hand was nothing more than the result of the laws of metallic nature. It is a perversion of language to assign any law as the efficient, operative cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent ; for it is only the mode according to which an agent proceeds : it implies a power ; for it is the order according to which that power acts. Without this agent, without this power, which are both distinct from itself, the law does nothing, is nothing. The expression, " the law of metallic nature," may sound strange and harsh to a philosophic ear ; but it seems quite as justifiable as some others which are more familiar to him, such as " the law of vegetable nature," "the law of animal nature," or, indeed, as " the law of nature" in general, when assigned as the cause of phenomena, in exclusion of agency and power, or when it is substituted into the place of these?.

VIII. Neither, lastly, would our observer be driven out of his conclusion or from his confidence in its truth, by being told that he knew nothing at all about the matter. He knows enough for his argument ; he knows the utility of the end ; he knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to the end. These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affect not the certainty of his reasoning. The consciousness of knowing little need not beget a distrust of that which he does know.

Application of the Argument

            … For every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature, with the difference on the side of nature of being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation. I mean, that the contrivances of nature surpass the contrivances of art, in the complexity, subtlety, and curiosity of the mechanism ; and still more, if possible, do they go beyond them in number and variety ; yet, in a multitude of cases, are not less evidently mechanical, not less evidently contrivances, not less evidently accommodated to their end or suited to their office, than are the most perfect productions of human ingenuity.

              I know no better method of introducing so large a subject, than that of comparing a single thing with a single tiling : an eye, for example, with a telescope. As far as the examination of the instrument goes, there is precisely the same proof that the eye was made for vision, as there is that the telescope was made for assisting it. They are made upon the same principles ; both being adjusted to the laws by which the transmission and refraction of rays of light are regulated. I speak not of the origin of the laws themselves ; but such laws being fixed, the construction in both cases is adapted to them. For instance, these laws require, in order to produce the same effect, that the rays of light, in passing from water into the eye, should be refracted by a more convex surface than when it passes out of air into the eye. Accordingly we find that the eye of a fish, in that part of it called the crystalline lens, is much rounder than the eye of terrestrial animals. What plainer manifestation of design can there be than this difference ? What could a mathematical instrument maker have done more to show his knowledge of bis principle, his application of that knowledge, his suiting of his means to his end — I will not say to display the com- pass or excellence of his skill and art, for in these all comparison is indecorous, hut to testify counsel, choice, consideration, purpose?

              To some it may appear a difference sufficient to destroy all similitude between the eye and the telescope, that the one is a perceiving organ, the other an unperceiving instrument. The fact is that they are both instruments. And as to the mechanism, at least as to mechanism being employed, and even as to the kind of it, this circumstance varies not the analogy at all. For observe what the constitution of the eye is. It is necessary, in order to produce distinct vision, that an image or picture of the object be formed at the bot- tom of the eye. Whence this necessity arises, or how the picture is connected with the sensation or contributes to it, it may be difficult, nay, we will confess, if you please, impossible for us to search out. But the present question is not concerned in the inquiry. It may be true, that in this and in other instances we trace mechanical contrivance a certain way, and that then we come to something which is not mechanical, or which is inscrutable. But this affects not the certainty of our investigation, as far as we have gone. The difference between an animal and an automatic statue consists in this, that in the animal we trace the mechanism to a certain point, and then we are stopped ; either the mechanism being too subtle for our discernment, or something else ... besides the known laws of mechanism taking place ; whereas, in the automaton, for the comparatively few motions of which it is capable, we trace the mechanism throughout. But, up to the limit, the reasoning is as clear and certain in the one case as in the other. In the example before us it is a matter of certainty, because it is a matter which experience and observation demonstrate, that the formation of an image at the bottom of the eye is necessary to perfect vision The image itself can be shown. Whatever affects the distinctness of the image, affects the distinctness of the vision. The formation then of such an image being necessary — no matter how — to the sense of sight and to the exercise of that sense, the apparatus by which it is formed is constructed and put together not only with infinitely more art, but upon the selfsame principles of art, as in the telescope or the camera-obscura. The perception arising from the image may be laid out of the question ; for the production of the image, these are instruments of the same kind. The end is the same ; the means are the same. The purpose in both is alike ; the contrivance for accomplishing that purpose is in both alike. The lenses of the telescopes and the humors of the eye bear a complete resemblance to one another, in their figure, their position, and in their power over the rays of light, namely, in bringing each pencil to a point at the right distance from the lens ; namely, in the eye, at the exact place where the membrane is spread to receive it. How is it possible, under circumstances of such close affinity, and under the operation of equal evidence, to exclude contrivance from the one, yet to acknowledge the proof of contrivance having been employed, as the plainest and clearest of all propositions, in the other?

              The resemblance between the two cases is still more accurate, and obtains in more points than we have yet represented, or than we are, on the first view of the subject, aware of. ...

              Every observation which was made in our first chapter concerning the watch, may be repeated with strict propriety concerning the eye; concerning animals; concerning plants; concerning all the organized parts of the works of nature.

               When we are inquiring simply after the existence of an intelligent Creator, imperfection, inaccuracy, liability to disorder, occasional irregularities, may subsist in a consider- able degree without inducing any doubt into the question ; just as a watch may frequently go wrong, seldom perhaps exactly right, may be faulty in some parts, defective in some, without the smallest ground of suspicion from thence arising that it was not a watch, not made, or not made for the purpose ascribed to it. When faults are pointed out, and when a question is started concerning the skill of the artist, or the dexterity with which the work is executed, then, indeed, in order to defend These qualities from accusation, we must be able, either to expose some intractableness and imperfection in the materials, or point out some invincible difficulty in the execution, into which imperfection and difficulty the matter of complaint may be resolved ; or, if we cannot do this, we must adduce such specimens of consummate art and contrivance proceeding from the same hand as may convince the inquirer of the existence, m the case before him, of impediments like those which we have mentioned, although, what from the nature of the case is very likely to happen, they be unknown and unperceived by him. This we must do in order to vindicate the artist's skill, or at least the perfection of it ; as we must also judge of his intention, and of the provisions employed in fulfilling that intention, not from an instance in which they fail, but from the great plurality of instances in which they succeed. But, after all, these are different questions from the question of the artist's existence ; or, which is the same, whether the thing before us be a work of art or not ; and the questions ought always to be kept separate in the mind. So likewise it is in the works of nature Irregularities and imperfections are of little or no weight in the consideration, when that consideration relates simply to the existence of a Creator. When the argument respects his attributes, they are of weight ; but are then to be taken in conjunction — the attention is not to rest upon them, but they are to be taken in conjunction, with the unexceptionable evidences which we possess of skill, power, and benevolence displayed in other instances ; which evidences may, in strength, number, and variety, be such, and may so overpower apparent blemishes, as to induce us, upon the most reasonable ground, to believe that these last ought to be referred to some cause, though we be ignorant of it, other than defect of knowledge or of benevolence in the author.

