Scientific Method: Role and Importance Essay
The scientific method is a problem-solving strategy that is at the heart of biology and other sciences. There are five steps included in the scientific method that is making an observation, asking a question, forming a hypothesis or an explanation that could be tested, and predicting the test. After that, in the feedback step that is iterating, the results are used to make new predictions. The scientific method is almost always an iterative process. In other words, rather than a straight line, it is a cycle. The outcome of one round of questioning generates feedback that helps to enhance the next round of questioning.
Science is an activity that involves the logical explanation, prediction, and control of empirical phenomena. The concepts of reasoning applicable to the pursuit of this endeavor are referred to as scientific reasoning (Cowles, 2020). They include topics such as experimental design, hypothesis testing, and data interpretation. All sciences, including social sciences, follow the scientific method (Cowles, 2020). Different questions and tests are asked and performed by scientists in various domains. They do, however, have a common approach to finding logical and evidence-based answers.
Scientific reasoning is fundamental for all types of scientific study, not simply institutional research. Scientists do employ specific ideas that non-scientists do not have to use in everyday life. However, many reasoning principles are useful in everyday life. Even if one is not a scientist, they must use excellent reasoning to understand, anticipate, and regulate the events that occur in the environment. When one wants to start their careers, preserve their finances, or enhance their health, they need to acquire evidence to determine the most effective method for achieving our goals. Good scientific thinking skills come in handy in all of these situations.
Experiments, surveys, case studies, descriptive studies, and non-descriptive studies are all forms of research used in the scientific method. In an experiment, a researcher manipulates certain factors in a controlled environment and assesses their impact on other variables (Black, 2018). Descriptive research focuses on the nature of the relationship between the variables being studied rather than on cause and effect. A case study is a detailed examination of a single instance in which something unexpected has occurred. This is normally done with a single individual in extreme or exceptional instances. Large groups of individuals are polled to answer questions about certain topics in surveys. Correlational approaches are used in non-descriptive investigations to anticipate the link between two or more variables.
The Lau and Chan technique describes how to assess the validity of a theory or hypothesis using the scientific method, also known as the hypothetical-deductive method (Lau & Chan, 2017). For testing theories or hypotheses, the hypothetical-deductive technique (HD method) is highly useful. It is sometimes referred to as “scientific procedure.” This is not quite right because science can’t possibly employ only one approach. However, the HD technique is critical since it is one of the most fundamental approaches used in many scientific disciplines, including economics, physics, and biochemistry. Its implementation can be broken down into four stages. The stages include using the hypothetical-deductive method, identifying the testable hypothesis, generating the predictions according to the hypothesis, and using experiments in order to check the predictions (Cowles, 2020). If the predictions that are tested turn out to be correct, the hypothesis will be confirmed. Suppose the results are incorrect; the hypothesis would be disconfirmed.
The HD method instructs us on how to test a hypothesis, and each scientific theory must be testable.
One cannot discover evidence to illustrate whether a theory is likely or not if it cannot be tested. It cannot be considered scientific information in that circumstance. Consider the possibility that there are ghosts that people cannot see, cannot communicate with, and cannot be detected directly or indirectly. This hypothesis is defined in such a way that testing is not possible. It could still be real, and there could be such ghosts, but people would never know; thus, this cannot be considered a scientific hypothesis. In general, validating a theory’s predictions raises the likelihood that it is right. However, this does not establish definitively that the theory is right in and of itself. When given additional assumptions, a hypothesis frequently creates a prediction. When a forecast fails in this way, the theory may still be valid.
When a theory makes a faulty prediction, it might be difficult to determine whether the theory should be rejected or whether the auxiliary assumptions are flawed. Astronomers in the 19th century, for example, discovered that Newtonian physics could not adequately explain the orbit of the planet Mercury. This is due to the fact that Newtonian physics is incorrect, and you require relativity to get a more accurate orbit prediction. When astronomers discovered Uranus in 1781, they discovered that its orbit did not match Newtonian physics predictions. However, astronomers concluded that it could be explained if Uranus was being affected by another planet, and Neptune was discovered as a result.
I had several instances where I have made assumptions on an important issue regardless of evidence. Once I have prepared the work on the topic of power distribution in the workplace and its relation to gender, I have assumed that possibly because of the general feminine traits, women are less likely to create a strong image of power in comparison with men. In fact, such a hypothesis needs to be tested, and it is testable. For example, I could first define what is meant by feminine traits by collecting data from different biological and psychological sources. After that, I could observe the information regarding what factors or behavior patterns contribute to establishing power in the workplace. If I found the correlation between the feminine character traits, communication style, and behavioral patterns with the distribution of power in the workplace, then I could confirm my hypothesis.
Thus, applying the scientific method can help to improve critical reasoning by using tools from scientific reasoning. By supporting the provided hypothesis with evidence from scientific research and statistical data, one can make their claim more valuable and objective. The scientific method is essential for the creation of scientific theories that explain information and ideas in a scientifically rational manner. In a typical scientific method application, a researcher makes a hypothesis, tests it using various methods, and then alters it based on the results of the tests and experiments. The new hypothesis is then retested, further changed, and retested until it matches observable events and testing results. Hypotheses serve as tools for scientists to collect data in this way. Scientists can build broad general explanations, or scientific theories, based on that evidence and the numerous scientific experiments conducted to investigate possibilities. In conclusion, a scientific method is an important approach to examining the hypothesis. By using the tools of the scientific method, the inferences become rational and objective.
Black, M. (2018). Critical thinking: An introduction to logic and scientific method . Pickle Partners Publishing.
Cowles, H. M. (2020). The Scientific Method . Harvard University Press.
Lau, J., & Chan, J. (2017). Scientific methodology: Tutorials 1-9 .
- Market Research Experiment: Developing and Testing Hypothesis Statements
- Credible Findings of Statistical Studies
- The Cosmic Dance of Siva
- A Trip to Mars: Approximate Time, Attaining Synchrony & Parking Orbit
- Social Research Conduction
- Pragmatic Development Description and Explanation
- Outreach Chicago's Study Variables and Research Design
- Types of Studies for the Outreach Chicago Firm
- Nobel Prize for Natural Experiments
- System Dynamics and Soft Systems and Action Research
- Chicago (A-D)
- Chicago (N-B)
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Scientific Method
Science is an enormously successful human enterprise. The study of scientific method is the attempt to discern the activities by which that success is achieved. Among the activities often identified as characteristic of science are systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories. How these are carried out in detail can vary greatly, but characteristics like these have been looked to as a way of demarcating scientific activity from non-science, where only enterprises which employ some canonical form of scientific method or methods should be considered science (see also the entry on science and pseudo-science ). Others have questioned whether there is anything like a fixed toolkit of methods which is common across science and only science. Some reject privileging one view of method as part of rejecting broader views about the nature of science, such as naturalism (Dupré 2004); some reject any restriction in principle (pluralism).
Scientific method should be distinguished from the aims and products of science, such as knowledge, predictions, or control. Methods are the means by which those goals are achieved. Scientific method should also be distinguished from meta-methodology, which includes the values and justifications behind a particular characterization of scientific method (i.e., a methodology) — values such as objectivity, reproducibility, simplicity, or past successes. Methodological rules are proposed to govern method and it is a meta-methodological question whether methods obeying those rules satisfy given values. Finally, method is distinct, to some degree, from the detailed and contextual practices through which methods are implemented. The latter might range over: specific laboratory techniques; mathematical formalisms or other specialized languages used in descriptions and reasoning; technological or other material means; ways of communicating and sharing results, whether with other scientists or with the public at large; or the conventions, habits, enforced customs, and institutional controls over how and what science is carried out.
While it is important to recognize these distinctions, their boundaries are fuzzy. Hence, accounts of method cannot be entirely divorced from their methodological and meta-methodological motivations or justifications, Moreover, each aspect plays a crucial role in identifying methods. Disputes about method have therefore played out at the detail, rule, and meta-rule levels. Changes in beliefs about the certainty or fallibility of scientific knowledge, for instance (which is a meta-methodological consideration of what we can hope for methods to deliver), have meant different emphases on deductive and inductive reasoning, or on the relative importance attached to reasoning over observation (i.e., differences over particular methods.) Beliefs about the role of science in society will affect the place one gives to values in scientific method.
The issue which has shaped debates over scientific method the most in the last half century is the question of how pluralist do we need to be about method? Unificationists continue to hold out for one method essential to science; nihilism is a form of radical pluralism, which considers the effectiveness of any methodological prescription to be so context sensitive as to render it not explanatory on its own. Some middle degree of pluralism regarding the methods embodied in scientific practice seems appropriate. But the details of scientific practice vary with time and place, from institution to institution, across scientists and their subjects of investigation. How significant are the variations for understanding science and its success? How much can method be abstracted from practice? This entry describes some of the attempts to characterize scientific method or methods, as well as arguments for a more context-sensitive approach to methods embedded in actual scientific practices.
1. Overview and organizing themes
2. historical review: aristotle to mill, 3.1 logical constructionism and operationalism, 3.2. h-d as a logic of confirmation, 3.3. popper and falsificationism, 3.4 meta-methodology and the end of method, 4. statistical methods for hypothesis testing, 5.1 creative and exploratory practices.
- 5.2 Computer methods and the ‘new ways’ of doing science
6.1 “The scientific method” in science education and as seen by scientists
6.2 privileged methods and ‘gold standards’, 6.3 scientific method in the court room, 6.4 deviating practices, 7. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries.
This entry could have been given the title Scientific Methods and gone on to fill volumes, or it could have been extremely short, consisting of a brief summary rejection of the idea that there is any such thing as a unique Scientific Method at all. Both unhappy prospects are due to the fact that scientific activity varies so much across disciplines, times, places, and scientists that any account which manages to unify it all will either consist of overwhelming descriptive detail, or trivial generalizations.
The choice of scope for the present entry is more optimistic, taking a cue from the recent movement in philosophy of science toward a greater attention to practice: to what scientists actually do. This “turn to practice” can be seen as the latest form of studies of methods in science, insofar as it represents an attempt at understanding scientific activity, but through accounts that are neither meant to be universal and unified, nor singular and narrowly descriptive. To some extent, different scientists at different times and places can be said to be using the same method even though, in practice, the details are different.
Whether the context in which methods are carried out is relevant, or to what extent, will depend largely on what one takes the aims of science to be and what one’s own aims are. For most of the history of scientific methodology the assumption has been that the most important output of science is knowledge and so the aim of methodology should be to discover those methods by which scientific knowledge is generated.
Science was seen to embody the most successful form of reasoning (but which form?) to the most certain knowledge claims (but how certain?) on the basis of systematically collected evidence (but what counts as evidence, and should the evidence of the senses take precedence, or rational insight?) Section 2 surveys some of the history, pointing to two major themes. One theme is seeking the right balance between observation and reasoning (and the attendant forms of reasoning which employ them); the other is how certain scientific knowledge is or can be.
Section 3 turns to 20 th century debates on scientific method. In the second half of the 20 th century the epistemic privilege of science faced several challenges and many philosophers of science abandoned the reconstruction of the logic of scientific method. Views changed significantly regarding which functions of science ought to be captured and why. For some, the success of science was better identified with social or cultural features. Historical and sociological turns in the philosophy of science were made, with a demand that greater attention be paid to the non-epistemic aspects of science, such as sociological, institutional, material, and political factors. Even outside of those movements there was an increased specialization in the philosophy of science, with more and more focus on specific fields within science. The combined upshot was very few philosophers arguing any longer for a grand unified methodology of science. Sections 3 and 4 surveys the main positions on scientific method in 20 th century philosophy of science, focusing on where they differ in their preference for confirmation or falsification or for waiving the idea of a special scientific method altogether.
In recent decades, attention has primarily been paid to scientific activities traditionally falling under the rubric of method, such as experimental design and general laboratory practice, the use of statistics, the construction and use of models and diagrams, interdisciplinary collaboration, and science communication. Sections 4–6 attempt to construct a map of the current domains of the study of methods in science.
