literature review about corruption

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• Published: 20 July 2023

Corruption, anti-corruption, and economic development

• Miao Zhang 1 ,
• Houli Zhang 1 ,
• Li Zhang 1 ,
• Xu Peng 1 ,
• Jiaxuan Zhu 1 ,
• Duochenxi Liu 1 &
• Shibing You   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-0102-4149 1  

Humanities and Social Sciences Communications volume  10 , Article number:  434 ( 2023 ) Cite this article

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• Politics and international relations

Corruption and anti-corruption efforts are intertwined with political and economic concerns. From an economic and political perspective, as the government strives to enhance its governance capabilities, it becomes crucial to consider the costs of anti-corruption supervision and the losses incurred from corruption. This evaluation is essential for formulating a scientifically sound anti-corruption strategy that maximizes government benefits. To address this issue, the paper presents a model that incorporates levels of supervision and associated costs. The findings reveal that in the case of homogeneous officials, the optimal level of supervisory input, which maximizes government benefit, is nearly zero when per capita income is low due to budgetary constraints on anti-corruption control. However, as per capita income reaches a certain threshold, the optimal level of supervisory input suddenly rises to its maximum and decreases as per capita income increases. Alternatively, if the government adopts a zero-tolerance approach towards corruption and provides adequate remuneration to its employees, ensuring that all competent authorities can resist corruption, then corruption can be eliminated. Moreover, when officials exhibit heterogeneity in terms of their honesty levels, certain conditions give rise to a middle per capita income range, resulting in an optimal level of supervisory input that leads to a phenomenon known as “partial corruption.” During this phase, the wages paid by the government to its employees promote honesty, preventing them from engaging in corruption. However, they are unable to curb the corrupt activities of more dishonest officials. To some extent, this model also explains the challenges associated with eradicating corruption in several middle-income countries.

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Introduction.

Corruption accompanies power, as the British politician Lord Acton remarked, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Corruption, as a misuse of power, is pervasive in all societies and is widely regarded as a major barrier to social and economic development. This is particularly true for developing countries, where the implications of corruption are the most damaging (UN, 2003 ). Shleifer and Vishny ( 1993 ) were among the first academics to define corruption as “the sale of government officials of government property for personal gain.” Similarly, Svensson ( 2005 ) defines corruption as “abuse of public office for private gain.” Later, Banerjee et al. ( 2013 ) defined corruption as a “violation of rules by officials for personal gain.” This includes not just overt corruption (officials accepting bribes), but also more subtle forms of bureaucratic corruption, such as nepotism. Corruption not only undermines fair competition and public trust, but it can also lead to resources misallocation ultimately reducing overall societal welfare. Consequently, identifying and effectively combating corruption is vital for every country or government.

Economic study on corruption has generally centered on two aspects: its causes and repercussions (Nie, 2014 ). Existing research on the causes of corruption typically discusses the roles of political systems, economic development levels, openness to foreign investment, legal traditions, education levels, culture, and religion (Acemoglu and Thierry, 2000 ; James et al., 2005 ; Šumah Š, 2018 ). Some studies also look into problems such as professional ethics, traditional customs, and demographics (Dollar et al., 2001 ; Rivas, 2013 ; Lee and Guven, 2013 ). In analyzing the repercussions of corruption, two extreme viewpoints have evolved (Aidt, 2009 ): those of the ‘sanders’ who believe corruption impedes progress, and those of the ‘greasers’ who believe corruption can (in certain cases) promote development. Given the multiplicity of causes of corruption and the fact that understanding these reasons can improve anti-corruption policy, there is significantly more research studying corruption’s causes than its economic impacts. For many developing countries, analyzing the fundamental mechanisms relating corruption, anti-corruption initiatives, and economic growth could provide insights into situations where high corruption coexists with high growth. A considerable amount of empirical analysis has been conducted on the causes and impacts of corruption (Adit, 2009 ; Dong and Torgler, 2010 ; Belgibayeva and Plekhanov, 2019 ). However, the principal-agent model, viewing corruption as an “agent violating the interests or preferences of the principal to benefit a third party,” provides a novel theoretical perspective that more effectively reveals the behavioral motivations and internal mechanisms underlying corruption.

Building on this foundation, the logical starting point of this study is that officials are motivated to engage in corruption to gain additional personal benefits when they have sufficient discretionary power, when economic rent exceeds salary levels, and when corruption detection and punishment are minimal (Yin and Nie, 2020 ). The government, on the other hand, has a similar reason to pass anti-corruption legislation. Anti-corruption actions, however, are not free; the government must invest significant human, physical, and financial resources in corruption surveillance and crackdowns. The relationship between such investment and government benefit is complex and varies depending on economic progress and governmental systems. Much of the existing research considers surveillance levels and costs from an exogenous perspective, assuming that they are determined by external variables rather than government decisions. However, in reality, when selecting anti-corruption strategies, governments must frequently evaluate monitoring levels and costs endogenously, incorporating these factors into their decision-making process. As a result, finding the best anti-corruption policy is a complex and critical topic.

Therefore, this study introduces a theoretical model that endogenizes the level of surveillance and costs to better understand how to balance corruption losses and the costs of anti-corruption surveillance investments, resulting in the optimal anti-corruption strategy under varying economic and political conditions. This study offers a fresh perspective on the coexistence of high corruption and high growth in certain developing countries. Furthermore, in many developing countries, such as those in East Asia, top-down supervision and incentives, rather than periodic elections, are the dominant influencers on official behavior. As a result, this research enriches the study of official behavior, which is ideally only influenced by the level of supervision.

The paper is divided into six sections. Following the introduction, the “Literature review” section provides a brief survey of the research on corruption and economic growth. The basic model’s construction is detailed in the “The basic model” section. The “Optimal choice of government supervision investment under homogeneous officials” section presents and discusses the government’s optimal choice. The “Optimum choice of government supervision investment under heterogeneous officials” section extends the problem to include a variety of corrupt officials. Finally, the “Conclusion and discussion” section provides research discussions and conclusions.

Literature review

Corruption and anti-corruption are both political issue and economic issue. The predominant focus of the economics community on the study of corruption is its impact on economic growth. However, consensus on this particular subject has yet to be established, with three prevailing opinions often voiced in the literature.

The first viewpoint is the “Harmful Corruption Hypothesis”. A group of scholars argue that rent-seeking activities not only cause inefficiencies but also lead to enormous unproductive waste (Krueger, 1974 ; Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1982 ). Furthermore, corruption encourages talented individuals to engage in rent-seeking activities, which reduces economic growth (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993 ; Murphy et al., 1993 ). Shleifer and Vishny ( 1994 ) discovered that when the goals of politicians and enterprises do not align with those of maximization of social welfare, result of bribery mechanism is by no means optimal. Wei ( 1997 , 2000 ) believes that corruption has a tax effect, which weakens foreign investment willingness. As for empirical research, Mauro ( 1995 ) analyzes relationship between corruption and economic growth using data from 58 countries. The result shows that corruption has a significant negative impact on investment and GDP growth. Mo ( 2001 ) examines transnational data from 1970 to 1985 and concludes that corruption directly causes a decrease in investment, a decline of human capital, and political instability, and therefore indirectly inhibits economic growth. Pellegrini and Gerlaph ( 2004 ) argue that corruption inhibits economic growth by affecting investment and trade policies. Some academics contend that corruption slows economic growth by affecting taxes (Blackburn et al., 2006 , Imam and Jacobs, 2014 , Ivanyna et al., 2016 ). After separating the indirect effects of corruption on economic growth, Swaleheen ( 2011 ) concludes that corruption has a direct negative impact on economic growth. Kunieda et al. ( 2014 ) argued that capital account liberalization would amplify the negative impact of corruption on economic growth. Gründler and Potrafke ( 2019 ) revisited the relationship between corruption and economic growth using the inverted Transparency International Perception of Corruption Index (CPI) from 2012 to 2018 across 175 countries/regions. Their study indicates that the impact of corruption on economic growth is most pronounced in autocratic countries and is transmitted to economic growth via a decline in FDI and an increase in inflation.

The second viewpoint is that “corruption leads to efficiencies”. In some countries, there are some ineffective and rigid regulations, and corruption can relieve or even circumvent those regulations that impede economic development, thereby enhancing market efficiency and economic development (Leff, 1964 ). The “queuing model” proposed by Lui ( 1985 ) describes a situation in which officials grant bribery enterprises priority when issuing business licenses, thereby accelerating approval process and improving market efficiency. The “auction model” proposed by Beck and Mayer ( 1986 ) is a concretization of the preceding model. They believe that companies that can afford to high bribes are the most likely to be the most productive. Therefore, the “auction” acquisition of operating rights will increase market efficiency. Acemoglu and Verdier ( 1998 \ 2000 ) discovers that if anti-corruption is expensive and resource allocation is significantly distorted, then the level of corruption that maximizes output or social welfare might be greater than zero. Dzhumashev ( 2014 ) believes that when government size exceeds the optimal value, corruption can increase market efficiency and stimulate economic growth. Egger and Winner ( 2005 ) discovered that corruption could stimulate direct foreign investment based on empirical research with data from 73 countries. Through enterprise-level data analysis in China, Wang and You ( 2012 ), found that corruption can enhance a firm’s revenues at a micro level. Jiang and Nie ( 2014 ) demonstrated empirically that regional corruption in China has a positive impact on the profitability of private enterprises but has no effect on the profitability of state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, natural experiments arising from exogenous changes in trade policies imply that corruption may aid private enterprises in evading government supervision, thus explaining the paradox of China’s high growth and high corruption.

The third viewpoint is that “corruption depends on its environment”. This viewpoint is a synthesis of the first two. It argues that both viewpoints have their reasons and environments for existence. Whether corruption is beneficial or not depends on the environment and system in which it lies. After restricting their sample to highly liberalized countries and controlling for some economic variables, Méndez and Sepúlveda ( 2006 ) found that the relationship between corruption and economic growth is not constant. Under the maximization of economic growth, the level of corruption is significantly greater than zero. When the level of corruption is low, it promotes economic growth; when the level of corruption is high, it inhibits economic growth. Aidt et al. ( 2008 ) found that corruption hampers economic growth when the government’s management system is relatively perfect, but has no effect when the government’s management system is poor. According to empirical research conducted by Meon and Weill ( 2010 ), the impediment of corruption to economic growth diminishes as system deficiencies increase. When system deficiencies are so severe that they result in extreme inefficiency, corruption can actually promote economic growth. Aidt ( 2009 ) reached a similar conclusion, namely that corruption only positively affects economic growth when the system is defective. Dong and Torgler ( 2010 ) discovered through empirical research on China’s data that corruption can impact economic growth in many ways, both positively and negatively. Its overall effect is the sum of all its individual effects. Zheng ( 2015 ) determined, using theoretical models, that under certain conditions, society may benefit from a certain level of corruption and that anti-corruption measures may reduce the efforts of competent officials more than those of lower ability. Alfada ( 2019 ) evaluated the threshold value at which corruption inhibits economic growth. And Petersen ( 2021 ) employs corruption scandals to explain the inverted-U relationship between democracy and corruption.

Regardless of one’s position on the advantages and disadvantages of corruption, its negative impact on social welfare cannot be denied in certain aspects, as evidenced by the preceding literature review. Extensive studies have been conducted on the consequences of corruption, and some scholars have attempted to investigate the causes and countermeasures of corruption using novel perspectives and methodologies. Due to the secretive nature of corruption, available data are frequently limited, making it difficult to draw conclusions about corruption’s underlying mechanisms. In recent years, some scholars have started employing laboratory experiments to analyze individual corruption behaviors. For instance, Banerjee ( 2016 ) employed laboratory corruption games to elucidate bribery behavior and disclose the impactful role of moral cost. This research also highlighted the crucial role of social norms against the backdrop of corrupt behavior. To explain the relationship between corruption and economic development, Yin and Nie ( 2020 ) developed a three-tier agent model involving the central government, local government, and enterprises. They proposed that companies’ adoption of non-compliant technology could spur economic growth but also lead to corruption issues. Banerjee et al. ( 2022 ), in their public goods laboratory experiment, discovered that the propensity for public officials to embezzle increased the likelihood of tax evasion among citizens, and that tax evasion in turn increased the likelihood of embezzlement. Introducing a policy to detect and penalize public officials for embezzling taxes significantly reduced tax evasion among citizens.

In conclusion, examining corruption from the perspective of anti-corruption measures seems to be a more fruitful research topic. Existing literature typically externalizes the cost of anti-corruption efforts and seeks to explore the specific pathways of corruption via its various direct and indirect impacts. However, among the numerous ways corruption impacts economic development, we cannot overlook the influence of anti-corruption efforts on economic growth. The construction of anti-corruption measures has never ceased despite the escalating phenomenon of corruption over the 30 years since China’s reform and opening up. China’s anti-corruption expenditures have reached an unignorable level, necessitating an evaluation of corruption issues from the perspective of the cost of anti-corruption supervision. In light of this, this paper proposes a supervisory model that internalizes anti-corruption efforts and examines, through comparative static analysis, how the government can choose the optimal supervisory level that maximizes social welfare under various circumstances.

