assignment of claims rights

31 U.S. Code § 3727 - Assignments of claims

In subsection (a)(1), the words “or share thereof” and “whether absolute or conditional, and whatever may be the consideration therefor” are omitted as surplus. In clause (2), the word “authorization” is substituted for “powers of attorney, orders, or other authorities” to eliminate unnecessary words.

In subsections (b) and (c), the word “official” is substituted for “officer” for consistency in the revised title and with other titles of the United States Code.

In subsection (b), the words “Except as hereinafter provided” are omitted as unnecessary. The words “read and” are omitted as surplus. The words “to the person acknowledging the same” are omitted as unnecessary. The text of 31:203(1st par. last sentence) is omitted as superseded by 39:410. The words “Notwithstanding any law to the contrary governing the validity of assignments ” and the text of 31:203(last par.) are omitted as unnecessary.

In subsection (c), before clause (1), the words “bank, trust company, or other . . . including any Federal lending agency” are omitted as surplus. The words “of money due or to become due under a contract providing for payments totaling at least $1,000” are substituted for “in any case in which the moneys due or to become due from the United States or from any agency or department thereof, under a contract providing for payments aggregating $1,000 or more” to eliminate unnecessary words. The text of 31:203(2d par. proviso cl. 1) is omitted as executed. In clause (1), the words “in the case of any contract entered into after October 9, 1940 ” are omitted as executed. In clause (2)(A), the words “payable under such contract” are omitted as surplus. In clause (3), the words “true” and “instrument of” are omitted as surplus. The words “department or” are omitted because of the restatement. The words “if any” and “to make payment” are omitted as surplus.

In subsection (d), before clause (1), the words “During a war or national emergency proclaimed by the President or declared by law and ended by proclamation or law” are substituted for “in time of war or national emergency proclaimed by the President (including the national emergency proclaimed December 16, 1950 ) or by Act or joint resolution of the Congress and until such war or national emergency has been terminated in such manner” to eliminate unnecessary words. The words “ Department of Energy (when carrying out duties and powers formerly carried out by the Atomic Energy Commission)” are substituted for “Atomic Energy Commission” (which was reconstituted as the Energy Research and Development Administration by 42:5813 and 5814) because of 42:7151(a) and 7293. The words “other department or . . . of the United States . . . except any such contract under which full payment has been made” and “of any moneys due or to become due under such contract” before “shall not be subject” are omitted as surplus. The words “A payment subsequently due under the contract (even after the war or emergency is ended) shall be paid to the assignee without” are substituted for “and if such provision or one to the same general effect has been at any time heretofore or is hereafter included or inserted in any such contract, payments to be made thereafter to an assignee of any moneys due or to become due under such contract, whether during or after such war or emergency . . . hereafter” to eliminate unnecessary words. The words “of any nature” are omitted as surplus. In clause (1), the words “or any department or agency thereof” are omitted as unnecessary. In clause (2), the words “under any renegotiation statute or under any statutory renegotiation article in the contract” are omitted as surplus.

Subsection (e)(1) is substituted for 31:203(4th par.) to eliminate unnecessary words.

In subsection (e)(2), the words “person receiving an amount under an assignment or allotment” are substituted for “assignees, transferees, or allottees” for clarity and consistency. The words “or to others for them” and “with respect to such assignments , transfers, or allotments or the use of such moneys” are omitted as surplus. The words “person making the assignment or allotment” are substituted for “assignors, transferors, or allotters” for clarity and consistency.

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• assignments basic law

Assignments: The Basic Law

The assignment of a right or obligation is a common contractual event under the law and the right to assign (or prohibition against assignments) is found in the majority of agreements, leases and business structural documents created in the United States.

As with many terms commonly used, people are familiar with the term but often are not aware or fully aware of what the terms entail. The concept of assignment of rights and obligations is one of those simple concepts with wide ranging ramifications in the contractual and business context and the law imposes severe restrictions on the validity and effect of assignment in many instances. Clear contractual provisions concerning assignments and rights should be in every document and structure created and this article will outline why such drafting is essential for the creation of appropriate and effective contracts and structures.

The reader should first read the article on Limited Liability Entities in the United States and Contracts since the information in those articles will be assumed in this article.

Basic Definitions and Concepts:

An assignment is the transfer of rights held by one party called the “assignor” to another party called the “assignee.” The legal nature of the assignment and the contractual terms of the agreement between the parties determines some additional rights and liabilities that accompany the assignment. The assignment of rights under a contract usually completely transfers the rights to the assignee to receive the benefits accruing under the contract. Ordinarily, the term assignment is limited to the transfer of rights that are intangible, like contractual rights and rights connected with property. Merchants Service Co. v. Small Claims Court , 35 Cal. 2d 109, 113-114 (Cal. 1950).

An assignment will generally be permitted under the law unless there is an express prohibition against assignment in the underlying contract or lease. Where assignments are permitted, the assignor need not consult the other party to the contract but may merely assign the rights at that time. However, an assignment cannot have any adverse effect on the duties of the other party to the contract, nor can it diminish the chance of the other party receiving complete performance. The assignor normally remains liable unless there is an agreement to the contrary by the other party to the contract.

The effect of a valid assignment is to remove privity between the assignor and the obligor and create privity between the obligor and the assignee. Privity is usually defined as a direct and immediate contractual relationship. See Merchants case above.

Further, for the assignment to be effective in most jurisdictions, it must occur in the present. One does not normally assign a future right; the assignment vests immediate rights and obligations.

