ethical theory meaning essay

Ethical Theories

Definition of ethical theories.

Imagine you’re playing a complex new board game, and you need to know the rules to play it well and fairly. Ethical theories are like those rules, but for life itself. Here’s the first simple definition: Ethical theories are ideas that help us decide which actions are good and bad by leading us to ethical choices that bring positive outcomes for everyone. These theories go deeper than just following rules; they help us see the bigger picture and understand why certain actions are better than others.

The second definition is: Imagine you’re on a hike, and you come to a place where the trail splits in different directions. To find the best path, you need a map or a compass; ethical theories are like that compass for life. They show us the way to make decisions, even when it’s hard, and help us think not just about what’s good for us, but what’s best for everyone involved. Grasping these ideas can turn us into kind and wise individuals.

Types of Ethical Theories

Consequentialism : This approach says that the conclusion of the story is what matters most. We judge our actions based on their end results. If the outcome is happy or brings benefits to the most people, those actions are seen as good.
Deontology : Deontology acts like a life manual, emphasizing rules and duties. When you play by these rules, your actions are considered good even if things don’t turn out as planned.
Virtue Ethics : This type focuses on who you are as a person rather than just what you do. It teaches that having good virtues, which are positive characteristics, will naturally lead to good actions.

Examples of Ethical Theories

Utilitarianism : This represents Consequentialism because it looks at the outcome of actions. A utilitarian decision, like when a government decides to spend money on vaccines to save many lives instead of funding a few large sports stadiums, is judged good because it creates the greatest happiness for the largest number of people.
Kantian Ethics : Part of Deontology, this view suggests that we should act in ways we would want everyone to act. For example, if a store accidentally gives you too much change, Kantian ethics says you should give the extra money back because that’s what you would want others to do in your shoes.
Aristotelian Ethics : An example of Virtue Ethics, Aristotelian ethics teaches that good habits lead to a good character. By practicing honesty, like always telling the truth even when it’s difficult, you develop integrity, which then influences all your actions positively.

Why is it Important?

Understanding ethical theories is like having a toolkit for life’s toughest spots. They provide a foundation that helps us judge our actions and live in a way that’s considerate of others and ourselves. Ethical theories help us make sense of our experiences and navigate the world with fairness. By applying these principles in our day-to-day lives, we contribute to a community where kindness and thoughtfulness thrive. When we use ethical reasoning, we not just solve personal dilemmas; we also address larger issues in society, contributing to the greater good.

The roots of ethical theories are ancient, stretching back to the times when philosophers like Socrates, Plato , and Aristotle pondered over what constitutes a meaningful and good life. They sparked the curiosity that led to the development of ethics, a study that has continued to evolve for thousands of years, influencing every new generation to seek the best way to live and treat others.

Controversies

There’s much debate over which ethical theory is the right one. For example, some people argue that focusing only on outcomes could lead us to justify bad actions for a good result. Others believe that rigidly following rules can sometimes result in unfair outcomes when special circumstances are not taken into account. These ongoing discussions remind us that our understanding of ethics is always growing and changing.

Ethical theories Essay

Companies and business leaders around the world are constantly faced with a predicament of ensuring that their organizations and employees adhere to the scope of ethics and the nature of ethical obligations within their respective market industries.

The guiding and important underlying laws or assumptions required in a system of thought that supersede the choice of right from wrong are expressed and explained by ethical theories (Hartman & DesJardins 2010). For business leaders to be able to deal with any surprises and occurrences they need to be well acquainted with ethics and what it entails.

In this sense ethics refers to “well based principles of right and wrong that direct what we as humans ought to do, in terms of rights, obligations, benefits to society, equality, or particular merits. Ethical principles enjoin virtues of honesty, compassion, and loyalty” (Hartman 2006). Hence, ethical theories endeavor to be comprehensible and methodical enough to be able to provide answers to the most essential practical ethical questions.

In most circumstances ethical theories are the foundation for ethical principles and whenever actions are being defended upon, by business people it is common to find the principles and not the theories appealing. There are several theories that include: deontology, utilitarianism, casuist, virtue, kantianism, aristotelianism, consequentialism among others (Hartman & DesJardins 2010).

In the case of MetaLife, a life insurance company, it is prudent for them not to try and justify the allegations by offering excuses but to come out and offer corrective measures, so as to assure their customers and stakeholders of their integrity. The insurance sector as a whole should adhere to the set down ethical codes of conduct as the deontological theory states.

According to this theory, obligations and duties should be conscientiously supported and followed by everybody when faced with an impasse (Hartman 2006).

It is quite evident that the employees in the sales division of MetaLife are not aware of the deontological theory of ethics. This is due to the negative exposure received by the company over its deceptive practices leading it to settle huge class actions law suits. Hiding and giving of excuses will not in any way help the public image of the company.

While the Kantian theory holds that ethics is choosing the right actions, the deontological theory asserts that human beings are controlled by definite strong ethical guidelines. According to Kantianism, it is MetaLife’s obligation to own up to its wrong and try and find ways of correcting the mess. Its employees have not been keen on observing the ethical code of conduct therefore the reason for the adverse negative image.

Approaching this issue, to admit or acknowledge something is wrong, whether grudgingly or with reluctance, is the first step to cleaning up the company’s image and work ethic. Secondly, tackling the responsible people for the mess will be the next step (Hartman & DesJardins 2010).

The company’s CEO should offer a sincere apology when on being interviewed, and promise to tackle the problem with no further delays. This results to a degree of trust being built between the company, clients, and stakeholders alike (Bowie 2002).

Ethical concepts are based on ethical principles and underscore diverse characteristics of an ethical predicament leading to the most ethically appropriate resolution according to the guiding principles contained in the ethical theory itself. Hartman (2006) notes, “People usually base their individual choice of ethical theory upon their life experiences”. In life many a time one is confronted with a dilemma, where they have to decide what is right or wrong.

Especially for business, it is a choice that has to be thought over carefully as it affects many groups at once (clients, the employees, employees, investors, stakeholders and customers). Often businesses opt for unethical choices as there are no immediate repercussions but they somehow tend to catch up with the decision maker, as is the case at MetaLife.

For the MetaLife Chief Executive Officer, before going for the interview one should ask himself these questions: if he has been able to truthfully identify the dilemma; how is he able to outline the problems facing the company if he was on the opposite side; when and how did these happen; to whom is he answerable and where his loyalty lies as an employee of the organization; what has led him to make the decision to take on the ethical route; are there any implications to the decision being intended; whether the decision is a long time solution or just to make short term solutions; and finally if he is sure, and confident with his decision.

Insurance is a vital component of life today and insurance professionals are a keystone to its effectiveness. However, they are constantly ignored to an extent where they resort to unethical measures to get recognition and get the work done. MetaLife‘s problems within the sales division can be attributed to this, where cases of unethical selling of services so as to get higher commissions by employees has been the case.

The CEO and management should take this as their obligation to find out what it is and rectify it before more class action suits are awarded against the company in future (Bowie 2002). Insurance agents are part and parcel of the company and industry as a whole (Trevino & Nelson 2010).

The agent meets the public every day, and the way an agent conducts his business leaves a lasting impression on clients and customers, and relates to the insurance industry as a whole.

MetaLife’s CEO after choosing to openly admit that there is a lack of stringent sales compliance procedures within the company and offer a public apology to customers, clients, investors, stakeholders and the company’s owners should during the interview guarantee that employees within the sales division and all insurance agents strictly adhere to the code of ethics and maintain high standards by equipping them with adequate and correct information and training.

Taking liability is a great act yet very difficult, as one does not know how the action will be received (Trevino & Nelson 2010; Bowie 2002).

Most companies especially within the insurance sector have opted to adopt ethics after realizing that it is all for their good. Unethical methods usually tend to be costly and taint a company’s image in the long-run at least. For instance, State Farm, a well renowned insurance and financial company provider worldwide, is still growing strong today despite being in the market since 1922.

One of its principles was to offer insurance to farmers at a lower cost since fewer of them could own cars and had much lesser accidents than city drivers. This just shows the impact of ethical principles guiding decision making. Instead of charging everyone the same premiums and making abnormal profits they opted to treat each different category of people as per their characteristics.

In this business, the insurance agent is the one who is in actual contact with a client and therefore should grasp the meaning and nature of the products they are selling, be able to evaluate a customer’s needs and preferences and be conversant with contractual requirements.

Bowie, N. (2002). The Blackwell guide to business ethics . Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Hartman, L. & DesJardins, J. (2010). Business Ethics: Decision-Making for Personal Integrity & Social Responsibility . New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Companies,Inc.

Hartman, L. (2006). Perspectives in Business Ethics . New York, NY: Academic Internet Publ. Academic Internet Publ.

Trevino, L. & Nelson, K. (2010). Managing Business Ethics . Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons.

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IvyPanda. (2018, May 22). Ethical theories. https://ivypanda.com/essays/ethical-theories/

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The Authors

Ethical Theories are attempts to provide a clear, unified account of what our ethical obligations are. They are attempts, in other words, to tell a single “story” about what we are obligated to do, without referring directly to specific examples. It is common in discussions of business ethics to appeal to one or more ethical theories in an attempt to clarify what it is right or wrong to do in particular situations. Some of the philosophical ethical theories commonly appealed to include:

Utilitarianism , which says that the right thing to do in any situation is whatever will “do the most good” (that is, produce the best outcomes) taking into consideration the interests of all concerned parties;
Kantianism (or Deontology more generally), which says that—as a matter of respect—there are certain absolute (or nearly absolute) rules that must be followed (for example, the rule that we must respect people’s privacy, or respect other people’s right to make decisions about their own lives);
Social Contract Theory (or “contractarianism”), which says that, in order to figure out what ethical rules to follow, we ought to imagine what rules rational beings would agree to in an “ideal” decision-making context;
Virtue Theory , which says that we ought to focus not on what rules to follow, but on what kinds of people (or organizations!) we want to be, and what kinds of ethical examples we ought to follow;
Feminist Ethics , which is a complex set of interrelated perspectives that emphasize interpersonal concerns such as caring, interdependence, and the ethical requirements of particular relationships. Such concerns are traditionally identified with women, but Feminist Ethics should not be thought of as a theory only for women.

In some cases, scholars attempt to use a single ethical theory to shed light on a topic or range of topics. (A good example would be Norman Bowie’s book, Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective .) A more typical approach—one taken by many business ethics textbooks today—is to attempt to use insights from various ethical theories to shed light on different aspects of a particular problem. Such an approach might involve, for example, asking which decision in a particular situation would result in the best consequences (a Utilitarian consideration) but then asking whether acting that way would violate any Kantian rules or whether a person acting that way would be exhibiting the kinds of virtues that a good person would exhibit.

The role of ethical theory in business ethics is somewhat controversial, in part because Business Ethics is seen as a branch of “applied ethics.” Some regard applied ethics (and hence Business Ethics, along with bioethics, environmental ethics, etc.) as a field that takes “standard” ethical theories and applies them to practical problems. Such an approach might involve asking, for example, “What would Kant say about privacy in the workplace?” Others regard applied ethics as an attempt to gain theoretical insight (or to “build” better ethical theories) by testing them against real-life problems.

1: Introduction to Contemporary Ethics - Technology, Affirmative Action, and Immigration

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As you enter this textbook, I would like you to remember two of the greatest quotes from arguably the greatest Philosopher, Socrates: “I am the wisest man alive, for I know one thing, and that is that I know nothing” and “the unexamined life is not worth living.” They are both from Plato’s Apology that describes the trial of Socrates in Athens for, most importantly, “corrupting the youth of Athens.” Despite the English connotations of the title, Socrates does not “apologize” for anything nor is he sorry – the Greek word apologia (the origin of the title) means “formal defense.” These quotes come up in the context of his illustrating how much more intelligent he is than his accusers (not the best idea when his life is on the line, but Socrates was true to himself) and defending his practice of encouraging the people of Athens, especially its youth, to think critically and rationally for themselves. Combine these two quotes, however, and we are left a bit of a conundrum: we must examine life for it to have value, but we are unlikely to come to know anything from this examination. Still, Socrates would argue, the pursuit of knowledge is important and fruitful. Examining life, ideas, knowledge, experience, and anything and everything we can think of, in a pursuit of truth and knowledge, is of the utmost importance. Yet, we must also recognize the limits of our abilities and approach all endeavors with a healthy dose of humility and openness. But if we are to examine life, where would this pursuit take us?

His two successors, Plato and Aristotle, had a goal in mind: we do Philosophy to arrive at an understanding of the ideal society. What’s the point of living if we aren’t achieving a life of, as Aristotle puts it, excellence ( arête in Greek) and flourishing ( eudaimonia )? Their philosophical examinations culminated in proposing an ideal state, and examining such a society falls under the umbrella of Political Philosophy. An integral part of a flourishing society includes setting up a system wherein everyone can attain happiness and live the good life. But why should we care about happiness? Or even other people? Why not just care about our own pleasures? An important part of their analyses is doing Ethics: studying right, wrong, good, and bad. How do we value happiness? Why do we value it? Do we value other things? Other people? What makes someone good? And so on. Thus, the final aim of Plato and Aristotle, and the purpose of Philosophy, was to do Ethics. I might be biased, however, since this is an Ethics textbook and I am primarily an Ethicist by training. Of course, anyone could argue that their field of Philosophy is more important to living a good life, like Metaphysics (the study of the nature of reality), Epistemology (the study of knowledge), Logic (the study of reason), and any other field. And they’d be right: you can’t do ethics without doing all of these things (and I’d argue you can’t do those without doing ethics). You have to be clear on the ideas you’re using and how they relate to get anywhere in any branch of philosophy. Most people don’t necessarily concern themselves with abstract concepts of knowledge on a daily basis, but we have to interact with people daily and are thus confronted with making moral decisions many times every day. We have to do things for ourselves and others, so how do we know what’s right to do? That is, of course, assuming we want to be good people. But what does good even mean?

This textbook will cover these topics, and many more, in detail. To frame these questions and analysis, we will focus primarily on contemporary moral issues, from those in medical ethics (euthanasia, abortion, etc.) to how we should treat non-human things (like the environment and animals) and issues that affect society as a whole, like technology and immigration, which is where we’ll begin. There will also be readings (mostly classic selections from extremely influential philosophers that you might have actually heard of, like Aristotle, John Stuart Mill, and Immanuel Kant) that cover the theories behind the moral principles we will be applying. It is actually much easier to understand these theories after examining how we normally apply them in our daily lives, so these chapters with “classic” readings will come in the later half of this work. It might seem backward, as it would seem more natural to learn the theories and then apply them, but it’s really not. You already know how to do ethics and you do moral analyses on a daily basis, and once you examine how we all regularly do morality, you are better positioned to appreciate the concepts that drive our moral habits.

There are two terms that will be used interchangeably in this work: ethics and morality. They are clearly separate words and you would assume (and many people do) that they would thus mean different things. But, for the branch of philosophy that is called both “Ethics” and “Morality”, they mean the exact same thing. Many people will take issue with this and want to say I’m wrong (which is a moral or ethical claim). But I get to play the expert card right now: in Philosophy, I have yet to meet someone that is an expert in the field of Ethics (or Morality) and believes the two mean something significantly different. Oftentimes non-philosophers will want to correct me and say that “Ethics is the theory; Morality is how we apply it” (or is it the other way around?), and I will admit that in some fields that might be how they use the terms. There is a branch of philosophy that deals with the theory of morality, however, and that is called Meta-Ethics (from the Greek for “about ethics”), so we do have a word for that. The application of moral theories to actions is sometimes called Applied or Normative Ethics, so there is also a term for that. But morality and ethics mean the same thing here, so why do we have two words that mean the same thing? It’s simple: ethics (as a word) comes from Greek and morality (as a word) comes from Latin. English uses words from many languages, and we tend to keep them all, even when they mean the same thing. I’ve probably written more than I need to already, but all I want to make clear is that you, the reader, should understand that ethics and morality mean the same things in this work. You will come to learn that getting very clear on the terms we use is vital to doing a proper moral analysis, so it is important to always pay close attention to language and clarify terms whenever it seems necessary. You don’t want to be misunderstood and you don’t want to misunderstand others. The philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein once believed that all philosophical problems are just linguistic problems. He changed his mind about this later on in his life, but he had a point: a lot of problems we have with each other are often not due to genuine disagreements (where we will be unable to find some common ground) but are rather misunderstandings due to language.

This first unit is meant to give you a taste of ethics and how it is applied. Chapter 1, The “Trolley Problem” and Self-Driving Cars: Your Car’s Moral Settings , is a fictional short story about potential moral settings for self-driving cars in the near future. Chapter 2, What is Ethics and What Makes Something a Problem for Morality? by David Svolba, explains the basic aspects of doing ethics and how it uniquely deals with problems. Chapter 3, Letter from the Birmingham City Jail by Martin Luther King, Jr, is a powerful letter written to his fellow clergymen while he was imprisoned for leading civil disobedience movements (in this case, the Alabama bus boycotts) in an attempt to end segregation in the United States. Chapter 4, A Defense of Affirmative Action , explores the reasons on all sides of policies that are aimed at helping minorities obtain positions in a system that unfairly overlooks them. Chapter 5, The Moral Issues of Immigration by B.M. Wooldridge, discusses the various angles of immigration and its problems and benefits. Chapter 6, The Ethics of our Digital Selves , analyzes the role that emerging technologies have on conceptions of our personal identities and how this has ethical implications.

Ethics and Human Resource Development pp 13–28 Cite as

Introduction to Ethical Theories

Amin Alizadeh 3 &
Deepu Kurian 4
First Online: 02 March 2024

103 Accesses

This chapter is an introduction to ethics, and it briefly covers the historical background of the major ethical theories and principles that are useful for analyzing moral problems. It presents eight theories and highlights the importance of each of them for the field of HRD. Four of these theories—Kantianism, utilitarianism, social contract theory, and virtue ethics—can be counted as the most relevant theories to our field. Such ethical theories are attempts to assist HRD students and practitioners in the decision-making process.

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Essays In Ethical Theory

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In this volume, R. M. Hare has collected a number of essays which fill in the theoretical background of his thought and which together give an overall picture of his views on a variety of questions. Each essay is self-contained, and topics covered include the objectivity and rationality of moral thinking, the issue between the ethical realists and their opponents, the place in our moral thought of appeals to common convictions, and how to tell whether a feature of a situation is morally relevant. His central theme is the paradox that, if moral judgements were just statements of fact, relativism would be inescapable. We can treat moral thinking as a rational activity only because moral judgements are more than this.

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Overview – Ethical Theories

Ethics is the study of morality – i.e. right and wrong, good and bad.

The syllabus looks at 3 ethical theories:

Utilitarianism

Kant’s deontological ethics.

Aristotle’s virtue ethics

Each theory provides a framework intended to guide moral behaviour. We can apply these theories to ethical dilemmas such as ‘is it ok to steal?’

For utilitarian theories, what matters is the consequence of an action. If your stealing a loaf of bread, say, prevents your family from dying of starvation, then the annoyance of the shopkeeper is likely to be outweighed by your happiness that your family is still alive. So stealing the bread is morally permissible.

Kant’s deontological ethics takes a rule-based approach. According to Kant, there are certain moral laws that are universal and we have a duty to follow them. He provides two tests to determine what these laws are. Based on these tests, Kant would say stealing is always wrong, regardless of the consequences.

Aristotle’s virtue theory takes a different approach to both Kant and utilitarianism. Kant and utilitarianism both give formulas for what to do , whereas Aristotle is more concerned with what sort of person we should be . So, if a virtuous person would not steal in a particular set of circumstances, then it is wrong to steal in those circumstances.

Utilitarian ethical theories are consequentialist. They say that it’s the consequences of an action that make it either right or wrong.

The most obviously relevant consequences are pain and pleasure . Generally speaking, utilitarian theories look to minimise pain and maximise pleasure.

For example, a utilitarian might argue that it is justified for a poor person to steal from a rich person because the money would cause more happiness for the poor person than it would cause unhappiness for the rich person. Similarly, a utilitarian might argue that murder is justified if the victim is himself a murderer and so killing him would save 10 lives.

The syllabus looks at 3 different versions of ultilitarianism:

Act utilitarianism : we should act so as to maximise pleasure and minimise pain in each specific instance
Rule utilitarianism : we should follow general rules that maximise pleasure and minimise pain (even if following these rules doesn’t maximise pleasure in every specific instance)
Preference utilitarianism : we should act to maximise people’s preferences (even if these preferences do not maximise pleasure and minimise pain)

Act utilitarianism

“The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation.” – Jeremy Bentham

Jeremy Bentham is widely considered to be the first utilitarian philosopher. His act utilitarianism can be boiled down to three claims:

Whether an action is right/good or wrong/bad depends solely on its consequences
The only thing that is good is happiness
No individual’s happiness is more important than anyone else’s

The felicific calculus

Act utilitarianism is sometimes called quantitative utilitarianism . It’s called quantitative because it’s about quantifying happiness – adding up all the happiness and subtracting all the pain – and then deciding how to act based on the numbers. Bentham provides the felicific calculus as a way to calculate utility in this way.

Intensity: how strong the pleasure is
Duration: how long the pleasure lasts
Certainty: how likely the pleasure is to occur
Propinquity: how soon the pleasure will occur
Fecundity: how likely the pleasure will lead to more pleasure
Purity: how likely the pleasure will lead to pain
Extent: the number of people affected

So, for example, if two different courses of action lead to two different intensities of pleasure, then the ethically right course of action is the one that leads to the more intense pleasure. It gets complicated, though, when comparing intensity with duration, say.

Anyway, the felicific calculus should (in theory) provide a means to calculate the total happiness: add up all the pleasures and minus all the pains.

Act utilitarians would agree that the morally good action is the one that maximises the total happiness.

Note: Many of the problems with act utilitarianism below inspired the alternative versions of utilitarianism (e.g. rule and preference ). If you are writing an essay (i.e. 25 marks) on utilitarianism you can use these to argue against act utilitarianism but for an alternative type of utilitarianism.

Difficult to calculate

Although act utilitarianism may seem simple in principle , in practice there are all sorts of difficulties with calculating utility.

For one thing, you can’t predict the future . For example, saving a child’s life would presumably a good way to maximise pleasure. But if that child went on to become a serial killer as an adult, saving their life could have actually been a bad thing according to utilitarianism – but how were you to know?

But even if we could predict the future, Bentham’s felicific calculus seems impractically complicated to use every single time one has to make a decision:

First, how do you quantify each of the seven variables? For example, how do you measure the intensity of pleasure? Are we supposed to hook everyone up to brain scanners?!
Second, how do you compare these seven variables against each other? For example, how do you decide between, say, a longer-lasting dull pleasure and a short-lived but more intense pleasure?
Finally, which beings do we include in this calculation? Animals can feel pleasures and pains too, so are we supposed to include them in our calculation? If so, is a dog’s pain equal to a human being’s? What about a mouse? Or a spider?

It all gets very complicated. Are we really supposed to predict all future outcomes, quantify all these variables, compare them, and calculate which act maximises utility most effectively? And every single time we act?! That’s just not practical!

Tyranny of the majority

There are some things that just seem wrong regardless of the consequences.

For example, imagine a scenario where a nasty murder has taken place and an angry crowd are baying for blood. In other words, it would make the crowd happy to see the perpetrator apprehended and punished for his crimes.

But what if the police can’t catch the murderer? They could just lie and frame an innocent man instead.