The basic model

The government’s resources are limited during a country’s economic development, so policymakers should make rational and scientific decisions in preventing, regulating, and combating corruption to maximize government benefit. In order to concretize this process, this model takes anti-corruption supervision as a factor of decision-makers’ consideration and endogenously internalizes the probability that officials will be found engaging in corruption.

Consider a static economy made up of citizens, governments, and their employees. All citizens are risk-neutral rational individuals with a total of \(\lambda\) , their per capita income is \(y\) , and they pay taxes to the government at average tax rate \(t\) . The government is policymaker that seeks to maximize benefits. Government benefit is increased by gathering taxes and employing officials to implement infrastructure or public utilities projects. Obviously, the right to implement a project leaves space for official corruption, which can be detrimental to the government’s benefit. Therefore, a group of supervisors is hired to stop or prevent corruption. Thus, government employees are separated into two groups: officials and supervisors. The number of supervisors is \(n\) , and the number of officials is \(1 - n\) , for a grand total of 1. Per capita wage rate of government employees is \(w\) . To ensure that people are willing to become government employees, a minimum wage constraint should be imposed, i.e., the wage of government employees should not be less than per capita income, then \(w\) should be satisfied \(w \ge y\) . For the government, it is necessary to find an appropriate proportion of supervisors and a wage \(\left( {n,w} \right)\) for government employees satisfying the above constraints to maximize government benefit. Next, each object’s behavior will be analyzed.

Since this model focuses on the level of supervision, the number of citizens defined as \(\lambda \left( {\lambda > 0} \right)\) , per capita income \(y\left( {y > 0} \right)\) , and average tax rate \(t\left( {t > 0} \right)\) are exogenous variables. The amount of tax paid by all citizens, i.e., government’s fiscal revenue f , is

where \(\gamma = t\lambda\) .

Supervisors

The government hires supervisors to supervise the behavior of officials. Define that all supervisors are homogeneous and have two states: normal working state and abnormal working state(laziness). Assuming that the probability \(p\) found by a supervisor that an official is in an abnormal working state is a function of the number \(n_e\) of supervisors in a normal working state, that \(p\) should be an increasing function of \(n_e\) , so we may define as

That is to say, \(p\) is exactly the proportion of the number of supervisors in normal work among government employees.

Because of the information asymmetry between the government and supervisors, the government does not know if supervisors are in an abnormal working state. In order to ensure their normal work, the government provides supervisors with an incentive on the basic wage \(w\) , that is, the salaries of all officials found to have abnormal working behaviors will be confiscated and distributed equally to all supervisors as an additional incentive. Assuming that the additional benefit of laziness is zero, in addition to the normal wage \(w\) , for each supervisor, the probability that an official in an abnormal working state will be found increases when he works normally compared with laziness, and there is a potentially higher possibility \(p\) of obtaining additional benefit, therefore, the benefit of each supervisor’s choice of normal work will not be lower than that of idleness. Thus, under government’s incentive policy, every supervisor will not choose to be lazy, so there are

Then, probability \(p\) that officials in abnormal working state will be found is

The government employs officials to operate infrastructure and public utility projects. Officials are fully aware of the number \(n\) of inspectors employed by the government, and the probability that officials will be discovered engaging in abnormal work is \(p(n) = n\) . Due to officials’ participation in the implementation of specific projects, there is room for corruption. We use the concept of “corruption space” to quantify officials’ rights, which demonstrates that officials can maximize their rent-seeking benefits. Total corruption space for all officials is defined as \(b\) , while the average corruption space per official is \(b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) . It shows that a corrupt official will receive additional benefits of \(b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) without being discovered. At the same time, effort input in infrastructure and public utilities projects will reduce by \(b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) .

There are two states for all officials: the normal working state and the corrupt state. In a normal working state, officials will receive a basic wage \(w\) ; in a corrupt state, there is \(p(n)\) probability that they will be found corrupt. Once found, all wages and corrupt income will be confiscated, so the expected return of an official in a corrupt position is \(\left[ {1 - p\left( n \right)} \right]\left[ {w + b/\left( {1 - n} \right)} \right]\) , and the expected return can be used to represent the officials’ utility, \(U = \max \left\{ {w,\left[ {1 - p\left( n \right)} \right]\left[ {w + b/\left( {1 - n} \right)} \right]} \right\}\) . Since \(p(n) = n\) , the formula of anticipated income can be converted to \(\left( {1 - n} \right)w + b\) .

So, if there is

where the official’s income in the normal working state is not less than the anticipated income in the corrupt working state, the official will choose the normal working state.

Conversely, if

where the official’s income in the normal working state is less than the anticipated income in the corrupt state, then the official will choose to corrupt rather than work.

The government’s objective is to maximize the government’s benefit function by choosing an appropriate proportion of supervisors and wages of government employees \(\left( {n,\,w} \right)\) . Define the government benefit function \(G\left( {n,\,w} \right)\) as follows,

where \(B\left( {n,w} \right)\) is the total corruption benefit accrued by all officials without being detected by supervisors, both \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) are coefficients.

The government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) is as follows: The government’s budget is total income tax \(f\) , of which a portion is used to pay government employees’ wages and the rest is for infrastructure and public utilities projects. Since corruption of officials may result in loss of \(B\left( {n,w} \right)\) and proportion \(p(n)\) is recovered by supervisor, part of resources ultimately devoted to infrastructure and public utilities is \(f - w - (1 - p(n))B(n,w)\) , which defined \(\alpha (\alpha > 0)\) as government benefit generated by investment of unit infrastructure and public utilities. Consequently, the government benefit from this part is \(\alpha [f - w - (1 - p(n))B(n,w)]\) . In addition, the supervisor is only responsible for supervising the official, whereas the official contributes directly to the government benefit of the supervisor. At this level, it is evident that the larger the number of officials, the greater the government’s benefit. Assuming that, regardless of officials’ working status, their contribution to government benefit in the implementation of infrastructure and public utilities projects is \(\beta (\beta > 0)\) , the additional government benefit generated by all officials is \(\beta \left( {1 - n} \right)\) .

In light of the above model, government’s objective is to:

It shows that the goal of policymakers is to maximize the government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) within certain constraints.

Optimal choice of government supervision investment under homogeneous officials

The above-described basic model has one feature: all officials are homogeneous, and their corruption space is identical and \(b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) . Here, we will explore the optimal choice of government under the basic model of homogeneous officials.

The government makes decisions with the goal of maximizing the government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) , which is accomplished by employing a certain number \(n\) of supervisors and setting a base wage \(w\) for each official. Individual officials, on the other hand, decide whether to engage in corruption with the goal of maximizing payoffs based on three factors: the level of wages offered by the government \(w\) , the probability \(p(p(n) = n)\) that an official in a non-normal work situation will be detected, and the exogenously given corruption space \(b\) . When the payoff \(w\) under normal work is comparable to the anticipated payoff \((1 - n)w + b\) under corrupt work, officials choose to work normally. Because government may lead to different behavior of officials when setting different wage levels, the total corruption benefit \(B\left( {n,w} \right)\) of officials will vary without being detected, thereby affecting the form of government benefit function. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze various situations to determine the optimal choice of government. The analysis is divided into three sections: first, government’s optimal choice when low wage is \(w < b/n\) ; second, government’s optimal choice when high wage is \(w \ge b/n\) ; third, government’s optimal choice \(\left( {n^ \ast ,w^ \ast } \right)\) when the first two situations are combined.

Prior to analysis, model parameters need to be constrained. Clearly, if the total corruption space B of all officials is large enough, it signifies an unlimited expansion of power, where no decision can prevent the occurrence of corruption; therefore, the total corruption space B should be controlled to a certain range. In addition, in order to reflect the informational and professional advantages of officials in the implementation of infrastructure or public utilities projects, the influence gap between unit officials and unit resources investment on government benefit should not be too large; otherwise, there would be no reason for the government to employ officials to carry out specific projects, so coefficient \(\beta /\alpha\) should be increased. In light of this, we apply the following assumptions to full text, unless otherwise specified:

Assumption 1 . The parameters \(b\) , \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) satisfy the following condition

Optimal choice for low wage ( \(w < b/n\) )

When the wage \(w < b/n\) is low, rational officials will find that the expected income from corruption \(\left( {1 - n} \right)w + b\) exceeds that \(w\) of normal work. Under such conditions, every official would choose to engage in corrupt practices. Consequently, the subsequent discussion will be solely devoted to analyzing the optimal choices for the government to maximize the government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) .

If each official’s corruption behavior will have additional benefits \(b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) that not discovered by supervisor, then the total corruption benefit \(B\left( {n,w} \right)\) of each official is as follows:

and the government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) is reduced to

Thus, we have the following proposition.

Proposition 1 . When wages \(w < b/n\) are lower, the optimal number of supervisors and their salaries are \(\left( {n_1^ \ast ,w_1^ \ast } \right) = \left( {0,y} \right)\) , the value of government benefit function is

The conclusion of Proposition 1 is evident in Fig. 1 . As shown in Fig. 1 , shaded area between straight line \(w = y\) , \(n = 0\) , \(n = 1\) and curve \(w = b/n\) is value \(n\) and \(w\) can be obtained. Since the objective function \(G(n,w)\) is a linear function about \(n\) and \(w\) , the indifference curve is a straight line. The closer it is to origin, greater is the objective function \(G(n,w)\) . When the indifference curve is closest to the origin, when \(n\) and \(w\) are zero and \(y\) respectively, the government benefit function reaches its maximal value.

When wages are low ( w ), the optimal choice is at the intersection of w  =  y and n  = 0.

If government does not provide sufficient wages, rational officials will engage in corruption at the risk of being caught. If the government also employs some supervisors, the contribution of illicit funds recovered by supervisors to government benefit cannot compensate for the loss of government benefit caused by wages paid to supervisors. In this case, the cost of combating corruption exceeds the societal loss induced by its acceptance. In order to maximize government benefit, a rational government will inevitably decide not to employ any supervisors, and to reduce the wages of government employees to the lowest level, that is, per capita income \(y\) .

Optimal choice for high wage ( \(w \ge b/n\) )

When wage ( \(w \ge b/n\) ) is higher, rational officials will discover that the benefits \(w\) of normal work will not be less than the anticipated benefits of corruption \(\left( {1 - n} \right)w + b\) , so all officials will choose to work normally. Similar to the previous scenario, the focus of this section will be on analyzing the government’s optimal choices to maximize the government benefit function G ( n , w ).

At this time, the total benefits of official corruption \(B\left( {n,w} \right)\) will be 0, and the government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) will be reduced to

Proposition 2 . When wage ( \(w \ge b/n\) ) is higher, the optimal number of supervisors and wages \(\left( {n_2^ \ast ,w_2^ \ast } \right)\) that the government should choose can be divided two situations:

i. If \(y < \sqrt {\beta b/\alpha }\) , then

where value of government benefit function is

ii. If \(y \ge \sqrt {\beta b/\alpha }\) , then

Graphically, if the government increases wages, the spectrum of values \(\left( {n,w} \right)\) in Fig. 1 will not fall below the curve \(w = b/n\) . As shown in Fig. 2 , shaded area between straight line \(w = y\) , \(n = 1\) and curve \(w = b/n\) is value \(n\) and \(w\) can be obtained. Currently, the objective function \(G(n,w)\) is still a linear function with respect to \(n\) and \(w\) , so the indifference curve is a straight line. Similarly, the closer to origin indifference curve represents, the greater value of objective function. Obviously, if the minimum wage constraint is small, i.e., \(y\) is small, then the optimal choice must be at the point where the indifference curve and \(w = b/n\) tangent; on the other hand, if the minimum wage constraint is large, optimal choice is at the point where \(w = y\) and \(w = b/n\) intersect, as shown in Fig. 3 .

If the minimum wage constraint is small, the optimal choice is at the point where w  =  b / n is tangent to G ( n , w ).

If the minimum wage constraint is large, optimal choice is at the point where \(w = y\) and \(w = b/n\) intersect.

If the government implements a policy to “cultivate honesty and integrity through high pay”, that is, to ensure that wages are sufficiently high to persuade rational officials to abandon the idea of corruption, then Proposition 2 describes the optimal course of action. When per capita income is very low, the government is not concerned about the impact of the minimum wage on government expenditure or government benefit. In order to ensure that payment is appropriate to “cultivate honesty and integrity”, the government will carefully consider the relationship between investment in supervisors and improvements in government benefits. It will then determine the best amount of investment and pay for supervisors. The equilibrium pay level will be more than the per capita income, and the equilibrium supervisor input will also be greater than zero. On the other hand, the minimum wage restriction has an effect on government decision-making when per capita income is high. Maintaining a large number of supervisors will be more expensive due to the high expense of paying employees. Therefore, in an ideal case, government will set the minimum per capita wage, and the number of inspectors will remain at the level necessary to “cultivate honesty and integrity” even if officials are paid per capita. As shown by Proposition 2, as per capita income increases, the minimum wage restriction also ensures a sufficiently high wage, so the optimal number of supervisors decreases as per capita income increases. This shows that as a society becomes wealthier, on the one hand, the risk of corruption increases, reduces possibility of official corruption, and the cost of anti-corruption measures rises, causing the number of supervisors to decrease.

