example of research title of phenomenology

Phenomenological Research: Methods And Examples

Ravi was a novice, finding it difficult to select the right research design for his study. He joined a program…

Ravi was a novice, finding it difficult to select the right research design for his study. He joined a program to improve his understanding of research. As a part of his assignment, he was asked to work with a phenomenological research design. To execute good practices in his work, Ravi studied examples of phenomenological research. This let him understand what approaches he needed and areas he could apply the phenomenological method.

What Is Phenomenological Research?

Phenomenological research method, examples of phenomenological research.

A qualitative research approach that helps in describing the lived experiences of an individual is known as phenomenological research. The phenomenological method focuses on studying the phenomena that have impacted an individual. This approach highlights the specifics and identifies a phenomenon as perceived by an individual in a situation. It can also be used to study the commonality in the behaviors of a group of people.  

Phenomenological research has its roots in psychology, education and philosophy. Its aim is to extract the purest data that hasn’t been attained before. Sometimes researchers record personal notes about what they learn from the subjects. This adds to the credibility of data, allowing researchers to remove these influences to produce unbiased narratives. Through this method, researchers attempt to answer two major questions:

• What are the subject’s experiences related to the phenomenon?
• What factors have influenced the experience of the phenomenon?

A researcher may also use observations, art and documents to construct a universal meaning of experiences as they establish an understanding of the phenomenon. The richness of the data obtained in phenomenological research opens up opportunities for further inquiry.

Now that we know what is phenomenological research , let’s look at some methods and examples.

Phenomenological research can be based on single case studies or a pool of samples. Single case studies identify system failures and discrepancies. Data from multiple samples highlights many possible situations. In either case, these are the methods a researcher can use:

• The researcher can observe the subject or access written records, such as texts, journals, poetry, music or diaries
• They can conduct conversations and interviews with open-ended questions, which allow researchers to make subjects comfortable enough to open up
• Action research and focus workshops are great ways to put at ease candidates who have psychological barriers

To mine deep information, a researcher must show empathy and establish a friendly rapport with participants. These kinds of phenomenological research methods require researchers to focus on the subject and avoid getting influenced.

Phenomenological research is a way to understand individual situations in detail. The theories are developed transparently, with the evidence available for a reader to access. We can use this methodology in situations such as:

• The experiences of every war survivor or war veteran are unique. Research can illuminate their mental states and survival strategies in a new world.
• Losing family members to Covid-19 hasn’t been easy. A detailed study of survivors and people who’ve lost loved ones can help understand coping mechanisms and long-term traumas.
• What’s it like to be diagnosed with a terminal disease when a person becomes a parent? The conflict of birth and death can’t be generalized, but research can record emotions and experiences.

Phenomenological research is a powerful way to understand personal experiences. It provides insights into individual actions and motivations by examining long-held assumptions. New theories, policies and responses can be developed on this basis. But, the phenomenological research design will be ineffective if subjects are unable to communicate due to language, age, cognition or other barriers. Managers must be alert to such limitations and sharp to interpret results without bias.

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Home » Phenomenology – Methods, Examples and Guide

Phenomenology – Methods, Examples and Guide

Table of Contents

Phenomenology

Definition:

Phenomenology is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with the study of subjective experience and consciousness. It is based on the idea that the essence of things can only be understood through the way they appear to us in experience, rather than by analyzing their objective properties or functions.

Phenomenology is often associated with the work of philosopher Edmund Husserl, who developed a method of phenomenological inquiry that involves suspending one’s preconceptions and assumptions about the world and focusing on the pure experience of phenomena as they present themselves to us. This involves bracketing out any judgments, beliefs, or theories about the phenomena, and instead attending closely to the subjective qualities of the experience itself.

Phenomenology has been influential not only in philosophy but also in other fields such as psychology, sociology, and anthropology, where it has been used to explore questions of perception, meaning, and human experience.

History of Phenomenology

Phenomenology is a philosophical movement that began in the early 20th century, primarily in Germany. It was founded by Edmund Husserl, a German philosopher who is often considered the father of phenomenology.

Husserl’s work was deeply influenced by the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, particularly his emphasis on the importance of subjective experience. However, Husserl sought to go beyond Kant’s transcendental idealism by developing a rigorous method of inquiry that would allow him to examine the structures of consciousness and the nature of experience in a systematic way.

Husserl’s first major work, Logical Investigations (1900-1901), laid the groundwork for phenomenology by introducing the idea of intentional consciousness, or the notion that all consciousness is directed towards objects in the world. He went on to develop a method of “bracketing” or “epoche,” which involved setting aside one’s preconceptions and assumptions about the world in order to focus on the pure experience of phenomena as they present themselves.

Other philosophers, such as Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre, built on Husserl’s work and developed their own versions of phenomenology. Heidegger, in particular, emphasized the importance of language and the role it plays in shaping our understanding of the world, while Sartre focused on the relationship between consciousness and freedom.

Today, phenomenology continues to be an active area of philosophical inquiry, with many contemporary philosophers drawing on its insights to explore questions of perception, meaning, and human experience.

Types of Phenomenology

There are several types of phenomenology that have emerged over time, each with its own focus and approach. Here are some of the most prominent types of phenomenology:

Transcendental Phenomenology

This is the type of phenomenology developed by Edmund Husserl, which aims to investigate the structures of consciousness and experience in a systematic way by using the method of epoche or bracketing.

Existential Phenomenology

This type of phenomenology, developed by philosophers such as Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre, focuses on the subjective experience of individual existence, emphasizing the role of freedom, authenticity, and the search for meaning in human life.

Hermeneutic Phenomenology

This type of phenomenology, developed by philosophers such as Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur, emphasizes the role of interpretation and understanding in human experience, particularly in the context of language and culture.

Phenomenology of Perception

This type of phenomenology, developed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, emphasizes the embodied and lived nature of perception, arguing that perception is not simply a matter of passive reception but is instead an active and dynamic process of engagement with the world.

Phenomenology of Sociality

This type of phenomenology, developed by philosophers such as Alfred Schutz and Emmanuel Levinas, focuses on the social dimension of human experience, exploring how we relate to others and how our understanding of the world is shaped by our interactions with others.

Methods of Phenomenology

Here are some of the key methods that phenomenologists use to investigate human experience:

Epoche (Bracketing)

This is a key method in phenomenology, which involves setting aside one’s preconceptions and assumptions about the world in order to focus on the pure experience of phenomena as they present themselves. By bracketing out any judgments, beliefs, or theories about the phenomena, one can attend more closely to the subjective qualities of the experience itself.

Introspection

Phenomenologists often rely on introspection, or a careful examination of one’s own mental states and experiences, as a way of gaining insight into the nature of consciousness and subjective experience.

Descriptive Analysis

Phenomenology also involves a careful description and analysis of subjective experiences, paying close attention to the way things appear to us in experience, rather than analyzing their objective properties or functions.

Another method used in phenomenology is the variation technique, in which one systematically varies different aspects of an experience in order to gain a deeper understanding of its structure and meaning.

Phenomenological Reduction

This method involves reducing a phenomenon to its essential features or structures, in order to gain a deeper understanding of its nature and significance.

Epoché Variations

This method involves examining different aspects of an experience through the process of epoché or bracketing, to gain a more nuanced understanding of its subjective qualities and significance.

Applications of Phenomenology

Phenomenology has a wide range of applications across many fields, including philosophy, psychology, sociology, education, and healthcare. Here are some of the key applications of phenomenology:

• Philosophy : Phenomenology is primarily a philosophical approach, and has been used to explore a wide range of philosophical issues related to consciousness, perception, identity, and the nature of reality.
• Psychology : Phenomenology has been used in psychology to study human experience and consciousness, particularly in the areas of perception, emotion, and cognition. It has also been used to develop new forms of psychotherapy, such as existential and humanistic psychotherapy.
• Sociology : Phenomenology has been used in sociology to study the subjective experience of individuals within social contexts, particularly in the areas of culture, identity, and social change.
• Education : Phenomenology has been used in education to explore the subjective experience of students and teachers, and to develop new approaches to teaching and learning that take into account the individual experiences of learners.
• Healthcare : Phenomenology has been used in healthcare to explore the subjective experience of patients and healthcare providers, and to develop new approaches to patient care that are more patient-centered and focused on the individual’s experience of illness.
• Design : Phenomenology has been used in design to better understand the subjective experience of users and to create more user-centered products and experiences.
• Business : Phenomenology has been used in business to better understand the subjective experience of consumers and to develop more effective marketing strategies and user experiences.

Purpose of Phenomenology

The purpose of phenomenology is to understand the subjective experience of human beings. Phenomenology is concerned with the way things appear to us in experience, rather than their objective properties or functions. The goal of phenomenology is to describe and analyze the essential features of subjective experience, and to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of consciousness, perception, and human existence.

Phenomenology is particularly concerned with the ways in which subjective experience is structured, and with the underlying meanings and significance of these structures. Phenomenologists seek to identify the essential features of subjective experience, such as intentionality, embodiment, and lived time, and to explore the ways in which these features give rise to meaning and significance in human life.

Phenomenology has a wide range of applications across many fields, including philosophy, psychology, sociology, education, healthcare, and design. In each of these fields, phenomenology is used to gain a deeper understanding of human experience, and to develop new approaches and strategies that are more focused on the subjective experiences of individuals.

Overall, the purpose of phenomenology is to deepen our understanding of human experience and to provide insights into the nature of consciousness, perception, and human existence. Phenomenology offers a unique perspective on the subjective aspects of human life, and its insights have the potential to transform our understanding of ourselves and the world around us.

Examples of Phenomenology

Phenomenology has many real-life examples across different fields. Here are some examples of phenomenology in action:

• Psychology : In psychology, phenomenology is used to study the subjective experience of individuals with mental health conditions. For example, a phenomenological study might explore the experience of anxiety in individuals with generalized anxiety disorder, or the experience of depression in individuals with major depressive disorder.
• Healthcare : In healthcare, phenomenology is used to explore the subjective experience of patients and to develop more patient-centered approaches to care. For example, a phenomenological study might explore the experience of chronic pain in patients, in order to develop more effective pain management strategies that are based on the patient’s individual experience of pain.
• Education : In education, phenomenology is used to study the subjective experience of students and to develop more effective teaching and learning strategies. For example, a phenomenological study might explore the experience of learning in students, in order to develop teaching methods that are more focused on the individual needs and experiences of learners.
• Business : In business, phenomenology is used to better understand the subjective experience of consumers, and to develop more effective marketing strategies and user experiences. For example, a phenomenological study might explore the experience of using a particular product or service, in order to identify areas for improvement and to create a more user-centered experience.
• Design : In design, phenomenology is used to better understand the subjective experience of users, and to create more user-centered products and experiences. For example, a phenomenological study might explore the experience of using a particular app or website, in order to identify ways to improve the user interface and user experience.

When to use Phenomenological Research

Here are some situations where phenomenological research might be appropriate:

• When you want to explore the meaning and significance of an experience : Phenomenological research is particularly useful when you want to gain a deeper understanding of the subjective experience of individuals and the meanings and significance that they attach to their experiences. For example, if you want to understand the experience of being a first-time parent, phenomenological research can help you explore the various emotions, challenges, and joys that are associated with this experience.
• When you want to develop more patient-centered healthcare: Phenomenological research can be useful in healthcare settings where there is a need to develop more patient-centered approaches to care. For example, if you want to improve pain management strategies for patients with chronic pain, phenomenological research can help you gain a better understanding of the individual experiences of pain and the different ways in which patients cope with this experience.
• When you want to develop more effective teaching and learning strategies : Phenomenological research can be used in education settings to explore the subjective experience of students and to develop more effective teaching and learning strategies that are based on the individual needs and experiences of learners.
• When you want to improve the user experience of a product or service: Phenomenological research can be used in design settings to gain a deeper understanding of the subjective experience of users and to develop more user-centered products and experiences.

Characteristics of Phenomenology

Here are some of the key characteristics of phenomenology:

• Focus on subjective experience: Phenomenology is concerned with the subjective experience of individuals, rather than objective facts or data. Phenomenologists seek to understand how individuals experience and interpret the world around them.
• Emphasis on lived experience: Phenomenology emphasizes the importance of lived experience, or the way in which individuals experience the world through their own unique perspectives and histories.
• Reduction to essence: Phenomenology seeks to reduce the complexities of subjective experience to their essential features or structures, in order to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of consciousness, perception, and human existence.
• Emphasis on description: Phenomenology is primarily concerned with describing the features and structures of subjective experience, rather than explaining them in terms of underlying causes or mechanisms.
• Bracketing of preconceptions: Phenomenology involves bracketing or suspending preconceptions and assumptions about the world, in order to approach subjective experience with an open and unbiased perspective.
• Methodological approach: Phenomenology is both a philosophical and methodological approach, which involves a specific set of techniques and procedures for studying subjective experience.
• Multiple approaches: Phenomenology encompasses a wide range of approaches and variations, including transcendental phenomenology, hermeneutic phenomenology, and existential phenomenology, among others.

Advantages of Phenomenology

Phenomenology offers several advantages as a research approach, including:

• Provides rich, in-depth insights: Phenomenology is focused on understanding the subjective experiences of individuals in a particular context, which allows for a rich and in-depth exploration of their experiences, emotions, and perceptions.
• Allows for participant-centered research: Phenomenological research prioritizes the experiences and perspectives of the participants, which makes it a participant-centered approach. This can help to ensure that the research is relevant and meaningful to the participants.
• Provides a flexible approach: Phenomenological research offers a flexible approach that can be adapted to different research questions and contexts. This makes it suitable for use in a wide range of fields and research areas.
• Can uncover new insights : Phenomenological research can uncover new insights into subjective experience and can challenge existing assumptions and beliefs about a particular phenomenon or experience.
• Can inform practice and policy: Phenomenological research can provide insights that can be used to inform practice and policy decisions in fields such as healthcare, education, and design.
• Can be used in combination with other research approaches : Phenomenological research can be used in combination with other research approaches, such as quantitative methods, to provide a more comprehensive understanding of a particular phenomenon or experience.

Limitations of Phenomenology

Despite the many advantages of phenomenology, there are also several limitations that should be taken into account, including:

• Subjective nature: Phenomenology is focused on subjective experience, which means that it can be difficult to generalize findings to a larger population or to other contexts.
• Limited external validity: Because phenomenological research is focused on a specific context or experience, the findings may have limited external validity or generalizability.
• Potential for researcher bias: Phenomenological research relies heavily on the researcher’s interpretations and analyses of the data, which can introduce potential for bias and subjectivity.
• Time-consuming and resource-intensive: Phenomenological research is often time-consuming and resource-intensive, as it involves in-depth data collection and analysis.
• Difficulty with data analysis: Phenomenological research involves a complex process of data analysis, which can be difficult and time-consuming.
• Lack of standardized procedures: Phenomenology encompasses a range of approaches and variations, which can make it difficult to compare findings across studies or to establish standardized procedures.

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Qualitative study design: Phenomenology

• Qualitative study design

Phenomenology

• Grounded theory
• Ethnography
• Narrative inquiry
• Action research
• Case Studies
• Field research
• Focus groups
• Observation
• Surveys & questionnaires
• Study Designs Home

Used to describe the lived experience of individuals.

• Now called Descriptive Phenomenology, this study design is one of the most commonly used methodologies in qualitative research within the social and health sciences.
• Used to describe how human beings experience a certain phenomenon. The researcher asks, “What is this experience like?’, ‘What does this experience mean?’ or ‘How does this ‘lived experience’ present itself to the participant?’
• Attempts to set aside biases and preconceived assumptions about human experiences, feelings, and responses to a particular situation.
• Experience may involve perception, thought, memory, imagination, and emotion or feeling.
• Usually (but not always) involves a small sample of participants (approx. 10-15).
• Analysis includes an attempt to identify themes or, if possible, make generalizations in relation to how a particular phenomenon is perceived or experienced.

Methods used include:

• participant observation
• in-depth interviews with open-ended questions
• conversations and focus workshops. 

