digital public goods essay

What is a Digital Public Good (DPG)?

The DPGA is guided by the release of the UN Secretary-General’s Roadmap for Digital Cooperation , defining a digital public good as open source software, open data, open AI models, open standards and open content that adhere to the DPG Standard and are of high relevance for attainment of the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) .

The Digital Public Goods Standard ( DPG Standard ) ​

The DPG Standard establishes the baseline requirements that must be met in order to earn recognition as a digital public good (DPG).

A Digital Public Good must meet the DPG Standard's 9 Key Indicators ( more details on the indicators here ):

• Advance the SDGs;
• Use of an approved open license;
• Clear Ownership
• Platform Independence
• Documentation
• Mechanism for Extracting Data
• Adherence to Privacy and Applicable Laws
• Adherence to Standards & Best Practices
• Do No Harm by design (including steps to address privacy, security, inappropriate and illegal content, and protection from harassment)

Meeting and utilizing the DPG Standard and the DPG Registry is essential to a successful DPGA country engagement pilot, as doing so helps inform future country engagement activities and test the DPG Standard and DPG Registry in action. These concepts are described in more detail below.

You can also have startups take this eligibility questionnaire to see if their solution is ready for nomination yet.

The Digital Public Goods Registry ( DPG Registry ) ​

The DPG Registry includes digital public goods that have either been nominated directly or have been pulled together from partnership databases. Once a nominated DPG has been reviewed against the DPG Standard, it is considered a DPG and labeled as such in the registry.

Therefore, the DPG Registry is an important starting point to see if there is already an existing DPG (or startup solution) that is similar in nature that can be reused for the particular problem the startup is trying to solve for.

On the DPG Registry, you can use the data explorer to filter by:

• Status: to see nominated projects vs. confirmed DPGs;
• Type: Software, AI Model, Content, Data, Standard; or
• Sustainable Development Goal .

How does a startup or project become a digital public good? ​

Anyone can submit a DPG nomination , but we highly recommend that the project owner submits, as they have access to required resources, documentation, and information about the project.

For more details on the DPG Nomination process, and what documentation is required, please head to the "Nominating a DPG" section of the guide.

Digital Public Goods Advocacy Resources ​

DPG Advocacy Resources Folder :

1. DPG Presentation to Accelerators (including benefits for accelerators as listed in this guide)

2. DPG Full Slide Template Branding

3. (Updated Oct 2021) DPG Presentation to General Audience – Why and How to Become a DPG

4. (Updated Q2 2021) DPG Presentation to General Audience – Why and How to Become a DPG

• The Digital Public Goods Standard (DPG Standard)
• The Digital Public Goods Registry (DPG Registry)
• How does a startup or project become a digital public good?
• Digital Public Goods Advocacy Resources

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• Ongoing Work
• Digital Public Goods

Promoting open-source solutions for a more equitable world

To unlock a more equitable world, a global effort is needed to encourage and invest in the creation of digital public goods: open-source software, open data, open artificial intelligence models, open standards and open content. This is key to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Digital public goods should adhere to privacy and other applicable laws, standards and best practices, do no harm. The Roadmap particularly highlights the role played by the Digital Public Goods Alliance, which was established in response to the High-Level Panel’s recommendation on Digital Public Goods, and with which the Office works closely.

The following outlines the key recommendations of the Roadmap and ongoing efforts to work towards these outcomes.

1-page brief

Workplan of Roundtable

• Get involved

5 ways digital public goods are powering the Global Goals

September 20, 2022.

From delivering health and education services to connecting displaced persons with humanitarian aid, digital public goods are critical to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.

The COVID-19 pandemic and other global crises have set back progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). And for two years in a row, the world has lost ground on human development, according to the latest Human Development Report .

To make up this lost ground and supercharge progress towards achieving the SDGs by the target date of 2030 – a mere eight years from now – the world needs powerful tools and strategies for transformation. And as nations strive towards the SDGs, attention now coalesces on digital public infrastructure (DPI). With digital public goods (DPG) as its foundation, DPI can deliver a generational leap in societal development.

In 2021, UNDP became a co-host of the Digital Public Goods Alliance , stewarding the global community towards forming the digital infrastructure that delivers whole-of-society benefits. Building inclusive digital public infrastructure can boost progress on multiple SDGs, including reducing poverty, improving governance and building climate resilience.

Here are five ways digital public goods are powering progress on the Global Goals.

1. Winning against COVID (Goal 3)

The COVID-19 Vaccine Intelligence Network (CoWIN) is the digital backbone of India’s COVID-19 vaccination drive – one of the world’s largest. The open and inclusive platform aims for universal vaccination and enables monitoring of vaccine utilization, coverage and wastage throughout the system. CoWIN has achieved great results, facilitating the delivery of 1.3 billion vaccinations in under a year across 327,000 centres serviced by over 1 million healthcare workers. Plans are underway for CoWIN to become an accredited DPG

On the opposite side of the globe, Jamaica has   implemented a pair of digital public goods in its COVID-19 recovery programme:  CommCare  facilitates real-time monitoring of vaccine delivery and distribution, while  DIVOC  provides digitally accessible vaccine certificates. The success of these DPGs in other countries provided experiential learnings that facilitated their effective adoption.

2. Delivering services to people on the move (Goal 16)

Ukraine’s ability to continue providing social protection and other critical services despite the ongoing war demonstrates the power of safe, inclusive and secure DPI. A comprehensive system of online services developed before the war is now providing Ukrainians a lifeline in times of crisis. Known as Diia (meaning “Action”), the fully automated service allows citizens to use digital documents in their smartphones and access more than 80 governmental services.

The Diia platform was also developed to enable the Government to reach its citizens in the most remote areas of the country, and those with disabilities, helping to ensure that no one is left behind.

In addition, the internally displaced persons registry service is working to eliminate duplication of financial assistance and allow humanitarian organizations to support the greatest possible number of people in need. It uses a digital public good called OpenG2P that was created by the Government of Sierra Leone with local open source innovators and UNDP during the Ebola crisis.

3. Dismantling barriers to trade (Goal 8)

The benefits of DPI in promoting inclusion and safeguards is also evident with the African Continental Free Trade Area ( AfCFTA ), an African Union initiative to enhance trade among its 54 member countries. Supportive digital infrastructure will be critical to the success of the endeavour in strengthening livelihoods, enabling small and medium enterprises, women and youth -led businesses to access the massive continental market of 1.3 billion people. Digital public goods also offer the potential for African countries to co-create common standards and principles to enable secure payments and data exchanges.

4. Climate-proofing agriculture (Goals 2 and 13)

Using inputs crowdsourced from hundreds of data scientists and citizen scientists, the Data in Climate Resilient Agriculture   (DiCRA) platform facilitates analysis and insight sharing on climate resilience in India’s Telangana State. Powered by artificial intelligence, DiCRA uses remote sensing and pattern detection algorithms, to identify farms that are highly vulnerable to climate change as well as those that demonstrate resilience.

“The DiCRA platform will put vital data and analytics into the hands of farmers in India, enabling them to mitigate the effects of climate change on their crops and livestock – boosting the resilience of their livelihoods and wider food security,” UNDP Administrator Achim Steiner said.

By listing it on the  Digital Public Goods Registry , India has made DiCRA available to people everywhere, promoting global cooperation to strengthen food systems in the face of the climate emergency.

5. Setting the record straight (Goal 16)

Information pollution is an urgent global challenge that undermines social cohesion and trust in democratic processes and institutions. UNDP’s  iVerify  tool was recently added to the  DPG Registry  of the  Digital Public Goods Alliance  as its first digital public good on fighting misinformation. iVerify is an automated fact-checking tool to combat the spread of false narratives during elections. Under the leadership of government and civil society partners, the tool has been used to support peaceful and fair elections in  Zambia  and  Honduras and is now under implementation in Kenya and Liberia.

Do no harm, by design

While DPI and other digital systems can unlock immense value, they can also expose people to risks such as privacy violations, data-driven behavioural manipulation, identity theft and fraud. Without careful attention to inclusiveness, digitalization can even exacerbate inequalities by blocking vulnerable groups from accessing essential public services.

UNDP is committed to putting human rights and inclusion at the centre of digital transformation and digital cooperation. Guided by the principle of ‘do no harm’, the Digital Public Goods Alliance promotes only those digital initiatives that adhere to privacy and other applicable laws and best practices to mitigate risks, by design, and contribute to a more equitable world.

At the 77th Session of the UN General Assembly, world leaders alongside members of the private sector and civil society will convene on 21 September for a side-event titled: ‘The Future of Digital Cooperation: Building Resilience through Safe, Trusted, and Inclusive Digital Public Infrastructure’. The event will map out a bold, inclusive and innovative digital cooperation agenda to put the rights of people at the centre of digital public infrastructure, and garner the technological and financial contributions needed to move it forward.  Join the event online .

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Welcome to the Digital Public Goods Alliance Roadmap, a public visualisation of the core, coordinated and aligned activities undertaken by organisations working to advance digital public goods.

The roadmap is a coordination, alignment, engagement, and communication tool capturing stakeholder activities that complement and advance the four DPGA strategic objectives described in the DPGA 5 year strategy. Organisations that participate in the annual roadmap work collaboratively, transparently monitoring activities, and share updates.