Optimum choice of comprehensive consideration of wages

If the government only requires a minimum wage (i.e., wage should not be less than per capita income) and does not impose a high or low wage, then when choosing optimal combination of supervisors and wages \(\left( {n,w} \right)\) , the government will consider the first two situations comprehensively to maximize the government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) and get optimal choice \(\left( {n^ \ast ,w^ \ast } \right)\) . In this way, the corollaries for proposition 1 and 2 are as follows (see appendix for proof).

Corollary 1 . If the government only restricts its employees’ minimum wage, the optimal number of supervisors and wages \(\left( {n^ \ast ,w^ \ast } \right)\) that the government should choose can be divided into the two situations below.

i. If \(y < \beta /\alpha\) , then

ii. If \(y \ge \beta /\alpha\) , then

Corollary 1 indicates that the best option for government investment in supervisors is to invest in none if per capita income y is so low that it drops below a particular threshold. The government currently believes that the benefits of fighting corruption surpass the expenses, even if only a small amount of effort is made. All officials are employed by the government. The highest degree of governmental gain will still be realized despite the lack of oversight and corruption among all officials. Specifically, if an economic society is relatively poor and has a low per capita income \(y\) , the government’s budget \(\gamma y\) will be quite limited. To improve government benefit, the government can only improve the quality of investment in infrastructure and public utilities. Therefore, government must employ sufficient officials with relevant information and expertize to operate specific infrastructure and public utilities projects. The government’s budget constrains its anti-corruption efforts. Considering that officials, whether corrupt or not, will contribute as much to government benefit as they do to the professionalism of project implementation, and that in order to obtain such “professional” benefits from officials, the government abandoned corruption supervision when the budget was limited, in such cases corruption will not offset an official’s contribution to government benefit in a “professional” way, even if the official is corrupt.

In addition, another portion of Corollary 1 states that if per capita income y exceeds a certain threshold value, the optimal choice of government investment in supervisors is greater than zero, and its value decreases as per capita income y rises. Specifically, when a society reaches a certain level of development, the per capita income is relatively high and the government will have relatively abundant budget γy . Therefore, in pursuit of high government benefit, the government does not rely entirely on officials to enhance the quality of implementation of infrastructure and public utilities projects. The government will consider officials more. Negative impact of staff corruption on government benefit maintains a team of supervisors greater than zero. Considering that when per capita income is higher than \(y \ge \beta /\alpha\) , there is \(w^ \ast = b/n^ \ast\) , the government has determined a reasonable proportion of supervisors and wage rate so that the expected income of officials in corrupt situations will not be higher than normal wage income; therefore, no rational official will participate in corruption activities under these conditions. It is worth mentioning that as a society becomes more affluent, the per capita income level y continues to rise, and the minimum wage constraint increases accordingly. As a result, the risk of corruption among officials rises, and an increase in their normal wages inhibits corruption to some extent, so the government needs fewer supervisors to ensure that a rational official is not corrupt.

Figure 4 shows the relationship between the optimal number of government supervisors \(n^ \ast\) and per capita income \(y\) . As shown in Fig. 4 , the optimal number of supervisors remains at zero as per capita income increases from zero until per capita income exceeds a critical value of \(\beta /\alpha\) , which we refer to as the “ critical value of supervising input of income.”

As per capita income y increases from 0, the optimal number of supervisors n undergoes a process of initially remaining at 0 level, then reaching a peak at b / y (when per capita income y reaches the critical value of β / α ), and finally gradually decreasing to approach zero infinitely.

The number of optimal supervisors surged abruptly to \(b/y\) and peaked at the critical point of \(\alpha b/\beta\) . As per capita income increased, the number of optimal supervisors began to decrease gradually. When per capita income approached infinity, that is, when \(y \to \infty\) , the number of optimal supervisors was infinitely close to zero. Figure 4 is also in line with reality. In fact, often poorer countries frequently lack anti-corruption measures, and corruption levels are relatively high. On the contrary, the wealthier developed countries can maintain a low level of corruption while spending less on supervision. For developing countries like China, the per capita income is at a medium-level, so it is likely located close to \(\alpha b/\beta\) (the highest level of supervision).

In addition, according to the definition of \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) , if the influence of unit officials on government benefit is greater because of their own information or professional advantages, the impact of unit resources input on government benefit is relatively small. Then, the critical value of supervision input \(N\) will be larger, and the government will rely more on officials, so it will wait until a higher per capita income level to combat corruption. On the contrary, if the influence of unit officials on government benefit is relatively small due to their own information or professional advantages, and the impact of unit resource investment on government benefit is relatively large, then the critical value of supervision input \(N\) will be relatively small. Due to low capacity of officials, the government may take anti-corruption actions in advance to reduce losses.

Because we assume that all officials are homogeneous and confront the same size of corruption space, in this section of discussion, all officials will be in the same state, that is, all corrupt acts or all normal work. In the next section, we will introduce heterogeneous officials into the model and expand it to some extent.

Optimum choice of government supervision investment under heterogeneous officials

In reality, it is unlikely that all officials share the same “corruption preferences” or are completely homogeneous. Therefore, this section will discuss the optimal choice of government investment in supervision when officials have heterogeneous “corruption preferences”.

Assuming that only officials with a ratio \(m\left( {m \in \left( {0,1} \right)} \right)\) maintain original assumption, we refer to these Group \(A\) officials. The remaining officials with a ratio \(1 - m\) are more honest than the former. The “corruption space” has decreased due to their own reasons. We refer to them as Group \(B\) officials. Defining a “corruption preference coefficient” \(\sigma \left( {\sigma \in \left( {0,1} \right)} \right)\) , which indicates officials’ inherent degree of corruption. We believe that Group \(B\) officials, due to their own integrity, will not fully use rights allocated to them to corrupt. Therefore, they impose restrictions on themselves to alter corruption space \(\sigma b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) . If corruption occurs with this official, he will receive additional benefit \(\sigma b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) without being discovered, and investment in infrastructure or public utilities projects will decrease \(\sigma b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) . The smaller the “corruption preference coefficient” \(\sigma\) , the more honest officials, and vice versa, the larger the corrupt officials. The “Corruption preference coefficient” of Group A officials are obviously 1.

Similarly, all officials may be in two states: normal work and corrupt state. Behavioral analysis of Group \(A\) officials can be found in the above model. For Group \(B\) officials, under normal working conditions, the benefit that each official will receive is basic wage \(w\) . In a corrupt state, every official has the probability of \(p(n)\) being found to be corrupt. Once found, all wages and corrupt income will be confiscated.

Therefore, under corruption, the expected income of Group \(B\) officials is

Thus, the utility function of Group \(B\) officials can be written as

Substituting \(p(n) = n\) , the formula becomes \(\left( {1 - n} \right)w + \sigma b\) . So, if there is

where the benefit of Group B officials under normal work is not less than expected benefits under corrupt work, so Group B officials will choose normal work.

Conversely, if \(w < \sigma b/n\) , where the benefit of Group \(B\) officials under normal work is less than the expected benefit under corrupt work, so Group \(B\) officials will choose corrupt work over normal work.

Obviously, the minimum wage to ensure that Group officials are not corrupt varies based on the varying levels of honesty of Group \(A\) officials and Group \(B\) officials themselves. In order to prevent corruption, the more honest Group \(B\) officials require a lower wage \(\sigma b/n\) . The optimal choice for a government, as determined by homogeneity of officials, is either to tolerate the corruption of all officials or to have zero-tolerance for corruption, as determined by the conclusion of a previous analysis. If officials’ “corruption preference” is heterogeneous, will there be an optimal choice for the government to supervise input if some officials will choose to corrupt while others do not? Intuitively, this is possible because there is a wage range \(w \in \left[ {\sigma b/n,\,b/n} \right)\) . When the wage is in this range, corruption will happen to Group \(A\) officials, but not Group \(B\) officials. If the cost of guaranteeing the non-corruption of Group \(B\) officials is less than the cost of guaranteeing non-corruption of all officials, then optimal choice of government supervision must be that wages are \(w \in \left[ {\sigma b/n,\,b/n} \right)\) , where it will be a society with “partial corruption”. Next, we will confirm existence of “partial corruption” through analysis.

Similarly, when the government formulates different wage levels, it may lead to different official behavior, resulting in varying levels of corruption income \(B\left( {n,w} \right)\) of officials without detection, which will affect the form of government benefit function. Considering the inconsistent behavior of Group \(A\) officials and Group \(B\) officials, we will discuss it in three cases: the first is the optimal choice of supervision input when the wage is low, i.e., \(w < \sigma b/n\) . The second is optimal choice of supervisory input when the medium wage is \(\sigma b < w < b/n\) . The third is optimal choice of supervisory input when the wage is high, i.e., \(w \ge b/n\) .

Optimal choice for low wage ( \(w < \sigma b/n\) )

When lower the wage \(w < \sigma b/n\) , according to the previous analysis, both Group \(A\) and Group \(B\) officials will find that the expected benefits of corruption will be greater than those of their normal work, so all officials will choose to corrupt. Corruption of Group \(A\) officials will have additional benefits \(b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) if it is not discovered by supervisor. Corruption of Group \(B\) officials will have additional benefits \(b/\left( {1 - n} \right)\) if it is not discovered by supervisor, then total corruption benefits of officials \(B\left( {n,w} \right)\) is

and government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) is reduced to

Proposition 3 . When the wage ( \(w < \sigma b/n\) ) is lower, the optimal number of supervisors and their salaries \(\left( {n_3^ \ast ,w_3^ \ast } \right)\) are \(\left( {n_3^ \ast ,w_3^ \ast } \right) = \left( {0,y} \right)\) , the value of government benefit function is

Similar to Proposition 1, the conclusion of Proposition 3 can be obtained by making a slight modification to Fig. 1 . As shown in Fig. 5 , the shaded area enclosed between the line \(w = y,n = 0,n = 1\) and the curve \(w = \sigma b/n\) are the values that can be obtained for \(n\) and \(w\) . The indifference curve remains a straight line. The closer it is to the origin, the larger the objective function \(G(n,w)\) becomes. Therefore, when the indifference curve is closest to the origin, the \(n\) and \(w\) are 0 and y , respectively, where the government benefit function reaches its maximum.

When the wage ( w  <  σb / n ) is low, the optimal number of supervisors and their salaries satisfy n  = 0 and w  =  y .

If the salary is insufficient, then both Group \(A\) and Group \(B\) officials will choose to engage in corruption at the risk of being discovered. If government continues to employ some supervisors, even though corruption losses caused by more honest Group \(B\) officials will be less than in the previous model, the contribution of corrupt funds recovered by supervisors to government benefit still cannot make up for wages paid to supervisors. The loss, or in this case, the cost of curbing corruption for the entire society is greater than that of tolerating it. When wages are restricted by an upper limit, a reasonable government will inevitably choose not to employ any supervisors and reduce wages of government employees to the lowest level, that is, per capita income \(y\) , so as to obtain the highest level of government benefit.

In addition, it is simple to find that the optimal value of the government benefit function is a decreasing function of both the proportion m of Group \(A\) officials and the corruption preference coefficient \(\sigma\) of Group \(B\) officials. This demonstrates that when proportion \(m\) of corrupt Group \(A\) officials m is smaller and proportion \(1 - m\) of honest Group \(B\) officials is larger, the value of optimal government benefit function is larger. At the same time, if the corruption preference coefficient \(\sigma\) of Group \(B\) officials is small, indicating that the level of honesty of Group \(B\) officials is higher, then the value of optimal government benefit function will be large. These conclusions are also in line with our intuitive understanding. The smaller \(m\) and \(\sigma\) , the more honest a society is, the greater government benefit will obviously be.

Optimal choice for medium wage ( \(\sigma b \le w < b/n\) )

When wages are in a medium range \(\sigma b \le w < b/n\) , rational Group \(A\) officials will find that the expected benefits of corruption \(\left( {1 - n} \right)w + b\) are greater than those w of normal work, while rational Group \(B\) officials will observe that the expected benefits of normal work will not be less than those of corruption \(\left( {1 - n} \right)w + \sigma b\) at this time, as all Group \(A\) officials will choose corruption work and all Group \(B\) officials will choose normal work. Currently, total revenue of corruption \(B\left( {n,w} \right)\) is as follows

and the government benefit function \(G\bf \left( {n,w} \right)\) is reduced to

Thus, we have the following proposition (proof omitted).

