thesis of civil disobedience

98 Civil Disobedience Essay Topics & Examples

Crafting a civil disobedience thesis or writing about historical figures and social movements? Get some original topics and read some samples on government resistance gathered by our team .

📝 Tips on Writing Stellar Civil Disobedience Essay Examples

🏆 best civil disobedience essay examples & topics, 📌 good civil disobedience topics for research, 👍 interesting civil disobedience essay topics, ❓ civil disobedience questions.

Civil disobedience has been a controversial topic since 1849 when the term first appeared in Thoreau’s essay.

Writing an essay on civil disobedience may be a challenging task because there are still many questions and unresolved issues around this concept. However, there are some useful tips that can help you to write excellent civil disobedience essays.

Here are some civil disobedience essay titles and topics we can suggest:

• Civil disobedience as a way to combat injustice
• Civil disobedience in the arguments of Martin Luther King
• Resistance movement and civil disobedience
• The question of nonviolence in civil disobedience
• How civil disobedience can shape society
• Civil disobedience as a form of passive resistance
• The meaning and significance of civil disobedience
• Gandhi and civil disobedience: A discussion

Once you have selected one of civil disobedience essay topics and titles, you can start working on your paper. Here are some key points you can use to write an excellent paper:

• Start with defining civil disobedience before writing your paper. Think of what this term means to you and research available sources to learn more about it.
• Study the topic you have selected thoroughly, even if you think that you know a lot about it. It is always a good idea to check out the latest news articles on civil disobedience along with scholarly sources. Remember that Wikipedia is not a reliable source of information.
• Do not hesitate to check out essay examples online. Civil disobedience essay examples can help you to evaluate the relevance of the issue you have selected for discussion and see how you can structure your paper. Avoid copying the works you will find online.
• Now you can start to develop an outline for your paper. Think of the main points you want to include and organize them within the essay. Do not forget to present a thesis statement at the end of the introductory paragraph. The number of body paragraphs will depend on the size of the paper. We would recommend including at least three body paragraphs.
• Clearly define the objectives of your essay or the message you want to convey in the paper.
• Do not forget to define civil disobedience and explain the meaning of this term. Providing examples is a good idea, too. You can also reflect on why individuals decide to disobey and what causes such behavior.
• Discuss the consequences and legal aspects associated with civil disobedience. The goal of your paper should be to help the reader understand the topic better and develop an opinion on it. Outline your perspective clearly.
• Remember to support your claims with evidence. Cite articles using appropriate citation style (MLA, APA, Harvard, or other). Ask your professor about the sources you can use for the essay.
• Remember to provide a civil disobedience essay summary or a simple concluding paragraph at the end of your paper. In this paragraph, you should state the main ideas and findings of your essay and research. You should not include in-text citations in this section.
• Include recommendations in a separate body paragraph or as a part of the concluding section, if applicable. Make sure that the recommendations are relevant to the topic you have selected and can potentially solve the issue.

Remember that you can check out some samples on our website. They are free and have the best ideas for your essay.

• Civil Disobedience: Advantages and Disadvantages Even without being told, people have to be obedient to the rules, laws and guidelines that have been set out by social institutions to ensure that there is peace and harmony in the society.
• Political Obligation and Civil Disobedience The disparity between the issues of legal political obligation and moral obligation makes it hard for liberal political theorists to analyze the natural duty and the moral basis of any person’s submission to his or […]
• Civil Disobedience and Pride in “Antigone” by Sophocles The play effectively depicts the theme of civil disobedience through the personality of Antigone, who is willing to break the rules to satisfy her morals standards and conscience. Therefore, the author uses the characters of […]
• King ‘s “Letter From Birmingham Jail” and Thoreau’s “Civil Disobedience” Despite this fact, both King and Thoreau had a common goal to expose the unjust laws that govern a society of civil resistance to unjust laws It should be stressed that both King and Thoreau […]
• “Civil Disobedience” by Henry David Thoreau He is worried about so many problems that exist in the system of law and the justice of the state. At the beginning of his argument, Thoreau states that some laws in the country are […]
• Civil Disobedience: Gandhi Non-Violent Campaigns It can be said that passive resistance or civil disobedience is the most harmonious way to fight for one right and achieve the goals.
• Self-Reliance Versus Civil Disobedience Thoreau says that he is a monarch of the survey, and it is his right to explore nature that no one can dispute.
• Mahatma Gandhi’s Salt Walk and Civil Disobedience The act signified the end of salt laws and allowed Indians to harvest saltwater and produce salt locally. Mahatma protested unfair salt laws imposed by staging a peaceful walk from his hometown in Ahmedabad to […]
• “Sit-Ins” in the US: The Civil Disobedience Civil disobedience is an opportunity to change the situation for better, at least in a challenging way. Moreover, to date, “Sit-Ins” are unlikely to bring many benefits, and people solve the problem of inequality in […]
• The Essay “Civil Disobedience” by Henry David Thoreau He claims that the government’s power is based more on the influence that the majority possesses rather than on the desire to act legitimately and fairly, which makes it overall unreliable as a source of […]
• Why Civil Disobedience Is Morally Justified Thus, civil disobedience becomes a morally justified act since it seeks to openly and non-violently address wrong and problematic phenomena in society.
• Good Samaritan vs Civil Disobedience in Law Bill of Rights asserts that the authority of a government is derived from the consent of the governed, and whenever any form of government becomes destructive, it is the right and duty of the people […]
• Emerson’s The American Scholar, Thoreau’s Walden and Civil Disobedience, Douglass’ Narrative of the Life‎ The importance of literature in our lives is impossible to exaggerate, partly because it represents the accumulated knowledge of the best minds of mankind through the whole course of human history, partly because it is […]
• Gandhi, ‘Satyagraha’ and Thoreau’s ‘Civil Disobedience’ Gandhi proposed some principles for the members of the Satyagraha and insisted that these principles must be followed to achieve the desired effect.
• Henry David Thoreau: On the Duty of Civil Disobedience It also goes against some of society and the state’s outlook and is opposed to statism and collectivism which is that of conforming to the community and national goals.
• Civil Disobedience, Protests, and Heroism Gandhi travelled to London to learn the law in the University of London in the year 1888. He says that he had wished for the white moderates to recognize that the existence of law and […]
• Unjust Laws and Civil Disobedience I consider accepting the unjust penalties enacted by the state a part of the activity that promotes the awareness of the injustice of certain laws and regard it as the demonstration of the person’s respect […]
• Civil Disobedience in Contemporary Society He lived in a society that valued the whites and ignored the black American citizens. When Socrates knew that he was going to die, he was not afraid of the afterlife.
• Violence and Bloodshed in “Civil Disobedience” by Henry Thoreau Overall, it is possible to argue that violence cannot be regarded as a legitimate way of civil disobedience because it implies that an individual rejects the idea of law and dialogue between a person and […]
• Rights to Civil Disobedience If the rights to civil disobedience are to be guaranteed, the values that accompany it would be prescribed in the legal code of ethics.
• Thoreau and his idea of civil disobedience The struggle for civil governance has been the most challenging aspect in several governments across the globe with the urge for better governance becoming a hotly contested subject internationally. However, the overriding reason is; should […]
• Civil Disobedience And Nonviolence It is the gist of this very long quote that answers the question and leaves the necessary action to be taken by the oppressed.
• Environmentalism and Civil Disobedience What the current society is enjoying today is considered to be because of the good care of the environment by the previous generations and the future generations are hence expected to either enjoy or suffer […]
• Concept of Civil Disobedience In most cases, this kind of disobedience comes through organizing people to act in a nonviolent manner to force the government to heed to their demands.
• Nonviolent Action Protests: Civil Disobedience Thus, ordinary protest is for the intetrst of the organizer and has no respect to the implications of the actions on the wider society.
• Thoreau, Socrates, and Civil Disobedience The striking difference in these two essays is that Thoreau is more rebellious when it comes to the government and he feels that the government is wrong and it must be subjected to criticism to […]
• An Analysis of Kirkpatrick Jennet’s Uncivil Disobedience: Studies in Violence and Democratic Politics In the case of John Brown and other militant abolitionists, the real picture is that they had failed to allow the responsible institutions to handle the matter of abolition within the limits of law and […]
• Describing Civil Disobedience Through the Acts of Martin Luther King
• A Description of Civil Disobedience as the Refusal To Obey Civil Laws
• Civil Disobedience: Are We Morally Obliged to Obey Unjust Laws?
• Civil Disobedience, Postmodernism and Globalization
• The Demonstration of Civil Disobedience in the Dialogue Between Socrates and Crito
• The Civil Rights Movement: Civil Disobedience Vs. Violence
• The Methods of Protecting Civil Rights in The Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass: An American Slave and Henry David
• Thoreau’s Civil Disobedience
• The Rhetorical Analysis Of Henry Thoreau’s Civil Disobedience
• To What Extent is Civil Disobedience Justified in a Democracy
• A Literary Analysis of Civil Disobedience by Henry David Thoreau
• A Comparison of Theories of Civil Disobedience of Gandhi and Fanon
• The Civil Disobedience in Resistance to Civil War by David Thoreau
• The Factors to Consider When Justifying Civil Disobedience
• Should Civil Disobedience Be Permitted In A Democracy
• Civil Disobedience : Effective And Non Violent Government
• The Use of Civil Disobedience to Protest Against the Destruction of Endangered Trees
• Civil Disobedience as a Basic Human Right in Antigone, a Play by Sophocles
• The Justification of the Civil Disobedience During the Vietnam War
• Should Civil Disobedience Be Violent or Non-Violent
• The Ineffectiveness of Civil Disobedience in a Non-Democratic Government
• Nelson Mandela: The Art of Civil Disobedience
• The Ideologies of Henry David Thoreau in the Essay Civil Disobedience
• The Underlying Meaning of Civil Disobedience
• Modern Technology Critiques by Henry David Thoreau in Civil Disobedience
• Transcendentalism in Civil Disobedience
• The Reasons Why Civil Disobedience and Uncivil Disobedience Are Effective Ways to Solve Problems
• The Influence of Henry David Thoreau’s Civil Disobedience on Martin Luther King Junior
• An Analysis of the Topic of Civil Disobedience and Racism in the United States of America
• An Overview of the Civil Disobedience and Passive Resistance of Mohandas Gandhi
• An Argumentation Against Civil Disobedience
• A Look at the Justification of David Thoreau’s Civil Disobedience Act Against Paying Taxes
• Thoreau on How to Use Civil Disobedience to Advance Justice
• Promoting The Use Of Civil Disobedience
• The Significance And History Of Civil Disobedience
• Democracy in Civil Disobedience, Slavery in Massachusetts, Benito Cereno and Bartleby the Scrivener
• Civil Disobedience: Freedom Fighters or Criminals?
• The Advantages and Disadvantages of Civil Disobedience and Uncivil Disobedience
• A Christian Philosophy on Civil Disobedience
• Ecoterrorism and Eco Sabotage vs. Civil Disobedience
• The Role and Contribution of Slavery on the Civil Disobedience in the U.S
• What Are the Two Main Claims of Civil Disobedience?
• Is Thoreau’s Conception of Civil Disobedience Compatible With Democratic Government?
• What Does Civil Disobedience Argue?
• Why Is Civil Disobedience Not Morally Justified?
• How Was Civil Disobedience Used in the Civil Rights Movement?
• What Is Thoreau’s Opinion on Wealth and Consumption? Why Does He Say That the Rich Are Less Likely to Practice Civil Disobedience?
• How Does Civil Disobedience Help a Social Movement?
• Was the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre a Failure of Civil Disobedience?
• How Does Civil Disobedience Work?
• What Is the Tone of Thoreau’s “Civil Disobedience”?
• How Does Stoicism Support Civil Disobedience?
• What Were the Limitations of Civil Disobedience?
• Which Type of Action Is More Effective, Taking Small Steps in Improving Your Livelihood or Taking Part in Climate Marches?
• How Does Disobedience Promote Social Progress?
• What Can Political Theory Tell Us About the Relationship Between Democracy and Protest?
• Is Every Unjust Law an Appropriate Target for Civil Disobedience?
• What Question Is at the Heart of Civil Disobedience?
• Is Civil Disobedience Ever Justified?
• How Effective Is Civil Disobedience?
• Why Should We Obey the Law?
• Is Civil Disobedience a Moral Responsibility of a Citizen?
• How Does Civil Disobedience Affect Society?
• What Would Happen Without Civil Disobedience?
• When Should Civil Disobedience Be Used?
• Why Is There a Need for Civil Disobedience?
• Is Disobedience Necessary for a Well Functioning Society?
• Does Civil Disobedience Have to Be Peaceful?
• Is Civil Disobedience a Crime?
• Can Civil Disobedience Lead to Violence?
• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

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Civil Disobedience

51 pages • 1 hour read

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Summary: “civil disobedience”.

