globalisation and democracy essay

Does Globalization Promote Democracy?: An early assessment

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September 1, 2001

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An enduring tenet of the post-Cold War era is that globalization can be a catalyst for democratization. In one formulation, when democratic ideals sweep (or even trickle) across borders into authoritarian states, globalization makes democratization inevitable. Proponents of this view point to the contagion of democratic transitions in the world over the past quarter-century and to the ability of technology to penetrate the most closed societies. Even the Orwellian North Korean government, they point out, has gone gingerly online, though the country’s broader population has no electronic access to the outside world.

But these broad trends cannot yet confirm a strong and direct connection between globalization and democratization. The evidence is mixed and will continue to be so for some time. For every society in which a “people’s power” revolution is helped along by international cheering squads and satellite television, another is daily becoming more cosmopolitan while adhering to traditional (and often authoritarian) practices. The city-state of Singapore, rated as “most global” on the A.T. Kearny/Foreign Policy magazine Globalization Index in terms of cross-border contact between people, has remained resolutely semi-authoritarian for the past 30 years and shows few signs of greater democratization. Moreover, while entire regions, particularly in the former Eastern bloc, embraced economic globalization and more open political processes at the onset of the 1990s, by the end of the decade many new democracies were faltering under the weight of globalization, whether because of unfavorable economic trends or greater transnational crime. It may not yet be possible to make a final judgment about the connection between globalization and democracy, but a closer look will clarify where globalization has helped democratization, where it has inhibited movement toward greater openness, and, assuming an increased pace of globalization, what the greater flows of people and ideas will mean for the world’s governments and societies in the years ahead.

Toward International Norms of Democracy

Perhaps the most tangible evidence of globalization’s impact on democratization has been the infusion of democratic norms, and the principles of human rights that support them, into many international and regional institutions. The principle of accountability for human rights abuse is increasingly unfettered by national borders, as the 1998 arrest of former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet in London demonstrated. The ad hoc United Nations war crimes tribunal that was convened for the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s was extended to Rwanda in the middle of the decade, presaging a broader move toward international justice. In the coming decade, the establishment of an International Criminal Court will be a watershed in that move.

Democratic principles are also reshaping regional institutions. The European Union, originally an economic community, now requires democratic government as a precondition for membership and promotes democracy in its collective foreign policy. The Organization of American States, once a diplomatic forum for both democratic and nondemocratic governments, now works actively to restore democracy when it is imperiled in member states. The Organization of African Unity, also a traditional diplomatic group, is attempting to forge a regional human rights code modeled after the Helsinki process in Europe.

But the process has its limits. Regional groups adopt codes of democratic practice where a quorum of democracies already exists or where the largest and most economically powerful states are democratic. In these cases, the weight of the democratic majority (and the benefits of membership in the club) are sometimes sufficient to help persuade nondemocratic states to liberalize. But the trend halts abruptly where the political spectrum includes an equal number of democratic and nondemocratic states or where authoritarian regimes are predominant. In Asia, for example, the diversity of political regimes has largely kept democracy and human rights off the table in the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

A more encouraging but more low-level trend has been the growth of transnational nongovernmental organizations devoted to promoting democracy and protecting human rights. These groups, which usually originate and are headquartered in Western nations, establish beachheads (and nurture local counterparts) in authoritarian nations, although they are seldom able to operate there without significant restrictions. Thus, in regions where authoritarian trends remain strong?most notably in Asia and the Middle East?the only networks dedicated to spreading democratic values and strengthening human rights are nongovernmental. For the foreseeable future, the best chance of building intergovernmental democracy and human rights regimes in these regions will be in a gradual crossover process, as NGO networks pull government officials into “track two” (mixed government and NGO) dialogues and other informal exercises.

The Instrumental Effects of Globalization

In regions lacking a widespread and overt commitment to democracy, Western policymakers and nongovernmental groups trying to promote greater political liberalization have placed their faith in the indirect effects of globalization. In this view, globalization offers a bait and switch. An authoritarian government agrees to a global regime to gain benefits of one sort (usually economic) but is forced to accept the political consequences (greater popular pressure for democracy) that follow. Policies crafted in accord with this theory focus on two aspects of globalization?international trade liberalization and telecommunications. Not surprisingly, the theory also supports two cherished American beliefs: that open markets and democracy are the inspiration and consequence of one another and that the march of technology cannot be stopped.

Thus, for more than a decade successive U.S. administrations have claimed that broadly maintaining trade with China, and specifically encouraging China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, would provide a back-door route to political reform. Adhering to WTO rules would require the regime in Beijing to provide more transparent and accountable government and would strengthen the concept of the rule of law, two fundamentals in modern democratic systems. In addition, foreign telecommunications companies would gain parity with government companies in China, spreading their technology and loosening the regime’s control over contact between China and the outside world, as well as among Chinese citizens themselves.

The logic, compelling in the long run, has short-term limits. In countries with enduring authoritarian regimes, leaders are more likely to accede to legal reform for pragmatic reasons?to improve economic conditions through increased international trade?so long as the reforms are not viewed by the populace as ideological capitulation. Leaders may also consider reforms pertaining to international trade to be easier to contain, because the initial focus is on commercial codes that primarily affect foreign business. Although it is possible to cordon off domestic populations in the early stages of such reform, the consequences of trade liberalization and marketization eventually require the regime to adopt a broader approach. But economic liberalization can also exacerbate problems that seem to outpace legal reform efforts and even encourage popular support for authoritarian or semi-authoritarian government. Russia’s entry into the international economy has, in the minds of many Russians, worsened official corruption and economic crime. As long as these trends are perceived to be stronger than (even impervious to) reform, citizens are likely to tolerate less than democratic rule as a short-term solution.

Moreover, some of the economic powers poised to enter international trade regimes, most notably China, could themselves affect the rules governing those regimes. Thus far, global trade rules have largely been written by Western democracies, whose combined economic power has placed aspiring entrants in the role of supplicants. But the entry of more “mixed” economic powers?governments committed to market reform but not necessarily to Western-style democracy?may change these institutions. At the least, the link between trade preferences and transparent processes may weaken slightly, as may support for overt political conditionality linked to trade, in the mode of the European Union. At worst, global trade institutions could be rent with bloc behavior, not unlike that sometimes seen in the United Nations.

Technology and Political Openness

Technology’s impact on democratization is likely to be more immediate, although not sufficient in itself to effect political change. Weak economies, along with government resistance, have contained the spread of technology in many Middle Eastern and some Asian states and will for the near future. But technology’s advent has added a new dimension to the prospects for political change. The most dramatic episodes of popular resistance against authoritarian regimes in the past decade have featured prominent roles for technology. In Tiananmen Square in 1989, Chinese demonstrators communicated with one another and the outside world by fax. In Bangkok in 1992, Thai professionals, dubbed “mobile phone mobs,” coordinated antimilitary demonstrations with student leaders and one another by cellular phone. In Indonesia in 1998, anti-Suharto resistance was largely directed via the Internet.

But for all these moments of high political drama, technology’s greatest promise in promoting political openness lies in the everyday intercourse of civil and political life. In authoritarian societies, the Internet differs from print and electronic media, because no government-dominated media exist for the regime to use as a counterweight. From its inception, the Internet has been a freer form of communication than any other, at least for those able to obtain it.

Modernizing authoritarian states often wish to expand the use of technology for economic development but also to keep citizens from using it for political purposes. Doing both, however, is increasingly difficult. China’s ambitious plan to build a national computerized information infrastructure has spurred domestic telecommunications industry growth of 30-50 percent a year since 1989. At the same time the government registers all Internet users, is investing in technology to monitor and filter cyber communications, and regulates acceptable topics for online discussion. But Chinese Internet users have learned how to circumvent many of these restrictions using proxy servers, a sign that technology can usually outmaneuver attempts to control it.

Today China’s 17 million Internet users are a small fraction of the nation’s population. But their number is increasing rapidly?growing 75 percent from 1997 to 1998 and then tripling in 1999. More important, political discourse in China has expanded despite state attempts to censor and prevent it. In the medium run, the effects of government efforts to control the Internet will depend in part on whether China can maintain brisk economic growth. If it does, Internet growth is likely to overwhelm attempts to control it. In the long run, the prognosis is favorable. In countries where technology is growing, control of global media may alternate between government and society, but the advantage will usually go to society in the end.

Downsides for Democracy

But globalization can also hand authoritarian regimes an edge. Regimes that accede to economic reforms most often allow openings they are confident they can control. If the immediate impact is favorable?an improved economy, greater access to modern technology and goods?the regime’s popular legitimacy may be strengthened by the perception that it has delivered (or at least permitted) the improvements. Ironically, globalization can thus extend the longevity of the regime, at least in the short run.

Conversely, bad economic times that are attributed, correctly or not, to globalization can also give authoritarian leaders a boost. When disillusionment with economic reform sets in, Western policymakers’ insistence on the link between reform and democratization can be used to authoritarian advantage. In the Asian economic crisis of 1997?98, Vietnam and Laos, which had begun very modest political reforms to accompany marketization, jettisoned these political moves when their trade with the countries hit hardest by the crisis declined. The failure of some of the region’s fastest-growing economies?those linked most closely to the West?was taken as a warning of the dangers of globalization. Hard-liners eclipsed reformers in the early post-crisis years or replaced them altogether in the political structure.