Proposition 4 . When wages are within the medium-level range \(\sigma b \le w < b/n\) , the optimal number of supervisors and their salaries \(\left( {n_4^ \ast ,w_4^ \ast } \right)\) depend on income per capital y .

i. If \(y < \sqrt {\sigma b\left( {\beta - \alpha bm} \right)/\alpha }\) , then

where the value of government benefit function is

ii. If \(y \ge \sqrt {\sigma b\left( {\beta - \alpha bm} \right)/\alpha }\) , then

As depicted in Fig. 6 , if the government sets wages at the mediate-level, the range \(\left( {n,w} \right)\) of values will be between curves \(w = b/n\) , \(w = \sigma b/n\) . Therefore, the value of the shadowed area surrounded by straight line \(w = y\) , \(n = 1\) and curves \(w = b/n\) , \(w = \sigma b/n\) can be obtained by \(n\) and \(w\) , At this time, the objective function \(G(n,w)\) is still a linear function about \(n\) and \(w\) , so the indifference curve is a straight line. Similarly, the closer to origin indifference curve represents, the greater value of objective function. Similar to previous results, if the minimum wage constraint is small, that is, \(y\) is small, then the optimal choice must be at the point where difference curve and \(w = \sigma b/n\) are tangent. If the minimum wage constraint is large, however, the optimal choice is the intersection of \(w = y\) and \(w = \sigma b/n\) .

If the minimum wage constraint is small, the optimal choice must be at the point where difference curve and w  <  σb / n are tangent. If the minimum wage constraint is large, the optimal choice is the intersection of w  =  y and w  <  σb / n .

The situation described in Proposition 4 is a form of “partial corruption”, in which only a part of officials (Group \(A\) officials) will be corrupted while the rest will not. If the government can only set wages within a certain range, which may lead to “partial corruption” due to certain constraints, then the government’s optimal choice is as outlined in Proposition 4. When per capita income is very low, the government is unconcerned about the impact of the minimum wage on government expenditure or government benefits. Government will thoroughly evaluate the relationship between investment in supervisors and improvement in government benefits, and determine an optimal investment of supervisors and wage level. Since it cannot fundamentally restrain corruption of Group \(A\) officials, the government will employ a high proportion of supervisors to ensure investigation rate of corruption after an incident, and will also pay higher wages than the per capita income. On the other hand, when per capita income is high, however, the minimum wage constraint has a certain impact on government’s decision-making. Because the cost of paying wages is too high, maintaining a higher number of supervisors will incur additional cost. Therefore, in the optimal case, the government will establish a minimum per capita wage. As the government function cannot prevent the corruption of Group \(A\) officials, it will maintain the number of supervisors at a level that only the average salary of Group \(B\) officials can guarantee to “cultivate honesty and integrity”.

When wages are higher \(w \ge b/n\) , both Group \(A\) and Group \(B\) officials will find that the benefits of normal work will not be less than expected benefits of corruption. Therefore, all officials will opt to work normally. At this time, the total revenue from official corruption \(B\) is 0, and the government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) is reduced to

Consequently, we are in the same situation as in section 2 of the previous part, so Proposition 2 is the conclusion.

It can be seen that when the government sets a high enough wage, regardless of how different officials are, they will not engage in corruption, so the heterogeneity of officials will not influence government’s decision-making.

Optimal choice with comprehensive consideration of salary when corruption preference is heterogeneous

If only minimum wage is required (i.e., wages should be no less than per capita income) and there are no other interval constraints, the government will consider the first three situations to maximize the government benefit function \(G(n,w)\) and obtain the optimal choice \(\left( {n^ \ast ,w^ \ast } \right)\) when determining the optimal combination of supervisors and wages \(\left( {n,w} \right)\) . It is noteworthy that the optimal choice of government lead to the emergence of “partial corruption” due to the heterogeneity of officials. We are concerned about whether it is possible for the government to consider all circumstances and choose the optimal wage to be set within an interval where “partial corruption” will occur if government’s wages are not constrained by interval. First, we argue that if per capita income is low, the optimal choice for government, similar to the case of homogeneous officials, is to maintain wages in per capita income without employing any supervisors. The following inferences are provided (see appendix for proof).

Corollary 2 . If only the minimum wage is constrained, then when \(y < \sqrt {\beta b/\alpha }\) , the value of the government benefit function is \(\left( {n^ \ast ,w^ \ast } \right) = \left( {0,y} \right)\) , where the value of government benefit function is

Corollary 2 demonstrates that if the per capita income \(y\) is below a certain value, the optimal choice for government investment in supervisors is to not invest in any supervisors. Similar to the previous part of Corollary 1, Corollary 2 states that when per capita income is low, the government’s budget and limitations cannot support the cost of anti-corruption. Even if society is relatively honest, that is, there are smaller \(m\) and smaller \(\sigma\) , the government will not raise wages to combat the corruption of the more honest Group \(B\) officials.

Obviously, we know from corollary 2 that if \(y < \sqrt {\beta b/\alpha }\) , the optimal choice of government does not occur to be “partial corruption”. Then when \(y \ge \sqrt {\beta b/\alpha }\) , is it possible for this situation to occur? The answer is yes; we provide lemma (see appendix for proof).

Lemma 1 . Denote a function of \(m\) :

where \(\delta = \beta /\alpha\) . There exist \(\sigma \in \left( {0,1} \right)\) and \(m \in \left( {0,1} \right)\) such that \(\sigma < g\left( m \right)\) .

In other words, set \(p = \left\{ {\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\left| {\sigma < g\left( m \right),m \in \left( {0,1} \right),\sigma \in \left( {0,1} \right)} \right.} \right\}\) satisfies \(P \ne \emptyset\) .

As a result, we stipulate that government’s optimal choice may lead to “partial corruption”. Assuming that Assumption 2 is true, we provide Proposition 5 (See Appendix for proof).

Assumption 2 . The ratio \(m\) of Group \(A\) officials and corruption preference coefficient \(\sigma\) of Group \(B\) officials satisfy the following constraints:

Proposition 5 . If only the minimum wage of its employees is constrained, then, if and only if Assumption 2 holds, there exists a per capita income range that causes “partial corruption” if the optimal supervising input level chosen by the government is optimal. The government weighs the number of supervisors and wages \(\left( {n^ \ast ,w^ \ast } \right)\) that maximize government benefit in all cases into three categories.

i. If \(y < \frac{{\delta - bm}}{{1 - m}}\) , then

at this time, the value of government benefit function is

ii. If \(\frac{{\delta - bm}}{{1 - m}} \le y < \frac{{\delta \left( {1 - \sigma } \right)}}{m} + \sigma b\) , then

at this time, value of government benefit function is

iii. If \(y \ge \frac{{\delta \left( {1 - \sigma } \right)}}{m} + \sigma b\) , then

In the case of Assumption 2 being satisfied, cases i and ii in Proposition 5 are analogous to those of Corollary 1; that is, when per capita income \(y\) is very low and even lower than a certain critical value, the optimal choice for investing in supervisors is zero. Now, all officials will attempt to corrupt, but when the per capita income \(y\) is high enough and even higher than some critical value, the government will invest more in supervision to prevent corruption. Notably, in case ii of Proposition 5, when per capita income \(y\) is at a mediate-level, the optimal choice for the government is to invest a certain number of supervisors to prevent Group B officials from engaging in corruption. In other words, the government believes that only the most honest officials will not invest in corruption supervising costs. Relative to government benefit, benefits are relatively small. At the same time, the cost of investing so heavily in supervisors that no government officials will attempt to corrupt them is greater than the increase in government benefit. In this way, “partial corruption” results from the government’s optimal choice.

Proposition 5 reveals the existence of “partial corruption”, but its existence is contingent on the truth of Assumption 2. When ratio \(m\) of Group \(A\) officials and corruption preference coefficient \(\sigma\) of Group \(B\) officials are within set \(P\) , it is conceivable for “partial corruption” to occur, noting definition of set \(P\) , that is, when \(\sigma < g\left( m \right)\) , there will be “partial corruption”. As far as we know, \(g\left( m \right)\) is the decreasing function of \(m\) , so when both σ and m are smaller, it is easier to satisfy \(\sigma < g\left( m \right)\) , and “partial corruption” is more likely to occur. Intuitively, the smaller the \(m\) , the fewer corrupt Group \(A\) officials and the greater the number of honest Group \(B\) officials. Government chooses appropriate supervising input so that Group \(B\) officials will not attempt to corrupt benefits of situation will be greater than the larger m , and the cost of supervising input has not changed. Therefore, it is more likely that “partial corruption” will occur. In addition, the smaller the σ is, the more honest Group \(B\) officials are. Government selects appropriate supervising input and only makes the cost of Group \(B\) officials not attempting corruption smaller than that of the larger \(\sigma\) , so “partial corruption” is also more likely to occur. To sum up, a smaller m means that stopping corruption of Group \(B\) officials will produce greater benefits, and a smaller σ means that stopping corruption of Group \(B\) officials will produce smaller costs, and the combination of the two makes the emergence of “partial corruption” possible. This also partially explains why it has always been difficult to eradicate corruption in some middle-income countries.

The result of Proposition 5 suggests a possible relationship between the optimal number of supervisors n * and per capita income y under heterogeneous officials. Figure 7 illustrates the relationship If Assumption 2. As shown in Fig. 7 , the critical value of supervising input for income \(N\) is \(N\left( m \right) = \frac{{\delta - bm}}{{1 - m}}\) .

The critical value of supervising input for income is N ( m ) = ( δ − bm )/(1 −  m ) in a period of “partial corruption”. Correspondingly, in the period of “comprehensive anti-corruption”, the critical value of comprehensive supervising of income can be denoted as L ( m , σ ) = δ (1 −  σ )/(1 −  m ) + σb .

Since \(N\left( m \right)\) is an increasing function as to \(m\) , therefore, when \(m\) is smaller, the critical value of supervising input is smaller, and the society will enter an anti-corruption period earlier as per capita income rises. Intuitively, the smaller \(m\) is, the more honest its officials, the greater the likelihood that the government will invest in proactive supervising. As the government knows that the cost of supervising honest officials is not excessively high, but because there are such officials, it will receive more government benefits.

Figure 7’s optimal supervising input exhibits two jumps compared to Fig. 4 . Obviously, the first jump in critical value of supervision input ushers in a period of “partial corruption”, whereas the second jump ushers in a period of “comprehensive anti-corruption”, so the government will invest fully in inspectors so that no officials will attempt corruption. We will turn this jump point as “ critical value of comprehensive supervising of income”, and denote as \(L\) , according to Proposition 5 and Fig. 7 , we have

Since \(L\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) is a decreasing function as to \(m\) and \(\sigma\) , the larger \(m\) and \(\sigma\) are, the smaller \(L\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) is, and the earlier the government will enter comprehensive anti-corruption period. Intuitively speaking, the larger \(m\) and \(\sigma\) indicates that Group \(A\) officials are more and Group \(B\) officials are less honest than Group \(A\) officials. Group \(B\) officials does not pay sufficient attention to Group \(A\) officials due to their small number and lack of difference from Group officials in terms of corruption. Therefore, the government will be more aware of anti-corruption’s flaws and will advance comprehensive anti-corruption. In addition, as shown in Fig. 5 , when per capita income is close to the “critical value of overall supervising of income” \(L\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) , the optimal level of supervising input may be the same, but the economy and society before per capita income is \(L\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) will produce “partial corruption”, whereas the economy and society after \(L\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) will not. If \(L\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) is regarded as demarcation point between middle-income countries and developed countries, then this model partially explains why poorer countries have more corruption than richer countries in terms of supervising investment at a lower level.

As shown in Fig. 7 , the optimal level of government supervision input causes per capita income range of “partial corruption” occur between the critical value of supervising input of income \(N\) and the critical value of overall supervising of income \(L\) . From the monotony of \(N\left( m \right)\) and \(L\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) , it can be deduced that the range enlarges with a decrease of \(m\) and \(\sigma\) , and with the increase of \(m\) and \(\sigma\) . When \(m\) and \(\sigma\) reaches a certain value, the area ceases to exist and degenerates to the situation depicted in Fig. 4 , that is, “partial corruption” does not exist, as shown by Proposition 6 (see appendix for evidence).

Proposition 6 . If Assumption 2 is false and the government only restricts its employees’ minimum wage, then the optimal level of supervision input chosen by government will not result in “partial corruption” regardless of the per capita income. To maximize government benefit in all circumstances, the government weighs the number of supervisors and their wages \(\left( {n^ \ast ,w^ \ast } \right)\) . It can be divided into two cases:

i. If \(y < \frac{\delta }{{m + \left( {1 - m} \right)\sigma }}\) , then

ii. If \(y \ge \frac{\delta }{{m + \left( {1 - m} \right)\sigma }}\) , then

If Assumption 2 is invalid, then Proposition 6 gives relationship between the optimal level of supervising input level and per capita income. Its figure resembles Fig. 4 . Only difference is that the critical value of supervising input of income \(N\) is

Since \(N\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) is a decreasing function of \(m\) and \(\sigma\) , the larger \(m\) and \(\sigma\) are, the smaller \(N\left( {m,\sigma } \right)\) is, and the earlier the government will enter a comprehensive anti-corruption period. Obviously, because \(m + \left( {1 - m} \right)\sigma < 1\) , the critical value of input from income supervising is larger than that of homogeneous officials. This is due to the fact that existence of Group \(B\) officials make the whole society more honest than homogeneous officials. Therefore, under the same level of per capita income, if comprehensive anti-corruption measures are taken. Obviously, higher benefits can be obtained in societies with greater corruption. In other words, the existence of more honest Group \(B\) officials reduce the government’s concern about corruption, resulting in the government taking supervision inputs later.

