international criminal law assignment

UCL Faculty of Laws

International Criminal Law (LAWS0349)

This module encompasses substantive law and procedure; international courts as institutions; and conceptual and normative challenges arising in the development, present operation, and future of international criminal law.

‘International criminal law’ is a relatively new field of international law, and one that is surprisingly difficult to demarcate. Certain ‘international’ crimes spring readily to mind (such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression), but there are many other offences which international treaties require states to criminalize in domestic law, including torture and offences related to terrorism. Conduct that is an element of one or more ‘international’ crimes may sometimes also be prosecuted as a more quotidian domestic crime; and, subject to international law rules governing the exercise of national criminal jurisdiction, ‘international’ crimes may be prosecuted in domestic courts, as well as in the specially-established tribunals with which international criminal law is often associated (such as the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo; the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda; the International Criminal Court; and ‘hybrid’ tribunals like those for Sierra Leone, Cambodia and Lebanon). 

These complexities give a good sense of why international criminal law is interesting, not only for those committed to mastering the sub-field but for those with generalist or theoretical interests in international law. Aspects of international criminal law—particularly long-standing debates over aggression, and the focus of international criminal law on individual responsibility (and on the human person as victim)—are intertwined with the changing nature of the international legal order as a whole. International criminal law intersects with principles of general public international law in areas like jurisdiction and immunities but has also generated a highly specific body of norms and jurisprudence, which the module will explore. International criminal law showcases ways in which international law can develop (while shedding light on theories of sources and interpretation); illuminates the negotiation of procedural matters and institutional structures between often-divergent judicial and legal traditions; and poses fundamental questions about the interrelation of law and justice.

Teaching in the module will focus on both careful legal analysis, and the larger historical, conceptual and normative questions to which the field gives rise; each informing the other.

Module Syllabus

Precise topics will vary to reflect current developments, but indicative topics include:

A general overview of foundations of international law relevant to the field (including sources, jurisdiction and immunities, the law of the United Nations, the law on use of force); 

The range of crimes arising under customary international law and treaty, and definitions of ‘international crimes’ over time; 

Prosecution of international crimes in national criminal courts (including matters of jurisdiction, immunities, amnesties); 

The development of international criminal courts; 

Key features of the International Criminal Court (including jurisdiction, admissibility, cooperation with states); 

Elements of select crimes; 

Modes of responsibility; 

Grounds for excluding responsibility; and 

International criminal law and international criminal justice: tensions and future possibilities. 

Recommended Materials

Core reading on each topic will be assigned from one or both of the following books (both of which are available from the library): 

Roger O’Keefe, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2015); and 

Robert Cryer, Darryl Robinson and Sergey Vasiliev, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, 4th ed (Cambridge University Press, 2019). 

We will also be using extracts from other works, and a range of judgments, articles and other texts. Individual seminar reading lists and these other course materials will be provided via online module pages, available at the beginning of term once students have enrolled. 

Preliminary Reading

Students with no previous knowledge of public international law should read one or more of: 

Jan Klabbers, International Law, 3rd ed (Cambridge University Press 2021), esp chapters 2, 3, 5, 7, 8; and  

James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (eds), Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012).  

Students seeking a very general preliminary overview of the field ahead of starting the module might like to look at the introductory chapter in Cryer et al, Introduction to Criminal Law and Procedure (details above).  

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International Criminal Law

Admission requirements.

Admission to the Masters programme.

Description

This course is an advanced introduction to the field of international criminal justice as constituted by its rules, institutions, and practices. It covers major topics including the origins, definition, conceptual foundations, and sources of international criminal law (ICL); the definitions of the four core crimes; the principles of individual criminal responsibility; the role of domestic courts in the enforcement of ICL; issues of jurisdiction and immunities; the nature and structure of international criminal proceedings, and the role of different actors, in particular victims. Particular attention will be paid to the law and practice of modern international criminal tribunals, such as the ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC. The course will also provide a broader outlook on international criminal justice, its goals, and deliverables as well as paradoxes and controversies propelling its development. This will equip the students with the capacity to orient themselves in the contemporary landscape of international criminal law, form informed and well-reasoned opinions on contentious matters, and assess current developments from a legal perspective. The course is linked to the research programme ‘Exploring the Frontiers of International Law’.

Course objectives

Objectives of the course This course aims to provide students with a thorough understanding of the object and method of ICL as a branch of public international law and to endow them with a solid knowledge of substantive and procedural law applied by international criminal tribunals. After the successful completion of the course, the students will be familiar with the major and contemporary issues in ICL and will be able to reflect critically on the current developments in international criminal justice.

Achievement levels The following achievement levels apply with regard to the course:

Knowledge: After successfully completing this course, the students will have a fair knowledge of the legal framework of international criminal law and of the case law of international criminal tribunals. The students will also be aware of the socio-political context in which international criminal tribunals operate and the unique challenges they are facing in implementing their mandates.

Academic skills and attitude: After successfully completing this course, the students will be able to identify, analyse, and interpret the relevant legal provisions and apply them to new factual situations. They will improve their analytical skills and learn how to critically engage with sources and develop solutions to legal problems.

Check MyTimetable .

Mode of instruction

Number of (2 hour) lectures: 5

Names of lecturers:

Required preparation by students: reading the prescribed material

There may be one or two guest lecture(s) by a prominent international criminal law practitioner.

