essay on the idea of democracy

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Essay on Democracy in 100, 300 and 500 Words

• Updated on  
• Jan 15, 2024

The oldest account of democracy can be traced back to 508–507 BCC Athens . Today there are over 50 different types of democracy across the world. But, what is the ideal form of democracy? Why is democracy considered the epitome of freedom and rights around the globe? Let’s explore what self-governance is and how you can write a creative and informative essay on democracy and its significance. 

Today, India is the largest democracy with a population of 1.41 billion and counting. Everyone in India above the age of 18 is given the right to vote and elect their representative. Isn’t it beautiful, when people are given the option to vote for their leader, one that understands their problems and promises to end their miseries? This is just one feature of democracy , for we have a lot of samples for you in the essay on democracy. Stay tuned!

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What is democracy , sample essay on democracy (100 words), sample essay on democracy (250 to 300 words), sample essay on democracy for upsc (500 words).

Democracy is a form of government in which the final authority to deliberate and decide the legislation for the country lies with the people, either directly or through representatives. Within a democracy, the method of decision-making, and the demarcation of citizens vary among countries. However, some fundamental principles of democracy include the rule of law, inclusivity, political deliberations, voting via elections , etc. 

Did you know: On 15th August 1947, India became the world’s largest democracy after adopting the Indian Constitution and granting fundamental rights to its citizens?

Must Explore: Human Rights Courses for Students 

Must Explore: NCERT Notes on Separation of Powers in a Democracy

Democracy where people make decisions for the country is the only known form of governance in the world that promises to inculcate principles of equality, liberty and justice. The deliberations and negotiations to form policies and make decisions for the country are the basis on which the government works, with supreme power to people to choose their representatives, delegate the country’s matters and express their dissent. The democratic system is usually of two types, the presidential system, and the parliamentary system. In India, the three pillars of democracy, namely legislature, executive and judiciary, working independently and still interconnected, along with a free press and media provide a structure for a truly functional democracy. Despite the longest-written constitution incorporating values of sovereignty, socialism, secularism etc. India, like other countries, still faces challenges like corruption, bigotry, and oppression of certain communities and thus, struggles to stay true to its democratic ideals.

Did you know: Some of the richest countries in the world are democracies?

Must Read : Consumer Rights in India

Must Read: Democracy and Diversity Class 10

As Abraham Lincoln once said, “democracy is the government of the people, by the people and for the people.” There is undeniably no doubt that the core of democracies lies in making people the ultimate decision-makers. With time, the simple definition of democracy has evolved to include other principles like equality, political accountability, rights of the citizens and to an extent, values of liberty and justice. Across the globe, representative democracies are widely prevalent, however, there is a major variation in how democracies are practised. The major two types of representative democracy are presidential and parliamentary forms of democracy. Moreover, not all those who present themselves as a democratic republic follow its values.

Many countries have legally deprived some communities of living with dignity and protecting their liberty, or are practising authoritarian rule through majoritarianism or populist leaders. Despite this, one of the things that are central and basic to all is the practice of elections and voting. However, even in such a case, the principles of universal adult franchise and the practice of free and fair elections are theoretically essential but very limited in practice, for a democracy. Unlike several other nations, India is still, at least constitutionally and principally, a practitioner of an ideal democracy.

With our three organs of the government, namely legislative, executive and judiciary, the constitutional rights to citizens, a multiparty system, laws to curb discrimination and spread the virtues of equality, protection to minorities, and a space for people to discuss, debate and dissent, India has shown a commitment towards democratic values. In recent times, with challenges to freedom of speech, rights of minority groups and a conundrum between the protection of diversity and unification of the country, the debate about the preservation of democracy has become vital to public discussion.

Did you know: In countries like Brazil, Scotland, Switzerland, Argentina, and Austria the minimum voting age is 16 years?

Also Read: Difference Between Democracy and Dictatorship

Democracy originated from the Greek word dēmokratiā , with dēmos ‘people’ and Kratos ‘rule.’ For the first time, the term appeared in the 5th century BC to denote the political systems then existing in Greek city-states, notably Classical Athens, to mean “rule of the people.” It now refers to a form of governance where the people have the right to participate in the decision-making of the country. Majorly, it is either a direct democracy where citizens deliberate and make legislation while in a representative democracy, they choose government officials on their behalf, like in a parliamentary or presidential democracy.

The presidential system (like in the USA) has the President as the head of the country and the government, while the parliamentary system (like in the UK and India) has both a Prime Minister who derives its legitimacy from a parliament and even a nominal head like a monarch or a President.

The notions and principle frameworks of democracy have evolved with time. At the core, lies the idea of political discussions and negotiations. In contrast to its alternatives like monarchy, anarchy, oligarchy etc., it is the one with the most liberty to incorporate diversity. The ideas of equality, political representation to all, active public participation, the inclusion of dissent, and most importantly, the authority to the law by all make it an attractive option for citizens to prefer, and countries to follow.

The largest democracy in the world, India with the lengthiest constitution has tried and to an extent, successfully achieved incorporating the framework to be a functional democracy. It is a parliamentary democratic republic where the President is head of the state and the Prime minister is head of the government. It works on the functioning of three bodies, namely legislative, executive, and judiciary. By including the principles of a sovereign, socialist, secular and democratic republic, and undertaking the guidelines to establish equality, liberty and justice, in the preamble itself, India shows true dedication to achieving the ideal.

It has formed a structure that allows people to enjoy their rights, fight against discrimination or any other form of suppression, and protect their rights as well. The ban on all and any form of discrimination, an independent judiciary, governmental accountability to its citizens, freedom of media and press, and secular values are some common values shared by all types of democracies.

Across the world, countries have tried rooting their constitution with the principles of democracy. However, the reality is different. Even though elections are conducted everywhere, mostly, they lack freedom of choice and fairness. Even in the world’s greatest democracies, there are challenges like political instability, suppression of dissent, corruption , and power dynamics polluting the political sphere and making it unjust for the citizens. Despite the consensus on democracy as the best form of government, the journey to achieve true democracy is both painstaking and tiresome. 

Did you know: Countries like Singapore, Peru, and Brazil have compulsory voting?

Must Read: Democracy and Diversity Class 10 Notes

Democracy is a process through which the government of a country is elected by and for the people.

Yes, India is a democratic country and also holds the title of the world’s largest democracy.

Direct and Representative Democracy are the two major types of Democracy.

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Democracy Essay for Students and Children

500+ words essay on democracy.

Democracy is known as the finest form of government. Why so? Because in a democracy, the people of the country choose their government. They enjoy certain rights which are very essential for any human being to live freely and happily. There are various democratic countries in the world , but India is the largest one. Democracy has withstood the test of time, and while other forms have the government has failed, democracy stood strong. It has time and again proved its importance and impact.

Significance of a Democracy

Democracy is very important for human development . When people have free will to live freely, they will be happier. Moreover, we have seen how other forms of government have turned out to be. Citizens are not that happy and prosperous in a monarchy or anarchy.

Furthermore, democracy lets people have equal rights. This ensures that equality prevails all over the country. Subsequently, it also gives them duties. These duties make them better citizens and are also important for their overall development.

Most importantly, in a democracy, the people form the government. So, this selection of the government by the citizens gives everyone a chance to work for their country. It allows the law to prevail efficiently as the rules are made by people whom they have selected.

In addition, democracy allows people of various religions and cultures to exist peacefully. It makes them live in harmony with one another. People of democracy are more tolerant and accepting of each other’s differences. This is very important for any country to be happy and prosper.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

India: A Democratic Country

India is known to be the largest democracy all over the world. After the rule of the British ended in 1947 , India adopted democracy. In India, all the citizens who are above the age of 18 get the right to vote. It does not discriminate on the basis of caste, creed, gender, color, or more.

Although India is the largest democracy it still has a long way to go. The country faces a lot of problems which do not let it efficiently function as a democracy. The caste system is still prevalent which hampers with the socialist principle of democracy. Moreover, communalism is also on the rise. This interferes with the secular aspect of the country. All these differences need to be set aside to ensure the happiness and prosperity of the citizens.

In short, democracy in India is still better than that in most of the countries. Nonetheless, there is a lot of room for improvement which we must focus on. The government must implement stringent laws to ensure no discrimination takes place. In addition, awareness programs must be held to make citizens aware of their rights and duties.

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Normative democratic theory deals with the moral foundations of democracy and democratic institutions, as well as the moral duties of democratic representatives and citizens. It is distinct from descriptive and explanatory democratic theory, which aim to describe and explain how democracy and democratic institutions function. Normative democracy theory aims to provide an account of when and why democracy is morally desirable as well as moral principles for guiding the design of democratic institutions and the actions of citizens and representatives. Of course, normative democratic theory is inherently interdisciplinary and must draw on the results of political science, sociology, psychology, and economics in order to give concrete moral guidance.

This brief outline of normative democratic theory focuses attention on seven related issues. First, it proposes a definition of democracy. Second, it outlines different approaches to the question of why democracy is morally valuable at all. Third, it discusses the issue of whether and when democratic institutions have authority and different conceptions of the limits of democratic authority. Fourth, it explores the question of what it is reasonable to demand of citizens in large democratic societies. This issue is central to the evaluation of normative democratic theories. A large body of opinion has it that most classical normative democratic theory is incompatible with what we can reasonably expect from citizens. Fifth, it surveys different accounts of the proper characterization of equality in the processes of representation and the moral norms of representation. Sixth, it discusses the relationship between central findings in social choice theory and democracy. Seventh, it discusses the question of who should be included in the group that makes democratic decisions.

1. Democracy Defined

2.1.1.1 the production of relatively good laws and policies: responsiveness theories, 2.1.1.2 the production of relatively good laws and policies: epistemic theories, 2.1.1.3 character-based arguments, 2.1.2 instrumental arguments against democracy, 2.1.3 grounds for instrumentalism, 2.2.1 liberty, 2.2.2 democracy as public justification, 2.2.3 equality, 3.1 instrumentalist conceptions of democratic authority, 3.2.1 democracy as collective self-rule, 3.2.2 freedom and democratic authority, 3.2.3 equality and authority, 3.3.1 internal limits to democratic authority, 3.3.2 the problem of persistent minorities, 3.3.3 external limits to democratic authority, 4.1 the problem of democratic participation, 4.2.1 elite theory of democracy, 4.2.2 interest group pluralism, 4.2.3 neo-liberalism.

• 4.2.4. The self-interest assumption

4.2.5 The Division of Democratic Labor

4.3.1 the duty to vote, 4.3.2 principled disobedience of the law, 4.3.3 accommodate disagreement through compromise and consensus, 5.1 what sort of representative system is best, 5.2 the ethics of representation, 6. social choice and democracy, 7. the boundary problem: constituting the demos, other internet resources, related entries.

The term “democracy”, as we will use it in this entry, refers very generally to a method of collective decision making characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an essential stage of the decision-making process. Four aspects of this definition should be noted. First, democracy concerns collective decision making, by which we mean decisions that are made for groups and are meant to be binding on all the members of the group. Second, we intend for this definition to cover many different kinds of groups and decision-making procedures that may be called democratic. So there can be democracy in families, voluntary organizations, economic firms, as well as states and transnational and global organizations. The definition is also consistent with different electoral systems, for example first-past-the-post voting and proportional representation. Third, the definition is not intended to carry any normative weight. It is compatible with this definition of democracy that it is not desirable to have democracy in some particular context. So the definition of democracy does not settle any normative questions. Fourth, the equality required by the definition of democracy may be more or less deep. It may be the mere formal equality of one-person one-vote in an election for representatives to a parliament where there is competition among candidates for the position. Or it may be more robust, including substantive equality in the processes of deliberation and coalition building leading up to the vote. “Democracy” may refer to any of these political arrangements. It may involve direct referenda of the members of a society in deciding on the laws and policies of the society or it may involve the participation of those members in selecting representatives to make the decisions.

The function of normative democratic theory is not to settle questions of definition but to determine which, if any, of the forms democracy may take are morally desirable and when and how. To evaluate different moral justifications of democracy, we must decide on the merits of the different principles and conceptions of human beings and society from which they proceed.

2. The Justification of Democracy

In this section, we examine different views concerning the justification of democracy. Proposed justifications of democracy identify values or reasons that support democracy over alternative forms of decision-making, such as oligarchy or dictatorship. It is important to distinguish views concerning the justification of democracy from views concerning the authority of democracy, which we examine in section 3 . Attempts to establish democratic authority identify values or reasons in virtue of which subjects have a duty to obey democratic decisions. Justification and authority can come apart (Simmons 2001: ch. 7)—it is possible to hold that the balance of values or reasons supports democracy over alternative forms of decision-making while denying that subjects have a duty to obey democratic decisions.

We can evaluate the justification of democracy along at least two different dimensions: instrumentally, by reference to the outcomes of using it compared with other methods of political decision; or intrinsically, by reference to values that are inherent in the method.

2.1 Instrumentalism

2.1.1 instrumental arguments in favor of democracy.

Two kinds of in instrumental benefits are commonly attributed to democracy: (1) the production of relatively good laws and policies and (2) improvements in the characters of the participants.

It is often argued that democratic decision-making best protects subjects’ rights or interests because it is more responsive to their judgments or preferences than competing forms of government. John Stuart Mill, for example, argues that since democracy gives each subject a share of political power, democracy forces decision-makers to take into account the rights and interests of a wider range of subjects than are taken into account under aristocracy or monarchy (Mill 1861: ch. 3). There is some evidence that as groups are included in the democratic process, their interests are better advanced by the political system. For example, when African Americans regained the right to vote in the United States in 1965, they were able to secure many more benefits from the state than previously (Wright 2013). Economists argue that democracy promotes economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2019). Several contemporary authors defend versions of this instrumental argument by pointing to the robust empirical correlation between well-functioning democratic institutions and the strong protection of core liberal rights, such as rights to a fair trial, bodily integrity, freedom of association, and freedom of expression (Gaus 1996: ch. 13; Christiano 2011; Gaus 2011: ch. 22).

A related instrumental argument for democracy is provided by Amartya Sen, who argues that

no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press. (Sen 1999: 152)

The basis of this argument is that politicians in a multiparty democracy with free elections and a free press have incentives to respond to the expressions of needs of the poor.

Epistemic justifications of democracy argue that, under the right conditions, democracy is generally more reliable than alternative methods at producing political decisions that are correct according to procedure-independent standards. While there are many different explanations for the reliability of democratic decision-making, we outline three of the most prominent explanations here: (1) Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, (2) the effects of cognitive diversity, and (3) information gathering and sharing.

The most prominent explanation for democracy’s epistemic reliability rests on Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (CJT), a mathematical theorem developed by eighteenth-century mathematician the Marquis de Condorcet that builds on the so-called “law of large numbers”. CJT states that, when certain assumptions hold, the probability that a majority of voters support the correct decision increases and approaches one as the number of voters increases. The assumptions are (Condorcet 1785):

• each voter is more likely than not to identify the correct decision (the competence assumption );
• voters vote for what they believe is the correct decision (the sincerity assumption );
• votes are statistically independent of one another (the independence assumption ).

While Condorcet’s original proof was restricted to decisions with only two choices, more recent work argues that CJT can be extended to decisions with three or more choices (List & Goodin 2001). The use of CJT to explain democracy’s reliability is often thought to originate with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s claim that

[i]f, when a sufficiently informed populace deliberates, the citizens were to have no communication among themselves, the general will would always result from the large number of small differences, and the deliberation would always be good. (Rousseau 1762: Book III, ch. IV)

Contemporary theorists continue to rely on CJT, or variants of it, to justify democracy (Barry 1965; Cohen 1986; Grofman and Feld 1988; Goodin & Spiekermann 2019).

The appeal of CJT for epistemic democrats derives from the fact that, if its underlying assumptions are satisfied, decisions produced by even moderately-sized electorates are almost certain to be correct. For example, if the assumptions of CJT hold for an electorate of 10,000 voters, and if each voter is 51 percent likely to identify the correct decision of two options, then the probability that a majority will select the correct decision is 99.97 percent. The formal mathematics of CJT are not subject to dispute. However, critics of CJT-based arguments for democracy argue that the assumptions underlying CJT are rarely, if ever, satisfied in actual democracies (see Black 1963: 159–65; Ladha 1992; Estlund 1997b; 2008: ch. XII; Anderson 2006). First, many have remarked that voters’ opinions are not independent of each other. Indeed, the democratic process seems to emphasize persuasion and coalition building. Second, the theorem does not seem to apply to cases in which the information that voters have access to, and on the basis of which they make their judgments, is segmented in various ways. Segmentation occurs when some sectors of the society do not have the relevant information while others do have it. Modern societies and politics seem to instantiate this kind of segmentation in terms of class, race, ethnic groupings, religion, occupational position, geographical place and so on. Finally, all voters approach issues they have to make decisions on with strong ideological biases that undermine the claim that each voter is bringing a kind of independent observation on the nature of the common good to the vote.

Advocates of CJT-based justifications of democracy generally respond to these sorts of criticisms by attempting to develop variations of CJT with weaker assumptions. These assumptions are more easily satisfied in democracies and so the revised theorems may show that even moderately-sized electorates are almost certain to produce correct decisions (Grofman & Feld 1988; Austen-Smith 1992; Austen-Smith & Banks 1996).

A second common epistemic justification for democracy—which is often traced to Aristotle ( Politics , Book II, Ch. 11; see Waldron 1995)—argues that democratic procedures are best able to exploit the underlying cognitive diversity of large groups of citizens to solve collective problems. Since democracy brings a lot of people into the process of decision making, it can take advantage of many sources of information and perspectives in assessing proposed laws and policies. More recently, Hélène Landemore (2013) has drawn on the “diversity-trumps-ability” theorem of Scott Page and Lu Hong (Hong & Page 2004; Page 2007)—which states that a random collection of agents drawn from a large set of limited-ability agents typically outperforms a collection of the very best agents from that same set—to argue that democracy can be expected to produce better decisions than rule by experts. Both Page and Hong’s original theorem and Landemore’s use of it to justify democracy are subject to dispute (see Quirk 2014; Brennan 2014; Thompson 2014; Bajaj 2014).

A third common epistemic justification for democracy relies on the idea that democratic decision-making tends to be more informed than other forms of decision-making about the interests of citizens and the causal mechanisms necessary to advance those interests. John Dewey argues that democracy involves “a consultation and a discussion which uncovers social needs and troubles”. Even if experts know how best to solve collective problems, they need input from the masses to correct their biases tell them where the problems lie (Dewey 1927 [2012: 154–155]; see also Anderson 2006; Knight & Johnson 2011).

Many have endorsed democracy on the grounds that democracy has beneficial effects on the characters of subjects. Many agree with Mill and Rousseau that democracy tends to make people stand up for themselves more than other forms of rule do because it makes collective decisions depend on their input more than monarchy or aristocracy do. Hence, in democratic societies individuals are encouraged to be more autonomous. Relatedly, by giving citizens a share of control over political-decision-making, democracy cultivates citizens with active and productive characters rather than passive characters. In addition, it has been argued that democracy tends to get people to think carefully and rationally more than other forms of rule because it makes a difference to political outcomes whether they do or not. Finally, some argue that democracy tends to enhance the moral qualities of citizens. When they participate in making decisions, they have to listen to others, they are called upon to justify themselves to others and they are forced to think in part in terms of the interests of others. Some have argued that when people find themselves in this kind of circumstance, they can be expected genuinely to think in terms of the common good and justice. Hence, some have argued that democratic processes tend to enhance the autonomy, rationality, activity, and morality of participants. Since these beneficial effects are thought to be worthwhile in themselves, they count in favor of democracy and against other forms of rule (Mill 1861 [1991: 74]; Elster 1986 [2003: 152]; Hannon 2020).

Some argue in addition that the above effects on character tend to enhance the quality of legislation as well. A society of autonomous, rational, active, and moral decision-makers is more likely to produce good legislation than a society ruled by a self-centered person or a small group of persons who rule over slavish and unreflective subjects. Of course, the soundness of any of the above arguments depends on the truth of the causal theories of the consequences of different institutions.

Not all instrumental arguments favor democracy. Plato argues that democracy is inferior to various forms of monarchy, aristocracy and even oligarchy on the grounds that democracy tends to undermine the expertise necessary to the proper governance of societies (Plato 1974, Book VI). Most people do not have the kinds of intellectual talents that enable them to think well about the difficult issues that politics involves. But in order to win office or get a piece of legislation passed, politicians must appeal to these people’s sense of what is right or not right. Hence, the state will be guided by very poorly worked out ideas that experts in manipulation and mass appeal use to help themselves win office. Plato argues instead that the state should be ruled by philosopher-kings who have the wisdom and moral character required for good rule. He thus defends a version of what David Estlund calls “epistocracy”, a form of oligarchy that involves rule by experts (Estlund 2003).

Mill defends a form of epistocracy that is sometimes referred to as the “plural voting” scheme (1861: ch. 4). While all rational adults get at least one vote under this scheme, some citizens get a greater number of votes based on satisfying some measure of political expertise. While Mill identifies the relevant measure of expertise in terms of formal education, the plural voting scheme is consistent with other measures. This scheme might be thought to combine the instrumental value of political expertise with the intrinsic value of broad inclusion.

One objection to any form of epistocracy—the demographic objection —holds that any criterion of expertise is likely to select demographically homogeneous individuals who are be biased in ways that undermine their ability to produce political outcomes that promote the general welfare (Estlund 2003).

