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After Nagorno-Karabakh War, Trauma, Tragedy and Devastation

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For Armenians uprooted from their homes, and for Azerbaijanis returning to uninhabitable towns, “It’s going to be very hard to forgive.”

By Carlotta Gall and Anton Troianovski

Photographs by Mauricio Lima and Ivor Prickett

FIZULI, Azerbaijan — Crossing into territory that Azerbaijan recently recaptured from Armenia is a journey into a devastated wasteland reminiscent of a World War I battlefield. The road passes miles of abandoned trenches and bunkers, and village after village of ruins, the white stones of homesteads scattered, every movable item — roofs, doors, window frames — picked clean.

The absence of life is eerie.

Wrecked Armenian tanks and armor lay beside the road and in hilltop positions, testament to the devastating power of Azerbaijani drones. Abandoned uniforms and equipment signal a panicked retreat by Armenian soldiers as Azerbaijani forces seized control of the district in early November.

Decades after the surrounding territory was seized by Armenia, the town of Fizuli, once a prosperous agricultural settlement of some 30,000 people, has become a forest, its ruined public buildings smothered by trees and undergrowth. The fate of the larger town of Aghdam, further north, is even more stark, its buildings split open to the skies on a desiccated plain, its main bridge destroyed.

“It’s going to be very hard for me to forgive them,” Elmaddin Safarov, 47, an army veteran, said of the Armenians, as he gazed at the wreckage of Aghdam, where 17 of his relatives died.

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnically Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan, has been one of the world’s most intractable territorial disputes . A six-year war ended in 1994 with Armenia claiming not just Nagorno-Karabakh but also great swaths of surrounding territory, and driving more than 800,000 Azerbaijanis into exile.

Azerbaijan regained control of Fizuli and Aghdam, part of the territory that Armenia had controlled, after six weeks of a blistering military offensive that ended with a Russian-brokered truce . Most of the core of Nagorno-Karabakh remains in Armenian hands, patrolled by Russian peacekeepers.

The war’s violence — the most intense conflict in Europe or its periphery this century — has layered fresh trauma and tragedy on top of decades of devastation.

For Armenians, it is families uprooted, a homeland lost, thousands of soldiers killed while defending against a fearsome 21st-century war machine. For Azerbaijanis, it is the legacy of a quarter-century of expulsion from their Soviet-era houses, from territory that is now recaptured but that may not become habitable for years.

And while the war may be over, a repository of hatred, reinforced by reports of atrocities by both sides, including videos of executions and beheadings of prisoners, promises to linger for generations to come.

Just days before, as Mr. Safarov was taking in his homeland’s devastation, a chilly mountain fog was creeping through the trees and filling every crevice of a military camp hidden off a village road on the other side of the front line, to the north. There, Armenian volunteer soldiers, some in their 60s, in sundry sneakers and hats, their faces blank and weathered, listened to their commander in silence and sadness.

The commander, retired Col. Artur Aleksanyan, 63, was telling them that it was time to go home.

“Everything is only beginning,” he pledged in a soft voice. “I’m sure we will return to our lands.”

Colonel Aleksanyan’s men, asked about the war, fixed on the horrors of Azerbaijan’s “suicide drones” that hovered over the battlefield, waiting for a target. The ordnance was so precise that Armenian soldiers operating battle tanks would drive onto the battlefield, fire off a round and jump out and run for cover, the soldiers said.

“It was hell,” one man kept repeating.

Reviewing his troops’ positions at the front, where the heavy weaponry had just been withdrawn, Colonel Aleksanyan picked his way through the dense, sticky mud past unexploded cluster bombs with their telltale red ribbons. The hillside was pockmarked with blast craters, some of them filled with twisted metal, moldy bread and human excrement. Along the ridgeline, the troops had dug trenches, a few feet deep and barely wide enough for one man to sleep in while a comrade manned the machine gun above him.

Colonel Aleksanyan was still dealing with the stomach injury he had sustained in the last war, in the 1990s, and the catheter tube snaking out of his uniform as he trudged up the battlefield was a reminder of that conflict’s unhealed wounds. He pointed out the valley below where, this fall, Azerbaijan had sent waves of infantry; his unit held their ground, and the scores of dead lay there for weeks, the stench drifting up to the trenches, until after the war’s end.

“We need to analyze our mistakes and after this, we will return,” Colonel Aleksanyan told his troops. “All the Armenians of all the world stand behind us.”

Armenians believe that the Soviet Union’s early decision to make Nagorno-Karabakh part of Azerbaijan is a historical wrong.

Colonel Aleksanyan was on the victorious side in the 1990s, when Armenia captured not only Nagorno-Karabakh proper but also surrounding territory inhabited by hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis.

To Armenia, occupying so much Azerbaijani territory was necessary to assure Nagorno-Karabakh’s security. To Azerbaijanis, it was an injustice that they were determined to reverse.

Now, despite its celebration of victory, Azerbaijan has recovered a mostly desolate and destroyed region.

“It looks like a hell,” said Umud Mirzayev, head of an Azerbaijani news agency, whose own village was among those ruined. “It used to be so green; it’s a place that was famous for farming, for grapes, cotton and sheep.”

Two former college classmates, returning to the town of Fizuli for the first time since fleeing the war 27 years earlier, struggled to find their way through ruins smothered in brambles and sprouting trees.

“It was impossible to pass along the roads because they are full of trees and undergrowth,” said one of them, Atakshi Babayev.

His companion, Nureddin Namazaliyev spotted the imposing czarist portico of the regional newspaper building, one of the few monuments still recognizable, and instantly knew his way home. His father had worked as editor in chief of the newspaper, Araz, for 50 years, and he had often walked with him to work.

But when he reached their old home, nothing remained.

“I could not find even a small piece of my house, not a piece of glass, not a single nail,” he said. He took instead some soil from the yard and brought it back to sprinkle on the graves of his parents in their ancestral village. “That was a very big thing for me because they could not go back,” he said.

Mr. Namazaliyev recalled that his cousin, who was held by Armenian forces as a prisoner of war, was forced to work dismantling houses in Aghdam. The stone, famous for its golden color, was sold, he said.

Vagif Hasanov, 61, the mayor of Aghdam, was blunt in his view of why Armenian forces destroyed the city. The graceful 19th-century central mosque is the only building left standing in Aghdam. Defiled by Armenian graffiti, it was used as a cowshed.

“They wanted to hurt Turks and Muslims,” Mr. Hasanov said. Would he contemplate Armenians returning to live in the city? He answered with a curt “No.”

It was the purposeful destruction of the city and its heritage that upset Mr. Namazaliyev the most. The newspaper and its printing presses were gone, the cinema and the cultural center had vanished, and the central Allakbar mosque had been reduced to rubble. The fine vineyards had been uprooted and turned to dust.

“They even damaged the soil of Fizuli,” Mr. Namazaliyev said.

Azerbaijan’s officials have pledged to offer reconciliation and equal status to Armenians living on its territory, but few can see it working in practice.

Armenians believe they are targeted by Azerbaijanis because Armenians are Christian, and they fear Azerbaijan’s increasingly close alliance with Turkey, which continues to deny the Armenian Genocide that started in 1915.

“There is no reason for Armenians to want to live under Azerbaijani rule,” said Gerard Libaridian, a former adviser to Armenia’s first president and a retired professor of Armenian history at the University of Michigan. “It would be a domination. It would not be a governance.”

Many Armenians say they will keep fighting for Nagorno-Karabakh to be recognized as an independent country, despite an international consensus that the territory is part of Azerbaijan.

“How can we talk about justice?” said Garik Melkonyan, the director of the Armenian newspaper Aravot and a member of Colonel Aleksanyan’s unit of volunteer soldiers, rejecting the idea of reconciliation with Azerbaijan. “History shows that they can’t give us anything.”

Some Armenians now acknowledge that opportunities for a lasting peace were lost over decades of halting and unproductive peace talks.

Mediators tried to at least allow Azerbaijanis to return and resettle some of the outlying districts such as Aghdam and Fizuli. But for years Armenia held on to them, seeing them as a bargaining chip for independence or secession for Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan’s leaders considered, but in the end never could agree, to letting go of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The deadlock was complicated by Armenian politicians and activists around the world increasingly taking the position — disputed by Azerbaijanis — that all of the captured lands were rightfully Armenian. And when Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan traveled to Nagorno-Karabakh — known in Armenia as Artsakh — in August 2019 and declared that “Artsakh is Armenia,” he sent the unmistakable message that the maximalist approach had won out.

For years, foundations funded by members of the Armenian diaspora have pushed for Armenian settlement of the occupied regions of Azerbaijan outside the core of Nagorno-Karabakh, arguing that they are also Armenia’s rightful lands.

“We have lived in this place for 5,000 years and we are only leaving it temporarily,” said the primate of the Armenian Church in Britain, Bishop Hovakim Manukian, in a goodbye sermon at the church in the village of Hak, or Minkend in Azerbaijani. “We have to come back. We have to come back and take over our land.”

A plaque in the church described centuries of pillaging and massacres by Turks and Kurds that wiped out the Armenian population of the area. The renovation of the church was financed by Virginia Davies, a lawyer in New York, in memory of her grandmother, a survivor of the Armenian genocide .

“For me and for all Armenians worldwide — and we are united — we cannot believe what has just happened to us,” Ms. Davies said in her farewell address at the church last month. “We will not cede our historic lands.”

But there was little mention of the ruins all around the village and the remains of houses dotting the hillside for miles along the road. Azerbaijanis’ desire to return to their homes here — even if it meant war — has long been a driving force in their country’s politics.

Now it is those ruins, visible across Nagorno-Karabakh and the territories controlled until recently by Armenia, that may feed a new wave of Azerbaijani anger at their neighbors as the damage and neglect of the last quarter-century come into view.