Working Groups

Number of (2 hour) working groups: 4

Names of instructors: tba

Required preparation by students: prepare the prescribed assignments (see Brightspace for more information

Assessment method

Examination form(s)

The final grade will be based on the results of a written exam.

There is a possibility of a written retake in case the student fails the written exam and, subject to certain conditions, when a passing grade is obtained.

The course coordinator may decide that retakes for the written exam will take form of an individual oral exam, in particular in case of the students who commenced their studies in February. The relevant students will be notified in due course.

Areas to be tested within the exam The written exam will test the students’ knowledge of the topics included in the course syllabus and covered in the required readings for the course and the (guest) lectures. The students are expected to know the legal framework and the case law of international criminal tribunals and to be able to apply law to facts and provide a proper and well-structured legal reasoning and persuasive arguments for any answers provided.

Regulation retake passed exams In this course it is possible to retake an exam that has been passed (cf. art. 4.1.8.1 and further of the Course and Examination Regulations). Students who have passed the exam may retake the final written assessment (test) of the course if they meet certain requirements. To retake a passed exam, students need to ask the Student Administration Office (OIC) for permission. For more information, go to 'course and exam enrollment' > 'permission for retaking a passed exam' on the student website.

Reading list

Obligatory course materials

Mandatory literature:

R. Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, 4th ed., Cambridge 2019

R. Cryer, International Criminal Law Documents, 1st ed., Cambridge 2019

Additional literature will be posted on Brightspace

No Reader will be provided

Assessment Students can gain a maximum of 100 points during the written exam. At the exam, students are only allowed to consult legal instruments (Statutes, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Elements of Crimes, etc.). They may NOT use textbooks and print outs of academic articles (closed book exam). Electronic devices are prohibited.

Exam Schedule of the written exam and retakes is to be announced.

Registration

Registration for courses and exams takes place via MyStudymap . If you do not have access to MyStudymap (guest students), look here (under the Law-tab) for more information on the registration procedure in your situation.  

Coordinator: R.W. Heinsch

E-mail: [email protected]

Institution/division

Institute: Public Law

Division: Public International Law

Room number secretariat: KOG, Office B1.11

Telephone number secretariat: 071-5277713/7723

E-mail: [email protected]

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International Criminal Law (LAW391)

UNE unit code: LAW391

*You are viewing the 2024 version of this unit which may be subject to change in future.

• Not offered in 2024

Unit information

This unit provides you with a rigorous overview of harmonisation of domestic crimes and criminal procedures as well as international crimes and criminal procedures.

The particular focus on harmonised crimes, such as terrorism and related proceedings, encourages critical analysis of a range of international criminal law concepts and principles.

You will also develop your understanding of specific supranational crimes, such as crimes against humanity, aggression, war crimes and related proceedings, as well as consider the fundamentals of the international law of war.

Intensive schools

There are no intensive schools required for this unit.

Enrolment rules

• LLM591 International Criminal Law

Please refer to the student handbook for current details on this unit.

Unit coordinator(s)

Learning outcomes.

Upon completion of this unit, students will be able to:

• demonstrate a coherent understanding of the scope and function of international criminal law, including the law of war, and its institutions;
• use initiative and judgement to critically reflect on the foundations of international criminal law, including the law of war, and its concepts;
• use initiative and judgement to identify and critically analyse, synthesise, and consolidate a persuasive and coherent legal argument that applies international criminal law concepts and principles, including the law of war, to complex fact situations; and
• demonstrate an ability to present clear and coherent knowledge, legal reasoning and professional judgment relating to international criminal law matters.

Assessment information

Assessments are subject to change up to 8 weeks prior to the start of the teaching period in which you are undertaking the unit.

Learning resources

Textbooks are subject to change up to 8 weeks prior to the start of the teaching period in which you are undertaking the unit.

Note: Students are expected to purchase prescribed material. Please note that textbook requirements may vary from one teaching period to the next.

An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure

ISBN: 9781108741613

Cryer, R., Robinson, D. and Vasiliev, S., CUP 4th 2019

Text refers to: All offerings

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International Law Guide

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See also...

Foreign Law Guide

General Guides and Resources for Public International Law

• GlobaLex Research guides to international law (by subject) and foreign law (by jurisdiction) from NYU's Hauser Global Law School Program.

• ASIL Research Guide to Public International Law An up-to-date guide to treaty and other public international law research with an emphasis on online resources. From the American Society of International Law.

Criminal Law

• ASIL Research Guide to International Criminal Law
• Research Guides to the International Criminal Courts for the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone From GlobaLex.
• Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Selected Bibliography From GlobaLex.
• International Criminal Court Legal Tools Provides access to documents important to international criminal law, including treaties, judgments and decisions, summaries of domestic criminal justice systems in many countries including relevant statutes or codes, and commentary on international criminal law and other aspects of international law.

Environmental Law

• ECOLEX: A Gateway to Environmental Law
• United Nations Environment Programme
• ASIL Research Guide to International Environmental Law
• A Basic Guide to International Environmental Legal Research From GlobaLex.