As these sections illustrate, the question of method is still central to the discourse about science. Scientific method remains a topic for education, for science policy, and for scientists. It arises in the public domain where the demarcation or status of science is at issue. Some philosophers have recently returned, therefore, to the question of what it is that makes science a unique cultural product. This entry will close with some of these recent attempts at discerning and encapsulating the activities by which scientific knowledge is achieved.
Attempting a history of scientific method compounds the vast scope of the topic. This section briefly surveys the background to modern methodological debates. What can be called the classical view goes back to antiquity, and represents a point of departure for later divergences. [ 1 ]
We begin with a point made by Laudan (1968) in his historical survey of scientific method:
Perhaps the most serious inhibition to the emergence of the history of theories of scientific method as a respectable area of study has been the tendency to conflate it with the general history of epistemology, thereby assuming that the narrative categories and classificatory pigeon-holes applied to the latter are also basic to the former. (1968: 5)
To see knowledge about the natural world as falling under knowledge more generally is an understandable conflation. Histories of theories of method would naturally employ the same narrative categories and classificatory pigeon holes. An important theme of the history of epistemology, for example, is the unification of knowledge, a theme reflected in the question of the unification of method in science. Those who have identified differences in kinds of knowledge have often likewise identified different methods for achieving that kind of knowledge (see the entry on the unity of science ).
Different views on what is known, how it is known, and what can be known are connected. Plato distinguished the realms of things into the visible and the intelligible ( The Republic , 510a, in Cooper 1997). Only the latter, the Forms, could be objects of knowledge. The intelligible truths could be known with the certainty of geometry and deductive reasoning. What could be observed of the material world, however, was by definition imperfect and deceptive, not ideal. The Platonic way of knowledge therefore emphasized reasoning as a method, downplaying the importance of observation. Aristotle disagreed, locating the Forms in the natural world as the fundamental principles to be discovered through the inquiry into nature ( Metaphysics Z , in Barnes 1984).
Aristotle is recognized as giving the earliest systematic treatise on the nature of scientific inquiry in the western tradition, one which embraced observation and reasoning about the natural world. In the Prior and Posterior Analytics , Aristotle reflects first on the aims and then the methods of inquiry into nature. A number of features can be found which are still considered by most to be essential to science. For Aristotle, empiricism, careful observation (but passive observation, not controlled experiment), is the starting point. The aim is not merely recording of facts, though. For Aristotle, science ( epistêmê ) is a body of properly arranged knowledge or learning—the empirical facts, but also their ordering and display are of crucial importance. The aims of discovery, ordering, and display of facts partly determine the methods required of successful scientific inquiry. Also determinant is the nature of the knowledge being sought, and the explanatory causes proper to that kind of knowledge (see the discussion of the four causes in the entry on Aristotle on causality ).
In addition to careful observation, then, scientific method requires a logic as a system of reasoning for properly arranging, but also inferring beyond, what is known by observation. Methods of reasoning may include induction, prediction, or analogy, among others. Aristotle’s system (along with his catalogue of fallacious reasoning) was collected under the title the Organon . This title would be echoed in later works on scientific reasoning, such as Novum Organon by Francis Bacon, and Novum Organon Restorum by William Whewell (see below). In Aristotle’s Organon reasoning is divided primarily into two forms, a rough division which persists into modern times. The division, known most commonly today as deductive versus inductive method, appears in other eras and methodologies as analysis/synthesis, non-ampliative/ampliative, or even confirmation/verification. The basic idea is there are two “directions” to proceed in our methods of inquiry: one away from what is observed, to the more fundamental, general, and encompassing principles; the other, from the fundamental and general to instances or implications of principles.
The basic aim and method of inquiry identified here can be seen as a theme running throughout the next two millennia of reflection on the correct way to seek after knowledge: carefully observe nature and then seek rules or principles which explain or predict its operation. The Aristotelian corpus provided the framework for a commentary tradition on scientific method independent of science itself (cosmos versus physics.) During the medieval period, figures such as Albertus Magnus (1206–1280), Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Robert Grosseteste (1175–1253), Roger Bacon (1214/1220–1292), William of Ockham (1287–1347), Andreas Vesalius (1514–1546), Giacomo Zabarella (1533–1589) all worked to clarify the kind of knowledge obtainable by observation and induction, the source of justification of induction, and best rules for its application. [ 2 ] Many of their contributions we now think of as essential to science (see also Laudan 1968). As Aristotle and Plato had employed a framework of reasoning either “to the forms” or “away from the forms”, medieval thinkers employed directions away from the phenomena or back to the phenomena. In analysis, a phenomena was examined to discover its basic explanatory principles; in synthesis, explanations of a phenomena were constructed from first principles.
During the Scientific Revolution these various strands of argument, experiment, and reason were forged into a dominant epistemic authority. The 16 th –18 th centuries were a period of not only dramatic advance in knowledge about the operation of the natural world—advances in mechanical, medical, biological, political, economic explanations—but also of self-awareness of the revolutionary changes taking place, and intense reflection on the source and legitimation of the method by which the advances were made. The struggle to establish the new authority included methodological moves. The Book of Nature, according to the metaphor of Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) or Francis Bacon (1561–1626), was written in the language of mathematics, of geometry and number. This motivated an emphasis on mathematical description and mechanical explanation as important aspects of scientific method. Through figures such as Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, a neo-Platonic emphasis on the importance of metaphysical reflection on nature behind appearances, particularly regarding the spiritual as a complement to the purely mechanical, remained an important methodological thread of the Scientific Revolution (see the entries on Cambridge platonists ; Boyle ; Henry More ; Galileo ).
In Novum Organum (1620), Bacon was critical of the Aristotelian method for leaping from particulars to universals too quickly. The syllogistic form of reasoning readily mixed those two types of propositions. Bacon aimed at the invention of new arts, principles, and directions. His method would be grounded in methodical collection of observations, coupled with correction of our senses (and particularly, directions for the avoidance of the Idols, as he called them, kinds of systematic errors to which naïve observers are prone.) The community of scientists could then climb, by a careful, gradual and unbroken ascent, to reliable general claims.
Bacon’s method has been criticized as impractical and too inflexible for the practicing scientist. Whewell would later criticize Bacon in his System of Logic for paying too little attention to the practices of scientists. It is hard to find convincing examples of Bacon’s method being put in to practice in the history of science, but there are a few who have been held up as real examples of 16 th century scientific, inductive method, even if not in the rigid Baconian mold: figures such as Robert Boyle (1627–1691) and William Harvey (1578–1657) (see the entry on Bacon ).
It is to Isaac Newton (1642–1727), however, that historians of science and methodologists have paid greatest attention. Given the enormous success of his Principia Mathematica and Opticks , this is understandable. The study of Newton’s method has had two main thrusts: the implicit method of the experiments and reasoning presented in the Opticks, and the explicit methodological rules given as the Rules for Philosophising (the Regulae) in Book III of the Principia . [ 3 ] Newton’s law of gravitation, the linchpin of his new cosmology, broke with explanatory conventions of natural philosophy, first for apparently proposing action at a distance, but more generally for not providing “true”, physical causes. The argument for his System of the World ( Principia , Book III) was based on phenomena, not reasoned first principles. This was viewed (mainly on the continent) as insufficient for proper natural philosophy. The Regulae counter this objection, re-defining the aims of natural philosophy by re-defining the method natural philosophers should follow. (See the entry on Newton’s philosophy .)
To his list of methodological prescriptions should be added Newton’s famous phrase “ hypotheses non fingo ” (commonly translated as “I frame no hypotheses”.) The scientist was not to invent systems but infer explanations from observations, as Bacon had advocated. This would come to be known as inductivism. In the century after Newton, significant clarifications of the Newtonian method were made. Colin Maclaurin (1698–1746), for instance, reconstructed the essential structure of the method as having complementary analysis and synthesis phases, one proceeding away from the phenomena in generalization, the other from the general propositions to derive explanations of new phenomena. Denis Diderot (1713–1784) and editors of the Encyclopédie did much to consolidate and popularize Newtonianism, as did Francesco Algarotti (1721–1764). The emphasis was often the same, as much on the character of the scientist as on their process, a character which is still commonly assumed. The scientist is humble in the face of nature, not beholden to dogma, obeys only his eyes, and follows the truth wherever it leads. It was certainly Voltaire (1694–1778) and du Chatelet (1706–1749) who were most influential in propagating the latter vision of the scientist and their craft, with Newton as hero. Scientific method became a revolutionary force of the Enlightenment. (See also the entries on Newton , Leibniz , Descartes , Boyle , Hume , enlightenment , as well as Shank 2008 for a historical overview.)
Not all 18 th century reflections on scientific method were so celebratory. Famous also are George Berkeley’s (1685–1753) attack on the mathematics of the new science, as well as the over-emphasis of Newtonians on observation; and David Hume’s (1711–1776) undermining of the warrant offered for scientific claims by inductive justification (see the entries on: George Berkeley ; David Hume ; Hume’s Newtonianism and Anti-Newtonianism ). Hume’s problem of induction motivated Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) to seek new foundations for empirical method, though as an epistemic reconstruction, not as any set of practical guidelines for scientists. Both Hume and Kant influenced the methodological reflections of the next century, such as the debate between Mill and Whewell over the certainty of inductive inferences in science.
The debate between John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) and William Whewell (1794–1866) has become the canonical methodological debate of the 19 th century. Although often characterized as a debate between inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism, the role of the two methods on each side is actually more complex. On the hypothetico-deductive account, scientists work to come up with hypotheses from which true observational consequences can be deduced—hence, hypothetico-deductive. Because Whewell emphasizes both hypotheses and deduction in his account of method, he can be seen as a convenient foil to the inductivism of Mill. However, equally if not more important to Whewell’s portrayal of scientific method is what he calls the “fundamental antithesis”. Knowledge is a product of the objective (what we see in the world around us) and subjective (the contributions of our mind to how we perceive and understand what we experience, which he called the Fundamental Ideas). Both elements are essential according to Whewell, and he was therefore critical of Kant for too much focus on the subjective, and John Locke (1632–1704) and Mill for too much focus on the senses. Whewell’s fundamental ideas can be discipline relative. An idea can be fundamental even if it is necessary for knowledge only within a given scientific discipline (e.g., chemical affinity for chemistry). This distinguishes fundamental ideas from the forms and categories of intuition of Kant. (See the entry on Whewell .)
Clarifying fundamental ideas would therefore be an essential part of scientific method and scientific progress. Whewell called this process “Discoverer’s Induction”. It was induction, following Bacon or Newton, but Whewell sought to revive Bacon’s account by emphasising the role of ideas in the clear and careful formulation of inductive hypotheses. Whewell’s induction is not merely the collecting of objective facts. The subjective plays a role through what Whewell calls the Colligation of Facts, a creative act of the scientist, the invention of a theory. A theory is then confirmed by testing, where more facts are brought under the theory, called the Consilience of Inductions. Whewell felt that this was the method by which the true laws of nature could be discovered: clarification of fundamental concepts, clever invention of explanations, and careful testing. Mill, in his critique of Whewell, and others who have cast Whewell as a fore-runner of the hypothetico-deductivist view, seem to have under-estimated the importance of this discovery phase in Whewell’s understanding of method (Snyder 1997a,b, 1999). Down-playing the discovery phase would come to characterize methodology of the early 20 th century (see section 3 ).
Mill, in his System of Logic , put forward a narrower view of induction as the essence of scientific method. For Mill, induction is the search first for regularities among events. Among those regularities, some will continue to hold for further observations, eventually gaining the status of laws. One can also look for regularities among the laws discovered in a domain, i.e., for a law of laws. Which “law law” will hold is time and discipline dependent and open to revision. One example is the Law of Universal Causation, and Mill put forward specific methods for identifying causes—now commonly known as Mill’s methods. These five methods look for circumstances which are common among the phenomena of interest, those which are absent when the phenomena are, or those for which both vary together. Mill’s methods are still seen as capturing basic intuitions about experimental methods for finding the relevant explanatory factors ( System of Logic (1843), see Mill entry). The methods advocated by Whewell and Mill, in the end, look similar. Both involve inductive generalization to covering laws. They differ dramatically, however, with respect to the necessity of the knowledge arrived at; that is, at the meta-methodological level (see the entries on Whewell and Mill entries).