Hobbes argues that democracy is inferior to monarchy because democracy fosters destabilizing dissension among subjects (Hobbes 1651: chap. XIX). On his view, individual citizens and even politicians are apt not to have a sense of responsibility for the quality of legislation because no one makes a significant difference to the outcomes of decision making. As a consequence, citizens’ concerns are not focused on politics and politicians succeed only by making loud and manipulative appeals to citizens in order to gain more power, but all lack incentives to consider views that are genuinely for the common good. Hence the sense of lack of responsibility for outcomes undermines politicians’ concern for the common good and inclines them to make sectarian and divisive appeals to citizens.

Many contemporary theorists expand on these Platonic and Hobbesian criticisms. A good deal of empirical data shows that citizens of large-scale democracies are ill-informed and apathetic about politics. This makes room for special interests to control the behavior of politicians and use the state for their own limited purposes all the while spreading the costs to everyone. Moreover, there is empirical evidence that democratic citizens often engage in motivated reasoning that unconsciously aims to affirm their existing political identities rather than arrive at correct judgments (Lord, Ross, & Lepper 1979; Bartels 2002; Kahan 2013; Achen & Bartels 2016). Some theorists argue that these considerations justify abandoning democracy altogether, while modest versions of these arguments have been used to justify modification of democratic institutions (Caplan 2007; Somin 2013; Brennan 2016). Relatedly, some theorists argue that rather than having beneficial effects on the characters of subjects as Mill and others argue, democracy actually has deleterious effects on the subjects’ characters and relationships (Brennan 2016: ch. 3).

Pure instrumentalists argue that these instrumental arguments for and against the democratic process are the only bases on which to evaluate the justification of democracy or compare it with other forms of political decision-making. There are a number of different kinds of argument for pure instrumentalism. One kind of argument proceeds from a more general moral theory. For example, classical utilitarianism has no room in its monistic axiology for the intrinsic values of fairness and liberty or the intrinsic importance of an egalitarian distribution of political power. Its sole concern with maximizing utility—understood as pleasure or desire satisfaction—guarantees that it can provide only instrumental arguments for and against democracy.

But one need not be a thoroughgoing utilitarian to argue for instrumentalism in democratic theory. There are arguments in favor of instrumentalism that pertain directly to the question of democracy and collective decision making generally. One argument states that political power involves the exercise of power of some over others. And it argues that the exercise of power of one person over another can only be justified by reference to the protection of the interests or rights of the person over whom power is exercised. Thus no distribution of political power could ever be justified except by reference to the quality of outcomes of the decision making process (Arneson 1993 [2002: 96–97]; 2003; 2004; 2009). Another sort of argument for instrumentalism proceeds negatively, attempting to show that the non-instrumental values most commonly used in attempted justifications for democracy do not actually justify democracy, and that an instrumental justification for democracy is therefore the only available sort of justification (Wall 2007).

Other arguments question the coherence of the idea of intrinsically fair collective decision making processes. For instance, social choice theory questions the idea that there can be a fair decision making function that transforms a set of individual preferences into a rational collective preference. The core objection is that no general rule satisfying reasonable constraints can be devised that can transform any set of individual preferences into a rational social preference. And this is taken to show that democratic procedures cannot be intrinsically fair (Riker 1982: 116). Ronald Dworkin argues that the idea of equality, which is for him at the root of social justice, cannot be given a coherent and plausible interpretation when it comes to the distribution of political power among members of the society. The relation of politicians to citizens inevitably gives rise to inequality; the process of democratic deliberation inevitably gives those with superior argument making abilities and greater willingness to participate more influence and therefore more power, than others, so equality of political power cannot be intrinsically fair or just (Dworkin 2000). In later work, Dworkin has pulled back from this originally thoroughgoing instrumentalism (Dworkin 1996).

2.2 Non-instrumentalism

Few theorists deny that political institutions must be at least in part evaluated in terms of the outcomes of having those institutions. Some argue in addition, that some forms of decision making are morally desirable independent of the consequences of having them. A variety of different approaches have been used to show that democracy has this kind of intrinsic value.

One prominent justification for democracy appeals to the value of liberty. According to one version of the view, democracy is grounded in the idea that each ought to be master of his or her life. Each person’s life is deeply affected by the larger social, legal and cultural environment in which he or she lives. Only when each person has an equal voice and vote in the process of collective decision-making will each have equal control over this larger environment. Thinkers such as Carol Gould conclude that only when some kind of democracy is implemented, will individuals have a chance at self-government (Gould 1988: 45–85). Since individuals have a right of self-government, they have a right to democratic participation. The idea is that the right of self-government gives one a right, within limits, to do wrong. Just as an individual has a right to make some bad decisions for himself or herself, so a group of individuals have a right to make bad or unjust decisions for themselves regarding those activities they share.

One major difficulty with this line of argument is that it appears to require that the basic rule of decision-making be consensus or unanimity. If each person must freely choose the outcomes that bind him or her then those who oppose the decision are not self-governing. They live in an environment imposed on them by others. So only when all agree to a decision are they freely adopting the decision (Wolff 1970: ch. 2). The trouble is that there is rarely agreement on major issues in politics. Indeed, it appears that one of the main reasons for having political decision making procedures is that they can settle matters despite disagreement.

One liberty-based argument that might seem to escape this worry appeals to an irreducibly collective right to self-determination. It is often argued that political communities have a right as a community to organize themselves politically in accordance with their values, principles, or commitments. Some argue that the right to collective self-determination requires democratic institutions that give citizens collective control over their political and legal structure (Cassese 1995). However, many argue democratic institutions are sufficient but not necessary to realize the right to collective self-determination because political communities might exercise this right to implement non-democratic institutions (Altman & Wellman 2009; Stilz 2016).

Another non-instrumental justification of democracy appeals to the ideal of public justification. The idea behind this approach is that laws and policies are legitimate to the extent that they are publicly justified to the citizens of the community. Public justification is justification to each citizen as a result of free and reasoned debate among equals.

Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory of deliberative democracy has been highly influential in the development of this approach. Habermas analyses the form and function of modern legal systems through the lens of his theory of communicative action. This analysis yields the Democratic Principle:

[O]nly those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted. (Habermas 1992 [1996: 110])

Habermas advances a conception of democratic legitimacy according to which law is legitimate only if it results from a free and inclusive democratic process of “opinion and will-formation”. What might such a process look like in a complex and differentiated society? Habermas answers by advancing a “two-track” model that understands democratic legitimation in terms of the relationship between institutionalized deliberative bodies (e.g legislatures, agencies, courts) and informal communication in the public sphere, which is “wild”, and not centrally coordinated.

One possible objection to this view is that free and inclusive democratic procedures are insufficient to satisfy the demand for deliberative consensus embodied in the Democratic Principle. This demand is unlikely to be satisfied in diverse societies, since deep disagreements about which laws ought to be enacted is likely to remain after the relevant process of opinion and will-formation. The Democratic Principle might thus be thought to embody an overly idealistic conception of democratic legitimacy (Estlund 2008: ch.10). Another possible worry is that the Discourse Principle is not a genuine moral principle, but a principle that embodies the felicity conditions of practical discourse. As such, the Discourse Principle cannot ground a conception of democratic legitimacy that yields robust moral prescriptions (Forst 2016).

Drawing on Habermas and John Rawls, among others, Joshua Cohen (1996 [2003]) develops a conception of democracy in which citizens justify laws and policies on the basis of mutually acceptable reasons. Democracy, properly understood, is the context in which individuals freely engage in a process of reasoned discussion and deliberation on an equal footing. The ideas of freedom and equality provide guidelines for structuring democratic institutions.

The aim of Cohen’s conception of democracy as public justification is reasoned consensus among citizens. But a serious problem arises when we ask about what happens when disagreement remains. Two possible replies have been suggested. It has been urged that forms of consensus weaker than full consensus are sufficient for public justification and that the weaker varieties are achievable in many societies. For instance, there may be consensus on the list of reasons that are acceptable publicly but disagreement on the weight of the different reasons. Or there may be agreement on general reasons abstractly understood but disagreement about particular interpretations of those reasons. What would have to be shown here is that such weak consensus is achievable in many societies and that the disagreements that remain are not incompatible with the ideal of public justification.

The basic principle seems to be the principle of reasonableness according to which reasonable persons will only offer principles for the regulation of their society that other reasonable persons can reasonably accept. One only offers principles that others, who restrain themselves in the same way, can accept. Such a principle implies a kind of principle of restraint which requires that reasonable persons avoid proposing laws and policies on the basis of controversial moral or philosophical principles. When individuals offer proposals for the regulation of their society, they ought not to appeal to the whole truth as they see it but only to that part of the whole truth that others can reasonably accept. To put the matter in the way Rawls puts it: political society must be regulated by principles on which there is an overlapping consensus (Rawls 2005: Lecture IV). This is meant to obviate the need for a complete consensus on the principles that regulate society.

However, it is hard to see how this approach avoids the need for a complete consensus, which is highly unlikely to occur in any even moderately diverse society. The reason for this is that it is not clear why it is any less of an imposition on me when I propose legislation or policies for the society that I must restrain myself to considerations that other reasonable people accept than it is an imposition on others when I attempt to pass legislation on the basis of reasons they reasonably reject. For if I do restrain myself in this way, then the society I live in will not live up to the standards that I believe are essential to evaluating the society. I must then live in and support a society that does not accord with my conception of how it ought to be organized. It is not clear why this is any less of a loss of control over society than for those who must live in a society that is partly regulated by principles they do not accept. If one is a problem, then so is the other, and complete consensus is the only solution (Christiano 2009).

Many democratic theorists have argued that democracy is a way of treating persons as equals when there is good reason to impose some kind of organization on their shared lives but they disagree about how best to do it. Peter Singer argues that when people insist on different ways of arranging matters properly, each person in a sense claims a right to be dictator over their shared lives (Singer 1973: 30–41). But these claims to dictatorship cannot all hold up. Democracy embodies a kind of peaceful and fair compromise among these conflicting claims to rule. Each compromises equally on what he claims as long as the others do, resulting in each having an equal say over decision making. In effect, democratic decision making respects each person’s point of view on matters of common concern by giving each an equal say about what to do in cases of disagreement (Singer 1973; Waldron 1999: chap. 5).

What if people disagree on the democratic method or on the particular form democracy is to take? Are we to decide these latter questions by means of a higher order procedure? And if there is disagreement on the higher order procedure, must we also democratically decide that question? The view seems to lead to an infinite regress.

An alternative way of justifying democracy on the basis of equality is to ground democracy in public equality. Public equality is a principle of equality which ensures that people can see that they are being treated as equals. This view arises from three ideas. First, there is the basic egalitarian idea that people’s interests ought to be equally advanced, or at least that they ought to have equal opportunities to advance them. Second, human beings generally have highly fallible and biased understandings of their own and other people’s interests. Third, persons have fundamental interests in being able to see that they are being treated as equals. Public equality is an egalitarian principle that can be seen to be realized among persons despite the dramatically incomplete forms of knowledge people have. It is not all of justice, but it is essential that the principle be realized in a pluralistic society.

Democracy is a uniquely publicly egalitarian way to make collective decisions when there is substantial disagreement and conflict of interest among persons about how to shape the society they share. Each can see that the only plausible way of overcoming persistent disagreement over how to shape the society they all live in, while still publicly treating all persons as equals in the face of bias and fallibility, is to give each person an equal say in the process of shaping that society. Thus, democracy is necessary to the realization of public equality in a political society. Within the framework determined by this publicly realized equality, persons are permitted to attempt to bring about their more particular ideas about justice and the common good that they think are right.

The idea of public equality also grounds limits to democratic decision making. The thought is that a society cannot democratically decide to abolish the democratic rights of some of its members. Public equality also requires that basic liberal and civil rights be respected as well, by the democratic process and so serves as a limit to democratic decision making (Christiano 2008; Valentini 2013).

A number of worries attend this kind of view. First, it is generally thought that majority rule is required for treating persons as equals in collective decision making. This is because only majority rule is neutral towards alternatives in decision making. Unanimity tends to favor the status quo as do various forms of supermajority rule. But if this is so, the above view raises the twin dangers of majority tyranny and of persistent minorities, i.e., groups of persons who find themselves always losing in majority decisions. Surely these latter phenomena must be incompatible with public equality. Second, the kind of view defended above is susceptible to the worry that political equality is not a coherent ideal in any modern state with a complex division of labor and the need for representation. This last worry will be discussed in more detail in the next sections on democratic citizenship and legislative representation. The first worry will be discussed more in the discussion on the limits to democratic authority.

A related approach grounds democracy in the ideal of relational equality . A concern with relational equality is a concern for

human relationships that are, in certain crucial respects at least, unstructured by differences of rank, power, or status. (Scheffler 2010: 225)

Niko Kolodny argues that democratic institutions are an essential component of relational equality (Kolodny 2014a,b). One line of Kolodny’s argument holds that political decisions involve the use of coercive force. Inequalities in the power to use force undermine equal social status at least in part because the power to use force is “the power that usually determines the distribution of other powers” (Kolodny 2014b: 307). Individuals who have superior power to use force on others have a superior social status. An egalitarian distribution of political power is thus essential for realizing social equality. And only democratic institutions provide an egalitarian distribution of political power. We will discuss the relationship between relational equality and democracy further when we discuss the authority of democracy in Part 3 below.

3. The Authority of Democracy

Since democracy is a collective decision process, the question naturally arises about whether there is any duty of citizens to obey democratic decisions when they disagree with it.

There are three main concepts of the legitimate authority of the state. First, a state has legitimate authority to the extent that it is morally justified in coercively imposing its rule on the members. Legitimate authority on this account has no direct implications concerning the obligations or duties that citizens may hold toward that state. It simply says that if the state is morally justified in doing what it does, then it has legitimate authority. Second, a state has legitimate authority to the extent that its directives generate duties in citizens to obey. The duties of the citizens need not be owed to the state but they are real duties to obey. The third is that the state has a right to rule that is correlated with the citizens’ duty to it to obey it. This is the strongest notion of authority and it seems to be the core idea behind the legitimacy of the state. The idea is that when citizens disagree about law and policy it is important to be able to answer the question, who has the right to choose?

Instrumental arguments for democracy give some reason for why one ought to respect the democracy when one disagrees with its decisions. There may be many instrumental considerations that play a role in deciding on the question of whether one ought to obey. And these instrumental considerations are pretty much the same whether one is considering obedience to democracy or some other form of rule.

There is one instrumentalist approach which is quite unique to democracy and that seems to ground a strong conception of democratic authority. That is the epistemic approach inspired by the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which we discussed in section 2.1.1.2 above. There, we discussed a number of difficulties with the application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to the case of voting in elections and referenda in large-scale democracies, including lack of independence, informational segmentation, and the existence of ideological biases.

One further worry about the Jury Theorem’s epistemic conceptions of authority is that it would prove too much since it undermines the common practice of the loyal opposition in democracies. If the background conditions of the Jury Theorem are met, a large-scale democracy majority is practically certain to produce the right decisions. On what basis can citizens in a political minority rationally hold on to their competing views? The members of the minority have a powerful reason for shifting their allegiance to the majority position, since each has very good reason to think that the majority is right. The epistemic conception of authority based on the Jury Theorem thus threatens to be objectionably authoritarian, since it looks like it demands not only obedience of action but obedience of thought as well. Even in scientific communities the fact that a majority of scientists favor a particular view does not make the minority scientists think that they are wrong, though it does perhaps give them pause (Goodin 2003: ch. 7).

Some theories of democratic authority combine instrumental and non-instrumental considerations. David Estlund argues that democratic procedures have legitimate authority because they are better than random and epistemically the best of the political systems that are acceptable to all reasonable citizens (Estlund 2008). They must be better than random because, otherwise, why wouldn’t we use a fair random procedure like a lottery or coin flip? Democratic authority must have an epistemic element. And the justification of democratic procedure must be acceptable to all reasonable citizens in order to respect their freedom and equality. Estlund’s conception of democratic authority—which he calls “epistemic proceduralism”— thus combines the ideal of public justification with a concern for the tendency of democracies to produce good decisions.

3.2 Intrinsic Conceptions of Democratic Authority

Some theorists argue that there is a special relation between democracy and legitimate authority grounded in the value of collective self-rule. John Locke argues that when a person consents to the creation of a political society, they necessarily consent to the use of majority rule in deciding how the political society is to be organized (Locke 1690: sec. 96). Locke thinks that majority rule is the natural decision rule when there is disagreement. He argues that a society is a kind of collective body that must move in the direction of the greater force. One way to understand this argument is as follows. If we think of each member of society as an equal and if we think that there is likely to be disagreement beyond the question of whether to join society or not, then we must accept majority rule as the appropriate decision rule. This interpretation of the greater force argument assumes that the expression “greater force” is to be understood in terms of the equal worth of each person’s interests and rights, so the society must go in the direction in which the greater number of persons wants it to go.

Locke thinks that a people, which is formed by individuals who consent to be members, could choose a monarchy by means of majority rule and so this argument by itself does not give us an argument for democracy. But Locke refers back to this argument when he defends the requirement of representative institutions for deciding when property may be regulated and taxes levied. He argues that a person must consent to the regulation or taxation of his property by the state. But he says that this requirement of consent is satisfied when a majority of the representatives of property holders consent to the regulation and taxation of property (Locke, 1690: sec. 140). This does seem to be moving towards a genuinely democratic conception of legitimate authority.

Rousseau argues that when individuals consent to form a political community, they agree to put themselves under the direction of the “general will” (Rousseau 1762). The general will is not a mere aggregation of individuals’ private wills. It is, rather, the will of the political community as a whole. And since the general will can only emerge as the product of a properly organized democratic procedure, individuals consent to put themselves under the direction of a properly organized democratic procedure. On one interpretation of Rousseau, democratic procedures are properly organized only when they (1) define rights that apply equally to all, (2) via a procedure that considers everyone’s interests equally, and (3) everyone who is coerced to obey the laws has a voice in that procedure.

There are at least two ways of understanding the idea of the general will. On what might be called the constitutive interpretation, the general will is constituted by the results of a properly organized democratic procedure. That is, the results of a properly organized democratic procedure are the general will in virtue of the fact that they emerge from a properly organized democratic procedure, and not because they reflect some procedure-independent truth about the common good. On what might be called the epistemic interpretation, the results of a properly organized democratic procedure are the way of tracking the procedure-independent truth about the common good. As we discussed in section 3.1 , Rousseau is often interpreted as appealing to Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to support the epistemic credentials of a properly organized democratic procedure.

Anna Stilz develops an account of democratic authority that appeals to the value of “freedom as independence” (Stilz 2009). Freedom as independence is freedom from being subject to the will of another. In order not to be subject to the will of others, individuals need property rights and a protected sphere of autonomy to pursue one’s plans. Drawing on Kant, Stilz argues that attempts by particular individuals, no matter how conscientious, to define and secure rights to property and autonomy in a state of nature will be inconsistent with freedom as independence. Such attempts unilaterally impose new obligations on others through acts of private will in the face of competing claims. But even if individuals in a state of nature do agree to a resolution of their competing claims, they are dependent on the will of others to honor this agreement. Stilz thus argues that justice must be administered by an authoritative legal system which can coercively impose one set of objective rules—rules we must respect even when we disagree—to adjudicate our conflicting claims. But if such a system is to be consistent with the freedom of subjects, it cannot be imposed by the private wills of rulers. The solution, Stilz argues, lies in Rousseau’s idea of the general will. When subjects obey the general will, they are not obeying the private will of any individual; they are obeying a will that arises from all and applies to all.

One worry with this account is that those who oppose democratically-enacted laws or policies can complain that those laws or policies are imposed against their will. Perhaps they are not subject to the will of a particular individual, but they are subject to the will of a majority. This might be thought to constitute a significant threat to individuals’ freedom as independence. Another worry, which Stilz’s view arguably inherits from Rousseau, is that the conditions for the general will to emerge are so demanding that the view implies that no state that exists or has existed has legitimate political authority. Stilz’s view might thus be thought to entail what A.J. Simmons calls “a posteriori anarchism” (Simmons 2001).

Another approach to democratic authority asserts that failing to obey the decisions of a democratic assembly amounts to treating one’s fellow citizens as inferiors (Christiano 2008: ch. 6). In the face of disagreement about substantive law and policy, democracy realizes a kind of public equality by giving each individual an equal say in determining which laws or policies will be enacted. Citizens who skirt laws made by suitably egalitarian procedures act contrary to the equal right of all citizens to have a say in making laws. Those who refuse to pay taxes or respect property laws on the grounds that they are unjust are affirming a superior right to that of others in determining how the shared aspects of social life ought to be arranged. Thus, they violate the duty to treat others publicly as equals. And there is reason to think this duty must normally have some pre-eminence. Public equality is the most important form of equality and democracy is required by public equality. The other forms of equality in play in substantive disputes about law and policy are ones about which people can have reasonable disagreements (within limits specified by the principle of public equality). Citizens thus have obligations to abide by the democratic process even if their favored conceptions of justice or equality are passed by in the decision making process.

Daniel Viehoff develops an egalitarian conception of democratic authority based on the ideal of relational equality (Viehoff 2014; see section 2.2.3 above for more on relational equality). Viehoff argues that relational equality is threatened by “subjection” in a relationship, which occurs when individuals have significantly different power over how they interact with and relate to one another. According to Viehoff, obeying the outcomes of egalitarian democratic procedures is necessary and sufficient for citizens to achieve coordination on common rules without subjection. It is sufficient because democratic procedures distribute decision-making power equally, which ensures that coordination is not determined by unequal power advantages. It is necessary because parties must set aside the considerations of greater and lesser power to realize non-subjection in their relationship.