Human Rights and Humanitarian Law

• UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
• OHCHR Jurisprudence Database Contains recommendations and findings from the various UN human rights committees that consider complaints from individuals.
• Refworld UNHCR's comprehensive information source on refugee status includes treaties, legislation and court decisions, as well as information organized by country and topic.
• European Court of Human Rights Pending cases, judgments, basic texts and a complete index to all ECHR judgments.
• Bayefsky.com: The United Nations Human Rights Treaties
• ICRC's Customary International Humanitarian Law Database A free online version of their two-volume publication.
• University of Minnesota Human Rights Library
• Human Rights Library: Collections on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights From the University of Minnesota.
• ESCR-Net Caselaw Database Database of domestic, international, and quasi-judicial cases and decisions on economic, social and cultural rights.
• U.S. Department of State - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
• Project Diana: An Online Human Rights Case Archive From Yale Law School.
• ASIL Research Guide to International Human Rights
• ASIL Research Guide to International Humanitarian Law
• International Human Rights Research Guide From GlobaLex.
• ICJ E-bulletin on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights International Commission of Jurist's free monthly publication of legal developments in the fields of counter-terrorism and human rights.

Intellectual Property

• WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization
• WIPO Lex Collection of intellectual property legislation (in English) from WIPO member countries.
• AIPPI - International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property An international NGO devoted to the "the development and improvement of intellectual property." The Questions/Committees section contains country-by-country reports on specific intellectual property law topics.
• European Patent Office
• U.S. Patent & Trademark Office General information, forms, and a free searchable patent and trademark database.
• U.S. Copyright Office Copyright basics, law, forms, and other materials available through the Library of Congress, the entity responsible for copyrights.
• ASIL Research Guide to International Intellectual Property Law
• IP Precedents Database Database of English translations of precedential domestic court decisions on IP topics; from the Research Center for the Legal System of Intellectual Property.

Law of the Sea

• United Nations: Oceans and Law of the Sea
• International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
• International Seabed Authority
• UVA Center for Oceans Law & Policy
• ASIL Research Guide to Law of the Sea

Trade, Investment or Economic Law

• GATT Documents Online From the WTO.
• GATT Digital Library From Stanford University.
• WorldTradeLaw.net
• International Trade Database: Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods From Pace University.
• Trans-Lex.org Research platform for transnational commercial law from the Center for Transnational Law, Cologne University, Germany.
• SICE - Foreign Trade Information System From the Organization of American States.
• United States International Trade Commission
• United States Trade Representative
• Harmonized Tariff Schedule

• ASIL Research Guide to International Economic Law
• ASIL Research Guide to International Commercial Arbitration
• Research Guide on the Harmonization of International Commercial Law From GlobaLex.

Women's Rights

• Women's Human Rights Resources From the University of Toronto.
• Women's Human Rights Documents From the University of Minnesota.
• Women's Rights Links From the University of Minnesota.
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 4, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 4, 2023, 8:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2pm ET on July 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces appear to be focusing on creating an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment. Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov reported on July 4 that Ukrainian forces are performing their main task of destroying Russian manpower, equipment, fuel depots, artillery, and air defenses and that a “war of destruction is equal to a war of kilometers.”[1] Danilov’s assessment underlines the prioritization of Ukraine’s ongoing campaign to attrit Russian manpower and assets over attempting to conduct massive sweeping mechanized maneuvers to regain large swaths of territory rapidly. NATO Military Committee Chair Admiral Bob Bauer reported on July 3 that Ukrainian forces are correct to proceed cautiously and avoid high casualties in the counteroffensive and acknowledged that the counteroffensive is difficult due to landmines and other obstacles up to 30km deep into Russian-occupied territory.[2] Bauer stated that Ukrainian forces should not face criticism or pressure for moving slowly.

Ukrainian forces have liberated territory in multiple areas of the front since the start of the counteroffensive in early June. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on July 3 that Ukrainian forces have liberated a total of 37.4 square kilometers in eastern and southern Ukraine in the past week.[3] Ukrainian forces are continuing to make steady, gradual advances.

The current pace of Ukrainian operations is not indicative of a stalemate or evidence that Ukraine cannot retake large areas. Ukrainian forces conducted slow and gradual interdiction campaigns against Russian concentration areas in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and limited ground attacks on the west (right) bank between August and November of 2022, before finally forcing the Russian withdrawal from the right bank in mid-November.[4] The situation in southern Ukraine is different, of course, because there is no natural bottleneck of the sort created by Russian reliance on the two bridges over the Dnipro. The Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson nevertheless alternated phases of relatively rapid advance with long periods of preparation, combat focused on attritting Russian forces, and limited gains that ultimately made Russian positions on the west bank of the river untenable.  By contrast, the Russian winter-spring offensive culminated in just over one month without making significant gains along the Luhansk-Kharkiv Oblast border.[5]  The current Ukrainian counter-offensive is less dramatic and rapid than the one that liberated much of Kharkiv Oblast, more successful than the failed Russian winter offensive, and generally most like the slower but ultimately successful Kherson counteroffensive in its pace and initial progress.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least four sectors of the front and advanced on July 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks in the Lyman direction.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area, in the western Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[7] Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian forces have made some unspecified advances on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks, and a prominent Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Bakhmut.[8] Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Valery Shershen stated that Ukrainian forces advanced up to two kilometers in the western Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reached Pryyutne, 15 kilometers southwest of Velyka Novosilka in western Donetsk Oblast.[9] Geolocated footage confirms that Ukrainian forces made additional advances south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[10]