3. Logic of method and critical responses
The quantum and relativistic revolutions in physics in the early 20 th century had a profound effect on methodology. Conceptual foundations of both theories were taken to show the defeasibility of even the most seemingly secure intuitions about space, time and bodies. Certainty of knowledge about the natural world was therefore recognized as unattainable. Instead a renewed empiricism was sought which rendered science fallible but still rationally justifiable.
Analyses of the reasoning of scientists emerged, according to which the aspects of scientific method which were of primary importance were the means of testing and confirming of theories. A distinction in methodology was made between the contexts of discovery and justification. The distinction could be used as a wedge between the particularities of where and how theories or hypotheses are arrived at, on the one hand, and the underlying reasoning scientists use (whether or not they are aware of it) when assessing theories and judging their adequacy on the basis of the available evidence. By and large, for most of the 20 th century, philosophy of science focused on the second context, although philosophers differed on whether to focus on confirmation or refutation as well as on the many details of how confirmation or refutation could or could not be brought about. By the mid-20 th century these attempts at defining the method of justification and the context distinction itself came under pressure. During the same period, philosophy of science developed rapidly, and from section 4 this entry will therefore shift from a primarily historical treatment of the scientific method towards a primarily thematic one.
Advances in logic and probability held out promise of the possibility of elaborate reconstructions of scientific theories and empirical method, the best example being Rudolf Carnap’s The Logical Structure of the World (1928). Carnap attempted to show that a scientific theory could be reconstructed as a formal axiomatic system—that is, a logic. That system could refer to the world because some of its basic sentences could be interpreted as observations or operations which one could perform to test them. The rest of the theoretical system, including sentences using theoretical or unobservable terms (like electron or force) would then either be meaningful because they could be reduced to observations, or they had purely logical meanings (called analytic, like mathematical identities). This has been referred to as the verifiability criterion of meaning. According to the criterion, any statement not either analytic or verifiable was strictly meaningless. Although the view was endorsed by Carnap in 1928, he would later come to see it as too restrictive (Carnap 1956). Another familiar version of this idea is operationalism of Percy William Bridgman. In The Logic of Modern Physics (1927) Bridgman asserted that every physical concept could be defined in terms of the operations one would perform to verify the application of that concept. Making good on the operationalisation of a concept even as simple as length, however, can easily become enormously complex (for measuring very small lengths, for instance) or impractical (measuring large distances like light years.)
Carl Hempel’s (1950, 1951) criticisms of the verifiability criterion of meaning had enormous influence. He pointed out that universal generalizations, such as most scientific laws, were not strictly meaningful on the criterion. Verifiability and operationalism both seemed too restrictive to capture standard scientific aims and practice. The tenuous connection between these reconstructions and actual scientific practice was criticized in another way. In both approaches, scientific methods are instead recast in methodological roles. Measurements, for example, were looked to as ways of giving meanings to terms. The aim of the philosopher of science was not to understand the methods per se , but to use them to reconstruct theories, their meanings, and their relation to the world. When scientists perform these operations, however, they will not report that they are doing them to give meaning to terms in a formal axiomatic system. This disconnect between methodology and the details of actual scientific practice would seem to violate the empiricism the Logical Positivists and Bridgman were committed to. The view that methodology should correspond to practice (to some extent) has been called historicism, or intuitionism. We turn to these criticisms and responses in section 3.4 . [ 4 ]
Positivism also had to contend with the recognition that a purely inductivist approach, along the lines of Bacon-Newton-Mill, was untenable. There was no pure observation, for starters. All observation was theory laden. Theory is required to make any observation, therefore not all theory can be derived from observation alone. (See the entry on theory and observation in science .) Even granting an observational basis, Hume had already pointed out that one could not deductively justify inductive conclusions without begging the question by presuming the success of the inductive method. Likewise, positivist attempts at analyzing how a generalization can be confirmed by observations of its instances were subject to a number of criticisms. Goodman (1965) and Hempel (1965) both point to paradoxes inherent in standard accounts of confirmation. Recent attempts at explaining how observations can serve to confirm a scientific theory are discussed in section 4 below.
The standard starting point for a non-inductive analysis of the logic of confirmation is known as the Hypothetico-Deductive (H-D) method. In its simplest form, a sentence of a theory which expresses some hypothesis is confirmed by its true consequences. As noted in section 2 , this method had been advanced by Whewell in the 19 th century, as well as Nicod (1924) and others in the 20 th century. Often, Hempel’s (1966) description of the H-D method, illustrated by the case of Semmelweiss’ inferential procedures in establishing the cause of childbed fever, has been presented as a key account of H-D as well as a foil for criticism of the H-D account of confirmation (see, for example, Lipton’s (2004) discussion of inference to the best explanation; also the entry on confirmation ). Hempel described Semmelsweiss’ procedure as examining various hypotheses explaining the cause of childbed fever. Some hypotheses conflicted with observable facts and could be rejected as false immediately. Others needed to be tested experimentally by deducing which observable events should follow if the hypothesis were true (what Hempel called the test implications of the hypothesis), then conducting an experiment and observing whether or not the test implications occurred. If the experiment showed the test implication to be false, the hypothesis could be rejected. If the experiment showed the test implications to be true, however, this did not prove the hypothesis true. The confirmation of a test implication does not verify a hypothesis, though Hempel did allow that “it provides at least some support, some corroboration or confirmation for it” (Hempel 1966: 8). The degree of this support then depends on the quantity, variety and precision of the supporting evidence.
Another approach that took off from the difficulties with inductive inference was Karl Popper’s critical rationalism or falsificationism (Popper 1959, 1963). Falsification is deductive and similar to H-D in that it involves scientists deducing observational consequences from the hypothesis under test. For Popper, however, the important point was not the degree of confirmation that successful prediction offered to a hypothesis. The crucial thing was the logical asymmetry between confirmation, based on inductive inference, and falsification, which can be based on a deductive inference. (This simple opposition was later questioned, by Lakatos, among others. See the entry on historicist theories of scientific rationality. )
Popper stressed that, regardless of the amount of confirming evidence, we can never be certain that a hypothesis is true without committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Instead, Popper introduced the notion of corroboration as a measure for how well a theory or hypothesis has survived previous testing—but without implying that this is also a measure for the probability that it is true.
Popper was also motivated by his doubts about the scientific status of theories like the Marxist theory of history or psycho-analysis, and so wanted to demarcate between science and pseudo-science. Popper saw this as an importantly different distinction than demarcating science from metaphysics. The latter demarcation was the primary concern of many logical empiricists. Popper used the idea of falsification to draw a line instead between pseudo and proper science. Science was science because its method involved subjecting theories to rigorous tests which offered a high probability of failing and thus refuting the theory.
A commitment to the risk of failure was important. Avoiding falsification could be done all too easily. If a consequence of a theory is inconsistent with observations, an exception can be added by introducing auxiliary hypotheses designed explicitly to save the theory, so-called ad hoc modifications. This Popper saw done in pseudo-science where ad hoc theories appeared capable of explaining anything in their field of application. In contrast, science is risky. If observations showed the predictions from a theory to be wrong, the theory would be refuted. Hence, scientific hypotheses must be falsifiable. Not only must there exist some possible observation statement which could falsify the hypothesis or theory, were it observed, (Popper called these the hypothesis’ potential falsifiers) it is crucial to the Popperian scientific method that such falsifications be sincerely attempted on a regular basis.
The more potential falsifiers of a hypothesis, the more falsifiable it would be, and the more the hypothesis claimed. Conversely, hypotheses without falsifiers claimed very little or nothing at all. Originally, Popper thought that this meant the introduction of ad hoc hypotheses only to save a theory should not be countenanced as good scientific method. These would undermine the falsifiabililty of a theory. However, Popper later came to recognize that the introduction of modifications (immunizations, he called them) was often an important part of scientific development. Responding to surprising or apparently falsifying observations often generated important new scientific insights. Popper’s own example was the observed motion of Uranus which originally did not agree with Newtonian predictions. The ad hoc hypothesis of an outer planet explained the disagreement and led to further falsifiable predictions. Popper sought to reconcile the view by blurring the distinction between falsifiable and not falsifiable, and speaking instead of degrees of testability (Popper 1985: 41f.).
From the 1960s on, sustained meta-methodological criticism emerged that drove philosophical focus away from scientific method. A brief look at those criticisms follows, with recommendations for further reading at the end of the entry.
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) begins with a well-known shot across the bow for philosophers of science:
History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed. (1962: 1)
The image Kuhn thought needed transforming was the a-historical, rational reconstruction sought by many of the Logical Positivists, though Carnap and other positivists were actually quite sympathetic to Kuhn’s views. (See the entry on the Vienna Circle .) Kuhn shares with other of his contemporaries, such as Feyerabend and Lakatos, a commitment to a more empirical approach to philosophy of science. Namely, the history of science provides important data, and necessary checks, for philosophy of science, including any theory of scientific method.
The history of science reveals, according to Kuhn, that scientific development occurs in alternating phases. During normal science, the members of the scientific community adhere to the paradigm in place. Their commitment to the paradigm means a commitment to the puzzles to be solved and the acceptable ways of solving them. Confidence in the paradigm remains so long as steady progress is made in solving the shared puzzles. Method in this normal phase operates within a disciplinary matrix (Kuhn’s later concept of a paradigm) which includes standards for problem solving, and defines the range of problems to which the method should be applied. An important part of a disciplinary matrix is the set of values which provide the norms and aims for scientific method. The main values that Kuhn identifies are prediction, problem solving, simplicity, consistency, and plausibility.
An important by-product of normal science is the accumulation of puzzles which cannot be solved with resources of the current paradigm. Once accumulation of these anomalies has reached some critical mass, it can trigger a communal shift to a new paradigm and a new phase of normal science. Importantly, the values that provide the norms and aims for scientific method may have transformed in the meantime. Method may therefore be relative to discipline, time or place
Feyerabend also identified the aims of science as progress, but argued that any methodological prescription would only stifle that progress (Feyerabend 1988). His arguments are grounded in re-examining accepted “myths” about the history of science. Heroes of science, like Galileo, are shown to be just as reliant on rhetoric and persuasion as they are on reason and demonstration. Others, like Aristotle, are shown to be far more reasonable and far-reaching in their outlooks then they are given credit for. As a consequence, the only rule that could provide what he took to be sufficient freedom was the vacuous “anything goes”. More generally, even the methodological restriction that science is the best way to pursue knowledge, and to increase knowledge, is too restrictive. Feyerabend suggested instead that science might, in fact, be a threat to a free society, because it and its myth had become so dominant (Feyerabend 1978).
An even more fundamental kind of criticism was offered by several sociologists of science from the 1970s onwards who rejected the methodology of providing philosophical accounts for the rational development of science and sociological accounts of the irrational mistakes. Instead, they adhered to a symmetry thesis on which any causal explanation of how scientific knowledge is established needs to be symmetrical in explaining truth and falsity, rationality and irrationality, success and mistakes, by the same causal factors (see, e.g., Barnes and Bloor 1982, Bloor 1991). Movements in the Sociology of Science, like the Strong Programme, or in the social dimensions and causes of knowledge more generally led to extended and close examination of detailed case studies in contemporary science and its history. (See the entries on the social dimensions of scientific knowledge and social epistemology .) Well-known examinations by Latour and Woolgar (1979/1986), Knorr-Cetina (1981), Pickering (1984), Shapin and Schaffer (1985) seem to bear out that it was social ideologies (on a macro-scale) or individual interactions and circumstances (on a micro-scale) which were the primary causal factors in determining which beliefs gained the status of scientific knowledge. As they saw it therefore, explanatory appeals to scientific method were not empirically grounded.