Fabienne Peter develops a fairness-based conception of democratic authority that incorporates epistemic considerations (Peter 2008; 2009). Drawing on insights from proceduralist epistemology, Peter’s “pure epistemic proceduralism” holds that suitably egalitarian democratic decisions are binding at least in part because they result from a fair procedure of knowledge-production. This account differs from Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism (see section 5.1 above) because it does not condition the authority of democratic procedures on their ability to produce decisions that track the procedure-independent truth. Rather, the authority of democratic procedures is grounded in their fairness. And it differs from pure procedural accounts because the relevant notion of fairness is fairness in knowledge-production.

3.3 Limits to the Authority of Democracy

What are the limits to democratic authority? A limit to democratic authority is a principle violation of which defeats democratic authority. When the principle is violated by the democratic assembly, the assembly loses its authority in that instance or the moral weight of the authority is overridden. A number of different views have been offered on this issue. We can distinguish between internal and external limits to democratic authority. An internal limit arises from the constitutive requirements of the democratic process or from the principles that ground democracy. An external limit arises from principles that are independent of the values or requirements that ground democracy.

External limits to democratic authority are rebutting limits, which are principles that weigh against—and may sometimes outweigh the principles that ground democracy. So in a particular case, an individual may see that there are reasons to obey the assembly and some reasons against obeying the assembly and in the case at hand the reasons against obedience outweigh the reasons in favor of obedience. Internal limits to democratic authority are undercutting limits. These limits function not by weighing against the considerations in favor of authority, they undercut the considerations in favor of authority altogether; they simply short circuit the authority. When an undercutting limit is in play, it is not as if the principles which ground the limit outweigh the reasons for obeying the democratic assembly, it is rather that the reasons for obeying the democratic assembly are undermined altogether; they cease to exist or at least they are severely weakened.

Some have argued that the democratic process ought to be limited to decisions that are not incompatible with the proper functioning of the democratic process. So they argue that the democratic process may not legitimately take away the political rights of its citizens in good standing. It may not take away rights that are necessary to the democratic process such as freedom of association or freedom of speech. But these limits do not extend beyond the requirements for proper democratic functioning. They do not protect non political artistic speech or freedom of association in the case of non political activities (Ely 1980: chap. 4).

Another kind of internal limit is a limit that arises from the principles that underpin democracy. And the presence of this limit would seem to be necessary to making sense of the first limit because in order for the first limit to be morally important we need to know why a democracy ought to protect the democratic process.

Locke gives an account of the internal limits of democracy in his idea that there are certain things to which a citizen may not consent (Locke 1690: ch. XI). She may not consent to arbitrary rule or the violation of fundamental rights including democratic and liberal rights. Since consent is the basis of democratic authority for Locke, this account provides an explanation of the idea behind the first internal limit, that democracy may not be suspended by democratic means but it goes beyond that limit to suggest that rights that are not essentially connected with the exercise of the franchise may also not be violated because one may not consent to their violation.

More recently, Ronald Dworkin has defended an account of the limits of democratic authority (Dworkin 1996). He argues that democracy is justified by appeal to a principle of self-government. He argues that self-government cannot be realized unless all citizens are treated as full members of the political community, because, otherwise, they are not able to identify as members of the community. Among the conditions of full membership, he argues, are rights to be treated as equals and rights to have one’s moral independence respected. These principles support robust requirements of non-discrimination and of basic liberal rights.

The conception of democratic authority that grounds it in public equality also provides an account of the limits of that authority (Christiano 2008: ch. 6). Since democracy is founded in public equality, it may not violate public equality in any of its decisions. The basic idea is that overt violation of public equality by a democratic assembly undermines the claim that the democratic assembly embodies public equality. Democracy’s embodiment of public equality is conditional on its protecting public equality. To the extent that liberal rights are grounded in public equality and the provision of an economic minimum is also so grounded, this suggests that democratic rights and liberal rights and rights to an economic minimum create a limit to democratic authority. This account also provides a deep grounding for the kinds of limits to democratic authority defended in the first internal limit and it goes beyond these to the extent that protection of rights that are not connected with the exercise of the franchise is also necessary to public equality.

This account of the authority of democracy also provides some help with a vexing problem of democratic theory. This problem is the difficulty of persistent minorities. There is a persistent minority in a democratic society when that minority always loses in the voting. This is always a possibility in democracies because of the use of majority rule. If the society is divided into two or more highly unified voting blocks in which the members of each group votes in the same ways as all the other members of that group, then the group in the minority will find itself always on the losing end of the votes. This problem has plagued some societies, particularly those with indigenous peoples who live within developed societies. Though this problem is often connected with majority tyranny it is distinct from the problem of majority tyranny because it may be the case that the majority attempts to treat the minority well, in accordance with its conception of good treatment. It is just that the minority never agrees with the majority on what constitutes proper treatment. Being a persistent minority can be highly oppressive even if the majority does not try to act oppressively. This can be understood with the help of the very ideas that underpin democracy. Persons have interests in being able to correct for the cognitive biases of others and to be able to make the world in such a way that it makes sense to them. These interests are set back for a persistent minority since they never get their way.

The conception of democracy as grounded in public equality can shed light on this problem. It can say that the existence of a persistent minority violates public equality (Christiano 2008: chap. 7). In effect, a society in which there is a persistent minority is one in which that minority is being treated publicly as an inferior because it is clear that its fundamental interests are being set back. Hence to the extent that violations of public equality undercut the authority of a democratic assembly, the existence of a persistent minority undermines the authority of the democracy at least with respect to the minority. This suggests that certain institutions ought to be constructed so that the minority is not persistent.

One natural kind of limit to democratic authority is the external kind of limit. Here the idea is that there are certain considerations that favor democratic decision making and there are certain values that are independent of democracy that may be at issue in democratic decisions. For example, many theories recognize core liberal rights—such as rights to property, bodily integrity, and freedom of thought and expression—as external limits to democratic authority. Locke is often interpreted as arguing that individuals have natural rights to property in themselves and the external world that democratic laws must respect in order to have legitimate authority (Locke 1690).

Some views may assert that there are only external limits to democratic authority. But it is possible to think that there are both internal and external limits. Such an issue may arise in decisions to go to war, for example. In such decisions, one may have a duty to obey the decision of the democratic assembly on the grounds that this is how one treats one’s fellow citizens as equals but one may also have a duty to oppose the war on the grounds that the war is an unjust aggression against other people. To the extent that this consideration is sufficiently serious it may outweigh the considerations of equality that underpin democratic authority. Thus one may have an overall duty not to obey in this context. Issues of foreign policy in general seem to give rise to possible external limits to democracy.

4. The Demands of Democratic Participation

In this section, we examine the demands of participation in large-scale democracies. We begin by examining a core challenge to the idea that democratic citizens are capable of governing a large and complex society. We then explore different proposed solutions to the core challenge. Finally, we examine the moral duties of democratic citizens in large-scale democracies in light of the core challenge.

A vexing problem of democratic theory has been to determine whether ordinary citizens are up to the task of governing a large and complex society. There are three distinct problems here:

• Plato argued that some people are more intelligent and informed about political matters than others and have a superior moral character, and that those persons ought to rule ( The Republic , Book VI)
• Others have argued that a society must have a division of labor. If everyone were engaged in the complex and difficult task of politics, little time or energy would be left for the other essential tasks of a society. Conversely, if we expect most people to engage in other difficult and complex tasks, how can we expect them to have the time and resources sufficient to devote themselves intelligently to politics?
• Since individuals have so little impact on the outcomes of political decision making in large societies, they have little sense of responsibility for the outcomes. Some have argued that it is not rational to vote since the chances that an individual’s vote will a decide the outcome of an election (i.e., will determine whether a candidate gets elected or not) are nearly indistinguishable from zero. For example, one widely accepted estimate puts the odds of an individual casting the deciding vote in a United States presidential election at 1 in 100 million. Many estimates put the odds much lower. Worse still, Anthony Downs has argued that almost all of those who do vote have little reason to become informed about how best to vote (Downs 1957: ch.13). On the assumption that citizens reason and behave roughly according to the Downsian model, either the society must in fact be run by a relatively small group of people with minimal input from the rest or it will be very poorly run. As we can see these criticisms are echoes of the sorts of criticisms Plato and Hobbes made.

These observations pose challenges for any robustly egalitarian or deliberative conception of democracy. Without the ability to participate intelligently in politics one cannot use one’s votes to advance one’s aims nor can one be said to participate in a process of reasoned deliberation among equals. So, either equality of political power implies a kind of self-defeating equal participation of citizens in politics or a reasonable division of labor seems to undermine equality of power. And either substantial participation of citizens in public deliberation entails the relative neglect of other tasks or the proper functioning of the other sectors of the society requires that most people do not participate intelligently in public deliberation.

4.2 Proposed Solutions to the Problem of Democratic Participation

Some modern theorists of democracy, called elite theorists, have argued against any robustly egalitarian or deliberative forms of democracy in light of the problem of democratic participation. They argue that high levels of citizen participation tend to produce bad legislation designed by demagogues to appeal to poorly informed and overly emotional citizens. They look upon the alleged uninformedness of citizens evidenced in many empirical studies in the 1950s and 1960s as perfectly reasonable and predictable. Indeed they regard the alleged apathy of citizens in modern states as highly desirable social phenomena.

Political leaders are to avoid divisive and emotionally charged issues and make policy and law with little regard for the fickle and diffuse demands made by ordinary citizens. Citizens participate by voting but since they know very little they are not effectively the ruling part of the society. The process of election is usually just a fairly peaceful way of maintaining or changing those who rule (Schumpeter 1942 [1950: 269]).

On Schumpeter’s view, however, citizens do have a role to play in avoiding serious disasters. When politicians act in ways that nearly anyone can see is problematic, the citizens can throw the bums out.

So the elite theory of democracy does seem compatible with some of the instrumentalist arguments given above but it is strongly opposed to the intrinsic arguments from liberty, public justification and equality. To be sure, there can be an elite deliberative democracy wherein elites deliberate, perhaps even out of sight of the population at large, on how to run the society.

A view akin to the elite theory but less pessimistic about citizens’ political agency and competence argues that a well-functioning representative democracy can function as a kind of “defensible epistocracy” (Landa & Pevnick 2020). This view holds that, under the right conditions, elected officials can be expected to exercise political power more responsibly than citizens in a direct democracy because each official is far more likely to cast the deciding vote in legislative assemblies (the “pivotality effect”) and officials have more incentive to exercise power with due regard for the general welfare (the “accountability effect”). Moreover, under the right conditions, representative democracy allows individuals to assess the competence of candidates for office and to select candidates who are best able to help the community pursue its commitments.

One approach that is in part motivated by the problem of democratic citizenship but which attempts to preserve some elements of equality against the elitist criticism is the interest group pluralist account of politics. Robert Dahl’s early statement of the view is very powerful.

In a rough sense, the essence of all competitive politics is bribery of the electorate by politicians… The farmer… supports a candidate committed to high price supports, the businessman…supports an advocate of low corporation taxes… the consumer…votes for candidates opposed to a sales tax. (Dahl 1959: 69)

In this conception of the democratic process, each citizen is a member of an interest group with narrowly defined interests that are closely connected to their everyday lives. On these subjects citizens are supposed to be quite well informed and interested in having an influence. Or at least, elites from each of the interest groups that are relatively close in perspective to the ordinary members are the principal agents in the process. On this account, democracy is not rule by the majority but rather rule by coalitions of minorities. Policy and law in a democratic society are decided by means of bargaining among the different groups.

This approach is conceivably compatible with the more egalitarian approach to democracy. This is because it attempts to reconcile equality with collective decision making by limiting the tasks of citizens to ones which they are able to perform reasonably well. It is not particularly compatible with the deliberative public justification approach because it takes the democratic process to be concerned essentially with bargaining among the different interest groups where the preferences are not subject to further debate in the society as a whole.

A third approach inspired by the problem of participation may be called the neo-liberal approach to politics favored by public choice theorists such as James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock (1962). Against elite theories, they contend that elites and their allies will tend to expand the powers of government and bureaucracy for their own interests and that this expansion will occur at the expense of a largely inattentive public. For this reason, they argue for severe restrictions on the powers of elites. They argue against the interest group pluralist theorists that the problem of participation occurs within interest groups more or less as much as among the citizenry at large. Only powerful economic interests are likely to succeed in organizing to influence the government and they will do so largely for their own benefit. Since economic elites will advance their own interests in politics while spreading the costs to others, policies will tend to be more costly (because imposed on everyone in society) than they are beneficial (because they benefit only the elites in the interest group.)

Neo-liberals infer that one ought to transfer many of the current functions of the state to the market and limit the state to the enforcement of basic property rights and liberties. These can be more easily understood and brought under the control of ordinary citizens.

But the neo-liberal account of democracy must answer to two large worries. First, citizens in modern societies have more ambitious conceptions of social justice and the common good than are realizable by the minimal state. The neo-liberal account thus implies a very serious curtailment of democracy of its own. More evidence is needed to support the contention that these aspirations cannot be achieved by the modern state. Second, the neo-liberal approach ignores the problem of large private concentrations of wealth and power that are capable of pushing small states around for their own benefit and imposing their wills on populations without their consent.

Somin (2013) also argues that government be significantly reduced in size so that citizens have a lesser knowledge burden to carry. But he calls for government decentralization so that citizens can vote with their feet in favor of or against competing units of government, in effect creating a kind of market in governments among which citizens can choose.

4.2.4 The self-interest assumption

A considerable amount of the literature in political science and the economic theory of the state are grounded in the assumption that individuals act primarily and perhaps even exclusively in their self-interest narrowly construed. The problem of participation and the accounts of the democratic process described above are in large part dependent on this assumption. When the preferences of voters are not assumed to be self-interested the calculations of the value of participation change. For example, if a person is a motivated utilitarian, the small chance of making a difference is coupled with a huge accumulated return to many people if there is a significant difference between alternatives. It may be worth it in this case to become reasonably well informed (Parfit 1984: 74). Even more weakly altruistic moral preferences could make a big difference to the rationality of becoming informed, for example if one had a preference to comply with perceived civic duty to vote responsibly (see section 4.3.1 for discussion of the duty to vote). Any moral preference can be formulated in consistent utility functions.

Moreover, defenders of deliberative democracy often claim that concerns for the common good and justice are not merely given prior to politics but that they can evolve and improve through the process of discussion and debate in politics (Elster 1986 [2003]; Gutmann & Thompson 2004; Cohen 1989 [2009]). They assert that much debate and discussion in politics would not be intelligible were it not for the fact that citizens are willing to engage in open minded discussion with those who have distinct morally informed points of view. Empirical evidence suggests that individuals are motivated by moral considerations in politics in addition to their interests (Mansbridge 1990).

Public deliberation in any large-scale democracy will occur within a complex and differentiated “deliberative system”, a

wide variety of institutions, associations, and sites of contestation accomplish political work. (Mansbridge et. al. 2012)

Moreover, the deliberative system of a complex democracy will be characterized by a division of democratic labor , with different parts of the system making different contributions to the overall system. The question arises: what is the appropriate role for a citizen in this division of labor? Philosophically, we should ask two questions. What ought citizens have knowledge about in order to fulfill their role? What standards ought citizens’ beliefs live up to in order to be adequately supported? One promising view is that citizens must think about what ends the society ought to aim at and leave the question of how to achieve those aims to experts (Christiano 1996: ch 5). The rationale for this division of labor is that expertise is not as fundamental to the choice of aims as it is to the development of legislation and policy. Citizens are capable in their everyday lives of understanding and cultivating deep understandings of values and of their interests. And if citizens genuinely do choose the aims and others faithfully pursue the means to achieving those aims, then citizens are in the driver’s seat in society and they can play this role as equals.

To be sure, citizens need to know who to vote for and whether those they vote for are genuinely advancing their aims. This would appear to require some basic knowledge of about how best to achieve their political aims. How is this possible without extensive knowledge? In addition, there is empirical evidence that those who are better informed have more influence on representatives (Erikson 2015). So, if this task requires some kind of knowledge to do well, how can this be compatible with equality?

One promising response is that ordinary citizens do not need individually to have a lot of knowledge of social science and particular facts in order to make political decisions based on such knowledge. Recent research in cognitive science indicates the individuals use “cognitive shortcuts” to save on time in acquiring information about the world they live in (Lupia & McCubbins 1998). This use of shortcuts is common and essential throughout economic and political life. In political life, we see part of the rationale for the many intermediate institutions between government and citizens (Downs 1957: 221–229). Citizens save time by making use of institutions such as the press, unions and other interest group associations, political parties, and opinion leaders to get information about politics. They also rely on interactions in the workplace as well as conversations with friends and families. Political parties can connect ordinary citizens in various ways to expertise because each one contains a division of labor within them that mirrors that in the state. Experts in parties have incentives to make their expertise intelligible to other members (Christiano 2012). In addition, under favorable conditions, political parties stimulate the development of citizens’ normative perspectives and facilitate a healthy public competition of political justifications based on those perspectives (White & Ypi 2016).

People are dependent on social networks in other ways in a democracy. People receive “free” information (which they do not deliberately seek out) about politics and law in school, through their jobs, in discussion with friends, colleagues and family and incidentally through the media. And this can form a better or worse basis on which to pursue other information. Institutions can make a difference to the stream of free information individuals receive. Education can be distributed in a more or less egalitarian way. The circumstances of work can provide more or less free information about politics and law. People who have jobs with a significant amount of power such as lawyers, business persons, government officials will be beneficiaries of very high quality free information. They need to know about law and politics to do their jobs properly. Those who hold low skilled and non-unionized jobs will receive much less free information about politics at work. To the extent that we can alter the economic division of labor by for example giving more place to unions or having greater worker participation, we might be able to reduce inequalities of information among citizens.

4.3 The Moral Duties of Democratic Citizens

What are the moral duties of democratic citizens in complex democracies? In this section, we discuss three important democratic duties: (1) the duty to vote, (2) the duty to promote justice through principled disobedience of the law, and (3) duties to accommodate disagreement through compromise and consensus.

It is often thought that democratic citizens have a moral duty to vote in elections. But this is not obvious. Individual votes are a causally insignificant contribution to the democratic process. In large-scale democracies, the chance that any particular citizen’s vote will decide the outcome of an election is minuscule. What moral reason do democratic citizens have to participate in politics even though they’re almost certain not to make the difference to who gets elected? Why shouldn’t they seek to promote the good or justice in other ways?

Parfit develops an act-utilitarian answer to this question (Parfit 1984: 73–75). Act-utilitarians hold that morally right actions maximize the total expected sum of the utilities of all persons in the society. Parfit argues that voting might nonetheless maximize expected utility if one candidate is significantly superior to the other(s). If we add the benefits to each member of the society of having the superior candidate win, we get a very large difference in value. So when we multiply that value by the probability of casting the deciding vote, which is often thought to be about 1/100,000,000 in a United States presidential election, we might still get a reasonably high expected value. When we subtract the cost to the voter and others of voting, which is often quite low, from this number, we may still have a good reason to vote.

One worry with Parfit’s view is that it faces a version of what Jason Brennan calls “the particularity problem” (Brennan 2011). This is the problem of explaining why citizens ought to promote value through political participation as opposed to through non-political acts. Voting is just one way of promoting overall utility; we need to know the expected utility of the different acts they might perform instead. Even if the argument above is correct, it might be the case that many individuals maximize expected utility by not voting and doing something even more beneficial with their time.

Alex Guerrero argues that citizens have moral reasons to vote because candidates who win by a larger proportion of votes can claim a greater “normative mandate” to govern (Guerrero 2010). Still each individual vote makes only a tiny contribution to the proportion of votes a candidate receives. So, we might doubt the strength of the reason to vote that Guerrero identifies.

Some theorists argue that individuals have a moral duty to vote in order to absolve themselves of complicity in state injustices (Beerbohm 2012; Zakaras 2018). All states commit injustices—they make and enforce unjust laws, wage unjust wars, and much else. And citizens of large-scale democracies have a kind of standing responsibility, by paying taxes and obeying laws, for their state’s injustices of which they must actively absolve themselves The complicity account argues that citizens avoid shared responsibility for their state’s injustices if they oppose those injustices through voting and of public advocacy (Beerbohm 2012).

One worry is that it is unclear why voting and publicly advocating against injustice should be thought to absolve responsibility that is established by paying taxes and obeying laws. Another worry is that one’s concern to oppose injustice should derive from a more direct concern for the wrongs suffered by victims of injustice rather than a concern with keeping one’s hands clean.

One sort of account that avoids this worry grounds the moral duty to vote in the importance of doing one’s fair share of the demands of political justice consistent with public equality. The demands of creating and sustaining just institutions distribute fairly among all citizens (Maskivker 2019). If one fails to do one’s fair share of these demands, then one fails to show due regard for the eventual victims of injustice. Furthermore, voting provides citizens with a mechanism for doing their fair shares of the demands of making their institutions just in a way that is consistent with respecting the public equality of fellow citizens. By showing up and casting a vote, citizens can contribute to the collective achievement of justice while maintaining equal decision-making power with fellow citizens.

Civil disobedience has long been recognized as a central mechanism through which democratic citizens may legitimately promote political justice in their society. According to the standard view, civil disobedience is a public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law that aims to change laws or government policies. People who engage in civil disobedience are willing to accept the legal consequences of their actions in order to show fidelity to the law (Bedau 1961; Rawls 1971: ch. 55). The standard definition of civil disobedience has been subjected to challenge. For example, some argue that the private acts in which the disobedient seeks to evade legal consequences can count as instances of civil disobedience (Raz 1979; Brownlee 2004, 2007, 2012).