Russian and Ukrainian officials escalated their rhetoric surrounding the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 4, but Russia is likely focused on accusing Ukraine of irresponsible actions around the ZNPP including setting conditions for a possible false flag attack . Russia remains unlikely to generate a radiological incident at the ZNPP at this time. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 4 that Ukrainian officials have begun preparations for a potential Russian provocation at the ZNPP “in the near future” and warned that Russian forces placed objects “resembling explosive devices” on the outer roofs of the ZNPP’s third and fourth reactors in order to blame damage to these areas on Ukrainian shelling.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky echoed this statement in his nightly address on July 4, and other Ukrainian military sources warned of possible Russian provocations at the plant.[12] As ISW has previously reported, it is unlikely that limited Russian sabotage at the ZNPP that Russia could hope to blame on Ukraine would be able to generate a massive radiological incident, as the ZNPP’s reactors were constructed to withstand considerable damage.[13] Ukrainian military sources reiterated this assessment and noted that even if the purported explosive devices detonate, the damage would not harm the reactor but would rather create the false impression that Ukrainian forces had shelled the reactors.[14] Advisor to the head of Russian nuclear energy operator Rosenergoatom, Renat Karchaa, also claimed on July 4 that Ukraine is planning to strike the ZNPP overnight on July 4-5.[15] ISW has previously assessed that such provocative Russian statements, and even the possibility of a tangible provocation at the plant, are likely part of a Russian wider information operation meant to accuse Ukraine of irresponsibility at the ZNPP ahead of the upcoming NATO summit and dissuade Ukrainian forces from conducting counteroffensive operations against occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[16]

The reported reorganization of Russian internal security organs suggests that the Kremlin has not yet concluded that it has effectively neutralized the threats of future armed rebellions following the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 rebellion. Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on July 3, citing internal law enforcement sources, that Russian law enforcement authorities are considering reassigning the “Grom” special units of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service (part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) to Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard).[17] Vedomosti noted that this reported change follows Russian President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with heads of various Russian law enforcement agencies on June 26 in the wake of the Wagner armed rebellion.[18] Several Russian sources spoke out against the reported transfer of ”Grom” to Rosgvardia, citing overall poorer equipment, training, and leadership quality.[19] Vedomosti claimed that Alexander Khinstein, former advisor to Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov, warned that the assignment of ”Grom” units to Rosgvardia would be a ”dangerous experiment.”[20] The alleged restructuring of Russia’s internal security forces suggests that the Kremlin is working to build an effective anti-rebellion force following Wagner’s armed rebellion. The fact that these purported changes are happening following the rebellion indicates that the Kremlin was correctly dissatisfied with the performance of security forces, which failed to stop or even contest Wagner’s march on Moscow, and suggests that the Kremlin has not ruled out the risk of future such rebellions.

Russian authorities are absolving Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of financial responsibility for damages caused by the Wagner Group rebellion and reportedly returned significant liquid assets to Prigozhin, possibly as part of the deal negotiated between Putin, Prigozhin, and Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko. The Rostov-on-Don administration claimed that the total damages from Prigozhin’s rebellion amounted to 92.5 million rubles (roughly $1 million), and that the administration will not recover damages from Prigozhin or the Wagner Group.[21] St. Petersburg news outlet Fontanka claimed, citing internal sources, that Russian authorities returned over 10 billion rubles (roughly $111 million) in cash, five gold bars, and hundreds of thousands of US dollars in cash to Prigozhin on July 2 that authorities had seized from Prigozhin-affiliated facilities in St. Petersburg on June 24.[22] Fontanka claimed that authorities only reversed their decision to hold onto Prigozhin‘s liquid assets on July 2 but did not specify a reason for the reversal. The legal basis that Russian authorities would have had for seizing Prigozhin’s assets remains unclear in any case, as Russian authorities dropped criminal charges against Prigozhin for the rebellion.[23] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that part of Prigozhin’s liquid assets were supposed to be compensation to the families of Russian pilots whom Wagner forces killed during the rebellion, but it is now uncertain whether Wagner will make those payments.[24] The milblogger assessed that Wagner will likely use at least part of the returned assets to support transferring Wagner Group personnel to Belarus.

The official Chechen response to an attack against a Russian opposition journalist in Chechnya may impact Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s standing in the Russian ultranationalist information space. Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta reported on July 4 that unspecified, masked actors in Grozny, Chechnya intercepted a car containing one of its journalists, Yelena Milashina, severely assaulted Milashina, destroyed her equipment and documents, and warned Milashina against writing “anything.”[25] Milashina traveled to Chechnya in order to cover the trial of Zarema Musayeva, the mother of an exiled Chechen opposition activist, and the attackers also assaulted Musayeva’s lawyer, Alexander Nemov, who was in the car with Milashina. Chechen courts sentenced Musayeva to five and a half years in prison on July 5 for alleged fraud and attacking Chechen authorities, but some Russian opposition voices claimed that Chechen authorities prosecuted Musayeva due to her son‘s activism.[26] Prominent Russian ultranationalist voices seized on Milashina’s attack despite its lack of relevance to the war in Ukraine likely out of concern for broader press censorship.[27] The voices condemned attacks against journalists – including Milashina – as unacceptable even though they disagree with Milashina.[28] The Russian Union of Journalists and the Russian Human Rights Council both issued statements of condemnation and opened investigations into the attack.[29]