Henry David Thoreau’s “On the Duty of Civil Disobedience,” more commonly known as “Civil Disobedience,” originated as a Concord Lyceum lecture given in January 1848 as the Mexican-American War was winding down. The essay and its central thesis—that following one’s conscience trumps the need to follow the law—have profoundly impacted global history, political philosophy, and American thought, notably influencing both Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.

The text was originally published in an 1849 essay collection titled Resistance to Civil Government edited by Transcendental writer and educator Elizabeth Peabody. The essay’s final form was published in 1866 under the title “Civil Disobedience” in a posthumous collection of Thoreau’s work. Today it can be found in the public domain. This guide utilizes the version found at ibiblio.org ( https://www.ibiblio.org/ebooks/Thoreau/Civil%20Disobedience.pdf ).

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The essay opens with Thoreau declaring that he believes in the adage “that government is best which governs least,” which he says amounts to “that government is best which governs not at all” (3). This is because the government often does not serve the public’s interest and can be “abused and perverted before the people can act through it” (3). Government is often not beneficial, as has been proven in the Mexican-American War, the work of a small group of people who have used the government as their tool despite public dissent. Thoreau also argues that government is harmful because it can be bent to the will of one person, though it was established to serve the will of the collective people.

Thoreau clarifies that he does not mean to get rid of government altogether, since people must have some entity—he uses the metaphor of the government as a machine—to hear their voices. However, he notes the US government really does not do anything the people do not do themselves: “It does not keep the country free,” “settle the West,” or “educate,” as these achievements stem from the “character inherent” to the American people, who would have accomplished even more if the government had not slowed their progress (4). Instead, Thoreau advocates not for no government but for a “better government” (4).

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This is difficult to achieve in a democracy because democracies are dominated by the majority. The majority is not always morally right but often merely stronger than the minority, so a “government in which the majority rule in all cases cannot be based on justice” (4). As such, Thoreau argues that laws created by the majority do not need to be followed if they go against a person’s conscience. It is better that a person do what is right than what is lawful.

Laws do not make a person more morally sound; in fact, following some laws actually makes a human less morally sound, as “even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice” (5). Thoreau brings up the example of a soldier who fights a war, since most soldiers know that war by its nature is unjust. Those soldiers become tools of the state who cannot really be thought of as men but as “small moveable forts and magazines” who serve “some unscrupulous man in power” since they lose their humanity when they cannot follow their own consciences (5). Thoreau argues that soldiers serve the government with their bodies while politicians and legislators serve with their heads. But because legislators do not usually make “moral distinctions,” they “are as likely to serve the devil, without intending it , as God” (6). There are leaders who do challenge the government or prioritize their moral principles, but they are few and are treated as traitors or enemies by the government.

Thoreau then asks how a person should behave toward the US government, especially given the moral injustices of the Mexican-American War and slavery . He argues that a moral person cannot “be associated with” the US government, as that person’s government cannot naturally be the “slave’s government also” (6). As such, he argues that Americans have a duty to rebel against the government. The reason there has not been a revolution against slavery is not because of the Southerners but because Thoreau’s neighbors in Massachusetts “are more interested in commerce and agriculture than they are in humanity” and would rather wait passively for someone else to solve the problem (8). Thoreau says the cause of building a moral government and eradicating slavery from the United States is paramount. To be a good citizen, one must follow their conscience and promote justice, even if the actions of individuals tear the nation itself apart.

Thoreau dismisses those who say they do not like the government but do nothing about it; he is especially vehement that voting is not a strong enough action to make the government just. Voting for the right thing does not do anything beyond telling the powers that be that you hope what you vote for prevails. The majority can choose whether to hear it, and regardless, the majority will always do whatever is in its own interest. Thus, the majority will only vote for the abolition of slavery, for instance, when there either are so few slaves left that the vote makes no difference or when the cause of slavery itself no longer benefits the majority’s interest. Worse, there are few independent voters left in America, as most are beholden to political party elites and vote for whomever the party places on the ballot.

However, Thoreau clarifies that a person has no obligation to eliminate the wrongs the government reinforces. A person may be busy living their own life or have other goals or interests than justice, but each person has a moral duty to “wash his hands” of injustices perpetrated by the government (10). Thoreau describes the hypocrites in his town who announce that they would not put down a slave insurrection or fight in Mexico if the government demanded it, but who still provide money to the government to support those actions.

Since everyone agrees that there are unjust laws, Thoreau asks whether people should “be content to obey” them, try to “amend them” but obey them until they are amended, or “transgress them all at once” (12). He states that most people will choose the second course of action, thinking that the cure of injustice is worse than the disease. This may be so, but this rationale is the fault of the government, as the State does not encourage dissent. Laws are set up to protect the State, and the State cannot fathom that a citizen might deny its authority. Thoreau revisits the metaphor of the machine to describe times when citizens need to rebel. If the injustice is necessary for the “machine of government” to function, it should be left alone as it will likely sort itself out (12). If the injustice has a part of the machine devoted exclusively to the injustice, it might need to be left alone as well, as it may be that the “remedy” may be “worse than the evil” (12). But if the injustice requires a citizen to be “the agent of injustice to another,” then Thoreau argues a citizen should “break the law” (12). That is, if a law requires one to live immorally and to harm another, the law must not be followed.

Breaking the law is the preferred action because the government cannot easily amend laws. In fact, the Constitution itself is “evil” as it sets up unjust laws (13). Thoreau states that his place in the world is simply to live in it, not to improve it. Besides, one person cannot do everything necessary to eliminate injustice. Rather, the preferred action is simply to withdraw support for the government. Abolitionists should stop providing their property or bodies to support the government of Massachusetts, as God would be on their side, and as each person is a “majority of one” who does not need to wait for the government to change (13).

Thoreau discusses his own actions, describing his interactions with the tax collector. Thoreau always makes sure to argue with the tax collector because he has voluntarily chosen to represent the unjust government and because Thoreau’s disagreement is with the men who make the laws, not the law itself. These conversations are small acts of rebellion, but Thoreau argues that small protests are important, as they are permanent and can combine to effect change. The tax collector, for instance, could be convinced to resign his office and, thus, slow the government. However, Thoreau laments that most men are too timid to act or risk being jailed for what they believe.

But prison is actually a freer place than society, as the prisoner can live an honorable life since they have been placed there for opposing the unjust State. Prison can also make a person more devoted to fighting injustice, since the imprisoned experience injustice firsthand rather than vicariously through the experience of the slave or the soldier.

Thoreau urges all those who stand against injustice to combine their weight against the State, since a minority that “clogs” the government can make the government change (15). After all, the State cannot imprison everyone and will choose to end a war or abolish slavery rather than arrest the masses. Additionally, Thoreau suggests that not paying taxes is preferred to letting the State use those tax dollars to cause violence and bloodshed. In fact, if enough people did not pay taxes, it would be “the definition of a peaceable revolution” (15). And even if there were to be some bloodshed in that revolution, it would be blood shed from a wounded conscience, blood Thoreau says he sees now.

Thoreau mostly focuses on prison as a consequence because the alternative—having property or goods taken—largely does not apply to the people who are most interested in ending injustice. Such people are not likely to have much property or wealth, as the wealthy are “sold to the institution”—the State—that made them wealthy (16). And wealth comes with a decreasing sense of virtue or morality. Should a person become rich, the best thing they can do is maintain the lifestyle they had before accumulating wealth. Thoreau also anticipates a criticism of his argument—that acting against the State will erode the State’s protections or, worse, that the State will come after that person’s property or family. Thoreau suggests that this quagmire is exactly why one should not attempt to accumulate wealth and should instead live with their own means, as it is impossible to live both morally and comfortably. Thoreau does not consider himself dependent on the State for anything, and because he is not rich, it costs him less to disobey the State than it would cost his soul, his humanity, and his integrity to obey it.

Thoreau then recounts his own acts of disobedience. He once refused to pay money to a church his father attended but that he did not. To avoid paying, he wrote to a town clerk that he did not wish to be viewed as a member of that church, and he has not gotten a bill since. However, he regrets that there is no way to write a similar letter for every society he wishes to divest himself from. He then states that he has not paid a poll tax in six years, and even spent one night in jail as a result, but he felt free in that jail. The wall that separated him from his town actually lifted his spirits, as he felt threatened not by the prisoners but by the world outside the prison walls. He learned to feel bad for the State because it does “not know its friends from its foes,” while he only has to answer to a higher power and obey his own laws (19). He recognized in jail that he was not part of the machinery of government and that the State could only ever take his body, not his mind.

Thoreau describes his night in prison as a trip to another country. He felt as though he was seeing his native village through the eyes of the past, as though he had entered the Middle Ages. He feels that he had never gotten a look at his town’s inner workings or institutions, especially the peculiar institution of prison, which contains perfectly formed holes for giving inmates food and open windows that let the town be heard and seen at all times. He is fascinated by how it functions, the gossip the inmates tell, and the verses they write. His roommate is a man accused of burning his barn, but Thoreau wonders if he accidentally lit a fire after passing out drunk. The cellmate shows him how the prison works and even offers friendly advice on saving his bread for later meals.

The next morning Thoreau is released because someone has paid his tax for him, against his wishes. After leaving prison, Thoreau feels changed, like he can see his city and its people more clearly. He recognizes that they are friends in “summer weather only” and that they cannot be counted on to effect change (21). He notes that none of them understand that an institution like the jail even exists. Thoreau leaves town and is no longer under the State’s oversight.

Out of town, he announces that he refuses allegiance to the State as a whole. He pays for the highway tax because it benefits his neighbors but refuses all other taxes. Thoreau admits that his neighbors probably mean well, and he wishes he could respect their wishes. However, he knows that supporting their wishes and paying all taxes would hurt others who do not live in his community. He criticizes the person who anonymously paid his taxes as being either supporting injustice (if the person paid the bill out of solidarity with the State) or interfering with the public good (if the person paid it to help him), as Thoreau’s actions (or inactions) are for the public good of change.

Despite his stances, Thoreau admits that he wants to follow the law, as he does not want conflict with anyone. He argues that the Constitution looks like it should deserve obeisance and respect from one point of view . However, when he looks at those laws from “a little higher,” they appear less moral, and he wonders if the laws are worth thinking about at all (24). He admits that most people disagree with him, but he is discontented by legislators and politicians. They are part of the unjust institutions and, therefore, cannot see how or why to change them. He argues that they may have made some useful systems, but they cannot see the inherent injustice in the law as a whole. Thoreau singles out Daniel Webster, the famous US congressman and diplomat, as a politician who will not reform government because he follows the institution and law as a whole. Webster supports slavery, for instance, not because he thinks slavery is just but because slavery is part of the original Constitution. Thus, to Thoreau, Webster has rightly been called the “Defender of the Constitution,” but that honor makes him prudent, not wise (25).

Thoreau concludes the essay by calling the authority of government “impure,” as a government cannot be just if it lacks the “sanction and consent of the governed” (27). Democracy is a step in the right direction for the power of the individual, but it does not go far enough. Thoreau imagines a State that would fully respect an individual and not mind if a few people chose to live completely free of the State altogether, “not meddling with it, nor embraced by it” (27-28). If such a State could exist, then an even “more perfect and glorious” State could follow (28).

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Article contents

Civil disobedience and conscientious objection.

• William Smith William Smith Department of Government and Public Administration, Chinese University of Hong Kong
•  and  Kimberley Brownlee Kimberley Brownlee School of Law, University of Warwick
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.114
• Published online: 24 May 2017

Civil disobedience and conscientious objection are distinct but related social practices that display people’s opposition to specific laws, policies, directives, or schemes. In general, these two practices arise from people’s deeply held commitments. Civil disobedience is more overtly communicative and political than conscientious objection. Civil disobedience is also, almost by definition, a breach of law, which people engage in to push for changes in either governmental or nongovernmental practices. Conscientious objection, by contrast, does not always break the law: sometimes it is a legally protected form of nonconformity. It is also less overtly political than civil disobedience, stemming as it does from people’s desire not to participate in practices they oppose, rather than from their ambition to change those practices. Both practices can be morally justified under specific conditions that, among other things, include doing only limited harm to other people. Moreover, under even more specific conditions, both practices could be said to be protected by moral rights. Civil disobedience and conscientious objection generate pressing normative and political challenges concerning the nature of the rule of law, respect for the rule of law, conditions for deliberative democracy, equality before the law, policing, adjudication, and punishment.

• civil disobedience
• conscientious objection

Introduction

Civil disobedience and conscientious objection are social practices motivated by moral and political beliefs. Civil disobedience is often characterized as a conscientious act of illegal protest that people engage in to communicate their opposition to law or government policy. Famous examples include Gandhi’s Salt March in 1930 , Rosa Parks’s refusal in 1955 to give up her bus seat in segregated Alabama, and Aung San Suu Kyi’s sustained campaign for democracy in Myanmar/Burma. These disobedient acts contrast with ones that are not civilly disobedient, such as radically violent protests, riots, and acts of terrorism.