Many Azerbaijanis say they are ready to accept Armenians remaining in Nagorno-Karabakh and even for Russian peacekeepers to protect them. But they insist on their territorial sovereignty and want to see a change in the general Armenian stance.

“Why should we fight, take guns and kill each other?” Teymur Haciyev, who was displaced from his home in the city of Shusha at the age of 9, said of the Armenians. “We really wish this was a good lesson for them. Maybe they will forget their dreams.”

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Introduction

Since the 2020 war Crisis Group tracked fatalities and detentions that take place along the front lines.

A man shepherds his cows near a rocket case left by the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh. REUTERS/Artem Mikryukov

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been the longest-running in post-Soviet Eurasia. In 1988, ethnic Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh demanded the transfer of what was then the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) from Soviet Azerbaijan to Armenia. As the Soviet Union collapsed, tensions grew into an outright war. When fighting ceased in 1994, Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent districts were wholly or partially controlled by Armenian forces. More than a million people had been forced from their homes: Azerbaijanis fled Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent territories, while Armenians left homes in Azerbaijan.

From 1994 until 2020, intermittent deadly incidents, including the use of attack drones and heavy weaponry on the front lines and activities of special operations forces, demonstrated the ever-present risk that war would reignite. In April 2016, four days of intense fighting at the line of separation shook the region, killed hundreds on both sides, and foreshadowed what was to come.

The dam broke in September 2020, and full-fledged war resumed on the 27th of that month. Six weeks of bloody armed conflict finally ended in the early hours of 10 November with a ceasefire brokered by the Russian Federation. Although the deal fell short of a clear and stable peace, it brought an end to the deadliest fighting the region had witnessed in nearly three decades with over 7,000 military and about 170 civilians killed and many more wounded. Under the agreement, Azerbaijan now again controls in full the seven districts adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh that Armenian forces had held since the previous war. It also holds a substantial part of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. The rest is patrolled by a Russian peacekeeping force but still governed by self-proclaimed local authorities.  

After the 2020 war, the front line became longer and more volatile. Opposing military positions were separated from one another by only 30-100 metres. Before the 2020 war, they were hundreds of metres apart. The front line’s movement placed military positions up against civilian settlements. The Russian peacekeeping mission’s outposts were deployed along the main roads in Armenian-populated areas of the conflict zone and the main traffic artery between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, including inside the Lachin corridor. The joint Russian-Turkish monitoring centre established as part of the November 2020 agreement, sat in Azerbaijani territory about 20km from the front line. 

Casualty Data

This map indicates the casualties that have happened between the 2020-war and 16 September 2023. 

Crisis Group developed this map to track the geography of casualties along the front lines and deeper inside the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone. Casualty data includes deaths and injuries of Armenians and Azerbaijanis from exchanges of fire along positions, sniper shots along with mine explosions in the conflict zone and along the front lines, aggregated monthly. All of these are plotted on a map which includes front lines before and after the 2020 war, drawn using satellite imagery, and the NKAO, as defined by Soviet-era maps. The Lachin corridor is presented as defined in current official maps published by the Russian peacekeeping mission to Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Crisis Group is also aware of at least one Russian military fatality and one non-fatal injury since the deployment of the Russian peacekeeping mission to Nagorno-Karabakh in November 2020.  

Note : September 13-14, 2022 saw escalation in the areas along the 200-km Armenian-Azerbaijani state border that resulted in large numbers of casualties and detentions. We could not fully corroborate locations, but they were mapped. 

You can download our complete dataset here: 

Download XLSX | Download CSV

You can also access the original geodata showing the pre-2023 corridors and frontlines on the map here:

Download GeoJSON | Download SHP

Breakdown by Casualty Category

Killed and wounded between the 9 november ceasefire to the 2020 war and 16 september 2023., combatants killed.

Includes combatants killed in exchanges of fire, as a result of sniper fire along the front lines and by mines in the conflict zone and along the front lines laid during the last three decades.

Combatants Wounded

Most combatant injuries occur along the front lines due to  exchanges of fire and mines triggered in the conflict zone.

Non-combatants Killed

Includes civilians killed by sniper fire and mines, including civilian state agency personnel engaged in demining, construction or emergency response.

Non-Combatants Wounded

Mine explosions have become the predominant cause of injuries  to non-combatants, including civilians living in or visiting the conflict zone and staff of civilian agencies operating in the area.

Here you can download a dataset on casualties between the 2020-war and 16 September 2023: 

All Casualties:

Armenian Casualties:

Azerbaijani Casualties:

Casualties Caused by Landmines:

The front line after the 2020-war crossed civilian settlements and nearby areas. When local residents or the military intentionally or unintentionally crossed the line to the other side, they often got detained. The map reflects geographical patterns in the detentions of combatants and non-combatants on both sides of the conflict. 

Note : September 13-14, 2022 saw escalation in the areas along the 200-km Armenian-Azerbaijani state border that resulted in large numbers of casualties and detentions. We cannot fully corroborate locations, but they have been mapped

Timeline of Events

What happened on the front lines depended in part on what officials said and did in regional capitals and around the world - and vice versa. This timeline of events charts key developments in the peace process, including meetings and political statements made by the conflict parties, mediators and other foreign actors since 2015. It includes periods of relative calm as well as those of escalation and conflict. Domestic political events are included when they have bearing on the conflict’s dynamics.

Download the timeline data here:

The data presented in this section were based on reports by the Azerbaijani and Armenian ministries of defence, the de-facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities and media on all sides. Crisis Group only included reports of fatalities and wounded in this dataset if it could establish through official or media reports, the identities of those killed or injured. Military casualties included contracted soldiers and conscripts, along with border guards deployed along the front lines. Most civilian casualties occurred near the front lines or were caused by mines installed close to military positions. The bar charts show the breakdown of military and civilian casualties by nationality.

Before the 2020 War: Visualising the Data

Servicemen attend Sunday service at Gandzasar monastery in May 2017. CRISISGROUP

killed and wounded in incidents between 1 January 2015 and 27 September 2020 (excluding 2 – 11 April 2016)

Military killed, military wounded, civilians killed, civilians wounded.

Casualties by Weapon Type Used:

Reports of Incidents

Crisis Group analysts collected data regarding incidents reported by Azerbaijan, Armenia and de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities in the conflict zone between 1 January 2015 and 26 September 2020, including both incidents that resulted in casualties and those that did not. Analysts cross-checked these reports against open source media reports.

incidents were reported along the Line of Contact between 1 January 2015 and 27 September 2020 (excluding 2-11 April 2016)

Heavy weaponry.

Both sides built up their arsenals in the years prior to 2020, including with the purchase of attack helicopters, fighter planes, surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank artillery systems and long-range mortars. Crisis Group tracked the use of such heavy weaponry.

Special Operations

Since 2015, deployment of special diversionary groups became a regular practice. Crisis Group tracked reports of Azerbaijani or Armenian forces crossing the front line.

Since April 2016, both sides used kamikaze drones and drones for surveillance.

The 2016 Escalation

The datasets above do not include information from the escalation that took place 2-11 April 2016. It began early in  the morning of 2 April 2016 with clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces along the line of separation. These then flared into outright fighting. Although Russia helped broker a ceasefire on 5 April, ending the worst of the violence, flare-ups continued through 11 April. The escalation left Azerbaijan in control of slightly more territory in the former NKAO and the adjacent territories for the first time since 1994’s ceasefire.

The spring of 2016’s fighting killed hundreds of people. However, exact numbers of dead and wounded remain disputed to this day. Because we do not have reliable data on casualties, we have not included the time period from 2-11 April 2016 in our datasets for 1 January 2015-27 September 2020, above.

Methodology and Terminology

A gate riddled with bullet holes near the front line. CRISISGROUP

Crisis Group generated its timeline of political developments and several datasets by collecting information regarding  casualties, detentions and incidents (uses of drones, heavy weaponry and special operations) reported in open sources in Armenia, Azerbaijan and the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh entity from 2015 onward. 

The timeline of events includes: 

• Diplomatic activity such as contacts between the conflict parties and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group meetings; 
• Statements by Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders, OSCE Minsk Group Co-chair countries, or representatives of the Russian peacekeeping mission, the Russian-Turkish joint monitoring centre, the OSCE, the UN, the European Union (EU) and other relevant actors;
• Political consultations between the Armenian government and the de facto leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh;
• Relevant domestic developments in Azerbaijan, Armenia and de facto Nagorno-Karabakh.

Starts from: Crisis Group has used Armenian and Azerbaijani government websites, de facto Nagorno-Karabakh sources and online media outlets in Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert to collect reports of casualties, detentions and incidents. The availability and specificity of data differs among the areas affected by the conflict. For specific time periods (in particular during the flare-up of fighting between 2 and 11 April 2016 or during the 2020 war), data is limited, disputed, or unavailable. Due to the lack of accurate data and because we judge the events of early April 2016 to represent an escalation, rather than interwar incidents, Crisis Group chose to exclude that period from our datasets. 

In tallying incidents, Crisis Group faced several limitations. For incidents that spanned multiple days, we used the last reported date. For incidents categorised as involving heavy weaponry, only those for which reports specify what type of heavy weaponry was used were included. The true number of incidents involving the use of heavy weaponry was therefore likely higher than that reflected in the bar charts. In cases when several instances of heavy weaponry, drone use or special operations were reported in the same location and at the same time, we counted these as one incident. For instance, a report detailing three types of heavy weapon use in the same location at the same time was counted as one incident involving heavy weaponry. However, when a report cites different types of actions (heavy weaponry, drones or special operations) in the same report, we counted each as a separate incident – eg, the simultaneous use of heavy weaponry and drones is counted as two incidents: one involving heavy weaponry, and another involving drones.