Kadyrov’s prominence in the broader Russian information space will likely force Kadyrov to choose between preserving his regime and his support in the ultranationalist information space, however. Kadyrov’s response was a brief acknowledgment that the relevant Chechen authorities are investigating the ”incident” - a response inconsistent in tone and content with Kadyrov’s usual flamboyant, long-winded messaging.[30] Kadyrov previously condemned Milashina as a ”terrorist” and demanded her detention, which is largely consistent with his overall effort to retain his authoritarian rule in Chechnya.[31] If Kadyrov supports the investigation into Milashina’s attack, he risks undermining his domestic regime and crackdowns against Chechen opposition voices. But if Kadyrov refuses to support the investigation, then he risks undermining his standing within an information space that is hypersensitive to the prospect of increased censorship. Kadyrov already struggles to balance these dual aims in his force arrayment in Ukraine; Kadyrov portrays Akhmat forces as capable fighters against Ukraine but has simultaneously largely avoided committing them intensive and attritional combat, and some Russian milbloggers have complained that Chechen forces are distracted posing online while other Russian forces actually fight.[32]  Chechen forces notably failed to engage Prigozhin’s rebels despite ostentatiously mobilizing and moving ostensibly to fight them, although Putin might have directed Kadyrov to avoid combat with Wagner forces.[33]

Russia is reportedly forming a new combined arms army as part of the Northern Fleet, likely in order to posture its preparedness against NATO. Russian news outlet Izvestia reported that Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) sources claimed that the existing 14th Army Corps of the Northern Fleet will be reformed into the new combined arms army with motorized rifle brigades, divisions, and regiments subordinate to it.[34] Izvestia suggested that the 14th Army Corps‘ 200th and 80th Brigades will be reorganized into a division under the new combined arms army.[35] Russian army corps before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine existed only within fleets and largely performed the same functions as combined arms armies. The reported decision to form a new combined arms army is thus likely posturing ahead of the NATO summit on July 11-12 intended to show Russia’s military response to the accession of Finland and possibly Sweden to the alliance. The promotion of the 14th Army Corps to a combined arms army level will not by itself increase Russian combat capacity, and it is unclear where the Russian military leadership could find the personnel and equipment that would be needed for the new organization to generate a material difference.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone attack on Moscow Oblast and Novaya Moskva on July 4. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses shot down and electronic warfare suppressed five of five Ukrainian drones.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed two drones near Valuevo, electronic warfare suppressed one in the Odinstovo Raion, one drone fell near Krivosheino, and one flew toward a military unit in Kubinka - likely the Russian airbase there.[37] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may have intended to strike Vnukovo Airport, and Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin announced that Russian authorities temporarily redirected some flights from Vnukovo Airport in response to the drones.[38] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces may have conducted the drone attack in retaliation for an alleged Russian strike on a Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) building in Sumy Oblast.[39]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces appear to be focusing on creating an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment. The current pace of Ukrainian operations is not indicative of a stalemate or evidence that Ukraine cannot retake large areas.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least four sectors of the front and advanced on July 4.
• Russian and Ukrainian officials escalated their rhetoric surrounding the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 5, but Russia is likely focused on accusing Ukraine of irresponsible actions around the ZNPP including setting conditions for a possible false flag attack. Russia remains unlikely to generate a radiological incident at the ZNPP at this time.
• The reported reorganization of Russian internal security organs suggests that the Kremlin has not yet concluded that it has effectively neutralized the threats of future armed rebellions following the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 rebellion.
• Russian authorities are absolving Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of financial responsibility for damages caused by the Wagner Group rebellion and reportedly returned significant liquid assets to Prigozhin, possibly as part of the deal negotiated between Putin, Prigozhin, and Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko.
• The official Chechen response to an attack against a Russian opposition journalist in Chechnya may impact Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s standing in the Russian ultranationalist information space.
• Kadyrov’s prominence in the broader Russian information space will likely force Kadyrov to choose between preserving his regime and his support in the ultranationalist information space, however.
• Russia is reportedly forming a new combined arms army as part of the Northern Fleet, likely in order to posture its preparedness against NATO.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone attack on Moscow Oblast and Novaya Moskva on July 4.
• Russian conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and south of Kreminna.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces escalated ground attacks in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on July 4.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russia continues efforts to mobilize its defense industrial base (DIB).

