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First Anglo Boer War

Causes of the War

The First Anglo-Boer is also known as the First Transvaal War of Independence because the conflict arose between the British colonizers and the Boers from the Transvaal Republic or Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR). The Boers had some help from their neighbours in the Orange Free State.

There were several causes of the First Anglo-Boer War.

• The expansion of the British Empire.
• Problems within the Transvaal government.
• The British annexation of the Transvaal.
• The Boer opposition to British rule in the Transvaal.

Henry Herbert, the 4th Earl of Carnarvon was the British Secretary of State for the Colonies (referred to as Lord Carnarvon) under Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, who was premier from 1868 to 1880. At the time the British government wanted to expand the British Empire.

Lord Carnarvon wanted to form a confederation of all the British colonies, independent Boer republics and independent African groups in South Africa under British control. By 1876 he realised that he would not be able to achieve his goal peacefully. He told Disraeli that: "By acting at once, we may ... acquire ... the whole Transvaal Republic after which the Orange Free State will follow."

He was prepared to use force to make the confederation a reality, a fact that was proved by the Anglo-Zulu War in 1879.

Problems within the Transvaal Government

T. F. Burgers was the president of the Transvaal Republic from 1872 until its annexation in 1877. The Republic was in serious financial trouble, especially as a war had just started between the Boers and the Pedi under their leader, Sekhukhune , in the North Eastern Transvaal, and because the Boer people not paid their taxes.

The Transvaal public was disappointed with their leadership and although Sekhukhune agreed to peace in February 1877, and was willing to pay a fine to the Republic, it was too late. Herbert sent Sir Theophilus Shepstone , the former Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal, to the Transvaal as special commissioner. Shepstone arrived in the Transvaal on 22 January 1877 with 25 men as support. Initially, he was vague about his real purpose. He used the weakness in the Transvaal government by making the Boers aware of the dangers of a bankrupt state and focusing on the government’s lack of control over black people like the Pedi and the Zulu. This demoralised the Boers.

Burgers did very little tried to stop Britain from taking over the Transvaal. Shepstone had told Burgers what his intentions were by the end of January 1877 and Burgers tried to convince the Transvaal government to take the situation seriously, but they refused to see the urgency of the matter.

The British annexation of the Transvaal

Lord Carnarvon thought that annexing the Transvaal would be the first step to confederation. English speaking people in the republic were positive towards the idea and the Boers were disappointed in their own government, which the thought would make it easier to convince them that they could not avoid annexation. Shepstone said that he had more than 3 000 signatures from people who wanted to be part of the British Empire.What he did not tell Carnarvon was that within the Boer population, there were many against the idea and wanted to retain their independence.

On 12 April 1877 a proclamation of annexation was read out in Church Square in Pretoria, the capital of the Transvaal Republic. There was no resistance and the Union Jack replaced the Vierkleur. The Transvaal Republic or Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) did not exist anymore, but was now the British Colony of the Transvaal Colony.

The Volksraad decided in May 1877 to send a delegation to England to make sure that the British government knew that most of the residents of the Transvaal Republic did not agree with the annexation but this delegation failed.. They also asked citizens not to resort to violence because this would create a negative impression in Britain.

The Boer opposition to British rule in the Transvaal

Former President T. F. Burgers and other people loyal to the former Transvaal Republic objected to the annexation and Paul Kruger and E. J. P. Jorissen went to London, England, in 1877 to present their case to Carnarvon. They failed and in 1878 they took a petition with more than 6 500 signatures from Boers to London, but the British government insisted that the Transvaal remain a British possession.

Sir Theophilus Shepstone was now the administrator of the Transvaal Colony and he realised that running it was going to be much more difficult than annexing it. The British government had made promises to the Boers to allow them some self-government, but Shepstone was slow to initiate this process. The colony remained nearly bankrupt and British plans to build a railroad to Delagoa Bay had to be put on hold.

Shepstone became increasingly unpopular with the Colonial Office in London. British Native commissioners were trying to control the black people in the area, but they could not get Sekhukhune and the Pedi to pay the fine he owed to the Transvaal Republic because they did not have enough soldiers to force him to do so. Shepstone also failed to control the Zulus on the southeastern border of the colony and many farmers had to leave their farms. Sir Owen Lanyon replaced Shepstone as administrator in 1879. In September of the same year Sir Garnet Wolseley was appointed High Commissioner of South East Africa and governor of Natal and Transvaal.

The Anglo-Zulu War in 1879 was supposed to increase British standing in South Africa, but had the opposite effect. The Zulu and Pedi were both defeated by the British in 1879, but non-violent Boer opposition had grown. In January 1878 a large group of Boers gathered in Pretoria to protest against the annexation. Another Boer delegation had gone to London in 1877, but they also returned unsuccessful in 1879, even though they spoke to Sir Michael Hicks Beach, Carnarvon's successor, who was far less committed to confederation.

The Boers had hoped that the election of the Liberal Party in Britain in April 1880 would mean independence for the Transvaal, but the new Prime Minister, W. E. Gladstone, insisted on maintain British control in Pretoria. The Volksraad of the Orange Free State, south of the Vaal River backed the Transvaal Boers in their call for the independence of the Transvaal in May 1879. Even Boers in the Cape Colony gave moral support to their comrades in the north. In October 1880 a newspaper from Paarl in the Cape Colony took the view that: "Passive resistance is now becoming futile."

The first open conflict between the British and Boers began in November 1880 in Potchefstroom. P. L. Bezuidenhout refused to pay extra fees on his wagon saying he already paid his taxes. The British authorities then confiscated the wagon. On 11 November 1880 a commando of 100 men under P. A. Cronje took back the wagon from the British bailiff and returned it to Bezuidenhout.

Following this, between 8 000 and 10 000 Boers gathered at Paardekraal, near Krugersdorp on 8 December 1880. As a result a triumvirate of leaders; Paul Kruger , Piet Joubert and M. W. Pretorius were appointed. On 13 December 1880 the leaders proclaimed the restoration of the Transvaal Republic and three days later raised their Vierkleur flag at Heidelberg, thus rejecting British authority. The events of the 13 December 1880 thus in effect started the war and ended passive resistance.

The first shots were fired in Potchefstroom. The Boers had about 7 000 soldiers, and some Free Staters joined their fellow Boers against the British enemy. There were only about 1 800 British soldiers stationed in towns across the Transvaal so British were outnumbered.

Sieges and battles during the First Anglo-Boer War

There were 4 main battles and several sieges during the First Anglo-Boer War. The Battles were at Bronkhorstspruit, Laingsnek, Schuinshoogte (Ingogo) and Majuba. The sieges were at Potchefstroom, Pretoria, Marabastad, Lydenburg, Rustenburg, Standerton and Wakkerstroom.

Early in the war it became clear that the colonisers had underestimated their opponents. They had assumed that the Boers were no match for the superior might of the British military force. The Boers had the advantage of knowing the local terrain. They were skilled with firearms because they hunted often. The red British uniforms made soldiers easy targets while the Boers who simply wore their civilian clothing, had good enemy cover.