Roadmap participation is determined on a rolling annual-term and is currently being updated for 2022/2023. The DPGA will invite stakeholders to add their activities to the roadmap based on a review and assessment of their DPG-related work. Organisations wishing to be included in the next roadmap can submit their activities for consideration through this form . Organisations that have activities in the roadmap will also be invited to become DPGA-members.

Explore the roadmap below to learn about the activities organisations are undertaking to help strengthen the DPG ecosystem.

The Role of Digital Public Goods in Transforming Public Service Delivery | Sociology UPSC | Triumph IAS

Table of Contents

Digital infrastructure: Efficiency in public service delivery

(relevant for general   studies paper prelims/mains).

Digital infrastructure:

Efficiency in public service delivery.

The concept of Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) and Digital Public Goods (DPG) is gaining traction as a means to accelerate a nation’s inclusive economic development, as demonstrated by India’s focus on DPIs within the G20 context. The establishment of DPIs can occur primarily through two methods: either through DPGs or through proprietary solutions.

Government utilization of digital technologies has predominantly relied on solutions provided by the private sector. This approach offers numerous benefits, including access to solutions from reputable brands, immediate cost savings, and the option to outsource development and maintenance. These advantages facilitate rapid problem-solving and yield quick returns.

Digital Public Goods (DPGs) 

Digital Public Goods (DPGs) refer to digital resources and software that are made available for public use, typically with the aim of benefiting a wide range of users and promoting public good.These resources are often open-source and can include various types of digital assets, such as software, data, content, and standards

DPGs can be used to deliver new and enhanced public services, such as:

• Identity systems
• Government schemes
• Digital public infrastructure, such as banking and payments

Some examples of DPGs in India include:

• National Digital Health Mission

Digital Public Goods as an Alternative Method of Public Service Delivery

• Vendor Lock-In: Vendor lock-in arises when an organization heavily relies on products or services from a specific technology provider, limiting flexibility and hindering the adoption of alternative solutions. A study conducted by PwC identified vendor lock-in as a primary obstacle to achieving interoperability among diverse public service delivery systems.

For instance, during its initial service phase, Apple constrained users to utilize iTunes exclusively. Music purchased through iTunes could only be played within the iTunes application or on an iPod.

• External Dependency : Depending on external entities, whether foreign technology corporations or international organizations, can expose an organization to vulnerabilities.
• Lack of Adaptability: Digitization initiatives must possess the ability to adapt to evolving needs and circumstances. For example, during the Covid-19 pandemic, many public institutions struggled to shift quickly to online service delivery due to the inflexibility of their existing systems.
• Risks of Discontinuation or Unilateral Modifications : When external entities control digital systems, there is a risk of these entities discontinuing services or making unilateral alterations that may not align with the interests of the local government or organization.

For instance, in 2014, the Government launched the National Digital Literacy Mission (NDLM) in partnership with the private sector. However, in 2017, the private sector partner, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), opted to withdraw from the project. This decision created a significant gap in NDLM implementation and adversely impacted its sustainability.

• Interoperability: Interoperability is vital for seamless data exchange and collaboration among different systems. Siloed systems lacking interoperability can result in duplicated efforts and data fragmentation.

For instance, the government’s Aadhaar biometric identity program is not integrated with the government’s tax system.

• Duplication and Fragmentation : Effort duplication and system fragmentation can lead to inefficiencies and increased costs. Coordination and collaboration among different organizations involved in digitization endeavours are imperative to mitigate these issues.

For example, the government administers multiple programs aimed at providing healthcare and education to underprivileged populations.

• Public Service Delivery Costs: Ultimately, digitization efforts in public service delivery aim to enhance efficiency and reduce costs. However, when the aforementioned challenges are not adequately addressed, digitization initiatives can result in heightened expenditures.

As an illustration, the government allocates a substantial budget for subsidies, yet many of these subsidies do not reach their intended recipients.

Challenges for Digital Public Goods

• Financing and sustainability : Digital public goods (DPGs) frequently encounter challenges in securing sufficient and consistent funding for their development, maintenance, and expansion. Additionally, they must establish viable business models to ensure their long-term viability and effectiveness.
• Technical capability and interoperability: DPGs necessitate a high level of technical expertise and capacity for their design, implementation, and management. Furthermore, they must adhere to open standards and protocols that facilitate compatibility with other systems and platforms.
• Digital divide and inclusion : DPGs must address the digital divide that exists among countries, regions, and communities, as well as within them. They must guarantee that their solutions are accessible, affordable, pertinent, and user-friendly for all potential beneficiaries, particularly the most vulnerable and marginalized groups.
• Data and digital rights: DPGs must uphold and safeguard the data and digital rights of their users, including privacy, security, consent, ownership, and governance. They must comply with relevant laws and regulations, in addition to adhering to ethical principles and best practices

Ways to better use DPGs

• Introducing DPGs (Digital Public Goods) and Infrastructure : As part of a comprehensive digital transformation strategy, governments have the opportunity to introduce Digital Public Goods (DPGs) and digital infrastructure to align the visions and objectives of various stakeholders. This may encompass the creation and implementation of open-source solutions that foster collaboration, efficiency, and coordination among diverse government agencies and departments.
• Developing Open-Source Policies : Governments can establish open-source policies to reduce reliance on proprietary solutions, promote innovation, and enhance transparency. These policies can incentivize the acquisition and utilization of open-source technologies in government initiatives. Embracing open-source technology can provide governments with access to a broader developer community, cost-effective solutions, and increased flexibility for tailoring digital tools to meet specific requirements.
• Reforming the Tendering System : The tendering system plays a pivotal role in selecting and executing digital projects. It is essential to reform this system to better recognize the needs and capabilities of systems integrators as partners. This reform can facilitate the customization and integration of Digital Public Goods with existing systems, ensuring their sustainability and scalability. It also encourages collaboration between governments and technology providers.
• Utilizing Existing Digital Infrastructure: Governments should explore opportunities to leverage successful existing digital public infrastructure when embarking on new projects. For instance, India’s CoWIN platform, which supported its Covid-19 vaccination campaign, built upon previous digital initiatives like e-Vin and India Stack. By building upon proven systems, governments can save time, resources, and effort while efficiently addressing large-scale challenges.
• Establishing an International Leadership Coalition: Collaborative efforts on a global scale are essential for advancing digital public goods. Governments can take the lead in establishing an international leadership coalition that includes heads of state, high-level executives from the private sector, and other stakeholders. This coalition can facilitate the exchange of best practices, mobilize resources, and create synergies to accelerate the development and adoption of impactful digital solutions in developing countries.

While the government bears the responsibility of delivering public services, ensuring sustainable development demands a collaborative effort that brings together the private and public sector. This collaboration is essential for the successful implementation of DPGs at a massive scale, reaching millions of individuals. This is precisely where the private sector can play a crucial role in supporting and driving user-centric innovation, thereby encouraging a broader adoption of digital solutions.  

Reference The Hindu

Related blogs… , frequently asked questions:, q1: what is the significance of digital public goods (dpgs) in public service delivery.

Answer : DPGs, often open-source in nature, serve as resources that enhance the efficiency, accessibility, and cost-effectiveness of public services, thereby playing a crucial role in the inclusive economic development of a nation.

Q2: How do issues of vendor lock-in affect the adaptability of digital systems in public services?

Answer : Vendor lock-in restricts the flexibility of public service systems, making them less adaptable to changing needs and potentially hindering interoperability with other platforms.

Q3: What challenges do Digital Public Goods face in terms of data and digital rights?

Answer : DPGs must navigate complexities related to data privacy, security, consent, and governance, while adhering to legal and ethical standards to protect user rights.

Q4: How can public-private collaboration enhance the scalability of Digital Public Goods?

Answer : Public-private collaboration can bring in the technical expertise, innovation, and financial resources needed to scale DPGs , thereby reaching a larger population more effectively.

Q5: What role does interoperability play in the success of Digital Public Goods?

Answer : Interoperability allows seamless data exchange and collaboration among various digital systems, reducing duplication of effort and enhancing the efficiency of public service delivery.

GS Related Practices Questions… 

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Digital Public Goods, Digital Public Infrastructure, public service delivery, open-source technology, interoperability, digital divide, digital rights, data privacy, tendering system, public-private collaboration, India’s digital initiatives, Aadhaar, UPI, NDLM

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[Sansad TV] India’s Leadership in Digital Public Goods (DPGs)

Why in news?

• Digitization initiatives in India and the work with digital public goods have been extraordinary, said Microsoft chairman and CEO Satya Nadella.
• India’s digital infrastructure has not only changed how Indians live and operate but it has also caught the fancy of other countries around the world.
• In this article, we will focus on a global technology commons that has the ability to address some of the world’s toughest challenges which India has much to contribute.

What are Digital Public Goods (DPGs)?

• Digital public goods are public goods in the form of software, data sets, AI models, standards or content that are generally free cultural works and contribute to sustainable national and international digital development.
• Several international agencies, including UNICEF and UNDP, are exploring DPGs as a possible solution to address the issue of digital inclusion, particularly for children in emerging economies.