In counting casualties and detentions, Crisis Group has only included those killed,wounded and detained whom we could identify by name, using statements by Armenian, Azerbaijani and de facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities, media reports and/or social media postings for basic biographical data, unique photos/video footage and funeral reports. 

Crisis Group’s datasets, upon which this Visual Explainer is based, are available here . We value feedback. Please send inquiries to [email protected] .

Terminology :

Crisis Group traditionally uses geographical names from the pre-conflict period of the late Soviet times. The borders of the NKAO were delineated in line with the latest maps of the General Staff of the Soviet Defence Ministry. The front lines reflect locations of military positions and trenches visible in satellite imagery available in early 2021. The geography of the Lachin corridor reproduces that in the publicly available official map of the Russian peacekeeping mission to Nagorno-Karabakh of the summer 2021 period.  

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone : the Soviet-era NKAO and the former Armenian-controlled adjacent territories.

Front line(s) : the line(s) that separate(s) Azerbaijani soldiers from the local Armenian forces of the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh defence ministry and the Armenian and Azerbaijani armies and armed forces along the state borders of these two states.  

Non-combatants : civilians  identified by name by representatives of the conflict parties or in media reports. Civilian casualty counts include civilians killed and wounded along front lines and by mines laid deep in the conflict area as early as the first war in Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition to ordinary residents, non-combatants include civilian state agency staff engaged in demining and other activities.

Combatants : Azerbaijani and Armenian armed forces, special police troops and border guards. We are not presently maintaining a consistent count of casualties among the  Russian military contingent present in Armenia or Nagorno-Karabakh or of any other foreign visitors. 

Reports of detentions : official statements, media reports or confirmed social media reports of combatants or non-combatants detained by the opposing side during the interwar periods along the front lines. Reported detentions range from several hours to weeks on end. 

Reports of incidents : incidents involving drones, heavy weaponry and/or special operations by armed forces.

Heavy weaponry : grenade launchers, rocket systems, tanks, military helicopters and/or other heavy armament, e.g., 110mm mortars and up.

Special operations : crossings of the front line by Azerbaijani or Armenian forces.

Drone use : drones used for reconnaissance or strikes in the conflict zone.

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A Renewed Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Reading Between the Front Lines

Photo: TOFIK BABAYEV/AFP via Getty Images

Critical Questions by Mathieu Droin , Tina Dolbaia , and Abigail Edwards

Published September 22, 2023

On Tuesday, September 19, Azerbaijan launched an attack against ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh, a contested mountainous region located in the South Caucasus, has been the epicenter of two large-scale conflicts and intermittent clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan for well over three decades. Known as “Artsakh” among Armenians, the region is officially recognized as part of Azerbaijan, yet its population of 120,000 is predominantly ethnic Armenian and has a local government that has historically maintained close cultural, social, and political ties with Yerevan. During Soviet rule, Nagorno-Karabakh held the status of an autonomous region within the Republic of Azerbaijan. The weakening and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the first Karabakh war between 1988 and 1994, which killed around 30,000 people and displaced more than a million, ending with an Armenian victory.

The second war erupted in 2020, leading to more than 6,000 deaths, while Azerbaijani forces recaptured previously lost territories in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. A subsequent ceasefire agreement, brokered by Russia after a 44-day successful Azerbaijani offensive, provided for up to 1,960 Russian peacekeepers stationed in the region, including near the Lachin Corridor —the lone highway connecting the separatist region to Armenia that had previously been controlled by Armenian forces.

The deployment of Russian troops in a contested territory was initially perceived as an important step toward furthering the Kremlin’s entrenchment in the South Caucasus. But Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has weakened its ability to effectively control and interfere in the decades-long conflict between the two neighboring states. This has created opportunities for other external actors—including Turkey, Israel, and Iran—to promote their own interests and agendas in the region. The renewed Azerbaijani offensive against Karabakh Armenians reflects these changing power dynamics, providing Western policymakers with an opportunity to step up as potential guarantors of longer-term peace and stability in the Caucasus—a title famously claimed by Russia.

Q1: Why did Azerbaijan initiate a new offensive against Karabakh Armenians?

A1: In the official statements issued by Azerbaijan’s defense ministry and presidential administration this Tuesday, Baku announced that it had begun an “anti-terrorist” operation in Nagorno-Karabakh aimed at neutralizing “illegal Armenian armed groups” engaged in sabotage and dissolving “the illegal regime” itself. The military operation was preceded by a nearly 10-month-long Azerbaijani blockade, prompted by what Baku has argued had been an illegal exploitation of the region’s natural resources by Karabakh Armenians. During the blockade, Azerbaijani troops closed the Lachin Corridor, through which Karabakh Armenians had been receiving food, medicine, and fuel supplies from Yerevan. As a result, the region’s 120,000 inhabitants experienced acute shortages of basic foodstuffs and medicines, as well as water and electricity . Residents claimed that Baku’s actions resembled “a slow-motion genocide,” using hunger as a weapon that would force them to leave the region once the road reopened.

On Wednesday—a day after Azerbaijan began its offensive, killing at least 200 people and injuring many more—Karabakh authorities surrendered and agreed to a Russia-brokered ceasefire, according to which the remaining units of Armenian forces would leave Nagorno-Karabakh. In a speech Wednesday evening, Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev lauded Baku’s ability to punish “the enemy properly” and regain full control over the region “with an iron fist.” By contrast, Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan said that Yerevan was not involved in drafting the terms of the ceasefire and that he found the language confusing, considering that “Armenia doesn’t have an army in Nagorno-Karabakh.”

This Thursday, a first round of talks , focused on the future of the region and its 120,000 ethnic Armenian inhabitants, was held between Azerbaijani and Karabakh authorities. However, if the three-decades-long conflict has taught anything to its observers, it is that Russia-brokered peace in the region usually tends to be fragile and fleeting.

Q2: What is Russia’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

A2: Since the conflict began in the 1990s, both Azerbaijan and Armenia have rapidly militarized, positioning Nagorno-Karabakh as the site of a globally funded arms build-up. In 2020, Baku and Yerevan spent 5.4 and 4.9 percent of their respective gross domestic products on defense, compared to a global average of 2.4 percent. Notably, Russia occupies a contradictory position as the dominant arms supplier to both sides and the main provider of peacekeeping forces to the region. Indeed, although Russia has a military base in Armenia and Armenia is a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, Russia has been turning its attention toward Azerbaijan—a major market for Russian arms exports. Russia accounted for approximately 94 percent and 60 percent of Armenia and Azerbaijan’s arms imports, respectively, from 2011 to 2020. It also oversaw the ceasefire that ended the war in 2020, leading to the deployment of an estimated 1,960 Russian peacekeepers stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Yet, thus far, Moscow has largely failed—or been deliberately unwilling—to fully resolve the ongoing hostilities between the two neighboring nations. Some have argued that Russia’s inability to quell the conflict, especially in the past year, reflects its singular focus on the war in Ukraine. Others have claimed that Russian peacekeepers turned a blind eye to Azerbaijan’s attack this Tuesday due to Armenian prime minister Pashinyan’s growing alignment with the United States following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year.

Q3: What other external actors are involved in the conflict?

A3: Beyond Russia, the main external actor involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is Turkey, which has provided its unwavering support to Azerbaijan, grounded in pan-Turkic cultural and linguistic affinities and strong economic ties. Turkish assistance proved decisive for Azerbaijan’s military superiority over Armenia during the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, notably thanks to the Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 drones. By extension, Baku also enjoys the support of Ankara’s closest partners, such as Pakistan and Qatar.

Despite competing for a greater influence over the South Caucasus, Moscow and Ankara agree that they prefer to keep international—and especially Western—involvement in the Karabakh conflict relatively minimal and contained. Both actors have notably tried to circumvent the OSCE Minsk Group —cochaired by France, Russia, and the United States—which was established in the 1990s “to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.”

Another regional dimension of this conflict is its potential for causing instability in Iran, which is home to a significant Azeri-speaking community—15–19 million Azeris live in Iran, compared to 10 million living in Azerbaijan. Tehran wants to avoid any potential spillover that would fuel Iranian Azeris’ claims for autonomy within Iran or rapprochement with Azerbaijan. Tehran is also concerned about Baku’s ambition to build an overland transport corridor in Armenia that would link mainland Azerbaijan to the landlocked Nakhichevan exclave, which would cut off Iran’s direct access to Yerevan. Therefore, while officially Iran holds a position of neutrality and expresses its availability to mediate between the two conflicting parties, it is in fact leaning in favor of Armenia.

Iran’s tilting toward Armenia partly explains why Israel, Iran’s archrival in the region, backs Azerbaijan, establishing itself as one of the key arms suppliers to Baku. In the five years leading up to the second Karabakh war, for instance, approximately 70 percent of Azerbaijan’s arms imports were from Israel, including drones, ammunition, and Barak 8 missiles, helping Baku achieve military victory in the 2020 war.

The United States has also received significant pressure from members of its Armenian diaspora to intervene. While Washington has historically sold arms to both countries, U.S. government representatives have spoken out against Azerbaijan’s attacks; in September 2022, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi traveled to Armenia and criticized Azerbaijan for its incursions on Armenian “security and democracy.” This Tuesday, the United States again took a stand, with U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken denouncing Azerbaijan’s latest offensive, just a few months after Blinken hosted Armenian and Azeri leaders in Munich earlier this year.

Q4: Is there a European-led effort to bring longer-term peace to the region?