Conclusion and discussion

Corruption has always been a worldwide issue, particularly in developing countries. In light of the fact that people do not yet have a clear understanding of how to balance the cost of corruption and anti-corruption supervision input, this paper has conducted a certain amount of theoretical research in this area.

Our research indicates that when per capita income is low, the optimal level of surveillance investment is virtually zero. Specifically, in a poorer socio-economic context where per capita income is below the “surveillance investment threshold,” government budgets are severely limited and unable to cover the costs of rigorous anti-corruption measures. Even minor efforts against corruption yield societal benefits that transcend the costs of such initiatives. Hence, governments can only enhance the quality of infrastructure and public service investment to advance government benefits. The chosen strategy entails hiring enough officers with relevant information and professional skills to implement specific infrastructure and public service projects with nearly zero investment in surveillance personnel. This choice is driven by the fact that officials, whether corrupt or not, can provide the same amount of government benefit due to their professional expertize in project implementation.

Secondly, when per capita income grows to a certain level, the optimal level of surveillance investment suddenly maximizes and declines as per capita income increases but always maintains a level greater than zero. In other words, as a society develops to a certain level, per capita income rises above the “surveillance investment threshold,” allowing the government a more flexible fiscal budget. At this stage, the government’s pursuit of high government benefits does not rely solely on improving project implementation quality by officers. The government also considers the negative impact of official corruption on societal welfare, therefore maintaining a positive level of supervision, reaching a maximum when per capita income is at the “surveillance investment threshold.” Furthermore, when per capita income is relatively high, the government determines a reasonable proportion and wage rate for surveillance personnel so that officials’ expected benefits from corruption do not exceed their normal wage income. In such a scenario, no rational official would participate in corrupt activities.

Finally, when officials’ corruption levels are heterogeneous, the proportion of more honest officials is larger, and their degree of honesty is higher. There may exist a middle per capita income range where an optimal level of supervising input results in “partial corruption.” In this scenario, the government only needs to maintain supervision input at a level that prevents honest officials from engaging in corruption. This conclusion also partly explains why poorer countries have higher corruption levels compared to wealthier countries when supervising investment is at a lower level. Additionally, this paper sheds light on the persistent challenge of eradicating corruption in certain middle-income countries.

The findings of this research provide a new perspective for understanding and addressing the corruption problem. However, it is worth noting the limitations of our study. First, our model is based on idealized assumptions and does not fully consider other potential factors affecting corruption, such as cultural factors, political environment, legal system, etc. The omission of these factors may impose certain restrictions on the practical application of our model. Second, our model is theoretically driven but lacks sufficient empirical data for validation, which could lead to potential bias in our conclusions. Third, our study assumes that the government’s budget allocation is solely based on economic efficiency considerations without considering the realities of political trade-offs and societal pressures. These factors can play a crucial role in the actual decision-making process. Moreover, our study predominantly features a static model without fully considering the time factor. For instance, as socio-economic development progresses, public tolerance of corruption may change, affecting the optimal level of corruption and anti-corruption surveillance investment. Future research could build a dynamic model to examine the influence of temporal variations and multiple factors on corruption and anti-corruption surveillance investment. In addition, laboratory experiments involving corruption games provide a more intuitive and operational method to assess and understand corruption decision-making behavior, presenting another area for continued development and refinement in future studies.

Data availability

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.

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Journal of Financial Crime

ISSN : 1359-0790

Article publication date: 2 July 2019

Existing reviews about corruption and anti-corruption have yet to treat the subject of prevention as the main focus of inquiry. The purpose of this paper is to address this need by analyzing definitions, theoretical underpinnings, methods and sectors of interest within published academic articles. By doing so, the main objective is to clarify the theoretical and conceptual foundations of the prevention of corruption.

Design/methodology/approach

The research design consists of a systematic literature review, which uses a keyword-string search method across relevant databases. A qualitative and quantitative coding scheme was implemented to provide descriptive statistics.

Results show a need for methodological diversity, theoretical debate and a clarification of the definitional foundations of corruption prevention. Specifically, the results underline a need for more interdisciplinary collaboration between the various fields that study the issue. To this end, a conceptualization of corruption prevention is proposed, built around a two by two matrix, to synthesize existing definitions and spark scholarly debate.

Practical implications

This paper contributes to the field of anti-corruption on a theoretical level by highlighting the current strengths and weaknesses of the inroads made by the existing literature. Moreover, on a practical research level, this paper suggests fruitful lines of inquiry to channel a rapidly expanding field of study.

Social implications

This paper underlines the need for corruption prevention policymaking to take note of the broad literature emanating from multiple social science disciplines. This paper also underlines the need for policy implementation to consider the socio-historical context and definitional idiosyncrasies of corruption for policy effectiveness.

Originality/value

A core original contribution of this paper is to advance a definition and conceptualization of corruption prevention. Using two conceptual axes – focus and scope – prevention tools are categorized and analyzed to spark further scholarly debate.

• Anti-corruption
• Systematic literature review
• Corruption prevention

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Dr Étienne Charbonneau for helpful comments on previous versions, as well as the École Nationale d’Administration Publique for financial support. All shortcomings belong to the authors.

Bautista-Beauchesne, N. and Garzon, C. (2019), "Conceptualizing corruption prevention: a systematic literature review", Journal of Financial Crime , Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 719-745. https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-10-2018-0106

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2024 Pulitzer Prizes announced: See full list of winners, nominees

The Pulitzer Prize Board announced winners and nominated finalists of the 108th Pulitzer Prize Monday.

Marjorie Miller , Administrator of the Pulitzer Prizes and the Vice President and Global Enterprise Editor at The Associated Press, announced the winners and finalists, which were awarded and designated on the recommendation of the Pulitzer Prize Board at Columbia University, according to a press release by the institution.

"The Pulitzer Prizes are more than journalism's esteemed honor," said Neil Brown, co-chair of the Pulitzer Prize Board. "They are a commitment to the highest standards of fairness, honesty and storytelling for those who pursue facts and reveal uncomfortable truths."

The Pulitzer Prize Board, on Thursday, also said it "recognizes the tireless efforts of student journalists across our nation’s college campuses , who are covering protests and unrest in the face of great personal and academic risk."

2024 Pulitzer Prize winners

Miller announced the 2024 Pulitzer Prize winners and nominated finalists via livestream on Monday.

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"The entries included many instances of workplace harm to employees, consumers and soldiers, hate crimes and criminal justice. Corruption and impunity and migration remained persistent themes in American life. And globally we saw stories on the proliferation of undemocratic uses of technology, along with the growing presence of AI in our lives."

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2023 winners

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Austin American-Statesman , part of the USA TODAY Network, was also a finalist in the category of public service for its coverage on law enforcement’s flawed response to the Uvalde shooting that left 19 school children and two teachers dead Texas.

Individual winners included Eli Saslow of The Washington Post for feature writing, Kyle Whitmire of AL.com for commentary and Andrea Long Chu of New York Magazine for criticism.

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Limitations of the international approach to anti-corruption: a systematic review of South Africa’s compelling case of failing anti-corruption

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In the Global South, anti-corruption initiatives continue to fail despite varying commitments to the international anti-corruption agenda. Concurrently, as this study demonstrates, researchers investigating this paradox appear confined within orthodox explanations for failing anti-corruption efforts. Through a systematic review of 58 studies, this paper demonstrates that South Africa’s anti-corruption corpora from 1995 to 2022 fall to this critique. By employing socio-legal theoretical perspectives, the paper elucidates how and why the orthodoxy dominates the corpora and subsequently suggests a more nuanced understanding of the country’s ongoing failure to combat corruption. For example, the paper argues that the intricacies of South Africa’s corruption challenge the perspective that anti-corruption measures fail simply due to widespread rule-breaking. Through the prism of legal pluralism, this paper demonstrates that adherence to rules is indeed prevalent in South Africa, albeit often not aligned with formal state anti-corruption legislation and regulations. Finally, the paper posits innovative approaches to enhance and broaden our comprehension of why anti-corruption efforts fail, especially in the Global South.

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Introduction

The United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and non-governmental entities like Transparency International converge upon a set of shared tenets and best practices regarding how to eradicate corruption globally. This commonality in perspective underpins what might be termed an international anti-corruption consensus (Gephart, 2009 , p. 8; Kuldova et al., 2024 ). Sampson ( 2010 , p. 262) articulates this notion further, observing that this consensus projects itself globally as an extensive array of policies, regulatory measures, conventions, training modules, and programmes dedicated to enhancing integrity and ameliorating public governance.

Regrettably, corruption persists as a potent scourge worldwide, casting a shadow of doubt over the efficacy of the international anti-corruption consensus (Gutterman & Lohaus, 2018 ). Numerous scholars and policy experts concur that the strategies and technologies of international anti-corruption consensus disproportionately depend on a principal-agent theoretical framework that misrepresents the complexity of corruption (Persson et al., 2010 , 2013 ) and neglects the nuanced local realities that are crucial for the successful implementation of anti-corruption measures (Jackson, 2020 ; Khan et al., 2019 ). In this paper, the aforementioned theoretical postulations are termed “the orthodoxy.”

Through a critical interpretive synthesis (CIS) of studies published between 1995 and 2022 on South Africa’s anti-corruption efforts, this paper elucidates how anti-corruption researchers appear confined within the orthodoxy in their attempt to unravel why the country’s anti-corruption efforts have yielded minimal results. Subsequently, this paper draws on socio-legal theories and critical corruption scholarships to present a nuanced understanding of the country’s failing anti-corruption and posit innovative approaches that can enhance our comprehension of corruption and anti-corruption in general.

This paper is structured as follows. The subsequent section provides a background on (anti) corruption in South Africa. Section three delves into the theoretical underpinnings that guide this study. Section four articulates how the Critical Interpretive Synthesis (CIS) method was employed in the study, and the subsequent section— section five —presents the study’s findings on why South Africa’s anti-corruption regime is failing. These findings are assembled under three interrelated thematic corpora from an interpretive synthesis of the eligible literature. Section six incorporates key arguments from the thematic corpora to illuminate their overall contribution to understanding the country’s failing anti-corruption, thereby suggesting how the corpora appear confined within the orthodoxy. Subsequently, in this section, the paper attempts a more nuanced understanding of the country’s ongoing failure to combat corruption. Lastly, the final section ( section seven ) proffers a summary of primary findings and their implications, supplemented by research recommendations for future studies.

Anti-corruption in South Africa: a compelling case

South Africa’s violent history, apartheid, and white supremacy are crucial to understanding the country’s anti-corruption challenges. The apartheid regime was inherently corrupt. According to Lodge ( 1998 ), the National Party, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, promoted transactive corruption by favoring white civil servants to foster the socio-economic fortunes of the white minority. Although this system was driven by the goals of Afrikaner Nationalism rather than individual enrichment (Seegers, 1993 ), it paved the way for a corrupt regime by the 1980s, especially at the homeland government level (Bauer, 2000 ; Lodge, 1998 ). The impending end of white rule led to a rush to exploit and plunder state resources (Hyslop, 2005 ; Van Vuuren, 2006 ). As one official described, many felt they were missing out if they did not engage in corruption (Bauer, 1999 , p. 78). Consequently, lack of accountability, kickbacks, favoritism, cronyism, and bribery became common in various state departments (Bauer, 1999 ; Hyslop, 2005 ; Lodge, 1998 ).

Despite democratic reforms and increased scrutiny, corruption remained pervasive across various sectors due to pre-existing structural weaknesses and ingrained habits (Lodge, 2001 ). Integrating former homeland administrations into new local governments and the infusion of political solidarity among the new ruling elite and its supporters perpetuated patrimonial habits, noticeably intensifying corruption in provincial and local governments (Lodge, 2001 ). Moreover, various new stimulants for corrupt behaviour, such as the shortages of skilled staffing in financial control systems and the expansion of citizen entitlements to public resources, arose (Camerer, 2009 ; Lodge, 1998 ; Van Vuuren, 2006 ). The systemic and structural weaknesses of the new state, coupled with the emergence of a new economic elite, culminated in creating an environment in which corruption flourished (Hyslop, 2005 ; Lodge, 1998 ).

The extent to which the country’s violent and racialized histories shape its current anti-corruption legislative framework is unclear. Today, South Africa is a devoted signatory to several anti-corruption conventions, such as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and the African Union Convention, to mention a few (Langendorf, 2015 , p. 57). It is essential to highlight, however, that before the ratification of the UNCAC, South Africa did not have legislation explicitly targeting corruption. Hence, corruption was fought through a general National Crime Prevention Strategy.

Meanwhile, the country has implemented several anti-corruption interventions over the last two decades. Nevertheless, these interventions have yielded minimal results (Budhram & Geldenhuys, 2018 ; Gray, 2021 ). The recent misappropriation of the Covid-19 relief fund, evidence of tender irregularities and scandals at the Ministry of Health, and the killing of a whistleblower in the Gauteng Health Department suggest that corruption is still endemic in the country (Patel & Govindasamy, 2021 ).