Globalization has also helped sustain authoritarian regimes by feeding nationalism in some non-Western states. During the Asian economic crisis, anti-Western sentiments flared even in countries well on the road to democracy, such as Thailand, when catastrophic drops in currency values were popularly attributed to manipulation by Western traders. In more authoritarian countries such as Malaysia, leaders turned this new nationalism to their advantage by salting their political platforms with anti-Western (and anti-globalization) rhetoric and portraying themselves as national champions.

Technology too has fed the nationalist backlash against globalization. Democracy promoters have long heralded the “CNN effect,” in which television brings world events into the living rooms of people whose leaders would prefer to block such coverage. In Thailand in 1992, when the military government banned reports of Bangkok street demonstrations on government-owned television stations, coverage of the events (and the military crackdown on demonstrators) was transmitted to citizens through satellite television, creating a galvanizing force for resistance. In recent years, authoritarian regimes have used television to their own advantage. In 1999, satellite TV brought NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade into the homes of urban Chinese, who were quick to respond with public protests. During that same incident nationalists also made use of the Internet. At the height of the protests, Chinese hackers broke into the website of the U.S. embassy in Beijing, in an eerie modern-day parallel to the 1900 Boxer Rebellion.

New “Global” Elites?

Perhaps the most important impact of globalization on political reform, and one of the most difficult to foretell, will be the way it shapes new political and social classes, particularly in authoritarian countries. In recent decades social scientists have theorized that globalization?in particular its ability to improve economic conditions through trade?will help create new middle classes that will, in turn, increase pressure for democratic reform. There is some truth to this generalization, but it downplays the role of elites in political change. However strong popular pressure for democracy might be, a democratic transition usually requires the approval, overt or tacit, of a significant segment of the ruling order. The key question is not whether globalization can help serve up larger street crowds demanding change, but whether it can change the very nature of elite groups.

Signs are emerging that globalization may be doing just that, with mixed effects for democratization. In countries (whether authoritarian or democratic) that emphasize modernization and economic growth based in part on foreign trade and investment, two developments are reshaping elite political culture. The first is the rise of technocrats, particularly those trained in global economics, in government and politics. In China, for example, technocrats are gradually assuming greater responsibility in the bureaucratic structure.The Communist Party of China has even begun to recruit them to enhance its own legitimacy. Technocrats are not, of course, automatically democratic reformers, but their influence can help make government more accountable and transparent, helping to lay the groundwork for a more democratic system.

A more noteworthy trend is the rise of new commercial elites in the power structures of many authoritarian and democratizing societies. Many made their fortunes in modern commercial sectors that benefited greatly from globalization. Seeking influence wherever they can find it, these new elites often pack the parliaments in countries where the executive branch had traditionally enjoyed exclusive control. In applying new communications techniques (and portions of their fortunes) to connect with voters, they have inspired a modern push for grassroots politics. Although generally considered reformers, they may also epitomize globalization’s lack of regulation. As these new elites have assumed power, indictments for political corruption have increased.

A Realistic Appraisal

Clearly, globalization is not a political panacea. At best a long-term ally in promoting democracy, it provides no automatic solutions. The sanguine correlations offered by some policymakers in the early post-Cold War years?particularly regarding the link between increased trade and democratization?should be reexamined. Although the advanced democracies can prime the pump of globalization, they should not expect to control the outcome or to realize immediate results. Indeed, the more enduring aspects of globalization may take at least a generation to realize. Until then, policymakers should be as ready to recognize globalization’s costs to democratization as they are to laud its benefits.

Foreign Policy

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Dr. Neil A. Lewis, Jr.

May 14, 2024

Vanessa Williamson

YaleGlobal Online

Globalization and the threat to democracy.

GOA, INDIA: “If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it.” The advice from Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi minister of propaganda, may have taken a leaf from the parable of 13th century Iranian poet Jalal ad-Din Rumi “The Students and Teacher.” In Rumi's story, students wanting a holiday dupe their teacher into believing he is ill by each telling him he is so. The teacher returns home worried about his health and berates his wife for being unconcerned.

The world over, citizens are veering right, concerned about migrants and dilution of tradition and culture. These are sometimes couched in terms of economic loss. Others gawp in disbelief with the rise and mass appeal of bigoted leadership.

It takes a special person and philosophy to seed fear in people and then cultivate and harvest it.  The right-wing nationalistic philosophy is insular and against the human instinct to commune and socialize, almost bordering on xenophobia. Such philosophies and their proponents reinvent ancient history, birthing self-righteous victimhood while stoking fires of race and religion. They become leaders by projecting disdain for accepted conventions and promising a balm for the perceived injustices that they claim are smiting people and in the process strike a chord with many.

Thus, Donald Trump was elected US president making promises of “draining the swamp” and “Make America great again” despite being a bigot with at least 20 women accusing him of sexual misconduct. India’s Narendra Modi was elected with similar promises, reducing the 2002 Gujarat riots during his tenure as chief minister to a non-issue. Vladimir Putin continues to lead Russia despite allegations of corruption and unexplained deaths of journalists, and war-mongering. Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines embraced allegations of murdering fellow citizens on charges of drug-dealing during his tenure as mayor and vice-mayor of Davao City. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repressed journalists and intellectuals and, despite espousing an Islamist agenda, has turned a blind eye to Chinese repression of Uighur Muslims.

Citizens in democracies repeatedly elect leaders who show scant respect for the law, minorities and the economically disenfranchised, leading to a decline in law and order and normalization of bigotry. Hate crimes in the United States have increased for the fifth consecutive year with a spike in 2016, and India has seen a tenfold increase since 2014. Since the 2016 Brexit vote, the United Kingdom reports an upswing in racism and hate-related crimes. Migrants under-report hate crimes because they lack faith in the system and fear reprisals, according to a Polish report sponsored by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The battle for equality between the haves and have-nots based on justice has mutated. Today it is the ideology of fear and suspicion that drives the battle. Globalization is not new, occurring in many forms over the centuries including trade and conquests in ancient times, then as colonization and more recently through the shifting of manufacturing and the transfer of goods, skills, financing and manpower among countries.

Thus, even as globalization changes society through the transfer of capital, goods and more, it weakens existing social pillars through new concepts. Current forms of globalization involve systems that offer the potential to be equitable. Manufacturing is outsourced to the global south. People migrate to the developed world as skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled workers. This transfer has led to varying levels of prosperity intra and inter nations and the transformation of longstanding cultural and national identities and demography. In countries like India, rural-urban migration has also led to this transmogrification and the breaking of long-held caste and class barriers. The concept of equity has also taken root with the UN Development Goals, Human Development Index and the World Happiness Index.

In this round of globalization, unlike previous forms, everyone participates and collaborates, willing or otherwise. To reap the benefits of this new economic order, nations must promulgate new laws on everything from products to welfare. Though new processes enabled new entrants to find socioeconomic space and a political voice, many are left feeling alienated. Political leaders ignored this disquiet. Their sense of marginalization brewed into disaffection as many perceived they were being sacrificed for a “greater common good,” feeling spurned for holding such fears. A disconnect grew between disaffected citizens and other more successful sections of society, along with government and laws.

Trump and the rest tapped into this population, vocalizing and giving form to their fears with constant reiteration á la Goebbels and constant promises of restitution.

Already outsiders, the leaders didn't worry about social sanctions when vocalizing these fears and became iconoclasts reveling in the confrontation with broader society. For the discontents, the rhetoric fearlessly spoke their truth. They promote narratives making them demagogues or suggesting their supporters are part of a grand design to return countries to former glory. Putin does this with bare-chested photos, Trump by constantly proclaiming his is the best presidency ever, and Modi’s growing cult does both.

Even as they promise better times, the leaders develop a siege mentality by finding bogeymen – refugees, migrants, Mexicans, Muslims, neighboring nations, Romas and so on. To ensure they remain beyond reproach, these leaders target the media and other critics. The Indian government has a dual approach when it comes to media that don’t toe the line and discontinues advertising in publications like the Telegraph of the ABP group and the Hindu while broadcasters like NDTV face harassment from government agencies. Journalists have been trolled and murdered. They face threats of physical violence and SLAPP suits . Trump labels traditional media outlets as “fake news.”

The World Press Freedom Index ranks the Philippines at 134th place because of the government’s crackdown on journalists. Russia is at 149, a nod to the government's suppression of independent media. Hungary has fallen 14 places to 87, with journalists openly “stigmatized,” while in Poland “the state-owned media have been turned into propaganda tools and are increasingly used to harass journalists.” The report describes Turkey as “the world’s biggest jailer of professional journalists.”

Far-right leaders suppress the voices that raise questions and inform citizens and instead communicate directly with people through Twitter and other social media, rallies or government-broadcasting networks like Modi’s radio broadcast Mann Ki Baat, loosely translated as Heart’s Voice. Direct communications – and dire warnings about legitimate news sources – quell disquiet about intentions or quality of leadership, ensuring ignorant servility and adulation.

These leaders strive to make themselves beyond reproach. Using due process, they weaken other pillars of democracy – the judiciary, education, administration and police branches.  They subvert established norms in regular communication, creating a new normal that also includes instigating citizens into prejudicial action. Such moves result in an increase in hate crimes in these countries, not only because of leaders’ tacit support but also because of the dilution in deterrence. That the leaders condone rather than condemn these actions, if not glorify them by silence, only serves to encourage repetition and the withering of law and order.