A late, and largely unexpected, criticism of scientific method came from within science itself. Beginning in the early 2000s, a number of scientists attempting to replicate the results of published experiments could not do so. There may be close conceptual connection between reproducibility and method. For example, if reproducibility means that the same scientific methods ought to produce the same result, and all scientific results ought to be reproducible, then whatever it takes to reproduce a scientific result ought to be called scientific method. Space limits us to the observation that, insofar as reproducibility is a desired outcome of proper scientific method, it is not strictly a part of scientific method. (See the entry on reproducibility of scientific results .)
By the close of the 20 th century the search for the scientific method was flagging. Nola and Sankey (2000b) could introduce their volume on method by remarking that “For some, the whole idea of a theory of scientific method is yester-year’s debate …”.
Despite the many difficulties that philosophers encountered in trying to providing a clear methodology of conformation (or refutation), still important progress has been made on understanding how observation can provide evidence for a given theory. Work in statistics has been crucial for understanding how theories can be tested empirically, and in recent decades a huge literature has developed that attempts to recast confirmation in Bayesian terms. Here these developments can be covered only briefly, and we refer to the entry on confirmation for further details and references.
Statistics has come to play an increasingly important role in the methodology of the experimental sciences from the 19 th century onwards. At that time, statistics and probability theory took on a methodological role as an analysis of inductive inference, and attempts to ground the rationality of induction in the axioms of probability theory have continued throughout the 20 th century and in to the present. Developments in the theory of statistics itself, meanwhile, have had a direct and immense influence on the experimental method, including methods for measuring the uncertainty of observations such as the Method of Least Squares developed by Legendre and Gauss in the early 19 th century, criteria for the rejection of outliers proposed by Peirce by the mid-19 th century, and the significance tests developed by Gosset (a.k.a. “Student”), Fisher, Neyman & Pearson and others in the 1920s and 1930s (see, e.g., Swijtink 1987 for a brief historical overview; and also the entry on C.S. Peirce ).
These developments within statistics then in turn led to a reflective discussion among both statisticians and philosophers of science on how to perceive the process of hypothesis testing: whether it was a rigorous statistical inference that could provide a numerical expression of the degree of confidence in the tested hypothesis, or if it should be seen as a decision between different courses of actions that also involved a value component. This led to a major controversy among Fisher on the one side and Neyman and Pearson on the other (see especially Fisher 1955, Neyman 1956 and Pearson 1955, and for analyses of the controversy, e.g., Howie 2002, Marks 2000, Lenhard 2006). On Fisher’s view, hypothesis testing was a methodology for when to accept or reject a statistical hypothesis, namely that a hypothesis should be rejected by evidence if this evidence would be unlikely relative to other possible outcomes, given the hypothesis were true. In contrast, on Neyman and Pearson’s view, the consequence of error also had to play a role when deciding between hypotheses. Introducing the distinction between the error of rejecting a true hypothesis (type I error) and accepting a false hypothesis (type II error), they argued that it depends on the consequences of the error to decide whether it is more important to avoid rejecting a true hypothesis or accepting a false one. Hence, Fisher aimed for a theory of inductive inference that enabled a numerical expression of confidence in a hypothesis. To him, the important point was the search for truth, not utility. In contrast, the Neyman-Pearson approach provided a strategy of inductive behaviour for deciding between different courses of action. Here, the important point was not whether a hypothesis was true, but whether one should act as if it was.
Similar discussions are found in the philosophical literature. On the one side, Churchman (1948) and Rudner (1953) argued that because scientific hypotheses can never be completely verified, a complete analysis of the methods of scientific inference includes ethical judgments in which the scientists must decide whether the evidence is sufficiently strong or that the probability is sufficiently high to warrant the acceptance of the hypothesis, which again will depend on the importance of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting the hypothesis. Others, such as Jeffrey (1956) and Levi (1960) disagreed and instead defended a value-neutral view of science on which scientists should bracket their attitudes, preferences, temperament, and values when assessing the correctness of their inferences. For more details on this value-free ideal in the philosophy of science and its historical development, see Douglas (2009) and Howard (2003). For a broad set of case studies examining the role of values in science, see e.g. Elliott & Richards 2017.
In recent decades, philosophical discussions of the evaluation of probabilistic hypotheses by statistical inference have largely focused on Bayesianism that understands probability as a measure of a person’s degree of belief in an event, given the available information, and frequentism that instead understands probability as a long-run frequency of a repeatable event. Hence, for Bayesians probabilities refer to a state of knowledge, whereas for frequentists probabilities refer to frequencies of events (see, e.g., Sober 2008, chapter 1 for a detailed introduction to Bayesianism and frequentism as well as to likelihoodism). Bayesianism aims at providing a quantifiable, algorithmic representation of belief revision, where belief revision is a function of prior beliefs (i.e., background knowledge) and incoming evidence. Bayesianism employs a rule based on Bayes’ theorem, a theorem of the probability calculus which relates conditional probabilities. The probability that a particular hypothesis is true is interpreted as a degree of belief, or credence, of the scientist. There will also be a probability and a degree of belief that a hypothesis will be true conditional on a piece of evidence (an observation, say) being true. Bayesianism proscribes that it is rational for the scientist to update their belief in the hypothesis to that conditional probability should it turn out that the evidence is, in fact, observed (see, e.g., Sprenger & Hartmann 2019 for a comprehensive treatment of Bayesian philosophy of science). Originating in the work of Neyman and Person, frequentism aims at providing the tools for reducing long-run error rates, such as the error-statistical approach developed by Mayo (1996) that focuses on how experimenters can avoid both type I and type II errors by building up a repertoire of procedures that detect errors if and only if they are present. Both Bayesianism and frequentism have developed over time, they are interpreted in different ways by its various proponents, and their relations to previous criticism to attempts at defining scientific method are seen differently by proponents and critics. The literature, surveys, reviews and criticism in this area are vast and the reader is referred to the entries on Bayesian epistemology and confirmation .
5. Method in Practice
Attention to scientific practice, as we have seen, is not itself new. However, the turn to practice in the philosophy of science of late can be seen as a correction to the pessimism with respect to method in philosophy of science in later parts of the 20 th century, and as an attempted reconciliation between sociological and rationalist explanations of scientific knowledge. Much of this work sees method as detailed and context specific problem-solving procedures, and methodological analyses to be at the same time descriptive, critical and advisory (see Nickles 1987 for an exposition of this view). The following section contains a survey of some of the practice focuses. In this section we turn fully to topics rather than chronology.
A problem with the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification that figured so prominently in philosophy of science in the first half of the 20 th century (see section 2 ) is that no such distinction can be clearly seen in scientific activity (see Arabatzis 2006). Thus, in recent decades, it has been recognized that study of conceptual innovation and change should not be confined to psychology and sociology of science, but are also important aspects of scientific practice which philosophy of science should address (see also the entry on scientific discovery ). Looking for the practices that drive conceptual innovation has led philosophers to examine both the reasoning practices of scientists and the wide realm of experimental practices that are not directed narrowly at testing hypotheses, that is, exploratory experimentation.
Examining the reasoning practices of historical and contemporary scientists, Nersessian (2008) has argued that new scientific concepts are constructed as solutions to specific problems by systematic reasoning, and that of analogy, visual representation and thought-experimentation are among the important reasoning practices employed. These ubiquitous forms of reasoning are reliable—but also fallible—methods of conceptual development and change. On her account, model-based reasoning consists of cycles of construction, simulation, evaluation and adaption of models that serve as interim interpretations of the target problem to be solved. Often, this process will lead to modifications or extensions, and a new cycle of simulation and evaluation. However, Nersessian also emphasizes that
creative model-based reasoning cannot be applied as a simple recipe, is not always productive of solutions, and even its most exemplary usages can lead to incorrect solutions. (Nersessian 2008: 11)
Thus, while on the one hand she agrees with many previous philosophers that there is no logic of discovery, discoveries can derive from reasoned processes, such that a large and integral part of scientific practice is
the creation of concepts through which to comprehend, structure, and communicate about physical phenomena …. (Nersessian 1987: 11)
Similarly, work on heuristics for discovery and theory construction by scholars such as Darden (1991) and Bechtel & Richardson (1993) present science as problem solving and investigate scientific problem solving as a special case of problem-solving in general. Drawing largely on cases from the biological sciences, much of their focus has been on reasoning strategies for the generation, evaluation, and revision of mechanistic explanations of complex systems.
Addressing another aspect of the context distinction, namely the traditional view that the primary role of experiments is to test theoretical hypotheses according to the H-D model, other philosophers of science have argued for additional roles that experiments can play. The notion of exploratory experimentation was introduced to describe experiments driven by the desire to obtain empirical regularities and to develop concepts and classifications in which these regularities can be described (Steinle 1997, 2002; Burian 1997; Waters 2007)). However the difference between theory driven experimentation and exploratory experimentation should not be seen as a sharp distinction. Theory driven experiments are not always directed at testing hypothesis, but may also be directed at various kinds of fact-gathering, such as determining numerical parameters. Vice versa , exploratory experiments are usually informed by theory in various ways and are therefore not theory-free. Instead, in exploratory experiments phenomena are investigated without first limiting the possible outcomes of the experiment on the basis of extant theory about the phenomena.
The development of high throughput instrumentation in molecular biology and neighbouring fields has given rise to a special type of exploratory experimentation that collects and analyses very large amounts of data, and these new ‘omics’ disciplines are often said to represent a break with the ideal of hypothesis-driven science (Burian 2007; Elliott 2007; Waters 2007; O’Malley 2007) and instead described as data-driven research (Leonelli 2012; Strasser 2012) or as a special kind of “convenience experimentation” in which many experiments are done simply because they are extraordinarily convenient to perform (Krohs 2012).
5.2 Computer methods and ‘new ways’ of doing science
The field of omics just described is possible because of the ability of computers to process, in a reasonable amount of time, the huge quantities of data required. Computers allow for more elaborate experimentation (higher speed, better filtering, more variables, sophisticated coordination and control), but also, through modelling and simulations, might constitute a form of experimentation themselves. Here, too, we can pose a version of the general question of method versus practice: does the practice of using computers fundamentally change scientific method, or merely provide a more efficient means of implementing standard methods?
Because computers can be used to automate measurements, quantifications, calculations, and statistical analyses where, for practical reasons, these operations cannot be otherwise carried out, many of the steps involved in reaching a conclusion on the basis of an experiment are now made inside a “black box”, without the direct involvement or awareness of a human. This has epistemological implications, regarding what we can know, and how we can know it. To have confidence in the results, computer methods are therefore subjected to tests of verification and validation.
The distinction between verification and validation is easiest to characterize in the case of computer simulations. In a typical computer simulation scenario computers are used to numerically integrate differential equations for which no analytic solution is available. The equations are part of the model the scientist uses to represent a phenomenon or system under investigation. Verifying a computer simulation means checking that the equations of the model are being correctly approximated. Validating a simulation means checking that the equations of the model are adequate for the inferences one wants to make on the basis of that model.
A number of issues related to computer simulations have been raised. The identification of validity and verification as the testing methods has been criticized. Oreskes et al. (1994) raise concerns that “validiation”, because it suggests deductive inference, might lead to over-confidence in the results of simulations. The distinction itself is probably too clean, since actual practice in the testing of simulations mixes and moves back and forth between the two (Weissart 1997; Parker 2008a; Winsberg 2010). Computer simulations do seem to have a non-inductive character, given that the principles by which they operate are built in by the programmers, and any results of the simulation follow from those in-built principles in such a way that those results could, in principle, be deduced from the program code and its inputs. The status of simulations as experiments has therefore been examined (Kaufmann and Smarr 1993; Humphreys 1995; Hughes 1999; Norton and Suppe 2001). This literature considers the epistemology of these experiments: what we can learn by simulation, and also the kinds of justifications which can be given in applying that knowledge to the “real” world. (Mayo 1996; Parker 2008b). As pointed out, part of the advantage of computer simulation derives from the fact that huge numbers of calculations can be carried out without requiring direct observation by the experimenter/simulator. At the same time, many of these calculations are approximations to the calculations which would be performed first-hand in an ideal situation. Both factors introduce uncertainties into the inferences drawn from what is observed in the simulation.
