society as an objective reality essay

Social Construction of Reality

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The social construction of reality is a theory that suggests that humans create their own understanding of reality, through their interactions and communications with others. This includes the way we see and interpret the world around us, as well as how we interact with others.

Social constructionism holds that the meaning of acts, behaviors, and events is not an objective quality of those phenomena but is assigned to them through social interactions. In this view, meaning is socially defined and organized and thus subject to social change.

The theory was first proposed by sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann in their 1967 book The Social Construction of Reality . In it, they argued that society is created by humans and human interaction, which they call habitualization.

According to the concept of habitualization, “any action that is repeated frequently becomes cast into a pattern, which can then be … performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effort” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).

illustration of a group of people socialising with lines connected above their heads

For example, social constructionism can influence whether or not something is seen as a crime , its severity, and the extent to which it is feared. How societies define and remedy crime is the outcome of numerous complex factors between different groups of actors.

In terms of identity, social constructionism is used to illustrate the view that an individual”s character is not totally given, but is built up by the individual in terms of different conceptions of gender, ethnicity, sexuality etc., which are influenced by personal preference and the reactions of others.

Key Takeaways

The Social Construction of Reality is a book about the sociology of knowledge written by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann. It was published in 1966 and it quickly became a classic work in the sociology of knowledge.
In the book, Berger and Luckmann argue that all knowledge is socially constructed, and that human beings are social animals who create their own reality through their interactions with others.
The book has been highly influential in the field of sociology, and the idea of the social construction of reality can be examined through the lenses of other movements, such as the Thomas Theorem and Symbolic Interactionism.
The use of the term social construction has become popular as sociologists have focused increasingly on identity as an organizing principle of postmodern life.
The term was originally used to describe the ways in which, for example, statistics did not always represent the real rate of what they were supposed to describe, but were the product of social processes involving many decisions by many individuals.
Interpretivists assume that access to reality happens through social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, and instruments (Myers, 2008).

The Construction of Reality

There are three main steps involved in constructing reality: Externalization, Society as Objective Reality, and Society as Subjective Reality.

Externalization, Objectivation, and Internalization are seen by Berger and Luckmann as fundamentally related in their role in the production of social reality. Continuously, each person externalized social reality.

They are involved in creating or maintaining particular institutions. Simultaneously, they construct a sense of objective reality. Finally, in the process of externalization and objectivation, the individual is being constructed as a social product (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).

Externalization is the process of making something external, or putting it outside of oneself. This can be done in a number of ways, such as through language, art, or even just by thinking about something.

Externalization is necessary in order to share one’s thoughts and ideas with others, and to create a shared understanding of the world.

Society as Objective Reality is the second stage of constructing reality. In this stage, people come to see their society as an objective reality that exists independently of them.

They begin to see the rules and institutions that make up their society as natural and inevitable. At this stage, people also come to believe that their own personal experiences are not as important as the collective experience of society (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).

Society as Subjective reality deals with the process of internalization. Berger and Luckmann (1967) argue that the internalization of reality involves primary socialization, secondary socialization and maintenance and the transformation of one”s subjective reality.

In more concrete terms, in society every individual is born with a predisposition to be social, but he must become a member of society through a specific process.

In order to join society, newcomers — such as toddlers — observe the subjective behavior of others literally, and they gradually learn the objective rules that define and shape social interaction in their culture (this is called foregoing, or primary socialization).

In this process, children move from being egocentric to being able to take the role of others into account. They internalize the rules as “means to ends” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).

Through secondary socialization , which happens after someone is socialized enough to join a society, individuals learn the particular way their society functions, such as its political system or economic structure.

And finally, maintenance refers to the ways in which individuals preserve and defend their worldview against threats from the outside world.

This includes things like confirmation bias, where people seek out information that supports their existing beliefs, and ostracism, where people exclude those who don’t conform to the prevailing worldview.

Theoretical Lenses

Symbolic interactionism.

Symbolic interactionism is a sociological theory that focuses on the ways in which people interact with each other. It is based on the idea that human beings are symbols, and that they use these symbols to create meaning in their lives. Symbolic interactionism has its roots in the work of Max Weber, George Herbert Mead, and Charles Horton Cooley.

Weber believed that humans were rational beings who acted in their own self-interest. He saw society as a system of rules and regulations that helped people to achieve their goals.

Mead believed that humans were social animals who communicate through symbols. He saw society as a system of interactions between people. Cooley, finally, believed that humans were social creatures who developed their own identities through their interactions with others (Leeds-Hurwitz, Braithwaite, & Baxter, 2006).

Symbolic interactionism focuses on the symbols that people use to interact with each other — these include language, gestures, and artifacts — as well as how people interpret those symbols in daily interactions.

For example, two people may have different interpretations of the same gesture, such as a head nod. In some cultures, a head nod may indicate agreement, while in others it may be interpreted as a sign of respect. The meaning of a head nod is not inherent in the gesture itself, but is instead created through the interaction between the two people.

Similarly, even within languages, the meaning of words is not inherent in the words themselves, but is instead created through the interaction between the speaker and the listener.

For example, the word “cat” can mean different things to different people. To a child, a cat may be a pet that they love. To a scientist, a cat may be an animal that they are studying.

The meaning of the word “cat” is not fixed, but is instead created through the interaction between the listener and the listener”s experiences (Leeds-Hurwitz, Braithwaite, & Baxter, 2006).

Thomas Theorem

The Thomas Theorem states that what people believe to be true, affects their behaviors and actions — “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas & Thomas 1928). People”s perceptions of reality influence how they act within that reality.

In other words, one”s social construction of reality can have a powerful influence on their lives. For example, someone who believes that the world is a dangerous place may be more likely to engage in risky behaviors than someone who does not share that belief.

Similarly, if a teenager is labeled as an outcast or high-achiever, they may learn to behave this way – even if it was not initially part of their identity.

Like the creators of habitualization, Thomas believed that moral codes and social norms are created by “successive definitions of the situation,” or what Merton calls a self-fulfilling prophecy. If enough people believe that a situation will happen, they can take actions that lead to the situation happening.

For example, in 2020, a large group of speculative investors began to buy up stocks that they believed would increase in value despite having a historically declining one. These stocks became known as “meme stocks.” This caused the prices of these stocks to increase, and more people began buying them, driving the prices many times higher than their initial valuations.

While there was no guarantee that these stocks would continue to rise in value, the collective belief of the investors led to a self-fulfilling prophecy, and the prices did indeed increase, for a time (Thomas & Thomas 1928).

The Thomas Theorem can be used to explain why certain social groups are marginalized or disadvantaged. For example, if a community believes that women are not capable of leadership roles, they are less likely to elect women into office or give them positions of power. This, naturally, is another instance of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

As a final example of how the Thomas Theorem can relate to social problems, if sociologists believe that social problems are caused by individual choices, then they are likely to focus on changing individual behavior.

However, if sociologists believe that social problems are caused by the way society is structured, then they are more likely to focus on changing social institutions. This can ultimately cause those outside sociology to focus on one avenue or the other in distributing blame (Thomas & Thomas 1928).

According to Robert K. Merton, people”s perceptions of reality are shaped by the cultural context in which they live. This theory can help sociologists to understand how individuals” beliefs and values are formed, and how they can change over time.

Merton”s perspective on the social construction of reality is related to both the lenses of symbolic interactionism and the Thomas theorem. He argued that there are three main components to the social construction of reality: symbols, language, and institutions.

Symbols are things like gestures, words, or objects that stand for something else. Language is the system of symbols that we use to communicate with each other. Institutions are the structures that shape our lives, such as family, government, or religion.

Merton, as mentioned earlier, also created the concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 1947).

Implications

Role and status.

Status is the position that an individual occupies in a social hierarchy. Status has two subtypes, according to Merton (1957): achieved and ascribed. Achieved status is a position that is gained through an individual”s own efforts and accomplishments, while ascribed status is one that is assigned to an individual at birth or assumed involuntarily later in life.

Role, meanwhile, is the set of expectations and norms — as well as expected behaviors —associated with that position. For example, in most “nuclear families,” the father is the head of the household and the primary breadwinner, while the mother is responsible for taking care of the home and raising the children.

This is an example of how social roles are connected to status. These roles culminate in role-sets, which are the various number of roles associated with some, or multiple, statuses.

The concepts of role and status help define an individual”s place in society.

The ways in which institutional actors of all roles and statuses respond to practical issues are influenced by the sociological construction of institutionality. Studies of institutionality evaluate how and to what extent definitions of reality are adapted to the varied preconceptions and practices of social organizations.

For example, past studies have examined questions like how police officers, social workers, and other institutional actors construct seemingly unrelated aspects of persons’ lives as evidence of their status as juvenile delinquents or refugees.

The sociologists who conduct these studies frequently portray reality construction as work; by constructing institutional realities, officials are able to meet their professional responsibilities (Miller & Nowacek, 2018).

Presentation of self

The presentation of oneself is the image that people project in order to be seen in a certain light. This image may or may not be accurate, but it is the one that the presenter wants others to see.

The presentation of self is an important part of the social construction of reality in that how people present themselves to others influences how they are seen and how they are interacted with.

For example, if someone wants to be seen as friendly, they may smile and make eye contact. If someone wants to be seen as intimidating, they may stand up straight and look people in the eye. These are all examples of role performance (Goffman, 2004).

It is important to note that the presentation of self is not always intentional; sometimes people give off certain cues without meaning to. For example, if someone is nervous, they may sweat or fidget, even if they don”t want to appear nervous. Or if someone is tired, they may yawn or have dark circles under their eyes, even if they are trying to appear awake and alert.

One of the first sociologists to investigate one”s presentation of oneself was Erving Goffman. According to him, a person is like an actor on a stage.

Goffman believed that people use “impression management” to present themselves in the way they desire. Each situation is a new scene, and individuals perform different roles depending on who is present (Goffman, 2004).

What is the difference between the social construction of reality vs. looking glass self?

The looking-glass self is a sociological theory that states that an individual”s self-image is based on how they think others perceive them.

The social construction of reality, on the other hand, is the theory that an individual”s perceptions of reality are shaped by their interactions with others. These theories are similar because they both suggest that an individual”s self-image is based on how they think others perceive them.

However, the social construction of reality theory goes a step further to say that an individual”s perceptions of reality are shaped by their interactions with others.

Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (2016). The social construction of reality. In Social Theory Re-Wired (pp. 110-122). Routledge.

Burr, V. (2015). Social constructionism . Routledge.

Edley, N. (2001). Unravelling social constructionism . Theory & Psychology , 11 (3), 433-441.

Goffman, E. (2004). Belief in part one is playing (pp. 59-63). Routledge.

Leeds-Hurwitz, W., Braithwaite, D. O., & Baxter, L. A. (2006). Social theories: Social constructionism and symbolic interactionism. Engaging theories in family communication: Multiple perspectives, 229-242.

Miller, G. and Nowacek, D. (2022). Social Construction of Reality. In The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, G. Ritzer (Ed.). https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405165518.wbeos1232

Merton, R. (1947). MERTON, ROBERT. Wright Mills, August, 1, 1947.

Merton, R. K. (1957). The role-set: Problems in sociological theory. The British Journal of Sociology, 8( 2), 106-120.

Miller, G., & Nowacek, D. (2018). The Social Construction of Reality.

Myers, M. D. (2008). Qualitative Research in Business & Management. SAGE Publications.

Thomas, W. I., & Thomas, D. S. (1928). The methodology of behavior study. The child in America: Behavior problems and programs, 553-576.

Berger and Luckmann’s View of the Socially Constructed Reality Essay

The idea that the reality is socially constructed is supported with many concepts discussed by Berger and Luckmann in their work The Social Construction of Reality. Berger and Luckmann’s view is based on the analysis of the notions of knowledge and recipe knowledge along with the reciprocal roles, on the concepts and constructs, language as the necessary aspect of the objectification, the processes and phenomena of institutionalisation, habitualisation, socialisation, internalisation, and externalisation.

