essay about the military

Thesoldiersproject is supported by its audience. When you buy through our links, we may earn an affiliate commission. Learn more

Why Is the Military Important to Society? [A Simple Explanation]

Written by Everett Bledsoe / Fact checked by Brain Bartell

This year’s national defense budget is 768.2 billion dollars. That’s a lot of money.

It is even higher than the budget for healthcare and education — two seemingly very important aspects in society.

With that much money dedicated to the military, it is presumed that the military is considered something very important to society. But why exactly?

This article will provide some information for you to answer, “Why is the military important to society?” While this is not an ‘importance of army in a country essay’, we will cover:

• The basics of the U.S military
• 5 reasons why the military is important to society
• The military preserves the open gates of global commerce and finance
• The military secures strategic alliances
• The military fuels continuous advancement (diplomatic & intelligence collection)
• The military enhances and promotes U.S public diplomacy
• A few other more direct impacts of the military on society

Happy reading!

Table of Contents

The U.S Military

The military’s importance in society, a few other more direct impacts of the military on society.

To start, let’s brief over what the military is in the U.S.

The military refers to the U.S Armed Forces. This comprises six service branches, which are the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Space Force, and Coast Guard.

The U.S PHS Commissioned Corps and NOAA Commissioned Officer Corps are the other two U.S uniformed services. The military has a total of eight.

It is headed by the commander in chief, which is the President of the U.S. Currently, this is Joe Biden. Together with the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Biden forms military policies.

• The DoD is headed by the Secretary of Defense, who, as of right now, is Loyd Austin.
• The DHS is headed by the Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas.

Now, onto the importance of the military:

Why do we need a military?

Since its inception, the military has contributed to forging a sense of national unity and identity. It is, therefore, a decisive component of U.S patriotic culture; there is an undeniable relationship between the military and society.

The key role of the military in the U.S is maintaining peace . It safeguards the well-being of the nation as a whole and more specifically, the American citizens within the nation.

This peace brings about stability, which, in turn, entails many other beneficial things for the U.S, such as:

• Preserving the open gates of global commerce and finance

The military preserves the open gates of global commerce and finance for the U.S economy. This is the first reason why it is so important in society. By maintaining the trading lanes and overall maritime system, it ensures the U.S continues to grow economically.

• Securing strategic alliances

The U.S partners with a lot of countries strategically. Part of securing and retaining these allies is providing military assistance (when necessary). In other words, the U.S military has its allies’ backs. The U.S’s “friendships” with these other countries typically reward them economically.

Here are three examples of such rewarding relationships:

The U.S & Canada

The U.S and Canada’s military collaboration can be traced back to the World Wars. Since then, the close ties entailed lucrative trading. Roughly 75% to 85% of Canadian trade is with the U.S. Plus, Canada is one of the U.S’s main suppliers of oil.

The U.S & The United Kingdom (UK)

The UK and the U.S share the biggest foreign direct investment partnership in the world. Hence, the UK-U.S alliance is very critical in terms of both countries’ economic prosperity. Many Britons visit the U.S every year, and they always spend a lot of money. This means a lot of money goes to U.S tourism annually.

The U.S & Saudi Arabia

The U.S has been a trade partner with Saudi Arabia since the beginning of the 20th century. The nation supplies the U.S with thousands of barrels of petroleum every year. The U.S also exports a lot of its goods to Saudi Arabia, such as cars, planes, helicopters, spacecraft, aircraft parts, etc.

The U.S & Malaysia

In June 2006, the U.S and Malaysia committed to a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). Since then, the nation has always been among the U.S’s top trading partners. Annual bilateral trade typically averages around $50 billion.

• Strengthening economic negotiating power with both allies and adversaries

The U.S’s immense economic negotiating power with both allies and adversaries is not naturally bestowed. It is the result of the U.S’s huge military force.

The U.S is said to have one of the most powerful militaries in the world. This consequently gives it leverage and “more say” in global discussions, especially those concerning monetary, currency policies, and trading.

Since the state of the economy directly affects society, it is safe to assume that the military plays a crucial role.

• Encouraging continuous advancement in terms of diplomatic and intelligence collection

The need to maintain a powerful, leading military (aka. a military that wins) entails that the U.S has to keep moving forward in terms of technology and diplomatic and intelligence collection.

As such, the existence of the military alone plays a role in instilling continuous advancement.

This is also prompted by the fact that other countries depend on its protection and the security assistance programs it provides. Essentially, it drives Americans forward and in effect, acts as a growth mindset installer on the country in general.

• Enhancing and promoting U.S public diplomacy

The military is one force behind the U.S’s successful public diplomacy. Why is this important? Well, public diplomacy helps facilitate actual cooperation across national borders and lines. It solidifies relationships and leverages the U.S image and approval in the eyes of foreign citizens. This is important for the U.S politically, economically, and socially.

The military’s Army Corps of Engineers:

• builds, repairs, and sustains the country’s network of 2,500 levees
• takes care of more than 25,000 miles of inland waterways and 700 dams
• runs ¼ of the hydroelectric power in the country
• maintains a system of water storage areas for droughts and floods
• maintains inland maritime recreation areas and conducts critical restoration

The Army is also often first-responders in crisis cases, such as fires and natural disasters.

• 70,000 Army soldiers were deployed to support people during Hurricane Katrina
• 200 active-duty soldiers fought the raging 260 wildfires in the Pacific Northwest

The Army research labs offer medical breakthroughs

• developed techniques to identify and track the Ebola virus
• developed one-hand tourniquets, blood-cooling containers, and responsive prosthetics

The US Navy, Marine Corps & Coast Guard

The US Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard ensure the seas are open and free so trading can happen. They also counter global piracy, and subsequently, keep the cost of goods from surging.

The Air Force

You may find this surprising, but the Air Force provides us with the accurate weather prediction we need.

They operate a 6-satellite constellation (Defense Meteorological Satellite Program) that provides local meteorologists forecasting so we can have warnings about serious weather ahead of time.

In addition, Air Force research leads to revolutionary innovations such as lasers and drones, also known as unmanned aerial technology. These, in turn, assist the U.S in terms of border security, storm prediction, and farming. They have expanded the drone market to reach $8 billion in 2020.

As with the Army, the Air Force is more than often the first responder in disasters. The branch is a homeland and global disaster relief responder.

• they fly cargo planes of fire retardants
• In 2015, dropped 250,000 gallons of fire retardant in California
• they carry out evacuation missions and coordinate airborne search and rescue
• they conduct aerial spray missions with cargo planes
• spray against mosquitoes after Hurricanes Katrina, Gustav, and Rita
• they fly cargo planes of oil repellent spray
• i.e., missions after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
• they picked up more than 8,000 people after Hurricane Katrina
• they serve as electrical utility work vehicles during Hurricane Sandy

Finally, they safeguard the U.S’s airspace by escorting planes and passenger jets as well as going on protective patrols.

• they escorted 2 international flights in response to an anon terror alert
• they conducted protective patrols in Phoenix, Arizona, during the Super Bowl
• they intercepted a Soviet-era nuclear-capable aircraft on Independence Day (2015)

So what do you think? Why is the military important to society? Comment your takeaway down below. We would love to hear about your thoughts and opinions.

And aside from:

Why else do you think the military is important to society? Also, please help us share this article with other readers, such as your friends and family members!

I am Everett Bledsoe, taking on the responsibility of content producer for The Soldiers Project. My purpose in this project is to give honest reviews on the gear utilized and tested over time. Of course, you cannot go wrong when checking out our package of information and guide, too, as they come from reliable sources and years of experience.

Importance of Military Essays ⚔

Essays on the military are critical because they help us comprehend the military’s history, tactics, and effects on society. They give us a place to conduct in-depth study and analysis, enabling us to examine and assess many facets of the military career.

We may learn a great deal about the complexity of combat, the advancement of military strategies and equipment, and the military’s influence on international politics and security by reading and writing on military topics. These pieces encourage critical thinking, spark intellectual debate, and improve military knowledge and study in addition to instructing and informing readers.

When writing a military essay, you may explore compare and contrast essay topics such as the similarities and differences between military strategies or the contrasting perspectives on the impact of warfare in different historical periods. For example, you can compare the military tactics used in World War I and World War II or contrast the views on the effectiveness of air power in modern warfare.

Types of Military Essays 🎖

Military essays come in various formats with various functions and writing styles. Here are four specific categories:

☑ Expository essays

 These papers seek to offer a concise and impartial exposition of a military subject or idea. They investigate the issue logically and methodically while providing factual information. Expository essays can be written on various subjects, including the history of a particular fight, the composition and organization of a military unit, and the operation of military technology.

☑ Argumentative Essays

In a military setting, an argumentative essay will express a particular point of view or argument and back it up with facts. Critical thinking and persuasive writing skills are needed to make a strong argument in these essays. Argumentative military essays could examine the moral ramifications of military action, debate the merits of a specific defense plan, or assess the efficacy of a military strategy.

☑ Comparative essay

Comparative essays analyze and contrast various elements of military systems, tactics, or historical events. They draw attention to contrasts, similarities, and patterns to comprehend the topic better. A comparative essay, for instance, can examine the parallels and differences between ancient and current combat or contrast the military strategies of various countries.

☑ Analytical essays

They dive into the specifics of a military subject, dissecting it into its component elements and critically analyzing them. To comprehend the subject, these essays require thorough investigation, data interpretation, and theoretical frameworks. Analyzing the origins and effects of a particular fight, evaluating the influence of military technologies on conflict, or reviewing the efficacy of a military doctrine are a few examples of analytical military studies.

If you’re looking to incorporate a capstone project into your military essay, consider exploring various capstone project ideas related to the military. These can range from analyzing the effectiveness of military training programs to developing strategies for improving military logistics or examining the ethical implications of autonomous weapon systems.

Format and Structure of a Military Essay 🪖

Here is a broad outline for a military essay, though precise requirements may change based on the assignment or institution:

☑️ Introduction

Start your paragraph with a compelling opening sentence or hook to capture the reader’s interest.

Describe the subject’s history and how it relates to the military.

Declare the essay’s thesis or significant point in clear terms.

Each paragraph should concentrate on a distinct subtopic or argument supporting the thesis.

Start each paragraph with a topic phrase that states the paragraph’s central theme.

Include examples, analysis, and supporting data to support the core point.

Use transitional words or phrases to transition between paragraphs and concepts seamlessly.

☑️ Discussion and Analysis

Discuss the implications of the evidence offered in the body paragraphs after it has been analyzed.

Think critically and offer perceptive criticism on the subject.

Consider opposing viewpoints or arguments, then reasonably and logically respond to them.

Summarise the key ideas covered in the essay, focusing on their importance.

Indicate how the essay’s main argument or thesis has been reinforced by restating it.

☑️ Citations & References

Include a separate section or bibliography for references, if necessary.

Use an appropriate citation format (such as APA, MLA, or Chicago) to give credit where credit is due.

Make that the reference list and in-text citations are formatted correctly and consistently.

Writing Tips for Military Essays

Research: Investigate your issue in-depth using reliable sources, including academic journals, books, government publications, and reliable websites. Obtain a range of viewpoints to create a comprehensive grasp of the subject.

Creating a Strong Thesis: Create a thesis statement that summarizes your essay’s essential points and is clear and concise. Throughout the essay, specific, contested arguments should support your thesis statement.

Creating an outline or structure for your essay guarantees the concepts are presented logically. Your essay should be broken up into an introduction, a body, and a conclusion. Each paragraph should contain a primary topic or point supporting your thesis.

Using Proper Language: Use a clear, concise, and formal tone when writing. Use proper and suitable military jargon and concepts. Aim to avoid jargon or excessively technical language that could mislead readers unfamiliar with military lingo.

Accurately citing your sources will ensure they receive due credit. Use the APA, MLA, or Chicago citation styles as specified by your instructor or institution. Use in-text citations for direct quotations, paraphrases, and other material that is not well known.

Military essay examples

“The Impact of Military Technology on Modern Warfare” examines how the character of warfare has changed due to developments in military technology, including drones, cyberwarfare, and artificial intelligence, and what this means for military strategy and ethics.

“Leadership Lessons from Historical Military Figures”: Examine the traits and tactics of historic military titans like Sun Tzu, Alexander the Great, and General George Patton, and discuss how they apply to modern military leadership.

Examine the historical development, present difficulties, and prospects for women serving in the armed forces in “The Role of Women in the Military.” Discuss how gender integration has affected military culture and effectiveness.

“The Use of Propaganda in Military Conflicts”: Examine how various countries and their armed forces have used propaganda to sway public opinion, inspire soldiers, and affect the results of military operations.

“Ethical Dilemmas in Modern Warfare”: Examine the moral dilemmas that military personnel face in today’s conflicts, such as the use of drones, the killing of civilians, and torture. Analyze various ethical systems and consider possible answers to these problems.

To incorporate the concept of a capstone project in your military essay, it’s crucial to understand the four essential elements that make up a successful capstone project. These elements include identifying a problem or challenge, conducting in-depth research, developing a comprehensive solution or approach, and presenting your findings through a well-structured and persuasive essay, for example, in “I want to be soldier” Essay .

For a concise and focused military essay, you may employ a 5-paragraph essay format . This format includes an introduction, three body paragraphs discussing key points or arguments, and a conclusion. It allows you to present your ideas clearly and organized, making it easier for readers to follow your thoughts.

Remember to pick a subject that interests you personally and fits the assignment’s or course’s requirements. To make your military essay exciting and instructive, do extensive research, create a fascinating topic, and employ concise, well-structured arguments backed by proof.

⏭ ORDER CUSTOM MILITARY ESSAY ⏮

As a result, military essays are critical in helping us learn more about the military, its history, tactics, and effects on society. They give people a place to conduct research, analyze information, and engage in critical thought, which promotes intellectual development and adds to the body of knowledge in military studies. Whether it’s an argumentative essay on the ethics of war or an expository essay on military technology, these pieces provide insightful analysis.

By diving into the complexities of military themes, we acquire a greater understanding of the sacrifices and difficulties military people face and the broader ramifications of their actions. Military essays provide a way to explore, analyze, and connect with the many facets of the military profession, making them an essential instrument in education, research, and intellectual conversation.

Writing a military essay can be a tricky task. Hence, you should seek professional help. There are various advantages to ordering your essay from WritingMetier . Our staff of expert writers, who specialize in military subjects, guarantees thoroughly researched and excellent articles.

You will receive personalized and unique content punctually provided and treated with strict confidentiality. We are the best option for your essay or military research paper demands because of our commitment to academic brilliance, user-friendly method, and focus on customer happiness.

Free topic suggestions

Laura Orta is an avid author on Writing Metier's blog. Before embarking on her writing career, she practiced media law in one of the local media. Aside from writing, she works as a private tutor to help students with their academic needs. Laura and her husband share their home near the ocean in northern Portugal with two extraordinary boys and a lifetime collection of books.

Similar posts

Military essay topics.

Discover an Array of Engaging Military Essay Topics that will Ignite Your Curiosity

What is a Military Essay? A military essay is a form of academic writing that examines different aspects of the military, including its history, strategy, operations, and societal influence. It allows students to delve into complex military topics and showcase their research and analytical skills.

How to write an Essay on Army Values?

Army values, deeply entrenched in military ethos, serve as guiding beacons not just for soldiers but for society at large. These principles of loyalty, respect, and selfless service are more than mere words; they are the very foundation upon which harmonious societies can be built.

How to Write a World War 2 Research Paper + Topics

Explore different topics and get tips on showcasing the global impact of this monumental World War 2.

Military Ethics Paper Topics🎖️

Explore the intricate ethical dimensions within the military while selecting an engaging paper topic. Analyze the foundational principles guiding ethical decision-making and examine current dilemmas that challenge military professionals.

Military Topics for Research Paper

Military Topics for Research Paper - article offers students a guided exploration into the undercurrents of these pivotal regions, inviting fresh perspectives and deep understanding. Key global regions with this guide.

We rely on cookies to give you the best experince on our website. By browsing, you agree to it. Read more

100+ Military Essay Topics

The military, with its history, disciplines, strategies, and controversial issues, has always been a fascinating subject for both scholars and ordinary citizens. It’s no wonder that many students, whether they have military experience or are merely curious about the topic, choose to write essays about it.

Table of Contents

What is a Military Essay?

A military essay is a piece of writing that delves into topics related to the armed forces, defense strategies, historical battles, military ethics, the role of the military in national and international politics, and more. These essays can be analytical, argumentative, historical, or even personal, reflecting on one’s own experiences in the military. The objective of such an essay is to shed light on specific issues or to present a balanced argument about a controversial military topic.

A Quick Guide on How to Choose a Military Essay Topic

Selecting the right topic is crucial for any essay, and when it comes to military subjects, the stakes are even higher. Here’s a quick guide:

• Interest is Key: Choose a topic that genuinely interests you. Your enthusiasm will reflect in your writing.
• Relevance Matters: Ensure that the topic is relevant to the current socio-political climate or has historical significance.
• Research is Crucial: Before settling on a topic, do preliminary research to ensure there’s enough material available.
• Seek Diversity: Don’t just stick to the mainstream topics. Explore lesser-known events, strategies, or personal narratives.

Military Essay Topics to Consider:

Historical analysis.

• The impact of World War II on modern military strategies.
• The evolution of naval warfare: From wooden ships to nuclear submarines.
• How the Cold War shaped military alliances and strategies.

Ethics and Morality

• The moral implications of using drones in warfare.
• Child soldiers: Understanding the tragedy and solutions.
• The balance between national security and personal freedom in times of war.

Modern Warfare and Strategies

• Cybersecurity and the new age of digital warfare.
• The role of artificial intelligence in modern military tactics.
• Understanding the military-industrial complex in the 21st century.

Role in Society

• Women in the military: Breaking barriers and challenges faced.
• How veterans reintegrate into civilian life and the challenges they encounter.
• The impact of compulsory military service on societal structures.

International Relations and Politics

• The role of NATO in today’s geopolitical landscape.
• The military strategies of emerging superpowers.
• Evaluating the pros and cons of military interventions.

Equipment and Technology

• The evolution and impact of stealth technology in aerial warfare.
• The role of satellites in modern military intelligence.
• Nuclear deterrence: More of a threat or a necessity?

Training and Discipline

• Analyzing the rigorous training regimens of elite military units.
• The importance of psychological preparation in military training.
• The role of discipline in shaping a soldier’s life and career.

Personal Narratives

• Personal experiences of soldiers in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
• The role of chaplains in providing spiritual support in warfare.
• A day in the life of an army medic: Challenges and rewards.