Conscientious objection is usually described as a principled act of nonconformity with a directive or legal order that people engage in for reasons of personal morality. Typical examples include the soldier’s refusal to fight in what he believes is an unjust war and the medical doctor’s refusal to perform legal abortions because she believes the procedure is deeply immoral. These refusals contrast with ones that are strategic, mercenary, or narrowly self-serving, such as a doctor refusing to perform abortions merely because her supervisor objects to them.

Both civil disobedience and conscientious objection belong to a broader category of conscientious disobedience , which we define here as nonconformity with a law, injunction, or formal directive for principled motives to communicate convictions to particular addressees. This broader category of conscientious disobedience is informed by a certain conception of conscientious action that requires that a person’s convictions and her conduct be consistent, and that her judgment about her own conduct align with her judgment about others’ conduct. On some accounts, conscientious conviction also requires that we not seek to evade the consequences of acting on our convictions and that we attempt to engage others in dialogue about our convictions. 1 In what follows, we identify a link between civil disobedience and conscientious objection based in a communicative conception of conscientious action , which helps to shed light on a philosophical literature that is marked by significant disagreement about the similarities and differences between these types of conscientious disobedience.

Section “ Conscientious Disobedience ” examines the nature of these two forms of disobedience, drawing out their differences and similarities. In general, civil disobedience is seen as the more political of the two practices since people tend to use it to achieve political reform. By contrast, conscientious objection, while it can have a political dimension, does not aim centrally to bring about reform. At the same time, both civil disobedience and conscientious objection can be seen as modes of action that are characterized, at least to a certain degree, by an intent to communicate convictions to a given audience.

Section “ Evaluating Conscientious Disobedience ” explores the fundamental questions that civil disobedience and conscientious objection raise about the relationship between citizens and political authority. For instance, what is the normative status of these two practices, particularly in liberal democratic societies? Answers to this question typically focus on moral or political justifications for these practices. Many thinkers argue that conscientious disobedience has socially beneficial consequences, such as triggering public deliberation about marginalized issues or remedying some social injustice. Other thinkers focus on citizens’ moral rights to engage in conscientious forms of disobedience independent of its social benefits.

Section “ Engaging with Conscientious Disobedience ” explores how the state should respond to conscientious disobedience. For instance, is it appropriate to subject people who breach the law conscientiously to legal sanctions? Whereas some thinkers argue for harsh sanctions for what they see as undemocratic, if not antisocial, behavior, many other thinkers argue for tolerant approaches, such as non-prosecution, light sentencing, and a moral claim against the imposition of punishment or penalties. They also highlight the many ways that institutional authorities, police, prosecutors, and lawmakers can accommodate conscientious law-breakers. These philosophical debates are practically significant, especially given that police, courts, and governments often show intolerance toward some types of conscientious law-breaking even in societies that pride themselves on their liberal institutions and traditions.

Conscientious Disobedience

Civil disobedience.

Let us begin with a conceptual specification of civil disobedience:

Civil disobedience is a constrained, communicative protest, contrary to law, that people engage in to support a change in governmental or nongovernmental practices.

The constrained nature of civil disobedience is usually, though not universally, understood in terms of nonviolence. Civil disobedience is associated with a tactical repertoire of typically nonviolent acts that includes, but is not limited to, sit-ins, occupations, trespassing, blockades, lock-downs, banner drops, illegal street theater, and jail solidarity. Civilly disobedient acts can be either direct or indirect. In other words, they can involve either a direct refusal to conform with the law that is the immediate object of the protest, or a refusal to conform with noncontentious laws as a means of indirectly expressing opposition to the object of the protest.

Some thinkers hold that civil disobedience can only target governmental bodies and practices (Raz, 1979 , p. 264). But, this gives an unduly narrow picture of its targets. To be sure, usually, dissenters direct their civil disobedience against public authorities that have the capacity to enact collective decisions through laws, policies, or directives at local, national, or transnational levels. Nevertheless dissenters can also engage in civil disobedience against nongovernmental agents, such as universities, corporations, and churches, whose lawful (or unlawful) practices they oppose. Of course, such protests often also intend to criticize the legal framework that tolerates such practices (Brownlee, 2013 , 2007 , p. 180).

The claim that civil disobedience is a communicative form of protest is widely accepted within the philosophical literature. Tony Milligan notes that a majority of commentators affirm what he calls the “communication thesis,” which holds that civil disobedience is to be understood primarily as a form of address or appeal (Milligan, 2013 , p. 18). The accounts of diverse thinkers such as Rawls ( 1999 ), Singer ( 1973 ), Bedau ( 1991 ), Habermas ( 1985 ), and Arendt ( 1972 ) conceptualize civil disobedience as a means of articulating oppositional arguments in the public sphere. The communication thesis is not, however, universally accepted. Milligan notes that the thesis may lead to what he describes as “the question of exclusions,” which arises insofar as our conceptual framework leads us to deny that certain forms of principled activism should be treated as civilly disobedient (Milligan, 2013 , p. 14). He considers forms of activism where the objective is primarily to disrupt or prevent a contentious practice, rather than to communicate opposition to that practice in the public realm. For example, radical environmental activists sometimes target contested development projects by covertly sabotaging machinery or imposing other forms of costs on developers. If we nonetheless insist on limiting civil disobedience to overtly communicative forms of protest, it might be difficult to categorize such activism as civilly disobedient (Welchman, 2001 ).

The communication thesis nonetheless retains considerable appeal in the conceptual specification of civil disobedience . First, the thesis is compatible with themes explored in the writings of prominent figures in the civil disobedience tradition. Gandhi and Martin Luther King, for instance, both defend civil disobedience as a means of reaching out to an opponent in order to provoke dialogue and to search for a reconciliation of perspectives. The Gandhian perspective insists that civilly disobedient agents must adopt a dialogic orientation toward their opponents, such that “the adversary is treated as worth hearing, as another person or group of persons with a viewpoint that, while different from one’s own, is not inferior by virtue of being different” (May, 2015 , p. 75). King, for his part, held that the role of civil disobedience is “to create such a crisis and establish such creative tension that a community that has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue” (King, 1991 , p. 71). There is, to be sure, some doubt about the extent to which Gandhi and King adopt a consistent position in their writings, as both flirt with the idea of disruptive protest as both a communicative and a noncommunicative strategy. 2 The prominent place of communicative intent in their writings nonetheless attests to its historical and practical relevance to civil disobedience.

Second, the communication thesis recognizes that certain forms of principled protest and resistance are necessarily excluded from the category of civil disobedience. This is because it is necessary to provide an account of the civility of this practice, which enables us to contrast it with other forms of principled disobedience. Civility can be associated with the conscientious motivations of its practitioners, particularly their aim to publicize the reasons for their protest so as to persuade the relevant audience to accept their position. The aim of reaching out to an audience in this way places certain constraints on civil disobedients’ conduct, because overly violent or forceful forms of expression may frustrate efforts to bring about a lasting change in law or societal practices. Civil disobedients have reasons to at least attempt to persuade others of the merits of their views rather than achieve change through force; this is partly because the strength of their message may be lost if it is drowned out by aggressive tactics and partly because their appeal rests on treating the addressees as interlocutors with whom reasoned discussion is possible. The case for militant resistance that goes beyond the constraints associated with civility may be more compelling if persuasion through dialogue appears to be, or is shown to be, impossible (Rawls, 1999 , pp. 322–323).

Third, the range of activity compatible with communicative intent is quite broad. In fact, the communication thesis helps to make sense of the pervasive disagreement in the philosophical literature about which particular constraints on conduct are to be associated with civil disobedience including: publicity, nonviolence, appeal to public political principles, fidelity to law, and willingness to accept punishment.

Consider, for instance, the much-discussed definition advanced by Rawls, according to which civil disobedience is “a public, non-violent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in law or policies of government” (Rawls, 1999 , p. 320). Rawls adds the further requirements that civil disobedients should give due notice of their protest, should limit their appeal to public political principles, and should abstain from coercive or intimidatory tactics that aim to force the hand of public authorities. One way of making sense of Rawls’s position is that the constraints reflect a certain conception of how civil disobedience functions as an appeal in the special circumstance of a “nearly just society” (Rawls, 1999 , p. 319). In a society within which the majority is both committed to justice and open to the possibility that its decisions reflect or entrench injustice, it makes sense to limit civil disobedience to tactics that enhance its credentials as a respectful appeal to that majority. For instance, Rawls contends that civil disobedience must be nonviolent because “to engage in violent acts likely to injure and to hurt is incompatible with civil disobedience as a mode of address” (Rawls, 1999 , p. 321). In other words, violence fails to respect the civil liberties of the audience and thus obscures the clarity and force of any appeal to their sense of justice.

The reticence of some critics to accept such constraints can be interpreted not as a rejection of the basic claim that civil disobedience is a communicative act but as a reflection of disagreement about the behavior that is compatible with communicative intent. Kimberley Brownlee, for example, departs from Rawls by allowing that certain forms of limited violence might be compatible with civil disobedience as a form of address. This is because the concept of violence includes a range of acts that can be major or minor in their impact on persons or property, as well as acts that might risk but not necessarily cause injury or damage. It is therefore implausible to contend that a modest or noninjurious act of violence would necessarily infringe the civil liberties of our addressees (Brownlee, 2012 , p. 198). This line of thought suggests a more permissive attitude toward violence even in the special context of a nearly just society.

The Rawlsian view can also be challenged on the grounds that constraints on conduct that might make sense within the special setting of a nearly just society are less appropriate in contexts that more closely resemble real world conditions. The requirement to give due notice, for instance, is reasonable in nearly just societies where public authorities could be trusted not to take steps to prevent protest from occurring but not in societies that make clear that they oppose peaceful protest that departs from lawful behavior.

Peter Singer focuses on a different issue by contesting Rawls’s claim that civil disobedience must incorporate an appeal to public political principles. Rawls insists on this condition because it fits well with his account of civil disobedience as a “stabilizing device,” which functions to publicize particularly serious departures from a society’s prevailing conception of justice. Singer argues that this condition is inappropriate in societies that either lack a settled conception of justice or hold a conception that fails to address important issues of moral concern. He thus offers a broader conception of civil disobedience as a plea to a democratic majority to reconsider its decisions, which allows protesters to draw on a potentially wide range of ethical ideas in defending their aims and conduct (Singer, 1973 , pp. 88–90).

These criticisms of Rawls are compatible with the thought that civil disobedience must observe some constraints on conduct if it is to function as a form of address. For instance, Daniel Markovits offers a nuanced perspective on coercion in his republican theory of civil disobedience. He agrees with the Rawlsian view that protesters should not attempt to impose a specific policy outcome on public authorities because such a strategy would be incompatible with the broadly democratic conception upon which the republican defense of civil disobedience rests. But he departs from the Rawlsian view that coercion is necessarily incompatible with civil disobedience as a mode of address, by allowing that a moderate degree of force might be legitimate as a means of securing a hearing for defeated or marginalized perspectives. As he puts it, “although democratic disobedience may not force a sovereign to change course , it may (try to) force the sovereign to reconsider ” (Markovits, 2005 , p. 1942; italics and parenthesis in original). The communication thesis thus enables us to understand the reasons behind the disagreements about conduct that permeate the literature, which might otherwise lead us to despair at the prospects for any meaningful dialogue about the nature of civil disobedience.

Conscientious Objection

Now let us consider the practice of conscientious objection:

Conscientious objection is the act of not conforming with some directive or legal order for reasons of personal morality.

In a nuanced way, conscientious objection—as an act of objecting— is also a communicative act of disobedience, which a person engages in to disassociate herself from actions that are incompatible with her moral convictions as she understands them. As an objection , this differs from noncommunicated disagreement or purely evasive disobedience.

Conscientious objection is associated with such actions as citizens refusing to serve in armed forces or military conflict, medical professionals’ refusing to provide certain forms of treatment or service, and public officials’ refusing to discharge certain duties. It can also take the form not of refusing to act but of defiantly acting, such as a doctor defiantly providing a medical service that she has been instructed to withhold.

Conscientious objection differs from civil disobedience in several ways. First, it is not necessarily an unlawful act, but it does entail at least nonconformity with an injunction, directive or norm short of law. Second, it can only be carried out in a direct fashion against the dictum that the objector opposes. Third, most importantly, conscientious objection, unlike civil disobedience, is not necessarily carried out as a means of protesting against or reforming the practice that the objector opposes, although—as shall be discussed—it can implicitly or explicitly raise the issue of exemptions.

The claim that conscientious objection is a communicative act is much less widely accepted in the philosophical literature than the claim that civil disobedience is a communicative act. This may reflect the fact that conscientious objection is often defined as an act that is in some sense not public in its aims or conduct, that is to say, not performed in public; it is not done either with fair notice to society and its authorities or with the aim of drawing the public’s attention. Joseph Raz, for instance, writes that “conscientious objection is a private act, designed to protect the agent from interference by public authority” and to assert “immunity from public interference with matters he regards as private to himself” (Raz, 1979 , p. 276). That said, the communicative dimensions of conscientious objection can be unpacked by reflecting on difficulties with this definition, particularly the claim that it is a “private” act.