A4: The conflict poses a pressing dilemma for European capitals that consider the region to be part of Europe yet have been unwilling to get militarily involved. Many on the continent have been vocal against Azerbaijan’s military buildup and aggressive posture, while seeking to avoid a direct clash with Baku. Azerbaijan has established itself as one of the major providers of hydrocarbons to Europe, notably through the Southern Gas Corridor , a trend set to increase as the continent diversifies away from Russian gas.

In the past, the European Union’s attempts to step up have been largely unsuccessful, since neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia has been willing to anger Turkey and Russia, their respective security guarantors in the conflict. But Russia’s ongoing military shortcomings in Ukraine and its deteriorating relations with Yerevan seem to have left a power vacuum that has not gone unnoticed for European policymakers.

Under the impetus of Paris, the European Union has harnessed the new platform of the European Political Community (EPC) , a continent-wide initiative that has convened twice, first in Prague in October 2022 and then in Chisinau in May 2023. The EPC hosted a new track of direct dialogue between Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders, led by European Council president Charles Michel alongside French and German policymakers. The leaders agreed to a new EU initiative in Armenia, which was established in January 2023 to contribute to stability in border areas, with the stated objective of “building confidence on the ground” and “ensuring an environment conducive to normalization efforts.”

The recent clashes constitute a setback for the EU-led effort. It remains to be seen if the next EPC summit planned to be held in the coming days in Granada, Spain, will allow for a resumption of the EU-led peace talks or a new Nagorno-Karabakh peace initiative.

Mathieu Droin is a visiting fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Tina Dolbaia is a research associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS. Abigail Edwards is a research assistant with the International Security Program at CSIS.

Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2024 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Mathieu Droin

Tina Dolbaia

Abigail Edwards

Programs & projects.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict | An Expert Analysis

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On Sunday, September 27, the long-simmering conflict in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region flared up, leaving hundreds dead and wounded, and sparking fears of broader regional hostilities. The Kennan Institute recently asked several of our experts to weigh in on this developing story and consider the following questions:

1. What triggered the sudden escalation in fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan on Sunday, September 27? While there have been flare-ups and confrontations over the past 26 years, how is this time different?

2. What is each side looking to gain and how far might they be willing to go to secure their respective goals?

3. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have support from major regional powers. Does the current conflict risk drawing in these greater powers – namely Russia and Turkey?

4. How can both sides settle the conflict? Does the Minsk Group or other diplomatic channels have a chance of aiding in restoring stability?

This compilation is one in an occasional series highlighting the expertise of Kennan Institute scholars and staff.

EXPLORE THE ANALYSIS FROM OUR EXPERTS

Audrey altstadt, professor of history, university of massachusetts amherst.

The Wilson Center

Azerbaijan has more to gain than Armenia by fighting at this time. Like other oil-producing states, Azerbaijan has faced revenue losses from low oil prices, and its budget shortfall will undermine social spending including on public health in the era of COVID-19. Despite quashing the opposition parties, President Ilham Aliyev remains fearful of popular uprisings like those in Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

In July, Baku tested new weapons from Turkey, including TB2 drones that are effective in mountainous terrain. In August, Turkey and Azerbaijan held joint military exercises. Aliyev had been using the new coronavirus restrictions to detain regime critics, yet in July he lauded a seemingly spontaneous demonstration in favor of war in Karabagh, a hot-button issue. As Aliyev has consolidated his power, the one prize that has eluded him has been Mountainous Karabagh and the surrounding territories, which remain occupied by Armenian forces. Moreover, the regional powers interested in containing this conflict are distracted by the pandemic and, for oil producers Russia and Iran, low oil prices. Other distractions are the Belarus situation for Russia, U.S. sanctions for Iran, and the U.S. disengagement in global affairs and the November election for everyone. Turkey is the exception, despite its COVID-19 troubles, because it has continued with impunity to project power in Syria and Libya. Ankara’s rhetoric on supporting Azerbaijan has been aggressive. So, powers that might act as brakes on Baku are busy and its main supporter is energized.

Success looks very different from the viewpoint of each principle. For Armenian Prime Minister Nicol Pashinyan, who reportedly is working to shore up his administration and remove vestiges of predecessors, war now is probably unwanted. Yerevan and the self-proclaimed republic in Stepanakert won on the ground in the 1990s—Armenian forces hold the Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabagh Autonomous Region and seven regions around it, de facto linking it to Armenia and expanding the corridor to Iran, Armenia’s trading partner and some-time supporter. Success for both Armenian entities, in the short term, is restoration of their holdings from the 1994 cease-fire. In the longer term, Armenian groups have laid claim to other territory in Azerbaijan, eastern Turkey, and Georgia, but these lands are not on the table right now.

In Baku, Ilham Aliyev has set a high bar. He promised to retake all the land occupied “for the last 30 years.” He has to make this maximalist pledge— “Take back two regions!” is hardly a battle cry! He could claim victory if Azerbaijani forces regained meaningful territory—and they seem intent on Jebrail and Fizuli to the south—then offer to resume negotiations from a stronger position. This could be his short-term goal. Whether it is achievable is another question. If both sides fight long enough to bring in resources from the Armenian diaspora or regional powers, the war would be far more lethal and could spin out of control and engulf the entire region. This outcome must be avoided at all costs.

Fighting here always risks drawing in neighbors. Russia is a key player as the former (and still aspirational) imperial power in the region that sells arms to both sides and brokers peace deals. Armenia and Russia have a defense pact, and Armenia hosts a Russian air base. Azerbaijan is Russia’s trading partner and the site of a strategically significant North-South Transit Corridor that links Iran and south Asia to Russia. Given its current list of troubles, Russia wants peace on the southern front. Moscow will work behind the scenes to alternately reassure and threaten the parties. Knowing the volatility of the region, Russia will avoid direct military involvement even if Armenia invokes their defense pact.

Turkey seems unencumbered by worries about the pandemic or threats from other powers. Its recent projections of power coupled with rhetoric to do “whatever is necessary” to back Azerbaijan’s drive to retake Karabagh sounds like a genuine threat. Former Turkish presidents and prime ministers have shown restraint, but President Erdoğan may not. Especially worrying is one report, denied by Ankara, of recruiting Syrian fighters for Azerbaijan. The introduction of outside fighters would lend a new dimension to the conflict and set a dangerous precedent. Instability here invites extremists with their own agendas threatening what is left of stability in the Middle East, and it would produce another humanitarian crisis, including a flood of refugees that no one is ready to manage.

The best path to settlement is to avoid serious escalation and end fighting immediately. This calls for restraint that none of the parties seems prepared to exercise. Cessation of fighting would be an essential step to a settlement, and settlement can only be political not military.

The OSCE Minsk Group as currently constructed has been ineffective—and this is true for other diplomatic efforts—not because of its own flaws but because the parties have not meaningfully negotiated. All sides have hardened their stances and continued to vilify their adversaries. Everyone wants all their demands fulfilled completely. There is no talk of compromise. Even to move toward settlement means to prepare populations for compromise, a necessary next step. It is a step no one has taken in 30 years, and the few who tried were called traitors.

How to break such a stalemate? Are there big enough carrots or sticks to force compromise? The need for regional peace demands that we seek a means for resolution. In an era of national sovereignty, however, outside powers or international organizations cannot impose necessary restrictions on the flow of weapons and fighters or of demilitarization of the occupied regions. Ultimately, the parties must decide to stop fighting and weigh the important of holding land against the lives that will be lost if fighting continues.

Oksana Antonenko, Director, Global Risks Analysis, Control Risks Group; Global Fellow, Wilson Center

Oksana Antonenko

It is difficult to establish exactly how the fighting started because there are no international observers or peacekeepers based along the line of contact. As always, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are accusing each other. Some international leaders, including President Emmanuel Macron of France, have stated that Azerbaijan started this escalation. Others, like President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, have accused Armenia. Regardless of which side fired the first shot, what is clear now is that the current fighting represents the most significant military escalation since the original cease-fire was signed in May 1994. This escalation is different from previous flareups because it appears to be a deliberate, rather than accidental, escalation. Both sides have declared mobilization, signaling readiness for a prolonged war, and the use of heavy weapons, drones, and aviation make this escalation particularly dangerous. However, in some sense the current escalation is similar to previous significant escalations. Much as was the case in 1996, it has been prompted by the loss of trust in the peace process, lack of property commitment by the international community to advance peace in the region, and the instrumentalization of the conflict by leaders of both countries to distract attention from domestic problems—this time connected to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The scenario of this escalation appears to be similar to previous ones. Azerbaijan is seeking to retake part of Nagorno-Karabakh by force to compel Armenia to relinquish some of its occupied territories. This tactic is often called “salami slicing”—meaning that Azerbaijan, despite its advantages in manpower and weaponry, cannot recapture the entire territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding occupied regions but can gradually reclaim territories bit by bit through frequent incursion. This time, the price of this territorial revision is set to be very high for both sides, as large casualties already have been reported and heavy fighting is likely to continue for some time. Although Azerbaijan believes that its demonstration of military force can compel Armenia to compromise at a negotiating table, the history of other conflicts shows that to achieve a sustainable peace deal, trust between the two sides is more important than the military balance. When the cease-fire is reinstated, it will take a long time to overcome the legacy of the current escalation. There are also significant concerns over domestic political impacts from the current escalation on governments in both countries, as expectations have been raised high on both sides, while military realities on the ground are not conducive to a clear-cut victory on either side. At the same time, the conflict is has already had significant costs for each side in terms of their men and treasure.