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) 

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 4 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups made unsuccessful attempts to cross the northern international border between Ukraine and Russia in unspecified areas in the Siversk and Slobozhansk directions.[40]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and south of Kreminna on July 4. Geolocated footage published on July 4 shows that Russian forces made limited advances east of Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna).[41]  The Ukrainian General Staff reported that  Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove), Novovodyane (16km southwest of Svatove), Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna), the Serebrianske forest area (10km south of Kreminna), and Vesele (30km south of Kreminna).[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces attempted to advance in the Svatove direction and that Russian forces conducted attacks near Kuzemivka (14km northwest of Svatove).[43] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on June 3 that Russian forces have about 180,000 troops in the area of responsibility of the Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces, 120,000 of which are operating in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction, including Airborne (VDV) forces, mechanized units, BARS (Russian Combat Reserve) units, Territorial Defense units, and Storm-Z assault units.[44] Footage published on July 4 purportedly shows the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating near Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[45]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on July 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Novoselivske, Novovodyane, and Yampolivka (16km west of Kreminna).[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks from Torske (16km west of Kreminna) and that artillery and UAV units of the Russian 120th Guards Artillery Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) repelled Ukrainian attacks near Dibrova.[47] 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian and Ukrainian forces escalated ground attacks in the Bakhmut area on July 4. Ukranian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that the situation in Bakhmut has escalated, and that Russian and Ukrainian forces are dueling for the initiative and control of terrain.[48] Malyar also stated that Ukrainian forces are advancing on the southern flank of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and that fighting continues on Klishchiivka’s northern flank.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled nine Russian attacks near Hryhorivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut), Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), west of Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut), and southeast of Bila Hora (15km southwest of Bakhmut).[50] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations north and south of Bakhmut, entrenching themselves in new positions.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[52] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Klishchiivka, Ozarianivka (16km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdiumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[53] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces held their positions and counterattacked from Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut) and along the M-03 highway in the direction of Minkivka (13km northwest of Bakhmut).[54] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that units of the Russian Southern Group of Forces repelled 10 Ukrainian attacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Yahidne, and Klishchivka.[55]

Pervasive issues with Russian combat capabilities likely continue to affect the ability of Russian forces to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Bakhmut area. Former Russian officer and prominent critical milblogger Igor Girkin claimed that Ukrainian forces are advancing north of Bakhmut where understaffed units of the Russian 3rd Army Corps (Western Military District) have been deployed.[56] ISW previously reported the formation and failure of the 3rd Army Corps, a new formation created in 2022 that was decimated during its first deployment to Kharkiv Oblast in September 2022 and again in its subsequent deployments to the Bakhmut area.[57] ISW previously assessed that issues with the ad hoc commitment of various depleted force groupings to the Bakhmut axis, alongside apparent command and control failures, were likely preventing Russian forces in the area from conducting sound defensive operations and would likely offer Ukrainian forces opportunities to exploit with limited counterattacks.[58]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on July 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces defended against Russian offensive operations near Avdiivka and repelled 15 Russian ground attacks near Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction.[60] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces carried out unsuccessful offensive operations in Marinka and on the southwestern approach to Avdiivka.[61]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on July 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Rivnopil, 10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border.[62] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks in the Vuhledar area east of Velyka Novosilka and south of Velyka Novosilka near Urozhaine.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reached the borders of Pryyutne, 15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[64] Ukrainian Tavrisk Direction Spokesperson Valeriy Shershen noted on July 4 that Ukrainian forces have advanced up to 2km into Russian defenses in an unspecified area of the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts) direction.[65]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 4. Geolocated footage posted on July 4 shows elements of the 810 th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) shelling Ukrainian positions south of Orikhiv, indicating that Ukrainian forces have advanced to within 2km north of Robotyne.[66] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks towards Robotyne but that elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) repelled Ukrainian attacks west of Robotyne.[67] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that several small Ukrainian assault groups launched an attack southwest of Orikhiv towards the Pyatykhatyky-Zherebryanky line (about 25km southwest of Orikhiv) and reported that elements of the Crimea and Sudoplatov volunteer battalions and the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) are defending in this area.[68]

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike in the Russian rear of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on July 4. Geolocated footage posted on July 4 shows the aftermath of a reported Ukrainian Storm Shadow missile strike on an unspecified Russian warehouse facility in Yakymivka, about 23km southwest of Melitopol along the T2209 Melitopol-Chonhar highway.[69] Russian sources additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Vasylivka (35km north of Melitopol along the E105 highway).[70]

Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are active near the Antonivsky Bridge on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast despite the Russian MoD’s efforts to claim that Russian forces have full control of this area.[71] One Russian milblogger claimed that there are heavy battles ongoing near the Antonivsky Bridge, and another warned that Ukrainian troops are regrouping and replenishing units to prepare for further attacks across the Dnipro River.[72] The Russian MoD claimed on July 1 that Russian troops fully restored their positions along the eastern shoreline of the Dnipro River, but milbloggers have continued to warn that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence on the east bank and are preparing for additional attacks.[73] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk also noted that Russian forces near the Dnipro River are trying to retake positions previously flooded by the explosion of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam.[74]