No specific language is required to create an assignment so long as the assignor makes clear his/her intent to assign identified contractual rights to the assignee. Since expensive litigation can erupt from ambiguous or vague language, obtaining the correct verbiage is vital. An agreement must manifest the intent to transfer rights and can either be oral or in writing and the rights assigned must be certain.

Note that an assignment of an interest is the transfer of some identifiable property, claim, or right from the assignor to the assignee. The assignment operates to transfer to the assignee all of the rights, title, or interest of the assignor in the thing assigned. A transfer of all rights, title, and interests conveys everything that the assignor owned in the thing assigned and the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor. Knott v. McDonald’s Corp ., 985 F. Supp. 1222 (N.D. Cal. 1997)

The parties must intend to effectuate an assignment at the time of the transfer, although no particular language or procedure is necessary. As long ago as the case of National Reserve Co. v. Metropolitan Trust Co ., 17 Cal. 2d 827 (Cal. 1941), the court held that in determining what rights or interests pass under an assignment, the intention of the parties as manifested in the instrument is controlling.

The intent of the parties to an assignment is a question of fact to be derived not only from the instrument executed by the parties but also from the surrounding circumstances. When there is no writing to evidence the intention to transfer some identifiable property, claim, or right, it is necessary to scrutinize the surrounding circumstances and parties’ acts to ascertain their intentions. Strosberg v. Brauvin Realty Servs., 295 Ill. App. 3d 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998)

The general rule applicable to assignments of choses in action is that an assignment, unless there is a contract to the contrary, carries with it all securities held by the assignor as collateral to the claim and all rights incidental thereto and vests in the assignee the equitable title to such collateral securities and incidental rights. An unqualified assignment of a contract or chose in action, however, with no indication of the intent of the parties, vests in the assignee the assigned contract or chose and all rights and remedies incidental thereto.

More examples: In Strosberg v. Brauvin Realty Servs ., 295 Ill. App. 3d 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998), the court held that the assignee of a party to a subordination agreement is entitled to the benefits and is subject to the burdens of the agreement. In Florida E. C. R. Co. v. Eno , 99 Fla. 887 (Fla. 1930), the court held that the mere assignment of all sums due in and of itself creates no different or other liability of the owner to the assignee than that which existed from the owner to the assignor.

And note that even though an assignment vests in the assignee all rights, remedies, and contingent benefits which are incidental to the thing assigned, those which are personal to the assignor and for his sole benefit are not assigned. Rasp v. Hidden Valley Lake, Inc ., 519 N.E.2d 153, 158 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). Thus, if the underlying agreement provides that a service can only be provided to X, X cannot assign that right to Y.

Novation Compared to Assignment:

Although the difference between a novation and an assignment may appear narrow, it is an essential one. “Novation is a act whereby one party transfers all its obligations and benefits under a contract to a third party.” In a novation, a third party successfully substitutes the original party as a party to the contract. “When a contract is novated, the other contracting party must be left in the same position he was in prior to the novation being made.”

A sublease is the transfer when a tenant retains some right of reentry onto the leased premises. However, if the tenant transfers the entire leasehold estate, retaining no right of reentry or other reversionary interest, then the transfer is an assignment. The assignor is normally also removed from liability to the landlord only if the landlord consents or allowed that right in the lease. In a sublease, the original tenant is not released from the obligations of the original lease.

Equitable Assignments:

An equitable assignment is one in which one has a future interest and is not valid at law but valid in a court of equity. In National Bank of Republic v. United Sec. Life Ins. & Trust Co. , 17 App. D.C. 112 (D.C. Cir. 1900), the court held that to constitute an equitable assignment of a chose in action, the following has to occur generally: anything said written or done, in pursuance of an agreement and for valuable consideration, or in consideration of an antecedent debt, to place a chose in action or fund out of the control of the owner, and appropriate it to or in favor of another person, amounts to an equitable assignment. Thus, an agreement, between a debtor and a creditor, that the debt shall be paid out of a specific fund going to the debtor may operate as an equitable assignment.

In Egyptian Navigation Co. v. Baker Invs. Corp. , 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30804 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2008), the court stated that an equitable assignment occurs under English law when an assignor, with an intent to transfer his/her right to a chose in action, informs the assignee about the right so transferred.

An executory agreement or a declaration of trust are also equitable assignments if unenforceable as assignments by a court of law but enforceable by a court of equity exercising sound discretion according to the circumstances of the case. Since California combines courts of equity and courts of law, the same court would hear arguments as to whether an equitable assignment had occurred. Quite often, such relief is granted to avoid fraud or unjust enrichment.

Note that obtaining an assignment through fraudulent means invalidates the assignment. Fraud destroys the validity of everything into which it enters. It vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments. Walker v. Rich , 79 Cal. App. 139 (Cal. App. 1926). If an assignment is made with the fraudulent intent to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors, then it is void as fraudulent in fact. See our article on Transfers to Defraud Creditors .

But note that the motives that prompted an assignor to make the transfer will be considered as immaterial and will constitute no defense to an action by the assignee, if an assignment is considered as valid in all other respects.

Enforceability of Assignments:

Whether a right under a contract is capable of being transferred is determined by the law of the place where the contract was entered into. The validity and effect of an assignment is determined by the law of the place of assignment. The validity of an assignment of a contractual right is governed by the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the assignment and the parties.

In some jurisdictions, the traditional conflict of laws rules governing assignments has been rejected and the law of the place having the most significant contacts with the assignment applies. In Downs v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co ., 14 N.Y.2d 266 (N.Y. 1964), a wife and her husband separated and the wife obtained a judgment of separation from the husband in New York. The judgment required the husband to pay a certain yearly sum to the wife. The husband assigned 50 percent of his future salary, wages, and earnings to the wife. The agreement authorized the employer to make such payments to the wife.