Since 1994, the role of external powers in this conflict was surprisingly limited compared to other post-Soviet conflicts. This is in part because Russia has maintained relative neutrality—by supplying weapons to both sides. Although Russia maintains formal security guarantees to Armenia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), these do not apply to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which Russia still recognizes as part of Azerbaijan. During previous escalations, just as in recent days, Russia did not intervene on one side or the other. However, the Russian position might change if Turkey continues to provide significant military support to Azerbaijan. President Erdogan has always been a strong supporter of Azerbaijan and believes that it has a legitimate right to impose a military solution in Armenia to reclaim territory. Turkey provided assistance in training and equipping Azeri forces, but until this most recent period it had never openly intervened during a conflict escalation phase. Both Russia and France have accused Turkey of providing weapons and mercenaries in support of the current Azeri offensive. If Turkey does not stop fanning the flames of the conflict by encouraging Azerbaijan to continue fighting, Ankara can significantly damage its relations with both Moscow and Brussels. In the latter case, these relations are already strained over Turkey’s recent policies in Libya, Syria, and the eastern Mediterranean.

A conflict settlement is now more distant than before the current escalation started. First, the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs should work with both sides (and with Turkey) to reestablish a sustainable cease-fire and to monitor its implementation. Then the two sides need to implement some confidence-building measures in order to rebuild trust before major negotiations can resume. The United States can play a role in promoting stabilization in the conflict zone; however, previous failures of U.S.-led peace initiatives on Nagorno-Karabakh, including the 2001 Key West summit, demonstrate how intractable and difficult this conflict is and will remain in the foreseeable future.

Krista Goff, Assistant Professor of History, University of Miami; Title VIII Short-Term Scholar, Kennan Institute

There was no immediate trigger in this instance and the escalation was not entirely unexpected. Since the cease-fire in May 1994, there have been repeated four- to five-day clashes along the 200-kilometer line of conflict, including a four-day war in April 2016 that left around 200 people dead. There was a temporary honeymoon after Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was elected in 2018, but the flare-up this past July provoked worsening rhetoric and military contingency planning on both sides.

There are a few other factors to consider. This is a mountainous area, so as the weather worsens it becomes a more difficult landscape for fighting. A lot of the traditional intermediaries have also been distracted—the United States by the upcoming presidential election and ongoing pandemic, Europe by the Brexit transition and the resurgence of COVID-19, Russia by the situation in Belarus, and the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) with a leadership crisis. Baku has also likely taken domestic issues into consideration. In the context of economic and social pressures related to the COVID-19 outbreak and opposition crackdowns, Baku could be seeking to rally support via renewed conflict with Armenians. 

The situation is still developing rapidly, but it is clear that this fighting will likely last longer than usual and that this is the most ambitious offensive we have seen in a long time. This is worrisome given that a lot of people in the region are already facing hardship and insecurity because of the pandemic. Armenia and Azerbaijan are on the cusp of another full-scale war and 300,000 people live near the front line of this growing confrontation.

It is hard to say how far each side is willing to go at this point. Is this going to be a more drawn-out version of the clashes that have come before, or will it be a turning point in this long-running conflict? This is still breaking news.

Azerbaijan has more to gain than Armenia from military escalation of the conflict. Since the 1994 ceasefire, Nagorno-Karabakh has been de facto independent and Armenians have also controlled seven adjacent Azerbaijani territories.   Yerevan is not incentivized to disrupt the status quo. In Baku, it is a different story. Azerbaijan’s military capabilities and geostrategic relationships have improved since the 1990s. It appears that Baku may be trying to build on earlier gains to reclaim Jabrayil and Fuzuli, two Azerbaijani regions that Armenian forces currently control in the whole or in part. Compared with other contested regions, this is a flatter area with fewer Armenian settlements, although there has been talk that Karabakh Armenians were seeking to change that.

This can be a risky gamble for President Ilham Aliyev, though. He will face a lot of criticism at home if the fighting does not go well for Azerbaijan. This is not just a territorial dispute, but a foundational conflict central to Azerbaijan’s national identity. War with Armenia has the potential to unite disaffected citizens and oppositionists behind the government, but the Azerbaijani public has not been primed for compromise or more losses. The death of an Azerbaijani general in the July clashes renewed public pressure on Baku to reclaim Azerbaijani territories under Armenian control and enable the return of internally displaced persons to their homes, but what will happen if Baku falls short again?

It may not be so much a question of whether this flare-up risks drawing in other powers, but whether some of those external actors have willingly inserted themselves into it. There is a multipolar dynamic at play in the region and Erdoğan has been pursuing a more assertive foreign policy lately. Turkey previously supported Azerbaijan politically, but also urged restraint. Now, Turkey seeks a bigger role in the region and has altered its approach, holding its largest-ever joint military exercises with Azerbaijan after the July conflict and calling for Armenia to leave the land it has been “occupying” in Azerbaijan. There have also been reports —substantiated by credible journalists and researchers but strongly denied in Ankara and Baku—that Ankara has facilitated the arrival of Turkish-backed Syrian National Army fighters to the Azerbaijani frontlines.

Russia and Armenia no doubt both want to avoid further deterioration of the situation to a point that might trigger Russia’s defense treaty with Armenia. Russia straddles relations with both countries—selling arms to Azerbaijan while holding treaty obligations with Armenia and maintaining a military base there—and Armenia does not want to cede more influence to Russia. President Vladimir Putin probably is best positioned to negotiate a cease-fire here, but what promises can he make to Aliyev that new talks will be more productive than those that followed the 2016 truce?

Both sides have declared martial law and are bracing for more conflict, but there is a general lack of global leadership at the moment. There was some hope in recent years  that progress could be made through negotiation, but no notable advancements were achieved and attitudes have hardened in Baku toward the stalled-out diplomatic process. Despite the July clashes, it has been almost a year since the OSCE Minsk Group was last in the region and, owing to COVID-19, nearly as long since it brought Armenia and Azerbaijan’s foreign ministers together face-to-face. So far, there has been no substantive action from this side, only ineffective calls from the co-chairs and German Chancellor Angela Merkel for Armenia and Azerbaijan to stop fighting and resume diplomatic talks.

It is not just a matter of diplomatic negotiation, but also of preparing the public on both sides for peace and compromise. The international community is involved, but this is a locally driven conflict. The Armenian and Azerbaijani leaderships have rallied their sides around contradictory resolutions to this conflict: that Armenia will achieve formal unification with Karabakh and that Azerbaijan will regain control over all of its Armenian-occupied territories, Nagorno-Karabakh included. If either side sees rapid military or territorial gains, then Russia or another negotiating partner will have room to try and impose a cease-fire, but a more protracted conflict will be harder to stop unless escalating casualties turn the public against war on both sides. This is a dynamic situation, but that scenario seems unlikely at the moment.

William H. Hill, Global Fellow, Kennan Institute

William Hill

In 1994, Armenia and Azerbaijan ended a war over Azerbaijan’s ethnic Armenian region of Nagorno-Karabakh. After 26 years of an uneasy armed standoff and unsuccessful international efforts at mediation and settlement, full-scale war may be breaking out again.

Although there has never been a robust international presence to monitor or enforce the 1994 cease-fire, military clashes along the line of confrontation between the parties have generally have been limited in size and duration. A multiday clash of significant military units in 2016 was the most recent exception to this pattern. Events in 2020 suggest that this quarter-century of uneasy armed peace may be ending.

In July 2020, hostilities broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan on a segment of their border at a considerable distance from Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent Armenian-occupied territories. Publicly available military information about the current hostilities is as yet spotty, but it appears that the forces involved on both sides are the largest since 1994, and attacks and clashes are occurring over a much broader front.

Relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have been on a downward slope for several years. Ethnic hostility, always present to some degree throughout the history of the Karabakh dispute, have deepened. Open fighting between groups from the Armenian and Azerbaijani diasporas in Moscow are illustrative of this phenomenon. Leaders of both countries have grown more frustrated over the failure of the OSCE Minsk Group mediators to obtain accommodation or concessions from the other side.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, installed in 2018, recently has taken a somewhat harder line on the Karabakh issue. During a visit to Karabakh last August, he asserted that “Artsakh [an Armenian name for Karabakh] is Armenia,” seeming to stray from the general principles for a settlement advanced by the mediators.  Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev explicitly stated that the goal of the military action is to restore Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity by recovering Karabakh and its surrounding occupied regions.

Another major difference in the current crisis is the international circumstances, in particular the alignment and actions of major international actors. In the past, Russia has had close relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan alike and has sold arms to both states. Recently, Moscow’s relationship has been much closer to Yerevan, as reflected in Armenia’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and frequent participation in Russian military exercises in the region. As a CSTO member, Armenia in theory has the right to call on Russia for support should the current conflict threaten its security—which could force Moscow to choose between its role as ally or mediator.

Azerbaijan has diversified its sources of arms and military equipment and has been getting increased support from Turkey. President Aliyev recently is reported to have complained about Russian arms deliveries to Armenia.  In his speech last week to the United Nations General Assembly, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan denounced Armenia and expressed strong support for Azerbaijan. Turkish and Azerbaijani troops conducted two weeks of joint exercises this summer, and some accounts allege Turkey is either participating in or providing direct military support to Azerbaijan in the current hostilities.

Turkey’s role as a member of the Minsk Group and supporter of the stated goals of the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) has clearly changed. Russia and Turkey are already at odds, supporting different parties in Syria and Libya. The Moscow-Ankara relationship would be further severely and unpredictably strained should they end up openly supporting opposing sides in an Armenia-Azerbaijan war. As one of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group, France remains involved in trying to mediate, but it is not clear whether President Emmanuel Macron will seek a larger role for the European Union in this conflict. U.S. President Donald Trump joined in an appeal for a cease-fire from the Minsk Group co-chairs, but otherwise the United States has seemed distant from events in the South Caucasus, distracted by its own domestic turmoil. Finally, Iran remains a wild card: a regional power bordering on both states, with longstanding ties to both but to date relatively little involvement in the Karabakh question and settlement process. Although Iran also would seem to be more concerned with other pressing problems, it bears watching.