At the battles of Laingsnek and Schuinshoogte the British forces suffered heavy losses and had to retreat. Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley had to wait for more reinforcements. Sir Evelyn Wood was appointed as his second-in-command, and Colley wanted him to lead in the extra soldiers from Newcastle. On 16 February 1881 Colley agreed to stop fighting on condition that the Boers gave up their hopes of requiring independence of the Transvaal. Negotiations came to nothing. On 26 February 1881 Colley decided to march on Majuba with 554 men, where the Boers had an outpost.

On the same day, General Piet Joubert and the Boer forces took up a position at Laing's Nek to check on the arrival of British reinforcements. Colley’s men reached the top of the mountain in the early hours of the morning and were very tired. From the hill Colley could see the Boer laager of tents and covered wagons, but as he could not bring his heavy guns up the steep slopes, he was unable to fire on their encampment. Joubert, however, immediately ordered his men to climb the steep hill, take cover and shoot down on the British. At 7 a.m., a force of 150 Boers in three divisions under veld-cornets S J Roos, J Ferreira and D J Malan began to climb from ledge to ledge up the mountain, firing steadily and effectively on the British as they climbed. Untrained in guerrilla warfare, the exposed British soldiers made easy marks, and when Colley himself was killed and the Boers were almost at the summit, the British fled.

The magnitude of their defencelessness may be appraised from the fact that they had over 200 casualties killed and wounded, whereas the Boers lost only one man killed and one who died later of his wounds. There are two simple monuments on the battlefield: an obelisk erected by the Boers, and a rectangular column commemorating the British fatalities. The humiliating British defeat at Majuba brought about the end of the First Anglo-Boer War and introduced a short-lived peace. Gladstone's Liberal government abandoned the previous government's federation policy, and, by the signing of the Pretoria Convention in August 1881, the Transvaal was granted 'complete self-government, subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty Queen Victoria'. Many British, however, assured of the innate power of their imperial status, continued to regard the Boer commandos as inferior adversaries. Looking on the Majuba Hill disaster as a 'freak' victory, they vowed retribution. The Transvaal War (also known as the First Boer War or the First War of Independence) was a 'curtain-raiser' to the far more ruthless Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. "Remember Majuba!" became a rallying cry of the British during Second Anglo-Boer War.

During the first Anglo-Boer War there were several sieges. Lydenburg, Potchefstroom, Pretoria, Marabastad, Rustenburg, Standerton and Wakkerstroom were all surrounded in by the Boers in order to stop the British forces stationed there from taking part in the fighting.

Prior to the war the British had been building a fort in Potchefstroom. Progress was very slow. On 15 December 1880 a large group of Boers on horses rode up to Potchefstroom. Major Thornhill, who saw them, raced back to the fort to warn his comrades. When a small group of Boers approached the fort shots were fired. Soon afterwards the Boers started firing on the fort from three directions. The fort’s low walls didn’t provide much protection.On 16 December 1880 the Boers replaced the Union Jack at the Landdrost’s office with a white flag. The thatched roof building was also set alight. The Boers demanded the British surrender of the fort but Colonel Winsloe refused. The siege continued and after 95 days the British force inside the fort surrendered as a result of hunger.

The siege of Lydenburg lasted from 6 January 1881 to 30 March 1881. After 5 December 1880 less than a hundred soldiers under 24 year-old Lieutenant Walter Long were left in Lydenburg. Although Long improved the fort's defences the water supply ran low by 23 January 1881. Long rejected a peace offering from the Boers and the siege only came to an end after 84 days.

Marabastad was a military station with about 50 000 British soldiers put in place to control the black population in the area. It was about 165 miles or 265 km north of Pretoria.Two companies of the 94th regiment that had been positioned in Lydenburg arrived at Marabastad in February 1880 and on 29 November 1880 they were ordered to march into Pretoria. This left only 60 men at the fort. On the same day the news of the British defeat at Bronkhorstspruit arrived and Brook was told to protect the fort against any attack. This siege began on 29 December 1880. The local residents supported the British fort and provided food. Captain Brook was told about the armistice on 22 March 1881, but decided to keep on defending the fort. The siege ended on 2 April 1881.

There were very few British soldiers at Rustenburg when the war broke out. When Boers demanded the surrender of the fort on 27 December 1880 the British force refused. The small mud fort provided little protection and the people inside suffered from the lack of food and water and diseases. The Boers issued terms of a truce on 14 March 1881 and on 30 March they received confirmation that it had been accepted.

When the news of the British loss at Bronkhorstspruit reached Pretoria, Colonel W. Bellairs, commander of the soldiers in the Transvaal, declared martial law and moved the whole civil population of Pretoria into 2 military camps. All food was taken and stored within the camps and 5 000 people waited for relief from Natal. There were about 1 340 fighting men and 2 forts were built south of the town.

Boer General Piet Joubert was happy with the effective containment of the British soldiers in Pretoria. This allowed him free movement elsewhere so he did not attack Pretoria. There were very few Boers stationed in the area and the British force tried to attack them on 29 December 1880, but gave up after several efforts.The siege dragged on because the British garrison was not aware of the events in Natal. On 28 March 1880 news of the peace terms reached Pretoria and by 8 August the Boer government took office in Pretoria once again.

The aftermath of the War

In the aftermath of the war the South African Republic (Tranvaal) regained its independence. The Pretoria Convention (1881) and the London Convention (1884) laid down the terms of the peace agreement. We must now look at these terms in more detail.

President Brand of the Orange Free State had been trying to get both the Transvaal Boers and the British to the negotiation table from the beginning of the conflict. Several peace offerings had been made from both sides with the most important ones being in January 1881, when Paul Kruger offered peace on the condition that the Transvaal independence was guaranteed. Another was made on 21 February 1881, when the British government offered peace if the Boers laid down their weapons.

Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley didn’t forward the message from the British government fast enough and because Paul Kruger was not in Natal, the battle of Majuba took place before peace negotiations could begin. On 5 March 1881 Sir Evelyn Wood and Piet Joubert agreed on an armistice in order to start peace negotiations at O’Neill’s cottage, which lay between the British and Boer lines. Negotiations were successful and the war ended on 23 March 1881.

The Pretoria Convention and the Independence of the Transvaal

After peace had been negotiated a British royal commission was appointed to draw up the Transvaal’s status and new borders. These decisions were confirmed and formalised at the Pretoria Convention that took place on 3 August 1881.

The new republic was named the Transvaal and was to be bean independent Republic, but it still had to have its foreign relations and policies regarding black people approved by the British government. The new state was also not allowed to expand towards the West. All these policies meant that the Transvaal was still under British suzerainty or influence. The Boer Triumvirate was worried about some of the requirements, but they took over the rule of the Transvaal on 10 August.

The conditions put forward by the British government were unacceptable from the Transvalers’ point of view and in 1883 a delegation including Paul Kruger, the new President of the Transvaal, left for London to review the agreement.

The London Convention

In 1884 the London Convention was signed. The Transvaal was given a new Western border and adopted the name of the South African Republic (SAR). Although the word suzerainty did not appear in the London Convention, the SAR still had to get permission from the British government for any treaty entered into with any other country other than the Orange Free State. The Boers saw this as a way for the British government to interfere in Transvaal affairs and this led to tension between Britain and SAR. This increased steadily until the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War in 1899.