Hume’s objections to the Teleological Argument for God

d) the inapplicability of all causal analogy.

e) The weakness of the analogy between the world and a human artefact e.g. a house, clock, ship or knitting loom

If the world were sufficiently like a known product of human design we should be entitled to infer that, like it, the world is a product of purposive activity. Hume says that we could equally well make out a case for regarding the world not as a vast machine, but as a vast crustacean-like organism, or even a floating vegetable! In short, you cannot compare inorganic matter and organic matter.

The argument explains the order found in nature by tracing its cause to a previous order existing in the mind of the creator. This reasoning assumes that a mental order – the order of the divine mind – is not in need of an explanation whereas a physical order is. By what right would we be satisfied by finding the order of the material world prefigured in an earlier order of ideas?

“If we stop, and go no farther; why go so far? Why not stop at the material world?”

Conclusion on Hume’s objections to the Teleological Argument for God

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Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Anselm: ontological argument for god’s existence.

Most of the arguments for God’s existence rely on at least one empirical premise. For example, the “fine-tuning” version of the  design argument  depends on empirical evidence of intelligent design; in particular, it turns on the empirical claim that, as a nomological matter, that is, as a matter of law, life could not have developed if certain fundamental properties of the universe were to have differed even slightly from what they are. Likewise, cosmological arguments depend on certain empirical claims about the explanation for the occurrence of empirical events.

In contrast, the ontological arguments are conceptual in roughly the following sense: just as the propositions constituting the concept of a bachelor imply that every bachelor is male, the propositions constituting the concept of God, according to the ontological argument, imply that God exists. There is, of course, this difference: whereas the concept of a bachelor explicitly contains the proposition that bachelors are unmarried, the concept of God does not explicitly contain any proposition asserting the existence of such a being. Even so, the basic idea is the same: ontological arguments attempt to show that we can deduce God’s existence from, so to speak, the very definition of God.

Table of Contents

• Introduction: The Non-Empirical Nature of the Ontological Arguments
• The Argument Described
• Gaunilo’s Criticism
• Aquinas’s Criticisms
• Kant’s Criticism: Is Existence a Perfection?
• Anselm’s Second Version of the Ontological Argument
• Modal Versions of the Argument
• References and Further Reading

1. Introduction: The Non-Empirical Nature of the Ontological Arguments

It is worth reflecting for a moment on what a remarkable (and beautiful!) undertaking it is to deduce God’s existence from the very definition of God. Normally, existential claims don’t follow from conceptual claims. If I want to prove that bachelors, unicorns, or viruses exist, it is not enough just to reflect on the concepts. I need to go out into the world and conduct some sort of empirical investigation using my senses. Likewise, if I want to prove that bachelors, unicorns, or viruses don’t exist, I must do the same. In general, positive and negative existential claims can be established only by empirical methods.

There is, however, one class of exceptions. We can prove certain negative existential claims merely by reflecting on the content of the concept. Thus, for example, we can determine that there are no square circles in the world without going out and looking under every rock to see whether there is a square circle there. We can do so merely by consulting the definition and seeing that it is self-contradictory. Thus, the very concepts imply that there exist no entities that are both square and circular.

The ontological argument, then, is unique among such arguments in that it purports to establish the real (as opposed to abstract) existence of some entity. Indeed, if the ontological arguments succeed, it is as much a contradiction to suppose that God doesn’t exist as it is to suppose that there are square circles or female bachelors. In the following sections, we will evaluate a number of different attempts to develop this astonishing strategy.

2. The Classic Version of the Ontological Argument

A. the argument described.

St. Anselm , Archbishop of Canterbury (1033-1109), is the originator of the ontological argument, which he describes in the Proslogium as follows:

[Even a] fool, when he hears of … a being than which nothing greater can be conceived … understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding.… And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.… Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

The argument in this difficult passage can accurately be summarized in standard form:

• It is a conceptual truth (or, so to speak, true by definition) that God is a being than which none greater can be imagined (that is, the greatest possible being that can be imagined).
• God exists as an idea in the mind.
• A being that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is, other things being equal, greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind.
• Thus, if God exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine something that is greater than God (that is, a greatest possible being that does exist).
• But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God (for it is a contradiction to suppose that we can imagine a being greater than the greatest possible being that can be imagined.)
• Therefore, God exists.

Intuitively, one can think of the argument as being powered by two ideas. The first, expressed by Premise 2, is that we have a coherent idea of a being that instantiates all of the perfections. Otherwise put, Premise 2 asserts that we have a coherent idea of a being that instantiates every property that makes a being greater, other things being equal, than it would have been without that property (such properties are also known as “great-making” properties). Premise 3 asserts that existence is a perfection or great-making property.

Accordingly, the very concept of a being that instantiates all the perfections implies that it exists. Suppose B is a being that instantiates all the perfections and suppose B doesn’t exist (in reality). Since Premise 3 asserts that existence is a perfection, it follows that B lacks a perfection. But this contradicts the assumption that B is a being that instantiates all the perfections. Thus, according to this reasoning, it follows that B exists.

b. Gaunilo’s Criticism

Gaunilo of Marmoutier, a monk and contemporary of Anselm’s, is responsible for one of the most important criticisms of Anselm’s argument. It is quite reasonable to worry that Anselm’s argument illegitimately moves from the existence of an idea to the existence of a thing that corresponds to the idea. As the objection is sometimes put, Anselm simply defines things into existence-and this cannot be done.

Gaunilo shared this worry, believing that one could use Anselm’s argument to show the existence of all kinds of non-existent things:

Now if some one should tell me that there is … an island [than which none greater can be conceived], I should easily understand his words, in which there is no difficulty. But suppose that he went on to say, as if by a logical inference: “You can no longer doubt that this island which is more excellent than all lands exists somewhere, since you have no doubt that it is in your understanding. And since it is more excellent not to be in the understanding alone, but to exist both in the understanding and in reality, for this reason it must exist. For if it does not exist, any land which really exists will be more excellent than it; and so the island understood by you to be more excellent will not be more excellent.”