If the crowd believe the murderer has been caught (even if it’s not really him) then they would be just as happy whether it was the actual perpetrator or not.

And let’s say the crowd is 10,000 people. Their collective happiness is likely to outweigh the innocent man’s pain at being falsely imprisoned. After all, there are 10,000 of them and only one of him (hence, tyranny of the majority ).

In this situation an act utilitarian would have to say it’s morally right to imprison the innocent man. In fact, it would be morally wrong not to!

Possible response: rule utilitarianism.

Moral status of particular relationships

Certain people – namely, friends and family – are more important to us than others.

But act utilitarianism is concerned only with the greatest good for the greatest number. There are no grounds, then, to justify acting to maximise their happiness over some random person on the street.

This means, for example:

That £10 you spend buying your mum a birthday present made her happy, sure, but it would have made Joe Bloggs in Mozambique happier. So, buying your Mum a birthday present was morally wrong according to utilitarianism.
The time you spent with your friends made them happy, but volunteering at the local soup kitchen would have increased the greatest good for the greatest number more effectively. So, you acted wrongly by spending time with your friends because this did not maximise the greatest happiness for the greatest number.

You get the idea. If we sincerely followed act utilitarianism we would never be morally permitted to spend time and money with our loved ones.

This objection can be used to show that act utilitarianism is too idealistic and doesn’t work in practice. Or, you could argue that certain relationships have a unique moral status and that act utilitarianism forces us to ignore these moral obligations.

Higher and lower pleasures

We saw above how Bentham’s felicific calculus seeks to quantify happiness. However, we can argue that this quantitative approach makes utilitarianism a ‘doctrine of swine’ in that it reduces the value of human life to the same simple pleasures felt by pigs and animals.

Possible response:

However, in response to this objection, utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill rejects Bentham’s felicific calculus and argues that not all pleasures and pains are equally valuable. Mill argues that people who have experienced the higher pleasures of thought, feeling, and imagination always prefer them to the lower pleasures of the body and the senses. Higher pleasures, he says, are more valuable than simple pleasures.

So, Mill takes a qualitative approach to happiness rather than Bentham’s purely quantitative approach. Returning to the ‘doctrine of swine’ objection, Mill argues that humans prefer higher pleasures over lower pleasures because they value dignity – and dignity is an important component of happiness. Thus, Mill famously says:

“It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.” John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism

Other values/preferences beyond happiness

There are situations where we might prefer something even if it makes us less happy, and situations where we might prefer something not happen even though it would make us more happy.

Yet despite maximising happiness, many people would prefer not to enter the experience machine . These people would prefer to live a real life and be in contact with reality even though a real life means less happiness and more pain compared to the experience machine.

According to act utilitarianism, everyone should enter the experience machine (because all that matters is maximising happiness). But it seems morally wrong to ignore a person’s preferences and, say, force them to enter the experience machine in order to increase happiness.

This example illustrates a problem with Bentham and Mill’s hedonism (the idea that happiness and pleasure are the only things of value). We realise there are things in life more important than simple pleasure – such as being in contact with reality – but act utilitarianism ignores our preferences for these things.

Possible response: preference utilitarianism.

Rule utilitarianism

“though the consequences in the particular case might be beneficial—it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be consciously aware that the action is of a class which, if practiced generally, would be generally injurious, and that this is the ground of the obligation to abstain from it.” John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism

Rule utilitarianism focuses on the consequences of general rules rather than specific actions ( act utilitarianism ).

This provides a response to the tyranny of the majority objection to act utilitarianism above . Although in this specific instance punishing the innocent man leads to greater happiness, as a general rule it would lead to more unhappiness.

For example, if you lived in a society where you knew innocent people were regularly framed, you would worry that it might happen to you. There would also be no satisfaction in seeing criminals ‘brought to justice’ as there would be no way to know whether they were guilty.

Preference utilitarianism

Preference utilitarianism is a non-hedonistic form of utilitarianism. It says that instead of maximising happiness (hedonistic utilitarianism), we should act to maximise people’s preferences .

This provides a response to the experience machine objection to act utilitarianism above. Act utilitarianism says we should shove everyone into the experience machine – whether they want to go in or not – because doing so would maximise their happiness. However, preference utilitarianism can reject this by saying we should respect people’s preference to live in the real world (even if living in the real world means less happiness).

A related example would be carrying out the wishes of the dead. It can’t increase the happiness of a deceased person to carry out their will (because they’re dead). However, if a deceased person expressed a preference for their money to be donated to the local cat shelter, say, then it seems there is a moral obligation to honour this preference. Act utilitarianism, though, would say we should ignore the preferences of the deceased and just spend the money in whichever way maximises happiness – but this seems wrong. Preference utilitarianism can avoid this outcome and say we should respect the preferences of the dead.

Preference utilitarianism can also tie in with Mill’s distinction between higher and lower pleasures . Mill claims that higher pleasures are just inherently more valuable than lower pleasures, but preference utilitarianism can explain this in terms of preference: We prefer higher pleasures over lower pleasures, and so should seek to maximise those.

Kant’s theory is quite long-winded, but it can be summarised as:

The only thing that is good without qualification is good will.
Good will means acting for the sake of duty.
You have a duty to follow the moral law.
Moral laws are universal .
You can tell is a maxim is universal if it passes the categorical imperative.
Contradiction in conception
Contradiction in will
Finally, do not treat people as means to an end (the humanity formula ).

The good will

Good will is one that acts for the sake of duty . This, according to Kant, is the source of moral worth.

So, if you save someone’s life because you expect to be financially rewarded, this action has no moral worth. You’re acting for selfish reasons, not because of duty.

However, if you save someone’s life because you recognise that you have a duty to do so, then this action does have moral worth.

Deontology (as in Kant’s deontological ethics) is the study of duty.

Kant argues that we each have a duty to follow the moral law. The moral law, according to Kant, is summarised by the categorical imperative.

The categorical imperative

“Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without contradiction.” – Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals

There are two kinds of maxims (rules): categorical and hypothetical .

E.g. “you should do your homework if you want to do well in the exam. “
E.g. “you shouldn’t steal” is a rule that applies to everyone, i.e. it applies universally.

According to Kant, moral laws are categorical, not hypothetical. Kant gives two ways to test whether a maxim/rule passes the categorical imperative: contradiction in conception and contradiction in will . He also gives another formula for the categorical imperative, called the humanity formula.

Test 1: contradiction in conception

For a law to be universal, it must not result in a contradiction in conception.

A contradiction in conception is something that is self-contradictory.

Example: we might ask Kant whether it is morally acceptable to steal. I.e., we might ask whether “you should steal” is a universally applicable maxim.

If stealing was universally acceptable, then you could take whatever you wanted from someone, and the owner of the object would have no argument against it. In fact, the very concept of ownership wouldn’t make sense – as everyone would have just as much right to an object as you do.

So, in a world where stealing is universally acceptable, the concept of private property disappears. If there is no such thing as private property, then stealing is impossible.

Therefore, Kant would say, the maxim “you should steal” leads to a contradiction in conception . Therefore, stealing is not morally permissible.

If a maxim leads to a contradiction in conception, you have a perfect duty not to follow that maxim. It is always wrong.

Test 2: contradiction in will

Assuming the maxim does not result in a contradiction in conception, we must then ask whether the maxim results in a contradiction in will – i.e. whether we can rationally will a maxim or not.

Example: can we rationally will “not to help others in need”?

There is no contradiction in conception in a world where nobody helps anyone else. But we cannot rationally will it , says Kant. The reason for this is that sometimes we have goals (Kant calls these ends ) that cannot be achieved without the help of others. To will the ends, we must also will the means .

So, we cannot rationally will such goals without also willing the help of others (the means).

Of course, not all goals require the help of others. Hence, Kant argues this results in an imperfect duty. In other words, it is sometimes wrong to follow the maxim “not to help others in need”.

The humanity formula

Kant gives another formulation of the categorical imperative :

“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity […] never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.” – Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals

Treating someone as a means to your own end means to use them. So Kant is basically saying don’t use people.

Example: tricking someone into marrying you.

If you pretend to love someone to marry them and take their money, you treat them as a means to make money.

According to Kant, it’s the deception that is the problem here as it undermines the rational agency of the other party. By withholding your true intentions, you prevent the other party from rationally pursuing their own ends (e.g. to find a loving partner).

But if you’re honest with the other party, the other party can make an informed choice on whether this fits with their ends. Their goal might be to get married to anyone , regardless of whether it’s love or not. In this case you can both (rationally) use each other for mutual benefit. You acknowledge each others ends , even if they are not the same.

Not all universal maxims are moral (and vice versa)

Kant argues that ignoring a perfect duty leads to a contradiction in conception . As we saw in the stealing example, the very concept of private property couldn’t exist if stealing was universally permissible. But by tweaking the maxim slightly, we can avoid this contradiction in conception and justify stealing.

For example, instead of my maxim being ‘to steal’, I could claim my maxim is ‘to steal from people with nine letters in their name’ or ‘to steal from stores that begin with the letter A’.

Both of these maxims can be universalised without undermining the concept of private property. They would apply rarely enough that there would be no breakdown in the concept of private property.

For Kant, if a maxim can be universalised, it is morally acceptable. But this shows that universalisable maxims are not necessarily good or moral.

You can also make this objection the other way round by appealing to maxims that can’t be made into universal laws and yet aren’t morally wrong.

For example, my maxim ‘to be in the top 10% of students’ can’t be made universal law because only 10% of people (by definition) can achieve this. And yet, it’s not morally wrong to try to be in the top 10% of students.

In the ‘stealing from people with nine letters in their name ‘ example, Kant would likely argue that modifying your maxim in this way is cheating because the extra conditions – such as the number of letters in a person’s name or the name of the store – are morally irrelevant to this situation.

The categorical imperative is concerned with the actual maxim I am acting on and not some arbitrary one I just made up.

Ignores consequences

There is a strong intuition that consequences (i.e. utilitarianism ) are important when it comes to moral decision making.

This intuition can be drawn out by considering ethical dilemmas such as the trolley problem:

Is it right to kill one person to save five people? Kant would say no, a utilitarian would say yes.

But what about 100 people? Or the entire population of the world? Surely if the consequences are significant enough we should consider breaking certain rules?

Another example is stealing. Many people would have the utilitarian intuition that it’s morally acceptable to steal food in some situations – for example, stealing food to save your starving family’s life. However, Kant says we have a perfect duty never to steal and so you should just let your family starve to death – but this doesn’t seem right.

The problem with such rigid rules is drawn out further in the lies section of applied ethics . Kant argues that we have a perfect duty not to lie – even if telling a lie would save someone’s life.

These thought experiments seem to draw out absurd and morally questionable results from following rules too strictly.

Ignores other valuable motivations

In the discussion of the good will , we saw how Kant argues that acting for the sake of duty is the source of moral worth.

In other words, being motivated by duty is the only motivation that has moral worth.

So, imagine a close friend is ill in hospital. You pay them a visit because you genuinely like them and want to make sure they’re ok. According to Kant, this motivation (concern for your friend) has no moral value.

However, if you didn’t really care about your friend but begrudgingly went to visit purely out of duty, this would have moral value according to Kant.

But this seems absurd. Kant seems to be saying we should want to help people because of duty, not because we genuinely care.

Kant would respond by making a distinction between acting for the sake of duty and acting in accordance with duty. There is nothing wrong with being motivated by motivations such as love, but we shouldn’t choose how to act because of them. Instead, we should always act out of duty, but if what we want to do anyway is in accordance with duty then that’s a bonus.

Conflicts between duties

Kant argues that it is never acceptable to violate our duties .

But what if you find yourself in a situation where such a situation was unavoidable? For example, Kant would say we have a duty to never lie . But what happens if you make a promise to someone but then find yourself in a situation where the only way to keep that promise is by telling a lie? Whichever choice you make you will seemingly violate one of your duties.

Kant claims that a true conflict of duties is impossible. Our moral duties are objective and rational and so it is inconceivable that they could conflict with one another. If it appears that there is a conflict in our duties, he says, it must mean we have made a mistake somewhere in formulating them. After all, you can’t rationally will a maxim to become a universal law if it conflicts with another law you rationally will – that would be contradictory .

So, if we think through our duties carefully, Kant says, a true conflict is irrational and inconceivable. Applied to the example above, Kant could say we shouldn’t make a promise that could conflict with our moral duties.

Foot: Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives

Philippa Foot argues that moral laws are not categorical in the way Kant thinks – there is no categorical reason to follow them. Instead, she argues, morality is a system of hypothetical imperatives:

The motivation for hypothetical imperatives is obvious: I should do my homework because I want to do well in the exam. I should leave now because I want to catch the train on time. These desires provide a rational reason why I should act according to these imperatives.

However, the reason for categorical imperatives is not so clear. Why shouldn’t I steal? Why shouldn’t I tell lies? If I don’t care about these rules – if I have no desire to follow them – then why should I? Kant would say following moral laws is a matter of rationality and that reason tells us we should follow the categorical imperative but Foot argues that:

“The fact is that the man who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency. Nor will his action necessarily be irrational. Irrational actions are those in which a man in some way defeats his own purposes […] Immorality does not necessarily involve any such thing.” – Philippa Foot, Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives

In other words, there is nothing irrational about disobeying the categorical imperative if you never accepted it in the first place. The categorical imperative does not itself provide any rational reason to follow it. We might feel that there is some moral force that compels us not to steal or tell lies but this feeling is just that: a feeling. In reality, there is no real reason to follow moral laws any more than there is reason to follow the rules of etiquette, such as “handshakes should be brief”.

Instead, Foot argues that we should see morality as a system of hypothetical , rather than categorical, imperatives. For example:

You shouldn’t steal if you don’t want to upset the person you’re stealing from
You shouldn’t tell lies if you care about having integrity
You shouldn’t murder if you want to be a just and virtuous person

Aristotle’s virtue theory

Like Kant, Aristotle’s ethics are somewhat long-winded. Aristotle also makes a bunch of different arguments that can sometimes seem a bit unconnected.

The first thing to say is that Aristotle starts by answering a slightly different question to Kant and utilitarianism . Instead of answering “what should I do?” (action-centred) he addresses a question more like “what sort of person should I be?” (agent-centred). It’s basically the other way round: Instead of defining a good person as someone who does good actions, Aristotle would define good actions as those done by good people.

The following is a brief summary of his main points:

Eudaimonia = the good life for human beings
The good life for a human being must consist of something unique to human beings
Human beings are rational animals, and reason is their unique characteristic activity (ergon)
The good life (eudaimonia) is one full of actions chosen according to reason
Virtues are character traits that enable us to act according to reason
The virtue is the middle point between a vice of deficiency and a vice of excess
Virtues are developed through habit and training

You can have good food, good friends, a good day. Aristotle’s ethical enquiry is concerned with the good life for a human being . The word Aristotle uses for this is eudaimonia , which is sometimes translated as ‘human flourishing’.

Aristotle has in mind the good life for a human in a broad sense. Eudaimonia is not just about following moral laws (e.g. Kant), or being happy (e.g. utilitarianism), or being successful – it’s about all these things together and more. It’s a good life in the moral sense as well as in the sense that it’s the kind of desirable and enjoyable and valuable life you would want for yourself.

Eudaimonia is a property of someone’s life taken as a whole. It’s not something you can have one day and then lose the next. Good people sometimes do bad things, but this doesn’t make them bad people. Likewise, people who have good lives (eudaimons) can sometimes have bad days.

Aristotle says that eudaimonia is a final end . We don’t try to achieve eudaimonia as a means to achieve some goal but instead it is something that is valuable for its own sake.

Arête, ergon, and virtue

While fleshing out this concept of eudaimonia, Aristotle uses the words arête and ergon . These roughly translate as:

Ergon: function/characteristic activity of a thing
Arête: property/virtue that enables a thing to achieve its ergon

Aristotle argues that eudaimonia must consist of something unique to humans. The ergon of humans, says Aristotle, is to use reason . Reason is what makes us unique from trees, plants, books, knives, animals – everything else in the world. However, this does not mean that we achieve eudaimonia by doing nothing but idly thinking and reasoning. Instead, Aristotle’s claim is that humans always choose their actions for some reason – good or bad. So, what Aristotle actually says is that the good life for a human being (eudaimonia) is one full of actions chosen according to good reason.

Virtues are character traits that enable us to choose our actions according to good reason. So, just as the arête of sharpness helps a knife fulfil its ergon to cut things, the arête of virtues help humans fulfil their ergon, which is to choose actions according to reason.

A bit like eudaimonia, virtues are not something you have one day but not the next. If someone has a virtuous character but slips up one day and does something unvirtuous, this doesn’t make them a bad person. Likewise, a bad person whose character is prone to vice doesn’t suddenly develop virtuous character through committing one virtuous act. So, again, virtues are character traits – they are part of what we are.

The doctrine of the mean

Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean (also called the golden mean) provides more detail about what virtuous character traits actually are. The doctrine of the mean says that virtues are the intermediate or average (the mean) between two extremes.

For example, if you never stand up for yourself then you are cowardly (vice of deficiency). But if you go too far the other way and start fights with anyone for the slightest reason then you are reckless (vice of excess). The correct and virtuous way to act is somewhere in between these two extremes.

Some other examples:

Again, virtues are character traits. So, for example, just because you have a good-tempered character in general this doesn’t mean you should always be good-tempered in every situation.

There are times when anger is the appropriate (and virtuous) response. The virtuous person is not someone who never feels angry or other extremes of emotions. Instead, the virtuous person is someone whose character disposes them to feel these extreme emotions when it is appropriate to do so. As Aristotle says:

“For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger… may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue.” Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics Book II.VI

The skill analogy

Acquiring virtues is somewhat analogous to acquiring skills such as learning to ride a bike or play the piano:

Nobody is born knowing how to play the piano, but we are born with the capacity to know how to play the piano. Likewise, nobody is born virtuous, but they have the capacity to become virtuous
You don’t learn to play the piano by simply reading books and just studying the theory, you have to actually do it. Likewise, it’s not enough to just read and learn about virtue, you have to actually act virtuously until it becomes part of your character.
When you first start learning to play the piano, you follow the rules and try not to press the wrong keys – but you don’t really understand what you’re doing. In the case of virtue, we start by teaching children rules for behaviour (e.g. “don’t eat too many sweets” or “if you haven’t got anything nice to say, don’t say anything at all”) and they just follow these rules because they’re told to – not because they understand why.
But as you progress with playing the piano, you become able to play automatically without thinking and, eventually, you might become so comfortable playing the piano that you’re able to improvise and understand what sounds good, what doesn’t, and why. Likewise, by following rules for acting virtuously, it eventually becomes part of our character (e.g. we develop the virtue of temperance by repeatedly refusing to indulge until it eventually becomes habit). Further, we begin to understand what virtue is and this enables us to improvise according to what the situation demands.

Another of Aristotle’s terms is phronesis , which translates as something like ‘practical wisdom’ .

Aristotle’s virtue ethics is not like Kant’s deontological ethics where what is good/right can be boiled down to a list of general rules . For Aristotle, what’s good/right will depend on the specific details of the situation. In one situation (out with your friends, say) it might be virtuous to tell a joke whereas in another situation (e.g. at a funeral) it would be inappropriate. Knowing what virtue requires according to the specific details of the situation requires a practical wisdom. For Aristotle, this means:

Having a general understanding of what is good for human beings ( eudaimonia ).
Being able to apply this general understanding to the specific details of the situation – the time, the place, the people involved, etc.
Being able to deliberate (i.e. think through) what is the virtuous goal according to these specific details.
And then acting virtuously according to this deliberation to achieve this virtuous outcome.

As the name suggests, practical wisdom is not the sort of thing you can learn from books – it’s practical . The skill analogy illustrates how virtuous actions become habit over time, leading to virtuous character that enables us to act virtuously in the wide variety of situations we find ourselves.

Moral responsibility

Aristotle says we should only praise or condemn actions if they are done voluntarily. In other words, you can’t criticise someone for acting unvirtuously if their actions weren’t freely chosen.

Voluntary: acting with full knowledge and intention
Compulsion (i.e. in voluntary): being forced to do something you don’t want to do – e.g. sailors throwing goods overboard to save the boat during a storm
Ignorance (i.e. non -voluntary): doing something you don’t want to do by accident – e.g. slipping on a banana skin and spilling a drink on someone

Aristotle says a person is only morally responsible for their voluntary actions.

No clear guidance

Aristotle describes virtues in the middle of the two extremes ( the doctrine of the mean ) and that this varies depending on the situation. But this isn’t very helpful as a practical guide of what to do.

For example, Aristotle would say it is correct to act angrily sometimes – but when exactly? And how angry are you supposed to get before it crosses over from a virtue to a vice of excess?

Kant gives the categorical imperative as a test to say whether an action is moral or not. And even utilitarianism has the felicific calculus . But with Aristotle, we have no such criteria against which to judge whether one course of action is better than another. The doctrine of the mean doesn’t give actual quantities, only vague descriptions as “not too much” and “not too little”. If you genuinely don’t know what the correct course of action is, virtue theory doesn’t provide any actual guidance for how to act.

Aristotle could reply that virtue theory was never intended to provide a set of rules for how to act. Life is complicated – that’s the whole reason why you need to develop practical wisdom in the first place, so you can act virtuously in the many complicated situations that arise. Plus, we can still reflect whether an action is, for example, courageous or stupid. We could also ask questions like “how could I be more friendly in this situation?” that help us decide how to act. Just because virtue theory doesn’t provide a specific course of action, that does not mean it provides no guidance whatsoever.

Circularity

Aristotle can be interpreted as defining virtuous acts and virtuous people in terms of each other, which doesn’t really say anything. He’s basically saying something like:

A virtuous act is something a virtuous person would do
And a virtuous person is a person who does virtuous acts

These descriptions are circular and so say nothing meaningful about what a virtuous person or a virtuous act actually is.

Competing virtues

We can imagine scenarios where applying two different virtues (e.g. justice and mercy) would suggest two different courses of action.

For example, if you’re a judge and someone has stolen something, you have to choose between the virtue of justice (i.e. punishing the criminal) and the virtue of mercy (i.e. letting the criminal go). You can’t choose to do both things, so whichever choice you make will be unvirtuous in some way.

Aristotle would reply that such conflicts between virtues are impossible. As mentioned in the no clear guidance objection, virtues are not rigid and unbreakable rules and the correct virtue and in what amount depends on the circumstances. Aristotle would say that practical wisdom would mean knowing what each virtue tells you to do and in what amount. So, for example, you could sentence a person according to justice, but show appropriate mercy if there are extenuating circumstances.

Difference between eudaimonia and moral good

According to Aristotle, the good life for a human being is eudaimonia. And, as mentioned, eudaimonia includes many elements beyond simply being moral – such as honour, wealth, and happiness. However, we often make a distinction between a good life for me (eudaimonia) and a morally good life.

difference between eudaimonia and morality

This suggests there is a difference between what is morally good and eudaimonia , and so Aristotle’s virtue ethics fails as an account of what morality is.

You could respond, however, that Aristotle was never trying to answer the (narrow) question of what a morally good life is. Aristotle’s inquiry and eudaimonia is concerned with the good life in general – human flourishing in a broad sense. Further, Aristotle would likely argue that achieving eudaimonia does involve some level of commitment to others. So, the kind of altruism demonstrated by the nurse in the example above would indeed be part of eudaimonia – it’s just not the only part. In other words, being morally good is necessary, but not sufficient , for eudaimonia.