Historical Perspectives

• The transformation of military strategies from ancient to modern times.
• The tactics and impact of guerrilla warfare throughout history.
• Military lessons from the Vietnam War.
• The influence of the Napoleonic Wars on contemporary warfare.
• The Crusades: A military and religious expedition.

Current Affairs and Modern Challenges

• The implications of North Korea’s military ambitions.
• The changing face of terrorism and its impact on global military strategies.
• The role of the U.S. military in global peacekeeping.
• China’s military expansion in the South China Sea.
• The future of warfare: Bio-weapons and other unconventional threats.

Technology and Innovation

• The challenges and benefits of integrating robotics into the battlefield.
• The evolution of military communication systems.
• The potential and ethics of genetically modified soldiers.
• How military tech influences civilian technology.
• The impact of space exploration on military aspirations.

Ethics, Morals, and Laws of War

• Torture in war: An in-depth ethical analysis.
• The use of chemical weapons: History and repercussions.
• The Geneva Conventions and their modern relevance.
• The thin line between soldiers and war criminals.
• Are there ever justifiable reasons for breaking the rules of war?

Societal Impacts and Military Influence

• The economic consequences of maintaining a large standing army.
• Propaganda and its role in military recruitment.
• How the military influences fashion and popular culture.
• The psychological impact of war on soldiers and civilians.
• Veterans and PTSD: The silent battle after war.

Training, Leadership, and Military Culture

• The physical and mental challenges of Navy SEAL training.
• The influence of ancient Spartan culture on modern military training.
• Leadership lessons from military generals.
• The concept of honor and valor in the military.
• The importance of camaraderie and brotherhood in military units.

Military Intelligence and Espionage

• The history and evolution of military codes and code breaking.
• Espionage during the Cold War: The silent heroes and villains.
• How technology is changing the face of military intelligence.
• Counterintelligence: Protecting secrets in a digital age.
• The challenges and successes of the CIA and MI6.

Gender, Diversity, and Inclusion

• The history of women’s roles in the military.
• Addressing LGBTQ+ rights within the armed forces.
• Challenges faced by minority groups in the military.
• The benefits of a diverse and inclusive military force.
• Gender roles and stereotypes in the military.

Military in Literature and Media

• The portrayal of war in classic literature.
• War movies: How Hollywood shapes our view of conflict.
• The role of war correspondents and their influence on public opinion.
• Military-themed video games: Edutainment or glorification of violence?
• The accuracy of military portrayals in popular TV shows.

International Policies and Alliances

• The history and future of NATO in global politics.
• Military neutrality: The case of Switzerland.
• The pros and cons of global disarmament treaties.
• The challenges of peacekeeping missions: A UN perspective.
• The role of the military in post-colonial African states.

Military Medical Practices

• Battlefield medicine: Evolution and advancements.
• The ethical dilemmas of triage in wartime.
• The development and importance of military nursing.
• Psychological support systems for soldiers in combat zones.
• Combatting epidemics in military camps: Historical and modern perspectives.

Strategic Defense and Military Installations

• The architecture and design of historical fortresses.
• The importance of military bases in foreign territories.
• Underground bunkers and their strategic significance.
• The role and evolution of aircraft carriers in naval warfare.
• Missile defense systems: Balancing offense and defense.

Military Traditions and Rituals

• The history and significance of military parades.
• Taps and the Last Post: Understanding military funerals.
• The tradition of military tattoos and their meanings.
• Rites of passage in different military cultures.
• Military awards and decorations: More than just medals.

Reserve and Paramilitary Forces

• The role of National Guard units in domestic emergencies.
• Comparing regular armies with reserve forces: Training, roles, and challenges.
• The significance and operations of the Coast Guard.
• Paramilitary forces and their impact on national security.
• Militias and their influence on geopolitical stability.

Military in Environmental Contexts

• Desert warfare: Challenges and strategies.
• The intricacies of jungle warfare and its historical significance.
• Arctic and mountain warfare: Overcoming nature’s harshest challenges.
• The environmental impact of military activities.
• Adapting military strategies for urban vs. rural combat scenarios.

Boost Your Military Essay with WriteOnDeadline!

Having difficulty bringing your military essay to life? At writeondeadline.com , we have a team of expert writers who can craft a compelling essay for you. Whether it’s thorough research, captivating storytelling, or an in-depth analysis you need, our professionals have got you covered. Dive deep into the discipline of defense with our top-notch writing services.

Useful References:

• U.S. Military History – An in-depth resource on the history of the U.S. Army.
• International Review of the Red Cross – A journal covering humanitarian law, policy, and action.
• RAND Corporation – Provides research and analysis on defense and security topics.
• Military Times – Offers up-to-date news and analysis on military issues.

Women Warriors

How have the experiences, representation, and recognition of women in the military transformed, a century after the ratification of the 19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution? As Brookings President and retired Marine Corps General John Allen has pointed out , at times, the U.S. military has been one of America’s most progressive institutions, as with racial integration in the years after World War II. But it also embodies a traditional, conservative, and in some ways “macho” culture. It’s an organization where many (though far from all) jobs require a type of physical strength that is more frequently attainable for the male frame. And the military is, in large part, a deployable institution whose members can face difficult conditions in the field. Women are no less suited to braving such austere conditions and have proved that in combat. But there can be major challenges associated with sending a mix-gender force into such conditions.

For these reasons, it took a long time to make the military fully accessible to women. Notably, it was only in the Obama years that all combat positions, including in the ground forces, were open to them. Previous milestones had been reached only gradually. Legislation formally allowing women into the military was passed in 1948 (even though tens of thousands had served in both world wars, and women like Harriet Tubman and Mary Walker had served in the Civil War as nurses, spies, and even soldiers disguised as men). Women first entered the military service academies in the 1970s and were only allowed to fly combat missions or serve on Navy combat ships in the 1990s.

Given the integral role women play in the future of the armed forces, at this juncture in 2020 it is important to step back and ask: Is the U.S. military a leading or a lagging organization in regard to gender equity? And, should its leadership be proud of what it has accomplished to date, or prodded to do much better?

On both questions, the answers are mixed. The armed forces have come a long way in the last few decades, but this is hardly the time to spike the football in the end zone. There is so much further to go and addressing these issues of gender equity will not be easy.

The U.S. military by the numbers

Today’s military is much more integrated along gender lines than at any time in the past. Women are no longer excluded from any type of combat mission: They are pilots and vehicle drivers and mechanics and infantry officers. But while the U.S. military today has never had a higher fraction of women, they remain just 16 percent of the total force. Percentages have roughly doubled in the last generation for the various services but, even today, averaged across the four major Department of Defense services, women represent only one of every six Americans in uniform, ranging from about 8 percent in the Marine Corps to 19 percent in the Air Force.

In senior leadership, the numbers are worse and reflect the work that still needs to be done to help integrate women into the military. One of us had the honor of pinning four stars on her shoulder and becoming the first woman in American history to run a military combatant command. But there have only been six women who have ever reached four-star rank. Since General Ann Dunwoody of the U.S. Army became the first in 2008, the United States has named roughly 100 four-star military officers. This means that only about 6 percent of four-star generals have been women even in the period after the glass ceiling was shattered. There has not yet been a female member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or a female secretary of defense (or deputy secretary), either.

While the U.S. military today has never had a higher fraction of women, they remain just 16 percent of the total force.

These gender disparities contrast with a military that, in other terms, is rather diverse today, with roughly half of its enlisted recruits either Hispanic or members of a minority. 1 About half of all U.S. military personnel are married, and 39 percent have children; single parents make up about 6 percent of the total armed forces. About 5 percent of military personnel are married to another member of the armed forces. In terms of their family income backgrounds, there is fairly equal representation across all five quintiles of U.S. income distribution. But there is modest over-representation from the three middle quintiles, and modest under-representation from the top and bottom income brackets. Politically, the American armed forces lean conservative, especially among the officer corps, but there is considerable breadth of opinion in the enlisted ranks. All of these generally encouraging facts stand in contrast to the poor gender balance.

While the share of women in the military is higher than ever, the experiences of women in the military are often inequitable. Women in the military services continue to suffer high rates of sexual assaults from their male counterparts. That is unacceptable and one of the many issues that must be addressed if we are to eventually see equal shares of men and women in the armed forces.

Addressing the issues

What can be done to address the issues of inequity and underrepresentation of women in the military? Without claiming to address the entirety of the problem, we have a few thoughts. The first few are designed to broaden the appeal of military service in general, including for men and women, and our final ideas here focus on improving gender representation directly.

First, the American armed forces need to recruit from a broader pool of Americans. Some 60 percent of Army recruits now come from military families, for example. And as of 2018, the Army recruited 50 percent of its enlisted soldiers from just 10 percent of the nation’s high schools, suggesting too much dependence on certain geographic areas. This suggests that military service has become a largely family affair, with most volunteers emulating their parents’ (usually their fathers’) career paths. There is nothing wrong with family pride, and it is admirable how many children of military parents are willing to accept the sacrifice of service even after they have experienced it growing up. But passing the baton from generation to generation like this tends to perpetuate traditions—most, but not all, of them good—and leaves too few American young people of both genders willing to consider service.

There may be ways to broaden the recruiting pool even in the face of a diminishing number of suitable applicants in today’s youth population who measure up to military standards. For example, in regard to the nation’s high level of obesity, while the military should not lower physical standards, it might look for clever ways to encourage would-be recruits to get themselves into shape. Perhaps they could be offered employment conditionally, provided that they worked with a nutritionist and physical trainer for a certain trial period to improve their fitness. If they reached appropriate standards in the process, they could then join the armed forces of the United States.

We need more women in the senior ranks of the military; it is not enough just to do better with the younger and more junior demographics, which means finding ways for women to return and continue their careers after they have children.

When it comes to addressing the issues of underrepresentation, it is important to examine the barriers that keep women from pursuing military service, most notably, that it remains very hard to have a family while in military service, and this is true even more for women than men given the realities of biology. It will not always be realistic for women in particular to maintain continuity of service through their childbearing years. However, we should not give up hope for these individuals. Career paths that offer more realistic ways to return to military service after an extended absence should continue to be developed by the military services. We need more women in the senior ranks of the military; it is not enough just to do better with the younger and more junior demographics, which means finding ways for women to return and continue their careers after they have children.

Elevating women’s voices

In order to increase representation and the appeal of military service for women, we should amplify the voices of women who have had the honor of serving to spread the word about how fulfilling it can be. They can be among the most persuasive, and one hopes also the most inspiring mouthpieces for the military. Marine Colonel Amy Ebitz highlighted some bright spots that reflect the opportunities for women in the military in regard to pay and experience, in a piece for Brookings in 2019: On the issue of equal pay, she wrote, “the military absolutely embodies the equal-pay-for-equal-work principle. Regardless of your gender, your pay will be equal to others with the same time in service and qualifications. In the U.S. economy more broadly, a woman earns only 79 percent of what a man earns.” And on experience and opportunity, she added, “military service allows you to learn skills and to experience places and things you otherwise may have not. That experience, coupled with veterans’ preference for many follow-on occupations, is priceless. … In combat, my female Marines, alongside their brothers, manned machine guns and fought bravely. And no one by their side questioned their role.”

Amy’s story is not entirely different from Lori’s, even though they come from two very different military services and cultures. What the stories have in common is that both have risen very high in the ranks and feel very positively about their respective times in service, even while recognizing how rare their experiences are. We finish with Lori reflecting on her years in uniform, as well as her decision to join the armed forces in the first place, back in the early 1980s. Her message is designed to be an inspiration, we hope, to women who might consider a career in the armed forces, but it is also an admonition to policymakers, in and out of the military services, about how far we still have to go:

“I am the luckiest person in the world. I am the daughter of an amazing airman, who flew Reece aircraft for his career, RF-101s and RF-4s. I didn’t understand the importance of what he did, but I knew that he was good at what he did. He flew throughout Europe during the Cold War, and flew in the Vietnam war as well. But when it came time for me to go to college, comparing his goals and mine, I realized we’re different. You see, I was the oldest of five children, from the oldest to the youngest was six years—yes, six years. My father suggested that I should go to the Air Force Academy. I smiled sweetly and said, uh no, I had been in the Air Force for 18 years and I was ready to move on. Once in college, it took me a while to settle on a concentration. Eventually, I landed on being an English major. When it came time to figure out what to do, I decided that I would join ROTC, become a commissioned officer in the USAF, and then decide what to do with rest of my life.

Life has a way of figuring things out for you also. I had no idea that I would stay in for 37 years. No idea that I would be promoted beyond major. No idea that I would have the privilege to support and defend the Constitution of the United States at the highest level. No idea that all of my mentors would be men and fighter pilots.

But you know what? I did and it all started with a couple of things:

—The military is a meritocracy. We all start out on the same playing field with the same oath.

— What was important was the fact that I was competent in what I did. In fact, one fighter pilot stated, ‘if I had to go to war, I want Lori on the radio.’

—What I realize is that I am a woman and I have done things that no other woman had done before, like being the first female instructor at the Nellis Fighter Weapons School, and ultimately running NORTHCOM and NORAD during the North Korean crises of 2017. But what I want people to understand is that I was a part of something bigger than myself; it was never about me, but it was about the institution. And I know that I am a role model and that I want to use this for the greater good.

Our nation needs diverse voices around the table. Whether it is a CEO’s table, the Joint Chiefs table, or the cabinet of the United States, a diversity of thought, background, heritage, race, and gender all add to the capability of any leader to make a decision. It makes our nation stronger and better.”

So yes, we’ve come a long way. But there is plenty of work yet to be done to encourage the participation of women in the military and to ensure their experiences and opportunities are equitable to those of the men who serve. If we put the work in, we will have a stronger military—and country—for it.

• America’s Promise Alliance, “U.S. Military Demographics,” Washington, D.C., 2019, https://www.americaspromise.org/us-military-demographics

About the Authors

Lori robinson, nonresident senior fellow – foreign policy, center for 21st century security and intelligence, michael e. o’hanlon, senior fellow – foreign policy, more from robinson and o’hanlon.

A conversation with Gen. Lori Robinson, the first woman to command USNORTHCOM

As the first woman in U.S. history to lead a combatant command, retired General Lori Robinson, who has joined The Brookings Institution as a nonresident senior fellow, was at the forefront of NORAD and U.S. Northern, Central, and Indo-Pacific Command missions to defend and secure America and its interests. Now retired, she brings a wealth […]

MORE FROM THE 19A SERIES

Leaving all to younger hands: Why the history of the women’s suffragist movement matters

Dr. Susan Ware places the passage of the 19th Amendment in its appropriate historical context, highlights its shortfalls, and explains why celebrating the Amendment’s complex history matters.

The history of women’s work and wages and how it has created success for us all

Former Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen examines the history of women entering the labor force and analyzes both the challenges that remain today and potential solutions to meet those challenges.

Women’s work boosts middle class incomes but creates a family time squeeze that needs to be eased

Middle-class incomes have risen modestly in recent decades, and most of any gains in their incomes are the result of more working women. Isabel Sawhill and Katherine Guyot explain the important role women play in middle class households and the challenges they face, including family “time squeeze.”

• Media Relations
• Terms and Conditions
• Privacy Policy

• Tools and Resources
• Customer Services
• 20th Century: Post-1945
• 20th Century: Pre-1945
• African American History
• Antebellum History
• Asian American History
• Civil War and Reconstruction
• Colonial History
• Cultural History
• Early National History
• Economic History
• Environmental History
• Foreign Relations and Foreign Policy
• History of Science and Technology
• Labor and Working Class History
• Late 19th-Century History
• Latino History
• Legal History
• Native American History
• Political History
• Pre-Contact History
• Religious History
• Revolutionary History
• Slavery and Abolition
• Southern History
• Urban History
• Western History
• Women's History
• Share This Facebook LinkedIn Twitter

Article contents

The vietnam war and american military strategy, 1965–1973.

• Gregory A. Daddis Gregory A. Daddis Department of History, United States Military Academy West Point
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.013.239
• Published online: 02 March 2015

For nearly a decade, American combat soldiers fought in South Vietnam to help sustain an independent, noncommunist nation in Southeast Asia. After U.S. troops departed in 1973, the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 prompted a lasting search to explain the United States’ first lost war. Historians of the conflict and participants alike have since critiqued the ways in which civilian policymakers and uniformed leaders applied—some argued misapplied—military power that led to such an undesirable political outcome. While some claimed U.S. politicians failed to commit their nation’s full military might to a limited war, others contended that most officers fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the war they were fighting. Still others argued “winning” was essentially impossible given the true nature of a struggle over Vietnamese national identity in the postcolonial era. On their own, none of these arguments fully satisfy. Contemporary policymakers clearly understood the difficulties of waging a war in Southeast Asia against an enemy committed to national liberation. Yet the faith of these Americans in their power to resolve deep-seated local and regional sociopolitical problems eclipsed the possibility there might be limits to that power. By asking military strategists to simultaneously fight a war and build a nation, senior U.S. policymakers had asked too much of those crafting military strategy to deliver on overly ambitious political objectives. In the end, the Vietnam War exposed the limits of what American military power could achieve in the Cold War era.