A lasting settlement seems even further away, not just because of the current fighting. Though the OSCE and its Minsk Group continue to be active, the issue also has been raised at the United Nations. This may encourage “forum-shopping” by both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Meanwhile, both parties have abandoned the principles accepted as the basis for a settlement first at Madrid in 2007: return of non-Karabakh territories to Azerbaijan; an international peacekeeping force; return of refugees; interim administration of Nagorno-Karabakh as a part of Azerbaijan; and ultimate determination of Karabakh’s status by popular will, namely through a referendum.

It seems unlikely that either Armenia or Azerbaijan can achieve a military victory sufficient to impose its will. Intervention by any external power to tip the balance toward one of the belligerents would most likely prompt intervention by other powers, thus widening the war. As of now there is no broadly accepted international settlement plan to replace the OSCE’s “Madrid principles.” This is a recipe for protracted stalemate, uncertainty and instability, with no clear path toward a lasting political resolution.

Michael Kofman, Director, Russia Studies Program, CNA Corporation; Global Fellow, Kennan Institute

This time around, there was no incident that sparked the conflict—rather, it is a preplanned Azeri offensive, with overt Turkish backing, to retake portions of Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku appears frustrated with Armenia’s seeming lack of interest in negotiations, and nationalist sentiment has been growing following a series of clashes in July.

Azerbaijan is looking to break through Armenian front lines in Nagorno-Karabakh and seize enough territory to declare victory. Its aims are doubtfully maximalist, but nonetheless the fighting is taking place through the depth of Armenian lines and along the border, which makes it more serious than anything seen since 1994. As Armenia mobilizes reserves, this war will prove costly in manpower and equipment for both sides.

Turkey is actively involved supporting Azerbaijan, providing drones, mercenaries, and advisers. Turkish aircraft have remained in the country following an exercise in July. Russia has armed both sides, but is principally Armenia’s ally. However, Moscow sees its role as maintaining stability in the region, which would be upset by a major offensive on either side. Consequently, Russia will probably work to establish a cease-fire as soon as possible to prevent the possibility of Azerbaijan making significant gains. Turkey seems more interested in the prospect of Azerbaijan taking territory, and is not concerned with a balanced or “peacemaker” role. Both countries have likely judged that Moscow’s attention is consumed with Belarus and would look to settle the war rather than get involved.

To settle the conflict, the Azeris first have to run out of steam, which is bound to happen after a few days. The terrain is mountainous, and despite a great public relations campaign, their forces have suffered losses. Armenians are likely to recover from the offensive and retake much of the lost terrain. This will produce the conditions on the ground to encourage all parties to seek peace, ideally within a few days. However, the fighting could grind on much longer this time around.

About the Authors

Audrey L. Altstadt

Krista Goff

William H. Hill

Michael Kofman

Kennan Institute

The Kennan Institute is the premier US center for advanced research on Russia and Eurasia and the oldest and largest regional program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The Kennan Institute is committed to improving American understanding of Russia, Ukraine, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the surrounding region though research and exchange.   Read more

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The Humanitarian Crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh Is a Textbook Example of Ethnic Cleansing

F or the past five weeks, the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, sandwiched between Azerbaijan and Armenia, has been blockaded by Azerbaijan. As much of the world celebrated Christmas and New Year, over 120,000 Armenian residents of the region—the oldest continuously inhabited Armenian homeland, dotted with Armenian churches and monasteries and monuments predating the spread of Christianity to Europe by decades—were cut off from the world.

A group of Azerbaijani citizens identifying as “environmental activists” barricaded the Lachin corridor, a mountainous road that serves as the only path between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, since December 12. The flow of food and medicine fell to a trickle before the supplies essential for the continuation of normal life gradually disappeared altogether. A place that once received 400 tons of food and medical supplies daily now barely receives a few carloads on a good day. Hospitals have indefinitely put surgeries on hold. Children are going hungry. There is an acute shortage of fuel as temperatures drop to below -4°C, and families are burning scraps to heat their homes.

Armenians, a people who endured a protracted genocide under the Ottoman Empire before being exposed to Soviet autocratic rule in the 20th century, are being subjected to collective punishment in the 21st century with the intent of driving them out of their home.

Nagorno-Karabakh, a historically Armenian territory, is known to Armenians as Artsakh. Despite its history and demography, it was handed to Soviet Azerbaijan in 1921 by Joseph Stalin, who implemented the imperial method of disrupting cohesive national and ethnic communities to keep diverse populations in check. In 1988, the people of Artsakh voted overwhelmingly in a referendum to dissolve Moscow’s artificial cartography, secede from Soviet Azerbaijan and assert their Armenian identity.

Read More: History Suggests This Winter Could Be Dangerous for Armenians

This defiant act of self-determination resulted in yet more massacres of Armenians, whose wish was not honored. Upon the USSR’s collapse, Artsakh ended up inside the Soviet frontiers inherited by Azerbaijan. The Armenians, however, defeated Azerbaijan in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, which lasted until 1994, when the region proclaimed its autonomy. Then, in 2020, at the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Azerbaijan launched a surprise offensive—now known as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War—with the open involvement and assistance of Turkey.

Azerbaijan wanted the land—without the people who inhabit the land. Its battlefield gains were followed by a ruthless effort to raze all traces of Armenian history. While Armenia maintains a medieval mosque in its capital, has excellent relations with the Islamic world and welcomes people of all faiths, Azerbaijan has taken to disfiguring and destroying Armenian churches in the territory it took as a matter of policy. Hundreds of Armenian servicemen still remain in Azeri captivity.

The humanitarian catastrophe we are now witnessing—or, more accurately, the world is refusing to witness—is a textbook enactment of ethnic cleansing. More than a dozen nongovernmental organisations, including Genocide Watch, have issued a stark warning that Azerbaijan’s blockade is “designed to, in the words of the Genocide Convention, deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to bring about the end of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group in whole or in part. All 14 risk factors for atrocity crimes identified by the UN Secretary-General’s Office on Genocide Prevention are now present.”

The only lifeline for Armenians in Artsakh is that slender road that connects them to Armenia.

Volunteers at home and in Armenian diaspora communities are doing all they can to help. As the former president of Armenia, I have decided to give the pension set up for me in law to humanitarian causes in Artsakh. Such efforts cannot, however, succeed in isolation. History—Armenian history—teaches us that the success of genocidal campaigns is always dependent on the silence of the world. It is time for the international community to speak up.

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The Karabakh Conflict Between Armenia and Azerbaijan pp 13–32 Cite as

The Historical Background to the Continuing Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh

• M. Hakan Yavuz 3 &
• Michael M. Gunter 4  
• First Online: 30 November 2022

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The Caucasus contains a bewildering number of ethnic groups with their own histories, current needs, and conflicting ambitions. The struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh involves an important, long-running, frozen/unfrozen conflict between the Armenians and Turkic Azerbaijanis over a relatively small, but symbolically important area in the Caucasus. This continuing conflict also has heavily involved Russia and Turkey, among others. Since Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan during Soviet times, Azerbaijan now claims it according to the international legal principle of territorial integrity. However, since the vast majority of its population is ethnic Armenian, Armenia claims it according to the principle of self-determination. This chapter will attempt to present a historically objective analysis of this conflict’s complicated historical origins that will provide a background upon which to help interpret the current situation and accurately place it within current Middle Eastern studies.

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Department of Political Science, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA

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Yavuz, M.H., Gunter, M.M. (2023). The Historical Background to the Continuing Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh. In: The Karabakh Conflict Between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16262-6_2

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• KARABAKH - AZERBAIJAN

Karabakh - Azerbaijan

Karabakh is one of the ancient historical regions of Azerbaijan. The name Karabakh is a combination of the words “gara” (black, big) and “bagh” (garden, land). The word “Karabakh” as a name given by Azerbaijani people to their land first appeared in primary sources of the 7th century. 

In dealing with the subject of Karabakh, the first question to be answered is: where is this place and which areas of Azerbaijan does it cover?  The answer to this question is especially relevant today for any understanding of the “Nagorno-Karabakh problem” created by the Armenian separatists. To answer this question we will refer first to Mirza Jamal Javanshir Garabaghli, the vizier of the Azerbaijani Karabakh khanate, who wrote in his book The History of Karabakh (1847):

"According to the ancient history books the borders of Karabakh region are as given below: the Araz River in the south, from Khudaferin Bridge to Sinig Bridge.

The eastern border of Karabakh is marked by the River Kura that flows into the River Araz in the village of Javad and runs into the Caspian Sea. The northern border is the River Goran that stretches from Yelizavetpol (Ganja province is meant) to the Kura river which splits and reaches the Araz at different points. In the west it is bordered by the Kushbek, Salvarti and Erikli mountains – the high Karabakh mountain range.”

A detailed description of Karabakh’s territories and borders during the first period of  Russian occupation and colonialism is drafted on the following basis:

1. This information was written by an official directly involved in Russia’s governance of Karabakh, in other words, the information is based on official documents;

2. Further, this is not only grounded in reality and experience, it is also backed up by primary sources. It was not by whim that Mirza Jamal referred to history books to substantiate his position. 

It is clear that the name “Karabakh” has long applied not just to the political-geographical area “Nagorno-Karabakh” but to the whole territory of Karabakh — its mountains and its plains. In other words, the name "Nagorno-Karabakh” is not a historical toponym, but is a name given to a part of Karabakh in the cause of separatism. Logic supports this argument: if mountainous (Nagorno) Karabakh exists, then plain and lowland Karabakh also exist. This is the reality: there are today both mountainous Karabakh and lowland Karabakh in Azerbaijan. In addition, both lowland and mountainous (Nagorno) Karabakh have been Azerbaijani homelands in all historical periods, home to the people who have the words “gara” and “bagh” in their lexicon. Hundreds of ancient and rare examples of folklore and musical treasures first appeared in Karabakh and are closely associated with this place.