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Between 1899 and 1902, the British Army fought a bitter colonial war against the Boers in South Africa. Although outnumbered, the Boers were a skilled and determined enemy. After initial setbacks and a long period of guerrilla warfare, the British eventually prevailed, but not without adopting controversial tactics.

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General Sir Redvers Buller's troops crossing the Tugela to relieve Ladysmith, February 1900

The origins of the Boer War lay in Britain's desire to unite the British South African territories of Cape Colony and Natal with the Boer republics of the Orange Free State and the South African Republic (also known as the Transvaal).

The Boers, Afrikaans-speaking farmers, wanted to maintain their independence. Indeed, in 1880-81 , the Transvaal Boers had successfully fought the British in order to achieve this. 

Map of Southern Africa, c1899

The discovery of gold in the South African Republic (SAR) in 1886 raised the stakes.​​​​​​ A large influx of English-speaking people, called Uitlanders (literally 'Outlanders') by the Afrikaners, were attracted by the goldfields. This worried the Boers, who saw them as a threat to their way of life.

Troops departing for the Jameson Raid, 1895

Jameson Raid

The Jameson Raid of 1896 was an attempt to create an uprising among the Uitlanders in the SAR. Led by Dr Leander Starr Jameson and his British South Africa Company troops, its failure was a humiliation for Britain and the supporters of confederation. It led to a further deterioration of the relationship between the British and Boer governments.

Anxious to overcome this set-back and to give the British policy fresh impetus, Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain appointed an outspoken imperialist, Sir Alfred Milner, as High Commissioner for South Africa in 1897.

Cartridge carried by a participant in the Jameson Raid, c1895

President Paul Kruger of the South African Republic, c1899

The Jameson Raid hardened Boer opinion and led to a resounding victory for Paul Kruger in the 1898 SAR presidential election. Kruger was even more reluctant to permit the Uitlanders to enjoy political power.

In 1899, the SAR offered an extension of the franchise to the Uitlanders. This was in return for British agreement not to interfere in the SAR's internal affairs.

Kruger also demanded that Britain drop its claim to rule the SAR and allow external arbitration of other unresolved disputes between the two governments. Confident that the Boers would be quickly defeated, Chamberlain rejected Kruger's proposals.

Members of a Boer commando, c1899

Boers strike

Recognising that Britain was not seeking a peaceful settlement, the SAR and its ally the Orange Free State resolved to strike first.

On 9 October, the SAR issued an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal not only of British troops from their borders, but of all reinforcements sent to South Africa since 1 June 1899. This ultimatum was rejected and on 12 October the allied republics invaded Cape Colony and Natal.

Canadian troops climbing a kopje, c1899

The Boers soon laid siege to the towns of Kimberley, Mafeking and Ladysmith and, in December 1899, defeated British attempts to relieve them in the battles of Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso.

'Black Week', as the period of these defeats became known, was a major shock to the British public who were used to hearing of victories throughout the Empire.

British infantry take cover during a Boer attack, c1899

7 October 1899

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A naval gun firing during the Battle of Modder River, November 1899

Skilled enemy

British tactics, which had generally proved successful against poorly armed opponents, turned out to be disastrous when used against the Boers. The British launched frontal attacks on concealed Boer positions. These were ineffective and led to several defeats in December 1899.

Using modern rifles and smokeless powder, the Boers were able to snipe at British infantry from long distances before withdrawing to avoid any set-piece confrontation. They were highly mobile, adept in fieldcraft and used to life on the high veldt.

Although the Boers only had 88,000 soldiers and relatively few artillery pieces, they were led by outstanding generals such as Louis Botha, Jan Smuts and Christiaan de Wet.

Boer commandos at Norvals Pont in northern Cape Colony, 1900

Mauser M1896 rifle used by General Louis Botha, c1900

Empire strikes back

After several reverses, the British mobilised their superior resources and sent more men to South Africa. These included troops from across the Empire, especially from Canada and Australia. Eventually, over 400,000 soldiers were involved.

At home, the population volunteered in great numbers to serve in South Africa. The war was the first campaign in which British people from all sectors of society took up arms, with many joining newly raised formations like the Imperial Yeomanry. It was a forerunner of the patriotic fervour that inspired volunteers during the First World War (1914-18).

An Australian scout in South Africa, 1901

Sheet music, 'The Imperial Yeomanry Polka', 1900

African and Indian role

On the outbreak of war, the British made a tacit agreement with their Boer enemies that both sides would not arm the black population. As the war progressed, however, this stance proved difficult to maintain and they began employing armed black people as scouts.

It is estimated that between 15,000 and 30,000 black Africans eventually served under arms with the British Army as scouts and sentries. Another 100,000 worked as labourers, transport drivers, blacksmiths, wheelwrights, farriers and builders.

Although the Indian Army was not deployed to South Africa, a small number of Indian stretcher bearers and servants took part in the campaign. The Indian Ambulance Corps consisted of 300 free Indians and 800 indentured workers from sugar estates, who were sent to the front by their employers.

Black African soldiers outside a blockhouse, 1900

Bearers of the Indian Ambulance Corps, 1901

Shortly after the SAR's ultimatum expired on 11 October 1899, 7,500 Orange Free State troops crossed the border into Cape Colony with the intention of capturing Kimberley. They wished to gain control of the diamond mines, the railway and the supplies in the town. The Boers were further motivated by a hatred of Cecil Rhodes, a leading proponent of confederation, who was among those besieged.

Kimberley had a garrison of 4,800 men, 600 of whom were regulars. They were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Kekewich.

Cecil Rhodes and members of the Kimberley garrison, 1900

Colonel Kekewich greeting the relief column, February 1900

Kekewich had to defend a civilian population of 50,000, as well as a perimeter 20 miles (32km) long. His task was hindered by a shortage of firearms.

On 15 October, Kimberley was cut off by the Boers. But their bombardment of the town did not begin until 6 November, after Kekewich had rejected Chief Commandant CJ Wessels' summons to surrender.

Although stocks of foodstuffs were initially high, rations had to be reduced early in 1900. This coincided with a marked increase in sickness and mortality. A shortage of fresh vegetables also caused scurvy among the black population.

The advance of Lieutenant-General John French's cavalry towards Kimberley, 13 February 1900

Relief delayed

British troops under Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen marched to relieve the town. They fought battles at Graspan, Belmont and Modder River before their advance was halted for two months after defeat at Magersfontein. Lord Roberts then assumed command of a reinforced column that renewed the offensive.

After a four-month siege, Kimberley was relieved on 15 February 1900, when a patrol of the Australian Horse from Lieutenant-General John French's Cavalry Division entered the town.

'Long Cecil', a British gun built at the De Beers workshops during the Siege of Kimberley, 1900

After successes against the invading Boers at the Battles of Talana and Elandslaagte on 20-21 October 1899, Lieutenant-General Sir George White's Natal Field Force, charged with the defence of the colony, was itself besieged in Ladysmith.