Researchers may also examine written records of experiences such as diaries, journals, art, poetry and music.

Descriptive phenomenology is a powerful way to understand subjective experience and to gain insights around people’s actions and motivations, cutting through long-held assumptions and challenging conventional wisdom.  It may contribute to the development of new theories, changes in policies, or changes in responses.

Limitations

• Does not suit all health research questions.  For example, an evaluation of a health service may be better carried out by means of a descriptive qualitative design, where highly structured questions aim to garner participant’s views, rather than their lived experience.
• Participants may not be able to express themselves articulately enough due to language barriers, cognition, age, or other factors.
• Gathering data and data analysis may be time consuming and laborious.
• Results require interpretation without researcher bias.
• Does not produce easily generalisable data.

Example questions

• How do cancer patients cope with a terminal diagnosis?
• What is it like to survive a plane crash?
• What are the experiences of long-term carers of family members with a serious illness or disability?
• What is it like to be trapped in a natural disaster, such as a flood or earthquake? 

Example studies

• The patient-body relationship and the "lived experience" of a facial burn injury: a phenomenological inquiry of early psychosocial adjustment . Individual interviews were carried out for this study.
• The use of group descriptive phenomenology within a mixed methods study to understand the experience of music therapy for women with breast cancer . Example of a study in which focus group interviews were carried out.
• Understanding the experience of midlife women taking part in a work-life balance career coaching programme: An interpretative phenomenological analysis . Example of a study using action research.
• Holloway, I. & Galvin, K. (2017). Qualitative research in nursing and healthcare (Fourth ed.): John Wiley & Sons Inc.
• Rodriguez, A., & Smith, J. (2018). Phenomenology as a healthcare research method . Journal of Evidence Based Nursing , 21(4), 96-98. doi: 10.1136/eb-2018-102990
• << Previous: Methodologies
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• Last Updated: Apr 8, 2024 11:12 AM
• URL: https://deakin.libguides.com/qualitative-study-designs

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How to Write a Phenomenological Dissertation A Step-by-Step Guide

• Katarzyna Peoples - Walden University, USA
• Description

Conducting phenomenological research for dissertations can be an involved and challenging process, and writing it up is often the most challenging part.  How to Write a Phenomenological Dissertation  gives students practical, applied advice on how to structure and develop each chapter of the dissertation specifically for phenomenological research.  Phenomenology is about personal experience and personal experience varies from researcher to researcher. However, this variation is a big source of confusion for new researchers in the social, behavioral, or health sciences. This brief text is written in a simple, step-by-step fashion to account for this flexibility and variation while also providing structure necessary for a successful dissertation. Broken up into chapters that follow each chapter of the dissertation, this text logically addresses the various parts of phenomenological research, starting with ensuring phenomenology is the right method for your research, writing the literature review, going through methods and results sections to analysis and discussion. The author, using experience gleaned from supervising phenomenological dissertations for many years, gives time-tested advice on how structure the dissertation to fit into more common frameworks, using checklists and tables throughout. Each chapter includes a list of helpful resources for students to use alongside this book with specific information on methods and research. Unique to this text is a chapter on creating your own phenomenological method which allows students to expand their viewpoints and experiment in future studies after the dissertation. 

See what’s new to this edition by selecting the Features tab on this page. Should you need additional information or have questions regarding the HEOA information provided for this title, including what is new to this edition, please email [email protected] . Please include your name, contact information, and the name of the title for which you would like more information. For information on the HEOA, please go to http://ed.gov/policy/highered/leg/hea08/index.html .

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Overall, I feel this is possibly the best work I have seen on this type of a dissertation. It is clear and concise as well as complete in mechanics.

It seems to make writing a phenomenological study more accessible by offering pathways to students.

It is well-informed, driven by experience and authoritatively written and yet leaves room for others to write their own. It is quite a feat.

While this book conforms with others in the domain of phenomenological research is it superior in many respects; chiefly the author's sound knowledge transfer of philosophy to methods; the fit between conceptual basic assumptions and object of research study; and clarity without sacrificing complexity.

The key strengths are the attempt to provide a systematic understanding of the process from A to Z with a specific focus on phenomenology. This text will be useful and versatile for student locked in to phenomenology.

Absolutely excellent text for introducing Phenomenology to students. There are some editorial issues in sections on intentionality (information in one chapter does not match another). And a spacing issue on one page making it difficult to follow the logic. If you contact me I would be happy to provide details but don't have the book in front of me at the moment. It would also be helpful to know if the book is aimed at PhD or Masters level dissertations as this is not clear. This is added to our reading list - we do not provide a recommended list as students in Education draw from such a wide range of texts. I have recommended it to colleagues supervising Phenomenological dissertations.

A book on research methods on phenomenology is scarce, and this book has successfully demonstrated what phenomenological research should do and how to connect to other disciplines for a deeper understanding of causal relationships in cities and human activities.

The research methodology reflects my academic training and interests.

• Gives students practical, applied advice on how to structure and develop each chapter of the dissertation specifically for phenomenological research. 
• Written in a simple, step-by-step fashion to account for this flexibility and variation while also providing structure necessary for a successful dissertation.
• Broken up into chapters that follow each chapter of the dissertation
• Logically breaks down the various parts of phenomenological research, starting with ensuring phenomenology is the right method for your research, writing the literature review, going through methods and results sections to analysis and discussion. 
• Provides time-tested advice on how structure the dissertation to fit into more common frameworks, using checklists and tables throughout.
• Includes a list of helpful resources for students to use alongside this book with specific information on methods and research.
• Includes a chapter on creating your own phenomenological method which allows students to expand their viewpoints and experiment in future studies after the dissertation. 

Sample Materials & Chapters

Chapter 1. How to Begin

Chapter 3. Methodology

Chapter 2. Introduction & Literature Review

For instructors

Select a purchasing option, related products.

What is phenomenology in qualitative research?

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7 February 2023

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Take a closer look at this type of qualitative research along with characteristics, examples, uses, and potential disadvantages.

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• What is phenomenological qualitative research?

Phenomenological research is a qualitative research approach that builds on the assumption that the universal essence of anything ultimately depends on how its audience experiences it .

Phenomenological researchers record and analyze the beliefs, feelings, and perceptions of the audience they’re looking to study in relation to the thing being studied. Only the audience’s views matter—the people who have experienced the phenomenon. The researcher’s personal assumptions and perceptions about the phenomenon should be irrelevant.

Phenomenology is a type of qualitative research as it requires an in-depth understanding of the audience’s thoughts and perceptions of the phenomenon you’re researching. It goes deep rather than broad, unlike quantitative research . Finding the lived experience of the phenomenon in question depends on your interpretation and analysis.

• What is the purpose of phenomenological research?

The primary aim of phenomenological research is to gain insight into the experiences and feelings of a specific audience in relation to the phenomenon you’re studying. These narratives are the reality in the audience’s eyes. They allow you to draw conclusions about the phenomenon that may add to or even contradict what you thought you knew about it from an internal perspective.

• How is phenomenology research design used?

Phenomenological research design is especially useful for topics in which the researcher needs to go deep into the audience’s thoughts, feelings, and experiences.

It’s a valuable tool to gain audience insights, generate awareness about the item being studied, and develop new theories about audience experience in a specific, controlled situation.

• Examples of phenomenological research

Phenomenological research is common in sociology, where researchers aim to better understand the audiences they study.

An example would be a study of the thoughts and experiences of family members waiting for a loved one who is undergoing major surgery. This could provide insights into the nature of the event from the broader family perspective.

However, phenomenological research is also common and beneficial in business situations. For example, the technique is commonly used in branding research. Here, audience perceptions of the brand matter more than the business’s perception of itself.

In branding-related market research, researchers look at how the audience experiences the brand and its products to gain insights into how they feel about them. The resulting information can be used to adjust messaging and business strategy to evoke more positive or stronger feelings about the brand in the future.

• The 4 characteristics of phenomenological research design

The exact nature of phenomenological research depends on the subject to be studied. However, every research design should include the following four main tenets to ensure insightful and actionable outcomes:

A focus on the audience’s interpretation of something . The focus is always on what an experience or event means to a strictly defined audience and how they interpret its meaning.

A lack of researcher bias or prior influence . The researcher has to set aside all prior prejudices and assumptions. They should focus only on how the audience interprets and experiences the event.

Connecting objectivity with lived experiences . Researchers need to describe their observations of how the audience experienced the event as well as how the audience interpreted their experience themselves.

• Types of phenomenological research design

Each type of phenomenological research shares the characteristics described above. Social scientists distinguish the following three types:

Existential phenomenology —focuses on understanding the audience’s experiences through their perspective. 

Hermeneutic phenomenology —focuses on creating meaning from experiences through the audience’s perspective.

Transcendental phenomenology —focuses on how the phenomenon appears in one consciousness on a broader, scientific scale.

Existential phenomenology is the most common type used in a business context. It’s most valuable to help you better understand your audience.

You can use hermeneutic phenomenology to gain a deeper understanding of how your audience perceives experiences related to your business.

Transcendental phenomenology is largely reserved for non-business scientific applications.

• Data collection methods in phenomenological research

Phenomenological research draws from many of the most common qualitative research techniques to understand the audience’s perspective.

Here are some of the most common tools to collect data in this type of research study:

Observing participants as they experience the phenomenon

Interviewing participants before, during, and after the experience

Focus groups where participants experience the phenomenon and discuss it afterward

Recording conversations between participants related to the phenomenon

Analyzing personal texts and observations from participants related to the phenomenon

You might not use these methods in isolation. Most phenomenological research includes multiple data collection methods. This ensures enough overlap to draw satisfactory conclusions from the audience and the phenomenon studied.

Get started collecting, analyzing, and understanding qualitative data with help from quickstart research templates.

• Limitations of phenomenological research

Phenomenological research can be beneficial for many reasons, but its downsides are just as important to discuss.

This type of research is not a solve-all tool to gain audience insights. You should keep the following limitations in mind before you design your research study and during the design process:

These audience studies are typically very small. This results in a small data set that can make it difficult for you to draw complete conclusions about the phenomenon.

Researcher bias is difficult to avoid, even if you try to remove your own experiences and prejudices from the equation. Bias can contaminate the entire outcome.

Phenomenology relies on audience experiences, so its accuracy depends entirely on how well the audience can express those experiences and feelings.

The results of a phenomenological study can be difficult to summarize and present due to its qualitative nature. Conclusions typically need to include qualifiers and cautions.

This type of study can be time-consuming. Interpreting the data can take days and weeks.

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Taking phenomenology beyond the first-person perspective: conceptual grounding in the collection and analysis of observational evidence

• Open access
• Published: 09 January 2022
• Volume 22 , pages 171–191, ( 2023 )

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• Marianne Elisabeth Klinke   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-1887-8623 1 , 2 &
• Anthony Vincent Fernandez   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-1376-4520 3 , 4  

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A Correction to this article was published on 21 December 2022

This article has been updated

Phenomenology has been adapted for use in qualitative health research, where it’s often used as a method for conducting interviews and analyzing interview data. But how can phenomenologists study subjects who cannot accurately reflect upon or report their own experiences, for instance, because of a psychiatric or neurological disorder? For conditions like these, qualitative researchers may gain more insight by conducting observational studies in lieu of, or in conjunction with, interviews. In this article, we introduce a phenomenological approach to conducting this kind of observational research. The approach relies on conceptual grounding to focus a study on specific aspects of the participants’ experiences. Moreover, the approach maintains the openness to novel discoveries that qualitative research requires while also providing a structured framework for data collection and analysis. To illustrate its practical application, we use examples of hemispatial neglect—a neurologic disorder in which patients characteristically lack awareness of their own illness and bodily capacities. However, the approach that we describe can be applied more broadly to the study of complex illness experiences and other experiential alterations.

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1 Introduction

Phenomenology, originally established as a philosophical research program, has been adapted for use across a variety of scientific disciplines, such as psychology, psychiatry, sociology, anthropology, and nursing. In each case, the adaptation requires the development of new ways of integrating phenomenology with the aims of the scientific field. In qualitative research in psychology and health care, for instance, there’s an extensive literature on how phenomenology may be used to conduct interviews and analyze interview data. However, in these fields, there’s relatively little methodological literature on the use of phenomenology in observational research, despite phenomenology’s influence on observational studies in sociology and anthropology, among other fields.

In this article, we introduce a phenomenological approach to conducting observational research that uses conceptual grounding to focus the study on specific aspects of the participants’ experiences. We argue that phenomenological interviewing is not, on its own, an adequate approach for studying certain subjects, including those who cannot accurately report or describe their own experiences. We demonstrate how phenomenologists can use observational evidence of human behavior in conjunction with first-person, self-reflective evidence. And we outline an approach to collecting and analyzing such evidence by using conceptual grounding. This approach is designed primarily for in-depth studies of first-person experiential alterations that are often difficult to understand or describe, such as in cases of complex illness experience. In this respect, it differs from anthropological approaches to integrating ethnography with phenomenological theory, which are often used to study social or cultural practices. Drawing on our own academic backgrounds in phenomenological psychiatry and neurological nursing, we illustrate our approach with an example of hemispatial neglect following stroke—in the following, referred to simply as “neglect”—which is a paradigmatic case of a condition that thwarts traditional techniques for understanding others’ experiences. However, the approach that we develop here may also be used to study other experiential alterations, including in cases where subjects are capable of accurately reflecting upon and describing their own experiences.

The article proceeds in 6 parts. First, we argue that an exclusive reliance on interviews is not sufficient to understand certain complex illness experiences and we therefore provide a philosophical justification for using behavioral evidence in applied phenomenology. Second, we identify some of the challenges of conducting observational research from a phenomenological perspective and outline how we aim to address these challenges. Third, we introduce an approach that uses conceptual grounding to collect observational evidence, which can supplement the shortcomings of first-person, self-reflective evidence. Fourth, we present a case study of a patient with neglect to illustrate the main characteristics of the disorder and highlight concrete problems that confront the researcher when accessing “neglect” experiences. Fifth, we outline different modes of observations that the phenomenologist can use and briefly describe how these modes of observation can help us understand complex experiences like neglect. Sixth, we use an empirical study of neglect to illustrate how our method of combining self-reflective evidence with observations can be employed and how researchers can use phenomenological concepts to navigate data collection and analysis when investigating complex illness experiences and other cases of experiential alteration.

2 Phenomenology and behavioral evidence: a philosophical justification

Without an adequate grasp of patients’ experiences, it’s difficult to provide quality care. For this reason, qualitative health researchers draw extensively on phenomenological approaches to interviewing and data analysis (see, e.g., Englander, 2012 , 2020 ; Giorgi, 2009 ; Høffding & Martiny, 2016 ; Smith et al., 2009 ; van Manen, 1990 , van Manen, 2016 ). Interviews are a valuable tool for gaining insight into illness experience, especially the experiences of people living with somatic conditions. However, approaches that rely exclusively on interview data face fundamental limitations when used to study the experience of people living with psychiatric or neurological conditions, some of which involve impaired insight or impaired capacities for verbal or written expression. If an interviewee is unable to accurately reflect upon their own experience or express or describe their experience, then the interviewer—no matter how skilled—cannot gain an adequate grasp of the experience.

Louis Sass and Elizabeth Pienkos acknowledge this problem when they write,

One limitation of our study, as with all phenomenological research, is that we must rely largely on patients who are able to describe their experiences; this can involve a selection bias in favour of patients who may not be typical of the entire diagnostic group at issue. Although this issue must be borne in mind, it must also be recognized that this is a necessary feature of phenomenological work, one that can only be avoided at the risk of ignoring the subtle features of a patient’s subjectivity. (Sass & Pienkos, 2013 , 108)

Sass and Pienkos’ characterization is representative of how many phenomenologists conceive of the discipline and its limitations, although few researchers have articulated this problem so directly. But do conditions that compromise the ability to describe one’s experience stand on the very edge, or even beyond, the domain of phenomenological research? Is this an inescapable limitation of phenomenology? We argue that, in contrast with popular characterizations of phenomenological methodology, phenomenologists do not rely exclusively on first-person, self-reflective evidence. When we say this, however, we don’t have in mind approaches like Francisco Varela’s neurophenomenology, where phenomenological accounts of experience and neuroscientific accounts of the brain impose mutual constraints upon each other (Varela, 1996 ; Varela and Shear, 1999 ). This kind of cross-disciplinary dialogue is valuable for phenomenological research, but doesn’t challenge phenomenology’s first-person, self-reflective methodology. In our proposal, by contrast, we argue that phenomenologists can collect and analyze behavioral evidence in much the same way that they do for self-reflective experiential evidence.