For many of the reasons described above, computer simulations do not seem to belong clearly to either the experimental or theoretical domain. Rather, they seem to crucially involve aspects of both. This has led some authors, such as Fox Keller (2003: 200) to argue that we ought to consider computer simulation a “qualitatively different way of doing science”. The literature in general tends to follow Kaufmann and Smarr (1993) in referring to computer simulation as a “third way” for scientific methodology (theoretical reasoning and experimental practice are the first two ways.). It should also be noted that the debates around these issues have tended to focus on the form of computer simulation typical in the physical sciences, where models are based on dynamical equations. Other forms of simulation might not have the same problems, or have problems of their own (see the entry on computer simulations in science ).
In recent years, the rapid development of machine learning techniques has prompted some scholars to suggest that the scientific method has become “obsolete” (Anderson 2008, Carrol and Goodstein 2009). This has resulted in an intense debate on the relative merit of data-driven and hypothesis-driven research (for samples, see e.g. Mazzocchi 2015 or Succi and Coveney 2018). For a detailed treatment of this topic, we refer to the entry scientific research and big data .
6. Discourse on scientific method
Despite philosophical disagreements, the idea of the scientific method still figures prominently in contemporary discourse on many different topics, both within science and in society at large. Often, reference to scientific method is used in ways that convey either the legend of a single, universal method characteristic of all science, or grants to a particular method or set of methods privilege as a special ‘gold standard’, often with reference to particular philosophers to vindicate the claims. Discourse on scientific method also typically arises when there is a need to distinguish between science and other activities, or for justifying the special status conveyed to science. In these areas, the philosophical attempts at identifying a set of methods characteristic for scientific endeavors are closely related to the philosophy of science’s classical problem of demarcation (see the entry on science and pseudo-science ) and to the philosophical analysis of the social dimension of scientific knowledge and the role of science in democratic society.
One of the settings in which the legend of a single, universal scientific method has been particularly strong is science education (see, e.g., Bauer 1992; McComas 1996; Wivagg & Allchin 2002). [ 5 ] Often, ‘the scientific method’ is presented in textbooks and educational web pages as a fixed four or five step procedure starting from observations and description of a phenomenon and progressing over formulation of a hypothesis which explains the phenomenon, designing and conducting experiments to test the hypothesis, analyzing the results, and ending with drawing a conclusion. Such references to a universal scientific method can be found in educational material at all levels of science education (Blachowicz 2009), and numerous studies have shown that the idea of a general and universal scientific method often form part of both students’ and teachers’ conception of science (see, e.g., Aikenhead 1987; Osborne et al. 2003). In response, it has been argued that science education need to focus more on teaching about the nature of science, although views have differed on whether this is best done through student-led investigations, contemporary cases, or historical cases (Allchin, Andersen & Nielsen 2014)
Although occasionally phrased with reference to the H-D method, important historical roots of the legend in science education of a single, universal scientific method are the American philosopher and psychologist Dewey’s account of inquiry in How We Think (1910) and the British mathematician Karl Pearson’s account of science in Grammar of Science (1892). On Dewey’s account, inquiry is divided into the five steps of
(i) a felt difficulty, (ii) its location and definition, (iii) suggestion of a possible solution, (iv) development by reasoning of the bearing of the suggestions, (v) further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection. (Dewey 1910: 72)
Similarly, on Pearson’s account, scientific investigations start with measurement of data and observation of their correction and sequence from which scientific laws can be discovered with the aid of creative imagination. These laws have to be subject to criticism, and their final acceptance will have equal validity for “all normally constituted minds”. Both Dewey’s and Pearson’s accounts should be seen as generalized abstractions of inquiry and not restricted to the realm of science—although both Dewey and Pearson referred to their respective accounts as ‘the scientific method’.
Occasionally, scientists make sweeping statements about a simple and distinct scientific method, as exemplified by Feynman’s simplified version of a conjectures and refutations method presented, for example, in the last of his 1964 Cornell Messenger lectures. [ 6 ] However, just as often scientists have come to the same conclusion as recent philosophy of science that there is not any unique, easily described scientific method. For example, the physicist and Nobel Laureate Weinberg described in the paper “The Methods of Science … And Those By Which We Live” (1995) how
The fact that the standards of scientific success shift with time does not only make the philosophy of science difficult; it also raises problems for the public understanding of science. We do not have a fixed scientific method to rally around and defend. (1995: 8)
Interview studies with scientists on their conception of method shows that scientists often find it hard to figure out whether available evidence confirms their hypothesis, and that there are no direct translations between general ideas about method and specific strategies to guide how research is conducted (Schickore & Hangel 2019, Hangel & Schickore 2017)
Reference to the scientific method has also often been used to argue for the scientific nature or special status of a particular activity. Philosophical positions that argue for a simple and unique scientific method as a criterion of demarcation, such as Popperian falsification, have often attracted practitioners who felt that they had a need to defend their domain of practice. For example, references to conjectures and refutation as the scientific method are abundant in much of the literature on complementary and alternative medicine (CAM)—alongside the competing position that CAM, as an alternative to conventional biomedicine, needs to develop its own methodology different from that of science.
Also within mainstream science, reference to the scientific method is used in arguments regarding the internal hierarchy of disciplines and domains. A frequently seen argument is that research based on the H-D method is superior to research based on induction from observations because in deductive inferences the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. (See, e.g., Parascandola 1998 for an analysis of how this argument has been made to downgrade epidemiology compared to the laboratory sciences.) Similarly, based on an examination of the practices of major funding institutions such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Biomedical Sciences Research Practices (BBSRC) in the UK, O’Malley et al. (2009) have argued that funding agencies seem to have a tendency to adhere to the view that the primary activity of science is to test hypotheses, while descriptive and exploratory research is seen as merely preparatory activities that are valuable only insofar as they fuel hypothesis-driven research.
In some areas of science, scholarly publications are structured in a way that may convey the impression of a neat and linear process of inquiry from stating a question, devising the methods by which to answer it, collecting the data, to drawing a conclusion from the analysis of data. For example, the codified format of publications in most biomedical journals known as the IMRAD format (Introduction, Method, Results, Analysis, Discussion) is explicitly described by the journal editors as “not an arbitrary publication format but rather a direct reflection of the process of scientific discovery” (see the so-called “Vancouver Recommendations”, ICMJE 2013: 11). However, scientific publications do not in general reflect the process by which the reported scientific results were produced. For example, under the provocative title “Is the scientific paper a fraud?”, Medawar argued that scientific papers generally misrepresent how the results have been produced (Medawar 1963/1996). Similar views have been advanced by philosophers, historians and sociologists of science (Gilbert 1976; Holmes 1987; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Schickore 2008; Suppe 1998) who have argued that scientists’ experimental practices are messy and often do not follow any recognizable pattern. Publications of research results, they argue, are retrospective reconstructions of these activities that often do not preserve the temporal order or the logic of these activities, but are instead often constructed in order to screen off potential criticism (see Schickore 2008 for a review of this work).
Philosophical positions on the scientific method have also made it into the court room, especially in the US where judges have drawn on philosophy of science in deciding when to confer special status to scientific expert testimony. A key case is Daubert vs Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (92–102, 509 U.S. 579, 1993). In this case, the Supreme Court argued in its 1993 ruling that trial judges must ensure that expert testimony is reliable, and that in doing this the court must look at the expert’s methodology to determine whether the proffered evidence is actually scientific knowledge. Further, referring to works of Popper and Hempel the court stated that
ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge … is whether it can be (and has been) tested. (Justice Blackmun, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals; see Other Internet Resources for a link to the opinion)
But as argued by Haack (2005a,b, 2010) and by Foster & Hubner (1999), by equating the question of whether a piece of testimony is reliable with the question whether it is scientific as indicated by a special methodology, the court was producing an inconsistent mixture of Popper’s and Hempel’s philosophies, and this has later led to considerable confusion in subsequent case rulings that drew on the Daubert case (see Haack 2010 for a detailed exposition).
The difficulties around identifying the methods of science are also reflected in the difficulties of identifying scientific misconduct in the form of improper application of the method or methods of science. One of the first and most influential attempts at defining misconduct in science was the US definition from 1989 that defined misconduct as
fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other practices that seriously deviate from those that are commonly accepted within the scientific community . (Code of Federal Regulations, part 50, subpart A., August 8, 1989, italics added)
However, the “other practices that seriously deviate” clause was heavily criticized because it could be used to suppress creative or novel science. For example, the National Academy of Science stated in their report Responsible Science (1992) that it
wishes to discourage the possibility that a misconduct complaint could be lodged against scientists based solely on their use of novel or unorthodox research methods. (NAS: 27)
This clause was therefore later removed from the definition. For an entry into the key philosophical literature on conduct in science, see Shamoo & Resnick (2009).
The question of the source of the success of science has been at the core of philosophy since the beginning of modern science. If viewed as a matter of epistemology more generally, scientific method is a part of the entire history of philosophy. Over that time, science and whatever methods its practitioners may employ have changed dramatically. Today, many philosophers have taken up the banners of pluralism or of practice to focus on what are, in effect, fine-grained and contextually limited examinations of scientific method. Others hope to shift perspectives in order to provide a renewed general account of what characterizes the activity we call science.
One such perspective has been offered recently by Hoyningen-Huene (2008, 2013), who argues from the history of philosophy of science that after three lengthy phases of characterizing science by its method, we are now in a phase where the belief in the existence of a positive scientific method has eroded and what has been left to characterize science is only its fallibility. First was a phase from Plato and Aristotle up until the 17 th century where the specificity of scientific knowledge was seen in its absolute certainty established by proof from evident axioms; next was a phase up to the mid-19 th century in which the means to establish the certainty of scientific knowledge had been generalized to include inductive procedures as well. In the third phase, which lasted until the last decades of the 20 th century, it was recognized that empirical knowledge was fallible, but it was still granted a special status due to its distinctive mode of production. But now in the fourth phase, according to Hoyningen-Huene, historical and philosophical studies have shown how “scientific methods with the characteristics as posited in the second and third phase do not exist” (2008: 168) and there is no longer any consensus among philosophers and historians of science about the nature of science. For Hoyningen-Huene, this is too negative a stance, and he therefore urges the question about the nature of science anew. His own answer to this question is that “scientific knowledge differs from other kinds of knowledge, especially everyday knowledge, primarily by being more systematic” (Hoyningen-Huene 2013: 14). Systematicity can have several different dimensions: among them are more systematic descriptions, explanations, predictions, defense of knowledge claims, epistemic connectedness, ideal of completeness, knowledge generation, representation of knowledge and critical discourse. Hence, what characterizes science is the greater care in excluding possible alternative explanations, the more detailed elaboration with respect to data on which predictions are based, the greater care in detecting and eliminating sources of error, the more articulate connections to other pieces of knowledge, etc. On this position, what characterizes science is not that the methods employed are unique to science, but that the methods are more carefully employed.
Another, similar approach has been offered by Haack (2003). She sets off, similar to Hoyningen-Huene, from a dissatisfaction with the recent clash between what she calls Old Deferentialism and New Cynicism. The Old Deferentialist position is that science progressed inductively by accumulating true theories confirmed by empirical evidence or deductively by testing conjectures against basic statements; while the New Cynics position is that science has no epistemic authority and no uniquely rational method and is merely just politics. Haack insists that contrary to the views of the New Cynics, there are objective epistemic standards, and there is something epistemologically special about science, even though the Old Deferentialists pictured this in a wrong way. Instead, she offers a new Critical Commonsensist account on which standards of good, strong, supportive evidence and well-conducted, honest, thorough and imaginative inquiry are not exclusive to the sciences, but the standards by which we judge all inquirers. In this sense, science does not differ in kind from other kinds of inquiry, but it may differ in the degree to which it requires broad and detailed background knowledge and a familiarity with a technical vocabulary that only specialists may possess.