Metaethics>>>

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6.1 Educational Ethics

The term, “ethics,” is a branch of philosophy that involves analyzing and conceptualizing moral behaviour and determining right from wrong. Educational ethics, in this sense, is analyzing and conceptualizing moral behaviour through pedagogical determinants. This means observing right or wrong actions. Ethical frameworks, regarding learning and epistemology, follow a set of normative ethics, which are morals of how one ought and should act on the ethical principles of justice, utilitarianism, deontology, and human rights [1] .

Justice : fair according to societal standards
Utilitarianism : the greatest good for the greatest number
Deontology : meeting duties obligated by society
Human Rights : the rights of humans to live, be free, and pursue happiness

Throughout this chapter, learning for citizenship and moral development will be reviewed in terms of normative ethics.

This can be looked at through educational democratization. It was Dewey who introduced the democratic conception of education as freeing for the individual and applying new methodological ideas of teaching and learning [2] . What the democratic conception achieves is a pathway towards a moral framework for teaching and learning. Content can be at the discretion of the educator, however, the process of learning is democratized through fairness, obligation, majority, and humanistic actions. Thus, democratic education, through an ethical framework, can be achieved. Effective pedagogy relies on these building blocks.

The role of schools within this ethical paradigm can be seen by where they are on their journey. Venezia, Venezia, Cavico, and Mujtaba conclude that age, formal education, and “ethics” education have no significant impact on ethics and morality [3] . This brings up questions about the value of ethics education, and whether schools are failing in normative ethics of justice, utilitarianism, deontology, and human rights? These findings suggest that marginalization in schools is a failure of justice and human rights. On the other hand, the growth of epistemology and pedagogy may have resulted in more rights and fairness for people. This ultimately adds to the conceptual ambiguity of ethics and moral developments in relation to schools.

Application of Ethics and Education

An analysis by Sergei Nizhnikov infers that the role of transcendentalism will become the dominant philosophy, as it incorporates the cross-cultural and mutual understanding of ethical actions in a modern and globalized world [4] . On a practical level, transcendentalism co-mingles, critiques, and reasons with the many normative ethics structures of justice, utilitarianism, deontology, and human rights. This is beneficial as it helps to develop a meta-cognitive conception of the different ethical structures and how to apply them in teaching and learning. As an example, a teacher may apply a justice framework, by using fairness, when marking papers. This is opposed to applying a utilitarian framework for deciding what activity the class wants to engage in through a vote. Combining and moving beyond ethics is an important factor, especially in a modern education framework. Use the accordion folder below for a more concise understanding of educational ethics.

Theories of Individual and Collective Learning Copyright © by Clayton Smith and Carson Babich is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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v.30(1); 2021 Feb

Principles of Clinical Ethics and Their Application to Practice

An overview of ethics and clinical ethics is presented in this review. The 4 main ethical principles, that is beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy, and justice, are defined and explained. Informed consent, truth-telling, and confidentiality spring from the principle of autonomy, and each of them is discussed. In patient care situations, not infrequently, there are conflicts between ethical principles (especially between beneficence and autonomy). A four-pronged systematic approach to ethical problem-solving and several illustrative cases of conflicts are presented. Comments following the cases highlight the ethical principles involved and clarify the resolution of these conflicts. A model for patient care, with caring as its central element, that integrates ethical aspects (intertwined with professionalism) with clinical and technical expertise desired of a physician is illustrated.

Highlights of the Study

Main principles of ethics, that is beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy, and justice, are discussed.
Autonomy is the basis for informed consent, truth-telling, and confidentiality.
A model to resolve conflicts when ethical principles collide is presented.
Cases that highlight ethical issues and their resolution are presented.
A patient care model that integrates ethics, professionalism, and cognitive and technical expertise is shown.

Introduction

A defining responsibility of a practicing physician is to make decisions on patient care in different settings. These decisions involve more than selecting the appropriate treatment or intervention.

Ethics is an inherent and inseparable part of clinical medicine [ 1 ] as the physician has an ethical obligation (i) to benefit the patient, (ii) to avoid or minimize harm, and to (iii) respect the values and preferences of the patient. Are physicians equipped to fulfill this ethical obligation and can their ethical skills be improved? A goal-oriented educational program [ 2 ] (Table (Table1) 1 ) has been shown to improve learner awareness, attitudes, knowledge, moral reasoning, and confidence [ 3 , 4 ].

Goals of ethics education

Ethics, Morality, and Professional Standards

Ethics is a broad term that covers the study of the nature of morals and the specific moral choices to be made. Normative ethics attempts to answer the question, “Which general moral norms for the guidance and evaluation of conduct should we accept, and why?” [ 5 ]. Some moral norms for right conduct are common to human kind as they transcend cultures, regions, religions, and other group identities and constitute common morality (e.g., not to kill, or harm, or cause suffering to others, not to steal, not to punish the innocent, to be truthful, to obey the law, to nurture the young and dependent, to help the suffering, and rescue those in danger). Particular morality refers to norms that bind groups because of their culture, religion, profession and include responsibilities, ideals, professional standards, and so on. A pertinent example of particular morality is the physician's “accepted role” to provide competent and trustworthy service to their patients. To reduce the vagueness of “accepted role,” physician organizations (local, state, and national) have codified their standards. However, complying with these standards, it should be understood, may not always fulfill the moral norms as the codes have “often appeared to protect the profession's interests more than to offer a broad and impartial moral viewpoint or to address issues of importance to patients and society” [ 6 ].

Bioethics and Clinical (Medical) Ethics

A number of deplorable abuses of human subjects in research, medical interventions without informed consent, experimentation in concentration camps in World War II, along with salutary advances in medicine and medical technology and societal changes, led to the rapid evolution of bioethics from one concerned about professional conduct and codes to its present status with an extensive scope that includes research ethics, public health ethics, organizational ethics, and clinical ethics.

Hereafter, the abbreviated term, ethics, will be used as I discuss the principles of clinical ethics and their application to clinical practice.

The Fundamental Principles of Ethics

Beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy, and justice constitute the 4 principles of ethics. The first 2 can be traced back to the time of Hippocrates “to help and do no harm,” while the latter 2 evolved later. Thus, in Percival's book on ethics in early 1800s, the importance of keeping the patient's best interest as a goal is stressed, while autonomy and justice were not discussed. However, with the passage of time, both autonomy and justice gained acceptance as important principles of ethics. In modern times, Beauchamp and Childress' book on Principles of Biomedical Ethics is a classic for its exposition of these 4 principles [ 5 ] and their application, while also discussing alternative approaches.

Beneficence

The principle of beneficence is the obligation of physician to act for the benefit of the patient and supports a number of moral rules to protect and defend the right of others, prevent harm, remove conditions that will cause harm, help persons with disabilities, and rescue persons in danger. It is worth emphasizing that, in distinction to nonmaleficence, the language here is one of positive requirements. The principle calls for not just avoiding harm, but also to benefit patients and to promote their welfare. While physicians' beneficence conforms to moral rules, and is altruistic, it is also true that in many instances it can be considered a payback for the debt to society for education (often subsidized by governments), ranks and privileges, and to the patients themselves (learning and research).

Nonmaleficence

Nonmaleficence is the obligation of a physician not to harm the patient. This simply stated principle supports several moral rules − do not kill, do not cause pain or suffering, do not incapacitate, do not cause offense, and do not deprive others of the goods of life. The practical application of nonmaleficence is for the physician to weigh the benefits against burdens of all interventions and treatments, to eschew those that are inappropriately burdensome, and to choose the best course of action for the patient. This is particularly important and pertinent in difficult end-of-life care decisions on withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, medically administered nutrition and hydration, and in pain and other symptom control. A physician's obligation and intention to relieve the suffering (e.g., refractory pain or dyspnea) of a patient by the use of appropriate drugs including opioids override the foreseen but unintended harmful effects or outcome (doctrine of double effect) [ 7 , 8 ].

The philosophical underpinning for autonomy, as interpreted by philosophers Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), and accepted as an ethical principle, is that all persons have intrinsic and unconditional worth, and therefore, should have the power to make rational decisions and moral choices, and each should be allowed to exercise his or her capacity for self-determination [ 9 ]. This ethical principle was affirmed in a court decision by Justice Cardozo in 1914 with the epigrammatic dictum, “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body” [ 10 ].

Autonomy, as is true for all 4 principles, needs to be weighed against competing moral principles, and in some instances may be overridden; an obvious example would be if the autonomous action of a patient causes harm to another person(s). The principle of autonomy does not extend to persons who lack the capacity (competence) to act autonomously; examples include infants and children and incompetence due to developmental, mental or physical disorder. Health-care institutions and state governments in the US have policies and procedures to assess incompetence. However, a rigid distinction between incapacity to make health-care decisions (assessed by health professionals) and incompetence (determined by court of law) is not of practical use, as a clinician's determination of a patient's lack of decision-making capacity based on physical or mental disorder has the same practical consequences as a legal determination of incompetence [ 11 ].

Detractors of the principle of autonomy question the focus on the individual and propose a broader concept of relational autonomy (shaped by social relationships and complex determinants such as gender, ethnicity and culture) [ 12 ]. Even in an advanced western country such as United States, the culture being inhomogeneous, some minority populations hold views different from that of the majority white population in need for full disclosure, and in decisions about life support (preferring a family-centered approach) [ 13 ].

Resistance to the principle of patient autonomy and its derivatives (informed consent, truth-telling) in non-western cultures is not unexpected. In countries with ancient civilizations, rooted beliefs and traditions, the practice of paternalism ( this term will be used in this article, as it is well-entrenched in ethics literature, although parentalism is the proper term ) by physicians emanates mostly from beneficence. However, culture (a composite of the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious or social group) is not static and autonomous, and changes with other trends over passing years. It is presumptuous to assume that the patterns and roles in physician-patient relationships that have been in place for a half a century and more still hold true. Therefore, a critical examination of paternalistic medical practice is needed for reasons that include technological and economic progress, improved educational and socioeconomic status of the populace, globalization, and societal movement towards emphasis on the patient as an individual, than as a member of a group. This needed examination can be accomplished by research that includes well-structured surveys on demographics, patient preferences on informed consent, truth-telling, and role in decision-making.

Respecting the principle of autonomy obliges the physician to disclose medical information and treatment options that are necessary for the patient to exercise self-determination and supports informed consent, truth-telling, and confidentiality.

Informed Consent

The requirements of an informed consent for a medical or surgical procedure, or for research, are that the patient or subject (i) must be competent to understand and decide, (ii) receives a full disclosure, (iii) comprehends the disclosure, (iv) acts voluntarily, and (v) consents to the proposed action.

The universal applicability of these requirements, rooted and developed in western culture, has met with some resistance and a suggestion to craft a set of requirements that accommodate the cultural mores of other countries [ 14 ]. In response and in vigorous defense of the 5 requirements of informed consent, Angell wrote, “There must be a core of human rights that we would wish to see honored universally, despite variations in their superficial aspects …The forces of local custom or local law cannot justify abuses of certain fundamental rights, and the right of self-determination on which the doctrine of informed consent is based, is one of them” [ 15 ].

As competence is the first of the requirements for informed consent, one should know how to detect incompetence. Standards (used singly or in combination) that are generally accepted for determining incompetence are based on the patient's inability to state a preference or choice, inability to understand one's situation and its consequences, and inability to reason through a consequential life decision [ 16 ].

In a previously autonomous, but presently incompetent patient, his/her previously expressed preferences (i.e., prior autonomous judgments) are to be respected [ 17 ]. Incompetent (non-autonomous) patients and previously competent (autonomous), but presently incompetent patients would need a surrogate decision-maker. In a non-autonomous patient, the surrogate can use either a substituted judgment standard (i.e., what the patient would wish in this circumstance and not what the surrogate would wish), or a best interests standard (i.e., what would bring the highest net benefit to the patient by weighing risks and benefits). Snyder and Sulmasy [ 18 ], in their thoughtful article, provide a practical and useful option when the surrogate is uncertain of the patient's preference(s), or when patient's preferences have not kept abreast of scientific advances. They suggest the surrogate use “substituted interests,” that is, the patient's authentic values and interests, to base the decision.

Truth-Telling

Truth-telling is a vital component in a physician-patient relationship; without this component, the physician loses the trust of the patient. An autonomous patient has not only the right to know (disclosure) of his/her diagnosis and prognosis, but also has the option to forgo this disclosure. However, the physician must know which of these 2 options the patient prefers.

In the United States, full disclosure to the patient, however grave the disease is, is the norm now, but was not so in the past. Significant resistance to full disclosure was highly prevalent in the US, but a marked shift has occurred in physicians' attitudes on this. In 1961, 88% of physicians surveyed indicated their preference to avoid disclosing a diagnosis [ 19 ]; in 1979, however, 98% of surveyed physicians favored it [ 20 ]. This marked shift is attributable to many factors that include − with no order of importance implied − educational and socioeconomic progress, increased accountability to society, and awareness of previous clinical and research transgressions by the profession.

Importantly, surveys in the US show that patients with cancer and other diseases wish to have been fully informed of their diagnoses and prognoses. Providing full information, with tact and sensitivity, to patients who want to know should be the standard. The sad consequences of not telling the truth regarding a cancer include depriving the patient of an opportunity for completion of important life-tasks: giving advice to, and taking leave of loved ones, putting financial affairs in order, including division of assets, reconciling with estranged family members and friends, attaining spiritual order by reflection, prayer, rituals, and religious sacraments [ 21 , 22 ].

In contrast to the US, full disclosure to the patient is highly variable in other countries [ 23 ]. A continuing pattern in non-western societies is for the physician to disclose the information to the family and not to the patient. The likely reasons for resistance of physicians to convey bad news are concern that it may cause anxiety and loss of hope, some uncertainty on the outcome, or belief that the patient would not be able to understand the information or may not want to know. However, this does not have to be a binary choice, as careful understanding of the principle of autonomy reveals that autonomous choice is a right of a patient, and the patient, in exercising this right, may authorize a family member or members to make decisions for him/her.

Confidentiality

Physicians are obligated not to disclose confidential information given by a patient to another party without the patient's authorization. An obvious exception (with implied patient authorization) is the sharing necessary of medical information for the care of the patient from the primary physician to consultants and other health-care teams. In the present-day modern hospitals with multiple points of tests and consultants, and the use of electronic medical records, there has been an erosion of confidentiality. However, individual physicians must exercise discipline in not discussing patient specifics with their family members or in social gatherings [ 24 ] and social media. There are some noteworthy exceptions to patient confidentiality. These include, among others, legally required reporting of gunshot wounds and sexually transmitted diseases and exceptional situations that may cause major harm to another (e.g., epidemics of infectious diseases, partner notification in HIV disease, relative notification of certain genetic risks, etc.).

Justice is generally interpreted as fair, equitable, and appropriate treatment of persons. Of the several categories of justice, the one that is most pertinent to clinical ethics is distributive justice . Distributive justice refers to the fair, equitable, and appropriate distribution of health-care resources determined by justified norms that structure the terms of social cooperation [ 25 ]. How can this be accomplished? There are different valid principles of distributive justice. These are distribution to each person (i) an equal share, (ii) according to need, (iii) according to effort, (iv) according to contribution, (v) according to merit, and (vi) according to free-market exchanges. Each principle is not exclusive, and can be, and are often combined in application. It is easy to see the difficulty in choosing, balancing, and refining these principles to form a coherent and workable solution to distribute medical resources.

Although this weighty health-care policy discussion exceeds the scope of this review, a few examples on issues of distributive justice encountered in hospital and office practice need to be mentioned. These include allotment of scarce resources (equipment, tests, medications, organ transplants), care of uninsured patients, and allotment of time for outpatient visits (equal time for every patient? based on need or complexity? based on social and or economic status?). Difficult as it may be, and despite the many constraining forces, physicians must accept the requirement of fairness contained in this principle [ 26 ]. Fairness to the patient assumes a role of primary importance when there are conflicts of interests. A flagrant example of violation of this principle would be when a particular option of treatment is chosen over others, or an expensive drug is chosen over an equally effective but less expensive one because it benefits the physician, financially, or otherwise.

Conflicts between Principles

Each one of the 4 principles of ethics is to be taken as a prima facie obligation that must be fulfilled, unless it conflicts, in a specific instance, with another principle. When faced with such a conflict, the physician has to determine the actual obligation to the patient by examining the respective weights of the competing prima facie obligations based on both content and context. Consider an example of a conflict that has an easy resolution: a patient in shock treated with urgent fluid-resuscitation and the placement of an indwelling intravenous catheter caused pain and swelling. Here the principle of beneficence overrides that of nonmaleficence. Many of the conflicts that physicians face, however, are much more complex and difficult. Consider a competent patient's refusal of a potentially life-saving intervention (e.g., instituting mechanical ventilation) or request for a potentially life-ending action (e.g., withdrawing mechanical ventilation). Nowhere in the arena of ethical decision-making is conflict as pronounced as when the principles of beneficence and autonomy collide.

Beneficence has enjoyed a historical role in the traditional practice of medicine. However, giving it primacy over patient autonomy is paternalism that makes a physician-patient relationship analogous to that of a father/mother to a child. A father/mother may refuse a child's wishes, may influence a child by a variety of ways − nondisclosure, manipulation, deception, coercion etc., consistent with his/her thinking of what is best for the child. Paternalism can be further divided into soft and hard .

In soft paternalism, the physician acts on grounds of beneficence (and, at times, nonmaleficence) when the patient is nonautonomous or substantially nonautonomous (e.g., cognitive dysfunction due to severe illness, depression, or drug addiction) [ 27 ]. Soft paternalism is complicated because of the difficulty in determining whether the patient was nonautonomous at the time of decision-making but is ethically defensible as long as the action is in concordance with what the physician believes to be the patient's values. Hard paternalism is action by a physician, intended to benefit a patient, but contrary to the voluntary decision of an autonomous patient who is fully informed and competent, and is ethically indefensible.

On the other end of the scale of hard paternalism is consumerism, a rare and extreme form of patient autonomy, that holds the view that the physician's role is limited to providing all the medical information and the available choices for interventions and treatments while the fully informed patient selects from the available choices. In this model, the physician's role is constrained, and does not permit the full use of his/her knowledge and skills to benefit the patient, and is tantamount to a form of patient abandonment and therefore is ethically indefensible.

Faced with the contrasting paradigms of beneficence and respect for autonomy and the need to reconcile these to find a common ground, Pellegrino and Thomasma [ 28 ] argue that beneficence can be inclusive of patient autonomy as “the best interests of the patients are intimately linked with their preferences” from which “are derived our primary duties to them.”

One of the basic and not infrequent reasons for disagreement between physician and patient on treatment issues is their divergent views on goals of treatment. As goals change in the course of disease (e.g., a chronic neurologic condition worsens to the point of needing ventilator support, or a cancer that has become refractory to treatment), it is imperative that the physician communicates with the patient in clear and straightforward language, without the use of medical jargon, and with the aim of defining the goal(s) of treatment under the changed circumstance. In doing so, the physician should be cognizant of patient factors that compromise decisional capacity, such as anxiety, fear, pain, lack of trust, and different beliefs and values that impair effective communication [ 29 ].

The foregoing theoretical discussion on principles of ethics has practical application in clinical practice in all settings. In the resource book for clinicians, Jonsen et al. [ 30 ] have elucidated a logical and well accepted model (Table (Table2), 2 ), along the lines of the systematic format that practicing physicians have been taught and have practiced for a long time (Chief Complaint, History of Present Illness, Past History, pertinent Family and Social History, Review of Systems, Physical Examination and Laboratory and Imaging studies). This practical approach to problem-solving in ethics involves:

Clinical assessment (identifying medical problems, treatment options, goals of care)
Patient (finding and clarifying patient preferences on treatment options and goals of care)
Quality of life (QOL) (effects of medical problems, interventions and treatments on patient's QOL with awareness of individual biases on what constitutes an acceptable QOL)
Context (many factors that include family, cultural, spiritual, religious, economic and legal).

Application of principles of ethics in patient care

Using this model, the physician can identify the principles that are in conflict, ascertain by weighing and balancing what should prevail, and when in doubt, turn to ethics literature and expert opinion.

Illustrative Cases

There is a wide gamut of clinical patient encounters with ethical issues, and some, especially those involving end-of-life care decisions, are complex. A few cases (Case 1 is modified from resource book [ 30 ]) are presented below as they highlight the importance of understanding and weighing the ethical principles involved to arrive at an ethically right solution. Case 6 was added during the revision phase of this article as it coincided with the outbreak of Coronavirus Infectious Disease-2019 (COVID-19) that became a pandemic rendering a discussion of its ethical challenges necessary and important.

A 20-year old college student living in the college hostel is brought by a friend to the Emergency Department (ED) because of unrelenting headache and fever. He appeared drowsy but was responsive and had fever (40°C), and neck rigidity on examination. Lumbar puncture was done, and spinal fluid appeared cloudy and showed increased white cells; Gram stain showed Gram-positive diplococci. Based on the diagnosis of bacterial meningitis, appropriate antibiotics were begun, and hospitalization was instituted. Although initial consent for diagnosis was implicit, and consent for lumbar puncture was explicit, at this point, the patient refuses treatment without giving any reason, and insists to return to his hostel. Even after explanation by the physician as to the seriousness of his diagnosis, and the absolute need for prompt treatment (i.e., danger to life without treatment), the patient is adamant in his refusal.

Comment . Because of this refusal, the medical indications and patient preferences (see Table Table2) 2 ) are at odds. Is it ethically right to treat against his will a patient who is making a choice that has dire consequences (disability, death) who gives no reason for this decision, and in whom a clear determination of mental incapacity cannot be made (although altered mental status may be presumed)? Here the principle of beneficence and principle of autonomy are in conflict. The weighing of factors: (1) patient may not be making a reasoned decision in his best interest because of temporary mental incapacity; and (2) the severity of life-threatening illness and the urgency to treat to save his life supports the decision in favor of beneficence (i.e., to treat).

A 56-year old male lawyer and current cigarette smoker with a pack-a-day habit for more than 30 years, is found to have a solitary right upper lobe pulmonary mass 5 cm in size on a chest radiograph done as part of an insurance application. The mass has no calcification, and there are no other pulmonary abnormalities. He has no symptoms, and his examination is normal. Tuberculosis skin test is negative, and he has no history of travel to an endemic area of fungal infection. As lung cancer is the most probable and significant diagnosis to consider, and early surgical resection provides the best prospects for cure, the physician, in consultation with the thoracic surgeon, recommends bronchoscopic biopsy and subsequent resection. The patient understands the treatment plan, and the significance of not delaying the treatment. However, he refuses, and states that he does not think he has cancer; and is fearful that the surgery would kill him. Even after further explanations on the low mortality of surgery and the importance of removing the mass before it spreads, he continues to refuse treatment.

Comment . Even though the physician's prescribed treatment, that is, removal of the mass that is probably cancer, affords the best chance of cure, and delay in its removal increases its chance of metastases and reaching an incurable stage − the choice by this well informed and mentally competent patient should be respected. Here, autonomy prevails over beneficence. The physician, however, may not abandon the patient and is obligated to offer continued outpatient visits with advice against making decision based on fear, examinations, periodic tests, and encouragement to seek a second opinion.