Perhaps the most common way of justifying civil disobedience argues that the same considerations that ground the pro tanto duty to obey the law sometimes make it appropriate to engage in civil disobedience of the law (see, e.g., Rawls 1971: ch. 57; Sabl 2001; Markovits 2005; Smith 2011). For example, Rawls argues that while citizens of a “nearly just” society have a pro tanto duty to obey its laws in virtue of it being nearly just, civil disobedience can be justified as a way of making the relevant society more just (Rawls 1971: ch. 57). Similarly, Daniel Markovits argues that members of a society with suitably egalitarian and inclusive democratic procedures have a general duty to obey its laws because they are produced by procedures that are suitably egalitarian and inclusive, but that civil disobedience can be justified as a way of making the relevant procedures more egalitarian or inclusive (Markovits 2005).

It is easy to see why this constitutes an attractive way of justifying civil disobedience, since it justifies it by appeal to the same values that ground the pro tanto duty to obey the law. On the other hand, as Simmons notes, if there is no general duty to obey the law, there would seem to be no presumption in favor of obedience and thus no special need for a justification of civil disobedience; obedience and disobedience would stand equally in need of justification (Simmons 2007: ch 4).

Advocates of the standard approach generally assume that only civil disobedience can be justified in this way. However, some argue civil disobedience does not enjoy a special normative presumption over uncivil disobedience. The core idea that insofar as the values that ground a pro tanto duty to obey the law—for example, justice or democratic equality—are sometimes best served by civil disobedience of the law, they are sometimes best served by covert, evasive, anonymous, or even violent disobedience of the law (Delmas 2018; Lai 2019; Pasternak 2018).

Disagreement about what laws, policies, or principles ought to be implemented is a persistent feature of democratic societies. It is often argued that citizens and officials have duties to moderate their political activity in order to accommodate the competing views of fellow citizens or officials. Two duties of accommodation are widely discussed in the literature: duties of compromise and duties of public justification.

A compromise can be understood as an agreement between parties to advance laws or policies that all regard as suboptimal because they disagree about which laws or policies are optimal (May 2005). While it is widely accepted that there are sometimes compelling instrumental reasons to compromise, whether there are intrinsic moral reasons to compromise is more controversial. Some defend intrinsic reasons to compromise based on democratic values like inclusion, mutual respect, and reciprocity (Gutmann and Thompson 2014; Wendt 2016; Weinstock 2013). However, Simon May argues that such arguments fail and that all reasons to compromise are pragmatic (May 2005).

Advocates of the public justification approach to democracy (see section 2.2.2 ) often argue that democratic citizens and officials have individual moral duties of public justification. John Rawls argues for a “duty of civility” that requires citizens and officials to be prepared to give mutually acceptable justifications for important laws when voting and engaged in public advocacy. Given the inevitability of disagreement about comprehensive moral and philosophical truth in free democracies, the duty of civility requires citizens to appeal to a reasonable “political” conception of justice that can be the object of an “overlapping consensus” between different comprehensive doctrines. While different theorists motivate duties of public justification in different ways, many appeal to the need for exercises of coercive political authority to respect citizens’ freedom and equality.

5. Democratic Representation

Representation is an essential part of the division of labor of large-scale democracies. In this section, we examine two moral questions concerning representation. First, what sort of representative system is best? Second, by what moral principles are representatives bound?

A number of debates have centered on the question of what kinds of representative systems are best for a democratic society. What choice we make here will depend heavily on our underlying moral justification of democracy, our conception of citizenship as well as on our empirical understanding of political institutions and how they function. The most basic types of formal political representation available are single member district representation, proportional representation and group representation. In addition, many societies have opted for multicameral legislative institutions. In some cases, combinations of the above forms have been tried.

Single member district representation returns single representatives of geographically defined areas containing roughly equal populations to the legislature and is prominent in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India, among other places. The most common form of proportional representation is party list proportional representation. In a simple form of such a scheme, a number of parties compete for election to a legislature that is not divided into geographical districts. Parties acquire seats in the legislature as a proportion of the total number of votes they receive in the voting population as a whole. Group representation occurs when the society is divided into non-geographically defined groups such as ethnic or linguistic groups or even functional groups such as workers, farmers and capitalists and returns representatives to a legislature from each of them.

Many have argued in favor of single member district legislation on the grounds that it has appeared to them to lead to more stable government than other forms of representation. The thought is that proportional representation tends to fragment the citizenry into opposing homogeneous camps that rigidly adhere to their party lines and that are continually vying for control over the government. Since there are many parties and they are unwilling to compromise with each other, governments formed from coalitions of parties tend to fall apart rather quickly. The post war experience of governments in Italy appears to confirm this hypothesis. Single member district representation, in contrast, is said to enhance the stability of governments by virtue of its favoring a two party system of government. Each election cycle then determines which party is to stay in power for some length of time.

Charles Beitz argues that single member district representation encourages moderation in party programs offered for citizens to consider (Beitz 1989: ch. 7). This results from the tendency of this kind of representation towards two party systems. In a two party system with majority rule, it is argued, each party must appeal to the median voter in the political spectrum. Hence, they must moderate their programs to appeal to the median voter. Furthermore, they encourage compromise among groups since they must try to appeal to a lot of other groups in order to become part of one of the two leading parties. These tendencies encourage moderation and compromise in citizens to the extent that political parties, and interest groups, hold these qualities up as necessary to functioning well in a democracy.

In criticism, advocates of proportional and group representation have argued that single member district representation tends to muffle the voices and ignore the interests of minority groups in the society (Mill 1861; Christiano 1996). Minority interests and views tend to be articulated in background negotiations and in ways that muffle their distinctiveness. Furthermore, representatives of minority interests and views often have a difficult time getting elected at all in single member district systems so it has been charged that minority views and interests are often systematically underrepresented. Sometimes these problems are dealt with by redrawing the boundaries of districts in a way that ensures greater minority representation. The efforts are invariably quite controversial since there is considerable disagreement about the criteria for apportionment.

In proportional representation, by contrast, representatives of different groups are seated in the legislature in proportion to citizens’ choices. Minorities need not make their demands conform to the basic dichotomy of views and interests that characterize single member district systems so their views are more articulated and distinctive as well as better represented.

Advocates of group representation, like Iris Marion Young, have argued that some historically disenfranchised groups may still not do very well under proportional representation (Young 1990: ch. 6). They may not be able to organize and articulate their views as easily as other groups. Also, minority groups can still be systematically defeated in the legislature and their interests may be consistently set back even if they do have some representation. For these groups, some have argued that the only way to protect their interests is legally to ensure that they have adequate and even disproportionate representation.

One worry about group representation is that it tends to freeze some aspects of the agenda that might be better left to the choice of citizens. For instance, consider a population that is divided into linguistic groups for a long time. And suppose that only some citizens continue to think of linguistic conflict as important. In the circumstances a group representation scheme may tend to be biased in an arbitrary way that favors the views or interests of those who do think of linguistic conflict as important.

What moral norms apply to representatives carrying out their official duties? We can get a better handle on possible answers by introducing Hannah Pitkin’s famous distinction between trustees and delegates (Pitkin 1967). Representatives who act as trustees rely on their own independent judgments in carrying out their duties. Norms of trusteeship are supported in recognition that, given a natural division of democratic labor, officials are in a much better position to make well-reasoned and well-informed political decisions than ordinary citizens.

Representatives who act as delegates defer to the judgments of their citizens. These norms might be thought to reflect the value of democratic accountability. Because the people authorize representatives to govern, it is natural to think that representatives are accountable to the people to enact their judgments. If representatives are not accountable in this way, citizens lose democratic control over their representatives’ actions.

Which norms should win out when they conflict? Pitkin argues that the answer varies by context. This seems plausible. For example, if we take the view that citizens primarily have the role of determining the aims of the society, we might think that representatives ought to be delegates with regard to the aims, but trustees with regard to the ways of realizing the aims (Christiano 1996). See Suzanne Dovi’s discussion of representation for a deeper and more nuanced discussion of these issues.

Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem is thought by some to provide a major set of difficulties for democratic theory (Arrow 1951). William Riker, Russell Hardin, and others have thought that the impossibility theorem shows that there are deep problems with democratic ideals (Riker 1982; Hardin 1999). Neither of these thinkers are opposed to democracy itself, they both think that there are good instrumental reasons for having democracy.

The basic results of social choice theory are laid out in detail elsewhere in the encyclopedia (List 2013). Here we will simply articulate the basic result and an illustration. The question of Arrowian social choice theory is: how do we determine a social preference for a society overall on the basis of the set of the individual preferences of the members? Arrow shows that a social choice function that satisfies a number of plausible constraints cannot be defined when there are three or more alternatives to be chosen by the group. He lays out a number of conditions to be imposed on a social choice function. Unlimited domain : The social choice function must be able to give us a social preference no matter what the preferences of the individuals over alternatives are. Non dictatorship : the social choice function must not select the preference of one particular member regardless of others’ preferences. Transitivity and completeness : The individual preferences orderings must be transitive and complete orderings and the social preference derived from them must be transitive and complete. Independence of irrelevant alternatives : the social preference between two alternatives must be the result only of the individual orderings between those two alternatives. Pareto condition : if all the members prefer an alternative x over y , then x must be ranked above y in the social preference. The theorem says that no social choice function over more than two alternatives can satisfy all of these conditions.

A useful illustration of this idea involves an extension of majority rule to cases of more than two alternatives. The Condorcet rule says that an alternative x wins when, for every other alternative, a majority prefers x over that alternative. For example, suppose we have three persons A , B and C and three alternatives x , y and z . A prefers x over y , y over z ; B prefers y over z and z over x ; C prefers x over z and z over y . In this case, x is the Condorcet winner since it beats y , and it beats z . The problem with this plausible sounding rule is the case of a majority cycle. Suppose you have three persons A , B and C , and three alternatives, x , y and z . In the case in which A prefers x over y and y over z , while B prefers y over z and z over x , and C prefers z over x and x over y , the Condorcet rule will yield a social preference of x over y , y over z and z over x . One can see here that the Condorcet rule satisfies all the conditions except transitivity of social preference. One way to avoid intransitivity is to restrict the domain of preferences from which the social preference arises. Another is to introduce cardinal information that compares the how much people prefer alternatives (violating independence). Another might be to make one person a dictator. So, this case nicely illustrates that one cannot satisfy all of the constraints simultaneously.

Riker argues that the theorem shows that the idea that the popular will can be the governing element in a society is false. If an existence condition for a popular will is a restricted set of preferences the question naturally arises as to whether such a condition is always or normally met in a moderately complex society. We might wonder whether a highly pluralistic society with a very complex division of labor is likely to satisfy the restricted preference set condition necessary to avoid cycles or other pathologies of social choice. Some have argued that we have empirical evidence to the effect that modern societies do normally satisfy such conditions (Mackie 2003). Others have argued that this seems unlikely (Riker 1982; Ingham 2019). This is not merely a defense of unlimited domain. It is a defense of the thesis that normally the collections of preferences in modern societies are not likely to have the properties that enable them to avoid cycles.

The fairness critique from social choice theory is based on the idea that when a voting process meets requirements of fairness, the fairness of the process and the preferences may not generate determinate outcomes. If cycles are pervasive, the outcomes of democratic processes may be determined by clever strategies and not by the fairness of the procedures (Riker 1982). Three remarks are in order here. First, it is compatible with the process being completely fair that the outcomes of the process are indeterminate. After all, coin flips are fair. Second, there is some question as to how prominent the cycles are. Third, one might think that if the conditions which enable opposing sides to strategize effectively are themselves roughly equal, then the concerns for fairness are fully met. If resources for persuasion and organization are distributed in an egalitarian way, perhaps the fairness account is vindicated after all. This point can be made more compelling when we consider Sean Ingham’s account of political equality. He includes intensity of preference in his account of fairness. This is a departure from the Arrowian approach, but it is in many ways a realistic one. The idea is that majorities have equal control over policy areas when they are able to get what they want with the same amount of intensity of preferences. And equality holds generally when all groups of the same size have the same control (Ingham 2019). There remains an extreme case in which all majorities have equal intensity of preference and are caught in a majority cycle. But the chances of this happening are very slim, even if the chances of majority cycles more generally are not as small. Even if there are a lot of majority cycles, if the issues are resolved in such a way that those majorities that have most at stake in the conflict are the ones that get their way, then we can have fairness in a quite robust sense even while having pervasive majority cycles.

If democratic societies allow members to participate as equals in collective decision making, a natural question arises: who has the right to participate in making collective decisions? We can ask this question within a particular jurisdiction (ought all adults have the right to participation? Ought children have the right to participation? Ought all residents have such rights?). But we can also ask what the extent of the jurisdiction ought to be. How many of the people in the world ought to be included in the collective decision-making? An easy, though slightly misleading, way of asking this question is, what ought the physical boundaries of a particular institution of collective decision-making be? We see partially democratic societies within the confines of the modern nation-state. But we might ask, why should we restrict the set of persons who participate in making decisions of the modern state just to those who happen to be the physical inhabitants of those states? Surely there are many other persons affected by decisions made by democratic states aside from those persons. For example, activities in one society A can pollute another society B . Why shouldn’t the members of B have a say in the decisions regarding the polluting activities in A ? And there can be many other effects that activities in A can have on B .

Some have suggested that the boundaries of a state ought to be determined through a principle of national self-determination. We identify a nation as an ongoing group of persons who share certain cultural, historical and political norms and who identify with each other and with a piece of land. Then we determine the boundaries of the territory by appeal to the size of the group of people and the land they cherish (Miller 1995; Song 2012). This is an appealing idea in many ways: shared nationality breeds a willingness to share the sacrifices that arise from collective decision making; it generates a sense of at-homeness for people. But it is hard to use as a general principle for dividing land among persons when one of the central facts for many societies is that a diversity of nations, ethnic groups and cultures co-mingle on the very same land.

Is there a democratic solution to the boundary problem? A number of ideas have been suggested. The first idea is that the people ought to decide what the boundaries are. But this suggestion, while it may be a pragmatic resolution to the problem, seems to beg the question about who the members are and who are not (Whelan 1983).

A second theoretical solution that has some democratic credentials is to invoke the principle that all who are subjected to decision making, in the sense of who are coerced or have duties imposed upon them, ought to have a say in the decision making (Abizadeh 2008). This principle is plausible enough, but it doesn’t get at enough cases. The pollution case above is not a case of subjection.

A third proposed theoretical solution is the all-affected principle. One formulation is “all affected persons ought to have a say in the decisions that affect them”. This does suggest that when the activities in one state affect those of another state, the people of the other state ought to have a say in those activities. Some have thought that this principle tends to lead to a kind of politically cosmopolitan principle in support of world government (Goodin 2007).

But the all-affected principle is conceptually quite uncertain and morally deeply problematic, and it provides very little, if anything, in the way of a solution to the boundary problem.

First, “having a say” is not clear. Does it require having a vote in collective decision-making? Or is it also satisfied by a person’s being able to modify another’s action by negotiating with them, as we see when there is bargaining over an externality? This latter version would undermine the idea that the all-affected principle has direct implications for the boundary problem. When the United States permits activities that produce acid rain in Canada, Canada can negotiate with the United States to lessen the production of acid rain and/or to compensate Canada for the harm. As long as there is a fair and effective system of negotiation, this would seem to satisfy the all-affected principle without giving Canadians a vote in American politics or Americans a vote in Canadian politics.

Second, it is not clear what “being affected” means. One, does a person being affected just mean that there is a change in the person’s situation or must the effect involve the setting back of one’s preferences, or interests, or legitimate interests, or exercise of one’s capacities or one’s good? Two, are one’s interests affected by a decision only when they are advanced or set back relative to some baseline (either the present state of affairs or some morally defined baseline like what you have promised me), or am I affected by decisions that could be to my advantage or disadvantage but end up making no difference? For example, if I am drowning in a pool and you are deciding whether to save me or go buy yourself a candy bar, am I affected by your buying the candy bar? If I am not affected when no change occurs, then who is affected by a decision often depends on who participates in the decision and we have no solution to the problem of inclusion. If I am affected, then the principle has some quite extraordinary implications. Now it turns out that impoverished persons in South Asia are affected by my buying a candy bar, since I could have sent the money to them (Goodin 2007).

The all-affected principle is a merely suggestive and rhetorically effective phrase. It is a conversation starter and a list of topics to be discussed, not a genuine principle. For example, if I must include everyone possibly affected by my decision for every decision I make, I will not be able to make many decisions and my decision making will no longer enable me to give a shape to my own life and my relations with others. My life becomes fragmented and lacks integrity (Williams 1973). An analog of this problem would arise for political societies, presumably. Each society would have to include a variety of different persons in each decision. It is hard to see how any society could take on any particular character if this is the case.

A more plausible principle that encompasses some of the suggestions of the all-affected principle is that a framework of institutions should be set up so that people have power to advance and protect their legitimate interests in life.

But if we understand the principle in this way, it is not clear that it helps us much with the boundary problem. First of all, there are different ways in which people can be said to possess power over their lives. One kind of power is the power to participate as an equal in a collective decision-making process. Another kind is to be able to advance one’s interests in a decentralized process like a market or a system of agreement making like international law. Recalling our pollution problem above, we could give the state of which they are members power to negotiate with the polluting state terms that are mutually agreeable. Only the power to participate as an equal in collective decision-making involves the boundaries of collective decision-making.

Another solution to the boundary problem is a conservative one. The basic idea is to keep the boundaries of states roughly as they are except if there is a pressing need to change them. Trying to alter the boundaries of political societies is a recipe for serious conflict because there is no institution that has the legitimacy or power actually to resolve problems at an international level and there is likely to be a lot of disagreement on how to do it. States as we know them, are by far the most powerful political entities in the international system. They have developed more effective practices of accountability of power than any other entity in the system. They have created unified societies with highly interdependent populations. Finally, states and the individuals in them can be made accountable to some degree to other individuals and states through the process of negotiation and international law making. The origin of these boundaries may be arbitrary, but it is not, for all that, irrelevant. To be sure, there are clear cases where borders can be changed. One source of pressing need is serious injustice within a country. Another might be the existence of permanent minorities that are sectionally defined. Here, we ask only how to revise boundaries and the basis of such revision is that it is a remedy for serious injustice (Buchanan 1991).

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What Is Democracy? Definition and Examples

• B.S., Texas A&M University

A democracy is a form of government that empowers the people to exercise political control, limits the power of the head of state, provides for the separation of powers between governmental entities, and ensures the protection of natural rights and civil liberties . In practice, democracy takes many different forms. Along with the two most common types of democracies—direct and representative—variants such as participatory, liberal, parliamentary, pluralist, constitutional, and socialist democracies can be found in use today.

Key Takeaways: Democracy

• Democracy, literally meaning “rule by the people,” empowers individuals to exercise political control over the form and functions of their government.
• While democracies come in several forms, they all feature competitive elections, freedom of expression , and protection of individual civil liberties and human rights.
• In most democracies, the needs and wishes of the people are represented by elected lawmakers who are charged with writing and voting on laws and setting policy.
• When creating laws and policies, the elected representatives in a democracy strive to balance conflicting demands and obligations to maximize freedom and protect individual rights.

Despite the prominence in the headlines of non-democratic, authoritarian states like China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, democracy remains the world’s most commonly practiced form of government. In 2018, for example, a total of 96 out of 167 countries (57%) with populations of at least 500,000 were democracies of some type. Statics show that the percentage of democracies among the world’s governments has been increasing since the mid-1970s, currently standing just short of its post- World War II high of 58% in 2016.

Democracy Definition

Meaning “rule by the people,” democracy is a system of government that not only allows but requires the participation of the people in the political process to function properly. U.S. President Abraham Lincoln , in his famed 1863 Gettysburg Address may have best-defined democracy as a “…government of the people, by the people, for the people…”

Semantically, the term democracy comes from the Greek words for “people” (dēmos) and “rule” (karatos). However, achieving and preserving a government by the people—a “popular” government—is far more complicated than the concept’s semantic simplicity might imply. In creating the legal framework under which the democracy will function, typically a constitution, several crucial political and practical questions must be answered.

Is “rule by the people” even appropriate for the given state? Do the inherent freedoms of a democracy justify dealing with its complex bureaucracy and electoral processes, or would the streamlined predictability of a monarchy , for example, be preferable?

Assuming a preference for democracy, which residents of the country, state, or town should enjoy the political status of full citizenship? Simply stated, who are the “people” in the “government by the people” equation? In the United States, for example, the constitutionally established doctrine of birthright citizenship provides that any person born on U.S. soil automatically becomes a U.S. citizen. Other democracies are more restrictive in bestowing full citizenship.

Which people within the democracy should be empowered to participate in it? Assuming that only adults are allowed to fully participate in the political process, should all adults be included? For example, until the enactment of the 19th Amendment in 1920, women in the United States were not allowed to vote in national elections. A democracy that excludes too many of the governed from taking part in what is supposed to be their government runs the risk of becoming an aristocracy—government by a small, privileged ruling class—or an oligarchy —government by an elite, typically wealthy, few.

If, as one of the foundational principles of democracy holds, the majority rules, what will a “proper” majority be? A majority of all citizens or a majority of citizens who vote only? When issues, as they inevitably will, divide the people, should the wishes of the majority always prevail, or should, as in the case of the American Civil Rights Movement , minorities be empowered to overcome majority rule? Most importantly, what legal or legislative mechanisms should be created to prevent the democracy from becoming a victim of what one of America’s Founding Fathers , James Madison , called “the tyranny of the majority?”

Finally, how likely is it that a majority of the people will continue to believe that democracy is the best form of government for them? For a democracy to survive it must retain the substantial support of both the people and the leaders they choose. History has shown that democracy is a particularly fragile institution. In fact, of the 120 new democracies that have emerged around the world since 1960, nearly half have resulted in failed states or have been replaced by other, typically more authoritarian forms of government. It is therefore essential that democracies be designed to respond quickly and appropriately to the internal and external factors that will inevitably threaten them.