About 13,500 troops - the majority British regulars - and 7,500 civilians - 2,500 of them Indians - were trapped. As the siege proceeded, the number of Boers in the trenches rarely exceeded 5,000. They opened their bombardment on 2 November with 17 field-guns.

British dead at Spion Kop, January 1900

Bread ration from the Siege of Ladysmith, 1900

Encouraged to believe that relief was coming by General Sir Redvers Buller's advance, the Ladysmith garrison made a number of sorties to distract the Boers. But the initiative passed back to the Boers after Buller's reverse at Colenso on 15 December, when he suggested to White that he should consider surrendering.

Caesar's Camp and Spion Kop

In January, the Boers attempted to take Ladysmith by storm. Their unsuccessful assaults on Caesar's Camp and Wagon Hill ended this policy. But after Buller was again defeated at Spion Kop on 24 January, the full rigours of the siege began to be felt in Ladysmith.

Saving the guns at Colenso, 15 December 1899

The Boer attack on Caesar's Camp, 6 January 1900

An alarming increase in sickness rates, coupled with serious shortages of food, led to the introduction of horseflesh into the rations.

But on 28 February 1900, Buller finally broke through after close co-operation between his infantry and artillery. This success freed up the men of the former Natal Field Force to play an active role in the prosecution of the war elsewhere.

‘Our provisions are getting very scarce… coffee, tobacco, jam, pickles and other necessaries. I don’t think I will ever again grumble at dry bread for tea, or complain if there’s no milk in the jug… The Boers are beginning to use their guns properly. This morning at 7 while some men of the Gloucestershire Regiment were eating breakfast, a shell burst on one of the sangars with terrible results, killing 7 men and wounding 10 others… it broke right in amongst them. All this afternoon shrapnel shells were flying.' Ladysmith diary of Army Schoolmaster WH Gilbert - 19 and 22 December 1899

The Relief of Ladysmith, 28 February 1900

Mafeking was the most northerly town in Cape Colony and had been claimed by the SAR prior to the outbreak of war. Immediately after the expiry of the SAR ultimatum on 11 October, 6,000 Boers under the command of General Piet Cronje attempted to seize it.

Strategic importance

The town contained stocks of food, forage and railway material, which would have proved useful to the Boers. In the wider context of the war, the Siege of Mafeking was of greater strategic importance to the British, since it prevented the besiegers from participating in the campaign against them further south.

Colonel Robert Baden-Powell during the Siege of Mafeking, 1899

Sergeant Horace Martineau who won the VC during the siege, 1899

The commander of Mafeking was Colonel Robert Baden-Powell. At the outset of the siege, he had at his disposal 750 locally raised troops and a force of 400 irregulars formed from the townspeople. In addition, more than 600 black Africans were employed as cattle guards. The civilian population of the town numbered 650 Europeans and 7,000 Africans.

Baden-Powell decided to defend a perimeter around 7.5 miles (12km) long around the town. As the siege progressed, the military role of the armed black population became increasingly important.

Baden-Powell had an ambivalent attitude towards the black Africans in Mafeking, without whose assistance the town would quickly have fallen. He reduced their rations during the siege and by playing down their contribution ensured that they received little reward after it.

A Boer Nordenfelt-Maxim machine gun at Mafeking, 1900

British defenders of Bradley’s Fort at Mafeking, 1900

The Boer bombardment of Mafeking began on 16 October. After Cronje left on 19 November and command devolved to General J Snyman, the siege became less energetic. It lasted 217 days and was the longest of the war.

By the time the town was relieved on 17 May, battle casualties on both sides had reached 463. Its relief led to riotous celebrations throughout Britain and made Baden-Powell a national hero.

Official keys to Bloemfontein, Orange Free State, presented to Lord Roberts following its capture on 13 March 1900

Lord Roberts at Pretoria, capital of the South African Republic, captured on 5 June 1900

British success

Following the end of the sieges, the war gradually turned Britain's way. By the end of May 1900, the British had overrun the Orange Free State. And by October, the Transvaal had been annexed.

Yet the British found that they only controlled the ground their columns physically occupied. As soon as the troops left a town or district, their control of that area faded away.

The attack on General Piet Cronje's force at Vedute Drift near Paardeberg, February 1900

24 January 1900

Battle of spion kop, 15 february 1900, relief of kimberley, 18 february 1900, battle of paardeburg, 27 february 1900, surrender of general piet cronje at paardeburg, 28 february 1900, relief of ladysmith, 13 march 1900, british occupation of bloemfontein, 15 may 1900, battles of glencoe and dundee, 17 may 1900, relief of mafeking, 24 may 1900, annexation of the orange free state, 29 may 1900, battle of doornkop, 31 may 1900, british occupation of pretoria, 11-12 june 1900, battle of diamond hill, 30 july 1900, surrender of general marthinus prinsloo in the brandwater basin, 1 september 1900, annexation of the south african republic, 13 september 1900, lord roberts calls on the boers to surrender, 29 september 1900, lord kitchener succeeds roberts as commander-in-chief, november 1900, concentration camps introduced.

Mounted infantry watering their horses, South Africa, 1901

Embroidered blockhouse by a soldier of the Essex Regiment, 1900

Guerrilla war

Many Boers fought on and 18 months of cruel guerrilla warfare were to follow the annexations. To control the countryside the British built stone and corrugated iron blockhouses that were manned by permanent garrisons, connected by telephone and barbed-wire fencing.

Farms burnt

To prevent the guerrillas from obtaining supplies, information and assistance, the British burnt thousands of farms and destroyed crops. The burnings were also undertaken as a punishment to the locals for supporting the guerrillas.

A British Army blockhouse, 1901

The City Imperial Volunteers burning a farm at Frederickstrad, 1901

‘We must put a stop to these raids on our railway and telegraph lines, and the best way will be to let the inhabitants understand that they cannot be continued with impunity. Troops are now available and a commencement should be made tomorrow by burning De Wet’s farm… He like all Free Staters now fighting against us is a rebel and must be treated as such. Let it be known all over the country that in the event of any damage being done to the railway or telegraph the nearest farm will be burnt to the ground.’ Letter from Lord Roberts to Lord Kitchener - 14 June 1900

Boer women and children at a concentration camp, c1901

The British also confined Boer families and black Africans in a network of concentration camps. As well as removing a means of support for the guerrillas, it was believed the presence of Boer families in the camps would make soldiers in the field surrender.

Accommodation in the camps was poor. Water and food were in short supply, and medical and sanitary facilities almost non-existent. Sickness became widespread. In all, 28,000 Boers, mainly women and children, died in the camps. Around half that number of black Africans died in separate camps.

'I call this camp system a wholesale cruelty… To keep these camps going is murder to the children... They drop in the terrible heat, and with the insufficient unsuitable food; whatever you do, whatever the authorities do, and they are, I believe, doing their best with very limited means, it is all only a miserable patch on a great ill. Thousands, physically unfit, are placed in conditions of life which they have not strength to endure. In front of them is blank ruin… If only the English people would try to exercise a little imagination – picture the whole miserable scene. Entire villages rooted up and dumped in a strange, bare place.' Emily Hobhouse - 1901

The policy proved to be counter-productive. It aroused widespread criticism at home and abroad because of the fatalities. Emily Hobhouse was instrumental in raising public awareness of the camps. She also organised a relief effort to aid the victims.