• counterinsurgency
• limited war
• Vietnam War
• Westmoreland

Introduction

By mid-June 1951, the Korean War had settled into an uneasy, yet conspicuous stalemate. Having blunted North Korean and Chinese offensives that killed thousands of soldiers and civilians, the United Nations forces, now under command of General Matthew B. Ridgway, dug in as both sides agreed to open negotiations. Though the enemy had suffered heavily under the weight of allied ground and air power, Washington and its partners had little stomach to press northward. As the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff declared, the objective was to effect “an end to the fighting . . . and a return to the status quo.” 1 Thus, President Harry Truman’s decision in April to relieve General Douglas MacArthur—who in Ridgway’s words “envisaged no less than the global defeat of communism”—suggested that political limitations were now an intrinsic part of developing and implementing strategy in a time of war. Yet what was the purpose of war and strategy if not the complete destruction of enemy forces? In a time when men had “control of machines capable of laying a world to waste,” Ridgway believed escalation without restraint would lead to disaster. Civilian and military authorities had to set attainable goals and work closely in selecting the means to achieve them. 2

Ridgway’s admonitions forecast inherent problems in a Cold War period increasingly dubbed an era of “limited war.” In short, the very definition of wartime victory seemed in flux. An uncertain end to the fighting in Korea implied there were, in fact, substitutes to winning outright on the field of battle. Even if Korea demonstrated the successful application of communist containment, at least one student of strategy lamented that limited war connoted “a deliberate hobbling of tremendous power.” 3 A Manichean view of the Cold War, however, presented knotty problems for those seeking to confront seemingly expansion-minded communists without unintentionally escalating beyond some nuclear threshold. How could one fight a national war for survival against communism yet agree to negotiate an end to a stalemated war? Political scientist Robert Osgood, writing in 1957, judged there were few alternatives to contesting communists who themselves were limiting military force to “minimize the risk of precipitating total war.” For Osgood, the challenge was to think about contemporary war as more than simply a physical contest between opposing armies. “The problem of limited war is not just a problem of military strategy but is, more broadly, the problem of combining military power with diplomacy and with the economic and psychological instruments of power within a coherent national strategy that is capable of supporting the United States’ political objectives abroad.” 4

If Osgood was correct in suggesting that war required more than just an application of military power, then strategy—as a problem to be solved—entailed more than just battlefield expertise. Thus, the post–World War II generation of U.S. Army officers was forced to think about war more broadly. And they did. Far from being slaves to conventional operations, officers ascending the ranks in the 1950s to command in Vietnam understood the rising importance of local insurgency movements. As Andrew Birtle has persuasively argued, by 1965 the army had “succeeded in integrating counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla warfare in substantive ways into its doctrinal, educational, and training systems.” 5 An examination of contemporary professional journals such as Military Review reveals a military establishment wrestling with the problems of local economic and social development, the importance of community politics, and the role played by indigenous security forces. In truth, officers of the day, echoing the recommendations of Harvard professor Henry Kissinger, did not define limited wars in purely military terms. Rather, they perceived strategic problems as those involving changes in technologies, societies, and, perhaps most importantly, political ideas. 6

These same officers labored to devise a coherent strategy for a limited contest in Southeast Asia within the larger construct of the Cold War. In an important sense, the development of strategy for all combatants necessitated attention to multiple layers, all interlaced. As Lyndon Johnson recalled of Vietnam in his 1971 memoir, “It was a political war, an economic war, and a fighting war—all at the same time.” 7 Moreover, American political and military leaders found that Cold War calculations mattered just as much as the fighting inside South Vietnam. Fears of appearing weak against communism compelled the Johnson White House to escalate in 1965 when it looked like Hanoi was making its final bid for Indochinese domination. As Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told a journalist in April, if the United States withdrew from Vietnam “there would be a complete shift of world power. Asia goes Red, our prestige and integrity damaged, allies everywhere shaken.” Thus, paraphrasing military theorist Basil Liddell Hart, policy imperatives at the level of grand strategy would set the foundations for—and later circumscribe—the application of military strategy on a lower plane. 8

Liddell Hart’s council that strategy involved more than “fighting power” would lead American officers in Vietnam into a near insolvable dilemma. Clearly, the civil war inside Vietnam was more than just a military problem. Yet in the quest to broaden their conception of war, to consider political and social issues as much as military ones, senior leaders developed a strategy that was so wide-ranging as to be unmanageable. Rather than a narrow focus on enemy attrition, sheer comprehensiveness proved to be a crucial factor undermining American strategy in Vietnam. In attempting to both destroy an adversary and build a nation, uniformed leaders overestimated their capacity to manage a conflict that had long preceded American involvement. A near unquestioning faith in the capacity to do everything overshadowed any unease with entanglement in a civil war rooted in competing notions of national liberation and identity. 9 In the end, senior U.S. policymakers had asked too much of those crafting military strategy to deliver on overly ambitious political objectives.

Devising Strategy for a New Kind of War

By June 1965, General William C. Westmoreland had been serving in the Republic of Vietnam for eighteen months. As the newly appointed commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the former West Point superintendent was heir to a legacy of varied strategic initiatives aimed at sustaining an independent, noncommunist foothold in Southeast Asia. Since the division of Vietnam along the seventeenth parallel in 1954, an American military assistance and advisory group (MAAG) had been training local forces for a threat both externally military and internally political. 10 The image of North Korean forces streaming across an international boundary in 1950 surely weighed heavily on U.S. officers. Yet these same men understood the importance of a steady economy and secure social structure in combating the growing insurgent threat inside South Vietnam. Consequently, the U.S. advisory group focused on more than just advising the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN) for conventional operations against the North Vietnam Army (NVA). 11

As advisers, however, the Americans could not dictate strategy to their Vietnamese allies. President Ngo Dinh Diem, struggling to gain popular support for his own social revolution, equally sought ways to secure the population—through programs like agrovilles and strategic hamlets—from a rising communist insurgency. Yet achieving consensus with (and between) Americans proved difficult. Staff officers debated how best to balance economic and political development with population security and the training of South Vietnamese forces. 12 Was the threat more military or political, more external or internal? Were local paramilitary forces or the conventional army better suited to dealing with these threats? All the while, a shadow government competed for influence within the countryside. When MACV was established in February 1962, its chief, Paul D. Harkins, received the mission to “assist and support the Government of South Vietnam in its efforts to provide for its internal security, defeat Communist insurgency, and resist overt aggression.” 13 Here was a tall order. Moreover, as military operations required a solid political footing for ultimate success, an unstable Saigon government further complicated American strategic planning. Following Diem’s overthrow and death in November 1963, the foundations on which the U.S. presence in South Vietnam rested appeared shaky at best. Hanoi’s own escalation in 1964 did little to assuage concern. 14

Though cognizant of the difficulties ahead, American leaders felt they had little choice but to persevere in South Vietnam. By early 1965, with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing him to “take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force” to assist South Vietnam, President Johnson believed he had little alternative but to escalate. He was in a difficult position. Hoping to preserve his domestic agenda but stand strong against communist aggression, Johnson initially hesitated on committing ground troops. Instead, he turned to airpower. Operation Rolling Thunder, launched in early March 1965, aimed at eliminating Hanoi’s support of the southern insurgency. Concurrently, Johnson hoped, in Michael Hunt’s words, to “bring a better life to the people of Vietnam—on American terms.” 15 The president would be disappointed on both counts. The punitive bombing of North Vietnam did little to interfere with Hanoi’s support of the insurgents and nothing to resolve the internal political problems of South Vietnam. Moreover, military leaders complained that the president’s gradual response, of limiting the tempo and ferocity of the air campaign, unduly limited American military might. (Few worried as restlessly as Johnson about full-blown Chinese or Soviet intervention.) By the spring, it became clear the president’s policies in South Vietnam were failing. In June, Westmoreland officially requested additional troops “as a stop-gap measure to save the ARVN from defeat.” 16

The decision to escalate in Vietnam persists as one of the most controversial in twentieth-century American foreign policy. Competing interpretations revolve around the question of purpose. Was escalation chosen as a matter of policy, of containing communism abroad? Was it used as a way to test American capacity in nation-building, of expanding democracy overseas? Or did escalation flow from concerns about prestige and credibility, both national and political? Clearly Johnson considered all these matters in the critical months of early 1965, and it is plausible to argue that the president believed he had few alternatives given reports of South Vietnam being on the verge of collapse. Yet ultimately intervention was a matter of choice. 17 Johnson feared the political ramifications and personal consequences of “losing” Vietnam just as Truman had “lost” China. Thus, when Westmoreland sent a cable to the Pentagon in early June requesting 40,000 combat troops immediately and more than 50,000 later, hasty deliberations in the White House led to support for MACV’s appeal. As McNamara later recalled, “South Vietnam seemed to be crumbling, with the only apparent antidote a massive injection of US troops.” 18

The task now fell to Westmoreland to devise an offensive strategy to use these troops. Realizing Hanoi had committed regular army regiments and battalions to South Vietnam, the MACV commander believed he had no choice but to contest this conventional threat. But he also had to provide security “from the guerrilla, the assassin, the terrorist and the informer.” 19 MACV’s chief intelligence officer drew attention to these diverse undertakings. As Phillip B. Davidson recalled, Westmoreland “had not one battle, but three to fight: first, to contain a growing enemy conventional threat; second, to develop the Republic of Vietnam’s Armed Forces (RVNAF); and third, to pacify and protect the peasants in the South Vietnamese countryside. Each was a monumental task.” 20 Far from being wedded to a battle-centric strategy aimed at racking up high body counts, Westmoreland developed a comprehensive campaign plan for employing his forces that factored in more than just killing the enemy.

Stabilization and security of South Vietnam formed the bedrock of Westmoreland’s “three-phase sustained campaign.” Phase I visualized the commitment of U.S. and allied forces “necessary to halt the losing trend by 1965.” Tasks included securing allied military bases, defending major political and population centers, and strengthening the RVNAF. In Phase II, Westmoreland sought to resume the offensive to “destroy enemy forces” and reinstitute “rural construction activities.” In this phase, aimed to begin in 1966, American forces would “participate in clearing, securing, reserve reaction and offensive operations as required to support and sustain the resumption of pacification.” Finally, in Phase III, MACV would oversee the “defeat and destruction of the remaining enemy forces and base areas.” It is important to note that Westmoreland’s plan included the term “sustained campaign.” 21 The general was under no illusions that U.S. forces were engaged in a war of annihilation aimed at the rapid destruction of the enemy. Attrition suggested that a stable South Vietnam, capable of resisting the military and political pressures of both internal and external aggressors, would not arise in a matter of months or even a few years.

Hanoi’s political and military leaders equally debated the strategic concerns of time, resources, and capabilities. Johnson’s decision to commit U.S. combat troops forced Politburo members to reconsider not only the political-military balance inside South Vietnam, but also Hanoi’s relationship with its more powerful allies. To be sure, national communists like Vo Nguyen Giap had discussed the role of a “long-term revolutionary war” strategy and the importance of political education in military training. 22 By 1965, however, the massive American buildup complicated strategic deliberations. In December, Hanoi’s leadership, increasingly under the sway of First Secretary Le Duan, promulgated Lao Dong Party Resolution 12, which outlined a basic strategy to defeat the Americans “under any circumstances.” The resolution placed greater emphasis on the military struggle as domestic priorities in the North receded into the background. As a result, Le Duan battled with senior military officials like Giap over the pace of military operations and the building of forces for a general offensive against the southern “puppets.” Escalation proved challenging for both sides. 23

The strategic decision making leading to American intervention in Vietnam illustrates the difficulties of developing and implementing strategy for a postcolonial conflict in the nuclear era. Even from Hanoi’s perspective, strategy was not a straightforward process. A sense of contingency, of choices, and of action and reaction permeate the critical years leading to 1965. Why Johnson chose war, and the restrictions he imposed on the conduct of that war, remain contentious questions. So too do inquiries into the nature of the threat that both Americans and their South Vietnamese allies faced. Finally, the relationship between political objectives and the strategy devised to accomplish those objectives offers valuable instruction to those researching the faith in, and limitations of, American power abroad during the Cold War. 24

From Escalation to Stalemate

In March 1965, the first contingent of U.S. Marines landed at Da Nang in Quang Nam province. Their mission, to defend American airbases supporting the bombing campaign against North Vietnam, called for setting up three defensive “enclaves” at Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai. As the summer progressed and additional army units arrived in country, Westmoreland sought authorization to expand beyond his airfield security mission. If South Vietnam was to survive, the general needed to have “a substantial and hard-hitting offensive capability . . . with troops that could be maneuvered freely.” 25 With the growing recognition that Rolling Thunder was not achieving desired results, the Pentagon gave Westmoreland the green light. The MACV commander’s desires stemmed largely from his perception of the enemy. To the general, the greatest threat to South Vietnam came not from the National Liberation Front (NLF) insurgency but rather from main force units, both NLF and NVA. Westmoreland appreciated the long-term threat insurgents posed to Saigon, but he worried that since the enemy had committed larger combat units to battle, he ignored them at his peril. 26

The Americans thus undertook offensive operations to provide a shield for the population, one behind which ARVN could promote pacification in the countryside. By early October, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division had expanded its operations into the Central Highlands, hoping to defeat the enemy and reestablish governmental control in the NLF-dominated countryside. Hanoi, however, had continued its own buildup and three North Vietnam Army regiments had joined local forces in Pleiku province near the Cambodian border. In mid-November, the cavalry’s lead battalion, using new techniques of helicopter insertion onto the battlefield, collided with the NVA. For two days the battle raged. Only the employment of B-52 strategic bombers, called in for close air support, staved off defeat. The battle of Ia Drang clearly demonstrated the necessity of conventional operations—Westmoreland could not risk NVA regiments controlling the critical Highway 19 and thus cutting South Vietnam in two. But the clash raised important questions as well. Was Ia Drang an American victory? Would such battles truly impact Hanoi’s will? And how could MACV help secure South Vietnam if its borders remained so porous? 27

Despite the attention Ia Drang drew—Westmoreland publicly called it an “unprecedented victory”—revolutionary development and nonmilitary programs never strayed far from MACV’s sights. Westmoreland continued to stress psychological operations and civic action, even in the aftermath of Ia Drang. In December, he wrote the 1st Infantry Division’s commander detailing how the buildup of forces should allow for an increased emphasis on pacification: “I am inviting this matter to your personal attention since I feel that an effective rural construction program is essential to the success of our mission.” 28 Unfortunately, these early pacification efforts seemed to be making little progress as Hanoi continued infiltrating troops into South Vietnam and desertions from the South Vietnamese armed forces rose sharply. 29 Accordingly, Westmoreland requested an additional 41,500 troops. Further deployments might be necessary. The request staggered the secretary of defense, who now realized there would be no rapid conclusion to the war. “The U.S. presence rested on a bowl of jelly,” McNamara recalled. His doubts, however, were not forceful enough to derail the president’s commitment to a secure, stable, and noncommunist South Vietnam. 30

When American and South Vietnamese leaders met at Honolulu in early February 1966, Johnson publicly reaffirmed that commitment. While Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky and Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu pledged a “social revolution” in Vietnam, Johnson urged an expansion of the “other war,” a term increasingly used to describe allied pacification efforts. 31 Concurrently, McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk defined Westmoreland’s goals for the coming year. MACV would increase the South Vietnamese population living in secure areas by 10 percent, multiply critical roads and railroads by 20 percent, and increase the destruction of NLF and NVA base areas by 30 percent. To make sure the president’s directives were not ignored, Westmoreland was to augment the pacified population by 235,000 and ensure the defense of political and population centers under government control. The final goal directed MACV to “attrite, by year’s end, VC/PAVN forces at a rate as high as their capability to put men in the field.” 32

The Honolulu conference is a critical episode for understanding American military strategy in Vietnam. The comprehensive list of strategic objectives presented by Rusk and McNamara forced American commanders to consider the war as an effort in both construction and destruction. The conference also reinforced the necessity of thinking about strategy in broader terms than simply battle. Attrition of enemy forces was only part of a much larger whole. In one sense, pacification of the countryside was a process of trying to create political space so the government of South Vietnam (GVN) could stabilize. (The New York Times reported in April that a “crisis in Saigon” was snagging U.S. efforts.) Yet MACV’s own definition of pacification—“the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people”—seemed problematic. 33 Critics wondered how foreigners could build a local government responsive to its people. Furthermore, the expansive nature of pacification meant U.S. troops would be asked to fight an elusive enemy while implementing a whole host of nonmilitary programs. Thus, while Westmoreland and senior commanders emphasized the importance of winning both control over and support of the Vietnamese people, American soldiers wrestled with building a political community in a land long ravaged by war. That they themselves too often brought devastation to the countryside hardly furthered the goals of pacification. 34

In important ways, waging battle—a necessity given Le Duan’s commitment to a general offensive in South Vietnam—undermined U.S. nation-building efforts in 1966 and underscored the difficulties of coordinating so many strategic actors. This management problem long had been a concern of counterinsurgency theorists. British adviser Sir Robert Thompson, a veteran of the Malayan campaign, articulated the need to find a “proper balance between the military and the civil effort, with complete coordination in all fields. Otherwise a situation will arise in which military operations produce no lasting results because they are unsupported by civil follow-up action.” 35 The reality of South Vietnam bore out Thompson’s claims. Worried about Saigon’s political collapse, American war managers too often focused on short-term, military results. The decentralized nature of strategic implementation equally made it difficult to weave provincial franchises into a larger national effort. 36

This lack of coordination led to pressures for a “single-manager” to coordinate the increasingly vast American enterprise in South Vietnam. (By the end of 1966, more than 385,000 U.S. military personnel alone were serving in country.) In May, Westmoreland incorporated a new directorate into his headquarters—Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support. While ostensibly a South Vietnamese program, CORDS redefined the allied pacification mission. 37 The directorate’s head, Ambassador Robert W. Komer, threw himself into the management problem and assigned each senior U.S. military adviser a civilian deputy for revolutionary development. MACV now provided oversight for all of the allied pacification-related programs: “territorial security forces, the whole RD effort, care and resettlement of refugees, the Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms,” or amnesty) program to bring VC [Vietcong] to the GVN side, the police program, the attempts to stimulate rural economic revival, hamlet schools, and so on.” 38 In short, CORDS assumed full responsibility for pacification.