A 71-year-old man with very severe chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) is admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU) with pneumonia, sepsis, and respiratory failure. He is intubated and mechanically ventilated. For the past 2 years, he has been on continuous oxygen treatment and was short of breath on minimal exertion. In the past 1 year, he had 2 admissions to the ICU; on both occasions he required intubation and mechanical ventilation. Presently, even with multiple antibiotics, intravenous fluid hydration, and vasopressors, his systolic blood pressure remains below 60 mm Hg, and with high flow oxygen supplementation, his oxygen saturation stays below 80%; his arterial blood pH is 7.0. His liver enzymes are elevated. He is anuric, and over next 8 h his creatinine has risen to 5 mg/dL and continues to rise. He has drifted into a comatose state. The intensivist suggests discontinuation of vasopressors and mechanical ventilation as their continued use is futile. The patient has no advance care directives or a designated health-care proxy.

Comment . The term “futility” is open to different definitions [ 31 ] and is often controversial, and therefore, some experts suggest the alternate term, “clinically non-beneficial interventions” [ 32 ]. However, in this case the term futility is appropriate to indicate that there is evidence of physiological futility (multisystem organ failure in the setting of preexisting end stage COPD, and medical interventions would not reverse the decline). It is appropriate then to discuss the patient's condition with his family with the goal of discontinuing life-sustaining interventions. These discussions should be done with sensitivity, compassion and empathy. Palliative care should be provided to alleviate his symptoms and to support the family until his death and beyond in their bereavement.

A 67-year old widow, an immigrant from southern India, is living with her son and his family in Wisconsin, USA. She was experiencing nausea, lack of appetite and weight loss for a few months. During the past week, she also had dark yellow urine, and yellow coloration of her skin. She has basic knowledge of English. She was brought to a multi-specialty teaching hospital by her son, who informed the doctor that his mother has “jaundice,” and instructed that, if any serious life-threatening disease was found, not to inform her. He asked that all information should come to him, and if there is any cancer not to treat it, since she is older and frail. Investigations in the hospital reveals that she has pancreatic cancer, and chemotherapy, while not likely to cure, would prolong her life.

Comment . In some ancient cultures, authority is given to members of the family (especially senior men) to make decisions that involve other members on marriage, job, and health care. The woman in this case is a dependent of her son, and given this cultural perspective, the son can rightfully claim to have the authority to make health-care decisions for her. Thus, the physician is faced with multiple tasks that may not be consonant. To respect cultural values [ 33 ], to directly learn the patient's preferences, to comply with the American norm of full disclosure to the patient, and to refuse the son's demands.

The principle of autonomy provides the patient the option to delegate decision-making authority to another person. Therefore, the appropriate course would be to take the tactful approach of directly informing the patient (with a translator if needed), that the diagnosed disease would require decisions for appropriate treatment. The physician should ascertain whether she would prefer to make these decisions herself, or whether she would prefer all information to be given to her son, and all decisions to be made by him.

A 45-year-old woman had laparotomy and cholecystectomy for abdominal pain and multiple gall stones. Three weeks after discharge from the hospital, she returned with fever, abdominal pain, and tenderness. She was given antibiotics, and as her fever continued, laparotomy and exploration were undertaken; a sponge left behind during the recent cholecystectomy was found. It was removed, the area cleansed, and incision closed. Antibiotics were continued, and she recovered without further incident and was discharged. Should the surgeon inform the patient of his error?

Comment . Truth-telling, a part of patient autonomy is very much applicable in this situation and disclosure to patient is required [ 34 , 35 , 36 ]. The mistake caused harm to the patient (morbidity and readmission, and a second surgery and monetary loss). Although the end result remedied the harm, the surgeon is obligated to inform the patient of the error and its consequences and offer an apology. Such errors are always reported to the Operating Room Committees and Surgical Quality Improvement Committees of US Hospitals. Hospital-based risk reduction mechanisms (e.g., Risk Management Department) present in most US hospitals would investigate the incident and come up with specific recommendations to mitigate the error and eliminate them in the future. Many institutions usually make financial settlements to obviate liability litigation (fees and hospital charges waived, and/or monetary compensation made to the patient). Elsewhere, if such mechanisms do not exist, it should be reported to the hospital. Acknowledgment from the hospital, apologies from the institution and compensation for the patient are called for. Whether in US or elsewhere, a malpractice suit is very possible in this situation, but a climate of honesty substantially reduces the threat of legal claims as most patients trust their physicians and are not vindictive.

The following scenario is at a city hospital during the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic: A 74-year-old woman, residing in an assisted living facility, is brought to the ED with shortness of breath and malaise. Over the past 4 days she had been experiencing dry cough, lack of appetite, and tiredness; 2 days earlier, she stopped eating and started having a low-grade fever. A test for COVID-19 undertaken by the assisted living facility was returned positive on the morning of the ED visit.

She, a retired nurse, is a widow; both of her grown children live out-of-state. She has had hypertension for many years, controlled with daily medications. Following 2 strokes, she was moved to an assisted living facility 3 years ago. She recovered most of her functions after the strokes and required help only for bathing and dressing. She is able to answer questions appropriately but haltingly, because of respiratory distress. She has tachypnea (34/min), tachycardia (120/min), temperature of 101°F, BP 100/60 and 90% O 2 saturation (on supplemental O 2 of 4 L/min). She has dry mouth and tongue and rhonchi on lung auscultation. Her respiratory rate is increasing on observation and she is visibly tiring.

Another patient is now brought in by ambulance; this is a 22-year-old man living in an apartment and has had symptoms of “flu” for a week. Because of the pandemic, he was observing the recommended self-distancing, and had no known exposure to coronavirus. He used saline gargles, acetaminophen, and cough syrup to alleviate his sore throat, cough, and fever. In the past 2 days, his symptoms worsened, and he drove himself to a virus testing station and got tested for COVID-19; he was told that he would be notified of the results. He returned to his apartment and after a sleepless night with fever, sweats, and persistent cough, he woke up and felt drained of all strength. The test result confirmed COVID-19. He then called for an ambulance.

He has been previously healthy. He is a non-smoker and uses alcohol rarely. He is a second-year medical student. He is single, and his parents and sibling live hundreds of miles away.

On examination, he has marked tachypnea (>40/min), shallow breathing, heart rate of 128/min, temperature of 103°F and O 2 saturation of 88 on pulse oximetry. He appears drowsy and is slow to respond to questions. He is propped up to a sitting position as it is uncomfortable for him to be supine. Accessory muscles of neck and intercostals are contracting with each breath, and on auscultation, he has basilar crackles and scattered rhonchi. His O 2 saturation drops to 85 and he is in respiratory distress despite nebulized bronchodilator treatment.

Both of these patients are in respiratory failure, clinically and confirmed by arterial blood gases, and are in urgent need of intubation and mechanical ventilation. However, only one ventilator is available; who gets it?

Comment . The decision to allocate a scarce and potentially life-saving equipment (ventilator) is very difficult as it directly addresses the question “Who shall live when not everyone can live? [ 5 ]. This decision cannot be emotion-driven or arbitrary; nor should it be based on a person's wealth or social standing. Priorities need to be established ethically and must be applied consistently in the same institution and ideally throughout the state and the country. The general social norm to treat all equally or to treat on a first come, first saved basis is not the appropriate choice here. There is a consensus among clinical ethics scholars, that in this situation, maximizing benefits is the dominant value in making a decision [ 37 ]. Maximizing benefits can be viewed in 2 different ways; in lives saved or in life-years saved; they differ in that the first is non-utilitarian while the second is utilitarian. A subordinate consideration is giving priority to patients who have a better chance of survival and a reasonable life expectancy. The other 2 considerations are promoting and rewarding instrumental value (benefit to others) and the acuity of illness. Health-care workers (physicians, nurses, therapists etc.) and research participants have instrumental value as their work benefits others; among them those actively contributing are of more value than those who have made their contributions. The need to prioritize the sickest and the youngest is also a recognized value when these are aligned with the dominant value of maximizing benefits. In the context of COVID-19 pandemic, Emanuel et al. [ 37 ] weighed and analyzed these values and offered some recommendations. Some ethics scholars opine that in times of a pandemic, the burden of making a decision as to who gets a ventilator and who does not (often a life or death choice) should not be on the front-line physicians, as it may cause a severe and life-long emotional toll on them [ 35 , 36 ]. The toll can be severe for nurses and other front-line health-care providers as well. As a safeguard, they propose that the decision should rest on a select committee that excludes doctors, nurses and others who are caring for the patient(s) under consideration [ 38 ].

Both patients described in the case summaries have comparable acuity of illness and both are in need of mechanical ventilator support. However, in the dominant value of maximizing benefits the two patients differ; in terms of life-years saved, the second patient (22-year-old man) is ahead as his life expectancy is longer. Additionally, he is more likely than the older woman, to survive mechanical ventilation, infection, and possible complications. Another supporting factor in favor of the second patient is his potential instrumental value (benefit to others) as a future physician.

Unlike the other illustrative cases, the scenario of these 2 cases, does not lend itself to a peaceful and fully satisfactory resolution. The fairness of allocating a scarce and potentially life-saving resource based on maximizing benefits and preference to instrumental value (benefit to others) is open to question. The American College of Physicians has stated that allocation decisions during resource scarcity should be made “based on patient need, prognosis (determined by objective scientific measure and informed clinical judgment) and effectiveness (i.e., likelihood that the therapy will help the patient to recover), … to maximize the number of patients who will recover” [ 39 ].

This review has covered basics of ethics founded on morality and ethical principles with illustrative examples. In the following segment, professionalism is defined, its alignment with ethics depicted, and virtues desired of a physician (inclusive term for medical doctor regardless of type of practice) are elucidated. It concludes with my vision of an integrated model for patient care.

The core of professionalism is a therapeutic relationship built on competent and compassionate care by a physician that meets the expectation and benefits a patient. In this relationship, which is rooted in the ethical principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence, the physician fulfills the elements shown in Table Table3. 3 . Professionalism “demands placing the interest of patients above those of the physician, setting and maintaining standards of competence and integrity, and providing expert advice to society on matters of health” [ 26 , 40 ].

Physicians obligations

Drawing on several decades of experience in teaching and mentoring, I envisage physicians with qualities of both “heart” and “head.” Ethical and humanistic values shape the former, while knowledge (e.g., by study, research, practice) and technical skills (e.g., medical and surgical procedures) form the latter. Figure Figure1 1 is a representation of this model. Morality that forms the base of the model and ethical principles that rest on it were previously explained. Virtues are linked, some more tightly than others, to the principles of ethics. Compassion, a prelude to caring, presupposes sympathy, is expressed in beneficence. Discernment is especially valuable in decision-making when principles of ethics collide. Trustworthiness leads to trust, and is a needed virtue when patients, at their most vulnerable time, place themselves in the hands of physicians. Integrity involves the coherent integration of emotions, knowledge and aspirations while maintaining moral values. Physicians need both professional integrity and personal integrity, as the former may not cover all scenarios (e.g., prescribing ineffective drugs or expensive drugs when effective inexpensive drugs are available, performing invasive treatments or experimental research modalities without fully informed consent, any situation where personal monetary gain is placed over patient's welfare). Conscientiousness is required to determine what is right by critical reflection on good versus bad, better versus good, logical versus emotional, and right versus wrong.

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Integrated model of patient care.

In my conceptualized model of patient care (Fig. (Fig.1), 1 ), medical knowledge, skills to apply that knowledge, technical skills, practice-based learning, and communication skills are partnered with ethical principles and professional virtues. The virtues of compassion, discernment, trustworthiness, integrity, and conscientiousness are the necessary building blocks for the virtue of caring. Caring is the defining virtue for all health-care professions. In all interactions with patients, besides the technical expertise of a physician, the human element of caring (one human to another) is needed. In different situations, caring can be expressed verbally and non-verbally (e.g., the manner of communication with both physician and patient closely seated, and with unhurried, softly spoken words); a gentle touch especially when conveying “bad news”; a firmer touch or grip to convey reassurance to a patient facing a difficult treatment choice; to hold the hand of a patient dying alone). Thus, “caring” is in the center of the depicted integrated model, and as Peabody succinctly expressed it nearly a hundred years ago, “The secret of the care of the patient is caring for the patient” [ 41 ].

Conflict of Interest Statement

The author declares that he has no conflicts of interest.

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Kant’s Moral Philosophy

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) argued that the supreme principle of morality is a principle of practical rationality that he dubbed the “Categorical Imperative” (CI). Kant characterized the CI as an objective, rationally necessary and unconditional principle that we must follow despite any natural desires we may have to the contrary. All specific moral requirements, according to Kant, are justified by this principle, which means that all immoral actions are irrational because they violate the CI. Other philosophers, such as Hobbes, Locke and Aquinas, had also argued that moral requirements are based on standards of rationality. However, these standards were either instrumental principles of rationality for satisfying one’s desires, as in Hobbes, or external rational principles that are discoverable by reason, as in Locke and Aquinas. Kant agreed with many of his predecessors that an analysis of practical reason reveals the requirement that rational agents must conform to instrumental principles. Yet he also argued that conformity to the CI (a non-instrumental principle), and hence to moral requirements themselves, can nevertheless be shown to be essential to rational agency. This argument was based on his striking doctrine that a rational will must be regarded as autonomous, or free, in the sense of being the author of the law that binds it. The fundamental principle of morality — the CI — is none other than the law of an autonomous will. Thus, at the heart of Kant’s moral philosophy is a conception of reason whose reach in practical affairs goes well beyond that of a Humean ‘slave’ to the passions. Moreover, it is the presence of this self-governing reason in each person that Kant thought offered decisive grounds for viewing each as possessed of equal worth and deserving of equal respect.

Kant’s most influential positions in moral philosophy are found in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (hereafter, “ Groundwork ”) but he developed, enriched, and in some cases modified those views in later works such as The Critique of Practical Reason , The Metaphysics of Morals , Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View , Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason as well as his essays on history and related topics. Kant’s Lectures on Ethics , which were lecture notes taken by three of his students on the courses he gave in moral philosophy, also include relevant material for understanding his views. We will mainly focus on the foundational doctrines of the Groundwork , even though in recent years some scholars have become dissatisfied with this standard approach to Kant’s views and have turned their attention to the later works. We find the standard approach most illuminating, though we will highlight important positions from the later works where needed.

1. Aims and Methods of Moral Philosophy

2. good will, moral worth and duty, 3. duty and respect for moral law, 4. categorical and hypothetical imperatives, 5. the formula of the universal law of nature, 6. the humanity formula, 7. the autonomy formula, 8. the kingdom of ends formula, 9. the unity of the formulas, 10. autonomy, 11. non-rational beings and disabled humans, 12. virtue and vice, 13. normative ethical theory, 14. teleology or deontology, 15. metaethics, other internet resources, related entries.

The most basic aim of moral philosophy, and so also of the Groundwork , is, in Kant’s view, to “seek out” the foundational principle of a “metaphysics of morals,” which Kant understands as a system of a priori moral principles that apply the CI to human persons in all times and cultures. Kant pursues this project through the first two chapters of the Groundwork . He proceeds by analyzing and elucidating commonsense ideas about morality, including the ideas of a “good will” and “duty”. The point of this first project is to come up with a precise statement of the principle or principles on which all of our ordinary moral judgments are based. The judgments in question are supposed to be those that any normal, sane, adult human being would accept on due rational reflection. Nowadays, however, many would regard Kant as being overly optimistic about the depth and extent of moral agreement. Perhaps he is best thought of as drawing on a moral viewpoint that is very widely shared and which contains some general judgments that are very deeply held. In any case, he does not appear to take himself to be primarily addressing a genuine moral skeptic such as those who often populate the works of moral philosophers, that is, someone who doubts that she has any reason to act morally and whose moral behavior hinges on a rational proof that philosophers might try to give. For instance, when, in the third and final chapter of the Groundwork , Kant takes up his second fundamental aim, to “establish” this foundational moral principle as a demand of each person’s own rational will, his conclusion apparently falls short of answering those who want a proof that we really are bound by moral requirements. He rests this second project on the position that we — or at least creatures with rational wills — possess autonomy. The argument of this second project does often appear to try to reach out to a metaphysical fact about our wills. This has led some readers to the conclusion that he is, after all, trying to justify moral requirements by appealing to a fact — our autonomy — that even a moral skeptic would have to recognize.

Kant’s analysis of the common moral concepts of “duty” and “good will” led him to believe that we are free and autonomous as long as morality, itself, is not an illusion. Yet in the Critique of Pure Reason , Kant also tried to show that every event has a cause. Kant recognized that there seems to be a deep tension between these two claims: If causal determinism is true then, it seems, we cannot have the kind of freedom that morality presupposes, which is “a kind of causality” that “can be active, independently of alien causes determining it” (G 4:446).

Kant thought that the only way to resolve this apparent conflict is to distinguish between phenomena , which is what we know through experience, and noumena , which we can consistently think but not know through experience. Our knowledge and understanding of the empirical world, Kant argued, can only arise within the limits of our perceptual and cognitive powers. We should not assume, however, that we know all that may be true about “things in themselves,” although we lack the “intellectual intuition” that would be needed to learn about such things.

These distinctions, according to Kant, allow us to resolve the “antinomy” about free will by interpreting the “thesis” that free will is possible as about noumena and the “antithesis” that every event has a cause as about phenomena. Morality thus presupposes that agents, in an incomprehensible “intelligible world,” are able to make things happen by their own free choices in a “sensible world” in which causal determinism is true.

Many of Kant’s commentators, who are skeptical about these apparently exorbitant metaphysical claims, have attempted to make sense of his discussions of the intelligible and sensible worlds in less metaphysically demanding ways. On one interpretation (Hudson 1994), one and the same act can be described in wholly physical terms (as an appearance) and also in irreducibly mental terms (as a thing in itself). On this compatibilist picture, all acts are causally determined, but a free act is one that can be described as determined by irreducibly mental causes, and in particular by the causality of reason. A second interpretation holds that the intelligible and sensible worlds are used as metaphors for two ways of conceiving of one and the same world (Korsgaard 1996; Allison 1990; Hill 1989a, 1989b). When we are engaging in scientific or empirical investigations, we often take up a perspective in which we think of things as subject to natural causation, but when we deliberate, act, reason and judge, we often take up a different perspective, in which we think of ourselves and others as agents who are not determined by natural causes. When we take up this latter, practical, standpoint, we need not believe that we or others really are free, in any deep metaphysical sense; we need only operate “under the idea of freedom” (G 4:448). Controversy persists, however, about whether Kant’s conception of freedom requires a “two worlds” or “two perspectives” account of the sensible and intelligible worlds (Guyer 1987, 2009; Langton 2001; Kohl 2016; Wood 1984; Hogan 2009).

Although the two most basic aims Kant saw for moral philosophy are to seek out and establish the supreme principle of morality, they are not, in Kant’s view, its only aims. Moral philosophy, for Kant, is most fundamentally addressed to the first-person, deliberative question, “What ought I to do?”, and an answer to that question requires much more than delivering or justifying the fundamental principle of morality. We also need some account, based on this principle, of the nature and extent of the specific moral duties that apply to us. To this end, Kant employs his findings from the Groundwork in The Metaphysics of Morals , and offers a categorization of our basic moral duties to ourselves and others. In addition, Kant thought that moral philosophy should characterize and explain the demands that morality makes on human psychology and forms of human social interaction. These topics, among others, are addressed in central chapters of the second Critique , the Religion and again in the Metaphysics of Morals, and are perhaps given a sustained treatment in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View . Further, a satisfying answer to the question of what one ought to do would have to take into account any political and religious requirements there are. Each of these requirement turn out to be, indirectly at least, also moral obligations for Kant, and are discussed in the Metaphysics of Morals and in Religion . Finally, moral philosophy should say something about the ultimate end of human endeavor, the Highest Good, and its relationship to the moral life. In the Critique of Practical Reason , Kant argued that this Highest Good for humanity is complete moral virtue together with complete happiness, the former being the condition of our deserving the latter. Unfortunately, Kant noted, virtue does not ensure wellbeing and may even conflict with it. Further, he thought that there is no real possibility of moral perfection in this life and indeed few of us fully deserve the happiness we are lucky enough to enjoy. Reason cannot prove or disprove the existence of Divine Providence, on Kant’s view, nor the immortality of the soul, which seem necessary to rectify these things. Nevertheless, Kant argued, an unlimited amount of time to perfect ourselves (immortality) and a commensurate achievement of wellbeing (ensured by God) are “postulates” required by reason when employed in moral matters.

Throughout his moral works, Kant returns time and again to the question of the method moral philosophy should employ when pursuing these aims. A basic theme of these discussions is that the fundamental philosophical issues of morality must be addressed a priori , that is, without drawing on observations of human beings and their behavior. Kant’s insistence on an a priori method to seek out and establish fundamental moral principles, however, does not always appear to be matched by his own practice. The Metaphysics of Morals , for instance, is meant to be based on a priori rational principles, but many of the specific duties that Kant describes, along with some of the arguments he gives in support of them, rely on general facts about human beings and our circumstances that are known from experience.

In one sense, it might seem obvious why Kant insists on an a priori method. A “metaphysics of morals” would be, more or less, an account of the nature and structure of moral requirements — in effect, a categorization of duties and values. Such a project would address such questions as, What is a duty? What kinds of duties are there? What is the good? What kinds of goods are there?, and so on. These appear to be metaphysical questions. Any principle used to provide such categorizations appears to be a principle of metaphysics, in a sense, but Kant did not see them as external moral truths that exist independently of rational agents. Moral requirements, instead, are rational principles that tell us what we have overriding reason to do. Metaphysical principles of this sort are always sought out and established by a priori methods.

Perhaps something like this was behind Kant’s thinking. However, the considerations he offers for an a priori method do not all obviously draw on this sort of rationale. The following are three considerations favoring a priori methods that he emphasizes repeatedly.

The first is that, as Kant and others have conceived of it, ethics initially requires an analysis of our moral concepts. We must understand the concepts of a “good will”, “obligation”, “duty” and so on, as well as their logical relationships to one another, before we can determine whether our use of these concepts is justified. Given that the analysis of concepts is an a priori matter, to the degree that ethics consists of such an analysis, ethics is a priori as a well.

Of course, even were we to agree with Kant that ethics should begin with analysis, and that analysis is or should be an entirely a priori undertaking, this would not explain why all of the fundamental questions of moral philosophy must be pursued a priori . Indeed, one of the most important projects of moral philosophy, for Kant, is to show that we, as rational agents, are bound by moral requirements and that fully rational agents would necessarily comply with them. Kant admits that his analytical arguments for the CI are inadequate on their own because the most they can show is that the CI is the supreme principle of morality if there is such a principle . Kant must therefore address the possibility that morality itself is an illusion by showing that the CI really is an unconditional requirement of reason that applies to us. Even though Kant thought that this project of “establishing” the CI must also be carried out a priori , he did not think we could pursue this project simply by analyzing our moral concepts or examining the actual behavior of others. What is needed, instead, is a “synthetic”, but still a priori , kind of argument that starts from ideas of freedom and rational agency and critically examines the nature and limits of these capacities.

This is the second reason Kant held that fundamental issues in ethics must be addressed with an a priori method: The ultimate subject matter of ethics is the nature and content of the principles that necessarily determine a rational will.