Her campaign forced an embarrassed government to act. Milner’s civilian authorities took over the camps’ administration from the Army and conditions slowly improved.

The policy was also militarily flawed. By relieving the Boer 'bitter enders' of responsibility for their families, it allowed them to concentrate on fighting. Later on, Lord Kitchener reversed this policy and encouraged his men to leave Boer families to be cared for by the enemy. This hampered Boer mobility and forced many to give up the struggle.

French anti-British caricature about the camps, c1901

Royal Engineers preparing to blow up a Boer farm, c1901

While regular troops swept the countryside in a ‘scorched earth’ policy, mounted infantry units tracked down the remaining mobile Boer guerrillas, engaging in small skirmishes and ambushes.

Eventually, these policies forced the Boers to seek terms. On 31 May 1902, the Treaty of Vereeniging was signed and the Boers accepted British sovereignty but with limited self-government. The Boer republics were fully integrated into the Union of South Africa in 1910.

The last stand of the 17th Lancers at Modderfontein, 17 September 1901

28 February 1901

Kitchener and louis botha meet at middelburg to discuss peace, 15 september 1901, boer leaders captured in arms to be banished, 21 september 1901, property of boers still fighting to be sold, 25 january 1902, dutch government offers to mediate, 7 march 1902, battle of tweebosch, 12 april 1902, boer peace delegates meet kitchener at pretoria, 31 may 1902, treaty of vereeniging signed.

A Boer War ambush, c1901

General Lord Kitchener in South Africa, 1901

First modern war

The British Army used a variety of technological innovations during the war. Although some had been used in previous campaigns, it was the scale of their employment in South Africa which was exceptional.

The distances involved in South Africa led to the extensive use of the electric telegraph and field telephone.

Field telegrapher sending news of victory at Klip Drift, 1899

Balloon Corps transport during the advance on Johannesburg, 1899

Balloons and trains

Hydrogen-filled balloons were used for observation and directing artillery. Railways played an important part in the campaign and were frequently attacked by the Boers.

To counter this threat, armoured trains regularly patrolled the main routes. Winston Churchill, then a war-correspondent, was travelling on board one such train when it was ambushed by Boer commandos.

Searchlights, powered by mobile generators, were used to light up the railway and facilitate track repairs at night.

An armoured train carrying a searchlight, 1900

A six-inch naval gun mounted on a railway truck, 1899

Engines and horses

Steam traction engines were used to move heavy loads along roads and across countryside, thereby helping to conserve draught animals, which had only a short life expectancy in South Africa. A similar fate awaited the majority of horses used by the mounted troops.

These animals were all too frequently put to work unacclimatised, ill-fed and ill-cared for. During the course of the war, some 350,000 horses and 50,000 mules perished.

Steam tractors towing 5-inch naval guns, 1900

Dead and dying horses in South Africa, c1900

Destruction

The war not only involved large numbers of men, animals and machines operating over an enormous area, it also resulted in physical destruction on a massive scale.

The farm burnings, railway sabotage and devastation in the countryside created difficulties in maintaining food supplies, particularly for the British Army who could not live off the land like their enemy.

Railway bridge at Kroonstadt blown up by the Boers, 1901

Burning a Boer farm, 1901

While the Boers were unable to hold their British captives for any length of time, the British developed a network of camps for Boer prisoners in South Africa, Bermuda, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India, and St Helena.

The war mobilised the resources of the British Empire and cost the British government £210 million (over £25 billion today). It resulted in more than 120,000 British and Imperial casualties, including 22,000 dead. Two thirds of the deaths were caused by disease and inadequate medical provision.

Boer prisoners of war arriving on St Helena, 1901

Bone and hair watch chain made by a Boer prisoner in India, 1902

Imperial lesson

The writer Rudyard Kipling remarked of the war, 'We have had an imperial lesson.' But the British Army learned from its defeats at the hands of the Boers.

Reforms in tactics, equipment and administration were introduced in the years after the conflict. These changes meant that when the Army marched to war in 1914 , it was the best equipped and trained force ever to leave British shores.

Members of The Royal Munster Fusiliers in South Africa, c1899

Explore further

Transvaal War

In 1880-81, the British fought a brief war against the Transvaal Boers in South Africa. The Boers had rebelled against British control and went on to inflict several stinging defeats during their successful fight for independence.

Frederick Roberts: Bobs

Field Marshal Frederick Sleigh Roberts was one of Britain’s most successful military commanders of the 19th century, winning victories during the Second Afghan War and revitalising the British campaign in the Boer War. 

Jan Smuts: The warrior-statesman

Field Marshal Jan Christiaan Smuts successfully led troops against Britain in the Boer War. He later commanded the South African Defence Force fighting alongside British soldiers in several First World War campaigns.

Herbert Kitchener: The taskmaster

Field Marshal Herbert Kitchener was famous for colonial victories in the Sudan and South Africa. Later, he helped build Britain’s first mass army during the First World War.

Boer War artillery volunteers

A rare Boer War naval gun, one of only three of its type remaining in Britain, sheds light on the largely unknown role of artillery volunteers in the South African war.

In 1879, the British fought a war against the Zulu kingdom. The Zulus resisted bravely and were only defeated after a series of particularly bloody battles that have gone down in the annals of colonial warfare.

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The International Impact of the Boer War

With hostilities in the Second South African War spanning the period from 1899 to 1902, with the result that Boer War centenaries have been falling thick and fast for the last couple of years, it is not altogether surprising that in recent times books on this conflict have been appearing at a furious rate. This latest offering is a collection of essays that examines, in various different ways, the international context of the fighting.

As with all such edited compendia, the main task facing the reviewer is to comment on the viability of the chosen theme, the quality of the chapters and the cohesion of the collection. As regards the first of these questions, there is no doubt whatsoever that the editor and contributors to this volume have hit upon an important topic. Over the last few years, a number of different scholars have explored various aspects of the international dynamic that surrounded the origins, course and consequences of the war fought between Britain and the two Afrikaner republics for supremacy in southern Africa. Thus, for example, in a recent volume by Apollon Davidson and Irina Filatova, the Russian perspective on the conflict has come under scrutiny. (1) In a similar vein, Richard B. Mulanax has performed a systematic examination of the outlook of the United States. (2) While, in separate monographs, Harold Rosenbach and this reviewer have looked at Wilhelmine Germany's interest in South Africa. (3) Furthermore, notable work has also appeared on the reactions the Boer War produced in various parts of the British Empire. (4) However, despite all the scholarship taking place - and the list above is very far from being exhaustive - prior to the publication of this book, no attempt had been made to put these various international perspectives on the war together in a single volume. Given that by doing so, this collection opens up the possibility for all kinds of interesting global comparisons and contrasts, it is clearly a valuable addition to the literature. On this basis alone, this new volume is to be greeted with enthusiasm.