How is it different from physical public good?

• Abundance: The nondepletable, nonexclusive, and nonrivalrous nature of digital public goods means the rules and norms for managing them can be different from how physical public goods are managed.
• Everlasting: DPGs can be infinitely stored, copied, and distributed without becoming depleted, and at close to zero cost.
• Inclusiveness: DPG is a good that is both non-excludable (no one can be prevented from consuming this good) and non-rivalrous (the consumption of this good by anyone does not reduce the quantity available to others).

Examples of DPGs

• DHIS2 , an open source health management system.
• Free and open-source software (FOSS), since FOSS is licensed to allow it to be shared freely, modified and redistributed, it is available as a digital public good.
• Open educational resources , which by their copyright are allowed to be freely re-used, revised and shared.

Digital public goods in India

• Aadhaar: Built on the foundation of Aadhaar and India Stack, modular applications, big and small, are transforming the way we make payments, withdraw our PF, get our passport and driving license and check land records, to name just a few activities.
• Unified Payment Interface (UPI): To give an example, consider the surge in UPI-based payments in India. This kind of growth doesn’t happen with a few entitled and privileged people using UPI more and more; it happens with more and more people using UPI more and more.
• DIKSHA Portal: The use of DIKSHA, the school education platform built on the open-source platform Sunbird, has followed the same trajectory — today close to 500 million schoolchildren are using it.

Key Indian initiative: ‘India Stack’

• India Stack is a set of (application programming interface) APIs that allows governments, businesses, startups and developers to utilize a unique digital Infrastructure to solve India’s hard problems towards presence-less, paperless, and cashless service delivery.
• The Open API team at iSPIRT has been a pro-bono partner in the development, evolution, and evangelization of these APIs and systems.

APIs included in India Stack:

The following APIs are considered to be a core part of the India Stack-

• Aadhaar Authentication
• Aadhaar e-KYC
• Digital Locker
• Unified Payment Interface (UPI)
• Digital User Consent – still work in progress.
• GSTN –Goods and Services Tax Network
• BBPS –Bharat Bill Payment System
• ETC – Electronic Toll Collection (known under the brand FASTag)

Why need DPGs?

• Cost Effectiveness: The cost of setting up an open source-based educational infrastructure, to supplement the physical infrastructure, for an entire country is less than laying two kilometers of high-quality road.
• Lower investment required: The investments required for transporting digital public goods are minuscule in comparison and there is no chance of a debt trap. Also, the code (platform) is highly reusable.
• Instantly visible outcomes: Unlike physical infrastructure such as ports and roads, digital public goods have short gestation periods and immediate, and visible impact and benefits.
• Faster service delivery: Processes get streamlined and wait times for any service come down dramatically. Issuances of passports, PAN cards and driving licences are such examples.
• Plugging the leakages: It eliminates ghost beneficiaries of government services, removes touts collecting rent, creates an audit trail, makes the individual-government-market interface transparent and provides efficiencies that help recoup the investments quickly.
• Wider outreach: Productivity goes up and services can be scaled quickly. Benefits can be rapidly extended to cover a much larger portion of the population.

Most significant utility of DPGs: Digital Diplomacy

  (1) Boost India’s Image as a leading technology player

• It will take made-in-India digital public goods across the world and boost India’s brand positioning as a leading technology player in the digital age. 
• India’s digital diplomacy will be beneficial to and welcomed by, all emerging economies from Peru to Polynesia, from Uruguay to Uganda, and from Kenya to Kazakhstan.

(2) Enhancing the productivity of emerging economies

• Emerging economies are characterized by gross inefficiencies in the delivery of government services and a consequent trust deficit.
• Digital public goods spread speed, transparency, ease and productivity across the individual-government-market ecosystem and enhance inclusivity, equity and development at scale.

Challenges associated with DPG Diplomacy

• Privacy issues : Potential violations of privacy and possible weaponization of data is a primary issue related to such digital initiatives.
• Increase in Inequalities : Success in the digital provision of services is dependent on many underlying factors, including digital literacy, education and access to stable and fast telecommunication services.
• Cybersecurity threats : While channels and databases used by the Government for transmission and storage are usually secure, other players in the ecosystem may not possess the requisite expertise or security to prevent and respond to breaches.
• Unserved remote areas : With digital services not being uniformly distributed, communities in remote areas often require on-ground staff to deploy and supplement digital tools.

Global liaison over DPGs: Digital Public Goods Alliance (DPGA)

• The DPGA is a multi-stakeholder initiative with a mission to accelerate the attainment of sustainable development goals in low- and middle-income countries by facilitating the discovery, development, use of, and investment in digital public goods.
• It is a UN initiative launched in 2019.

Way Forward

• Data localization : India needs to ensure that digital goods diplomacy doesn’t become an exercise to gather data and provisions must be made for data localization.
• Training of Individuals : Individuals across the countries need to be trained in cyber security for successful digital goods diplomacy. A lead can be taken up by CERT-In.
• No Authoritative nature : India needs to ensure that data with the state doesn’t lead to authoritarianism in these countries. Decentralized and distributed storage using Blockchain technology can be used by India.
• Ensuring Inclusivity : Digital ecosystems should be guided by factors of availability, accessibility, affordability, value and trust.
• Citizen-Centralism: There is a need to ensure the design is citizen-centric and ensures inclusive access to services at the last mile will help drive adoption and sustain these ecosystems.
• Data privacy robustness: Designing privacy-protection and secure databases are critical. It is, therefore, imperative that regulations governing any digital initiative must take into account provisions of the Personal Data Protection Bill.

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India’s use case of digital public goods phenomenal, applicable globally

• January 6, 2023
• Posted by: OptimizeIAS Team
• Category: DPN Topics

Subject: Science and Technology

• Microsoft’s CEO Satya Nadella lauded India’s strides in the adoption and work with digital public goods and termed it to be “phenomenal”.

What is Digital public good?

• Digital public goods are public goods in the form of software, data sets, AI models, standards or content that are generally free cultural works and contribute to sustainable national and international digital development.

• Use of the term “digital public good” appears as early as April 2017 , when Nicholas Gruen wrote Building the Public Goods of the Twenty-First Century , and has gained popularity with the growing recognition of the potential for new technologies to be implemented at a national scale to better service delivery to citizens.
• A digital public good is defined by the UN Secretary-General’s Roadmap for Digital Cooperation, as: “open source software, open data, open AI models, open standards and open content that adhere to privacy and other applicable laws and best practices, do no harm, and help attain the SDGs.
• Digital technologies have also been identified by countries, NGOs and private sector entities as a means to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
• This translation of public goods onto digital platforms has resulted in the use of the term “digital public goods”.
• Several international agencies, including UNICEF and UNDP , are exploring DPGs as a possible solution to address the issue of digital inclusion, particularly for children in emerging economies.
• Example of DPGs in India: Aadhar, UPI, account aggregator system, ONDC, Open AI protocols, India stack, etc.

Why is it called a public good?

• Digital public goods share some traits with public goods including non-rivalry and non-excludability.

How is it different from physical public good?

• Most physical resources exist in limited supply.
• When a resource is removed and used, the supply becomes scarce or depleted. Scarcity can result in competing rivalry for the resource.
• The nondepletable, nonexclusive , and nonrivalrous nature of digital public goods means the rules and norms for managing them can be different from how physical public goods are managed.
• Digital public goods can be infinitely stored, copied, and distributed without becoming depleted, and at close to zero cost.
• Abundance rather than scarcity is an inherent characteristic of digital resources in the digital commons.

Usage of DPGs:

• A public good is a good that is both non-excludable (no one can be prevented from consuming this good) and non-rivalrous (the consumption of this good by anyone does not reduce the quantity available to others).
• Extending this definition to global public goods, they become goods with benefits that extend to all countries, people, and generations and are available across national borders everywhere. Knowledge and information goods embody global public goods when provided for free.
• The online world provides a great medium for the provision of global public goods, where they become global digital public goods.
• Once produced in their digital form, global public goods are essentially costless to replicate and make available to all, under the assumption that users have Internet connectivity to access these goods.
• DHIS2, an open source health management system.
• Free and open-source software (FOSS), Since FOSS is licensed to allow it to be shared freely, modified and redistributed, it is available as a digital public good.
• Open educational resources, which by their copyright are allowed to be freely re-used, revised and shared.

Digital Public Goods Alliance (DPGA):

• In mid-2019 the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation published The Age of Digital Interdependence.
• In response, in late 2019 the Governments of Norway and Sierra Leone, UNICEF and iSPIRT formally initiated the Digital Public Goods Alliance as a follow-up on the High-level Panel.
• The subsequent UN Secretary-General’s Roadmap for Digital Cooperation, published in June 2020 , mentions the Digital Public Goods Alliance specifically as “a multi-stake-holder initiative responding directly to the lack of a “go to” platform, as highlighted by the Panel in its report.”
• The report further highlights digital public goods as essential to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals in low- and middle-income countries and calls on all stakeholders, including the UN to assist in their development and implementation.