According to Berger and Luckmann, reality is socially constructed because it is formed with references to the social knowledge and developed concepts which are distributed because of the people’s interactions. Thus, people operate the common concepts in which the definite knowledge is reflected (Calhoun et al. 2002). People form their reality with references to the commonsense, customs, and habits.

The common ideas, values, processes, and notions are habitualised and then institutionalised, making the base for the people’s reality which becomes socially constructed. Thus, Berger and Luckmann state that “all human activity is subject to habitualisation. Any action that is repeated frequently becomes cast into a pattern” (Berger & Luckmann 1967, p. 53). As a result, the habitualised actions and processes are institutionalised within the society as the definite constructs.

To understand the specifics of Berger and Luckmann’s view according to the socially constructed reality along with determining its strengths and weaknesses, it is necessary to evaluate the relevance of using such notions as objectification, internalisation, externalisation, habitualisation, institutionalisation, socialisation, and ‘recipe knowledge’ as important ones to explain the idea of the reality which is presented by Berger and Luckmann as socially constructed.

Many researchers and sociologists support Berger and Luckmann’s view that reality is socially constructed according to the idea’s general implications, but provide a lot of additional research in relation to the concepts used by Berger and Luckmann in their discussion and details (Remmling 1973).

Thus, Strauss concentrates on the idea that Berger and Luckmann’s view in relation to the social construction of reality should be discussed as “a supra-individual endeavour” (Strauss 2009, p. 229). This opinion can be considered as relevant because of the large context within which Berger and Luckmann discuss the individual in relation to the society and objective reality.

In spite of the fact Berger and Luckmann intend to support their position in relation to the social construction and socially constructed reality with a lot of theoretical argumentation, many researchers concentrate on the points which are not included in the discussion of the socially constructed reality.

Thus, Turner pays attention to the fact that Berger and Luckmann are inclined to avoid claims “to have identified the directional principle or the end point of change, or to have identified some circumstance or realm in which reality was not “socially constructed” (Turner 1991, p. 22). That is why, there are a lot of aspects regarding the social theory and social constructionism which can be discussed with references to Berger and Luckmann’s view.

However, Turner’s approach to discussing Berger and Luckmann’s view of the socially constructed reality can be considered as rather objective because the researcher focuses on all the aspects of Berger and Luckmann’s work and determine the strengths and weaknesses of the theory.

As it was mentioned, the theory of social constructionism is based on the correlation of the notions of subjectivity, objectivity and objectification, internalisation, and externalisation. It is important to concentrate on the meaning of objectification for constructing the people’s reality.

Objectification is necessary to share the knowledge and to construct the reality round the people. Objectification is usually the result of people’s discussing the objects with the help of definite signs and symbols. In this case, the role of language is significant. However, the process of objectification does not provide people with the vision of the objective reality because it is not the “part of the ‘nature of things’”, and the objective reality can exist and develop as the “product of human activity” (Berger & Luckmann 1967, p. 52).

It is also important to pay attention to the fact that the reality of definite social groups can be discussed as different because of the particular features of their perceiving the world objects and sharing the knowledge about them. The concepts and constructs about the reality depend on the language and symbols used to distribute the definite knowledge within the group.

Thus, Berger and Luckmann accentuate that the common knowledge shared by the definite social group forms the social reality and refer to the role of the language in the process as the means for objectification. According to Berger and Luckmann, “an understanding of language is thus essential for any understanding of the reality of everyday life” (Berger & Luckmann 1967, p. 37).

Furthermore, this understanding is associated with developing the socially recognised concepts and constructs. From this point, it is necessary to refer to the idea of constructs. Embree agrees with Berger and Luckmann’s vision that constructs and concepts are reflected in the words which are used by people to define this or that object according to their perception of the object and the further habitualisation of this vision of the object by the public.

Thus, constructs become recognisable for the public because they reproduce the people’s common vision of definite object (Embree 2009). This idea can be discussed as the supportive one to analyse the reality in relation to the social construction proposed by Berger and Luckmann.

Berger and Luckmann’s main idea is presented in the statement that the everyday reality is socially constructed because it is based on the everyday social interactions with the help of which people can share their knowledge, visions of values, customs, and concepts. Wallace does not argue this notion in the work, but provides the discussion of the theory accentuating its major ideas and aspects.

The reality is constructed when the process of institutionalisation of the practice and knowledge is based on habitualisation and objectification. Wallace states that “the creation of a new institution occurs in the moment of externalisation; once externalised, it is objectified, and once objectified, it acts back on the individual as an internalised entity” (Wallace 1988, p. 33).

Thus, the reality is socially constructed not only because of the dependence on the shared common knowledge as a result of the social interactions but also because of the fact the knowledge is developed with references to some processes such as habitualisation and objectification. Then, the knowledge becomes institutionalised, and it forms the reality which can be discussed as socially constructed.

In their work, Berger and Luckmann also pay much attention to the discussion of the process of the person’s socialisation as the important factor to become the part of the society and, as a result, to operate within the objective reality.

According to Berger and Luckmann, an individual becomes the member of society after becoming familiar with the definite language to share the knowledge, and the successful socialisation is the “establishment of a high degree of symmetry between objective and subjective reality” (Berger & Luckmann 1967, p. 163).

The socially constructed reality discussed by Berger and Luckmann is rather objective because it is based on the socially adopted concepts, customs, and ideas (Holstein & Gubrium 2008). Operating the notions of the social construction and constructed reality, Berger and Luckmann refer to the idea that the “social world is a human product” which is later reflected in Tulloch’s discussion (Tulloch 1976, p. 198).

Tulloch provides some points to support the opinion that the constructed reality actually depends on the correlation of externalisation, objectification, and internalisation as it was claimed by Berger and Luckmann (Tulloch 1976). That is why, it is possible to state that Berger and Luckmann have many arguments to support their vision of the reality and explain it with references to the theoretical background and everyday practice as it is presented in the researchers’ work.

To assess the deepness of Berger and Luckmann’s discussion and theory, it is important to focus on the concept of the ‘recipe knowledge’. In their book, Berger and Luckmann develop the concept of the ‘recipe knowledge’ basically, paying more attention to this concept as associated with the process of rationalising the life of people and constructing their everyday reality.

On the contrary, Shaffer states that it is necessary to develop the idea of the ‘recipe knowledge’ with determining the basic types of it. It is possible to determine ‘simple recipes’ and ‘standardised recipes’ which differ according to situations in which they are used. From this point, ‘standardised recipes’ are more effective to make the human life more rationalised. Shaffer states that “recipes are the principal tool for accomplishing the rationalization of any area of human endeavour” (Shaffer 2010, p. 58).

In his research, Shaffer goes far beyond Berger and Luckmann’s vision of the ‘recipe knowledge’ and state that recipe knowledge refers to “the attempt to transfer practical abilities or “knowhow” from a skilled or knowledgeable performer to a novice by offering step-by-step directions in terms that are familiar to the novice and by utilizing behaviors already within the repertoire of the novice” (Shaffer 2010, p. 56).

Moreover, Berger and Luckmann focus on the fact that reality is socially constructed using the notion of ‘recipe knowledge’ directly to support their idea.

The researchers stress, “since everyday life is dominated by the pragmatic motive, recipe knowledge, that is, knowledge limited to pragmatic competence in routine performance, occupies a prominent place in the social stock of knowledge” (Berger & Luckmann 1967, p. 42). The recipe knowledge contributes to the development of the people’s reciprocal roles and social constructs to form the everyday reality of the definite group of people.

Berger and Luckmann claim that recipe knowledge “serves as a channelling, controlling force in itself, and indispensable ingredient of the institutionalisation of this area of conduct” (Berger & Luckmann 1967, p. 66). As a result, recipe knowledge is the necessary part of the reality as formed with references to the social construction along with such processes as objectification and institutionalisation.

Reference List

Berger, P & Luckmann, T 1967, The social construction of reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge , Doubleday, USA.

Calhoun, C, Gerteis, J, Moody, J, Pfaff, S, & Virk, I 2002, Contemporary sociological theory , Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.

Embree, L 2009, “Phenomenology and social constructionism: constructs for political identity”, Journal of Phenomenological Psychology , vol. 40 no. 2, pp. 127-139.

Holstein, J & Gubrium, J 2008, Handbook of constructionist research , Guilford Press, USA.

Remmling, G 1973, Towards the sociology of knowledge: origin and development of a sociological thought style , Taylor & Francis, USA.

Shaffer, L 2010, “Beyond Berger and Luckmann’s concept of ‘Recipe Knowledge’: simple versus standardized recipes”, Sociological Viewpoints , vol. 9 no. 1, pp. 55-63.

Strauss, D 2009, “The (social) construction of the world – at the crossroads of Christianity and Humanism”, South African Journal of Philosophy , vol. 28 no. 2, pp. 222-233.

Tulloch, J 1976, “Sociology of knowledge and the sociology of literature”, Journal of Sociology , vol. 27 no. 2, pp. 197-210.

Turner, S 1991, “Social constructionism and social theory”, Sociological Theory , vol. 9 no. 1, pp. 22-33.

Wallace, L 1988, “Catholic women and the creation of a new social reality”, Gender and Society , vol. 2 no. 1, pp. 24-38.

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IvyPanda. (2018, December 15). Berger and Luckmann’s View of the Socially Constructed Reality. https://ivypanda.com/essays/berger-and-luckmanns-view-of-the-socially-constructed-reality/

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1. IvyPanda . "Berger and Luckmann’s View of the Socially Constructed Reality." December 15, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/berger-and-luckmanns-view-of-the-socially-constructed-reality/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Berger and Luckmann’s View of the Socially Constructed Reality." December 15, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/berger-and-luckmanns-view-of-the-socially-constructed-reality/.

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Social Construction of Reality

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Published: Sep 16, 2023

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The basics of social construction of reality, examples of socially constructed realities, implications of the theory, 1. reality as a collective endeavor, 2. language as a shaper of reality, 3. institutionalization, 1. cultural relativism, 2. critical thinking, 3. interconnectedness.

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Module 4: Socialization

The social construction of reality, learning outcomes.

Explain the social construction of reality, including habitualization

Two mimes are shown making faces and performing on a street.

Figure 1. Who are we? What role do we play in society? According to sociologists, we construct reality through our interactions with others. In a way, our day-to-day interactions are like those of actors on a stage. (Photo courtesy of Jan Lewandowski/flickr)

Just as socialization is mostly determined by the world and culture around us, our perception of the world is also influenced by external forces. Consider your own society, for example. A society describes a group of people who live in a defined geographical area, interact with one another, and share a common culture. How do you think your society was “constructed”? Who decided upon the appropriate social norms and behaviors that shape your reality and experience? Sociologists understand that reality is socially constructed, meaning that people shape their experiences through social interaction.

In 1966 sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann wrote a book called The Social Construction of Reality . In it, they argued that society is created by humans and human interaction, which they call habitualization . Habitualization describes how “any action that is repeated frequently becomes cast into a pattern, which can then be … performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effort” (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Not only do we construct our own society but we also accept it as it is because others have created it before us. Society is, in fact, a matter of “habit.”

For example, your school exists as a school and not just as another building because you and others agree that it is a school. If your school is older than you are, it was created by the agreement of others who came before you. In a sense, it exists by consensus, both prior and ongoing. This is an example of the process of institutionalization , the act of implanting a convention or norm into society. Bear in mind that the institution, while socially constructed, is still quite real.

Another way of looking at this concept is through William I. and Dorothy Thomas’s notable Thomas theorem which states, “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas and Thomas 1928). That is, people’s behavior can be determined by their subjective construction of reality rather than by objective reality. The Thomases used a case study of a mentally ill prisoner who believed his fellow inmates were talking about him and physically attacked them every time he saw their lips move. Although the other prisoners were not talking about him, it did not matter, because the situation (i.e., gossip, verbal abuse) was real to the mentally ill prisoner and the consequences (i.e., physical attacks) were very real.