Gaunilo’s argument, thus, proceeds by attempting to use Anselm’s strategy to deduce the existence of a perfect island, which Gaunilo rightly views as a counterexample to the argument form. The counterexample can be expressed as follows:

• It is a conceptual truth that a piland is an island than which none greater can be imagined (that is, the greatest possible island that can be imagined).
• A piland exists as an idea in the mind.
• A piland that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is greater than a piland that exists only as an idea in the mind.
• Thus, if a piland exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine an island that is greater than a piland (that is, a greatest possible island that does exist).
• But we cannot imagine an island that is greater than a piland.
• Therefore, a piland exists.

Notice, however, that premise 1 of Gaunilo’s argument is incoherent. The problem here is that the qualities that make an island great are not the sort of qualities that admit of conceptually maximal qualities. No matter how great any island is in some respect, it is always possible to imagine an island greater than that island in that very respect. For example, if one thinks that abundant fruit is a great-making property for an island, then, no matter how great a particular island might be, it will always be possible to imagine a greater island because there is no intrinsic maximum for fruit-abundance. For this reason, the very concept of a piland is incoherent.

But this is not true of the concept of God as Anselm conceives it. Properties like knowledge, power, and moral goodness, which comprise the concept of a maximally great being, do have intrinsic maximums. For example, perfect knowledge requires knowing all and only true propositions; it is conceptually impossible to know more than this. Likewise, perfect power means being able to do everything that it is possible to do; it is conceptually impossible for a being to be able to do more than this.

The general point here, then, is this: Anselm’s argument works, if at all, only for concepts that are entirely defined in terms of properties that admit of some sort of intrinsic maximum. As C.D. Broad puts this important point:

[The notion of a greatest possible being imaginable assumes that] each positive property is to be present in the highest possible degree. Now this will be meaningless verbiage unless there is some intrinsic maximum or upper limit to the possible intensity of every positive property which is capable of degrees. With some magnitudes this condition is fulfilled. It is, e.g., logically impossible that any proper fraction should exceed the ratio 1/1; and again, on a certain definition of “angle,” it is logically impossible for any angle to exceed four right angles. But it seems quite clear that there are other properties, such as length or temperature or pain, to which there is no intrinsic maximum or upper limit of degree.

If any of the properties that are conceptually essential to the notion of God do not admit of an intrinsic maximum, then Anselm’s argument strategy will not work because, like Guanilo’s concept of a piland, the relevant concept of God is incoherent. But insofar as the relevant great-making properties are limited to omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection (which do admit of intrinsic maximums), Anselm’s notion of a greatest possible being seems to avoid the worry expressed by Broad and Guanilo.

c. Aquinas’s Criticisms

While St. Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) believed that God’s existence is self-evident, he rejected the idea that it can be deduced from claims about the concept of God. Aquinas argued, plausibly enough, that “not everyone who hears this word ‘God’ understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body.” The idea here is that, since different people have different concepts of God, this argument works, if at all, only to convince those who define the notion of God in the same way.

The problem with this criticism is that the ontological argument can be restated without defining God. To see this, simply delete premise 1 and replace each instance of “God” with “A being than which none greater can be conceived.” The conclusion, then, will be that a being than which none greater can be conceived exists – and it is, of course, quite natural to name this being God.

Nevertheless, Aquinas had a second problem with the ontological argument. On Aquinas’s view, even if we assume that everyone shares the same concept of God as a being than which none greater can be imagined, “it does not therefore follow that he understands what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally.”

One natural interpretation of this somewhat ambiguous passage is that Aquinas is rejecting premise 2 of Anselm’s argument on the ground that, while we can rehearse the words “a being than which none greater can be imagined” in our minds, we have no idea of what this sequence of words really means. On this view, God is unlike any other reality known to us; while we can easily understand concepts of finite things, the concept of an infinitely great being dwarfs finite human understanding. We can, of course, try to associate the phrase “a being than which none greater can be imagined” with more familiar finite concepts, but these finite concepts are so far from being an adequate description of God, that it is fair to say they don’t help us to get a detailed idea of God.

Nevertheless, the success of the argument doesn’t depend on our having a complete understanding of the concept of a being than which none greater can be conceived. Consider, for example, that, while we don’t have a complete understanding (whatever this means) of the concept of a natural number than which none larger can be imagined, we understand it well enough to see that there does not exist such a number. No more complete understanding of the concept of a maximally great being than this is required, on Anselm’s view, to successfully make the argument. If the concept is coherent, then even a minimal understanding of the concept is sufficient to make the argument.

d. Kant’s Criticism: Is Existence a Perfection?

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) directs his famous objection at premise 3’s claim that a being that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind. According to premise 3, existence is what’s known as a great-making property or, as the matter is sometimes put, a perfection. Premise 3 thus entails that (1) existence is a property; and (2) instantiating existence makes a thing better, other things being equal, than it would have been otherwise.

Kant rejects premise 3 on the ground that, as a purely formal matter, existence does not function as a predicate. As Kant puts the point:

Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of something which is added to the conception of some other thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgement. The proposition, God is omnipotent , contains two conceptions, which have a certain object or content; the word is , is no additional predicate-it merely indicates the relation of the predicate to the subject. Now if I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one), and say, God is , or There is a God , I add no new predicate to the conception of God, I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its predicates – I posit the object in relation to my conception.

Accordingly, what goes wrong with the first version of the ontological argument is that the notion of existence is being treated as the wrong logical type. Concepts, as a logical matter, are defined entirely in terms of logical predicates. Since existence isn’t a logical predicate, it doesn’t belong to the concept of God; it rather affirms that the existence of something that satisfies the predicates defining the concept of God.

While Kant’s criticism is phrased (somewhat obscurely) in terms of the logic of predicates and copulas, it also makes a plausible metaphysical point. Existence is not a property (in, say, the way that being red is a property of an apple). Rather it is a precondition for the instantiation of properties in the following sense: it is not possible for a non-existent thing to instantiate any properties because there is nothing to which, so to speak, a property can stick. Nothing has no qualities whatsoever. To say that x instantiates a property P is hence to presuppose that x exists. Thus, on this line of reasoning, existence isn’t a great-making property because it is not a property at all; it is rather a metaphysically necessary condition for the instantiation of any properties.

But even if we concede that existence is a property, it does not seem to be the sort of property that makes something better for having it. Norman Malcolm expresses the argument as follows:

The doctrine that existence is a perfection is remarkably queer. It makes sense and is true to say that my future house will be a better one if it is insulated than if it is not insulated; but what could it mean to say that it will be a better house if it exists than if it does not? My future child will be a better man if he is honest than if he is not; but who would understand the saying that he will be a better man if he exists than if he does not? Or who understands the saying that if God exists He is more perfect than if he does not exist? One might say, with some intelligibility, that it would be better (for oneself or for mankind) if God exists than if He does not-but that is a different matter.