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- Blackmun opinion , in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (92–102), 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
- Scientific Method at philpapers. Darrell Rowbottom (ed.).
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The scientific method is a series of steps that scientific investigators follow to answer specific questions about the natural world. Scientists use the scientific method to make observations, formulate hypotheses , and conduct scientific experiments .
A scientific inquiry starts with an observation. Then, the formulation of a question about what has been observed follows. Next, the scientist will proceed through the remaining steps of the scientific method to end at a conclusion.
The six steps of the scientific method are as follows:
Observation
The first step of the scientific method involves making an observation about something that interests you. Taking an interest in your scientific discovery is important, for example, if you are doing a science project , because you will want to work on something that holds your attention. Your observation can be of anything from plant movement to animal behavior, as long as it is something you want to know more about. This step is when you will come up with an idea if you are working on a science project.
Once you have made your observation, you must formulate a question about what you observed. Your question should summarize what it is you are trying to discover or accomplish in your experiment. When stating your question, be as specific as possible. For example, if you are doing a project on plants , you may want to know how plants interact with microbes. Your question could be: Do plant spices inhibit bacterial growth ?
The hypothesis is a key component of the scientific process. A hypothesis is an idea that is suggested as an explanation for a natural event, a particular experience, or a specific condition that can be tested through definable experimentation. It states the purpose of your experiment, the variables used, and the predicted outcome of your experiment. It is important to note that a hypothesis must be testable. That means that you should be able to test your hypothesis through experimentation . Your hypothesis must either be supported or falsified by your experiment. An example of a good hypothesis is: If there is a relation between listening to music and heart rate, then listening to music will cause a person's resting heart rate to either increase or decrease.
Once you have developed a hypothesis, you must design and conduct an experiment that will test it. You should develop a procedure that states clearly how you plan to conduct your experiment. It is important you include and identify a controlled variable or dependent variable in your procedure. Controls allow us to test a single variable in an experiment because they are unchanged. We can then make observations and comparisons between our controls and our independent variables (things that change in the experiment) to develop an accurate conclusion.
The results are where you report what happened in the experiment. That includes detailing all observations and data made during your experiment. Most people find it easier to visualize the data by charting or graphing the information.
Developing a conclusion is the final step of the scientific method. This is where you analyze the results from the experiment and reach a determination about the hypothesis. Did the experiment support or reject your hypothesis? If your hypothesis was supported, great. If not, repeat the experiment or think of ways to improve your procedure.
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A Guide to Using the Scientific Method in Everyday Life
The scientific method —the process used by scientists to understand the natural world—has the merit of investigating natural phenomena in a rigorous manner. Working from hypotheses, scientists draw conclusions based on empirical data. These data are validated on large-scale numbers and take into consideration the intrinsic variability of the real world. For people unfamiliar with its intrinsic jargon and formalities, science may seem esoteric. And this is a huge problem: science invites criticism because it is not easily understood. So why is it important, then, that every person understand how science is done?
Because the scientific method is, first of all, a matter of logical reasoning and only afterwards, a procedure to be applied in a laboratory.
Individuals without training in logical reasoning are more easily victims of distorted perspectives about themselves and the world. An example is represented by the so-called “ cognitive biases ”—systematic mistakes that individuals make when they try to think rationally, and which lead to erroneous or inaccurate conclusions. People can easily overestimate the relevance of their own behaviors and choices. They can lack the ability to self-estimate the quality of their performances and thoughts . Unconsciously, they could even end up selecting only the arguments that support their hypothesis or beliefs . This is why the scientific framework should be conceived not only as a mechanism for understanding the natural world, but also as a framework for engaging in logical reasoning and discussion.
A brief history of the scientific method
The scientific method has its roots in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Philosophers Francis Bacon and René Descartes are often credited with formalizing the scientific method because they contrasted the idea that research should be guided by metaphysical pre-conceived concepts of the nature of reality—a position that, at the time, was highly supported by their colleagues . In essence, Bacon thought that inductive reasoning based on empirical observation was critical to the formulation of hypotheses and the generation of new understanding : general or universal principles describing how nature works are derived only from observations of recurring phenomena and data recorded from them. The inductive method was used, for example, by the scientist Rudolf Virchow to formulate the third principle of the notorious cell theory , according to which every cell derives from a pre-existing one. The rationale behind this conclusion is that because all observations of cell behavior show that cells are only derived from other cells, this assertion must be always true.
Inductive reasoning, however, is not immune to mistakes and limitations. Referring back to cell theory, there may be rare occasions in which a cell does not arise from a pre-existing one, even though we haven’t observed it yet—our observations on cell behavior, although numerous, can still benefit from additional observations to either refute or support the conclusion that all cells arise from pre-existing ones. And this is where limited observations can lead to erroneous conclusions reasoned inductively. In another example, if one never has seen a swan that is not white, they might conclude that all swans are white, even when we know that black swans do exist, however rare they may be.
The universally accepted scientific method, as it is used in science laboratories today, is grounded in hypothetico-deductive reasoning . Research progresses via iterative empirical testing of formulated, testable hypotheses (formulated through inductive reasoning). A testable hypothesis is one that can be rejected (falsified) by empirical observations, a concept known as the principle of falsification . Initially, ideas and conjectures are formulated. Experiments are then performed to test them. If the body of evidence fails to reject the hypothesis, the hypothesis stands. It stands however until and unless another (even singular) empirical observation falsifies it. However, just as with inductive reasoning, hypothetico-deductive reasoning is not immune to pitfalls—assumptions built into hypotheses can be shown to be false, thereby nullifying previously unrejected hypotheses. The bottom line is that science does not work to prove anything about the natural world. Instead, it builds hypotheses that explain the natural world and then attempts to find the hole in the reasoning (i.e., it works to disprove things about the natural world).
How do scientists test hypotheses?
Controlled experiments
The word “experiment” can be misleading because it implies a lack of control over the process. Therefore, it is important to understand that science uses controlled experiments in order to test hypotheses and contribute new knowledge. So what exactly is a controlled experiment, then?
Let us take a practical example. Our starting hypothesis is the following: we have a novel drug that we think inhibits the division of cells, meaning that it prevents one cell from dividing into two cells (recall the description of cell theory above). To test this hypothesis, we could treat some cells with the drug on a plate that contains nutrients and fuel required for their survival and division (a standard cell biology assay). If the drug works as expected, the cells should stop dividing. This type of drug might be useful, for example, in treating cancers because slowing or stopping the division of cells would result in the slowing or stopping of tumor growth.
Although this experiment is relatively easy to do, the mere process of doing science means that several experimental variables (like temperature of the cells or drug, dosage, and so on) could play a major role in the experiment. This could result in a failed experiment when the drug actually does work, or it could give the appearance that the drug is working when it is not. Given that these variables cannot be eliminated, scientists always run control experiments in parallel to the real ones, so that the effects of these other variables can be determined. Control experiments are designed so that all variables, with the exception of the one under investigation, are kept constant. In simple terms, the conditions must be identical between the control and the actual experiment.
Coming back to our example, when a drug is administered it is not pure. Often, it is dissolved in a solvent like water or oil. Therefore, the perfect control to the actual experiment would be to administer pure solvent (without the added drug) at the same time and with the same tools, where all other experimental variables (like temperature, as mentioned above) are the same between the two (Figure 1). Any difference in effect on cell division in the actual experiment here can be attributed to an effect of the drug because the effects of the solvent were controlled.
In order to provide evidence of the quality of a single, specific experiment, it needs to be performed multiple times in the same experimental conditions. We call these multiple experiments “replicates” of the experiment (Figure 2). The more replicates of the same experiment, the more confident the scientist can be about the conclusions of that experiment under the given conditions. However, multiple replicates under the same experimental conditions are of no help when scientists aim at acquiring more empirical evidence to support their hypothesis. Instead, they need independent experiments (Figure 3), in their own lab and in other labs across the world, to validate their results.
Often times, especially when a given experiment has been repeated and its outcome is not fully clear, it is better to find alternative experimental assays to test the hypothesis.
Applying the scientific approach to everyday life
So, what can we take from the scientific approach to apply to our everyday lives?
A few weeks ago, I had an agitated conversation with a bunch of friends concerning the following question: What is the definition of intelligence?
Defining “intelligence” is not easy. At the beginning of the conversation, everybody had a different, “personal” conception of intelligence in mind, which – tacitly – implied that the conversation could have taken several different directions. We realized rather soon that someone thought that an intelligent person is whoever is able to adapt faster to new situations; someone else thought that an intelligent person is whoever is able to deal with other people and empathize with them. Personally, I thought that an intelligent person is whoever displays high cognitive skills, especially in abstract reasoning.
The scientific method has the merit of providing a reference system, with precise protocols and rules to follow. Remember: experiments must be reproducible, which means that an independent scientists in a different laboratory, when provided with the same equipment and protocols, should get comparable results. Fruitful conversations as well need precise language, a kind of reference vocabulary everybody should agree upon, in order to discuss about the same “content”. This is something we often forget, something that was somehow missing at the opening of the aforementioned conversation: even among friends, we should always agree on premises, and define them in a rigorous manner, so that they are the same for everybody. When speaking about “intelligence”, we must all make sure we understand meaning and context of the vocabulary adopted in the debate (Figure 4, point 1). This is the first step of “controlling” a conversation.
There is another downside that a discussion well-grounded in a scientific framework would avoid. The mistake is not structuring the debate so that all its elements, except for the one under investigation, are kept constant (Figure 4, point 2). This is particularly true when people aim at making comparisons between groups to support their claim. For example, they may try to define what intelligence is by comparing the achievements in life of different individuals: “Stephen Hawking is a brilliant example of intelligence because of his great contribution to the physics of black holes”. This statement does not help to define what intelligence is, simply because it compares Stephen Hawking, a famous and exceptional physicist, to any other person, who statistically speaking, knows nothing about physics. Hawking first went to the University of Oxford, then he moved to the University of Cambridge. He was in contact with the most influential physicists on Earth. Other people were not. All of this, of course, does not disprove Hawking’s intelligence; but from a logical and methodological point of view, given the multitude of variables included in this comparison, it cannot prove it. Thus, the sentence “Stephen Hawking is a brilliant example of intelligence because of his great contribution to the physics of black holes” is not a valid argument to describe what intelligence is. If we really intend to approximate a definition of intelligence, Steven Hawking should be compared to other physicists, even better if they were Hawking’s classmates at the time of college, and colleagues afterwards during years of academic research.
In simple terms, as scientists do in the lab, while debating we should try to compare groups of elements that display identical, or highly similar, features. As previously mentioned, all variables – except for the one under investigation – must be kept constant.
This insightful piece presents a detailed analysis of how and why science can help to develop critical thinking.
In a nutshell
Here is how to approach a daily conversation in a rigorous, scientific manner:
- First discuss about the reference vocabulary, then discuss about the content of the discussion. Think about a researcher who is writing down an experimental protocol that will be used by thousands of other scientists in varying continents. If the protocol is rigorously written, all scientists using it should get comparable experimental outcomes. In science this means reproducible knowledge, in daily life this means fruitful conversations in which individuals are on the same page.
- Adopt “controlled” arguments to support your claims. When making comparisons between groups, visualize two blank scenarios. As you start to add details to both of them, you have two options. If your aim is to hide a specific detail, the better is to design the two scenarios in a completely different manner—it is to increase the variables. But if your intention is to help the observer to isolate a specific detail, the better is to design identical scenarios, with the exception of the intended detail—it is therefore to keep most of the variables constant. This is precisely how scientists ideate adequate experiments to isolate new pieces of knowledge, and how individuals should orchestrate their thoughts in order to test them and facilitate their comprehension to others.
Not only the scientific method should offer individuals an elitist way to investigate reality, but also an accessible tool to properly reason and discuss about it.
Edited by Jason Organ, PhD, Indiana University School of Medicine.