Painting depicting Oedipus and three other ancient Greek figures.

Figure 2. The story line of a self-fulfilling prophecy appears in many literary works, perhaps most famously in the story of Oedipus. Oedipus is told by an oracle that he will murder his father and marry his mother. In going out of his way to avoid his fate, Oedipus inadvertently fulfills it. Oedipus’s story illustrates one way in which members of society contribute to the social construction of reality. (Photo courtesy of Jean-Antoine-Theodore Giroust/Wikimedia Commons)

Like Berger and Luckmann in their description of habitualization, the Thomases state that our moral codes and social norms are created by “successive definitions of the situation.” Racism, or the belief that one race is superior to another, is a social construction. In the United States, racism has been defined over time through laws and repeatedly interpreted by the courts. In Scott v. Sanford (1857), the U.S. Supreme Court declared that Dred Scott, a former slave, was not a citizen (or person under the law), and therefore could not sue and be recognized in federal court. Forty years later (1896), the Court upheld segregation laws in the trial of Plessy v. Ferguson , and infamously decided that “separate but equal” was okay. Homer Plessy, who was one-eighth Black, had purchased a first class ticket for a train in Louisiana, but was arrested and jailed for sitting in the “White’s Only” car. The Plessy v. Ferguson ruling would not be reversed until the Brown v. Board of Education ruling (1954).

Sociologist Robert K. Merton used the phrase self-fulfilling prophecy to describe how even a false idea can become true if it is acted upon. One example Merton gives is of a “bank run.” Say for some reason, a number of people falsely fear that their bank is soon to be bankrupt. Because of this false notion, people run to their bank and demand all of their cash at once. As banks rarely, if ever, have that much money on hand, the bank does indeed run out of money, fulfilling the customers’ prophecy. Here, reality is constructed by an idea. Examples of Merton’s bank run self-fulfilling prophecy took place at two major international airports on opposite sides of the country (JFK in New York City and LAX in Los Angeles) within two weeks of each other in 2016, as people tweeted and posted pictures of an active shooter situation. Although there were no gunshots or active shooters in either airport, the reactions by law enforcement and security and the thousands of frightened travelers were very real in their consequences.

Symbolic interactionists offer another lens through which to analyze the social construction of reality. With a theoretical perspective focused on the symbols (like words, gestures, and artifacts) that people use to interact, this approach is interested in how people interpret those symbols in daily interactions. For example, we might feel frightened seeing a person carrying a gun, unless, of course, it turns out to be a police officer. Interactionists also recognize that language and body language reflect our values. One has only to learn a foreign tongue to know that not every English word can be easily translated into another language. The same is true for gestures. While Americans might recognize a “thumbs up” as meaning “great,” in Germany it would mean “one” and in Japan it would mean “five.” Thus, our construction of reality is influenced by our symbolic interactions and culturally specific knowledge.

A Year Without the Internet–by choice?

The Internet provides fertile new ground in terms of understanding how meaning is created, or constructed, and how those realities become our social world. Americans are increasingly spending their waking hours on the Internet; according to “Surveying the Digital Future,” an annual report conducted by researchers at USC Annenberg , Americans are spending 23.6 hours online each week, up from 9.4 hours per week in 2000, and home use has risen from 3.3 hours per week to 17.6 hours per week over the same period. [1] What are the implications for family life, friendships, consumer habits, and how we receive news? How does this change the way we see ourselves as well as those around us?

Listen to Paul Miller’s TEDx talk about his journey of going offline for one year . What things changed for him? How does he strive to find balance?

Think It Over

Think of a self-fulfilling prophecy that you’ve experienced or observed. Based on this example, do you agree with the Thomas theorem? Are there any current events that we might better understand by applying the Thomas theorem?
Imagine a year offline. In what ways do you think your reality would change or shift?

Contribute!

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Cole, J. and Suman M. 2017. "Surveying the digital future." USC Annenberg Annual Report. ↵
Modification, adaptation, and original content. Authored by : Sarah Hoiland for Lumen Learning. Provided by : Lumen Learning. License : CC BY: Attribution
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4.4: Social Constructions of Reality

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Learning Objectives

By the end of this section, you should be able to:

Interpret the sociological concept of reality as a social construct
Define roles and describe their places in people’s daily interactions
Explain how individuals present themselves and perceive themselves in a social context

Until now, we’ve primarily discussed the differences between societies. Rather than discuss their problems and configurations, we’ll now explore how society came to be and how sociologists view social interaction.

For example, your school exists as a school and not just as a building because you and others agree that it is a school. If your school is older than you are, it was created by the agreement of others before you. In a sense, it exists by consensus, both prior and current. This is an example of the process of institutionalization , the act of implanting a convention or norm into society. Bear in mind that the institution, while socially constructed, is still quite real.

Another way of looking at this concept is through W.I. Thomas’s notable Thomas theorem which states, “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas and Thomas 1928). That is, people’s behavior can be determined by their subjective construction of reality rather than by objective reality. For example, a teenager who is repeatedly given a label—overachiever, player, bum—might live up to the term even though it initially wasn’t a part of his character.

Like Berger and Luckmann in their description of habitualization, Thomas states that our moral codes and social norms are created by “successive definitions of the situation.” This concept is defined by sociologist Robert K. Merton as a self-fulfilling prophecy . Merton explains that with a self-fulfilling prophecy, even a false idea can become true if it is acted upon. One example he gives is of a “bank run.” Say for some reason, a number of people falsely fear that their bank is soon to be bankrupt. Because of this false notion, people run to their bank and demand all of their cash at once. As banks rarely, if ever, have that much money on hand, the bank does indeed run out of money, fulfilling the customers’ prophecy. Here, reality is constructed by an idea.

Symbolic interactionists offer another lens through which to analyze the social construction of reality. With a theoretical perspective focused on the symbols (like language, gestures, and artifacts) that people use to interact, this approach is interested in how people interpret those symbols in daily interactions. Interactionists also recognize that language and body language reflect our values. One has only to learn a foreign tongue to know that not every English word can be easily translated into another language. The same is true for gestures. While Americans might recognize a “thumbs up” as meaning “great,” in Germany it would mean “one” and in Japan it would mean “five.” Thus, our construction of reality is influenced by our symbolic interactions.

Roles and Status

As you can imagine, people employ many types of behaviors in day-to-day life. Roles are patterns of behavior that we recognize in each other that are representative of a person’s social status. Currently, while reading this text, you are playing the role of a student. However, you also play other roles in your life, such as “daughter,” “neighbor,” or “employee.” These various roles are each associated with a different status.

Sociologists use the term status to describe the responsibilities and benefits that a person experiences according to their rank and role in society. Some statuses are ascribed —those you do not select, such as son, elderly person, or female. Others, called achieved statuses , are obtained by choice, such as a high school dropout, self-made millionaire, or nurse. As a daughter or son, you occupy a different status than as a neighbor or employee. One person can be associated with a multitude of roles and statuses. Even a single status such as “student” has a complex role-set , or array of roles, attached to it (Merton 1957). It is important to note that status refers to the rank in social hierarchy, while role is the behavior expected of a person holding a certain status.

If too much is required of a single role, individuals can experience role strain . Consider the duties of a parent: cooking, cleaning, driving, problem-solving, acting as a source of moral guidance—the list goes on. Similarly, a person can experience role conflict when one or more roles are contradictory. A parent who also has a full-time career can experience role conflict on a daily basis. When there is a deadline at the office but a sick child needs to be picked up from school, which comes first? When you are working toward a promotion but your children want you to come to their school play, which do you choose? Being a college student can conflict with being an employee, being an athlete, or even being a friend. Our roles in life have a great effect on our decisions and who we become.

A person sits at a desk while working at a computer, while holding a baby of about six months old. A second child leans against the chair as well.

Presentation of Self

Of course, it is impossible to look inside a person’s head and study what role they are playing. All we can observe is behavior, or role performance. Role performance is how a person expresses his or her role. Sociologist Erving Goffman presented the idea that a person is like an actor on a stage. Calling his theory dramaturgy, Goffman believed that we use “impression management” to present ourselves to others as we hope to be perceived. Each situation is a new scene, and individuals perform different roles depending on who is present (Goffman 1959). Think about the way you behave around your coworkers versus the way you behave around your grandparents versus the way you behave with a blind date. Even if you’re not consciously trying to alter your personality, your grandparents, coworkers, and date probably see different sides of you.

As in a play, the setting matters as well. If you have a group of friends over to your house for dinner, you are playing the role of a host. It is agreed upon that you will provide food and seating and probably be stuck with a lot of the cleanup at the end of the night. Similarly, your friends are playing the roles of guests, and they are expected to respect your property and any rules you may set forth (“Don’t leave the door open or the cat will get out.”). In any scene, there needs to be a shared reality between players. In this case, if you view yourself as a guest and others view you as a host, there are likely to be problems.

Impression management is a critical component of symbolic interactionism. For example, a judge in a courtroom has many “props” to create an impression of fairness, gravity, and control—like their robe and gavel. Those entering the courtroom are expected to adhere to the scene being set. Just imagine the “impression” that can be made by how a person dresses. This is the reason that attorneys frequently select the hairstyle and apparel for witnesses and defendants in courtroom proceedings.

Goffman’s dramaturgy ideas expand on the ideas of Charles Cooley and the looking-glass self . According to Cooley, we base our image on what we think other people see (Cooley 1902). We imagine how we must appear to others, then react to this speculation. We don certain clothes, prepare our hair in a particular manner, wear makeup, use cologne, and the like—all with the notion that our presentation of ourselves is going to affect how others perceive us. We expect a certain reaction, and, if lucky, we get the one we desire and feel good about it. But more than that, Cooley believed that our sense of self is based upon this idea: we imagine how we look to others, draw conclusions based upon their reactions to us, and then we develop our personal sense of self. In other words, people’s reactions to us are like a mirror in which we are reflected.

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Learning Objectives

Understand the sociological concept of reality as a social construct.

Symbolic interactionists offer another lens through which to analyze the social construction of reality. With a theoretical perspective focused on the symbols (like language, gestures, and artifacts) that people use to interact, this approach is interested in how people interpret those symbols in daily interactions. For example, we might feel fright at seeing a person holding a gun, unless, of course, it turns out to be a police officer. Interactionists also recognize that language and body language reflect our values. One has only to learn a foreign tongue to know that not every English word can be easily translated into another language. The same is true for gestures. While Americans might recognize a “thumbs up” as meaning “great,” in Germany it would mean “one” and in Japan it would mean “five.” Thus, our construction of reality is influenced by our symbolic interactions.

Key Takeaways

Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann wrote a book called The Social Construction of Reality . In it, they argued that society is created by humans and human interaction, which they call habitualization . In other words, society is, in fact, “habit.”
The Thomas theorem states that people’s behavior can be determined by their subjective construction of reality rather than by objective reality. In other words the beliefs and behaviors of a group of people can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy, where even a false idea can become true if it is acted upon. If people act upon this false belief it becomes true in its consequences.

Introduction to Sociology: Understanding and Changing the Social World Copyright © 2016 by University of Minnesota is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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4.2 Social Construction of Reality

Race, gender, families, scientific facts, sexuality, nationalism, and reality: What might they have in common? One commonality is that they are all socially constructed. What do sociologists mean when they say something is a social construct? At the most basic level, social constructionism , or the social construction of reality, means “what we take to be the truth about the world importantly depends on the social relationships of which we are a part” (Gergen 2018:7). Humans make meaning collectively. It’s something we are socialized into from birth. In this section, we will explore several traditions that focus on meaning-making and its connection to social reality.