At first, this may seem like a radical departure from what many of us take phenomenology to be. In philosophy, phenomenology is popularly characterized as “the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view” (Smith, 2018 ). This characterization is not, however, aligned with the classical texts. Many phenomenologists made claims about experience that were not supported by first-person, self-reflective evidence. Husserl and Heidegger, for example, made phenomenological claims about the experiences of non-human animals. Merleau-Ponty also developed detailed studies of infant experience. And, in his studies of subjects with neurological or psychiatric conditions, he often relied more heavily on descriptions of their behavior provided by neurologists and psychologists than he did on their own self-reports. If we turn to more contemporary studies, such as Shaun Gallagher’s analysis of the case of Ian Waterman, we find a similar reliance on observations of Waterman’s behavior used in conjunction with his first-person reports (Gallagher, 2005 ). Footnote 1

In much of the classical literature, this use of observational or behavioral evidence remains unacknowledged. One exception, however, is Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of behavioral evidence in his lectures on phenomenology and the human sciences. Reflecting on the classical foundations of phenomenological methodology, he says,

Husserl was so far from making internal perception into a principle that he granted a greater certitude, in certain respects, to external perception than to internal observation. Reflection on the meaning or the essence of what we live through is neutral to the distinction between internal and external experience . (Merleau-Ponty, 1964 , 64–65; emphasis in original)

The internal–external distinction that Merleau-Ponty uses here is not especially common in phenomenology. But his elaboration suggests that “external perception” refers to the observation of another’s behavior. He says,

…nothing prevents my phenomenological reflection from having a bearing […] on another person, since I perceive him and his modes of behavior. Nothing prevents the clarification of the intentions or meanings or ways of acting from referring not only to my own conduct but to that of another whom I witness. Nothing prevents me from explaining the meaning of the lived experience of another person, in so far as I have access to it, by perception. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964 , 65)

Here, Merleau-Ponty broadens the scope of phenomenological reflection to include the researcher’s ability to reflect on others’ behavior. Between his own studies of people with psychiatric and neurological disorders and these methodological remarks, we have precedent for the use of behavioral evidence in phenomenology. But this leaves us with two key questions: First, how should phenomenologists justify the use of behavioral evidence? Second, how should phenomenologists collect and analyze behavioral evidence?

To the first question, there may be various ways to justify the use of behavioral evidence in phenomenological research. However, because we aim to outline concrete methods for collecting and analyzing such evidence, we’ll provide just one brief justification: Within phenomenology, human behavior isn’t studied as the effect of physiological or neurological processes. Rather, behavior is understood as expressive. Bodily actions can express subjective states, such as beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions. And they can also express the sense or meaning of objects within another’s lived world. If you see your friend tense her muscles and stand erect as a dog runs toward her, you perceive not only her subjective feeling of fear, but also the dog as a fearsome object within her lived world—even if it doesn’t have this sense within your lived world. Just as you understand the other’s experience through verbal expressions, you can understand the other’s experience through bodily expressions. This is why the phenomenological use of behavioral evidence differs fundamentally from the phenomenological use of neurological evidence. Behavioral evidence, like first-person self-reflective evidence, directly expresses subjectivity.

The second question, regarding how we should collect and analyze this evidence, is more difficult to answer. The classical phenomenologists provide remarkably little in the way of concrete methodological advice. To develop an approach to collecting and analyzing behavioral evidence in phenomenological studies, we need to look to contemporary approaches to applied phenomenology and see which elements of these approaches might be adapted for our purposes.

3 The challenges of observational research

If one wants to use phenomenology in observational research, perhaps the most obvious field to turn to is anthropology, which has a well-established history of drawing inspiration from philosophical phenomenology when conducting observational studies (see, e.g., Csordas, 1990 , 1999 ; Desjarlais, 1992 ; Desjarlais & Throop, 2011 ). However, despite the extensive influence of phenomenology, anthropologists have provided little concrete methodological guidance on how to conduct phenomenological observations (certainly nothing that compares with the extensive methodological literature on phenomenological interviewing in fields like psychology and nursing). This is because anthropologists tend to use phenomenology as a broad theoretical background, rather than as a methodology. In this respect, anthropologists don’t conduct “phenomenological observations” in a way that’s analogous to how psychologists or nurse researchers might conduct “phenomenological interviews.” If we want to find examples of a phenomenological approach to conducting observations, we’ll therefore need to turn to fields that more commonly use phenomenology as a methodology.

In the field of nursing, we find at least one example of a phenomenological approach to observational research in the work of Karin Dahlberg, one of the progenitors of Reflective Lifeworld Research. As we explain in more detail in the following section, our aims differ in important respects from those of Dahlberg and her collaborators. Nevertheless, the problems that she outlines provide a useful frame for discussing the challenges of our approach and the solutions that we have developed.

Dahlberg identifies two major problems for phenomenological observational research. The first arises from the “surplus of meaning” (Dahlberg, 2006 , 5) in human behavior. When we perceive another person, we perceive an expressive body that immediately conveys emotions, desires, and intentions through its gestures, facial expressions, and other bodily movements. The expressiveness of human behavior allows us to understand others both in everyday life and in the context of research in the human sciences. But, as Dahlberg says, when we investigate the other’s behavior, we always find that “there are many more intentional objects than the phenomenon” (Dahlberg, 2006 , 4). In other words, we never experience the phenomenon that we’re investigating in isolation. It’s always embedded in a broader context that we can’t help but attend to. On the one hand, by attending to this broader context, we may discover phenomena that we hadn’t anticipated. On the other hand, the sheer range of phenomena to consider can be overwhelming, causing the researcher to lose focus. This problem is not exclusive to observational research. It’s possible, for example, for an interviewee to go off on tangents, providing information that is unrelated to the research question. But, when conducting an interview, the researcher may bring the participant back from a tangential remark and refocus them on the phenomenon of interest. When conducting an observational study, in contrast, the researcher is often not in a position to bring the participant back to the phenomenon of interest. Depending on the kind of observational study, they may not be able to actively engage the participant at all.

The second problem with observational research arises from the interpretation of expressive behavior. Observations, in contrast with traditional interviews, require that the researcher is the first one to formulate the participant’s experience—as Dahlberg says, “it is the researcher who words the experience” (Dahlberg, 2006 , 4). In an interview, the participant has the opportunity to present an initial interpretation of their experience, putting it in their own words and, thus, heading off or correcting the researcher’s potential misunderstandings. The researcher will, of course, interpret interview data in subsequent analyses; but the range of legitimate interpretations is already constrained by how the participant described their own experience. In observational research, by contrast, the participant’s behavior is open to a broader range of interpretations because the meaning of non-verbal expressions are often not as definite as the meaning of verbal expressions.

In light of these problems, one might assume that Dahlberg urges phenomenologists to stick to interviews and avoid observational research. But this is hardly the case. Rather, she says, “The emphasis on the surplus of meanings and the linguistic aspects of participative research points to the necessity of ‘bridling’ the evolving understanding, so that meanings do not come too carelessly or glibly, so that we do not make definite what is indefinite” (Dahlberg, 2006 , 6). In her article, Dahlberg doesn’t expand on her notion of bridling in detail. However, she articulates this approach more fully in her collaborative work with Helena Dahlberg and Maria Nyström (2008). Bridling is a way of keeping the researcher’s pre-understanding in check. Pre-understanding encompasses the prejudices or presuppositions that the researcher has about the phenomenon being investigated. Our everyday ways of talking about and making sense of things shape how we understand the phenomenon that we’re interested in. And our philosophical and scientific knowledge of the topic provides us with theoretical frames that we may not be fully aware of. Bridling, in short, is an open attitude toward the phenomenon being investigated, a commitment to not settle on an interpretation too quickly in light of one’s prior theoretical frames and biases: “Following the principle of not making definite what is indefinite means allowing the phenomenon its indefiniteness for as long as possible” (Dalhberg et al., 2008 , 133). When applied to observational research, bridling helps address the two challenges outlined above: It requires that one acknowledge the ambiguities inherent in bodily expression and not be too quick to settle on a definite interpretation of the participant’s experience.

We largely agree with these ideas. However, we diverge at a key point. Dahlberg and her collaborations say that bridling “is by no means something that could be understood as a methodological technique” (2008, 133). It is, instead, a phenomenological attitude or orientation toward the phenomena. We’ve found, however, that to understand the kinds of conditions that we’re interested in, we need a way to focus or frame our study so that we can attend to a specific aspect of the condition and explore it in considerable depth. Footnote 2 We outline this approach in the following section. At first, our approach may seem opposed to Dahlberg’s recommendation of openness. However, as we make clear, our approach should be understood as operating within an attitude of “bounded openness.” The researcher must still be open to novel discoveries and even to perspectives that they had not yet considered. But, to obtain the kind of depth and nuance required to understand complex experiences, including the experience of complex illness, the researcher needs to constrain the scope of her study in advance of conducting observations and interpreting data.

4 Conceptual grounding in observational research

How should we overcome the challenges of conducting observational phenomenological research? Here, we outline a conceptual approach to observational studies, building upon recent work on the use of phenomenological concepts, rather than phenomenological methods, in qualitative research (Fernandez, 2017 ; Fernandez & Køster, 2019 ; Køster & Fernandez, 2021 , Zahavi & Martiny, 2019 ; Zahavi, 2019 ). This approach draws inspiration from phenomenology’s successful applications in psychiatry and the cognitive sciences, which rely on phenomenological concepts to guide their investigations. Dan Zahavi, for instance, has urged qualitative researchers to model their approach on these successful applications by drawing upon phenomenology’s theoretical and conceptual frameworks, rather than phenomenology’s philosophical methods, such as the epoché or reductions. Speaking of qualitative interviewing, he writes,

… it is all about conducting the interview in light of quite specific ideas and notions, notions taken from phenomenological theory. To conduct a phenomenological interview is consequently not simply a question of being open-minded and interested in first-person experience. It is very much also about adopting and employing a comprehensive theoretical framework that will allow one to ask the right questions. (Zahavi, 2019 , 6)

This call for theoretical framing in qualitative research may seem to contrast with the position advanced by Dahlberg, Dahlberg, and Nyström. They say, “Pre-understanding may […] include one’s favorite theories or thought models which become part of, or worse yet, the starting point for the research. Research that blindly follows a theory or a thought model is not open” ( 2008 , 134). However, the contrast may not be as strong as it at first seems. Zahavi does not, for instance, argue that we should take on phenomenology’s theoretical frameworks dogmatically or unreflectively. In fact, the primary reason to take on phenomenology’s theoretical frameworks is precisely because they allow the researcher to think outside dominant or competing theoretical frameworks.

What are these phenomenological frameworks that psychiatrists and cognitive scientists draw upon? They consist primarily of what phenomenologists call essential, ontological, or existential structures. As Zahavi writes, the task of phenomenology is to “…disclose, disentangle, explicate, and articulate those components and structures that are implicitly contained in the pre-reflective experience” ( 2019 , 904). For our purposes, we’ll follow Heidegger and simply refer to these structures as “existentials.” These include selfhood, temporality, affectivity, and embodiment, among a range of other key structural features of human existence. When we apply these concepts in our own approach, we understand them as windows or lenses that provide us with a definite perspective on the phenomenon of interest. Which phenomenon we’re interested in, and which questions we have about it, will determine which existentials should ground our study. We won’t go into considerable detail on how to select existentials here as this has been addressed elsewhere (see Køster & Fernandez, 2021 ) .

Approaching a new phenomenon with a definite theoretical or conceptual framework may seem to undermine any possibility of openness or bridling, which are especially important in observational studies. However, we argue that a researcher can use this kind of framework to ground a phenomenological study while also remaining open in a way that’s consistent with Dahlberg’s approach to bridling. Consider, for instance, how phenomenological psychopathologists have approached the study of schizophrenia. These researchers have extensive knowledge of the condition, which they’ve gained through medical training, their own research, and interactions with patients. When they turned to phenomenology to study this condition, they didn’t put this prior knowledge to the side so that they could view the phenomenon in a completely unbiased light. Rather, they drew on key phenomenological concepts that, in light of their prior knowledge, they thought might be valuable for understanding schizophrenic experience. In particular, they focused on the concept of selfhood. By drawing upon phenomenology’s distinctions among different kinds and levels of selfhood (e.g., the distinction between minimal selfhood and narrative selfhood), they were able to formulate pointed questions that helped them identify some of the core disturbances characteristic of schizophrenic experience. This kind of research has proved a valuable resource for both the understanding and diagnosis of schizophrenia (Parnas et al., 2005 , 2013 ).

But doesn’t this way of conducting phenomenological research limit our potential understanding of the condition in question? Aren’t there features of schizophrenia that the researchers may have missed by focusing too narrowly on the structure of selfhood? It’s certainly possible to miss out on key features of a condition within the scope of a single study. But we need to keep in mind that our understanding of complex experiences must be developed through an ongoing and expanding research program. Each individual study can only take so many perspectives upon the phenomenon if it’s going to explore these aspects with the depth and nuance required. A study that inquires into the experience of schizophrenia, broadly construed, can only scratch the surface of this condition. A study that, in contrast, focuses specifically on an existential structure, such as selfhood, temporality, or embodiment, allows the researcher to explore this aspect of experiential life in considerably greater depth.

This conceptually grounded approach is consistent with calls for bridling for two reasons. First, we need to think of these studies as just one small piece of an overarching research program. Each existential structure provides a window onto the phenomenon in question and allows the researcher to attend to this aspect of the phenomenon. In the case of complex illness experience, there’s always the risk that the particular existential structure that the researcher selected will not provide much insight into the condition. The researcher might investigate, for instance, the affective alterations associated with a particular condition, only to discover that the condition isn’t characterized by an affective disturbance. The possibility of running into dead ends may suggest that the particular study is too narrow. But if we understand openness as an attitude that belongs to the research program as a whole, then we should understand this individual study as closing off a particular path so that we can direct our attention to more valuable research questions.

Second, and following from the first, a study may point the researcher toward other existential structures that they had not intended to explore and had not realized were central to understanding the condition in question. To provide an analogy, this is like peering into a room through a window, only to see another window on the other side of the room that may provide a better vantage point. We’ll illustrate this kind of development in Sect. 7 , where we show how a study of neglect that was initially framed through the concepts of body schema and body image revealed that the condition should be explored, in future studies, through the concepts of agency and ownership.

Up to this point, our discussion has remained fairly theoretical and abstract. To clarify our approach in a more concrete way, we turn to hemispatial neglect and elaborate our approach in the following sections.

5 A case study of neglect

Before discussing how a qualitative study of neglect was developed and implemented, we first present an account of a patient with neglect, which is a composite of patients that one of the authors has interacted with in her research and practice. The case study serves multiple functions in the context of this article. It introduces the reader to the condition of neglect. It highlights some of the challenges involved in understanding the experience of living with this condition. And it also illustrates that qualitative researchers seldom enter their research projects as blank slates. Rather, as we discuss in more detail in Sect. 7 , researchers should draw upon previous clinical and research experience when determining the optimal conceptual grounding of their research project.