An influx of Russian tourists to Crimea is generating serious traffic jams along one of Russia’s most important ground lines of communication, prompting Putin and other senior Russian officials to direct state resources to help tourists move closer to a zone of active hostilities. Russian Transport Minister Vitaly Saveliev met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 4 to report on the situation at the entrance to the Kerch Strait Bridge and to ask for increased ferry crossings to reduce traffic jams.[75] Putin called for maximizing the use of ferries to ”normalize” the transport situation across the Kerch Strait and indicated that the Russian MoD should also lend transport assets to the area.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that the traffic at the entrance of the Kerch Strait Bridge in Krasnodar Krai has increased by 40% since July 1 and is expected to increase further in the coming days as the summer tourist season is in full swing.[77] Another Russian milblogger called on the Black Sea Fleet to provide two large landing ships for the crossing of civilian vehicles to solve traffic issues and emphasized that Russian authorities have seriously underestimated the desire of Russians to continue vacationing in occupied Crimea despite ongoing hostilities.[78] Russian authorities are dealing with pervasive civilian and transport issues to Crimea partially because of their continued refusal to fully mobilize Russian society onto a wartime footing, resulting in the continued promotion of tourism to occupied Crimea despite the fact it is a legitimate rear-area target for continued Ukrainian strikes.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia continues efforts to mobilize its defense industrial base (DIB). Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, Industry and Trade Minister Denis Manturov, and unspecified other military leaders and DIB representatives discussed the implementation of the Russian state defense order to increase DIB production, but the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) did not provide details on the topics discussed or agreed plans.[79] Yelabuga, Tatarstan regional entity “Alabuga Start” advertised a program for women aged 16 to 22 to develop careers building drones.[80] The program claims to offer benefits including a 52,000 ruble ($577) monthly salary, training, housing, relocation aid, and opportunities for further education. ISW has previously reported that a Russo-Iranian contract is providing for the manufacture of Shahed drones in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ).[81]

Russian officials continue to posture Russia as able to generate enough manpower to maintain the war effort in Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed that Russian forces have recruited over 185,000 contract and conscripted personnel since January 1, 2023, 109,000 of whom are in reserve.[82] Medvedev claimed that Russian forces recruited 1,400 people per day for contract service in June 2023.

Russia continues efforts to expand international military cooperation. Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Nikolai Yevmenov and Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu met in Beijing on July 3 and discussed ongoing mutual cooperation and organizing joint military exercises.[83] Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Alexander Fomin met with Kuwaiti Army Assistant Chief of Staff Brigadier General Fawaz Al-Harbi in Moscow on July 4 and confirmed Russian and Kuwaiti intent to further defense cooperation.[84]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems) 

Russian officials continue to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of providing pediatric healthcare. Russian Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova claimed on July 4 that Russian authorities sent 23 disabled children from occupied Donetsk Oblast to a rehabilitation center in Krasnogorsk, Moscow Oblast and 12 children to a rehabilitation center in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast.[85] Lvova-Belova claimed that Russian authorities plan to send about 370 more children in at least four more trips to rehabilitation centers by the end of 2023.[86] Lvova-Belova did not specify if the children have returned or will return to occupied Donetsk Oblast. ISW has previously reported on Russian authorities using access to pediatric healthcare as a guise to deport children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.[87]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://twitter.com/OleksiyDanilov/status/1676116133819170817

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-right-be-cautious-with-counter-offensive-top-nato-official-says-2023-07-03/

[3] https://t.me/annamaliar/899

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2023

[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/28072

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9ev...

[8] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/04/syly-oborony-prodovzhuyut-vesty-nastupalni-operacziyi-na-bahmutskomu-melitopolskomu-i-berdyanskomu-napryamkah/; https://t.me/strelkovii/5874 ; https://t.me/annamaliar/903

[9] https://suspilne dot media/521387-na-berdanskomu-napramku-zaporizkoi-oblasti-vijskovi-zsu-prosunulisa-do-dvoh-kilometriv-vpered/;  https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/videos/932914671129838/

[10] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1676197514641387521; https://t.me/wargonzo/13655

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ABo9LEqPDXC5mk6WF1Y8DnZ7p1DBLvQt2gWt1TwufuY7FfCaM7yYvYP6eBhn7uYHl  

[12] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/svit-bachit-sho-yedinim-dzherelom-nebezpeki-dlya-zaporizkoyi-84065; https://t.me/AFUStratCom/18805 ; https://t.me/spravdi/31142

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112122 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062223

[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-accuse-each-other-pl...

[15] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-accuse-each-other-pl...

[16] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept22 ;

[17] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/07/04/983567-vedomstva-prorabativayut-vopros-o-perepodchinenii-politseiskogo-spetsnaza-rosgvardii

[18] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/07/04/983567-vedomstva-prorabativayut-vopros-o-perepodchinenii-politseiskogo-spetsnaza-rosgvardii; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/71530; https://t.me/mod_russia/27870    

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/20216; https://t.me/dva_majors/20220 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/10678 ; https://t.me/rosich_ru/44861

[20] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2023/07/04/983567-vedomstva-prorabativayut-vopros-o-perepodchinenii-politseiskogo-spetsnaza-rosgvardii

[21] https://www.kavkazr dot com/a/administratsiya-rostova-ne-budet-trebovatj-vozmescheniya-uscherba-ot-prigozhina-posle-myatezha-v-gorode/32488862.html; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/03/vlasti-rostova-na-donu-otsenili-pochti-v-sto-millionov-rubley-uscherb-gorodu-ot-myatezha-chvk-vagnera; https://rtvi dot com/news/glava-rostova-na-donu-rasskazal-o-summe-ushherba-ot-myatezha-chvk-vagner/

[22] https://www.fontanka dot ru/2023/07/04/72460373/

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[24] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91216

[25] https://t.me/novaya_pishet/41030 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/04/v-chechne-napali-na-zhurnalistku-novoy-gazety-elenu-milashinu-i-advokata-aleksandra-nemova-ih-zhestko-izbili-zhurnalistke-slomali-paltsy

[26] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2023/07/04/chechen-court-sentences-mother-of-prominent-activist-to-55-years-in-prison-a81728