Fundamental issues in moral philosophy must also be settled a priori because of the nature of moral requirements themselves, or so Kant thought. This is a third reason he gives for an a priori method, and it appears to have been of great importance to Kant: Moral requirements present themselves as being unconditionally necessary . But an a posteriori method seems ill-suited to discovering and establishing what we must do whether we feel like doing it or not; surely such a method could only tell us what we actually do. So an a posteriori method of seeking out and establishing the principle that generates such requirements will not support the presentation of moral “oughts” as unconditional necessities. Kant argued that empirical observations could only deliver conclusions about, for instance, the relative advantages of moral behavior in various circumstances or how pleasing it might be in our own eyes or the eyes of others. Such findings clearly would not support the unconditional necessity of moral requirements. To appeal to a posteriori considerations would thus result in a tainted conception of moral requirements. It would view them as demands for which compliance is not unconditionally necessary, but rather necessary only if additional considerations show it to be advantageous, optimific or in some other way felicitous. Thus, Kant argued that if moral philosophy is to guard against undermining the unconditional necessity of obligation in its analysis and defense of moral thought, it must be carried out entirely a priori .

Kant’s analysis of commonsense ideas begins with the thought that the only thing good without qualification is a “good will”. While the phrases “he’s good hearted”, “she’s good natured” and “she means well” are common, “the good will” as Kant thinks of it is not the same as any of these ordinary notions. The idea of a good will is closer to the idea of a “good person”, or, more archaically, a “person of good will”. This use of the term “will” early on in analyzing ordinary moral thought prefigures later and more technical discussions concerning the nature of rational agency. Nevertheless, this idea of a good will is an important commonsense touchstone to which Kant returns throughout his works. The basic idea, as Kant describes it in the Groundwork, is that what makes a good person good is his possession of a will that is in a certain way “determined” by, or makes its decisions on the basis of, whatever basic moral principles there may be. The idea of a good will is supposed to be the idea of one who is committed only to make decisions that she holds to be morally worthy and who takes moral considerations in themselves to be conclusive reasons for guiding her behavior. This sort of disposition or character is something we all highly value, Kant thought. He believes we value it without limitation or qualification. By this, we believe, he means primarily two things.

First, unlike anything else, there is no conceivable circumstance in which we regard our own moral goodness as worth forfeiting simply in order to obtain some desirable object. By contrast, the value of all other desirable qualities, such as courage or cleverness, can be diminished, forgone, or sacrificed under certain circumstances: Courage may be laid aside if it requires injustice, and it is better not to be witty if it requires cruelty. There is no implicit restriction or qualification to the effect that a commitment to give moral considerations decisive weight is worth honoring, but only under such and such circumstances .

Second, possessing and maintaining a steadfast commitment to moral principles is the very condition under which anything else is worth having or pursuing. Intelligence and even pleasure are worth having only on the condition that they do not require giving up one’s fundamental moral convictions. The value of a good will thus cannot be that it secures certain valuable ends, whether of our own or of others, since their value is entirely conditional on our possessing and maintaining a good will. Indeed, since a good will is good under any condition, its goodness must not depend on any particular conditions obtaining. Thus, Kant points out that a good will must then also be good in itself and not in virtue of its relationship to other things such as the agent’s own happiness, overall welfare or any other effects it may or may not produce A good will would still “shine like a jewel” even if it were “completely powerless to carry out its aims” (G 4:394).

In Kant’s terms, a good will is a will whose decisions are wholly determined by moral demands or, as he often refers to this, by the Moral Law. Human beings inevitably feel this Law as a constraint on their natural desires, which is why such Laws, as applied to human beings, are imperatives and duties. A human will in which the Moral Law is decisive is motivated by the thought of duty . A holy or divine will, if it exists, though good, would not be good because it is motivated by thoughts of duty because such a will does not have natural inclinations and so necessarily fulfills moral requirements without feeling constrained to do so. It is the presence of desires that could operate independently of moral demands that makes goodness in human beings a constraint, an essential element of the idea of “duty.” So in analyzing unqualified goodness as it occurs in imperfectly rational creatures such as ourselves, we are investigating the idea of being motivated by the thought that we are constrained to act in certain ways that we might not want to simply from the thought that we are morally required to do so.

Kant confirms this by comparing motivation by duty with other sorts of motives, in particular, with motives of self-interest, self-preservation, sympathy and happiness. He argues that a dutiful action from any of these motives, however praiseworthy it may be, does not express a good will. Assuming an action has moral worth only if it expresses a good will, such actions have no genuine “moral worth.” The conformity of one’s action to duty in such cases is only related by accident to morality. For instance, if one is motivated by happiness alone, then had conditions not conspired to align one’s duty with one’s own happiness one would not have done one’s duty. By contrast, were one to supplant any of these motivations with the motive of duty, the morality of the action would then express one’s determination to act dutifully out of respect for the moral law itself. Only then would the action have moral worth.

Kant’s views in this regard have understandably been the subject of much controversy. Many object that we do not think better of actions done for the sake of duty than actions performed out of emotional concern or sympathy for others, especially those things we do for friends and family. Worse, moral worth appears to require not only that one’s actions be motivated by duty, but also that no other motives, even love or friendship, cooperate. Yet Kant’s defenders have argued that his point is not that we do not admire or praise motivating concerns other than duty, only that from the point of view of someone deliberating about what to do, these concerns are not decisive in the way that considerations of moral duty are. What is crucial in actions that express a good will is that in conforming to duty a perfectly virtuous person always would, and so ideally we should, recognize and be moved by the thought that our conformity is morally obligatory. The motivational structure of the agent should be arranged so that she always treats considerations of duty as sufficient reasons for conforming to those requirements. In other words, we should have a firm commitment not to perform an action if it is morally forbidden and to perform an action if it is morally required. Having a good will, in this sense, is compatible with having feelings and emotions of various kinds, and even with aiming to cultivate some of them in order to counteract desires and inclinations that tempt us to immorality. Controversy persists, however, about whether Kant’s claims about the motive of duty go beyond this basic point (Timmermann 2007; Herman 1993; Wood 1998; Baron 1995).

Suppose for the sake of argument we agree with Kant. We now need to know what distinguishes the principle that lays down our duties from these other motivating principles, and so makes motivation by it the source of unqualified value.

According to Kant, what is singular about motivation by duty is that it consists of bare respect for the moral law. What naturally comes to mind is this: Duties are rules or laws of some sort combined with some sort of felt constraint or incentive on our choices, whether from external coercion by others or from our own powers of reason. For instance, the bylaws of a club lay down duties for its officers and enforce them with sanctions. City and state laws establish the duties of citizens and enforce them with coercive legal power. Thus, if we do something because it is our “civic” duty, or our duty “as a boy scout” or “a good American,” our motivation is respect for the code that makes it our duty. Thinking we are duty bound is simply respecting, as such, certain laws pertaining to us.

However intuitive, this cannot be all of Kant’s meaning. For one thing, as with the Jim Crow laws of the old South and the Nuremberg laws of Nazi Germany, the laws to which these types of “actions from duty” conform may be morally despicable. Respect for such laws could hardly be thought valuable. For another, our motive in conforming our actions to civic and other laws is rarely unconditional respect. We also have an eye toward doing our part in maintaining civil or social order, toward punishments or loss of standing and reputation in violating such laws, and other outcomes of lawful behavior. Indeed, we respect these laws to the degree, but only to the degree, that they do not violate values, laws or principles we hold more dear. Yet Kant thinks that, in acting from duty, we are not at all motivated by a prospective outcome or some other extrinsic feature of our conduct except insofar as these are requirements of duty itself. We are motivated by the mere conformity of our will to law as such.

To act out of respect for the moral law, in Kant’s view, is to be moved to act by a recognition that the moral law is a supremely authoritative standard that binds us and to experience a kind of feeling, which is akin to awe and fear, when we acknowledge the moral law as the source of moral requirements. Human persons inevitably have respect for the moral law even though we are not always moved by it and even though we do not always comply with the moral standards that we nonetheless recognize as authoritative.

Kant’s account of the content of moral requirements and the nature of moral reasoning is based on his analysis of the unique force moral considerations have as reasons to act. The force of moral requirements as reasons is that we cannot ignore them no matter how circumstances might conspire against any other consideration. Basic moral requirements retain their reason-giving force under any circumstance, they have universal validity. So, whatever else may be said of basic moral requirements, their content is universal. Only a universal law could be the content of a requirement that has the reason-giving force of morality. This brings Kant to a preliminary formulation of the CI: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law” (G 4:402). This is the principle which motivates a good will, and which Kant holds to be the fundamental principle of all of morality.

Kant holds that the fundamental principle of our moral duties is a categorical imperative . It is an imperative because it is a command addressed to agents who could follow it but might not (e.g. , “Leave the gun. Take the cannoli.”). It is categorical in virtue of applying to us unconditionally, or simply because we possesses rational wills, without reference to any ends that we might or might not have. It does not, in other words, apply to us on the condition that we have antecedently adopted some goal for ourselves.

There are “oughts” other than our moral duties, according to Kant, but these oughts are distinguished from the moral ought in being based on a quite different kind of principle, one that is the source of hypothetical imperatives . A hypothetical imperative is a command that also applies to us in virtue of our having a rational will, but not simply in virtue of this. It requires us to exercise our wills in a certain way given we have antecedently willed an end. A hypothetical imperative is thus a command in a conditional form. But not any command in this form counts as a hypothetical imperative in Kant’s sense. For instance, “if you’re happy and you know it, clap your hands!” is a conditional command. But the antecedent conditions under which the command “clap your hands” applies to you do not posit any end that you will, but consist rather of emotional and cognitive states you may or may not be in. Further, “if you want pastrami, try the corner deli” is also a command in conditional form, but strictly speaking it too fails to be a hypothetical imperative in Kant’s sense since this command does not apply to us in virtue of our willing some end, but only in virtue of our desiring or wanting an end. For Kant, willing an end involves more than desiring; it requires actively choosing or committing to the end rather than merely finding oneself with a passive desire for it. Further, there is nothing irrational in failing to will means to what one desires. An imperative that applied to us in virtue of our desiring some end would thus not be a hypothetical imperative of practical rationality in Kant’s sense.

The condition under which a hypothetical imperative applies to us, then, is that we will some end. Now, for the most part, the ends we will we might not have willed, and some ends that we do not will we might nevertheless have willed. But there is at least conceptual room for the idea of a natural or inclination-based end that we must will. The distinction between ends that we might or might not will and those, if any, we necessarily will as the kinds of natural beings we are, is the basis for his distinction between two kinds of hypothetical imperatives. Kant names these “problematic” and “assertoric”, based on how the end is willed. If the end is one that we might or might not will — that is, it is a merely possible end — the imperative is problematic. For instance, “Don’t ever take side with anyone against the Family.” is a problematic imperative, even if the end posited here is (apparently) one’s own continued existence. Almost all non-moral, rational imperatives are problematic, since there are virtually no ends that we necessarily will as human beings.

As it turns out, the only (non-moral) end that we will, as a matter of natural necessity, is our own happiness. Any imperative that applied to us because we will our own happiness would thus be an assertoric imperative. Rationality, Kant thinks, can issue no imperative if the end is indeterminate, and happiness is an indeterminate end. Although we can say for the most part that if one is to be happy, one should save for the future, take care of one’s health and nourish one’s relationships, these fail to be genuine commands in the strictest sense and so are instead mere “counsels.” Some people are happy without these, and whether you could be happy without them is, although doubtful, an open question.

Since Kant presents moral and prudential rational requirements as first and foremost demands on our wills rather than on external acts, moral and prudential evaluation is first and foremost an evaluation of the will our actions express. Thus, it is not an error of rationality to fail to take the necessary means to one’s (willed) ends, nor to fail to want to take the means; one only falls foul of non-moral practical reason if one fails to will the means. Likewise, while actions, feelings or desires may be the focus of other moral views, for Kant practical irrationality, both moral and prudential, focuses mainly on our willing.

One recent interpretive dispute (Hill 1973; Schroeder 2009; Rippon 2014) has been about whether hypothetical imperatives, in Kant’s view, have a “wide” or “narrow” scope. That is, do such imperatives tell us to take the necessary means to our ends or give up our ends (wide scope) or do they simply tell us that, if we have an end, then take the necessary means to it.

Kant describes the will as operating on the basis of subjective volitional principles he calls “maxims”. Hence, morality and other rational requirements are, for the most part, demands that apply to the maxims that we act on. . The form of a maxim is “I will A in C in order to realize or produce E ” where “ A ” is some act type, “ C ” is some type of circumstance, and “ E ” is some type of end to be realized or achieved by A in C. Since this is a principle stating only what some agent wills, it is subjective . (A principle that governs any rational will is an objective principle of volition, which Kant refers to as a practical law). For anything to count as human willing, it must be based on a maxim to pursue some end through some means. Hence, in employing a maxim, any human willing already embodies the form of means-end reasoning that calls for evaluation in terms of hypothetical imperatives. To that extent at least, then, anything dignified as human willing is subject to rational requirements.

Kant’s first formulation of the CI states that you are to “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (G 4:421). O’Neill (1975, 1989) and Rawls (1980, 1989), among others, take this formulation in effect to summarize a decision procedure for moral reasoning, and we will follow their basic outline: First, formulate a maxim that enshrines your proposed plan of action. Second, recast that maxim as a universal law of nature governing all rational agents, and so as holding that all must, by natural law, act as you yourself propose to act in these circumstances. Third, consider whether your maxim is even conceivable in a world governed by this new law of nature. If it is, then, fourth, ask yourself whether you would, or could, rationally will to act on your maxim in such a world. If you could, then your action is morally permissible.

If your maxim fails the third step, you have a “perfect” duty admitting “of no exception in favor of inclination” to refrain from acting on that maxim (G 4:421). If your maxim fails the fourth step, you have an “imperfect” duty requiring you to pursue a policy that can admit of such exceptions. If your maxim passes all four steps, only then is acting on it morally permissible. Following Hill (1971), we can understand the difference in duties as formal: Perfect duties come in the form “One must never (or always) φ to the fullest extent possible in C ”, while imperfect duties, since they require us to adopt an end, at least require that “One must sometimes and to some extent φ in C .” So, for instance, Kant held that the maxim of committing suicide to avoid future unhappiness did not pass the third step, the contradiction in conception test. Hence, one is forbidden to act on the maxim of committing suicide to avoid unhappiness. By contrast, the maxim of refusing to assist others in pursuit of their projects passes the contradiction in conception test, but fails the contradiction in the will test at the fourth step. Hence, we have a duty to sometimes and to some extent aid and assist others.

Kant held that ordinary moral thought recognized moral duties toward ourselves as well as toward others. Hence, together with the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, Kant recognized four categories of duties: perfect duties toward ourselves, perfect duties toward others, imperfect duties toward ourselves and imperfect duties toward others. Kant uses four examples in the Groundwork , one of each kind of duty, to demonstrate that every kind of duty can be derived from the CI, and hence to bolster his case that the CI is indeed the fundamental principle of morality. To refrain from suicide is a perfect duty toward oneself; to refrain from making promises you have no intention of keeping is a perfect duty toward others; to develop one’s talents is an imperfect duty toward oneself; and to contribute to the happiness of others is an imperfect duty toward others. Again, Kant’s interpreters differ over exactly how to reconstruct the derivation of these duties. We will briefly sketch one way of doing so for the perfect duty to others to refrain from lying promises and the imperfect duty to ourselves to develop talents.

Kant’s example of a perfect duty to others concerns a promise you might consider making but have no intention of keeping in order to get needed money. Naturally, being rational requires not contradicting oneself, but there is no self-contradiction in the maxim “I will make lying promises when it achieves something I want.” An immoral action clearly does not involve a self-contradiction in this sense (as would the maxim of finding a married bachelor). Kant’s position is that it is irrational to perform an action if that action’s maxim contradicts itself once made into a universal law of nature . The maxim of lying whenever it gets you what you want generates a contradiction once you try to combine it with the universalized version that all rational agents must, by a law of nature, lie when doing so gets them what they want.

Here is one way of seeing how this might work: If I conceive of a world in which everyone by nature must try to deceive people any time this will get them what they want, I am conceiving of a world in which no practice of giving one’s word could ever arise and, because this is a law of nature, we can assume that it is widely known that no such practice could exist. So I am conceiving of a world in which everyone knows that no practice of giving one’s word exists. My maxim, however, is to make a deceptive promise in order to get needed money. And it is a necessary means of doing this that a practice of taking the word of others exists, so that someone might take my word and I take advantage of their doing so. Thus, in trying to conceive of my maxim in a world in which no one ever takes anyone’s word in such circumstances, and knows this about one another, I am trying to conceive of this: A world in which no practice of giving one’s word exists, but also, at the very same time, a world in which just such a practice does exist, for me to make use of in my maxim. It is a world containing my promise and a world in which there can be no promises. Hence, it is inconceivable that I could sincerely act on my maxim in a world in which my maxim is a universal law of nature. Since it is inconceivable that these two things could exist together, I am forbidden ever to act on the maxim of lying to get money.

By contrast with the maxim of the lying promise, we can easily conceive of adopting a maxim of refusing to develop any of our talents in a world in which that maxim is a universal law of nature. It would undoubtedly be a world more primitive than our own, but pursuing such a policy is still conceivable in it. However, it is not, Kant argues, possible to rationally will this maxim in such a world. The argument for why this is so, however, is not obvious, and some of Kant’s thinking seems hardly convincing: Insofar as we are rational, he says, we already necessarily will that all of our talents and abilities be developed. Hence, although I can conceive of a talentless world, I cannot rationally will that it come about, given that I already will, insofar as I am rational, that I develop all of my own. Yet, given limitations on our time, energy and interest, it is difficult to see how full rationality requires us to aim to fully develop literally all of our talents. Indeed, it seems to require much less, a judicious picking and choosing among one’s abilities. Further, all that is required to show that I cannot will a talentless world is that, insofar as I am rational, I necessarily will that some talents in me be developed, not the dubious claim that I rationally will that they all be developed. Moreover, suppose rationality did require me to aim at developing all of my talents. Then, there seems to be no need to go further in the CI procedure to show that refusing to develop talents is immoral. Given that, insofar as we are rational, we must will to develop capacities, it is by this very fact irrational not to do so.

However, mere failure to conform to something we rationally will is not yet immorality. Failure to conform to instrumental principles, for instance, is irrational but not always immoral. In order to show that this maxim is categorically forbidden, one strategy is to make use of several other of Kant’s claims or assumptions.

First, we must accept Kant’s claim that, by “natural necessity,” we will our own happiness as an end (G 4:415). This is a claim he uses not only to distinguish assertoric from problematic imperatives, but also to argue for the imperfect duty of helping others (G 4:423) He also appears to rely on this claim in each of his examples. Each maxim he is testing appears to have happiness as its aim. One explanation for this is that, since each person necessarily wills her own happiness, maxims in pursuit of this goal will be the typical object of moral evaluation. This, at any rate, is clear in the talents example itself: The forbidden maxim adopted by the ne’er-do-well is supposed to be “devoting his life solely to…enjoyment” (G 4:423) rather than to developing his talents.

Second, we must assume, as also seems reasonable, that a necessary means to achieving (normal) human happiness is not only that we ourselves develop some talent, but also that others develop some capacities of theirs at some time. For instance, I cannot engage in the normal pursuits that make up my own happiness, such as playing piano, writing philosophy or eating delicious meals, unless I have developed some talents myself, and, moreover, someone else has made pianos and written music, taught me writing, harvested foods and developed traditions of their preparation.

Finally, Kant’s examples come on the heels of defending the position that rationality requires conformity to hypothetical imperatives. Thus, we should assume that, necessarily, rational agents will the necessary and available means to any ends that they will. And once we add this to the assumptions that we must will our own happiness as an end, and that developed talents are necessary means to achieving that end, it follows that we cannot rationally will that a world come about in which it is a law that no one ever develops any of their natural talents. We cannot do so, because our own happiness is the very end contained in the maxim of giving ourselves over to pleasure rather than self-development. Since we will the necessary and available means to our ends, we are rationally committed to willing that everyone sometime develop his or her talents. So since we cannot will as a universal law of nature that no one ever develop any talents — given that it is inconsistent with what we now see that we rationally will — we are forbidden from adopting the maxim of refusing to develop any of our own.

Most philosophers who find Kant’s views attractive find them so because of the Humanity Formulation of the CI. This formulation states that we should never act in such a way that we treat humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means only but always as an end in itself. This is often seen as introducing the idea of “respect” for persons, for whatever it is that is essential to our humanity. Kant was clearly right that this and the other formulations bring the CI “closer to intuition” than the Universal Law formula. Intuitively, there seems something wrong with treating human beings as mere instruments with no value beyond this. But this very intuitiveness can also invite misunderstandings.

First, the Humanity Formula does not rule out using people as means to our ends. Clearly this would be an absurd demand, since we apparently do this all the time in morally appropriate ways. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any life that is recognizably human without the use of others in pursuit of our goals. The food we eat, the clothes we wear, the chairs we sit on and the computers we type at are gotten only by way of talents and abilities that have been developed through the exercise of the wills of many people. What the Humanity Formula rules out is engaging in this pervasive use of humanity in such a way that we treat it as a mere means to our ends. Thus, the difference between a horse and a taxi driver is not that we may use one but not the other as a means of transportation. Unlike a horse, the taxi driver’s humanity must at the same time be treated as an end in itself.

Second, it is not human beings per se but the “humanity” in human beings that we must treat as an end in itself. Our “humanity” is that collection of features that make us distinctively human, and these include capacities to engage in self-directed rational behavior and to adopt and pursue our own ends, and any other rational capacities necessarily connected with these. Thus, supposing that the taxi driver has freely exercised his rational capacities in pursuing his line of work, we make permissible use of these capacities as a means only if we behave in a way that he could, when exercising his rational capacities, consent to — for instance, by paying an agreed on price.

Third, the idea of an end has three senses for Kant, two positive senses and a negative sense. An end in the first positive sense is a thing we will to produce or bring about in the world. For instance, if losing weight is my end, then losing weight is something I aim to bring about. An end in this sense guides my actions in that once I will to produce something, I then deliberate about and aim to pursue means of producing it if I am rational. Humanity is not an “end” in this sense, though even in this case, the end “lays down a law” for me. Once I have adopted an end in this sense, it dictates that I do something: I should act in ways that will bring about the end or instead choose to abandon my goal.

An end in the negative sense lays down a law for me as well, and so guides action, but in a different way. Korsgaard (1996) offers self-preservation as an example of an end in a negative sense: We do not try to produce our self-preservation. Rather, the end of self-preservation prevents us from engaging in certain kinds of activities, for instance, picking fights with mobsters, and so on. That is, as an end, it is something I do not act against in pursuing my positive ends, rather than something I produce.

Humanity is in the first instance an end in this negative sense: It is something that limits what I may do in pursuit of my other ends, similar to the way that my end of self-preservation limits what I may do in pursuit of other ends. Insofar as it limits my actions, it is a source of perfect duties. Now many of our ends are subjective in that they are not ends that every rational being must have. Humanity is an objective end, because it is an end that every rational being must have. Hence, my own humanity as well as the humanity of others limit what I am morally permitted to do when I pursue my other, non-mandatory, ends.