If CORDS could be viewed as a microcosm of Westmoreland’s comprehensive strategy, it also underscored the difficulties of implementing so many programs at once. Physically controlling the population did not guarantee allied forces were making inroads against the insurgency’s political infrastructure. Improved security conditions did not necessarily win civilian “hearts and minds.” Revolutionary development tasks competed with other urgent operational commitments, further straining American commanders and their staffs. More importantly, pacification required a deeper appreciation of Vietnamese culture than most Americans possessed. 39 Senior officers labored to balance the competing requirements of attacking enemy units and performing civic action in the hamlets and villages. On the ground, many American soldiers made few distinctions between friend and foe when operating in the countryside. The army’s personnel rotation policy, under which individual soldiers served for twelve months before returning home, only exacerbated these problems. With some units experiencing a 90 percent personnel turnover within a three-month period, the pacification process was erratic at best. 40

As 1967 wore on, American journalists increasingly used words like “stalemate” and “quagmire” to describe the war in Vietnam. Early-year operations like Cedar Falls and Junction City, though inflicting heavy damage on the enemy, failed to break Hanoi’s will. At most, pacification was yielding modest results. Political instability in Saigon continued to worry U.S. embassy officials. Both the White House and MACV thus found it ever more difficult to convince Americans at home that their sacrifices were generating results. 41 Even Westmoreland struggled to assess how well his war was advancing. Body counts told only a fraction of the story. A lack of fighting in a certain district could either mean the area was pacified or the enemy was in such control that battle was unnecessary. Two years into the war, American soldiers remained unsure of their progress. (MACV and the CIA even debated the number of soldiers within the enemy’s ranks.) President Johnson, however, watched the growing domestic dissent with concern and, given the war’s ambiguities, called Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker home in support of a public relations campaign. In three appearances in 1967 MACV’s commander reported to national audiences his views on the ongoing war. Though guarded in his commentary, Westmoreland’s tone nonetheless was optimistic given the president’s desires to disprove claims of a stalemated war. 42

Hanoi’s political and military leaders similarly deliberated their own progress in 1967. Because of the American imperialists’ “aggressive nature,” the Politburo acknowledged the southern insurgency campaign had stalemated in the countryside. Still, to Le Duan in particular, an opportunity existed. A strategic offensive might break the impasse by instigating a popular uprising in the South, thus weakening the South Vietnamese–American alliance and forcing the enemy to the negotiating table. A southern uprising might well convince the international community that the United States was unjustly fighting against an internally led popular revolution. More importantly, a military defeat of the Americans, real or perceived, might change the political context of the entire conflict. 43

During the plan’s first phase, to be executed in late 1967, NVA units would conduct conventional operations along South Vietnam’s borders to draw American forces away from urban areas and to facilitate NLF infiltration into the cities. Le Duan planned the second phase for early 1968, a coordinated offensive by insurgent and regular forces to attack allied troops and support popular uprisings in the cities and surrounding areas. Additional NVA units would reinforce the uprising in the plan’s final phase by assaulting American forces and wearing down U.S. military strength in South Vietnam. 44

Though Le Duan’s desired popular uprising failed to materialize, the general offensive launched in late January 1968 shocked most Americans, especially those watching the war at home. Commencing during the Tet holiday, communist forces attacked more than 200 cities, towns, and villages across South Vietnam. Though not completely surprised, Westmoreland had not anticipated the ability of Hanoi to coordinate an offensive of such size and scope. The allies, however, reacted quickly and the communists suffered mightily under the weight of American and South Vietnamese firepower. Yet the damage to the U.S. position in Vietnam, some argued irreparable, had been done. Even in the offensive’s first hours, senior CIA analyst George Carver predicted that “the degree of success already achieved in Saigon and around the country will adversely affect the image of the GVN (and its powerful American allies as well) in the eyes of the people.” 45 Indeed, Tet had taken a heavy psychological toll on the population. After years of U.S. assistance, the Saigon government appeared incapable of securing the country against a large-scale enemy attack. Any claims of progress seemed artificial at best, intentionally deceitful at worst.

News reports about Westmoreland’s late-February request for an additional 206,000 men, followed soon after by the president’s decision not to run for reelection, only reinforced perceptions of stalemate. Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, who replaced McNamara in early March, wondered aloud how MACV was winning the war yet needed more troops. Public opinion mirrored growing doubts within Johnson’s inner circle. A 10 March Gallup poll found only 33 percent of Americans believed the United States was making progress in the war. Thus, Johnson approved only 10,500 additional troops for Westmoreland and in late March suspended all air attacks over North Vietnam in hopes of opening talks with Hanoi. If the 1968 Tet offensive was not an outright turning point of the war—many historians still consider it to be—Hanoi’s assault and Washington’s response brought about a shift in American policy and strategic goals. Westmoreland, hoping for a change in strategy that would expand operations into the Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries and thus shorten the war, instead received word in late spring that he would be leaving Vietnam to become the Chief of Staff of the Army. The best the general had been able to achieve was a long and bloody stalemate. 46

Historians have seized upon the Tet offensive and mid-1968 impasse as proof of a misguided military strategy crafted by a narrow-minded general who cared only for piling up high body counts. Such arguments should be considered with care. Far from being focused only on military operations against enemy main force units, Westmoreland instead crafted a strategy that took into account the issues of pacification, civic action, land reform, and the training of South Vietnamese units. If Tet illustrated anything, it was that battlefield successes—both military and nonmilitary—did not translate automatically into larger political outcomes. Despite the wealth of manpower and resources Americans brought to South Vietnam, they could not solve Saigon’s underlying political, economic, and social problems. Moreover, Westmoreland’s military strategy could not answer the basic questions over which the war was fought. In a contest over Vietnamese national identity in the postcolonial era, the U.S. mission in South Vietnam could only keep Saigon from falling to the communists. It could not convince the people a better future lay with an ally, rather than an enemy, of the United States.

From Stalemate to Withdrawal

In June 1968, Creighton W. Abrams, a West Point classmate of Westmoreland, assumed command of MACV. Only a month before, the enemy launched a series of new attacks in South Vietnam. Dubbed “mini-Tet,” the offensive sputtered out quickly but produced 125,000 new refugees inside a society already heavily dislocated by years of fighting. Reporters were quick to highlight the differences between the outgoing and incoming commanders. But Abrams, in Andrew Birtle’s words, differed from Westmoreland “more in emphasis than in substance.” Stressing a “one war” concept that viewed the enemy as a political-military whole, the new commander confronted familiar problems. As one officer recalled, “By the time Abrams arrived on the scene, there were few options left for changing the character of the war.” 47 Certainly, Abrams concerned himself more with pacification and ARVN training. These programs rose in importance, though, not because of some new strategic concept, but rather because the American phase of the war had largely run its course. From this point forward, the war’s outcome would increasingly rest on the actions of the Vietnamese, both North and South. While U.S. officials remained committed to an independent, noncommunist Vietnam, peace had replaced military victory as Americans’ principal national objective. 48

The inauguration of Richard M. Nixon in January 1969 underscored the diminishing role of South Vietnam in American foreign policy. The new president hoped to concentrate on his larger aim of improving relations with China and the Soviet Union. Such foreign policy designs hinged on reversing the “Americanization” of the war in Southeast Asia while fortifying South Vietnam to withstand future communist aggression. As Nixon’s national security advisor Henry Kissinger recalled, the challenge was to withdraw American forces “as an expression of policy and not as a collapse.” 49 Of course, Nixon, still the Cold War warrior, remained committed to opposing the expansion of communism. Withdrawal from Vietnam thus required maintaining an image of strength during peace negotiations if the United States was to retain credibility as a world power and a deterrent to communist expansion. Nixon’s goal of “peace with honor” thus would hold crucial implications for military strategists inside Vietnam. 50

In truth, Nixon’s larger policy goals complicated the process of de-Americanizing the war, soon dubbed “Vietnamization” by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. In shifting more of the war’s burden to the South Vietnamese, the president was quietly redefining success. Realizing, in Nixon’s words, that “total military victory was no longer possible,” the new administration sought a “fair negotiated settlement that would preserve the independence of South Vietnam.” 51 (Both Nixon and Laird believed flagging domestic support was limiting their options, long a concern of senior policymakers.) Abrams would preside over an American war effort increasingly concerned with reducing casualties while arranging for U.S. troop withdrawals. Moreover, the impending American departure did little to settle unresolved questions over the most pressing threat to South Vietnam. In preparing to hand over the war, should Americans be training the ARVN to defeat conventional North Vietnamese forces or a battered yet resilient insurgency? 52

After a detailed examination of the war led by Kissinger, Nixon formulated a five-point strategy “to end the war and win the peace.” The new policy depended first on pacification, redefined as “meaningful continuing security for the Vietnamese people.” Nixon also sought diplomatic isolation of North Vietnam and placed increasing weight on negotiations in Paris. Gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces was the fourth aspect of Nixon’s strategy. As the president recalled, “Americans needed tangible evidence that we were winding down the war, and the South Vietnamese needed to be given more responsibility for their defense.” (Some ARVN officers balked at the insinuation that they hadn’t been responsible for their nation’s security.) The final element, Vietnamization, aimed at training and equipping South Vietnam’s armed forces so they could defend the country on their own. Of note, political reform in Saigon, largely a task for Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, accompanied the military side of Vietnamization. “Our whole strategy,” Nixon declared, “depended on whether this program succeeded.” 53

For Abrams, the problem now became one of synchronizing all facets of his “one war” approach. Back in August 1968, MACV had to fend off another enemy offensive, the third of the year. Without retreating from the conventional threat, Abrams turned increasing attention to pacification. Under the influence of the new CORDS chief William Colby, the GVN initiated an Accelerated Pacification Campaign at year’s end. The campaign endeavored to upgrade 1,000 contested hamlets to relatively secure ratings by the end of January 1969. To provide political space for the Saigon government, U.S. military operations increased dramatically to keep the enemy off balance, further depopulating the countryside and creating more refugees. 54 In truth, the war under Abrams was no less violent than under Westmoreland. Still, the new MACV chief hoped to cut into the NLF infrastructure by boosting the number of those who would rally to Saigon’s side under the Chieu Hoi amnesty program, reinvigorating local defense forces, and neutralizing the insurgency’s political cadre. 55 This last goal fell largely to “Phoenix,” an intelligence coordination program that targeted the NLF political organization for destruction by police and local militia forces. MACV believed the defeat of the enemy infrastructure “essential to preclude re-establishment of an operational or support base to which the VC can return.” 56

While media attention often focused on battles like the costly engagement at “Hamburger Hill” in May 1969, conventional combat operations overshadowed MACV’s larger efforts to improve and modernize South Vietnam’s armed forces. For Abrams, any successful American withdrawal was predicated on improvements in this key area of Vietnamization. In the field, U.S. advisers trained their counterparts on small-unit patrolling and coordinating artillery support with infantry and armor operations. In garrison, the Americans concentrated on improving the ARVN promotion system and building an effective maintenance program. Moreover, ARVN leadership and morale needed attention to help reduce desertion rates. So too did intelligence, logistic, and operational planning programs. Abrams also had to propose an optimal force structure and help develop an operational approach best suited to ARVN capabilities. 57

Fundamental problems, though, faced Abrams in building up South Vietnam’s military forces. After Nguyen Van Thieu, South Vietnam’s president since the September 1967 election, announced a national mobilization in mid-1968, the size of the regular army and popular and regional forces increased substantially. In two years, the total armed forces grew by 40 percent. Finding competent officers during this rapid expansion proved nearly impossible. Additionally, capable ARVN leaders, of which there were many, too often found themselves and their units still relegated to secondary roles during allied maneuvers. 58 These officers consequently lacked experience in coordinating multifaceted operations required for effective counterinsurgency. Problems within the enlisted ranks rivaled those among ARVN’s leadership. Newsweek offered a harsh appraisal of the typical South Vietnamese trooper who was “often dragooned into an army where he is poorly trained, badly paid, insufficiently indoctrinated about why he is fighting—and, for the most part, led by incompetent officers.” 59 Simply increasing the number of soldiers and supplying them with better weapons would not achieve the larger goals of Vietnamization.

Moreover, the ultimate success of Vietnamization depended on resolving perennial problems. Hanoi continued to send men and material into South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. North Vietnamese units still found refuge in sanctuaries along the Cambodian and Laotian borders. Thus, expanding the war into Cambodia offered an opportunity to give the GVN the breathing space it needed. From his first day in office, Nixon sought to “quarantine” Cambodia. (Hanoi had taken advantage of the nominally neutral country by building base areas from which NVA units could infiltrate into South Vietnam.) To Nixon and Kissinger, improvements in ARVN readiness and pacification mattered only if South Vietnam’s borders were secure. On April 30, 1970, the president announced that U.S. troops were fighting in Cambodia. By expanding the war, Nixon was hoping to shorten it. While officials in Saigon and Washington heralded the operation’s accomplishments—Nixon stated that the “performance of the ARVN had demonstrated that Vietnamization was working”—the incursion into Cambodia left a mixed record. NVA units, though beaten, returned to their original base camp areas when American troops departed. By early June, the allies had searched only 5 percent of the 7,000 square miles of borderland despite having aimed to disrupt the enemy’s logistical bases. Additionally, the ARVN’s reliance on American firepower did not augur well for a future without U.S. air and artillery backing. 60

Worse, the Cambodian incursion set off a firestorm of political protest at home. After Ohio National Guardsmen fired into a demonstration at Kent State University on May 4, leaving four students dead, a wave of antiwar rallies swept the nation, closing nearly 450 colleges and universities. Less than four months earlier, the New York Times reported on the My Lai massacre. In March 1968, with the Tet offensive still raging, American soldiers on a search and destroy mission had summarily executed more than 300 unarmed civilians. Claims of civilian casualties prompted an informal inquiry, but army investigators covered up the story for nearly eighteen months. 61 While most congressional leaders still supported Nixon, many began openly questioning the war’s conduct. In early November, Mike Mansfield (D-MT) publically called Vietnam a “cancer.” “It’s a tragedy,” argued the Montana senator. “It’s eating out the heart of America. It’s doing us no good.” Senator George McGovern (D-SD) joined the chorus of dissenters, imploring Nixon to “stop our participation in the horrible destruction of this tiny country and its people.” The loss of support incensed the president. Nixon insisted that the pace of Vietnamization, not the level of dissent, determine U.S. troop withdrawals. Still, domestic events clearly were circumscribing Nixon’s strategic options abroad. 62

The discord at home seemed matched by discontent within the ranks of U.S. troops remaining in South Vietnam. Though contemporary views of a disintegrating army now appear overblown, clearly the strategic withdrawal was taking its toll on American soldiers. By early 1970, with the first units already departed Vietnam and more scheduled to leave, officers worried how the withdrawal was affecting their soldiers’ capacity to fight. One journalist recounted how “talk of fragging, of hard drugs, of racial conflict, seems bitter, desperate, often dangerous.” 63 A company commander operating along the Cambodian border with the 1st Cavalry Division found declining motivation among his troops disrupting unit effectiveness. “The colonel wants to make contact with the enemy and so do I,” reported the young captain, “but the men flat don’t.” 64 Few draftees wanted to be fighting in Vietnam in the first place and even fewer wanted to risk being killed in a war clearly that was winding down. In addition, Abrams increasingly had to concern himself with racial polarization inside his army. Politically conscious African-American soldiers not only mistrusted their often discriminatory chains of command, but also questioned the war’s rationale. Many blacks denounced the ideal of bringing democracy to South Vietnam when they were denied many freedoms at home. In short, the U.S. Army in Vietnam seemed to be unraveling. 65

By the end of 1970, U.S. strength dropped to some 254,800 soldiers remaining in country. Kissinger warned that unilateral withdrawals were weakening the bargaining position of the United States in Paris, but Nixon continued with the redeployments to prove Vietnamization was on track. 66 With the new year, however, came the realization that NVA logistical bases remained intact. While the Cambodian operation had denied Hanoi the use of the Sihanoukville port, the Ho Chi Minh Trail continued to serve as a major infiltration route into South Vietnam. “An invasion of the Laos Panhandle,” one ARVN officer recalled, thus “became an attractive idea.” Such an operation would “retain the initiative for the RVNAF, disrupt the flow of enemy personnel and supplies to South Vietnam, and greatly reduce the enemy’s capability to launch an offensive in 1971.” 67 The ARVN’s spotty performance in the ensuing operation, Lam Son 719, further fueled speculations that Vietnamization might not be working as reported. Though Nixon declared the campaign had “assured” the next round of U.S. troop withdrawals, Kissinger worried that Lam Son had exposed “lingering deficiencies” that raised questions over South Vietnam’s ability to bear the full burden of the ongoing war. 68

If Kissinger agonized over the need to balance negotiations with troop withdrawals and offensive operations to keep the enemy off balance, he was not alone. Inside Hanoi’s Politburo, Le Duan equally pondered strategic alternatives in the aftermath of Lam Son 719. Though only sixteen U.S. maneuver battalions remained in South Vietnam by early 1972, on all fronts the war appeared deadlocked. Le Duan hoped a new invasion would “defeat the American ‘Vietnamization’ policy, gain a decisive victory in 1972, and force the U.S. imperialists to negotiate an end to the war from a position of defeat.” 69 Abrams remained unclear regarding enemy intentions. Was a large-scale invasion an act of desperation, as Nixon believed, or a way to gain leverage in negotiations by controlling South Vietnamese territory? North Vietnamese strategists certainly were taking risks but not out of desperation. The 1972 Nguyen-Hue campaign aimed for a collapse of South Vietnam’s armed forces, Thieu’s ouster, and the formation of a coalition government. Failing these ambitious goals, Le Duan envisioned the struggle continuing against a weakened ARVN. In either case, the Politburo believed its “actions would totally change the character of the war in South Vietnam.” 70

The subsequent “Easter Offensive,” begun on March 30, 1972, unleashed three separate NVA thrusts into South Vietnam. In some areas, the ARVN fought bravely; in others, soldiers broke and ran. Abrams responded by throwing B-52 bombers into the battle as Nixon ordered resumption of bombing in the North and the mining of Haiphong harbor. Gradually, yet perceptibly, the offensive’s momentum began to slow. Although North Vietnam’s spring offensive had ended with no dramatic battlefield victory, it had met its goal of changing the character of the war. 71 U.S. officials proclaimed Vietnamization a final success given that the ARVN had successfully blunted the enemy’s assault. Overwhelming U.S. air support, however, quite literally saved many units from being overrun and, more intangibly, helped sustain morale during hard months of fighting. Equally important, North Vietnamese leaders made several errors during the campaign. The separate offensives into South Vietnam dissipated combat strength while placing overwhelming strain on logistical support capabilities. Moreover, tactical commanders lacked experience in employing tanks and squandered infantry units in suicidal assaults. 72

By the end of June, only 49,000 U.S. troops remained in South Vietnam. Like his predecessor, Abrams was pulled to become the army’s chief of staff before the guns had fallen silent. Throughout the summer and fall, stalemated discussions in Paris mirrored the military standoff inside South Vietnam. In October, Kissinger reported to Nixon a breakthrough with the North Vietnamese delegation and announced an impending cease-fire. President Thieu fumed that Kissinger had conceded too much, allowing NVA units to remain in South Vietnam and refused to sign any agreement. The resulting diplomatic impasse, fueled by Thieu’s defiance and Hanoi’s intransigence, infuriated Nixon. By December, the president had reached his limits and ordered a massive air campaign against North Vietnam to break the deadlock. Nixon intended the bombing assault, codenamed Linebacker II, to induce both Hanoi and Saigon to return to the negotiating table. On December 26, the Politburo agreed to resume talks while Nixon pressed Thieu to support the armistice. The final settlement changed little from the principles outlined in October. One month later, on January 27, 1973, the United States, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government signed the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. 73

Conclusions

In large sense, Nixon’s use of B-52 bombers during Linebacker II illustrated the limits of American military power in Vietnam. The press reacted strongly, referring to the bombing of urban targets in North Vietnam as “war by tantrum” and an act of “senseless terror.” 74 But by late 1972, B-52s were the only tools left in Nixon’s arsenal. Despite years of effort and sacrifice, the best the Americans could achieve was a stalemate only temporarily broken by strategic bombing. Many senior military officers, perhaps unsurprisingly, would point to Linebacker II as proof of a mismanaged war. They argued that if only civilian policymakers had been less restrictive in setting unnecessary boundaries, those in uniform could have won much earlier and at much less cost. Such arguments, however, tended to discount the larger political concerns of presidents and their advisers hoping to limit a war that had become the centerpiece of American foreign policy and one that had divided the nation. 75

Others advanced a different “if only” argument regarding U.S. military strategy for Vietnam. They posited that upon taking command of MACV, Abrams, deviating almost immediately from Westmoreland’s conventional methods, had changed the American approach to, and thus nature of, the war. This “better war” thesis found acceptance among many officers in whom a conviction endured that a better application of strategy could have yielded better political results. Yet senior American commanders, even before Westmoreland’s tenure at MACV, tended to see the war as a comprehensive whole and devised their strategy accordingly. Despite frequent heavy-handedness in applying military power inside South Vietnam, almost all officers recognized that the war ultimately was a contest for political power.