Though the far-right have a nationalistic agenda, they are not averse to globalizing their views and colonizing new territories. The US-based syndicated news website Breitbart has made inroads into Europe. Steve Bannon, Trump’s former chief strategist, supports far-right endeavors across the globe. Brexiteer Nigel Farage has become a familiar face in the US. Unfortunately, the hate and fear which such people propound, multiplied manifold by the internet's globalized network with its social media and web forums, result in tragedies like the one in Christchurch. In an irony of sorts, the far-right and the Islamists use the same medium to spread fear and instigate people to violent acts.

At this juncture it would be natural to wonder whether globalization threatens democracy or offers the answer to growing bigotry. Initial forays of globalization were driven by economics, now influenced by concepts of equity and fairness, ultimately strengthening democracy. However, such concepts have yet to mature to answer the fears of many. This limbo has resulted in the rise of the far-right. Paradoxically the far-right is using globalization and the democratic process to destroy what has been achieved. It therefore stands to reason that a globally connected population must defeat this Goebbelsian effort to bury democracy.

S amir Nazareth is the author of the travelogue 1400 Bananas, 76 Towns & 1 Million People . He writes on socio-political and environmental issues.

What is the remedy? Far right policies will result in catastrophe in due course of time, as it happened to Hitler's Germany. If majority prefers far right leaders, they will have to pay for it in due course of time.

"The right-wing nationalistic philosophy is insular and against the human instinct to commune and socialize". Sorry, but you introduce this article with an unsubstantiated claim. Whilw there were "natural" societies, which welcomed every stranger as guets (and paid bitterly for this folly), there were also many indigenious societies which forcibly kept any intruders at a safe distance. Thus while there certainly is a human instinct to commune and socielize there IMHO there is no such instinct to do it with any strangers arriving and even without regard to their number. There is also a human instinct of self-preservation.

VERY INSIGHTFUL AND EXHIBITS CLARITY OF THOUGHT!

So you were taught to believe that conservatives are the ones who are driving globalism? How does that happen when you have also been taught to believe that conservatives have a deep fear and loathing of foreigners? You can't have it both ways and in this case, you couldn't be more wrong about both ideas. Learn to think independently. Stop drinking the leftist Koolaid!

Globalization, Democracy and Development

This paper addresses the interactions between globalization, the quality of democracy, and economic convergence using simultaneous estimation techniques. To reflect process, we use multi-dimensional, de facto, and continuous measures of democracy and globalization. To reflect context, as defined by space (geography) and time (history), we control for the distance to the income frontier. Using this measure of development, we extend the test for the two-way relationship between democracy and globalization put forward by Eichengreen and Leblang (2008) for the period 1870-2000. Focusing on the more recent wave of globalization (1970-2005), we find a two-way relationship between democracy and globalization and also significant two-way relationships with development. In the restricted sample of non-OECD countries, however, democracy hurts development.

We thank Barry Eichengreen, Carles Boix, Marc Flandreau, Paul Leblang and other participants in conferences at Princeton University, the Royal Academy of Belgium and the Lisbon Institute of Advanced Military Studies for comments on earlier versions. We are also grateful to Ricardo Vicente who performed the initial estimations in 2007 and Bruno Desormière who prepared the database and contributed to a 2010 draft. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research, the OECD, or its Member countries.

MARC RIS BibTeΧ

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The Globalization Paradox: Review of Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy

2013, International Journal of Constitutional Law

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Initially, it's briefly presented some historical elements which attest that the process of global economic regulation has been constructed within western rules, and that the 'universalistic' notion of globalization has been the outcome of the exercise of structural power by western nations such as US, criticized by S. Strange's contributions of analysis. It will be explored three economic empirical variables which demonstrate the unequal impact-effects of globalization on developing countries and the unfairness outcome of liberalization. Taking in account analysis such as the foreign trade policy and the operations of multinational corporations with Rugman and the voluntaristic perspective of B. Jones in development economy, it will be, further on, confirmed the existence of structural powers in international political economy, synthesizing the previous contribution by presenting the general skeptical perspective on globalization. Rodrik's contributions will be taken into account as possible positive insights within this economic framework. Rodrik's pragmatic approach brings him to place as crucial driving force of change an institutional reform: the only viable starting point for a more fair developing economy.

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A good case can be made for being cautious about the headlong rush into globalization taking place in the world today. I support this caution, analyzing a number of issues from the perspective of a social economist.

Globalizing economic institutions such as transnational corporations and forums of economic governance are a central part of the world today. The World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Economic Forum, for example, are crucial institutions mediating, administering, or providing forums for discussing economic processes of globalization. They bear the brunt of the critique of the anti-corporate globalization movement discussed in a later volume in the present series: Globalizing Movements and Global Civil Society. However, they are only the most prominent face of the changing institutions and regimes of global economics. The present volume documents the practices of these globalizing institutions, but more importantly it broadens out the discussion to cover questions of power and institutionalization. The volume examines the patterns of change across the globe from the end of the nineteenth century to the present. It includes material which debates the place of these economic institutions and regimes, but the emphasis is on understanding the modalities of economic regulation and institutionalization, and how they relate to state sovereignty, market law, and economic power. Whereas the previous volume in the ‘Central Currents in Globalization’ series focused on the way in which processes of globalization are extended by capitalism as a mode of production and exchange, the present volume focuses on the dominant mode of organization, including the instituting of patterns of power. The volume takes a special interest in the state as part of the globalization process. Expressed in a different way, this volume focuses on global economic integration, regulation and governance, while a complementary volume later in the ‘Central Currents in Globalization’ series, Global Legal and Political Governance, takes up the theme of political governance, including examining the new multilateral political regimes.

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The requirements of global economic liberalization do not fit with the requirements of democracy. I take the main characteristic of the environment of globalization to be the pressure on all states in the global system to restructure their economies and societies in order to survive and prosper in a competitive global capitalist economy in which production and exchange is increasingly organized along liberal lines. This has far-reaching consequences for the relationship between capitalism and liberal democracy. In the past, its ideal-typical form combined management of both economic development and social provision by the state with a political system arising out of civil society and remaining largely autonomous (a liberal polity, in other words, in a socio-economic framework managed by the state). In a future structured by globalization the ideal-typical pattern will be the reverse: an economic and social system shaped by liberal economic forces operating at a global level which states have limited capacity to resist, and a political system managed by the state in order to mitigate the consequences of global economic liberalism (a liberal economy, in other words, in a political framework managed by the state). States will take a more direct role in the management of their citizens, in order to compensate for their decreasing inability to manage the broader social and political environment.Thus, globalization does not mean the end of the State, but possibly the end of liberal democracy.

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Despite some notable achievements in many parts of the planet the gap between the rich and the poor has become wider rather than tighter. On the political sphere success seems much more unequivocal, though. Indeed, beyond a handful of anachronistic exceptions, the world seems to have surrendered to the delights of democracy. From there to the conclusion that economic globalization favors democracy there was a small step that many economists and political scientists all over the world have not hesitated to make. Refusing to share this optimism, many other scientists have, on the contrary, severely questioned the democratic character of the global economy almost since the term globalization itself has been invented. In this work I intend to show how the logic of globalization, in other words the logic of internationalized market capitalism conflicts with a substantive definition of democracy in developed countries as much as in developing countries. First of all we will explain why, i...

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Call for Papers: Narratives of Struggle and Hope: Ethnography, Education, and Democracy at a Crossroads

• May 14, 2024
• vol 70 issue 34

The University of Pennsylvania’s Graduate School of Education will host the 2025 Ethnography in Education Research Forum February 7-8, 2025. The topic of the conference is Narratives of Struggle and Hope: Ethnography, Education, and Democracy at a Crossroads. For the conference, the Ethnography in Education Research Forum invites scholars and researchers to submit their qualitative and ethnographic inquiries that interrogate the connection between democracy and education, particularly in uncertain or precarious times. The call for papers seeks to explore the nuanced ways in which educators and educational institutions, broadly defined, may serve as sites for democratic struggle, hope, or something in between.

The conference will discuss the politicized times we live in. The last decade has come to be marked by global crises, political divisions, and economic insecurity, and the approaching 2024 presidential election holds the potential to redress or exacerbate these tensions. As we anticipate the political landscape unfolding, a wide and growing array of issues pose challenges for educators, schools, families, and scholars as they seek to understand and navigate an evolving landscape.

Submissions are encouraged that delve into the multifaceted dimensions of uncertainty, revealing how complex human beings acquiesce, ignore, resist, or challenge their political worlds. Ethnographers, practitioners, students, and scholars are therefore invited to illuminate how university campuses, K-12 schools, and community spaces become dynamic arenas for the negotiation of democratic values, where societal uncertainties are woven into the daily experiences of students, educators, and administrators.

This call for papers goes out to scholars who aim to foster a rich dialogue on schools as (potentially) democratic spaces in uncertain times, challenging researchers to rethink and redefine the boundaries of their ethnographic practice to capture the essence of democratic education in the face of uncertainty.

Papers will be accepted through June 1, 2024. For more information, including submission guidelines, visit https://2025forum.dryfta.com .

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The impact of economic, social, and political globalization and democracy on life expectancy in low-income countries: are sustainable development goals contradictory?