India Stake:

• India Stack is a set of  (application programming interface) APIs that allows governments, businesses, startups and developers to utilize a unique digital Infrastructure to solve India’s hard problems towards presence-less, paperless, and cashless service delivery.
• The Open API team at iSPIRT has been a pro-bono partner in the development, evolution, and evangelisation of these APIs and systems.

The four distinct technology layers provided are:

• Presenceless layer: Where a universal biometric digital identity allows people to participate in any service from anywhere in the country.
• Paperless layer: Where digital records move with an individual’s digital identity, eliminating the need for massive amount of paper collection and storage.
• Cashless layer: Where a single interface to all the country’s bank accounts and wallets to democratize payments.
• Consent layer: Which allows data to move freely and securely to democratize the market for data.

APIs included in India Stack:

• Aadhaar Authentication
• Aadhaar e-KYC
• Digital Locker
• Unified Payment Interface (UPI)
• Digital User Consent – still work in progress.

The following APIs are also considered to be societal platforms built on similar principles like India Stack:

• GSTN – The Goods and Services Tax Network
• BBPS – The Bharat Bill Payment System
• ETC – Electronic Toll Collection (known under the brand FASTag)
• Citizens: Brings millions of Indians into the formal economy by reducing friction.
• Software ecosystem: Fosters innovation to build products for financial Inclusion, healthcare & educational services at scale.
• Government: Brings a paradigm shift in the way government services are delivered in a transparent, accountable and leakage free model.

Russia’s Digital Economy Program: An Effective Strategy for Digital Transformation?

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• First Online: 16 December 2020

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• Anna Lowry 4  

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This chapter focuses on the state program “Digital Economy of the Russian Federation” (2017) and its subsequent transformation into the national project (2018) to be implemented from 2018 to 2024. It examines the effectiveness of the government’s strategy in this area and provides an analysis of the program’s content in terms of its main objectives and mechanisms of implementation, drawing on the constructive criticism of the program in the literature. It also reviews the history of the development of the program, main actors involved in its design and implementation, and the nature of the decision-making process.

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• Digital economy
• National project
• State program

1 Introduction

The impact of new technological innovations is all-pervasive today from altering consumer preferences in the direction of highly customized on-demand products to changing the way companies create, market, and deliver goods and services, in particular through increasing reliance on technology-enabled platforms. Currently, digital technologies are changing the business model of companies, especially in the banking and telecommunications sectors, while increasing efficiency and revealing new market opportunities. Even traditional industries increasingly employ methods for analyzing large volumes of data to make effective management decisions. The Internet of Things improves the quality of equipment operation, increases productivity of oil and gas fields, and makes urban infrastructure more energy efficient. In the next decade, the further development of such innovations as unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), augmented reality, block chain, robotics, and artificial intelligence will open up a wide range of opportunities for consumers, business, and governments (Aptekman et al. 2017 ).

In Russia, the digital transformation of the economy is becoming one of the main strategic directions of its development (Jakutin 2017 ). In his address to the Federal Assembly in December 2016, President Putin set the task of preparing a digital economy program. The President has repeatedly called attention to the challenges of Russia’s digital transformation, most notably in his speech at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June 2017. This provided an impetus for the subsequent discussion of the digitalization strategy at various discussion platforms in Russia. Within a month, almost all major Russian business associations and scientific communities held meetings, seminars, and conferences on digital issues. The public discussions became the basis of the organizational work on the formation of a digital transformation strategy for the Russian economy in the government’s program (for more on digital government, see Chap. 3 ). Approved by the Presidential Council for Strategic Development and Priority Projects, the Digital Economy Program acquired the status of an official government document already in July 2017. On July 28, 2017, Prime Minister Medvedev signed a governmental order approving the program “ Cifrovaâ èkonomika Rossijskoj Federacii ” (Digital Economy of the Russian Federation). Footnote 1 Subsequently, national projects in 12 areas of strategic development were established. Footnote 2 One of these is the national program “Digital Economy of the Russian Federation,” approved by the Presidential Council for Strategic Development and National Projects Footnote 3 on December 24, 2018 (Pasport 2018 ), and created on the basis of the Digital Economy Program ( 2017 ).

2 Putting “Digital” in Perspective: Theories of Technological Change

Despite the widespread use of the term “digital economy,” it remains a fuzzy and contradictory concept. It is usually understood as all types of economic activity based on digital technologies, including e-commerce, Internet services, electronic banking, entertainment, and others. However, it is not clear where the precise boundary between digital and “analog” economies is now (Grammatchikov 2017 ). Additionally, economists note the contradiction in the term itself, suggesting that in economics, all processes have long been described, diagnosed, and projected using digits/numbers (Jakutin 2017 , 32; Ivanov and Malineckij 2017 , 4).

Digital transformation of the economy occurs under the influence of innovation waves (Aptekman et al. 2017 , 21). The first wave of digital innovations, starting from the 1960s, involved automation of existing technologies and business processes. Starting from the mid-1990s, the rapid development of Internet technologies, mobile communications, social networks, and the emergence of smartphones have led to the widespread use of technology by end consumers. In the broader scientific context, these innovation waves, or interrelated radical breakthroughs, form a constellation of interdependent technologies defined as a technological revolution . Carlota Perez ( 2002 , 2010 ) identifies five such revolutions since the initial Industrial Revolution in England. Each technological revolution is accompanied by a set of “best-practice” principles—a techno-economic paradigm —which guides a vast reorganization of economic and social institutions.

In Russian literature, digital transformation is often associated with the transition to the sixth technological order, or tehnologičeskij uklad (Glaz’ev 1993 , 2010 ). A technological order is defined as a complex of technologies characteristic of a certain level of development of production. Each technological order encompasses a closed cycle from the extraction of primary resources to all stages of their processing to the production of products that meet the relevant level of public consumption (Rodionov et al. 2017 , 80). In this framework, digital economy is understood as a form of economic organization of society, resulting from scientific and technological progress, aimed at creating greater value with the use of technology of the sixth technological order and enabling its long-term sustainable development (Rodionov et al. 2017 , 79). Digital transformation is conceptualized as the material embodiment of nano- and bio-technologies, artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things, robotics, and other modern technologies based on electronic devices (Jakutin 2017 , 28). With regard to the Russian economy, its digital transformation is seen as part of a broader task of economic modernization, moving away from its raw-materials orientation.

3 Russia on the Global Digital Market

There are a number of studies that seek to identify the leaders of the digital economy and calculate its share in the gross domestic product (GDP) of different countries. According to the latest McKinsey study (Aptekman et al. 2017 ), Russia’s digital economy accounts for 3.9 percent of its GDP, compared to 10.9% in the United States (US), 10% in China, and 8.2% in the European Union (EU, in 2015 prices). At the same time, digital transformation is one of the main factors of economic growth in Russia as well as globally. From 2011 to 2015, the total volume of Russia’s digital economy increased by 59%, which means that it is currently growing at a rate that is 9 times faster than the country’s GDP. Based on this considerable growth potential, the study suggests that it is possible to triple the size of Russia’s digital economy by 2025 from the current 3.2 to 9.6 trillion rubles, which would bring Russia to the level of developed economies in terms of the relative share of digital economy in GDP (8–10%).

To assess Russia’s relative position on the global digital market, it is possible to use relevant international indices. The Networked Readiness Index, developed by the World Economic Forum, measures countries’ preparedness to reap the benefits of emerging technologies and to capitalize on the opportunities presented by the digital revolution (Baller et al. 2016 ). It is made up of four main categories—environment (political/regulatory and business/innovation), readiness (measured by information and communication technologies (ICT) affordability, skills, and infrastructure), usage (individual, business, and government), and impact (economic and social). Russia ranks 41st in the Networked Readiness Index 2016, far behind the leading countries such as Singapore, Finland, Sweden, Norway, the United States, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and Japan. Russia’s relatively weak position in the ranking can be attributed to the gaps in the regulatory framework for the digital economy and the insufficiently favorable environment for innovation and doing business, and consequently, low ICT business usage (Programma 2017 , 8).

Another relevant index is the International Digital Economy and Society Index (I-DESI) developed by the European Commission to measure the digital economy performance of EU28 Member States and the EU as a whole compared to 17 other countries (Wiseman et al. 2018 ). It is a composite index that comprises 5 dimensions: connectivity, digital skills, citizen use of Internet, business technology integration, and digital public services. Based on this index, Russia lags behind the EU average but is still ahead of China, Chile, Mexico, Turkey, and Brazil (Wiseman et al. 2018 , 14). Russia ranked above the EU average in terms of human capital (digital skills) but fell behind in the other 4 dimensions. It received the lowest rating among the 45 countries in the study in terms of overall connectivity and was ranked below the EU bottom 4 in terms of business technology integration (for more, see Chap. 13 ).

4 Analysis of the Digital Economy Program: Definitions, Goals, and Indicators

This section provides an analysis of the program’s content in terms of its definitions, goals, and indicators. It focuses on the 2017 state program as a conceptual document laying the framework for the subsequent national program (2018), which is more target oriented. The analysis also shows how the broadly formulated goals of the original program have been redefined and fine-tuned in the 2018 national program with more concrete tasks, indicators, and mechanisms of implementation.