Simone is a molecular biologist on the verge of obtaining a doctoral title at the University of Ulm, Germany. He is Vice-Director at Culturico (https://culturico.com/), where his writings span from Literature to Sociology, from Philosophy to Science. His writings recently appeared in Psychology Today, openDemocracy, Splice Today, Merion West, Uncommon Ground and The Society Pages. Follow Simone on Twitter: @simredaelli
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This has to be the best article I have ever read on Scientific Thinking. I am presently writing a treatise on how Scientific thinking can be adopted to entreat all situations.And how, a 4 year old child can be taught to adopt Scientific thinking, so that, the child can look at situations that bothers her and she could try to think about that situation by formulating the right questions. She may not have the tools to find right answers? But, forming questions by using right technique ? May just make her find a way to put her mind to rest even at that level. That is why, 4 year olds are often “eerily: (!)intelligent, I have iften been intimidated and plain embarrassed to see an intelligent and well spoken 4 year old deal with celibrity ! Of course, there are a lot of variables that have to be kept in mind in order to train children in such controlled thinking environment, as the screenplay of little Sheldon shows. Thanking the author with all my heart – #ershadspeak #wearescience #weareallscientists Ershad Khandker
Simone, thank you for this article. I have the idea that I want to apply what I learned in Biology to everyday life. You addressed this issue, and have given some basic steps in using the scientific method.
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The Importance of The Scientific Method
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Scientific Method: Role and Importance Essay
1. introduction.
What then is the scientific method and what does it do? There is no clear and defining answer to this, but in a nutshell, the scientific method is the procedure by which scientists, communally and over periods of time, endeavored to assemble an accurate (that is reliable, consistent and non-arbitrary) representation of the world. The scientific method has been extremely successful in bringing the world out of its state of primitive knowledge and is perhaps the one characteristic that best distinguishes man from other animals. The world in which we know today is a result of the method being used, and all our achievements are according to Bacon, a result of this method. The scientific method is more than just a way of discovering ideas. It is a way of correcting our mistakes and the only definite way we have of separating our thoughts from the truth. The scientific method is the only way to ask and answer scientific questions by examining the world around us. From this, the scientific method is used to judge the merit of other methods. Thus, the method has a twofold function; it is the measure of the validity and worth of all other methods, and it is the way of finding out which method is the best.
1.1 Definition of the Scientific Method
The scientific method is defined as the steps scientists follow to create a logical, intelligent answer to questions. It is a complex method used instead of common sense to arrive at a solution. There are six well-defined steps; the first being stating the problem. This is the question that the scientist wants to know the answer to. The second step is the formation of a hypothesis. A hypothesis is an intelligent guess based on the problem that is proposed to be the solution to the problem. Step three is the designing of an experiment. This experiment is to prove or disprove the hypothesis. This is done by having a control group, which is used as a standard of comparison. Following this, a conclusion is formed if the data from the experiment has proven or disproven the hypothesis. If the hypothesis is proven true after a number of experiments, it is then considered to be a theory or law. This is a basic explanation of the scientific method, and I will be explaining it in a more detailed manner throughout the essay. Marie Curie once said, "All my life through, the new sights of nature made me rejoice like a child." People such as Curie are in every way scientists. Every day we are faced with different problems, and we often casually come up with a solution. For example, when offered lemon or vanilla ice cream, one may prefer vanilla and say it is better. This is an observation that has led to a casual conclusion. This is almost the same manner that a scientist uses to draw a hypothesis. The scientist, however, quickly moves to testing his hypothesis, while the average person may be too lazy. This is the main difference between the scientific method and common sense. Lemon ice cream is the control group, and the vanilla ice cream is the test group. If the person finds out that he enjoyed the vanilla ice cream more, then he has come to a solution. Although it is a question of relatively no importance, this is the very way that astronauts have proven weightlessness.
1.2 Historical Background
The scientific method actually began in the early 17th century when Galileo (1564-1642) and Francesco Maria Grimaldi (1618-1663) discovered that they could not adequately describe the phenomenon of light passing through different media with the current model of light that was in existence at that time, namely the emission theory. Although this was not a widespread adoption of the new method of inquiry, it is an example of a classic experiment, which is an integral part of the scientific method. It was not until the late 19th and early 20th centuries that the method of hypothesis-prediction-confirmation began to take its current form, by a series of critical experiments in the field of gravitation and general relativity. The understanding of the details of gravitation by the scientific community has evolved through the use of the scientific method and culminated in the current consensus of the theory of general relativity. This is in contrast to the previous acceptance of Newtonian gravitation as an absolute force acting at a distance. The next important step in the scientific method was the controlled experiment. The controlled experiment developed when it was realized that variables in an experiment needed to be controlled. This was first done by a Flemish Physician Jan Baptista van Helmont (1579-1644) when trying to determine where plants get their mass from. He performed an experiment in which he grew a willow tree in a weighed amount of soil and supplied it only with rain and groundwater. After five years, he weighed the tree plus the dirt and the difference in weight of the tree and dirt (which he assumed was negligible) was the weight of the water. He found that the willow tree weighed approximately 75 kgs and the dry soil was the same weight that he had started with. This showed him that the mass of the tree was derived from water and not the soil, thus proving his hypothesis. This rich history of the scientific method has led to an increasingly rigorous method of inquiry, and it is the aim of this essay to show its importance in the field of scientific research.
1.3 Purpose of the Essay
A study was done by Harvard on the use of the scientific method in reading the popular news magazine, The Scientist. It showed that stories were failed by its test on implicitly confirming them. This, according to the philosophers of science, is precisely what gives the scientific method its claim to providing a better understanding of the world than any other method. They regard the requirement to be explicit about one's theories and to test them as essential. Since not until one is explicit about a theory can it be critically evaluated, and it isn't really tested until it has survived attempts to show it false. Our primary goal should not be testing theories but achieving improvements in understanding the world. However, if we take this theory seriously, we may take the view that the understanding will be then when there are theories that are well-tested and hard to refute. At any given time, there are many competing theories about the same arrangement of evidence. So scientists concentrate on their time on improving these theories and only in times of crisis, when a competing theory has produced surprising explanatory successes, do they seriously try to compare this with the old theory by testing them. This is what happened between Newton and Einstein, who didn't refute Newton's theory of gravity after experiments in principle but offered a new, better theory that was hard to produce and so in detail comparing the old theory.
2. Key Steps of the Scientific Method
Initially, a scientist will develop a stance based on the status quo of the subject in question. From this, they will develop an educated guess as to why an event occurs. This is known as a hypothesis. A hypothesis is largely based on prior knowledge of the subject and can be used to make predictions. The next stage involves testing the hypothesis. It is at this time that a scientist will seek to ask others within the same field whether the ideas are "good" and will be awarded funding for the experiment. The funding-dependent nature of modern-day science means that this step is often revisited after experimentation is performed. Step 3 involves the testing and retesting of the hypothesis, provides an answer to the question, and guides the scientist toward the need for further research. The final steps of the scientific method involve the analysis of the data obtained by experimentation and the formulation of a conclusion, often leading to communication of the results to the scientific community.
2.1 Observation and Question Formulation
A scientist's work first begins when a question is asked. This question is informed by observation of the world around. Observation and questioning are two interrelated components of the first step of the scientific method. Observation is viewing an occurrence without involving oneself in it. It is a factual and measurable event. A scientist must be as objective as possible. If the event is a natural phenomenon, it cannot be contrived, and a scientist must look for occurrences in nature to develop a question. A question comes after an observation is made. This is a testable and measurable inquiry and should narrow down the scope of the observation to a point where it can be explained by the scientific method. Although observation and questioning are deemed as the first step of the scientific method, it can be argued that the science method of a particular investigation began when a scientist first identified a problem or when a scientist first made a mental note of a haphazard occurrence of events without actually stating a question at the time. In the later case, observation and questioning can be viewed as a continuing recurring process as a haphazard event may lead to a mental note from a scientist who may later develop a question to explain the event.
2.2 Hypothesis Development
A hypothesis is more than just an educated guess. It is a prediction or explanation that is tested by an experiment. First, a scientist must formulate a research question that she wants to answer. The question should be clear and precise. Next, the scientist makes an educated guess, or hypothesis, as to the possible answer to the question. The hypothesis is a simple statement that defines what the scientist expects to happen in his experiment. This should be based on previous knowledge, and most importantly, the hypothesis should be testable. If a question cannot be tested, there can be no research analyses or results. The purpose of the hypothesis is not to arrive at the correct answer to the question, but to provide a logical and realistic foundation for the research. Step 2.2 is included in all types of scientific research, though it may be labeled differently depending on the field of study. The term "hypothesis" is often used in an objective, systematic proposal trying to explain something. In a more basic or exploratory research project, the hypothesis may be formed after the research has been thoroughly defined. This step remains a key feature that defines the difference between a scientific and an opinion-based project, as the statement proposes our understanding of a question that can be tested in a logical manner.
2.3 Experimentation and Data Collection
In this step, a scientist tests a hypothesis using a specific method. An experiment is conducted and its results analyzed. Despite popular opinion, an experiment does not have to be conducted in a laboratory. The key attribute of an experiment is the control over the test conditions. A good experiment will have a control group and a test group; the control group is subjected to the same conditions as the test group, except for one key single variable. This variable is the factor being tested in the experiment. By isolating the variable, the scientist can attribute any change in the results to the tested factor. If the results are positive, implying the hypothesis is correct, the experiment may be repeated in order to assure the results are reproducible. There are two main types of experiments, these being inductive and deductive. Inductive experiments are used to identify a trend or pattern and are generally used to develop a hypothesis. Deductive experiments are used to test the validity of a hypothesis. The data from a deductive experiment is often used to disprove a hypothesis rather than to prove it. Both types of experiments can be useful to the testing process of a hypothesis.
2.4 Analysis and Interpretation of Results
The results obtained from the test are analyzed using statistical methods so that the data can give a definite answer to the formulated hypothesis. Analysis of data helps determine the outcome of the experiment. If the data supports the hypothesis, then the hypothesis is "accepted". If the data does not support the hypothesis, then the hypothesis is "rejected". It is important to make sure the analysis of data is free from any bias so that the results can be interpreted in the light of testing a given hypothesis. Usually in testing the hypothesis, it is comparing the results in an experiment to those of others such as drawing a cause-effect conclusion. Comparing results between two experiments is very common in scientific method. If the results support the hypothesis, then the scientist has evidence to support his/her theory. Often, it is necessary to conduct further testing to verify the theory. If the results do not support the hypothesis, then the scientist must either form a new hypothesis to test or conclude that the testing has not provided a true answer (in which case the scientist must examine the test and retest the hypothesis). Sometimes the results of an experiment can show that the hypothesis tested was actually right for an incorrect reason. This is termed as "lucking out" and may result in a scientific discovery since the unexpected results can lead into a new theory. This was the case when Rontgen discovered x-rays from his testing of cathode rays. His data did not support the hypothesis and he did not know the cause of an unexplainable glow that he obtained. Further testing led to the discovery of x-rays in an attempt to find the source of the glow.
2.5 Conclusion and Communication
At the end of the analysis, a conclusion is formed, drawing consensus from the evidence collected in the experiment. This is where the tested hypothesis is supported or refuted. If the hypothesis is not supported, a new question will arise and the steps of the scientific method will be repeated. An analysis of the nature of questions and hypotheses and the testing and observation will reveal the extreme value of the scientific method as a problem-solving tool. A successful experiment will be one that uses all the steps of the scientific method, and collects and analyses the data in a conclusive manner, resulting in either support or non-support for the hypothesis. The more formal and complete an experiment, the more conclusive will be the results. These can then be successfully communicated to others. The communication of experimental results whether they are support or non-support for a hypothesis, in the clearest and most efficient manner, is an extremely important but often neglected part of scientific process and progress. The clearer the communication of results, the more useful they are to others who may have similar questions and hypotheses and who are attempting to make further experiments or analyses in the same area.