Comprehending the complexities of strategy and effectively implementing it, however, were not one and the same. Officers serving in Vietnam quickly found that strategy included much more than simply drafting a plan of political-military action. The complexity of the threat, both political and military, confounded U.S. analysts and staff officers. Westmoreland understood the important role played by southern insurgent forces but argued he could not stamp out these irregular “termites” without substantially eliminating the enemy’s main force units. Even ascertaining enemy motives proved difficult. Not long after Abrams took command, MACV still faced a “real problem, following the Tet offensive, trying to figure out” the enemy’s overall military strategy. 76

Perhaps most importantly, senior U.S. policymakers were asking too much of their military strategists. In the end, the war was a struggle between and among Vietnamese. For the United States, the foundation on which American forces waged a struggle—one that involved both construction of an effective host government and destruction of a committed communist-nationalist enemy—proved too fragile. Officers like Westmoreland and Abrams found that nation-building in a time of war was one of the most difficult tasks to ask of a military force. Yet American faith in the power to reconstruct, if not create, a South Vietnamese political community led to policies that did not address a fundamental issue—the internal contest to define and come to a consensus on Vietnamese nationalism and identity in the modern age.

More than any other conflict during the Cold War era, Vietnam exposed the limits of American military power overseas. It was a reality that many U.S. citizens found, and continue to find, discomforting. Yet if a perspective is to be gained from the long American experience in Southeast Asia, it lies here. Not all problems can be solved by military force, even when that force is combined with political, economic, and social efforts. The capacity of Americans to reshape new political and social communities may not, in fact, be limitless. Writing of his own experiences in the Korean War, Matthew Ridgway offered an important conclusion while the war in Vietnam was still raging. In setting foreign policy objectives, the general advised that policymakers look “to define them with care and to make sure they lie within the range of our vital national interests and that their accomplishment is within our capabilities.” 77 For those seeking to understand the disappointments of American military strategy during the Vietnam War, Ridgway’s counsel seems a useful starting point.

Discussion of the Literature

The historiography on the American experience in Vietnam remains a contentious topic. For a starting point, the best surveys are George Herring’s America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950– 1975, 4th edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002) , which is more a diplomatic and political history, and Mark Atwood Lawrence’s The Vietnam War: A Concise International History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) , which places the war in an international perspective. A solid textbook is George Moss , Vietnam: An American Ordeal , 6th edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2009). An excellent collection of essays can be found in both David Anderson’s The Columbia History of the Vietnam War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011 ) and Jayne Werner and Luu Doan Huhnh , The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997).

The escalation of the war under Johnson is well covered. Among the most important works are Fredrik Logevall , Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999 ), and Lloyd C. Gardner , Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995) . Larry Berman has two very good works on LBJ: Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982 ), and Larry Berman , Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989). Brian VanDeMark’s Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) is also useful. Robert Dallek , Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961–1973 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) , provides a balanced overview of the president’s struggles with the war.

The topic of U.S. military strategy is hotly debated. Gregory A. Daddis , Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) , offers a reinterpretation of those works in suggesting Americans were blind to the realities of the war. Samples of these latter works include: Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. , The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) ; Harry G. Summers Jr. , On Strategy: A Critical Appraisal of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982) ; and Jeffrey Record , The Wrong War: Why We Lost in Vietnam (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998). More persuasive is Andrew J. Birtle , U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942–1976 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2006). Though Abrams left behind no written work on the war, Lewis Sorley , a staunch admirer of the general, provides insights in Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968–1972 (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2004) . Mark Clodfelter takes on the air war in The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989). Thomas L. Ahern Jr. looks at the CIA in Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010). Finally, an often overlooked yet important work on senior military leaders is Robert Buzzanco , Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

On the war’s final years, see Jeffrey Kimball , Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998) ; Ronald H. Spector , After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1993) ; and James H. Willbanks , Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004) . Lewis Sorley’s A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999) takes an overly sympathetic view of the Abrams’s years.

For memoirs from senior leaders, students should consult William Colby with James McCargar , Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989) ; Lyndon Baines Johnson , The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963–1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971) ; Henry Kissinger , Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003) ; Robert W Komer , Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986) ; Robert S. McNamara , In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995) ; Richard Nixon , RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978) ; Bruce, Palmer Jr. , The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984) ; and William C. Westmoreland , A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976). Among the best memoirs from junior officers and soldiers are: Philip Caputo , A Rumor of War (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1977) ; David Donovan , Once a Warrior King (New York: Ballantine, 1986) ; Stuart A. Herrington , Stalking the Vietcong: Inside Operation Phoenix: A Personal Account (Navato, CA: Presidio, 2004) ; and Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway . We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young (New York: HarperCollins, 1993). Less a memoir than an excellent collective biography of the enlisted soldier serving in Vietnam is Christian G. Appy , Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993)

Journalists’ accounts were important in covering the American experience and in setting a foundation for how the war has been outlined in popular memory. Among the most indispensable of this genre are David Halberstam , The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1969) ; David Halberstam , The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964, 1988) ; Michael Herr , Dispatches (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968) ; Don Oberdorfer , Tet! (New York: Doubleday, 1971) ; and Neil Sheehan , A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1988). Also useful is Peter Braestrup , Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1977).

The South Vietnamese perspective often gets lost in American-centric works on the war but should not be disregarded. Mark P. Bradley’s Vietnam at War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) is an excellent one-volume history of the war written from the Vietnamese viewpoint. Both Andrew Wiest , Vietnam’s Forgotten Army Vietnam’s Forgotten Army: Heroism and Betrayal in the ARVN (New York: New York University Press, 2008 ) and Robert K. Brigham , ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006) , make an important contribution for understanding the U.S. Army’s most important allies. Three provincial studies also delve into the war inside South Vietnam’s villages: Eric M. Bergerud , The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991) ; Jeffrey Race , War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972) ; and James Walker Trullinger Jr. , Village at War: An Account of Revolution in Vietnam (New York: Longman, 1980). For an argument on the cultural divide between allies, see Frances FitzGerald , Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).

If the South Vietnamese perspective often is overlooked, the North Vietnamese also tends to get short shrift in American works. Relying on new research, the best among this group are Pierre Asselin , Hanoi’s’ Road to the Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013) ; Lien-Hang T. Nguyen , Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012) ; Ang Cheng Guan , The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002 ) and Ending the Vietnam War: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975 , translated by Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002) ; William J. Duiker , The Communist Road to Power , 2d ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996) ; and Warren Wilkins , Grab Their Belts to Fight Them: The Viet Cong’s Big Unit War against the U.S., 1965–1966 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011).

Finally, students should not overlook the value of novels in understanding the war from the soldiers’ viewpoint. Among the best are Bao Ninh , The Sorrow of War: A Novel of North Vietnam (New York: Riverhead, 1996) ; Josiah Bunting , The Lionheads (New York: George Braziller, 1972) ; Karl Marlantes , Matterhorn: A Novel of the Vietnam War (New York: Atlantic Monthly, 2010) ; Tim O’Brien , The Things They Carried (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990) ; and Robert Roth , Sand in the Wind (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).

Primary Sources

Among the best documentary collections are Michael H. Hunt , A Vietnam War Reader: A Documentary History from American and Vietnamese Perspectives (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010 ), and Mark Atwood Lawrence , The Vietnam War: An International History in Documents (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). Also useful is Robert McMahon and Thomas Paterson , Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War: Documents and Essays (Boston: Wadsworth, 2007). For encyclopedias on the war, see Spencer C. Tucker , ed., The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social & Military History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001 ), and Stanley I. Kutler , Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War , 2d ed. (New York: Scribner, 2005).

Researchers should also consult two still useful collections of documents: The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision making on Vietnam, ed. Mike Gravel , 5 vols. (Boston: Beacon, 1971–1972), and William Conrad Gibbons , The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships , 4 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986–1995). The U.S. Department of State has collected a wonderful array of documents in the Foreign Relations of the United States ( FRUS ) series. These resources can be found online at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments .

For researchers delving into primary sources, the best place to begin is the Virtual Vietnam Archive run by Texas Tech University in Lubbock, Texas. This online archive houses more than four million pages of materials and is located at http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/ . The physical archive has much more additional material for researchers. For higher level strategic insights, the presidential libraries in Boston, Massachusetts (Kennedy), Austin, Texas (Johnson), and Yorba Linda, California (Nixon) have important archival holdings. Those seeking insights into the U.S. Army will find excellent resources at the U.S. Army Military History Institute in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and the U.S. Army Center of Military History at Fort McNair, Washington, DC. The National Archives in College Park, Maryland, offers a vast amount of resources as well. Finally, for those wishing to focus on cultural issues within the region, researchers may wish to consult the John M. Echols Collection on Southeast Asia at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York. Researcher information can be found at http://asia.library.cornell.edu/ac/Echols/index .

Further Reading

• Anderson, David L. , ed. The Columbia History of the Vietnam War . New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
• Cosmas, Graham A. MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2006.
• Cosmas, Graham A. MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973 . Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2007.
• Daddis, Gregory A. Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in the Vietnam War . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
• Elliott, David W. P. The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930–1975. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002.
• Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975 . 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002.
• Hess, Gary R. Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War . Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008.
• Hunt, Richard A . Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds . Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995.
• Kimball, Jeffrey . Nixon’s Vietnam War . Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998.
• Lawrence, Mark Atwood. The Vietnam War: A Concise International History . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
• Nguyen, Lien-Hang T. Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam . Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 2012.

1. JCS quoted in Max Hastings , The Korean War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 229. Hastings argued that the “Korean War occupies a unique place in history, as the first superpower essay of the nuclear age in the employment of limited force to achieve limited objectives,” p. 338. On the relationship of Korea to Europe, see Stanley Sandler , The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 144.

2. Matthew B. Ridgway , The Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967 ; reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1986), 145, 232.

3. Bernard Brodie , Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), 311 . For a broader context of this period, see Jonathan M. House , A Military History of the Cold War, 1944–1962 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012) .

4. Robert E. Osgood , Limited War: The Challenge to American Security (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 5, 7 .

5. Andrew J. Birtle , U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942–1976 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2006), 278. See also Douglas Porch , Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2103), 217 . For a counterargument on how U.S. Army officers shunned learning and thus lost the war in Vietnam, see John Nagl , Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

6. Henry A. Kissinger , Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 139 . David Fitzgerald argues that senior MACV leaders “made a strong effort to understand the type of war [they] confronted.” Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2013), 38 . On multiple dimensions of strategy, see Colin S. Gray , “Why strategy is difficult,” in Strategic Studies: A Reader , 2d ed., ed. Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (New York: Routledge, 2014), 43.

7. Lyndon Baines Johnson , The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963–1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), 241 . On larger Cold War issues, see John Lewis Gaddis , Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 240 .

8. McNamara quoted in Gerard J. DeGroot , A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War (Harlow, UK: Longman, 2000), 135 . On enemy escalation and its impact, see David Kaiser , American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 346 . B. H. Liddell Hart , Strategy , 2d rev. ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954), 335–336.

9. Neil L. Jamieson argues that “Vietnamese clung to and fought over their own competing and incompatible visions of what Vietnam was and what it might and should become.” In Neil L. Jamieson , Understanding Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), x .

10. Ronald H. Spector , Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1983), 336 . While early MAAG commanders realized the importance of economic development as part of an overall approach to strategy, Lieutenant General Lionel McGarr, who took over MAAG in August 1960, elevated the importance of counterinsurgency training within the ARVN ranks. Spector, Advice and Support , 365. See also Alexander S. Cochran Jr. , “American Planning for Ground Combat in Vietnam: 1952–1965,” Parameters 14.2 (Summer 1984): 65 .

11. Robert Buzzanco , Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 65, 72–73 . While sympathetic to Ngo Dinh Diem , Mark Moyar covers the American participation during the advisory years in Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) .

12. Agrovilles were supposedly secure communities to which rural civilians were relocated in hopes of separating them from NLF insurgents. On Diem, development, and engineering a social revolution, see Edward Miller , Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013) . For a competing interpretation, see James M. Carter , Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State Building, 1954–1968 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). On training of South Vietnam forces, James Lawton Collins Jr. , The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950–1972 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975) .

13. Graham A. Cosmas , MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2006), 35 .

14. For the North Vietnamese perspective, especially in the years preceding full American intervention, see Pierre Asselin , Hanoi’s Road to the Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013) , and William J. Duiker , The Communist Road to Power , 2d ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview , 1996) . For a perspective of Diem somewhat at odds with Miller, and especially Moyar, see Seth Jacobs , Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950–1963 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) .

15. Michael H. Hunt , Lyndon Johnson’s War: America’s Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 1945–1968 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1996), 94 . On the air campaign, see Mark Clodfelter , The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989) , and Lloyd C. Gardner , “Lyndon Johnson and the Bombing of Vietnam: Politics and Military Choices,” in The Columbia History of the Vietnam War , ed. David L. Anderson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

16. Westmoreland quoted in Larry Berman , Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), 71 . For an example of senior officers blaming civilians for limiting military means to achieve political ends, see U.S. Grant Sharp , Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (San Rafael, CA: Presidio, 1978) .

17. On the contentious topic of escalation, see Fredrik Logevall , Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) , and Lloyd C. Gardner , Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995). David L. Di Leo offers a treatment of a key dissenter inside the Johnson White House in George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

18. Robert S. McNamara , In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), 188.

19. Westmoreland’s assessment in The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking in Vietnam, vol. 4, ed. Mike Gravel . (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971–1972), 606. See also chapter 7, “Evolution of Strategy,” in William C. Westmoreland , A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976) .

20. Phillip B. Davidson , Vietnam at War: The History: 1946–1975 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988), 354 . On MACV guidance in implementing this broad strategy, see John M. Carland , “Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland’s Approach in Two Documents,” Journal of Military History 68.2 (April 2004): 553–574 .

21. U. S. Grant Sharp and William C. Westmoreland , Report on the War in Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 100 . The Pentagon Papers , Vol. 4, 296.

22. Vo Nguyen Giap , People’s War, People’s Army: The Viet Công Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 46, 61 . On the evolution of Hanoi’s strategic thinking, see David W. P. Elliott , “Hanoi’s Strategy in the Second Indochina War,” in The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives , ed. Jayne S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993) .

23. The strategic debate is best outlined in Lien-Hang T. Nguyen , Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 71 . See also Nguyen Vu Tung , “Coping with the United States: Hanoi’s Search for an Effective Strategy,” in The Vietnam War , ed. Peter Lowe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 46–48 ; and Hanoi Assessment of Guerrilla War in South, November 1966, Folder 17, Box 06, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 01-Assessment and Strategy, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas (hereafter cited as TTUVA). Resolution 12 in Communist Strategy as Reflected in Lao Dong Party and COSVN Resolutions, Folder 26, Box 07, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 06-Democratic Republic of Vietnam, TTUVA, p. 3.

24. For a useful historiographical sketch on the debates over intervention and American strategy, see Gary R. Hess , Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2009) , chapters 3 and 4.

25. Westmoreland quoted in Davidson, Vietnam at War , 313. On early U.S. Army actions in Vietnam, see John M. Carland , Stemming the Tide: May 1965 to October 1966 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2000) , and Shelby L. Stanton , The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965–1973 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985) .

26. Westmoreland explained his rationale for focusing on main force units in A Soldier Reports , 180. For a counterargument against this approach, see Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. , The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) .

27. The best monograph on the Ia Drang battles remains Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway , We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young (New York: HarperCollins, 1993) . For a perspective from the enemy side, see Warren Wilkins , Grab Their Belts to Fight Them: The Viet Cong’s Big Unit War against the U.S., 1965–1966 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011) , especially chapter 6.

28. COMUSMACV memorandum, “Increased Emphasis on Rural Construction,” 8 December 1965, Correspondence, 1965–1966, Box 35, Jonathan O. Seaman Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as MHI).

29. Westmoreland highlighted Hanoi’s continuing infiltration of forces into South Vietnam at the end of 1965. An evaluation of U.S. operations in early December underscored his concerns that “our attrition of their forces in South Vietnam is insufficient to offset this buildup.” In Carland, “Winning the Vietnam War,” 570. On the media’s take on these early battles, see “G.I.’s Found Rising to Vietnam Test,” New York Times , December 26, 1965.

30. Memorandum to President Lyndon B. Johnson from Robert S. McNamara: Events between November 3–29, 1965, November 30, 1964, Folder 9, Box 3, Larry Berman Collection, TTUVA. On McNamara being “shaken” by the meeting, see Neil Sheehan , A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1988), 579–580 . McNamara, In Retrospect , 221–222.

31. “Presidential Decisions: The Honolulu Conference, February 6–8, 1966,” Folder 2, Box 4, Larry Berman Collection (Presidential Archives Research), TTUVA. John T. Wheeler , “Only a Fourth of South Viet Nam Is Under Control of Saigon Regime,” Washington Star , January 25, 1966.

32. “1966 Program to Increase the Effectiveness of Military Operations and Anticipated Results Thereof,” February 8, 1966, in The War in Vietnam: The Papers of William C. Westmoreland , ed. Robert E. Lester (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1993) , Incl. 6, Folder 4, Reel 6. See also U.S. Department of State , Foreign Relations of the United States , vol. 5, Vietnam, 1967 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), 216–219 (hereafter cited as FRUS ). Westmoreland took to heart the importance of rural construction. See MACV Commander’s Conference, February 20, 1966, Counter VCI Folder, Historian’s Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, DC (hereafter cited as CMH).

33. Pacification defined in “Handbook for Military Support of Pacification,” February 1968, Folder 14, Box 5, United States Armed Forces Manual Collection, TTUVA. Seymour Topping , “Crisis in Saigon Snags U.S. Effort,” New York Times , April 5, 1966 . Martin G. Clemis , “Competing and Incompatible Visions: Revolution, Pacification, and the Political Organization of Space during the Second Indochina War,” paper presented at the 81st Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History, April 2014, Kansas City, MO.