• Published: 18 January 2021
• Volume 23 , pages 13508–13525, ( 2021 )

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• Arif Eser Guzel   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-5072-9527 1 ,
• Unal Arslan 1 &
• Ali Acaravci 1  

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The 17 Sustainable Development Goals announced by the United Nations are important guides for the development processes of developing countries. However, achieving all of these goals is only possible if the goals are consistent with each other. It has been observed in the literature that possible contradictions between these goals are ignored. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to investigate whether two sustainable development goals (SDGs) of the UN are contradictory or supporting each other in low-income countries. These SDGs are “Good Health and Well-Being” (SDG3) and “Partnerships for the Goals” (SDG17). For this purpose, the role of globalization and democracy in life expectancy is empirically investigated in 16 low-income countries over the period 1970–2017. While globalization has been used as an indicator of the partnership between countries, democracy has been used as an indicator of accountability and cooperation between governments and societies. According to estimations of the continuous-updated fully modified (CUP-FM) and bias-adjusted ordinary least squares (BA-OLS), globalization and its subcomponents such as economic, social, and political globalization affect life expectancy positively. Democracy also increases life expectancy in those countries. The GDP per capita is also used as a control variable. Our results show that a higher level of per capita income is positively associated with higher levels of life expectancy. In conclusion, no contradiction was found between SDG3 and SDG17 in those countries. Achieving a healthier society requires economic, social, and political integration between governments and societies.

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The Human Development Index as the Key Indicator for Measuring the Quality of Life of the Population in Altai Krai

Human Development Index

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1 Introduction

The main problem of economics is to increase economic development and social welfare. Increasing the social welfare level is a complex process that depends on economic and non-economic factors. Achieving economic development or increasing the level of welfare depends on achieving and sustaining the main objectives in political, economic, and social areas. Today, development is no longer a process that can be realized through policies implemented by governments alone. It requires cooperation between governments and societies. While cooperation between different countries requires globalization in the economic, social, and political fields, democracy is the way to ensure cooperation between governments and societies.

Health is one of the most important indicators of social welfare. Besides being one of the indicators of development, it is one of the determinants of human capital formation which is necessary for economic development. Individuals living in developed countries live a healthier life compared to those living in less developed countries. While the differences between the levels of development of countries determine the health conditions, at the same time, improvement of public health paves the way for economic development. Healthy people have higher opportunities to earn a higher income than unhealthy people. Individuals with higher incomes can benefit from better nutrition and access to health services. Therefore, economic development and improvement of health conditions represent a two-way process. In this context, the determination of the variables that will enable the achievement of the goal of a healthier society is especially important in explaining the economic differences between developing countries and developed countries. Because of its importance, health-related goals have an important place both among the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) announced by the United Nations.

The world leaders with the support of international funding organizations announced the Millennium Declaration in September 2000 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. They committed their nations to a new international partnership to achieve some development targets having with the final deadline of 2015. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) consist of 8 goals, 21 targets, and 60 related indicators covering a wide spectrum of development areas such as “End Poverty and Hunger (MDG 1),” “Universal Education (MDG 2),” “Gender Equality (MDG 3),” “Child Health (MDG 4),” “Maternal Health (MDG 5),” “Combat HIV/AIDS (MDG 6),” “Environmental Sustainability (MDG 7),” and “Global Partnership (MDG 8).” As we see, three of the goals are directly associated with the health status of the people. In the deadline of 2015, according to “Health in 2015: From MDGs to SDGs” report of the World Health Organization (WHO), there are improvements in health-related targets such as child health, maternal health, and combat with HIV/AIDS. Globally, HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria targets have been met. Also, the child mortality rate was reduced by 53% and maternal mortality by 43% (WHO 2016 ). On a global view, although health-related problems are largely resolved, the situation is not as good for low-income countries. As shown in Fig.  1 , significant differences exist between developing countries and developed countries in achieving health-related goals.

Source Halisçelik and Soytas (2015)

World Bank Income Groups’ MDGs Index Values in 2015.

According to MDGs, indexes in the context of health status show that the goals desired in terms of health are not attained in low-income countries compared to other income groups. After the deadline of MDGs, the United Nations has announced 17 SDGs, and “Good Health and Well-Being” takes its place as the third goal. Since achieving these goals requires the cooperation of countries and societies, “Partnership for the Goals” is determined as the seventeenth SDG. According to the United Nations ( 2019 ), the main indicators of global partnerships are trade, foreign direct investments, remittances, financial integration technology transfers, data monitoring and accountability, internet usage, and political integration among countries. In our study, while globalization is used as a proxy indicator of global cooperation, democracy is an indicator of cooperation between societies and governments. Democracy also refers to accountability levels of governments.

Globalization can simply be defined as the process of international integration which has economic, social, and political dimensions (Dreher 2006 ). Many countries have adapted to this process and have enjoyed the welfare effects of globalization by implementing necessary economic and institutional transformation. However, some countries still suffer from poor adaption to global markets. According to the KOF Globalization Index published by the Swiss Economic Institute ( 2020 ), low-income countries have the lowest globalization level compared to other income groups. They also suffer from bad health conditions such as low life expectancy, communicable diseases, and high mortality rates according to MDG indexes given above. At this point, the literature is divided into two parts. The first one blames globalization and argues that poverty and as a result of this, low life expectancy derives from the inequality created by globalization itself (Buss 2002 ). The second group mostly focuses on the benefits of free trade, capital mobility, and technology transfers (Rao and Vadlamannati 2011 ). The low-income countries also suffer from low institutional quality in the context of democracy and political rights. According to Freedom House’s list of electoral democracies, the countries without electoral democracy are mostly the low-income countries in the Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia (Freedom House 2019 ).

The main question of our study is to determine whether the problem of low life expectancy in low-income countries is due to the low levels of globalization and weak political institutions in these countries. To answer this question, the role of economic, social, and political globalization and democracy in life expectancy in those countries is empirically investigated. This study provides several contributions to previous literature. First, we provide a new perspective in the context of sustainable development goals. Previous studies mostly focused on how to achieve SDGs, while possible conflicts between the goals were mostly ignored especially in the context of health. Such conflicts between sustainable development goals in the literature have mostly focused on the impact of economic growth and globalization on the sustainable environment (Ulucak and Bilgili 2018 ; Zafar et al. 2019a ). Those studies are mostly addressed the relationship between SDG7, SDG8, SDG13, and SDG17 (Zafar et al. 2019b ). To the best of our knowledge, it is the first study that investigates the relationship between SDG3 and SDG17. It is also important to examine this relationship in low-income countries since they still suffer from low levels of life expectancy, less adaptation to globalization, and poor democratic institutions compared to other income groups. Previous works mostly provide global evidence, while only a few studies focus on less developed countries. Achieving these 17 goals put forward by the United Nations at the same time is possible only if these goals do not conflict with each other. Second, empirical works in previous literature consist of traditional estimation methods called first-generation tests. In the analysis of panel data, the estimators considering cross-sectional dependence are called the second-generation estimators. Cross-sectional dependency simply refers to the situation when the shock that occurs in one country affects other countries as well. The source of this problem encountered in panel data analysis is the economic, financial, and political integration among countries (Menyah et al. 2014 ). The ignorance of cross-sectional dependence results in biased and inconsistent estimates and wrong inferences (De Hoyos and Sarafidis 2006 ; Chudik and Pesaran 2013 ). Low-income countries are mostly African countries where there is a rising trend in terms of integration to global markets and institutions (Beck et al. 2011 ). Using estimation techniques that consider cross-sectional dependence in those countries prevents misleading results. As the literature is divided into two parts about the effects of globalization on human well-being, fresh evidence via robust estimation methods is required in order to provide proper policy implications. To fill this gap, our work provides second-generation estimations.

2 Literature review

To improve the health conditions of a country, the welfare of the poor should be improved as well. Poverty is detrimental to access to health services. Therefore, the positive impact of globalization on health first emerged with its positive effects on economic growth (Labonté et al. 2009 : 10). The effects of globalization on growth were mostly driven by free trade, international specialization, technology transfers, knowledge spillovers, and competitive markets. It also offers broader opportunities for entrepreneurs and paves the way for innovation (Grossman and Helpman 2015 : 101). As expected, poverty rates significantly reduced in the last two decades because of the integration of developing economies to global markets (Harrison 2006 ). When trade liberalization and income increases are considered together, people's access to treatments and medications can be easier and life expectancy may be prolonged. However, we should consider other possibilities in the context of spreading communicable diseases. As Deaton ( 2004 ) mentioned before, access to cheap and easy travel can increase the rate of spread of communicable diseases. Migration is also another fact to take into account. Particularly rising sexual tourism and migrant sex workers increase the spread of sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS. But today there are improved treatment methods to solve these problems. Even HIV-infected people can survive with antiretroviral therapy, and it also reduces sexual transmission of the infection (Dollar 2001 ; Cohen et al. 2011 ). Due to the high cost of advanced drugs as in the case of antiretroviral therapy, it should be accepted that people in low-income countries will have trouble accessing the drugs (Buss 2002 ). There are approaches known as the unequal exchange that globalization increases inequality among countries and that developed countries are more profitable from the globalization process (Love, 1980 ). It may also increase domestic income inequality. There are a few studies that came with the conclusion that globalization rises inequality (Dreher and Gaston 2008 ; Ha 2012 ), but Bergh and Nilsson ( 2010 ) suggested a different perspective. Due to extensive R&D investments and scientific activities, developed countries can find new treatment methods and supply advanced drugs. The only way to access that knowledge and these drugs are trade and integration between developed and underdeveloped countries. Globalization can play an important role in improving the health conditions of low-income countries to the extent that it can provide these linkages. One should also notice that wider markets and higher returns are important factors that motivate entrepreneurs. Buss ( 2002 ) claimed that the intellectual property rights of advanced drugs belong to private firms in developed countries, and because of the strong protection of property rights, less developed countries have trouble accessing them. However, rising global human rights became an important step to advance public health issues against economic concerns in the trade of pharmaceutical products.