[27] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18182187; https://t.me/sashakots/40758; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/14692

[28] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18182187; https://t.me/sashakots/40758 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/14692

[29] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18182187

[30] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3743;

[31] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/02/03/obozrevatel-novoy-gazety-elena-milashina-uedet-iz-rossii-posle-ugroz-kadyrova; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/07/04/razberemsya-ramzan-kadyrov-o-napadenii-na-elenu-milashinu-i-aleksandra-nemova; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20April%2016.pdf

[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2023

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20May%2031%2C%202023%20PDF.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[34] https://iz dot ru/1538203/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/poliarnyi-okrug-v-sostave-severnogo-flota-sozdadut-obshchevoiskovuiu-armiiu

[35] https://iz dot ru/1538203/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/poliarnyi-okrug-v-sostave-severnogo-flota-sozdadut-obshchevoiskovuiu-armiiu

[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/28057 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/28057; https://t.me/severrealii/18203 ; https://t.me/shot_shot/53667 ; https://t.me/shot_shot/53668 ; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/2376 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/19166 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/62267; https://t.me/vrogov/10743; https://t.me/istories_media/2957; https://t.me/astrapress/31717; https://t.me/astrapress/31721; https://t.me/astrapress/31723; https://t.me/astrapress/31724 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48938 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103099 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103100 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103102 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103107

[37] https://t.me/rybar/49303; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48650; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37131 ; https://gfsis.org.ge/maps/russian-military-forces

[38] https://t.me/rybar/49303; https://t.me/mos_sobyanin/5854

[39] https://t.me/milinfolive/103104

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9ev...

[41] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1676238337202331648?s=20

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9ev...

[43] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91146

[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/07/03/vorog-namagayetsya-nastupaty-na-lymano-kupyanskomu-napryamku-sergij-cherevatyj/

[45] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/10707

[46] https://t.me/mod_russia/28072

[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644 ; https://t.me/rybar/49287; https://t.me/kremlinprachka/24720

[48] https://t.me/annamaliar/903

[49] https://t.me/annamaliar/903

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkdwwHKJ5eZcJc9FQ6u2pJAfj4vkxsmmVQTVdqqNbJFGN4KTPEKy7wywg3ATtH9ol

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9evCzYCUKw7ZJdEccNPotT5BoeWZaKcopvwQGEWDWtirJjwTfl

[52] https://t.me/grey_zone/19409 ; https://t.me/strelkovii/5874  

[53] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644  

[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644  

[55] https://t.me/mod_russia/28072

[56] https://t.me/strelkovii/5874 

[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[58] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2023

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9evCzYCUKw7ZJdEccNPotT5BoeWZaKcopvwQGEWDWtirJjwTfl  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkdwwHKJ5eZcJc9FQ6u2pJAfj4vkxsmmVQTVdqqNbJFGN4KTPEKy7wywg3ATtH9ol ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02A52T2ugTVhiavau9evCzYCUKw7ZJdEccNPotT5BoeWZaKcopvwQGEWDWtirJjwTfl   

[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91146

[61] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644

[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02pkdwwHKJ5eZcJc9FQ6u2pJAfj4vkxsmmVQTVdqqNbJFGN4KTPEKy7wywg3ATtH9ol

[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/28072; https://t.me/mod_russia/28066

[64] https://t.me/wargonzo/13644

[65] https://suspilne dot media/521387-na-berdanskomu-napramku-zaporizkoi-oblasti-vijskovi-zsu-prosunulisa-do-dvoh-kilometriv-vpered/ ;  https://www.facebook.com/PresscentrTavria/videos/932914671129838/

[66] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1676197514641387521 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/13655

[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48680 ; https://t.me/berloga_life/13918; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48664  

[68] https://t.me/rybar/49306; https://t.me/batalyon15/2205; https://t.me/batalyon15/2202; https://t.me/batalyon15/2200; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/8536; https://t.me/voin_dv/3520; https://t.me/rusich_army/9742; https://t.me/rusich_army/9741; https://t.me/rusich_army/9739; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/48667  

[69] https://t.me/vrogov/10736 ; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1676220226902294528?s=20; https://t.me/rybar/49304

[70] https://t.me/vrogov/10733 ; https://t.me/vrogov/10734; https://t.me/rybar/49304

[71] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[72] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91146; https://t.me/readovkanews/61932; https://t.me/dva_majors/20233 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/20234 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/20196 ; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/37139   

[73] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2023 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[74] https://suspilne dot media/521107-v-lavah-armii-rf-pevna-panika-tomu-voni-tak-golosno-kricat-pro-antonivskij-mist-gumenuk-pro-situaciu-na-hersonsini/

[75] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18188277

[76] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/18188277

[77] https://t.me/southtower/8821  

[78] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/91215

[79] https://t.me/mod_russia/28067 

[80] https://t.me/rusich_army/9749; https://t.me/AlabugaService/57

[81] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070323

[82] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/18189843 ; https://ria dot ru/20230704/kontraktniki-1882224486.html

[83] http://www.mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/qwfb/16234721.html; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-03/china-says-it-wants-m...

[84] https://t.me/mod_russia/28080

[85] https://t.me/malvovabelova/1675

[86] https://t.me/malvovabelova/1675

[87] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2023