The idea here is that existence is very different from, say, the property of lovingness. A being that is loving is, other things being equal, better or greater than a being that is not. But it seems very strange to think that a loving being that exists is, other things being equal, better or greater than a loving being that doesn’t exist. But to the extent that existence doesn’t add to the greatness of a thing, the classic version of the ontological argument fails.

3. Anselm’s Second Version of the Ontological Argument

As it turns out, there are two different versions of the ontological argument in the Prosologium . The second version does not rely on the highly problematic claim that existence is a property and hence avoids many of the objections to the classic version. Here is the second version of the ontological argument as Anselm states it:

God is that, than which nothing greater can be conceived.… And [God] assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O Lord, our God.

This version of the argument relies on two important claims. As before, the argument includes a premise asserting that God is a being than which a greater cannot be conceived. But this version of the argument, unlike the first, does not rely on the claim that existence is a perfection; instead it relies on the claim that necessary existence is a perfection. This latter claim asserts that a being whose existence is necessary is greater than a being whose existence is not necessary. Otherwise put, then, the second key claim is that a being whose non-existence is logically impossible is greater than a being whose non-existence is logically possible.

More formally, the argument is this:

• By definition, God is a being than which none greater can be imagined.
• A being that necessarily exists in reality is greater than a being that does not necessarily exist.
• Thus, by definition, if God exists as an idea in the mind but does not necessarily exist in reality, then we can imagine something that is greater than God.
• But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God.
• Thus, if God exists in the mind as an idea, then God necessarily exists in reality.
• God exists in the mind as an idea.
• Therefore, God necessarily exists in reality.

This second version appears to be less vulnerable to Kantian criticisms than the first. To begin with, necessary existence, unlike mere existence, seems clearly to be a property. Notice, for example, that the claim that x necessarily exists entails a number of claims that attribute particular properties to x . For example, if x necessarily exists, then its existence does not depend on the existence of any being (unlike contingent human beings whose existence depends, at the very least, on the existence of their parents). And this seems to entail that x has the reason for its existence in its own nature. But these latter claims clearly attribute particular properties to x .

And only a claim that attributes a particular property can entail claims that attribute particular properties. While the claim that x exists clearly entails that x has at least one property, this does not help. We cannot soundly infer any claims that attribute particular properties to x from either the claim that x exists or the claim that x has at least one property; indeed, the claim that x has at least one property no more expresses a particular property than the claim that x exists. This distinguishes the claim that x exists from the claim that x necessarily exists and hence seems to imply that the latter, and only the latter, expresses a property.

Moreover, one can plausibly argue that necessary existence is a great-making property. To say that a being necessarily exists is to say that it exists eternally in every logically possible world; such a being is not just, so to speak, indestructible in this world, but indestructible in every logically possible world – and this does seem, at first blush, to be a great-making property. As Malcolm puts the point:

If a housewife has a set of extremely fragile dishes, then as dishes, they are inferior to those of another set like them in all respects except that they are not fragile. Those of the first set are dependent for their continued existence on gentle handling; those of the second set are not. There is a definite connection between the notions of dependency and inferiority, and independence and superiority. To say that something which was dependent on nothing whatever was superior to anything that was dependent on any way upon anything is quite in keeping with the everyday use of the terms superior and greater.

Nevertheless, the matter is not so clear as Malcolm believes. It might be the case that, other things being equal, a set of dishes that is indestructible in this world is greater than a set of dishes that is not indestructible in this world. But it is very hard to see how transworld indestructibility adds anything to the greatness of a set of dishes that is indestructible in this world. From our perspective, there is simply nothing to be gained by adding transworld indestructibility to a set of dishes that is actually indestructible. There is simply nothing that a set of dishes that is indestructible in every possible world can do in this world that can’t be done by a set of dishes that is indestructible in this world but not in every other world.

And the same seems to be true of God. Suppose that an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, eternal (and hence, so to speak, indestructible), personal God exists in this world but not in some other worlds. It is very hard to make sense of the claim that such a God is deficient in some relevant respect. God’s indestructibility in this world means that God exists eternally in all logically possible worlds that resemble this one in certain salient respects. It is simply unclear how existence in these other worlds that bear no resemblance to this one would make God greater and hence more worthy of worship. From our perspective, necessary existence adds nothing in value to eternal existence. If this is correct, then Anselm’s second version of the argument also fails.

4. Modal Versions of the Argument

Even if, however, we assume that Anselm’s second version of the argument can be defended against such objections, there is a further problem: it isn’t very convincing because it is so difficult to tell whether the argument is sound. Thus, the most important contemporary defender of the argument, Alvin Plantinga, complains “[a]t first sight, Anselm’s argument is remarkably unconvincing if not downright irritating; it looks too much like a parlor puzzle or word magic.” As a result, despite its enduring importance, the ontological argument has brought few people to theism.

There have been several attempts to render the persuasive force of the ontological argument more transparent by recasting it using the logical structures of contemporary modal logic. One influential attempts to ground the ontological argument in the notion of God as an unlimited being. As Malcolm describes this idea:

God is usually conceived of as an unlimited being. He is conceived of as a being who could not be limited, that is, as an absolutely unlimited being.… If God is conceived to be an absolutely unlimited being He must be conceived to be unlimited in regard to His existence as well as His operation. In this conception it will not make sense to say that He depends on anything for coming into or continuing in existence. Nor, as Spinoza observed, will it make sense to say that something could prevent Him from existing. Lack of moisture can prevent trees from existing in a certain region of the earth. But it would be contrary to the concept of God as an unlimited being to suppose that anything … could prevent Him from existing.

The unlimited character of God, then, entails that his existence is different from ours in this respect: while our existence depends causally on the existence of other beings (e.g., our parents), God’s existence does not depend causally on the existence of any other being.

Further, on Malcolm’s view, the existence of an unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible. Here is his argument for this important claim. Either an unlimited being exists at world W or it doesn’t exist at world W ; there are no other possibilities. If an unlimited being does not exist in W , then its nonexistence cannot be explained by reference to any causally contingent feature of W ; accordingly, there is no contingent feature of W that explains why that being doesn’t exist. Now suppose, per reductio , an unlimited being exists in some other world W’ . If so, then it must be some contingent feature f of W’ that explains why that being exists in that world. But this entails that the nonexistence of an unlimited being in W can be explained by the absence of f in W ; and this contradicts the claim that its nonexistence in W can’t be explained by reference to any causally contingent feature. Thus, if God doesn’t exist at W , then God doesn’t exist in any logically possible world.