4.1 Definition of the Digital Economy

The state program defines digital economy as “an economic activity, in which the key factor of production is data in the digital form” (Programma 2017 , 4–5). In classic economic theory, labor, capital, and raw materials are considered the main factors of production. In the context of innovative economy, technology and knowledge also play a key role in production. However, it is not clear why data in digital form should be considered the main factor of production (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017 , 6). The authors of the program provide the following explanation: “Currently data become a new asset, mainly due to their alternative value, that is, as data are used for new purposes and realization of new ideas” (Programma 2017 , 5). At the same time, the program does not specify these new purposes. A related criticism is that “data in the digital form” do not define the essence of today’s digital economy since data have always been used to describe and evaluate economic activity (Jakutin 2017 , 32). A simpler and more straightforward definition of the digital economy would have been as an economy based on digital technologies. Consequently, strategic management of the digitalization processes of the Russian economy would entail, first, the management of the development of digital technologies and, second, the management of the processes of their deployment in the economic sphere (Jakutin 2017 , 36).

4.2 Goals of the Programs

The 2017 program outlines its three main goals as follows. The first goal is “creation of the ecosystem of the digital economy of the Russian Federation,” which ensures effective interaction between business, scientific and educational community, the state, and Russian citizens. This goal is weakly formulated and can hardly claim the status of a long-term target of government activities on digitalization. The “Strategy for the Development of the Information Society in the Russian Federation for 2017–2030” defines the “ecosystem of the digital economy” as “a partnership of organizations ensuring the continuous interaction of their technological platforms, applied Internet services, analytical systems, information systems of public authorities of the Russian Federation, organizations and citizens” (Strategiâ 2017 , 5). Thus, the creation of the ecosystem of the digital economy entails the creation of “a partnership of organizations.” However, a partnership is not the main element of the digital economy (Jakutin 2017 , 41). Regardless of whether enterprises-owners of digital technologies, Internet portals, and servers form or do not form a partnership, the economy does not cease to be digital.

The second goal is defined as “the creation of necessary and sufficient institutional and infrastructural conditions, the removal of existing obstacles and restrictions for the creation and (or) development of high-tech businesses and the prevention of the emergence of new obstacles and restrictions both in traditional industries and in new industries and high-tech markets” (Programma 2017 , 2). This goal is too big and too compressed in its content. It can be subdivided into two separate strategic objectives: the formation of the institutional environment of Russia’s digital economy and the creation of its infrastructure.

The third goal is increasing competitiveness of Russian industries and the economy as a whole on the global market. However, this goal cannot be considered one of the directions of digitalization. Competitiveness is itself a result of the development of the digital economy. While improving competitiveness is a necessary task, it requires an active and diverse economic policy. The program lacks such a policy (Jakutin 2017 , 45).

The national program “Digital Economy of the Russian Federation” ( 2018 ), developed on the basis of the 2017 program, redefines the goals as follows. The first goal is a three-fold increase in domestic spending on the development of the digital economy from all sources (by share in GDP) compared to 2017. The second goal is “creating a sustainable and secure information and telecommunications infrastructure for high-speed transmission, processing and storage of large amounts of data that is accessible to all organizations and households.” The third goal is the use of predominantly domestic software by government agencies, local governments, and organizations. Thus, compared to the earlier program, the national digital economy program has more concrete goals. Consequently, the indicators have also been redefined accordingly. They are shown in Table 4.1 .

The redefined and more concrete goals, with corresponding indicators, of the subsequent national program (2018) are a significant improvement on the original version of the program. In this regard, the shift from a very broadly formulated goal of creating the ecosystem of the digital economy to the more concrete objective of increasing domestic expenditures on the development of the digital economy, with fine-tuning of the necessary methodology, should be noted. Compared to the earlier version, the use of domestic software by government agencies is elevated to one of the main goals of the program. In the 2017 program, these measures were addressed under the rubric of information security with corresponding indicators for decreasing the share of foreign ICT equipment and software in the purchases of federal and regional government authorities and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The new program uses different indicators for government bodies and SOEs but focuses exclusively on software, omitting ICT equipment. In sum, the program has been revised so that there is a better fit between the goals, specific measures to be implemented, and target indicators. However, much of the original criticism regarding the lack of measures for streamlining the production of domestic ICT equipment remains valid. Similarly, there are no indications in the program that it is aimed at addressing import dependence in the component base of hardware or creating mechanisms to overcome the rigid sanctions regime applied to Russian high-tech companies (Jakutin 2017 , 37).

4.3 Levels of the Digital Economy

According to the program, the digital economy comprises three levels: markets and industries , where the interaction of specific subjects (suppliers and consumers of goods and services) takes place; platforms and technologies , where competencies for the development of markets and industries are formed; and environment that creates the conditions for the development of platforms and technologies and effective interaction of market actors and covers regulations, information infrastructure, personnel, and information security. The program focuses on “the two lower levels of the digital economy,” and specifically, the development of key institutions that create the conditions for the development of the digital economy (regulations, personnel and education, the formation of research and technological competencies) and basic infrastructural elements of the digital economy (information infrastructure and information security) (Programma 2017 , 2–3).

The levels of the digital economy identified in the program do not correspond to the traditional micro-, meso-, and macro-levels established in economic theory (Jakutin 2017 , 45). The first, “upper” level, according to the program, “markets and industries,” entails the interaction of specific subjects (suppliers and consumers of goods and services). In other words, it is the level of an enterprise or the micro-level. Referring to the micro-level as the “upper” level of the digital economy, the program puts established economic theory on its head. The two “lower” levels, according to the program, are platforms and technologies, and “the environment.”

The program states that it “focuses on the two lower levels of the digital economy” but in practice restricts itself to just one level, “the environment,” broken into two components—institutions and infrastructure (Programma 2017 , 2–3). The program thus sees the basic directions of creating the digital economy as the development of various institutions and infrastructure. Omitted in this statement of objectives is the digital economy itself, or to use the program’s terminology, the entire second level—digital platforms and technologies. This omission is remarkable considering that the digital platform is generally recognized as the building block of the digital economy. It is defined as the system of algorithmic relationships of a significant number of market participants, united by a single information environment, which reduces transaction costs due to the use of a package of digital technologies and changes in the division of labor (Jakutin 2017 , 47). The digital platform, thus, can rightfully claim the status of the main “level” of the digital economy, without any reservations about the second, third or lower levels.

4.4 Cross-Cutting Technologies

The program provides support for the development of “cross-cutting” technologies but does not offer a definition of this term. Nine technologies fall within the scope of the program, specifically, big data, neurotechnology and artificial intelligence, distributed registry systems, quantum technologies, new production technologies, industrial Internet, components of robotics and sensorics, wireless technology, and virtual and augmented reality technology (Programma 2017 , 3). The list of technologies will be updated as new technologies emerge and develop. The program will also be supplemented with relevant sections and road maps in the process of the implementation of specific measures in the field of health, creation of “smart cities,” and public administration.

In the words of former Minister of Telecom and Mass Communications, Nikolaj Nikiforov, who presented the program at a meeting of the Council on Strategic Development and Priority Projects, cross-cutting technologies is “when a digital technology is developed once and can be used many times in various industries” (Zasedanie 2017 ). However, the program does not specify an economic mechanism that makes these technologies “cross-cutting.” If the technology was “once” developed by someone, what is the mechanism that will allow this technology to “get away” from its owner and find its “cross-cutting” application “in various industries”? Jakutin ( 2017 , 50) raises a number of valid questions in this regard: Who will pay for it? Who will ensure its distribution? What about copyright and intellectual property rights? The state program does not provide any answers to these questions. The choice of the nine “cross-cutting” technologies listed in the program is likewise arbitrary. According to Sneps-Sneppe et al. ( 2018 , 38), the nine cross-cutting technologies identified in the program represent a random collection of modern technologies, and hardly the most important ones. Furthermore, it is difficult to notice the manifestation of these technologies in the program.

Compared to the original version of the program, the revised national program (2018) represents an improvement in terms of introducing a number of concrete measures for the development of “cross-cutting” technologies, which are incorporated into the new federal project “Digital technologies.” These measures are aimed at achieving the goal of the national program to increase domestic expenditures on the digital economy and include (1) the creation of “cross-cutting” digital technologies predominantly on the basis of domestic research and development (R&D) and (2) the creation of an integrated system of financing projects for the development and implementation of digital technologies and platform solutions, including venture financing and other development institutions. The first objective encompasses a range of policies such as designing road maps for the development of promising cross-cutting digital technologies, creation of digital platforms for conducting R&D in these technologies, support of Russian high-tech companies, which develop products, services and platform solutions on the basis of cross-cutting technologies for the digital transformation of priority industries, and forming demand for Russian digital technologies, products and platform solutions, in part by launching digital transformation of state corporations and companies with state participation.