34. On Westmoreland’s approach to pacification, see Gregory A. Daddis , Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) , chapter 5. For a counterargument that dismisses allied pacification efforts, see Nick Turse , Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2013).

35. Sir Robert Thompson , Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 55 . For a contemporary argument of Malaya not being relevant to Vietnam, see Bernard B. Fall , Viet-Nam Witness: 1953–66 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 272 .

36. Thomas L. Ahern Jr. , Vietnam Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 171–175 .

37. The best monograph on pacification remains Richard A. Hunt , Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995) . For a balanced treatment of Komer, see Frank L. Jones , Blowtorch: Robert Komer, Vietnam, and American Cold War Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013) . See also Robert W. Komer , Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986) . A partial impetus for an increased emphasis on pacification stemmed from a March 1966 report known as PROVN, shorthand for “A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam.” PROVN stressed nonmilitary means and argued that “victory” could be achieved only by “bringing the individual Vietnamese, typically a rural peasant, to support willingly the Government of South Vietnam (GVN).” Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, “A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (Department of the Army, March 1966), 1, 3. The best review of this still hotly debated document is Andrew J. Birtle , “PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal,” Journal of Military History 72.4 (October 2008): 1213–1247 .

38. Robert W. Komer , “Clear, Hold and Rebuild,” Army 20.5 5 (May 1970): 19 . On CORDS establishment, see National Security Action Memorandum No. 362, FRUS , 1964–1968, vol. 5, 398–399. Though revolutionary development remained, at least nominally, a South Vietnamese program, many observers believed the inability of the ARVN to take over pacification in the countryside helped spur the establishment of CORDS. Robert Shaplen , The Road from War: Vietnam, 1965–1970 (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 122 . As of March 31, 1967, 53 ARVN infantry battalions were performing missions in direct support of pacification. MACV Monthly Evaluation Report, March 1967, MHI, 13.

39. For a contemporary discussion on the cultural divide between Americans and Vietnamese and how this impacted both military operations and the pacification program, see Frances FitzGerald , Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972). Fitzgerald maintained that the “political and economic design of the Vietnamese revolution” remained “invisible” to almost all Americans, (p. 143).

40. For competing tasks within CORDS, see Chester L. Cooper, et al., “The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam, Volume III: History of Pacification,” March 1972, Folder 65, U.S. Marine Corps History Division, Vietnam War Documents Collection, TTUVA, 271. Journalist Ward Just reported that the real yardsticks of pacification’s progress were “the Vietnamese view of events, the Vietnamese mood, the Vietnamese will and the Vietnamese capability.” See “Another Measure of Vietnam’s War,” Washington Post , October 15, 1967. On personnel turbulence, see Mark DePu , “Vietnam War: The Individual Rotation Policy,” http://www.historynet.com/vietnam-war-the-individual-rotation-policy.htm .

41. As a sampling of contemporary journalist critiques of the war in 1967, see: Joseph Kraft , “The True Failure in Saigon—South Vietnam’s Fighting Force,” Los Angeles Times , May 3, 1967 ; Ward Just , “This War May Be Unwinnable,” Washington Post, June 4, 1967 ; and R. W. Apple , “Vietnam: The Signs of Stalemate,” New York Times , August 7, 1967. On the war in 1967 being perceived as a stalemate, see Sir Robert Thompson , No Exit from Vietnam (New York: David McKay, 1969), 67 ; and Anthony James Joes , The War for South Viet Nam, 1954–1975, rev. ed. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 96 . On military operations early in 1967, see Bernard W. Rogers , Cedar Falls–Junction City: A Turning Point (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974, 2004) .

42. On Johnson’s salesmanship campaign, see Larry Berman , Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989) , especially chapters 5–7. On the MACV-CIA debate, see James J. Wirtz , “Intelligence to Please? The Order of Battle Controversy during the Vietnam War,” Political Science Quarterly 106.2 (Summer 1991): 239–263 .

43. On Hanoi’s views and its policy for a decisive victory, see Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975 , trans. Merle L. Pribbenow (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 206–207 . On overriding political goals of Tet, see: Ang Cheng Guan , The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002),116–126 ; James J. Wirtz , The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 10, 20–21 ; Ronnie E. Ford , Tet 1968: Understanding the Surprise (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 70–71 ; and Gabriel Kolko , Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 303 .

44. If successful, Hanoi’s leaders also would be in a more advantageous position if forced into a “fighting while negotiating” phase of the war. Ford, Tet 1968 , 93. See also Merle L. Pribbenow II , “General Võ Nguyên Giáp and the Mysterious Evolution of the Plan for the 1968 Tết Offensive,” Journal of Vietnamese Studies 3 (Summer 2008): 1–33 .

45. Carver quoted in Robert J. McMahon, “Turning Point: The Vietnam War’s Pivotal Year, November 1967–November 1968,” in Anderson, The Columbia History of the Vietnam War , 198. For a journalist’s account, see Don Oberdorfer , Tet! (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971) . For an accessible reference book, see William T. Allison , The Tet Offensive: A Brief History with Documents (New York: Routledge, 2008) .

46. Gallup poll results in the aftermath of Tet in Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War , 185. Background on LBJ’s March 31 speech in Robert Mann , A Grand Delusion: America’s Descent into Vietnam (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 600–602 ; A. J. Langguth , Our Vietnam: The War, 1954–1975 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 492–493 ; and Kolko, Anatomy of a War , 320–321. Decision on troop levels in Mann, A Grand Delusion , 576.

47. Zeb B. Bradford , “With Creighton Abrams during Tet,” Vietnam (February 1998): 45 . Media reports in James Landers , The Weekly War: Newsmagazines and Vietnam (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004), 145–146 . As examples arguing for a change in strategy, see A. J. Langguth , “General Abrams Listens to a Different Drum,” New York Times , May 5, 1968 , and “A ‘Different’ War Now, With Abrams in Command,” U.S. News & World Report , August 26, 1968, 12. On Abrams’s “one-war” concept, see Lewis Sorley , A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999), 18 . The Westmoreland-Abrams strategy debate remains contentious. In his admiration of Abrams, Lewis Sorley is most vocal in supporting a change in strategic concept. See as an example, Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968–1972 (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2004), xix . Others are less certain. Phillip Davidson served under both commanders, as did Robert W. Komer—neither subscribed to a change in strategy under Abrams. Davidson, Vietnam at War , 512, and Komer in The Lessons of Vietnam, ed. W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), 79 . Andrew Birtle’s argument on the change being “more in emphasis than in substance” seems most compelling. “As MACV admitted in 1970, ‘the basic concept and objectives of pacification, to defeat the VC/NVA and to provide the people with economic and social benefits, have changed little since the first comprehensive GVN plan was published in 1964.’” In U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine , 367.

48. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, May 1976, MHI, p. 40. On peace replacing military victory, see Daniel C. Hallin , The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 178 .

49. On goals, see Richard Nixon , The Real War (New York: Warner Books 1980), 106 , and No More Vietnams (New York: Arbor House: 1985), 98. Henry Kissinger , The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 298 . See also Larry Berman , No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 2001), 50 . Jeffrey Kimball argues that de-Americanization “was a course made politically necessary by the American public’s desire to wind down the war and doubts among key segments of the foreign-policy establishment about the possibility of winning the war.” The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 12.

50. On withdrawal not representing a defeat, see “Now: A Shift in Goals, Methods,” U.S. News & World Report , January 6, 1969, 16. On global perspective, see Jeffrey Kimball , Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 62 . Michael Lind argues that Nixon had to withdraw “in a manner that preserved domestic support for the Cold War in other theaters.” Vietnam: The Necessary War (New York: Free Press, 1999), 106 .

51. Richard Nixon , RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 349 . On realizing limits to U.S. power, see Lawrence W. Serewicz , America at the Brink of Empire: Rusk, Kissinger, and the Vietnam War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2007), 10 . On containing communism, see U.S. Embassy Statement , “Objectives and Courses of Action of the United States in South Viet-Nam,” FRUS , 1964–1968, vol. 7, 719 . See also Lloyd Gardner , “The Last Casualty? Richard Nixon and the End of the Vietnam War, 1969–75,” in A Companion to the Vietnam War , ed. Marilyn B. Young and Robert Buzzanco (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 230 .

52. On problems of different types of threats, see Viet-Nam Info Series 20: “The Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet Nam,” from Vietnam Bulletin, 1969, Folder 09, Box 13, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 02-Military Operations, TTUVA, ps. 8, 25. See also Richard Shultz Jr. , “The Vietnamization-Pacification Strategy of 1969–1972: A Quantitative and Qualitative Reassessment,” in Lessons from an Unconventional War: Reassessing U.S. Strategies for Future Conflicts, ed. Richard A. Hunt and Richard H. Shultz Jr. (New York: Pergamon, 1982), 55–56 . Loren Baritz argues that the “Nixon administration abandoned counterinsurgency” since it realized the NLF no longer was a significant threat. Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 279 .

53. Nixon, No More Vietnams , 104–107. Definition of pacification on p. 132.

54. Pacification Priority Area Summary, September 3, 1968, prepared by CORDS, Folder 65, US Marine Corps History Division, Vietnam War Documents Collection, TTUVA. Countryside depopulation in Charles Mohr , “Saigon Tries to Recover from the Blows,” New York Times , May 10, 1968 ; and David W. P. Elliott , The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930–1975, concise ed. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), 331, 336 . On problems of measuring pacification security, see Gregory A. Daddis , No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 118–122 .

55. The Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms”) program, begun in 1963, aimed to “rally” Vietcong defectors to the GVN side as part of a larger national reconciliation effort. The plan sought to give former insurgents “opportunities for defection, an alternative to the hardships and deprivations of guerrilla life, political pardon, and in some measure, though vocational training, a means of earning a livelihood.” Jeanette A. Koch , The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963–1971 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1973), v .

56. Vietnam Lessons Learned No. 73, “Defeat of VC Infrastructure,” November 20, 1968, MACV Lessons Learned, Box 1, RG 472, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland. See also Dale Andradé , Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990) ; and Mark Moyar , Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997, 2007) .

57. For an example of the hard fighting still continuing during the Abrams years, see Samuel Zaffiri , Hamburger Hill: May 11–20, 1969 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1988). On what U.S. advisers were doing as part of Vietnamization, see Jeffrey J. Clarke , Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1988), 342–343 .

58. On ARVN increases, see in Larry A. Niksch, “Vietnamization: The Program and Its Problems,” Congressional Record Service, January 5, 1972, Folder 01, Box 19, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 02-Military Operations, TTUVA, p. CRS-21. The best work on the South Vietnamese Army is Robert K. Brigham , ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006) .

59. “The Laird Plan,” Newsweek , June 2, 1969, 44. On ARVN lacking experience, see James H. Willbanks , Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 51 ; and Samuel Zaffiri , Westmoreland: A Biography of General William C. Westmoreland (New York: William Morrow, 1994), 211 .

60. Vietnamization working in Nixon, RN , 467. On enemy infiltration, see John Prados , The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999) . On the incursion, see John M. Shaw , The Cambodian Campaign: The 1970 Offensive and America’s Vietnam War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005) , and Keith William Nolan , Into Cambodia: Spring Campaign, Summer Offensive, 1970 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1990) .

61. On My Lai, see Michael Bilton and Kevin Sim , Four Hours in My Lai (New York: Viking, 1992) , and William Thomas Allison , My Lai: An American Atrocity in the Vietnam War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012) .

62. Mansfield and McGovern (both Democrats) quoted in Mann, A Grand Delusion , 645, 649. See also Berman, No Peace, No Honor , 76. For an introduction to the antiwar movement and its impact on Nixon, see Melvin Small , Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America’s Hearts and Minds (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2002).

63. Donald Kirk , “Who Wants to Be the Last American Killed in Vietnam?” New York Times , September 19, 1971 . See also “As Fighting Slows in Vietnam: Breakdown in GI Discipline” U.S. News & World Report , June 7, 1971, and George Lepre , Fragging: Why U.S. Soldiers Assaulted Their Officers in Vietnam (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2011) . “Fragging,” derived from fragmentation grenade, was the act of fratricide, usually against an officer in a soldier’s chain of command. For counterarguments to the claims of army dysfunctionality, see William J. Shkurti , Soldiering on in a Dying War: The True Story of the Firebase Pace Incidents and the Vietnam Drawdown (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011 ), and Jeremy Kuzmarov , The Myth of the Addicted Army: Vietnam and the Modern War on Drugs (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009) .

64. Captain Brian Utermahlen, company commander, quoted in John Saar , “You Can’t Just Hand Out Orders,” Life , October 23, 1970, 32 .

65. “The Troubled U.S. Army in Vietnam,” Newsweek , January 11, 1971, 30, 34. On avoiding risks in a withdrawing army, see Saar, 31. James E. Westheider , The African American Experience in Vietnam: Brothers in Arms (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008) .

66. Troop strengths in Shelby L. Stanton , Vietnam Order of Battle: A Complete Illustrated Reference to U.S. Army Combat and Support Forces in Vietnam, 1961–1973 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2003), 334 . Kissinger’s concerns in The White House Years , 971.

67. Nguyen Duy Hinh , Lam Son 719 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979), 8 . On Lam Son 719 being linked to continuing withdrawals, see Andrew Wiest , Vietnam’s Forgotten Army: Heroism and Betrayal in the ARVN (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 199 .

68. Two new works cover the Lam Son 719 operation: James H. Willbanks , A Raid Too Far: Operation Lam Son 719 and Vietnamization in Laos (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2014) , and Robert D. Sander , Invasion of Laos, 1971: Lam Son 719 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014) .

69. Politburo quoted in Victory in Vietnam , 283. On Hanoi’s strategic motives, see Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War , 324; Stephen P. Randolph , Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 28–29 ; and Ngo Quang Truong , The Easter Offensive of 1972 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), 157–158 .

70. Politburo quoted in Victory in Vietnam , 283. On uncertainty over Hanoi’s intentions, see Berman, No Peace, No Honor , 124; Allan E. Goodman , The Lost Peace: America’s Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 117–118 ; and Anthony T. Bouscaren , ed., All Quiet on the Eastern Front: The Death of South Vietnam (Old Greenwich, CT: Devin-Adair, 1977), 44 . Nixon viewed the invasion “as a sign of desperation.” In RN , 587.

71. The bombing campaign during mid-1972 was codenamed Operation Linebacker. On debates between the White House and MACV over the best use of B-52s, see Randolph, Powerful and Brutal Weapons , 119–120; Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War , 314–315; and H. R. Haldeman , The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York: G. P. Putnam’s, 1994), 435 . On the campaign ending with “no culminating battles and mass retreats, just the gradual erosion of NVA strength and the release of pressure against defending ARVN troops,” see Randolph, Powerful and Brutal Weapons , 270.

72. James H. Willbanks argues that “the fact U.S. tactical leadership and firepower were the key ingredients . . . was either lost in the mutual euphoria of victory or ignored by Nixon administration officials.” In The Battle of An Loc (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 166.

73. Thieu’s defiance and Hanoi’s intransigence in Robert Dalleck , Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 443 . Paris agreement in Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War , 366–368. See also Kimball, The Vietnam War Files , 276–277.

74. Linebacker II goals in Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War , 364–365. Press quoted in ibid. , 366 .

75. Ronald B. Frankum Jr. , “‘Swatting Flies with a Sledgehammer’: The Air War,” in Rolling Thunder in a Gentle Land: The Vietnam War Revisited , ed. Andrew Wiest (New York: Osprey, 2006), 221–222.

76. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports , 180–181. MACV staff in Sorley, Vietnam Chronicles , 9.

77. Ridgway, The Korean War , 247.

Related Articles

• Vietnamese Americans in Little Saigon, California

Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, American History. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 30 May 2024

• Cookie Policy
• Privacy Policy
• Legal Notice
• Accessibility
• [66.249.64.20|185.194.105.172]
• 185.194.105.172

Character limit 500 /500

The Military Service: Reasons for Joining Essay

A decision to join the army can be one of the most major decisions in one’s life. Therefore, it is important to understand its motivation, the factors that influenced the decision, the background, and the values that make joining the army a correct step in life. Certainly, there are dozens of reasons that are named when the soldiers are interviewed, as some of them may be original, and others may be common. However, it requires emotional intelligence to recognize your motives.

Army values determine the spiritual and moral orientations of the individual and underlie the actions, deeds, and motives of individual servicemen and military teams and are a kind of self-regulator of the behavior of servicemen. The values of military service reflect in any society the processes in which the Armed Forces are involved, designed to protect and defend the state’s interests. The army profession is one of the most trusted in the country because all people know that the army will protect them (U.S. Army, 2019). In the process of professional military activity, the personality of a serviceman and the value orientations for its implementation are formed. Service in the army has always been considered a privilege because it is an opportunity to protect your family and the whole country.

The latest world events also affect the decision to join the army. The Russian war against Ukraine shows that, unfortunately, the world is not at peace, and there are risks that conflicts will continue to arise worldwide. The dangers of terrorism and war are terrifying, which is why countries such as the United States should maintain their military strength to oppose terrorist states and the chaos they bring to the world.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (2019). The Army Profession. U.S. Army. Web.

• Military Deployment From Social Service Perspective
• The Effectiveness of Alcohol Marketing, Regulation and How It Is Can Protect the Consumer From Fake Products
• The Role of Women in the Vietnam War
• Closing the Gap Between Military Service and Civilian Career
• Military Effectiveness of Nazi Germany in 1939-1941
• Duties and Responsibilities of the US Army Under Title Code 10
• The Greatest Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats to the US Army
• The Ethics of War: A Contractarian Ethics of War
• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2023, July 3). The Military Service: Reasons for Joining. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-military-service-reasons-for-joining/

"The Military Service: Reasons for Joining." IvyPanda , 3 July 2023, ivypanda.com/essays/the-military-service-reasons-for-joining/.

IvyPanda . (2023) 'The Military Service: Reasons for Joining'. 3 July.

IvyPanda . 2023. "The Military Service: Reasons for Joining." July 3, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-military-service-reasons-for-joining/.

1. IvyPanda . "The Military Service: Reasons for Joining." July 3, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-military-service-reasons-for-joining/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "The Military Service: Reasons for Joining." July 3, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-military-service-reasons-for-joining/.

• Share full article

Advertisement

Supported by

Guest Essay

America’s Military Is Not Prepared for War — or Peace

By Roger Wicker

Mr. Wicker, a Republican, is the ranking member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee.

“To be prepared for war,” George Washington said, “is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.” President Ronald Reagan agreed with his forebear’s words, and peace through strength became a theme of his administration. In the past four decades, the American arsenal helped secure that peace, but political neglect has led to its atrophy as other nations’ war machines have kicked into high gear. Most Americans do not realize the specter of great power conflict has risen again.