South Africa is distinct in many ways but shares some significant commonalities with other sub-Saharan countries. The country’s multi-racial demography, settler colonial historical legacy, relatively strong constitutionalism, multi-party liberal democracy, and economic development over the last two decades set it free from the trappings of the stereotypical African context where bad governance and the lack of the rule of law are used to explain away failing anti-corruption efforts. Aside from its strong constitutionalism and the rule of law, South Africa had the best anti-corruption legislation on the African continent, having significantly implemented the UNCAC provisions and receiving a “Very Good” rating in the integrity index (Integrity, 2008 ). Hence, South Africa’s failing anti-corruption regime represents a compelling analytical case for understanding the intricacies of the international anti-corruption consensus.

Theoretical perspectives on [anti]-corruption

Combatting corruption comprises three interdependent efforts: understanding corruption, designing counteractive strategies, and establishing anti-corruption institutions to enforce and implement the strategies. Developing a far-reaching theoretical characterization of corruption has perhaps been the most challenging among these interdependent efforts.

The orthodoxy and its critique

Rose-Ackerman’s ( 1997 , 2008 ) conceptualization of corruption as the “misuse of public office for private gain” and variants of it (see, for example, Nye, 1967 ; Transparency International, 2022 ; World Bank, 1997 ) has resounded well with academics, policymakers, and shaped international anti-corruption practice for decades (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013 ). In this view, corruption occurs when the authority of a public official is exercised in a manner that violates the public trust and contravenes its anticipated purpose of pursuing the public’s collective interest (Ganahl, 2014 ; Rose-Ackerman, 2008 ). According to Tanzi ( 1998 ), the public-private divide stresses corruption among public officials and shadows corrupt practices in the private sector or private-private corruption. Nevertheless, the Transparency International variant of the definition seems to offset this critique. By conceptualizing corruption as the abuse of ‘entrusted power’ for private gain, the dichotomy remains. However, the description encompasses public and private officials (Transparency International, 2022 ).

Critical corruption scholars argue that this conceptualisation frames corruption within a rational-legal bureaucratic system marked by structured hierarchy and distinct roles within the public sector aimed at functioning on codified, logical, and societal rules. In contrast, the private sphere is shaped by familial obligations, emotions, beliefs, and customs. Moreover, it views corruption as dysfunctional, ethically reprehensible, transactional, and definitively harmful (Gutterman & Lohaus, 2018 ). However, this perspective is inherently Western and may not align with non-Western societies, where the boundary between public and private realms is more fluid, with private aspects like family obligations and spirituality influencing the public sphere (Zaloznaya, 2013 ). Thus, cloaked as universal, this perspective is reductive and imposes Western notions of corruption on variable local experiences and cultural understandings (Zaloznaya, 2013 ).

Furthermore, this conceptualisation primarily construes corruption as motivated by an individual’s cost-and-benefit calculus or, as Zaloznaya ( 2013 , p. 711) rehearses March and Olsen ( 1994 ), a form of rationality that reflects the logics of consequence whereby people break legal and ethical codes for the sake of material benefits and power. Thus, individuals’ self-seeking instrumental calculus amidst entrusted power creates corruption opportunities. Also known as the principal-agent theory, this perspective views corruption as occurring in a dualistic relation where the official (agent with entrusted power) has more information and discretional power in a specific situation and uses this advantage for their gain, even when it goes against the interests of the public (principal) (Rose-Ackerman, 2008 ; Tanzi, 1998 ). Within this perspective, corruption persists amidst principals’ poor supervision, monitoring, and sanctioning of officials (Jackson, 2020 ).

Anti-corruption reforms, especially those promoted by the international anti-corruption consensus through international best practices and conventions, as well as through political pressure from Western governments and aid conditionalities from international organizations such as the World Bank and IMF, are along the lines of this theoretical perspective and, therefore, often promote counteractive measures that seek to primarily enhance monitoring, supervision, transparency, accountability, and the compliance of public agents with bureaucratic norms, procedures, and formal rules (Khan et al., 2019 ; Kuldova et al., 2024 ; Sampson, 2005 ; Zaloznaya, 2013 , p. 707).

Meanwhile, several scholars insist that the principal-agent perspective mischaracterises the nature and mechanism of corruption, especially in systemic corrupt contexts. Rothstein ( 2021 ) argues that “principals,” as assumed in the principal-agent perspective, barely exist in these contexts because the top politicians and bureaucratic leaders accrue the most from corruption and thus are less incentivised to combat it. In the case of developing countries, Khan et al. ( 2019 , p. 8) add that the perspective erroneously assumes that people are generally rule-abiding; hence, corruption results from occasional violations that can be addressed with improvements in good governance, transparency, and accountability. However, in reality, rule violation is generally more prevalent. As a result of this theoretical mischaracterisation, the implementation of the UNCAC and other international best practices has yielded minimal results, especially in systemic corrupt contexts (Jackson, 2020 ; Khan et al., 2019 ; Persson et al., 2010 ).

Critics of the principal-agent perspective argue that corruption, when systemic, is mainly a collective action problem. The collective-action theory proposes that corrupt practices persist in the contexts of their occurrence because they are generally considered the norm. As a result, people either lose or sometimes gain little from behaving otherwise, especially if it is impossible to trust that others in the same context will follow suit (Bauhr, 2017 ; Kaufmann et al., 2015 ; Marquette & Peiffer, 2015a ; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013 ). In this context, corruption is seen as a manifestation of “free-riding” behaviour (Olson, 1971 ). This interpretation of corruption considers good governance, rule of law, transparency, and accountability as public goods that are non-excludable (meaning it is impossible to prevent people from benefiting) and non-rivalrous (one person’s use does not diminish availability for others) (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015b , p. 3; Rothstein, 2011 ). As a result, even individuals who do not actively contribute to producing good governance, accountability, and transparency can still reap the benefits, becoming what is known as “free riders.” Hence, those who engage in corruption do so out of self-interest, knowing their participation will not lead to losing their beneficial status (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015b , p. 6). Furthermore, free riders also perceive their contribution to the production of good governance as insignificant, with the expectation that others will also free-ride on their efforts.

The collective-action perspective emphasizes that corruption is a collective rather than an individual issue (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015a ). It implies that effective anti-corruption initiatives must build mutual trust in producing good governance, transparency, and accountability. Nevertheless, both principal-agent and collective action theories postulate that individuals are motivated by self-interest; therefore, increasing surveillance and implementing punitive measures can enhance accountability and curb corruption (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015b , p. 6).

Socio-legal perspectives

According to Krygier ( 1990 ), law is a tool the state uses to translate its wishes into action and maintain social order. However, several socio-legal scholarships have critiqued this instrumental view, which construes law as external to society. These scholarships demonstrate that law is constitutive or integral to society (Halliday & Morgan, 2013 ; Sarat & Kearns, 2009 ; Silbey, 2005 ), thus emphasizing the importance of individuals’ understanding and interpretation of the law (Halliday & Morgan, 2013 ) which shape their everyday behavior (Hertogh, 2004 ).

Informed by this constitutive perspective, recent socio-legal studies on anti-corruption have presented more nuanced explanations for the limited success of anti-corruption efforts, particularly in non-Western countries. For example, these studies highlight the importance of legal pluralism in understanding why anti-corruption efforts fail (Bierschenk, 2008 ; Urinboyev & Svensson, 2018 ). Legal pluralism refers to the coexistence and clash of multiple sets of rules or ‘legal orders’ that interrelate with and influence people’s social behaviour. These legal orders encompass various forms of law, including national/state law, customary rules, religious decrees, moral codes, and practical norms (Griffiths, 2003 ; Merry, 1988 ). The concept of legal pluralism recognizes that state law is just one of many legal orders within society. Especially in non-Western societies, legal anthropology studies have demonstrated the existence of non-state normative systems or “semi-autonomous fields,” as Sally Moore calls them, that possess defined boundaries and internal mechanisms, including extra-legal activities that challenge externally directed behavioural changes that contradict the field’s normative order (Moore, 1972 , p. 720). Members of semi-autonomous fields feel a moral obligation to conform to the internal rules and moral codes because their membership is contingent upon their conformity to internal norms rather than external expectations (Overman et al., 2014 ). Consequently, this poses crucial challenges to legal and administrative reforms that contravene the internal norms of semi-autonomous fields.

The legal pluralism perspective ties in with legal consciousness studies investigating the taken-for-granted worldviews and assumptions about law and legality that shape people’s everyday behavior (Halliday & Morgan, 2013 , p. 2). Legality in the legal consciousness approach signifies the ‘meaning, sources of authority, and cultural practices commonly recognised as legal, regardless of who employs them or for what ends’ (Ewick & Silbey, 1998 , p. 22). Holen ( 2023 , p. 22) succinctly defines this notion of legality as an assemblage of normativity, i.e., the state laws, morals, social norms, religious norms, commands, customs, expectations, and etiquette. Legal consciousness scholarships suggest that at the individual level, on the one hand, this intricate assemblage of normativity shapes people’s understanding of legality—what is right or wrong, corrupt or not—in varying situations. On the other hand, at the structural level, this intricate assemblage of normativity could account for why a discrepancy comes to exist between what the law purports to offer and what it achieves in reality— typically called “the gap problem” in socio-legal research (Halliday & Morgan, 2013 , p. 3; Silbey, 2005 , p. 323).

The legal pluralism and legal consciousness approaches can deepen our understanding of why corruption persists even amid international-standard anti-corruption legislative and institutional frameworks, especially in third-world countries. These socio-legal perspectives provide a critical theoretical toolkit for understanding this discrepancy beyond the orthodoxy . By empirically focusing on everyday social logic, local cultural categories, and norms concerning the law, these perspectives can disentangle the intricacies of legality that shape individual understanding and attitude regarding corruption on the one hand and, on the other hand, how these complexities come to produce the structural ineffectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives.

Systematic review method

According to Tranfield et al. ( 2003 ), systematic review methods differ from traditional narrative reviews because they rely on a more transparent and rigorous process of gathering and selecting literature. This study employed the Critical Interpretive Synthesis (CIS) systematic review method. The CIS approach is a novel review method that combines conventional systematic methodology with qualitative analysis techniques from grounded theory and meta-ethnography (Depraetere et al., 2021 ; Flemming, 2010 ). This method comprises the following steps: searching the literature, eligibility assessment, data extraction, and interpretive synthesis (Dixon-Woods et al., 2006 ). In searching for literature, this study followed the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) methodological guidelines (Moher et al., 2009 ). Thus, a search was conducted on the Web of Science (WoS), Scopus, and Google Scholar databases for studies published between January 1995 and June 2022 via the following search term in the title or abstract:

[corruption OR anti-corruption OR anti-corruption]

[South Africa]

The search resulted in 529 records. These comprised 89 papers from Web of Science, 58 from Scorpus, and 382 from Google Scholar. Afterward, duplicates were identified and removed, bringing the total down to 474 records. Then, the titles and abstracts of the 474 records were screened, after which all potentially eligible studies were extracted via the Zotero reference management software for further eligibility assessment. The potential eligible studies comprised only peer-reviewed journal articles, books, or chapters of books published in English within the social sciences from 1995 to 2022. However, to be eligible for the interpretive synthesis, a potential study should have been concerned with, but not limited to, South Africa’s anti-corruption institutions, agencies, strategies, laws, regulations, and policies. Eventually, 58 of the 474 records met the eligibility and quality criteria and were selected for the critical interpretive synthesis (Fig. 1 ).

PRISMA flow diagram

Subsequently, the lines-of-argument synthesis strategy (LOA) (Noblit et al., 1988 ) was used to identify and synthesise evidence, key findings, and critical arguments found in the 58 eligible literature into three interrelated scholarly corpora that comprehensively account for South Africa’s failing anti-corruption. It is possible that some relevant studies may have used words synonymous with corruption or anti-corruption and were thus uncaptured by this systematic method’s search strategy. Also, studies that use specific names of places or organisations in South Africa without mentioning “South Africa” in the abstract or title may have been omitted. I conducted a “retrospective reference list checking” of the 58 eligible studies to address these limitations (Gough & Richardson, 2018 , p. 125). However, no additional eligible studies were found. Thus, the 58 eligible studies reflect a substantial proportion of research on South Africa’s anti-corruption regime.

This study found an overall increase in peer-reviewed anti-corruption research on South Africa, particularly in the last decade, a period where the country’s corruption woe is reported to have peaked (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022 ) and public discourse was marked by a growing discernment of corruption’s pervasiveness in the country (James, 2023 ). However, most of these studies employed secondary research methods in investigating anti-corruption at the macro or national level. The lack of primary empirical investigation, chiefly ethnographic inquiries of anti-corruption at South Africa’s sub-national or local level, is alarming because understanding local contextualities is crucial to effective anti-corruption design and implementation. Notwithstanding, the synthesis of findings and critical arguments within the 58 eligible anti-corruption studies produced three mutually supporting corpora that comprehensively account for South Africa’s failing anti-corruption. Broadly, the first corpus demonstrates the country’s lack of ethical and dedicated political and bureaucratic leaders. The second corpus appraises South Africa’s anti-corruption regime, i.e., legal and institutional framework. It examines its susceptibility to politicisation and political pressure. Lastly, the third corpus shifts attention to the actor’s anti-corruption perspective. It investigates the intricacies of anti-corruption compliance in South Africa (Fig. 2 ).