Democratic Principles

While their opinions vary, a consensus of political scientists agree that most democracies are based on six foundational elements:

• Popular sovereignty: The principle that the government is created and maintained by the consent of the people through their elected representatives.
• An Electoral System: Since according to the principle of popular sovereignty, the people are the source of all political power, a clearly defined system of conducting free and fair elections is essential.
• Public Participation: Democracies rarely survive without the active participation of the people. Health democracies enable and encourage the people to take part in their political and civic processes. 
• Separation of Powers: Based on a suspicion of power concentrated in a single individual—like a king—or group, the constitutions of most democracies provide that political powers be separated and shared among the various governmental entities.
• Human Rights: Along with their constitutionally enumerated rights freedoms, democracies protect the human rights of all citizens. In this context, human rights are those rights considered inherent to all human beings, regardless of nationality, sex, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, language, or any other considerations.
• A Rule of Law: Also called due process of law , the rule of law is the principle that all citizens are accountable to laws that are publicly created and equitably enforced in a manner consistent with human rights by an independent judicial system.

Types of Democracy

Throughout history, more types of democracy have been identified than there are countries in the world. According to social and political philosopher Jean-Paul Gagnon, more than 2,234 adjectives have been used to describe democracy. While many scholars refer to direct and representative as the most common of these, several other types of democracies can be found around the world today. While direct democracy is unique, most other recognized types of democracy are variants of representative democracy. These various types of democracy are generally descriptive of the particular values emphasized by the representative democracies that employ them.

Originated in Ancient Greece during the 5th century BCE, direct democracy , sometimes called “pure democracy,” is considered the oldest non-authoritarian form of government. In a direct democracy, all laws and public policy decisions are made directly by a majority vote of the people, rather than by the votes of their elected representatives.

Functionally possible only in small states, Switzerland is the only example of a direct democracy applied on a national level today. While Switzerland is no longer a true direct democracy, any law passed by the popularly elected national parliament can be vetoed by a direct vote of the public. Citizens can also change the constitution through direct votes on amendments. In the United States, examples of direct democracy can be found in state-level recall elections and lawmaking ballot initiatives .

Representative

Also called indirect democracy, representative democracy is a system of government in which all eligible citizens elect officials to pass laws and formulate public policy on their behalf. These elected officials are expected to represent the needs and viewpoints of the people in deciding the best course of action for the nation, state, or other jurisdiction as a whole.

As the most commonly found type of democracy in use today, almost 60% of all countries employ some form of representative democracy including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

Participatory

In a participatory democracy, the people vote directly on policy while their elected representatives are responsible for implementing those policies. Participatory democracies rely on the citizens in setting the direction of the state and the operation of its political systems. While the two forms of government share similar ideals, participatory democracies tend to encourage a higher, more direct form of citizen participation than traditional representative democracies.

While there are no countries specifically classified as participatory democracies, most representative democracies employ citizen participation as a tool for social and political reform. In the United States, for example, so-called “grassroots” citizen participation causes such as the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s have led elected officials to enact laws implementing sweeping social, legal, and political policy changes.

Liberal democracy is loosely defined as a form of representative democracy that emphasizes the principles of classical liberalism —an ideology advocating the protection of individual civil liberties and economic freedom by limiting the power of the government. Liberal democracies employ a constitution, either statutorily codified, as in the United States or uncodified, as in the United Kingdom, to define the powers of the government, provide for a separation of those powers, and enshrine the social contract .

Liberal democracies may take the form of a constitutional republic , like the United States, or a constitutional monarchy , such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.

Parliamentary

In a parliamentary democracy, the people directly elect representatives to a legislative parliament . Similar to the U.S. Congress , the parliament directly represents the people in making necessary laws and policy decisions for the country.

In parliamentary democracies such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan, the head of government is a prime minister, who is first elected to parliament by the people, then elected prime minister by a vote of the parliament. However, the prime minister remains a member of the parliament and thus plays an active role in the legislative process of creating and passing laws. Parliamentary democracies are typically a feature of a constitutional monarch, a system of government in which the head of state is a queen or king whose power is limited by a constitution.

In a pluralist democracy, no single group dominates politics. Instead, organized groups within the people compete to influence public policy. In political science, the term pluralism expresses the ideology that influence should be spread among different interest groups, rather than held by a single elite group as in an aristocracy. Compared to participatory democracies, in which individuals take part in influencing political decisions, in a pluralist democracy, individuals work through groups formed around common causes hoping to win the support of elected leaders.

In this context, the pluralist democracy assumes that the government and the society as a whole benefit from a diversity of viewpoints. Examples of pluralist democracy can be seen in the impact special interest groups, such as the National Organization for Women , have had on American politics.

Constitutional

While the exact definition continues to be debated by political scientists, constitutional democracy is generally defined as a system of government based on popular sovereignty and a rule of law in which the structures, powers, and limits of government are established by a constitution. Constitutions are intended to restrict the power of the government, typically by separating those powers between the various branches of government, as in the United States’ constitution’s system of federalism . In a constitutional democracy, the constitution is considered to be the “ supreme law of the land .”

Democratic socialism is broadly defined as a system of government based on a socialist economy , in which most property and means of production are collectively, rather than individually, controlled by a constitutionally established political hierarchy—the government. Social democracy embraces government regulation of business and industry as a means of furthering economic growth while preventing income inequality .

While there are no purely socialist governments in the world today, elements of democratic socialism can be seen in Sweden’s provision of free universal health care, education, and sweeping social welfare programs. 

Is America a Democracy

While the word “democracy” does not appear in the United States Constitution, the document provides the basic elements of representative democracy: an electoral system based on majority rule, separation of powers, and a dependence on a rule of law. Also, America’s Founding Fathers used the word often when debating the form and function of the Constitution.  

However, a long-running debate over whether the United States is a democracy or a republic continues today. According to a growing number of political scientists and constitutional scholars, it is both—a “democratic republic.”

Similar to democracy, a republic is a form of government in which the country is governed by the elected representatives of the people. However, since the people do not govern the state themselves, but do so through their representatives, a republic is distinguished from direct democracy.

Professor Eugene Volokh of the UCLA School of Law argues that the governments of democratic republics embrace the principles shared by both republics and democracies. To illustrate his point, Volokh notes that in the United States, many decisions on local and state levels are made by the people through the process of direct democracy, while as in a republic, most decisions at the national level are made by democratically elected representatives.

Brief History

Archeological evidence suggests that disorganized practices at least resembling democracy existed in some parts of the world during prehistoric times, However, the concept of democracy as a form of populist civic engagement emerged during the 5th century BCE in the form of the political system used in some of the city-states of Ancient Greece , most notably Athens . At that time, and for the next several centuries, tribes or city-states remained small enough that if democracy was practiced at all, it took the form of direct democracy. As city-states grew into larger, more heavily populated sovereign nation-states or countries, direct democracy became unwieldy and slowly gave way to representative democracy. This massive change necessitated an entirely new set of political institutions such as legislatures, parliaments, and political parties all designed according to the size and cultural character of the city or country to be governed.

Until the 17th century, most legislatures consisted only of the entire body of citizens, as in Greece, or representatives selected from among a tiny oligarchy or an elite hereditary aristocracy. This began to change during the English Civil Wars from 1642 to 1651 when members of the radical Puritan reformation movement demanded expanded representation in Parliament and the universal right to vote for all male citizens. By the middle 1700s, as the power of the British Parliament grew, the first political parties—the Whigs and Tories—emerged. It soon became obvious that laws could not be passed or taxes levied without the support of the Whig or Tory party representatives in Parliament.

While the developments in the British Parliament showed the feasibility of a representative form of government, the first truly representative democracies emerged during the 1780s in the British colonies of North America and took its modern form with the formal adoption of the Constitution of the United States of America on March 4, 1789.

Sources and Further Reference

• Desilver, Drew. “Despite global concerns about democracy, more than half of countries are democratic.” Pew Research Center , May 14, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/14/more-than-half-of-countries-are-democratic/.
• Kapstein, Ethan B., and Converse, Nathan. “The Fate of Young Democracies.” Cambridge University Press, 2008, ISBN 9780511817809.
• Diamond, Larry. “Democracy in Decline?” Johns Hopkins University Press, October 1, 2015, ISBN-10 1421418185.
• Gagnon, Jean-Paul. “2,234 Descriptions of Democracy: An Update to Democracy's Ontological Pluralism.” Democratic Theory, vol. 5, no. 1, 2018.
• Volokh, Eugene. “Is the United States of America a republic or a democracy?” The Washington Post , May 13, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/13/is-the-united-states-of-america-a-republic-or-a-democracy/. 
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• The Three Branches of US Government
• Representative Democracy: Definition, Pros, and Cons
• Understanding the Ballot Initiative Process
• The Powers of Congress
• About the Legislative Branch of U.S. Government
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1.1: Introduction - What is Democracy?

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Democracy may be a word familiar to most, but it is a concept still misunderstood and misused at a time when dictators, single-party regimes, and military coup leaders alike assert popular support by claiming the mantle of democracy. Yet the power of the democratic idea has prevailed through a long and turbulent history, and democratic government, despite continuing challenges, continues to evolve and flourish throughout the world.

Democracy, which derives from the Greek word "demos," or "people," is defined, basically, as government in which the supreme power is vested in the people. In some forms, democracy can be exercised directly by the people; in large societies, it is by the people through their elected agents. Or, in the memorable phrase of President Abraham Lincoln, democracy is government "of the people, by the people, and for the people."

Freedom and democracy are often used interchangeably, but the two are not synonymous. Democracy is indeed a set of ideas and principles about freedom, but it also consists of practices and procedures that have been molded through a long, often tortuous history. Democracy is the institutionalization of freedom.

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US government and civics

Course: us government and civics   >   unit 1.

• The social contract
• Democratic ideals of US government
• The ideas at the heart of US government
• Democratic ideals in the Declaration of Independence
• Democratic ideals in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution
• The Declaration of Independence
• Democratic ideals in the Preamble to the US Constitution
• The Preamble to the Constitution

Ideals of democracy: lesson overview

• Ideals of democracy

People to know

Important documents.

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”

“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution.”

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By the People: Essays on Democracy

Harvard Kennedy School faculty explore aspects of democracy in their own words—from increasing civic participation and decreasing extreme partisanship to strengthening democratic institutions and making them more fair.

Winter 2020

By Archon Fung , Nancy Gibbs , Tarek Masoud , Julia Minson , Cornell William Brooks , Jane Mansbridge , Arthur Brooks , Pippa Norris , Benjamin Schneer

The basic terms of democratic governance are shifting before our eyes, and we don’t know what the future holds. Some fear the rise of hateful populism and the collapse of democratic norms and practices. Others see opportunities for marginalized people and groups to exercise greater voice and influence. At the Kennedy School, we are striving to produce ideas and insights to meet these great uncertainties and to help make democratic governance successful in the future. In the pages that follow, you can read about the varied ways our faculty members think about facets of democracy and democratic institutions and making democracy better in practice.

Explore essays on democracy

Archon fung: we voted, nancy gibbs: truth and trust, tarek masoud: a fragile state, julia minson: just listen, cornell william brooks: democracy behind bars, jane mansbridge: a teachable skill, arthur brooks: healthy competition, pippa norris: kicking the sandcastle, benjamin schneer: drawing a line.

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TED Talks on democracy

How business leaders can renew democracy

How to bridge political divides — from two friends on opposing sides

How AI and democracy can fix each other

What the world can learn from Ukraine's fight for democracy

What makes someone vote against their political party?

Your creative superpowers can help protect democracy

How to build democracy — in an authoritarian country

When AI can fake reality, who can you trust?

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Democracy works — we just need better leaders

The case for a new Great Migration in the US

A crash course in making political change

The Idea of Democracy in Theory and Practice

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• Soobhiraj Bungsraz 2  

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‘Out of the dark and from very long ago has come a word’ (Dunn 2005 : 10), a disruptive word called democracy to describe a form of government that gave the demos , or the people, sovereign power in its originating city-state, Athens. Citizens could (indeed were expected to) represent themselves regardless of their wealth or class (Held 2006 : 14). This was a radical departure from earlier forms of government in the ancient Greek world as democracy, as understood at the time, empowered the ordinary citizens to participate in their own rule, effectively citizens of the ancient democracies were both rulers and ruled.