A very similar argument can be given for the claim that an unlimited being exists in every logically possible world if it exists in some possible world W ; the details are left for the interested reader. Since there are only two possibilities with respect to W and one entails the impossibility of an unlimited being and the other entails the necessity of an unlimited being, it follows that the existence of an unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible.

All that is left, then, to complete Malcolm’s elegant version of the proof is the premise that the existence of an unlimited being is not logically impossible – and this seems plausible enough. The existence of an unlimited being is logically impossible only if the concept of an unlimited being is self-contradictory. Since we have no reason, on Malcolm’s view to think the existence of an unlimited being is self-contradictory, it follows that an unlimited being, i.e., God, exists. Here’s the argument reduced to its basic elements:

• God is, as a conceptual matter (that is, as a matter of definition) an unlimited being.
• The existence of an unlimited being is either logically necessary or logically impossible.
• The existence of an unlimited being is not logically impossible.
• Therefore, the existence of God is logically necessary.

Notice that Malcolm’s version of the argument does not turn on the claim that necessary existence is a great-making property. Rather, as we saw above, Malcolm attempts to argue that there are only two possibilities with respect to the existence of an unlimited being: either it is necessary or it is impossible. And notice that his argument does not turn in any way on characterizing the property necessary existence as making something that instantiates that property better than it would be without it. Thus, Malcolm’s version of the argument is not vulnerable to the criticisms of Anselm’s claim that necessary existence is a perfection.

But while Malcolm’s version of the argument is, moreover, considerably easier to understand than Anselm’s versions, it is also vulnerable to objection. In particular, Premise 2 is not obviously correct. The claim that an unlimited being B exists at some world W clearly entails that B always exists at W (that is, that B ‘s existence is eternal or everlasting in W ), but this doesn’t clearly entail that B necessarily exists (that is, that B exists at every logically possible world). To defend this further claim, one needs to give an argument that the notion of a contingent eternal being is self-contradictory.

Similarly, the claim that an unlimited being B does not exist at W clearly entails that B never exists at W (that is, that it is always true in W that B doesn’t exist), but it doesn’t clearly entail that B necessarily doesn’t exist (that is, B exists at no logically possible world or B ‘s existence is logically impossible. Indeed, there are plenty of beings that will probably never exist in this world that exist in other logically possible worlds, like unicorns. For this reason, Premise 2 of Malcolm’s version is questionable.

Perhaps the most influential of contemporary modal arguments is Plantinga’s version. Plantinga begins by defining two properties, the property of maximal greatness and the property of maximal excellence, as follows:

• A being is maximally excellent in a world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect in W; and
• A being is maximally great in a world W if and only if it is maximally excellent in every possible world.

Thus, maximal greatness entails existence in every possible world: since a being that is maximally great at W is omnipotent at every possible world and non-existent beings can’t be omnipotent, it follows that a maximally great being exists in every logically possible world.

Accordingly, the trick is to show that a maximally great being exists in some world W because it immediately follows from this claim that such a being exists in every world, including our own. But notice that the claim that a maximally great being exists in some world is logically equivalent to the claim that the concept of a maximally great being is not self-contradictory; for the only things that don’t exist in any possible world are things that are conceptually defined in terms of contradictory properties. There is no logically possible world in which a square circle exists (given the relevant concepts) because the property of being square is inconsistent with the property of being circular.

Since, on Plantinga’s view, the concept of a maximally great being is consistent and hence possibly instantiated, it follows that such a being, i.e., God, exists in every possible world. Here is a schematic representation of the argument:

• The concept of a maximally great being is self-consistent.
• If 1, then there is at least one logically possible world in which a maximally great being exists.
• Therefore, there is at least one logically possible world in which a maximally great being exists.
• If a maximally great being exists in one logically possible world, it exists in every logically possible world.
• Therefore, a maximally great being (that is, God) exists in every logically possible world.

It is sometimes objected that Plantinga’s Premise 4 is an instance of a controversial general modal principle. The S5 system of modal logic includes an axiom that looks suspiciously similar to Premise 4:

AxS5: If A is possible, then it is necessarily true that A is possible.

The intuition underlying AxS5 is, as James Sennett puts it, that “all propositions bear their modal status necessarily.” But, according to this line of criticism, Plantinga’s version is unconvincing insofar as it rests on a controversial principle of modal logic.

To see that this criticism is unfounded, it suffices to make two observations. First, notice that the following propositions are not logically equivalent:

PL4 If “A maximally great being exists” is possible, then “A maximally great being exists” is necessarily true.

PL4* If “A maximally great being exists” is possible, then it is necessarily true that “A maximally great being exists” is possible.

PL4 is, of course, Plantinga’s Premise 4 slightly reworded, while PL4* is simply a straightforward instance of AxS5. While PL4 implies PL4* (since if A is true at every world, it is possible at every world), PL4* doesn’t imply PL4; for PL4 clearly makes a much stronger claim than PL4*.

Second, notice that the argument for Premise 4 does not make any reference to the claim that all propositions bear their modal status necessarily. Plantinga simply builds necessary existence into the very notion of maximal greatness. Since, by definition, a being that is maximally great at W is omnipotent at every possible world and a being that does not exist at some world W’ cannot be omnipotent at W’ , it straightforwardly follows, without the help of anything like the controversial S5 axiom, that a maximally great being exists in every logically possible world.

Indeed, it is for this very reason that Plantinga avoids the objection to Malcolm’s argument that was considered above. Since the notion of maximal greatness, in contrast to the notion of an unlimited being as Malcolm defines it, is conceived in terms that straightforwardly entail existence in every logically possible world (and hence eternal existence in every logically possible world), there are no worries about whether maximal greatness, in contrast to unlimitedness, entails something stronger than eternal existence.

IV. Is the Concept of a Maximally Great Being Coherent?

As is readily evident, each version of the ontological argument rests on the assumption that the concept of God, as it is described in the argument, is self-consistent. Both versions of Anselm’s argument rely on the claim that the idea of God (that is, a being than which none greater can be conceived) “exists as an idea in the understanding.” Similarly, Plantinga’s version relies on the more transparent claim that the concept of maximal greatness is self-consistent.