The human rights approach focuses on how globalization affected disadvantaged people worldwide (Chapman 2009 ). It is an important instrument in the suppression of the inequality created by economic globalization. Because of the pressure on the government about human rights, disadvantaged people are becoming able to meet their basic human needs. The role of political globalization on this point is forcing governments to adopt global institutions. It increases the number of international organizations in which a country is a member. This makes governments more accountable in the global area and forcing them to pay attention to protect human rights. Gelleny and McCoy ( 2001 ) also claimed that integration among countries leads to political stability. Therefore, governments' tendency to violate human rights in order to maintain their power becomes lesser. Moreover, as social dimensions of globalization expand and communication opportunities among people in different countries increase, the possibility of human rights violations being discovered by other people increases (Dreher et al. 2012 ). Governments that know the international sanctions required by these violations have to be more cautious against human rights violations. Social globalization also provides cultural integration among the world’s people, and it changes lifestyles and consumption patterns worldwide. The consequences of this change can have positive and negative effects. First, increased urban population and sedentary lifestyles may enhance prepared food consumption and reduce daily movements which result in rising obesity and diabetes (Hu 2011 ). Second, although rapidly increasing consumption options and diversity are known as welfare indicators, they also can cause stress which is known as an important determinant of many diseases both psychological and physical (Cutler et al. 2006 ). Third, due to knowledge spillovers and communication technology, people can learn about healthy nutrition and protection from communicable diseases. Thus, unhealthy but traditional consumption patterns and lifestyles may change. These days we experience the coronavirus epidemic and we see once again the importance of globalization. Countries are aware of infectious diseases in different parts of the world in a very short time and can take measures to stop the spread of the virus. The changes created by social and political globalization play a major role in this emergence. Social globalization enables people in very remote areas of the world to communicate with each other, while political globalization forces governments to be transparent about infectious diseases.

With economic globalization, increased economic activity may lead to urbanization. One may think about unhealthy conditions of an urban area such as environmental degradation, air and water pollution, higher crime rates, and stress which reduce life expectancy. However, according to Kabir ( 2008 ), people living in an urban area can benefit from improved medical care, easy access to pharmacy, and to the hospitals that use higher technology. They can also get a better education and can enjoy better socioeconomic conditions.

Democracy can be considered as another determinant of life expectancy. In order to solve the health problems of the poor, people should draw the attention of the government. Sen ( 1999 ) claimed that the instrumental role of democracy in solving problems is enabling people to express and support their claims. Thus, the attention of politicians can be attracted to the problems of the poor. Politicians who have never tasted poverty do not have the urge to take action against the problems of the poor at the right time. Another linkage can be established through accountability (Besley and Kudamatsu 2006 ). In democracies, governments have an obligation to account to citizens for what purposes the resources were used. Thus, resources can be allocated to solve important public issues such as quality of life, communicable diseases, and mortality.

Compared to theoretical discussions, previous literature provides a lack of empirical evidence. Barlow and Vissandjee ( 1999 ) examined the determinants of life expectancy with cross-sectional data available in 1990 for 77 developed and developing countries. According to regression results, per capita income, literacy rate, and lower fertility are important determinants of life expectancy while living in a tropical area decreasing it. Another finding in this study shows that health expenditures in those countries failed to increase life expectancy. Following this study, Or ( 2000 ) analyzed the determinants of health outcomes in 21 industrialized OECD countries covering the period 1970–1992. This study presents gender-specific estimates separately for men and women. Fixed effects estimation results reveal a significant negative relationship between public health expenditure and women's premature death. The relationship also occurs for men, while GDP per capita dropped from the regression model due to high collinearity. Furthermore, GDP per capita and the proportion of white-collar workers reduce premature death for both men and women, while alcohol consumption increases it.

Franco et al. ( 2004 ) analyzed the impact of democracy on health utilizing political rights data of 170 countries. Empirical results show that people living in democracies enjoy better health conditions such as longer life expectancy, better maternal health, and lower child mortality. Following this, Besley and Kudamatsu ( 2006 ) investigated the nexus between democracy and health outcomes utilizing panel data from the 1960s to the 2000s. In their study, they used life expectancy at birth and child mortality variables for 146 countries as indicators of health outcomes. According to results, democracy has a positive and significant effect on life expectancy at birth and it also reduces child mortality. Safaei ( 2006 ) also investigated the impact of democracy on life expectancy and adult and child mortality rates with the data of 32 autocratic, 13 incoherent, and 72 democratic countries. According to the OLS estimation results, improving democratic institutions increases life expectancy and reduces child and adult mortality rates. Another finding of the study is that socioeconomic factors such as income, education, and access to health care services are important determinants of health status.

Owen and Wu ( 2007 ) found a positive relationship between trade openness and health outcomes using a panel of 219 countries. Health outcome measures of this study are infant mortality and life expectancy. Trade openness is one of the most important dimensions of globalization.

Kabir ( 2008 ) analyzed the determinants of life expectancy in 91 developing countries. Empirical results obtained are the opposite of the expected. According to results, per capita income, literacy rate, per capita health expenditure, and urbanization have no significant impact on life expectancy. On the other hand, the number of physicians has a positive and significant impact on life expectancy, while malnutrition reduces it. As a dummy variable, living in Sub-Saharan Africa is another factor that reduces life expectancy due to communicable diseases like HIV, malaria, etc.

Bergh and Nilsson ( 2010 ) used a panel of 92 countries in the period 1970–2005 to investigate the relationship between globalization and life expectancy. They used social, political, and economic globalization data separately, and the results show a significant positive effect of economic globalization on life expectancy at birth. But no significant relationship was found between social globalization, political globalization, and life expectancy. They also used average years of education, urban population, the number of physicians, and nutrition as control variables and the effect of economic globalization was still positive and significant.

Welander et al. ( 2015 ) examined the effects of globalization and democracy on child health in their panel data analysis for 70 developing countries covering the period 1970–2009. According to the results, globalization significantly reduces child mortality. In addition, democracy improves child health and it also increases the beneficial effects of globalization on child health. Following this study, Tausch ( 2015 ) analyzed the role of globalization in life expectancy in 99 countries. The results of OLS estimates show that globalization leads to inequality, and therefore, it reduces health performance in terms of life expectancy and infant mortality. These results are contradictory to positive views on the role of globalization in public health. However, in 19 of 99 countries, globalization increases public health performance. Ali and Audi ( 2016 ) also analyzed the role of globalization in life expectancy in Pakistan. According to ARDL estimation results, life expectancy is positively associated with higher levels of globalization. Another study on the Pakistan case proposed by Alam et al. ( 2016 ) concluded that foreign direct investment and trade openness which are important indicators of economic globalization affects life expectancy positively.

Patterson and Veenstra ( 2016 ) concluded that electoral democracies provide better health conditions compared to other countries. Their analysis includes annual data from 168 countries covering the period 1960–2010. Empirical results show democracy has a significant positive impact on life expectancy and it reduces infant mortality.

In their recent study, Shahbaz et al. ( 2019 ) investigated the impact of globalization, financial development, and economic growth on life expectancy. The authors used nonlinear time series analysis methods utilizing the data of 16 Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1970–2012. Their results show that globalization, financial development, and economic growth affect life expectancy positively in 14 of 16 Sub-Saharan African countries.

The previous literature provides a lack of evidence in the context of globalization, democracy, and life expectancy relationship. There are also methodological weaknesses in previous empirical studies. First, it can be observed that previous studies are mostly based on traditional estimation methods. Second, the panel data analyses are based on the first-generation estimators that assume cross-sectional independence. This assumption is hard to satisfy due to integration among countries. In addition, ignoring the cross-sectional dependence results in inconsistent estimations. Particularly in empirical work in the context of globalization which refers to economic, political, and cultural integration among countries, considering the cross-sectional dependence becomes more important. Therefore, in order to make a methodological contribution to previous literature, we used second-generation panel time series methods considering cross-sectional dependence.

3 Methodology and data

According to the United Nations, achieving sustainable development goals requires global cooperation and partnership. Therefore, “partnerships for goals” has taken its place as the 17th sustainable development target. However, it was emphasized that some sub-goals should be realized in order to reach this goal. These include improving international resource mobility, helping developing countries to attain debt sustainability, promoting the transfer of information and technology between developed and developing countries, an open and rule-based free trade system, encouraging public–private and civil society partnerships, increasing transparency and accountability, and high quality and reliable data (United Nations 2019 ). In our empirical work, economic, social, and political globalization and democracy variables were used as proxies of the subcomponents of SDG17. In addition, the life expectancy at birth variable that mostly used in related literature as a proxy of health status and well-being, it is used in our study as a proxy of SDG3. In this study, we investigated the role of globalization and democracy in life expectancy in 16 low-income countries. Footnote 1 Following Barlow and Vissandjee ( 1999 ) and ( 2000 ), GDP per capita is used as a control variable in order to mitigate omitted variable bias. Our dataset is covering the period 1970–2017. Following the related literature, we present our model as follows:

where lex is life expectancy at birth which refers to the average number of years a newborn is expected to live. Life expectancy at birth data is provided by World Bank ( 2019 ) World Development Indicators. Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. The dataset is consisting of a weighted average of collected data from several co-founders. In Eq.  1 , X refers to the KOF Globalization Index developed by Dreher ( 2006 ). This index has been used in previous literature as a proxy of SDG17 (Saint Akadiri et al. 2020 ). The current version of the data published by the Swiss Economic Institute is revised by Gygli et al. ( 2019 ). The globalization variables are between 0–100, and 100 refers to the highest globalization level. In our analysis, we used subcomponents of globalization index such as economic (EC), social (SOS), and political (POL) globalization in addition to overall globalization (GLB). Due to high collinearity, the effects of different types of globalization are analyzed separately. Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 represent the estimations with overall, economic, social, and political globalization indexes, respectively. The democracy variable ( dem ) is provided from the Polity IV project dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2002 ). While the increases in this indicator represent a more democratic regime, the decreases represent a more autocratic regime. Finally, gdp is real GDP per capita (constant 2010 $) and it is provided from World Bank World Development Indicators. All variables transformed to the logarithmic form except democracy due to negative values. In the estimation of the model, the panel data analysis methods are used.