It is far past time to rebuild America’s military. We can avoid war by preparing for it.

When America’s senior military leaders testify before my colleagues and me on the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee behind closed doors, they have said that we face some of the most dangerous global threat environments since World War II. Then, they darken that already unsettling picture by explaining that our armed forces are at risk of being underequipped and outgunned. We struggle to build and maintain ships, our fighter jet fleet is dangerously small, and our military infrastructure is outdated. Meanwhile, America’s adversaries are growing their militaries and getting more aggressive.

In China, the country’s leader, Xi Jinping, has orchestrated a historic military modernization intended to exploit the U.S. military’s weaknesses. He has overtaken the U.S. Navy in fleet size, built one of the world’s largest missile stockpiles and made big advances in space. President Vladimir Putin of Russia has thrown Europe into war and mobilized his society for long-term conflict. Iran and its proxy groups have escalated their shadow war against Israel and increased attacks on U.S. ships and soldiers. And North Korea has disregarded efforts toward arms control negotiations and moved toward wartime readiness.

Worse yet, these governments are materially helping one another, cooperating in new ways to prevent an American-led 21st century. Iran has provided Russia with battlefield drones, and China is sending technical and logistical help to aid Mr. Putin’s war. They are also helping one another prepare for future fights by increasing weapons transfers and to evade sanctions. Their unprecedented coordination makes new global conflict increasingly possible.

That theoretical future could come faster than most Americans think. We may find ourselves in a state of extreme vulnerability in a matter of a few years, according to a growing consensus of experts. Our military readiness could be at its lowest point in decades just as China’s military in particular hits its stride. The U.S. Indo-Pacific commander released what I believe to be the largest list of unfunded items ever for services and combatant commands for next year’s budget, amounting to $11 billion. It requested funding for a raft of infrastructure, missile defense and targeting programs that would prove vital in a Pacific fight. China, on the other hand, has no such problems, as it accumulates the world’s leading hypersonic arsenal with a mix of other lethal cruise and attack missiles.

Our military leaders are being forced to make impossible choices. The Navy is struggling to adequately fund new ships, routine maintenance and munition procurement; it is unable to effectively address all three. We recently signed a deal to sell submarines to Australia, but we’ve failed to sufficiently fund our own submarine industrial base, leaving an aging fleet unprepared to respond to threats. Two of the three most important nuclear modernization programs are underfunded and are at risk of delays. The military faces a backlog of at least $180 billion for basic maintenance, from barracks to training ranges. This projects weakness to our adversaries as we send service members abroad with diminished ability to respond to crises.

Fortunately, we can change course. We can avoid that extreme vulnerability and resurrect American military might.

On Wednesday I am publishing a plan that includes a series of detailed proposals to address this reality head-on. We have been living off the Reagan military buildup for too long; it is time for updates and upgrades. My plan outlines why and how the United States should aim to spend an additional $55 billion on the military in the 2025 fiscal year and grow military spending from a projected 2.9 percent of our national gross domestic product this year to 5 percent over the next five to seven years.

It would be a significant investment that would start a reckoning over our nation’s spending priorities. There will be conversations ahead about all manner of budget questions. We do not need to spend this much indefinitely — but we do need a short-term generational investment to help us prevent another world war.

My blueprint would grow the Navy to 357 ships by 2035 and halt our shrinking Air Force fleet by producing at least 340 additional fighters in five years. This will help patch near-term holes and put each fleet on a sustainable trajectory. The plan would also replenish the Air Force tanker and training fleets, accelerate the modernization of the Army and Marine Corps, and invest in joint capabilities that are all too often forgotten, including logistics and munitions.

The proposal would build on the $3.3 billion in submarine industrial base funding included in the national security supplemental passed in April, so we can bolster our defense and that of our allies. It would also rapidly equip service members all over the world with innovative technologies at scale, from the seabed to the stars.

We should pair increased investment with wiser spending. Combining this crucial investment with fiscal responsibility would funnel resources to the most strategic ends. Emerging technology must play an essential role, and we can build and deploy much of it in less than five years. My road map would also help make improvements to the military procurement system and increase accountability for bureaucrats and companies that fail to perform on vital national security projects.

This whole endeavor would shake our status quo but be far less disruptive and expensive than the alternative. Should China decide to wage war with the United States, the global economy could immediately fall into a depression. Americans have grown far too comfortable under the decades-old presumption of overwhelming military superiority. And that false sense of security has led us to ignore necessary maintenance and made us vulnerable.

Our ability to deter our adversaries can be regained because we have done it before. At the 50th anniversary of Pearl Harbor, in the twilight of the Soviet Union, George H.W. Bush reflected on the lessons of Pearl Harbor. Though the conflict was long gone, it taught him an enduring lesson: “When it comes to national defense,” he said, “finishing second means finishing last.”

Regaining American strength will be expensive. But fighting a war — and worse, losing one — is far more costly. We need to begin a national conversation today on how we achieve a peaceful, prosperous and American-led 21st century. The first step is a generational investment in the U.S. military.

Roger Wicker is the senior U.S. senator from Mississippi and the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook , Instagram , TikTok , WhatsApp , X and Threads .

• Transition Guide (Opens in new window)
• Subscribe Now (Opens in new window)
• Your Military
• Army Times (Opens in new window)
• Navy Times (Opens in new window)
• Air Force Times (Opens in new window)
• Marine Corps Times (Opens in new window)
• Pentagon & Congress
• Defense News (Opens in new window)
• Israel-Palestine
• Extremism & Disinformation
• Afghanistan
• Benefits Guide (Opens in new window)
• Family Life
• Military Pay Center
• Military Retirement
• Military Benefits
• Discount Depot
• Gear Scout (Opens in new window)

Military Culture

• Military Fitness
• Military Movies & Video Games
• Military Sports
• Pay It Forward (Opens in new window)
• Military History
• Salute to Veterans
• Black Military History
• Congressional Veterans Caucus (Opens in new window)
• Military Appreciation Month
• Vietnam Vets & Rolling Thunder
• Service Members of the Year (Opens in new window)
• World War I
• Honor the Fallen (Opens in new window)
• Hall of Valor (Opens in new window)
• Create an Obituary (Opens in new window)
• Medals & Misfires
• Installation Guide (Opens in new window)
• Battle Bracket
• America's Military
• Task Force Violent
• CFC Givers Guide
• Newsletters (Opens in new window)
• Early Bird Brief
• MCON (Opens in new window)
• Long-Term Care Partners
• Navy Federal

Why I chose to serve in the military

Veterans Day is an opportunity for the country to reflect on the service of those willing to put their lives on the line to protect the values we hold most dear. For those that served, it’s a chance to recall their military careers. It’s also a day to look back at the motivations behind joining one of the four branches. To some, military service was a family tradition. For others, it was a fresh start.

This year, Military Times reached out to veterans to get firsthand accounts of why they joined the military.

“I had always juggled with the idea of joining the military while in high school, but I chickened out instead, [and] I went to college like most other recent graduates. After completing my BA in 2008, I had a rough time finding a job and the economy was less than ideal. With student loans to pay off, I knew I had to figure something out. So, I wandered into a recruiting office and signed up without having any knowledge of what I was doing or getting myself into. I completed my five year Navy contract in 2014 and have no regrets.”

— Laura Muñoz, 34, Navy, North Carolina

“I was mentored by two Vietnam veterans in high school. One was my academic counselor and the other was in our development office. Coach Andy Slatt was also CW4 Andy Slatt and was shot down in Vietnam as an aeroscout. Retired Maj. Gen. Patrick Brady was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions as a Dustoff pilot. Both talked to me about the values and shared sense of purpose. I liked the idea of being on a team.”

— Ryan Kranc, 42, Army, Virginia

“I joined the Marines in 2008 because I was broke and needed money for school. Was majoring in journalism at the University of Minnesota and was three semesters in when I joined. Went in as a combat correspondent, ended up getting into broadcasting and worked at AFN in Iwakuni Japan and AFN Afghanistan. Got out in 2011, finished school, graduated in 2014, and have been in TV ever since.”

Brad Hanson, 34, Marine Corps, Wisconsin

“[I had] no interest in going to college and thought I knew the direction for my life. Ended up being a great chance to grow.”

— Elizabeth Ruiz, 36, Marine Corps, North Carolina

“I signed up for the military to ‘get away.’ I had gone to culinary school and settled for a job as an assistant manager to a local pizza place. I was really sick of where my life was going and I wanted ‘more’ for my life. So I decided to join the Air Force and travel and get out to see the world for free. I recently found out a former friend/crush went into the Air Force for four years and was deployed overseas. He was the class clown. I thought to myself, ‘If this class clown with a C-average can make it in the Air Force, I know I can.’ So all this ran through my mind as I was in my car driving down the highway, and the song ‘Fly Away’ by Lenny Kravitz was playing in the background on the radio... and I thought, 'I am going to sign up for the Air Force, that is what I am going to do. I am going to ‘get away, fly away’ as the song implied.”

— Jodie Mather, 45, Air Force, Wisconsin

“I signed up to serve because I felt very fortunate to grow up with the freedoms of this country. My mother and grandmother immigrated from Cuba in 1966 to escape the authoritarian regime of Fidel Castro, and my service was a way to thank them and the country that has given us so much. West Point offered an incredible education opportunity at no cost other than the commitment to serve in the Army. I was also humbled to think that I was walking in the footsteps of giants such as Presidents Eisenhower and Grant, Gen. MacArthur and others. I decided to stay in the service because of the people, their indomitable will, spirit and camaraderie to tackle any problem, mission or assignment.”

— Harrison Brandon Morgan, 29, Army, Kansas

“I am Navajo. I grew up on the Navajo Reservation in Crystal, New Mexico. I was in 10th grade, not planning on joining the military at all. I was actually planning on going to college. One day, my history teacher ran into our classroom and turned on the television. As he quickly shuffled through the channels, everyone stopped what they were doing and became concerned. The news outlet showed the World Trade Center Towers in New York City right after the second tower was hit. What I saw that day changed this country and changed me. I thought about what I could do, how I can support and protect my country. I went to a recruiter in Gallup, New Mexico, and started the process. I was delayed entry until I graduated high school. On July 22, 2003, I got on the first plane ride to go to basic training. I was in the Army for 15 years, five months, and five days. As I look back, I am proud of my teenage self for making that decision — that I stepped up, I volunteered, I made a major decision all on my own.”

— Reba Lynn Benally, 35, Army, Arizona.

**Accounts have been edited for clarity.

Sarah Sicard is a Senior Editor with Military Times. She previously served as the Digitial Editor of Military Times and the Army Times Editor. Other work can be found at National Defense Magazine, Task & Purpose, and Defense News.

In Other News

VA urges mortgage firms to extend foreclosure pause until next year

A moratorium on foreclosures of va-backed home loans is set to expire at the end of the week..

More kosher, halal foods needed in commissaries, lawmakers say

Are commissaries meeting the religious dietary needs of troops and families.

Dozens of Navy TH-73 Thrasher helicopters damaged in Florida storm

The navy is utilizing its th-57b/c sea ranger helicopters while the thrashers are assessed and repaired..

VA says its trust scores among veterans are at highest level ever

More than four in five veterans surveyed said they trust the department's programs and outreach efforts..

Sailors eligible for extra housing money during training

A new policy attempts to alleviate the financial burden on sailors so they are not footing the bill for two homes..

An official website of the United States government

Here’s how you know

Official websites use .gov A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.

Secure .gov websites use HTTPS A lock ( Lock Locked padlock icon ) or https:// means you’ve safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

Learn about the U.S. military branches

Six branches make up the armed forces of the United States. Find out about each branch’s mission and history.

Use resources from the National Archives to research the history of the U.S. military.

Branches of the U.S. military

Each branch of the military has its own purpose, carrying out its mission on land, water, or in the air.

LAST UPDATED: December 8, 2023

Have a question?

Ask a real person any government-related question for free. They will get you the answer or let you know where to find it.

Official websites use .gov

Secure .gov websites use HTTPS

Diversity, Equity, Inclusion Are Necessities in U.S. Military

You have accessed part of a historical collection on defense.gov. Some of the information contained within may be outdated and links may not function. Please contact the DOD Webmaster with any questions.

Diversity, equity and inclusion in the military are necessities for the United States, Bishop Garrison, the senior advisor to the secretary of defense for human capital and diversity, equity and inclusion said.

Garrison spoke to the Center for a New American Security today about the progress being made by the department and what still needs to happen.

Some 41 percent of the military identify as members of minority groups, and that number will grow larger, Garrison said. The military must be able to attract, train and retain them for the services to retain competitive edges, he said.

I want people to see [diversity, equity and inclusion] as another tool in the toolkit and another way of solving these problems." Bishop Garrison, the senior advisor to the secretary of defense for human capital and diversity, equity and inclusion

Fewer Americans between the ages of 18 to 24 — the prime ages for recruits — qualify for military service. "So, we have to find out ways of getting to a broader talent pool and broader interest groups in order to bring those highly qualified, talented individuals in," he said.

He noted that the percentage of minorities drops as they rise up the ranks. "Their numbers tend to begin to decline in terms of service; they tend to get out, and there could be a variety of reasons as to why that actually is," he said. "We need to take a very data-driven approach to get a better understanding as to what's actually happening here. What is the problem? And how can we address it?"

Garrison said the need for diversity, equity and inclusion to be a consideration or a part of all decisions in the military.

"I would hope that as many leaders and members of the total force as possible see [diversity, equity and inclusion] efforts as a force multiplier," he said. He wants them to see the program as a way to make the U.S. military more successful in achieving critical missions and in making forces more lethal.

Bringing in more talented infantry personnel or military intelligence analysts is the goal for any program, he said. When the military gets recruits from diverse backgrounds, there will be more innovative thought, more innovative solutions to incredibly complex and complicated problems that are facing the national security apparatus today, he said. "I want people to see [diversity, equity and inclusion] as another tool in the toolkit and another way of solving these problems.

"It's not just something that has to be done because of some type of cultural ideology or culture wars that are going on — that's not the case at all. It is, again, not diversity for diversity's sake," Garrison said.

Subscribe to Defense.gov Products

Choose which Defense.gov products you want delivered to your inbox.

Related Stories

Defense.gov, helpful links.

• Live Events
• Today in DOD
• For the Media
• DOD Resources
• DOD Careers
• Help Center
• DOD / Military Websites
• Agency Financial Report
• Value of Service
• Taking Care of Our People
• FY 2025 Defense Budget
• National Defense Strategy

The Department of Defense provides the military forces needed to deter war and ensure our nation's security.

The Strategic and Ideological Motivations Behind Germany’s Invasion of the Soviet Union

This essay is about the reasons behind Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, known as Operation Barbarossa. It examines the ideological, strategic, and economic motivations driving Hitler’s decision. Ideologically, Hitler sought Lebensraum and aimed to destroy communism, which he viewed as a threat to the Aryan race. Strategically, he believed that defeating the Soviet Union would force Britain to surrender and eliminate the Eastern Front. Economically, the invasion was intended to secure vital resources for Germany’s war effort. The essay also highlights how initial successes turned into a prolonged conflict, ultimately altering the course of World War II and leading to Germany’s downfall.

How it works

Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, known as Operation Barbarossa, was one of the most significant and complex military campaigns of World War II. This bold move by Adolf Hitler’s regime was driven by a combination of ideological convictions, strategic necessities, and economic ambitions. Understanding the multifaceted reasons behind this invasion requires examining the broader context of Nazi ideology, military strategy, and geopolitical objectives.

At the core of the invasion was Hitler’s deeply ingrained ideological hatred for communism and his vision of Lebensraum, or “living space.

” Hitler believed that the German people needed more territory to sustain their growing population and to ensure the nation’s prosperity. The vast expanses of the Soviet Union, particularly the fertile lands of Ukraine, represented an ideal solution to this problem. By conquering the Soviet Union, Hitler aimed to secure these territories for German settlement and agricultural exploitation, thereby expanding the Reich and ensuring its self-sufficiency.

Moreover, the invasion was seen as a crucial step in the Nazi plan to eradicate communism, which Hitler viewed as a mortal enemy of the Aryan race. The Soviet Union, under Joseph Stalin’s leadership, embodied the communist threat that Hitler had long railed against. He perceived the Bolshevik regime not only as an ideological adversary but also as a racial one, dominated by Jews whom he believed were orchestrating a global conspiracy against Germany. Thus, the invasion was framed as a crusade to destroy the Jewish-Bolshevik menace and secure the future of the Aryan race.

Strategically, Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union was also influenced by military considerations. By 1941, Germany had already achieved significant victories in Western Europe, but Britain remained unconquered. Hitler hoped that a swift and decisive victory over the Soviet Union would force Britain to capitulate or seek terms, as it would lose a potential ally and face the daunting prospect of standing alone against a vastly empowered Germany. Additionally, defeating the Soviet Union would eliminate the Eastern Front, allowing Germany to concentrate its military efforts on other theaters, particularly against Britain and potentially the United States.

Economic factors also played a critical role in the decision to invade. The Soviet Union possessed vast natural resources, including oil, grain, and minerals, which were crucial for sustaining Germany’s war effort. The German economy, despite its initial successes, faced significant resource shortages. Securing the Soviet Union’s resources would alleviate these shortages and provide the German military-industrial complex with the materials needed to continue the war on multiple fronts. This resource acquisition was particularly vital for maintaining the momentum of Germany’s blitzkrieg strategy, which relied heavily on mechanized and armored forces requiring substantial fuel and raw materials.

The timing of the invasion was influenced by a combination of opportunism and perceived threats. The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 had provided Germany with a temporary buffer, allowing it to focus on conquering Western Europe. However, by 1941, Hitler grew increasingly suspicious of Stalin’s intentions and feared that the Soviet Union might attack Germany if it sensed an opportunity. Preemptively striking the Soviet Union was thus seen as a way to neutralize this potential threat before it could materialize. Additionally, the rapid victories in the West had bolstered Hitler’s confidence in the Wehrmacht’s capabilities, leading him to believe that a similar outcome could be achieved in the East.

The invasion plan itself, Operation Barbarossa, was characterized by its scale and ambition. Hitler envisioned a rapid, decisive campaign that would crush the Soviet Union within a few months. The initial phase of the invasion saw significant German advances, with vast territories being captured and large numbers of Soviet troops being encircled and defeated. However, the Soviet Union’s vast geography, harsh climate, and resilient population soon turned the conflict into a protracted and brutal war of attrition. The initial successes gave way to fierce resistance, logistical challenges, and the devastating Russian winter, which ultimately halted the German advance and led to catastrophic losses.