Number of eligible studies per year

Corpus one: lack of ethical and dedicated leaders

Data Box 1: Review-Data in Corpus One

In 2001, Tom Lodge asserted that “detracting from the government’s proclaimed commitment to fighting corruption are attacks by senior politicians on the work of anti-corruption agencies” (Lodge, 2001 , p. 62). Lodge’s assertion still holds. Bruce ( 2014 ) observed that political actors attain and maintain control over crucial anti-corruption agencies by controlling their politically appointed top officials.

In Naidoo’s ( 2013 , p. 531) view, “no aspect of South Africa’s anti-corruption efforts have coveted as much political controversy as the country’s specialised institutional responses.” The controversial disbandment of the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) and verdicts from Hugh Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others are watershed events that epitomise the country’s challenges with political interference and the politicisation of its anti-corruption regime (Mphendu & Holtzhausen, 2016 ; Pillay, 2017 ).

Shortly after its establishment in 2001, the DSO launched a fierce campaign against corruption and organised crimes. Eventually, they gained a reputation for investigating and prosecuting high-profile cases occasionally involving top-ranking members of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) (Berning & Montesh, 2012 ; Naidoo, 2013 ; Pillay, 2017 , p. 6).

Parenthetically, in 2007, the ANC, during its National Congress, resolved that the DSO should be disbanded (Kinnes & Newham, 2012 ). As a result, the Parliament passed the South African Police Service Amendment Bill to dissolve the DSO and replace it with the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) (Berning & Montesh, 2012 ). Whereas the disbanded DSO was under the National Prosecution Authority (NPA), its successor, i.e., the DPCI, was placed under the South African Police Service (SAPS). Ultimately, the DSO’s closure severely compromised the state’s ability to investigate and counter corruption (April & Sebola, 2016 ; Berning & Montesh, 2012 ). For example, April and Sebola ( 2016 ) demonstrate that under the DPCI, corruption-related arrests and convictions rates declined by 60 per cent and 83 per cent, respectively.

Consequently, the public accused the ANC government of dissolving the DSO to undermine investigations to protect corrupt ANC party officials (Berning & Montesh, 2012 ; Bruce, 2014 ; Keightley, 2011 ; Kinnes & Newham, 2012 ; Mphendu & Holtzhausen, 2016 ; Tushnet, 2019 ). Eventually, the Constitutional Court ruled that the legislation establishing the DPCI was unconstitutional because it failed to secure an adequate degree of independence for the DPCI (Berning & Montesh, 2012 ; Kinnes & Newham, 2012 ; Olutola, 2014 ; Tushnet, 2019 ). Besides, the DCPI has been plagued with unstable leadership, factionalism, and illegal promotion and appointments (Pillay, 2017 ).

However, the DSO’s demise was also due to several mistakes during their investigation and prosecution of high-profile cases. For example, they violated the principles of attorney-client privileges and exceeded their jurisdiction by collecting intelligence without a legal basis (Berning & Montesh, 2012 ). Moreover, Quarcoo ( 2009 ) insists that the DSO’s demise became imminent early in its establishment when they made the prosecution of high-profile individuals their primary focus. He claims that the investigation and prosecution of top politicians by anti-corruption agencies like the DSO may suggest that the law reserves no haven for the political elite. However, due to the political ramifications of such endeavours, the agency’s prosecutorial powers invariably are vulnerable to partisan application, or the accusation thereof, both impugning the agency’s legitimacy” (Quarcoo, 2009 , p. 33). Quarcoo argues that a country that overemphasises the prosecutorial instead of preventive functions of its anti-corruption agencies risks jeopardising its sustainability, which seems to have been the fate of the DSO.

South Africa’s struggles with political interference and politicisation of anti-corruption are complex. There are no indications, at least in this corpus, that this problem can be circumvented through institutional design due to the rather unfortunate efficacy of collective political actions. One may, therefore, assume that South Africa’s anti-corruption enforcement will improve if its top political leaders become dedicated, willing, and ethical (Lodge, 2001 ; Mphendu & Holtzhausen, 2016 ; Okafor, 2009 ).

However, the corpus cautions that improved political will and dedication must be accompanied by innovative bureaucratic leadership required to design, adjust, and enforce measures (e.g., ethics training) to improve the moral climate of their institutions and reduce corruption (Lekubu & Sibanda, 2021 ; Mantzaris, 2016 ; Naidoo, 2012 ; Parboteeah et al., 2014 ). In the country’s local governance, for example, April and Sebola ( 2016 ) observed that appointing senior officials based on only political connectivity and employment equity is rampant. This absence of meritocracy has ushered many departments under incompetent leaders who do not effectively apply the country’s anti-corruption laws and policies, thereby creating institutional environments that entrench unethical and corrupt practices (Majila et al., 2014 ; Manyaka & Nkuna, 2014 ).

In any case, leaders must exemplify their institution’s code of conduct and other professional ethics in their daily behaviour to improve the ethical climate of their institutions (Parboteeah et al., 2014 ). Sadly, many public sector departments in South Africa are led by unethical leaders who instead exploit loopholes in their systems for personal gain (Naidoo, 2012 ; Odeku, 2019 , p. 11). Bribery and corruption prevail even within the top leadership of the country’s anti-corruption enforcement agencies (Olutola, 2014 ). In the last decade alone, two successive National Commissioners of the SAPS have been implicated, and one was convicted for corrupt practices (Keightley, 2011 ; Kinnes & Newham, 2012 ). In addition, there is evidence of some clerks and judges engaging in bribery (Roelofse et al., 2014 ; Sundström, 2015 ) and corrupt senior managers converting anti-corruption incentives into reward schemes for colluding subordinates (Sundström, 2019 ). Meanwhile, leaders who resist political interference are unceremoniously removed from office (Pillay, 2017 ).

Corpus two: political susceptibility of anti-corruption regime

Data Box 2: Review-Data in Corpus Two

South Africa’s anti-corruption legal framework is considered sound because it conforms to international anti-corruption standards (Kurakin & Sukharenko, 2018 ; Langendorf, 2015 , pp. 57–58; Majila et al., 2014 ; Safara & Odeku, 2021 , pp. 209–214). Aside from the existing legal framework, there are recent calls for a “right to freedom from corruption law” (Maseko, 2021 , p. 127; Mubangizi, 2020 , p. 245; Mubangizi & Sewpersadh, 2017 , p. 67). Advocates of this law maintain that it will empower ordinary people to demand transparency and accountability and claim constitutional damages from corrupt public officials. Simultaneously, the legal framework is plagued with voluminous laws and technical formalities, resulting in ambiguities and conflicting provisions (Kanjere & Koto, 2021 ; Sewpersadh & Mubangizi, 2017 , p. 14). Hence, it is unclear how the passing of more laws will improve the country’s fight against corruption.

Besides, for Langendorf ( 2015 ), passing anti-corruption laws in South Africa has primarily been mere adherence to the prescripts of international law. Makiva ( 2021 ) shows evidence of Langendorf’s claim in her mixed-method comparative study of public procurement corruption in Kenya and South Africa. She found that although the design of institutional architecture adheres to international law and best practices, leaders often deliberately put weak internal controls in place to lubricate corrupt activities. As a result, she concludes that the adherence of these countries’ anti-corruption design to international law and best practices is perhaps primarily to attain legitimacy from the international community (Makiva, 2021 ).

Analyses of the DSO’s disbandment and the Glenister case suggest that in practice, South Africa’s anti-corruption laws are often either not applied or selectively applied, and its anti-corruption institutions are not sufficiently independent (Langendorf, 2015 , pp. 84–87; Sewpersadh & Mubangizi, 2017 , p. 14). Nonetheless, it is the primary responsibility of anti-corruption institutions and agencies to enforce and implement the country’s anti-corruption measures. Therefore, if the legal framework is presumably sound amid widespread corruption, one may be inclined to scrutinise the country’s anti-corruption institutional framework.

South Africa’s anti-corruption institutional model relies on rich and varied laws, rules, and regulations, creating about 19 institutions, agencies, and coordinating mechanisms (Pillay, 2017 ). According to Dassah ( 2014 ), the country’s model suffers from every possible weakness of the multi-agency model, such as red-tapism, patronage networking, and rivalry among agencies. In addition, the mandates of the anti-corruption agencies are unclear and overlap, leading some observers to argue that the model lacks proper oversight, coordination, a unified strategic approach, and a leading central agency (Bruce, 2014 ; Chetty & Pillay, 2017 ; Faull, 2011 ; Pillay, 2017 ). These scholars concur that South Africa should establish an independent and centralised single anti-corruption agency (Majila et al., 2014 , p. 236; Montesh & Berning, 2012 , p. 135). However, Mphendu and Holtzhausen ( 2016 ) maintain that because anti-corruption requires a multi-faceted approach that reinforces all pillars of South Africa’s integrity system, no single institution can eliminate the country’s corruption single-handedly. Instead, improving the coordination between agencies can enhance speedier prosecution and the effectiveness of the anti-corruption architecture (Naidoo, 2013 , p. 533).

Subsequently, instead of a single centralised agency, Budhram ( 2015 , p. 53), for example, calls for the formation of a Corruption Intelligence Centre (CIC) that will gather and share crucial information and intelligence needed for other anti-corruption agencies to function effectively. Accordingly, South Africa’s National Development Planning Commission (NDP) refutes claims that fragmentation of anti-corruption efforts is a crucial problem for the country’s fight against corruption (Bruce, 2014 ; Pillay, 2017 ). To this end, the commission emphasises the importance of the existing checks and balances in the current multi-agency model. It claims that the country does not have the institutional foundation suitable and adequate for establishing a single-agency model (Bruce, 2014 ).

Nevertheless, it is discernible within the literature that the most crucial challenge of the country’s multi-agency framework is its susceptibility to political interference and pressure (Bruce, 2014 ; Dassah, 2014 ; Imiera, 2020 ; Keightley, 2011 ; Lodge, 2001 ; Majila et al., 2014 ; Mphendu & Holtzhausen, 2016 ; Naidoo, 2013 ; Pillay, 2017 ; Roelofse et al., 2014 ). Ostensibly, it is usual for corrupt employees to gain impunity through protection from government officials (Roelofse et al., 2014 ). For example, Majila et al. ( 2014 ) employed a self-administered structured questionnaire to several officials from provincial departments in the Eastern and Northern Cape to examine whether anti-corruption agencies are apolitical and capable of exercising their duties effectively. They found that, in most cases, political power was used to protect the corrupt activities of family members, friends, and political supporters. Similarly, Nzo’s ( 2016 , p. 114) ethnographic study of the political complexities involved in council decision-making in the Northern Cape revealed that political pressure to show loyalty to the ANC political party influenced ANC councillors and other political officeholders to ignore legal recourse against certain persons implicated in financial misconduct. Due to political interference, anti-corruption agencies have become increasingly unmotivated to devote themselves wholly to their duties because the effective and appropriate enforcement of laws and regulations often depends on the will and determination of political actors (Majila et al., 2014 ).

However, Naidoo ( 2013 ) argues that the problem of political interference and pressure has little to do with the current multi-agency approach and more to do with the principal-agent lines of accountability upon which the country’s anti-corruption strategies and institutional framework are designed. After an intra-institutional and inter-institutional analysis of South Africa’s anti-corruption enforcement, Naidoo ( 2013 , p. 523) observes that because the integrity of the country’s approach is shaped by principal-agent accountability, institutional or political actors can compromise or sideline anti-corruption mechanisms through collective action efforts. Therefore, even though the call for a single-agency model is profound in the eligible literature and chiefly inspired by the successes of Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), proponents have struggled to demonstrate how this framework will be more resilient to collective action efforts and political pressure (Bruce, 2014 ; Mphendu & Holtzhausen, 2016 ; Pillay, 2017 ).

Corpus three: contextual realities of anti-corruption compliance

Data Box 3: Review-Data in Corpus Three

Generally, understanding contextual realities requires primary empirical, often ethnographic, research methods. As shown in the descriptive analysis of the eligible literature, there is a lack of ethnographic enquiries into South Africa’s anti-corruption efforts. This dearth explains why corpus three comprises relatively few studies compared to one and two, which focus on more structural and macro-level intricacies.