Turning to the individual chapters, contributions are to be found on the war as seen from the perspective of each of the five European continental great powers, as well as from the standpoint of the two minor European powers most interested in the conflict, namely Portugal and the Netherlands. A further national perspective is provided by a chapter on the United States, a power whose rise to global significance had recently been made evident by her victory in the war with Spain. On top of this, there are four additional essays. One looks at the origins of the war. Another examines it in the context of Britain's imperial position. Yet another outlines the view held by British subjects resident at the key port of Delagoa Bay. And a final contribution charts the opinions of the German military advisor to the Ottoman Empire, Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz. Without exception, all the essays are clearly written, contain interesting ideas and are produced to a high standard. They do, however, differ a little in length and, also, in the degree and nature of the research upon which their conclusions are based. Thus, while some incorporate substantial archival investigations and are rich in new documentary citations (for example, the chapter by Roy Bridge on Austria-Hungary), others are interpretations/re-interpretations that seem to owe more to previously published material (for example, William Tilchin on the USA). This does not, however, detract from the strength or quality of a collection, the principal merit of which derives from the fact that it brings a range of international perspective on the Boer War together in the same place. In any event, the majority of the essays are strong on the historiography. And those not contributing much in the way of new archival material are often strongest in this respect. Their insights into the existing literature and their critiques of the various arguments and works on offer are definitely worth reading, even if, as in the case of the chapter by Tilchin, the major historiographic excursions are modestly tucked away in the endnotes.

As regards the question of cohesion, the volume is also strong in this respect, although this is an area where I have one minor reservation. That there is a common theme to the collection is not in any doubt. Admittedly, the various contributors interpret the idea of 'international impact' slightly differently, but the term, it must be admitted, is relatively elastic and lends itself to a variety of different emphases. Thus, that some of the authors are more inclined to stress public opinion and the reaction of the press, while others focus more on high politics and the operation of foreign policy, is a desirable reflection of the distinct national responses to the war in South Africa. A straightjacket would not have been appropriate here and the editor and contributors are right to have avoided unnecessary uniformity in this respect. Nevertheless, diversity does at times require some justification and it seems, to this reviewer at least, that there are three chapters that rest rather uneasily within the collection.

The first of these is Peter Henshaw's essay on the origins of the war. This, it must be said, is an excellent piece that mixes a clear synthesis of existing arguments with some of its author's own original work in this area. However, for all its many qualities, there is a necessary distinction between the origins of a war and the impact it has on global affairs once the fighting begins. Given that this essay is immediately followed by eight chapters on different countries' responses to the conflict, this contribution on the war's genesis looks a little out of place here.

A similar point could be made, albeit for different reasons, with respect to Sandra Ferreira's chapter on the British community in Delagoa Bay. This is a simulating and well-researched contribution to the scholarship that has much to commend it. However, it differs markedly from the nine chapters that precede it, being concerned with neither the opinion nor the reaction of a particular state, but rather with a small British community in Portuguese colonial Africa. While not suggesting that the state is the only unit worth evaluating in international affairs, the inclusion of just a single chapter looking at the behaviour of a small local enclave in a volume otherwise mainly concerned with the responses of entire countries makes this chapter a noticeable oddity. Had there been further essays on the reactions of other local communities, then the critical mass would have existed to claim that this book looked at the international impact of the Boer War at both the macro (state) and micro (local) levels. However, a single chapter on a locality does not really allow this to be stated with any conviction. Rather, it hints at possibilities that the volume does not go on to develop.

Finally, there is Feroz Yasamee's exploration of the views of Colmar von der Goltz. This chapter is truly fascinating and thoroughly deserves to be published, but one wonders if this is the most appropriate place for it. Goltz was an interesting figure, who, it would seem, was genuinely influenced by the Boer War. However, with so much of this volume focusing on particular national responses, to include one solitary chapter where the perspective of a single individual is considered, seems - as with Ferreira's chapter - to buck the trend. On what basis was Goltz chosen as the sole individual to be profiled? Is he representative of individuals in general? Or is he the token individual? Does he substitute for a chapter on the Ottoman Empire? With no clear answers to these questions, the chapter feels - like the two others just mentioned - out of place.

The inclusion of these three chapters invites a couple of further questions. The first of these concerns the topics left out of the collection. Given the emphasis in the volume on the distinct responses of various different states, a chapter on Japan - a rising power, a colonial nation, and, shortly after the war's close, a British ally - would have fitted well within the established parameters of the volume. So, too, would chapters on such key constituents of the British Empire as Canada and Australia. Inevitably with edited collections, space and the availability of contributors are major issues, but one wonders, nevertheless, why essays on the origins of the war, on Britons living at Delagoa Bay and on Colmar von der Goltz were preferred to these more obvious alternatives. The second question concerns the underpinnings of the book. Having decided to include these three chapters, it seems to me that more should have been done to justify this to the reader. The logical place for this would have been in the introduction, the arena where the editor of a compendium can set out the rationale for the volume, explain its structure, and detail the themes that link the chapters together. However, this approach was not the one adopted here. Rather, the introduction to this volume, written by the eminent historian of Wilhelmine Germany, Professor Wolfgang Mommsen, offers a highly interesting commentary on the book, but one that, by definition, is Mommsen's own perspective rather than a guide to the intentions and ideas of the editor. Mommsen's views are, of course, interesting and informative - readers are reminded, for example, that he believes that Germany's leaders began the First World War 'against their own better judgement' (p.7), a point brought rather ingeniously into a discussion of the Boer War! - but the latter would have been useful as well. If not provided in the introduction, perhaps Keith Wilson might have offered some explanatory remarks, either directly following from Mommsen's commentary or, alternatively, at the end of the volume as a conclusion. That this is not done is in no sense a serious blemish on the volume, but it would have been a helpful addition.

Such minor reservations aside, it should be said that the overriding impression that one gets from this volume is of sustained scholarship within a coherent framework. While quibbles can be raised as to the choice of topics included and/or excluded, this is nevertheless a useful work that combines in a single accessible package a range of high quality essays that do genuinely help to clarify the international aspects of the Second South African War. The fact that it is available in paperback is also to be commended.

• Apollon Davidson & Irina Filatova, The Russians and the Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902 (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1998). Back to (1)
• Richard B. Mulanax, The Boer War in American Politics and Diplomacy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994). Back to (2)
• Harold Rosenbach, Das Deutsche Reich, Großbritannien und der Transvaal (1896-1902) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993); Matthew S. Seligmann, Rivalry in Southern Africa, 1893-99: The Transformation of German Colonial Policy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998). Back to (3)
• Works on Canada seem especially prolific. See, for example, Carman Miller, Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899-1902 (Montreal: Canadian War Museum & McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993). Back to (4)

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African Studies Primary Source Guide: The Boer Wars (1880-1881, 1899-1902)

• Slavery and the Slave Trade (16th-19th centuries)
• The Boer Wars (1880-1881, 1899-1902)
• Visual Resources