4.2.1 Social Constructionism: The Basics

One of the more influential takes on social constructionism emerged from the work of Austrian-American sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. In their 1966 book, The Social Construction of Reality , they argued that society is created by humans and human interaction, which they call habitualization . Habitualization describes how “any action that is repeated frequently becomes cast into a pattern, which can then be … performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effort” (Berger and Luckmann 1966).

Habits allow us to efficiently go about our day to day lives. If we had to start from scratch everyday, our lives would be weighed down by way too many choices. For example, most days each of us probably has a morning routine we follow, oftentimes not thinking about it too much. This allows us to prepare for our day in a timely manner.

Not only do we construct our own society but we also accept it as it is because others have created it before us. Society is, in fact, “habit.” For example, your school exists as a school and not just as a building because you and others agree that it is a school. If your school is older than you are, it was created by the agreement of others before you. In a sense, it exists by consensus, both prior and current. This is an example of the process of institutionalization , the act of implanting a convention or norm into society. Bear in mind that the institution, while socially constructed, is still quite real.

Once meanings are institutionalized they may appear durable or even “natural.” Through socialization, which we will explore in more detail below, people learn these institutionalized meanings and become members of their society.

Another way of looking at this concept is through William I. and Dorothy S. Thomas’s notable Thomas theorem which states, “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas and Thomas 1928). That is, people’s behavior can be determined by their subjective construction of reality rather than by objective reality. For example, a teenager who is repeatedly given a label—overachiever, player, bum—might live up to the term even though it initially wasn’t a part of their character. Or if we took something like race, even though it is socially constructed, people believe it is real. As a result it has real life consequences, especially when considering access to opportunities.

4.2.2 Constructionism and Cross-Cultural Comparisons

Because we live enmeshed within our own cultures, it can be difficult to see how reality is constructed by the society to which we belong. One way to practice seeing how our immediate society constructs segments of its reality is by applying a constructionist lens to cultures outside of our own.

4.2.2.1 The Social Construction of Beauty

Let’s explore this with the social construction of beauty. In 1949, the French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir published the book, The Second Sex. There, she introduced the idea that “one is not born, but rather becomes a woman.” A woman becomes one through men’s construction of femininity and the feminine ideal. Both constructs, she explained, serve men’s economic and physical ends. Beauty itself has been determined by men, Beauvoir would say. As a result, society emphasizes women’s bodies and prioritizes them being on display. Along with this, women are socialized into accepting a more passive role in life, except for actively tending to their appearance.

In this 2-minute video, Beauty is a Social Construct [YouTube Video] , pay attention to the ways Beauvoir and the narrator describe how this social construct shows up in real life (figure 4.2). That is, what behaviors do they point out are related to the social construction of beauty?

Figure 4.2. Beauty is a Social Construct [YouTube Video]

Beauvoir held an activist stance, encouraging women to reject male expectations of beauty and femininity. She asserted that women shouldn’t have to act, engage, or present themselves to please men. She also suggested that resistance to male stereotypes of beauty can mean greater equality.

Beauvior criticized Western society’s patriarchy, a system in which men hold power. She advocated for the destruction of patriarchal institutions and was critical of the Western practice of the traditional nuclear family. Living in France, this was the society in which she lived and evaluated. But, how do other societies construct beauty and femininity? Do societies that are not patriarchal construct beauty differently?

4.2.2.2 Beauty Across Time and Culture

Researchers have shown that people’s sense of beauty varies across time and culture. Throughout cultures across the world, people exaggerate the features of beauty that their culture deems attractive. Ideal characteristics differ across cultures, such as neck length, foot size, and lip size. It does illustrate the cultural evaluation of beauty and the (often painful) techniques used to achieve the unnaturally extreme forms of beauty. What notions of female beauty in your culture might be similar to or different from conceptions of beauty found in the video Feminine Beauty: A Social Construct [YouTube Video] ?

4.2.2.3 Examples of Beauty

We don’t have to look extensively to find societies that express beauty differently than in Western culture. Figure 4.3 shows a bronze sculpture of a woman named Ilchee, or Moon Woman, who was born in the late 1700s. She was a member of Chinook Nation in present day Oregon and Washington and was the daughter of an influential chief. The sculpture is installed along the waterfront in Vancouver, Washington, and was designed by the sculptor Eric Jensen to honor the Chinook people who lived in the area for thousands of years. Jensen represented Ilchee looking toward her family’s ancestral home nearby.

As a child, Ilchee’s caretakers bound her head in order to create the striking angle of her profile. The elite of some Chinook tribes practiced head binding as a mark of social status as well as to enhance their sense of beauty. In some tribes the heads of children were bound, regardless of the gender, and in some tribes, the heads of girls were given more attention to flattening (Ruby and Brown 1993, Dingwall 1931).

Another example of the social construction of beauty can be seen in the preference for yaeba in Japan. Yaeba refers to teeth, especially the upper canines, that have one tooth overlapping another, or protruding from a spot higher in the gum as shown in figure 4.4. To some, this may portray a fang-like appearance. To many in Japan, it is considered a mark of youthfulness and natural beauty. It has recently become a trend for teenage girls to have dental procedures to create or emphasize this look. Others point to it as an expression of the Japanese traditional aesthetic of wabi , which is a consideration of beauty in imperfect things; in simplicity and authenticity (Yaeba Dentistry: The Appeal of Pointy Teeth 2018).

Figure 4.4. Yaeba: Perfectos dientes imperfectos” (“Yaeba: Perfect imperfect teeth”) [YouTube Video]

How do other cultures see the sense of beauty from the United States? Tanning to achieve the ultimate sun-kissed look is considered an odd practice by women from cultures that prioritize fair and porcelain-like skin. Similarly the U.S. preference for very straight and very white teeth is sometimes seen as obsessive and overly uniform (Barford 2022). Professor Jimmy Steele of the School of Dental Science at Newcastle University finds that,

U.S. teeth are sometimes whiter than it is physically possible to get in nature— there is a new reality out there. The most extreme tooth bleaching is terrifying, it looks like it’s painted with gloss paint and has altered what people perceive as normal. (Barford 2022)

What other ways might societies outside of the United States find the U.S. social construction of beauty peculiar? What other ways can you identify the social construction of beauty in other cultures?

4.2.3 Symbolic Interactionism

Let’s revisit symbolic interactionism that we first discussed in Chapter 2 . As Herbert Blumer (1969:2) stated, symbolic interactionism was based on the following premises:

Humans act toward things on the basis of the meanings they ascribe to those things.
The meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with others and the society.
These meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he/she encounters.

Interactionists are concerned with how meanings are constructed through interactions with others. We attach meanings to situations, roles, relationships, and most things in our lives whenever we encounter them. For a symbolic interaction between people to occur, these meanings to some extent have to be shared and agreed upon with the people you are interacting with.

4.2.4 Ethnomethodology

Another micro-level theory that can help explain our daily interactions is ethnomethodology. In simple terms, ethnomethodology is the study of everyday folk methods, how we go about ordering our day-to-day lives. Oftentimes, how we organize our lives is taken for granted and can be hard to explain. Harold Garfinkel, the founder of ethnomethodology, developed an approach to showing the hidden rules for how we live our lives. He called these breaching experiments. In breaching experiments, the experimenter goes out in public and breaks everyday unspoken rules and expectations. The breaking of unspoken rules helps reveal people’s expectations. The experiment also shows how people will repair interactions once an unspoken rule has been broken. As an example, say you and your classmates started dancing Laxed (Siren Beat) [TikTok] through the library. How do you think people in the library would respond? What norms related to libraries might this impromptu dance party reveal?

4.2.5 Licenses and Attributions for Social Construction of Reality

First, third, and fifth paragraphs in“Social Constructionism: The Basics” are modified from “4.3 Social Construction of Reality”by Tonja R. Conerly, Kathleen Holmes, Asha Lal Tamang in Openstax Sociology 3e , which is licensed under CC BY 4.0 . Access for free at OpenStax ; https://openstax.org/books/introduction-sociology-3e/pages/4-3-social-constructions-of-reality . First paragraph added the first sentence, in the fifth paragraph included information about Dorothy Thomas’ contribution, added race example.

“Beauty across time and culture’” is an adaptation of the blog, “Conceptions of Beauty across Cultures” on the website, The Sociological Cinema published under the CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 US license . Minor edits made for clarity and to remove reference of a video.

Figure 4.3. Photo of bronze sculpture of Ilchee Moon Girl , By Kevin W, HMdb.org

Figure 4.4. Screenshot from video, “Yaeba: Perfectos dientes imperfectos” (“Yaeba: Perfect imperfect teeth”) published on YouTube.

All other content in “Constructionism and Cross-Cultural Comparisons” by Aimee Krouskop is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 .

All other content in “Social Constructionism”, “Social Constructionism: The Basics”, “Symbolic Interactionism” and “Ethnomethodology” sections are original content by Matthew Gougherty and licensed under CC BY 4.0 .

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4.3 Social Constructions of Reality

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you should be able to:

Interpret the sociological concept of reality as a social construct
Define roles and describe their places in people’s daily interactions
Explain how individuals present themselves and perceive themselves in a social context

Roles and Status

Presentation of Self

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Want to cite, share, or modify this book? This book uses the Creative Commons Attribution License and you must attribute OpenStax.

Access for free at https://openstax.org/books/introduction-sociology-3e/pages/1-introduction

Authors: Tonja R. Conerly, Kathleen Holmes, Asha Lal Tamang
Publisher/website: OpenStax
Book title: Introduction to Sociology 3e
Publication date: Jun 3, 2021
Location: Houston, Texas
Book URL: https://openstax.org/books/introduction-sociology-3e/pages/1-introduction
Section URL: https://openstax.org/books/introduction-sociology-3e/pages/4-3-social-constructions-of-reality

© Jan 18, 2024 OpenStax. Textbook content produced by OpenStax is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License . The OpenStax name, OpenStax logo, OpenStax book covers, OpenStax CNX name, and OpenStax CNX logo are not subject to the Creative Commons license and may not be reproduced without the prior and express written consent of Rice University.

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Society and Social Interaction

18 Social Constructions of Reality

Learning objectives.

Understand the sociological concept of reality as a social construct
Define roles and describe their places in people’s daily interactions
Explain how individuals present themselves and perceive themselves in a social context

Symbolic interactionists offer another lens through which to analyze the social construction of reality. With a theoretical perspective focused on the symbols (like language, gestures, and artifacts) that people use to interact, this approach is interested in how people interpret those symbols in daily interactions. For example, we might feel fright at seeing a person holding a gun, unless, of course, it turns out to be a police officer. Interactionists also recognize that language and body language reflect our values. One has only to learn a foreign tongue to know that not every English word can be easily translated into another language. The same is true for gestures. While Americans might recognize a “thumbs up” as meaning “great,” in Germany it would mean “one” and in Japan it would mean “five.” Thus, our construction of reality is influenced by our symbolic interactions.

Roles and Status

Presentation of Self

Impression management is a critical component of symbolic interactionism. For example, a judge in a courtroom has many “props” to create an impression of fairness, gravity, and control—like her robe and gavel. Those entering the courtroom are expected to adhere to the scene being set. Just imagine the “impression” that can be made by how a person dresses. This is the reason that attorneys frequently select the hairstyle and apparel for witnesses and defendants in courtroom proceedings.

Society is based on the social construction of reality. How we define society influences how society actually is. Likewise, how we see other people influences their actions as well as our actions toward them. We all take on various roles throughout our lives, and our social interactions depend on what types of roles we assume, who we assume them with, and the scene where interaction takes place.

Section Quiz

Mary works full-time at an office downtown while her young children stay at a neighbor’s house. She’s just learned that the childcare provider is leaving the country. Mary has succumbed to pressure to volunteer at her church, plus her ailing mother-in-law will be moving in with her next month. Which of the following is likely to occur as Mary tries to balance her existing and new responsibilities?