Consider the following case: Liza, a lawyer in her early sixties, was admitted to the acute stroke unit yesterday. During doctors’ rounds, Liza was asked to describe what had happened at home and why she had been admitted to the hospital. She explained correctly that she had suffered a stroke. But she said that she had not initially noticed that anything was wrong. She had just gone to the bathroom to take a painkiller because she had a headache. While walking back to bed, she tripped over her grandchild’s toys and fell to the floor. She just wanted to rest for a while. But her husband insisted that she should go to the hospital. Liza was quite upset with her husband because his concerns didn’t make any sense. As far as she was concerned at that point, she was just fine.

Liza’s apparently coherent account of how she ended up in the hospital conflicted with her husband’s description of what happened. He was quite concerned that his usually very sensible wife was ignorant of the fact that she could not move her left side and puzzled by her peculiar statements and actions. He explained that Liza had stood up to take a pain killer for her headache. Shortly after, he heard coughing and gasping from the bathroom, so he rushed to see what was wrong. Liza was standing in front of the mirror trying to swallow her pain medication, with water leaking out of her mouth. He guided her into their bedroom. But, before they reached their bed, Liza lost all strength in the left side of her body and fell. According to her husband, Liza provided “bizarre explanations” to account for why she could not stand up and kept insisting that she had fallen over their grandchild’s toys, even though there were no toys on the floor. The strange behavior continued after hospital admission. While fully awake, alert, and able to carry on a seemingly normal conversation, Liza behaved quite strangely, became annoyed with the staff, and had difficulties comprehending why they prohibited her from walking independently. She did not fully acknowledge that she was paralyzed. For example, if she was asked to move her left arm, she elevated her right arm instead and was quite satisfied with her own performance, expressing the belief that she had successfully moved her left paralyzed arm. Liza’s physical attempts to move as she did prior to the stroke would cause her to, for instance, tumble back when trying to sit up. On several occasions, she accused staff of holding her down or having her constrained her to the bed. This “rough treatment” affected her deeply and her frustration was almost tangible. She said, “I’m a prisoner, nobody listens to reason. I just get a rude answer when I ask them (the staff) to lower the bed rails, even if I ask nicely.”

Three weeks after the stroke, Liza became more aware that her left-sided extremities were indeed paralyzed. Nevertheless, she frequently attempted to ambulate by herself—even though she had promised, quite convincingly, to call for assistance if she needed to move. She appeared forgetful about her left-sided paralysis when acting impulsively, such as when she suddenly needed to go to the bathroom, wanted to fetch her phone on the table, or was thirsty. At one moment she could engage in serious conversations where she expressed, for instance, concern over never being able to manage at home again due to her disability. Moments later, she might ask her relatives to bring her the needlework and embroidery that she was working on at home so she could finish it, which she obviously was not capable of working on due to her paralysis.

Liza had suffered from a heterogeneous condition called neglect. In the most severe cases of neglect, patients may display quite dramatic behavior, acting as if the left side of their environment has completely ceased to exist (Bartolomeo, 2014 ). In less severe cases, patients only occasionally miss out on left sided stimuli. Characteristic examples of neglect behavior include seeing patients collide with objects or people to the left, situations where they act ignorant of the left side of their body, and lack awareness of the extent of their own disability (anosognosia) (Bonato et al., 2012 ; Ronchi, 2011 ). However, it may also involve situations in which patients transpose events from the left hemispace onto the right (allesthesia) or a tendency for patients to fabricate stories or otherwise venture to justify the missing details in their experiences (Bottini et al., 2009 ). Patients may also complain about diversion and unfamiliarity of the left side of their body or maintain that their affected limbs belong to the therapist, physician, or nurse. Such confabulations take place without intentional dishonesty and they are not a sign of mental disorder (Bottini et al., 2009 ; Rode et al., 2014 ). When these errors of perception are “simple”, they can be corrected easily by pointing them out to patients. However, in more complex cases, patients persistently overthrow any attempts at rectification and act threatened if they are confronted with their mistaken perceptions (Feinberg et al., 2005 ).

At first glance, patients with neglect appear articulate and may seem to have the cognitive abilities required to process and provide first-person, self-reflective reports. It is thus tempting to merely interview patients with neglect if you wish to gain insight into their experiences. However, in spite of their verbal abilities, they are not “good informants” in the traditional sense; no matter how skilled an interviewer might be, the interviewee with neglect simply cannot provide the kind of evidence that such a study requires. The responses of patients with neglect may not be sufficiently anchored in reality and there is characteristically a mismatch between their perspectives of a given situation and the perspectives of others. Observations are thus of pivotal importance.

6 Approaches to observational research

Now that we have a basic understanding of neglect and why it needs to be studied through observation, we should outline the various kinds of observations that a researcher might conduct:

Observing in proximity with direct interaction: On this approach, the researcher enacts along with participants, which provides opportunities to determine how they perceive and how they tune in to their daily activities. The researcher is with the participants, not just beside them in the pursuit of understanding the experience. Being with participants and having some degree of joint intentionality requires reciprocity between the participant’s and researcher’s intentions and acts. Actions are interlocked and, to some degree, synchronized and recalibrated in the immediacy of interactions (Schutz, 1967 ). Footnote 3

Observing during highlighted events: These are situations where the researcher pays attention to how participants engage with others, for instance by accompanying them to a rehabilitation session or observing them while they watch television. In these situations, the researcher is not burdened with the necessity to act but takes a more unobtrusive stance in observing a scene.

Reports of observations from others: In the case of illness experience, this may include reports from friends, relatives, or hospital staff. This is the least reliable form for observation but may still provide important information that furnishes future targets for the researcher’s own observations.

Observations, as must be emphasized, are not used to reduce patients’ experiences to their actions. From a phenomenological standpoint, observation exceeds the insight that one could gain from an objectifying third-person perspective. Rather, through observation, one attends to the bodily expressions of a person’s subjective experience, including his desires, intentions, or emotions. And, because phenomenological observations gear into the subjective life of the participant, they also call for methods that allow the researcher to integrate observations and self-reflective reports to gain a more complete understanding of the participant’s experience.

The way that observations and interviews supplement each other in the data collection of complex illness experiences is illustrated clearly when Liza claims that other people are constraining her ability to move freely, for example when she wants to stand up. This makes her feel trapped, misunderstood, and even maltreated. On the contrary, the researcher observing Liza knows for certain that other people are not constraining her movements. The difference between the interpretations that Liza and the researcher entertain does not mean that their experiences are not about the same thing. Their experiences have common ground that should be joined to provide a coherent report of Liza’s subjective experience. We are, however, not looking for perfect attunement between these perspectives. On the contrary, the desynchronized perspectives may be precisely what reveals the core of her complex illness experience.

For patients such as Liza, who are prone to incorporate fictional elements into their stories, it may be extremely difficult for the researcher to discern what is true or what is not. However, the experience that the patient talks about does not have to be “true” and the researcher does not have to agree with the patient’s perspective for the experience to provide essential information for understanding their condition. There is a sense in which patients’ experiences of “what it is like” and their self-reflections are by nature “epistemically secure (that is self-intimating, infallible, indubitable and incorrigible) but also metaphysically and epistemically direct” (Choifer, 2018 , 336). But there’s also a sense in which first-person beliefs can be meaningfully “corrected by others or be overridden by external evidence” (Zahavi, 2005 , 13)—or, as we prefer to look at it, not overridden but rather merged.

In the case of Liza, it is obvious that the phenomenologist is faced with challenges that go beyond the ones described by Dahlberg ( 2006 ). Dahlberg seems to entertain the idea that data gathered by interviews are more “to the point” than data gathered through observation. But, as illustrated, Liza’s self-reflective knowledge cannot be interpreted correctly without paying attention to her actions. In fact, there’s a sense in which her bodily actions are more “honest” than her verbal account.

Having provided some practical guidance on different forms of observations, we now turn to an empirical study of neglect to illustrate how observational research, coupled with limited interviews, can be framed by phenomenological concepts in order to focus on specific features of experience.

7 An example of conceptual grounding in an observational study of neglect

It is clear that neglect experience is remarkably complex. The condition includes more elements than we can possibly capture without using some kind of compass to navigate toward the cardinal features of the experience. Without such a guide, we run the risk of gaining too much irrelevant and superficial information. If the phenomenologist sets out with an overly broad research question—such as “What is the subjective experience of neglect?”—then they’re unlikely to gain new insight into the experience. By using phenomenological concepts, the researcher can focus on a specific dimension of experience and study it in considerable detail. But how does the researcher select the most relevant concepts to ground a study? The researcher should draw upon prior knowledge of the topic, including scientific scholarship, first-person reports, memoirs of illness experience, clinical reports, and so on. By drawing on this body of knowledge, they should identify structural features of subjectivity that may be key to understanding the experience in question. Then, they should devise a research question and approach that focuses specifically on those features of experience and inquire into them in depth. Footnote 4

For a concrete example of how such concepts can ground observational research, we will turn to one of the authors’ empirical studies of neglect. Participants included 12 neglect hospital admitted patients (8 women) with moderate to severe neglect within 21 days following stroke (Klinke et al., 2015). Finding the most fruitful concepts to ground the data collection and analysis was a time-consuming and laborious endeavor. It was decided early on that the key focus would be on embodiment. However, to focus the study even further, an array of concepts related to bodily action and body awareness were explored by investigating their different uses within phenomenology and the cognitive sciences and by considering how they might relate to neglect. Previous clinical encounters with neglect patients were used as a springboard to consider if the concepts were likely to furnish new insights and to identify key events where observations of participants should take place. How the concepts could be used as tools to merge different types of data (i.e., interview and observational data) was also an important consideration. To make sure that the most illuminating concepts were selected, the research team, consisting of healthcare professionals and researchers specialized in neglect as well as philosophically trained phenomenologists, engaged in repeated discussions about the aspects of neglect that might be better understood through phenomenology and the concepts that would be most valuable to the study. Footnote 5 Finally, three concepts—“body schema”, “body image”, and “affordance”— were selected because their conceptual distinctions seemed particularly valuable for understanding components of embodiment associated with neglect (Klinke et al., 2014 ).

In our previous experience with neglect patients, we had observed that they often acted as if they still had the same bodily capabilities as they did prior to the stroke, which implied an asymmetry between the body schema and body image. The body schema constitutes the tacit and habitual ways that the body, almost automatically, accomplishes daily tasks. To proficiently use the body to fulfill one’s intentions requires a sense of proprioception, i.e., a tacit sense of bodily posture and position, and an advanced set of sensory-motor skills. Without paying conscious attention to movement, the body is acquainted to its own capabilities during the unperturbed flow of daily activities and finetunes its movements according to the demands of the environment (Gallagher, 2005 ). The body image, in contrast, refers to a range of experiences, including emotions, beliefs, and perceptions that a person has about one’s body (Gallagher, 2005 ).

Under normal circumstances, even after stroke, people are acquainted with their bodily capabilities. If, for instance, you suffered a pure motor paralysis and were relearning to use your fingers, you would be aware of your bodily limitations. When trying to grab a glass of water, you would concentrate intensely on closing your fingers around the glass while lifting it up to your mouth. You wouldn’t simply attempt to reach out and grab the glass of water in the same way that you had before your paralysis. This is because your body schema has updated to accommodate your current bodily capacities. You then rely, in part, on your body image when you explicitly attend to the movements of your fingers and their position around the glass. This is, however, not how neglect patients behave when they have paralysis following a stroke. This kind of body-awareness and ability to adjust seems to have vanished and causes neglect patients to misperceive the kinds of actions that their environment affords. Affordances can crudely be characterized as the range of unique possibilities within the environment that an individual acts upon (Gibson, 1986 ). So, rather than experience an environment full of brute, meaningless objects, we experience our environment as filled with objects that afford various possibilities for action. For instance, a floor is walkable, an apple is eatable, a chair sittable, and so forth. However, a floor may no longer be walkable if you have left-sided paralysis. Nevertheless, we had noticed that patients with neglect tended to act as if the floor was still walkable because they misperceive such affordances. Affordances thus seemed to provide a way to describe situations where an asymmetry between body schema and body image emerges due to neglect. To capture situations where neglect patients misperceived what their environments afforded them and attempted to use bodily capacities that they no longer had, the study focused on the following main question: “What does it mean to misperceive affordances and how do misperceived affordances manifest in patients with neglect?”.

When preparing for data collection, the concepts are “frontloaded”, which means that they’re integrated into the initial design of the study (Gallagher, 2003 ; for a more detailed account of how frontloading, which was originally developed as a way to integrate phenomenology and experimental cognitive science, can also be used in qualitative research, see Køster & Fernandez, 2021 ). This helps the researcher frame the study and decide on the content of the data collection protocol, including guidance on what to ask and which situations to observe. Footnote 6 For example, because we wanted to better understand affordances that neglect patients acted upon, we focused our observations on daily activities that required a certain kind of bodily awareness. Our observations were especially targeted to include daily care situations where we knew from our clinical experience that mismatches between the body schema and body image were prone to occur. It encompassed both “online” actions, where patients responded to affordances in the immediacy of a situation without contemplating what they were about to do (e.g., when responding to a sudden need to go to the bathroom), as well as situations that required reflection on one’s own bodily capabilities prior to action (e.g., when staff provided guidance or corrections on how to dress or ambulate). We deliberately used different modes of observation, enacting and observing interaction between neglect patients and others. Footnote 7 By relying on our pre-selected set of concepts we were able to distinguish situations where patients misperceived affordances—for instance, when they acted surprised about the outcomes of their behavior or where there was a mismatch between their perspective of the situation and other peoples’ perspective.

The data collection also included questions corresponding to the observations, for instance questions related to lack of insight. For example, when patients requested to be discharged or to ambulate without supervision, they were asked, “Do you know why you are in the hospital?” or “What happened in this situation and how have your bodily abilities changed?” And when relatives acted surprised and did not fulfill the patient’s wishes, such as lowering their bedrails so they could get out of bed despite being paralyzed, patients were later asked, “How did you experience the way that other people responded to your wishes, for instance when you asked your wife to lower the bedrails so you could go to the bathroom by yourself?” This line of questioning was not executed to verify or falsify the participants’ experiences, but rather to reveal the absence in their bodily awareness and how they behaved in light of this absence, both in actions and words—and also to establish if further observations, during other situations or when inquiring about the same events at different time-points, might bring more nuance to the data. Footnote 8 Gathering data on the same “event”, both in proximity of the event and later on, turned out to be important even in the preliminary analysis of data from the first participant: a 48 year old woman with moderate neglect who had slight paralysis in her left extremities. She could ambulate with minor physical support but was nevertheless dependent on constant supervision due to her neglect. An event where the patient neglected to remove her shirt from her left arm before showering played out as follows:

Initially when her attention was drawn to the soaked clothes, she showed comprehension: “I do not seem to be in control of anything hanging onto here [pointing at her left arm].” This insight, however, quickly tapered off to a point where she minimized the difficulties profoundly. When requested to describe how she had managed to shower later the same day, the prompt reply was “fine—this was no problem.” When confronted with the soaked clothes, she confirmed that “a small amount of water accidently squirted onto here [pointing to her left arm]; this happens all the time.” Any additional pursuing was not possible because she became upset when her performance was questioned. (Klinke et al., 2015 , 1629)

Pursuing specific events of misperceived affordances in the remaining 11 study participants revealed that memories of events occurring on their left side, including verbal information provided within the neglected space, often faded over time or were replaced by confabulations. In a similar manner, other distinctive features of neglect emerged throughout the study when the researcher interrogated misperceived affordances. The showering example also shows how it was impossible to disentangle interviews and observations completely. Thus, patients were asked questions at the moment the researcher observed neglect. Their reflective responses to these questions—or their lack of capacity to acknowledge their neglect behavior—furnished new ideas for observations. This worked in a circular manner, where the researcher continually moved closer to the “heart” of the experience while accommodating the observations to suit each patient’s unique neglect problems.