Several generations of Azerbaijani archaeologists have studied and introduced to the world’s academics the Guruchay culture (Palaeolithic period), the Leylatepe culture (Eneolithic), the Kura – Araz culture (early Bronze Age), the Uzerliktepe culture (middle Bronze Age), the Khojaly-Gedebey culture (late Bronze and early Iron Ages), as well as hundreds of historical monuments of the ancient and medieval periods.  International archaeology has long accepted these monuments as belonging to the history of the Azerbaijani people and these monuments have nothing to do with Armenian history.

Nagorno-Karabakh lies in the centre of the western regions of the Azerbaijan Republic, part of Karabakh as a whole.  The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region was established on the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic in July 1923, under Soviet rule. The region was 4,400 sq.km in area, or 5.1% of the total area of the Azerbaijan Republic. It included the districts of Shusha, Askeran, Hadrut, Mardakert and Martuni (the last three districts had not been so named until then) and the city of Stepanakert (which was called Khankendi until the early years of Soviet rule). Nagorno-Karabakh is an integral part of the present Azerbaijan Republic and is one of the territories to which Armenians were moved on a mass scale from 1820. Today the Autonomy and seven surrounding regions are under occupation by the Armenian Republic.

The Nagorno-Karabakh problem is rooted in the 18 th  century, when Armenians were moved from the Iran Plateau and Anadolu and relocated to Karabakh, a determined policy of the Iranian political elite. The Armenians gradually increased in number and began making territorial claims on Azerbaijan. They continued their separatist activities during the Karabakh khanate and organized campaigns by external forces against it. After Russian occupation of the khanate in 1805, the relocation of Armenians there, as well as to Nakhchivan and Irevan, was intensified. In order to formalise this process some paragraphs were even appended to the Turkmenchay Treaty in 1828. The Armenians began making concrete territorial claims on Karabakh, Nakhchivan and Irevan from the beginning of the twentieth century with strong support from Iran and Russia. In pursuit of this goal, Armenians perpetrated genocide in 1918 throughout Azerbaijan. The main aim was to create a "Great Armenia, from sea to sea”. After the establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in 1918 Irevan, the historically ancient territory of Azerbaijan was ceded to the Armenians and the issue seemed to be resolved. Further, during Soviet rule Zangazur and Goycha were given to Armenia. Thus, Russia and Iran realized their aims not only to separate Azerbaijan from Turkey, but also to split Nakhchivan from Azerbaijan geographically. However, their repeated attempts to annex Karabakh to Armenia in the Soviet era were in vain.

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Armenians in Karabakh had already armed and they began operations there in 1988. Large-scale military operations were halted with the signing of a cease-fire in 1994, and Nagorno-Karabakh together with another seven, adjacent, regions of Azerbaijan  - Lachin, Kalbajar, Aghdam, Fizuli, Jabrayil, Gubadli and Zangilan - were occupied by Armenia. The separatist regime in Nagorno-Karabakh declared its “independence” in 1991. This “independence”, which does not comply in any way with international law, rightly remains unrecognized by any country.

Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of Azerbaijan

• Territory- 4,400 sq.km
• Population (1989)-189,085
• Armenians- 145,450 (76.9%)
• Azerbaijanis – 40,688 (21.5%)
• Russians – 1,922 (1%)
• Other nationalities –1,025 (0.6%)

Nagorno-Karabakh and other, surrounding, regions - dates invaded

• Nagorno-Karabakh – 1988-1992 (Shusha  –  May 08, 1992)
• Lachin –   May 18, 1992
• Kalbajar – April 2, 1993
• Aghdam – July 23, 1993
• Fizuli –     August 23, 1993
• Jabrayil – August 23, 1993
• Gubadli – August 31, 1993
• Zangilan – October 29, 1993

Victims of agression in Azerbaijan

• Killed –  20,000
• Injured– 50,000

The Working Group on Assessment of the Casualties and Losses to the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan that reports to the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan, has produced information that more than 800 billion dollars of damage has been caused to Azerbaijan by the Armenia-Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The cities, settlements and villages liberated from Armenian occupation between 27 September and 9 November 2020 

As a result of a successful counter-offensive launched in Karabakh by the Azerbaijani army on 27 September, 5 cities, 4 settlements and 286 villages had been liberated from occupation by 9 November. At that point, these included: Jabrayil city and 90 villages of that region; Fuzuli city and 53 villages in that region; Zengilan city, the Minjivan, Aghbend and Bartaz settlements, and 52 villages in that region; Hadrut settlement and 35 villages in Khojavend region; 3 villages within Terter region; Gubadli city and 41 villages in that region; 9 of Khojaly region’s villages; Shusha city; 3 villages in Lachin region, as well as several strategic heights towards Aghdere and Murovdagh; the Bartaz, Sighirt, Shukurataz heights and 5 other unnamed heights in Zengilan. 

On 10 November, the President of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of Armenia and the President of Russia signed a statement declaring a complete ceasefire and end to all military operations in the conflict zone. In accord with the statement, Aghdam region was handed back to Azerbaijan on 20 November, Kelbajar region on 25 November and Lachin region on 1 December. The Gazakh region villages Baghanis Ayrim, Kheyrimli, Sofulu, Barkhudarli, Yukhari Askipara, Gizil Hajili and Ashaghi Askipara, as well as Kerki village in the Sadarak region of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, will also be liberated from Armenian occupation. After the cessation of hostilities on 10 November 2020, Azerbaijan's sovereignty was established over other cities, settlements and villages in Karabakh, and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan was restored. Karabakh is Azerbaijan!

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In the late 80s and early 90s of the 20th century, Armenia made open territorial claims to the historical lands of Azerbaijan and launched military aggression against our country. At that time, Armenia, taking advantage of the chaos in Azerbaijan, occupied 20% of our lands. The policy of ethnic cleansing pursued by Armenia resulted in that more than 1 million Azerbaijanis were expelled from their native lands.

The nearly 30-year-long negotiation process on eliminating the consequences of military aggression against Azerbaijan and fulfilling UN Security Council Resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 has not yielded results due to Armenia's destructive stand.

Since 2019, the provocative statements and steps taken by the Armenian military-political leadership have purposefully completely disrupted the negotiation process. With this, Armenia once again demonstrated that its real goal is to strengthen the current status quo and annex the territories of Azerbaijan. Aggressive and offensive national security strategy and military doctrine adopted by Armenia, expansion of the policy of illegal settlement in the occupied territories, call for a “new war for new territories”, decision to create “volunteer detachments” consisting of civilians, sabotage on the Armenian-Azerbaijani state border in the direction of Tovuz committed on July 12, 2020, at the same time, increased tension on the line of contact in general, concentration of its troops in the frontline areas, as well as collection of a large number of weapons and ammunition indicated that Armenia was preparing for a large-scale attack.

On September 27, 2020, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia once again grossly violated the norms of international law, using various types of weapons, including heavy artillery, and fired at the residential areas and military positions of the Republic of Azerbaijan from several directions. As a result of the another military provocation, civilians and soldiers were killed and injured, and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan started counter-offensive operations in order to prevent and neutralize real and potential military threats against the national security of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

According to the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Azerbaijan, in accordance with international legal norms and principles, the Republic of Azerbaijan reserves the right to use all necessary means, including military force, to restore its territorial integrity due to occupation of a part of the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the Republic of Armenia and its refusal to liberate the occupied lands within the political settlement of the problem. As an independent, democratic, legal, secular, unitary state capable of ensuring the national interests of the people and the country, the Republic of Azerbaijan determines and implements the national security policy for the sake of its development. A meeting of the Security Council was immediately held under the chairmanship of Ilham Aliyev, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and certain tasks were given to provide an adequate response to the aggressor.

Given the occupation by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the adjacent regions, as well as the real threat of an armed attack on the Republic of Azerbaijan, by the Presidential Decree dated September 27, 2020, from September 28, 2020 at 12 a.m. martial law was declared throughout the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan in order to bring the country, population and territory, as well as the Armed Forces and other armed formations, to readiness for defense. By the Order dated September 28, 2020, partial mobilization was announced in the Republic of Azerbaijan, decisions were made on preparations for hostilities and their conduct. As a result of the counter-offensive operations launched by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, several districts of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as other strategically important territories, were freed from occupation from the first day. To this end, on September 29, 2020, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan signed the Decree "On the organization of a temporary special administration in the territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan liberated from occupation." Based on the decree, temporary commandant’s offices were established in the liberated territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, in accordance with the administrative territorial division of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which carry out special management for each district. Under the temporary commandant’s offices, operational headquarters including representatives of relevant state bodies (institutions) have been established and their duties have been defined. As a result of the successful military operations carried out by our brave and victorious Army, which liberated the Motherland from occupation, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia were defeated and forced to retreat with heavy losses in manpower and equipment. To avenge heavy losses suffered on the battlefield the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia targeted the civil infrastructure facilities in the cities and districts remote from the conflict zone and the frontline zone of Azerbaijan, in particular residential buildings, hospitals, medical centers, school buildings, kindergartens, administrative buildings of state institutions, agricultural fields. The Armenian Armed Forces committed crimes against the peace and humanity, as well as war crimes by firing from various types of weapons, ballistic missiles, as well as prohibited artillery weapons. Civilians were brutally killed. Large-scale damage was caused to the civilian population, state property, including infrastructure facilities, as well as business entities.