First, it is mistaken to conceptualize conscientious objection as private in the sense that it is carried out in an evasive or clandestine manner. Conscientious objection, unlike the related notion of conscientious evasion , is carried out by agents on the assumption that public authorities are aware (or may become aware) of their nonconformity. Emanuela Ceva illustrates this difference through a contrast between parents who hide their refusal to vaccinate their children and parents who declare their refusal to vaccinate their children. The parents in the latter case “communicate to their fellow citizens the impossibility of their complying with a democratically enacted decision that demands something of them that goes against their moral integrity” (Ceva, 2015 , p. 42).

Second, it is misleading to think about conscientious objection as private in the sense of a purely private conviction that clashes with societal laws, requirements, or norms. There is, of course, an important sense in which conscientious objection does place an individual in an oppositional relation to mainstream views, but this should not obscure the fact that her convictions have been forged in dialogue with others. Michael Walzer suggests that “it is chiefly in ideological sects, parties and movements that commitments are made that later lead to conscientious objection” (Walzer, 1970 , p. 139). The doctor who refuses to perform an abortion on religious grounds, for instance, is acting on the basis of convictions that have emerged through ongoing interaction with others in religious communities. Furthermore, such communities are likely to devote considerable attention to the moral complexities that arise in clashes between the requirements of secular society and the dictates of faith. It is, for Walzer, a matter of great significance that the convictions expressed through conscientious objection typically “follow from some more or less consistent pattern of interpersonal commitment and group action” (Walzer, 1970 , p. 141). This is partly because an act of conscientious objection is almost always an implicit or explicit invitation to engage in dialogue, addressed to those who profess to share our convictions, which may elicit responses in the form of expressions of solidarity or—perhaps less commonly—sympathetic criticism.

Third, it is a mistake to think about conscientious objection as private in the sense that it has no aspirations to impact upon broader legal or societal arrangements. The temptation to think in this way arises because conscientious objectors often do not offer a direct challenge to a contentious law or practice but rather seek to avoid the personal implications of conformity. So, for example, a registrar who refuses to officiate a same-sex marriage does not challenge the legislation that allows for such unions, if her objective is merely to gain permission not to be a participant to a ceremony that she opposes on conscientious grounds. 3 The act nonetheless retains an important public dimension because it is either an implicit or explicit appeal to establish a de jure or de facto exemption on the grounds of conviction. The act of conscientious objection thus has the often foreseen effect of promoting deliberation about the important issue of legal or societal accommodation for conscientious conviction. This is because a conscientious objector is not merely asking to be left alone, but to be given some sort of guarantee that his or her subjective moral integrity will not be compromised through compulsory enrolment in practices he or she perceives as objectionable. The answer that addressees give to this request will have consequences beyond those for the agent in question, as it will in all likelihood establish a legal or societal precedent for the treatment of relevantly similar persons.

The upshot of these considerations is that conscientious objection, unlike conscientious evasion or other forms of personal disobedience, has a constitutive communicative dimension. 4 There may nonetheless be some uncertainty about why an agent prefers to communicate his or her convictions through conscientious objection rather than civil disobedience. This is particularly relevant if we are inclined to think that conscientious conviction is best served through conduct that not merely disassociates an agent from perceived wrongdoing, but which also articulates a direct or indirect challenge to the perceived wrongdoing itself. This is a weighty consideration, which offers some support to the intuition that civil disobedience is often more worthy of moral praise than conscientious objection. There are, though, two considerations that can support the decision of an agent to prefer conscientious objection over civil disobedience in certain contexts. First, civil disobedience may have no reasonable prospects for success given the prevailing climate of opinion in society, such that securing an exemption from the contentious law or practice—particularly on religious grounds—may be a more realistic goal. This consideration is anticipated by Rawls, who notes that conscientious objectors tend to be “less optimistic than those undertaking civil disobedience and […] entertain no expectation of changing laws or policies” (Rawls, 1999 , p. 324). Second, conscientious objection may be a more appropriate course of action than civil disobedience is in light of the facts of moral pluralism within society. This consideration is explored by Ceva, who discusses the case of a pro-life doctor who “thinks it is wrong for him to perform abortions but, as he recognizes the uncertainties concerning the status of the fetus, he may not think this is equally wrong for any other doctor” (Ceva, 2015 , p. 44). These concerns may lead conscientious agents to favor conscientious objection as a less confrontational mode of communication than civil disobedience.

Evaluating Conscientious Disobedience

In evaluating these two types of conscientious disobedience, thinkers tend to ask two key questions. First, when, if ever, are people morally justified in resorting to these practices? Second, regardless of their justifiability, do people have a moral right to engage in these practices rightly or wrongly under certain conditions?

The Justification of Civil Disobedience

The attempt to justify civil disobedience must reckon with a number of objections that can be leveled against this practice. First, let us consider the detrimental consequences that civil disobedience might have on relations of civic friendship in a democratic society. For instance, civil disobedience often has negative impacts on public order, imposes burdens on third parties and public officials, and has a polarizing effect on democratic debate. These negative impacts might support the view that civil disobedience should be rejected in favor of lawful modes of advocacy, at least on the (not uncontroversial) assumption that lawful forms of advocacy are likely to be less divisive or harmful than unlawful forms of advocacy.

Replies to this concern tend to highlight the potential that civil disobedience has to achieve particular societal benefits, which can override the case against it. Ronald Dworkin, writing in the context of the civil rights movement and the anti–Vietnam War movement in the United States, argues that civil disobedience often entails the violation of law that is of uncertain constitutional validity. This can have the beneficial consequence of either prompting courts to address this uncertainty or, in conditions where the issue is not ripe for adjudication, stimulating societal deliberation about the issues at stake (Dworkin, 1978 , pp. 206–222).

In a similar vein, many authors explore the potential benefits of civil disobedience as a means of contributing to democratic debate. Jürgen Habermas explores the role of civil disobedience as a means of publicizing novel interpretations of constitutional principles in changing social and political circumstances (Habermas, 1996 , p. 384). William Smith defends civil disobedience as a means of highlighting exclusions and inequalities that question the fairness of democratic debates and decisions (Smith, 2004 ). Daniel Markovits notes the potential that civil disobedience has to rectify deficits in democratic discussion by turning the community’s collective attention to topics that are being ignored or actively suppressed (Markovits, 2005 ). But, of course, there is no guarantee that civil disobedients will champion topics that are generally being neglected or that the topics they champion, if neglected, ought to be resurrected for further debate. That said, their activism may stimulate defenders of other views to enter the political arena, thereby bringing to the fore those topics that do need close discussion.

These responses typically support the resort to civil disobedience by drawing attention to certain advantages it may enjoy over lawful advocacy, such as its capacity to generate publicity or to signal the urgency of the protesters’ cause. Also, the case for civil disobedience seems to be much stronger when reasonable lawful methods have been attempted and found wanting. Rawls, for instance, holds that civil disobedience can have a stabilizing effect by inhibiting departures from justice and rectifying them when they occur, at least when civil disobedients exhaust all legal options first and coordinate their efforts with other minority groups so as not to overburden the ear of the community to whose sense of justice they appeal (Rawls, 1999 , pp. 326–331). When other, legal means have been exhausted, civil disobedience may be the only suitably constrained way to remedy a (perceived) injustice.

A related objection is that civil disobedience might encourage or incite other parties to engage in more harmful types of activity. Replies tend to note both that civil disobedience is, by nature, a constrained breach of law and hence should bring with it comparatively modest risks in itself and, moreover, that civil disobedients are not themselves responsible for other people choosing to engage in less civil forms of disobedience. They may bear some responsibility when they decide not to coordinate their activities with other conscientious protesters (see Rawls, 1999 , pp. 328–329), but they are not accountable for others’ decision to break the law.

A third objection focuses less on the deleterious consequences of civil disobedience and more on its expressive dimension. The thought is that civil disobedience manifests a disrespectful and arrogant attitude, in the sense that protesters appear to privilege their moral convictions over the outcome of a democratic process. There are two potential responses to this concern. The first is to suggest that civil disobedience can be justified as a remedial measure to counter deficits or distortions in the democratic process (Weinstock, 2016 ). The second response is that civil disobedience is neither disrespectful nor arrogant, because it is an attempt to communicate rather than impose convictions on others. The constraints on conduct associated with communicative intent embody an appropriate respect both for the democratic process and for the status of its participants as free and equal citizens (Moraro, 2014 ).

A fourth objection is that civil disobedience is typically doomed to fail, because it is an essentially symbolic protest that eschews significant acts of force or violence. As such, it may appear to be a somewhat impotent and self-indulgent gesture in the face of injustice (Barry, 1973 , p. 153). A first reply is to focus on success stories where civil disobedients have effectively redressed injustices and furthered democratic aims. The paradigm examples of civil disobedience are cases in point: Gandhi’s resistance against British rule in India; Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King Jr., and the civil rights movement against segregation in the United States; Nelson Mandela’s and the ANC’s thirty-year push for democracy in South Africa (which did include some violent acts of protest); and Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD’s equally long struggle for democracy in Myanmar/Burma. A second reply focuses on the relationship between the constrained conduct of civil disobedience and the achievement of just and stable outcomes. Andrew Sabl, for instance, offers a “forward-looking” defense of civil disobedience, which presents it as more likely to preserve conditions for future cooperation between oppressed and oppressors than revolutionary violence (Sabl, 2001 ). A third reply focuses on the fact that, intuitively, constrained breach of law seems most defensible in the most hostile conditions, where dissenters seem least likely to succeed in airing their views or achieving change through this or any other constrained means. Rawls, for one, holds that, in an unjust or corrupt system, if any means to overturning that system are justified, surely (nonviolent) civil disobedience is justified (Rawls, 1999 , p. 319). In such cases, among other things, civil disobedience can be an important outlet for the expression of frustration or a means for subjugated agents to reaffirm their sense of dignity and self-respect through resistance (Smith, 2013 , pp. 45–47).

A fifth objection is that civil disobedience might be employed in pursuit of frivolous or unjust causes, or carried out for the wrong sort of reasons. In response, the justification of civil disobedience might be thought to depend, at least in part, on the credibility and urgency of its cause. In Rawls’s view, for example, such a cause is properly responsive to one of the two principles of justice, which guarantee all members of the society equal rights and civil liberties and fair equality of opportunity (Rawls, 1999 , pp. 326–327). On broader accounts, disobedients’ causes may track a range of important values that cannot be subsumed easily under Rawls’s two principles of justice, including animal welfare, non-members’ interests, and the environment. Concerning motives, according to many thinkers, civil disobedients must support their good cause for the right reasons, and not for merely extraneous reasons such as enjoying the experience of protest or self-serving reasons such as promoting their personal interests. However, some other thinkers hold that such selflessness is too strong a condition for justified civil disobedience. In their view, justified disobedience could be animated by an attitude of “not in my backyard,” such as when people protest against the construction of a new prison in their neighborhood (Celikates, 2013 ). Related to that, civil disobedients should engage in particular modes of suitably constrained illegal protest that align appropriately with their communicative aims. When these various conditions are met, most thinkers are bound to concur that civil disobedience is justified.

The Justification of Conscientious Objection

To be justified, a conscientious objector, like the civil disobedient, must have a good cause and be properly animated by that cause when he or she objects to a given directive. To meet these two conditions, not only must the conscientious objector believe that either the general character of the law or directive is morally wrong or that it extends to cases it should not (Raz, 1979 , p. 263) but also he or she must be broadly correct in his or her views: that is, the objector must have undefeated moral reasons for taking this stance. Since, however, conscientious objection does not aim to produce political reform, he or she does not have to pass the additional, demanding tests for justification that are often said to apply to civil disobedience, such as (1) likelihood of good consequences, (2) some coordination with other minority-opinion holders, and (3) declaration of the reasons for the protest as well as, on some views, self-identification.

That said, conscientious objection does touch the lives of individual people, usually when those people are the intended recipients of the goods and services that the objector refuses to provide (or refuses to withhold). Sometimes, the impact that the objector’s refusal has on other people is modest: the customer who wants to buy alcohol may have to go to a different shop if this clerk refuses to process the sale of alcohol. But, in other cases, the objector’s impact on others by denying them goods or services, such as medical treatment or a prescription, matters greatly to the recipients, even if the objector has a good pro tanto reason to refuse because reasonable people may disagree about the moral acceptability of the goods or services. The refusal may delay proceedings such that the persons cannot receive the service; or it may cause them to feel stigmatized and reluctant to request the service elsewhere.

Thus, the justificatory constraints on conscientious objection pertain centrally to the negative impact that the objection has on immediately affected persons as well as the broader ramifications of refusals in that domain.