The process of frontloading concepts to frame a phenomenological study can be characterized as explorative and dynamic. In fact, looking through one conceptual window sometimes led to the discovery of conceptual windows that we had not previously considered, but provided new opportunities for observation and ways of posing questions. For instance, when studying body schema, body image, and affordances in neglect, we also realized that studying various aspects of “agency” and “ownership” would be valuable for a follow-up study. When conducting a study framed through the concepts of agency and ownership, observations would center on situations that display lack of bodily control and problems in feeling the body as mine. Moreover, subsequent interviews may include general questions, such as “Do you feel that you have control over your body/situation?” as well as questions about specific events, such as “Can you describe how you used your arms when you were getting dressed this morning?” By conceiving of each concept as a window onto the phenomenon, we understand that other windows may offer valuable insight into the experience—and these insights are not fragmentary, since each provides a perspective on the same phenomenon. Investigating complex illness is akin to mapping unplotted territory. You learn more along the way and the data collection continuously evolves:

[The] ability to observe increases with increasing knowledge (or decreases when it learns that it was mistaken in some piece of background information it employed). In the process of acquiring knowledge, we not only learn about nature, we also learn how to learn about it, by learning (among other things) what constitutes information and how to obtain it. (Shapere, 1982 , 513–514).

By having researched neglect patients’ experiences in light of their body schema, body image, and affordances, it became clear that their habitual bodily skills in many situations no longer align with actual bodily skills—and this loss of alignment is largely outside the scope of their reflective self-awareness, as illustrated by how they misperceive possibilities in the environment. Merleau-Ponty describes similar quandaries in a patient with a phantom limb when he writes,

At the same moment that my usual world gives rise to habitual intentions in me, I can no longer actually unite with it if I have lost a limb. Manipulable objects, precisely insofar as they appear as manipulable, appeal to a hand that I no longer have…. The patient knows his disability precisely insofar as he is ignorant of it, and he ignores it precisely insofar as he knows it…: it is as though our body comprises two distinct layers, that of the habitual body and that of the actual body. (Merleau-Ponty, 2012 , 84)

In contrast to patients with phantom limbs, patients with moderate to severe neglect have difficulties upgrading their body schema according to their actual capabilities. They continue to misperceive affordances and not learn from their mistakes. Footnote 9

By frontloading key concepts, we were better able to attend to important issues associated with the embodied subjective experience of neglect and untangle its existential impact from other disorders. It’s important to note that while we expect that many aspects of our approach will apply broadly to the study of other complex experiences, including those characteristic of some neurological and psychiatric disorders, it will need to be modified for individual research projects.

8 Conclusion

Researchers using applied phenomenology to study complex illness and other experiential alterations should make use of the rich resources one can find in phenomenology’s philosophical tradition. These resources include a vast number of concepts that can structure a study without predetermining the study’s conclusions, thereby maintaining an attitude of bounded openness. Frontloading concepts allows the researcher to focus on a particular aspect of experience and study it in considerable detail. And this process can be used to more tightly integrate philosophical phenomenology with observational research methods.

People with neglect, and other complex illness experiences, are often incapable of providing coherent reflections of their experiences. Therefore, they are often excluded from qualitative research studies, including approaches that use applied phenomenology. Yet, experiences such as theirs are perhaps the most important cases for us to study, since they are often poorly understood by healthcare professionals. To properly understand these experiences, the researcher needs multiple modes of access to the participant’s subjectivity, including through interviews and observations. Such studies have the potential to inform and guide clinical care, insofar as they provide clinicians with more insight into the experiences and perspectives of their patients. And there are doubtless many other kinds of experiences and experiential alterations that might be better understood by using a phenomenological approach to observational research.

The practice of observational research within applied phenomenology may be deemed unconventional, since philosophical phenomenology is often characterized as a first-person reflective method. However, as we’ve argued, many of the classical phenomenologists used observations in their own research, including in the study of complex illness experience. And observational methods are not entirely absent from contemporary approaches to phenomenological qualitative research—although genuine integrations of phenomenology and observational methods have been rare. Self-reflective reports and observations of behavior should not be understood as standing in opposition. Rather the researcher can draw on key concepts within phenomenology to integrate these two perspectives and gain greater insight into the structures of the participant’s subjectivity and their experience.

Change history

21 december 2022.

A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-022-09867-x

For further readings of the case of Ian Waterman, we refer to the book Pride and a Daily Marathon where the neurologist Jonathan Cole provides in-depth insight into how Waterman developed strategies to move around and manage many common daily activities although he, due to a rare auto-immune neurological condition, lost all sense of position and proprioception below the neck when he was 19 years old (Cole, 1995 ).

Dahlberg’s interest in observational research typically focuses on interactions among healthcare workers and patients. She refers, for example, to an observational study by Wireklint Sundström that found that the “smooth, often wordless, co-working between ambulance carers was of extreme importance” (as described in Dahlberg, 2006 ); yet, despite the importance of this kind of interaction, the ambulance workers did not mention it in their interviews. This shows that observations can often reveal aspects of experience that participants are not reflectively aware of. However, in this case, the ambulance workers could have, at least in principle, been reflectively aware of this aspect of their professional practice—perhaps if one asked different questions or interviewed different ambulance workers, such insights would have been articulated. Our own interest, by contrast, is primarily concerned with cases where the very capacities to reflect upon or report one’s experience are compromised in illness or injury. In such cases, observational research becomes all the more important because it may be the only genuine mode of access to at least some aspects of the patient’s experience.

Schutz argues that although observation of the other is indirect, it still, in some cases, provides better access to the other’s experience than I might even have to my own experience. Through observations I can directly observe the other's subjective experience in the midst of their actual occurrence which is something that is impossible for my own experiences: “we have to wait for our own [experiences] to elapse in order to peer at them as they recede into the past. No man can see himself in action, any more than he can know the “style” of his own personality” (Schutz, 1967 , xxvi).

For a more detailed account of how this process can be used in the design of interview-based studies, see (Køster & Fernandez, 2021 ).

It is important to use the resources of intersubjective collaboration. The researcher had extensive clinical experience with neglect patients that she could draw on but needed to collaborate with experts in phenomenology to help expand her conceptual understanding. A reverse situation is presented by Kristian Martiny in his study of Cerebral Palsy where he as a phenomenologist discussed his observations of research participants with neuro-physiological researchers and healthcare professionals to expand his clinical comprehension (Høffding & Martiny, 2016 ).

Due to ethical requirements, the researcher will typically need a framework in advance, which provides detail about the character/intimacy of the observations and the corresponding questions that will be posed to participants. However, the framework should be flexible enough to be tailored to fit each participant’s unique neglect manifestations.

Observation took place through interaction or unobtrusively while others (e.g., relatives or medical staff) interacted with participants for four to eight hours, denoting actual hours of activity. To achieve this, the researcher observed each participant during 2–4 days at different time-points. The clinical observations were used to prompt in-situ interviews and guide the content of more formal interviews. Trust can be a confounding issue during data collection because patients typically refrain from volunteering sensitive, personal details or acting naturally if a trusting relationship between them and the researcher is not established. Therefore, it is essential to establish a rapport that invites patients to express their experiences, however odd or uncanny. To establish such a rapport, the researcher will need to demonstrate genuine interest and appear knowledgeable when patients convey their experiences.

Rather than have a generic list of observations and questions, the researcher builds a framework that allows for flexibility to interrogate different contexts of misperceived affordances, see Klinke et al., 2014 ,  2015 , for examples of this kind of framework.

For examples of changes that specifically pertains the body schema, body image, and affordances in neglect, see Klinke et al., 2014 .

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Klinke, M.E., Fernandez, A.V. Taking phenomenology beyond the first-person perspective: conceptual grounding in the collection and analysis of observational evidence. Phenom Cogn Sci 22 , 171–191 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-021-09796-1

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Phenomenological psychology and qualitative research

Magnus englander.

1 Department of Social Work, Faculty of Health & Society, Malmö University, Malmö, Sweden

James Morley

2 Department of Psychology, Ramapo College of New Jersey, Mahwah, NJ USA

This article presents the tradition of phenomenologically founded psychological research that was originally initiated by Amedeo Giorgi. This data analysis method is inseparable from the broader project of establishing an autonomous phenomenologically based human scientific psychology. After recounting the history of the method from the 1960’s to the present, we explain the rationale for why we view data collection as a process that should be adaptable to the unique mode of appearance of each particular phenomenon being researched. The substance of the article is then devoted to a detailed outline of the method’s whole-part-whole procedure of data analysis. We then offer a sample analysis of a brief description of an ordinary daydream. This is an anxiety daydream in response to the recent Covid-19 pandemic. We present this daydream analysis in full to show the concrete hands-on 5 step process through which the researcher explicated the participants’ expressions from the particular to the general. From this brief sample analysis, the researcher offers a first-person reflection on the data analysis process to offer the reader an introduction to the diacritical nature of phenomenological psychological elucidation.

Pure phenomenology's tremendous significance for any concrete grounding of psychology is clear from the very beginning. If all consciousness is subject to essential laws in a manner similar to that in which spatial reality is subject to mathematical laws, then these essential laws will be of most fertile significance in investigating facts of the conscious life of human and brute animals.—Husserl 1917 . 1 The natural sciences were never intended to study man as a person. One need not leave the realm of science to study man adequately. We need only to broaden science itself.—Giorgi, 1970 2

Introduction

Recently, there has been a healthy and long overdue discussion over how best to appraise the many new qualitative methods and how they contribute to scientific knowledge in psychology. For phenomenological psychologists the crucial challenge is, as expressed by Edmund Husserl (quoted above), to show how phenomenology provides a " concrete grounding " and " fertile significance " to the development of psychology as a science. Historically, it is well known that psychology, by and large, has imitated the methodology of the natural sciences. As expressed by Amedeo Giorgi (quoted above), by emulating physical science, psychology gave up studying human beings "as persons ." In response to this critical flaw at the heart of modern psychology, phenomenological psychologists endeavor to redirect psychology toward a more phenomenologically based direction. The centerpiece of this project has been the development of a qualitative research methodology that would make a phenomenological psychological science possible. What follows is an outline of the original research method, where we also offer an example of data analysis as carried out by the researcher.

Historical context: the project of a human science psychology

Before we launch into our main presentation, we believe that it is important to offer a brief historical review to illustrate the unique way in which this method developed in close collaboration with phenomenological philosophy. The following section is a synthesis that draws from historical accounts by Smith ( 2002 ), ( 2010 ), Cloonan ( 1995 ), and Churchill and Wertz’s ( 2015 ), as well as from the past experience of the authors.

In the early 1960’s Giorgi found phenomenology to be practiced in an ambivalent and often methodologically contradictory manner in European academic psychology. Similarly, American humanistic psychologists, sympathetic to phenomenology, were active critics of the deterministic approaches of mainstream psychology. But they, nonetheless, like their European counterparts, also defaulted to non-phenomenological measurement techniques when it came to their own research designs. It was as a response to this situation that the first systematically phenomenological psychology program was founded at Duquesne University in the early 1960’s. In this context Giorgi and his colleagues articulated this distinctly phenomenological way of doing psychological research—a methodology consistent with its phenomenological foundations. While Giorgi took the lead role in the development of this methodology, it needs to be stressed that this a was also an interdisciplinary community endeavor that took place between the philosophy and psychology departments at Duquesne University spanning the 1960’s to the late 1980’s. John Scanlon, the translator of Husserl’s phenomenological psychology lectures, was particularly supportive as a consultant to Giorgi and his colleagues during this period—as was Richard Rojcewicz, Al Lingis, Lester Embree, and several non-Duquesne but sympathetic scholars such as Martin Dillon, William Richardson and many others whom, records show, were often invited as guest speakers and consultants. Also, the psychology curriculum required students to take a minimum of two courses in modern philosophy, whereas the psychology faculty consistently audited philosophy courses.

In 1970 Giorgi launched the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology , which was at the outset a joint venture with European phenomenologically oriented psychologists and psychiatrists, as well as phenomenological philosophers. The journal was initially co-edited by Georges Thines and Carl F. Graumann. Serving on the first editorial board were Europeans such as Blankenburg, Buytendijk, Gurwitsch, van den Berg, van Breda, and Straus. The key point here is that the work being done on the development of the research methodology was part of a radically interdisciplinary and international project from the very beginning. As part of the overall project, Giorgi also founded the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center . This research center also carries a copy of Husserl’s unpublished papers from the archives in Leuven, as well as the archives of Gurwitsch, Straus, Strasser, Bouman, Heidegger’s Marburg lectures, Buytendijk’s Pensée Repensée , and over 20,000 volumes, making it the largest collection of existential-phenomenological literature in the world. At the official inception of the center, Giorgi invited John Salis as his co-director.

Giorgi's seminal work, Psychology as a Human Science: A Phenomenology-Based Approach ( 1970 ) expressed a phenomenological response to the historical situation of psychology as a natural science. This also served as a foundational text for the psychology curriculum at Duquesne. Here, as a psychologist, he first proposed the necessity of a rigorously procedural, qualitative research method for a human scientific psychology. It made the appeal for an overall paradigmatic unity of “approach, method, and content” as the basis for a non-naturalistic psychology—an authentic Geisteswissenschaft or ‘human scientific’ psychology. Giorgi insisted that if psychology is to be true to its own subject matter, the scientific study of humans as persons, then the meaning of term 'empirical' in psychology must by necessity be 'broadened' beyond empiricism’s restriction to the sensory (see also, Giorgi, 1971 , 2009 ). A phenomenologically empirical science would be inclusive of all experience. This would include (in Husserl’s terms) the ir-real, or the more than sensory aspects of experience, not just the real or sense-based measurables of classical empiricism. The vision was to employ the overall phenomenological paradigm to ground a human scientific psychology, a scientific enterprise autonomous from the naturalistic juggernaut of mainstream psychology.

Over this 50-year history this methodological approach has been known by various names: the phenomenological psychological method, the existential-phenomenological psychological method, the qualitative phenomenological method, human science psychology and even “the Duquesne method.” The founding Duquesne faculty mostly preferred the term “ Existential-Phenomenological Psychology ” to highlight the influence of all main continental thinkers: Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty—as well as Husserl and many others. The term “existential” also expressed their emphasis on concrete psychological situatedness in contrast to transcendental phenomenological philosophy. Phenomenological psychologists who received their graduate training from within the Duquesne research tradition, such as, Frederick Wertz (Wertz et al., 2011 ) used the term “Phenomenological Psychological Method,” whereas Scott Churchill ( 2022 ) maintains the original Duquesne term “Existential Phenomenological Research.” As we will see ahead, it was only in 2009 that Giorgi committed to the nomenclature of “the descriptive phenomenological method in psychology.” The emphasis on description was done to offer a counterpoint to the penchant among qualitative researchers, often influenced by cultural postmodernism, to take the extreme position that 'everything is an interpretation'—something rejected by Giorgi as the imposition of a hermeneutic universalism (Giorgi, 1992 ). 3 However, while generally based on Husserl’s approach, it is very important to highlight how in his 2009 text he never claimed his method to be identical to Husserl's. It was instead it was a modification of Husserlian philosophical methodology to adapt to the human scientific context of the discipline of psychology (Giorgi, 2014 , 2021 ). 4 In addition, Giorgi ( 2006 , 2010 , 2018 ) has also made several critical comparisons with other qualitative phenomenological methods as well as replies to philosophers (Giorgi, 2017 , 2020 , 2021 ). Several of his psychology colleagues and ex-students have developed variations of the method. Davidson ( 1988 , 2003 , 2021 ), for example, offers such a variation, to which both Giorgi ( 2020 , 2021 ) and Wertz ( 2016 ) are sympathetic. Churchill ( 2022 ) maintains the core Husserlian elements while complimenting them with Heideggerian insights. But all such variations maintain most of the key components of the overall method—as shall be outlined ahead.