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• Leadership Styles: Democratic and Collective The difference between Democratic and Collective Participative styles, however, lies in the role of the leader in decision-making.
• The Internet is a Democratic Technology As opposed to what in the media channels of communication where the information let out to the public is filtered and influenced by what the government want the people to know, the Internet is free […]
• Democracy in Canada Though Canada is among the countries which are highly ranked in the realms of democracy around the world, it has a number of limitations and in-adequacies within its political system.
• Robespierre From Democracy to Totalitarianism Consequently, as a result of the failure of the constitutional monarch and the foreign wars that threatened the French Jacobins, the Committee of Public Safety was constituted in part of the new Republic, on April […]
• Citizenship Education and Democracy In simple terms, the role of educators is to teach children to be true citizens who can contribute to the evolvement of their countries.
• “The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy” by Rodrik, D The book focuses on the globalization trends and the competing interests of nationalism and internationalism. This is one of the aspects of paradox that the author of this book is talking about.
• In What Ways Did American Culture Become More Democratic in the Early 19th Century The latter were used as instruments for airing the voices of the people. The party was keen in drawing the attention of workers who were facing the hard times of industrial revolution.
• Tunisian Transition to Democracy and Its Specificities This paper aims to investigate the specificities of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, especially the determinants of its short duration, its positive implications on the system, and transformations in the society.
• Views of American Muslims on Democracy In this regard, the research would take the form of a survey whereby the researcher identifies the sample population and posts questionnaires to them.
• Organizational Theory: Democratic Leadership Taylorism is based on the theory of scientific management and the idea that output is linked to payment. Moreover, the framework implies the presence of a string hierarchy, which can be damaging to the morale […]
• Types of Democracy Known to Modern Society In conclusion, some of the types of democracy are representative, participatory, and deliberative. Deliberative is a rather intriguing form of democracy, where people are randomly chosen to express views.
• Stock Market Performance During Republican and Democratic Presidencies To compare the stock market performance during Republican and Democratic presidencies, the stock market data for the S&P 500 index over the past few decades were computed.
• The Democrats and the Whigs of 1830-1840 The Jacksonian Democrats and the Wigs were interested in American society’s modernization and economic development. However, the parties had different views on achieving economic efficiency and prosperity and the role of government in the economy.
• Democratic Development in Colombia vs. Peru After a downturn in 2015 and a boom in 2009 due to the global financial crisis of 2008, the country’s economy is back on track as of 2016 and is riding the rising tide that […]
• Structures of Direct Democracy in California Others may argue that the proposition is a strength of direct democracy because it allows for the people’s will to be directly expressed and implemented.
• Emerging Democracy and Education in South Africa In the process of education reformation, the example of South Africa can be used to demonstrate the ability to shape the democratic mindset of the population by increasing the focus on critical thinking and civic […]
• American Democracy: Role of Anger The fact that the incident on January 6 was followed by a number of occasions where agents were seen engaged in sensitive operations makes it feasible to comprehend the explanation behind the public’s mistrust of […]
• Populism and Its Influence on Democracy Essentially, it explores the connections shared between Populism and authoritarianism and the potential democratic setbacks that might arise from the rise of authoritarian Populism.
• Women’s Rights: Democratic Perceptions Therefore, it is proper to claim that women would not be able to exercise their rights and freedoms as frequently without the efforts of Democrats.
• The Work “Republic” by Plato: Arguments for Democracy The primary argument that democracy is worse than timarchy and oligarchy derives directly from the text of Republic, where Socrates agrees that only tyranny is worse than democracy.
• Democracy: The Influence of Freedom Democracy is the basis of the political systems of the modern civilized world. Accordingly, the democracy of Athens was direct that is, without the choice of representatives, in contrast to how it is generated nowadays.
• The Article “Plato on Democracy and Expertise” by R. W. Sharples The central message permeating the writing is that the rigidity of truth on which the conceptual model of democracy is built is a problem since any system needs to acknowledge the malleability of the underlying […]
• Is a Secret Ballot a Basic Tenet of Democracy? The Supremacy Clause establishes that federal laws, constitutions, and regulations take precedence over state laws.”This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States…under the Authority of the United States, will be the supreme Law of […]
• Processes of Democratization in Spain, Portugal, and Greece Kornetis and Cavallaro claim that the processes of democratization resulted in the collapse of “the Francoist regime, the Salazar-Caetano regime of Estado Novo, and the Colonels’ military dictatorship in Greece “.
• Democracy and Its Crucial Features The equality of income and wealth remain the central issue of democracy, since, though democratic societies strive to egalitarianism, they fall short of ensuring equal income and wealth to everyone.
• Can the Democrats Win Back Rural Voters? The article used the Movement Lab approach to be able to win back the rural voters. The article relates to voting and election topic because it deals with voter turnout and strategies to be used […]
• Threat of Cyber Operations to Democracy and National Security Among its most important characteristics include the recognition of individual’s dignity, respect for equality, faith in the rule of the majority, and respect for the rights of the minority.
• Aspects of Democratic Regimes In the textbook, Dickovick and Eastwood, democratic regimes are described as ones where people individually and groups have the ability to voice and contest their ideas, as well as the opportunity to shape political life […]
• Characteristics of American Democracy Conversely, American democracy allows everyone and anybody to have the same opportunities regardless of the situation it is about, based on equal rights in the United States.
• Democrats Caught in Election-Year Gambit With Bloated Gas Prices These Midterms would be one of the most consequential in history as they will likely decide the political gridlock and demonstrate the voter confidence in the party that wins the majority.
• Abstracts for “Democracy: What’s It Good For?” and “The New Concert of Powers” The subject of the essay Democracy: What’s It Good For? is related to the issues of democracy in terms of its efficiency regarding the misinformation and irrationality of people’s choices.
• Corruption in Infrastructure of the Democratic Republic of Congo The mining companies are negatively affected by rampant corruption and a culture of everyday transactions, which has resulted in the misappropriation of public funds.
• Are Propositions, Recalls, and Referendums Democratic? According to this kind of leadership, a government is a social body retrieving its authority from the population and should always promote the will of the masses, especially the majority.
• Corruption in the Democratic Republic of Congo This is a comprehensive report published by the IMF that examines in tremendous detail the corruption, policy, and frameworks of governance and corruption in the DRC.
• Struggles of Democracy: Social Insurance Programs There are always segments of people in the society who struggle more than the general population, and by taking measures, the government increases the economic growth and general well-being.
• The UK Parliament and Democratic Legislature The critical point about the UK Parliament is the importance of tradition in its structure and functioning, affecting the selection process, the arrangement of power, and the communication between the members of the Parliament.
• Jackson Democracy: Transformation of American Conservatism Andrew Jackson was the 7th president of the United States of America, his term of office lasted from 1829 to 1837.
• The Meaning of Liberal Democracy in the US The establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR during Roosevelt’s presidency was an important event in the history of the two states and the entire history of the world.
• Democracy in Ancient Greece and Today From the lecture, I discovered that the word democracy partly originates from the word demes which means the small division of the bigger sections that Athens was divided into during the ancient time.
• The Diplock Courts and the Democratic Society The legal definition of the term is still ambiguous, but the best definition is considered to be the achievement of ideological, political, economic, or religious goals by violent means.
• “Korean Film: History, Resistance, and Democratic Imagination” by Min et al. The key message of the article in question is that Korean film culture is complex and heterogeneous, but it has yet to receive at the time of writing the attention it deserves from the progressive […]
• Jury Service as an Essential Part of the Democracy A Jury Service is an integral part of the U.S.judicial branch, due to which people can make responsible decisions and understand that their opinion is essential to the state.
• Democracy, Republicanism, and Liberalism in 19th Century Mexico and Colombia They emphasized the role of Mexico and its republican, democratic, and liberal principles in those changes. They started to imitate the political principles in Europe and the U.
• The Democratic Radicals and Conservatives Struggle of American Government The roots of the American government can be traced back to the aftermath of the American civil war and the results of the American War of Independence.
• Zinn’s and Schweikart’s Beliefs on American Democracy Namely, Zinn’s personal assumptions concerning the problem of racism and colonialism as the cornerstone of inequality in the U.S.are represented clearly in the book.
• Trust and Democracy Overview It will create a status quo where the American model of democracy that has been recognized and revered in the world is no longer a democracy but merely an illusion of one.
• Racial Democracy in Brazil Racial democracy in Brazil is a phenomenon connected to the idea that racial differences encourage individuals to look for a broad identity that would include every population presented in the country.
• Democratic Republic of Congo’s Refugee Crisis The refugee crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo is one example of how refugees suffer because of poor healthcare access and the inability to provide for themselves.
• Plato’s Views on Democracy Plato’s point of view appeared to me as a more appealing out of the two presented opinions on the best course for a political regime within a country.
• How to Make People Who Support Democrats Believe in Aliens The ones who are convinced in their existence the way they trust the course of actions proposed by Democrats help overcome the threat for the stability of the government.
• “After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy” by Coyne The reason for this is that the United States has used the excuse of protecting democracy when interfering in the internal affairs of different states.
• “Engendering Democracy in Brazil” by Sonia Alvarez In addition, the review integrates information acquired from essays by Barbara Nelson and Saint-Germain regarding gender equality and the electoral participation of women in democratic processes.
• The Democratic Political Strategy in Florida Establishing a connection to the Florida audiences can be especially advantageous for the democratic party, as it can let them know of all the recent changes and developments.
• Deliberative Democracy as an Improvement of Democratic Participation More specifically, the schools of a democratic system of most significant interest are deliberative democracy and democratic participation. At the same time, deliberative democracy realizes the political interest of every citizen in a thorough discussion.
• Democratic Politics and Australian Attitudes According to Stoker et al, the younger generations are usually blamed for the emergence of the aforementioned tendency. Overall, the primary idea behind the study consisted of disproving the presupposition, according to which young people […]
• America’s Voting Democracy: Failing After All Even though the United States did not start as a democracy and it took hundreds of years to ensure voting rights for the general populations in its entirety, these are still not the grounds to […]
• Theories of Global Politics. Democracy Effectiveness In the classical theme of ancient Athenian society, it is the representation of the ‘will of the people’ and had to include the views of all citizens in the decision making matters.
• Democratic Rule and Educated Citizenry They may think it is simply a matter of taxing big business in order to get something for the whole town, when, in reality, the higher tax will result in lower needed investment in the […]
• Russia’s Contemporary Political Regime not Democratic Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin was elected the first president of the Russian Federation on the 12th in June 1991. Some argue that the idea of politics as a mean for […]
• Democratic Principle: The Constitution of the US The two major democratic principles are closely interrelated and the parties involved into them can actually change places from time to time: the minority has the right to become the majority, thus the latter becomes […]
• International Political Economy, Democratization, and Terrorism IPE describes the global power dynamics that control international trade and finance, fuel globalization, and wealth distribution across the globe. Sachs argues that globalization and the emergence of political economics have led to the increased […]
• Democracy and Black Lives Matter It then continued as a series of protests against racial prejudice and police brutality ones that the police attempted to subdue with force.
• The New State of Israel: A Block to the Development of Democracy Since the infamous Palestine conflict is rooted deeply in political, cultural, social, and religious misconceptions between the Jewish and the Muslim residents of the area, the advocacy of the current Israeli strategy concerning the emphasis […]
• Internet Function and Potential in a Democratic Society This situation is comparable to the Medieval Age before the introduction of printing in the 1440s. The church and the courts monopolized books, and the population had no chance to learn an alternative opinion on […]
• Democracy, Political Power, and Public Policy Issues 1 Now, the question of balance between democracy and political power is as relevant as it was decades ago, being the center of the debate in the United States and the rest of the world.
• Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City’ by Robert Dahl A political stratum is defined as a group of individuals who take an active position in the political life of the country.
• Democratic Presidential Nominees for 2020 American society is a complex concept with many determinants, and the election of the President in the country is one of the most significant events because it shows the achieved progress and preferred values.
• Truthful Information for Building a Democracy Democracy is defined as the rule of the people, by the people for the people. Greenberg and page argue that for a democratic government to be established, information is of the essence.
• Francis Fukuyama: Can Liberal Democracy Survive the Decline of the Middle Class? Then, the author shifts to explaining the importance of the existence of a strong and abundantly represented in the society middle class layer as it is a foundation for all the democratic values in the […]
• Democracy in Asia India and the Price of Peaceful Change In his last kick, Gandhi decided to encourage the Indians to make their own salt, which was the most taxed by the British government.
• Israel as the Jewish and Democratic State: Can It Be Possible? However, the historical evaluation of the situation in Israel and the development of the Israel-Palestinian conflict that led to the Israel war of independence in 1948 and continues today shows that it is not an […]
• Ancient Democracy: Review All of the Athenians were involved in the process of selecting the candidates for the positions of the Archons the advisors to the ruler of the city.
• The Democratic Presidential Debate The part of the debate concerning the immigration policies and the candidate’s views of them is highly representative of the overall rhetorical strategies in use.
• “Inequality, Democracy, and the Environment” by Downey Liam Downey examines in his work Inequality, democracy, and the environment, the nature of these problems and tries to explain the causes of their occurrence.
• Organizational Culture: Democratic Leadership Democratic leadership would be an effective approach to leading others in the workplace because members of a group are allowed to offer their ideas that are applied to solve problems.
• Differences Between the Democrats and Republicans The activin expression in a marrow stromal cells is however regulated by the incubation with the necrosis factor of the tumor and the interleukin 1 alpha.
• Democracy Emergence in Ancient Greece and Why Plato Was Opposed to It The result of this war was the defeat of Athens by Sparta at the end of the fifth century which led to the overthrow of many democratic regimes.
• Democracy: Forms, Requirements and Homosexuality Democracy exists in two major forms there is the liberal democracy which is a very capitalistic economic approach in nature while the other form is a socialist democracy that embraces economic aspects like subsidies and […]
• Democratic Governance and Policy Networks The contribution of each of these actors was valuable for improving the quality of legislation which became the result of the collaborative work of the interested parties.
• Rape as a Weapon of War: Democratic Republic of Congo While some researchers argue that the occurrence of wartime rape, with its frequency, savagery and systematic organization during these times, is inherently entwined with the nature of the conflicts, most of them emphasize that the […]
• A Government and Basic Democratic Requirements to It In pluralism, the people who make policies are the top government officials and they do not involve the public. The relevance of involvement in the implementation of government policies is not clear to the citizens.
• “Jihad Versus Mcworld” by Benjamen Barber: Tribalism and Globalism Threat to Democracy The forces of Jihad and the forces of McWorld are fighting for sovereignty and neither supports democracy. It is the decentralization of confederations that may save democracy, according to Barber.
• Parliamentary Democracy: Will of the People Representation The party with the majority votes is sought to be representing the will of the people. In The will of the people: Notes towards a dialectical voluntarism, Peter Hallward states that the will of the […]
• Terrorism and Liberal Democracy: What We Should Know When confronted with external coercion like global terrorism, democracies react like a pendulum by first of all providing security and then vacillating back in the direction of moderation, the quest of lenience, and the encouragement […]
• Greek and Hellenistic World and Democracy In addition to the above, the model of democracy in Greece was composed of the Assembly, the Council and the courts that were collectively referred to as the governing bodies.
• Is the Constitution Supportive of Today’s Democracy? Additionally, one of the dominant elements in most constitutions is the principle of democracy which refers to the government by the people for the people themselves.
• Jihad vs. Mcworld Article: How Globalization Hinders Democracy In the recent past, most economies in the world have been adopting strategies aimed at increasing democracy in all areas of the economy i.e.political, economic, social, etc.globalization is one of the factors that influence the […]
• Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Democracy This was seen in the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment in a case involving Sherbert and Verner. The court mentioned the importance of a compelling interest from the state in regard to employment […]
• Benjamin’s Concept of Democracy Against Bennett’s Propositions on News and Democracy However, what seems good to many seems to work better and much more acceptable, from this point of view it is fair to reiterate Churchill’s pronouncement that, the present democracy is the best of all […]
• Origin and History of the Democratic Party and the Federal Constitution The acknowledgement of the USA independence by the Great Britain and the ratification of the treaty of peace of the 1783 at once led to the formation of schemes and the organization of factions, having […]
• Asian Experience in Democratization As long as the authorities in some of the Asian countries are elected, democracies in these countries still lack the characteristics which can be associated with democracy in other parts of the world.”In other words, […]
• Democratic Transition in Asian Communities As long as the authorities in some Asian countries are elected, democracies in these countries still lack the characteristics which can be associated with democracy in other parts of the world.”In other words, if a […]
• The Latin American Democracy: The Creation of Policy Policy, it is no surprise, is created in Latin American countries in manners that directly correlate with each system’s structure of accountability for their representatives, as is the case in every democracy.
• The Crises of Democracy, Society, and Environment The severity of the situation arises due to the homogeneity of American intelligentsia on the idea of democracy and the reported submissiveness towards all actions taken by the Government and capitalists to be right.
• A Dream Deferred and Democracy by Langston Hughes But if they over dry, they will become hard to chew and lose all the nutrition, This warns us of the consequences that may befall us if we sit there and wait for conditions to […]
• The Sources of Leadership and Democracy in Britain Also, the powers of the British Government are derived from the appeal or iron authority of the British rulers to the party blocs rather than from the power of the influence of the leaders to […]
• Democratization Theories at the Present Political Map The world history witnessed a great number of changes in the political state of countries, in the form of ruling and the change as well as the form of power in every state existing nowadays.
• Human Rights and Global Democracy by Michael Goodhart Considering that the current human rights bodies focus mostly on rights of individuals, there is needs for translating the rights in a global context.
• Democracy Is the Best Form of Government for All the World’s Inhabitants The challenge to the leaders, therefore, is to provide good leadership and governance to reciprocate the good work of the voters.
• Democratic Empowerment via Village Elections During Imperial China The villager assembly oversees the progress of the VCs and ensures that the decisions they make are for the common good of the rest of the villagers.
• Anti-Democratic Movement and Path of Democratization According to Lijphart, the Westminster model of democracy provides a throughout insight into the essence of democracy not only in the United Kingdom but in the rest of the world as well.
• Deliberative Democracy Case Studies When the government fails to give the reasons for engaging in war, citizens have the right to question justification of the government for the war and the respect it gives the citizens.
• Democrats vs. Republicans: Who Is Superior? The differences between the democratic regimes and the republicans have been described using all sorts of criteria. Under democrats, the lower 20% of the population tends to match the income growth of the top 5%.
• Torture and Democratic Society 1948, United Nations General Assembly, after the second world war adopted the Universal declaration on human rights, which prohibits the use of torture or any other form of inhuman or demeaning treatment or punishment In […]
• The State, Democracy and Globalization In order for people to understand the government there should be a system of communicating the state policies to the local individuals.
• Ideology of Race and the New Democratic Nation His main argument in this matter is that whilst racism did not at first lead the colonists in enslaving the blacks, the concept of the native hereditary inferiority on the component of Africans and African […]
• Roadblocks to Democracy in Iraq A huge part of Iraq has remained isolated from government control for the larger part of their history as a result of the harsh terrain and topography alongside lack of building material to construct roads.
• Revolutionary Vision: Popular Democracy or Elite Plutocracy? For instance, there are not many people who know how exactly the Constitution of the USA was created and adopted: “When the Constitution was completed, “the majority of the people were completely against it”.
• Ideology of the Democratic Party The Democratic Party of USA is the oldest political party in the world. Dilemma and destiny: the Democratic Party in America.
• Slavery and Democracy in 19th Century America In the 19th century when white folks are busy building a nation and taking part in the more significant aspects of creating a new future for their children, Negro slaves were still doing a backbreaking […]
• Comparing Democracy Effort Between Mali and the USA Abraham Lincoln defined it as a government of the people, for the people and by the people. The main function of the judiciary in Mali is the protection and guard of human rights and freedoms.
• Venezuela: A Democracy Under Siege This essay will critically evaluate Venezuela in different aspects in the following order : democratic principles and the constitution, political systems, economic policies and institutions, the media, and civil societies to show how Chavez is […]
• A Critique on Deliberative Democracy The belief that the United States of America is a democratic country automatically create the assumption that it is a government by the people, for the people, and of the people as laid down by […]
• Will China Become Democratic in Near Future? China, being one of the countries yet truly to begin the process of democratization, stands on a point that future progress will be important not only for the people in China but also for the […]
• Relationship Between Democracy and Violence in Colombia The escalating violence in the 1980s has in fact, watered-down Colombia’s democratic governance mainly because of the country’s incapacity to tame the violence.
• The Role of Media in the Democratization of Lebanon Even today, the country is considered to be one of the banking hubs of the Western Asia region and this can be evidenced by the fact that during the periods before the civil war in […]
• Relationship Between Democracy and the State If leaders are not visionary and their ideas are not cohesive, the situation leads to the formation of splinter groups within the state, a condition that is unbefitting for the health of a democracy.
• Kwangju Democratization Movement The Chun Doo-Hwan government was not justified in the use of force during the Kwangju democratization movements and failed in the restoration of democracy in the country.
• Democracy in the Educational Process He gives us the understanding of the changing attitude to the democracy in the society. The public education was organized by the idea of “democratic community and equality”.
• American Culture of Liberty and Democracy Undoubtedly democracy is the government of the people, for the people, by the people.’ But it is also true that it is only a part of the people of which the government is, has raised, […]
• The Role of Education in Democracy Propaganda is in itself an aspect of education where the Public Information Committee provided some knowledge on the certain issues surrounding the war in order to win public support.
• Descriptive Meaning of Democracy This term is however modified in meaning nowadays and it can be used in various applications; that is, it is used in a variety of ways depending on the time of use, the place where […]
• Democracy Threats in Australia Governance as the rule of the people by the people has been more subjected to the teachings of democracy that have been adopted as a form of governance.
• Modern China – Is True Democracy Still a Dream?
• The Battle Over Democracy Within Burma
• Utopian Society: National Socialism and Libertarian Democracy
• The Synergy Between Capitalism and Democracy
• The Nature of Democracy in the Period 1871-1914
• Elitism and Democracy Relations
• Democratization of China: History
• American Imperialism and Democracy
• Democrats and Rebuplicans Political Campaigns
• Democracy: The Greatest Gift Enlighten-Ica Can Give
• Weimar Democracy History Analysis: Why the Organization Failed
• Classical Political Thought. Democracy in Plato’s Republic
• Elements of Democracy and Constitutionalism
• Democracy: Under the Influence
• Aspect of Democracy in Seattle
• Democracy and Dictatorship in Ancient Greece and Today
• Haiti and Cape Verde Democracy: History and Philosophy
• Habermas’s Theory of Democracy
• Relevance of Building Democratic Institutions in Russia
• Germany and Poland Passages to Democracy Comparison
• Southeast Asian Changing Experience of Democracy
• The Level of Democracy in Singapore and Thailand
• Democratic Breakdown in Latin America
• Democracy Within the Realm of a Republic
• Urban Democracy and Capitalism
• Democratic Party in the US: History and Analysis
• Democratic Consolidation in Africa
• Public Opinion: The Image of Democracy by Lippmann
• Democracy and Freedom in Pakistan
• Public Opinion and Democracy: Under the Influence?
• Direct Democracy in Switzerland and Slovak Republic
• Failed Democracy in Pakistan and Nigeria
• Success of Democracy in US: Comparative Approach for Explaining
• Donald Trump and American Democracy
• Enemies of American Democracy
• Underdevelopment, Economic Inequality and Democratization
• Democracy Development in the World up to 1500 CE
• Greek Legacy in a Contemporary Democratic State
• Republican Versus Democrat Political Beliefs
• Strangers in the US Democracy
• Is Democratization Leading to a More Secure World?
• American Democratic Political Model as an Innovation
• Federalists and Democrats in the 19th Century
• Athenian Democracy: Pay for Public Service
• “Terror and Democracy at the Age of Stalin” by Goldman
• Globalization and Democratization Effects on Libya
• Western Liberal and Democratic Values
• UNDP and USAID: Source Evaluation
• “Democracy and International Relations in Asia” by Acharya
• Democratic Society: Basic Values and Priorities
• Democratic Globalization and Its Benefits
• ‘Democrats, Republicans Agree on a Budget Deal’ by Silverleib and Cohen
• Comparative Democratization and Dictatorships
• American Democratic and Republican Parties
• Democracy in the Arab World
• Technology and Democratic Education
• Democracy Promotion and Humanitarian Intervention
• Media and Democracy: Free Press and Fake News
• Empire and Democracy Conflict by Thucydides
• Democracy: Perception and Application
• Democracy and Oligarchy: the Meaning of Equality
• Democracy in Sudan: Key Factors
• Earth Democracy: Beyond Dead Democracy and Killing Economies
• Democracy in Egypt: Key Factors
• Politics of the Democratic Republic of Congo
• Globalization Impact on Africa’s Democratization Process
• “Democracy for the Few” by Michael Parenti
• Community Engagement in Democracy Building
• Democratic Deficit in the European Union
• Democracy Concerns and Exaggerated Challenges
• Kenya in Pre- and Post-Democracy Periods
• Constitutional Amendments to Expand Democracy
• 2012 Presidential Elections: Republicans vs. Democrats
• The Democratization of Japan
• Struggle for Democracy: President Interview
• The United States of America and Its Democracy
• Special Interest Groups Enhancing Democracy
• Okuma Shigenobu and Modern Democracy in Japan
• Federalists vs. Democratic-Republicans in the US
• Ruling America: Wealth and Power in a Democracy
• The Taisho Democracy Period in Japanese History
• The United States Promoting Democracy in Africa
• Libya: Challenges of Transitioning to Democracy
• Democratic Leadership, Value System, Followership
• “American Democracy is Doomed” by Matthew Yglesias
• Kuwait’s Democratization and Its Challenges
• Democratic Consolidation in Asia
• Leader Selection in Liberal Democratic Minimalism
• To What Extent Is Burma Democracy?
• American Democracy’ History: Turner’s Thesis
• Teaching Standards, Democracy and World Learning
• Religious Fundamentalism’ and Democracy’ Comparison
• American Democracy and Equality Criticism
• Democracy in Chile: Evidence and Effects
• Egyptian Democracy and Citizens’ Readiness for It
• Why Japan Was Able to Build a Successful Democracy?
• Democracy and Religion: Modern Theories
• Democratic Transitions: Weaknesses and Challenges
• Liberal Democracy: Marxist and Conservatism’ Approaches
• The Rise of American Democracy: Influences of the Constitution
• Democracy and Peaceful International Relations
• Democracy: Features and Impact on Peace
• American Democracy: Federal Government vs. States’ Rights
• The Taliban Insurgency: Democracy in Dangerous Places
• Human Development: Democratization and Economy’ Relations
• Democracy Promotion: Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism
• US Promotion of Democracy: Tools and Approaches
• Political Corruption as a Trigger of Democracy
• Democracy in the United States System
• Political Culture: Democracy and Civil Societies
• Democracy in Cambodia: Strategy and Recommendations
• Can Democracy Be Successfully Exported by Force?
• Youth Participation in Democracy: China
• Chinese Democratic Dictatorship Essence
• Sustainable Democracy in Developing Countries
• Democracy Versus Other Forms of Government
• The US’s Democracy Features
• Egypt Democratization Process
• Chinese Democracy in the Documentary “Please Vote for Mes”
• Democracy and Wealthy Americans Policy
• The History of Democracy in Libya
• The Development of America’s Democracy
• American Democracy and Society
• Democrats and Republicans Comparative Analysis
• Democracy and Religion in Turkey Government
• The Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance
• Can Judicial Review Be Reconciled With Democracy?
• Canadian Social Democracy Historical Evolution
• America’s Democracy History: Constitutional Perspectives
• China’s Democracy Movement
• Machiavelli’s Views on Democratization and Their Relation to Modern Politics
• Peace and Democracy: US Impact in the Middle East
• Outbreak Democratic Institutions
• Major Shifts in the Politics of Republican and Democratic Parties
• The National Curriculum for England and Wales From an Ideal Democratic Learning Society Perspective
• The Foundation of Democracy: Waiting for the King to Come
• Economic and Political Liberalism and Democracy
• Possibility of Attaining a Democracy in the Middle East
• Conflicts in Syria Present No Opportunity for Future Democratization
• Democracy and Global Peace
• Principles of Democratic Structuring
• Form of Political Ideology: Social Democracy
• Is Sectarianism an Obstacle to the Democratization of Iraq?
• Islam and Democracy in Egypt
• Copyright and Democratic Governance
• How Chinese Cultural Revolution Influenced Modern Democracy in China
• Should Democracy Be Adopted by All Nations?
• Liberal Democracy, Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust
• Partial Democracy and Governance Assessment in Egypt
• Rohr and Rosenbloom on Democracy
• How Does Turkey’s Greater Democratization Influence the Handling of the Cyprus Dispute?
• Is Majority Rule Democratic?
• Danish Aid to Africa: Implication for Civil Society & Democracy
• What Is Democratic Consolidation?
• Democracy and Economic Growth: Asia-Pacific Region Experiences
• FDR’s New Deal: Democratic Platform
• Capitalism, Democracy and the Treaty of Waitangi are Three Ways Through Which We in Aotearoa ‘Organise’ Ourselves
• Democratic Space Is Relevant in Early Childhood Education
• Taxes, Capitalism, and Democracy: Karl Marx vs. Plato
• Amu Chua: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability
• Democracy Measures in United Kingdom, France, Japan and China
• Democracy and Power in Online World
• Brazil: Embracing Structural Changes to Consolidate Democracy
• Democracy Strategy for the Middle East Countries
• Three Important Features of our Democracy
• Democratic Racism in Canada
• The Liberal Position of Democrats and Republicans
• Social Construction of “Race” and “Racism” and Its Relationship to Democratic Racism in Canada
• The Probability for Libya to Become a Democracy
• Ancient Greek Democracy That Still Makes People Strive for Perfection
• The Concept of Democracy by Force
• Democracy and Reform’s Trilemma
• Unitary Versus Adversary Democracy
• Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force to Effective Democracy
• Can Democracy Be Spread by Force?
• Democratization Process in Argentina
• Democratic Governments Role in the Global Economy
• The Main Impacts of the Civil War in the Democratic Republic of Congo
• What Is ‘Liberal Representative Democracy’ and Does the Model Provide an Appropriate Combination of Freedom and Equality?
• Policy Mechanisms for Trade Reform in a Democracy
• Transition to Democracy in Latin America
• Understanding Greek Culture’s Influence on Democratic Ideas
• How Development Leads to Democracy
• The Relationship Between Democracy and Islam in Indonesia
• Democracy System of Government
• Democratic Influence on Public Policies
• Democratization and the Indigenous Languages of Mexico and Venezuela
• The Required Freedom and Democracy in Afghanistan
• The Need for Ethical Leadership and Governance in Democracy
• The Democratic Process in Canada: The Role Played by Political Parties
• China’s Democracy Perspective and Practice
• Democracy in the Policy of United States of America
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• Chicago (A-D)
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ENCYCLOPEDIC ENTRY

Democracy (ancient greece).