But many philosophers are skeptical about the underlying assumption, as Leibniz describes it, “that this idea of the all-great or all-perfect being is possible and implies no contradiction.” Here is the problem as C.D. Broad expresses it:

Let us suppose, e.g., that there were just three positive properties X , Y , and Z ; that any two of them are compatible with each other; but that the presence of any two excludes the remaining one. Then there would be three possible beings, namely, one which combines X and Y , one which combines Y and Z , and one which combines Z and X , each of which would be such that nothing … superior to it is logically possible. For the only kind of being which would be … superior to any of these would be one which had all three properties, X , Y , and Z ; and, by hypothesis, this combination is logically impossible.… It is now plain that, unless all positive properties be compatible with each other, this phrase [i.e., “a being than which none greater can be imagined”] is just meaningless verbiage like the phrase “the greatest possible integer.”

Thus, if there are two great-making characteristics essential to the classically theistic notion of an all-perfect God that are logically incompatible, it follows that this notion is incoherent.

Here it is important to note that all versions of the ontological argument assume that God is simultaneously omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. As we have seen, Plantinga expressly defines maximal excellence in such terms. Though Anselm doesn’t expressly address the issue, it is clear (1) that he is attempting to show the existence of the God of classical theism; and (2) that the great-making properties include those of omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection.

There are a number of plausible arguments for thinking that even this restricted set of properties is logically inconsistent. For example, moral perfection is thought to entail being both perfectly merciful and perfectly just. But these two properties seem to contradict each other. To be perfectly just is always to give every person exactly what she deserves. But to be perfectly merciful is to give at least some persons less punishment than they deserve. If so, then a being cannot be perfectly just and perfectly merciful. Thus, if moral perfection entails, as seems reasonable, being perfectly just and merciful, then the concept of moral perfection is inconsistent.

The problem of divine foreknowledge can also be seen as denying that omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection constitute a coherent set. Roughly put, the problem of divine foreknowledge is as follows. If God is omniscient, then God knows what every person will do at every moment t . To say that a person p has free will is to say that there is at least one moment t at which p does A but could have done other than A. But if a person p who does A at t has the ability to do other than A at t , then it follows that p has the ability to bring it about that an omniscient God has a false belief – and this is clearly impossible.

On this line of analysis, then, it follows that it is logically impossible for a being to simultaneously instantiate omniscience and omnipotence. Omnipotence entails the power to create free beings, but omniscience rules out the possibility that such beings exist. Thus, a being that is omniscient lacks the ability to create free beings and is hence not omnipotent. Conversely, a being that is omnipotent has the power to create free beings and hence does not know what such beings would do if they existed. Thus, the argument concludes that omniscience and omnipotence are logically incompatible. If this is correct, then all versions of the ontological argument fail.

5. References and Further Reading

• Anselm, St., Anselm’s Basic Writings , translated by S.W. Deane, 2 nd Ed. (La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Co., 1962)
• Aquinas, Thomas, St., Summa Theologica (1a Q2), “Whether the Existence of God is Self-Evident (Thomas More Publishing, 1981)
• Barnes, Jonathan, The Ontological Argument (London: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1972)
• Broad, C.D., Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953)
• Findlay, J.N., “God’s Existence is Necessarily Impossible,” from Flew, Antony and MacIntyre, Alasdair, New Essays in Philosophical Theology (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1955)
• Gale, Richard, On the Nature and Existence of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)
• Hartshore, Charles, The Logic of Perfection (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1962)
• Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Lectures on the History of Philosophy , translated by E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simson (London, Kegan Paul, 1896)
• Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason , translated by J.M.D. Meiklejohn (New York: Colonial Press, 1900)
• Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding , translated by A.G. Langley (Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing, 1896).
• Malcolm, Norman, “Anselm’s Ontological Argument,” Philosophical Review , vol. 69, no. 1 (1960), 41-62
• Miller, Ed L., God and Reason , 2 nd Ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1995)
• Pike, Nelson, “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action,” Philosophical Review , vol. 74 (1965)
• Plantinga, Alvin, God, Freedom, and Evil (New York: Harper and Row, 1974)
• Plantinga, Alvin, The Ontological Argument from St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965)
• Pojman, Louis, Philosophy of Religion (London: Mayfield Publishing Co., 2001)
• Rowe, William, “Modal Versions of the Ontological Argument,” in Pojman, Louis (ed.), Philosophy of Religion , 3 rd Ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1998)
• Sennett, James F., “Universe Indexed Properties and the Fate of the Ontological Argument,” Religious Studies , vol. 27 (1991), 65-79

Author Information

Kenneth Einar Himma Email: [email protected] Seattle Pacific University U. S. A.

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Critically compare the cosmological and teleological arguments for God’s existence. [40]

St Thomas Aquinas presents five ways of demonstrating God’s existence based on observation in his Summa Theologica (1,2,3).  The first four of these ways are Cosmological arguments, reasoning from observations of movement, efficient causation, contingency and grades of perfection in the universe a posteriori to the conclusion that God as a Prime Mover, uncaused cause, necessary being and supreme perfection must exist.  The fifth way is a teleological argument, reasoning from observation of order and purpose (teleology) in the universe a posteriori to the existence of an intelligent designer “ which is what everybody calls God .”  Clearly, Aquinas saw both Cosmological and Teleological Arguments as persuasive arguments for God’s existence, however the Teleological Argument offers better support to the God of Christian worship than the Cosmological Argument does.

David Hume criticised cosmological arguments in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779).  His character Philo pointed out that it is based on limited observations of the universe.  For all we know there might be uncaused things out there… as indeed Quantum Physics and Particle Physics has since shown to be the case.  Further, the argument is based on the fallacy of composition, the assumption that just because the parts of the universe have a cause that the whole universe must have a cause.  As Bertrand Russell later pointed out; just because all men have mothers doesn’t mean that the human race has a mother, it could be that the universe is a “ brute fact ”.  Hume’s criticisms of the cosmological argument are difficult to overcome.  While it is fair to say that Hume’s claims about the limitations of human observations as the basis for knowledge about natural laws are just as much of a problem for science as they are for religion, his other criticisms hit hard.  In truth, the universe might, for all we know, be uncaused or be its own cause.  It is fair to ask why what is true of the part should also have to be true of the whole.  Although William Lane Craig argues that the cosmological argument – at least in his own Kalam version, which stops short of concluding that the Prime Mover is “ what everybody calls God ” – is the best support for the reasonableness of faith, his claims about the impossibility of an actual infinite and about the Big Bang theory needing a cause have been shown to be mistaken by critics such as Erik Sotnak and Stephen Hawking.  While the cosmological argument might superficially seem to be supported by Big Bang theory, in reality Cosmology shows that the idea of causation cannot apply outside the space-time matrix of our universe.  While it seems incredible, as Terry Pratchett quipped, science proposes that “ in the beginning there was nothing, which exploded .” It is clear, therefore, that the cosmological argument is not persuasive. 