After the husband moved from New York, the wife learned that he was employed by an employer in Massachusetts. She sent the proper notice and demanded payment under the agreement. The employer refused and the wife brought an action for enforcement. The court observed that Massachusetts did not prohibit assignment of the husband’s wages. Moreover, Massachusetts law was not controlling because New York had the most significant relationship with the assignment. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the wife.

Therefore, the validity of an assignment is determined by looking to the law of the forum with the most significant relationship to the assignment itself. To determine the applicable law of assignments, the court must look to the law of the state which is most significantly related to the principal issue before it.

Assignment of Contractual Rights:

Generally, the law allows the assignment of a contractual right unless the substitution of rights would materially change the duty of the obligor, materially increase the burden or risk imposed on the obligor by the contract, materially impair the chance of obtaining return performance, or materially reduce the value of the performance to the obligor. Restat 2d of Contracts, § 317(2)(a). This presumes that the underlying agreement is silent on the right to assign.

If the contract specifically precludes assignment, the contractual right is not assignable. Whether a contract is assignable is a matter of contractual intent and one must look to the language used by the parties to discern that intent.

In the absence of an express provision to the contrary, the rights and duties under a bilateral executory contract that does not involve personal skill, trust, or confidence may be assigned without the consent of the other party. But note that an assignment is invalid if it would materially alter the other party’s duties and responsibilities. Once an assignment is effective, the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and assumes all of assignor’s rights. Hence, after a valid assignment, the assignor’s right to performance is extinguished, transferred to assignee, and the assignee possesses the same rights, benefits, and remedies assignor once possessed. Robert Lamb Hart Planners & Architects v. Evergreen, Ltd. , 787 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1992).

On the other hand, an assignee’s right against the obligor is subject to “all of the limitations of the assignor’s right, all defenses thereto, and all set-offs and counterclaims which would have been available against the assignor had there been no assignment, provided that these defenses and set-offs are based on facts existing at the time of the assignment.” See Robert Lamb , case, above.

The power of the contract to restrict assignment is broad. Usually, contractual provisions that restrict assignment of the contract without the consent of the obligor are valid and enforceable, even when there is statutory authorization for the assignment. The restriction of the power to assign is often ineffective unless the restriction is expressly and precisely stated. Anti-assignment clauses are effective only if they contain clear, unambiguous language of prohibition. Anti-assignment clauses protect only the obligor and do not affect the transaction between the assignee and assignor.

Usually, a prohibition against the assignment of a contract does not prevent an assignment of the right to receive payments due, unless circumstances indicate the contrary. Moreover, the contracting parties cannot, by a mere non-assignment provision, prevent the effectual alienation of the right to money which becomes due under the contract.

A contract provision prohibiting or restricting an assignment may be waived, or a party may so act as to be estopped from objecting to the assignment, such as by effectively ratifying the assignment. The power to void an assignment made in violation of an anti-assignment clause may be waived either before or after the assignment. See our article on Contracts.

Noncompete Clauses and Assignments:

Of critical import to most buyers of businesses is the ability to ensure that key employees of the business being purchased cannot start a competing company. Some states strictly limit such clauses, some do allow them. California does restrict noncompete clauses, only allowing them under certain circumstances. A common question in those states that do allow them is whether such rights can be assigned to a new party, such as the buyer of the buyer.

A covenant not to compete, also called a non-competitive clause, is a formal agreement prohibiting one party from performing similar work or business within a designated area for a specified amount of time. This type of clause is generally included in contracts between employer and employee and contracts between buyer and seller of a business.

Many workers sign a covenant not to compete as part of the paperwork required for employment. It may be a separate document similar to a non-disclosure agreement, or buried within a number of other clauses in a contract. A covenant not to compete is generally legal and enforceable, although there are some exceptions and restrictions.

Whenever a company recruits skilled employees, it invests a significant amount of time and training. For example, it often takes years before a research chemist or a design engineer develops a workable knowledge of a company’s product line, including trade secrets and highly sensitive information. Once an employee gains this knowledge and experience, however, all sorts of things can happen. The employee could work for the company until retirement, accept a better offer from a competing company or start up his or her own business.

A covenant not to compete may cover a number of potential issues between employers and former employees. Many companies spend years developing a local base of customers or clients. It is important that this customer base not fall into the hands of local competitors. When an employee signs a covenant not to compete, he or she usually agrees not to use insider knowledge of the company’s customer base to disadvantage the company. The covenant not to compete often defines a broad geographical area considered off-limits to former employees, possibly tens or hundreds of miles.

Another area of concern covered by a covenant not to compete is a potential ‘brain drain’. Some high-level former employees may seek to recruit others from the same company to create new competition. Retention of employees, especially those with unique skills or proprietary knowledge, is vital for most companies, so a covenant not to compete may spell out definite restrictions on the hiring or recruiting of employees.

A covenant not to compete may also define a specific amount of time before a former employee can seek employment in a similar field. Many companies offer a substantial severance package to make sure former employees are financially solvent until the terms of the covenant not to compete have been met.

Because the use of a covenant not to compete can be controversial, a handful of states, including California, have largely banned this type of contractual language. The legal enforcement of these agreements falls on individual states, and many have sided with the employee during arbitration or litigation. A covenant not to compete must be reasonable and specific, with defined time periods and coverage areas. If the agreement gives the company too much power over former employees or is ambiguous, state courts may declare it to be overbroad and therefore unenforceable. In such case, the employee would be free to pursue any employment opportunity, including working for a direct competitor or starting up a new company of his or her own.