3.1 Cross-sectional dependence

Traditional panel data methods are based on the assumption that no cross-sectional dependence exists among cross section units. However, this assumption is hard to satisfy due to rising economic, social, and political integration between countries. The estimations do not take this process into account may cause inconsistent results. Such results may also lead to incorrect inferences (Chudik and Pesaran, 2013 ). The existence of cross-sectional dependence in variables and the error term is obtained from the model analyzed with Pesaran ( 2004 ) \({\text{CD}}_{{{\text{LM}}}}\) and Pesaran et al. ( 2008 ) bias-adjusted LM test. These techniques are robust whether N > T and T > N. Therefore, \({CD}_{LM}\) and bias-adjusted LM ( \({LM}_{adj})\) tests are found to be appropriate and their test statistics can be calculated as follows:

Equation  2 shows the calculation of Pesaran ( 2004 ) \({CD}_{LM},\) and Eq.  3 is Pesaran et al. ( 2008 ) bias-adjusted LM test statistic. \({V}_{Tij}\) , \({\mu }_{Tij}\) , and \({\widehat{\rho }}_{ij},\) respectively, represent variance, mean, and the correlation between cross section units. The null and alternative hypothesis for both test statistics; \({H}_{0}\) : No cross-sectional dependence exist; \({H}_{1}\) : Cross-sectional dependence exist.

In the selection of stationarity tests and long-run estimators, the existence of cross-sectional dependence will be decisive. If the null of no cross-sectional dependence is rejected, second-generation methods that assume cross-sectional dependence should be used in order to provide unbiased and consistent estimation results.

3.2 Slope homogeneity

Pesaran and Yamagata ( 2008 ) proposed a method to examine slope heterogeneity in panel data analysis based on the Swamy ( 1970 )’s random coefficient model.

The calculation of the test statistic of Swamy’s model is given in Eq.  4 .

In Eq.  4 , \({\stackrel{\sim }{\beta }}_{i}\) and \({\overbrace{\beta }}_{WFE},\) respectively, indicate the parameters obtained from pooled OLS and weighted fixed effects estimation, while \({M}_{T}\) is the identity matrix. The test statistic obtained from Swamy’s model is improved by Pesaran et al. ( 2008 ) as follows:

where \(\stackrel{\sim }{S}\) is the Swamy test statistic and k is a number of explanatory variables. \({\stackrel{\sim }{\Delta }}_{adj}\) is a bias-adjusted version of \(\stackrel{\sim }{\Delta }\) . \({\stackrel{\sim }{Z}}_{it}\) =k and \(Var\left({\stackrel{\sim }{Z}}_{it}\right)=2k(T-k-1)/T+1\) . The null and alternative hypothesis for both test statistics is given below.

The rejection of the null hypothesis shows that slope coefficients of Eq. 1 are heterogeneous. In the selection of panel data estimation methods, the results of those preliminary analysis are taken into account.

3.3 Unit root test

Pesaran ( 2006 ) suggested a factor modeling approach to solve the cross-sectional dependency problem. This approach is simply based on adding cross-sectional averages to the models as proxies of unobserved common factors. The Cross-sectionally Augmented Dickey–Fuller (CADF) unit root test developed by Pesaran ( 2007 ) is based on that factor modelling approach. This method is an augmented form of Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) regression with lagged cross-sectional average and its first difference to deal with cross-sectional dependence (Baltagi, 2008 : 249). This method considers the cross-sectional dependence and can be used, while N > T and T > N. The CADF regression is:

\({\stackrel{-}{y}}_{t}\) is the average of all N observations. To prevent serial correlation, the regression must be augmented with lagged first differences of both \({y}_{it}\) and \({\stackrel{-}{y}}_{t}\) as follows:

After the calculation of CADF statistics for each cross section ( \({CADF}_{i}\) ), Pesaran ( 2007 ) calculates the CIPS statistic as average of CADF statistics.

If the calculated CIPS statistic exceeds the critical value, it means that the unit root hypothesis is rejected. After the preliminary analysis of unit root, the existence of a long-run relationship between the variables in our model will be investigated via Westerlund and Edgerton ( 2007 ) cointegration test. After this, the long-run coefficients will be estimated using the continuous-updated fully modified (CUP-FM) estimator developed by Bai and Kao ( 2006 ) and Bias-adjusted OLS estimator developed by Westerlund ( 2007 ).

3.4 Cointegration test and long-run relationship

In this study, the cointegration relationship was investigated by Westerlund and Edgerton ( 2007 ) LM bootstrap test. This method considers cross-sectional dependence and provides robust results in small samples (Westerlund and Edgerton, 2007 ). This method is based on the following equation

where \({n}_{ij}\) is an independent and identically distributed process with zero mean and var( \({n}_{ij})\) = \({{\sigma }_{i}}^{2}\) . Westerlund and Edgerton ( 2007 ) suggested following LM test in order to test the null of cointegration

where \({S}_{it}\) is partial sum process of the fully modified estimate of \({z}_{it}\) and \({\widehat{w}}_{i}^{-2}\) is the estimated long-run variance of \({u}_{it}\) conditional on \(\Delta {x}_{it}^{^{\prime}}\) . If the calculated LM statistic is below the critical value, the null of cointegration will be accepted. The critical values will be provided using the bootstrap method in order to prevent cross-sectional dependence.

In the estimation of long-run coefficients, the CUP-FM estimator was used and this method is based on the following regression

where \({\widehat{\lambda }}_{i}^{^{\prime}}\) refers to the estimated factor loadings and \(\hat{y}_{{i,t}}^{ + } = y_{{i,t}} - \left( {\lambda _{i} ^{\prime } \hat{\Omega }_{{F \in i}} + \hat{\Omega }_{{\mu \in i}} } \right)\hat{\Omega }_{{ \in i}}^{{ - 1}} {{\Delta }}x_{{i,t}}\) indicates the transformation of the dependent variable for endogeneity correction. According to Bai and Kao ( 2006 ), CUP-FM estimator is robust under cross-sectional dependence. However, the assumption that the number of common factors (k) is known cannot be satisfied in practice (Westerlund, 2007 ). Therefore, Westerlund ( 2007 ) suggested a bias-adjusted estimator (BA-OLS) following the methodology of Bai and Kao ( 2006 ) except in the context of determining the number of common factors. The author suggested the estimation of k using an information criterion as

where \(IC\left(k\right)\) is the information criterion. In this study, we determined the number of common factors via the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) as follows.

In the equation above, V(k) is the estimated variance of \({\widehat{u}}_{it}\) based on k factors. By minimizing the BIC, we obtain \(\widehat{k}\) . Westerlund ( 2007 ) showed that the estimation of k provides better results compared to CUP-FM estimator assuming k is known. Both of the estimators require cointegrated variables in the long run.

3.5 Empirical results and discussion

The results of Pesaran ( 2004 ) \({CD}_{LM}\) and Pesaran et al. ( 2008 ) bias-adjusted LM tests are given in Table 1 .

The results given in Table 1 show that the null of no cross-sectional dependence is rejected at 1% according to both \({CD}_{LM}\) and \({LM}_{adj}\) test statistics in all variables. In addition, in the error terms obtained from models 1, 2, 3, and 4 the null of no cross-sectional dependence is rejected at 1%. These results show that the methods to be used in the analysis of the stationarity of the variables and the determination of the long-run relationship should consider the cross-sectional dependence.

The results of homogeneity tests developed by Pesaran and Yamagata ( 2008 ) are given in Table 2 . According to the results, the null of homogeneity is accepted at %1 in all models. Therefore, estimators assume parameter homogeneity are used in our analysis.

After the preliminary analysis of cross-sectional dependence, the CADF unit root test developed by Pesaran ( 2007 ) is found to be appropriate for our model because of its robustness under cross-sectional dependence. The results of the CADF unit root test are given in Table 3 .

In the analysis of unit root, constant and trend terms are both considered at level, while only constant term is added at first difference. Maximum lag level is determined as 3, while optimum lag level is determined by F joint test from general to particular. According to results, the null of unit root is accepted for all variables, while calculated CIPS statistics of first-differenced variables exceed 1% critical value. All variables have a unit root, and their first differences are stationary ( \({I}_{1})\) . Therefore, in order to determine the existence of a long-run relationship, we applied Westerlund and Edgerton ( 2007 ) panel cointegration test. This method considers cross-sectional dependence and can be used, while the series are integrated in the same order. The results are shown in Table 4 .