We can distinguish two types of objection: ones that react to the content of the dictum and ones that react to the identity of affected parties. Mark Wicclair argues that there is a salient moral difference between a doctor refusing to provide a service such as abortion, on the one hand, and a doctor refusing to provide that service to a certain group of patients, such as African Americans, Muslims, lesbian women, or unmarried women, on the other hand (Wicclair, 2011 ). Only the latter is directly discriminatory. However, the former may be indirectly discriminatory since only women seek abortions and, hence, a doctor refusing to perform abortions potentially puts a disproportionate burden on women.

Both of these types of objections differ from a third type, which Wicclair does not discuss, which is driven by formal or circumstantial features, such as a doctor refusing to provide abortions on certain days of the week or in facilities that provide other services that the doctor opposes, such as euthanasia. Of the three types, this last may be the easiest to justify, other things being equal, though it, too, can manifest unjust discrimination.

Questions about justifying conscientious objection arise most vividly in the context of war. Rawls, for one, focuses his discussion of conscientious refusal on the context of war, arguing that people’s justified refusals to go to war, while they are not political acts (since they do not take place in the public forum in the way civil disobedience does) are based on the same principles of justice, which include roughly the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello (Rawls, 1999 , pp. 331–335). In a similar vein, Jeff McMahan proposes that not only conscripts but voluntary , active-duty soldiers should also be allowed to selectively conscientiously object against fighting in wars that they have good reason to believe are unjust (McMahan, 2013 ). Indeed, in such cases, soldiers have not so much a moral justification as a moral duty to refuse to fight.

The Right to Civil Disobedience

In liberal philosophy, a right of conduct is typically understood to give people a protected sphere of autonomy in which to behave unencumbered by third parties even when they act wrongly. Both the right to civil disobedience and the right to conscientious objection, if credible, would give their holders the right to engage in the putatively wrongful conduct of disobeying an order or formal rule, on the ground that the disobedience falls within a protected moral sphere of personal autonomy.

According to Joseph Raz, people have a moral right to civil disobedience to the extent that it reclaims political participation rights that should be respected by their society (Raz, 1979 ). People’s moral right to civil disobedience is restricted, therefore, to illiberal regimes. In liberal regimes, people’s rights to political participation are, by hypothesis, adequately protected by law. In other words, in such a society, the law already provides people with adequate opportunities for political participation within the law. Therefore, in such a society, their political participation rights cannot ground a right to civil disobedience.

Raz’s regime-centric view of the right to civil disobedience confronts several objections. First, in illiberal regimes, only those people whose rights are not adequately respected can claim they have a moral right to engage in civil disobedience. Other people, whose own participation rights are not compromised, have no moral right of solidarity to engage in civil disobedience with them in the way that, for example, morally sensitive white people in pre–civil rights America might have civilly disobeyed segregation laws in collaboration with black people to undo generations of bigotry and division. In reply, Raz might argue that in an illiberal regime no one’s participation rights are adequately protected because not everyone is given a seat at the table. The people who are granted participation rights are unable to engage fully with the people who are denied such rights and, hence, neither group can participate effectively to adopt policies that serve their own and others’ interests.

Second, in liberal regimes, resorting to civil disobedience need not imply that dissenters are attempting (illegitimately) to reclaim participation rights. Their disobedience can instead be a response to the operational realities of politics (i.e., that decisions must be made and votes taken before minorities can fully make their case). In other words, the right to political participation either cannot or should not be limited to legal methods (Lefkowitz, 2007 ). One limitation of this approach is that it does not generate a universal moral right to engage in civil disobedience in liberal democratic regimes; it generates such a right only for members of persistent, vulnerable minorities who are unable to make their case fully before decisions are made.

Third, in rooting the right to civil disobedience in participation rights, Raz risks delimiting unduly the range of causes that people could raise through civil disobedience. In other words, his view risks making participation-rights-issues the only issue that people could legitimately advance under their right to civil disobedience. And this would clash with Raz’s liberal commitment to rights as protecting a sphere of conduct in which to act wrongly—that is a sphere in which to advance a cause that is neither meritorious nor related to participation rights.

Fourth, a regime-centric account struggles to accommodate new forms of disobedience such as globalized disobedience. In principle, Raz’s account could be extrapolated to the global context in a fully functioning system of international law where the liberality or illiberality of that global system determined whether people had a moral right to civilly disobey in defense of meaningful participation rights. However, Raz’s account cannot allow for a right to engage in either civil disobedience in solidarity as a visitor to another country, or in home-based civil disobedience oriented toward another state’s policies.

Finally, the moral right to civil disobedience could be rooted more plausibly and profitably in something other than participation rights. It could be rooted more humanistically in persons’ needs to have a protected sphere in which to express and communicate their personal convictions through conduct that aligns with those convictions. This defense starts with the observation that we human beings are expressive creatures with capacities for agency, dignity, and deep belief (Brownlee, 2012 ).

To this argument, some thinkers add a further, double-harmony argument for a moral right to civil disobedience: society’s interests in the enhancement of democratic deliberation. And, when disobedients’ causes are well founded, they may serve society by exposing or rectifying a moral wrong, thereby acting as a stabilizing force (Markovits, 2005 ; Rawls, 1999 , p. 336; Brownlee, 2012 ).

The Right to Conscientiously Object

In professional contexts, many liberal societies recognize a right to conscientiously object to performing certain legal functions of an office. In health care, for instance, professionals seem to have an ever-expanding right to refuse to perform standard functions of their job, including performing legal abortions, blood transfusions, and surgical procedures, as well as dispensing certain pharmaceutical drugs. Sometimes the right does not seem to require even minimally evidential satisfactoriness, such as whether the drug being objected to actually does what the objector believes it does. An extreme form of support for this right, found in many US laws protecting health professionals who object, is a kind of “conviction absolutism,” according to which people who object on grounds of sincere belief should be exempt from performing any act that conflicts with those beliefs. (For a critique of such absolutism, see Wicclair, 2011 .)

At the opposite end of the spectrum, some thinkers defend what is called the “incompatibility thesis,” namely, that, in the case of many professionals (notably health-care professionals) it is contrary to their professional obligations to refuse to provide the legal goods and services within the scope of their professional competence; therefore, they have no right to refuse to perform their professional duties on grounds of sincere belief (Savulescu, 2006 , pp. 294–297).

Between these two extremes, thinkers such as Wicclair, Dan Brock, and others argue for a middle-ground, compromise position (at least in professional domains such as health care), according to which we should accommodate some conviction-driven objections within specified ethical limits that rein in conscientious objections (Brock, 2008 ). Most if not all accounts of professional obligation seem to favor a content-sensitive, compromise approach, including accounts based on general ethical theories, accounts that track supposed internal professional morality, evolutionary nonessentialist accounts, and traditionalist nonessentialist accounts, as well as contractual obligations and covenant obligations (Wicclair, 2011 ).

It is noteworthy that, in contrast to the expanding range of exemptions and accommodations in many professional spheres for conscientious and usually religiously inspired objections, there is one professional realm in which there is no recognized right for professionals to conscientiously object—namely, the military. In the United States, for example, where there is general recognition of the right to object in health care and in many other domains, there is no comparable right to object in its all-voluntary military, even on the grounds that God instructed a person not to fight in certain ways or in certain wars.

In defending a right to engage in conscientious objection, it is not possible to appeal to political participation rights or double harmony between the objector’s interests in subjective integrity and society’s interests, except perhaps when, coincidentally, society garners the benefit of increased democratic deliberation. The right to conscientious objection must rest solely on the humanistic value of protecting the person’s sphere of autonomy in which to act wrongly. Some argue that when a person’s formal office raises such deep moral qualms for her, she should seek another form of employment. This appears to be too strong a condition: in many contexts—such as the military—responsiveness to moral qualms may be both commendable and necessary. It may, though, be appropriate to suggest that a medically trained professional could avoid the particular branch of medicine that would require her to perform tasks she opposes: for instance, she need not enter obstetrics and gynecology if she opposes performing abortions.

Engaging with Conscientious Disobedience

This section explores ethical and legal issues that arise in confrontations between conscientious disobedients and public authorities. A prominent theme in the philosophical literature is the moral case for the state to take an accommodating approach toward conscientious disobedients. Philosophers have adopted an increasingly sophisticated approach to this issue, focusing on the distinct issues raised by the treatment of disobedients by different organs of the state, including police forces, courts, and government.

The police play an important front-line role in the state’s response to many cases of conscientious disobedience, particularly acts of civil disobedience that disrupt public order (LeGrande, 1967 ). Police forces’ operational decisions play an important role in shaping the environment within which such protest takes place, influencing the prospects for success for civil disobedience actions that aspire to communicate opposition within the public sphere. The police also have an important symbolic role to play, as their operational decisions can express and influence societal perceptions of conscientious disobedience.

The theme of policing has received rather less attention by philosophers than issues associated with the post-arrest treatment of protesters. This is unfortunate, because prevailing policing strategies can—and indeed should—be subject to moral analysis in light of both the societal benefits of civil disobedience, which at least sometimes outweigh its potential harms, and the case in favor of treating this form of protest as a moral right. These considerations, discussed in the previous section, are difficult to reconcile with policing strategies that tend to limit the effectiveness and visibility of civil disobedience.

The shortcomings of these approaches are examined by Smith as part of his case for “negotiated accommodation,” a normative approach that police forces should adopt toward civilly disobedient protest (Smith, 2012 ). The term “accommodation” in this context means that the police should, where possible, cooperate with civil disobedients to assist in their commission of a protest that is effective as an expression of their grievance against law or policy.

The accommodating approach requires that police take a flexible attitude toward policing tactics and recognize the political legitimacy of suitably conducted forms of conscientious lawbreaking. It calls on police to adopt tactics such as under-enforcement of law, pre-negotiated arrests, and on-the-scene dialogue and negotiation between officers and activists. The latter idea is particularly significant, as it allows police and protesters to defuse tense confrontations through a negotiated settlement acceptable to both sides. A potentially violent confrontation could thus be transformed into a choreographed spectacle, whereby protesters are permitted to engage in a symbolic act of rule or norm violation in return for giving police officers certain guarantees about their subsequent behavior or conduct (Smith, 2012 , pp. 830–834).

Negotiated accommodation can be contrasted with “command-and-control” or “strategic incapacitation” tactics, which mandate police action to stop civilly disobedient acts from occurring or to limit the duration of such acts insofar as they occur (Vitale, 2007 , p. 406). The accommodating approach rejects the heavy-handed tactics associated with these preventative approaches, such as their quasi-militaristic use of force, infringements of personal privacy, and extensive restrictions on protest and demonstration. The accommodating approach can also be contrasted with “negotiated management” tactics, which recommends dialogue with protesters as a means for the police to exercise control over their protest (Waddington, 1994 , p. 102). Negotiated accommodation has more in common with this approach, but it insists on a genuine dialogue informed by a willingness on the part of police to facilitate, rather than constrain, civil disobedience.

An objection to Smith’s type of accommodating approach is that it might expose law-abiding persons to greater levels of disruption and disorder than more repressive or managerial techniques. But it is not obvious that this is the case. First, repressive or managerial policing strategies may not enjoy significant comparative advantage as a means of reducing levels of disruption and disorder. If activists perceive that police are taking steps to marginalize the impact of their protest, this may push them toward a more confrontational relationship with police and the adoption of more radical or assertive protest tactics. Second, the case in favor of negotiated accommodation is presumptive. This means that it can, in principle, be outweighed in the face of sufficiently compelling countervailing considerations. The fact that inconvenience would be a corollary of unlawful protest, or that protesters might for a short time block a right-of-way or occupy government or corporate property, should ordinarily not be taken as sufficient reason to take preventive steps against civil disobedience. The genuine prospect of harm to third parties or damage to their property, by contrast, or serious and prolonged disruption to the life of the community, should ordinarily be taken as a countervailing consideration that outweighs the good of accommodating civilly disobedient protest. The operational judgment that police make in particular contexts must be informed by past experience of similar protest actions, awareness of the intentions and methods of protest groups gleaned through an open dialogue with activists, and a risk assessment that is as comprehensive as possible.

A rather different objection is that negotiated accommodation might contribute to the co-optation of civil disobedience, understood as a set of processes that exert pressure on activists to mold their protest into forms that are approved by police and/or other organs of the state. This objection rests on a misunderstanding of Smith’s argument. The ideal of negotiated accommodation imposes moral obligations on police forces to explore avenues for dialogue with protesters, rather than preventative force or managerial pressure. It does not impose moral obligations on protesters to respond to an invitation to dialogue offered by police forces. Civil disobedients might resist such overtures on expressive or strategic grounds, such as their interest in staging a protest that communicates the extent of their alienation from state institutions or that adopts noncooperative tactics as a means of drawing greater attention to their cause. Of course, protesters’ refusal to negotiate might strengthen the case in favor of police forces switching from accommodating tactics to preventative or managerial approaches. In any case, the adoption of negotiated accommodation by police would leave ample scope for protesters to break free from the alleged threat of co-optation.