It has been held that an employee’s covenant not to compete is assignable where one business is transferred to another, that a merger does not constitute an assignment of a covenant not to compete, and that a covenant not to compete is enforceable by a successor to the employer where the assignment does not create an added burden of employment or other disadvantage to the employee. However, in some states such as Hawaii, it has also been held that a covenant not to compete is not assignable and under various statutes for various reasons that such covenants are not enforceable against an employee by a successor to the employer. Hawaii v. Gannett Pac. Corp. , 99 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (D. Haw. 1999)

It is vital to obtain the relevant law of the applicable state before drafting or attempting to enforce assignment rights in this particular area.

Conclusion:

In the current business world of fast changing structures, agreements, employees and projects, the ability to assign rights and obligations is essential to allow flexibility and adjustment to new situations. Conversely, the ability to hold a contracting party into the deal may be essential for the future of a party. Thus, the law of assignments and the restriction on same is a critical aspect of every agreement and every structure. This basic provision is often glanced at by the contracting parties, or scribbled into the deal at the last minute but can easily become the most vital part of the transaction.

As an example, one client of ours came into the office outraged that his co venturer on a sizable exporting agreement, who had excellent connections in Brazil, had elected to pursue another venture instead and assigned the agreement to a party unknown to our client and without the business contacts our client considered vital. When we examined the handwritten agreement our client had drafted in a restaurant in Sao Paolo, we discovered there was no restriction on assignment whatsoever…our client had not even considered that right when drafting the agreement after a full day of work.

One choses who one does business with carefully…to ensure that one’s choice remains the party on the other side of the contract, one must master the ability to negotiate proper assignment provisions.

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Assignment of claims

An untraditional approach to combining the claims of plaintiffs; how it differs from class actions, joinder, consolidation, relation and coordination

A large class of plaintiffs engages you to bring a common action against a defendant or set of defendants. As counsel, you resolve to combine the plaintiffs’ various claims into a single lawsuit. In this article, we touch on some of the traditional approaches, such as a class action, joinder, consolidation, relation, and coordination. To that list, we add as an approach the assignment of claims, a procedural vehicle validated by the United States Supreme Court, but not typically employed to combine the claims of numerous plaintiffs.

Class actions

In Hansberry v. Lee (1940) 311 U.S. 32, the United States Supreme Court explained that “[t]he class suit was an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree in suits where the number of those interested in the subject of the litigation is so great that their joinder as parties in conformity to the usual rules of procedure is impracticable. Courts are not infrequently called upon to proceed with causes in which the number of those interested in the litigation is so great as to make difficult or impossible the joinder of all because some are not within the jurisdiction or because their whereabouts is unknown or where if all were made parties to the suit its continued abatement by the death of some would prevent or unduly delay a decree. In such cases where the interests of those not joined are of the same class as the interests of those who are, and where it is considered that the latter fairly represent the former in the prosecution of the litigation of the issues in which all have a common interest, the court will proceed to a decree.” ( Id. at pp. 41-42.)

In California’s state courts, class actions are authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 382, which applies when the issue is “‘one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.’” ( Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955, 968; see also, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.760-3.771.) “The party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.” ( Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) “The community of interest requirement involves three factors: ‘(1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.’” ( Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435; see Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq. [Consumers Legal Remedies Act]; cf. Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., rule 23(a) [prerequisites for federal class action].)

Parties, acting as co-plaintiffs, can also obtain economies of scale by joining their claims in a single lawsuit. Under California’s permissive joinder statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 378 (section 378), individuals may join in one action as plaintiffs if the following conditions are met:

(a)(1) They assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action; or

(2) They have a claim, right, or interest adverse to the defendant in the property or controversy which is the subject of the action.

(b) It is not necessary that each plaintiff be interested as to every cause of action or as to all relief prayed for. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective right to relief.

This strategy of joining multiple persons in one action has been referred to as a “mass action” in some decisions involving numerous plaintiffs. (See Aghaji v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1113; Petersen v. Bank of America Corp . (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 238, 240 ( Petersen ); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B) [federal definition of “mass action”].)

In Petersen , for example, 965 plaintiffs who borrowed money from Countrywide Financial Corporation in the mid-2000’s banded together and filed a single lawsuit against Countrywide and related entities. ( Petersen , supra , 232 Cal.App.4th at pp.  242-243.) The plaintiffs alleged Countrywide had developed a strategy to increase its profits by misrepresenting the loan terms and using captive real estate appraisers to provide dishonest appraisals that inflated home prices and induced borrowers to take loans Countrywide knew they could not afford. ( Id. at p. 241.) The plaintiffs alleged Countrywide had no intent to keep these loans, but to bundle and sell them on the secondary market to unsuspecting investors who would bear the risk the borrowers could not repay. ( Id. at pp. 241, 245.) Countrywide and the related defendants demurred on the ground of misjoinder of the plaintiffs in violation of section 378. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed all plaintiffs except the one whose name appeared first in the caption. ( Id . at p. 247.) The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for further proceedings. ( Id . at p. 256.)

Petersen resolved two questions. First, it concluded the operative pleading alleged wrongs arising out of “‘the same . . . series of transactions’” that would entail litigation of at least one common question of law or fact. ( Petersen, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 241.) The appellate court noted the individual damages among the 965 plaintiffs would vary widely, but the question of liability provided a basis for joining the claims in a single action. ( Id. at p. 253.) Second, the appellate court concluded “California’s procedures governing permissive joinder are up to the task of managing mass actions like this one.” ( Id. at p. 242.)