5 Russia’s Digital Economy Program: Management System

The program’s management system can be characterized as flexible, with multiple centers of decision-making (Sneps-Sneppe et al. 2018 ; Ivanov and Malineckij 2017 ). In governance studies, a system with multiple semi-autonomous decision centers operating under an overarching set of rules is defined as polycentricity (Aligica and Tarko 2012 ; Carlisle and Gruby 2017 ). Despite the number of advantages ascribed to polycentric governance systems, including suitability for managing complex areas such as science, the concept of polycentricity has not been systematically applied in the study of innovation systems or science governance. This is somewhat surprising considering that the literature on science governance in Russia has framed the issue in terms of decentralization. At the same time, this literature acknowledges that the virtues of a decentralized science system are far from obvious in Russia or elsewhere since “[t]he best science is unapologetically elitist” (Graham and Dezhina 2008 , vii). This section will briefly review these debates on the organization and support of science in Russia in the context of the Digital Economy Program. The objective is to assess the extent to which its management system resembles or differs from a polycentric structure by exploring its main attributes. These are: (1) the multiplicity of decision centers; (2) an overarching system of rules; and (3) a spontaneous order created by evolutionary competition between the various decision centers’ ideas (Aligica and Tarko 2012 , 254).

5.1 Multiple Decision Centers

The most striking aspect of the program’s management system is the multiplicity of decision centers and the range of participants involved in the program’s development and implementation. The governmental commission for the use of information technologies to improve the quality of life and the conditions of doing business is responsible for the overall control over the implementation of the Digital Economy Program (Postanovlenie 2017 ). Its Sub-Commission for digital economy is in charge of reviewing action plans and monitoring their implementation, approving methodological recommendations and regulations as well as resolving disagreements between participants and reviewing contradictions in draft laws. Relevant ministries oversee their own areas. Footnote 4 The Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation oversees the formation of research and technological competencies, Footnote 5 information infrastructure, and security while the Ministry of Economic Development administers regulatory, personnel, and educational policy. 1.8 trillion rubles will be spent in 2019–2024 on the implementation of the national program for the development of the digital economy. More than 1 trillion of these funds will be allocated from the federal budget (Pasport 2018 , 75). Footnote 6

The Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian Federation acts as the project management office for the implementation of the Digital Economy Program. It provides organizational and methodological support for the implementation of the program, including the preparation of guidelines for the development of action plans and reports on their implementation. The Center also provides information and analytical support for the activities of the Sub-Commission and ensures the operation of a system of electronic interaction of the program’s participants.

An autonomous non-profit organization (ANO) Digital Economy coordinates the participation of expert and business community in the implementation, development, and evaluation of the program’s effectiveness. Created by Russian high-tech companies (Yandex, Mail.Ru Group, Rambler & Co, Rostec, Rosatom, Sberbank, Rostelecom, the Skolkovo Foundation, the Agency for Strategic Initiatives, and others), the organization functions as a platform for state-business dialogue. It forms and coordinates the activities of working groups and competence centers for the program’s areas and evaluates the overall implementation of the program. In addition to ensuring the interaction with business and scientific community, its functions include support of digital technology start-ups and small/medium-sized enterprises (SME) as well as foresight and digital development forecasts.

Working groups prepare proposals for action plans and participate in evaluating the effectiveness of their implementation. Competence centers are responsible for the preparation and implementation of action plans. The ANO Digital Economy initially comprised working groups and competence centers in the following five areas: information infrastructure; formation of research and technological competencies; personnel and education; regulation; and information security. State corporations Rosatom and Rostech served as competence centers for the formation of research and technological competencies while Russian Venture Company headed the working group in this area. Russia’s state nuclear corporation, Rosatom, oversaw the development of new production technologies, big data, virtual and augmented reality technologies, and quantum technologies. State corporation Rostec, which promotes the development, production and export of high-technology industrial products for civil and defense sectors, was responsible for the development of neurotechnology and artificial intelligence, industrial Internet, robotics and sensor components, wireless technology, and distributed registry systems (Sistema 2017 ). The competence centers and leaders of working groups for the other four areas were the Skolkovo Foundation/MTS (regulation), the Agency for Strategic Initiatives/1C Company (personnel), Rostelecom/MegaFon (infrastructure), and Sberbank/InfoWatch (security).

5.2 A Single System of Rules

The Russian government has made consistent efforts to develop an overarching set of rules governing the dissemination and use of information technologies in different spheres and to coordinate the various digitalization programs and initiatives within a comprehensive system of strategic planning. Thus, the Digital Economy Program is closely linked to the documents already in force on the strategic development of the Russian economy (Programma 2017 , 4). It complements the goals and objectives of the National Technology Initiative and the adopted strategic planning documents, specifically the Forecast of Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation for the Period until 2030, the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation ( 2016 ), the Strategy for the Development of the Information Society in the Russian Federation for 2017–2030, the priority project “Improving the organization of medical care through the introduction of information technologies” (2016), and other documents, including those of the Eurasian Economic Union. The adopted strategic planning documents provide for measures aimed at stimulating the development of digital technologies and their use in various sectors of the economy. For example, the adopted socio-economic development forecast of the Russian Federation envisions the active dissemination and widespread use of information technologies in the socio-economic sphere, public administration, and business (for more, see Chap. 3 ).

The Strategy for the Development of the Information Society in the Russian Federation for 2017–2030 is the closest strategic document to the Digital Economy Program in terms of content, with the goals of the Strategy being closely related to the program (Programma 2017 , 4). Based on the Strategy, the program also takes into account its founding acts and legislative framework. These include the Federal Law No. 172-FZ “ O strategičeskom planirovanii v Rossijskoj Federacii ” (On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation, 2014), “ Strategiâ nacional’noj bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii ” (National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, 2015), “ Doktrina informacionnoj bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii ” (Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2016) as well as related legal acts that determine the direction of the application of ICTs in Russia (Jakutin 2017 , 30–31).

5.3 A Spontaneous Order?

Despite the existence of multiple decision-making centers and an evolving overarching system of rules governing digitalization—key attributes of polycentric governance—the nature of the order generated by this system is ambiguous and remains a subject of controversy. At the heart of this controversy is the question of whether the program’s management system represents a move toward a more effective decentralized system of science governance or a step toward further bureaucratization of science. Theoretically, this question revolves around the nature of entry into the system—free, meritocratic, or spontaneous (Aligica and Tarko 2012 , 254). Practically, the respective debate in Russia has centered on the role of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) in overseeing digitalization.

The critics of the Digital Economy Program have been quick to note the absence of scientific organizations in its management system. They emphasize that the RAS, the main scientific organization responsible for determining research areas, including in the field of ICT, is not included in the management and implementation of the program. The absence of scientific organizations in the program’s management system is seen as evidence of an established post-Soviet trend of technological development without the involvement of domestic scientific community (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017 ). The criticism goes further by suggesting that the program’s flexible management system with multiple centers of decision making is ill suited for governing science in Russia. According to Ivanov and Malineckij ( 2017 , 11), such an approach has been tried before and proven ineffective in managing Russia’s scientific and technological complex. It leads to the growth of the bureaucratic apparatus and increases its costs while reducing the quality of policy.

An alternative view suggests that the absence of the RAS in the government’s digital economy programs and initiatives is not coincidental, and that the Academy has traditionally been dismissive of Information Technologies (IT) professionals. As a result, information technologies were “pushed out” from the RAS. Currently, only a few IT sectors are represented in the RAS such as supercomputer computing and onboard software. According to Gorbunov-Posadov ( 2018 ), the academy cannot keep up with the pace of development of the IT industry, which puts its capacity to function as a universal body of national scientific expertise into question.

These opposing views were reflected in the controversial RAS reform and its public perception. The reform, launched in 2013, originally envisaged the dissolution of the RAS, which caused a negative reaction in scientific circles and led to a wave of protests across Russia. Without going into the details of the reform process, it suffices to note that significant changes in the management system of Russian science were made in 2018. The Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation was established in May 2018, with all institutes of the RAS subsequently falling under its jurisdiction. Amendments to the Law on Science and the Law on the RAS redefined and strengthened the role of the academy in the management system of Russian science. Specifically, the changes reaffirmed a key role of the RAS in the design and implementation of Russia’s scientific and technological development strategy (Mehanik 2019 ).

Pursuant to the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 16 of January 17, 2018, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education formed Councils in seven priority areas of scientific and technological development of the Russian Federation (IMEMO 2019 ). The first priority area and the name of the corresponding Council is “transition to digital, intelligent production technologies, robotic systems, new materials and methods of design, creation of big data processing systems, machine learning and artificial intelligence.” Its functions include formulating and monitoring of scientific and technological programs and projects in this area as well as providing expert and analytical support for the implementation of Russia’s scientific and technological development priorities. Among the members of the Council are academicians, representatives of leading research centers and universities, big business, federal executive bodies, and state corporations (RAS 2018 ).

Thus, the Council oversees digitalization within the framework of the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation but is far from the only institution responsible for the formation of Russia’s digital economy. Other programs and initiatives in this area include the Digital Economy Program and the National Technology Initiative, with their own teams and management systems. Additionally, most ministries have their own digitalization programs. Whereas critics insist that the duplication of functions and incontinency between various programs within this framework is a result of a poorly coordinated system of management (Chujkov 2019 ), it could also be argued that it is a result of a delicate compromise between the government, the RAS, and other stakeholders. Even though the role of the Academy has been strengthened, the existence of multiple decision-making centers prevents the monopolization of scientific expertise and allows competition between different ideas to take place. Thus, the polycentric structure of the Digital Economy Program’s management system is amplified on a broader scale of Russia’s digital economy governance where this program coexists with other digitalization initiatives.