Constant and trend are both considered in the analysis of cointegration, and critical values are obtained from 5000 bootstrap replications. The results show that the null of cointegration is accepted for all models. There is a long-run relationship between life expectancy, globalization, democracy, and GDP per capita. After determining the cointegration relationship, we estimated long-run coefficients utilizing CUP-FM and BA-OLS estimators proposed by Bai and Kao ( 2006 ) and Westerlund ( 2007 ), respectively.

The long-run estimation results given in Table 5 show that overall, economic, social, and political globalization are positively associated with life expectancy at 1% significance level according to both CUP-FM and BA-OLS estimators. The results show that a 1% increase in globalization index increases life expectancy %0.014 and %0.015 according to CUP-FM and BA-OLS estimators, respectively. The impact of economic, social and political globalization indexes is 0.013%, 0.011%, and 0.015% according to CUP-FM estimation results while 0.014%, 0.012%, and 0.017% according to both estimators, respectively.

Our results confirms the findings of Owen and Wu ( 2007 ), Ali and Audi ( 2016 ), and Shahbaz et al. ( 2019 ) who found a positive relationship between globalization and life expectancy. Our empirical work also supports the evidence of Bergh and Nilsson ( 2010 ) in terms of positive effect of economic globalization on life expectancy. While the authors found no significant impact of social and political globalization on life expectancy, our results show that life expectancy is positively associated with both social and political globalization. The results we found contradict Tausch ( 2015 )’s evidences in 80 of 99 countries. However, according to his results, in 19 of 99 countries, globalization affects health positively. When these countries are examined, it is seen that 14 of them are countries in the low and lower-middle income groups. In this sense, it can be said that the evidence we found for low-income countries is in line with the author's evidence. As Dreher ( 2006 ) mentioned, despite its possible inequality effects, the net effect of globalization on development is mostly positive and our empirical work supports that idea. The effect of democracy on life expectancy is also positive and significant at 1% which confirms the findings of Franco et al. ( 2004 ) and Besley and Kudamatsu ( 2006 ). In electoral democracies, people living in poverty and suffering from health problems can easily attract the attention of policymakers compared to autocracies. This leads to the reallocation of resources to solve the primary problems of the society. In the context of sustainable development goals, our results show that there is no conflict between SDG3 (good health and well-being) and SDG17 (partnerships for the goals). The improvement of the health conditions of the poor countries depends on global partnership and economic, social, and political integration among countries. In addition, democracy is an important tool in achieving the goal of a healthy society, as it fosters accountability, transparency, and partnership between governments and the societies they rule. As stated in the introduction section, low-income countries show low performance in terms of health-related sustainable development goals, and their connections with global markets are weak compared to other countries. At the same time, democratic institutions are not developed. Our work supports the idea that in order to achieve SDG3, global partnership and democracy are required.

The GDP per capita that used as a control variable has a positive impact on life expectancy at a 1% level. These results support the evidence of Barlow and Vissandjee ( 1999 ), Or ( 2000 ), and Shahbaz et al. ( 2019 ). Individuals living in countries with high per capita income are expected to have higher welfare and have a longer life expectancy (Judge, 1995 ). In low-income countries where people still suffer from having difficulty in meeting basic human needs, increasing per capita income may lead to better nutritional status, easier access to advanced treatment methods and technology.

4 Conclusion

In this study, the effects of globalization and democracy on life expectancy are empirically investigated in low-income countries. While globalization and democracy indexes are used as proxy indicators of “Partnerships for the Goals (SDG 17),” life expectancy used a proxy of “Good Health and Well-Being (SDG 3).” With this, it is aimed to examine the existence of contradiction between those SDGs. In the estimation of the long-run relationship between the variables, second-generation panel data analysis methods that consider cross-sectional dependency are used. According to the results, the globalization index and its subcomponents such as economic, social, and political globalization are important instruments to achieve a healthier society. In addition, higher levels of democracy lead to higher levels of life expectancy. Finally, GDP per capita growth improves health status of countries.

The findings obtained from our study show that economic, social, and political integration of countries and democracy accelerate the process of achieving a healthier society. Therefore, it is seen that SDG3 and SDG17 targets are compatible with each other. In order to achieve SDG3, economic, social, and political integration between countries should be encouraged and democratic institutions should be improved. Policy makers should remove the barriers on globalization, and they should promote participation on international organizations and public–private and civil society partnerships.

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Guzel, A.E., Arslan, U. & Acaravci, A. The impact of economic, social, and political globalization and democracy on life expectancy in low-income countries: are sustainable development goals contradictory?. Environ Dev Sustain 23 , 13508–13525 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-021-01225-2

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What lies beneath Gaza’s rubble and ruin

The hysteria over campus protests in the United States has shifted American attention away from the depth of the ongoing calamity in Gaza.

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In a fit of ideological pique last week, far-right Rep. Lauren Boebert (R-Colo.) scoffed at protesters agitating against pro-Israel policies on campuses across the United States . “I get a strange inkling that all these Columbia and UCLA students running around yelling ‘Free Palestine’ would not be jumping at the opportunity to do a semester abroad in Gaza,” she wrote on social media , before later journeying to a protest encampment at George Washington University and almost sparring with students when trying to pull down a Palestinian flag.

Boebert’s scorn is shared even by some of her opponents in the Washington establishment, many of whom have cast the student demonstrations as, at best, unproductive far-left agitprop or, more darkly, dangerous antisemitic behavior that must be expunged from the academy. Hundreds of campus protesters have been arrested in recent days in police crackdowns from California to New York.

Boebert’s comment, though, drew derision on two counts: First, that protesters angry about alleged Israeli war crimes in Gaza would need to go to the besieged territory itself to justify their anger. And, second, that students could even do “a semester abroad” in Gaza, where Israel has spent the past half year systematically destroying most of its educational institutions, including all of its universities .

For months, Palestinian civil society activists have drawn attention to the steady eradication of Gaza’s cultural patrimony. Israel’s punishing campaign against militant group Hamas has seen much of the territory reduced to ruin. In the process, many libraries, museums and colleges have been ransacked and razed — in some instances, by deliberate Israeli demolition. Thousands of artifacts in various collections, including Roman coins and other materials from Gaza’s pre-Islamic past, have been potentially lost during the war .

The hysteria over campus protests in the United States has shifted American attention away from the depth of the ongoing calamity in Gaza. U.N. officials and aid agencies are still grappling with the scale of the destruction in the territory, where dozens are still dying every day. Since Hamas launched its Oct. 7 terrorist strike on southern Israel, more than 34,500 Palestinians in the territory — many of them women and children — have been killed. Some 5 percent of Gaza’s overall population has been killed or injured, according to a U.N. report that cites local data.

That figure doesn’t include the more than at least 10,000 people that the U.N. estimates are still missing beneath the rubble, citing the Palestinian Civil Defense (PCD). The challenge of finding the missing is growing more dire, given the widespread destruction of heavy machinery and equipment needed to dig through the debris.

“Rising temperatures can accelerate the decomposition of bodies and the spread of disease,” the U.N. humanitarian affairs office said in a statement , adding that the PCD was appealing to “all relevant stakeholders to urgently intervene to allow the entry of needed equipment, including bulldozers and excavators, to avert a public health catastrophe, facilitate dignified burials, and save the lives of injured people.”

Sifting through Gaza’s wreckage will be no simple task. Israel has dumped a huge amount of ordnance on the territory. Mungo Birch, head of the U.N. Mine Action Program in Palestinian territory, said last week that the amount of unexploded missiles and bombs lying in the rubble is “unprecedented” since World War II. He said tiny Gaza is a site of some 37 million tons of rubble — more than what’s been generated across all of Ukraine during Russia’s war — and 800,000 tons of asbestos and other contaminants. He said his agency has only a fraction of the funding it needs to begin clearing operations whenever the war ends.

Over the weekend, U.S. and Egyptian officials attempted to facilitate a last-ditch effort to broker a truce between Israel and Hamas . A delegation from the Palestinian militant group was in Cairo and expressed optimism that a breakthrough could be found. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who faced mass protests at home against his continued tenure in office, seemed more wary of the arrangement and remains bent on carrying out a full offensive against the southern Gazan city of Rafah, where more than a million Palestinians already displaced in the territory have taken shelter.

Top U.N. officials say famine has already gripped parts of Gaza. Beyond the desperately insufficient trickle of humanitarian aid into the territory, the war has also “severely hampered” Gaza’s “ability to produce food and clean water,” according to my colleagues . “Israeli airstrikes and bulldozers have razed farms and orchards. Crops abandoned by farmers seeking safety in southern Gaza have withered, and cattle have been left to die.”

The fear surrounding Rafah and the uncertainty over a potential cease-fire sit against the looming reality of how difficult it will be for Gaza to recover. More than 70 percent of all housing in the territory has been destroyed. A report by the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) found that the war has reversed 40 years of development and improvement in social indicators such as life expectancy, health and educational attainment in Gaza.

The agency estimated that reconstruction, at this point, would cost some $40 billion to $50 billion. And if it follows the pace observed after previous conflicts, UNDP estimates that it will take “approximately 80 years to restore all the fully destroyed housing units” in Gaza.