Consolidation

Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (a) provides that, “[w]hen actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” (See also Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., rule 42.)

There are two types of consolidation. The first is a consolidation for purposes of trial only, when the actions remain otherwise separate. The second is a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes, when the actions are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment. ( Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147 ( Hamilton ).)

Consolidation is designed to promote trial convenience and economy by avoiding duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to the various actions. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleadings, § 341, p. 470.) Unless all parties in the involved cases stipulate, consolidation requires a written, noticed motion (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.350(a); Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 514), and is subject to the trial court’s discretion. ( Hamilton, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1147.)

In a procedure somewhat similar to consolidation, under California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a), a pending civil action may be related to other civil actions (whether still pending or already resolved by dismissal or judgment) if the matters “[a]rise from the same or substantially identical transactions, incidents, or events requiring the determination of the same or substantially identical questions of law or fact” or “[a]re likely for other reasons to require substantial duplication of judicial resources if heard by different judges.” ( Id. , rule 3.300(a)(2), (4).) An order to relate cases may be made only after service of a notice on all parties that identifies the potentially related cases. No written motion is required. ( Id ., rule 3.300(h)(1).) The Judicial Council provides a standard form for this purpose. When a trial court agrees the cases listed in the notice are related, all are typically assigned to the trial judge in whose department the first case was filed. ( Id ., rule 3.300(h)(1)(A).)

Related cases are not consolidated cases. Related cases maintain their separate identities but are heard by the same trial judge. Consolidated cases, in contrast, essentially merge and proceed under a single case number.

Coordination

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 404, the Chairperson of the Judicial Council is authorized to coordinate actions filed in different courts that share common questions of fact or law. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.500 et seq.) The principles underlying coordination are similar to those that govern consolidation of actions filed in a single court. (See Pesses v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 117, 123; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407 [complex and multidistrict litigation].)

Thus, for example, in McGhan Med. Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 804 ( McGhan ), the plaintiffs petitioned for coordination of 300 to 600 breast implant cases pending in 20 different counties. Coordination was denied because the motion judge found that common questions did not predominate “in that the cases involve[d] different implants, different designs, different warnings, different defendants, different theories of defect, different modes of failure, and different injuries.” ( Id. at p. 808.) Among other factors, the trial court concluded that it was impractical to send hundreds of cases to a single county and that the benefits of coordination could be best achieved by voluntary cooperation among the judges in the counties where the cases were pending. ( Id. at p. 808, fn. 2.)

The Court of Appeal reversed in an interlocutory proceeding, ruling the trial court had misconceived the requirements of a coordinated proceeding. ( McGhan, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 811.) As the appellate court explained, Code of Civil Procedure section 404.7 gives the Judicial Council great flexibility and broad discretion over the procedure in coordinated actions. ( Id. at p. 812.) Thus, on balance, the coordinating judge would be better off confronting the coordination drawbacks (including difficulties arising from unique cases, discovery difficulties, multiple trials, the necessity of travel, and occasional delay) because the likely benefits (efficient discovery and motion practice) were so much greater. ( Id. at pp. 812-814.)

Civil Code section 954 states “[a] thing in action, arising out of the violation of a right of property, or out of an obligation, may be transferred by the owner.” The term “thing in action” means “a right to recover money or other personal property by a judicial proceeding.” (Civ. Code, § 953.) California’s Supreme Court has summarized these provisions by stating: “A cause of action is transferable, that is, assignable, by its owner if it arises out of a legal obligation or a violation of a property right. . . .” ( Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003.) The enactment of Civil Code sections 953 and 954 lifted many restrictions on assignability of causes of action. ( Wikstrom v. Yolo Fliers Club (1929) 206 Cal. 461, 464; AMCO Ins. Co. v. All Solutions Ins. Agency, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 883, 891 ( AMCO ).)

Thus, California’s statutes establish the general rule that causes of action are assignable. ( AMCO, supra , 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 891-892.) This general rule of assignability applies to causes of action arising out of a wrong involving injury to personal or real property. ( Time Out, LLC v. Youabian, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1009; see also, e.g., Bush v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1381 [“‘assignability of things [in action] is now the rule; nonassignability, the exception. . .’”].)

Although the assignment of claims on behalf of others to an assignee, or group of assignees, is not unique, it has not typically been used as a procedural vehicle for combining the claims of numerous plaintiffs. But, that’s not to say it can’t be done.

In fact, the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned such an approach. In Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc. (2008) 554 U.S. 269 ( Sprint ), approximately 1,400 payphone operators assigned legal title to their claims for amounts due from Sprint, AT&T, and other long-distance carriers to a group of collection firms described as “aggregators.” ( Id. at p. 272.) The legal issue presented to the United States Supreme Court was whether the assignees had standing to pursue the claims in federal court even though they had promised to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the assignor. ( Id . at p. 271.) The Court concluded the assignees had standing.

In support of its conclusion, the Court recognized the long-standing right to assign lawsuits:

. . . [C]ourts have long found ways to allow assignees to bring suit; that where assignment is at issue, courts — both before and after the founding — have always permitted the party with legal title alone to bring suit; and that there is a strong tradition specifically of suits by assignees for collection. We find this history and precedent ‘well nigh conclusive’ in respect to the issue before us: Lawsuits by assignees, including assignees for collection only, are ‘cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.’

( Sprint , supra , 554 U.S . at p. 285.)

On this basis, the Court concluded:

Petitioners have not offered any convincing reason why we should depart from the historical tradition of suits by assignees, including assignees for collection. In any event, we find that the assignees before us satisfy the Article III standing requirements articulated in more modern decisions of this Court.