Role conflict
Self-fulfilling prophecy
Status conflict
Status strain

According to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, society is based on ________.

habitual actions
institutionalization
role performance

Paco knows that women find him attractive, and he’s never found it hard to get a date. But as he ages, he dyes his hair to hide the gray and wears clothes that camouflage the weight he has put on. Paco’s behavior can be best explained by the concept of ___________.

role strain
the looking-glass self
habitualization

Short Answer

Draw a large circle, and then “slice” the circle into pieces like a pie, labeling each piece with a role or status that you occupy. Add as many statuses, ascribed and achieved, that you have. Don’t forget things like dog owner, gardener, traveler, student, runner, employee. How many statuses do you have? In which ones are there role conflicts?

Think of a self-fulfilling prophecy that you’ve experienced. Based on this experience, do you agree with the Thomas theorem? Use examples from current events to support your answer as well.

Further Research

TV Tropes is a website where users identify concepts that are commonly used in literature, film, and other media. Although its tone is for the most part humorous, the site provides a good jumping-off point for research. Browse the list of examples under the entry of “self-fulfilling prophecy.” Pay careful attention to the real-life examples. Are there ones that surprised you or that you don’t agree with? http://openstax.org/l/tv-tropes

Berger, P. L., and T. Luckmann. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge . Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.

Cooley, Charles H. 1902. Human Nature and the Social Order . New York: Scribner’s.

Goffman, Erving. 1959. The Presentation of Self In Everyday Life . New York: Doubleday.

Merton, Robert K. 1957. “The Role-Set: Problems in Sociological Theory.” British Journal of Sociology 8(2):110–113.

Thomas, W.I., and D.S. Thomas. 1928. The Child in America: Behavior Problems and Programs . New York: Knopf.

Introduction to Sociology 2e Copyright © 2012 by OSCRiceUniversity (Download for free at https://openstax.org/details/books/introduction-sociology-2e) is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

Inventions in Sociology pp 71–100 Cite as

The Sociology of Objectivity

Sal Restivo 2
First Online: 19 March 2022

348 Accesses

This chapter is based on a paper the author published in 1974 in which he introduced the idea of a “sociology of objectivity.” There is an aura of the 1960s about the original paper, an aura that reminds us of some of the more extreme subjectivities and spiritualisms of that period. At the end of the day, these features of the paper were harbingers of new and more complex strategies in developing a sociological foundation for pursuing objective results in and about science. The paper set the agenda for much of the author’s future work on science, values, objectivity, and global problems.

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Descartes’ Theory of Ideas

Ideas are among the most important items in Descartes’ philosophy. They serve to unify his ontology and epistemology. As he says in a letter to Guillaume Gibieuf (1583–1650), dated 19 January 1642, “I am certain that I can have no knowledge of what is outside me except by means of the ideas I have within me.” [ 1 ] Descartes never published anything that specifically worked out a theory of ideas. Even so, he said enough in published and unpublished work, as well as in correspondence, that allows for a basic reconstruction of a theory. This entry will focus principally on the theory of ideas and how it relates to Descartes’ ontology, though in Section 6 of this entry, which includes discussion of simple natures and Descartes’ concepts of clarity and distinctness, certain components of his epistemology are briefly considered. For more on the epistemology, see the related entry Descartes, René: epistemology .

1. Ideas Understood as Modes of Thinking

2. ideas and the formal-objective reality distinction.

3. Three Kinds of Idea (Innate, Adventitious, and Factitious)

4. Primary Ideas and a Principle of Representation

5. the rules : simple natures and the concepts of clarity and distinctness, primary sources, secondary sources, other internet resources, related entries.

According to Descartes’ ontology there are substances , attributes , and modes . These are understood relative to one another, in terms of ontological dependence. Modes depend on attributes, and attributes depend on substances. The dependence relation is transitive; thus, modes depend ultimately on substances. No substances, no modes. In Principles , Part I, Article 53, Descartes says that a mode “presupposes” an attribute (AT VIIIA 25; CSM I 210), and in Article 52 he says that an attribute “presupposes” an existing substance. A mode of some thing was understood by Descartes as a a way of being that thing. So, where X is some substance, a mode M is a way of being X . That said, in Article 52 he also says that a substance minus its attributes cannot be known to the human mind. Attributes are in fact what make existing substances intelligible to the human mind. He reaffirms this in Article 62, where he says that there is only a distinction in reason between an attribute and an existing substance. (AT VIIIA 30; CSM I 214) This strongly suggests that although one may draw a conceptual distinction between an attribute and existing substance, the two are not distinct in reality. They are really one and the same thing. (Nolan 1997, Hoffman 2002) Subsequently, if mode M is a way of being X , where X is the substance, the intelligibility of X requires that we conceive some attribute A . And so, strictly speaking, mode M is understood as a mode of attribute A , where A is the attribute through which the existing substance X is conceived (where in reality A and X are presumably identical).

The nature of a mind, Descartes says, is to think. If a thing does not think, it is not a mind. In terms of his ontology, the mind is an existing (finite) substance, and thought or thinking is its attribute. Insofar as the nature of a mind is to think, where thought is the mind’s defining feature, Descartes calls it the mind’s principal attribute (AT VIIIA 25; CSM I 210–11). An idea is a mode of thinking. In being a mode of thinking, an idea is understood as a way of being (an instance of) thinking, or an idea is way in which an instance of thinking is manifested. This is similar to what Descartes says about a body, its principal attribute, and its modes. The nature of a body is to be extended (in length, breadth, and depth). A body is a (finite) substance, and extension is its attribute. Since extension is the defining feature of a body, Descartes refers to it as a body’s principal attribute. Shape is a mode of extension. What this means is that shape is a way of being extended, or a way in which an instance of extension is manifested. Thus, shape is to extension as idea is to thought. Thus a shape presupposes extension and an idea presupposes thinking, where each principal attribute presupposes an existing substance.

Insofar as ideas are modes, they occupy the lowest rung on Descartes’ ontological ladder. This can be contrasted to Plato’s theory, for example, which casts ideas as substances, occupying the upper-most rung of the ontological ladder. So, whereas for Plato ideas are the most real things in the cosmos, for Descartes ideas are among the least real. Another departure from Plato’s view was Descartes’ taking ideas as the vehicles of representation, as the items doing the representing. By contrast, Plato took ideas to be the things represented. Socrates, for instance, was taken by Plato to be a representation of the form or idea of man. These differences are certainly enough to suggest that ideas are playing significantly different roles in their respective systems. So, it would not be reasonable to think that Descartes’ view was simply an extension of Plato’s, despite the fact that Descartes had adopted some of Plato’s terminology.

Ideas are not the only modes of thinking. Doubting and judging, for example, are also modes of thinking. Early in the Third Meditation, Descartes works out a basic division of the various modes of thinking. He sorts them into two kinds: simple and complex. Ideas are included in the category of simple modes. Doubting, judging, and the like, are included in the category of complex modes. Even so, all complex modes include ideas as constituents. A complex mode of thought includes at least two basic mental components: an idea and some “additional” mental feature. He writes:

…[C]onsiderations of order appear to dictate that I now classify my thoughts into definite kinds, and ask which of them can properly be said to be the bearers of truth and falsity. Some of my thoughts are as it were the images of things, and it is only in these cases that the term “idea” is strictly appropriate — for example, when I think of a man, or a chimera, or the sky, or an angel, or God. Other thoughts have various additional forms: thus when I will, or am afraid, or affirm, or deny, there is always a particular thing which I take as the object of my thought, but my thought includes something more than the likeness of that thing. Some thoughts in this category are called volitions or emotions, while others are called judgements. (AT VII 36–7; CSM II 25–6)

In this passage, ideas are cast as modes of thinking that represent (or present or exhibit) objects to the mind—objects such as a man, or Pegasus, or the sky, or an angel, or God (and given what Descartes says in the First Meditation, among the list of things exhibited to the mind by way of its ideas, one could add colors, sounds, feels, and so on (AT VII 20; CSM II 13–14)). On Descartes’ view, an idea is the only kind of (simple) mode that does this. When considering one of the more complex modes of thought—for instance, fearing a lion or affirming the Pythagorean Theorem, where the lion and the theorem are the objects presented—it is the idea that is doing the presenting; it is the vehicle of representation. As Descartes will note in the Fourth Meditation, he takes there to be two basic faculties (capacities or abilities) of the mind: the intellect (or understanding ) and the will . Ideas are “produced” by the intellect. So, the idea of the Pythagorean Theorem has its origin in the faculty of the intellect or understanding. The act of affirming, the other component of the more complex thought of affirming this theorem, has its origin in the faculty of the will. Contributions from both faculties, then, give rise to the more complex kinds of thought.

Descartes is careful to not identify ideas as pictures or as visual images , but instead says that they are as it were [ tanquam ] images of things. This is a long-standing theme, for we find it expressed as early as The World (AT XI 3–6; CSM I 81–2) and the Optics (AT VI 112–13; CSM I 165), and as late as the Principles (AT VIIIA 32–3; CSM I 216–17) and Description of the Human Body (AT XI 255–257; CSM I 322–23), where in these contexts ideas are cast as representing their objects without necessarily resembling them. This is important to the theory, since the idea of cold or the idea of sweet, for example, insofar as they are ideas, represent something to the mind, but they are not visual images. The point holds for other ideas, such as the idea of God, which Descartes explicitly lists in the above passage. The idea of God represents something to the mind (it represents an infinite substance), and in line with traditional theological doctrine, supposing that God is non-spatial and non-temporal, the idea cannot be understood as being a visual image of God.

Consistent with what he says in the above Third Meditation passage, Descartes says in other places that an idea is “the form of any given thought, immediate perception of which makes me aware of the thought” (AT VII 160; CSM II 113). In his reply to Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), author of the Third Set of Objections, Descartes says that an idea is “whatever is immediately perceived by the mind” (AT VII 181; CSM II 127). In his reply to Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655), author of the Fifth Set of Objections, he says that the term “idea” is extended “to cover any object of thought” (AT VII 366; CSM II 253). In a letter to Marin Mersenne (1588–1648), dated July 1641, he says that “idea” denotes “in general everything which is in our mind when we conceive something, no matter how we conceive it” (AT III 393; CSMK III 185). Long-standing interpretations take such passages as telling us that ideas have the special feature of intentionality—they are directed at their respective objects. It is in terms of this directedness that the mind is said to be aware of an object.

One long-standing interpretation, the Representationalist interpretation, says that for Descartes the objects immediately presented to the mind (by way of an idea) are purely mental objects. This interpretation emphasizes Descartes’ saying that such objects are solely in the intellect, as when he says to Caterus that the object of which the mind is immediately or directly aware when having the idea of the Sun “…is not an actual entity, that is, it is not a being located outside the intellect…” (AT VII 103; CSM II 75) The object at which the mind is directed, the immediate object of awareness, is not the Sun itself, but is instead a purely mental object, which represents (or stands for) the Sun in the heavens. This purely mental object is said to constitute the content of the idea. On this view, an idea is sometimes referred to as a tertium quid , a third thing, which “stands between” the mind’s eye, so to speak, and the object that the idea represents.

Another long-standing interpretation, the Direct Realist interpretation, says that for Descartes the objects immediately represented or presented to the mind (by way of an idea) are not always mental objects. (Nadler 1989) The idea of the Sun is understood as being a mental operation (a mode of the mind) directed at the Sun itself. In fact, on this interpretation, all ideas are, properly speaking, to be understood as operations or acts of the mind. This holds even for the idea of Pegasus. The idea is a mental operation and in this case is directed at the mentally fabricated object, Pegasus. Here, Pegasus is a purely mental object. By contrast, the (sensory) idea of the Sun is directed at the Sun itself, the Sun in the heavens. Thus, this interpretation allows ideas to be directed at mental and extra-mental objects. The import of this interpretation is that the immediate objects of awareness need not be purely mental—so, no tertium quid —which differs dramatically from the Representationalist interpretation. Although both readings have their merits, the remainder of this entry will work within the framework of the Representationalist reading.