Hume’s character Philo also attacked the teleological argument in the Dialogues , criticising the tendency to make the argument using inappropriate analogies and pointing out apparent imperfections in the design of the universe, which might undermine the idea that the designer would be perfect.  Later, both Charles Darwin and JS Mill pointed out the brutality in nature and reasoning that an Ichneumon wasp could not have been designed by the God of Christianity.

“ Nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another are nature’s everyday performances. ”  Mill: Three Essays on Religion

Nevertheless, these critics all failed to exclude the possibility that the universe could be designed to contain evil for some morally sufficient reason.  As St. Augustine argued, it could be that natural evil in the world is a just punishment for sin.  Moral evil could be the necessary bi-product of human freedom.  Evil does not necessarily undermine the claim that the universe was designed by God.  Alternatively, as John Hick argued, suffering could be positively created by God to afford the opportunity for “ soul-making ” with any injustices being accounted for through an afterlife.  Further, there are versions of the teleological argument which do not rely on spurious analogies – such as FR Tennant’s aesthetic argument and anthropic principle.  These are more persuasive than the cosmological argument.  Hume’s criticisms fall short of undermining Tennant’s claim that God is needed to explain beauty and human consciousness in the universe and evolution through natural selection fails to explain these aspects of the universe adequately either.  Modern Intelligent Design arguments – such as those proposed by Michael Behe from irreducible complexity and by William Dembski from specified complexity – show that evolution cannot provide the complete explanation that atheists like Richard Dawkins claim it can.  While Paley’s argument in Natural Theology can be rightly criticised for its use of the famous watchmaker analogy, its appeal to our incredulity at the scientific claim that all this could have arisen by chance is powerful.  To accept that evolution through natural selection can provide a complete explanation of the universe and that there is no intelligence guiding it is difficult to accept.  Take the Japanese puffer-fish… can evolution really account for the extent of the intricacy and beauty of its designs?  It is clear, therefore, that the teleological argument is more persuasive than the cosmological argument.

In addition, even if the cosmological argument was persuasive, it would only serve to demonstrate the existence of a Prime Mover, an uncaused cause, a necessary being outside time and space.  It is not easy to see how this being could be the God of Christian worship.  Aristotle stopped short of claiming that the Prime Mover could be a God in any normal sense, its power being limited to supporting the existence of all contingent things and its goodness being limited to being fully actualised and containing no potential. How could a God who is outside time and space act to create the universe when there could be no time before during or after his action and when there would be no space to differentiate the creation from the creator?  Both human understanding and the language which tries to communicate it struggles to cope with objects outside the space-time matrix which bounds our experience.  It might, of course, be fair to say that human understanding and language cannot expect to be able to comprehend or describe God.  Yet, without the ability to claim that God exists, that God is the all-powerful creator and that God is good with some content, it is difficult to see how Religion could prosper.  St. Thomas Aquinas attempted to show how human language could be used to describe God in positive terms as analogies, but even he admitted that he content of attributes such as goodness must needs be limited and cannot be understood in the same way as human goodness.  The teleological argument, by contrast, does not rely on locating God outside time and space.  As the intelligent designer, it seems likely that God would have defined the purpose of the universe from within the same logical framework which governs its operation today.  In this way, God’s power and goodness have real content, as they relate to how He created the complex order and purposiveness we can observe.  It follows that the teleological argument offers better support for the God of Christian worship than the cosmological argument does.

In conclusion, the teleological argument offers better support for the God of Christian worship than the cosmological argument does.   Clearly, the teleological argument relies on the possibility of defending God’s goodness and power against charges of creating or allowing evil and suffering, but it is still more persuasive than the cosmological argument.  Even Immanuel Kant, who rejected all the classical arguments for God’s existence in his Critique of Pure Reason, saw the age and persistence of the teleological argument as pointers to its status as the most powerful of the arguments for God’s existence.

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Teleological Argument: The Strongest Proof of God?

Can there be conclusive proof for the existence of God? In this article, we dive into the "teleological argument" to find out more.

Have you ever noticed that everything in the universe seems to work? That our body is so intricately designed to support life, and that everything in the universe is so finely interconnected with everything else. Does it not then follow that this intricacy and purposiveness of design is indicative of a Supreme Creator, of God? This is known as the ‘teleological argument’ and is what we will explore in this article.

Teleological Argument: An Introduction

The term ‘teleology’ can be understood by looking at its Greek origin. It comes from the word telos , meaning ‘end’ or ‘goal,’ as well as logos , meaning ‘explanation.’ So, in simple terms, it can be thought of as meaning ‘end-explanation.’ More specifically, it refers to things which are explained in relation to their purpose, rather than as a consequence of their causes. For example, if you believe that human life has some or other purpose, then you have a teleological picture of humanity.

The ‘teleological arguments’ are a group of interrelated arguments in favor of the existence of God . Variations of the arguments are, among others, the ‘argument from design,’ the ‘argument from regularity,’ the ‘intelligent design argument’ and the ‘fine-tuning argument.’

The first premise of teleological arguments looks at natural phenomena, recognizing their extreme detail, structure, and functional nature in achieving a purpose. The argument ends with the conclusion that this must be the work – the creation – of a deliberative mind, that being God.

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The argument tends to be structured in the following way:

• The universe and/or world exhibits x
• The nature of x would suggest design by an intelligent mind
• Thus, the universe must be the product of intelligent design

William Paley’s Argument from Design

The teleological argument is present in much of the scripture of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, and is thought to trace back at least to Socrates in ancient Greece. One of its first philosophically rigorous expressions was in Saint Thomas Aquinas’ (1225-74) ‘Fifth Way.’ However, the most famous articulation of the argument from design came from English philosopher William Paley (1743-1805) in his Natural Theology (1802). It is expressed as follows.

Paley invites us to imagine finding a watch on a deserted beach. He then asks us to consider how we would explain its origin. It is unlikely we would explain it away as simply having been there forever, having come into existence through a series of causal events. Rather, due to its complexity of design, its interconnectedness with every other part of itself, and its clear purposiveness, we would likely think that it had been designed by an intelligent mind .

Paley then uses this observation to make an analogy. Just as the watch bears all the marks of design – of a watch-maker – so too does the universe bear all the marks of design – of a universe-maker. Moreover, Paley emphasizes the fact that the universe is exponentially more complex and purposive in its design:

“The contrivances of nature surpass the contrivances of art, in the complexity, subtlety, and curiosity of the mechanism” (Paley, 1802).