Primary Sources for the Boer Wars

• Francis John Baker Boer War diary, 1885-1919 The collection comprises a manuscript diary covering the years 1901-1902, written in 1912 from notes taken during that time period. Francis John Baker provides lengthy, detailed descriptions of his experiences in the Boer War and daily camp life. Military documents, family correspondence, and photographs are included.
• Borton family papers, 1804-1973 (Beinecke) The collection consists of correspondence, journals, photographs, maps, printed material and other papers, documenting four generations of the Borton family and their military and personal experiences within the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842), the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1843-1880), the First Anglo-Sikh War (1845-1846), also known as the Sutlej campaign, the Crimean War (1853-1856), the Second Boer War (1899-1902), the First World War (1914-1918), India, Iraq, and Mauritius.
• Frederick Russell Burnham papers, 1864-1951 The papers consist of correspondence, subject files, writings, and photographs documenting the personal and professional life of Frederick Russell Burnham, especially his years in Africa, and his exploration work in Mexico.
• Johan William Colenbrander collection, 1860-1998 The collection consists primarily of photocopies of documents and photographs, assembled by Johan Cornelis Alphons Lawrence Colenbrander, which relate to the personal life and professional activities of his father, Johan W. Colenbrander.
• Herbert Edmund Crocker Boer War diaries, 1900 The papers comprise four manuscript diaries written by Herbert Edmund Crocker in 1900 and a typed transcription. The diaries contain lengthy, detailed descriptions of his military service in South Africa in 1900 and the daily rigors of camp life. The diaries are interspersed with sketches and maps drawn by Crocker.
• Brian Murray du Toit collection, 1902-1996 The collection consists of copies of speeches, public statements, press releases, memoranda, letters, church records, personal journals, travel documents, family photographs, kinship charts, field notes, manuscripts and related materials on the Inkatha Freedom Party and descendants of the Boers who left South Africa following the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. Du Toit has used these materials in several published works, including three books on the Afrikaner diaspora.
• R. Emms papers, 1900-1903 The papers consist of diaries, memorabilia, printed materials, and photographs of R. Emms, a noncommissioned officer in the British Army, Company E, 2nd Batallion, Norfolk Regiment, during the Boer War in South Africa. In his diaries and sketches, Emms recounts army life and battles in which he participated. The photographs are primarily of the Norfolk Regiment encampment and soldiers.
• Mary Henrietta Kingsley papers, 1897-1900 The papers consist of letters written by Mary Kingsley to English merchant John Holt and his wife. Among the topics discussed are British government policy in West Africa, treatment of Africans, the behavior of missionaries, the interests of the trading community, and public opinion in England. The letters were written during the period between Kingsley's return from her West African travels and before going to South Africa during the Boer War.
• George S. Lewis papers, 1900 The papers consist of letters written by Private George S. Lewis from South Africa to his family in England between April 9 and November 24, 1900. Lewis describes a collision involving his troopship as it approached Cape Town; his travels from Cape Town to Bloemfontein; his capture and imprisonment by Boers; hospitalization in Johannesburg; work in Pretoria; and return to Cape Town and then England. Also included are two photographs of Lewis and letters to Lewis from family and friends.
• Henry M. Lyons papers, 1893-1948 The papers consist of correspondence, a diary, and memorabilia of Henry M. Lyons, a private in the British Royal Army Medical Corps, 10th Bearer Company, 12th Brigade, during the Boer War. Lyons recounts his experiences as a stretcher bearer and his impressions of camp life, the Boers, numerous skirmishes, and the weather and terrain of South Africa. Memorabilia includes his medical kit and a letter of a captured Boer.
• Alfred Stephen McCarthy papers, 1877-1955 The papers consist of a diary kept by McCarthy during his year of service with the 6th Imperial Bushmen cavalry unit in the Boer War, 1900-1901; legal documents, including birth and marriage certificates; limited correspondence; photographs; records kept by McCarthy during his tenure as a sergeant with the New South Wales police, 1901-1922; a collection of McCarthy's bush poetry; and newspaper clippings collected by McCarthy.
• Vivian Prewett papers, 1900-1901 The papers consist of letters of Vivian J. A. Prewett, a trooper with the 13th Company, Imperial Yeomanry. Prewett corresponded with family and friends during his tour of duty during the Boer War. The letters chronicle Prewett's sailing to South Africa, his arrival in Cape Town, the daily routine of camp life, his participation in combat, as well as his personal observations of the Boers and of England's involvement in the war.

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Boer War letters from Indigenous Australians show it wasn't entirely a 'white man's war'

History might have forgotten Private Frank Leighton Sinclair had he not sat down to write a letter from Bloemfontein in South Africa to his brother back home in NSW's Kangaroo Valley on March 17, 1900, during the Boer War.

"Two men accidentally shot themselves, and one has since died. It is a terrible sight to see men and horses lying dead all around," he wrote.

Mr Sinclair wrote of walking through the night to avoid hypothermia after being stranded with no tent during heavy rain.

"It makes a man very determined to fight when he sees men and horses cut to pieces."

A few months later, and less than 200 kilometres south, another 28-year-old wrote a letter home to Braidwood from South Africa.

"I have seen quite enough fighting and have had some very narrow squeaks," Trooper Jack Alick Bond wrote.

Neither could have known it at the time, but their letters would be published in newspapers and found decades later, revealing Indigenous involvement in what history has dubbed the "white man's war".

Mr Sinclair and Mr Bond are now remembered as two of just 11 known Australian Indigenous men to have served during the Boer War.

From Yuin land to the Boer War

The two Yuin men, from the NSW south coast, were on separate ships but departed from Woolloomooloo, Sydney to the war on January 17, 1900.

Mr Bond sailed aboard the Surrey with the 1st Australian Horse. Mr Sinclair sailed aboard the Southern Cross with B Squadron 1st New South Wales Mounted Rifles.

Indigenous military historian Peter Bakker has often wondered if the two men met while boarding in Sydney that day.

"I've often had that thought," he said. "I like to think they did. There's certainly a possibility," he said.

"Two men happened to leave at the same time, from the same area – both Yuin – to serve in the Boer War. And these two men are the only two I've found written correspondence from."

Mr Bakker has uncovered sections of five letters — one from Jack Alick Bond, four from Frank Leighton Sinclair — that were printed in local newspapers at the time and are now the earliest known letters from Indigenous servicemen sent from the front during active military service.

"I knew straight away [these letters] were very important," Mr Bakker said.

"We have very few letters actually written by Aboriginal men from this time period."

Proof of Indigenous involvement

Indigenous men were permitted to enrol in the armed forces until the 1903 Defence Act and were considered on merit along with all other would-be soldiers based on their horse riding, marksmanship and bushman skills.

It was only after two failed conscription referendums during World War I that then prime minister Billy Hughes relaxed the rules regarding Indigenous enrolment so that anyone with at least one "white" parent could enlist.

It was not until 1949 that all restrictions were lifted.

Mr Bakker said the letters showed Aboriginals had been involved in what was always considered the "white man's war".

"Australia has been a multicultural society right from the settlement of Australia," he said.

He has found evidence of about 70 Indigenous soldiers fighting at Gallipoli, as well as Australians of Turkish, German, Maori and Chinese descent, among other ethnicities.

"They fight as one — as Australians. We need to be far more aware that we've been very Anglo centric in our thinking about Australian history and about Australian military history," he said.

A family connection to the front

Illawarra man Daniel Dawson called his mother out of the blue in 2006 from outside a barber where his shoulder-length hair had just been buzz-cut.