Nevertheless, this corpus highlights the complexities of the country’s corruption problem that are crucial to understanding compliance and non-compliance with anti-corruption rules and regulations. In South Africa, corruption can be embedded in loyalties and solidarities forged around a contemporary political morality that rationalises the act as a form of redress and a means to reverse historic racial inequities (Bruce, 2014 ; Gray, 2021 , p. 377; Mubangizi, 2020 ). According to Bruce ( 2014 , p. 57), these contemporary solidarities and loyalties are “manifestations of political and other solidarities, partly animated by ideas of justice and associated with opposition to apartheid and the apartheid period more generally.” Gray ( 2021 , p. 377) describes this as a sense of entitlement, a feeling of the state’s indebtedness to one who struggled during the apartheid and was deprived because of it.

Even though this political morality may emanate from deeply held beliefs and worldviews concerning the country’s socio-economic realities, such rationalisation could also serve as a neutralisation technique (Bruce, 2014 ). Due to this prevailing political morality, the prescripts of the Constitution have become just one of several moral points of reference and, hence, not unambiguously adhered to by many (Bruce, 2014 , p. 54; Munzhedzi, 2016 ; Bähre, 2005 ). Consequently, the implementation of government policies such as the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), ideally aimed at empowering the previously disadvantaged, has instead culminated into fertile avenues with opportunities for individuals and groups with political connections to pursue self-interest (Bruce, 2014 , p. 57; Munzhedzi, 2016 , p. 1). Furthermore, Bähre’s ( 2005 ) anthropological study indicates that this prevailing political morality perpetuates the pervasive culture of silence and impunity surrounding corrupt practices.

Meanwhile, other scholarships underplay the socio-political dimension of this morality to argue that corruption’s pervasiveness is instead indicative of a general moral crisis in South Africa (Mantzaris, 2016 ; Odeku, 2019 ; Pitsoe, 2013 , p. 751; van Niekerk, 2003 , p. 137). To illustrate this, Mantzaris ( 2016 ) explains that in South Africa, individual desires for personal gratification have heightened due to the portrayal of lavish lifestyles as a valued norm through commercialism and advertisement. Owing to this status quo, individuals with inadequate training in moral ethics and values cannot restrain themselves when encountering corruption opportunities (Mantzaris, 2016 ; Odeku, 2019 ; Pitsoe, 2013 , p. 751; van Niekerk, 2003 , p. 137). However, Nomtha Gray’s ( 2021 ) case study demonstrates that construing compliance/non-compliance as simply a product of individual ethics and morals is perhaps reductionist.

Gray found that “authority and seniority also conferred rectitude,” leading low-level officials to treat irregular instruction as ethics and principles of their ‘principals’ (Gray, 2021 , pp. 378, 380). His interviews demonstrate that informal sanctioning and micro-power relations in South Africa’s public procurement departments lead low-level officials to believe that acting contrary to irregular instructions from their superiors amounts to insubordination (Gray, 2021 , p. 378). Consequently, officials execute irregular instructions even when they do not understand them. This practice led him to conclude that South Africa’s public procurement practices are reminiscent of apartheid-era levels of compliance that prioritise ‘following orders’ above formal procurement policies (Gray, 2021 , p. 369).

Gray’s observation corroborates Brogden and Nijhar’s ( 1998 , p. 104) arguments that corrupt practices in South Africa are sustained through interstices of power masked within permissive formal procedures. To a large extent, Gray ( 2021 ) demonstrates the implication of informal norms and micro-power relations on compliance or non-compliance with formal rules and bureaucratic protocols. Alexander et al. ( 2022 ) further unravel these intricacies by showing that compliance or non-compliance is also shaped by officials’ perceptions of the applicability, suitability, and relatability of formal rules and bureaucratic protocols to the contextual realities of their daily work.

In a mixed-method study of anti-corruption challenges and opportunities in urban planning, Alexander et al. ( 2022 ) found that most public planners believe that their code of conduct is vague and complex and does not correspond to the daily socio-political realities of their work. These socio-political realities include financial and human resource constraints, overlapping administrative and political systems, and competing socio-economic, environmental, and spatial needs. According to Alexander et al. ( 2022 , p. 8), this discrepancy has resulted in the planners’ dependence on individual negotiation and deal-making outside the formal planning process. However, in doing so, they establish the normative validity of their conduct on the “logic of appropriateness” — they conduct themselves in ways they deem appropriate for specific situations (Alexander et al., 2022 , p. 8). Therefore, they may not view non-compliance with formal rules and regulations as corruption and vice versa.

South Africa’s anti-corruption appears to be confined within the orthodoxy. Essentially, the corpora suggest that the country’s anti-corruption regime adheres to the principal-agent model, which hinges primarily on oversights, regulations, and enforcing formal regulations and bureaucratic procedures. However, this model is undermined by the absence of ethical ‘principals,’ whose integrity is essential for its success. The corpora indicate that corruption in South Africa is better understood as a collective action problem, wherein corrupt behavior is perceived as “normal” and mutually expected by both principals and agents. This situation results in a lack of incentive from both parties to combat it. Nonetheless, the collective action theory does not offer an exhaustive account for understanding and addressing corruption in South Africa.

Beyond the orthodoxy

The consensus apparent within the corpora concerning the robustness of South Africa’s anti-corruption legislation is fraught with challenges. This consensus is based on South Africa’s adherence to the UNCAC and international best practices. As a result, the corpora exonerate the legislation prematurely, shifting the attention toward law enforcement and policy implementation. However, as posited by Langendorf ( 2015 ), South Africa’s corruption problems indicate that it may have followed the UNCAC roadmap but has undoubtedly gotten lost because the map is not the territory. Undoubtedly, the international anti-corruption consensus faces particular difficulties concerning the tension between the universality of the anti-corruption norms and its simultaneous contextualization of specific and local application” (Gephart, 2009 , p. 4). Hence, the conformance of South Africa’s anti-corruption regime with the UNCAC and international best practices may inadvertently undermine its sensitivity to the country’s socio-political and legal context.

Furthermore, such adherence to international law may also subjugate the country’s anti-corruption regime to the domination, control, and neo-liberal interests of the Global North or the West. However, this claim cannot be considered a given because universal norms can arise through participatory crafting processes (Fassbender et al., 2012 ). Besides, Africa is an active innovator and generator of norms within the international legal order (Gathii, 2012 ; Levitt, 2008 ).

Nevertheless, scholars of the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) maintain that international law extends a historical pattern that privileges Western interests. These scholars argue that international law has played a complicit role in fostering neo-colonial relationships, perpetuating a relation in which the Global North imposes its social, economic, and political interests on the Global South (Mutua, 2000 , p. 31). As Chimni ( 2022 , p. 46) contends, contemporary imperialism has shifted from direct colonization to consensually negotiated shared rules, deploying multi-layered strategies like power, mediation, and revolutionary approaches to achieve harmonization objectives. These also embody a specific vision of how states around the world are supposed to function - namely, according to the ideal of a Western state, and if they deviate from this ideal, they are seen as failed, fragile, or corrupt. Therefore, anti-corruption researchers must be critical of the UNCAC and other international standards as they may primarily disseminate, validate, sustain, and impose Western interests, ideologies, and governance structures on the Global South (Bracking, 2014 ; Brown & Cloke, 2011 ; Snyman, 2021 ).

As part of a global disciplinary effort to manage uncertainties, reduce risks, and establish normalized governance, the international anti-corruption consensus allows its actors to present their involvement as impartial, apolitical, and driven by combating a universal problem. However, their proposed solutions inherently carry political and ideological underpinnings, albeit obscured by layers of technocratic language (Snyman, 2022 ). Indeed, recent scholarship from critical corruption researchers such as Joaquin Villanueva ( 2019 ) and Jose Atiles ( 2020 , 2023a , b ; Atiles et al., 2022 ) serves to illuminate how discourses on corruption operate politically to extend, justify, and contest neo-colonial relationships. Unfortunately, appraisals of South Africa’s anti-corruption regime often lack a critical approach to international law and do not adequately draw on actor perspectives and the rich social contexts within which regulations are enforced.

Nonetheless, the smaller corpus three suggests that the UNCAC norms embedded in the country’s anti-corruption laws and policies do not automatically resonate with some cross-section of people in South Africa who, through informal norms, practices, and local rationalities, contest them. Meanwhile, this nuanced and impactful disparity is yet to garner significant attention within South Africa’s anti-corruption corpora. Nevertheless, the corpora lay an essential empirical and theoretical foundation for future research.

Furthermore, the corpora indicate the prevalence of other normative orders besides the state legal system that shape public attitudes, experiences, and behaviors toward anti-corruption laws and regulations. This phenomenon is exemplified by the incongruent normative stances between the ANC political party and the South African Parliament on the one hand—which resolved to disband the DSO—and the prescripts of state law as manifest in the South African Supreme Court’s adjudication that deemed the disbandment unconstitutional (refer to Corpus two ). Although various studies in the reviewed body of work hint at the existence of semi-autonomous social fields, they fail to thoroughly analyze these phenomena through the lens of legal pluralism (see, for example, Alexander et al., 2022 ; Bähre, 2005 ; Bruce, 2014 ; Gray, 2021 ).

Notwithstanding, empirical evidence supporting the prevalence of semi-autonomous fields in South Africa challenges the idea that anti-corruption measures fail due to widespread rule-breaking. Through the prism of legal pluralism, it becomes evident that adherence to rules is indeed prevalent in the country, albeit often not aligned with formal state legislation and regulations. These findings also corroborate legal consciousness scholarship, which proposes that a complex combination of norms shapes individuals’ understanding of legality. Therefore, prioritizing empirical examination of everyday social logic, local cultural categories, and norms concerning law can assist researchers in unravelling the complexities of legality that shape individuals’ understanding and attitudes towards anti-corruption initiatives. The country’s anti-corruption corpora suggest a significant interconnection between its social, cultural, and legal spheres. However, when examining the role of law in combatting corruption, the corpora predominantly adopt an instrumentalist perspective. Meanwhile, this is not peculiar to anti-corruption research on South Africa. The instrumental perspective dominates anti-corruption studies globally, which, in de Sa e Silva’s view ( 2022 , p. 365), is perhaps due to the field’s orientation to policy.

Thus, rooted in the instrumental view, the failure of South Africa’s anti-corruption regime to significantly reduce corruption is almost entirely attributed to the country’s inability to effectively enforce its sound anti-corruption legislation and institutional framework due to a lack of principled principals, political will, and dedication. Indeed, a perplexing gap remains between the theoretical intentions of the country’s anti-corruption regime (promising accountability, transparency, and institutional autonomy) and the practical realities of endemic impunity and political interference. However, the corpora fail to provide a sufficient explanation of this paradox. The corpora’s limitation suggests the necessity for a critical understanding of the intricate interaction between law and society.

This paper contends that the complex nature of corruption in South Africa calls for a critical reorientation within its anti-corruption scholarship. Scholars must shift from an instrumental perspective to a constitutive understanding of the law’s role in addressing corruption. This shift entails a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between law and society, considering both the “pull” – the constraints imposed by formal law – and the “push” – individuals’ interpretations of the law (Marshall & Barclay, 2003 , p. 618). This shift could provide a more nuanced understanding of the intricacies of corruption and contribute to formulating more effective strategies to combat it. Despite their potential value, these socio-legal perspectives have not garnered significant focus from anti-corruption scholarship in South Africa and globally.

South Africa’s anti-corruption corpora spanning the last two decades attribute the country’s failing anti-corruption primarily to the lack of dedicated and proactive leadership to guarantee effective monitoring, supervision, and enforcement of the country’s anti-corruption regime. This paper maintains that although comprehensible, this accumulated scholarship appears to be confined within ‘the orthodoxy’ and does not offer a sufficient understanding of why corruption is still endemic in the country. Subsequently, the paper critically engages with the corpora in a humble attempt to drive it beyond the orthodoxy.

Subsequently, it draws on TWAIL scholarships to critique the corpora’s consensus that South Africa’s anti-corruption legislative and institutional framework is sound primarily because it adheres closely to the UNCAC and international best practices. It argues that although the UNCAC as international law may appear to be apolitical or neutral, it may also embed political and ideological underpinnings that advance the interests of the Global North over the Global South. Subsequently, the close adherence of South Africa’s anti-corruption regime to the UNCAC and other international best practices instead necessitates critical empirical enquiry.

Moreover, the corpora demonstrate that a nexus between formal and informal norms shapes individuals’ worldviews and behavior toward anti-corruption regulations and their perception of legality. This intricacy calls for a nuanced empirical enquiry into the country’s anti-corruption regulations—one that delves into people’s internalized perceptions and ideas of the law that shape their daily conduct. However, scholars of South Africa’s anti-corruption regime have yet to inculcate such a constitutive perspective of law into their inquiries. This paper concludes that adopting a constitutive perspective, using socio-legal approaches like legal pluralism and legal consciousness, can offer a more nuanced understanding of South Africa’s failing anti-corruption regime beyond the ‘orthodoxy.’

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The author confirms that all data generated or analysed during this study are included in this published article and its supplementary information files.

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Thomas Duke Labik Amanquandor

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Labik Amanquandor, T. Limitations of the international approach to anti-corruption: a systematic review of South Africa’s compelling case of failing anti-corruption. Crime Law Soc Change (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-024-10152-y

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Accepted : 19 April 2024

Published : 09 May 2024

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-024-10152-y

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