Democracy in ancient Greece served as one of the first forms of self-rule government in the ancient world. The system and ideas employed by the ancient Greeks had profound influences on how democracy developed, and its impact on the formation of the U.S. government.

Social Studies, Ancient Civilizations

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The ancient Greeks were the first to create a democracy . The word “ democracy ” comes from two Greek words that mean people ( demos ) and rule ( kratos ). Democracy is the idea that the citizens of a country should take an active role in the government of their country and manage it directly or through elected representatives . In addition, it supports the idea that the people can replace their government through peaceful transfers of power rather than violent uprising or revolution . Thus, a key part of democracy is that the people have a voice.

The first known democracy in the world was in Athens. Athenian democracy developed around the fifth century B.C.E. The Greek idea of democracy was different from present-day democracy because, in Athens, all adult citizens were required to take an active part in the government. If they did not fulfill their duty they would be fined and sometimes marked with red paint. The Athenian definition of “citizens” was also different from modern-day citizens: only free men were considered citizens in Athens. Women, children, and slaves were not considered citizens and therefore could not vote.

Each year 500 names were chosen from all the citizens of ancient Athens. Those 500 citizens had to actively serve in the government for one year. During that year, they were responsible for making new laws and controlled all parts of the political process. When a new law was proposed, all the citizens of Athens had the opportunity to vote on it. To vote, citizens had to attend the assembly on the day the vote took place. This form of government is called direct democracy.

The United States has a representative democracy. Representative democracy is a government in which citizens vote for representatives who create and change laws that govern the people rather than getting to vote directly on the laws themselves.

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The Concepts and Fundamental Principles of Democracy

• Categories: Democracy

About this sample

Words: 1261 |

Published: Jan 15, 2019

Words: 1261 | Pages: 3 | 7 min read

• Sovereignty of the people.
• Government based upon consent of the governed.
• Majority rule.
• Minority rights.
• Guarantee of basic human rights.
• Free and fair elections.
• Equality before the law.
• Due process of law.
• Constitutional limits on government.
• Social, economic, and political pluralism.
• Values of tolerance, pragmatism, cooperation, and compromise.

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Guest Essay

The One Idea That Could Save American Democracy

By Astra Taylor and Leah Hunt-Hendrix

Ms. Taylor and Ms. Hunt-Hendrix are political organizers and the authors of the book “Solidarity: The Past, Present, and Future of a World-Changing Idea.”

These days, we often hear that democracy is on the ballot. And there’s a truth to that: Winning elections is critical, especially as liberal and progressive forces try to fend off radical right-wing movements. But the democratic crisis that our society faces will not be solved by voting alone. We need to do more than defeat Donald Trump and his allies — we need to make cultivating solidarity a national priority.

For years, solidarity’s strongest associations have been with the left and the labor movement — a term invoked at protests and on picket lines. But its roots are much deeper, and its potential implications far more profound, than we typically assume. Though we rarely speak about it as such, solidarity is a concept as fundamental to democracy as its better-known cousins: equality, freedom and justice. Solidarity is simultaneously a bond that holds society together and a force that propels it forward. After all, when people feel connected, they are more willing to work together, to share resources and to have one another’s backs. Solidarity weaves us into a larger and more resilient “we” through the precious and powerful sense that even though we are different, our lives and our fates are connected.

We have both spent years working as organizers and activists . If our experience has taught us anything, it is that a sense of connection and mutualism is rarely spontaneous. It must be nurtured and sustained. Without robust and effective organizations and institutions to cultivate and maintain solidarity, it weakens and democracy falters. We become more atomized and isolated, suspicious and susceptible to misinformation, more disengaged and cynical, and easily pitted against one another.

Democracy’s opponents know this. That’s why they invest huge amounts of energy and resources to sabotage transformative, democratic solidarity and to nurture exclusionary and reactionary forms of group identity. Enraged at a decade of social movements and the long-overdue revival of organized labor, right-wing strategists and their corporate backers have redoubled their efforts to divide and conquer the American public, inflaming group resentments in order to restore traditional social hierarchies and ensure that plutocrats maintain their hold on wealth and power. In white papers, stump speeches and podcasts, conservative ideologues have laid out their vision for capturing the state and using it as a tool to remake our country in their image.

If we do not prioritize solidarity, this dangerous and anti-democratic project will succeed. Far more than just a slogan or hashtag, solidarity can orient us toward a future worth fighting for, providing the basis of a credible and galvanizing plan for democratic renewal. Instead of the 20th-century ideal of a welfare state, we should try to imagine a solidarity state.

We urgently need a countervision of what government can and should be, and how public resources and infrastructure can be deployed to foster social connection and repair the social fabric so that democracy can have a chance not just to limp along, but to flourish. Solidarity, here, is both a goal worth reaching toward and the method of building the power to achieve it. It is both means and ends, the forging of social bonds so that we can become strong enough to shift policy together.

Historically, the question of solidarity has been raised during volatile junctures like the one we are living through. Contemporary conceptions of solidarity first took form after the democratic revolutions of the 18th century and over the course of the Industrial Revolution. As kings were deposed and the church’s role as a moral authority waned, philosophers and citizens wondered how society could cohere without a monarch or god. What could bind people in a secular, pluralistic age?

The 19th-century thinkers who began seriously contemplating and writing about the idea of solidarity often used the image of the human body, where different parts work in tandem. Most famously, the French sociologist Émile Durkheim put solidarity at the center of his inquiry, arguing that as society increased in complexity, social bonds between people would strengthen, each person playing a specialized role while connected to a larger whole. Solidarity and social cohesion, he argued, would be the natural result of increasing social and economic interdependence. But as Durkheim himself would eventually recognize, the industrial economy that he initially imagined would generate solidarity would actually serve to weaken its fragile ties, fostering what he called anomie, the corrosive hopelessness that accompanied growing inequality.

In the United States, solidarity never achieved the same intellectual cachet as in Europe. Since this nation’s founding, the concept has generally been neglected, and the practice actively suppressed and even criminalized. Attempts to forge cross-racial solidarity have met with violent suppression time and again, and labor organizing, effectively outlawed until the New Deal era, still occupies hostile legal ground. Decades of market-friendly policies, promoted by Republicans and Democrats alike, have undermined solidarity in ways both subtle and overt, from encouraging us to see ourselves as individual consumers rather than citizens to fostering individualism and competition over collectivity and cooperation.

As our profit-driven economy has made us more insecure and atomized — and more susceptible to authoritarian appeals — the far right has seized its opportunity. A furious backlash now rises to cut down the shoots of solidarity that sprung up as a result of recent movements pushing for economic, racial, environmental and gender justice. In response, programs that encourage diversity and inclusion are being targeted by billionaire investors, while small acts of solidarity — like helping someone get an abortion or bailing protesters out of jail — have been criminalized.

Awaiting the return of Mr. Trump, the Heritage Foundation has mapped out a plan to remake government and society, using the full power of the state to roll back what it calls “the Great Awokening” and restore a Judeo-Christian, capitalist “culture of life” and “blessedness.” “Woke” has been turned into a pejorative so that the word can be wielded to tarnish and break the solidarity that people have only just begun to experience.

Our vision of a solidarity state offers a pointed rejoinder to this project. Social democrats and socialists have been right to emphasize the need for redistribution and robust public investment in goods and services. We must restructure our economy so that it works for the many and not the few. But unlike conservatives — think, for example, of Margaret Thatcher, the prime minister of Britain who in 1981 said, “Economics are the method; the object is to change the heart and soul” — liberals and leftists have tended to downplay the role of policy in shaping public sensibilities. This is a mistake.

Laws and social programs not only shape material outcomes; they also shape us, informing public perceptions and preferences, and generating what scholars call policy feedback loops. There is no neutral state to aspire to. Policies can either foster solidarity and help repair the divides that separate us or deepen the fissures.

Today, the American welfare state too often does the latter. As sociologists including Suzanne Mettler and Matthew Desmond have detailed, lower-income people tend to be stigmatized for needing assistance, while more-affluent citizens reap a range of benefits that are comparatively invisible, mainly through tax credits and tax breaks. Both arrangements — the highly visible and stigmatized aid to the poor and the more invisible and socially acceptable aid to the affluent — serve to foster resentment and obscure how we are all dependent on the state in various ways.

Instead of treating citizens as passive and isolated recipients of services delivered from on high, a solidarity state would experiment with creative ways of fostering connection and participation at every opportunity for more Americans. What if we had basic guarantees that were universal rather than means-tested programs that distinguish between the deserving and undeserving, stigmatizing some and setting groups apart? What if, following the model of a widely admired program in Canada, the government aided groups of private citizens who want to sponsor and subsidize migrants and refugees? What if public schools, post offices, transit systems, parks, public utilities and jobs programs were explicitly designed to facilitate social connection and solidarity in addition to providing essential support and services?

We’ll get there only if we take up the challenge of building solidarity from wherever we happen to sit. Both means and end, solidarity can be a source of power, built through the day-to-day work of organizing, and our shared purpose. Solidarity is the essential and too often missing ingredient of today’s most important political project: not just saving democracy but creating an egalitarian, multiracial society that can guarantee each of us a dignified life.

Astra Taylor and Leah Hunt-Hendrix are political organizers and the authors of the book “Solidarity: The Past, Present, and Future of a World-Changing Idea.”

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook , Instagram , TikTok , WhatsApp , X and Threads .

How to Write a Thesis about Democracy

One of my subscribers, Nadir, is asking, “How do I write a thesis about democracy?”

That’s a great question.

We’re going to break this task into three steps. Let’s do it.

Step 1: We’re going to break up “democracy,” meaning the concept of democracy, into more manageable parts.

Step 2: We’re going to come up with an overall structure, which is almost an equivalent of creating an outline.

Step 3:  Finally, we’re going to write out the thesis statement. Let’s do it.

Step 1. How can we break democracy into manageable parts?

We’ll use the Power of Three because it’s the easiest way to break up a topic. The power of three just means using three supporting ideas as evidence in our body of the essay.

How can we divide democracy into three parts? How can we discuss democracy in three different ways or three different sections of a paper?

Supporting Idea 1. Early origins.

These would be the origins of democracy that take their root in Ancient Greece.

Supporting Idea 2 .  Modern roots of today’s democracy.

So what would be the modern roots? The modern roots are the main thinkers of the Enlightenment and their ideas.

These are such prominent philosophers as John Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu.

The Age of Enlightenment is also known as the Age of Reason, and that is where today’s democracy really takes root.

Supporting Idea 3. Democracy today .

This would answer the question, how is today’s democracy different from democracy of the early origins, such as in ancient Greece, and during the Age of Enlightenment?

Step 2. Coming up with the overall structure.

We know that we have three sections because we used the power of three to get three supporting ideas. So, here is how we can structure our overall argument.

In section 1 , we’re going to talk about the ancient Greek origins of democracy.

In section 2 , we’re going to talk about its modern roots.

In section 3 , we’ll discuss democracy today.

What will these sections contain?

In Section 1 , we’re really talking about Athenian democracy. And we can subdivide this topic into more than one subtopic.

In ancient Greece, principles with which we are familiar were born. These include voting for rulers and to pass legislation. This could be one subsection.

But we can also note some peculiarities of that ancient kind of democracy.

For example, only non-slave men could vote, which made up only about 10-15% of the population. 

As a result, we now have two subsections of main section 1. Essentially, we are talking about two things:

• The familiar principles of Athenian democracy
• The peculiarities of its early days

Section 2 is about the early modern roots of democracy.

We’re talking about some of the main thinkers. The two philosophers who come up right away if you do a search on Google are John Locke and Montesquieu.

These two names give us two subsections. See how it works?

Could we subdivide them further? How can we discuss Johns Locke and Montesquieu? Well, we can discuss them in terms of their ideas.

For example, John Locke was concerned with such concepts as equality, social contract, and private property. We can simply write about several concepts from each of these thinkers to have a neat little subsection about each one.

You can write a paragraph on equality, and then a paragraph on social contract, and so on.

In order to discuss these thinkers, all we would have to do is discuss their ideas. Since each of them had more than one idea, this gives us a wonderful way to keep writing.

How much you want to subdivide your sections will depend on how big your paper has to be.

If you need only three to four pages, maybe you don’t have to go that deep. But if you have to write a 10-page or a 15-page paper, this way of dividing into subsections would be very helpful to you.

Section 3 is about Democracy today.

Modern democracy has its similarities to the Ancient Greek origins and to the early modern roots. It also has its differences from them.

The similarities can include some of the main ideas that remain constant at all times.

The differences can include some of the peculiarities of each time period, such as voter rights or electronic or mail-in voting.

And we’re ready to write out our thesis statement, based on all the preparatory work we just did.

Step 3. Writing out the thesis statement.

We are totally ready to write this thesis statement.

And here we are.

Democracy is an ancient principle that has undergone changes and that is practiced in today’s society. It originates in Ancient Greece but was rediscovered during the period of Enlightenment in Britain and France. While today’s democracy shares elements with the ancient and early modern forms, it has its own distinct traits.

Let’s take a closer look at this thesis statement.

The first sentence should summarize your entire essay completely and perfectly. And that’s exactly what we’re doing here.

The remaining sentences must outline the supporting points. We combined the first two supporting points in the second sentence. And the third sentence is devoted to the third supporting point.

Let’s take a look.

And there you have it: three steps to going from one concept, which in this case is Democracy, to a full thesis statement.

I wrote a detailed tutorial on how to write a thesis statement on any topic . This would be your best next step.

Hope this was helpful!

Tutor Phil is an e-learning professional who helps adult learners finish their degrees by teaching them academic writing skills.

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Nikole Hannah-Jones’ essay from ‘The 1619 Project’ wins commentary Pulitzer

Of all the thousands upon thousands of stories and projects produced by American media last year, perhaps the one most-talked about was The New York Times Magazine’s ambitious “The 1619 Project,” which recognized the 400th anniversary of the moment enslaved Africans were first brought to what would become the United States and how it forever changed the country.

It was a phenomenal piece of journalism.

And while the project in its entirety did not make the list of Pulitzer Prize finalists, the introductory essay by Nikole Hannah-Jones , the creator of the landmark project, was honored with a prestigious Pulitzer Prize for commentary.

After the announcement that she has been awarded the Pulitzer Prize, Hannah-Jones told the Times’ staff it was “the most important work of my life.”

While nearly impossible, and almost insulting, to try and describe in a handful of words or even sentences, Hannah-Jones’ essay was introduced with this headline: “Our Democracy’s Founding Ideals Were False When They Were Written. Black Americans Have Fought to Make Them True.”

In her essay, Hannah-Jones wrote, “But it would be historically inaccurate to reduce the contributions of black people to the vast material wealth created by our bondage. Black Americans have also been, and continue to be, foundational to the idea of American freedom. More than any other group in this country’s history, we have served, generation after generation, in an overlooked but vital role: It is we who have been the perfecters of this democracy.”

RELATED TRAINING: Make Diversity a Priority During the Pandemic 

Hannah-Jones’ and “The 1619 Project,” however, were not without controversy. There was criticism of the project, particularly from conservatives. Former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich called it “propaganda.” A commentator for The Federalist tweeted the goal of the project was to “delegitimize America, and further divide and demoralize its citizenry.”

But the most noteworthy criticism came from a group of five historians. ln a letter to the Times , they wrote that they were “dismayed at some of the factual errors in the project and the closed process behind it.” They added, “These errors, which concern major events, cannot be described as interpretation or ‘framing.’ They are matters of verifiable fact, which are the foundation of both honest scholarship and honest journalism. They suggest a displacement of historical understanding by ideology.”

Wall Street Journal assistant editorial features editor Elliot Kaufman wrote a column with the subhead: “The New York Times tries to rewrite U.S. history, but its falsehoods are exposed by surprising sources.”

In a rare move, the Times responded to the criticism with its own response . New York Times Magazine editor-in-chief Jake Silverstein wrote, “Though we respect the work of the signatories, appreciate that they are motivated by scholarly concern and applaud the efforts they have made in their own writings to illuminate the nation’s past, we disagree with their claim that our project contains significant factual errors and is driven by ideology rather than historical understanding. While we welcome criticism, we don’t believe that the request for corrections to The 1619 Project is warranted.”

That was just a portion of the rather lengthy and stern, but respectful response defending the project.

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In the end, the 1619 Project — and Hannah-Jones’ essay, in particular — will be remembered for one of the most impactful and thought-provoking pieces on race, slavery and its impact on America that we’ve ever seen.

And maybe there was another reason for the pushback besides those questioning its historical accuracy.

As The Atlantic’s Adam Serwer wrote in December , “U.S. history is often taught and popularly understood through the eyes of its great men, who are seen as either heroic or tragic figures in a global struggle for human freedom. The 1619 Project, named for the date of the first arrival of Africans on American soil, sought to place ‘the consequences of slavery and the contributions of black Americans at the very center of our national narrative.’ Viewed from the perspective of those historically denied the rights enumerated in America’s founding documents, the story of the country’s great men necessarily looks very different.”

There’s no question that Hannah-Jones’ essay, which requires the kind of smart thinking and discussion that this country needs to continue having, deserved to be recognized with a Pulitzer as the top commentary of 2019. After all, and this is not hyperbole, it’s one of the most important essays ever.

In addition, we should acknowledge the other two finalists in this category: Washington Post sports columnist Sally Jenkins and Los Angeles Times columnist Steve Lopez.

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Jenkins continues to be among the best sports columnists in the country. Meanwhile, has any writer done more to shine a light on homelessness than Lopez? This is the third time in the past four years (and fourth time overall) that Lopez has been a finalist in the commentary category.

In any other year, both would be deserving of Pulitzer Prizes. But 2019 will be remembered for Nikole Hannah-Jones’ powerful essay and project.

More Pulitzer coverage from Poynter

• With most newsrooms closed, Pulitzer Prize celebrations were a little different this year
• Here are the winners of the 2020 Pulitzer Prizes
• Here are the 2020 Pulitzer Prize-winning editorial cartoons
• Pulitzers honor Ida B. Wells, an early pioneer of investigative journalism and civil rights icon
• Reporting about climate change was a winner in this year’s Pulitzers
• ‘Lawless,’ an expose of villages without police protection, wins Anchorage Daily News its third Public Service Pulitzer
• The iconic ‘This American Life’ won the first-ever ‘Audio Reporting’ Pulitzer
• The Washington Post won a Pulitzer Prize for explanatory reporting for a novel climate change story

The International Fact-Checking Network’s statement on proposed legislation before the Georgian parliament

The IFCN supports press freedom for all fact-checkers, including FactCheck Georgia and Myth Detector

Opinion | TV networks want Biden and Trump to debate. What’s the point?

Debates offer Americans a chance to see candidates answer tough questions, with journalistically sound pushback, about topics crucial to the country

Opinion | Newsrooms should treat the electorate like the hiring committee it actually is

At its core, the electorate is a hiring committee for public servants. Yet very few of the best practices for hiring are followed in the process.

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India’s democracy: illusion or reality.

For the last sixty years, since it gained independence in 1947, India has claimed the position of the world’s largest democracy. For almost as long, skeptics have seen India’s democracy as an Indian rope trick,1 an illusion in which the superstructure of democratic government—a parliament and prime minister, periodic elections, constitutionally-guaranteed freedoms—hides the reality of on-the-ground authoritarian rule by local landlords, bureaucracy, and party bosses, buttressed by a culture of caste-based inequality, and sustained by India’s continuing desperate poverty.

If this is an illusion, it is an impressive one. Within two years of independence, and through open and spirited debate, India produced a constitution that guarantees “fundamental rights,” and a federal and parliamentary system with a significant role for the Supreme Court, which over the years has enhanced its powers in the system through decisions that limit parliamentary sovereignty. From the beginning, there was tolerance of peaceful dissent and a wide range of active political associations. Despite some small-scale Communist-led rebellions, the Communist Party was not banned. There was a vigorous free press.

The 1951–52 elections for national parliament and state legislatures highlighted the bold decision to adopt universal adult suffrage. Despite the high level of illiteracy and low level of education, all men and women twenty-one and older—the age limit has since been lowered to eighteen—had the right to vote. With Jawaharlal Nehru in the lead, the campaign was very lively, with literally thousands of public meetings and processions. There was no doubt that the Congress Party would win the election easily, since it was a mass movement that had brought freedom to the country. It had major responsibility for governing the country in the five years before the election, but it is significant that Nehru, as Prime Minister, had included important leaders of other parties in the cabinet, including the Law Minister, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the leader of the “untouchables,” and S. P. Mookherjee, who later founded the Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Even though the Congress won an overwhelming majority of seats in parliament and in every state legislature, it received less than half the vote. Thus, a mandate was given for Congress to rule, and for the opposition to legitimately hold it accountable.

Nehru continued to act as tutor for India’s democracy, making sure to attend parliament on important occasions, respecting opposition party leaders, and listening to those in power in the states, who were his comrades in the freedom struggle and Congress Party members. The next two sets of elections (held in 1957 and 1962) followed the same pattern, with the Congress surviving the major political crisis that ended with the reorganization of the states—a substantial redrawing of the map of India based on language. In the 1967 election, however, the Congress met defeat in many major states, bringing opposition coalitions to power. The defeat was one factor that caused a split in the party in 1969. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, adopting a populist electoral appeal, swept aside the other Congress splinter, and in the aftermath of India’s successful war against Pakistan in 1971, won victories in states lost in 1967 and in several other mid-term elections. Indira Gandhi’s actions seemingly re-established Congress hegemony.