The courts also play a significant role in the state’s response to unlawful protest, particularly decisions relating to the imposition of penalties or punishment. Daniel Farrell observes a curious tendency for philosophers to affirm that conscientious disobedience is often justified, while also holding that the imposition of punishment is justified (Farrell, 1977 , p. 165). This tendency, he suggests, might be supported through a certain conception of law as a rule-based system that should not or cannot differentiate between justified and unjustified violations, or through concerns about detrimental consequences for society that might follow if punishment is not imposed. Farrell contends that a legal system could (and in fact should) suspend imposition of punishment if a defendant succeeds in convincing a jury of his or her peers that unlawful protest is justified. Farrell thus arrives at a position similar to that of Rawls, who writes that “courts should take into account the civilly disobedient nature of the protester’s act, and the fact that it is justifiable (or may seem so) by the political principles underlying the constitution, and on these grounds reduce and in some cases suspend the legal sanction” (Rawls, 1999 , p. 339).

The view that conscientious disobedients should be exempt from punishment if their unlawful act is (or appears) justifiable is more modest than the claim that there is a presumption against imposing punishment irrespective of their act’s justifiability. This stronger claim, or something close to it, nonetheless enjoys a certain degree of support in the philosophical literature. The issue is complicated by the fact that contrasting attitudes can be adopted toward conscientious objection and civil disobedience. Horder ( 2004 ) and Raz ( 1979 ), for instance, suggest that there may be a stronger case for leniency toward the former than the latter. Their reason, roughly speaking, is the good of protecting personal autonomy in cases where agents are confronted with a choice between legal compliance and deep moral convictions. This good is particularly weighty in cases where the law has a rationale that is difficult to reconcile with autonomy, as in the case of paternalistic legislation, and where an agent’s decision not to conform has little or no problematic consequences. This consideration has less weight in relation to civil disobedience: although it may be inspired by deep moral convictions, its aims are at least partly strategic or political and its impacts can be significant in terms of societal stability or the rights of affected parties.

The thought that conscientious objection may be a more appropriate object of toleration than civil disobedience, as Brownlee ( 2012 , pp. 5–7) points out, appears to be quite widespread among liberal political philosophers. There are nonetheless important objections to the claim that the presumption against punishment is stronger in relation to conscientious objection than civil disobedience. First, consider the suggestion that conscientious objection, unlike the more political and strategic tactic of civil disobedience, does not challenge democratic authority. Horder writes that, “those acting purely for reasons of conscience do not seek to challenge the state’s supreme right, through law, to take decisions on behalf of a whole community, either generally or on some particular issue” (Horder, 2004 , p. 224). In response, it is not at all clear that civil disobedience challenges the “supreme right” of the state to take decisions on behalf of the community. Instead, as noted in the previous sections, it is an unlawful but constrained attempt to initiate or engage in communication with the state about how it exercises that right. This is, as we have seen, a crucial element of the defense of civil disobedience put forward by a range of thinkers, including Rawls, Singer, Habermas, Brownlee, Smith, and Markovits. It appears implausible, absent further explanation, to contend that the constrained form of lawbreaking associated with civil disobedience is a greater challenge to democratic authority than conscientious objection (Brownlee, 2012 , pp. 174–178).

Second, consider the claim that negative consequences would follow if civil disobedients, like conscientious objectors, were permitted to employ legal defenses that might reduce prospects of punishment. Horder, for instance, suggests that granting an excusatory defense for civil disobedience might entail “unwelcome follow-on threats to common goods, such as a greater willingness amongst protest movements at large to forego a preference for law-abiding protest in favour of rights violations” (Horder, 2004 , p. 224). This concern has some affinity with the familiar worry that removing the threat of punishment would encourage more people to engage in civil disobedience, which could be seen as particularly troublesome if it functions as an incentive to civilly disobey in the name of frivolous or mistaken causes.

There are two potential responses to this concern. The first is to endorse a presumption against punishing civil disobedience but to allow the courts to impose other forms of sanction for this offense. This approach is favored by David Lefkowitz, who utilizes the distinction between punishment as a mode of sanction that expresses moral disapproval and penalties that lack such a condemnatory dimension. Civil disobedience should not be punished on this account, but penalties can be imposed as a means of deterring excessive or frivolous forms of protest (Lefkowitz, 2007 , pp. 218–219). The second response is to endorse a presumption against all forms of legal sanction, including punishment and penalties but to allow that this presumption can be overridden in certain circumstances. This approach is favored by Brownlee. Her argument challenges the assumption that non-punishment of civil disobedience will necessarily foster a preference for protest that entails “rights-violations.” It is by no means evident that the constrained forms of law violation involved in civil disobedience necessarily amount to infringements of other persons’ rights. It is, furthermore, disrespectful of a person’s autonomy to impose sanctions on the grounds that doing so is necessary to deter undesirable conduct of others (Brownlee, 2012 , p. 174). Insofar as there is compelling reason to believe that an unlawful protest entails rights-violations, or that the case for sanctions as a deterrent is overwhelming, the presumption against punishment may be overridden. In such, hopefully rare, circumstances, “it would be appropriate for judges to acknowledge that punishment is a necessary evil and that an apology is due to the civil disobedients whom they censure” (Brownlee, 2012 , p. 251). Defense lawyers, solicitors, and juries also have special roles to play in softening the blow of the law upon protesters and in emphasizing the valuable service that conscientious disobedience can provide to a society.

The Government

The police and the courts tend to be at the forefront of the state’s response to conscientious disobedience, for the simple reason that these state actors hold primary responsibility for detecting and dealing with unlawful activity. This should not obscure the role that government bodies, particularly the legislature, play in shaping the environment within which police and legal actors react to conscientious dissent. The influence of such bodies can be attributed to their role in crafting the relevant legislative frameworks within which police and courts operate, as well as their impact on the tenor of public discussion.

Few philosophers have given sustained attention to the normative issues surrounding governments’ treatment of conscientious disobedience, but several authors have defended approaches that are broadly tolerant or respectful of this practice. In relation to conscientious objection, Raz foregrounds the role of the legislature in anticipating and avoiding clashes between law and conscience. There are, according to Raz, powerful objections against introducing a general legal defense of conscientious objection, such as the danger of abuse and the difficulty of ascertaining whether the defense should apply to a given case. This should not be taken as a basis for intolerant treatments of conscientious objection but rather emphasizes that “the main device for protecting freedom of conscience is and must in any case be the avoidance of laws to which people are likely to have conscientious objection” (Raz, 1979 , p. 288). This approach requires that governments be sensitive to the moral and prudential case for not subjecting citizens to unwelcome interference in relation to areas that are likely to implicate matters of deep personal conviction. If it is necessary to introduce laws that might lead to conflicts between law and conscience, the government should anticipate this through incorporating “general exemptions from law for categories of people identified independently of their moral views” (Raz, 1979 , p. 288).

Of course, governments may be unable to anticipate potential clashes between law and conscience in this way. In cases where people object to legal compliance on grounds of sincere conviction, governments should therefore remain open to the moral case for revising law and policy and introducing exemptions after the fact. This does not necessarily require that an exemption be granted; as Emanuela Ceva notes, “the concession of conscientious exemptions is not a matter for principled argumentation, but an issue whose case-by-case evaluation must be open to consequence-sensitive considerations concerning the impact that any given exemption could have on the rights of others” (Ceva, 2015 , p. 48). The basic requirement is that lawmaking bodies should be receptive to claims of deep belief, even in circumstances where such claims are advanced in the public realm through acts of conscientious objection. These acts should not trigger condemnation but rather an authentic deliberative process that identifies and weighs the relevant factors before reaching a considered judgment. As an aside, it is worth noting that the formulation and dissemination of standards through norm-setting bodies at the international or global level can inform dispute resolutions at national or local levels. The promotion of a right to conscientious objection in the medical profession, for instance, has involved the formulation of guidelines by bodies such as the World Health Organization. 5

In relation to civil disobedience, the good of respecting conscientious conduct suggests that lawmakers and policymakers should work with police and courts to make accommodating approaches more (rather than less) likely. Often governments reject such an approach, preferring laws and policies that increase the likelihood of repressive forms of policing and punitive legal sanctions. For example, social movement scholars have examined the ways in which policymakers in several democratic societies tend to encourage the adoption of command-and-control policing of large-scale protests. As Della Porta and Reiter note, “tolerance of minor violations was undermined by a bipartisan agreement between right-wing and centre-left parties to label any form of direct action (such as occupations or roadblocks) or even symbolic actions of civil disobedience (such as paying only half-price for public services or books) as violent” (Della Porta & Reiter, 2006 , pp. 184–185). This reveals the importance of differentiating civil disobedience from modes of conduct, such as terrorism, in order to guard against the danger that officials will exploit indeterminacy or vagueness in public order statutes or national security legislation as an excuse for improper extensions of the category of illegitimate protest.

The case for accommodation might be resisted on the grounds that communication of convictions through acts of civil disobedience is not necessarily worthy of respect, particularly in cases where the relevant convictions are misguided or abhorrent. In response, it is important to note that the object of respect is not necessarily the content of our convictions but the constrained and conscientious nature of our disobedient conduct.

In fact, it is possible to envisage government response to civil disobedience that would tend to increase, rather than diminish, the extent to which protesters’ convictions are exposed to critical scrutiny. Hannah Arendt, writing about the wave of civil disobedience that swept through the United States in the wake of the civil rights and students’ movements, suggested that authorities should “deal with civil-disobedient groups in the same way as with pressure groups, which, through their representatives—that is, registered lobbyists—are permitted to influence and ‘assist’ Congress by means of persuasion, qualified opinion, and the numbers of their constituents” (Arendt, 1972 , p. 101). Smith builds on this suggestion by suggesting that the complaints of civil disobedients could be treated as in-puts to either consultative or appellate mechanisms, depending on whether their protest is against a proposed or existing law or policy. These mechanisms could take the form of a specially convened public commission or inquiry, existing institutional forums or committees that are relevant to the contested policy area, or—most ambitiously—a permanent body set up for the purpose of hearing complaints from civil disobedients. This republican proposal has the advantage of providing a political forum within which a dialogic exchange between policymakers and protesters could be staged, allowing for both sides of a particular controversy to be aired and interrogated. The forum would enjoy a certain advantage over courts as deliberative venues, in that it would allow for a discussion on the merits of the broader issues that is not limited by the imperative of arriving at determinations of innocence or guilt before the law (Smith, 2013 , pp. 127–135). The precise institutional form of a dialogue between protesters and policymakers is less significant than the underlying imperative that public authorities should engage with civil disobedience, rather than treat it as a nuisance that is merely to be tolerated or—as is more commonly the case—a threat to be deterred.

This article has surveyed some of the more significant themes in the philosophical literature on civil disobedience and conscientious objection, but it is far from definitive. There are, for instance, a number of important issues not addressed in depth here, which are nonetheless significant for both established and—in particular—emerging scholarship in this area. First, in addition to reflection on matters of justification and rights, there is considerable interest on the moral duty to engage in conscientious disobedience (Walzer, 1970 ; Delmas, 2014 ). Second, there is growing recognition that persons may have legitimate reasons to civilly disobey the actions of a state that is not their own or the actions of governance or non-governance agencies at the international, transnational, or global levels (Caney, 2015 ; Celikates, 2015 ). Third, there is increasing interest in the relationship between traditional forms of conscientious disobedience and forms of dissent—such as hacktivism, distributed denial of server actions, and digitally based dissemination of classified documents or sensitive information—that take place in the virtual or online realm (Sauter, 2014 ; Scheuerman, 2016 ). These themes illustrate the continued relevance of conscientious disobedience to democratic practice, as well as the considerable scope for further philosophical reflection on its ethical and political dimensions.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Candice Delmas, the editors and anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. They also wish to thank Fay Niker for her research assistance. William Smith acknowledges the support of the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Project No. CU14409814). Kimberley Brownlee acknowledges the support of a Philip Leverhulme Prize from the Leverhulme Trust.

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1. This communicative conception of conscientious conduct is elaborated at length in Brownlee ( 2012 , pp. 29–47).

2. On Gandhi’s complex attitudes towards persuasion and coercion in relation to civil disobedience, see Haksar ( 2003 ). On King and the US Civil Rights movement, see Stears ( 2010 , pp. 153–159).

3. This case would be different—and perhaps better classified as civil disobedience—if the registrar frames her defiance as part of a campaign against the legislation permitting same-sex marriage. We thank Candice Delmas for this point.

4. The concept of personal disobedience is discussed in Brownlee ( 2012 , pp. 27–28).

5. See the WHO website: http://www.ipas.org/en/The-Storehouse-for-Abortion-Law-and-Policy/Conscientious-objection/WHO-resources.aspx .