( Sprint , supra , 554 U.S at pp. 285-286.)

The Court also considered the argument that the aggregators were attempting to circumvent the class-action requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. ( Sprint, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 290-291.) The Court rejected this argument as a barrier to aggregation by assignment on the grounds that (1) class actions were permissive, not mandatory, and (2) “class actions constitute but one of several methods for bringing about aggregation of claims, i.e., they are but one of several methods by which multiple similarly situated parties get similar claims resolved at one time and in one federal forum. [Citations.]” ( Id. at p. 291.)

Granted, Sprint arose in the context of Article III, a “prudential standing” analysis. However, in reaching its decision that assignees had standing, the Court relied significantly on three California state decisions addressing assignment of rights under California law. (See Sprint, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 294-296.)

Under California law, assignment of claims is not a panacea. Not all claims can be assigned. In California, assignment is not allowed for tort causes of action based on “wrongs done to the person, the reputation or the feelings of an injured party,” including “causes of action for slander, assault and battery, negligent personal injuries, seduction, breach of marriage promise, and malicious prosecution.” ( AMCO, supra , 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 892 [exceptions to assignment also include “legal malpractice claims and certain types of fraud claims”].) Other assignments are statutorily prohibited. (See, e.g., Civ. Code, § 2985.1 [regulating assignment of real property sales contracts]; Gov. Code, § 8880.325 [state lottery prizes not assignable].)

Likewise, because a right of action cannot be split, a partial assignment will require the joinder of the partial assignor as an indispensable party. (See, e.g., Bank of the Orient v. Superior Court (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 588, 595 [“[W]here . . . there has been a partial assignment all parties claiming an interest in the assignment must be joined as plaintiffs . . . ”]; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Pleadings, § 131(2), p. 198 [“If the assignor has made only a partial assignment, the assignor remains beneficially interested in the claim and the assignee cannot sue alone”].)

That said, California’s rules of law regarding standing and assignments do not prohibit an assignee’s aggregation of a large number of claims against a single defendant or multiple defendants into a single lawsuit. To the contrary, no limitations or conditions on this type of aggregation of assigned claims is imposed from other rules of law, such as California’s compulsory joinder statute. (See Sprint , supra , 554 U.S. at p. 292 [to address practical problems that might arise because aggregators, not payphone operators, were suing, district “court might grant a motion to join the payphone operators to the case as ‘required’ parties” under Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., rule 19].)

There are many procedural approaches to evaluate when seeking to combine the claims of multiple plaintiffs. Class actions and joinders are more traditional methods that trial counsel rely on to bring claims together. Although a largely unexplored procedural approach, assignment appears to be an expedient way of combining the claims of numerous plaintiffs. It avoids the legal requirements imposed for class actions and joinders, and it sidesteps a trial judge’s discretion regarding whether to consolidate, relate, or coordinate actions. Indeed, under the right circumstances, an assignment of claims might provide a means of bypassing class action waivers in arbitration agreements. Perhaps an assignment of claims should be added to the mix of considerations when deciding how to bring a case involving numerous plaintiffs with similar claims against a common defendant or set of defendants.

Judith Posner

Judith Posner is an attorney at Benedon & Serlin, LLP , a boutique appellate law firm.

Gerald Serlin

Gerald Serlin is an attorney at Benedon & Serlin, LLP , a boutique appellate law firm.

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Assignment of Claims

• First Online: 02 September 2017

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• İlhan Helvacı 2  

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A claim arising from a contract or some other source of obligation, such as a tort or unjust enrichment, may be transferred to third parties. A claim may be transferred by an agreement, by a court order or by law. In this section, assignment of claims effected by agreement and those effected by a court decision or operation of law are analysed respectively.

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For further explanations, see Kocaman ( 1989 ), Dayınlarlı ( 2008 ), Günergök ( 2014 ).

Cession des créances , Abtretung von Forderungen .

Becker ( 1941 ), art. 164, N. 4.

Tercier ( 2004 ), p. 304; Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 164, N. 32–35; Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1236; Tercier et al. ( 2016 ), p. 521; Engel ( 1997 ), p. 872.

Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1237; Tercier et al. ( 2016 ), p. 522; Engel ( 1997 ), p. 872; Tercier ( 2004 ), p. 305; Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 164, N. 36.

Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 247; Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1237; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), pp. 571–574; Tercier et al. ( 2016 ), p. 522.

Becker ( 1941 ), art. 164, N. 5; Tercier ( 2004 ), p. 305; Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 240; Tercier et al. ( 2016 ), p. 522.

Déclaration de volonté , Willenserklärung .

Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 164, N. 20; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 566.

Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), pp. 562–563; Reisoğlu ( 2014 ), p. 466; Nomer ( 2015 ), p. 449.

Acte de disposition , Verfügungsgeschäft . See Chap. 14 fn. 5–6.

Conversely, such a contract is an acquisitive transaction with regard to the assignee.

Pouvoir de disposer, Verfügungsmacht .

Tercier ( 2004 ), p. 306.

Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 560.

Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1231; Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), pp. 241–242.

von Tuhr and Escher ( 1974 ), § 93, II, p. 333; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 560; Reisoğlu ( 2014 ), p. 465; Becker ( 1941 ), art. 164, N. 1. For further explanations see Honsell et al. ( 2003 ), art. 164, N. 23–25.

Nomer ( 2015 ), p. 449; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 569.

Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 563.

See Sect. 8.2.2 .

Nomer ( 2015 ), p. 449; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), pp. 566–567; Eren ( 2015 ), pp. 1234–1235.

See Sect. 29.2 .

Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 164, N. 19.

See Sect. 29.3 .

Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 250; Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 164, N. 61; Tercier ( 2004 ), p. 307.

Tercier et al. ( 2016 ), p. 524; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), pp. 574–575; Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1238.

Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 577.

Feyzioğlu ( 1977 ), p. 641; Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 241; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 575.

See Sect. 26.4 .

Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 251; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), pp. 577–578.

For further explanations, see Helvacı ( 2008 ).

Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 170 fn. 30, cf. Feyzioğlu ( 1977 ), p. 651; Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 260.

For further explanations see Çetiner ( 2010 ).

Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1240; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 576; Oğuzman et al. ( 2016 ), p. 1049, compare to Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 170, N. 9.

Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 576; Nomer ( 2015 ), p. 450.

Feyzioğlu ( 1977 ), p. 651; Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 259; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 578.

Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 170, N. 11; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 578; Feyzioğlu ( 1977 ), p. 651; Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 260.

For further explanations see Günergök ( 2014 ).

Tercier ( 2004 ), p. 308.

Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 167, N. 21; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), pp. 582–583; Nomer ( 2015 ), p. 452; Reisoğlu ( 2014 ), p. 470.

Becker ( 1941 ), art. 168, N. 7; Engel ( 1997 ), p. 884; Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 168, N. 4; Feyzioğlu ( 1977 ), p. 656; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), pp. 583–584.

Öz ( 1990 ), pp. 57–58.

Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 252 ff ; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 586; Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1241

See Sect. 18.4.2.2 .

Thévenoz and Werro ( 2012 ), art. 169, N. 11; Feyzioğlu ( 1977 ), p. 658; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 587; Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1241.

For further explanations see Engin ( 2002 ).

Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 591.

Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 593.

See Sect. 24.2 .

Tekinay et al. ( 1993 ), p. 266; Eren ( 2015 ), p. 1227; Oğuzman and Öz ( 2016 ), p. 596.

See Sect. 25.4.2 , fn. 43.

The transfer of possession is of a factual nature. The material transfer of possession must be complemented by the parties’ agreement (referred to as a real agreement) concerning the transfer of ownership or the constitution of rights in rem . The real agreement is a bilateral legal act and does not require any specific form. It may be formed by the parties’ express or implied declarations of will (intention).

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Helvacı, İ. (2017). Assignment of Claims. In: Turkish Contract Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60061-1_32

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When Assigning the Right to Pursue Relief, Always Remember to Assign Title to, Or Ownership in, The Claim

• Posted on: Oct 4 2016

Whether a party has standing to bring a lawsuit is often considered through the constitutional lens of justiciability – that is, whether there is a “case or controversy” between the plaintiff and the defendant “within the meaning of Art. III.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). To have Article III standing, “the plaintiff [must have] ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant [its] invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on [its] behalf.” Id. at 498–99 (quoting Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).

To show a personal stake in the litigation, the plaintiff must establish three things: First, he/she has sustained an “injury in fact” that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the injury has to be caused in some way by the defendant’s action or omission. Id . Finally, a favorable resolution of the case is “likely” to redress the injury. Id . at 561.

When a person or entity receives an assignment of claims, the question becomes whether he/she can show a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, i.e. , a case and controversy “of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.’” Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 285 (2008) (quoting Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 777–78 (2000)).

To assign a claim effectively, the claim’s owner “must manifest an intention to make the assignee the owner of the claim.” Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc. , 106 F.3d 11, 17 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). A would-be assignor need not use any particular language to validly assign its claim “so long as the language manifests [the assignor’s] intention to transfer at least title or ownership , i.e., to accomplish ‘a completed transfer of the entire interest of the assignor in the particular subject of assignment.’” Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). An assignor’s grant of, for example, “‘the power to commence and prosecute to final consummation or compromise any suits, actions or proceedings,’” id. at 18 (quoting agreements that were the subject of that appeal), may validly create a power of attorney, but that language would not validly assign a claim, because it does “not purport to transfer title or ownership” of one. Id.

On September 15, 2016, the New York Appellate Division, First Department, issued a decision addressing the foregoing principles holding that one of the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert claims because the assignment of the right to pursue remedies did not constitute the assignment of claims.  Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecom., S.à.r.l. , 2016 NY Slip Op. 06051.

BACKGROUND :

Cortlandt involved four related actions in which the plaintiffs – Cortlandt Street Recovery Corp. (“Cortlandt”), an assignee for collection, and Wilmington Trust Co. (“WTC”), an indenture trustee – sought payment of the principal and interest on notes issued in public offerings. Each action alleged that Hellas Telecommunications, S.a.r.l. and its affiliated entities, the issuer and guarantor of the notes, transferred the proceeds of the notes by means of fraudulent conveyances to two private equity firms, Apax Partners, LLP/TPG Capital, L.P. – the other defendants named in the actions.

The defendants moved to dismiss the actions on numerous grounds, including that Cortlandt, as the assignee for collection, lacked standing to pursue the actions. To cure the claimed standing defect, Cortlandt and WTC moved to amend the complaints to add SPQR Capital (Cayman) Ltd. (“SPQR”), the assignor of note interests to Cortlandt, as a plaintiff. The plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia , SPQR entered into an addendum to the assignment with Cortlandt pursuant to which Cortlandt received “all right, title, and interest” in the notes.

The Motion Court granted the motions to dismiss, holding that, among other things, Cortlandt lacked standing to maintain the actions and that, although the standing defect was not jurisdictional and could be cured, the plaintiffs failed to cure the defect in the proposed amended complaint. Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecom., S.à.r.l. , 47 Misc. 3d 544 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. 2014).