6 Criticism of the Program and Weaknesses of the Government’s Digitalization Strategy

6.1 imitation and copying of western models.

In the post-Soviet economy, the practice of borrowing ideas and approaches from foreign programs has become widespread. According to Ivanov and Malineckij ( 2017 , 4), the Digital Economy Program, which is based on the recommendations of the World Economic Forum, was no exception. This copying of Western models inevitably affects the content and quality of the program. The emphasis is not on essential, critical matters but on external issues such as places in the ratings and keeping up with technological trends. Furthermore, the program does not proceed from the ability to produce new types of products but from the interests of a “qualified consumer.” In the broader sense, the common criticism of the program is that it does not deal with the economy as such or, more precisely, changing the technological base, which would lead to socio-economic transformations. The program focuses predominantly on the development of key institutions and infrastructure of the digital economy while “practically nothing is said about production, distribution or consumption” (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017 , 4). As Loginov ( 2017 ) notes, “a lot and even too much is said about the ‘digital’ and practically nothing about the ‘economy.’” The program does not provide a clear answer as to how the “digital” would fit into the economy.

The fallacy of the catch-up logic of the program is highlighted by the government’s expert council in their conclusion on the program’s first draft. The goal of the program, according to the expert council, was not to advance Russia’s development but rather to raise the digitalization level of its economy to the current level of developed countries by 2025. This means that by that time Russia will need a new program for the development of the digital economy, since one of the fundamental characteristics of the ICT sphere is the rapid introduction of new technologies, the emergence of which cannot be foreseen today (Demidov 2017 ).

6.2 Emphasis on Services to the Detriment of Production

Since the program is implicitly aimed at raising the digitalization level of the Russian economy to that of developed countries, it makes sense to briefly examine the industries and services that comprise the high-tech sector in developed economies. The US statistics, for example, distinguishes five high-tech manufacturing industries—pharmaceutical industry, semiconductor manufacturing, production of scientific and measuring equipment, production of communication equipment, and aerospace industry. The foundation of all these industries is electronics (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017 , 8). There are also five service industries that comprise the high-tech sector of the US economy—business, financial, and communication services, education, and healthcare. Looking at the Digital Economy Program from this perspective, it is possible to conclude that it is focused on service industries while neglecting the high-tech manufacturing sector, the development of which is blocked in Russia.

One of the main criticisms of the program is that it does not provide measures for the development of Russian electronic components and systems ( èlementnaâ komponentnaâ baza ). At the same time, many of the program’s objectives require the development of electronic components (Loginov 2017 ). Specifically, the digital transformation of industry, or Industry 4.0, cannot occur without a national technological base, including the industry of domestic micromechanics and nanoelectronics (Sitnikov 2017 ). Micro-Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS) top the list of technologies necessary for the development of Industry 4.0. In Russia, these technologies are developed within the framework of Rusnano’s programs. Footnote 7 Critics consider them ineffective, lamenting that Russia still has “ancient” technological competencies at the level of classical mechanics and limited laser processing capabilities. That is, it is capable of producing parts with an accuracy of 0.1 mm on its equipment whereas the standard for global leaders in this field is 0.0001 mm.

One possible initiative in this regard could be the creation of a national 5G network based on Russian equipment (Loginov 2017 ). However, the program’s activities in this field are limited to “assessing the capabilities” of the domestic industry to produce telecommunications equipment. As Loginov ( 2017 ) accurately points out, the domestic capabilities of building 4G networks were already assessed in 2011, but as a result, the networks were modernized using Chinese equipment. The program includes a number of target indicators for the development of domestic telecommunications industry, specifically increasing the share of domestic products in the purchases of software by federal and regional executive bodies and state-owned companies. However, in the absence of concrete measures for the revival of Russian telecommunications industry, it is unlikely that the program will meet these targets (Sneps-Sneppe et al. 2018 , 39).

6.3 Preservation of Technological Dependence

Most of the communications equipment and software in Russia is of foreign origin. Russia is critically dependent on the import of IT equipment (from 80% to 100% for various categories) and software (about 75%) (Aptekman et al. 2017 , 43). In 2016, the volume of sales of smartphones in Russia amounted to about 30 million units; the sales of personal computers—about 5 million units. The share of products of Russian manufacturers, which are built almost completely on the basis of foreign components, is miniscule in these volumes, just a few percent (Betelin 2017 , 24). As another example, the networks of Rostelecom, Russia’s largest provider of digital services, have until recently been the arena of struggle between two American companies—Cisco Systems and Juniper Networks (Sneps-Sneppe et al. 2018 , 37). Rostelecom’s main project is a high-speed internet protocol (IP) network built entirely with the products developed by Juniper Networks.

The preservation of technological dependence runs counter to the Strategy of National Security and the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017 , 7). The critical dependence on imported components carries serious risks for the national security. It also blocks the development of many sectors of the domestic industry. The existing experience of using borrowed solutions in microelectronics indicates that Russian enterprises have access to technology and technical solutions with a lag of two or more generations, and the amount of payments for their use ranges from 30% to 80% of development costs and up to 50% in mass production (Betelin 2017 , 23). This is one of the main reasons why the semiconductor industry in Russia is not significant in economic or social terms. There is a risk that the implementation of the Digital Economy Program and the related National Technology Initiative will not lead to Russia gaining any significant share of the new global high-tech markets. Without developing domestic electronics industry, the transition to the digital economy can be considered only in the context of purchases of electronic equipment abroad, including for defense and security. This would require addressing an additional problem of “non-declared capabilities” or the detection of hidden functions of the supplied equipment, permitting unauthorized control (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017 , 8).

6.4 Lack of Scientific Support

One of the criticisms of the program’s management system is the absence of scientific organizations (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017 , 11). With regard specifically to the ICT infrastructure, Sneps-Sneppe et al. ( 2018 , 41) note that Russian scientific research institutes, industrial science, and professional scientists are not involved in addressing systemic issues of infrastructure development and the preparation of relevant conceptual documents. The lack of scientific support adversely affects the quality of the program, which does not provide sufficient justification for the key role of the digital economy in ensuring Russia’s economic leadership.

Available studies suggest that the products of the leaders of the global markets of semiconductors, electronic products, and software, such as INTEL, AMD, IBM, and Microsoft currently form the basis for the development of the digital economy (Betelin 2017 , 24). In these conditions, the main risks and challenges for the formation of Russia’s digital economy stem from the lack of similar companies in Russia that carry proportionate economic and social weight. While the program envisions the creation of ten large high-tech companies by 2024, it lacks actual measures for stimulating domestic electronics industry and relies on modernization of the communications network based on imported equipment. Such modernization efforts are likely to result in the reduction of the size of the digital economy in Russia rather than its growth (Loginov 2017 ).

Even though the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation ( 2016 ) defines the key role of Russian fundamental science in ensuring the country’s readiness for grand challenges and timely assessment of the risks associated with scientific and technological development, in practice the program relies on the use of foreign scientific results and technologies (Strategija 2016 ; Ivanov and Malineckij 2017 , 12). One of the stated objectives of the program is the creation of a support system for exploratory and applied research on the digital economy, which is supposed to ensure technological independence of each of the globally competitive cross-cutting technologies (Programma 2017 , 11). However, relevant activities do not include basic (fundamental) research. Thus, the criticism of such an approach is that it cannot in principle ensure technological independence in ICT because new technologies can be created only on the basis of systematic results of exploratory and fundamental research (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017 , 12).

6.5 Lack of Reliable ICT Infrastructure

A number of studies note that the ICT infrastructure is relatively well developed in Russia, with digital services available for the majority of the country’s population (Aptekman et al. 2017 , 36). On this basis, some analysts even point out that it is “completely unnecessary” for the government “to try to control or stimulate this process” (Loginov 2017 ). This view suggests that Russian telecom companies are able to deal with the infrastructural issues on their own, at the level of their commercial needs.

Sneps-Sneppe et al. ( 2018 ) offer an alternative point of view from the perspective of telecom professionals. The basis of information and communication infrastructure, the information space of any country, is the next-generation network (NGN), which provides a user with universal broadband access to an unlimited range of ICT services. Has such an infrastructure been developed in Russia, and who is building it? The construction of next-generation networks in Russia has been carried out by private capital to make a profit from providing access to the Internet and related services. This is done without taking into account the task of creating the foundation of the country’s digital infrastructure—a single telecommunications network of the Russian Federation, as required by the current law “ O svâzi ” (On Communications) and the interests of the state and society. The result, according to the authors, is the uncertainty of the architecture, location, and connectivity of the traffic exchange nodes of the composite network and the inability to manage it even in emergency situations. This “conglomerate of private fragments of the global Internet” cannot be used as an infrastructure for the networks that require high reliability and security of information exchange, which relates to the objectives of the Digital Economy Program (Sneps-Sneppe et al. 2018 , 40–41). The ICT infrastructure cannot be developed solely on the commercial basis. It has to meet the needs of the state, governance, and national security, in addition to being an increasingly important factor in improving the quality of life of the citizens.