When speaking of an existent mode—in this case, an actually occurring idea—Descartes will say that it possesses formal reality . The formal reality of a thing is the kind of reality the thing possesses in virtue of its being an actual or an existent thing (AT VII 41–42, 102–4; CSM II 28–29, 74–5). For example, given that the Sun is an actual or existent thing, it possesses formal reality. By contrast, given that Pegasus is not an actual or existent thing, he does not possess formal reality. Given that the idea of the Sun or the idea of Pegasus are actual or existent ideas, where an idea is actual or existent when it is being actively thought by a mind, each would possess formal reality.

Descartes took there to be three “levels” of formal reality: the level of infinite substance, the level of finite substance (as defined by its principal attribute), and the level of mode. The level of formal reality of an infinite substance is greater than that of a finite substance, and the level of formal reality of a finite substance is greater than that of a mode. This is understood in terms of ontological dependence. A mode depends for its formal reality on the formal reality of a finite substance, and a finite substance depends for its formal reality on the formal reality of an infinite substance. An existent idea, in possessing the level of formal reality of a mode, is less “real” than a finite substance, which is in line with what was said in the previous section of this entry.

When speaking of ideas as representing things to the mind, Descartes will refer to an idea’s objective reality . The objective reality of a thing is the kind of reality a thing possesses in virtue of its being a representation of something ( ibid .). Given that the idea of the Sun and the idea of Pegasus represent things to the mind (they represent or exhibit the Sun and Pegasus respectively), each possesses objective reality. Descartes says that ideas possess objective reality by their very nature. Equally importantly, ideas are the only items in his ontology that possess both formal and objective reality. (AT VII 42; CSM II 29)

As with formal reality, there are three “levels” of objective reality. Descartes says, “Undoubtedly, the ideas which represent substances to me amount to something more and, so to speak, contain within themselves more objective reality than the ideas which merely represent modes or accidents” (AT VII 40; CSM II 28). And, Descartes’ Third Meditation examination of his idea of God reveals that the objective reality that it contains or possesses is that associated with an infinite substance. At the very least, the view is that the idea of God contains a level of objective reality that is greater than that contained in an idea representing a finite substance. Thus, the levels of objective reality possessed by ideas, the reality they possess in virtue of their representing things to the mind, are (nominally) three: infinite substance, finite substance, and mode. The categories of the objective-reality hierarchy, then, correspond to those of the formal-reality hierarchy.

“The nature of an idea,” Descartes says, “is such that of itself it requires no formal reality except what it derives from my thought, of which it is a mode” (AT VII 41; CSM II 28). In fact, “In so far as the ideas are (considered) simply (as) modes of thought, there is no recognizable inequality among them: they all appear to come from within me in the same fashion” (AT VII 40; CSM II 27–8). Each idea is simply a mode of thought, and insofar as an idea is an existent (or actual) mode, it possesses a level of formal reality of that of a mode. He continues: “But in so far as different ideas (are considered as images which) represent different things, it is clear that they differ widely” (AT VII 40; CSM II 28). The differences will not only be in terms of the “objects” represented, but, as noted above, ideas will differ with respect to the levels of objective reality they contain (AT VII 40; CSM II 28).

To see the formal-objective reality distinction at work within the context of Descartes’ theory, consider an idea that has been mentioned several times already—the idea of God, as introduced in the Third Meditation. Descartes’ analysis of this idea begins with his focusing on the fact that the idea represents to him an infinite substance (AT VII 45; CSM II 31). The formal-objective reality distinction suggests the following. When considered simply as an existent mode of Descartes’ mind, which is to consider it in terms of its formal reality, Descartes sees no trouble in accounting for the origin of the formal reality of this idea: the formal reality possessed by this idea is derived from the formal reality of his mind. In other words, the existence of the idea, as mode, depends on the existence of his mind. But when considered in terms of what this idea represents or presents to the mind, which is to consider the idea in terms of its objective reality, Descartes discovers a problem, which can be formulated: what is the origin of the idea’s objective reality? This challenge arises in light of Descartes’ saying:

Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must be at least as much (reality) in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause. For where, I ask, could the effect get its reality from, if not from the cause? And how could the cause give it to the effect unless it possessed it? It follows from this both that something cannot arise from nothing, and also that what is more perfect — that is, contains in itself more reality — cannot arise from what is less perfect. And this is transparently true not only in the case of effects which possess (what the philosophers call) actual or formal reality, but also in the case of ideas, where one is considering only (what they call) objective reality. A stone, for example, which previously did not exist, cannot begin to exist unless it is produced by something which contains, either formally or eminently everything to be found in the stone; similarly, heat cannot be produced in an object which was not previously hot, except by something of at least the same order (degree or kind) of perfection as heat, and so on. But it is also true that the idea of heat, or of a stone, cannot exist in me unless it is put there by some cause which contains at least as much reality as I conceive to be in the heat or in the stone. For although this cause does not transfer any of its actual or formal reality to my idea, it should not on that account be supposed that it must be less real. The nature of an idea is such that of itself it requires no formal reality except what it derives from my thought, of which it is a mode. But in order for a given idea to contain such and such objective reality, it must surely derive it from some cause which contains at least as much formal reality as there is objective reality in the idea. For if we suppose that an idea contains something which was not in its cause, it must have got this from nothing; yet the mode of being by which a thing exists objectively (or representatively) in the intellect by way of an idea, imperfect though it may be, is certainly not nothing, and so it cannot come from nothing. (AT VII 40–1; CSM II 28–9)

The challenge in the examination of the idea of God is to account for the origin of the idea’s level of objective reality. He determines that the formal reality possessed by his own mind cannot be its origin. He concludes that there must be some being that in fact possesses the requisite level of formal reality, which in this case will be greater than that of a finite substance. (For more, see the SEP entry on Descartes’ epistemology .) Notice how this differs from what he says about the formal reality of an idea, namely, that his mind is the cause or origin of an idea’s formal reality.

The examination of the idea of God follows almost directly upon the introduction of the possible connection between the objective reality of some of his ideas and the formal reality of extra-ideational or extra-mental objects. Descartes’ analysis of the idea of God suggests a principle of representation, which is discussed in Section 4 of this entry.

There is a second distinction that Descartes introduces worth noting, the material-objective distinction . Some scholars believe that it is simply an alternate way of expressing the formal-objective reality distinction. The material-objective distinction is never clearly formulated in the body of the Meditations , though Descartes employs it in his reply to Antione Arnauld (1612–1694), in the Fourth Set of Replies.

Descartes introduces the material-objective distinction in the Preface To the Reader of the Meditations (which was very likely written after the Meditations and the Objections and Replies). He says that the word “idea” is philosophically ambiguous:

“Idea” can be taken materially, as an operation of the intellect, in which case it cannot be said to be more perfect than me. Alternatively, it can be taken objectively, as the thing represented by that operation; and this thing, even if it is not regarded as existing outside the intellect, can still, in virtue of its essence, be more perfect than myself. (AT VII 8; CSM II 7)

The term “idea” can be used to refer to a specific kind of act or operation of the mind—here, it is the act of representing . In this sense, the idea is simply an existent mode of the mind. In light of the formal-objective reality distinction, since the formal reality of an idea (a mode) is derived from the formal reality of the mind (its substance), it follows that its level of formal reality cannot be greater than that of the mind. This is what Descartes means when claiming that his ideas, understood as operations of his mind, cannot be “more perfect” than his mind. When using “idea” to refer to an operation of the mind, “idea” is expressing what he calls the material sense. Sometimes he will say, as he does in the above quoted passage, that when understanding an idea to be an operation of the mind that it is taken materially .

Alternatively, the term “idea” can be used to refer to that which is presented or exhibited directly to the mind by way of the mental operation. When using “idea” to refer the object exhibited directly to the mind, “idea” is expressing what he calls the objective sense. Sometimes he will say, as he does in the above quoted passage, that when understanding an idea as the object immediately presented to the mind (by way of a mental operation), the idea is taken objectively .

Consider again the idea of God. When taking this idea materially, the idea is understood as an operation of the mind. When taking this very same idea objectively, the idea is understood as that which is presented directly to the mind by way of this operation. The nature of the object presented, Descartes says, can be more perfect than his mind. So, even though he is not an infinite being, an idea can nevertheless present to him a being that is infinite, a being that possesses a greater level of reality than that possessed by a finite substance. Again, the emphasis is that such is possible only if the cause of the objective being possesses the requisite level of formal reality, which in this case, as just noted, must be greater than that of a finite substance.

Where the two distinctions may differ is with respect to how Descartes employs them. When tracing out the origins of the formal and objective reality possessed by an idea, Descartes employs the formal-objective reality distinction. In some cases, as in the case of the idea of God, the origin of the formal reality of the idea is his own mind, whereas the origin of the objective reality is God (something that exists independently of his mind). However, when Descartes is speaking about the relation between an idea understood as a mental operation, and this very same idea now understood as the object presented by way of this operation, Descartes employs the material-objective distinction. The difference is with respect to the number of relations in play in the analysis. Consider again the idea of God. Concerning the formal-objective reality distinction, the number of relations is two: the relation between the idea as mode and the mind, and the relation between the object presented in or by the idea and God. Concerning the material-objective distinction, there is only one relation being considered: the relation between the idea as mental operation and this idea as object presented (via this operation).

3. Three Kinds of Idea

In the Meditations , after Descartes casts ideas as modes that represent or exhibit objects to the mind, he divides ideas into kinds. He says:

Among my ideas, some appear to be innate, some to be adventitious, and others to have been invented by me. My understanding of what a thing is, what truth is, and what thought is, seems to derive simply from my own nature. But my hearing a noise, as I do now, or seeing the sun, or feeling the fire, comes from things which are located outside me, or so I have hitherto judged. Lastly, sirens, hippogriffs and the like are my own invention. (AT VII 37–8; CSM II 26)

Here, Descartes considers three kinds of idea: innate ideas , adventitious ideas , and what are sometimes called factitious ideas . The categories are determined by considering the possible origins of the ideational contents presented or exhibited to the mind. The first category includes ideas whose contents have their origin in his nature ( qua thinking thing). An example is his idea of what thought or thinking is. The third category includes ideas whose contents have their origin in the contents of other ideas. An example would be the idea of Pegasus, where its content is drawn perhaps from the contents of the idea of a horse and the idea of a bird. Adventitious ideas, however, appear at least at first glance to be importantly different, since Nature has always taught him, he says, to think that they are “derived from things existing outside me” (AT VII 38; CSM II 26). The category arises in part from ordinary (pre-philosophical) experience: “…I know by experience that these ideas do not depend on my will, and hence that they do not depend simply on me. Frequently I notice them even when I do not want to: now, for example, I feel the heat whether I want to or not, and this is why I think that this sensation or idea of heat comes to me from something other than myself, namely the heat of the fire by which I am sitting” (AT VII 38; CSM II 26). An account of their origin, he suggests, may require an appeal to things that exist external to, or independently of, his mind. Adventitious ideas include sensory ideas; ideas that originate in sensory experience—such as the ideas of the Sun or the Moon, but also the more simple ideas of colors, sounds, heat, cold, and the like.