Across the development of this research tradition, there have been innumerable studies published in various psychology journals and books based on this overall approach. This research tradition is cited as a significant development within the history of modern psychology (see Brennan & Houde, 2017 ). Important theoretical and original qualitative research findings were published in the four volume, Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology (Giorgi et al., 1971 , 1975 , 1979 , 1983 ), as well as the edited volume Phenomenology and Psychological Research (Giorgi, 1985 ). The latter contains paradigmatic empirical studies on learning (by Giorgi) criminal victimization (by Wertz), thinking while playing chess (by Aanstoos), and self-deception (by Fischer). A brief representative sampling that illustrates the range of recent research outputs is as follows: Living through positive experiences of psychotherapy (Giorgi & Gallegos, 2005 ), Lived persistent meaning of early emotional memories (Englander, 2007 ), Art appreciation (Roald, 2008 ), Pivotal moments in therapy (B. Giorgi, 2011 ), Postpartum depression (Røseth et al., 2011 ), Autism and culture (Desai et al., 2012 ), Leading a police vehicle pursuit (Broomé, 2013 ), Social anxiety (Beck, 2013 ), The suffering of older adults (Morrissey, 2015 ), The beginning of an extra-marital affair (Zapien, 2016 ), Mental health and the workplace (Tangvald-Pedersen and Bongaardt, 2017 ) Disturbances in maternal affection (Røseth and Bongaardt, 2019 ) Cross cultural learning (DeRobertis, 2017 , 2020 ), and Black men’s experience of police harassment (Vogel, 2021 ).

Data collection

Since this research tradition is oriented toward data analysis, this section on data collection will be brief and limited to some basic principles. Because psychologists are usually already well trained in interview techniques (Englander, 2020 ; Giorgi, 2020 ), it is natural that interviews will be commonly used to collect descriptive material. However, we stress that the method is not, by itself, an interview method. 5 Instead, each data collection strategy is developed in an idiosyncratic way by first understanding how each phenomenon best reveals itself in its own unique mode of appearance (Englander, 2020 ). For instance, when studying ‘thinking while playing chess’ Aanstoos ( 1985 ), found interviewing, by itself, to be insufficient for accessing the subtle psychological nuances of playing chess. To accommodate this phenomenon, Aanstoos ( 1983 ), developed a 'think aloud method' where one player freely spoke his thoughts into a recorder during a chess game while the opponent had his ears covered. In other words, the principle here was to design the data collection process by attending closely to the particularity of the phenomenon. Typically, the phenomenon is carefully circumscribed in advance through pilot studies, field work and clinical contexts from which the researcher can uncover the ways to best solicit descriptions and expressions that can most successfully reveal deeper psychological meanings.

Our main point here is that there should be a ‘custom fit’ between the phenomenon and the data collection design to solicit maximally good descriptions of the phenomenon within the context of everyday life. Strategies for collecting such descriptions should not be presumed beforehand and imposed on the phenomenon. The data collection design should fit the phenomenon instead of the phenomenon being forced to fit the design . Concretely, the phenomenon or related phenomena should be carefully studied through the trial-and-error process of pilot studies before any final decisions are made regarding data collection strategies.

Having made these points, some general recommendations have been laid out for data collection procedures. Drawing from existential-phenomenological philosophers such as Sartre ( 1962 , 28–29) and Merleau-Ponty ( 1962 ), phenomenological psychologists acknowledge that a person is always in a situation. At the start of any data collection, the research focus is on a concrete situation in which the participant has directly experienced the phenomenon under investigation. A concrete situation is not an idea, an attitude or anything abstract and conceptual—it is an experience that is directly lived. This acknowledgement of the situated concrete nature of psychological phenomena is another reason why data collection designs, again, need to be unique to the phenomenon and independently ‘custom-designed’ by the researcher. Or put another way, each study seeks the mode of investigation that allows the phenomenon to best express itself in its own distinctive way.

Data analysis 6

This is a ‘whole-part-whole’ qualitative method that includes steps where the researcher adopts the phenomenological psychological attitude and applies the technique of eidetic variation. Again, in contrast to philosophical analysis, phenomenological psychology begins and ends with meanings as lived and contextualized within the mundane, everyday lifeworld.

Concrete 5 step method of data analysis

The data analysis has five steps. Over the course of nearly five decades of experience we have learned that success with this method is best achieved by applying each step in a generally sequential relation to the other steps. In this way, all five steps work as an integral whole. The steps that follow where adopted from a recent publication by Giorgi et al. ( 2017 ). Having said this, it is important to also point out that these steps have both a linier and non-linier dimension to them. The linear sequential ‘steps’ offers an initial structure and organization that can also liberate the researcher to move back and forth, reviewing previous steps and revising them in relation to new discoveries and intuitions. In actual concrete practice, the process becomes more like a working draft or scaffold to work from. Ahead, in our discussion of the case analysis, this non-linier dimension will be more fully addressed.

Step 1. Initial reading for a sense of the whole

As this is a whole-part-whole method, the procedure begins with the ‘sense of the whole,’ proceeds with an analysis of the parts, and concludes with a newly elucidated ‘sense of the whole.’ Thus, the preliminary ‘appreciation’ of the entire description is important because it prepares and assists the researcher for the next steps where one studies its parts. This ‘sense of a whole’ should not be confused with hypothesis, conclusions or theorizations. Instead, it should be seen as a tentative understanding that is only an opening prelude to a relationship with the descriptive material. Importantly, it is this ‘sense of the whole,’ provided by the participant’s full descriptive account, that will act as the background to the diacritical figure-ground analysis carried out during the latter steps. In concrete practical terms, the researcher reviews the transcription (or audio or video) several times before starting Step 2. Again, this first step establishes the figure-ground framework that will drive the part-whole analysis of the entire method as every part, or meaning unit, will usually be explicated in terms of its relationship with the whole of the description.

Step 2. Adopting the phenomenological psychological attitude

Adopting the overall phenomenological attitude or ‘way of seeing’ is what distinguishes this method from other forms of non-phenomenological qualitative research. Importantly, and this can’t be stressed enough from the onset, in our work as social scientists doing life-world qualitative research, the epoché and the reduction function in a different context then in philosophy. 7 So, modified to accommodate the psychological sphere of interest, this attitude is essential to the next steps of the data analysis. Most would agree that time needs to be dedicated to the study authoritative primary sources in phenomenology to fully understand the nature of this phenomenological approach to research. This involves, (1) the epoché (or suspension) of the natural attitude, and (2) an assumption of the phenomenological psychological reduction.

With the practice of the epoché we try to just let the experience of something arise in its “givenness.” 8 In Husserl’s terms this is a ‘putting out of play’ or ‘parenthesizing’ of any positions of belief or doubt toward the world as independent of our consciousness of the world. This ordinary everyday position towards reality is what phenomenologists call the ‘natural attitude.’ A corollary of the natural attitude is the naturalistic attitude which is the commonsense belief that all things are ultimately explained by the physical causes of natural science. So, the psychologist appropriates the epoché for several reasons, (1) it clears the way for us to better understand how the participants are experiencing the world, self and others, and (2) it liberates us to better describe other people’s experiences without falling back on physical explanations, rationalizations, stereotypes or explaining them away with hypothetical models and concepts. (3). It allows researchers to become more aware of how, as Merleau-Ponty ( 1962 , p xiii) put it, one’s own ‘intentional threads’ are themselves influencing the phenomenon. (4). It invites researchers to overcome prejudices and doubts with regard to their own aptitudes for intuitive imagination. Put another way, the epoché opens us to see how the world is profusely intertwined with both the researchers and the research participant's experience of it, characterizing a radically non-dogmatic and open-minded perspective towards psychological research.

We will next go into some detail on the nature of the reduction in phenomenological psychology because it is here that phenomenological psychologists make significant and necessary modifications to the reduction, and in turn the epoché , as originally expressed by Husserl and philosophical phenomenologists. The phenomenological psychological reduction is what one does after first understanding the perspective of the epoché. Here we ‘reduce’ or restrict our frame of reference to a particular region of meaning. The psychological, in this sense, can be viewed as a particular region of science that is a psychological reduction. In the human scientific context of a qualitative psychology, a psychological reduction takes on a different meaning than Husserl’s original incomplete depiction of the psychological reduction. Husserl saw the psychological reduction as both a propaedeutic steppingstone towards the transcendental (or philosophical) reduction, 9 as much as he also saw it as the basis for new kind of psychological science—as we are applying it here. However, not being a psychologist, Husserl was not able to offer detail on how to apply the psychological reduction in an applied human science context. It is here where Giorgi's modification of the psychological reduction incorporates the doings of science to qualitative psychological research. The psychological region pertains to a particular domain of lived experience—an experience that is neither abstractly conceptual, nor objectively physical; it is concretely and personally lived, by a particular person, always socially engaged, in a particular situation in everyday social life, in space, time and history.

In this sense, the psychological reduction maintains an intimate but distinctively delicate, even tricky, relationship with the natural attitude. While philosophers may be disinterested in the natural attitude in order to pursue other matters, the phenomenological psychologist is studying exactly the natural attitude itself. This mundane world of everyday common-sense beliefs is precisely the subject matter of the phenomenological psychologist—and any other phenomenologically identified social scientists. In this sense, the psychological position transforms the nature of the epoché. Instead of the philosopher’s full suspension of the world of the natural attitude, the psychologist takes strong interest in exactly this world of the natural attitude. This means that the psychologist performs an epoché that is both in and out of the natural attitude. Within the psychological reduction we ‘step back’ from the natural attitude in order to study its structures. Again, the phenomenological psychologist is cognizant of the faith of the assumed world of the natural attitude but still studies this worldview not unlike the empathic manner of an anthropologist, doing field work, who both spontaneously participates in village life, like a fellow villager, while also maintaining his social scientific perspective. So, unlike the faith of the participant, the researcher’s is a faith that regularly, and methodically, steps back and questions itself. These points will be further developed in our reflection on how this attitude, particular to the phenomenological psychologists, was applied to the data analysis process performed on our sample case description.

Another aspect of this circumscribed 'psychological' region is that it pertains to the domain of relevance that is, itself, the ‘discipline’ of psychology 10 and what Giorgi ( 2009 ) has referred to as the 'disciplinary perspective'. Giorgi suggests that this ‘disciplinary’ reduction to the domain of the psychological (2009) should be most accurately depicted as a human scientific reduction. 11 In stark contrast to the empirical theory of science that drives mainstream psychology, the approach provided here allows researchers to explicate psychological meanings in their morphological, provisional, phenomenological sense.

Step 3. Dividing data into meaning units

This next step is motivated by practicality. Attempting to analyze, for example, 30–40 pages of transcribed interview material all at once is a daunting task. This is precisely why a data analysis method is helpful. Nevertheless, to stay consistent with a phenomenological theory of science, Step 3 is carried out from within the phenomenological attitude. For example, while reading through the recorded material, the researcher breaks down the material into smaller manageable parts to allow for a closer and more detailed focus in the upcoming Step 4. By phenomenologically elucidating the parts, the researcher is also able to begin distinguishing the participants’ meanings from how these appear in the natural attitude. This allows the expression by the participants to later (i.e., in Step 4) be explicated into phenomenologically psychologically sensitive description. The material is thus broken into manageable sections referred to as “meaning units.” The length of a meaning unit can vary from one sentence to an entire paragraph or (on rare occasions) a whole page of material. The length of meaning units can also vary from researcher to researcher, and such variation does not necessarily have any bearing on the general findings at the end of the analysis. Often the material can be easily differentiated. The main point is that too large a meaning unit can be unwieldy to analysis. It is also important to point out that not all meaning units are essential to the general structure of the phenomenon. However, all meaning units need to be analyzed (in Step 4). This last point is important, because sometimes when the researcher relaxes the epoché and returns to the natural attitude, some meaning units might mistakenly appear redundant. Nevertheless, when analyzed carefully, there is always the possibility of discovery.

Typically, researchers break this into two side-by-side columns that are written out in text form, referred to as Column 1 and Column 2 . This two-column transcription procedure serves several purposes. It conveniently organizes the process for the researcher and, importantly, it makes the data analysis process transparent and thus open for critique by other phenomenological researchers. As an additional procedure to this step, Giorgi also suggests that one modifies the participants’ expression into third person expressions. However, this is only a suggestion intended for researchers who are having difficulty in seeing the difference between the individual (or the idiographic level) and the phenomenon (the nomothetic level). Another discretionary modification is to extend columns, beyond the usual two, into three or even four columns. This was employed in the daydream analysis ahead where the researcher found a third column to be of value as it allowed him to visually check his more generalized transformations with the original meaning units—right before his eyes.

Step 4. Transformation of everyday expression to psychological meaning

The relationship between Column 1 (i.e., everyday expression, or naive description, of the participant) and Column 2 (i.e., phenomenological description of psychological meaning) is distinctive to this method. Here one carefully elucidates the participants’ essential meanings into generalizable terms within the domain of psychological relevance—as expressed above. We grasp and draw out the fuller psychological meanings embedded within the everyday description. Now, it is in this particular step that the phenomenological attitude takes center stage and is explicitly put into practice for the purpose of a phenomenological psychological analysis. In addition, in order to seek the general meanings within the lived experience this step also includes the tool of eidetic variation . This means that the researcher needs to maintain a general focus on the phenomenon under investigation while carrying out this detailed analysis. In this context, phenomenological elucidation is not a matter of mere notetaking, summarizing, annotating or just condensing meanings. It is more about how the researcher adjusts one’s mindset so as to allow the psychologically relevant meanings to emerge to one’s consciousness. In a certain sense, one opens oneself, or renders oneself a vehicle to the fuller meanings of the participant’s naive description, but always with a focus on the phenomenon. This is a receptive or ‘discovery’ mode of consciousness—not one of actively applying ideas, theories or concepts. One can understand this position as a contemplative openness to the givens of the other’s experience as it emerges through the participants’ expressions. There is an imaginative participation in the subjects’ descriptions not unlike the engagement one experiences when reading a novel, a poem, or any act of expressive art. There is here an ironically 'focused openness' or put another way: a resolute receptiveness. One converts the participant’s expressions (as conveyed within the natural attitude) into phenomenologically clarified psychological meanings by carefully following the intentionality in the participants' expression. The watchwords here are: elucidation, illumination, and explication. Here, we do not add to what our participants say, instead we bring forth the fuller meanings.

In addition, one does not need to restrict oneself to only one column during the analysis. It is perfectly feasible for the researcher to extend the analysis of the initial meaning unit into several levels of elucidation—such as a column 3 or 4. As noted in the previous section on Step 3, this 4th step is also about the spirit of transparency in science (similar to how one shows one's work when doing mathematics). By extending the analysis into stages or levels of analysis, one is showing colleagues exactly how one has reached these extended levels of generalization.

Step 5. Returning to the whole and moving toward the general structure

It is at this phase that the researcher moves from a part-whole eidetic analysis to a new focus on the whole again. But now we have a new whole, a whole that is the end result of this entire procedure. Remaining within the phenomenological psychological attitude, as described above, the researcher’s intimate engagement with the meaning unit analysis now becomes an act of synthesis of the parts together into what is usually a temporally sequential narrative. The watchword here is structure. A structure is understood in gestalt terms as a whole, but a whole composed only of essential parts. The idea here is that if one where to hypothetically remove one of the parts, then the rest of the structure would fall apart. Therefore, the researcher wants to be prudent to not overstuff a structure. A good structure should follow the elegance of simplicity—as much as reasonable. Furthermore, the features or constituent parts should be invariant. By invariant we do not mean universal or absolute. We are fully aware that human phenomena are contingent to history and culture. We only mean that an invariant psychological structure should “hold together” within this culture at this point in history. Within these parameters we think it reasonable that generalized psychological claims can be made. 12

It is important to note that most other qualitative research methods present their conclusions in terms of ‘themes.’ But because this approach emphasizes phenomena as totalities, i.e. as structures, we avoid any overemphasis on themes and prefer to comment on the structure of the phenomenon as a totality as much as possible. When we do discuss parts, we prefer the term ‘constituents’ to stress their relatedness to the whole of the structure. It is conventional for many other methods to present to readers curated direct quotes from their participants. But because we have already performed a very close analysis of the direct expressions of the participants in the earlier steps of the data analysis, we prefer to offer readers the more structural, or general, levels of meaning in any discussion of our results as will be seen ahead when we discuss the results of our analysis of an experience of daydreaming. In short, our inclination is to offer readers prepared or explicated data instead of curated raw data.