The humanity in myself and others is also a positive end, though not in the first positive sense above, as something to be produced by my actions. Rather, it is something to realize, cultivate or further by my actions. Becoming a philosopher, pianist or novelist might be my end in this sense. When my end is becoming a pianist, my actions do not, or at least not simply, produce something, being a pianist, but constitute or realize the activity of being a pianist. Insofar as the humanity in ourselves must be treated as an end in itself in this second positive sense, it must be cultivated, developed or fully actualized. Hence, the humanity in oneself is the source of a duty to develop one’s talents or to “perfect” one’s humanity. When one makes one’s own humanity one’s end, one pursues its development, much as when one makes becoming a pianist one’s end, one pursues the development of piano playing. And insofar as humanity is a positive end in others, I must attempt to further their ends as well. In so doing, I further the humanity in others, by helping further the projects and ends that they have willingly adopted for themselves. It is this sense of humanity as an end-in-itself on which some of Kant’s arguments for imperfect duties rely.

Finally, Kant’s Humanity Formula requires “respect” for the humanity in persons. Proper regard for something with absolute value or worth requires respect for it. But this can invite misunderstandings. One way in which we respect persons, termed “appraisal respect” by Stephen Darwall (1977), is clearly not the same as the kind of respect required by the Humanity Formula: I may respect you as a rebounder but not a scorer, or as a researcher but not as a teacher. When I respect you in this way, I am positively appraising you in light of some achievement or virtue you possess relative to some standard of success. If this were the sort of respect Kant is counseling then clearly it may vary from person to person and is surely not what treating something as an end-in-itself requires. For instance, it does not seem to prevent me from regarding rationality as an achievement and respecting one person as a rational agent in this sense, but not another. And Kant is not telling us to ignore differences, to pretend that we are blind to them on mindless egalitarian grounds. However, a distinct way in which we respect persons, referred to as “recognition respect” by Darwall, better captures Kant’s position: I may respect you because you are a student, a Dean, a doctor or a mother. In such cases of respecting you because of who or what you are, I am giving the proper regard to a certain fact about you, your being a Dean for instance. This sort of respect, unlike appraisal respect, is not a matter of degree based on your having measured up to some standard of assessment. Respect for the humanity in persons is more like Darwall’s recognition respect. We are to respect human beings simply because they are persons and this requires a certain sort of regard. We are not called on to respect them insofar as they have met some standard of evaluation appropriate to persons. And, crucially for Kant, persons cannot lose their humanity by their misdeeds – even the most vicious persons, Kant thought, deserve basic respect as persons with humanity.

The third formulation of the CI is “the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law .” (G 4:432). Although Kant does not state this as an imperative, as he does in the other formulations, it is easy enough to put it in that form: Act so that through your maxims you could be a legislator of universal laws. This sounds very similar to the first formulation. However, in this case we focus on our status as universal law givers rather than universal law followers . This is of course the source of the very dignity of humanity Kant speaks of in the second formulation. A rational will that is merely bound by universal laws could act accordingly from natural and non-moral motives, such as self-interest. But in order to be a legislator of universal laws, such contingent motives, motives that rational agents such as ourselves may or may not have, must be set aside. Hence, we are required, according to this formulation, to conform our behavior to principles that express this autonomy of the rational will — its status as a source of the very universal laws that obligate it. As with the Humanity Formula, this new formulation of the CI does not change the outcome, since each is supposed to formulate the very same moral law, and in some sense “unite” the other formulations within it. Kant takes each formulation that succeeds the first in its own way as bringing the moral law “closer to feeling”. The Autonomy Formula presumably does this by putting on display the source of our dignity and worth, our status as free rational agents who are the source of the authority behind the very moral laws that bind us.

This formulation has gained favor among Kantians in recent years (see Rawls, 1971; Hill, 1972). Many see it as introducing more of a social dimension to Kantian morality. Kant states that the above concept of every rational will as a will that must regard itself as enacting laws binding all rational wills is closely connected to another concept, that of a “systematic union of different rational beings under common laws”, or a “Kingdom of Ends” (G 4:433). The formulation of the CI states that we must “act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends” (G 4:439). It combines the others in that (i) it requires that we conform our actions to the laws of an ideal moral legislature, (ii) that this legislature lays down universal laws, binding all rational wills including our own, and (iii) that those laws are of “a merely possible kingdom” each of whose members equally possesses this status as legislator of universal laws, and hence must be treated always as an end in itself. The intuitive idea behind this formulation is that our fundamental moral obligation is to act only on principles which could earn acceptance by a community of fully rational agents each of whom have an equal share in legislating these principles for their community.

Kant claimed that all of these CI formulas were equivalent. Unfortunately, he does not say in what sense. What he says is that these “are basically only so many formulations of precisely the same law, each one of them by itself uniting the other two within it,” and that the differences between them are “more subjectively than objectively practical” in the sense that each aims “to bring an Idea of reason closer to intuition (by means of a certain analogy) and thus nearer to feeling” (G 4:435). He also says that one formula “follows from” another (G 4:431), and that the concept foundational to one formula “leads to a closely connected” concept at the basis of another formula (G 4:433). Thus, his claim that the formulations are equivalent could be interpreted in a number of ways.

Kant’s statement that each formula “unites the other two within it” initially suggests that the formulas are equivalent in meaning , or at least one could analytically derive one formula from another. Some of Kant’s commentators, for example, have argued along the following lines: That I should always treat humanity as an end in itself entails that I should act only on maxims that are consistent with themselves as universal laws of nature (O’Neill 1975, 1990; Engstrom 2009; Sensen 2011). There are remaining doubts some commentators have, however, about whether this strategy can capture the full meaning of the Humanity Formula or explain all of the duties that Kant claims to derive from it (Wood 1999, 2007; Cureton 2013).

Perhaps, then, if the formulas are not equivalent in meaning, they are nevertheless logically interderivable and hence equivalent in this sense. The universal law formula is not itself derived, as some of Kant’s interpreters have suggested, from the principle of non-contradiction. That would have the consequence that the CI is a logical truth, and Kant insists that it is not or at least that it is not analytic. Since the CI formulas are not logical truths, then, it is possible that they could be logically interderivable. However, despite his claim that each contains the others within it, what we find in the Groundwork seems best interpreted as a derivation of each successive formula from the immediately preceding formula. There are, nonetheless, a few places in which it seems that Kant is trying to work in the opposite direction. One is found in his discussion of the Humanity Formula. There Kant says that only something “ whose existence in itself had an absolute worth” could be the ground of a categorically binding law (G 4:428). He then boldly proclaims that humanity is this absolutely valuable thing, referring to this as a “postulate” that he will argue for in the final chapter of the Groundwork (G 4:429n). One might take this as expressing Kant’s intention to derive thereby the universal law formula from the Humanity Formula: If something is absolutely valuable, then we must act only on maxims that can be universal laws. But (he postulates) humanity is absolutely valuable. Thus , we must act only on maxims that can be universal laws. This (we think) anomalous discussion may well get at some deep sense in which Kant thought the formulations were equivalent. Nonetheless, this derivation of the universal law formulation from the Humanity Formulation seems to require a substantive, synthetic claim, namely, that humanity is indeed absolutely valuable. And if it does require this, then, contrary to Kant’s own insistence, the argument of Groundwork II does not appear to be merely an analytic argument meant simply to establish the content of the moral law.

The most straightforward interpretation of the claim that the formulas are equivalent is as the claim that following or applying each formula would generate all and only the same duties (Allison 2011). This seems to be supported by the fact that Kant used the same examples through the Law of Nature Formula and the Humanity Formula. Thus, the Universal Law Formulation generates a duty to φ if and only if the Humanity Formula generates a duty to φ, (and so on for the other formulations). In other words, respect for humanity as an end in itself could never lead you to act on maxims that would generate a contradiction when universalized, and vice versa. This way of understanding Kant’s claim also fits with his statement that there is no “objective practical difference” between the formulations although there are “subjective” differences. The subjective differences between formulas are presumably differences that appeal in different ways to various conceptions of what morality demands of us. But this difference in meaning is compatible with there being no practical difference, in the sense that conformity to one formulation cannot lead one to violate another formulation.

At the heart of Kant’s moral theory is the idea of autonomy. Most readers interpret Kant as holding that autonomy is a property of rational wills or agents. Understanding the idea of autonomy was, in Kant’s view, key to understanding and justifying the authority that moral requirements have over us. As with Rousseau, whose views influenced Kant, freedom does not consist in being bound by no law, but by laws that are in some sense of one’s own making. The idea of freedom as autonomy thus goes beyond the merely “negative” sense of being free from causes on our conduct originating outside of ourselves. It contains first and foremost the idea of laws made and laid down by oneself, and, in virtue of this, laws that have decisive authority over oneself.

Kant’s basic idea can be grasped intuitively by analogy with the idea of political freedom as autonomy (See Reath 1994). Consider how political freedom in liberal theories is thought to be related to legitimate political authority: A state is free when its citizens are bound only by laws in some sense of their own making — created and put into effect, say, by vote or by elected representatives. The laws of that state then express the will of the citizens who are bound by them. The idea, then, is that the source of legitimate political authority is not external to its citizens, but internal to them, internal to “the will of the people.” It is because the body politic created and enacted these laws for itself that it can be bound by them. An autonomous state is thus one in which the authority of its laws is in the will of the people in that state, rather than in the will of a people external to that state, as when one state imposes laws on another during occupation or colonization. In the latter case, the laws have no legitimate authority over those citizens. In a similar fashion, we may think of a person as free when bound only by her own will and not by the will of another. Her actions then express her own will and not the will of someone or something else. The authority of the principles binding her will is then also not external to her will. It comes from the fact that she willed them. So autonomy, when applied to an individual, ensures that the source of the authority of the principles that bind her is in her own will. Kant’s view can be seen as the view that the moral law is just such a principle. Hence, the “moral legitimacy” of the CI is grounded in its being an expression of each person’s own rational will. It is because each person’s own reason is the legislator and executor of the moral law that it is authoritative for her. (For a contrasting interpretation of autonomy that emphasizes the intrinsic value of freedom of choice and the instrumental role of reason in preserving that value, see Guyer 2007).

Kant argues that the idea of an autonomous will emerges from a consideration of the idea of a will that is free “in a negative sense.” The concept of a rational will is of a will that operates by responding to what it takes to be reasons. This is, firstly, the concept of a will that does not operate through the influence of factors outside of this responsiveness to apparent reasons. For a will to be free is thus for it to be physically and psychologically unforced in its operation. Hence, behaviors that are performed because of obsessions or thought disorders are not free in this negative sense. But also, for Kant, a will that operates by being determined through the operation of natural laws, such as those of biology or psychology, cannot be thought of as operating by responding to reasons. Hence, determination by natural laws is conceptually incompatible with being free in a negative sense.

A crucial move in Kant’s argument is his claim that a rational will cannot act except “under the Idea” of its own freedom (G 4:448). The expression “acting under the Idea of freedom” is easy to misunderstand. It does not mean that a rational will must believe it is free, since determinists are as free as libertarians in Kant’s view. Indeed, Kant goes out of his way in his most famous work, the Critique of Pure Reason , to argue that we have no rational basis for believing our wills to be free. This would involve, he argues, attributing a property to our wills that they would have to have as ‘things in themselves’ apart from the causally determined world of appearances. Of such things, he insists, we can have no knowledge. For much the same reason, Kant is not claiming that a rational will cannot operate without feeling free. Feelings, even the feeling of operating freely or the “looseness” Hume refers to when we act, cannot be used in an a priori argument to establish the CI, since they are empirical data.

One helpful way to understand acting “under the Idea of freedom” is by analogy with acting “under the Idea” that there are purposes in nature: Although there is, according to Kant, no rational basis for the belief that the natural world is (or is not) arranged according to some purpose by a Designer, the actual practices of science often require looking for the purpose of this or that chemical, organ, creature, environment, and so on. Thus, one engages in these natural sciences by searching for purposes in nature. Yet when an evolutionary biologist, for instance, looks for the purpose of some organ in some creature, she does not after all thereby believe that the creature was designed that way, for instance, by a Deity. Nor is she having some feeling of “designedness” in the creature. To say that she “acts under the Idea of” design is to say something about the practice of biology: Practicing biology involves searching for the purposes of the parts of living organisms. In much the same way, although there is no rational justification for the belief that our wills are (or are not) free, the actual practice of practical deliberation and decision consists of a search for the right causal chain of which to be the origin — consists, that is, seeking to be the first causes of things, wholly and completely through the exercise of one’s own will.

Kant says that a will that cannot exercise itself except under the Idea of its freedom is free from a practical point of view ( im practischer Absicht ). In saying such wills are free from a practical point of view, he is saying that in engaging in practical endeavors — trying to decide what to do, what to hold oneself and others responsible for, and so on — one is justified in holding oneself to all of the principles to which one would be justified in holding wills that are autonomous free wills. Thus, once we have established the set of prescriptions, rules, laws and directives that would bind an autonomous free will, we then hold ourselves to this very same of set prescriptions, rules, laws and directives. And one is justified in this because rational agency can only operate by seeking to be the first cause of its actions, and these are the prescriptions, and so on, of being a first cause of action. Therefore, rational agents are free in a negative sense insofar as any practical matter is at issue.

Crucially, rational wills that are negatively free must be autonomous, or so Kant argues. This is because the will is a kind of cause—willing causes action. Kant took from Hume the idea that causation implies universal regularities: if x causes y , then there is some universally valid law connecting X s to Y s. So, if my will is the cause of my φing, then Φing is connected to the sort of willing I engage in by some universal law. But it can’t be a natural law, such as a psychological, physical, chemical or biological law. These laws, which Kant thought were universal too, govern the movements of my body, the workings of my brain and nervous system and the operation of my environment and its effects on me as a material being. But they cannot be the laws governing the operation of my will; that, Kant already argued, is inconsistent with the freedom of my will in a negative sense. So, the will operates according to a universal law, though not one authored by nature, but one of which I am the origin or author. And that is to say that, in viewing my willing to φ as a negatively free cause of my φing, I must view my will as the autonomous cause of my having φed, as causing my having φed by way of some law that I, insofar as I am a rational will, laid down for my will.

Thus, Kant argues, a rational will, insofar as it is rational, is a will conforming itself to those laws valid for any rational will. Addressed to imperfectly rational wills, such as our own, this becomes an imperative: “Conform your action to a universal non-natural law.” Kant assumed that there was some connection between this formal requirement and the formulation of the CI which enjoins us to “Act as though the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature.” But, as commentators have long noticed (see, e.g. , Hill, 1989a, 1989b), it is not clear what the link is between the claim that rational autonomous wills conform themselves to whatever universally valid laws require, and the more substantial and controversial claim that you should evaluate your maxims in the ways implied by the universal law of nature formulation.

Kant appeared not to recognize the gap between the law of an autonomous rational will and the CI, but he was apparently unsatisfied with the argument establishing the CI in Groundwork III for another reason, namely, the fact that it does not prove that we really are free. In the Critique of Practical Reason , he states that it is simply a “fact of reason” ( Factum der Vernunft ) that our wills are bound by the CI, and he uses this to argue that our wills are autonomous. Hence, while in the Groundwork Kant relies on a dubious argument for our autonomy to establish that we are bound by the moral law, in the second Critique , he argues from the bold assertion of our being bound by the moral law to our autonomy.

The apparent failure of Kant’s argument to establish the autonomy of the will, and hence the authority of moral demands over us, has not deterred his followers from trying to make good on this project. One strategy favored recently has been to turn back to the arguments of Groundwork II for help. Kant himself repeatedly claimed that these arguments are merely analytic but that they do not establish that there is anything that answers to the concepts he analyzes. The conclusions are thus fully compatible with morality being, as he puts it, a “mere phantom of the brain” (G 4:445). Kant clearly takes himself to have established that rational agents such as ourselves must take the means to our ends, since this is analytic of rational agency. But there is a chasm between this analytic claim and the supposed synthetic conclusion that rational agency also requires conforming to a further, non-desire based, principle of practical reason such as the CI. Nevertheless, some see arguments in Groundwork II that establish just this. These strategies involve a new “teleological” reading of Kant’s ethics that relies on establishing the existence of an absolute value or an “end in itself” (we say more about this teleological reading below). They begin with Kant’s own stated assumption that there is such an end in itself if and only if there is a categorical imperative binding on all rational agents as such. If this assumption is true, then if one can on independent grounds prove that there is something which is an end in itself, one will have an argument for a categorical imperative. One such strategy, favored by Korsgaard (1996) and Wood (1999) relies on the apparent argument Kant gives that humanity is an end in itself. Guyer, by contrast, sees an argument for freedom as an end in itself (Guyer 2000). Both strategies have faced textual and philosophical hurdles. Considerable interpretive finesse, for instance, is required to explain Kant’s stark insistence on the priority of principles and law over the good in the second Critique (CPrR 5:57–67)

Although most of Kant’s readers understand the property of autonomy as being a property of rational wills, some, such as Thomas E. Hill, have held that Kant’s central idea is that of autonomy is a property, not primarily of wills, but of principles. The core idea is that Kant believed that all moral theories prior to his own went astray because they portrayed fundamental moral principles as appealing to the existing interests of those bound by them. By contrast, in Kant’s view moral principles must not appeal to such interests, for no interest is necessarily universal. Thus, in assuming at the outset that moral principles must embody some interest (or “heteronomous” principles), such theories rule out the very possibility that morality is universally binding. By contrast, the Categorical Imperative, because it does not enshrine existing interests, presumes that rational agents can conform to a principle that does not appeal to their interests (or an “autonomous” principle), and so can fully ground our conception, according to Kant, of what morality requires of us.

A different interpretive strategy, which has gained prominence in recent years, focuses on Kant’s apparent identification, in Groundwork III, of the will and practical reason. One natural way of interpreting Kant’s conception of freedom is to understand it in terms of the freedom and spontaneity of reason itself. This in turn apparently implies that our wills are necessarily aimed at what is rational and reasonable. To will something, on this picture, is to govern oneself in accordance with reason. Often, however, we fail to effectively so govern ourselves because we are imperfect rational beings who are caused to act by our non–rational desires and inclinations. The result, at least on one version of this interpretation (Wolff 1973), is that we either act rationally and reasonably (and so autonomously) or we are merely caused to behave in certain ways by non–rational forces acting on us (and so heteronomously). This is, however, an implausible view. It implies that all irrational acts, and hence all immoral acts, are not willed and therefore not free. Most interpreters have denied that this is the proper interpretation of Kant’s views. However, several prominent commentators nonetheless think that there is some truth in it (Engstrom 2009; Reath 2015; Korsgaard 1996, 2008, 2009). They agree that we always act under the “guise of the good” in the sense that our will is necessarily aimed at what is objectively and subjectively rational and reasonable, but these interpreters also think that, for Kant, there is a middle–ground between perfect conformity to reason and being caused to act by natural forces. In particular, when we act immorally, we are either weak–willed or we are misusing our practical reason by willing badly. We do not have the capacity to aim to act on an immoral maxim because the will is identified with practical reason, so when we will to perform an immoral act, we implicitly but mistakenly take our underlying policy to be required by reason. By representing our immoral act as rational and reasonable, we are not exercising our powers of reason well, so we are simply making a “choice” that is contrary to reason without “willing” it as such. Our choice is nonetheless free and attributable to us because our will was involved in leading us to take the act to be rational and reasonable. It remains to be seen whether, on this complicated interpretation of Kant, it sufficiently allows for the possibility that one can knowingly and willingly do wrong if the will is practical reason and practical reason is, in part, the moral law.

Several recent discussions of Kant’s moral theory have focused on understanding and assessing its implications for how we should regard and treat people with various kinds of disabilities. Kant does not say much explicitly about those with disabilities, but his moral framework is often seen as both hostile to and supportive of the interests of disabled people.

One of the most important criticisms of Kant’s moral theory concerns human beings with severe cognitive disabilities who lack the moral capacities and dispositions that, according to Kant, are needed for people to have dignity, be ends in themselves, possess moral rights, legislate moral laws, be a member of the kingdom of ends, or otherwise have basic moral status (Kittay 2005, Vorhaus 2020, Barclay 2020; cf. the SEP entry cognitive disability and moral status ). When we reflect on what makes us morally special, according to Kant, we find that it is not our contingent properties, the biological species we belong to, or even our capacity to be conscious or to feel pain. Kant argues that rational nature, specifically the moral capacities and dispositions to legislate and follow moral principles, is what gives us inner worth and makes us deserving of respect (G 4:428–36, 446–7; Rel 6:26). Our basic moral status does not come in degrees. It is always equal to that of other people regardless of the level, if any, at which our moral capacities and dispositions are developed, realized, or exercised. Infants and young children, according to Kant, almost always have a moral nature even though their moral capacities and dispositions are undeveloped or underdeveloped (MM 6:280–1, 422; see also Schapiro 1999). Virtually all people with Down Syndrome and autism have basic moral status even if their moral capacities and dispositions are not as fully realized or exercised as they are in other people. Being asleep or in a coma does not preclude someone from having basic moral status even if their moral capacities and dispositions are temporarily or permanently dormant. Some human beings with significant cognitive disabilities, however, do not have even bare capacities or dispositions to recognize, accept, legislate, and follow moral norms. Kant seems to imply that anencephalic infants, those in persistent vegetative states, and other human beings with the most severe cognitive disabilities lack dignity and are not ends in themselves. They are apparently excluded from the moral community in ways that have unacceptable implications for how we should or should not regard and treat them.

There is little or no evidence that Kant himself thought about this problem, which is also connected with the moral status of many non-human animals who seem to matter morally but who lack the moral capacities and dispositions that, according to Kant, are necessary for basic moral status. Kant’s defenders have nonetheless explored what his basic moral framework might imply about the moral status of those with severe cognitive disabilities. One approach is simply to bite the bullet by admitting that people with certain severe cognitive disabilities lack the basic moral status that others of us share (Wood 1998, Sussman 2001. (This general strategy is deployed by Regan and followed by Wood, McMahan, Warren, Merkel, and others. For the claim that such humans are not persons, on Kant’s theory, see also Sussman, Idea , 242.) Proponents of this view can emphasize that, although we do not have duties to such people, we can have duties regarding them, such as duties of moral self-improvement that give us reasons to treat those with significant cognitive disabilities humanely for the sake of improving how we treat other human beings with basic moral status (MM 6:442) or duties of beneficence that give us reasons to care for them as a kindness to their families (G 4:430). Pragmatic considerations might also give us reasons to err on the side of caution when it comes to assessing whether someone entirely lacks the moral capacities and dispositions that ground basic moral status. Because of difficulties making such determinations and the moral risks involved in judging incorrectly, we should perhaps assume, unless we have very strong evidence to the contrary, that each human being has basic moral status (Korsgaard 1996).

A second approach to addressing the problem of moral status for those with significant cognitive disabilities is to emphasize passages in which Kant says all human beings have dignity or are ends in themselves (G 4:428–29; MM 6:410) and to argue that, according to Kant’s theories of biology and psychology, all human beings, including those with severe cognitive disabilities, necessarily have the requisite features of moral personhood (Kain 2009). A third approach is to draw on and perhaps supplement some of Kant’s moral views by, for example, arguing that because we value things, we must value ourselves as ends, which in turn commits us to valuing all human and non-human animals as ends (Korsgaard 2020) or that respect for all human beings is a constitutive feature of rational agency that does not depend on any intrinsic properties of the objects of respect (Sensen 2018).

In addition to discussing the moral status of people with severe cognitive disabilities, Kantian philosophers have also been exploring how his moral theory applies to other moral issues that concern how we should regard and treat people with disabilities. Although Kant’s focus was on specifying principles for all circumstances or for all human contexts, he recognized that a complete specification of his system of moral duties, ends, and ideals must include applications of basic moral standards to particular contexts and groups of people (MM 6:468–9).