A series of economic and political crises, however, resulted in Mrs. Gandhi, in June 1975, invoking a constitutional provision for declaring a national “Emergency.” She jailed opposition leaders, imposed press censorship, and rammed through constitutional amendments to reduce the autonomy of the judiciary and enhance executive powers. Despite very little popular resistance, after a year or so there was considerable disillusionment with the claimed benefits of the Emergency and disquiet with apparent abuses of power. To her everlasting credit, Mrs. Gandhi not only allowed the scheduled election of parliament, but did not interfere with its administration. The election was as free and fair as previous ones, with most opposition leaders freed from jail and the press allowed to function as before.

The unexpected and exhilarating defeat of Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress in the 1977 election constituted a second liberation from authoritarian rule. It is critical to note that Mrs. Gandhi quietly handed over power to the winners, and three years later fought successfully to return to power through democratic means. In the meantime, the constitutional powers of the judiciary had been restored, other changes repealed, and the Congress faced a credible political alternative at both national and state levels. The press rapidly changed into a more active institution, doing investigative reporting and challenging the government in ways it hadn’t before the Emergency.

In the four decades since 1977, India’s democracy has weathered other crises—the separatist movements in Punjab and the northeast states, for example—without returning to authoritarian rule. Regular elections have been held, and there has been peaceful alternation of power between parties or coalitions six times at the national level and countless times in the states. 2 A free press has become a largely free media, as the government has diluted its monopoly of TV (although it still holds complete control of the radio broadcast system), and information flows freely from abroad, as it has always done. Political parties and non-governmental organizations, ranging from local social action groups to country-wide issue-oriented movements (on the environment, for instance) continue to grow in importance. Individual freedoms of speech, association, and assembly are largely unconstrained.

Currently, the political landscape continues to feature a national parliament that meets regularly, debates openly, but in many ways is fairly weak as a legislative body. Now, twenty-eight states also have regularly elected and functioning legislatures, chief ministers, and cab inets that make policies in crucial areas mainly reserved for the states, such as law and order, education, health, and economic development. Originally, local government institutions were creatures of state government. However, local government has found a place in the constitution, with required periodic elections and a mandate for substantial transfer of resources for development purposes. Elections throughout India have produced literally millions of newly elected representatives, one-third of them women. For the most part, however, substantial financial resources have not been provided to those institutions.

A judicial system at the upper levels—the High Courts of the states and the Supreme Court in Delhi—is respected for administration of justice, though burdened by widespread inefficiency. Some cases take literally decades to decide. There is corruption at the lowest levels.

The players in the system have changed dramatically over the last sixty years. At present, in national elections, the Congress Party gets around a quarter of the vote, as does the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Parties powerful in only one state split the rest of the vote. There are hundreds of small parties and thousands of independent candidates, very few of whom win any seats.

Over time, more and more states have developed two-party systems, many of which have in fact two coalitions, but they are not necessarily the same two parties (or coalitions) that are competing. The Congress remains a force in almost all states, but the BJP’s strength is confined mostly to northern and western states. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) has won every election in West Bengal since 1977, and in Tamil Nadu, the two major contestants are the two Tamil nationalist parties, the DMK and the AIADMK. Other major parties include the Socialist Party and the BSP—the party whose core is the people once considered outside and beneath the Hindu castes (the Untouchables), many of whom now use the term “dalit” (oppressed)—in Uttar Pradesh; the Akali Dal (party of the Sikhs) in Punjab; the cultural nationalist TDP in Andhra Pradesh; and the RJD (a middle-caste based party) in Bihar.

A pattern of instability in state governments after the 1967 election lasted about two decades. Now, it is not exceptional for state governments to last a full five-year term, and recently several have won re-election. This stability has helped state governments to become more active and effective promoters of programs in education and economic development; they now play the central government for resources rather than being manipulated, as in the past when their local political footing was less sure. Some instability associated with coalitions surfaced in Delhi after the 1989 election, when a coalition called the “Third Force” (i.e., neither Congress-led nor BJP-led) took power, but soon had to be rearranged. The same thing happened in 1996–98. The BJP-led coalition that won in 1998 came apart, but a new version won in 1999 and served a full term. The Congress-led coalition that won narrowly in 2004 has managed to stay together.

In sum, India appears to have a democracy that functions according to the rules. The country handles external and internal crises well, while accommodating new political leaders, movements, and patterns of political rule and opposition. The ordinary citizen has not been left out: turnout in elections has risen to a present-day figure of about fifty-five to sixty percent of eligible voters, and the percentage of women, people designated “tribal,” and other marginal groups has almost reached that of the population as a whole. Turnout percentages of poor and rural voters are significantly higher than the average Indian turnout.

Indian citizens show strong support for democracy. In the 2007 State of Democracy in South Asia report, ninety-two percent of a large survey sample believe democracy to be suitable for India; “strong democrats” outweigh “non-democrats” by forty-one to fifteen percent (with forty-three percent as “weak democrats”). 3 In Yogendra Yadav’s summation: “The idea of democracy has, above all, come to supply the only valid criterion for claims to legitimate rule and, correspondingly, the moral basis of political obligation.” 4

If this is all not an illusion, and India is indeed democratic, then it stands as a mammoth exception that tests our understanding of what makes countries democratic. India has features that most believe make democracy impossible. Although its economic growth in recent years has been high, India remains a very poor country with a per capita income well below the threshold that seemingly demarcates democracies from dictatorships. 5 It has a bewildering number of ethnic communities, separated by language, religion, and caste, with occasionally alarming incidents of inter-community violence. 6 Caste remains a major feature of the social and political landscape with its religiously-sanctioned inequality. India is usually ranked among the world’s worst countries when it comes to the prevalence of corruption. The military is strictly under civilian control, and, historically, has never been a threat to stage a coup. However, the military has been given power for significant periods and allowed to ignore normal legal processes in certain parts of the country, such as the northeastern border states, Punjab from 1984 to 1992, and Kashmir since 1989. Finally, it has a bureaucracy inherited from colonial rule that—in practice and in the attitudes of its officials—is often capricious, authoritarian, and almost impossible to hold accountable. 8

Clearly, there are also flaws, perhaps fatal flaws, in India’s democracy. Are those many elections truly free and fair, given that in each election there are reports of intimidation, forcible occupation of polling stations, and other irregularities? With literacy and significant education still at very low levels, how can citizens cast their votes effectively? Do programs and policies change meaningfully when new parties come to power? Doesn’t the weakness of the rule of law at the lowest level encourage criminalization of politics and increase the difficulty of bringing corrupt officials to justice? Are there not powerful landowning and other classes that dominate and control politics in Delhi, state capitals, and local arenas?

Let us sketch responses to these questions and link them, in general, to underlying anti-democratic features. To begin, let us consider the integrity of elections. An autonomous Election Commission, one of the most respected institutions in the country, conducts elections and its record has been remarkably good. The electoral registers the Commission compiles can be quite inaccurate, and may contain many names of those who have died or moved; other names are missing. However, political parties and ordinary citizens have ready access to the rolls and are able to challenge or add names. Currently the rolls are being computerized, and anyone with an Internet connection can check them. The Election Commission has a code of conduct for election campaigns that regulates the hours of public meetings, requires financial and criminal record disclosure by candidates, recognizes parties and assigns them symbols, and attempts to regulate expenditures. Although expenditure rules are routinely flouted, it is not clear that this affects the outcome. Early on, money to buy votes for particular leaders flowed quite freely, but as voters gained confidence that the ballot was truly secret, vote-buying produced unreliable results and became less important.

On polling days, the Election Commission has full authority to mobilize government employees, such as teachers and security forces, to conduct the election. Most elections have violent incidents, including murdering candidates and ballot box stuffing. These occurrences have declined in recent years, however, as security has tightened; polling is on multiple days for up to a month. In cases where an election has been “countermanded,” a fresh poll is held weeks later, with additional security—and invariably there is no further problem. Vote fraud still exists in a few areas, but even then affects only a small percent of the vote total. All voting is on Indian-designed and Indian-manufactured electronic machines. This has accelerated the vote count results, but even before these technological advances, elaborate procedures were in place to make sure ballot boxes were secure and votes counted fairly.

Uncontested elections are rare at national and state levels. The range in ideology, policy, and social base of the winning parties is quite large. Communists have ruled West Bengal for thirty years, and in Kerala, a Communist-led coalition has alternated with a Congress-led coalition for almost as long. There are parties with cultural nationalist agendas, religious parties, and parties centered on particular castes that have ruled solely, or in coalition, in many states and in Delhi.

Election campaigns are wide open and thoroughly reported in the press. Spirited discussions also occur on TV. Face-to-face contact of candidates with voters remains at the heart of the campaign, however, with countless speeches and snippets of discussions during the three-week, eighteen-hour day sprint to polling day. This lessens the significance of education. Male voters with little or no schooling are practiced in judging what a candidate says and remembering it. As a rule, women do not attend meetings or hear speeches, and if uneducated, they have more difficulty than peer males understanding issues. Still, considerable empirical evidence exists that regardless of gender, most people no longer vote according to the dictates of husbands, or caste leaders, or even those with economic power over them. The secret ballot makes an enormous difference.

People appear to act rationally when they vote—not wasting their vote on candidates who have no chance of winning. They frequently throw out incumbents (about fifty percent), and usually disregard boasts of accomplishments and promises of good things to come, such as roads, electricity, or fertilizer supply. Local issues count more than national issues, except in extraordinary elections like 1977. The poor value the vote as one of the very few ways they can exercise even the smallest amount of power. Typically, they are utterly dependent on their landlord or their boss in a shop, with no recourse to laws, or even public opinion, if they are made to work long hours without decent pay, let alone other benefits; they are often beaten. They have no influence when it comes to getting proper health care or other government benefits. But with the assurance of a secret ballot and usually an uncertainty about who is leading, they find rich and powerful candidates begging for their vote.

There are, of course, large numbers of poor people who vote, and in India, the voter turnout of the poor is now higher than that of the non-poor. The contrast becomes most clear when the very poor are compared to the very rich, or illiterates to college graduates. The reverse is true in developed countries, including the US.9 And they get results. The most recent example is the party that won the 2007 state assembly election in the giant state of Uttar Pradesh (185 million inhabitants), which is led by an ex-untouchable woman named Mayawati, who captured a majority of the seats—mainly with the votes of the poor. 10

India’s society is socially fragmented to a high degree. For example, even if we ignore the fact that Hindi, the national language, composed of mutually unintelligible dialects (in addition to literary and film dialogue forms), is spoken by a minority of Indians. In any given electoral constituency, with a few exceptions, no community, whether caste or religious, has a majority, so cross-caste, and often cross-religion alliances must be created to win. Some of these alliances are horizontal, with middle-level farmers uniting, while others are vertical, between landlord groups and their farm workers, for example. Caste and religious groups, especially in local arenas, are often divided into factions, which can further complicate support. In some villages, and even in larger areas, powerful men organize followers into armed gangs to intimidate the lower classes. In some areas (mainly in the tribal belt of east-central India), these oppressed people have been organized to resist by workers of a coalition of revolutionary parties. In most of India, however, politics of all kinds—including democratic electoral politics—is more a matter of shifting alliances, countervailing groups, and leader-follower relationships based on the personal characteristics of the leader.

Efforts to create class-like movements on a broader level—farmers’ movements, for example—have been unsuccessful, and the caste associations that became prominent in the early years of independence have faded from the scene. In no state, much less at the national level, are there institutions that pull together even economic interest groups for effective political action. There are multiple and competing business associations, and Communist, Congress, and BJP parties mainly control trade unions through affiliating federations. Feminist, environmental, and other social movements have some impact on politics, using such tools as demonstrations and litigation, but they usually steer clear of electoral politics. The rich, and even the urban middle classes, manage to advance and protect their interests in large measure through networks of kinship and common institutions, such as schools and colleges, social clubs, and professional associations. This form of interest group politics by well-positioned groups is typical of not only India, but of all democracies.

Corruption in the court and criminal justice systems most certainly distorts the rule of law and the implementation of government programs. Although many politicians have criminal cases pending against them, very few have been convicted and almost none have exhausted their appeals. The serious “mafias” (the word is used in India) that are involved in smuggling, illicit drugs, alcohol, and other protection or extortion rackets and that control politicians, exist in relatively few cities. In certain government departments, corruption is endemic— contractors and others pay bribes shared by officials and politicians who control their transfers and promotions. That said, the national scale or even state-level corruption in which policies are bought and sold is rare.

Democracy in India is not a façade behind which one finds dominant classes or other societal institutions that exercise power. India is not very different from other democracies in the extent to which the bureaucracy governs without much day-to-day accountability. Colonial rule was built on a very small, elite corps of administrators whose task was primarily to maintain order. When independence came, those who did not quit were allowed to continue, but they had to prove their loyalty to the new political order, and to the leaders they had put in jail just a few years before. At the same time, the tasks of government expanded enormously, as the promises in education, health care, and, most of all, economic development, required a much-enhanced bureaucratic apparatus. Unlike many Third World countries, the balance of power between elected politicians and bureaucrats in India favored the politicians, and that advantage has not been lost. 11

In contrast to most post-colonial countries—Pakistan presents a particularly vivid comparison—India’s military has been kept firmly under civilian and political control. Because the military also needed to demonstrate their loyalty to the new political leaders, when fighting erupted with Pakistan in Kashmir at independence, and a border dispute with China in 1962 ended in war, the military had an important national security mission, which it had been taught, in the British tradition, would be undermined by involvement in politics. The Indian government also was aware of the need to keep the military budget firmly under civilian control. Coups in many Third World countries have been associated with armies controlled by particular, often minority ethnic communities. Although Punjabis, particularly Sikhs, were disproportionately represented in the army at independence, they were still a small minority, which was further diluted as the navy and air force expanded.

Most important, though, was the success of the Indian democratic system in resolving crises involving states with different languages and cultures, and dealing with the economic crisis of the mid-1960s. The army faced insurgencies in peripheral states, but never had to deal with a law and order problem the government could not handle. Each time the military was not called upon for domestic purposes—notably not even during the Emergency—the less likely the chance of subsequent intervention.

The absence of a military coup, or even the threat of one, is one explanation for why India remains a democracy. It is less clear why India has maintained a democracy while remaining below the theoretical threshold of development that many political scientists see as crucial for sustained democracy. Using quantitative data, scholars have shown that almost all countries at the lowest level of development are autocracies, and almost all countries at the highest level of development are democracies. Development that breaches the threshold does not necessarily produce democracy. However, when a high development country becomes democratic, it nearly always sustains its democracy.

Carles Boix and Susan Stokes make a persuasive argument that “democracy is caused not by income [the measure of development] per se but by other changes that accompany development, in particular, income equality.” 12 As India has developed, its inequality has increased only slightly and remains at the comparatively low figure, as measured by a Gini coefficient of consumption, of 30.5 in 2004–05. 13 Smaller Gini coefficients indicate greater equality of income and wealth distribution. Significantly, in the countryside, the small farmers have increased in number and in percent of landholdings at the expense of marginal farmers and large landowners. In urban India, the middle class has expanded at the most rapid rate, especially in recent years. India is exceptional in this as well: for example, the Gini indexes of Nigeria, China, and Brazil, are, respectively, thirtyfour percent, thirty-seven percent, and seventy-eight percent larger than India’s, which indicates substantially greater inequality. 14 It is quite possible that India’s democracy helps explain the difference. When the poor can vote effectively, government is more likely to ensure that they get a more substantial share of the benefits of development.

The income equality argument does not sufficiently explain why India was able to build a democracy when others failed. The best probable explanation of why India is democratic today is that it had a functioning democracy yesterday. Particularly for a country like India that is struggling to develop and manage huge societal and cultural change at the same time, the success of democracy builds on its ability to solve those problems, as demonstrated by its earlier successes. 15 The 1977 election, or possibly the first half of 1980, when Sanjay Gandhi seemed to be leading the Congress Party towards a more authoritarian program, marked crucial “roads not taken” moments. Before then, although democratic institutions had been established and worked effectively, there was a good chance democracy would break down. 16

Nehru’s personal role in setting India firmly on a democratic path has been noted, but Nehru himself got his opportunity from being the “first among equals” in the Congress movement that transformed itself into a party of governance. That nationalist movement is unique in the colonial era for its longevity, the depth and breadth of its roots in the populace, and the general extent to which it was internally democratic. Founded in 1885, for thirty-five years the Congress was essentially an annual gathering of the elite of India’s educated class who had petitioned the British to grant rights to their citizens in India. As the British resisted change, the Congress debated among themselves and demanded rights from the Raj. Then Gandhi transformed the Congress into a mass movement with a permanent governing body and a revolutionary constitution. He then led movements of civil disobedience in the early 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Each of these drew in larger and larger numbers of followers. The new Congress organization ensured that they were represented in the highest councils by leaders with local support, as well as by Gandhian or other nationalist credentials. As a movement for independence, the Congress was inclusive and included rich and poor, socialists, and Hindu nationalists. Only those who rejected nonviolence were excluded. Gandhi’s respect for the rule of law was such that while he claimed to be the judge of which laws he would follow, he insisted that he be condemned in court for breaking those laws. Although Gandhi and his trusted lieutenants effectively ran the Congress from above, the annual sessions and the debates on policies were exercises in free speech.

The second leadership generational transfer brought Jawaharlal Nehru in, with Gandhi’s support, even though Nehru’s views on socialism and modernist development contradicted Gandhi’s own ideas favoring village-level economic self-sufficiency and the belief that the rich should hold property as “trustees” for the poor. Over generations, the Congress developed a style of leadership and internal functioning that fit well with democracy. It developed momentum derived from effective action with an unrivalled network of support that reached minorities, women, and the rural poor. These political attributes served India well when independence came in 1947.

If India had not begun with that precious inheritance, it is doubtful that its democracy would be the reality it is today. That reality is clear in the unwavering commitment to democratic practices, especially in elections, and in the effective control of the military and bureaucrats. With the exception of the Emergency of 1975–77, the crises in the federal system, the ethnic and revolutionary insurgencies, and wars with India’s neighbors have been handled without damaging the democratic system, although the government has been responsible for severe violations of civil rights in the localities concerned, some of them quite substantial states, like Punjab and Kashmir.

As in all democracies, groups and some individuals wield a very wide range of power vis-à-vis government, but even at the local level there are only a few places where landlords or dominant castes can consistently get their way. In state and national government, it is the political party system that shapes most policy—not big business, or external powers, or a religious institution. In recent decades, there has been an impressive mobilization of the poor and previously marginalized groups, including the lower castes and women, which has been reflected in voting, in participation in local government, and in the leadership that has come to power. If India continues to grow economically at a rapid pace, the final foundation piece for a stable democracy will soon be put in place.

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• See Lee Siegel, Net of Magic: Wonders and Deceptions in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) for a discussion of the magicians’ “rope trick.”
• Not counting the rearrangement of coalitions in 1990 and 1997, and with a fresh election in 1999.
• In Pakistan “non–democrats” (forty-one percent) outweigh “strong democrats” (ten percent), with “weak democrats” at forty-nine percent.
• Yogendra Yadav, “Politics,” in Marshall Bouton and Philip Oldenburg, eds., India Briefing: A Transformative Fifty Years (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 31.
• See: Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, “Cultural and Economic Prerequisites of Democracy: Reassessing Recent Evidence,” Studies in Comparative International Development 39, 4 (Winter 2005), 87–106.
• See: D. L. Sheth, “Society,” in Marshall Bouton and Philip Oldenburg, eds., India Briefing: A Transformative Fifty Years (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1999).
• See: Transparency International India, India Corruption Study 2005; To Improve Governance , http://www.cmsindia.org/cms/events/corruption.pdf, (accessed July 7, 2007).
• See Myron Weiner, The Child and the State in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
• See the Wikipedia entry on “voter turnout” (accessed September 20, 2007): “In developed countries, non-voters tend to be concentrated in particular demographic and socioeconomic groups, especially the young and the poor. However, in India, which boasts an electorate of more than 670 million people, the opposite is true. The poor, who comprise the majority of the demographic, are more likely to vote than the rich and the middle classes.” For representative India data, see the important chapter by Yogendra Yadav, “Understanding the Second Upsurge: Trends of Bahujan [“majority”] participation in electoral politics in the 1990s,” (Francine R. Frankel et al., eds., Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 120–145.
• See Yogendra Yadav and Sanjay Kumar, “Poor Man’s Rainbow over U.P.,” Indian Express (online edition), May 18, 2007; the data show that forty-one percent of the poor, and only fifteen percent of the rich, voted for the Bahujan Samaj Party.
• For an important argument on this issue, see Fred W. Riggs, “Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View,” in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 120–167.
• Carles Boix and Susan Carol Stokes, “Endogenous Democratization,” World Politics 55, 4 (July 2003), 540.
• See Surjit S. Bhalla, “Misconceived Ideas—Income Inequality,” Business Standard (New Delhi), July 7, 2007, http://www.business–standard.com/economy/storypage.php? tab=r&autono=290320&subLeft=3&leftnm=3 (accessed July 7, 2007).
• UNDP, Human Development Report 2006, Table 15, http://hdr.undp.org/ hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR06–complete.pdf (accessed July 7, 2007). The report does not note precisely what the Gini index is measuring (income, consumption, wealth?).
• See Atul Kohli, ed., The Success of India’s Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
• For the general analysis of democratic breakdowns (and “reequilibration,” which is what happened in India in 1977), see Juan J. Linz, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration . (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). For a pessimistic view of the survival of India’s democracy even after 1977, see Ainslie Embree, “The Emergency as a Signpost to India’s Future,” in Peter Lyon and James Manor, eds., Transfer and Transformation: Political Institutions in the New Commonwealth (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983), 59–67.
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