Situated structures

As an optional procedure one can add an extra step between the meaning unit analysis (step 4) and the General Structure (step 5). While Giorgi stressed the general structure, most advanced researchers find it effective to add this intermediary step—as demonstrated in the analysis offered ahead. 13 This can support the eventual goal of generality and can be an extremely helpful ‘bridge step’ toward the general structural description. But it must be stressed that to remain only on the level of situated individual experience would miss the key purpose of the method—which is to achieve a general (inter-subjective) structural description of the phenomenon. Having said this, a situated structure can be very rich in life world details and remarkably illuminative in its own right. One could depict this as a structure on the idiographic or individual level. This is often popular with clinical psychologists who prefer an individual ‘case-study’ level of understanding. But unlike ‘clinical’ case-studies, this is a research phenomenon which is different from a diagnostic, or therapeutic relationship. Here the research intention is paramount—not the clinical intention. Again, this is the elucidation of an individual participant’s experience performed as a step before moving to the general structure. This would be an essential structure of the invariant aspects of an individual person’s experience of the phenomenon. In more simple language this is a basic summary of the psychologically relevant aspects of this particular person’s experience of the phenomenon. Developing situated structures from three or more research participants can be a very helpful way to eidetically scrutinize the phenomenon as experienced by all of the participants. But when it comes to groups, it is important to emphasize that within the phenomenological approach to science, eidetic comparison (Wertz, 2010 ) should not be confused with statistical comparison. Though more challenging (especially for newcomers), in phenomenological psychology an eidetic analysis could just as well be performed on a single participant as on a group. But having made this qualification, a group of any number of situated structures is always a great support to one’s eidetic analysis towards generalizability. 14

The general structure

At this point, these phenomenologically elucidated ‘parts’ of the data analysis (including the situated structures) are brought back together into a new whole . Phenomenological psychology is definitively a search for psychological essences or what we prefer to call general invariant structures. Husserl called this ‘eidetic analysis’ and the primary technique he used for this level of analysis he called eidetic or ‘imaginary variation.’ In this analysis, one imaginatively reviews the phenomenologically clarified parts of the previous analysis as achieved in step 4, with an eye for intuiting a new whole. Again, this is a discovery frame of mind where I render myself open to the continually emerging intuitions and patterns in the elucidated data as they give themselves to my awareness. In other words, it is not an empirical summary or the common denominator of facts across the cases, but another level of the analysis. Specific to this level of the analysis is the technique of imagining the phenomenon in its various profiles, angles or possibilities. For example, as a researcher I can ask myself if the structure of this phenomenon is possible without any of the particular constituent parts that I have discovered during my analysis in Step 4? I may even imagine adding new parts that were not explicitly expressed in the data but ‘apperceptively’ or intuitively suggested by the data. To reiterate, in contrast to most other qualitative approaches, the general structure is an integral whole and is never just a series of separate themes. The key idea here is that a structure is a full gestalt , a whole, or a totality that dissipates when a part is removed. Therefore, it is important to edit a general structure with rigor and integrity and to delete all that is unessential to the systemic pattern that makes the phenomenon what it is. The general structure is typically narrated in the present tense—though not always. Sometimes a phenomenon may split off into types or variants. In such cases one could have two or three general structures, representing different ‘types.’ Therefore, forcing a closure by applying a psychological theory is not an option. The findings, as supported by the analysis, can at a later stage in the discussion section (of the research report) be presented in dialogue with established psychological theories (‘backloading’ in current nomenclature) and other research results (See Fig.  1 ).

Overview—flowchart of data analysis process (from Giorgi et al., 2017 ). R researcher, P participant

Case example

What follows is a brief case example of a phenomenological psychological data analysis. Again, unlike philosophy where the research is done in a solitary first person manner, in phenomenological psychology we take a second person position. We see ourselves as participants —not mere observers—as we try to grasp the fuller meaning of other people’s concrete descriptions as expressed within the natural attitude of everyday life (Englander, 2020 ; Giorgi, 2009 ). We make no demands on our participants to take the reflective attitude of the practicing phenomenologist. Instead, only the researcher is responsible for taking the phenomenological stance as he or she reads the expressions of the participant. Here the data analysis is conducted within the tension of two intertwined goals: to be faithful to the intentional meanings as expressed while also deepening their meaning through their re-expression within the phenomenological psychological attitude—as performed in meaning unit analysis (step 4) and the development of structures (step 5). This, again, is what we call elucidation or explication . This is a fidelity that also takes us into a deeper understanding of the expressed intentions our participants. This is exactly the power of the epoché (within the psychological standpoint) as applied to the grasping or bringing-forth of psychological meaning. Like the way certain artists can transform the taken-for-granted experience of an ordinary object, such as an apple in a still-life painting, into an apple seen afresh ‘as if for the first time,’ so does the phenomenological psychologist strive to bring out the psychological meaning of the participant’s experience of the phenomenon.

The sample presented here is taken from the context of an ongoing research project on daydreaming that is currently replicating and updating a previously published study (Morley, 1998 , 1999 , 2003 ) through fresh interview material. As explained above, the data collection process was customized to suit the unique nature of the phenomenon. Here, in this particular research context, the procedure for collecting daydream reports has been to first request a self-written protocol from persons who are not themselves directly involved with psychology. A formal protocol question prompt (see below) was given to the participant to help guide the written description. As mentioned above, the reason for beginning with a written description is that, as an imaginary phenomenon, daydreaming can become unwieldy and difficult to articulate during an interview. Through pilot trials we have learned that written descriptions help the participant to ground or anchor their memory of the daydream. It then serves as an organizing point of reference for the interview—without imposing any leading external influences. Then, the researcher and participant begin the interview itself by re-reading the written protocol together to refresh their memories of the event. The researcher initiates the interview by asking the participant to take the initiative to express what, in the written description, he or she feels is most in need of elaboration or expansion. After the participants have offered further elaborations on what stands out as most important to them, the researcher will then pose questions from an informal semi-structured check-list of points of special phenomenological interest to the researcher. Specifically, the researcher asks for fuller descriptions of existential constants such as space, time, embodiment, social relations, sense of reality, and sense of self as experienced during the various temporal phases of the daydream. The actual interview approach, for this particular phenomenon, will vary across a spectrum from a gentle reiterative style to intensive and challenging inquiries 15 —depending on circumstances. As described above, this data collection method was developed through the researcher’s intimate relationship with the phenomenon over time.

A full data analysis of an entire interview would surfeit the space of this presentation. So it is for this reason that we chose to offer a concise sample of the analysis process drawn from material that was recently collected in the form of an initial written protocol. While not as detailed and spontaneous as the interview that followed, the written protocol still offers the reader a rich “sense of the whole’ that allows for a faithful sample the data analysis process. So, though brief, this was still a reasonably good description that offers a worthy example of the whole-part-whole dynamic central to the analysis process of this method. Choosing a brief sample also expresses the authors’ confidence that even the smallest fragment of an everyday type of description will explode in meaning when approached from within the phenomenological psychological attitude. Not unlike how the sensory empirical world burst open with the introduction of telescopes and microscopes, so does the human life world open up before us when beheld from within the openness provided by the lens of the overall phenomenological perspective as expressed above.

Having said this, we again caution that as a sample data analysis it does not benefit from the detail offered by the follow-up interview. This small sample is offered for strictly didactic reasons. More importantly, it also stands alone without the fuller dimensionality offered by the intersubjective eidetic analysis at least two other individual case examples to which it’s whole and constituent parts could be eidetically compared. It was for this reason that we restricted the title of the phenomenon from “daydreaming” to “an anxiety daydream” to reflect the particularity of the one sample. But even without the intersubjective corroboration of at least two other daydream descriptions, we hope readers will agree that it can be surprising to see what can emerge when using only one case example.

To reiterate, in brief, we begin with the whole daydream description as depicted in the written protocol. After reading for the whole we then break it into parts—or meaning units. Then, we phenomenologically elucidate each of the parts, or meaning units, though the technique of using columns—in this case we used 3 columns (most researchers only use two). Finally, we return to a renewed sense of the whole in both of the situated and general structures. The situated structure, like a case study, is idiographic to the particular description while the general structure is an attempt to achieve a nomothetic statement on the phenomenon of anxious daydreaming. In this instance, the general structure will be restricted to the meanings elicited from this single, and very brief, case example and will therefore be somewhat limited and tentative. It’s very important to note that in most research instances the general structure will be an eidetic analysis based on the various other individual situated structures. The general structure corresponds to what one could call the results of the research process. While the constituent parts of the whole structure will be discussed in most research reports, unlike most other qualitative methods that discuss themes , typically supported with selected quotes, we prefer to keep the whole structure of the experience as the primary reference point.

Ahead, within the analysis we will refer to the participant as ‘P.’ Later, in the discussion, we will address the participant through the pseudonym of Ashling.

Written daydream protocol—initial protocol prompt to the participant (P)

Please concretely describe a situation in which you experienced a daydream. Please describe what was happening when the daydream began, what the daydream was about, what it was like while having the daydream, and how the daydream came to an end. Please try to be as concrete and detailed in your description as possible.

Ashling’s written protocol description—including step 3, marking the meaning units

On March 14, 2020, I was in Tepoztlán, Mexico. Trump had recently announced he would be suspending travel from Europe to the US due to COVID-19. I had just moved to Mexico a few months prior. I feared if the closure was happening with Europe it would most likely be happening with Mexico very soon, a golden moment for Trump to assert his plan for the border with Mexico to be even more impenetrable. As we drove back from Tepoztlán to Mexico City and night was falling, I started to gaze out the window, daydreaming, as we passed the silhouetted Popocatépetl volcano in the distance.

I started thinking about how I would get back to my family in the US if flights were suspended with Mexico. As we continued to drive I thought about if we didn’t stop in Mexico city but just continued all the way to the border (about a 15 h drive). In my daydream I imagined arriving at the border and that there would be mayhem, cars piled up for miles and the border patrol not allowing anyone across. The border agents were armed and aggressive and unreachable. I imagined the reasons I would give, that my family needed me etc., but reasoning with them was not working. And I envisioned somehow managing to get past them as they were distracted by the chaos, and the relief felt by speeding into the US away from the border and onward towards home.

I felt anxious imagining the border patrol and their dominance, their potential to shoot us when we sped past, defying their rules of closure. But I then felt relief at the outcome of getting past, of fighting our way in and across and making it to a place of safety.

When my partner and I later got to the apartment in Mexico City that night I looked into flights to get to Boston where we would be in a familiar place during this most intensive and uncertain time. My good friend called me from Rennes in France and told me how bad it was, that death rates were rising, and how she wasn't leaving the house at all. She advised me to leave quickly and that to have a garden was a saving grace for her, and that at least in Boston I would have a garden. I booked my flight and packed a small case. I daydreamed again as I looked around the apartment, that 10 or so years would pass, and I would finally be able to come back and all my things would be here but between and around old weeds and crumbled walls and cobwebs, a scene left untouched and abandoned.

Meaning unit analysis

Situated structure of an anxiety daydream.

Daydreaming for this person was an imaginary manifestation of her feelings of anxiety. By manifesting this anxiety as a dramatically staged scenario, she was able to live-out or play-out the enactment of her anxiety and its eventual resolution. This particular daydream occurred as a person’s affective response to the threat of having her freedom of movement, across international borders, curtailed or restricted by political forces beyond her control. In particular she feared being cut-off and separated from her home and family during a time of great uncertainty. These strongly felt emotions around the experience of constraint or restriction had no means of expression within the context of a long road trip in a car. Turning her gaze, away from the car interior, out the window towards the twilight horizon of the landscape, P entered into an imagined scenario where she is in the same car but has arrived at the international border between her foreign country of residence and her desired home country. The daydream manifests the person’s own momentary existential situation as a scene of chaos and mayhem enforced by the imposing, threatening and impersonal agents of power i.e. the border guards who refuse to allow her to cross the border into her home country. P imagines trying to reason or negotiate with the guards but realizes that dialogue is futile in this situation. Again, these are circumstances out of her control. As a staged enactment or ‘metaphorization’ of her actual existential situation, the daydream is both the expression and revelation of her life situation. It allows her to “express” her immersion in the situation which also, in a reversible way, offers her a reflective distance to “see” the feeling of restriction that has occupied her. As both the expression and revelation of her present life situation the daydream is, in this sense, lived ambiguously as both an active and passive experience. These ambiguously dual, yet interwoven, perspectives are implicit to her daydreaming experience. Next, within the imaginary narrative of the daydream, the daydreaming/daydreamed person commits an act of defiant transgression. P shifts the narrative from that of passive casualty of powers beyond her control, to one where she takes charge, or assumes agency, by choosing the extreme risk of speeding past the distracted guards and thus flouting their overbearing authority by driving across the border without their sanctioned permission. By taking matters into her own hands and transgressing the rules, P escapes confinement and experiences the satisfaction that comes with the security of having returned to her home country. The daydream concludes with feelings of relief. The experience of this daydream allowed P to articulate her desire to return home to her native country during this time of uncertainty—a desire that was converted into an actual concrete decision to eventually book an airline flight home to family and friends.

Tentative general structure of an anxiety daydream

Daydreaming emerges in a situation of unfulfilling circumstances. In the case of anxiety, it appears in the form on an ominous and yet opaque threat to one’s well-being. This feeling presents itself as a demand for action—to seek the source of the threat and to overcome it. However, this demand for action cannot be achieved in the current situation as it is impeded by circumstances where no real behavioral action is possible. This becomes a tension between the feeling’s demand for action, regarding the ominous threat, and its restraining context. The person turns attention away from the immediately restraining situation by seeking out and shifting attention to another horizonal field of focus. It is here that the emotion takes the course of expressing itself through the medium of an imaginary scenario that opens up an opportunity for the fulfillment of the emotion. The emotion transforms into a world scenario where it is expressed in the form of an enacted narrative drama. The person assumes a dual intentional role as both the author/narrator of the dramatic scenario and well as the actor immersed within the dramatic action. The emotion is now lived in a narrative context that allows the possibility of its fulfilment. As a staged enactment the daydream can become a living metaphor of the person’s actual existential situation. The daydream scenario can be both the expression and revelation of one’s emotional situation. Its expression makes it possible to “see” one’s immersion in the emotional dramatic scenario. It can offer the opportunity for a reflective distance from the feeling of restriction that had previously occupied the person. As both expression and revelation of the person’s present life situation daydreaming reveals an ambiguous interplay between both active and passive aspects of experience. These ambiguously interwoven perspectives vary between being implicit or explicit to the daydreamer. Though daydreaming takes place within an imaginary region of experience, this region is always also interfused within one’s life historical horizons—always expressing one’s life projects and goals.

Commentary on the analysis

In any phenomenological psychological research report, there is an extensive theoretical discussion of the results (i.e. the constituent parts of general and situated structures) with the phenomenological and natural scientific literature. We have much to say here, especially with regard to such constituents as ‘dual intentionality’ ‘multiple realities, the ‘affective-imaginary dynamic,’ the “linkage of expression with revelation’ and, of course, the comparison of these findings with current studies in cognitive science (such as the default mode network). But alas, as the purpose of this essay is didactic with regard to the method, and due to the limits of space, we must defer this full dialogue to a future publication.

Due to the brevity of the written description, and the very fact of there being only a single participant, the researcher can only modestly offer a highly tentative sample general structure. However, despite its brevity, the participant, whom we will here call ‘Ashling,’ offered a rich and full description and the researcher feels confident that the situated structure was faithful to the participants experience.