When prospective parents choose not to produce children that would likely have disabilities, they might express disrespectful attitudes about existing people with disabilities (Velleman 2015, Sussman 2018). People with disabilities are often ridiculed, abused, treated as children, denied opportunities to continue developing their natural abilities in, for example, assisted living facilities that instead emphasize their comfort, and excluded from friendships or other forms of solidarity in ways that arguably violate moral duties that Kant describes (Cureton 2021, Hill 2020). They often face obstacles to developing and maintaining self-respect by those who regard them as, for example, burdensome, malingering, or curiosities (Stohr 2018). People with disabilities also tend to receive assistance from others that is incompatible with the respect they are owed. Beneficence, according to Kant, must be tempered by respect so that we do not, for example, impose burdensome obligations of gratitude on a blind person who would rather navigate to the next conference session herself, “help” a Deaf person by offering to pay for cochlear implants that he does not want, finish the sentences of someone with a speech impediment in ways that express condescension or pity, or mistake a strict duty to install a wheelchair ramp as an optional duty of charity (Cureton 2016, Holtman 2018).

Kant defines virtue as “the moral strength of a human being’s will in fulfilling his duty” (MM 6:405) and vice as principled immorality (MM 6:390). This definition appears to put Kant’s views on virtue at odds with classical views such as Aristotle’s in several important respects.

First, Kant’s account of virtue presupposes an account of moral duty already in place. Thus, rather than treating admirable character traits as more basic than the notions of right and wrong conduct, Kant takes virtues to be explicable only in terms of a prior account of moral or dutiful behavior. He does not try to make out what shape a good character has and then draw conclusions about how we ought to act on that basis. He sets out the principles of moral conduct based on his philosophical account of rational agency, and then on that basis defines virtue as a kind of strength and resolve to act on those principles despite temptations to the contrary.

Second, virtue is, for Kant, strength of will, and hence does not arise as the result of instilling a “second nature” by a process of habituating or training ourselves to act and feel in particular ways. It is indeed a disposition, but a disposition of one’s will, not a disposition of emotions, feelings, desires or any other feature of human nature that might be amenable to habituation. Moreover, the disposition is to overcome obstacles to moral behavior that Kant thought were ineradicable features of human nature. Thus, virtue appears to be much more like what Aristotle would have thought of as a lesser trait, viz., continence or self-control.

Third, in viewing virtue as a trait grounded in moral principles, and vice as principled transgression of moral law, Kant thought of himself as thoroughly rejecting what he took to be the Aristotelian view that virtue is a mean between two vices. The Aristotelian view, he claimed, assumes that virtue typically differs from vice only in terms of degree rather than in terms of the different principles each involves (MM 6:404, 432). Prodigality and avarice, for instance, do not differ by being too loose or not loose enough with one’s means. They differ in that the prodigal person acts on the principle of acquiring means with the sole intention of enjoyment, while the avaricious person acts on the principle of acquiring means with the sole intention of possessing them.

Fourth, in classical views the distinction between moral and non-moral virtues is not particularly significant. A virtue is some sort of excellence of the soul, but one finds classical theorists treating wit and friendliness alongside courage and justice. Since Kant holds moral virtue to be a trait grounded in moral principle, the boundary between non-moral and moral virtues could not be more sharp. Even so, Kant shows a remarkable interest in non-moral virtues; indeed, much of Anthropology is given over to discussing the nature and sources of a variety of character traits, both moral and non-moral.

Fifth, virtue cannot be a trait of divine beings, if there are such, since it is the power to overcome obstacles that would not be present in them. This is not to say that to be virtuous is to be the victor in a constant and permanent war with ineradicable evil impulses or temptations. Morality is “duty” for human beings because it is possible (and we recognize that it is possible) for our desires and interests to run counter to its demands. Should all of our desires and interests be trained ever so carefully to comport with what morality actually requires of us, this would not change in the least the fact that morality is still duty for us. For should this come to pass, it would not change the fact that each and every desire and interest could have run contrary to the moral law. And it is the fact that they can conflict with moral law, not the fact that they actually do conflict with it, that makes duty a constraint, and hence is virtue essentially a trait concerned with constraint.

Sixth, virtue, while important, does not hold pride of place in Kant’s system in other respects. For instance, he holds that the lack of virtue is compatible with possessing a good will (G 6: 408). That one acts from duty, even repeatedly and reliably can thus be quite compatible with an absence of the moral strength to overcome contrary interests and desires. Indeed, it may often be no challenge at all to do one’s duty from duty alone. Someone with a good will, who is genuinely committed to duty for its own sake, might simply fail to encounter any significant temptation that would reveal the lack of strength to follow through with that commitment. That said, he also appeared to hold that if an act is to be of genuine moral worth, it must be motivated by the kind of purity of motivation achievable only through a permanent, quasi-religious conversion or “revolution” in the orientation of the will of the sort described in Religion . Until one achieves a permanent change in the will’s orientation in this respect, a revolution in which moral righteousness is the nonnegotiable condition of any of one’s pursuits, all of one’s actions that are in accordance with duty are nevertheless morally worthless, no matter what else may be said of them. However, even this revolution in the will must be followed up with a gradual, lifelong strengthening of one’s will to put this revolution into practice. This suggests that Kant’s considered view is that a good will is a will in which this revolution of priorities has been achieved, while a virtuous will is one with the strength to overcome obstacles to its manifestation in practice.

Kant distinguishes between virtue, which is strength of will to do one’s duty from duty, and particular virtues, which are commitments to particular moral ends that we are morally required to adopt. Among the virtues Kant discusses are those of self-respect, honesty, thrift, self-improvement, beneficence, gratitude, sociability, and forgiveness. Kant also distinguishes vice, which is a steadfast commitment to immorality, from particular vices, which involve refusing to adopt specific moral ends or committing to act against those ends. For example, malice, lust, gluttony, greed, laziness, vengefulness, envy, servility, contempt and arrogance are all vices in Kant’s normative ethical theory.

(Interest in Kant’s conception of virtue has rapidly grown in recent years. For further discussion, see Cureton and Hill 2014, forthcoming; Wood 2008; Surprenant 2014; Sherman 1997; O’Neil 1996; Johnson 2008; Hill 2012; Herman 1996; Engstrom 2002; Denis 2006; Cureton forthcoming; Betzler 2008; Baxley 2010).

The Categorical Imperative, in Kant’s view, is an objective, unconditional and necessary principle of reason that applies to all rational agents in all circumstances. Although Kant gives several examples in the Groundwork that illustrate this principle, he goes on to describe in later writings, especially in The Metaphysics of Morals , a complicated normative ethical theory for interpreting and applying the CI to human persons in the natural world. His framework includes various levels, distinctions and application procedures. Kant, in particular, describes two subsidiary principles that are supposed to capture different aspects of the CI. The Universal Principle of Right, which governs issues about justice, rights and external acts that can be coercively enforced, holds that “Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law” (MM 6:230). The Supreme Principle of the Doctrine of Virtue, which governs questions about moral ends, attitudes, and virtue, requires us to “act in accordance with a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have” (MM 6:395). These principles, in turn, justify more specific duties of right and of ethics and virtue.

In Kant’s framework, duties of right are narrow and perfect because they require or forbid particular acts, while duties of ethics and virtue are wide and imperfect because they allow significant latitude in how we may decide to fulfill them. For example, Kant claims that the duty not to steal the property of another person is narrow and perfect because it precisely defines a kind of act that is forbidden. The duty of beneficence, on the other hand, is characterized as wide and imperfect because it does not specify exactly how much assistance we must provide to others.

Even with a system of moral duties in place, Kant admits that judgment is often required to determine how these duties apply to particular circumstances. Moral laws, Kant says, “must be meticulously observed” but “they cannot, after all, have regard to every little circumstance, and the latter may yield exceptions, which do not always find their exact resolution in the laws” (V 27:574; see also CPR A133/B172; MM 6:411).

The received view is that Kant’s moral philosophy is a deontological normative theory at least to this extent: it denies that right and wrong are in some way or other functions of goodness or badness. It denies, in other words, the central claim of teleological moral views. For instance, act consequentialism is one sort of teleological theory. It asserts that the right action is that action of all the alternatives available to the agent that has the best overall outcome. Here, the goodness of the outcome determines the rightness of an action. Another sort of teleological theory might focus instead on character traits. “Virtue ethics” asserts that a right action in any given circumstance is that action a virtuous person does or would perform in those circumstances. In this case, it is the goodness of the character of the person who does or would perform it that determines the rightness of an action. In both cases, as it were, the source or ground of rightness is goodness. And Kant’s own views have typically been classified as deontological precisely because they have seemed to reverse this priority and deny just what such theories assert. Rightness, on the standard reading of Kant, is not grounded in the value of outcomes or character.

There are several reasons why readers have thought that Kant denies the teleological thesis. First, he makes a plethora of statements about outcomes and character traits that appear to imply an outright rejection of both forms of teleology. For instance, in Groundwork I, he says that he takes himself to have argued that “the objectives we may have in acting, and also our actions’ effects considered as ends and what motivates our volition, can give to actions no unconditional or moral worth…[this] can be found nowhere but in the principle of the will, irrespective of the ends that can be brought about by such action” (G 4: 400). This appears to say that moral rightness is not a function of the value of intended or actual outcomes. Kant subsequently says that a categorical imperative “declares an action to be objectively necessary of itself without reference to any purpose—that is, even without any further end” (G 4:415). A categorical imperative “commands a certain line of conduct directly, without assuming or being conditional on any further goal to be reached by that conduct” (G 4:416). These certainly appear to be the words of someone who rejects the idea that what makes actions right is primarily their relationship to what good may come of those actions, someone who rejects outright the act consequentialist form of teleology. Moreover, Kant begins the Groundwork by noting that character traits such as the traditional virtues of courage, resolution, moderation, self-control, or a sympathetic cast of mind possess no unconditional moral worth, (G 4:393–94, 398–99). If the moral rightness of an action is grounded in the value of the character traits of the person who performs or would perform it then it seems Kant thinks that it would be grounded in something of only conditional value. This certainly would not comport well with the virtue ethics form of teleology.

Second, there are deeper theoretical claims and arguments of Kant’s in both the Groundwork and in the second Critique that appear to be incompatible with any sort of teleological form of ethics. These claims and arguments all stem from Kant’s insistence that morality is grounded in the autonomy of a rational will. For instance, Kant states that “if the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims for its own giving of universal law…heteronomy always results” (G 4:441). If the law determining right and wrong is grounded in either the value of outcomes or the value of the character of the agent, it seems it will not be found in the fitness of the action’s maxim to be a universal law laid down by the agent’s own rational will. And Kant’s most complete treatment of value, the second Critique’s “On the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason”, appears to be a relentless attack on any sort of teleological moral theory. “The concept of good and evil” he states, “must not be determined before the moral law (for which, as it would seem, this concept would have to be made the basis) but only (as was done here) after it and by means of it” (CPrR 5:63).

A number of Kant’s readers have come to question this received view, however. Perhaps the first philosopher to suggest a teleological reading of Kant was John Stuart Mill. In the first chapter of his Utilitarianism , Mill implies that the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative could only sensibly be interpreted as a test of the consequences of universal adoption of a maxim. Several 20th century theorists have followed Mill’s suggestion, most notably, R. M. Hare. Hare argued that moral judgments such as “Stealing is wrong” are in fact universal prescriptions (“No stealing anywhere by anyone!”). And because they are universal, Hare argued, they forbid making exceptions. That in turn requires moral judgments to give each person’s wellbeing, including our own, equal weight. And when we give each person’s wellbeing equal weight, we are acting to produce the best overall outcome. Thus, in his view, the CI is “simply utilitarianism put into other words” (1993, p. 103). More recently, David Cummiskey (1996) has argued that Kant’s view that moral principles are justified because they are universalizable is compatible with those principles themselves being consequentialist. Indeed, Cummiskey argues that they must be: Respect for the value of humanity entails treating the interests of each as counting for one and one only, and hence for always acting to produce the best overall outcome.

There are also teleological readings of Kant’s ethics that are non-consequentialist. Barbara Herman (1993) has urged philosophers to “leave deontology behind” as an understanding of Kant’s moral theory on the grounds that the conception of practical reason grounding the Categorical Imperative is itself a conception of value. Herman’s idea is that Kant never meant to say that no value grounds moral principles. That, she argues, would imply that there would be no reason to conform to them. Instead, Kant thought the principles of rationality taken together constitute rational agency, and rational agency so constituted itself functions as a value that justifies moral action (1993, 231). Herman’s proposal thus has Kant’s view grounding the rightness of actions in rational agency, and then in turn offering rational agency itself up as a value. Both Paul Guyer and Allen Wood have offered proposals that differ from Herman’s in content, but agree on the general form of teleology that she defends as a reading of Kant. Guyer argues that autonomy itself is the value grounding moral requirements. Moral thinking consists in recognizing the priceless value of a rational agent’s autonomous will, something in light of whose value it is necessary for any rational agent to modify his behavior (1998, 22–35). And Wood argues that humanity itself is the grounding value for Kant. While the second Critique claims that good things owe their value to being the objects of the choices of rational agents, they could not, in his view, acquire any value at all if the source of that value, rational agency, itself had no value (1999, 130; see also 157–8). Finally, Rae Langton has argued that if Kant’s theory is to be thought of as an objectivistic view, we must suppose that the value of humanity and the good will are independent of simply being the objects of our rational choices. If their value thereby becomes the source of the rightness of our actions — say, our actions are right if and because they treat that self-standing value in various ways — then her reading too is teleological.

It is of considerable interest to those who follow Kant to determine which reading — teleological or deontological — was actually Kant’s, as well as which view ought to have been his. A powerful argument for the teleological reading is the motivation for Herman’s proposal: What rationale can we provide for doing our duty at all if we don’t appeal to it’s being good to do it? But a powerful argument for the deontological reading is Kant’s own apparent insistence that the authority of moral demands must come simply from their being the demands of a rational will, quite apart from the value that will may have (see Schneewind 1996; Johnson 2007, 2008; and Reath 1994). On the latter view, moral demands gain their authority simply because a rational will, insofar as you are rational, must will them. Proponents of this reading are left with the burden of answering Herman’s challenge to provide a rationale for having willed such demands, although one response may be that the very question Herman raises does not make sense because it asks, in effect, why it is rational to be rational. On the former view, by contrast, a rationale is at hand: because your will is, insofar as it is rational, good. Proponents of this former reading are, however, then left with the burden of explaining how it could be the autonomy of the will alone that explains the authority of morality.

It has seemed to a number of Kant’s interpreters that it is important to determine whether Kant’s moral philosophy was realist, anti-realist or something else (e.g. a constructivist). The issue is tricky because terms such as “realism,” “anti-realism” and “constructivism” are terms of art, so it is all too easy for interlocutors to talk past one another.

One relevant issue is whether Kant’s views commit him to the thesis that moral judgments are beliefs, and so apt to be evaluated for their truth or falsity (or are “truth apt”).

One might have thought that this question is quite easy to settle. At the basis of morality, Kant argued, is the Categorical Imperative, and imperatives are not truth apt. It makes little sense to ask whether “Leave the gun, take the cannoli.” is true. But, in fact, the question is not at all easy. For one thing, moral judgments such as “Lying is wrong” might well be best analyzed according to Kant’s views as “The Categorical Imperative commands us not to lie”, and this judgment is not an imperative, but a report about what an imperative commands. Thus while at the foundation of morality there would be an imperative which is not truth apt, particular moral judgments themselves would describe what that imperative rules out and so would themselves be truth apt.

Philosophers such as R.M. Hare, however, have taken Kant’s view to be that moral judgments are not truth apt. Although on the surface moral judgments can look as if they describe a moral world, they are, as Hare reads Kant, “prescriptions”, not “descriptions”. This is not, in his view, to say that Kant’s ethics portrays moral judgments as lacking objectivity. Objectivity, according to Hare, is to be understood as universality, and the Categorical Imperative prescribes universally.

A second issue that has received considerable attention is whether Kant is a metaethical constructivist or realist.

Constructivism in metaethics is the view that moral truths are, or are determined by, the outcomes of actual or hypothetical procedures of deliberation or choice. Many who interpret Kant as a constructivist claim that his analysis of “duty” and “good will” reveals that if there are moral requirements then the agents who are bound to them have autonomy of the will (Rawls 1980; Korsgaard 1996; O’Neil 1989; Reath 2006; Hill 1989a, 1989b, 2001; Cureton 2013, 2014; Engstrom 2009). Autonomy, in this sense, means that such agents are both authors and subjects of the moral law and, as such, are not bound by any external requirements that may exist outside of our wills. Instead, we are only subject to moral requirements that we impose on ourselves through the operation of our own reason independently of our natural desires and inclinations. The common error of previous ethical theories, including sentimentalism, egoism and rationalism, is that they failed to recognize that morality presupposes that we have autonomy of the will. These theories mistakenly held that our only reasons to be moral derive from hypothetical imperatives about how to achieve given moral ends that exist independently of the activity of reason itself (for a discussion of Kant’s more specific objections to previous ethical theories, see Schneewind 2009). On these interpretations, Kant is a skeptic about arbitrary authorities, such as God, natural feelings, intrinsic values or primitive reasons that exist independently of us. Only reason itself has genuine authority over us, so we must exercise our shared powers of reasoned deliberation, thought and judgment, guided by the Categorical Imperative as the most basic internal norm of reason, to construct more specific moral requirements. Kantians in this camp, however, disagree about how this rational procedure should be characterized.

Other commentators interpret Kant as a robust moral realist (Ameriks 2003; Wood 1999; Langton 2007; Kain 2004). According to these philosophers, Kant’s theory, properly presented, begins with the claim that rational nature is an objective, agent-neutral and intrinsic value. The moral law then specifies how we should regard and treat agents who have this special status. Autonomy of the will, on this view, is a way of considering moral principles that are grounded in the objective value of rational nature and whose authority is thus independent of the exercise of our wills or rational capacities.

Some interpreters of Kant, most notably Korsgaard (1996), seem to affirm a kind of quietism about metaethics by rejecting many of the assumptions that contemporary metaethical debates rest on. For example, some of these philosophers seem not to want to assert that moral facts and properties just are the outcomes of deliberative procedures. Rather, they seem more eager to reject talk of facts and properties as unnecessary, once a wholly acceptable and defensible procedure is in place for deliberation. That is, the whole framework of facts and properties suggests that there is something we need to moor our moral conceptions to “out there” in reality, when in fact what we only need a route to a decision. Once we are more sensitive to the ethical concerns that really matter to us as rational agents, we will find that many of the questions that animate metaethicists turn out to be non-questions or of only minor importance. Others have raised doubts, however, about whether Kantians can so easily avoid engaging in metaethical debates (Hussain & Shaw 2013).

Primary Sources

Kant’s original German and Latin writings can be found in Königlichen Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), 1900–, Kants gesammelte Schriften, Berlin: Walter De Gruyter. Most translations include volume and page numbers to this standard Academy edition. Citations in this article do so as well. There are many English translations of Kant’s primary ethical writings. The recent Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant provides critical translations of Kant’s published works as well as selections from his correspondence and lectures. The following volumes of that series are especially relevant to his moral theory:

Practical Philosophy , translated by Mary Gregor, 1996. Includes: “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?,” Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , Critique of Practical Reason , and The Metaphysics of Morals .
Religion and Rational Theology , translated by Allen Wood and George di Giovanni, 1996. Includes: Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
Anthropology, History, and Education , translated by Robert Louden and Guenther Zoeller, 2008. Includes: “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim,” Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View , and “Lectures on Pedagogy”
Lectures on Ethics , translated by Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind, 2001.
Critique of Pure Reason , translated by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, 1998.

Recent Commentaries on Kant’s Ethical Writings

There have been several comprehensive commentaries on the Groundwork that have been published recently, some of which also include new English translations.

Allison, Henry, 2011, Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Denis, Lara, 2005, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals , Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press.
Guyer, Paul, 2007, Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Reader’s Guide , New York: Continuum.
Hill, Thomas & Zweig, Arnulf, 2003, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals , New York: Oxford University Press.
Höffe, Otfried (ed. ), 1989, “ Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten”: Ein Kooperativer Kommentar , Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann.
Schönecker, Dieter, 2015, Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Timmermann, Jens, 2007, Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wolff, Robert Paul, 1973, The Autonomy of Reason: A Commentary on Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , New York: Harper & Row.

There are also recent commentaries on the The Metaphysics of Morals :

Andreas Trampota, Andreas, Sensen, Oliver & Timmermann, Jens (eds.), 2011, Kant’s “Tugendlehre”: A Commentary , Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 343–364.
Byrd, Sharon & Hruschka, Joachim, 2010 Kant’s Doctrine of Right: A Commentary , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gregor, Mary, 1963, The Laws of Freedom , Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

The classic commentary on the Critique of Practical Reason is:

Beck, Lewis White, 1960, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Other Secondary Sources

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Barclay, Linda, 2020, Disability with Dignity , New York: Routledge.
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Herman, Barbara, 1993, The Practice of Moral Judgment , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
–––, 1996, “Making Room for Character,” in Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty , in S. Engstrom and J. Whiting (eds.), New York: Cambridge University Press, 36–60.
Hill, Thomas E., 2001, “Hypothetical Consent in Kantian Constructivism,” Social Philosophy and Policy , 18 (2): 300–329. Reprinted in his 2002 Human Welfare and Moral Worth , New York: Cambridge University Press, 61–96
–––, 1989a, “Kantian Constructivism in Ethics,” Ethics , 99: 752–70. Reprinted in his 1992 Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory , Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 226–250.
–––, 1971, “Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation,” Kant Studien , 62: 55–76. Reprinted in his 1992 Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory , Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 147–175.
–––, 2008, “Kantian Virtue and ’Virtue Ethics’”, in Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant’s Ethics of Virtues , Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 29–60. Reprinted in his 2012 Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 129–59.
–––, 1973, “The Hypothetical Imperative,” The Philosophical Review , 82: 429–50. Reprinted in his 1992 Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory , Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 17–37.
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–––, 1972, “The Kingdom of Ends,” Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress: Held at the University of Rochester, March 30–April 4, 1970 , Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 307–15. Reprinted in his 1992 Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory , Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 58–66.
–––, 2020, “Ideals of Appreciation and Expressions of Respect,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability , Adam Cureton and David Wasserman (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 363–379.
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Hudson, Hud, 1994, Kant’s Compatibilism , Ithica: Cornell University Press.
Hussain, Nadeem & Shaw, Nishi, 2013, “Meta–ethics and its Discontents: A Case–study of Korsgaard,” in C. Bagnoli (ed.), Constructivism in Ethics , New York: Cambridge University Press, 82–107.
Johnson, Robert N., 1996, “Kant’s Conception of Merit,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 77: 313–37
–––, 2007, “Value and Autonomy in Kantian Ethics,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics , Vol. 2, R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 133–48.
–––, 2008, “Was Kant a Virtue Ethicist?,” in Kant’s Ethics of Virtue, M. Betzler (ed.), Berlin: DeGruyter, 61–76.
–––, 2011, Self-Improvement: An Essay in Kantian Ethics , New York: Oxford University Press.
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–––, 2009, “Kant’s Defense of Human Moral Status,” Journal of the History of Philosophy , 47(1): 59–101.
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Kohl, Markus, 2016, “Kant on Idealism, Freedom, and Standpoints,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie , 98(1): 21–54.
Korsgaard, Christine, 1996, Creating the Kingdom of ends , New York: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 1996, The Sources of Normativity , O. O’Neill (ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press.
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–––, 2020, Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Langton, Rae, 2007, “Objective and Unconditioned Value,” The Philosophical Review , 116(2): 157–185.
Louden, Robert, 2000, Kant’s Impure Ethics , New York: Oxford University Press.
O’Neill, Onora, 1975, Acting on Principle , New York: Columbia University Press.
–––, 1989, Constructions of Reason , New York: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 1996, Towards Justice and Virtue , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Rawls, John, 1971, A Theory of Justice , Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
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–––, 2011, Kant on Human Dignity , Berlin, New York: de Gruyter.
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Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

The Common Good

Markkula Center for Applied Ethics
Ethics Resources
Ethical Decision Making

Commenting on the many economic and social problems that American society confronts, Newsweek columnist Robert J. Samuelson once wrote: "We face a choice between a society where people accept modest sacrifices for a common good or a more contentious society where groups selfishly protect their own benefits." The common good has been an important ethical concept in a society that has encouraged many to "look out for Number 1."