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Home — Essay Samples — Social Issues — Social Movements — Civil Disobedience

Essays on Civil Disobedience

Hook examples for civil disobedience essays, the echoes of thoreau hook.

Begin your essay by revisiting the influential writings of Henry David Thoreau. Explore his essay "Civil Disobedience" and its enduring impact on movements for social and political change.

The Power of Nonviolent Resistance Hook

Examine the concept of nonviolent resistance as a form of civil disobedience. Discuss iconic figures like Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., who used peaceful protest to effect transformative change.

From Suffragettes to Sit-Ins Hook

Trace the history of civil disobedience movements. Highlight pivotal moments, such as the suffragette movement or lunch counter sit-ins during the civil rights era, to illustrate the diversity of causes and methods.

The Moral Obligation Hook

Explore the ethical and moral underpinnings of civil disobedience. Discuss the idea that individuals engage in acts of protest not only to challenge unjust laws but also as a moral duty to uphold justice.

Environmental Activism and Civil Disobedience Hook

Connect civil disobedience to contemporary environmental movements. Analyze the actions of activists who engage in acts of protest to raise awareness about climate change and environmental conservation.

The Digital Age of Civil Disobedience Hook

Discuss the role of technology and social media in modern civil disobedience. Explore how digital platforms have empowered activists to mobilize, organize, and advocate for change on a global scale.

The Legal and Ethical Boundaries Hook

Examine the fine line between civil disobedience and lawbreaking. Discuss the ethical considerations of breaking the law for a just cause and the consequences faced by individuals who engage in acts of protest.

Lessons from International Movements Hook

Look beyond national borders and explore civil disobedience in international contexts. Investigate movements like the Arab Spring or Hong Kong's pro-democracy protests to gain insights into global struggles for change.

Artistic Expression and Civil Disobedience Hook

Highlight the intersection of art and civil disobedience. Discuss how artists have used their creative talents to convey powerful messages and challenge societal norms, sparking conversations and change.

Thoreau's Civil Disobedience: a Philosophical Exploration

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Does Disobedience Promote Social Progress

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Civil Disobedience and Its Importance for Better Changes

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Review of Henry David Thoreau’s Writing, Civil Disobedience

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Civil disobedience is a form of nonviolent resistance characterized by the deliberate and conscientious violation of laws, rules, or policies enacted by a governing authority, with the aim of challenging perceived injustices or promoting social change. Rooted in the belief that certain laws or actions are morally or ethically unacceptable, civil disobedience involves individuals or groups engaging in peaceful acts of protest or defiance to bring attention to and challenge oppressive systems, discriminatory practices, or unjust policies.

Civil disobedience, as a concept and practice, has its origins in various historical contexts and philosophical traditions. It traces its roots back to ancient times, with examples of individuals and groups engaging in acts of resistance against unjust laws or oppressive regimes. However, the modern concept of civil disobedience emerged prominently in the 19th and 20th centuries. One significant influence on the development of civil disobedience was the philosophy of Henry David Thoreau, an American writer and transcendentalist. In his essay "Civil Disobedience" (1849), Thoreau advocated for the idea that individuals have a moral duty to resist unjust laws and government actions. His writings inspired many subsequent activists and thinkers, including Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., who employed civil disobedience as a means of achieving social and political change. Throughout history, civil disobedience has been utilized by various movements and individuals advocating for different causes, such as the suffragettes fighting for women's rights, the civil rights movement in the United States, and protests against oppressive regimes worldwide. Civil disobedience has often been employed as a nonviolent strategy to challenge unjust policies, raise awareness, and prompt dialogue and reform.

1. Mahatma Gandhi: Gandhi, a leader in India's struggle for independence from British rule, popularized the concept of nonviolent resistance. His approach to civil disobedience, known as Satyagraha, emphasized peaceful resistance, civil disobedience, and self-sacrifice. 2. Martin Luther King Jr.: A prominent leader in the American civil rights movement, King advocated for racial equality and justice. He utilized civil disobedience tactics, such as peaceful protests and boycotts, to challenge racial segregation and discrimination in the United States. 3. Rosa Parks: Parks is widely known for her pivotal role in the civil rights movement. By refusing to give up her bus seat to a white passenger in Montgomery, Alabama, she sparked the Montgomery Bus Boycott, a significant event in the fight against racial segregation. 4. Nelson Mandela: Mandela, an anti-apartheid activist and former president of South Africa, fought against racial oppression through civil disobedience. He spent 27 years in prison for his activism before becoming a symbol of resistance and reconciliation.

1. Nonviolent Protests: Nonviolent protests involve gathering in public spaces to express dissent peacefully. This can include sit-ins, marches, rallies, or public demonstrations that aim to raise awareness, disrupt systems, and challenge the status quo. 2. Civil Disobedience Campaigns: Civil disobedience campaigns involve planned actions where participants deliberately and openly violate specific laws or regulations to highlight their unjust nature. This could include acts such as public acts of defiance, refusal to pay taxes, or intentional acts of civil disobedience. 3. Boycotts: Boycotts involve the organized refusal to engage with or purchase goods or services from institutions or businesses that support or perpetuate unjust practices. Economic pressure is used as a means to bring attention to the cause and prompt change. 4. Civil Resistance: Civil resistance encompasses a range of nonviolent actions aimed at disrupting or obstructing unjust systems. This can include acts of noncooperation, such as strikes, walkouts, or work slowdowns, to challenge oppressive policies or practices. 5. Symbolic Actions: Symbolic actions are often employed in civil disobedience to convey a message or draw attention to an issue. This can include public gestures, artistic expressions, or symbolic acts that resonate with the cause and create a visual impact.

1. Nonviolent Resistance: Civil disobedience is rooted in the principle of nonviolence. It rejects the use of physical force and instead relies on peaceful means to challenge unjust laws or policies. By refusing to resort to violence, civil disobedience aims to demonstrate moral integrity and inspire change through empathy and compassion. 2. Conscious Lawbreaking: Civil disobedience involves a deliberate and conscious violation of specific laws or regulations that are deemed unjust or oppressive. Participants willingly accept the legal consequences of their actions, viewing their acts of defiance as a way to expose and challenge unjust systems. 3. Moral and Ethical Grounding: Civil disobedience is driven by a strong moral and ethical conviction. Participants believe that their actions are morally justified and that they have a responsibility to stand up against injustice. It often emerges from a deep commitment to core principles such as equality, human rights, and social justice. 4. Public and Symbolic Nature: Civil disobedience typically takes place in public spaces to maximize visibility and impact. By engaging in acts of protest openly, participants seek to raise awareness, spark dialogue, and encourage others to question the legitimacy of unjust laws or policies. Symbolic gestures and actions are often employed to convey a powerful message and evoke empathy or solidarity. 5. Pursuit of Change and Reconciliation: Civil disobedience is not merely an act of rebellion; it is a call for change and reconciliation. It aims to prompt dialogue, create pressure for reform, and ultimately lead to a more just and equitable society. By highlighting the flaws in existing systems, civil disobedience seeks to initiate constructive discussions and foster positive transformation.

1. Literature: One notable literary representation of civil disobedience is Henry David Thoreau's essay "Civil Disobedience." Thoreau's work inspired future activists, including Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., and has become a foundational text in understanding the philosophy and practice of civil disobedience. 2. Film: The movie "Selma" (2014) directed by Ava DuVernay portrays the civil rights march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama, led by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. The film depicts the nonviolent civil disobedience strategies employed by activists to combat racial discrimination and secure voting rights. 3. Music: The song "We Shall Overcome" has become an anthem for civil rights movements around the world. It originated as a gospel hymn and was later adapted as a protest song during the civil rights movement in the United States. Its powerful lyrics and melody capture the spirit of solidarity and resilience in the face of oppression.

1. One significant example of civil disobedience is Rosa Parks' refusal to give up her seat to a white passenger on a segregated bus in Montgomery, Alabama, in 1955. This act of defiance sparked the Montgomery Bus Boycott, which lasted for over a year and played a pivotal role in the civil rights movement. 2. Mahatma Gandhi's Salt March in 1930 is another notable act of civil disobedience. In protest against British colonial salt laws, Gandhi and his followers marched over 240 miles to the Arabian Sea to make their own salt. This event garnered international attention and highlighted the power of nonviolent resistance in the fight for Indian independence. 3. In recent years, the climate change movement has witnessed acts of civil disobedience on a global scale. One prominent example is the formation of Extinction Rebellion, a socio-political movement that employs nonviolent civil disobedience to demand urgent action on climate change. Their protests and disruptive actions have gained attention worldwide, raising awareness about the need for immediate and transformative environmental policies.

Civil disobedience is an important and captivating topic to explore in an essay due to its profound impact on society, history, and the pursuit of justice. It provides a lens through which to examine the power of individuals and communities in challenging unjust laws and oppressive systems. By examining the history and philosophy of civil disobedience, an essay can shed light on the transformative role it has played in various movements, from the civil rights movement to environmental activism. It invites reflection on the ethical and moral dimensions of dissent and resistance in the face of injustice. Furthermore, exploring civil disobedience allows for an examination of the tension between law and morality, and the role of dissent in shaping a more equitable society. It prompts critical analysis of the relationship between citizens and their governments, highlighting the importance of civil liberties and the exercise of individual agency.

1. Arendt, H. (1972). Crises of the Republic. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 2. Brownlee, K. (2012). Civil disobedience. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/civil-disobedience/ 3. Gandhi, M. K. (1907). Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule. Navajivan Publishing House. 4. King, M. L. (1963). Letter from Birmingham Jail. In J. M. Washington (Ed.), A testament of hope: The essential writings and speeches of Martin Luther King Jr. (pp. 289-302). HarperOne. 5. Martin, B. (2007). Defining civil disobedience. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 35(1), 3-26. 6. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press. 7. Rawls, J. (1999). The justification of civil disobedience. In Collected papers (pp. 525-546). Harvard University Press. 8. Raz, J. (1979). The rule of law and its virtue. In The authority of law: Essays on law and morality (pp. 210-241). Oxford University Press. 9. Simmons, J. (2009). Civil disobedience and the duty to obey the law. Cambridge University Press. 10. Thoreau, H. D. (1849). Civil Disobedience. In Resistance to Civil Government. Cosimo Classics.

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Civil Disobedience in the Reasoning of the European Court Of Human Rights

The objective of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of the legal value of civil disobedience, shed light upon its soundness as a doctrine, legality of its tactics and its significance for constitutional democracies. The study first presents the most debated features of civil disobedience to provide a model definition for its usage. It puts forward argumentation taken from the theories of justice, responsive law, democracy and the rule of law. Finally, it analyzes conditions to the wide justification and future recognition of civil disobedience by examining the reasoning defended by the European Court of Human Rights.

Related Papers

Frederic J M S Megret

This article argues that there is an increasing trend of civil society resorting to civil disobedience in relation to international legal values. International law, however, has not caught up with this trend. In fact, both international law and civil disobedience can gain much from a better understanding of their interaction. The article briefly traces the record of arguments drawn from international law in civil disobedience cases, highlights the theoretical constraints of the debate, and seeks to throw some basic foundations for an international legal theory of legitimate civil disobedience.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

Karolina Rozmarynowska (Dominik)

Dansk Filosofisk Selskabs årsmøde 2017 & "Engaging the Contemporary", University of Malta

Lisbet Rosenfeldt Svanøe

Danish Yearbook of Philosophy

The article argues that civil disobedience must be perceived as an action with progressive and political significance, thus reflecting, from a Kantian perspective, the recognizable paradox between morality and law, as expressed in Kant's moral and political writings. Hence, this article firstly analyzes on which grounds Kant claims rebellion to be unjust. Secondly, it examines how and if people, from a Kantian point of view, can defend themselves against an unjust sovereignty. On this basis, it argues that 'civil disobedience' can be juxtaposed with the Kantian idea of 'freedom of the pen,' thus having the same function as a political corrective. However, two questions are still to be answered, namely if civil disobedience must be punished, and if civil disobedience as a political corrective can be justified? By considering civil disobedience primarily as political agency, both questions are answered in the affirmative.

Res Publica

Kimberley Brownlee

(Des)troços: revista de pensamento radical

Adopting a genealogical methodology, this paper aims to unveil the historical intricacies of civil concept and the liberal model of civil disobedience. As suggested by Hanson, there has been a Resistance to civil government later republished as Civil disobedience that goes from its editors until Gandhi. By the same token, there has been a second process, not of selective appropriation per se, but of colonization in which authors of the liberal model of civil disobedience impose a series of theoretical constraints in the form of constitutive elements that ought to be fulfilled in order for a political movement to be considered a legitimate case of civil disobedience. This has resulted in civil disobedients being required to recognize the legitimacy of legal and political systems and to demand changes only within the boundaries of the rule of law. Conversely, we suggest a different and radical approach to civil disobedience, one that acknowledges that civil-base, i.e., determined from real political actions and not necessarily centered on legal foundations or normative status.