In Descartes’ analysis of his idea of God, he discovers that it is innate, since it is neither adventitious nor factitious. It is not adventitious (or sensory), since he has had no sensory experiences of God (i.e., he has never seen, heard, felt, smelt, or tasted God). This would be in line with the theological demand that God is immaterial. It is not factitious, for its content is something that his mind cannot fabricate from other ideas—the idea represents an actual infinity; at best his mind can only produce the factitious idea of a potential infinity. (AT VII 46–7; CSM II 32) Even so, it becomes clear to him that the innate idea of God is like the adventitious idea of the Sun, but unlike the innate idea of what thought is (which has its origin in his own nature), since like the adventitious idea of the Sun, the objective reality possessed by the idea has its origin in the formal reality belonging to something other than his own mind. His analysis concludes that the origin of the objective reality must be in an existing God (an actual infinite substance, something possessing an infinite level of formal reality). In the Sixth Meditation, he will ultimately conclude that the objective reality of his idea of body, also innate, must have, like the innate idea of God, its origin in the formal reality belonging to something other than his own mind, namely, it will have its origin in an existing corporeal substance (an extended being that possesses a finite level of formal reality). Ultimately, the objective reality (i.e., contents) of his innate ideas and adventitious ideas must have their origin in the formal reality of things, some of the latter being things existing independently of his mind.

This is not the only place in Descartes’ work where innate and adventitious ideas are cast as sharing the trait of having their respective origins in things existing independently of his mind. For instance, in Comments on a Certain Broadsheet , published in 1648, Descartes casts innateness as a faculty (AT VIIIB 358; CSM I 304), which aligns with what he had said to Hobbes in the Third Set of Replies: “…when we say that an idea is innate in us, we do not mean that it is always there before us. This would mean that no idea was innate. We simply mean that we have within ourselves the faculty of summoning up the idea” (AT VII 189; CSM II 132). Scholars note that this may be different from the way in which innate ideas were cast in the Third Meditation. But in the sense of innate–as–faculty , in Comments on a Certain Broadsheet , Descartes goes on to say that there is a sense in which even sensory ideas (ideas of qualities such as pains, colors, sounds, and so on), ideas arising via the senses, which are a species of adventitious idea, are nevertheless innate. The argument unfolds as follows: Given that the human (or embodied) mind has the faculty or capacity to have sensory ideas of pains, colors, sounds, and so on, where these are occasioned on the occurrence or presence of certain motions in the brain, and nothing of the motions in the brain is transferred to the mind, and nothing resembling the pains, colors, and sounds is present in bodies (including the brain), then the ideas of pains, colors, and sounds (i.e., the ideas of those qualities ) “must be all the more innate.” (AT VIIIB 359; CSM I 304)

One interpretation that has relatively recently emerged addresses the concern over the alleged similarity between innate and adventitious ideas by emphasizing the role that innate ideas play (Nolan 1997, Lennon 2007, Nelson 2008, De Rosa 2010). Consider, for example, the adventitious or sensory idea of the Sun. This idea presents the Sun to the mind as a shaped thing. An analysis of this idea reveals that the innate idea of extension (body) is in play, for without it the human mind simply could not experience (or even conceive) the Sun as shaped. Shape presupposes extension. As Descartes puts it in the Principles , everything “which can be attributed to body presupposes extension, and is merely a mode of an extended thing,” which, according to Descartes, is aligned with the view that “…shape is unintelligible except in an extended thing…” (AT VIIIA 25; CSM I 210). In this sense, insofar as a shaped thing is made intelligible to a human mind, the innate idea of extension is involved. As some scholars have put it, the innate idea underlies or informs the occurring idea of the Sun (Nolan 1997, Nelson 2008, De Rosa 2010). This interpretation finds further support in what Descartes says in a letter to Princess Elisabeth, dated 21 May 1643, where Descartes introduces what he calls the “primitive notions.” These are what in other contexts he calls the innate ideas. In the letter, he claims that these ideas serve as “…the patterns on the basis of which we form all our other conceptions” (AT III 665; CSMK III 218). So, it is the unique role of the innate ideas that distinguishes them from adventitious ideas, where their role is to serve as that which makes other things intelligible.

Scholars agree that Descartes recognizes at least three innate ideas: the idea of God, the idea of (finite) mind, and the idea of (indefinite) body. In the letter to Elisabeth, he includes a fourth: the idea of the union (of mind and body).

There is an alternate division of ideas worth noting. In the Third Meditation, after having introduced the tripartite division of innate, adventitious, and factitious ideas, Descartes continues to entertain the possible origins of the contents of his ideas. His analysis turns on the principle that an effect can never be greater than its cause, which is underwritten by the self-evident principle that something cannot come from nothing. He says: “And although one idea may perhaps originate from another, there cannot be an infinite regress here; eventually one must reach a primary idea, the cause of which will be like an archetype which contains formally (and in fact) all the reality (or perfection) which is present only objectively (or representatively) in the idea.” (AT VII 42; CSM II 29) Here, Descartes introduces the notion of a primary idea . The import of this notion is that the contents of some of his ideas may have their origin in things located “outside” his mind—that is, in things that exist independently of his mind.

Descartes’ analysis suggests that the contents of some of his innate ideas and all of his adventitious ideas have their origin in things existing independently of his mind. Such ideas are included in the category of Primary Idea. The innate idea of God is a primary idea, since the objective reality it possesses has its origin the formal reality of God. Likewise, the innate idea of body is a primary idea, since the objective reality it possesses has its origin in the formal reality of body. And, as just noted, the adventitious idea of the Sun is a primary idea, since the objective reality it possesses has its origin the formal reality of the Sun. Factitious ideas, whose contents have their origin in the contents of other ideas, no doubt fall into the category of Non-Primary idea . A non-primary idea is one whose objective reality has its origin in the objective reality of some other idea. The factitious idea of Pegasus is an example of a non-primary idea.

This alternate scheme (Primary and Non-Primary), although partitioning ideas differently than the initial scheme (Innate, Adventitious, and Factitious), appears to do no philosophical harm to Descartes’ view. Even so, it is interesting the extent to which Descartes’ category of primary idea is later echoed in the views of John Locke and David Hume, whose respective theories require a similar category, which they refer to as simple idea .

Some scholars believe that in Descartes’ brief discussion of primary ideas there is suggested a principle of representation (Wilson 1978, Clatterbaugh 1980, Chappell 1986, Smith 2005a, 2010a). The principle is notoriously difficult to formulate, and there is no consensus among scholars as to how it is best understood. However, a large number of scholars agree on one component of the principle, which can be expressed as a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for representation. This principle of representation ( PR ) can be expressed as follows:

(PR) Primary idea A represents object B only if the objective reality of idea A has its origin in the formal reality of object B.

PR is at work in Descartes’ analyses of all primary ideas, which includes all innate and adventitious ideas. The innate idea of his (i.e., Descartes’) mind is said to be of or to represent his mind insofar as the idea’s objective reality has its origin in the formal reality of his mind. The innate idea of God is said to represent God insofar as the idea’s objective reality has its origin in the formal reality of God (an infinite substance). The innate idea of a body is said to represent a body insofar as the idea’s objective reality has its origin in the formal reality of a corporeal substance. The adventitious idea of the Sun is said to represent the Sun insofar as the idea’s objective reality has its origin in the formal reality of the Sun. And the list could go on.

The following analogy may be instructive. Suppose that Socrates stands before a mirror. Both Socrates and the mirror are actual things, so both, using Descartes’ terminology, would possess formal reality. Each can presumably exist independently of the other. The image of Socrates arises as a relation between Socrates and the mirror. It cannot exist independently of Socrates or the mirror. Destroy Socrates or the mirror, and this image of Socrates is destroyed. Using Descartes’ terminology, the image is an objective being insofar as it is a representation of Socrates. Although the image represents Socrates, it is nevertheless “located” on the mirror’s surface. And, since the surface is a mode of the mirror, there is a sense in which this image would be too. The mirror is the bearer of the image. This is a sense in which the image “belongs to” the mirror. The relationship to Socrates is different. The image is said to be an image of Socrates . The image is about him. He is not the bearer of the image, but is what this image represents . So, the relation that Socrates has to this image must be importantly different from the relation that the mirror has to this image. Employing Descartes’ terminology, and in light of PR , the image is of Socrates insofar as this objective being (the image) has its origin in the formal reality of Socrates. To be sure, the image derives its existence, or its formal reality, from the formal reality of the mirror, but its objective being has its origin not in the mirror but in Socrates.

It is in the Rules that Descartes introduces the simple natures . The simple natures are not only what our ideas are of —that is, they not only constitute the contents of our ideas, the “objects” immediately presented to the mind—but are also the natures possessed by things. (AT X 399; CSM I 32) Examples of simple natures are colors, sounds, smells, shapes, sizes, extension, and the like. He says, for example, in Rule Twelve, “if I judge that a certain shape is not moving, I shall say that my thought is in some way composed of shape and rest; and similarly in other cases.” (AT X 420; CSM I 45) In the First Meditation, Descartes mentions similar ideational elements “from which all the images of things” are formed. (AT VII 20; CSM II 13–14) In the Second Meditation, in his analysis of the adventitious idea of a piece of wax, Descartes again provides a list of such ideational elements. (AT VII 30–32; CSM II 20–21) In the Third Meditation, he refers to such items as “elements in my ideas.” (AT VII 44; CSM II 30) And, in the Sixth Meditation, when revisiting some of what he had established in the Second Meditation, talk of these qualities that are “the only immediate objects of my sensory awareness” is again introduced. (AT VII 75ff; CSM II 52ff) So, although Descartes does not employ the “simple natures” terminology in later work, the philosophical notion certainly looks to be present in his later work.

Simple natures form an ordered, hierarchical system. Upon analysis they appear to be sorted into two basic groups or classes, which not surprisingly corresponds to Descartes’ mind-body dualism. (AT X 399; CSM I 32) Descartes refers to this partition of simple natures as the enumeration . The basic classes of this enumeration will also be partitioned. In light of this, this ultimate enumeration—the partition of the simple natures into the classes of thinking and extended things—can be referred to as the master enumeration . As laid out in the Rules , the hierarchy is not understood in terms of the ontology, but in terms of what must be known in terms of what. (AT X 381; CSM I 21) These groups or classes are formed in light of epistemic priority. One group includes those simple natures that presuppose the simple nature thought or thinking , while the other group includes those simple natures that presuppose the simple nature extension . The view is that the simple nature shape , for instance, presupposes the simple nature extension in that the former is known (understood) on the basis of the latter. As Descartes puts it later in the Principles , “shape is unintelligible except in an extended thing.” (AT VIIIA 25; CSM I 210) No extension, no shape. The same holds for the other class. The simple nature hot , a sensible quality, presupposes the simple nature thought or thinking in that the former is known (or understood) on the basis of the latter. No thought or thinking, no (feeling of) hotness.

Descartes recognizes two forms of conjunction found among the simple natures: necessary and contingent conjunction. (AT X 421f; CSM I 45f) Two simple natures are said to be necessarily conjoined whenever one presupposes (entails) the other. ( Ibid. ) So, for instance, the simple nature shape is necessarily conjoined with the simple nature extension insofar as the former presupposes (or entails) the latter. An idea is said to be clear whenever the necessary conjunction between simple natures in the idea is exhibited or made explicit. Descartes’ procedure for making an idea “clearer” is to compare the simple natures in the idea. He writes that the procedure:

…is carried over from one subject to another solely by means of comparison, which enables us to state that the thing we are seeking is in this or that respect similar to, or identical with, or equal to, some given thing. Accordingly, in all reasoning it is only by means of comparison that we attain an exact knowledge of the truth. (AT X 439; CSM I 57)

He goes on to say that “Unity is the common nature which, we said above, all things which we are comparing must participate in equally.” (AT X 449; CSM I 63 See also AT X 440f; CSM I 57f) The simple natures shape and size share in common their presupposing the simple nature extension . Extension is the common nature; it unites such natures into a single thing (a body). Thought or thinking is the common nature that unites the other simple natures into a single thing (a mind). An idea is said to be obscure , then, whenever no necessary conjunction (the “presupposes” relation) is exhibited or made explicit in an idea.