When we look at the human body, it exemplifies a purposiveness of design in every minuscule part. From our kidneys to our stomach, our eyes to our ears, every part of our body serves a distinctive purpose, operating not only as individual elements but also as one interconnected system. Surely, as we accept the existence of the watch-maker, we must similarly accept that of a universe-maker?

Richard Swinburne’s Argument from Regularity

A variation of the teleological argument is that of the argument from regularity. It can best be summed up by the words of English philosopher Richard Swinburne, a contemporary proponent of the argument:

“The universe might have so naturally been chaotic, but it is not – it is very orderly.” (Swinburne, 1979)

It is observed that everything in the universe seems to be perfectly aligned to support human life as well as many other natural phenomena. Yet, it could have so easily not been. If the universe did not have carbon-producing stars, if the composition of the ocean or the atmosphere was different, or if the universe was slightly colder or warmer, there would be no life. The universe is clearly ‘fine-tuned’ to support life: this is known as the fine-tuning argument.

Is this not evidence of a designer?

David Hume’s Response

You may, perhaps, be convinced by the argument for design. For many people, it articulates a feeling about the universe they’ve always had. Yet, on the other hand, you may equally be skeptical of its inductive conclusion. Either way, we’re now going to turn to look at its criticisms, beginning with some of the most famous ones put forward by Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776).

Hume laid out his rebuttal of the teleological argument in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) through the characters of Cleanthes and Philo.

Hume first began by calling into question the strength of the watchmaker analogy. Cleanthes puts forward a variation of the argument from design via an analogy with man-made objects. Philo proceeds to pick apart this argument.

Philo first questions the validity of the analogy. If we are to suggest that the universe was designed by a mind in some way similar to ours, then where are we to draw the line of similarity? Does this mind also possess emotions, for example? Is this mind part of a body similar to ours, with all its fallibilities? This criticism of the analogy highlights the problem of anthropomorphism present in the inductive leap from the argument’s premises to its conclusion.

Philo then makes the point that if we are to truly apply the analogy, then the argument of design results in a belief in polytheism . Though the watch may require only one ‘maker’ or designer, this is not the case with many other man-made objects. For example, a bridge or skyscraper requires hundreds of individuals, working in specified, various roles, to achieve its construction. Therefore – following in line with the analogy – surely the universe would have likewise required hundreds of gods to spur its creation?

By advancing this argument, Hume is not offering support for polytheism but is rather highlighting the flawed nature of the analogy. He concludes that, even if we are to allow for a designer, we can ultimately know very little of the mind behind it all. In continuation of the analogy and its flaws, Hume makes the pithy observation that:

“This world, for aught he knows […] was only the first rude essay of some infant deity who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance.” (Hume, 1779)

Hume further disproves the analogy. We know that the watch comes from the watchmaker and the house from the architect. We know this empirically, i.e. based on our experience. However, we have no experiential evidence of universe-makers. We would need to have some sort of similar experience with universe-makers and/or the creation of material worlds to properly make this analogy. Therefore, due to this huge inferential leap, the argument is barely even comparing like with like.

Darwinism and God

Charles Darwin’s (1802-1882) theory of evolution, as described in his On the Origin of Species , challenges one of the central assumptions of the teleological argument.

Proponents of the teleological argument highlight the exquisite ways in which everything is designed for its habitat. The long neck of the giraffe allows it to access higher branches and leaves; the polar bear’s white coat allows it to camouflage itself while hunting. Proponents of the argument point to this as conclusive evidence of objects designed specifically for their environments.

However, in doing this, proponents of this line of thinking are treating adaptation as a fixed, static process. On the contrary, Darwinism argues that adaptation is a dynamic process, accounting for the long, gradual process of evolution.

In the Darwinian evolutionary view, there is a superabundance of life, which results in a struggle for existence. Those organisms whose features are best suited to their respective environments will have a competitive advantage over those whose features are not. These better-adapted organisms will be more likely to survive and reproduce, passing their genetic advantages on to their offspring. Thus, over many generations, species evolve to suit their respective environments. This, of course, gives the misleading appearance of species ‘designed’ to fit in their environments.

As best described by British philosopher Brian Davies:

“What accounts for the appearance of design is the disappearance of the unfit […] They have all been killed off.” (Davies, 1982)

Similarly, contemporary atheist Richard Dawkins has emphasized how the theory of evolution exposes the false dichotomy of the argument from design.

Proponents of the argument from design ask us to explain the manifold adaptations of nature and the finely-tuned universe as either the result of design or chance. The likelihood of all these things occurring by chance is improbable. Thus, we are forced to turn to design as the better answer. However, as emphasized by Dawkins, Darwinism gives us a third option, which is not the same as chance, that being the process of gradual evolution over millions of years.

Thus, instead of seeing the human eye as either an ‘accident’ of nature or the handiwork of a deity, we can rather explain it as the result of millions of years of evolution.

The Teleological Argument Meets the Problem of Evil

‘ The problem of evil ’ refers to the issue of reconciling so much suffering in the world with the classical values ascribed to God. While this is not a direct refutation of the teleological argument, it does put the question to the theistic claims made by those who propose it.

The theistic creator is traditionally thought to be all-powerful (omnipotent), all-loving (omnibenevolent), and all-knowing (omniscient), among other things. Given this, let’s revisit the argument from design – this time from an alternative perspective.

If we look at our world, we will notice that it is full of suffering . Famine, poverty, war, genocide, disease, natural disasters – these are but a few of the horrors common to our world. Therefore, if our universe is indeed the product of design, then what can be said of its designer? Can the trio of theistic values really be thought true?

This was part of what David Hume was getting at in saying that, for all we know, this world was the creation of an ‘infant deity’ who, after looking at his work, was ‘ashamed of his lame performance.’

Thus, in the same way, strict adherence to the watchmaker analogy results in polytheism, and full application of the argument from design calls into question the traditional trio of theistic values.

Overall, the traditional teleological argument can at first seem convincing. However, when met with the challenge of Darwinism and the theory of evolution, it begins to unravel. This is where contemporary fine-tuning arguments have picked up and re-developed the argument from design to work alongside our current scientific knowledge.

Why Did Kant Think the Ontological Proof for God’s Existence Failed?

By Matthew Fitzgerald BA English Literature and Philosophy Matthew is a student of the Open University, majoring in English Literature and Philosophy, with a view for postgraduate study in the latter. His writing has been commended in international competitions, most recently winning him second place in the Benjamin Franklin House Literary Prize. When not reading or writing, Matthew can be found traveling. In particular, he is an avid deep-sea wreck diver, having dived many historical wrecks, especially those of the Red Sea.

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