The Motion Court’s Ruling

As an initial matter, the Motion Court cited to the reasoning of the court in Cortlandt Street Recovery Corp. v. Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch , No. 12 Civ. 9351 (JPO), 2013 WL 3762882, 2013 US Dist. LEXIS 100741 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2013) (the “SDNY Action”), a related action that was dismissed on standing grounds.  The complaint in the SDNY Action, like the complaints before the Motion Court, alleged that Cortlandt was the assignee of the notes with a “right to collect” the principal and interest due on the notes. As evidence of these rights, Cortlandt produced an assignment, similar to the ones in the New York Supreme Court actions, which provided that as the assignee with the right to collect, Cortlandt could collect the principal and interest due on the notes and pursue all remedies with respect thereto. In dismissing the SDNY Action, Judge Oetken found that the complaint did not allege, and the assignment did not provide, that “title to or ownership of the claims has been assigned to Cortlandt.” 2013 WL 3762882, at *2, 2013 US Dist. LEXIS 100741, at *7. The court also found that the grant of a power of attorney (that is, the power to sue on and collect on a claim) was “not the equivalent of an assignment of ownership” of a claim. 2013 WL 3762882 at *1, 2013 US Dist. LEXIS 100741 at *5. Consequently, because the assignment did not transfer title or ownership of the claim to Cortlandt, there was no case or controversy for the court to decide ( i.e. , Cortlandt could not prove that it had an interest in the outcome of the litigation).

The Motion Court “concur[red] with” Judge Oeken’s decision, holding that “the assignments to Cortlandt … were assignments of a right of collection, not of title to the claims, and are accordingly insufficient as a matter of law to confer standing upon Cortlandt.”  In so holding, the Motion Court observed that although New York does not have an analogue to Article III, it is nevertheless analogous in its requirement that a plaintiff have a stake in the outcome of the litigation:

New York does not have an analogue to article III. However, the New York standards for standing are analogous, as New York requires “[t]he existence of an injury in fact—an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated.”

Under long-standing New York law, an assignee is the “real party in interest” where the “title to the specific claim” is passed to the assignee, even if the assignee may ultimately be liable to another for the amounts collected.

Citations omitted.

Based upon the foregoing, the Motion Court found that Cortlandt lacked standing to pursue the actions.

Cortlandt appealed the dismissal. With regard to the Motion Court’s dismissal of Cortlandt on standing grounds, the First Department affirmed the Motion Court’s ruling, holding:

The [IAS] court correctly found that plaintiff Cortlandt Street Recovery Corp. lacks standing to bring the claims in Index Nos. 651693/10 and 653357/11 because, while the assignments to Cortlandt for the PIK notes granted it “full rights to collect amounts of principal and interest due on the Notes, and to pursue all remedies,” they did not transfer “title or ownership” of the claims.

The Takeaway

Cortlandt limits the ability of an assignee to pursue a lawsuit when the assignee has no direct interest in the outcome of the litigation. By requiring an assignee to have legal title to, or an ownership interest in, the claim, the Court made clear that only a valid assignment of a claim will suffice to fulfill the injury-in-fact requirement. Cortlandt also makes clear that a power of attorney permitting another to conduct litigation on behalf of others as their attorney-in-fact is not a valid assignment and does not confer a legal title to the claims it brings. Therefore, as the title of this article warns: when assigning the right to pursue relief, always remember to assign title to, or ownership in, the claim.

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Assignment of a claim or cause of action

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Assignment of claims

The European Commission proposes to harmonise conflict of laws rules on the third-party effects of assignment of claims

When claims are assigned across borders, it's not always easy for investors, credit providers and other market participants to know which national law applies to determine who owns the assigned claims. Different national rules about the third-party (or ownership) effects of assignments of claims complicate the use of claims as collateral and make it difficult for investors to price the risk of debt investments.

Removing legal uncertainties about the ownership of claims after they have been assigned on a cross-border basis is important for the assignor and the assignee of the claims. However, it is also essential for market participants who are not party to the assignment but who interact with any of the parties and need certainty about who has legal title over the assigned claims.

Commission initiatives

The  Action plan on building a capital markets union , adopted by the Commission in September 2015, envisaged targeted action on securities ownership rules and third-party effects of assignments of claims.

In order to consult all interested parties, in February 2017 the Commission published an  inception impact assessment  providing an overview of the problems to be addressed and the possible solutions.

In April 2017, the Commission launched a public consultation ( consultation on conflict of laws rules for third party effects of transactions in securities and claims ) and established an Expert group on conflict of laws regarding securities and claims. The members of the Expert group assisted the Commission by providing specialist advice on private international law and financial markets as a sound basis for policymaking.

On 12 March 2018, the Commission proposed the adoption of common conflict of laws rules on the third-party effects of assignments of claims . The proposal provides that, as a rule, the law of the country where the assignor has its habitual residence will govern the third-party effects of the assignment of claims. As an exception, the law of the assigned claim will govern the third-party effects of the assignment of specific claims. By introducing legal certainty, the new rules will promote cross-border investment, enhance access to credit and contribute to market integration. The proposal, which deals with the law applicable to the ownership questions of assignments of claims, complements the rules in the Rome I Regulation , which deal with the law applicable to the contractual questions of assignments of claims.

Previous work in relation to claims

The question of the third-party effects of assignments of claims was raised when the  Rome Convention  was being transformed into the Rome I Regulation ( Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 ). The Rome I Regulation did not address the issue, but required the Commission to prepare a report on the matter. To that effect, the Commission asked the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) to carry out a study and the Commission presented its report in September 2016

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