Examining the Digital Economy Program from this perspective, it is possible to make the following observations. First, despite the emphasis on the infrastructure development in the program and the key role of Rostelecom in this area, the main efforts are aimed at the provision of new ICT services. The program’s activities do not include the development of technical means (Sneps-Sneppe et al. 2018 , 40). The program is oriented toward the spread of the Internet and higher-level tasks such as satellite communications and 5G network without addressing the prior issue of the lack of a unified telecommunication network. Second, the risks associated with the ongoing modernization of private networks on the basis of next-generation technologies such as Software-Defined Networking (SDN), Network Function Virtualization (NFV), and 5G are not adequately addressed in the program. Third, the program focuses on the Internet, or regulation of IP packets, whereas the existing law “On Communications” is still oriented toward traditional networks and communication services. The actual meaning of such basic terms of the law as “federal communications,” “a single ( edinaâ ) telecommunication network,” and “a public telecommunications network” has changed dramatically. To date, this has not been reflected in the legal framework and mechanisms for regulating the development of the domestic telecommunications sector (Sneps-Sneppe et al. 2018 , 40). Despite the long list of measures in the program aimed at improving legal regulation of the digital economy, these specific problems of the current legal framework are not addressed.

7 Conclusion

The state program “Digital Economy of the Russian Federation” can be seen as the government’s latest attempt to approach the task of Russia’s modernization in new technological conditions. For Russia to fully harness the economic and social benefits of the digital revolution, digital technologies have to become the key factor in the modernization of Russian industries as well as the creation of completely new industries and markets, which requires a targeted and systemic state support based on a clear and coherent strategy. In this regard, the Digital Economy Program is an important milestone representing the Russian government’s concerted effort to envision the medium-term future of the digital economy in Russia and draft a comprehensive strategy in this area, even as it falls short in terms of its potential transformative effect on Russian industry.

Given the current state of development of domestic ICT equipment and software, the digitalization of Russian economy deserves the status of a strategic task. Such a strategic orientation, especially in the broader context of a shift from the management of hydrocarbon exports to technology governance, is extremely important. At the same time, the experience of post-Soviet development shows that the main problem lies not in ideas but in their implementation. One of the main reasons past economic initiatives were not successful is that they were made without sufficient scientific assessment based on very general considerations (Ivanov and Malineckij 2017 , 3). As the analysis shows, some of the same mistakes are repeated in the case of the Digital Economy Program.

Even though the program’s management system with its multiple decision centers and an evolving overarching system of rules governing digitalization resembles a polycentric structure, which in theory is suitable for managing complex areas such as science, the advantages of this system in Russia’s case seem questionable. Alternatively, more attention should be paid to the nature of entry into this system. At present, the multiplicity of decision centers in the program’s governance structure masks the insufficient involvement of scientific organizations, which is reflected in the program’s content. The lack of scientific support adversely affects the quality of the program, which does not justify the role of the digital economy in ensuring Russia’s economic leadership or provide measures for stimulating domestic electronics industry.

Although the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development defines the key role of Russian fundamental science in the assessment of challenges associated with scientific and technological development, in practice the program relies on foreign scientific results and technologies. Thus, the government attempts to address an important technological problem without using domestic scientific potential. This affects the content and quality of the program, which proceeds from the interests of a “qualified consumer” and focuses on the spread of the Internet and provision of new ICT services while neglecting the critical state of Russian electronic components and systemic issues of ICT infrastructure development.

The program is too concise and general, and consequently, does not provide sufficient justification for the key role of the digital economy in ensuring Russia’s economic leadership or allow an adequate assessment of possible risks and challenges. The program defines multiple target indicators but does not provide evidence that the achievement of these indicators will reduce Russia’s technological gap with leading countries. Furthermore, it lacks actual measures for stimulating domestic electronics industry and relies on the modernization of the communications network based on imported equipment. The critical dependence on imported components blocks the development of many sectors of the domestic industry and runs counter to the Strategy of National Security and the Strategy for the Scientific and Technological Development of the Russian Federation. Without developing domestic electronics industry, the transition to the digital economy can be considered only in the context of purchases of electronic equipment abroad, which is likely to result in the reduction of the size of the digital economy in Russia rather than its growth.

Unless otherwise noted, all translations are author’s own.

Presidential Decree No. 204 of May 7, 2018 “ O nacional’nyh celâh i strategičeskih zadačah razvitiâ Rossijskoj Federacii na period do 2024 goda ” (On the national goals and strategic objectives of development of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2024).

On July 19, 2018, the Council for Strategic Development and Priority Projects was reorganized into the Council for Strategic Development and National Projects (“ Ob uporâdočenii ” 2018 ).

The Digital Economy Program ( 2017 ) had five areas. In the process of its transformation into the national program (2018), the areas became federal projects and their number increased to six.

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Lowry, A. (2021). Russia’s Digital Economy Program: An Effective Strategy for Digital Transformation?. In: Gritsenko, D., Wijermars, M., Kopotev, M. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Digital Russia Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42855-6_4

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The Houston area experienced another wave of severe thunderstorms and rainfall on Tuesday afternoon, leading to the collapse of a partially constructed house in Magnolia. KPRC 2′s Deven Clarke learned that the boy was working construction as a summer job.

The collapse occurred at the 33100 block of Willow Heights Lane in Magnolia.

• SEE ALSO: Severe storms moving into Houston area bringing flood, hail, wind threats | Ground stop at IAH, 85K without power

Magnolia firefighters have arrived at the scene. Emergency response efforts are currently underway.

This report is ongoing. We’ll provide updates as they come.

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About the Authors

Holly galvan posey.

Holly joined the KPRC 2 digital team in March 2024, leveraging her eight years of expertise in blogging and digital content to share her passion for Houston. Outside of work, she enjoys exploring the city's vibrant scenes, all while balancing her roles as a wife and mother to two toddlers.

Michael Horton

Michael is a Kingwood native who loves shooting hoops, visiting local breweries and overreacting to Houston sports. He joined the KPRC family in the spring of 2024. He earned his B.A. from Texas A&M University in 2022 and his M.A. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2023.

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World Economic Situation and Prospects 2024

Global economic growth is projected to slow from an estimated 2.7 per cent in 2023 to 2.4 per cent in 2024, trending below the pre-pandemic growth rate of 3.0 per cent, according to the United Nations World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP) 2024. This latest forecast comes on the heels of global economic performance exceeding expectations in 2023. However, last year’s stronger-than-expected GDP growth masked short-term risks and structural vulnerabilities. 

The UN’s flagship economic report presents a sombre economic outlook for the near term. Persistently high interest rates, further escalation of conflicts, sluggish international trade, and increasing climate disasters, pose significant challenges to global growth.

The prospects of a prolonged period of tighter credit conditions and higher borrowing costs present strong headwinds for a world economy saddled with debt, while in need of more investments to resuscitate growth, fight climate change and accelerate progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

“2024 must be the year when we break out of this quagmire. By unlocking big, bold investments we can drive sustainable development and climate action, and put the global economy on a stronger growth path for all,” said António Guterres, United Nations Secretary-General. “We must build on the progress made in the past year towards an SDG Stimulus of at least $500 billion per year in affordable long-term financing for investments in sustainable development and climate action.”

Subdued growth in developed and developing economies Growth in several large, developed economies, especially the United States, is projected to decelerate in 2024 given high interest rates, slowing consumer spending and weaker labour markets. The short-term growth prospects for many developing countries – particularly in East Asia, Western Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean – are also deteriorating because of tighter financial conditions, shrinking fiscal space and sluggish external demand. Low-income and vulnerable economies are facing increasing balance-of-payments pressures and debt sustainability risks. Economic prospects for small island developing States, in particular, will be constrained by heavy debt burdens, high interest rates and increasing climate-related vulnerabilities, which threaten to undermine, and in some cases, even reverse gains made on the SDGs.

Inflation trending down but recovery in labour markets still uneven Global inflation is projected to decline further, from an estimated 5.7 per cent in 2023 to 3.9 per cent in 2024. Price pressures are, however, still elevated in many countries and any further escalation of geopolitical conflicts risks renewed increases in inflation. 

In about a quarter of all developing countries, annual inflation is projected to exceed 10 per cent in 2024, the report highlights. Since January 2021, consumer prices in developing economies have increased by a cumulative 21.1 per cent, significantly eroding the economic gains made following the COVID-19 recovery. Amid supply-side disruptions, conflicts and extreme weather events, local food price inflation remained high in many developing economies, disproportionately affecting the poorest households. 

“Persistently high inflation has further set back progress in poverty eradication, with especially severe impacts in the least developed countries,” said Li Junhua, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs. “It is absolutely imperative that we strengthen global cooperation and the multilateral trading system, reform development finance, address debt challenges and scale up climate financing to help vulnerable countries accelerate towards a path of sustainable and inclusive growth.”

According to the report, the global labour markets have seen an uneven recovery from the pandemic crisis. In developed economies, labour markets have remained resilient despite a slowdown in growth. However, in many developing countries, particularly in Western Asia and Africa, key employment indicators, including unemployment rates, are yet to return to pre-pandemic levels. The global gender employment gap remains high, and gender pay gaps not only persist but have even widened in some occupations.   

Related Sustainable Development Goals

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