3. Applications of the Scientific Method
When one looks at scientific research, problem solving and testing, and policy development, one can easily see how the application of scientific methods can be very handy. Science requires a systematic approach in order to answer questions about the world around it. From asking a question, to developing a method for testing, and possibly even testing future implications of the results, the scientific method is a never-ending cycle of thinking and analyzing. The scientist is always thinking of the next step in improving an idea in order to solve a question. Testing is only a part of the method. The ability to reason and think critically about an issue is a valuable skill. An example of this can be seen in problem solving. When encountering a problem, be it in the field of computer programming or in a relationship with a friend, one can benefit from applying the scientific method. By taking the steps of identifying the problem, discussing hypotheses and possible solutions, then testing each solution and possibly coming up with more problems along the way, one can promote a more effective way of critical thinking and troubleshooting. Although the concept of testing ideas is something very familiar to the field of science, the practice of it is a skill that can be used in many areas and can benefit an individual in determining the best solution to a problem.
3.1 Scientific Research
It is known that all good research begins with a question or a problem. The way to truly answer each question is to use specific methods to determine an answer. The best method known is to use the scientific method of research, which has six basic steps: asking a question, doing background research, constructing a hypothesis, testing the hypothesis with an experiment, analyzing the data, and drawing a conclusion. Finally, communicating the results. The process of using this method helps to provide a solid answer to the question in the end. It is likely that the answer may simply lead to another question, which is great because when this occurs, the scientific method can be used all over again, and in the end, there will always be a solid answer to the problem at hand. On the other hand, using the scientific method can sometimes have its flaws. A well-known advantage of the scientific method is that the data obtained is much clearer for other researchers to see and can be proven true, compared to data that is obtained by using methods of non-scientific research. This will increase researchers' confidence in the findings and also accelerate the accumulation of knowledge. A method of empirical research has a huge advantage over non-scientific methods, which often make conclusions based on limited evidence. This should make it easier to solve problems since there would be a clearer understanding of the question and solid evidence to lead to a conclusion.
3.2 Problem Solving in Various Fields
A problem consists of an undesirable situation and a desired situation. Problem solving involves the diagnosis of the situation, the selection of the best alternatives, and the prediction of the outcome of each alternative. It also involves the actual decision making, the implementation, and the evaluation of the decision and the problem. Scientists form hypotheses regarding the cause of the undesirable situation. They then systematically test the hypotheses to determine if any are valid. Usually, this will involve some manipulation of the situation. It might be most effective for a scientist to randomly assign some subjects to a control group, which will ascertain the current state of the situation, and an experimental group, which will have the manipulated treatment applied. Independent and dependent variables are identified and controlled. The scientist can then examine the correlation between the independent variable and the undesirable situation and examine if changing the independent variable will also change the dependent variable. The activity can be similar to a pseudo experiment, like testing to see if increased political stability in a third world country will increase the standard of living of its citizens, or a historical study, like trying to determine the cause of an increase or decrease in the street crime rate. The more conclusive the evidence, the more the hypotheses are supported or refuted. If a supported hypothesis presents an effective solution to the problem, the scientist may use it to implement a decision. Acting the same as he predicted the alternative outcomes would act, he can monitor and evaluate the situation to see if the alternative actually improves the situation.
3.3 Decision Making and Policy Development
In the previous section, we observed that problem solving was a large part of the methodology used by scientists and researchers alike. They identify problems and yet again, using logic, attempt to solve them in the most efficient manner possible. In many cases, problems lead to decisions that need to be made. Decision making is the selection of a procedure to be implemented in order to resolve some form of problem. The scientific method is often applied to decision making. The steps are similar to those that are used in solving a problem, which make it easier to come to the most effective solution. The decisions made are based on a set of conditions and they attempt to match the condition with an alternative. Usually, the best decision is the one that selects the alternative which will bring most fulfillment to the condition. If the result is not the one desired, the decision maker will re-evaluate the alternative and condition. In policy development, decisions are made in attempts to change the current state of problems or to avoid a potential problem. A policy is a decision that is implemented by a group or an organization, which is intended to carry out a specific course of action. It is very similar to a decision, instead it involves many decisions following the selection of a preferred alternative. The aim is to change a set of undesirable conditions to more desirable ones. This can be achieved by using the alternatives available to bring a resolution to the conditions. Both decisions and policies can have effects. If the effects are good ones, it can be said the decision was a fruitful one. However, some decisions have many alternatives with unpredictable results. This can be risky and often, to avoid such risk, a decision maker will attempt to simulate the decision in hope to make the optimal move.
4. Criticisms and Limitations of the Scientific Method
The scientific method is a very powerful tool to increase understanding of a complex issue. However, the scientific method is by no means free from limitations or criticism. Predictably, the scientific method receives the strongest criticism from disciplines outside of the natural sciences, and its objectivity is held into question. Particularly in the social sciences, the scientific method has been accused of lacking objectivity or being unable to gain full understanding of phenomena. Objectivity is heavily tied in with the concept of bias, which is the influence of a person's existing knowledge or beliefs upon his/her findings. It has been said that there is no research without bias, and the line between the unbiased pursuance of knowledge and testing of a preconceived hypothesis is sometimes a fine one. An example of bias discussed in philosophy is the response by physicists to the problems of light as a wave or particle. At no time in the history of philosophy did such a question arise in the mind of a philosopher, and yet the reason it was addressed in physics is simply that philosophers of physics were not making progress and physicists felt a need to study the nature of the problem. This biased the physicist's findings as they had mathematical data to prove that light was a wave and stopped researching when they encountered it, despite the fact that a particle theory had equal explanatory power. Said Kuhn, the result of the 20th century research into the nature of light was a 400 years accumulation of knowledge in which no real progress was ever made. This is an extreme case, but it is hard to say that any scientist has not at some time tested a hypothesis built from existing knowledge and had that bias affect their results.
4.1 Subjectivity and Bias
One of the most well-known criticisms of the scientific method is the presence of human subjectivity and bias. The scientific method was developed in part to escape such things, and it is therefore counter-effective if a scientist allows his or her personal beliefs to determine the outcome of an experiment. For this reason, the second step of the scientific method is often the hardest to uphold. Here, a scientist must form a hypothesis - an informed statement about the likely outcome of an experiment. This hypothesis is formed from previous knowledge which may in itself be biased, the issue is therefore how to decide whether a biased hypothesis is worth pursuing and testing. If the scientist decides that it isn't, the experiment has already fallen victim to bias. A similar problem lies in the testing stage. If a scientist holds a biased view, he or she may only notice results which agree with their hypothesis and ignore results which invalidate it. In extreme cases, a scientist may manipulate the results of an experiment so that they better fit the hypothesis, or even fabricate results. Such fraud can be very damaging, and in recent years there have been many high-profile cases of scientists found guilty of such acts. In an attempt to combat this, the practice of blind testing is becoming more common. This is an experiment where the tester does not know what he is testing, or what the expected outcome is. This prevents his biases from affecting the outcome. The most common type of blind testing is a double-blind test, where neither the tester nor the subjects know the details of the experiment. The issue of bias in the scientific method is a difficult problem, and as yet there is no perfect solution. However, it is clear that by merely recognizing the presence of bias and the damage it can cause, the scientific community has taken a step in the right direction.
4.2 Ethical Considerations
The scientific method is applied to such a wide variety of activities that it would be difficult to pinpoint a single set of universal ethical considerations. However, broad categories can be identified. First, there is the question of the morality of the activity being studied. For example, research into the reproductive habits of a low-income community with the aim of limiting their birth rate is an activity which carries many value assumptions and would be widely regarded as immoral. Scientists are usually in agreement as to what activities are immoral - where they fall down is on what constitutes each activity. In the previous example, the researchers might believe that they are contributing to a better quality of life for the community in question. Their study is not necessarily an unbiased look at the habits in question: it might also fall foul of the second activity in the category to be discussed: research using human subjects. A great deal of scientific activity passes by the criteria that dictates what does and does not constitute research using human subjects. In recent decades, medical research has been severely limited by this criteria, with much of it being forced underground into less developed countries. During the mid 20th century, drug companies in developed countries conducted research into the long-term effects of new drugs by administering them to prison inmates. This too would now be viewed as a clear breach of the criteria on research using human subjects, despite the fact that the inmates would often be better off than if they had not taken the drug. Third in this category is the notion that the end results of scientific activities should in some way be beneficial for society. This also has value assumptions attached to it: what is beneficial, and for whom? An activity perceived as beneficial for society in general might still be viewed as detrimental to certain groups within society. Taking the example of a scientific study comparing the intelligence levels of different races, a highly contentious issue, the researchers might believe that their study is beneficial for the races in question, suggesting that better education policies could be formulated if the reasons for differing educational attainment between races were better understood. However, it is difficult to see how the results of this study would not reinforce existing racial stereotypes. All value assumptions aside, the scientific method has often fallen short of this criterion. The development of new weapons technology is an activity which has often been of great benefit to the country commissioning it, but this does not necessarily mean that it was arrived at using a scientific methodology designed to maximize benefit for society in general.
4.3 Complexity of Real-World Problems
Complexity is another criticism labeled at the scientific method. This criticism is usually associated with trying to utilize the scientific method in the study and application of different sciences such as economics, biology, and physics. Critics argue that the scientific method is reductionist. They say that the construction of a simplified model of a complex phenomenon defines away too much of the problem to fit the simple structure the model embodies. The scientist tests the model and if it is not validated, or in the case of economic models, does not behave as expected, the scientist makes revisions until the model does work. The point at which the model works is often a long way from the original real-world problem. Often it is so far away that the problem it was originally addressing has been forgotten or is no longer relevant. At this point, the scientist has a paradigm. The problem with this is that the paradigm may not be valid or applicable to the real world, but the scientist has invested so much time and effort into the paradigm that it becomes very difficult to give it up. This whole process can have far-reaching effects and if the scientist has embodied the paradigm into policymaking, the effects can be disastrous. An example is the stagflation of the 1970s. Keynesian economists had developed an almost globally accepted paradigm that their policies could keep the trade-off between inflation and unemployment at any point. Keynesian models were simulated and were working, however, when the OPEC oil shocks occurred, the Keynesian policies did not have the expected results. But because the effort put into the model had been so great and the paradigm so widely accepted, it was not given up and Keynesian policies were followed to try to fix the new problems, only making things worse. The building and embodiment of a paradigm is said to be the only way a model can work, but it is extremely difficult to test for the validity of the paradigm and because of this, there is a risk of the model becoming an exercise in theoretical self-indulgence.
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The scientific method is a problem-solving strategy that is at the heart of biology and other sciences. There are five steps included in the scientific method that is making an observation, asking a question, forming a hypothesis or an explanation that could be tested, and predicting the test.
The study of scientific method is the attempt to discern the activities by which that success is achieved. Among the activities often identified as characteristic of science are systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories.
The scientific method is guidelines/steps which scientists follow to solve a problem. There are several steps in the scientific method depends on the problem at hand. Amongst these steps include 1) observation, 2) hypothesis, 3) research, 4) experiment 5) data analysis 6) conclusion of that question 7) communicate results.
scientific method, mathematical and experimental technique employed in the sciences. More specifically, it is the technique used in the construction and testing of a scientific hypothesis.
The scientific method is an empirical method for acquiring knowledge that has characterized the development of science since at least the 17th century. The scientific method involves careful observation coupled with rigorous scepticism, because cognitive assumptions can distort the interpretation of the observation.
The scientific method is a series of steps that scientific investigators follow to answer specific questions about the natural world. Scientists use the scientific method to make observations, formulate hypotheses, and conduct scientific experiments.
The scientific method is a process for gathering data and processing information. It provides well-defined steps to standardize how scientific knowledge is gathered through a logical, rational problem-solving method. Scientific knowledge is advanced through a process known as the scientific method.
The scientific method—the process used by scientists to understand the natural world—has the merit of investigating natural phenomena in a rigorous manner. Working from hypotheses, scientists draw conclusions based on empirical data.
At its core, the scientific method is centered around critical thinking. It encourages individuals to question assumptions, challenge preconceived notions, and rigorously test hypotheses.
The best method known is to use the scientific method of research, which has six basic steps: asking a question, doing background research, constructing a hypothesis, testing the hypothesis with an experiment, analyzing the data, and drawing a conclusion.