It was, he told his shocked mother, because he'd just been accepted into the army.

"I don't know what came about. I've just done it as a personal goal. And I don't know why or what was in it for me," he said.

Ever since he'd seen a stall for the army at a high school careers day, the idea of serving in the military had appealed to Mr Dawson.

However, after 14 years as a private in the Australian Army Reserve and a tour of Timor-Leste with the Australian Border Force, Mr Dawson investigated his Indigenous past.

He said he was "astonished", "wowed" and "baffled" to learn his third-great-grand-uncle was Frank Sinclair.

Suddenly his military service took on new meaning.

"When they say it's in your blood and that bloodlines can make a strong contribution towards what you do and how you do things in life, that has reflected to me significantly," he said.

Also in the family tree were 10 Sinclairs who fought during WWI and 22 family members who served during World War II.

"There's always been a strong connection to the army," he said.

"To hear these stories was just astonishing."

Mr Dawson says it is important to remember the history of Indigenous people serving in the military, and the letters from Private Sinclair, because they show what Australia's forefathers endured.

"They show the hardship and the sacrifice," he said.

"They've given me a sense of pride and dignity."

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Home — Essay Samples — History — Boer War — The First and the Second Boer War

The First and The Second Boer War

• Categories: Boer War British History

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Published: Dec 5, 2018

Words: 1181 | Pages: 3 | 6 min read

Table of contents

The boer war, leading up to the first boer war, the first boer war, the second boer war, uniform/weapons.

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Guest Essay

What Began as a War on Theater Won’t End There

By James Shapiro

Mr. Shapiro is the author of the forthcoming “The Playbook: A Story of Theater, Democracy, and the Making of a Culture War.”

Productions of plays in America’s high schools have been increasingly under attack. In 2023, Anton Chekhov’s “Three Sisters” was rejected in Tennessee (since it deals with adultery); “August: Osage County,” the Pulitzer Prize-winning play by Tracy Letts, was canceled in Iowa after rehearsals had begun (the community was deemed not ready for it); and in Kansas, students were not even allowed to study, let alone stage, “The Laramie Project ,” a play by Moisés Kaufman and members of the Tectonic Theater Project about the murder of a gay student, Matthew Shepard.

It should come as no surprise, then, that in the Educational Theater Association’s most recent survey, 85 percent of American theater teachers expressed concern about censorship . Even Shakespeare is at risk: In Florida, new laws led to the restriction of “A Midsummer Night’s Dream” to grades 10 through 12 and “Romeo and Juliet” could not be taught in full to avoid falling afoul of legislation targeting “sexual conduct.” Kill off young people’s exposure to theater, and you kill off a generation of playgoers, along with the empathy and camaraderie (already in short supply) that are intrinsic to theater. According to the latest report from the National Endowment for the Arts , from 2017 to 2022 the percentage of Americans who went even once a year to see a nonmusical play dropped by roughly half, from about 10 percent to less than 5 percent.

What begins as a war on theater never ends there.

The current attacks on theater in American schools have their origins in a struggle that took place in the late 1930s, when America’s political leadership believed that the arts, no less than industry and agriculture, were vital to the health of the Republic and deserving of its financial support. There was still an implicit understanding that theater and democracy — twinborn in ancient Greece, spheres where competing visions of society could be aired and debated — were mutually dependent. Funded by Congress as part of a Works Progress Administration relief bill and established in 1935, the Federal Theater Project by 1939 had staged over 1,000 productions in 29 states, seen free or for a pittance by 30 million spectators, or roughly one in four Americans, two-thirds of whom had never seen a play before.

It brought children’s plays on touring trucks to kids in crowded cities. It staged works in Spanish, Yiddish and Italian to reach immigrants. It established what it called Negro units from Hartford, Conn., to Seattle to support Black actors and playwrights. It staged Christmas plays and classics by Shakespeare and Euripides and nurtured young playwrights and directors, including Arthur Miller and Orson Welles. It brought free theater to asylums, orphanages, hospitals, prisons and veterans’ homes. It revived playgoing in rural states where the movies had all but ended it. Ten million listeners a week tuned in to its radio broadcasts. It established ties with hundreds of educational, fraternal, civic and religious groups, strengthening communal bonds.

It turned out that Americans were hungry for plays about issues that mattered to their lives, topics largely shunned by Hollywood and the commercial stage. So they flocked to see new plays about substandard housing and the plight of struggling farmers. One of the most remarkable Federal Theater ventures was a stage version of Sinclair Lewis’s novel “It Can’t Happen Here ,” in which a fascist is elected president of the United States. It opened on the same day, Oct. 27, 1936, in 18 cities across the country, and by the time it closed, more than 379,000 Americans had seen it. The cost of these thousand or so productions to taxpayers was roughly the price of building a single battleship.

The program’s popularity contributed to its undoing. Many of those in Congress who had voted to fund the Federal Theater became frightened by its reach and impact, its interracial casting, its challenge to the status quo — frightened, too, perhaps, by the prospect of Americans across racial, economic and political divides sitting cheek by jowl in packed playhouses.

Three years after the creation of the Federal Theater, Congress authorized the establishment of what would become the House Un-American Activities Committee, chaired by Martin Dies of Texas. It was to supposed to spend seven months investigating the rise of Nazism, fascism and communism in America and submit a report. The ambitious Mr. Dies, desperate to have his committee’s life extended, instead focused much of his attention on a more vulnerable target: the Federal Theater, accusing it of disseminating offensive and communistic and therefore un-American values. In the course of waging and winning this battle, he assembled a right-wing playbook so pervasive that it now seems timeless. He succeeded wildly: All Federal Theater productions were abruptly terminated in 1939, and the House Un-American Activities Committee lasted until 1975. With a nascent national theater now destroyed, targeting theater in schools was the inevitable next step for his successors, who — whether cynical politicians or school board members eager to police what offends their sensibilities — have all stolen a page from the Dies playbook.

It’s hard to imagine what America would be like today had support for the Federal Theater continued and Mr. Dies’s committee not been renewed. Counterfactual history is best left to novelists. But a more vibrant theatrical culture extending across the land might well have led to a more informed citizenry and, by extension, a less divided and more equitable and resilient democracy. What happened instead was that Mr. Dies begat Joseph McCarthy, who begat Roy Cohn, who begat Donald Trump.

Some of those familiar with this history haven’t given up. Right now, artists are preparing projects that on July 27 will open simultaneously in 18 U.S. cities and towns, much as “It Can’t Happen Here” did in 1936 . Under the rubric of Arts for EveryBody, the initiative is bringing together performers, audiences, community leaders and local officials. It is a small start and a promising one. So, too, is legislation coming before Congress, the STAGE Act of 2024, that would provide badly needed support for endangered nonprofit theaters across the land. Passing it should be a no-brainer, but there’s a likelihood that the Dies playbook will be used to defeat it. Until those in power in this country pivot from suppressing theater to investing in it, it’s not just the arts but also democracy itself that remains vulnerable.

James Shapiro teaches English at Columbia University and is the author of the forthcoming “ The Playbook: A Story of Theater, Democracy, and the Making of a Culture War .”

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