Ideas are said to be confused whenever they include or contain simple natures belonging to the two mutually exclusive classes of simple nature (the two classes together forming the enumeration). Here, the Latin confusio means mixed together . The adventitious idea of the Sun is an example of a confused idea. In presenting the Sun as circular-shaped and hot, the idea includes simple natures that belong to the two mutually exclusive classes. Shape belongs to the class whose members presuppose the simple nature extension , whereas heat (a quality) belongs to the class whose members presupposes the simple nature thought or thinking . An idea is said to be distinct , then, whenever it includes or contains only simple natures belonging to one of the mutually exclusive classes. The astronomical idea of the Sun, as introduced in the Third Meditation, looks to be an example of a distinct idea. It includes only those simple natures belonging to the class whose members presuppose the simple nature extension . (Smith 2010, 2015)

In the Third Meditation, Descartes introduces what scholars refer to as “the truth rule”: Whatever one perceives clearly and distinctly is true. (AT VII 35; CSM II 24) In the Fifth Meditation, in his analysis of the clear and distinct idea of a triangle, Descartes argues that since “whatever is true is something (i.e., real )” (AT VII 65; CSM II 45), it follows that “everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that thing (the triangle) really does belong to it…” (AT VII 65; CSM II 45) As others have argued (Wahl 1995, Lennon 2007, Smith 2010a, Smith 2015), for Descartes, to say that something was “real” was in part to say that it existed independently of a finite mind. This is the import of Descartes’ proving the existence of God and body. They are real things. In his analysis of the idea of the triangle, Descartes concludes that the natures that he clearly and distinctly perceives the triangle as possessing are in fact possessed by the triangle. These natures are real .

Russell Wahl has argued that for Descartes truth was related directly to natures . (Wahl 1995) What is true, he says, “is the object before the mind and not the idea—not the operation of the mind, but what is perceived.” (Wahl 1995, p. 188) In other words, truth is not related to the idea taken materially, but to the idea taken objectively. This, he says, is no doubt related to Descartes’ claim that whatever is true is something (real). (AT VII 65; CSM II 45) The import of this view is that the simple natures, which constitute the contents of ideas, are also the very same natures possessed by things—at least when the idea is clear and distinct. Here, the simple natures look to be serving as an ontological bridge, so to speak, between the mind and extra-mental reality. Wahl’s reading is controversial, but worth noting, since the potentiality lurks in its being able to bring closer together the Representationalist and Direct Realist readings.

A relatively recent suggestion, which emerged in part as a response to the conflict between the Representationalist and Direct Realist interpretations, comes from Paul Hoffman. (Hoffman 2002) He bases his suggestion on a view held by Aquinas. Given that simple natures are the ontological elements of ideas and things, Hoffman in essence argues that it is the simple natures themselves that possess the two kinds of reality that Descartes had introduced in the Third Meditation, namely, formal and objective reality. (Hoffman 2002) Consider the adventitious idea of the Sun. As noted earlier, this idea is obscure and confused. Even so, it reportedly represents the Sun in the heavens. Descartes makes clear in the Third Meditation that the astronomical idea of the Sun better “resembles” the object reportedly in the heavens than does the adventitious idea. One way this may be the case is that the astronomical idea is clear and distinct in that it includes only those simple natures that presuppose extension , such as shape , size , motion , and so on (distinct), and it exhibits the presupposition relation (clear). The Sun is a body whose nature is extension (in length, breadth, and depth).

“The sun as it exists objectively,” says Hoffman, “is able to represent the sun as it exists formally in the heavens precisely because it is the same thing that has these two modes of existence.” (Hoffman 2002, p. 168) That is, the Sun possesses both formal and objective reality, or rather, the simple natures that constitute the thing referred by the words “the Sun” possess both formal and objective reality. Hoffman’s suggestion is that it is the objective reality possessed by the simple natures that the mind “engages” when perceiving the Sun. It is via the Sun’s objective being that the mind has “access to” the Sun in the heavens. This suggestion would seem to straddle both the Representationalist and Direct Realist interpretations, though, as Hoffman himself characterizes his view, his suggestion leans in the direction of the Direct Realist interpretation.

That said, there is trouble lurking in Hoffman’s suggestion. Descartes very clearly says that ideas are the items in his ontology that possess objective reality, and they possess it by their very nature. (AT VII 42; CSM II 29) If the Sun, for instance, or any of the simple natures that constitute the Sun, are the items that possess objective reality, then the Sun or the simple natures that constitute it are ideas . But the Sun, or the simple natures that constitute it, also presumably possess formal reality, which is the kind of reality a thing possesses insofar as it is a real or actual thing. If by “real” Descartes in part means exists independently of a finite mind , as Wahl and Lennon contend, then the Sun, or the simple natures that constitute it, insofar as they possess formal reality, exist independently of the finite mind. This would entail that ideas can and do exist independently of the finite mind. But this runs counter to Descartes’ ontology. For further examination of the Representationalist and Direct Realist interpretations, which includes a critical look at Hoffman’s suggestion, see (Smith 2010a).

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Wilson, Margaret, 1978. Descartes , London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Pessin, Andrew, “Descartes’ Theory of Ideas”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/descartes-ideas/ >. [This was the previous entry on Descartes’ Theory of Ideas in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — see the version history .]

Aristotle, General Topics: psychology | Descartes, René: epistemology | Descartes, René: modal metaphysics | properties | universals: the medieval problem of

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I thank Alan Nelson for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this entry, and I thank Andrew Pessin for his original entry on this material, which helped set the stage for this one.

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PDF Excerpt from Part II, Chapter 1 Society as Objective Reality
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE Anchor Books, Garden City, New York, 1966, pp. 51-55, 59-61. Excerpt from Part II, Chapter 1 Society as Objective Reality 1. INSTITUTIONALIZATION PETER L. BERGER and THOMAS LUCKMANN a. Organism and Activity [ . . . ] It should be clear from the foregoing that the ...
Social Construction of Reality
Society as Objective Reality is the second stage of constructing reality. In this stage, people come to see their society as an objective reality that exists independently of them. They begin to see the rules and institutions that make up their society as natural and inevitable. At this stage, people also come to believe that their own personal ...
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Society as objective reality Institutionalization. Institutionalization of social processes grows out of the habitualization and customs, gained through mutual observation with subsequent mutual agreement on the "way of doing things". This reduces uncertainty and danger and allows our limited attention span to focus on more things at the ...
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According to Berger and Luckmann, an individual becomes the member of society after becoming familiar with the definite language to share the knowledge, and the successful socialisation is the "establishment of a high degree of symmetry between objective and subjective reality" (Berger & Luckmann 1967, p. 163).
7.6: The Social Construction of Reality
Sociologists understand that reality is socially constructed, meaning that people shape their experiences through social interaction. In 1966 sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann wrote a book called The Social Construction of Reality. In it, they argued that society is created by humans and human interaction, which they call ...
Reading: Social Constructions of Reality
In 1966 sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann wrote a book called The Social Construction of Reality. In it, they argued that society is created by humans and human interaction, ... Thomas 1928). That is, people's behavior can be determined by their subjective construction of reality rather than by objective reality. For example, a ...
Social Construction of Reality: [Essay Example], 595 words
The concept of the social construction of reality challenges the idea that reality is an objective, fixed truth. Instead, it suggests that our understanding of the world is shaped by our interactions, culture, language, and societal institutions. Recognizing the social construction of reality encourages us to be more open-minded, empathetic ...
The Social Construction of Reality
Sociologists understand that reality is socially constructed, meaning that people shape their experiences through social interaction. In 1966 sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann wrote a book called The Social Construction of Reality. In it, they argued that society is created by humans and human interaction, which they call ...
4.4: Social Constructions of Reality
This page titled 4.4: Social Constructions of Reality is shared under a CC BY 4.0 license and was authored, remixed, and/or curated by OpenStax via source content that was edited to the style and standards of the LibreTexts platform; a detailed edit history is available upon request. Society is based on the social construction of reality.
5.3 Social Construction of Reality
In other words, society is, in fact, "habit." The Thomas theorem states that people's behavior can be determined by their subjective construction of reality rather than by objective reality. In other words the beliefs and behaviors of a group of people can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy, where even a false idea can become true if it ...
4.2 Social Construction of Reality
4.2.1 Social Constructionism: The Basics. One of the more influential takes on social constructionism emerged from the work of Austrian-American sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. In their 1966 book, The Social Construction of Reality, they argued that society is created by humans and human interaction, which they call habitualization.
Social Constructionism as a Sociological Approach
This essay concerns itself with a detailed presentation of the contents of two works on the construction of reality in society. One is Berger and Luckmann's well-known book (The social construction of reality. Penguin Book, Harmondsworth, 1966); the other is the somewhat less known book on the same subject by Holzner (Reality construction in society. Schenkman Publishing Company, Cambridge ...
The Reality of Role-Playing: An Essay on Social ...
symbolic reality as "any form of symbolic expression of objective reality such as art, literature, or media contents." (Adoni, Mane 326). Symbolic reality is introduced before subjective reality
4.3 Social Constructions of Reality
In 1966 sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann wrote a book called The Social Construction of Reality. In it, they argued that society is created by humans and human interaction, ... Thomas 1928). That is, people's behavior can be determined by their subjective construction of reality rather than by objective reality. For example, a ...
Social Constructions of Reality
Rather than discuss their problems and configurations, we'll now explore how society came to be and how sociologists view social interaction. In 1966 sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann wrote a book called The Social Construction of Reality. In it, they argued that society is created by humans and human interaction, which they call ...
Reflection on Social Construction of Reality
Additionally, the author explains: 1) the concept of society as both objective and subjective realities, and the processes involved in this conceptualization, namely: institutionalization through reciprocal habitualization and typification (Baumer & Tomlinson, 2015); and individually defines these processes.
The Sociology of Objectivity
The concept "objectivity" has been described as slippery and used in contradictory and inclusive ways (Bergmann 1947).Gouldner (1970: 102-105) analysed objectivity as a value and an ideology that manifests detachment and alienation from self and society.And Friedrichs (1970: 207) noted an increasing preference among philosophers and scientists for the term "empirical" over "objective."
The Concept of Society As An Objective Reality
The Concept of Society as an Objective Reality - Free download as Powerpoint Presentation (.ppt / .pptx), PDF File (.pdf), Text File (.txt) or view presentation slides online. Society
"Social Construction of Reality" Essay
Good Essays. 1468 Words. 6 Pages. Open Document. "Social Construction of Reality". Reality is not an objective thing that is imposed upon us, but is created by us. Reality does not exist externally but internally, as each individual or group interprets it, and is always changing. Due to these concepts sociologists often speak about the ...
Descartes' Theory of Ideas
When speaking of ideas as representing things to the mind, Descartes will refer to an idea's objective reality. The objective reality of a thing is the kind of reality a thing possesses in virtue of its being a representation of something (ibid.). Given that the idea of the Sun and the idea of Pegasus represent things to the mind (they ...
The Concept of Society as an Objective Reality
This lecture aims to: 1. Explain how society and its institutions shape individuals;2. Demonstrate curiosity about the basic social institutions and be able ...
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Society as an Objective Reality - Free download as Powerpoint Presentation (.ppt / .pptx), PDF File (.pdf), Text File (.txt) or view presentation slides online. Society can be understood as both an objective reality and a concept. Durkheim viewed society as a sui generis reality that cannot be reduced to just individuals. He argued that society's norms and rules constrain individuals' actions ...
Society as an Objective Reality
Words 3550. Pages 15. Society As An Objective Reality. The Organism and Activity. The concept of social reality according to Berger and Luckmann can be considered objective and subjective in meaning, being that man sees the world in two spheres; one that is based upon ideas that he forms from socialization and of himself and one that is based ...

Social Construction of Reality

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The Construction of Reality

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Berger and Luckmann’s View of the Socially Constructed Reality Essay

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4.2 Social Construction of Reality

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4.2.2 Constructionism and Cross-Cultural Comparisons

4.2.2.1 The Social Construction of Beauty

4.2.2.2 Beauty Across Time and Culture

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