The non-linier dimension of data analysis

While the researcher initially worked with fidelity to the 5 step method, it is also important to note that there was a significantly non-linier dimension to this process. This was especially the case when it came to the composition of the situated and general structures. Once the meaning units were demarcated, the process towards the situated and eventual general structures took on a life of its own. In other words, while the meaning units established a framework for data analysis, once the 3 column framework was established, and the participant’s expressions were laid out before his eyes , the researcher began a back-and-forth process of checking, rechecking, reflecting and intuitively linking the meanings into fuller wholes and patterns. To use an imperfect metaphor, we can compare this explication process to what is called a detective’s “crazy wall” that is used to help interpret and understand a crime case. From detective stories and movies, we are familiar with how the investigator will post pieces of data and information across a wallboard, or sometimes a city map. The detective can then use this to meaningfully link the information and datapoints with connecting strings. Seeing the constituent parts ‘before his eyes’ helps the investigator to make the ‘meaningfully intuitive connections’ that lead to better understanding of the case. Obviously, this helps the investigator to step back and see the dynamic relation between the parts and the whole and it is from this perspective that insights and discoveries can arise. This is exactly the benefit of meaning unit analysis.

The diacritical aspect of data analysis

To reiterate, the psychological phenomenological attitude is focused on understanding the particular experience of a particular person. Obviously, as evidenced by the general structure, we do not stop a the particular—but this is where we begin. While this attitude undoubtedly suspends the naturalistic attitude of physical science, its disposition towards the more global natural attitude, as discussed above, contains a strategic ambiguity. Very importantly, unlike phenomenological philosophy, phenomenological psychology directly takes up the naively believed world of the natural attitude as a subject of inquiry. Ours is, as Maurice Natanson, citing Alfred Schutz, calls it: “a phenomenology of the natural attitude” ( 1973 , p107). In other words, while we ourselves as researchers are trained to be aware of our own natural attitude, and ‘step back’ from it as best we can, it is also true that we do not entirely put it aside. So, for example, when reading Ashling’s description of her daydream, the researcher imaginatively participated with the description of her daydream and, for that moment, may have been empathically engrossed within the world of her natural attitude. In a recent publication this is well described by Scott Churchill as a ‘disciplined fascination’ (Churchill, 2022 ). Also, as a denizen of the natural attitude oneself, the researcher may well have applied his background stock of knowledge of daydreaming, garnered from personal experiences as well as professional readings on the subject; all of this in order to better understand Ashling’s experience and intentional structures. Hence, as discussed above, this is not a pure epoché or a pure reduction as practiced by the philosopher. On the other hand, unlike Ashling, or any research participant, the researcher continually practices a ‘stepping back’ from that believed world, again, in order to better understand her world. There is, in this way, a weaving process that is unique to the phenomenological psychological attitude.

The figure-ground metaphors used by Merleau-Ponty are very helpful here. Throughout his works he explicitly describes what we are calling the phenomenological psychological attitude, as a ‘ diacritical ’ process (Kearney, 2011 ) that is, like the act of breathing—both inhaling and exhaling as one whole act. This is precisely what we mean by the strategic ambiguity of the phenomenological psychological position. In his well-known discussion on methodology Merleau-Ponty describes the attitude of the researcher as follows: “Reflection does not withdraw us from the world…’ “…it steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice…” ( 1962 , p xiii). As psychologists these threads or tethers to the natural attitude are never cut, they are “loosened or slackened” to enable us to see the intentions of others—as well as one’s own. Seeing my own intentional threads can reveal fore-understandings that could either inhibit or enhance my analysis.

In this case, a young woman is learning about the encroaching covid pandemic, wants to return to the security of her home and family, and becomes upset about the closing international borders that could restrict, and become an obstacle, to her desire to return home. This was the big picture to which the researcher returned, in a circular manner, throughout the analysis.

The researcher came to see how Ashling was originally overcome with a desire to go home while simultaneously experiencing a feeling of being impeded from that intention. Though she did not explicitly say this, one could easily imagine how, as more borders closed, Ashling’s desire to return home would only intensify. The beginning part of the daydream narrative reflected this distressing and overwhelming devils circle where she is impeded by powers beyond her control. But in meaning unit 7 we see a turn.

Another diacritical element is the weaving between the whole of the description and its parts. As a reader one could say that I am “zooming-in” on the unique and minute details of the participants expressions as much as I am continually “zooming-out” to use the whole as the context for understanding these details. For example, Ashling’s use of key expressions in Meaning Unit 7 (MU7) such as “envisioned,” “getting past” and “the relief felt” all offered a basis for enhanced eidetic exploration and fuller illumination. They allowed the researcher to come to the insight of Ashling’s shift in position, from that of passive victim of overpowering circumstances to that of an active agent of an imaginary act of courageous transgression—driving past the armed and aggressive border guards to cross the border. Understanding the “whole” of her situation is what brought to light the essential meaning of the daydream.

Spelling out tacit meanings

By explication, or elucidation, we mean the process of spelling-out latent or tacit meanings. To offer an example, Ashling, of course, never explicitly said that she experienced a ‘dual intentional structure.’ It was the task of the researcher to cull out this structural component that was implicit to the description and likely lived-out in a pre-thematic way by Ashling. The researcher’s recognition of this constituent happened during the researcher’s transition from the meaning unit analysis to the whole of the situated structure. It was in this process of “putting the whole story back together again” that the researcher saw how this double intentionality was experienced by Ashling. Here, there were two distinct but related intentions, (1). the intention to deal with the practical frustrations of booking a flight home during an uncertain period of international crisis (the actual world), and (2). the daydreamed intention of getting past imaginary border guards (the daydreamed world scenario). The researcher came to see Ashling as experiencing both intentions and both corresponding world relations—the actual car scenario and the other being the daydreamed car scenario. Hence, the dual intentional structure. One could call this a “generalizing process” but, in actual practice, it was a much fuzzier and more unclear event than any such nominalizations can portray. Once again, we can understand this as a diacritical process: (1). The insight came ‘as given’ in the discovery manner of a direct phenomenological intuition, and (2). This pattern was ‘recognized’ from the researcher’s background stock of knowledge (or fore-understanding) as a daydream researcher and reader of phenomenological literature. Because this elucidation process is itself somewhat pre-reflective, one can never have absolute certainty over whether it was an intuitive given or a pre-understanding.

Again, Merleau-Ponty’s diacritical approach helps to illuminate this elucidation process. In describing Merleau-Ponty’s ( 1968 ) diacritical approach to grasping meaning, Kearney cites James Joyce’s statement that it is possible to have “two thinks at a time.” ( 2011 , p 1). Directly addressing psychological research, Merleau-Ponty says: “One may say indeed that psychological knowledge is reflection but that it is at the same time an experience. According to the phenomenologist (Husserl) it is a material apriori . Psychological reflection is a “constatation” (a finding). Its task is to discover the meaning of behavior through an effective contact with my own behavior and that of others. Phenomenological psychology is therefore a search for the essence, or meaning, but not apart from the facts.” (Merleau-Ponty,  1964 , p.95).

With the term “constatation’ Merleau-Ponty is suggesting that both observing , (receiving the intuitive givens) and asserting (actively applying one’s stock of knowledge) can be at play in the same act of psychological understanding. Both are one whole movement within the same act—in the chiasmatic, reversable manner of a figure-ground dynamic. While space does not allow us to develop this issue in the detail it deserves, we raise this matter to try to bring some light to the act of elucidation that is so central to this method. The take home point here is that, while the method highlights the significance of description, this does not mean that one needs to choose between stark antinomies such as description and interpretation, or phenomenology and hermeneutics as within this elucidation process of ‘disciplined fascination’ both movements come together.

Towards dual disciplinary citizenship

This method was designed to give psychological researchers an organized and structured framework for doing second person research. The whole-part-whole process, in itself, is not complicated or difficult to understand and learn. What is difficult for those who are beginning this style of research, is the assumption of the phenomenological psychological attitude. This attitude, which distinguishes this method from non-phenomenological qualitative research methods, can’t be taken for granted and requires training, study, and the support of a like-minded research community. Because it is founded in phenomenological epistemology, phenomenological psychology is a hybrid discipline. The practice of phenomenological psychology requires a kind of ‘dual citizenship’ in both psychology and phenomenological philosophy. Those trained solely in philosophy’s orthodox emphasis on textual exegesis may often lack experience in practical professional life-world applications as well as an overall knowledge of the literature and scientific history psychology. On the other hand, those trained solely in psychology, with little to no exposure to philosophy, coupled with the field’s strictly naturalist experimental orientation—which underscores the natural/naturalistic attitude—come to phenomenology with this resilient attitudinal disadvantage that can take effort to overcome. What we have here, in the current academic world, is a set-up for mutual misunderstanding between these disciplines. While the sharp disciplinary divides of the current academic world make such ‘dual citizenship’ training difficult and rare, this is possible, but only with special effort and unique pedagogical interventions. There are institutionalized training programs, usually schools of psychotherapy, that are open to such interdisciplinary training. Yet, these programs are few and far-ranging in their offerings. Most independent researchers entering this field need to supplement their training in naturalistic psychology with an intense period of philosophical study of primary sources and guidance in this study is too often lacking. Then, on the other hand, it is encouraging to see the increasing number of philosophers who are taking an interest in “applied phenomenology.” Yet, we currently see little cognizance, in much of this recent literature, of the 50-year phenomenological psychological research tradition. We mention this, as a friendly invitation to psychologically interested philosophical researchers to acquaint themselves with their predecessors to avoid re-inventing the wheel and duplicating research results and techniques that have already been developed within the phenomenological psychological research tradition. In the same breath, we would just as strongly urge our colleagues in the social sciences to give more serious study to the phenomenological philosophical tradition.

Open access funding provided by Malmö University.

1 From Husserl’s inaugural lecture in Freiburg given 1917 and published in Husserl—Shorter Works ( 1981 , 17).

2 This quote is from a talk that Giorgi gave at the Symposium on science and scientism: the human sciences Trinity College, May 15–16, 1970 and documented by Maurice Friedman ( 1984 ) Contemporary Psychology: revealing and obscuring the human . Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. (p.30).

3 To Giorgi, relativism is as much a dogmatism to be avoided in psychology as is reductionism. Giorgi's ( 2009 ) method, hence, became known as the descriptive phenomenological psychological research method. With the emphasis on description Giorgi intended to apply the phenomenological attitude by staying true to discoveries from the everyday lifeworld. So even though discoveries may sometimes be incomplete, he preferred that they were described in their incompleteness rather than forced into unnecessary closure for aesthetic or ideological reasons (ibid.). Hence, both psychologically relevant aspects of Husserl's phenomenology as well as the discovery-oriented spirit of science became essential influences on Giorgi's approach to the project of a qualitative research method in psychology.

4 Initially influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s psychologically oriented thought, Giorgi turned more to Husserl’s methodological emphasis in his pursuit of a phenomenological theory of science to support a qualitative psychological research method (see Giorgi, 2009 ). As Giorgi ( 2014 , 236) recently stated "…I use Husserl because he confronts the issue directly and he contrasts his position with that of the empiricists." In the late 90’s, several other qualitative methods using a phenomenological approach started to emerge, most had a stronger emphasis on postmodernism or hermeneutics. Giorgi differentiated his method from the newer ones by stressing that his was a more descriptive emphasis as opposed to an interpretative one (Giorgi, 1992 , see also, Giorgi 2006 , 2010 , 2018 ). Of course, the distinction should not be understood too literally, because in certain settings the use of the word ‘interpretation’ could synonymously refer to the act of ‘description.’ However, with the term ‘description’ Giorgi ( 1992 ) simply meant to stay true, or rooted, to what appeared in the data . This is similar to what is called a “close reading of the text” in literary studies. The intention was to avoid the kind of intrusive and overly imposing 'interpretations' where gaps in the qualitative data would be 'filled' with theoretical explanations, abstractions or even speculations.

5 Developing phenomenological interviewing skills requires practice and training that is often already present in the education of most clinical psychologists and health care workers. However, phenomenological psychologists have been recently applying the insights of philosophical phenomenology to better articulate the role of empathic reflection in participant observation (Englander, 2020 ; Churchill 2010 ) and designing phenomenologically inspired teaching methods (Englander  2014 ; Churchill, 2018 ) for improving quality of psychological interviewing and qualitative phenomenological research generally.

6 For a chronological development of the methodology, see Giorgi ( 1975a , 1975b , 1985 , 1997 , 2009 , 2018 ).

URL =  <  https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/schutz/  > .

8 The history of phenomenology could be considered one big ongoing deliberation about the meaning and possibility of the epoché. We hope readers will forgive us for sidestepping these discussions for the purposes of this presentation where space only permits us to present the epoché as practically applied to the research process in phenomenological psychology. But we will make this one brief point. All major phenomenological themes such as embodiment, temporality, intersubjectivity and even the hermeneutic circle were developed by philosophers thorough their initial employment of the epoché —or awareness of the natural attitude. It is therefore important, we believe, for one to understand the practice of the epoché to, in turn, fully grasp these phenomenological concepts. We find it inconceivable that one could proficiently comprehend basic phenomenological concepts such as the lived body or intersubjectivity while remaining unreflectively within the influence of the natural attitude. Similarly, we have learned through experience that success with the method we are presenting here is often in direct proportion to one’s awareness of their natural attitude.

9 The relation between the transcendental and the psychological reduction is another long-deliberated issue in the history of phenomenology which we can’t develop here. In brief, because the transcendental “philosophical” reduction is a non-personal and non-situated level of reflection it is simply not appropriate for performing qualitative psychological research—at the moment that we are doing it. To our knowledge, no phenomenological psychologist would claim to be doing both standpoints at once. But this does not mean that psychologists must, or should, ignore the insights of transcendentally derived philosophical concepts when we design our research or reflect on the results of our psychological analysis. Phenomenological philosophy can be a perfectly compatible basis from which to deepen our understandings of the results of our descriptive analysis. In short, psychologists may visit the transcendental position, but we do not unpack our bags, and we always remember our return ticket.

10 This is very similar to the relevance structure of a world as suggested by Schutz ( 1962 ).

11 As Giorgi ( 2009 , 99–100) writes, “The researcher does, of course, assume the human scientific (psychological) reduction. Everything in the raw data is taken to be how the objects were experienced by the describer, and no claim is made that the events described really happened as they were described. The personal past experiences of the researcher and all his or her past knowledge about the phenomenon are also bracketed. This bracketing results in a fresh approach to the raw data and the refusal to posit the existential claim allows the noetic-noematic relation to come to the fore so that the substratum of the psychologist's reality can be focused upon. That is, the particular way in which the describer's personal acts of consciousness were enacted to allow the phenomenal intentional objects to appear from the basis of the sense determination that the psychologist is interested in uncovering.”.

12 For a more elaborate discussion on general knowledge claims in qualitative research and its relation to a phenomenological theory of science, see for example, Englander ( 2019 ).

13 Giorgi originally included situated structures but later dropped them to emphasize the nomothetic (or generalized knowledge) aspect of the method. But most Giorgi’s colleagues and ex-students prefer to include situated structures as a transition to the general. As teachers we have learned that this psychologically rich transitional step is of great pedagogical value. For most newcomers to the method, it is intuitively much easier to construct situated structures before moving on to develop general structures. We also find situated structures to be of great psychological value in their own right—as we hope is demonstrated in our case example ahead.

14 It is important to note that research participants are not considered from the stance of an empirical theory of science. Any qualitative methodology, grounded in a phenomenological theory of science, cannot naively adopt the concept of the population (and sampling methods ) as its ground for making general knowledge claims (see for example, Englander, 2019 ).

15 At points in the interview when a more active questioning is called for, evocation techniques like those from the explication interview, or the micro phenomenological interview method, can be very effective. (see Petitmengin et al., 2018 ) Here, we invoke the daydream so that both the interviewer and the participant can, in an almost trance-like way, imaginatively re-live the daydream together. These techniques can provoke profoundly rich description. Here is another example of how we approach data collection as always contingent to the manner in which the phenomenon best expresses itself. Again, this is why we endorse an adaptable approach to data collection.

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Magnus Englander, Email: [email protected] .

James Morley, Email: ude.opamar@yelromj .

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