“My very big concern — in addition to the numbers — is the breaking down of communities and families in Gaza,” UNDP regional director Abdallah al-Dardari told The Washington Post . “If you know 60 people in your family have been killed — like our colleague Issam al-Mughrabi who was killed with 60 people in his family during one raid — you will go numb,” Dardari said. “The consequences of this war will stay with us far beyond the end of the war.”

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The Deep, Tangled Roots of American Illiberalism

By Steven Hahn

Dr. Hahn is a Pulitzer Prize-winning historian at New York University and the author, most recently, of “Illiberal America: a History.”

In a recent interview with Time, Donald Trump promised a second term of authoritarian power grabs, administrative cronyism, mass deportations of the undocumented, harassment of women over abortion, trade wars and vengeance brought upon his rivals and enemies, including President Biden. “If they said that a president doesn’t get immunity,” Mr. Trump told Time, “then Biden, I am sure, will be prosecuted for all of his crimes.”

Further evidence, it seems, of Mr. Trump’s efforts to construct a political world like no other in American history. But how unprecedented is it, really? That Mr. Trump continues to lead in polls should make plain that he and his MAGA movement are more than noxious weeds in otherwise liberal democratic soil.

Many of us have not wanted to see it that way. “This is not who we are as a nation,” one journalist exclaimed in what was a common response to the violence on Jan. 6, “and we must not let ourselves or others believe otherwise.” Mr. Biden has said much the same thing.

While it’s true that Mr. Trump was the first president to lose an election and attempt to stay in power, observers have come to recognize the need for a lengthier view of Trumpism. Even so, they are prone to imagining that there was a time not all that long ago when political “normalcy” prevailed. What they have failed to grasp is that American illiberalism is deeply rooted in our past and fed by practices, relationships and sensibilities that have been close to the surface, even when they haven’t exploded into view.

Illiberalism is generally seen as a backlash against modern liberal and progressive ideas and policies, especially those meant to protect the rights and advance the aspirations of groups long pushed to the margins of American political life. But in the United States, illiberalism is better understood as coherent sets of ideas that are related but also change over time.

This illiberalism celebrates hierarchies of gender, race and nationality; cultural homogeneity; Christian religious faith; the marking of internal as well as external enemies; patriarchal families; heterosexuality; the will of the community over the rule of law; and the use of political violence to achieve or maintain power. This illiberalism sank roots from the time of European settlement and spread out from villages and towns to the highest levels of government. In one form or another, it has shaped much of our history. Illiberalism has frequently been a stalking horse, if not in the winner’s circle. Hardly ever has it been roundly defeated.

A few examples may be illustrative. Although European colonization of North America has often been imagined as a sharp break from the ways of home countries, neo-feudal dreams inspired the making of Euro-American societies from the Carolinas up through the Hudson Valley, based as they were on landed estates and coerced labor, while the Puritan towns of New England, with their own hierarchies, demanded submission to the faith and harshly policed their members and potential intruders alike. The backcountry began to fill up with land-hungry settlers who generally formed ethnicity-based enclaves, eyed outsiders with suspicion and, with rare exceptions, hoped to rid their territory of Native peoples. Most of those who arrived in North America between the early 17th century and the time of the American Revolution were either enslaved or in servitude, and master-servant jurisprudence shaped labor relations well after slavery was abolished, a phenomenon that has been described as “belated feudalism.”

The anti-colonialism of the American Revolution was accompanied not only by warfare against Native peoples and rewards for enslavers, but also by a deeply ingrained anti-Catholicism, and hostility to Catholics remained a potent political force well into the 20th century. Monarchist solutions were bruited about during the writing of the Constitution and the first decade of the American Republic: John Adams thought that the country would move in such a direction and other leaders at the time, including Washington, Madison and Hamilton, wondered privately if a king would be necessary in the event a “republican remedy” failed.

The 1830s, commonly seen as the height of Jacksonian democracy, were racked by violent expulsions of Catholics , Mormons and abolitionists of both races, along with thousands of Native peoples dispossessed of their homelands and sent to “Indian Territory” west of the Mississippi.

The new democratic politics of the time was often marked by Election Day violence after campaigns suffused with military cadences, while elected officials usually required the support of elite patrons to guarantee the bonds they had to post. Even in state legislatures and Congress, weapons could be brandished and duels arranged; “bullies” enforced the wills of their allies.

When enslavers in the Southern states resorted to secession rather than risk their system under a Lincoln administration, they made clear that their Confederacy was built on the cornerstone of slavery and white supremacy. And although their crushing defeat brought abolition, the establishment of birthright citizenship (except for Native peoples), the political exclusion of Confederates, and the extension of voting rights to Black men — the results of one of the world’s great revolutions — it was not long before the revolution went into reverse.

The federal government soon allowed former Confederates and their white supporters to return to power, destroy Black political activism and, accompanied by lynchings (expressing the “will” of white communities), build the edifice of Jim Crow: segregation, political disfranchisement and a harsh labor regime. Already previewed in the pre-Civil War North, Jim Crow received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court and the administration of Woodrow Wilson .

Few Progressives of the early 20th century had much trouble with this. Segregation seemed a modern way to choreograph “race relations,” and disfranchisement resonated with their disenchantment with popular politics, whether it was powered by Black voters in the South or European immigrants in the North. Many Progressives were devotees of eugenics and other forms of social engineering, and they generally favored overseas imperialism; some began to envision the scaffolding of a corporate state — all anticipating the dark turns in Europe over the next decades.

The 1920s, in fact, saw fascist pulses coming from a number of directions in the United States and, as in Europe, targeting political radicals. Benito Mussolini won accolades in many American quarters. The lab where Josef Mengele worked received support from the Rockefeller Foundation. White Protestant fundamentalism reigned in towns and the countryside. And the Immigration Act of 1924 set limits on the number of newcomers, especially those from Southern and Eastern Europe, who were thought to be politically and culturally unassimilable.

Most worrisome, the Ku Klux Klan, energized by anti-Catholicism and antisemitism as well as anti-Black racism, marched brazenly in cities great and small. The Klan became a mass movement and wielded significant political power; it was crucial, for example , to the enforcement of Prohibition. Once the organization unraveled in the late 1920s, many Klansmen and women found their way to new fascist groups and the radical right more generally.

Sidelined by the Great Depression and New Deal, the illiberal right regained traction in the late 1930s, and during the 1950s won grass-roots support through vehement anti-Communism and opposition to the civil rights movement. As early as 1964, in a run for the Democratic presidential nomination, Gov. George Wallace of Alabama began to hone a rhetoric of white grievance and racial hostility that had appeal in the Midwest and Middle Atlantic, and Barry Goldwater’s campaign that year, despite its failure, put winds in the sails of the John Birch Society and Young Americans for Freedom.

Four years later, Wallace mobilized enough support as a third-party candidate to win five states. And in 1972, once again as a Democrat, Wallace racked up primary wins in both the North and the South before an assassination attempt forced him out of the race. Growing backlashes against school desegregation and feminism added further fuel to the fire on the right, paving the way for the conservative ascendancy of the 1980s.

By the early 1990s, the neo-Nazi and Klansman David Duke had won a seat in the Louisiana Legislature and nearly three-fifths of the white vote in campaigns for governor and senator. Pat Buchanan, seeking the Republican presidential nomination in 1992, called for “America First,” the fortification of the border (a “Buchanan fence”), and a culture war for the “soul” of America, while the National Rifle Association became a powerful force on the right and in the Republican Party.

When Mr. Trump questioned Barack Obama’s legitimacy to serve as president, a project that quickly became known as “birtherism,” he made use of a Reconstruction-era racist trope that rejected the legitimacy of Black political rights and power. In so doing, Mr. Trump began to cement a coalition of aggrieved white voters. They were ready to push back against the nation’s growing cultural diversity — embodied by Mr. Obama — and the challenges they saw to traditional hierarchies of family, gender and race. They had much on which to build.

Back in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville, in “Democracy in America,” glimpsed the illiberal currents that already entangled the country’s politics. While he marveled at the “equality of conditions,” the fluidity of social life and the strength of republican institutions, he also worried about the “omnipotence of the majority.”

“What I find most repulsive in America is not the extreme freedom reigning there,” Tocqueville wrote, “but the shortage of guarantees against tyranny.” He pointed to communities “taking justice into their own hands,” and warned that “associations of plain citizens can compose very rich, influential, and powerful bodies, in other words, aristocratic bodies.” Lamenting their intellectual conformity, Tocqueville believed that if Americans ever gave up republican government, “they will pass rapidly on to despotism,” restricting “the sphere of political rights, taking some of them away in order to entrust them to a single man.”

The slide toward despotism that Tocqueville feared may be well underway, whatever the election’s outcome. Even if they try to fool themselves into thinking that Mr. Trump won’t follow through, millions of voters seem ready to entrust their rights to “a single man” who has announced his intent to use autocratic powers for retribution, repression, expulsion and misogyny.

Only by recognizing what we’re up against can we mount an effective campaign to protect our democracy, leaning on the important political struggles — abolitionism, antimonopoly, social democracy, human rights, civil rights, feminism — that have challenged illiberalism in the past and offer the vision and political pathways to guide us in the future.

Our biggest mistake would be to believe that we’re watching an exceptional departure in the country’s history. Because from the first, Mr. Trump has tapped into deep and ever-expanding illiberal roots. Illiberalism’s history is America’s history.

Steven Hahn is a Pulitzer Prize-winning historian at New York University and the author, most recently, of “ Illiberal America: a History .”

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