In conclusion, Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union was driven by a complex interplay of ideological, strategic, and economic factors. Hitler’s quest for Lebensraum and his desire to destroy communism were central to the decision, while military strategy and resource acquisition provided additional motivation. The invasion, though initially successful, ultimately became a turning point in World War II, leading to a prolonged and bloody conflict that would decisively alter the course of the war and the fate of Nazi Germany. The operation’s failure underscored the perils of overreaching ambition and the formidable challenges posed by the Soviet Union.

Cite this page

The Strategic and Ideological Motivations Behind Germany's Invasion of the Soviet Union. (2024, May 28). Retrieved from https://papersowl.com/examples/the-strategic-and-ideological-motivations-behind-germanys-invasion-of-the-soviet-union/

"The Strategic and Ideological Motivations Behind Germany's Invasion of the Soviet Union." PapersOwl.com , 28 May 2024, https://papersowl.com/examples/the-strategic-and-ideological-motivations-behind-germanys-invasion-of-the-soviet-union/

PapersOwl.com. (2024). The Strategic and Ideological Motivations Behind Germany's Invasion of the Soviet Union . [Online]. Available at: https://papersowl.com/examples/the-strategic-and-ideological-motivations-behind-germanys-invasion-of-the-soviet-union/ [Accessed: 30 May. 2024]

"The Strategic and Ideological Motivations Behind Germany's Invasion of the Soviet Union." PapersOwl.com, May 28, 2024. Accessed May 30, 2024. https://papersowl.com/examples/the-strategic-and-ideological-motivations-behind-germanys-invasion-of-the-soviet-union/

"The Strategic and Ideological Motivations Behind Germany's Invasion of the Soviet Union," PapersOwl.com , 28-May-2024. [Online]. Available: https://papersowl.com/examples/the-strategic-and-ideological-motivations-behind-germanys-invasion-of-the-soviet-union/. [Accessed: 30-May-2024]

PapersOwl.com. (2024). The Strategic and Ideological Motivations Behind Germany's Invasion of the Soviet Union . [Online]. Available at: https://papersowl.com/examples/the-strategic-and-ideological-motivations-behind-germanys-invasion-of-the-soviet-union/ [Accessed: 30-May-2024]

Don't let plagiarism ruin your grade

Hire a writer to get a unique paper crafted to your needs.

Our writers will help you fix any mistakes and get an A+!

Please check your inbox.

You can order an original essay written according to your instructions.

Trusted by over 1 million students worldwide

1. Tell Us Your Requirements

2. Pick your perfect writer

3. Get Your Paper and Pay

Hi! I'm Amy, your personal assistant!

Don't know where to start? Give me your paper requirements and I connect you to an academic expert.

short deadlines

100% Plagiarism-Free

Certified writers

This Memorial Day, Ask Me About My Brother

B efore my brother Ben was killed in Afghanistan in 2009, Memorial Day was one of my favorite holidays. It meant parties with friends and family, all of us excited by a long weekend and the promise of summer ahead. The fact that Memorial Day was also about violent and traumatic loss was a more abstract and theoretical concept—until the year those losses included my big brother with the contagious giggle and the drive to serve.

For the first few years after Ben’s death, Memorial Day made me angry and indignant. We’re honoring my brother’s death with mattress sales and BBQs? I thought to myself. Nevermind that my brother enjoyed nothing more than barbequing and a good nap. He loved Memorial Day and all its contradictions. He could hold grief and joy together in a way that seemed effortless.

I began to dread attending the Memorial Day events I once enjoyed with him. Would people say anything to me? And did I want them to? Siblings are often asked questions that no one would dare ask a bereaved parent. Questions about how he died. How he really died. “What exactly happened that day?” “What happened after?” “How are your parents doing?” It’s amazing how many questions people can ask about your sibling’s death without ever stopping to ask about their life.

But which is worse: having someone say something or not? I’ve learned that being at that barbeque, knowing everyone else is aware of your loss and its connection to the day but receiving no acknowledgment at all is perhaps the worst outcome of all. I would be left feeling like the elephant in the room, trying to act like everything is fine when it most certainly was not.

The loss of a sibling is a unique form of grief that can be deeply traumatic at any age, and its long-term impact can be seen in every aspect of who we are. Siblings are supposed to be one of our longest shared relationships, and when that is cut short—as it always is when war is involved—siblings are left to pick up the pieces within their nuclear family and support grieving parents and loved ones. Many surviving siblings diminish their own grief so as not to further burden their already broken families, and find themselves struggling to address their loss even years later.

Studies have shown that surviving siblings have increased rates of depression and somatic symptoms, a lower sense of meaningfulness and benevolence in the world, and lower perceived self-worth. Siblings are also more likely to experience complicated grief or prolonged grief disorder, a form of intensified grief that often includes difficulty accepting the loss, preoccupation with the circumstances surrounding it, and a painful combination of bitterness, anger, yearning, and longing. What’s more, siblings grieving on Memorial Day in particular have experienced a violent loss which increases the likelihood that they’re experiencing traumatic grief ; a powerful grief and PTSD cocktail that can rewire your brain and leave you feeling unsafe and utterly alone in the world.

Surviving military siblings, especially, find ourselves dealing with the trauma of war without the sibling we expected to grow old with, our parents grieving so deeply we have nearly lost them, too. Gina Moffa, a trauma-informed grief therapist in NYC and author of the book Moving On Doesn’t Mean Letting Go, explained to me that “people often don't understand how re-traumatizing anniversaries can be for someone who experienced a military loss. While people are having a barbecue or enjoying a long weekend, surviving siblings are dealing with the symptoms of trauma as if they've just heard the news again for the first time.”

Read More: My Brother Was Killed in Afghanistan. He Became Real to Me Again in Quarantine

So what if you haven’t lost a loved one to war, but you’re celebrating Memorial Day with someone who has? Trickier still: What if it’s someone you don’t know well? Social support is one of the strongest antidotes we have to the loneliness and isolation that thrive alongside grief. It breaks the isolation and denial that allows traumatic and complicated grief to flourish.

What if Memorial Day wasn’t about how our siblings died, but about how they lived? Let me talk about my brother’s love of grilled meat in any form. Let me recount our sibling hijinx while we cut the berry cobbler. Instead of asking me to recount his murder, let me tell you about the time he and cousin Steven bought a turkey fryer a few days before Thanksgiving and attempted to deep fry everything in Aunt Jane’s kitchen.

I know this conversation is not easy for anyone involved. Grief and loss is an incredibly complex topic, and if I hadn’t been through loss myself, there’s no way I’d know how to approach someone that's grieving in moments like this. I’m a deeply curious person and I’d probably be ask too many detailed questions. But that also might make me the perfect person to give some advice here. Curiosity is valid and, more than anything, it’s human. But that’s also what Google is for; don’t put someone on the spot asking about their trauma. If you meet someone at a Memorial Day celebration this year who has lost someone in the military, store that info away to Google later and in that moment, focus on life. Ask, “What was your brother or sister’s name?” “Is it helpful to talk about them?” And if yes, “What were they like?”

Your simple question can bring a surviving sibling back to life during an otherwise traumatic day. As Moffa explains, “when somebody checks in and they're compassionate, patient, and supportive; when they just sit with us no matter how long it's been, we feel tethered again. We are tethered to something that can make us feel alive and open the space for joy and life again. It brings us back to ourselves. That check in can be a life saving experience.”

Supporting someone who is grieving this Memorial Day doesn’t mean canceling your plans and spending the day at the cemetery or ignoring all those things you want to do on your day off. It simply means reaching out and checking in, including them in your plans, and making sure they feel seen and heard on that day.

This Memorial Day, you have the power to heal. You have the power to reframe the day from one that memorializes a violent death to one that opens up the door to conversations about life.

More Must-Reads from TIME

• How Selena Gomez Is Revolutionizing the Celebrity Beauty Business
• Javier Milei’s Radical Plan to Transform Argentina
• How Private Donors Shape Birth-Control Choices
• What Happens if Trump Is Convicted ? Your Questions, Answered
• The Deadly Digital Frontiers at the Border
• What's the Best Measure of Fitness? 
• The 31 Most Anticipated Movies of Summer 2024
• Want Weekly Recs on What to Watch, Read, and More? Sign Up for Worth Your Time

Contact us at [email protected]

Home — Essay Samples — Government & Politics — Army — Accountability and the Leader Army

Accountability and The Leader Army

• Categories: Army Army Values

About this sample

Words: 775 |

Updated: 16 November, 2023

Words: 775 | Pages: 2 | 4 min read

Table of contents

Introduction, video version.

• Holmberg, M., Salazar, A., Herd, J., Lane, B., & Orslene, N. (2019, May 20). A Culture of Trust. Retrieved from Army University Press: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2019/May/A-Culture-of-Trust/#bio
• Rickey, M. (2012, December 13). Senior NCO defines accountability. Retrieved from JOINT BASE ELMENDORF-RICHARDSON: https://www.jber.jb.mil/News/Commentaries/Display/Article/292895/senior-nco-defines-accountability/

Cite this Essay

Let us write you an essay from scratch

• 450+ experts on 30 subjects ready to help
• Custom essay delivered in as few as 3 hours

Get high-quality help

Prof. Kifaru

Verified writer

• Expert in: Government & Politics

+ 120 experts online

By clicking “Check Writers’ Offers”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy . We’ll occasionally send you promo and account related email

No need to pay just yet!

Related Essays

6 pages / 2541 words

4 pages / 1917 words

2 pages / 821 words

1 pages / 491 words

Remember! This is just a sample.

You can get your custom paper by one of our expert writers.

121 writers online

Still can’t find what you need?

Browse our vast selection of original essay samples, each expertly formatted and styled

Related Essays on Army

The Profession of Soldiering is among the most noble of professions as it pulls the best and brightest of our society. Those individuals who have a sense of duty, and a desire to serve a greater good, even though it may cost [...]

Questia. (n.d.). Transforming Leader Development through Lifelong Learning. Retrieved from https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P3-411111911/transforming-leader-development-through-lifelong-learning

When we think of law enforcement and military, we tend to consider them as one and the same. However, there are significant differences that distinguish them from each other. While both entities play critical roles in [...]

Leadership is crucial in all aspects of life, but it is especially vital in the context of the military. The United States Army places a high emphasis on developing strong leaders who can navigate complex challenges and ensure [...]

Valley Forge is a military camp that is located in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania. During many of the major wars in 1700s and 1800s Valley Forge became a place the army’s went to during the winter months. It’s location was far [...]

The purpose of this essay is to talk about Army leader attributes. An Army Leader is someone who has been selected for many reasons. They show special skills that not all Soldiers have like character, intellect, and presence. [...]

Related Topics

By clicking “Send”, you agree to our Terms of service and Privacy statement . We will occasionally send you account related emails.

Where do you want us to send this sample?

By clicking “Continue”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy policy.

Be careful. This essay is not unique

This essay was donated by a student and is likely to have been used and submitted before

Download this Sample

Free samples may contain mistakes and not unique parts

Sorry, we could not paraphrase this essay. Our professional writers can rewrite it and get you a unique paper.

Please check your inbox.

We can write you a custom essay that will follow your exact instructions and meet the deadlines. Let's fix your grades together!

Get Your Personalized Essay in 3 Hours or Less!

We use cookies to personalyze your web-site experience. By continuing we’ll assume you board with our cookie policy .

• Instructions Followed To The Letter
• Deadlines Met At Every Stage
• Unique And Plagiarism Free

Watch our Memorial Day tribute to the military who sacrificed all to serve their country

Memorial Day is the unofficial start of summer. It's a time to gather with friends and family for a grill out, a picnic, or maybe a trip to the beach to soak up the sun. But while it may well feel like a day of celebration, what sometimes gets forgotten is that it was conceived as a day of commemoration for the brave military members who died serving their country.  

A University of Phoenix survey found that less than half of Americans polled knew the exact purpose of Memorial Day, while around a third were unsure of the difference between Memorial Day and Veterans Day.

To clarify, Veterans Day, which takes place in November, is a tribute to all those who served honorably in the military in wartime or peacetime, whether living or dead.

The confusion is compounded by Armed Forces Day, a military celebration held in May for those currently serving. However, while the reasons differ, the sentiment of each day is the same: all three are important opportunities to show gratitude.

So, when you chow down on that hot dog, barrel down that slip 'n slide, or whatever you do for fun this Memorial Day, spare a moment to acknowledge the people in uniform whose sacrifice made a difference.

On this Memorial Day, watch the video for a surprise reunion of battle buddies bonded by the loss of their leade r

Humankind is your go-to spot for good news! Click here to submit your uplifting, cute, or inspiring video moments for us to feature. Also, click here to subscribe to our newsletter , bringing our top stories of the week straight to your inbox.

Santa Clarita Valley's #1 Local News Source

From drab to fab: elevate your essay writing with powerful techniques, sponsored post.

• May 28, 2024

Essays. The mere word can make some students groan and break out in a cold sweat. Some of them don’t know where to start, and others wonder, “How do I make my essay better to get a good grade?” But essays don’t have to be your nemesis. With the right tools and tricks, you can transform your essays from drab to absolutely fabulous!

Whether you panic at the sight of a blank page or feel like your texts always end up being a confusing jumble, you’re in the right place. And yes, sometimes it helps to get extra guidance from websites like WritePapers when it comes to academic writing. Yet, with the strategies we’ll talk about here, you can start crafting those A+ essays your teachers will rave about. 

Let’s ditch the dull texts and get creative!

Spice Up Your Sentences

Basic sentences get the job done, but they won’t make your essay pop. To really elevate your writing, you should experiment with different sentence structures and words. 

Think about how you can add flair to your writing strategies. A mix of sentence lengths is a great starting point. Short, punchy sentences can create emphasis. Longer, detailed sentences are perfect for describing complex ideas. 

And don’t forget the power of those vivid verbs! They bring your writing to life. Instead of describing something as “interesting,” try words like “fascinating,” “captivating,” or “riveting.”

Master Transitions

Smooth transitions are essential for creating a strong, cohesive essay. Imagine trying to cross a river without any bridges…it’d be tough! Effective transitions show the relationships between your ideas, taking your reader on a clear and logical journey. 

Using signal words and phrases is a cornerstone of successful transitions. For example, if you’re adding onto a previous point, words like “furthermore” or “additionally” work wonders. Want to show contrast? Try “however” or “on the other hand.” To demonstrate cause and effect, use words like “consequently” or “therefore” are your friends. 

But transitions can be more subtle than just these signal words. A well-placed example or brief anecdote can seamlessly move from one concept to the next.

Apply the Right Evidence

Using relevant evidence is one of the best essay writing strategies. But simply dropping a quote won’t cut it. The real magic comes from analyzing and integrating evidence into your own words. Explain why that particular quote or piece of data backs up your argument. 

Moreover, you should provide context for your evidence. Don’t let it stand alone in a disconnected way – weave it seamlessly into your writing. 

And lastly, remember that variety is key when it comes to essay writing tips. Mix up the types of evidence you use – a poignant quote, a relevant statistic, or a vivid example – to keep your reader engaged and make your points even more convincing.

Don’t Skip the Revision Step

Never underestimate the power of thorough revision. It’s where you can refine your ideas, polish your writing, and truly make your essay better. 

One crucial step in the revision process is to take a break after writing your first draft. Returning to your work with fresh eyes lets you catch those sneaky errors or confusing passages you might have glossed over initially.

Reading your work aloud is another invaluable strategy! Hearing your words spoken out loud helps you notice awkward phrasing or areas where the flow feels off. This is a simple yet highly effective way to identify where you might need to focus on how to improve writing skills.

Finally, remember that revision isn’t just about fixing typos (although those are important, too!). Take a step back and ask yourself the big questions: 

• Is your thesis statement crystal clear? 
• Is your essay well-organized? 
• Does each paragraph seamlessly support your main argument? 

If you find yourself needing guidance or an extra set of eyes, don’t hesitate to seek out help with writing. There are numerous resources available, including online platforms and essay writing services, that can provide valuable feedback and help you take your writing to the next level.

Embrace Your Voice

One of the easiest ways to fall into the “drab essay” trap is by trying to sound overly formal or academic. While correct grammar and good structure are non-negotiable, letting your own voice shine through is what makes your writing memorable. Think about these tips:

• Write like you talk (but a bit more polished). Imagine you’re explaining your essay topic to a friend. What kind of language would you use? Keep the tone engaging and natural.
• Don’t be afraid of strong opinions. Essays are opportunities to argue your point of view. Using words like “clearly,” “undoubtedly,” or “importantly” adds conviction to your statements.
• Own your perspective. Share insights or experiences that relate to your topic. This sets your essay apart from the crowd.

Your writing doesn’t have to be filled with complex jargon to be impressive. Clarity, confidence, and a dash of personality can create an engaging essay that your teachers won’t soon forget!

Final Thoughts

Essays aren’t always the most thrilling thing in the world. But with the strategies we talked about, you can learn to craft sentences that make your reader lean in, not zone out. You’ll master the art of making your ideas flow effortlessly, and you’ll use evidence like a pro to back up your arguments.

The revision process allows you to look at the piece of writing from another perspective. Don’t be afraid to read your essay out loud, get feedback from others, and ask those big-picture questions about your organization and thesis statement. 

And hey, we all need a little extra support sometimes! There are tons of amazing resources out there to help if you need guidance on how to write better essays.

Most importantly, don’t try to sound like someone you’re not. Let your personality be reflected in your writing. Share your unique perspectives, use vivid language, and express your opinions with confidence. Your teachers will notice the difference!

Related To This Story

Summer skincare products: look for these ingredients  , tips for authenticating watches: how to verify originality, how to effectively manage incontinence with the right pads: expert tips , 15 projects to make with svg files, the most common injuries in a construction site, what to do if you’ve been terminated unjustly in california, latest news.

Hart’s Class of 2024 is encouraged to find the way 

Chiquita Canyon hosting in-person sessions to provide help for relief fund Friday, Saturday  

City approves $6.5M for road work  

Deputies arrest couple after brief investigation 

Wilk’s bill aimed at reducing animal shelter overcrowding headed to Assembly 

Sign up for the, morning rundown.

Filled with the top stories to start your day, and emergency news alerts. 

25060 Avenue Stanford, St. 141

Valencia, CA, 91355

Main Desk: 661-259-1234

Newsroom: 661-255-1234

Advertising: 661-287-5564

Have a news tip? Let us know!

News Sections

• Coronavirus
• Environment
• Politics & Government

More Sections

• Video + Podcasts
• Sunday Signal
• Subscribe to Print
• Classified Ads
• Event Calendar