Thus, the second largest city of Azerbaijan, the ancient Ganja, which has numerous historical and cultural monuments, the cities of Mingachevir (hydroelectric power station) and Yevlakh (the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan oil pipeline), where strategic facilities are located and through which they pass; as well as Beylagan, Barda, Terter, Gabala, Goranboy, Aghjabadi, Absheron, Khizi and other districts were fired from ballistic missiles and other heavy artillery installations.

On September 27, 2020, at around 6:00 p.m., a family (5 people) was completely destroyed as a result of a shell hitting the house of villager Gurbanov Elbrus Isa, located in Gashalti-Garagoyunlu village, Naftalan city.

As a result of rocket and heavy artillery attacks on Ganja city on October 4, 5, 8, 11 and 17, 26 civilians were killed and 175 civilians were injured, large-scale damage was inflicted on civil infrastructure facilities and vehicles.

As a result of the rocket and heavy artillery attacks of the Armenian armed forces, 29 people were killed, 112 people were injured , and civil infrastructure facilities and vehicles were heavily damaged in Barda region.

In general, as a result of Armenia's military aggression, 93 civilians, including 12 children and 27 women, were killed, 454 civilians were injured, a total of 12,292 residential and non-residential areas, 288 vehicles, and 1,018 farms were damaged.

In the period from September 27 to November 10, 2020, Terter, Aghjabadi and Goranboy districts located outside the battlefield and the conflict zone have been shelled by Armenia for 5 times using prohibited and extremely dangerous phosphorus bombs at different times.

On October 08, 03, 04 and 08 November 2020, the armed forces of Armenia in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as the persons heading the military units located on the territory of the Republic of Armenia and the criminal communities created by them, grossly violated the requirements of the 1949 Geneva Convention “On the Protection of Civilian Population” during armed conflicts. Using methods of warfare causing large-scale destruction, they fired artillery shells at settlements located in the territories of the Fizuli and Terter districts, where civilians or persons who did not participate in the battles densely live. Also, in order to cause extensive, long-term and serious damage to the environment and deliberate killing of people in violation of the basic principles of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, forests with valuable and perennial trees, which are considered the natural wealth of the Republic of Azerbaijan, located in the villages of Arayatly, Alkhanly of Fuzuli districts, in Sakhlabad village of Terter district and in Shusha, were fired with at least six 122-mm artillery shells of the D-4 type, each of which contained 3.6 kilograms of the chemical composition P-4 (white phosphorus). By deliberately setting fire to natural resources located in these areas, they caused great damage. An aggressive war was planned and carried out against the Republic of Azerbaijan, and terrorism was also committed.

Our soldiers and officers, who demonstrated heroism in the struggle for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan, our civilians who worked in the rear, and our people as a whole, showed determination and will, unity and solidarity, rallying like a fist, dealt crushing blows to the enemy. Unable to withstand the victorious march of the Azerbaijan Army, the enemy went on provocations and committed war crimes, targeting innocent civilians. As a result of 44 days of hostilities, the victorious Azerbaijani Army liberated from occupation the cities of Jabrayil, Fuzuli, Zangilan and Gubadli, the city of Shusha, which occupies a special place in the history, culture and hearts of the Azerbaijani people and is considered the pearl of Karabakh, the settlements of Minjivan, Aghband, Bartaz of Zangilan district, the settlement of Hadrut and a number of villages in Khojavend district, more than 300 settlements, including Sugovushan village, Terter district, several villages in the Khojaly and Lachin districts, as well as important strategic heights in the directions of Aghdara, Murovdagh and Zangilan.

Brave Azerbaijani soldiers and officers, moving forward step by step, broke through the engineering and fortification systems built by Armenia over the years. Our lands were liberated at the cost of the blood and lives of our soldiers and officers, our martyrs. Azerbaijan's victories in the military field, especially the liberation of Shusha from occupation on November 8, played a decisive role in the fate of the war, thus Armenia admitted its defeat. According to the Statement signed on November 10, 2020 by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the President of the Russian Federation, the war ended with the victory of Azerbaijan. Armenia capitulated and was forced to return Kalbajar, Aghdam and Lachin districts to Azerbaijan.

By the Presidential Decrees dated December 2, 2020, September 27 was declared the Day of Remembrance, and November 8 - Victory Day in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

For almost 30 years, Armenia has mined most of the Azerbaijani lands occupied, even lands that do not have a military purpose. Despite the agreement reached in the Tripartite Statement between the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation dated November 10, 2020, Armenia refuses to hand over maps and diagrams of minefields. In doing so, it grossly violates the requirements of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the basic norms and principles of international humanitarian law, including the guarantees set forth in articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention, article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and articles 2 (1) and 3 (2) Protocol No. 4 thereto. In addition to posing a threat to human life, mined areas also hinder the efficient use of land. Despite the fact that the areas have long been cleared of mines, the number of civilians injured and killed is increasing as a result of regularly occurring mine explosions. From November 10, 2020 to the present, as a result of mine explosions in the liberated territories, 23 civilians were killed and 36 civilians received injuries of varying severity.  

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Azerbaijan urges top UN court to toss out Armenian case alleging racial discrimination

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Lawyers for Azerbaijan on Monday urged the top United Nations court to throw out a case filed by Armenia linked to the long-running dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, arguing that judges do not have jurisdiction.

Armenia filed the case at the International Court of Justice in 2021, accusing Azerbaijan of a “state-sponsored policy of Armenian hatred” that has led to “systemic discrimination, mass killings, torture and other abuse.”

The legal dispute stems from long-standing tensions that erupted into a 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh that left more than 6,600 people dead. The region is within Azerbaijan, but had been under the control of ethnic Armenian forces backed by Armenia since the end of a separatist war in 1994.

Armenia’s case is based on an international convention on stamping out racial discrimination, which has a clause allowing disputes to be resolved by the world court if bilateral negotiations fail to broker a settlement.

However, Azerbaijani deputy Foreign Minister Elnur Mammadov told judges Monday that Armenia could not bring the dispute to the court in The Hague, arguing that the two countries had not first engaged in serious negotiations.

“Armenia had its sights firmly set on commencing these proceedings before the court and using the effect of these proceedings to wage a public media campaign against Azerbaijan,” Mammadov said.

International law professor Stefan Talmon, representing Azerbaijan, added that Armenia “never gave negotiations a chance.”

He said that “with no negotiations and no genuine attempt at negotiations, that basically is the end of Armenia’s application” to the court.

Azerbaijan also argued that most allegations in Armenia’s case fall outside the scope of the discrimination convention, meaning the court did not have jurisdiction.

Armenia is scheduled to respond Tuesday to Azerbaijan’s arguments.

Azerbaijan has also brought a case against Armenia at the world court alleging breaches of the same convention. Objections filed by Armenia to the Azerbaijani case will be heard later this month.

The 2020 conflict ended with a Russia-brokered ceasefire agreement that granted Azerbaijan control over parts of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as some adjacent territories.

Azerbaijan waged a lightning military campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh last year that resulted in the vast majority of the region’s 120,000 residents fleeing.

In December, the two sides agreed to begin negotiations on a peace treaty. However, many residents of Armenia’s border regions have resisted the demarcation effort, seeing it as Azerbaijan encroaching on areas they consider their own.

Armenia’s prime minister said last month that the Caucasus nation needs to define its border with Azerbaijan quickly to avoid a new round of hostilities .

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The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Analysis

Research question: Whether geopolitical and ethnic-legal causes of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can lead to its escalation from a local to a regional one.

Hypothesis: Without mutual respect between governments for the ethnonational interests of their opponents, the aggravation of political relationships between Armenia and Azerbaijan concerning the territories of Nagorno-Karabakh is inevitable.

Thesis statement: The Nagorno-Karabakh competition may develop from a local to a regional one, and the escalation of the hostility is inevitable if the geopolitical and national contexts do not change.

Research Precis

Nagorno-Karabakh is the disputable territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and its political destiny is connected with the preservation of ethnonational principles of both sides of the conflict. The investigation focuses on the reasons causing the political and military tension. Understanding the reasons that led to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the parties interested in it allows one to articulate claims concerning possible outcomes in this situation. The research question is whether geopolitical and ethnic-legal causes of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can lead to its escalation from a local to a regional one. It is possible to hypothesize that without mutual respect of the governments for the ethnonational interests of their opponents, the aggravation of political relationships between Armenia and Azerbaijan concerning the territories of Nagorno-Karabakh is inevitable. This political tension led to increased radical opinions among Armenian and Azerbaijan populations concerning the disputable territory. The subsequent polarization of society concerning this issue might cause the dramatic escalation of the military confrontation (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project 1). Therefore, the Nagorno-Karabakh competition may develop from a local to a regional one, and the escalation of the hostility is inevitable if the geopolitical and national contexts do not change.

The main definitions in the current investigation are ethnonational, geopolitical, and state-legal causes of the conflict between Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azerbaijan. The variables that represent the definitions mentioned earlier in the research are the right to self-determination and the state’s territorial integrity. The indicators for these variables that can be measured objectively are the consequences of the collapse of the USSR that led to socio-economic and political disproportions, historical hostility and mutual distrust between the Armenian and Azerbaijani ethnic groups, the negative regional influence of the United States, and Turkey in the Caucasus region, the unbalanced national policy of Azerbaijan (Clark and Yazici 1). Therefore, the concepts of the right to national self-determination and the country’s territorial integrity can be observed, measured, and used in the subsequent investigation using the indicators mentioned above of the variables.

Works Cited

Armed Conflict Location, and Event Data Project. “Civilians Under Fire in Nagorno-Karabakh: September-November 2020.” Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, 2020, pp. 1-2.

Clark, Mason, and Ezgi Yazici. “Erdogan Seeks to Upend Kremlin-Backed Status Quo in Nagorno-Karabakh.” Institute for the Study of War, 2020, pp. 1-3.

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