Modern Law Review

Pok Yin S Chow

Since the enactment of the Human Rights Act, the law concerning civil disobedience has changed dramatically. Originally sceptical about this form of protest activity, the UK courts now recognise the value of civil disobedience and the need for its protection on the grounds of free expression and assembly. Yet, as lawbreaking plays a crucial part in civil disobedience, the shift in judicial attitude may also affect how we view civil disobedience as a constitutional practice. This article reviews the change in direction in the development of case law on civil disobedience and discusses its constitutional significance. It argues that a more tolerant approach to civil disobedience will strengthen constitutional democracy.

<Abstract> In this paper I will make some critical comments on the most widely accepted theory of civil disobedience developed by John Rawls. Based on that foundation, I develop a theory of democratic resistance which is to be understood as a weapon of the people to resist structural oppression and domination and to combat the abuse of democratic institutions by the privileged groups. Then I am going to explain the concept of the basic structure of imputation which though consists mainly of legal norms, but also forms new moral rights and duties, because the person-to-person relationships in daily life are shaped and determined by this basic structure. Based on the discussions above, I would like to define the idea of the rule of law in a new fashion: The rule of law, in one crucial aspect, means that people autonomously decide the reasonable basic structure of imputation by the procedure of constitutional democracy. The principles of

Mateusz Pilich

The article takes up the difficult problem of the so-called disobedience of judges against the background of the experiences of the Polish departure from constitutional democracy in 2015–2020. The special role and responsibility of a judge in the state imposes restrictions on her freedom of opinion in the public sphere. Openly manifesting opposition to government policy, which in the case of an ordinary citizen is only the implementation of human rights and freedoms, may be described as controversial and contrary to applicable ethical regulations. The main thesis of this paper is the assertion that although judges who act as impartial arbitrators in disputes should generally refrain from ostentatiously opposing the actions of political authorities, they are not deprived of the possibility of protest. Also in the exercise of office, and not outside the sphere of their duties, judges should take into account overriding moral values that should be implemented by the legal order, and no...

Indiana International & Comparative Law Review

Joseph Zand

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Trump’s Trial Lawyer Gambled a Gilded Manhattan Career to Represent Him

Todd Blanche was a prosecutor and worked for a prestigious firm. Now, he is the principal lawyer for Donald Trump as he becomes the first former president to face prosecution.

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By Maggie Haberman ,  Ben Protess and Alan Feuer

Just over a year ago, Todd Blanche was a registered New York Democrat and a partner at Wall Street’s oldest law firm, where the nation’s corporate elite go for legal help. Now, he is a registered Florida Republican who runs his own firm, where the biggest client is a man both famous and infamous for his legal troubles: Donald J. Trump.

Mr. Blanche recently bought a home in Palm Beach County near Mr. Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate. He brought his family to Mr. Trump’s campaign celebration there on Super Tuesday. And during Mr. Trump’s first criminal trial, set to begin in Manhattan on April 15, he will use space at 40 Wall Street, the former president’s office tower near the courthouse.

After a well-credentialed career as a federal prosecutor and a white-collar defense lawyer, Mr. Blanche, 49, has bet his professional future on representing Mr. Trump, the first former U.S. president to be indicted.

It was a striking career move — forfeiting a lucrative law firm partnership to represent a man notorious for cycling through lawyers and ignoring their bills — that has baffled Mr. Blanche’s former colleagues at the U.S. attorney’s office in the Southern District of New York.

Many have privately questioned, at social events and in informal alumni gatherings, why he would upend his life and risk his reputation for Mr. Trump, whose refusal to acknowledge his loss in the 2020 election has become a chasm in the U.S. political and legal systems. Many prominent lawyers have refused to represent the former president, they note, and three of Mr. Trump’s former lawyers are now witnesses against him.

Mr. Blanche’s decision to defend Mr. Trump in three of the former president’s four criminal cases has pushed the lawyer outside his comfort zone. He developed a reputation as a skilled courtroom prosecutor — working in the same office as Alvin L. Bragg, now the Manhattan district attorney prosecuting Mr. Trump — but has far less experience at the defense table. Mr. Trump’s Manhattan case will be only his second criminal trial as a defense lawyer, and one of his few state court engagements.

Despite the risks, Mr. Blanche has much to gain from Mr. Trump. No longer just another high-priced defense lawyer in a city full of them, Mr. Blanche is handling the country’s most significant criminal case, raising his profile and creating a question about whether a door would open for him in a second Trump administration.

He jokes about having his eye on an ambassadorship to Italy, friends say, although he often says he has no actual interest in a government job. Still, many assume he would welcome the chance to run his old office, the Southern District, a role that the agency’s alumni covet.

As the Manhattan trial draws near, some of his former Southern District colleagues have come to Mr. Blanche’s defense, noting that every defendant, no matter how polarizing, is entitled to capable counsel.

“I have heard from a good number of people in the S.D.N.Y. who have said, ‘Why the heck would Todd do this — why would he ever take this case?’” said Elie Honig, the CNN senior legal analyst, who worked with Mr. Blanche at the Southern District and speaks highly of him. “My response is, generally, when did we become pearl-clutchers about defense lawyers defending defendants?”

“That’s what the job is and what our system requires,” he added.

Mr. Blanche has his hands full. He is the lead counsel on both Mr. Trump’s trial in Manhattan on charges that he covered up a sex scandal surrounding his 2016 presidential campaign, as well as the case in Fort Pierce, Fla., where he is charged under the Espionage Act over his retaining of sensitive government documents after he left office. Mr. Blanche is also a co-counsel in Mr. Trump’s federal case in Washington on charges that he conspired to defraud the United States with his efforts to overturn his 2020 election loss.

At the heart of the strategy used by Mr. Blanche and his colleagues on the Trump legal team is a favorite Trump tactic: stalling.

The defense team has sought to delay the trials as long as possible, hoping to push them past Election Day, and Mr. Trump’s associates privately say they see it working. In the case brought by the Manhattan district attorney, the judge recently granted a three-week delay, though he has rejected Mr. Blanche’s effort to postpone the case further.

Mr. Blanche, who is working on the Manhattan case with Susan Necheles, a veteran defense lawyer, is not a total newcomer to Mr. Trump’s world. With the blessing of his former law firm, Cadwalader, Mr. Blanche had in recent years represented other associates of the former president, including Paul Manafort, his onetime campaign chairman, and Boris Ephsteyn, a roving adviser.

Last April, he founded Blanche Law in New York and began defending Mr. Trump himself.

His fees, like those of other Trump lawyers, have been paid through Save America, the political action committee seeded with tens of millions of small-dollar donations that Mr. Trump raised as he pushed false claims of widespread election fraud in November 2020 and after. The PAC paid Cadwalader roughly $420,000 when Mr. Blanche was representing Mr. Epshteyn, while Blanche Law has been paid just over $3 million since April 2023, federal records show.

While no one’s job in Mr. Trump’s world is ever safe, Mr. Blanche is enjoying an extended honeymoon, developing a reputation in Mr. Trump’s orbit for reading him well.

Some of Mr. Blanche’s friends said that they had perceived him to be a centrist, law-and-order Democrat, whose politics were not so at odds with Mr. Trump that his transition to voting as a Republican was especially jarring.

They describe him as deeply loyal to the people he cares about, and a true believer in the notion that Mr. Trump should not face trial in the Manhattan case. Mr. Blanche has a competitive streak — he has finished two full Ironman races — but by Trump lawyer standards, he is nonconfrontational and soft-spoken. He also is uninterested in appearing on television, even though Mr. Trump often likes to see his lawyers onscreen.

Although Mr. Trump usually doesn’t refer to Mr. Blanche as a “fighter,” one of. his highest accolades, he does tell associates that his lawyer is smart and doing a good job. In recent court appearances, the two men have seemed almost chummy, whispering frequently to one another at the defense table.

Mr. Blanche’s decision to move to Florida reflected how fundamentally his representation of Mr. Trump has influenced not only Mr. Blanche’s professional life, but his personal one. Mr. Blanche’s wife, a doctor, has joined him in Florida, where he had for some time been looking to move for family reasons, and where he maximizes his time with a client who doesn’t like being scheduled. He commutes to New York for trial matters.

The website of Mr. Blanche’s firm briefly listed its address as Mr. Trump’s building at 40 Wall Street, where the former president has repeatedly held news conferences after court appearances. Two people close to Mr. Blanche, who were not authorized to discuss the situation publicly, said the space was a temporary war room; the address was removed from the firm’s website after The New York Times asked the campaign about the arrangement.

Bruce Green, who teaches legal ethics at Fordham Law School in New York, said he didn’t see a problem with Mr. Blanche’s tight bond with Mr. Trump, although he did question whether it could affect the lawyer’s judgment.

“Lots of defendants don’t trust their lawyers, but here there’s obviously a good relationship,” Mr. Green said. “Still, while it’s important to have trust, it’s also important to have a sense of detachment. If you drink the Kool-Aid, so to speak, it could impair your willingness to tell a client hard truths.”

Many of the arguments that Mr. Blanche has raised on behalf of Mr. Trump, the presumptive Republican nominee for president, echoed the former president’s own laments about his criminal cases. In filings and hearings, Mr. Blanche has painted a picture of the former president as the victim of partisan attacks from Democrats and has attacked the cases themselves as attempts to derail Mr. Trump’s campaign for the White House.

Even some seemingly casual phrases Mr. Blanche has woven into his court filings appear designed with the client’s perspective in mind. In papers recently filed in the classified document case, he referred offhandedly to Mr. Trump’s “first term” in office, implying that there would be a second.

At times, his rhetoric has irritated the judge overseeing the Manhattan criminal case. Just last week, the judge wrote in an order that while he welcomed “zealous advocacy and creative lawyering,” he also expected attorneys to “demonstrate the proper respect and decorum that is owed to the courts.” Sending a none-too-subtle shot across the bow, the judge reminded Mr. Blanche’s team of his power to punish disobedience with criminal contempt.

The judge, Juan M. Merchan, also lambasted Mr. Blanche in a courtroom full of reporters last week, rebuking him for not directly answering a question. (Mr. Blanche apologized.) When Mr. Blanche accused the district attorney’s office of prosecutorial misconduct, Justice Merchan questioned how long Mr. Blanche had worked as a prosecutor, implying that he should have known better than to have leveled that claim.

Mr. Blanche joined the Southern District in 1999, not as a prosecutor, but as a paralegal. He worked days and went to Brooklyn Law School at night, commuting from Long Island. Mr. Blanche, who was married at 20 and a grandfather in his 40s, conveyed a decidedly middle-class vibe at an office known for its Ivy League pedigree.

When he returned to the Southern District a few years later as a prosecutor, he focused largely on violent crime, rather than the white-collar cases that prosecutors have parlayed into lucrative law firm jobs. Mr. Blanche ultimately became a co-leader of the Southern District’s violent crimes unit.

As a violent crimes prosecutor, Mr. Blanche was responsible for handling a variety of unsavory cooperating witnesses, including drug dealers and murderers. That experience, his former colleagues said, showed a contrarian streak and an empathetic side that explains his decision to essentially put his career on the line for someone as divisive as Mr. Trump.

Sabrina Shroff, a longtime federal defender, recalled that as a prosecutor Mr. Blanche had once dropped robbery charges against one of her clients after she demonstrated to him that the case should be dismissed.

“It would have been easy to write my client off,” she said, “and he didn’t.”

Nicole Hong contributed reporting, and Kitty Bennett contributed research.

Maggie Haberman is a senior political correspondent reporting on the 2024 presidential campaign, down ballot races across the country and the investigations into former President Donald J. Trump. More about Maggie Haberman

Ben Protess is an investigative reporter at The Times, writing about public corruption. He has been covering the various criminal investigations into former President Trump and his allies. More about Ben Protess

Alan Feuer covers extremism and political violence for The Times, focusing on the criminal cases involving the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol and against former President Donald J. Trump.  More about Alan Feuer

Our Coverage of the Trump Hush-Money Case

The manhattan district attorney has filed charges against former president donald trump over a hush-money payment to a porn star on the eve of the 2016 election..

Taking the Case to Trial: Trump is all but certain to become the first former U.S. president to stand trial on criminal charges after a judge denied his effort to delay the proceeding and confirmed it will begin on April 15 .

Implications for Trump: As the case goes to trial, the former president’s inner circle sees a silver lining in the timing. But Trump wouldn’t be able to pardon himself  should he become president again as he could if found guilty in the federal cases against him.

Michael Cohen: Trump’s former fixer was not an essential witness in the former president’s civil fraud trial in New York  that concluded in January. But he will be when he takes the stand in the hush-money case .

Stormy Daniels: The chain of events flowing from a 2006 encounter that the adult film star said she had with Trump has led to the brink of a historic trial. Here's a look inside the hush-money payout .