Appeals to the common good have also surfaced in discussions of business' social responsibilities, discussions of environmental pollution, discussions of our lack of investment in education, and discussions of the problems of crime and poverty. Everywhere, it seems, social commentators are claiming that our most fundamental social problems grow out of a widespread pursuit of individual interests.

What exactly is "the common good", and why has it come to have such a critical place in current discussions of problems in our society? The common good is a notion that originated over two thousand years ago in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. More recently, the ethicist John Rawls defined the common good as "certain general conditions that are...equally to everyone's advantage". The Catholic religious tradition, which has a long history of struggling to define and promote the common good, defines it as "the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment." The common good, then, consists primarily of having the social systems, institutions, and environments on which we all depend work in a manner that benefits all people. Examples of particular common goods or parts of the common good include an accessible and affordable public health care system, an effective system of public safety and security, peace among the nations of the world, a just legal and political system, an unpolluted natural environment, and a flourishing economic system. Because such systems, institutions, and environments have such a powerful impact on the well-being of members of a society, it is no surprise that virtually every social problem in one way or another is linked to how well these systems and institutions are functioning.

As these examples suggest, the common good does not just happen. Establishing and maintaining the common good require the cooperative efforts of some, often of many, people. Just as keeping a park free of litter depends on each user picking up after himself, so also maintaining the social conditions from which we all benefit requires the cooperative efforts of citizens. But these efforts pay off, for the common good is a good to which all members of society have access, and from whose enjoyment no one can be easily excluded. All persons, for example, enjoy the benefits of clean air or an unpolluted environment, or any of our society's other common goods. In fact, something counts as a common good only to the extent that it is a good to which all have access.

It might seem that since all citizens benefit from the common good, we would all willingly respond to urgings that we each cooperate to establish and maintain the common good. But numerous observers have identified a number of obstacles that hinder us, as a society, from successfully doing so.

First, according to some philosophers, the very idea of a common good is inconsistent with a pluralistic society like ours. Different people have different ideas about what is worthwhile or what constitutes "the good life for human beings", differences that have increased during the last few decades as the voices of more and more previously silenced groups, such as women and minorities, have been heard. Given these differences, some people urge, it will be impossible for us to agree on what particular kind of social systems, institutions, and environments we will all pitch in to support.

And even if we agreed upon what we all valued, we would certainly disagree about the relative values things have for us. While all may agree, for example, that an affordable health system, a healthy educational system, and a clean environment are all parts of the common good, some will say that more should be invested in health than in education, while others will favor directing resources to the environment over both health and education. Such disagreements are bound to undercut our ability to evoke a sustained and widespread commitment to the common good. In the face of such pluralism, efforts to bring about the common good may lead to adopting or promoting the views of some, while excluding others. This has led some to argue the common good is an unachievable goal.

A second problem encountered by proponents of the common good is what is sometimes called the "free-rider problem". The benefits that a common good provides are, as we noted, available to everyone, including those who choose not to do their part to maintain the common good. Individuals can become "free riders" by taking the benefits the common good provides while refusing to do their part to support the common good. An adequate water supply, for example, is a common good from which all people benefit. But to maintain an adequate supply of water during a drought, people must conserve water, which entails sacrifices. Some individuals may be reluctant to do their share, however, since they know that so long as enough other people conserve, they can enjoy the benefits without reducing their own consumption. If enough people become free riders in this way, the common good which depends on their support will be destroyed. Many observers believe that this is exactly what has happened to many of our common goods, such as the environment or education, where the reluctance of all person to support efforts to maintain the health of these systems has led to their virtual collapse.

The third problem encountered by attempts to promote the common good is that of individualism. our historical traditions place a high value on individual freedom, on personal rights, and on allowing each person to "do her own thing". Our culture views society as comprised of separate independent individuals who are free to pursue their own individual goals and interests without interference from others. In this individualistic culture it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to convince people that they should sacrifice some of their freedom, some of their personal goals, and some of their self-interest, for the sake of the "common good". American cultural traditions, in fact, reinforce the individual who thinks that she should not have to contribute to the community's common good, but should be left free to pursue her own personal ends.

Finally, appeals to the common good are confronted by the problem of an unequal sharing of burdens. Maintaining a common good often requires that particular individuals or particular groups bear costs that are much greater than those borne by others. Maintaining an unpolluted environment, for example, may require that particular firms that pollute install costly pollution control devices, undercutting profits. Making employment opportunities more equal may require that some groups, such as white males, limit for a time their own employment chances. Making the health system affordable and accessible to all may require that insurers accept lower premiums, that physicians accept lower salaries, or that those with particularly costly diseases or conditions forego the medical treatment on which their live depend. Forcing particular groups or individuals to carry such unequal burdens "for the sake of the common good", is, at least arguably, unjust. Moreover, the prospect of having to carry such heavy and unequal burdens leads such groups and individuals to resist any attempts to secure common goods.

All of these problems pose considerable obstacles to those who call for an ethic of the common good. Still, appeals to the common good ought not to be dismissed. For they urge us to reflect on broad questions concerning the kind of society we want to become and how we are to achieve that society. They also challenge us to view ourselves as members of the same community and, while respecting and valuing the freedom of individuals to pursue their own goals, to recognize and further those goals we share in common.

This article appeared originally in Issues in Ethics V5, N1 (Spring 1992). It was updated in August 2018.

Solar Eclipse 2024

What the World Has Learned From Past Eclipses

C louds scudded over the small volcanic island of Principe, off the western coast of Africa, on the afternoon of May 29, 1919. Arthur Eddington, director of the Cambridge Observatory in the U.K., waited for the Sun to emerge. The remains of a morning thunderstorm could ruin everything.

The island was about to experience the rare and overwhelming sight of a total solar eclipse. For six minutes, the longest eclipse since 1416, the Moon would completely block the face of the Sun, pulling a curtain of darkness over a thin stripe of Earth. Eddington traveled into the eclipse path to try and prove one of the most consequential ideas of his age: Albert Einstein’s new theory of general relativity.

Eddington, a physicist, was one of the few people at the time who understood the theory, which Einstein proposed in 1915. But many other scientists were stymied by the bizarre idea that gravity is not a mutual attraction, but a warping of spacetime. Light itself would be subject to this warping, too. So an eclipse would be the best way to prove whether the theory was true, because with the Sun’s light blocked by the Moon, astronomers would be able to see whether the Sun’s gravity bent the light of distant stars behind it.

Two teams of astronomers boarded ships steaming from Liverpool, England, in March 1919 to watch the eclipse and take the measure of the stars. Eddington and his team went to Principe, and another team led by Frank Dyson of the Greenwich Observatory went to Sobral, Brazil.

Totality, the complete obscuration of the Sun, would be at 2:13 local time in Principe. Moments before the Moon slid in front of the Sun, the clouds finally began breaking up. For a moment, it was totally clear. Eddington and his group hastily captured images of a star cluster found near the Sun that day, called the Hyades, found in the constellation of Taurus. The astronomers were using the best astronomical technology of the time, photographic plates, which are large exposures taken on glass instead of film. Stars appeared on seven of the plates, and solar “prominences,” filaments of gas streaming from the Sun, appeared on others.

Eddington wanted to stay in Principe to measure the Hyades when there was no eclipse, but a ship workers’ strike made him leave early. Later, Eddington and Dyson both compared the glass plates taken during the eclipse to other glass plates captured of the Hyades in a different part of the sky, when there was no eclipse. On the images from Eddington’s and Dyson’s expeditions, the stars were not aligned. The 40-year-old Einstein was right.

“Lights All Askew In the Heavens,” the New York Times proclaimed when the scientific papers were published. The eclipse was the key to the discovery—as so many solar eclipses before and since have illuminated new findings about our universe.

Telescope used to observe a total solar eclipse, Sobral, Brazil, 1919.

To understand why Eddington and Dyson traveled such distances to watch the eclipse, we need to talk about gravity.

Since at least the days of Isaac Newton, who wrote in 1687, scientists thought gravity was a simple force of mutual attraction. Newton proposed that every object in the universe attracts every other object in the universe, and that the strength of this attraction is related to the size of the objects and the distances among them. This is mostly true, actually, but it’s a little more nuanced than that.

On much larger scales, like among black holes or galaxy clusters, Newtonian gravity falls short. It also can’t accurately account for the movement of large objects that are close together, such as how the orbit of Mercury is affected by its proximity the Sun.

Albert Einstein’s most consequential breakthrough solved these problems. General relativity holds that gravity is not really an invisible force of mutual attraction, but a distortion. Rather than some kind of mutual tug-of-war, large objects like the Sun and other stars respond relative to each other because the space they are in has been altered. Their mass is so great that they bend the fabric of space and time around themselves.

Read More: 10 Surprising Facts About the 2024 Solar Eclipse

This was a weird concept, and many scientists thought Einstein’s ideas and equations were ridiculous. But others thought it sounded reasonable. Einstein and others knew that if the theory was correct, and the fabric of reality is bending around large objects, then light itself would have to follow that bend. The light of a star in the great distance, for instance, would seem to curve around a large object in front of it, nearer to us—like our Sun. But normally, it’s impossible to study stars behind the Sun to measure this effect. Enter an eclipse.

Einstein’s theory gives an equation for how much the Sun’s gravity would displace the images of background stars. Newton’s theory predicts only half that amount of displacement.

Eddington and Dyson measured the Hyades cluster because it contains many stars; the more stars to distort, the better the comparison. Both teams of scientists encountered strange political and natural obstacles in making the discovery, which are chronicled beautifully in the book No Shadow of a Doubt: The 1919 Eclipse That Confirmed Einstein's Theory of Relativity , by the physicist Daniel Kennefick. But the confirmation of Einstein’s ideas was worth it. Eddington said as much in a letter to his mother: “The one good plate that I measured gave a result agreeing with Einstein,” he wrote , “and I think I have got a little confirmation from a second plate.”

The Eddington-Dyson experiments were hardly the first time scientists used eclipses to make profound new discoveries. The idea dates to the beginnings of human civilization.

Careful records of lunar and solar eclipses are one of the greatest legacies of ancient Babylon. Astronomers—or astrologers, really, but the goal was the same—were able to predict both lunar and solar eclipses with impressive accuracy. They worked out what we now call the Saros Cycle, a repeating period of 18 years, 11 days, and 8 hours in which eclipses appear to repeat. One Saros cycle is equal to 223 synodic months, which is the time it takes the Moon to return to the same phase as seen from Earth. They also figured out, though may not have understood it completely, the geometry that enables eclipses to happen.

The path we trace around the Sun is called the ecliptic. Our planet’s axis is tilted with respect to the ecliptic plane, which is why we have seasons, and why the other celestial bodies seem to cross the same general path in our sky.

As the Moon goes around Earth, it, too, crosses the plane of the ecliptic twice in a year. The ascending node is where the Moon moves into the northern ecliptic. The descending node is where the Moon enters the southern ecliptic. When the Moon crosses a node, a total solar eclipse can happen. Ancient astronomers were aware of these points in the sky, and by the apex of Babylonian civilization, they were very good at predicting when eclipses would occur.

Two and a half millennia later, in 2016, astronomers used these same ancient records to measure the change in the rate at which Earth’s rotation is slowing—which is to say, the amount by which are days are lengthening, over thousands of years.

By the middle of the 19 th century, scientific discoveries came at a frenetic pace, and eclipses powered many of them. In October 1868, two astronomers, Pierre Jules César Janssen and Joseph Norman Lockyer, separately measured the colors of sunlight during a total eclipse. Each found evidence of an unknown element, indicating a new discovery: Helium, named for the Greek god of the Sun. In another eclipse in 1869, astronomers found convincing evidence of another new element, which they nicknamed coronium—before learning a few decades later that it was not a new element, but highly ionized iron, indicating that the Sun’s atmosphere is exceptionally, bizarrely hot. This oddity led to the prediction, in the 1950s, of a continual outflow that we now call the solar wind.

And during solar eclipses between 1878 and 1908, astronomers searched in vain for a proposed extra planet within the orbit of Mercury. Provisionally named Vulcan, this planet was thought to exist because Newtonian gravity could not fully describe Mercury’s strange orbit. The matter of the innermost planet’s path was settled, finally, in 1915, when Einstein used general relativity equations to explain it.

Many eclipse expeditions were intended to learn something new, or to prove an idea right—or wrong. But many of these discoveries have major practical effects on us. Understanding the Sun, and why its atmosphere gets so hot, can help us predict solar outbursts that could disrupt the power grid and communications satellites. Understanding gravity, at all scales, allows us to know and to navigate the cosmos.

GPS satellites, for instance, provide accurate measurements down to inches on Earth. Relativity equations account for the effects of the Earth’s gravity and the distances between the satellites and their receivers on the ground. Special relativity holds that the clocks on satellites, which experience weaker gravity, seem to run slower than clocks under the stronger force of gravity on Earth. From the point of view of the satellite, Earth clocks seem to run faster. We can use different satellites in different positions, and different ground stations, to accurately triangulate our positions on Earth down to inches. Without those calculations, GPS satellites would be far less precise.

This year, scientists fanned out across North America and in the skies above it will continue the legacy of eclipse science. Scientists from NASA and several universities and other research institutions will study Earth’s atmosphere; the Sun’s atmosphere; the Sun’s magnetic fields; and the Sun’s atmospheric outbursts, called coronal mass ejections.

When you look up at the Sun and Moon on the eclipse , the Moon’s day — or just observe its shadow darkening the ground beneath the clouds, which seems more likely — think about all the discoveries still yet waiting to happen, just behind the shadow of the Moon.

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Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is an ethical theory that asserts that right and wrong are best determined by focusing on outcomes of actions and choices.

Utilitarianism is an ethical theory that determines right from wrong by focusing on outcomes. It is a form of consequentialism.

Utilitarianism holds that the most ethical choice is the one that will produce the greatest good for the greatest number. It is the only moral framework that can be used to justify military force or war. It is also the most common approach to moral reasoning used in business because of the way in which it accounts for costs and benefits.

However, because we cannot predict the future, it’s difficult to know with certainty whether the consequences of our actions will be good or bad. This is one of the limitations of utilitarianism.

Utilitarianism also has trouble accounting for values such as justice and individual rights. For example, assume a hospital has four people whose lives depend upon receiving organ transplants: a heart, lungs, a kidney, and a liver. If a healthy person wanders into the hospital, his organs could be harvested to save four lives at the expense of one life. This would arguably produce the greatest good for the greatest number. But few would consider it an acceptable course of action, let alone the most ethical one.

So, although utilitarianism is arguably the most reason-based approach to determining right and wrong, it has obvious limitations.

Related Terms

Consequentialism

Consequentialism is an ethical theory that judges an action’s moral correctness by its consequences.

Moral Philosophy

Moral Philosophy studies what is right and wrong, and related philosophical issues.

Moral Reasoning

Moral Reasoning is the branch of philosophy that attempts to answer questions with moral dimensions.

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Ethics
The term ethics may refer to the philosophical study of the concepts of moral right and wrong and moral good and bad, to any philosophical theory of what is morally right and wrong or morally good and bad, and to any system or code of moral rules, principles, or values. The last may be associated with particular religions, cultures, professions, or virtually any other group that is at least ...
Ethical Theories: Explanation and Examples
Definition of Ethical Theories Imagine you're playing a complex new board game, and you need to know the rules to play it well and fairly. Ethical theories are like those rules, but for life itself. Here's the first simple definition: Ethical theories are ideas that help us decide which actions are good and bad by leading us to ethical choices that bring positive outcomes for everyone ...
Moral Theory
There is much disagreement about what, exactly, constitutes a moral theory. Some of that disagreement centers on the issue of demarcating the moral from other areas of practical normativity, such as the ethical and the aesthetic. Some disagreement centers on the issue of what a moral theory's aims and functions are. In this entry, both questions will be addressed.
Ethical theories
In most circumstances ethical theories are the foundation for ethical principles and whenever actions are being defended upon, by business people it is common to find the principles and not the theories appealing. There are several theories that include: deontology, utilitarianism, casuist, virtue, kantianism, aristotelianism, consequentialism ...
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A Guide to Writing in Ethical Reasoning 15 | page 1 Introduction This guide is intended to provide advice for students writing the papers in Ethical Reasoning 15. Most of the paper assignments for the course can be approached flexibly and creatively — there is no single recipe for writing successful papers in the course.
Ethical Theory: Overview
Ethical Theory: Overview. Ethical Theories are attempts to provide a clear, unified account of what our ethical obligations are. They are attempts, in other words, to tell a single "story" about what we are obligated to do, without referring directly to specific examples. It is common in discussions of business ethics to appeal to one or ...
1: Introduction to Contemporary Ethics
There is a branch of philosophy that deals with the theory of morality, however, and that is called Meta-Ethics (from the Greek for "about ethics"), so we do have a word for that. The application of moral theories to actions is sometimes called Applied or Normative Ethics, so there is also a term for that.
Introduction to Ethical Theories
Abstract. This chapter is an introduction to ethics, and it briefly covers the historical background of the major ethical theories and principles that are useful for analyzing moral problems. It presents eight theories and highlights the importance of each of them for the field of HRD. Four of these theories—Kantianism, utilitarianism, social ...
The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory
Ethical theories have always been of central importance to philosophy, and remain so—ethical theory is one of the most active areas of philosophical research and teaching today. Courses in ethics are taught in colleges and universities at all levels, and ethical theory is the organizing principle for all of them. ...
Essays In Ethical Theory
In this volume, R. M. Hare has collected a number of essays which fill in the theoretical background of his thought and which together give an overall picture of his views on a variety of questions. Each essay is self-contained, and topics covered include the objectivity and rationality of moral thinking, the issue between the ethical realists ...
Ethical Theories
Overview - Ethical Theories. Ethics is the study of morality - i.e. right and wrong, good and bad. The syllabus looks at 3 ethical theories: Utilitarianism. Kant's deontological ethics. Aristotle's virtue ethics. Each theory provides a framework intended to guide moral behaviour.
Consequentialism
Consequentialism, as its name suggests, is simply the view that normative properties depend only on consequences. This historically important and still popular theory embodies the basic intuition that what is best or right is whatever makes the world best in the future, because we cannot change the past, so worrying about the past is no more useful than crying over spilled milk.
Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone ...
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Research Ethics: Research. J.E. Sieber, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2001 4 Summary. While ethical theory and codes of ethics offer important general guidance, intelligent application requires understanding of how ethical problems may arise and of effective solutions to those problems. By its nature, social/behavioral research continues into new territory ...
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Ethics Resources. A Framework for Ethical Decision Making. This document is designed as an introduction to thinking ethically. Read more about what the framework can (and cannot) do. We all have an image of our better selves—of how we are when we act ethically or are "at our best.". We probably also have an image of what an ethical ...
Deontology
Deontology is an ethical theory that uses rules to distinguish right from wrong. Deontology is often associated with philosopher Immanuel Kant. Kant believed that ethical actions follow universal moral laws, such as "Don't lie. Don't steal. Don't cheat." Deontology is simple to apply.
6.1 Educational Ethics
The term, "ethics," is a branch of philosophy that involves analyzing and conceptualizing moral behaviour and determining right from wrong. Educational ethics, in this sense, is analyzing and conceptualizing moral behaviour through pedagogical determinants. This means observing right or wrong actions. Ethical frameworks, regarding learning ...
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The 4 main ethical principles, that is beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy, and justice, are defined and explained. Informed consent, truth-telling, and confidentiality spring from the principle of autonomy, and each of them is discussed. In patient care situations, not infrequently, there are conflicts between ethical principles (especially ...
Kant's Moral Philosophy
1. Aims and Methods of Moral Philosophy. The most basic aim of moral philosophy, and so also of the Groundwork, is, in Kant's view, to "seek out" the foundational principle of a "metaphysics of morals," which Kant understands as a system of a priori moral principles that apply the CI to human persons in all times and cultures. Kant pursues this project through the first two chapters ...
Normative ethics
The central question of normative ethics is determining how basic moral standards are arrived at and justified. The answers to this question fall into two broad categories—deontological and teleological, or consequentialist.The principal difference between them is that deontological theories do not appeal to value considerations in establishing ethical standards, while teleological theories do.
The Common Good
The Catholic religious tradition, which has a long history of struggling to define and promote the common good, defines it as "the sum of those conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment." The common good, then, consists primarily of having the ...
Consequentialism
Consequentialism. Consequentialism is an ethical theory that judges whether or not something is right by what its consequences are. For instance, most people would agree that lying is wrong. But if telling a lie would help save a person's life, consequentialism says it's the right thing to do. Two examples of consequentialism are ...
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Newton's theory predicts only half that amount of displacement. Eddington and Dyson measured the Hyades cluster because it contains many stars; the more stars to distort, the better the comparison.
Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is an ethical theory that determines right from wrong by focusing on outcomes. It is a form of consequentialism. Utilitarianism holds that the most ethical choice is the one that will produce the greatest good for the greatest number. It is the only moral framework that can be used to justify military force or war.

Ethical Theories

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1: Introduction to Contemporary Ethics - Technology, Affirmative Action, and Immigration

Introduction to Ethical Theories

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Essays In Ethical Theory

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Overview – Ethical Theories

Utilitarianism

Act utilitarianism

The felicific calculus

Difficult to calculate

Tyranny of the majority

Moral status of particular relationships

Higher and lower pleasures

Other values/preferences beyond happiness

Rule utilitarianism

Preference utilitarianism

The good will

The categorical imperative

Test 1: contradiction in conception

Test 2: contradiction in will

The humanity formula

Not all universal maxims are moral (and vice versa)

Ignores consequences

Ignores other valuable motivations

Conflicts between duties

Foot: Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives

Aristotle’s virtue theory

Arête, ergon, and virtue

The doctrine of the mean

The skill analogy

Moral responsibility

No clear guidance

Circularity

Competing virtues

Difference between eudaimonia and moral good

Metaethics>>>

6.1 Educational Ethics

Application of Ethics and Education

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Principles of Clinical Ethics and Their Application to Practice

Highlights of the Study

Introduction

Ethics, Morality, and Professional Standards

Bioethics and Clinical (Medical) Ethics

The Fundamental Principles of Ethics

Beneficence

Nonmaleficence

Informed Consent

Truth-Telling

Confidentiality

Conflicts between Principles

Illustrative Cases

Conflict of Interest Statement